Pericles' Anatomy of Democratic Courage

Ryan Balot

The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 122, No. 4. (Winter, 2001), pp. 505-525.

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PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

IN HIS CELEBRATED DISSERTATION, ADAM PARRY (1988,21) outlined the traditional relationship between intelligence and action in the fol- lowing way: "The popular clichi, going from Hesiod through Solon and later writers, reveals a basic distrust of the intellect. The man of action is admired, the man of intelligence and words looked on with suspicion. The philosophic writers emphasized the split by turning the distinction around. The man of intelligent words knows reality, the man of action becomes a brute or a fool. Gorgias, and much more profoundly, Thucy- dides, see and dramatize a possible equilibrium." Although schematic, Parry's formulation rightly points to Thucydides' status as a transitional figure in conceiving the evolving relationship between intellect and ac- tion. In this article, I examine specifically the vision of courage offered by Pericles in Thucydides' History. Pericles' analysis of courage illustrates certain innovations in the classical Greek conception of intellect and action. Understanding Pericles' analysis will help to specify Parry's in- sight and make it more concrete.

A useful place to start is Pericles' well-known, but famously am- biguous, explanation of courage:

~ p h ~ t o ~ o t K P ~ ~ E ~ E V ~ E L V & i 6 t a6' Gv z i v w v x i v 6 t ~ a i w < oi 261 T E ~ a i occcptozazcc y t yvc jo~ov~e< 6121 zccGzct y i dtlro~pelr6yevo~ ~ a i k~ TGV ~ t v 6 G v o v .

(Thuc. 2.40.3)'

the man who can most truly be accounted brave is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet in life and of what is terrible, and then goes out undeterred to meet what is to come. (trans. Warner)

For at least a century now, readers of Thucydides have argued that Pericles anticipates Plato's discussion of courage in the Laches, which

I have used the Oxford Classical Text of Thucydides; all translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

American Journal of Philology 122 (2001) 505-525 0ZOO1 hg The Johns Hopkins University Press

506 RYAN BALOT

explores, among other things, the relationship between courage and knowl- edge.2 Plato's Nicias, for example, defines courage as "knowledge of what inspires fear and confidence (tZn ton deindn kai tharraleon epistZmZn) both in war and in every other situation" (Lach. 194e11-195al). Scholars have tended to take this connection too far, however, attributing to Thucydides a "Platonic unity of the virtues,"hr a conception of courage that is, like Socrates', closely related or even equivalent to know1edge.j

My contention is that Pericles develops a composite view of cour- age that requires both a properly habituated character and intellectual understanding.' His emphasis on intellectual insight adds something new to the traditional notion of courage, but he combines the intellect with character rather than making courage equivalent to knowledge. Pericles reconfigures traditional associations between military valor and delib- eration in a specifically democratic way. Speaking as he does in the traditional genre of the epitaphios, Pericles offers no explicit theoretical account of courage, but a coherent body of concepts can be extracted

Meyer (1899,2.387-88 n. 2) argued for a close connection between Thucydides and Plato: "Das sind vollstandig die Gedanken, die Plato im Laches und sonst entwickelt: die wahre Tapferkeit beruht auf Erkentniss, die echte a p e ~ f iberuht auf dem Wissen, nicht auf dem Instinkt."

Williams 1998, 37; cf. 64-65. Sharples 1983, 13940. Hornblower (1991,306; 1987, 128-29) stresses the Platonic

character of this passage, which, he argues, may indicate a direct connection between Socrates andThucydides; in his note on the passage, Marchant (1961,176) also points to the Platonic and Aristotelian discussions of courage, while Huart (1968, 418-31) provides a penetrating analysis of Thucydides' uses of eupsuchia and andreia and their relationship to Plato's accounts of courage in the Laches and Protagoras. De Romilly 1980 offers a characteristically perceptive treatment but is overly schematic in mining Thucydides for principles that can then be used to provide an intellectual and cultural background for Plato's dialogues. On Socrates' "intellectualist" account of virtue, see Nehamas 1999; Penner 2000,165-71; and Brickhouse and Smith 1994,68-71.

'Here and throughout this article, I am talking about Pericles as he is presented in Thucydides' History. On the issue of the historicity of Thucydides' speeches, I generally follow Yunis (1996,6146), who argues that "the speeches are fictitious and serve Thucydides' own artistic and didactic ends"; but, as I shall argue, Pericles' Funeral Oration does capture several important features of the Athenian democracy. Cf. also Woodman 1988,l-69, esp. 11-15; de Ste. Croix 1972, 7-11; Swain 1993. Moreover, I sharply distinguish Pericles' arguments and reasoning from those of Thucydides himself: where Pericles in the History is an advocate of and spokesman for participatory democracy, and develops a notion of courage in light of his democratic ideals,Thucydides, in my view, is critical of participatory democracy because of his negative opinions of the demos: see Ober 1998,52-121. Pericles is also critical of other forms of government and other regimes, such as the Athenian oligarchy of 411 B.c., and the Melian oligarchs, but he offers a particularly well-developed critique of the Athenian democracy.

507 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

from his rhetorical assertions. Pericles' democratic ideal of courage, fi- nally, shows that Plato's later account of courage, in the Republic for example, is indebted to the Athenian democracy, however much Plato tried to distance himself from the democracy for the purpose of political criticism.

