http://ssi.sagepub.com/Social Science Information

http://ssi.sagepub.com/content/52/3/329The online version of this article can be found at:

 DOI: 10.1177/0539018413483939

2013 52: 329Social Science InformationKarl-Dieter Opp

sociological research programWhat is Analytical Sociology? Strengths and weaknesses of a new

  

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of: 

  Maison des Sciences de l'Homme

can be found at:Social Science InformationAdditional services and information for    

  http://ssi.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

 

http://ssi.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:  

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:  

http://ssi.sagepub.com/content/52/3/329.refs.htmlCitations:  

What is This? 

- Aug 5, 2013Version of Record >>

at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on September 24, 2013ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Social Science Information52(3) 329–360

© The Author(s) 2013Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navDOI: 10.1177/0539018413483939

ssi.sagepub.com

What is Analytical Sociology? Strengths and weaknesses of a new sociological research program

Karl-Dieter OppDepartment of Sociology, University of LeipzigDepartment of Sociology, University of Washington (Seattle)

AbstractIn this article, several problems of Analytical Sociology (AS) – a new school of sociological thought – are discussed. A first contention of this article is that the critique of the covering-law model (i.e. the Hempel–Oppenheim scheme) submitted by proponents of AS is problematic. The rejection of rational choice theory in AS is criticized as well. It is argued that the alleged alternative general theory applied by proponents of AS, namely DBO theory (claiming that Desires, Beliefs and Opportunities determine behavior), is equivalent to a wide version of rational choice theory. Furthermore, the focus on theories of the middle range in AS and the neglect of general theories is considered problematic. Finally, it is argued that the goals of AS can better be achieved if it is supplemented by a research program of empirical theory comparison.

KeywordsAnalytical Sociology, explanation, Hempel–Oppenheim scheme, rational choice theory, social mechanisms, theories of the middle range

RésuméL’article discute plusieurs problèmes que pose une nouvelle école de pensée sociologique, la sociologie analytique (Analytical Sociology – AS). Une première constatation est que la critique du modèle de Hempel–Oppenheim (‘covering law theory’) que font les défenseurs de l’AS est problématique. Le fait que ces derniers rejettent aussi la théorie du choix rationnel est également analysé et critiqué. L’auteur défend la thèse que la théorie générale alternative que proposent les défenseurs de l’AS, à savoir la théorie des DBO (qui affirme que ce sont les désirs, les croyances et les opportunités qui déterminent le

Corresponding author:K-D Opp, Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, Universität Leipzig, Sulkyweg 22, 22159 Hamburg, Germany. Email: kdopp@arcor.de

483939 SSI52310.1177/0539018413483939Social Science InformationOpp2013

Theory and methods/Théorie et méthodes

330 Social Science Information 52(3)

comportement), est équivalente à une version large de la théorie du choix rationnel. De plus, le fait que l’AS mette l’accent sur des théories intermédiaires et néglige les théories générales est perçu comme problématique. Finalement, l’auteur défend la thèse que l’AS atteindrait mieux les buts qu’elle s’est fixée si elle était complétée par un programme de recherche visant une comparaison empirique des théories sociales.

Mots-clésexplication, mécanismes sociaux, modèle Hempel–Oppenheim, sociologie analytique, théorie du choix rationnel, théories intermédiaires

The foundation of a new sociological school of thought called ‘Analytical Sociology’ (AS) was launched with the publication of a book on social mechanisms, edited by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg in 1998 (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998a).1 Hedström’s book from 2005 (Hedström, 2005) is seen as a sort of ‘manifesto’ (Barbera, 2006: 32) of the approach. Meanwhile there are several programmatic articles (Barbera, 2006; Hedström & Bearman, 2009b; Hedström & Udéhn, 2009; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010), books (Demeulenaere, 2011a; Hedström, 2005; Kron & Grund, 2010), a handbook (Hed-ström & Bearman, 2009a), and there is a controversy (Kron & Grund, 2010; Manzo, 2010; Opp, 2005, 2007). There is an International Network of Analytical Sociologists (INAS – formerly European Network of Analytical Sociologists) and an annual confer-ence. Sections in the national sociological associations and a journal will certainly fol-low, and soon.

What is the research program of AS? One basic claim is to provide explanations by mechanisms.2 Several publications by AS advocate focus on this kind of explanation (Demeulenaere, 2011a; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998a; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Another point in the agenda is to pursue a rigorous sociology (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 58), which is one of the meanings of ‘Analytical’ in the label Analytical Sociology.3 Micro-macro explanations or, in other words, structural individualism are advanced as well. Furthermore, the approach favors the application of middle-range theories (MRTs) and is thus based on Robert K Merton’s research agenda. Alternatively, the application of rational choice theory (RCT) is rejected. The general action theory advanced in AS is DBO theory (which claims that desires, beliefs and opportunities determine behavior; see below), but the focus is on applying MRTs. In regard to its philosophical foundation, the Hempel–Oppenheim logic of explanation, the HO-scheme, is attacked. The claim is that mechanism explanations should replace deductive nomological explanations.

The new approach seems to be well received (Manzo, 2010: 129–130). It is in line with the beliefs and the research program of a large group of sociologists: to discover ‘mechanisms’ is something that has been on the sociological agenda for a long time. Since most sociologists don’t like RCT, its rejection makes the approach attractive too. Applying theories of the middle range is actually what most sociologists do in their daily work and, thus, pushes at an open door. The quest for precision also appeals to a large group of sociologists, including those who focus on quantitative empirical research and most of the time apply middle-range theories. At the intersection of these different groups is apparently a large set of sociologists who are thus supportive of AS.

Opp 331

This article discusses some claims of the AS program which seem problematic. The arguments against the HO-scheme, which describes how to proceed in explanations, are analyzed and found problematic. Second, the rejection of RCT and the emphasis on applying theories of the middle range are questioned as well. It is further shown that DBO theory – the general action theory applied in AS – is equivalent to a wide version of RCT. Finally, an extension of the program of AS is suggested: it is argued that the goals of AS can best be achieved if AS is supplemented by a research program of empiri-cal theory comparison.

The critique provided in this article does not plead to dismiss AS. Instead, it argues for dropping some unnecessary and untenable claims, and complementing the program by focusing on empirical theory comparison, which would make the program much stronger. I wish to emphasize that I value the program of AS very positively as an important step in the development of a rigorous explanatory sociology. I am thus a supporter of AS and a strong supporter if the claims discussed in this paper are dropped and if empirical the-ory comparison is added to the agenda.

Before we enter into the discussion, a terminological note is necessary. Concepts like ‘law’, ‘law-like statement’ and ‘theory’, which are used throughout this article, have dif-ferent meanings. A ‘law’ (or, equivalently, ‘law-like statement’ or ‘theory’) is here defined as any ‘statement of universal conditional form which is capable of being con-firmed or disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings’ (Hempel, 1942: 35). Laws are thus general in the sense that there is no reference to specific times and places. Laws may have different attributes that are sometimes included in their definition. For example, laws may be more or less confirmed, or they may be derived or not derived from a theory, i.e. from other laws. In this article, it is of importance that laws may be deterministic or probabilistic. In its most simplified form, a deterministic law states: whenever an event of a specific kind C (cause) occurs at a certain time and place, then an event of a specific kind E (effect) will always occur (Hempel, 1942: 35). If there is only a certain probability that E occurs when C is given, then the law is called probabilistic or statistical (Hempel, 1965: 376–377). It is important to note that the concept of law as it is used in this article refers to deterministic as well as probabilistic statements.

There is a vast literature on the concept of law (for an overview see Swartz, 2009). We use a relatively wide concept here because it describes the ‘hypotheses of general form’ (Hempel, 1942) that are typically used in the social sciences.

One claim of AS is to provide mechanism explanations. Because there are a vast num-ber of definitions of the mechanism concept (see the long list in Mahoney, 2001: 579–580; see also Gross, 2009: 359–366; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 51; Manzo, 2010: 149–150),4 and because the definitions are often not clear (see e.g. Mahoney, 2001; Opp, 2007), we state here at the outset how this concept is used in AS: ‘A social mechanism … is a constellation of entities and activities that is organized in such a way that it regu-larly brings about a particular type of outcome ... In one way or another these mecha-nisms are always about actors and the causes and consequences of their actions, because actors bring about change in society’ (Hedström, 2005: 11). The basic structure of a mechanism explanation is thus a micro-macro explanation (exemplified by the well-known Coleman boat) where actors bring about ‘change in society’, i.e. macro properties.

332 Social Science Information 52(3)

I. How to establish causality in mechanism-based explanations: the usefulness of the covering-law model

Advocates of AS try to find causal processes because a mechanism consists of those processes. How is causality established? Take the most elementary mechanism: X Z Y (meaning X leads to Z, Z leads to Y). What is the procedure to make sure that X caused Z and that Z caused Y? Advocates of AS reject a procedure that is used – explic-itly or implicitly – by many or perhaps most scientists: the Hempel–Oppenheim scheme, also called the covering-law model or deductive nomological explanation (see Hempel, 1965; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; see also the overview in Hempel, 1966). Is this rejection of the HO-scheme justified? If so, what is the superior alternative? These are the questions that are addressed in this section.

The logic of explanation: the Hempel–Oppenheim scheme

According to Hempel and Oppenheim, an explanation consists, first of all, of an explanandum, i.e. the description of a phenomenon that is to be explained. Such an explanandum could be the protests in the GDR (East Germany) in 1989. This explanan-dum is derived from an explanans. The latter consists, first of all, of a law or theory (or also of a set of laws). These are, as said before, general statements that are not restricted to some particular time or place and that specify under what conditions certain phenom-ena occur. Assume that the following law is empirically well confirmed: ‘If political discontent and perceived efficacy of persons in a country are high, protests will occur.’ The second component of the explanans is a description of the initial conditions. They specify whether, in the situation where the explanandum obtains, the causes mentioned in the law exist. In the example these causes refer to the political dissatisfaction and perceived influence of the population. According to the law, the initial conditions are expected to be high political discontent and perceived efficacy. The law thus provides information about what are the causes in the situation: it asserts that in general certain classes of events are (initial) conditions for the explananda. In explaining specific explananda, the law tells us what are the concrete phenomena that are determinants of the explanandum.

