Opportunities and Constraints for Regionalism in East Asia

Yik Heng Choi / 20149655

Opportunities & Constraints for Regionalismin East Asia

Yik Heng Choi

20149655

3200PSWEAS: Politics of East Asia


1.

The end of the Cold War and decolonization sparked an

increasing shift towards regionalism in East Asia. A region

can be delineated according to geographical proximity,

shared characteristics of norms and identities1. Regionalism

is then the promotion of the region’s autonomy via specific

political and economic ends2. Besides the rising economic

capabilities of North-East Asia (and in particular China),

efforts towards East-Asian community building are especially

pronounced in South-East Asia via ASEAN. It ‘has been

constructing its own economic sphere with the proliferation

of various bi-lateral and plural-lateral FTAs’3. Against

this backdrop, we can consolidate the main factors for

opportunities for regionalism in East Asia as: regional

1 Vayrynen, Raimo. (2003). ‘Regionalism Old and New’. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, P 26. Retrieved from http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/uploads/media/11_Vaerynen_2003.pdf Date Accessed: 1 June 2015.2 Ibid.3 Chao, Junior Y, Roger. (2002). East Asian Regionalism: Perspectives, Realities and the Future. City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/4029151/East_Asian_Regionalism_Perspectives_Realities_and_the_Future Date Accessed: 1 June 2015.

https://www.academia.edu/4029151/East_Asian_Regionalism_Perspectives_Realities_and_the_Future


http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/uploads/media/11_Vaerynen_2003.pdf


multilateralism for economic growth and the U.S as a

regional stabilizer.

While the region has achieved much success with economic

integration, there remains little political regionalism.

Chao explains, ‘multiple Asian regionalism frameworks,

cultural diversity, internal (or the potential) conflict

within the region and an economy that is more globally than

regionally integrated…challenges…East Asian regionalism’4.

The constraints for regionalism in East Asia can be

attributed to: the balance of power between China and U.S,

nation-building and historical memories in NEA (North-East

Asia), and maritime territorial disputes in the East and

South China Seas. The region’s instability poses

difficulties towards regional institution, wherein deep-

seated socio-historical conflicts and identity politics

between countries compound geopolitical and maritime

territorial disputes. Relations between countries fluctuate

between cooperation and conflict, undermining efforts

towards solidarity- and thus regionalism.

In analyzing how these factors influence regional

4 Ibid.


institution building, I will take into account realist

perspectives on the balance of power; (neo)liberalist

perspectives on peace and market-led integration, as well as

constructivist perspectives regarding the construction of

national identity and history. The constructivist approach

is invaluable when evaluating the depth of relations in East

Asia. Acharya proposes an ‘asian universalism’5, which takes

into account how global and local discourses reinforce one

another when analyzing international relations. Relations in

East Asia are mediated by ‘local historical, cultural and

ideational frameworks, which have their roots in local

conceptions of power politics, utilitarianism and normative

transformation’6. Using the scholarly readings we have

examined in the course, in interrogating the opportunities

and constraints for regionalism, I hope to present more

nuanced understandings of power and diplomacy in East Asia

and as such, its future for regionalism.

5 Acharya, Amitav. (2008). P 60.6 Ibid.


Cooperation

Economic Growth and Regional Multilateralism

Originally formed as a security organization due to military

conflicts; since the 1997 financial crisis, ASEAN has

focused more on economic and trade co-operation- as with the

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), to combat economic

vulnerability. There is a sense of an emerging East Asian

regionalism via ‘soft cooperation’7 in various multilateral

initiatives and groups. There is APEC (Asia Pacific Economic

Community), APT (ASEAN Plus Three), AEC (ASEAN Economic

Community) and even growing calls for an East Asian Economic

Community (EAEC)8 and common market. Hastiadi states that

‘expansion of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)

7 Webber, Douglas. (2010). P 320.8 Stubbs, Richard. (2009). P 442.


leads the bottom up regionalism process’9. Moving from

‘market-led regionalism’10 to ‘institution-led regionalism’11

would ‘lead to a more intense production network’12 and

increase global competitiveness. Furthermore, there are

growing trends of “Asianization” in Asia Pacific

multilateralism, which Funabashi defines as a growing ‘Asian

consciousness and identity’13 particularly ‘animated by

workaday pragmatism’.