Kenneth Dover has argued that "an archaic mode of indicating that a man was all that a man should be confined itself to two aspects of his character, his valour on the battlefield and his wisdom in discussion (sc. of tactics, organization, and other matters relevant to victory or survival in war)."6 These two aspects of the ideal could be connected as dual but largely unrelated attributes of an individual (as in Homer's Odysseus) or opposed to each other in a way that emphasized thinking (as in the philosophical tradition) or action (as in the popular tradition).' Thucy- dides' Pericles develops these two facets of the ideal by showing how they are related to each other, how the Athenians exemplify them, and how the institutions and politicians of Athens, at least in the ideal case, educate and encourage the Athenians to exemplify a particular brand of democratic courage. By the end of the classical period, both Plato and Aristotle are firmly convinced that courage requires knowledge along with a properly habituated c h a r a ~ t e r . ~

In order to grapple with Pericles' connection between character and knowledge, we might return to his claim about how to evaluate the most courageous men. The sentence has led to a philological controversy on which hangs the question of whether courage is founded primarily on an intellectual basis, or partly on an intellectual basis and partly on the

Dover 1974, 161. On these varying formulations, cf. Thuc. 2.11.5 with Hdt. 3.4.1, Thuc. 1.71.1; see further Edmunds 1975,39 n. 48, Rusten on 2.11.5,2.40.1.

'Parry 1988, 15-57. For Aristotle's composite conception of virtue as requiring both practical wisdom

and a properly trained character, see, e.g., Eth. Nic. 1103b21-25,1144alSb1, 1144b30-32. On Aristotle's critique of Socratic intellectualism, see Eth. Nic. 1144b17-30, Eud. Eth. 1216b3-26, with Nehamas 1999,27-28,46. With Plato the situation is more ambiguous: in the Protagoras (360d4-5), Socrates argues that "Knowledge of what is fearful and what is not fearful is courage" (HZ sophia ara tdn deinon kai mZ deindn andreia estin); the Laches of course ends aporetically (see 199e11); while in the Republic, on the other hand, books 2- 3 are devoted to describing the correct education of character, which is then later comple- mented by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge (at 430~2-3 Socrates qualifies his discussion of courage by suggesting that he has now defined civic courage [politikdn andreian],which seems to be a qualified form of courage dependent not on knowledge but on true belief). Penner (2000,165-71) seems to me right to contrast the Socratic intellectu- alism of the earlier dialogues with Plato's emphasis in the Republic on both character and intellect.

508 RYAN BALOT

basis of character. The crux of the matter is the grammatical interpreta- tion of dia tauta, which is generally understood to refer to the knowledge of what is fearful and what is p l e a ~ a n t . ~ On a "concessive" reading, the sentence would be translated as follows: "Those would rightly be judged most courageous who understand both the fearful and the pleasant and do not turn away from risks on account of this." On the causal reading, it would be translated, "Those would rightly be judged most courageous who understand both the fearful and the pleasant and on account of this do not turn away from risks."1°

At first glance, the word order seems to support the causal reading, since dia tauta comes before the negative me and perhaps should not be understood within the negative clause. Additionally, because of the con- text, R. W. Sharples (1983,139-40) has argued forcefully in favor of this interpretation: "It is true that [Pericles] has just mentioned the Spartans (by implication) as being bold through ignorance, so there may indeed be something of a paradox in the idea that knowledge too can cause men to face dangers; but it is this, that knowledge causes men to face dangers, that must be the primary meaning of Thucydides' words, rather than that the Athenians are brave in spite of their knowledge" (his emphasis).

If we read dia tauta in a concessive sense, however, Pericles will be identifying two equally significant and potentially antithetical facets of courage: intellectual understanding of what is fearful and pleasant and the disposition of character that drives such men to face danger in spite of their rational reflection. There are good contextual reasons for taking the expression in this way. As Pericles has just said, "and we ourselves (autoi) either judge (krinomen) at any rate (ge) or formulate our policy correctly (enthumoumetha orthos), not supposing that words harm deeds, but believing rather that harm comes from not being taught in advance in words before going in deed to what is necessary. For we differ in this also that we ourselves, the same men (hoi autoi), both dare the most and calculate about things which we undertake; whereas for others ignorance brings confidence, and calculation hesitation" (2.40.2-3)." The conces-

See Classen-Steup 1889,72, and Gomme 1956,123, on this phrase. 'O Translators and commentators are sharply divided on the issue: Woodruff 1993,

42-13; Marchant 1961,176; Yunis 1996,76; and Williams 1998,122, favor the "concessive" reading; Sharples 1983,139, and perhaps Gomme 1956,123, favor the "causal" reading.

" Like many other sentences in the oration, this one is opaque and difficult to interpret grammatically. On the general issues involved, see most recently Hornblower 1991, who, following Meyer, shows that krinomen and enthumoumetha refer to two distinct intellectual processes. In his commentary Rusten (1989, 155), following Edmunds (1972), shows that ge lays emphasis on the likelier member of the pair. On the reading autoi (rather than hoi autoi) at the beginning of the quoted passage, see the following note.

509 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

sive dia tauta implicitly contrasts Athenians with Spartans on the ground that Athenians are unusual in combining what are apparently two anti- thetical activities-calculating rationally and acting daringly.

Throughout the paragraph (2.40),Pericles emphasizes that the Athe- nians are uniquely capable of uniting opposite attributes. The Athenians enjoy fine things with restraint and they are lovers of wisdom but are not soft (2.40.1). Care for both private and political matters can be found in the very same men (tois autois) at Athens, while those devoted to their own business have an adequate knowledge of politics (2.40.2). Pericles uses the pronoun tois autois in order to emphasize that the very same men are able to do things that are typically believed to be antithetical. The pronoun is picked up in the sentence quoted above: Pericles says that the Athenians themselves, the very same men (hoi autoi), both think first and act co~rageous ly .~~ Hence, the tenor of the paragraph suggests that knowledge is a constituent of the ideal form of courage for Pericles, but it must be accompanied by, and can also be antithetical to, a willing- ness to run risks.