The typical procedure for explaining social phenomena is not a systematic application of this explanation scheme. Instead, one points to various factors that existed before the protests, and claims that these were the causes. The problem with this kind of argument is that invoking a factor as a cause is arbitrary: why are certain factors chosen as causes and not other factors? Thus, the selection problem of factors that are deemed causal is not solved. Let us illustrate this with an example. Boris Becker and Steffi Graf, two German tennis players, each won the Wimbledon championships several times, but they won them simultaneously only once, in July 1989. Assume it is claimed that this was the cause for the East German revolution. How does one know that this ‘explanation’ is wrong, i.e. that the Becker–Graf victories in 1989 were not causes of the East German protests?

The HO-scheme offers a solution to this problem: it suggests the application of a law or theory (in some cases, which will not be dealt with here, several laws must be applied).

Opp 333

Remember that the terms ‘law’ and ‘theory’ are used interchangeably. As was said before, a law specifies that in general a phenomenon will occur under certain conditions. In the example there is a well-confirmed theory asserting that, if there is political discontent and if individuals think that their protest will be efficacious in bringing about the desired situation (i.e. will contribute to the public good), then protest will occur. This theory would give a good reason for the claim that it was political discontent and perceived efficacy of the East German population that brought about the protests. Invoking discon-tent and efficacy is now no longer ad hoc or arbitrary. Instead, we apply a general state-ment that is empirically confirmed and which gives us reliable information that discontent and efficacy bring about protest. Furthermore, there is ‘common knowledge’ (i.e. a law) that says that sports events do not trigger protests. The explanation of the protests in Leipzig would thus be:

Law: If political discontent and perceived efficacy of persons in a country are high, protests will occur.Initial condition: Political discontent and efficacy in the GDR in the fall of 1989 were high.Explanandum: Protests occurred in the GDR in 1989.

Thus, the explanation ‘protests occurred because discontent and perceived efficacy were high in East Germany in 1989’ is not a satisfactory explanation for the protests. This is only the relationship between the initial conditions and the explanandum. The law is thus a spotlight that helps the researcher to select the relevant causal factors.

The HO-scheme allows deductive as well as inductive-statistical explanations. In the latter, probabilistic (or, equivalently, statistical) laws are used. For example, the previous law may state that, if C (political discontent and perceived efficacy) occurs, then E (protest) occurs always. In this case, the explanandum can be logically derived from the law and the description of the initial conditions. This is not possible if the law is probabilistic and states e.g. that, if C occurs, then E is to be expected with a certain probability p. Assume p is .9. Then one will expect with practical certainty that E will occur. Depending on the size of p, the explanandum is more or less cer-tain, i.e. will be regarded as more or less confirmed (see Hempel, 1965: 381–425; 1966: Ch. 4).

Social science laws are certainly not deterministic. Nonetheless, in applying them to explain specific phenomena, typically deductive arguments are used. This is shown in the section on ‘Actual and propagated methodology’ below. The implicit assumption seems to be that the relationship between the causes and the effects is so close that the explanandum is ‘practically certain’. Although there is a clear logical difference between deductive and inductive arguments, it seems acceptable to use the simpler deductive reasoning in explaining social phenomena.

Although the HO-scheme sounds plausible, it is controversial (see e.g. Kitcher & Salmon, 1989; Salmon, 1989; Schurz, 1988; Woodward, 2003: 152–186). Hedström and Ylikoski’s judgment is clear (2010: 55; see also Ylikoski, 2011: 155): ‘the cover-ing-law approach is a failure as a theory of explanation’. Let us look at the major arguments.5

334 Social Science Information 52(3)

Are deductive nomological explanations and mechanism explanations alternatives?

Hedström (2005: 13–14) distinguishes three types of explanations: covering-law expla-nations (these refer to the HO-scheme), statistical explanations and mechanism explana-tions. Although Hedström discusses similarities between covering-law and mechanism explanations, they are regarded as distinct types. Whatever they have in common, a mechanism-based explanation is not ‘wedded to the idea that an explanation is a deduc-tive argument’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 55).6 One justification for this claim is that mechanisms refer to processes that explain the origin of the explanandum. The HO-scheme, it is asserted, cannot be applied in this case (Kron & Grund, 2010: 8; see also Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b: 7–8; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 50).

This argument is not tenable. A causal process can be broken down into several causal relationships, as Hedström himself emphasized. Assume Y (e.g. the East German revolu-tion) is explained by a causal process, beginning with Gorbachev’s new policy in 1985, its effects on beliefs of East German citizens that the chances to effect changes by means of collective action increased, etc. Assume we stipulate the following causal chain, where the main interest is to explain the process that leads to Y:

U V W X Y

This chain can be dissected into several explanatory steps. For each step, an explanatory argument can be constructed. Take the hypothesis:

U V

U is the initial condition, whereas V is the explanandum. Thus, a law can be applied that specifies that events of the kind U lead to events of the kind V. The same holds for the other components of the chain such as V W. There may be more complicated pro-cesses, but in any event, when explaining causal processes laws can be applied succes-sively. The argument that the HO-scheme is not applicable to causal processes is therefore not tenable. On the contrary, causality in a mechanism explanation can only be estab-lished if laws are applied.

This implies that mechanisms are not full-fledged explanations. They consist of a sequence of singular statements. Mechanisms become full-fledged explanations when theories are applied, as described before.

‘Irrelevant’ explanations that confirm the adequacy conditions of the HO-scheme

It has been shown that explanations are to be classified as adequate according to the HO-scheme which no scientist will accept as meaningful. For example, how to explain that Peter did not become pregnant? Assume that Peter regularly takes birth-control pills. The law that can be applied is that no-one who takes birth-control pills becomes pregnant (Hedström, 2005: 16; the example is from Salmon, 1971). This is formally an adequate explanation: the law, the explanandum and the initial conditions are true (let us assume

Opp 335

this), and the explanandum can be derived from the law and the initial conditions. Nonetheless, the explanation is unsatisfactory: the law is ‘irrelevant’. Thus, an additional criterion of ‘relevance’ has to be introduced.

If scientists use the HO-scheme, they apply the theories that are accepted in their discipline to answer the questions that are of interest. Thus, a biologist would never apply the hypothesis mentioned above to explain why men do not become pregnant. It is therefore obvious that social scientists will apply ‘relevant’ theories in explaining social phenomena. These are the theories that exist in their discipline. The possibility of ‘irrel-evant’ laws does not imply that the HO-scheme is to be dispensed with: it implies that additional criteria are to be specified for the use of laws in social science explanations (Opp, 2005). The appropriate criterion is that the laws to be applied are those used in the social sciences. This criterion is so obvious that one can only wonder how such ‘irrele-vant’ examples can be invented and used as arguments against the HO-scheme. This scheme outlines a general procedure for an adequate explanation. It is neither intended nor possible to include all the requirements for an adequate explanation that scientists have developed in their specific discipline.

Counterfactuals as a solution?

It is argued by proponents of AS that, among other things, instead of deductive nomo-logical explanations, counterfactual arguments could help to establish causality.7 The basic idea is that a factor A is a cause of B if it holds: ‘If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred either.’ For example, smoking is a cause for cancer if it can be established that, had the person not smoked, he or she would not have gotten cancer. This simple example indicates already that the counterfactual definition of causality is highly prob-lematic: had the person not smoked, he or she could nonetheless have gotten cancer. Thus, the counterfactual definition is not meaningful if a phenomenon has several causes.

Another problem is that it is not clear how one can know whether the absence or pres-ence of a factor would or would not lead (or has led) to an explanandum. How do we know what would have happened if a person had not smoked or if the demonstration on 9 October 1989 in Leipzig had not taken place? In the latter case, would there not have been a revolu-tion in East Germany? Only laws can inform us about factors that were relevant for the occurrence of certain explananda. This is even admitted by a proponent of counterfactual explanations who concedes that the ability to answer counterfactual ‘what-if-things-had-been-different questions’ ‘ties together theoretical and practical knowledge’ (Ylikoski & Kuorikoski, 2010: 205). To return to the Becker–Graf example: how do we know what would have happened in East Germany if Becker and Graf had not won Wimbledon simul-taneously? Thus, the counterfactual idea of causation is highly problematic. It certainly does not qualify as a general explanatory scheme and as a replacement for the HO-scheme.

Does the covering-law model discourage mechanism-based explanations?

One problem proponents of AS have with the HO-scheme is that it does not explicitly demand mechanism-based explanations, it ‘allows for and thereby legitimizes superfi-cial theories and explanations’ (Hedström, 2005: 20, also 17).8 How could a formal

336 Social Science Information 52(3)

scheme that in general, i.e. for all empirical sciences, specifies the procedure for an adequate explanation include the demand that one should pursue the type of explanation that is favored by AS (or by any specific scientific discipline)? It is absolutely not mean-ingful to provide such rules in a general scheme because otherwise the scheme would have to foresee future methodological developments of a science: there may be kinds of explanations that are deemed useful today, but are turned down in the future.

The conclusion thus is that, if the HO-scheme does not prescribe mechanism explana-tions, this by no means implies that this type of explanation is encouraged or discour-aged. The question of what kind of explanation is meaningful is simply left open. This has to be decided by the scientists. The scientists are free to specify additional criteria that an explanation must meet. Normally this is accepted. For example, mathematics and computer simulation do not demand mechanism explanations either. Does this imply that mechanism explanations are discouraged? Not at all. But it does not imply either that these explanations are encouraged. Scientists will apply these instruments to formalize or simulate mechanisms, i.e. the theoretical apparatus is considered useful.

If mechanism explanations are inconsistent with the HO-scheme, one would defi-nitely not expect the major proponents of the scheme to illustrate it with mechanism explanations. However, this happens in the basic paper by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), as Demeulenaere (2011b: 190) correctly points out.

The ‘generative theory of causality’ in Analytical Sociology

AS is built on the ‘generative theory of causality’ (see e.g. Demeulenaere, 2011b: 18; Manzo, 2011b: 268, both with further references; Hedström, 2005: Ch. 2). This means that ‘the cause is supposed to have the power to generate the effect and is connected to it’ (Harré, 1984[1972]: 116). Accordingly, a mechanism ‘should detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to be explained was brought about’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 50; emphasis added). In other words, there is not just a regularity of events of type X being associated with events of type Y, there are some ‘inner’ or ‘generative’ properties of the (causal) factor and its effect. Cause and effect are not ‘separate and independent objects’ (Ekström, 1992: 108).

Let us look at two examples. (1) John (a scholar) buys a computer because he wants to reduce the time it takes to write papers and books. His motive or desire is certainly a cause for this action. (2) Assume that two hundred years ago a statistical inquiry finds that those who smoke develop lung cancer more frequently than those who do not smoke. Assume further that at the time the physiological processes connecting smoking and cancer were not known. In the first case, we would certainly say that the desire ‘brought about’ the action. In the second case, one would say that there is an ‘external’ relation between ‘sepa-rate’ variables. (3) Let us extend example 2: assume the mechanism is known: we know that smoking triggers some physiological processes which, in turn, lead to cancer. In this case one would say that there is an ‘inner’ relationship between smoking and cancer.