However, as Webber observes, this is mainly ‘cooperation

without integration’14. Without a ‘common vision of East

Asian regionalism’15, economic integration ‘run[s] ahead of

formal institutional building in the region’16. For East

Asia to become a regional institution with ‘hard-core

regional leadership’17, ASEAN has to ‘boost [its] authority

vis-à-vis member states’18 and move past the “ASEAN way” of

‘non-interference in the internal affairs of member-

states’19. They have yet to launch any bold projects that

would ‘exert strong centripetal effects on other regional9 Hastiadi, Faisal Fithra. (2011). P 13. 10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 Funabashi, Yoichi. (1993). 13 Ibid.14 Webber, Douglas. (2010). P 320.15 Ibid. P 320.16 Stubbs, Richard. (2009). P 446.17 Webber, Douglas. (2010). P 320.18 Ibid. P 322.19 Stubbs, Richard. (2009). P 448.


states like guide the regional cooperation of APT’20. Also,

APT will first have to reconcile their political differences

in order to generate ‘genuinely multilateral regional

cooperation or integration processes’21. As Narine contends,

‘there is an underlying tension between the strong

attachment of national sovereignty and the creation of a

robust regional community’22. Until then, economic co-

operation is unlikely to have positive spill-over effects

and solve the intrinsic ‘lack of a coherent regional voice

for East Asia’23.

U.S’s Hub-and-Spokes System

The U.S plays an important role in promoting regional

stability and multilateral integration in East Asia. Its

extensive security alliances with East Asian countries like

Japan and much of SEA ensures its hegemony against China’s

military rise. These alliance mechanisms would motivate

East Asian countries to co-operate according to U.S

interests, which are largely in favor of keeping the peace

(and status quo) in the region. Saunder states that U.S

20 Webber, Douglas. (2010). P 323.21 Ibid.22 Narine, Shaun. (2002). P 237.23 Stubbs, Richard. (2009). P 447.


rebalance to East Asia stabilizes the region24. For example

it participates in multilateral forums, maximize returns on

U.S investments and partnerships, and sustains global

leadership. While U.S’s building of a hub-and-spokes system

can be said to promote co-operation in the region by

providing a hedging strategy for smaller SEA countries

against China, it is unsustainable and more importantly,

drives China away from the community.

Constraints

Balance of Power between China and U.S

Realist scholars contend that ‘a changing balance of power

is destablising the region’25. Especially with the Obama

administration, Zhao argues that its ‘Pivot to East Asia’26

is to ‘shore up U.S leadership’27 and ‘combat U.S anxiety24 Saunders, C. Phillip. (2013). 25 Webber, Douglas. (2010). P 320.26 Zhao, Suisheng. (2012). P 375.27 Ibid.


about China’s great power aspiration’28. In return, its

allies, like Japan and much of South East Asia, seek US

leadership as a security provider and deepen strategic

relations with each other to preserve their independence and

freedom of action in face of China assertiveness. What this

means is that the perception of Chinese threat circumvents

regionalism, as building alliances with the U.S and one

another are part of a hedging strategy to protect their own

interests. While U.S acts as a regional balancer and

maintains the status quo, China would contend that it is the

target of U.S’s rebalance; further straining ties in the

region. Strategic alliances between the U.S and Japan for

instance, are to combat the ‘common China threat’29. Thus,

China regards U.S intervention with suspicion and

intensifies militarization, creating regional tensions.

Increasingly, smaller countries in East Asia are forced to

choose sides between the region’s big powers and have to

play a delicate balancing act between being viewed as a

proxy to China or U.S’s dominance.

Bilateral relations, or more accurately, ‘multilateralism as

a tool for bilateral policy’30 characterizes East Asia. Zhao

depicts ‘an American Pacific century’31 where U.S reasserts

28 Ibid.29 Attanassova-Cornelis, Elena. (2013). P 60.30 Zhao, Suisheng. (2012). P 375.31 Ibid.


itself forcefully into regional diplomacy like critiquing

the South China Seas dispute and President Obama’s APEC

summit in Hawaii; further dividing China and its neighbors.

As Dosch reveals, ‘a firm bilateralism is the most promising

insurance against the emergence of a structural situation

that would hinder American access to the region’32. Hence,

China and the U.S’s competition for pre-eminence in the

region inhibit regionalism by promoting instead, hedging

and/or alliance politics. It has been suggested by scholars

like Wallace that for Japan, a strengthened relationship

with its neighbors and the promotion of multilateral

cooperation in the Asia Pacific enables a dual hedge between

China and U.S33. It is striking that despite the ‘sporadic

conflicts related to the past’34, the region is considered

relatively stable yet countries have shown to be more

inclined towards peace, but not solidarity.

Nation-Building & Historical Memories in NEA

Post-colonial East Asia shares a tumultuous past of wars and

colonialization by the West (and Japan) that makes it

particularly aversive to military confrontation. However, as

they develop further and integrate, deeply emotional

problems between countries resurface and threaten peace.32 Dosch, Jorn. (2011). P 225.33 Wallace, J Corey. (2013). P 480.34 Park, Cheol Hee. (2008). P 20.