Thus the contested prepositional phrase dia tauta lies at the heart of a paradox in Pericles' Funeral Oration. The "solution" may be that Pericles' enigmatic formulation expresses an ambiguity that is not fully articulated by Thucydides." The phrase offers a snapshot of Pericles in the process of transforming the Athenians' understanding of the role of intellectual insight in their willingness to run risks, but, as it stands, his statement is too compressed to make that role clear.

If we move outward, then, from Pericles' contested statement to his vision of courage throughout the speeches, we find that Pericles holds a composite view of courage that requires both the knowledge of value and a daring character that has been properly trained to act in accord- ance with one's judgments. Pericles typically discusses these attributes in

'? Following the commentary of Rusten and Hornblower on this phrase, I believe that the autoi of 2.40.2 (not 2.40.3) intensifies the subject "we" without emphasizing the notion of "sameness." Rather, it stresses that the Athenians deliberate and judge in per- son-they do it themselves. That fact of democratic participation will figure in my later discussion of the democratic context of Pericles' account of courage. This interpretation, and the translation offered in the text, requires a different manuscript reading (kai autoi . . . krinomen rather than kai hoi autoi . . .krinomen) from that accepted by editors who believe that the idea of sameness is emphasized.

"Parry (1988,166)is the only critic to see this passage as ambiguous and to suggest, at least implicitly, that its ambiguities have a larger thematic and even philosophical significance: "the rest of the world may well admire the Athenians for achieving so much in action despite their concern with the intelligence; but we know that the one is an effect of the other."

510 RYAN BALOT

a paratactic "bothland" construction: tolman te . . . kai . . . eklogizesthai (2.40.3) and gignoskontes kai . . . me apotrepomenoi (2.40.3). These ex- pressions are paralleled by another paratactic participial formulation later in the oration, where Pericles urges his audience, "When it [Athens] seems great to you, lay it to heart that men who dared and knew their duty and had a sense of shame in their actions acquired these things" (2.43.1).14 Pericles impresses upon his listeners that the courage of the war dead is constituted by three different, but related, elements: their daring (tolmontes), their knowing (gignoskontes) what it is right to do (ta deonta), and their having a sense of shame or honor (aischunomenoi).

It is useful to deal in turn with the components of Pericles' vision of courage-intellect (knowing) and character (daring and having a sense of shame). First, then, the intellectual, which, as we will see, has two components-a knowledge of ultimate or long-term values, and a knowl- edge of what to do in particular situations in order to achieve those values (which I shall call "practical" or "technical" knowledge). The intellectual component of courage can be illuminated by a comparison and contrast with Aristotle's more elaborate exploration of courage. In assessing Aristotle's account of courage, David Pears (1980, 183) has argued that in the heat of battle the individual must evaluate, among other things, both the value of the external goal-for example, saving his city, along with the corresponding benefits that doing so will bring to himself and his family-and also the disvalue of the "countergoal"-that is, death or physical trauma. The individual must reckon up these respec- tive values and disvalues correctly in order to act in a way that appropri- ately contributes to his eudaimonia.

Throughout the speech, Pericles suggests that the external goal of fighting is the salvation of the city, which in turn preserves the long-term materialistic, and even hedonistic, values of the mass audience he is addressing-in particular, continued enjoyment of the fruits of empire. In his reckoning, the polis is worth risking one's life for because of its practices (epitddeuseos), its constitution (politeias), and its way of life or character (trop6n)-all of which have made the city great and its citi- zens' lives free and flourishing (2.36.4, 2.38). In a famous sentiment, he captures the Athenians' relationship with their polis through an erotic metaphor: "Gaze, day after day, upon the power of the city and become

511 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

lovers (erastas) of Athens" (2.43.1).15 Rather than identifying a philo- sophical or metaphysical ideal as his ultimate source of value-an ideal such as the Platonic forms-Pericles bases his value judgment on an irreducible belief in the value of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the polis.

In a detailed examination of the erotic metaphor, Sara Monoson (1994, 270-71) argues persuasively that "The metaphor urges citizens willingly and affectionately to offer their city fine and extraordinary gifts in the form of public service of a variety of sorts and patiently to tend to the city's developing needs." Equally, the erastzs (here, the citizen) de- rives at least commensurate profit from his reciprocal relationship with the erdmenos (the city). He is handsomely compensated for his labors and risks by the city's guarantee of political and personal freedom, its stable social order, and the massive material benefits it offers, as head of an empire, to private citizens and their families. Er6s is a metaphor that expresses not destabilizing individual passion for a fellow human being but rather the citizens' appreciation of the value of the city and a willing- ness to act on that appreciation, along with an awareness of the benefits they will receive in turn.