Let us compare the examples. The question addressed in this article is: are laws required to establish the causal relationships in the examples? This is certainly the case in all examples: the question is why we believe that one factor is a cause of the other factor or factors. How would we answer this question? Typically, we would refer to

Opp 337

general knowledge, i.e. to laws, in arguing that the relationships between the factors are causal. In example 1, we would say that ‘we know’ that desires ‘lead to’ or ‘bring about’ action. In example 2, we would argue as well that ‘we know’ that smoking is related to cancer. In other words, in both cases events of the type X (desire to smoke) are regularly related to events of the type Y. Similarly, in example 3, laws are required as evidence for the claim that smoking leads to certain processes in the organism that in turn lead to cancer. Thus, in all three cases we need laws that specify that there are regular relationships between certain types of factors like desires and action, regard-less of whether we think there is an ‘inner’ causal relationship between factors or whether they are regarded as ‘separate’.

Why would we be inclined to say that, in the first and third examples, there is an ‘inner’ relationship between the factors, in contrast to the second example? Is there any possibility of testing empirically whether desires ‘bring about’ action or whether cause and effect are ‘separate’? It seems that the difference is more of a psychological nature. Intuitively, we would say that in examples 1 and 3 the cause and effect are ‘closer’, and perhaps we are more familiar with the relationship. But the only thing that we can test and observe is a regular relationship between variables.

We thus conclude that the idea of a generative causality is not inconsistent with a deductive nomological explanation. At least no proponent of AS has shown so far what exactly the difference is between statements like ‘X brings about Y’ and ‘X is regularly related to Y’.

Are social science theories not suitable for explaining social phenomena?

Social scientists do not have (or have only few) laws that are comparable to laws in the natural sciences (see e.g. Elster, 2007: 35–36; Hanzel, 1999). For example, social science laws are not deterministic and they are to some extent falsified. Should these laws really be part of the HO-scheme? Surprisingly, the answer is that they should be included. As Hedström and Ylikoski argue, ‘of course, mechanism-based explanations still rely on causal generalizations ... but they do not have to satisfy the traditional criteria for laws. Rather, it is sufficient that they fulfill Woodward’s (2003) invariance requirements’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 55).9 Thus, the HO-scheme is preserved but only the requirements that a ‘law’ should meet are to be changed.

Let us look at Woodward’s invariance criterion. A relationship between two factors X and Y is ‘causal’ if manipulating the value of the variable X changes the value of Y. Causality is thus related to manipulation or intervention. Smoking (X) is a cause of cancer (Y) if changing the frequency of smoking will change the frequency of cancer.

Does this definition of causality not involve laws? First of all, the statement ‘manipu-lating smoking changes cancer’ is a law: it is equivalent to ‘if smoking increases (or decreases), then cancer increases (or decreases)’. The reason is that ‘manipulation’ means that a change in a factor X always leads to (or is associated with) certain values of another factor Y.

Now assume that it is observed that John began smoking at a certain time, and that later John got cancer. Is this a causal relationship? To be sure, there is a ‘symbolic

338 Social Science Information 52(3)

manipulation’ in the sense that some factor changed, and that afterwards it was observed that John got cancer. But we do not know whether this manipulation was a cause of can-cer. This is exactly like the Becker–Graf example. We only know that smoking occurred before John got cancer. We can say that John’s smoking brought about his cancer when we know that, in general, if events of the type S (smoking) occur, then always events of the type C (cancer) are observed. This is a law. Thus, the interventionist definition of causality clearly implies the application of laws or ‘invariances’.

Furthermore, in explaining singular events (John got cancer), the law or invariance statement directs our attention to initial conditions. Finally, there is a deductive relation-ship between the ‘invariance’, the statements of the initial conditions and the explanan-dum. The adoption of Woodward’s ideas in AS thus does not imply dispensing with theories in mechanism explanations. It actually means that one uses the laws or theories that exist in the social sciences.

This means that the idea of the HO-scheme, that some general statement is needed to direct our attention to the factors that are causal, is entered through a back door with another expression: the general statements are no longer called laws but invariances. Woodward confirms this: an ‘invariant’ relationship means that there is some ‘causal or nomological’ relationship between variables (Woodward, 2000: 205) – whatever the exact nature of the relationship is.

Although there are, according to Woodward’s interventionist conception, differences between laws and invariances (Woodward, 2003: 265–267), the basic structure of the HO-scheme is preserved. In particular, Woodward makes it clear that explanations need generalizations: ‘The notion of invariance ... is intended to do the work (the work of distinguishing between causal and merely accidental generalizations) that is done by the notion of a law of nature in other philosophical accounts’ (2003: 16). Thus, adopting Woodward’s interventionist conception does not provide any justification for getting rid of theories and the HO-scheme.

Furthermore, Woodward applies invariances to explain specific explananda. This is already clear at the beginning of his book, where he invokes a law of physics that explains the motion of a block sliding down an inclined plane (2003: 12–14; see also 2000: 211–212). He discusses to what extent in specific cases a change in the angle of elevation of the plane changes the acceleration of the block. Woodward thus applies a law that points to the initial conditions (change of angle of elevation). Law and initial conditions logi-cally imply the explanandum (acceleration of the block).

Our conclusion is that social science theories come at least close to ‘invariances’ in Woodward’s sense. Woodward’s ideas on which AS is based thus suggest applying existing social science theories and applying a deductive argument in explaining specific explananda.

Actual and propagated methodology: how the Hempel–Oppenheim scheme is actually used in mechanism-based explanations in Analytical Sociology

The most convincing argument for the fruitfulness of the HO-scheme is the fact that those who criticize it actually apply it. This happens in the AS literature. An example taken from HC White (1970; see Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 59, see also Hedström,

Opp 339

2005: 55) about vacancy chains and an illustration of Hedström’s DBO theory from his book (2005) illustrate this. The first example explains mobility:

A retirement, motivated perhaps by a desire for a more leisurely life, creates an opportunity for others, i.e., a job vacancy waiting to be filled by a new occupant. The vacancy generated by the retirement is filled by another individual whose reason for taking the job, perhaps, is to attain more status, a higher salary, or just a change in venue, but this creates another vacancy in this person’s old job, and in this way vacancy chains create social interdependencies that are important for explaining mobility. Individuals’ desires – for retirement, promotion, status, or change in venue – motivate the system. Without such orientations, people may not move. But explanatory understanding is only achieved by recognizing that actions take place in relational structures that in this case channel mobility opportunities and thereby explain why we observe what we observe .... (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 59)

The explanandum is mobility. Assume that in a country A the mobility is higher than in another country B. How can this be explained? The previous argument applies a theory: it is assumed that in general certain variables are relevant for the mobility in a country: the number of open positions, the number of individuals who have a desire to change positions and to fill new ones. This is the ‘generalization’ applied in the argument or, in terms of the HO-scheme, the law. In explaining mobility in a specific country, the researcher applies this generalization: the country-specific factors are the free positions, the desires (motivations or preferences) of people to leave or fill positions, and, one should add, the decisions of those who fill positions (such as employers). Empirical data may show that, in society A, a retirement wave occurs due to the aging of the population. Furthermore, those in charge of filling (or eliminating) positions decide to fill the empty positions (and not to eliminate them). These specific circumstances are the initial condi-tions of the HO-scheme. This is granted if it is said in the quotation that desires and opportunities ‘explain why we observe what we observe’.

If it is denied that a general theory is applied in explaining vacancy chains, we would ask: how do you know that desires and opportunities are relevant for mobilization? Why not some sports event (like the Becker–Graf Wimbledon victories)? The answer would clearly be that ‘we know’ that in general desires and opportunities explain behavior.

Hedström (2005: 39) provides an even simpler example to illustrate DBO theory (see below). The explanandum is ‘why Mr Smith brought an umbrella today’. DBO theory suggests that a ‘specific set of desires, beliefs and opportunities’ is relevant for a behav-ior. One belief may be ‘that it would rain today’. In this way, an explanandum is derived from a theory (DBO theory) and the pertinent initial conditions, namely the specific set of desires, beliefs and opportunities.

Thus, general considerations as well as the specific examples from the AS literature – many other examples could be added – clearly indicate that the basic idea of the HO-scheme is actually applied in AS. Is there a better argument for the fruitfulness of the basic idea of the HO-scheme?

In general, if theories are applied to explain singular phenomena – which is done in AS and which is on the methodological agenda of AS – the HO-scheme is applied auto-matically: the theories serve to identify the factors that are causes in concrete situations.

340 Social Science Information 52(3)

If this is done the explanandum logically follows from the theory applied and the initial conditions. This is exactly the procedure recommended by the HO-scheme.

Conclusion I

The arguments for an abandonment of the HO-scheme are not convincing. The most convincing argument for its fruitfulness is the fact that those who reject it cannot help applying it.

To be sure, nobody will deny the problems of the HO-scheme. But that a methodo-logical conception is problematic is not a sufficient reason to reject it out of hand. A general decision rule is to reject methodological rules only if there are better ones. This is actually done in regard to theories. The proponents of AS plead for applying theories of the middle range. Obviously, these theories are problematic as well (see below). Nonetheless, they are applied in explanations of social phenomena.

The major argument for using the HO-scheme in AS – and in every social science that applies theories – is that a deductive procedure is always used, as our examples clearly illustrate: the sociological theory applied solves the problem of selecting the causes for an explanandum (i.e. to avoid Becker–Graf explanations). The laws in a deductive explanatory argument consist of the – admittedly imperfect – social science theories. This is the procedure that is useful and that actually is applied in AS and the social sci-ences in general. Utilizing such laws is to be preferred to the arbitrary (or ‘intuitive’) selection of ‘causes’, as in the Becker–Graf explanation. There is no alternative offered in AS.10 To be sure, the theories may be problematic. However, this is not a problem restricted to the HO-scheme but one that sociologists and social scientists in general have to solve. The HO-scheme is merely a methodological procedure; it is not in any sense a theory, as Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 55) and others assert. If, despite the previous arguments, the HO-scheme is still rejected in AS, one should show what is wrong with the previous examples, and we would like to know how Becker–Graf explanations can be avoided.

II. The dismissal of rational choice theory in Analytical Sociology

Another claim of AS is to renounce the application of RCT. As Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 60) put it: ‘There is nothing in the idea of a mechanism-based explanation that would require the explanation to be articulated in terms of rational choice theory’.11 To what extent is this claim justified?