North-East Asia (NEA)- in particular China, South Korea and

Japan, are rife with deep-seated tensions stemming from

unresolved historical memories over China’s century of

humiliation, Japan’s colonialization of Korea (and Taiwan)

and World War II. While South East Asia (SEA) is

comparatively united on historical knowledge and possesses a

regional identity, bilateral relations in NEA are less

positive. The current geopolitical reality of NEA is shaped

by Japan and China’s normalization i.e. intensified

militarization and security policies. However, these mutual

strategic distrust over security and resource concerns are

intimately linked with nationalism and the politicization of

historical memories. The constructivist approach is pivotal

in understanding why the Japan-China-ROK relationship is

‘far away from reaching a strategic understanding’35 and as

Park sums up, a whirlpool of ‘cooperation coupled with

conflicts’36.

Park proclaims that ‘convergence or divergence of threat

perceptions set the stage for cooperation or conflict’37.

Drawing upon Atanassova-Cornelis, Chinese threat perceptions

of Japan are influenced by constructions of ‘self’ as

35 Ibid.36 Park, Cheol Hee. (2011). P 95.37 Park, Cheol Hee. (2011). P 95.


victimized by Japan- the ‘victimizing Other’38 in order to

legitimize CCP (Chinese Communist Party) rule. Park warns

that ‘historical enmity explains conflicts but not co-

operation’39, so it is important to contextualize with

‘domestic political [management of] situations where

historical contention can escalate or de-escalate to bolster

particular political interests’40. Japanese right-wing

politicians could be seen as the ‘origin of the chain

reaction’41- with issues like the history textbook

controversy, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and even Abe’s

remilitarization (in part due to China’s growing military

prowess). Worsening public perceptions on both sides then

influence policy approaches like CCP leaders’ ‘hard-line

approach towards Tokyo in official discourse and state-

controlled media’42 on island sovereignty and military

defence. ‘Mutually hostile nationalistic sentiment’43 leads

into a ‘chain reaction’44 of ‘increasing mutual animosity’45

between Japan and China. In spite of risking ‘national

interests of maintaining stable trade and economic relations

with Japan’46, modern Chinese nationalism builds itself

38 Attanassova-Cornelis, Elena. (2012). P 97.39 Ibid. P 100.40 Ibid. P 100.41 Ibid.42 Ibid.43 Rozman, Gilbert. (2013).44 Ibid.45 Ibid.46 Ibid.


against Japan and its past colonialism47. The escalation of

Japan-China tensions over territorial and national security

issues like Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are

particularly destabilizing for the region. Without coming to

a mutual understanding on the history issue (and what makes

a sufficient apology), the region would perpetually be

unable to resolve these volatile geopolitical conflicts.

Maritime Territorial Disputes in the South & East China Seas

- South China Sea (SCS)

China and neighboring South-East Asian countries lay

competing claims over the Spratlys. Like the East China Sea,

Womack emphasizes that these claims ‘annex the territory to

the body of the imagined community of the nation’48. In

particular, neighboring countries like Philippines and

Vietnam may be anxious about China’s growing power and hence

discord over the Spratlys represent an ‘ambiguous frontier

between Chinese intentions and South-east Asia’s

47 Spitzer, Kirk. (2012, Dec 11). 48 Womack, Brantly. (2011). P 376.


interests’49. While its sovereignty is not challenged, the

unclear definition of innocent passage in the context of

freedom of navigation in EEZs frustrates the SEA countries.

While it is unlikely for a military seizure due to the

consequent regional isolation, this dispute only heightens

SEA’s vulnerability against a rising China50. As Womback

argues, it is difficult for these SEA countries to fight

against Chinese assertions as ‘disparity in economic

capacity has direct implications for security since military

budgets cannot keep pace with China’51. This has negative

implications for China-SEA relations.

- East China Seas (ECS)

As nationalist interpretations of history feeds the crisis

in the East China Sea (ECS), the ‘possibility of future

riots, diplomatic crises and possibility of even clashes

involving paramilitary forces around the disputes

territories is all too real’52. Patalano explains that

Chinese and Japanese assertiveness on territorial claims of

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is due economic development and

political affirmation53. The conflict over sea power is

49 Ibid. P 384.50 Ibid.51 Ibid. P 378.52 Spitzer, Kirk. (2012, Dec 11). 53 Patalano, Alessio. (2014). P 34.


‘representative of a mounting Sino-Japanese energy

rivalry’54 for ECS’s large oil and gas reserves.