Aristotle maintains, by contrast, that erds is an irrational emotion that makes men bold through passion but not genuinely courageous (Eth. Eud. 1229a20-24). Pericles' use of the metaphor, however, can withstand this criticism, since his "erotic" notion of citizenship captures fundamental features of the Athenians' loyalty to their city, which he explains as a rational desire for their own eudaimonia. As he tells his fellow citizens, "You yourselves now emulate them [the war dead] and judge that well-being (to eudaimon) is freedom (to eleutheron) and free- dom (to eleutheron) is courage (to eupsuchon); do not stand on the sidelines and watch the risks of war" (2.43.4). Pericles of course does not mean to equate freedom with courage but rather to propose that cour- age is the defender of freedom, which is a key ingredient of Athens's democratic way of life and hence of the city's well-being. This formula- tion allows him to manage a neat transition from the city's welfare, which is promoted by individual patriotism, to the individual's welfare, which is guaranteed by the safety of the city. The city guarantees the democratic way of life, and even the glorious imperialism, which makes the individual's

512 RYAN BALOT

life worth living. Elsewhere, Pericles similarly argues, "I hold that a city that prospers as a whole benefits its private citizens more than if it benefits each of its citizens individually while stumbling as a collective body" (2.60.2,trans. Woodruff [adapted]). Pericles' reference to eros thus emphasizes reciprocity between individual citizens and the city, and he integrates the erotic metaphor into a plausible, and rationally defensible, conception of citizen well-being.

In Pericles' view, then, it is rational and prudent for the Athenians to become lovers of their polis since their polis and its democratic ethos guarantee the citizens' freedom and thus their individual eudaimonia. Against Aristotle's criticism, Pericles can propose that his vision of cour- age includes a rational understanding of ultimate values-the value of the polis in general and of the citizens' flourishing-which is carefully and self-consciously articulated in terms of eudaimonia. But, as I men- tioned, this is merely one half of the meaning of "knowing what must be done" (gignoskontes ta deonta), the other half being a practical knowl- edge of what to do in particular situations. To be more precise, knowl- edge of long-term values is a precondition of knowing what must be done in particular situations; particular actions must be undertaken in the light of overarching goals that make sense of them. If the Athenians and their leaders take a long-term view of their own good, then they must also be able to understand how to act in particular situations in order to attain their overall good. In Pericles' analysis, then, the Athen- ians must judge correctly what particular circumstances demand of them, in light of their larger vision of civic and individual flourishing. Before treating the more practical type of knowledge possessed by the Athen- ians, I want to discuss their daring characters, which will lead directly back to a discussion of the Athenians' practical understanding.

As for character, the Athenians are supposed to be both daring and equipped with a proper sense of shame. As a first step in explaining the Athenians' daring character, Pericles distinguishes Athenian from Spartan courage: "We willingly run risks even though we have a relaxed lifestyle rather than one of rigorous training, and we do so with courage (andreias)derived not from laws more than from our habits (tropon)" (2.39.4).16To Pericles, the Athenians' understanding of their long-term values helps them act in appropriate ways, but their courage is also based on their character and habits. Pericles does not offer much explanation of how the Athenians' national character has been produced. In this he is

l6 For the translation of the genitives (of cause) as "derived from" see Rusten's commentary.

513 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

similar to the Corinthians at Sparta (1.68-71), who explain the Athenian national character (tropoi) as full of polupragmosunt? and pleonexia, without offering an account of how the Athenians came to embody these attributes. Indeed, Pericles' emphasis is on the Athenians' relaxed lifestyle (cf. aneimends diait6menoi, 2.39.1), in spite of which they are still natu- rally courageous.

My suggestion is that shame is the primary rhetorical tool enabling Pericles to encourage his audience to live up to the standards set by their ancestors. Through helping the Athenians develop a proper sense of shame, Pericles encourages them to restrain their short-term desires and to internalize their ancestors' behavior as an ideal. Thus, Pericles exem- plifies in his rhetoric the importance of prerational training for produc- ing courageous citizens. As we have seen, Pericles' interventions in the Assembly sometimes take the form of education through rational argu- ment about the Athenians' long-term self-interest. But his rhetoric also helps to inculcate a proper sense of shame in his listeners and to train their desires appropriately.

Aristotle considered shame to be a virtue of character, rather than of intellect, and he believed that civic courage was grounded in an atti- tude of appropriate shame. As John Cottingham has put it, "One ought not to be brave under compulsion, but because it is a fine thing (kalon), and hence civic courage (the first and most important in the list of states analogous to courage) is grounded in a proper sense of shame, and a 'desire for something noble . . . , and avoidance of reproach, which is a disgrace."'" Similarly, we will see that Thucydides represents appropri- ate shame as dependent on correct emotional response, instead of ratio- nal or articulate knowledge.

The habits of courage, Pericles declares, have been displayed by each generation of Athenians, and he urges members of his audience to live up to the ideals of their ancestors. As he says, "When it [Athens] seems great to you, lay it to heart that men who dared and knew their duty and had a sense of shame in their actions acquired these things. If they ever failed when they attempted something, they did not on that account think it right to deprive the city of their excellence (aretes), and they put forward for Athens the best contribution they could" (2.43.1). In his view, the empire had been won through the toil of several genera- tions, all of whom tried, to the extent they were able, to conform to a standard of honor and excellence, and they were ashamed to compro- mise that standard.

I 7 Cottingham 1996, 59.