Versions of rational choice theory: the wide and the narrow versions

In discussing the strengths and weaknesses of RCT, it is of utmost importance to realize that there are different versions of RCT. This theory is not a single theory but a family of theories. If RCT is criticized, it is therefore important to specify which version is being attacked. One extreme version is a narrow neo-classical variant, which assumes, among

Opp 341

other things, that individuals have full and correct information and that only egoistic motives matter. Indeed, many proponents of this version make ‘unrealistic’ assumptions – one of the criticisms of ‘the’ theory of rational action (see our discussion of this objec-tion below). This narrow version is the target of attacks by proponents of AS. This becomes clear when Hedström attacks ‘homo economicus’ who ‘is an atomized actor equipped with unlimited cognitive abilities that allow him to consistently choose the optimal course of action’ (Hedström, 2005: 36). In attacking a version of RCT, one should select the most fruitful one. It doesn’t make sense to criticize a version whose weaknesses are obvious and well known, and which is increasingly rejected by adherents of RCT. The superior variant is the wide version of RCT, which is increasingly accepted in the social sciences. The assumptions of this version can be summarized as follows:12

1 Preferences are determinants of action. In contrast to a narrow version, there are no restrictions on the kinds of preferences. In particular, altruistic motivations (i.e. an intrinsic interest in the welfare of others) and internalized norms (i.e. an intrinsic preference to follow certain norms) are possible preferences. What kinds of preferences exist in a specific situation has to be determined empirically.

2 The wide version assumes that perceived constraints determine behavior. These are beliefs about what kind of action is relevant for goal attainment. In contrast to a narrow version, there are no restrictions on the kinds of beliefs: they may be wrong or incomplete. Of course, there is no ‘atomized actor’ (see the quotation above): individuals are embedded in social networks, and decisions depend on the constraints of the social context.

3 Perceived behavioral alternatives and not, as in the narrow version, the actually existing alternatives explain action.

4 There is utility maximization: individuals do what seems best for them from their perspective and not, as in a narrow version, from the perspective of an omniscient observer. Thus, the narrow version is a special case of the wide version. The wide version takes into account the limited cognitive capabilities of actors and the variety of existing preferences and beliefs (i.e. perceived constraints) that deter-mine behavior in specific contexts.

If one wants to apply the rationality concept, one may say that the wide version assumes subjective rationality: social action is determined by what the actors think is best for them. They thus act ‘reasonably’, from their perspective.

DBO theory: an alternative to rational choice theory?

Hedström proposes a theory of action that he calls DBO theory (Hedström, 2005: 38–66). This should be ‘a micro-foundation for sociological theory’ (2005: 40). The acro-nym refers to desires (D), beliefs (B, i.e. ‘propositions about the world that are held to be true’; Hedström, 2005: 38), and opportunities (O, i.e. behavioral options open to an agent). It is held that these variables determine action.

It is not clearly specified what kinds of beliefs are relevant for explaining a specific action. To take Hedström’s umbrella example: what kind of beliefs led Mr Smith to bring

342 Social Science Information 52(3)

Table 1. A comparison of the variables and assumptions of a wide version of rational choice theory (RCT) and DBO theory.

Variables and hypotheses of a wide version of RCT

Corresponding variables of DBO theory

Preferences DesiresPerceived constraints or opportunities (= beliefs)

Beliefs (not clear what kinds of beliefs determine which kinds of behavior)

Perceived behavioral opportunities Perceived behavioral opportunitiesUtility maximization No corresponding hypothesis explicitly formulated

an umbrella? This question is not answered explicitly; the relevant beliefs are introduced ad hoc. We may add a hypothesis from RCT: an action A is chosen that is believed to be the best way to achieve a goal (see e.g. Bohman, 1992: 212). The examples in Hedström’s book indicate that this hypothesis is not inconsistent with DBO theory and would thus be a useful extension.

Do actors maximize utility in DBO theory? There is no explicit discussion of this hypothesis in Hedström’s account (2005: 38–42). One may thus conclude that this assumption is not made (Diekmann, 2010). This makes the theory unfalsifiable: assume there are conflicting aims or conflicting opportunities: what will people do? The exam-ples (see e.g. 2005: 40) clearly assume that individuals do what they think is best for them. To illustrate: if Mr Smith does not wish to get wet and therefore brings an umbrella to work (2005: 40), this is preferable to him to leaving the umbrella at home and getting wet. It is obvious that Mr Smith maximizes utility, i.e. bringing the umbrella is best for him in this situation. In discussing RCT Hedström writes that actors act ‘reasonably’ (2005: 61). This can be interpreted as doing what is best for the actor.

What are the differences between DBO theory and RCT? Hedström regards DBO theory as an ‘alternative’ to RCT (2005: 41). He further claims that RCT ‘can in certain respects be seen as a specific type of DBO theory’ (2005: 41). But he does not analyze in detail what distinguishes the theories and how exactly RCT fits into DBO theory. Hedström’s theses are merely claims that await a detailed discussion. So what is the relationship between RCT and DBO theory?

Table 1 shows the variables and assumptions of RCT theory (left column) and DBO (right column). The preferences in RCT are equivalent to the desires in DBO theory. The (perceived) constraints in RCT are the beliefs in DBO theory. The behavioral opportuni-ties in RCT are the opportunities in DBO theory. When we add to DBO theory the hypothesis of utility maximization, and when we specify what kinds of beliefs are rele-vant to explain action, our conclusion is: RCT and DBO are equivalent. It is one theory; only the terminology is different.

If we do not add the assumptions from RCT mentioned before to DBO theory, then DBO theory is a deficient version of RCT. The flaws are a missing assumption about why individuals perform certain actions (utility maximization) and about what kinds of beliefs are relevant for explaining a specific action. The complemented version could be called the strong version of DBO theory.

Opp 343

If these assumptions are not added, DBO theory is not a theory in the strict sense of the term, namely a set of general statements with explanatory power that allow explana-tions of specific explananda. Accordingly, the theory is sometimes interpreted as a theo-retical framework (personal communication from Filippo Barbera). This is a set of concepts that are used in a loose way to explain some phenomena, if this seems plausible (see e.g. Ostrom, 2007). Similarly, Diekmann (2010: 194) argues that DBO theory is not a theory that has any explanatory power. An indicator for this is, according to Diekmann, that the theory is not falsifiable. However, when we add the two assumptions mentioned before, which are implicitly applied in Hedström’s text, then DBO theory is a full-fledged theory. In what follows we discuss only the strong version of DBO theory. It does not make sense to focus on an obviously flawed theory if a better one is available.

The equivalence of the two theories – the strong version of DBO theory and the wide version of RCT – seems so evident that one wonders that this is not recognized by pro-ponents of AS. The reason is probably that the attacks are directed at a narrow version of RCT: the reference is to homo economicus (as mentioned before); the discussion of the alleged ‘instrumentalism’ of RCT (Hedström, 2005: 60–66; for a discussion see Diekmann, 2010) and the discussion of ‘rationality’ also indicate that the target is the narrow version. These assumptions are not part of a wide version of RCT.

What are the consequences of our conclusion about the equivalence of RCT and DBO theory? If the previous critique of RCT is correct, then this critique holds for the strong version of DBO theory as well (and for the weak version a fortiori). If our rejection of the critique of RCT is correct, then this holds for DBO theory as well. Take the claim that RCT makes unrealistic assumptions (see our discussion below). It is clear that this does not hold for a wide version of RCT, and, of course, not for DBO theory either. If two theories consist of the same variables and assumptions, how can one theory be burdened with problems and the other one not?

If both theories are equivalent, then the weaknesses of DBO theory hold for RCT as well. DBO theory has been criticized (see in particular Gross, 2009; see also the discus-sion by Manzo, 2010: 150–157). Since we concentrate on the critique of RCT by AS advocates, we do not go into the critique of DBO theory.13

The equivalence of DBO theory and RCT can be demonstrated with the example of the vacancy chains. There are assumptions about preferences (such as ‘desire for a more leisurely life’) and opportunities (vacant jobs). The belief is that filling a job realizes actors’ goals. Why would people take another job? Apparently, actors do what they think is best for them. A clearer application of RCT (and the strong version of DBO theory) is hardly possible. This holds for the umbrella example as well – this is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

A problem with all discussions of the relationship between RCT and DBO theory (and not only a problem with Hedström’s discussion, as was said before) is that none of the discussants specifies exactly the assumptions of DBO theory on the one hand and of RCT on the other, that are to be compared. For example, Manzo (2010: 156–157) speci-fies assumptions of DBO theory, but not exactly the assumptions of the version of RCT that he has in mind. He continuously refers to ‘standard rational choice theory’ (e.g. 2010: 154). This seems to refer to the narrow version. (Again, it may be asked why a wide version is not the target of the critique.) Without the exact specification of the

344 Social Science Information 52(3)

assumptions that are compared, claims about the relationship between RCT and DBO theory are unwarranted. Why do the discussants not set up a table like the one presented in this article? Only such a detailed comparison allows a rigorous discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the two theories.

Two advantages of applying general theories of individual action

As is shown below, the focus of AS is on applying theories of the middle range. Before this claim is discussed, two advantages of applying general theories of action – in par-ticular DBO theory or RCT – are discussed here. These advantages suggest that it is not an acceptable strategy to focus mainly (or exclusively) on developing and applying mid-dle-range theories.

In what follows we should always write ‘RCT and DBO theory’ because both are equivalent. In order to avoid such cumbersome expressions we only speak of RCT and stipulate that this means ‘RCT and DBO theory’.

One of the merits of applying a general theory that is important for a major argument to be discussed below (referring to empirical theory comparison) is that a general theory can integrate existing lower-level theories, i.e. previously unconnected propositions can be derived from a general theory. This is illustrated by the great number of studies apply-ing RCT to fields that were previously the subject-matter of other social sciences. Such areas are family relationships, voting behavior, crime, emergence and effects of norms and institutions, social exchange, discrimination, etc. To be sure, there are controversies about these applications of RCT. But there can be no doubt that RCT has provided numerous new, valid and also interesting explanations.

However, it is not only this capacity to integrate existing knowledge. It is perhaps much more important that RCT often implies a modification of existing lower-level prop-ositions. These include theories of the middle range. The literature on the application of RCT (or general behavioral theory) referred to in the previous paragraph testifies that existing findings and theories are often modified. The first sociologist to provide an extensive treatise on this capability was Andrzej Malewski (1967).14 His argument, which he illustrates with many examples, is that theories of high generality such as learn-ing or dissonance theory imply the conditions under which more special theories hold.