Provocations like the Senkaku trawler collision, patrol

incursions, Japanese arrest of a trespassing Taiwanese

fishing boat and even sightings of a ‘Chinese warship

locking its weapon guiding radar on a Japanese destroyer’55

are worrying. The ‘increasing use of maritime forces in the

pursuit of [defending] national claims’56 is testament to

the symbolic nature of the disputed islands and its

definition of national borders. They represent ‘the

projection of power’57 via territorial sovereignty of Japan

and China, as well as their economic rights to access the

sea-lanes. The sensitive issue of the island’s symbolic

sovereignty and history lends the territorial dispute to be

exploited by domestic politics. Moreover, the overlapping

EEZs and continental shelf claims highlights the failure of

international law and bodies to set clear limitations and

effectively deal with the region’s complex, heterogeneous

nature (and history). More importantly, Chinese insistence

on bilateral management of the dispute further restricts the

intervention of regional institutions and other parties.

54 Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. (2011). 55 Patalano, Alessio. (2014). P 54.56 Patalano, Alessio. (2014). P 47.57 Patalano, Alessio. (2014). P 34.


Conclusion

It is important to acknowledge cooperation, or the desire

for, within East Asian countries. The construction of Japan

and the U.S as a ‘significant or dangerous other’58 creates

‘tension between policy-elites efforts to strengthen their

domestic legitimacy by resorting to nationalism [while]

avoiding unnecessary conflict with the outside world’59.

Hence, the balance of power/threat is not a simple, “zero

58 Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. (2012). P 95.59 Ibid. P 96.


sum” process. The unresolved history issue between Japan,

China and ROK highlight how diplomacy and power is much more

intricate for ‘states are moral agents deeply affected by

history60. Looking at Chinese rhetoric, it is clear that

shame and the loss of “face” threatens its national

identity. So unless Japan shows remorse and assumes full

responsibility for its past atrocities, it is ‘still not

sorry enough’61 and the region is in fragile stability. If

East Asia, and in particular China, wants to create its own

model of regionalism and “Asian” diplomacy, it first has to

overcome its historical incongruities and build mutual

trust.

As Acharya proclaims, the ‘Asian-Pacific variety of

multilateralism…remains constrained by the primacy of state

interests and conflicting conceptions of regional identity

that have in other regional theaters, frustrated cooperation

among sovereign states’62. The present emphasis on regional

identity based on a vague “Asian only” criteria is

unsustainable- how about U.S and Russia? Furthermore, the

region’s intrinsic divisions (eg: tensions between self and

other) make a “whole”, united and collective identity

problematic. We should not envision an East Asian community

in the same way as the European Union (EU), but perceive its

60 Suzuki, Shogo. (2007). P 23.61 Spitzer, Kirk. (2012, Dec 11). 62 Acharya, Amitav. (1997). P 17.


regional cooperation (and the ‘theory and practice of

multilateralism’63) in addition to the Eurocentric paradigm.

This means that an East Asian diplomacy cannot revert to

ethnocentrism, but use its ‘distinctive institutional

characteristics and decision-making processes’64 i.e. “soft”

regionalism to ‘result in more effective and durable

institutions’65.

Zhang posits that East Asia requires ‘gradual institutional

building in its own way’66, but the end goal should not be a

‘super regional organization’67 or an ‘exclusive regional

identity’68. There is potential in soft-power diplomacy as

an “East Asian” way, but it is still largely state-led and

hence ill equipped to deal with the emotional dimension of

soft power69. What is unique to the region is how

traditional and nontraditional security concerns inevitably

intersect with culture and history. Melissen proposes that

‘non-state actors such as NGOs, private individuals and

civil society is mandatory’70. The cultural industry is a

potential arena for inciting political action and

63 Acharya, Amitav. (1997). P 18.64 Acharya, Amitav. (1997). “Multilateralism: Is there an Asia-Pacific Way?”. The NationalBureau of Asian Research. 8(2). P 11.65 Ibid.66 Zhang, Yunling. (2010). P23.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Lee,Shin-Wha. (2011). “The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East Asia”. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia. Melissen,Jan. Lee, Song Jong. (eds). P27.70 Ibid.


reconciliation. What this could present to countries is the

possibilities soft power to enact regional pressures while

maintaining an open and non-exclusionary regionalism model.

However this is impossible without China’s political reform

in its struggle between the old and new. In what is possibly

the region’s most tense area- Japan has Hello Kitty, South

Korea has the Hallyu Wave, but China has Tiananmen. Perhaps

it is in the field that it resists most – culture, that

China can find possibilities to reconcile nationalism

(national pride) with regionalism (regional consensus).

Until there is a consensus over which and what kind of

region constitutes East Asia without limiting national

interests, regional institution building will unfortunately

remain half-baked.

(2588 words)

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http://nation.time.com/2012/12/11/why-japan-is-still-not-sorry-enough/

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Opportunities and Constraints for Regionalism in East Asia

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