514 RYAN BALOT

Pericles urges his audience to develop a precisely similar set of standards: "Don't show yourselves to be inferior to your ancestors on two counts, since they took the empire through their own toil and did not receive it from others; moreover, they kept it safe and passed it on to you (it is more shameful [aischion]for those who already control an empire to have it taken away than to fail in attempting to acquire more)" (2.62.3).18 In the Funeral Oration, moreover, the Athenians receive an education in appropriate shame through images of the behavior of the fallen fellow-citizens, who have lived up to the ideals embodied by their ancestors.I9 Pericles argues that his contemporaries must resolve to be no less daring than the dead (2.43.1), who "fled a shameful reputation, but stood up to their task at the risk of their lives" (2.42.4).20 The rhetorical power of Pericles' evocation of shame results from his appeal to the Athenians' emotions and desires, rather than their intellects as such. Pericles is trying to inculcate in his listeners a respect for the dead and for the traditions of the city, both of which he presents in terms of

Through offering the Athenians an education in recent history and appropriate behavior on the field of battle, Pericles undertakes to train their desires and to create a self-image for them that contributes to their ability to administer and defend their empire courageously. This training contributes to the Athenians' sense of shame because, as Bernard Wil- liams (1993,78) has shown, "The basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition." Through the operations of shame, the Athenians internalize an "other"-here their ancestors or those lost in battle-whose critical gaze drives them to live up to the ideals articulated by Pericles. Pericles' images thus mobilize a set of imagistic, prerational responses that help to define and consolidate the Athenian character. At the end of his final

'\ . . tGv .re natkpwv p i xeipou~ at' drpcp6.repa cpavijvat, di pet& n6vwv ~ a i06 nap' &Xhwv 6e~bpevot ~ a t h o ~ o v 6ht e tcai npook~t 6 t aohoav t e~ naph6ooav Gpiv a&&(ai 'o~tov h ~ o v t a ~ drtu~ijoat).drcpatpe&ivatfj ~.rwpkvou~

l9 Cf. Monoson (1994,268) who also explores thepaideia offered to the city by those who have given their bodies in battle.

20 . . . .rb pkv a i o ~ p b v TOG X6you Bquyov, tb 6 ' Bpyov t@ohpat t bxhpetvav. Rusten 1989, 162, points out, correctly in my view, that in 2.43.1-2 Pericles encourages his audience to "develop the same resolution as the dead (6tbvotav (43.1) and t i j ~yvwpq~ (43.3) refer to the attitude described in 42.4)."

21 Note, too, that Pericles importantly links the Athenians' courageous response to the vicissitudes of war to the customs of their ancestors, and he urges his audience not to let those customs lapse in its generation (2.64.2).

515 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

speech in the History, he exhorts the Athenians in language that draws together and echoes his account of courage and the necessity of avoiding shame: "Knowing beforehand your future glory and the shame to be avoided now, be full of zeal on both counts. . . . The most powerful cities and individuals are the ones that are least upset in their minds in the face of disaster, and firmest in action to resist it" (2.64.6, trans. Woodruff [ a d a ~ t e d ] ) . ~ ~

Pericles' ideal vision requires in particular that the Athenians give up their attachment to their private wealth. Hence, for example, Pericles encourages the citizens to view themselves as islanders (1.143.5), in the hope that they will base their deliberations less on striving to maintain personal property than on courageously sacrificing their own narrow self-interests for the sake of the city as a whole. In a similar vein, Pericles teaches the Athenians to have the correct understanding of their farm- land: "You should think of your land as a little garden, and your house as a trinket of our wealth, of little value compared to this power. Under- stand that if we keep hold of our freedom and preserve it we will easily recover these things; but if people submit to others they will usually lose what they already had" (2.62.3, trans. Woodruff [ a d a ~ t e d ] ) . ~ ~ Thus the countergoal, in Pericles' argument, is the loss of personal property in the short term, which, weighed in the balance against the good of the polis, is negligible; indeed, the loss will easily be recuperated, he says, as long as the Athenians defend their city. Pericles' creation of this highly Atheno- centric self-understanding for individual Athenians is complemented by his reflection upon the dead soldiers' determination to check the enemy's aggression, even if that meant dying in the effort and never living to become rich (2.42.4).

Here we come to the point of convergence between correct opin- ion about values and the appropriate training of desire. On the one hand, Pericles believes that if the Athenians really understand what is good for

22 Gpe 1< 6h k< t e tb kkhhov xahbv rrpoyv6vte< &< .re t b ahtitca k i a i o ~ p b v t@ii6q rrpo0Gkq1 hpcp6tepa tc~~ 'pao0e . . . oYttve< apb5 t h< Cupcpophq yv&g khv ijxtota hurroGvtat, &pyy 6h pdthtota hvrk~ouotv, o&tot xai n6hewv xai i6twt&v xpdtttotoi eiotv. The second sentence is similar in theme and terminology to the passage from 2.40.3 with which this discussion began.

23 This proper understanding of the relative values of wealth and the city allows the Athenians to alienate their bodies, as the Corinthians say at Sparta (1.70.6). Similarly, Saxonhouse (1996,68) insightfully argues that Pericles urges the Athenians to disregard their physical sufferings through an act of mental transcendence: "It is only by casting off attachments to bodies that we can unite the city into one-and, as one, make the city have one mind, not many minds."

516 RYAN BALOT

them and for the city, then they will consider their property to be essen- tially worthless, as compared with the freedom of their city. Given his claim that eudaimonia consists in liberty, and liberty in courage, Pericles appropriately invokes liberty as a value that takes precedence over land and houses, and that links courage and eudaimonia. On the other hand, Pericles says that the war dead correctly restrained their desire for wealth in the interests of acting courageously for the city: "None of them be- came a coward because he set a higher value on enjoying the wealth that he had; none of them put off the terrible day of his death in hopes that he might overcome his poverty and attain riches. Their longing to punish their enemies was stronger than this" (2.42.4, trans. Woodruff). By saying that vengeance (timdrian) was more desirable (potheinoteran) than wealth, Pericles indicates his focus on the dead soldiers' proper disciplining of their private desires for the sake of promoting the common good. This self-restraint is the standard of excellence he presents to his audience.