A brief illustration is the theory of status inconsistency. The basic idea of Benoit-Smullyan (1944: 160) was that there is a tendency to status equilibration: the various types of status, e.g. in the economic and political hierarchy, tend to reach a common level. For example, two statuses are education and income. ‘Status equilibration’ would exist if both status dimensions have similar values, e.g. if people with high income also have a high education. If this equilibrating tendency is seriously hampered, ‘social tensions of revolu-tionary magnitude may be generated’. This was the first version of a theory of the middle range. Lenski (1954) formulated a general proposition based on the idea that ‘individuals characterized by a low degree of status crystallization differ significantly in their political attitudes and behavior from individuals characterized by a high degree of status crystal-lization, when status differences in the vertical dimensions are controlled’ (1954: 405–406). He tested this hypothesis for four statuses or status hierarchies: income hierarchy, occupation hierarchy, education hierarchy and ethnic hierarchy. He measured these

Opp 345

statuses and suggested a scale for status crystallization. One finding was that respondents with low crystallization voted democrat more frequently than those with high crystalliza-tion. The dependent variable thus was voting behavior.

Subsequent work extended this approach in various directions. For example, other measures of status crystallization or, equivalently, status consistency were suggested, and other dependent variables were added. Research suggested that status inconsistency did indeed have various effects on behavior and attitudes. But under what conditions which kinds of effects are to be expected was not spelled out.

Assume you – the reader – are given the task of applying RCT to derive hypotheses about the effects of status inconsistency. The first question would be whether status inconsistency has something to do with costs and benefits. Only then would we expect that there be some effect at all. In other words, RCT suggests that status inconsistency would have effects on behavior only if it were costly (or beneficial) to actors. In generat-ing hypotheses about the effects of status inconsistency, one should explore various social situations in which status inconsistency occurs. In these situations the relevant actors have to be specified. These are, first of all, the persons who have inconsistent statuses. Assume there is a person with a high income and a low education. Is this costly for the person or for his or her interaction partners? This depends on the situation. If the person is an athlete, nobody will care. But if the person is a manager whose colleagues all have high education, the manager will be ashamed and his colleagues will despise him. If the situation is costly for these actors, what will their behavioral options be? This depends again on the social situation. For example, the manager has several options: change at least one of the statuses (e.g. take classes to acquire a better education), hide the low education, or quit the job (which will rarely happen because it is perhaps the most costly option). The interaction partners could reduce interaction, which is costly as well. Again, what happens depends on the situation. The task would be to model the effects of status inconsistency in different types of situations – a task that Malewski (1967) as well as Homans (1974) have tackled.

This example illustrates the possibilities of applying a general theory in order to modify a theory of the middle range. Many other examples can be added. Reference group theory – a prime example of a middle-range theory – holds only under certain conditions. Having a reference group or person means identifying with a group or person. However, identifica-tion with a group does not always lead to compliance with the norms or expectations of a group (for the effects of identification with social movements see Opp, 2009: 220–221).

This example illustrates another important fact:15 rational choice theorists themselves have formulated numerous middle-range theories (MRTs). Examples are the theory of collective action, theories explaining crimes or certain kinds of crime and theories of voting. The difference between these and other MRTs is that they are based on a general theory of action.

The explanatory content of rational choice theory

Another strength of RCT not appreciated by AS advocates is its high explanatory power. As can be seen below, many theories of the middle range explain rather broad classes of phenomena such as crime or revolutions. It can thus not be explained what form of crime

346 Social Science Information 52(3)

or revolution occurs. In contrast, RCT accounts for a large class of very specific phenom-ena. The kind of action chosen (such as a specific kind of crime) depends on the kinds of costs and benefits. For example, in explaining crime, RCT would require looking at the options of a person or group in a certain situation. The kind of (criminal or legal) action that is most beneficial will be chosen. Thus, RCT has a relatively high explanatory power.16 This is not the case for most middle-range theories.

Some major objections to rational choice theory in Analytical Sociology

There is a vast literature criticizing RCT. It goes without saying that this critique cannot be addressed in the present article. Instead, we concentrate on the critique offered by proponents of AS.

‘Assumptions’ in rational choice theory. One reason advanced for rejecting RCT is that this theory makes ‘empirically false assumptions’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 60–61; also Hedström, 2005: 36). Is this an acceptable argument? In using RCT to explain social phenomena, it is necessary to make assumptions about the distribution of initial conditions. In explaining real phenomena it is obvious that these assump-tions must be empirically correct, i.e. they must be based on empirical data. For example, assume that a relatively low election turnout is explained by the erosion of the ethic of voting, i.e. a preference to conform to a norm that prescribes election participation. This assumption may be wrong and must therefore be empirically tested. That scholars sometimes make assumptions that are empirically false is no argument against the fruitfulness of RCT. This mistake may be made in any explana-tion. There is nothing in the wide version of RCT that requires making ‘empirically false assumptions’.

But there are explanations for which the empirical validity of assumptions is irrele-vant. Sometimes researchers simply want to explore what would happen if reality were structured in a certain way. What would happen in a situation in which no norms exist and in which individuals are only interested in increasing their own welfare (see the computer simulations by Axelrod, 1984)? These assumptions – no existence of norms, egoistic preferences – are ‘false’ in the sense that they do not exist in any known society. But making these assumptions answers questions that are of interest. For example, do we need internalized norms to arrive at a conflict-free society?

Thus, simply asserting that rational choice scholars sometimes make false assump-tions is not an argument against this theory.17

The falsity of rational choice theory. A serious critique of RCT is that there are situations where the theory is false. Let us assume this claim is correct. Is this a sufficient reason to eliminate a theory from further scientific application?

If this question were to be answered in the affirmative, no theory or, to be cautious, extremely few theories in the social sciences could be applied. The reason is that there are falsifications for each theory that has been seriously tested. A common practice in the social sciences is to apply theories that provide valid explanations, even if there are falsi-fications. This practice is adopted by advocates of AS as well. For example, they

Opp 347

recommend applying theories of the middle range. It cannot be doubted that each of these theories is falsified if it has been tested – see our discussion below. A condition for dis-carding a theory is the existence of a better theory. Even critics of RCT admit that there is at present no better theory. Thus, falsification alone is not a criterion for dismissing a theory.

Conclusion II

The conclusion is that the reasons adduced by proponents of AS to discard RCT are not convincing. Even if Hedström and collaborators evaluate the deficiencies of RCT more negatively than advocates of the rational choice approach, one will not ban a theory from the discipline if that theory apparently has merits, if one applies the theory implicitly and if one does not have a better one.

However, RCT and DBO theory are in fact equivalent if one eliminates some clear flaws of DBO theory. This implies that DBO theory and RCT have the same deficiencies and merits. Since DBO theory is regarded as a useful theory by AS proponents, this holds for the wide version of RCT as well. If, therefore, RCT is to be eliminated from the social sciences, DBO theory should be too. But no proponent of AS will agree to dismiss DBO theory – and we agree.

III. The focus on theories of the middle range

Advocates of AS play down the application of DBO theory: it does not play the major role as RCT does in the rational choice approach. Instead, advocates of AS ‘share Merton’s vision of middle-range theory as the type of theory sociology should aim for’ (Hedström & Udéhn, 2009: 26). As Merton put it (1957: 5): sociologists should ‘focus attention on what might be called theories of the middle range’. Is this really a satisfac-tory strategy? In this section we provide a general discussion of MRTs, i.e. of their strengths and weaknesses. Such a discussion is missing in AS. It is important in order to assess the fruitfulness of the suggested strategy to focus on MRTs and neglect general theories.

Robert K Merton’s research program

Merton thought ‘that it would seem reasonable to suppose that sociology will advance in the degree that its major concern is with developing theories of the middle range and will be frustrated if attention centers on theory in the large’ (Merton, 1957: 9). The emphasis on middle-range theories is of ‘major’ concern. To be sure, Merton grants ‘that both the general and the special theories are needed’, but this is ‘banal’ (1957: 9). The problem is, according to Merton, ‘allocating our scant resources’ (1957: 9).

Merton adds a caveat: although theories of the middle range ‘have the largest prom-ise’, there should be ‘an enduring and pervasive concern with consolidating the special theories into a more general set of concepts and mutually consistent propositions’ (1957: 10). To be sure, ‘sociology will advance insofar as its major (but not exclusive)

348 Social Science Information 52(3)

concern is with developing theories of the middle range’ (1967: 50; emphasis added). This, then, implies not giving up the search for general theories.18

Hedström and collaborators accept the major focus on theories of the middle range, but they do not seem to advance Merton’s second claim to also devote resources to develop general theories (see in particular Hedström & Udéhn, 2009) and, in addition, apply them in explanations. To what extent is this acceptable?

Before we provide an answer to this question we need to clarify what is meant by a ‘middle-range’ theory. Apparently, ‘middle range’ refers to the generality of theories. This is a quantitative concept, and the question arises: where on this continuum is the ‘middle range’? Another question is: what does ‘generality’ of theories mean in this context? It seems that Merton and others have an inclusion relation of the explananda of theories in mind. For example, the explananda of RCT, namely action, are more general than the explananda of theories that explain deviant behavior (such as anomie theory). The latter’s explananda are more general than those of theories of suicide. Because in this article the focus is on DBO and RCT on the one hand, and more ‘specific’ theories on the other, we denote as ‘middle range’ any theory that explains some specific kinds of behavior.19

Is it acceptable to focus on MRTs and neglect the development and application of general theories? Not only DBO and RCT are problematic. Middle-range theories are burdened with several problems as well.

Problem 1: which middle-range theory should be selected if there are several theories for given explananda? For a given explanandum there is usually not only one MRT that could be applied. For example, there are numerous theories of crime (see any textbook on crimi-nology), there are different theoretical approaches to explain political protest and social movements, and there are different theories explaining the rise of the nation-state (see e.g. Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010). Assume a researcher wants to explain crime or political protest. What theory should be selected? If AS claims to apply theories of the middle range, there should be criteria specifying which MRT is to be selected if several theories exist.

Problem 2: are theories of the middle range better confirmed than rational choice or DBO theory? According to Merton, middle-range theories are ‘better grounded’ than ‘com-plete sociological systems today’ (Merton, 1957: 7). Is this really the case? Is each of the theories of crime better confirmed than DBO theory or RCT?

A first problem in answering these questions is to compare the degree of confirmation (or falsification) of theories. How does one determine whether a theory T1 is ‘better grounded’ than a theory T2? It goes without saying that this question is extremely diffi-cult to answer and has never been answered for any MRT in sociology.

But perhaps such comparisons are not necessary because MRTs are not falsified? Everybody knows that this is simply not true: there is no theory in the social sciences that is only confirmed.

Thus, the claim that MRTs are ‘better grounded’ than general theories is difficult to justify. Furthermore, there is no detailed analysis in AS (and in sociology in general) that compares the degree of confirmation of general theories and MRTs. Advocates of AS have not developed measures for comparing the degree of confirmation of theories, and

Opp 349

they have not provided detailed analyses about the confirmation of RCT and MRTs. The conclusion thus is that at present it is not possible to provide evidence that MRTs are ‘better grounded’ than RCT.

Problem 3: middle-range theories do not always allow mechanism-based explanations. Theo-ries of the middle range are often macro theories. This holds, for example, for anomie theory, Durkheim’s hypotheses about suicide and for theories of revolutions. There is no clear micro–macro modeling, and no causal processes are specified. Thus, if one pro-poses to focus on middle-range theories, one should specify the kinds of MRTs that fit into the program of AS. Sometimes MRTs are micro theories, and no processes are speci-fied. Examples are some theories of protest behavior. Thus, at least a subset of MRTs is not suitable for AS. It would be of interest to see a list of MRTs that advocates of AS accept as the theoretical foundation of their approach.

Problem 4: the missing explanatory value of middle-range theories. The explananda of many MRTs are relatively unspecific. Anomie theory, for example, explains crime. It is not possible to explain, e.g. under what conditions murders, burglaries or thefts occur. The explanatory value is thus relatively low. Another example are theories of revolution that do not explain the various processes that lead to specific kinds of revolution. Thus, many MRTs have a low explanatory power. It seems highly questionable to use these theories as a theoretical foundation of AS or of any other theoretical paradigm.

Problem 5: the implicit general background theories of middle-range theories. Merton’s ano-mie theory claims that the existence of legitimate structural opportunities for realizing cultural goals leads to a low crime rate. This is a macro proposition. Merton implicitly applies theoretical hypotheses about individual behavior. For example, in commenting on cultural goals he notes that these are ‘purposes and interests, held out as legitimate objectives for all or for diversely located members of the society’ (1957: 132). It is fur-ther obvious that the structural opportunities to realize the goals are opportunities for individual actors. If the legitimate opportunities are blocked, deviant behavior (or other reactions; see Merton’s modes of adaptation) occur. Apparently, choosing illegitimate means if legitimate ones are blocked is, from the point of view of individuals, their best option. This is a rudimentary version of RCT. But it is never applied systematically by Merton and other advocates of anomie theory.

In status inconsistency theory it is assumed ‘that a person whose status is poorly crys-tallized occupies an ambiguous position in society – a position in which he is likely to be subjected to numerous unpleasant experiences in the normal course of social interaction’ (Lenski, 1956: 458). Thus, the assumption is that poor status crystallization is costly. The implicit theory is that costs are a determinant of behavior. Why is this theory not applied more systematically in order to derive hypotheses about the effects of status inconsist-ency, as has been done by Homans and Malewski (see above)?

A detailed analysis of theories of protest and social movements has shown that the leading authors of all the theoretical approaches implicitly apply a version of RCT (Opp, 2009). If RCT had been applied explicitly, the derivation of the specific theories could have been examined.

350 Social Science Information 52(3)

In general, MRTs are based on general theories about individual behavior, but these theories are not explicitly and systematically formulated and applied. It is not clear what the arguments for this practice are. In any event, the use of implicit background theories is an argument for not focusing mainly on MRTs.

Problem 6: an ‘economic’ argument – why should we have a special theory for each class of social phenomena? Focusing on MRTs means that we need to apply an MRT for each phenomenon to be explained. We need a theory of suicide, a theory of murder, a theory of divorce, a theory of family conflict, etc. For many of these explananda, there are sev-eral theories. Wouldn’t it be more economical to apply a general theory for all these phenomena?

Problem 7: are middle-range theories an intermediary step toward a general theory? Analyti-cal sociologists could argue that the focus on MRTs is important because this paves the way for the development of sound general theories. This would be in line with Merton’s speculation that the development of MRTs is an intermediary step to a general theory. General theory will be ‘effectively built through work on special theories’. Trying to construct a general theory immediately without a detour through MRTs does not seem useful. As Merton puts it, ‘it will remain a largely unfulfilled plan if one seeks to build it [general theory] directly at this time’ (1957: 9; see also Merton, 1967: 45–48). At present (i.e. in 1957), the necessary ‘preparatory work has not yet been done’ (Merton, 1957: 6). This idea is also held in AS (Manzo, 2010: 139).

If Merton is right, one might expect that existing general theories like the theory of cognitive dissonance or learning theory were somehow derived (or generated) from lower-level theories. There is no evidence that this procedure has been applied.

Furthermore, Merton does not tell us how to proceed from existing MRTs to more general theories. Is this a process of inductive inference? If so, what would be the logical rules for such an inference? Or is the idea that, if there are enough middle-range theories, there will be a Newton or Einstein in the social sciences who gets the ingenious intuition for a general theory?

The number of middle-range theories that have accumulated over the last five or six decades is tremendous. How many MRTs do we need before a general theory emerges? Couldn’t one suspect that the strategy to accumulate MRTs is a failure if so many MRTs exist and still no perfect general theory exists? How long do we have to wait?

All these are open questions, and it does not seem wise to focus on MRTs with an uncertain prospect of arriving at a general theory (for a discussion see also Opp, 1970).

Problem 8: many MRTs are not clearly formulated and are thus difficult to apply (or cannot be applied at all) to explain social phenomena. They thus lack precision compared to RCT and DBO theory. Examples are the existing theories of protest and social movements such as the perspectives of resource mobilization and political opportunity structures. It is difficult to determine what exactly the dependent and independent variables are. Another example is role set theory (see Merton, 1967): this is more a set of questions than a set of propositions. It is thus difficult to apply many MRTs for explaining social phenomena.

Opp 351

Five strengths of theories of the middle range

It was argued before that general theories often correct MRTs. But this should not lead to discarding MRTs. Malewski argued that an ‘approximate knowledge is not useless. On the contrary: theoretical propositions of low generality ... are extremely valuable for a prediction of social changes’ (1967: 31; translated from German by this author). This is the argument that was also invoked when we discussed the falsity of RCT. Malewski’s recommendation makes sense because MRTs not only face problems, their application has several advantages, as discussed here.

Strength 1: the integration of empirical findings. Merton emphasized time and again the capacity of MRTs to ‘consolidate otherwise segregated hypotheses and empirical unifor-mities’ (1957: 280; see also 10, 328; and the summary in Boudon, 1991). This means that many hypotheses that are so far unconnected to a given MRT can be shown to be special cases of the theory. For example, reference-group theory can explain various empirical findings (Merton, 1957; see also the summary in Boudon, 1991). To illustrate, the idea of relative deprivation can be subsumed under reference-group theory: ‘relative’ depriva-tion means, among other things, that one compares his or her situation with that of a certain (reference) group. Merton analyzes in detail the findings of Samuel Stouffer’s The American Soldier. This analysis entails the intensive re-examination of research reported in these volumes, with an eye to subsuming the findings under higher-level abstractions or generalizations (Merton, 1957: 226). In more formal terms this means that many special propositions can be derived from reference-group theory. This holds for MRTs in general: they have an integrating function.

Strength 2: the modification of other theories. Anomie theory and other sociological theo-ries held that social structures were major determinants of crime. This was inconsistent with previous biological theories of crime. Emile Durkheim’s theory of suicide also implied that extra-social factors could not explain the different suicide rates across coun-tries or denominations. Thus, MRTs often modify existing MRTs. This is the same merit that general theories have for MRTs (see above).

Strength 3: the possibility to discover weaknesses of general theories. It can happen that a well-confirmed MRT falsifies a general theory, i.e. cannot be derived from RCT. For example, RCT would predict that the effects of status inconsistency on behavior depend on the costs of having inconsistent statuses. If empirical research shows that the costs of having inconsistent statuses are irrelevant, this would be a falsification of RCT. With regard to the program of theory comparison to be discussed later, this strength is perhaps the most important one.

Strength 4: middle-range theories point to initial conditions of RCT. Sometimes variables of rational choice explanations are not new: they were standard variables in sociology or political science long before they were included in rational choice explanations. For example, political efficacy is a standard variable in political science for explaining politi-cal participation (see e.g. already Verba & Nie, 1972: 19ff.). In explaining collective

352 Social Science Information 52(3)

action, the individual influence on the provision of a public good is a central variable for participating in collective action. This variable actually refers to efficacy. MRTs thus may suggest possible incentives that can be included in rational choice explanations.

Strength 5: middle-range theories may be a starting-point for mechanism-based explanations. As was noted before, theories of the middle range are often macro propositions. In this case, they could be the starting-point for answering why-questions, i.e. for attempting to explain them. To illustrate: after a change of political opportunities it is often observed that political protest increases. An interesting question is under what conditions this hap-pens, i.e. to provide a mechanism explanation.

Conclusion III

MRTs have various weaknesses, in particular with regard to validity and explanatory power. However, they have some strengths as well. The exclusive focus on MRTs thus seems not to be justified. As Merton already held, it seems preferable to invest resources in developing both, MRTs and general theories.

IV. How can the strengths of RCT/DBO theory and MRTs be utilized? The program of empirical theory comparison

The most important conclusions to be drawn from the previous discussion are the follow-ing. First of all, it is highly problematic to renounce the application of RCT unless a better theory is available. This is not in sight. Dispensing with RCT would mean giving up a possibility for enhancing our knowledge. Second, although MRTs are problematic as well, their positive features mentioned above suggest that it would be unwise to neglect them and to concentrate instead on general behavioral theories. Third, RCT is capable of modi-fying MRTs, and the latter may provide falsifications of RCT. Fourth, it is difficult to assess each of the theories in isolation. For example, is RCT better than anomie theory?

In order to improve the state of our theoretical knowledge, one should take advantage of the merits of MRTs and RCT. This can be done through a research program focusing on empirical theory comparison. This program can be outlined as follows.

One line of research would be to derive implications from RCT for given explananda and compare these propositions with those of existing MRTs. These implications, which might differ, should then be tested empirically. For example, in the field of deviant behavior, propositions from RCT can be compared with propositions of theories of crime like differential associations or routine activity theory.