Pericles' development of his fellow-Athenians' moral character has a strong historical dimension, not only because Pericles persistently re- fers the Athenians to paradigms drawn from Athens' history, but also because the Athenians themselves initiated their own tradition of daring in the Persian War period. As Pericles tells it, the Athenians' ancestors "thrust away the Persians more through intelligence (gnomei) than good fortune (tuchei), and through daring (tolmBi) rather than power (duna- mei)" (1.144.4). The Athenians, under Themistocles' leadership, com- bined intellectual insight with a daring character in order to ward off the Persians. Speaking of the Athenians' decision to abandon the city during the Persian War, Steven Forde (1986,437) has argued, "The astonishing deed of the Athenians, which seems to display the greatest courage, seems also to bear a certain tincture of impiety. It might go beyond what merely human courage is permitted. It is audacity; it is daring." Pericles would undoubtedly reject this formulation. Elsewhere,Thucydides clearly distinguishes reckless daring from courage: it is in the perverse condi- tions of the Corcyraean stasis, not in successful Athens, that the two tend to be conflated (3.82.4).2J

What then does Pericles' understanding of Themistocles' gnome entail? In the quoted passage, Pericles emphasizes the perception of which practical alternatives exist and which are likely to rnateriali~e.~'

24 A similar distinction between courage and reckless daring can be found at Laches 196e-197b (cf. de Romilly 1980,314); cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1115a18-19,1115b24-33; Eth. Eud.1229b22-30.

2 5 In discussing Socrates' cross-examination of Laches in the Laches, Santas 1969 invokes a distinction between practical knowledge of particulars and long-term knowledge

517 PERICLES' ANATOMY O F DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

This is not of course to suggest that Themistocles lacked long-term judg- ments about the good of Athens. After all, he developed path-breaking strategies to promote Athens' long-term welfare both before the Persian Wars, by using the silver from Laureion for ships (1.14.3), and afterward, by rebuilding Athens' walls before rebuilding individual houses (1.90.3). In this quotation (1.144.4), however, Pericles' contrast between intelli- gence (gnome) and good fortune (ruche)suggests that he is referring to the specific, pragmatic judgments about when and how to fight the Per- sians in order to win. The Athenians won because they appreciated particular facts about the situation (e.g., the respective sizes of the fleets at Salamis, or which side was more likely to win in a confined space as opposed to the open sea), not because they were lucky. Similarly, as much as his Funeral Oration emphasizes the knowledge of long-term values, Pericles, like Themistocles before him, calculates rationally on the basis of the Athenians' naval expertise and their overwhelming financial advantages. Pericles must consider factual knowledge, as well as the knowledge of long-term values, in determining a proper course of action. If courage includes balancing the value of the external goal against the disvalue of the countergoal, then factual knowledge throws into the calculus an appreciation for the odds-the likelihood that one or an- other eventuality will result.

In his speech in indirect discourse, for example, Pericles convinces the Athenians that they have the technical and financial resources to meet the Spartan threat (2.13). Presenting a conversation between Socrates and Plato's brother Glaucon, Xenophon later showed in excru- ciating detail that technical financial knowledge was a key ingredient of successful leadership (Mem. 3.6). In Thucydides' final verdict, moreover, Pericles inspired the Athenians to take heart when they were wrongly afraid, while also taking them down a notch when they became overcon- fident (2.65.9).26 He did this by persuading the Athenians to consider not only ultimate values. but also facts about their situation, such as their naval training and their financial advantages, both of which figured into his attempts to hit the mean between rash overconfidence and unreason- able fear. Indeed, it is hard to see what that mean could be unless one

of what is valuable: "a distinction between being wise or knowing what the alternatives before one are and which alternative is likely to materialize, and being wise or knowing the comparative values or worth of the alternatives before one." Pericles' conception of cour- age, in my reconstruction, includes both practical knowledge and the long-term knowledge of value, along with the proper habituation of civic character.

26 On Pericles' notion of appropriate fear, see Williams 1998,127-28; Edmunds 1975, 52-60; for a general study of fear in Thucydides, see de Romilly 1956.

518 RYAN BALOT

had a sense both of the importance of winning the war generally and of the particular strategic conditions of participants on both sides.

Pericles usefully supplements Aristotle's dismissal of technical and tactical knowledge in the Eudemian Ethics, where the philosopher at- tributes to Socrates, perhaps inaccurately, the idea that bravery is knowl- edge of a technical sort (1230a6-8). In order to show that technical knowledge is the basis only of a deficient form of courage, Aristotle says, "Sailors who know how to go aloft are not daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves against the dangers" (1230a8-10, trans. Ra~kham).~' In other words, men should be thought less brave (or "defectively" brave) because their tech- nical competence, rather than knowledge of what is truly valuable in human life, makes them less fearful. By contrast, Pericles rightly factors in technical knowledge beneath the larger umbrella of a knowledge of ultimate values. It is only within the framework of larger values that Pericles' rational calculations of advantage could become meaningful. In other words, courage is in Pericles' view the virtue that permits coura- geous people to put into practice their underlying values in the appropri- ate way. Pericles strikes an appropriate balance between the knowledge of fact and the knowledge of value in envisioning Athenian courage.