A second strategy could be to start with a given MRT and examine whether it can be integrated into RCT. Perhaps a theoretical analysis shows that it is inconsistent with RCT. The next step is again to test the hypotheses.

A third strategy could be to compare MRTs in order to find out which one is best. The best one could then be compared with implications of RCT.

The first step in empirical theory comparison is always a theoretical analysis. This means, among other things, examining the meanings of the terms of the theories to be

Opp 353

compared. Perhaps such an analysis indicates that the terms are different but that they refer to the same phenomena. The other possibility is that the terms are identical but that their meanings differ. Thus, a detailed meaning analysis of the terms of the theories to be compared is necessary. Another component of the theoretical analysis is to derive hypoth-eses about a specific field.

Empirical theory comparison implies that the theories that clearly prove inferior are to be eliminated. The danger is eliminating a theory that is actually better than the others. This is similar to a type I or type II error in statistical significance tests: empirical tests may not be conclusive enough to eliminate a theory. Thus, only if the tests are rigorous and the results clear should a theory be eliminated.

This program is consistent with Merton’s research program. He wrote that there should be ‘an enduring and pervasive concern with consolidating the special theories into a more general set of concepts and mutually consistent propositions’ (1957: 10). This means that we should look at the logical implications of the various theories for each other.

The program of empirical theory comparison is also consistent with a major methodo-logical postulate in the philosophy of science. Authors like Imre Lakatos emphasized the importance of comparative theory testing. Lakatos (1970: 119) wrote: ‘... no experiment, experimental report, observation statement or well-corroborated low-level falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to falsification. There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory.’ This implies that comparative tests of theories like MRTs and RCT would be superior to isolated tests, which is common practice in the social sciences. This argument points to a major advantage of comparative theory testing: it is the only way to learn about the relative standing of theories in regard to their truth. Even if we find that a theory is well confirmed, an alternative theory may still be better. But this can only be discovered if the theories are tested simultaneously.

Is empirical theory comparison inconsistent with AS? Not at all. ‘Theoretical plural-ism may be a valuable property of a discipline since it is likely to entail competition between different approaches, and this competition may stimulate further theoretical development’ (Hedström, 2005: 37).

Empirical theory comparison is a conservative strategy in the sense that the focus is on looking at given theories. These are the starting-point. Already at this point researchers will think about modifying the theories that are to be tested. Thus, already at the initial steps of theory comparison this methodology has some heuristic value.

Assume that RCT or an MRT are falsified. In a next step a researcher will try to modify the theories. In the process of dealing with the consequences of falsification, one option is to invent a completely new theory. But as a first step it is useful to compare given theories. However, it is important to note that the program of theory comparison is open to new theoretical developments.

V. What we can learn and what we cannot learn from Analytical Sociology

Although the research program of AS has various weaknesses, there are several points worth including in a research program for sociology or for the social sciences in general. Let us first summarize the flaws of AS:

354 Social Science Information 52(3)

1 The exclusive or primary focus on theories of the middle range is mistaken. As has been shown, they are not less problematic than RCT or DBO theory.

2 Rejection of the HO-scheme, i.e. of deductive nomological explanation, is not tenable. The major argument for applying the covering-law model is that propo-nents of AS actually proceed in this way without being aware of it. Every scien-tist who applies theories to explain empirical phenomena actually uses a deductive procedure, and theories are actually applied in AS.

3 One important point has not been addressed so far in this article: AS has not solved all the problems that critics of RCT mention time and again: explaining preferences and beliefs. As Edling and Rydgren, two advocates of AS, note: ‘We must learn more about how beliefs and desires originate’ (2010: 118; translation by this author).

4 There are other problems with AS that cannot be discussed for reasons of space (see the critical literature mentioned above). The problems discussed in this arti-cle are in our opinion the most important ones.

The research program of AS has several merits, which are parts of the rational choice approach as well.

1 One important strength is the focus of AS on rigor. Mechanism-based explana-tions are thus not ‘storytelling’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 53), ‘concern for conceptual precision is at the heart of contemporary AS’ (Manzo, 2010: 138).

2 The focus on causal processes will probably be accepted by every social scientist.

3 The focus on methodological individualism, i.e. bottom-up explanations, will be accepted by many social scientists as well. This includes agent-based modeling as a strategy for looking at implications of theoretical and empirical assumptions. It seems that many macro sociologists meanwhile accept that macro phenomena or relationships at the macro level should be explained by processes on the micro level.

4 A theoretical-empirical sociology is not an issue for a growing group of sociolo-gists and social scientists. However, it runs counter to ‘grand theory’, ‘postmod-ern’ approaches or social systems theory (Luhmann), which focus more on discourse than on explanation in the strict sense (see also Barbera, 2006: 37–38).

5 What should be added to the AS research program (and thus to a rational choice approach) and what seems an almost compelling consequence of the claim to bring MRTs back in is the research program of empirical theory comparisons, as has been argued before.

6 AS has stimulated theoretical and empirical research on many specific social phenomena. The substantive theoretical ideas in Hedström’s book (2005), the contributions in the Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology (Hedström & Bearman, 2009a) and those in Demeulenaere’s edited book (Demeulenaere, 2011a, Part III) testify to this. Reading this substantive work, one wonders what the differences are from a wide rational choice approach. Actually, all these posi-tive features of AS fit very well into such an approach and will be supported by its advocates.20

Opp 355

Is AS a new approach? Its single claims have been pursued and advocated by many sociologists in the past, from quite different schools of thought, including rational choice scholars. What is new is the explicit integration ‘of these elements under a unitary meta-theoretical framework’ (Manzo, 2011a; similarly Manzo, 2010: 131).

The major focus of this article has been the problematic claims of AS. This may con-vey the impression that this author completely rejects AS. I would like to emphasize again what I said at the beginning: this impression is wrong. Dropping the problematic claims, this author regards the program of AS as a very welcome movement that is on the right track to promote an explanatory sociology in the strict sense.

Notes

1. We use some acronyms in this paper and hope that this does not impair readability: in addition to AS (Analytical Sociology) we employ RCT (rational choice theory), MRTs (middle-range theories) and HO-scheme (Hempel–Oppenheim scheme).

2. For a historical account of mechanism explanations, see Manzo (2010: 132–139). Manzo also discusses the origins of AS. We explain the meaning of this concept in AS shortly.

3. There seem to be different meanings (see Demeulenaere, 2011b: 1–3; Manzo, 2010: 136–139). 4. Sometimes the expression used is ‘causal’ or ‘social’ mechanism. For reasons of brevity we

speak simply of ‘mechanisms’. 5. See also Hedström’s discussion (2005: 15–20). For a critique of this discussion see Diekmann

(2010) and Opp (2005, 2007). Other authors argue that mechanism and deductive nomologi-cal explanations are compatible without showing this in detail (see e.g. Bunge, 1997: 441–442; Demeulenaere, 2011c; Sawyer, 2011). Elster’s position (e.g. 2007: Ch. 2) is not clear: on the one hand, he states that ‘the credibility of an explanation increases with the extent to which general laws are spelled out in terms of a causal chain’ (Elster, 2007: 34); on the other hand, he argues that mechanism explanation and deductive nomological explanations are inconsistent.

6. A contradiction to this statement can be found in Hedström’s book (2005: 30): ‘a mecha-nism-based explanation ... can be characterized as a theoretical deductive argument’. See also Manzo (2010: 142), who argues that the ‘objection does not concern the deductive character of nomological explanation’. Here we simply note the contradiction and discuss only the critique of the HO-scheme referring to the deductive explanation that is clearly stated in the quotation above. For a discussion of mechanism explanations and the HO-scheme see also Opp (2005, 2007).

7. For a summary of the counterfactual definition of causality, see Menzies (2008). For the social sciences, see Fearon (1991), Morgan & Winship (2007), Winship & Morgan (1999). See also the discussion by Gangl (2010) and the anthology of important contributions in Collins et al. (2004; chapter 1 gives a good overview of the discussion).

8. This claim is also discussed in Manzo (2010: 143), Hedström & Swedberg (1998a: 8), Opp (2005: 174–177). In a similar vein, Bunge (1997) mentions various deductive explanations which are not ‘very illuminating’, and distinguishes them from more ‘illuminating’ mecha-nism explanations. But he does not discuss whether the latter do need laws and, thus, the HO-scheme.

9. For a brief sketch of his basic ideas, see Woodward (2003: 9–12; see also Woodward, 2000). For a brief summary of Woodward’s concept of invariance, see Glymour (2004: 786, as well as the critique 789–790; see further Woodward, 2003: 239–314).

10. This is illustrated by a recent article from Ylikoski (2011), which is of interest here because he seems to be the philosophical expert on AS. The new approach suggested by him is the

356 Social Science Information 52(3)

‘contrastive counterfactual account of explanation’: one should construct the explanandum ‘contrastively’, i.e. one should not only answer the question ‘why f’ but ‘why f rather than c’ (2011: 163). This may be useful advice, but it is not spelled out in detail how a simple refor-mulation of the explanandum can help to solve the causality question: how do we get from the reformulation of the explananda to their causes? Ylikoski suggests a mixture of the inter-ventionist and counterfactual approaches. Furthermore, he suggests applying ‘the notion of understanding’ (2011: 107), although he discusses its problems (2011: 156–158). This recent article thus indicates that a solution of the causality problem by proponents of AS is missing.

11. Hedström’s evaluation of RCT has changed radically. In an earlier article (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996: 127–128) we can read: ‘Rational choice theory provides an action theory that is useful in many branches of sociology and, perhaps even more importantly, rational choice theory represents a type of theorizing that deserves to be emulated more widely in sociology. This type of theorizing is analytical; it is founded upon the principle of methodological indi-vidualism; and it seeks to provide causal cum intentional explanations of observed phenom-ena.’ But perhaps there are good reasons for such a turn? As we see below, the answer is ‘no’.

12. For a characterization and a detailed discussion of the wide and the narrow versions, see Opp (1999). The wide version is applied, for example, by Boudon (e.g. 1996), Esser (e.g. 1999), Simon (e.g. 1983) and many others. Assuming that DBO and RCT are equivalent, as is argued below, Peter Hedström and associates are to be counted as advocates of the wide version as well. In behavioral economics, a wide version is increasingly applied: according to results of the ultimatum and dictator games, altruism and (fairness) norms are included in the theory (see authors like E Fehr and S Gächter), which are components of a wide version of RCT, as can be seen below.

13. Incidentally, Manzo’s defense of DBO theory against the charges of Gross (2009) is also a defense of the wide version of RCT. The extensions of DBO theory discussed by Manzo are also fruitful extensions of the wide version of RCT. But so far these extensions are still more orienting statements than testable and informative theoretical propositions.