Interestingly, it is the Spartan general Brasidas, not Pericles, who explicitly offers a more sophisticated account of technical knowledge than Aristotle allows for in his example of the sailors. After Phormio's defeat of the Spartans off the headland of Rhium, Brasidas encourages his troops to see that courage is a necessary feature of deploying techni- cal knowledge in frightening situations: "Their [the Athenians'] knowl- edge of these things, which you fear most of all, has to be combined with courage. Then, in the hour of danger, they will remember how to do what they have learned to do. But without courage, no skill will avail in the face of peril" (Thuc. 2.87.4, trans. Warner [adapted]).28 For Brasidas, courage is that feature of character that allows people to maintain their technical knowledge in circumstances where they are apt to forget it through fear of losing their lives. It is the ability, in other words, to maintain one's knowledge in situations of pleasure and pain. This is a reasonable point, as Plato saw when he urged that the Guardians of his Kallipolis be tested for their ability to maintain true belief in the face of pleasure and pain (429~5-430~1). What is missing from Brasidas' concep-

"Compare also Aristotle's discussion in Eth. Nic. 1115a35-b4,1116b3-23. 2%tov6~ 68 il hxtot ipq, ijv pdthtota cpo@eEoOe, dtv6peiav phv E~ouoa xai pvipqv Etet hv

t @ 8€1v@ kntteheiv B EpaOev, &VEU 6h e i ) ~ u x i a < oG6epia rkxv11 npb< t o b ~ ~tv6Gvou5 ics~Get.

519 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

tion, however, is an explanation of when, how, and why the Spartans should be fighting in the first place-that is, an explanation of the values for which Spartans would fight at all.

Scholars, such as Jacqueline de Romilly (1980, 309-lo), typically underestimate the Spartans' own governing values, viewing the Spartans as unreflectively carrying out duties imposed by their laws and paideia. But the Spartans have an overarching framework of values within which their courageous behavior makes sense. The difference between Spar- tans and Athenians is rather one of degree: whereas individual Athe- nians are expected to understand, in a deep and articulate way, why they are behaving as they do, ordinary Spartans tend to have a vaguer, less self-conscious understanding of their behavior and values. But it is also important to see that the Spartans have a framework of values within which they apply their courage. In the words of Archidamus, "We are good soldiers because our self-control (s6phrosunCs) is the chief cause of a sense of shame (aid&) and shame (aischunb) of courage (eupsuchia); while we have good judgment because our education leaves us too igno- rant to look down on our laws, and our self-control is too strict for dis- obeying them" (1.84.3, trans. W ~ o d r u f f ) . ~ ~

Archidamus emphasizes that these values have been handed down from the Spartans' ancestors (1.85.1); like the Athenians, the Spartans too are trying to live up to ideals of behavior laid down in advance by their own civic traditions. Their ideals are directed at promoting the success and safety of Sparta in war and in peace (1.82.1). The character- istically Spartan emphasis on the collective good means that there is correspondingly less interest in individual eudaimonia than in Athens. There is no Spartan "Funeral Oration" because of the deep differences between Sparta and Athens in self-image and political organization.

By comparison with Athens, the Spartans lack the ability to articu- late the values that ground their courage. They obey the laws ignorantly; they believe that the way in which general principles of their culture should be applied to particular circumstances, such as their allies' com- plaints, is self-evident. In his hawkish speech to the Assembly, Sthenelaidas urges the Spartans to put an end to the Athenians' injustice against Sparta's allies (1.86.1-2), presumably believing that he and the other Spartans recognize injustice when they see it, without needing to make long speeches about it. For Sthenelaidas, a lengthy speech is merely a

29 In interpreting the relationship between the key abstractions in this sentence, I follow Nussbaum 1986,508 n. 24; see also Hornblower's commentary.

520 RYAN BALOT

means to delay action or retribution, not a method of figuring out more precisely the fundamental grounding of one's own actions (1.86.4-5). By contrast with the Athenians' imagination and innovation, the Spartans are hidebound by their belief in the value of tradition, which both gives them values and militates against their reflecting deeply upon those values. Even so, their tradition provides them with a self-image of self- control, shame, and courage, which guides their decisions in particular situations, with a view to making Sparta successful and keeping control over the allies. It is open to them to believe that they are going to war in order to fight injustice. However much they lack the articulation of value characteristic of the Athenians, they still can point to core values in the light of which they make policy decisions.

Herodotus provides at least one hint that might help explain the Athenian democracy's unique focus on the individual's own assent to and understanding of the values that guide particular decisions. After describing how Athens finally got rid of its tyranny, Herodotus explains that the Athenians then became all the better at fighting their neighbors because they were fighting for themselves rather than a master: "when they [the Athenians] were held down [by the tyrants], they were slack in their duties, since they were working for a master; but once they were free, then each one of them was eager to work for his own sake" (5.78). Athens's military success, in other words, was based on the recognition by ordinary Athenians that they were fighting for what was valuable to themselves as individuals. The transformation charted by Herodotus im- plies that ordinary Athenians had also transformed their relationship to their city and their understanding of their own new commitments and values. It is not accidental that such a transformation also affected their ability to fight successfully. Democracy generated a specific form of cour- age, which was based on an individual's correct apprehension of his own self-interest as a citizen and of an appropriate understanding of his relationship to the polis. The Athenians' new self-understanding, accord- ing to Herodotus, made them more courageous.

By sharply contrasting Athens with Sparta, Thucydides elaborates Herodotus' insights into courage as a specifically democratic value. At least implicitly, Thucydides poses the question of whether soldiers can be truly courageous if they merely know how to follow someone who knows, perhaps blindly, as in Sparta. Or must they, rather, understand for them- selves why they are entering into dangerous situations and how to do so appropriately?

Pericles' speeches emphasize the latter option-that courage has a necessary epistemological component. This is a more plausible and richer

521 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

conception of courage than the Spartan conception, and I believe that it arises in Athens because of Athens's democratic politics, where the bur- den of understanding how to act during crises rests squarely on the shoulders of the citizens themselves. By definition in a democracy, citi- zens themselves must choose which policies to follow, all the more so in a direct democracy in wartime, where ordinary Athenians had to vote on policies at meeting after meeting during the war.30 The issue is not so much that the Athenians made a conscious choice to be brave, as Lowell Edmunds (1975,60-66) suggests, but rather that they conceive of cour- age in a way that derives from the participatory democracy evoked by Pericles. In order to participate effectively in democratic politics, indi- vidual Athenians must have an intellectual understanding of the issues involved in making any decision, both in terms of the society's core values (the knowledge of the fearful and the pleasant) and in terms of their ability to predict outcomes a~cura t e ly .~~ Pericles democratized the traditionally and exclusively heroic virtue of courage, making it available to, and even necessary for, the entire democratic citizenry.32 The fallen soldiers knew what they must do because their entire public life had been an education in the values on which their actions and decisions were based.

Taking a long view of Greek thinking about courage, the demo- cratic context has led to a more discursive conception of courage, which does not abandon the traditional emphasis placed on character, but which helps explain how a daring character is to be put into action at the right time, in the right place, and with the right intentions. This combina- tion of character and intellect as key constituents of courage held sway for the rest of the classical period and was adopted by Plato and Aristotle,

30 Here the translation of krinomen and enthumoumetha (2.40.2) again becomes important (cf. above, n. 11):as Hornblower points out,Thucydides' grammar lays stress on krinomen ("we judge"), which suggests that individual Athenians are masters at judging policy correctly, even if they do not formulate it personally (cf. also the defense of demo- cratic decision making offered by Athenagoras, 6.39.1). The point is that, by contrast with the Spartans, the Athenians practice a deep, reflective form of judging that continually forces them to reevaluate both their values and the facts of their situation in light of present circumstances.

j1For logismos and logos as rational calculation, see the excellent chapter of Edmunds (1975,7-88).

32 Loraux (1986,15-76, esp. 52-56) offers an illuminating survey of the ways in which the funeral oration as a genre appropriates formerly heroic privileges for all the citizens of the polis; Ober (1989,259-70) shows that fourth-century oratory created a general "democ- ratization of birth privilege" (259).

522 RYAN BALOT

despite their criticisms of democracy. Hence we are left with the paradox that the dominant fourth-century philosophical account of courage was set in place by the values and political structure of the Athenian democ- racy, against which Plato and to a lesser extent Aristotle directed stern political criticisms.

Needless to say, the foregoing is an account of Pericles' ideal vision of courage, which leads to two concluding comments. First, whatever Pericles the rhZt6r or the character believed about democracy,Thucydides does not allow that the Athenian demos is an informed democratic citizenry capable of rational reflection about its own values. Rather, the demos needs Pericles' guidance to achieve success and eud~irnonia.~~ From Thucydides' perspective, then, Pericles' ideal vision must remain contingent on the wise leadership of men like Themistocles and Per ic le~ .~~ The irony is that Pericles, even as he evokes the democratic ideal, does not understand his own importance within the democratic system. In his account of the Mytilenian and Sicilian debates, and in numerous other episodes, Thucydides shows that once the post-Periclean successors had taken charge, the democratic assembly was divided by lies, greed, and a general fragmentation of interests. If Pericles occupies a position of such special prominence within the democracy (e.g., 2.65), then Pericles' own democratic construction of courage, with its novel emphasis on the epis- temology of each citizen, falls apart at the seams-or so Thucydides might explain.

Second, however, the idea of uniting daring and knowledge as constituents of courage was not foreign to the democratic experience. In Manville's judgment, for example, democracy's strength lies in its ability to integrate apparent contradictions-the democracy united individual- ism with consensus, and political equality with social ineq~ality.~' This

33 Aristotle said that Pericles exhibited practical wisdom (phronbis) as a statesman (Eth. Nic. 1140b7-11). For Aristotle, phronbis is an intellectual excellence in virtue of which human beings correctly deliberate about what is best for themselves or their commu- nities and find the virtuous mean in the practical world in light of their conception of eudaimonia. See further Macleod 1983, 127, on Pericles' connections between practical wisdom and courage.

34 This is argued in Ober 1998,52-121; cf. Ober 1993, Balot 2001. Pope 1988 rightly points out that Thucydides criticizes both oligarchs and democrats on moral and prudential grounds. Even though Thucydides offers an extensive critique of Athenian democracy, it must be emphasized that he also criticizes nondemocrats, such as the Melians, the Athenian oligarchs of 411 B.c., and the Spartans, for their political rashness and irresponsibility.

35 Manville (1997, 73-84) has ingeniously related this arguably unique capacity of democracy to what he calls the "bothland" (as opposed to "eitherlor") thinking character-

523 PERICLES' ANATOMY OF DEMOCRATIC COURAGE

means that, in his conception of courage, Pericles captures something true about democratic experience, despite Thucydides' criticisms of the demos. In other words, his articulation of what constitutes courage de- rives from, and depends on, actual democratic practice. His anatomy of courage and his application of this virtue to the democratic citizenry are altogether innovative when set against the long-standing Greek tradition of viewing courage from a heroic, elite vantage point.36

WASHINGTON I N ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY e-mail: rkbalot@artsci.wustl.edu

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