14. Malewski, a Polish sociologist, was born in 1929 and committed suicide in 1963. His major book of 1967 has never been translated into English (the title translates as ‘Behavior and Interaction: The theory of behavior and the problem of integration of the social sciences’).

15. This point was made by Clemens Kroneberg during a presentation of a former version of this article at the University of Mannheim.

16. This concept of explanatory power is based on Popper (1959: 112–135), who speaks of ‘empirical content’ referring to the degree of falsifiability (e.g. 1959: 113). Applied to the present context, this means that a theory that explains a broad range of specific phenom-ena (such as kinds of crime) has a higher empirical content than a theory that explains only whether some of the phenomena (some kinds of crime) are to be expected.

17. There is a long discussion about the ‘realism’ of assumptions in economic models. See already Friedman (1953) and in particular Nagel (1963). It is striking that this controversy is not addressed by proponents of AS.

18. It should be noted that, at the time when Merton’s book was published, in 1957, the prevail-ing ‘theory’ was Talcott Parsons’ functionalism, which consisted of a conceptual system and ‘general orientations’ and not of clear and informative explanatory hypotheses (see Merton, 1957: 9). This is clearly seen by Merton. What he had in mind when he wrote about ‘theory’ are nonetheless general ‘statements of relationships between specified variables’ (1957: 9). This is the concept of law (or, equivalently, theory) as it is used in this article. Sociological rational choice theory as we know it today did not yet exist in 1957.

19. A second criterion could be a reference to specific types of situations: status inconsistency theory provides hypotheses about the effects of status inconsistency. Frustration-aggression

Opp 357

theory focuses on situations in which a person is frustrated. Since RCT does not refer to specific types of situations, it is more general, and the situation-specific theories could be called MRTs. A third possible criterion is the logical derivability of a theory: a theory T2 may be called an MRT if it can be logically derived from a more general theory T1. This criterion is impractical because one must always carry out an analysis of the logical relation-ships between theories before it can be decided whether a theory is an MRT. Thus, there is no clear definition of what a ‘theory of the middle range’ is. In this article we use the inclusion-definition because it captures what Merton and others seem to be referring to most of the time.

20. Hedström & Bearman’s (2009b: 22) assertion that AS is no variant of the rational choice approach is thus problematic if the questionable claims of proponents of AS are dropped.

References

Axelrod R (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, NY: Basic Books.Barbera F (2006) A star is born? The authors, principles and objectives of analytical sociology.

Papers: Revista de Sociologia 80: 31–50.Benoit-Smullyan E (1944) Status, status types, and status interrelations. American Sociological

Review 9(2): 151–161.Bohman J (1992) The limits of rational choice explanation. In: Coleman JS, Fararo TJ (eds)

Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and critique. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 207–228.Boudon R (1991) What middle-range theories are. Contemporary Sociology 20(4): 519–522.Boudon R (1996) The ‘cognitivist model’: A generalized ‘rational-choice-model’. Rationality &

Society 8(2): 123–150.Bunge M (1997) Mechanisms and explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27(4): 410–465.Collins JD, Hall EJ, Paul LA (eds) (2004) Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.Demeulenaere P (ed.) (2011a) Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Demeulenaere P (2011b) Causal regularities, action and explanation. In: Demeulenaere P (ed.)

Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173–200.Demeulenaere P (2011c) Introduction. In: Demeulenaere P (ed.) Analytical Sociology and Social

Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–32.Diekmann A (2010) Analytische Soziologie und Rational Choice. In: Kron T, Grund T (eds) Die

Analytische Soziologie in der Diskussion. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 193–206.

Edling C, Rydgren J (2010) Auf der Suche nach Identität: Analytische Soziologie und die Makro-Mikro-Verbindung. In: Kron T, Grund T (eds) Die Analytische Soziologie in der Diskussion. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 115–132.

Ekström M (1992) Causal explanation of social action: The contribution of Max Weber and of critical realism to a generative view of causal explanation in social science. Acta Sociologica 35(2): 107–122.

Elster J (2007) Explaining Social Behavior: More nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Esser H (1999) Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen, Band 1: Situationslogik und Handeln. Frankfurt-a-M: Campus.

Fearon JD (1991) Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics 43(2): 169–195.

Friedman M (1953) The methodology of positive economics. In: Friedman M (ed.) Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 3–43.

358 Social Science Information 52(3)

Gangl M (2010) Causal inference in sociological research. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 21–47.Glymour C (2004) Critical notice. James Woodward: Making Things Happen – a theory of causal

explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55(4): 779–790.Gross N (2009) A pragmatist theory of social mechanisms. American Sociological Review 74(3):

358–379.Hanzel I (1999) The Concept of Scientific Law in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology.

Dordrecht: Kluwer.Harré R (1984[1972]) The Philosophies of Science: An introductory survey. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.Hedström P (2005) Dissecting the Social: On the principles of analytical sociology. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Hedström P, Bearman P (eds) (2009a) The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Hedström P, Bearman P (2009b) What is analytical sociology all about? An introductory essay. In:

Hedström P, Bearman P (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–24.

Hedström P, Swedberg R (1996) Rational choice, empirical research, and the sociological tradi-tion. European Sociological Review 12(2): 127–146.

Hedström P, Swedberg R (eds) (1998a) Social Mechanisms: An analytical approach to social theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hedström P, Swedberg R (1998b) Social mechanisms: An introductory essay. In: Hedström P, Swedberg R (eds) Social Mechanisms. An analytical approach to social theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–31.

Hedström P, Udéhn L (2009) Analytical sociology and theories of the middle range. In Hedström P, Bearman P (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 25–47.

Hedström P, Ylikoski P (2010) Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 49–67.

Hempel CG (1942) The function of general laws in history. The Journal of Philosophy 39(2): 35–48.Hempel CG (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of

Science. New York, NY/London: Free Press.Hempel CG (1966) The Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Hempel CG, Oppenheim P (1948) Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy of Science 15(2):

135–175.Homans GC (1974) Social Behavior: Its elementary forms. New York, NY: Harcourt.Kitcher P, Salmon WC (eds) (1989) Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis, MN: University of

Minnesota Press. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. XIII)Kron T, Grund T (eds) (2010) Die Analytische Soziologie in der Diskussion. Wiesbaden: VS

Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.Lakatos I (1970) Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In: Lakatos

I, Musgrave A (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science (London 1965), vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 191–196.

Lenski GE (1954) Status crystallization: A non-vertical dimension of social status. American Sociological Review 19(4): 405–413.

Lenski GE (1956) Social participation and status crystallization. American Sociological Review 21(4): 458–464.

Mahoney J (2001) Beyond correlational analysis: Recent innovations in theory and method. Sociological Forum 16(3): 575–593.

Malewski A (1967) Verhalten und Interaktion: Die Theorie des Verhaltens und das Problem der sozialwissenschaftlichen Integration. Tübingen: Mohr.

Opp 359

Manzo G (2010) Analytical sociology and its critics. European Journal of Sociology 51(1): 129–170.

Manzo G (2011a) The whole is greater than the sum of its parts: Some remarks on The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. European Sociological Review 27(6): 829–835.

Manzo G (2011b) Relative deprivation in silico: Agent-based models and causality in analytical sociology. In: Demeulenaere P (ed.) Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 266–308.

Menzies P (2008) Counterfactual theories of causation. In: Zalta EN (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter). Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/.

Merton RK (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. (2nd edn)Merton RK (1967) On sociological theories of the middle range. In: Merton RK (ed.) On

Theoretical Sociology. New York, NY: Free Press, 39–72.Morgan SL, Winship C (2007) Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and principles for

social resarch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Nagel E (1963) Assumptions in economic theory. The American Economic Review 53(32): 211–219.

(Papers and Proceedings of the seventy-fifth annual meeting of the American Economic Association)

Opp K-D (1970) Theories of the middle range as a strategy for the construction of a general socio-logical theory: A critique of a sociological dogma. Quality and Quantity 4(2): 243–253.

Opp K-D (1999) Contending conceptions of the theory of rational action. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(2): 171–202.

Opp K-D (2005) Explanations by mechanisms in the social sciences: Problems, advantages and alternatives. Mind & Society 4(2): 163–178.

Opp K-D (2007) Review essay of Peter Heström’s book Dissecting the Social. European Sociological Review 23(1): 115–122.

Opp K-D (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A multidisciplinary intro-duction, critique and synthesis. London/New York, NY: Routledge.

Ostrom E (2007) Institutional rational choice: An assessment of the institutional analysis and development framework. In: Sabatier PA (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process. Cambridge, MA: Westview, 21–64.

Popper KR (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York, NY: Basic Books.Salmon WC (1971) Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh, PA: University

of Pittsburgh Press.Salmon WC (1989) Four decades of scientific explanation. In: Kitcher P, Salmon W (eds) Scientific

Explanation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 3–219. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. XIII)

Sawyer K (2011) Conversation as mechanism: Emergence in creative groups. In: Demeulenaere P (ed.) Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 78–95.

Schurz G (ed.) (1988) Erklären und Verstehen in der Wissenschaft. Munich: Oldenbourg.Simon HA (1983) Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Swartz N (2009) Laws of nature. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: http://www.

iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/ (accessed July 2011).Verba S, Nie NH (1972) Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality. New

York, NY: Harper & Row.White HC (1970) Chains of Opportunity: System models of mobility in organizations. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.Wimmer A, Feinstein Y (2010) The rise of the nation-state across the world, 1816 to 2001.

American Sociological Review 75(5): 764–790.

360 Social Science Information 52(3)

Winship C, Morgan SL (1999) The estimation of causal effects from observational data. Annual Review of Sociology 25: 659–706.

Woodward J (2000) Explanation and invariance in the special sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51(1): 197–254.

Woodward J (2003) Making Things Happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ylikoski P (2011) Social mechanisms and explanatory relevance. In: Demeulenaere P (ed.) Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 154–171.

Ylikoski P, Kuorikoski J (2010) Dissecting explanatory power. Philosophical Studies 148(2): 201–219.

Author biography

Karl-Dieter Opp is Professor Emeritus at the University of Leipzig (Department of Sociology, Germany) and Affiliate Professor at the University of Washington (Department of Sociology, Seattle). His areas of interest include collective action, political participation and protest, rational choice theory, philosophy of the social sciences, and social norms and institutions. He is the author of The Rationality of Political Protest (1989) and co-author of The Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution (1995). He edited (with Michael Hechter) Social Norms (2001). His most recent English-language book is Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique and synthesis (2009).