| 4 9 9

Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, Vol. 40, Number 4, pps. 499–531. ISSN 1939-1811, elec-tronic ISSN 1939-182X. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the Univer-sity of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo. asp. DOI: 10.1525/hsns.2010.40.4.499.

LI NO CAM PR U BÍ!

One Grain, One Nation: Rice Genetics and the Corporate State in Early Francoist Spain (1939–1952)

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to show the links between rice genetics and the corporatist political economy of early Francoism. After investigating the transition from prewar rice pro-ducers’ associations to a new federation embedded in a vertical union, I identify three main novelties of the new organization: its national scope, its need to address lack of supply rather than overproduction, and its hierarchical functioning. I then focus on the one state-owned agricultural station devoted to rice research, showing how its agri-cultural scientists shaped, and relied on, the state-controlled unions, both for produc-ing and distributing new varieties of rice and for controlling the seeds farmers used. Finally, I explore how this relationship made it possible for the scientists to test, mul-tiply, and distribute throughout the Spanish landscape the seeds they produced at the laboratory, thus putting hierarchical unity and autarky to work and demonstrating the role of scientists as active agents of state formation and landscape transformation within a corporatist political economy.

KEY WOR DS: early Francoism, corporatism, hybrid rice, genealogical selection, Estación Arroc-era de Sueca

Rice production in Spain during the early years of Francoism (!"#"–!"$%) o&ers an illuminating example of the links between agricultural research and state corporatism. Brie'y, agricultural experts who were engaged in rice breeding

*University of California, Los Angeles, (%($ Bunche Hall, Box "$!)*#, Los Angeles, CA "++"$-!)*#; linocamprubi@ucla.edu.

,e following abbreviations are used: AGA, Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares, Spain (within the archive, (!!) refers to the Ministry of Agriculture section, followed by sub-catalogues, !.!, !.%, etc., followed by box numbers); BOE, Boletín O!cial del Estado; CSIC, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientí-cas; EAS, Estación Arrocera de Sueca; FIEAE, Fed-eración de Industriales Elaboradores de Arroz Española; FSAAE, Federación Sindical de Agricul-tores Arroceros de España; GM, Gaceta de Madrid; INIA, Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agronómicas; JHB, Journal of the History of Biology.

HSNS4004_04.indd 499 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 0 0 | C A M P R U B Í

placed themselves at the center of a vertically integrated system that attempted to unify state politics, capital, labor, and scienti-c research. ,e scienti-c lab-oratory was able thereby to shape the system from within and to capitalize on it to obtain new laboratory products (seeds) and spread them throughout the Spanish landscape. ,e organization of rice production and distribution after the end of the Spanish Civil War (!"#(–!"#") went hand in hand with new techniques of rice hybridization and selection.1

,e -rst section of this paper explores how, right after the war, the mandatory unionization of rice producers fostered the vertical reorganization of the sector. By investigating the transformation of rice unions under the new regime, I describe the corporate state at work. ,e second and third sections are devoted to the Rice Station of Sueca (Estación Arrocera de Sueca, EAS), the main sci-enti-c institution in Spain for research on rice. Stressing the intermingling of research and administration, I look at the activities of the Station, the profes-sional careers of some of its members, and the changing character of the meth-ods they followed for hybridization and selection, both before and after the advent of the new regime. ,e fourth section argues that these methods co-evolved with the new structure of the vertical unions and bene-ted from the resources it provided, setting the EAS researchers markedly apart from private breeders, not only in terms of their -elds for multiplication and tools for in'u-encing farmers’ choices of seeds but also in their economic, political, and agri-cultural behavior. ,e head of the EAS proudly stated that, by !"$%, thanks to science and political organization, his team could obtain the entire national crop from a single hybrid grain in just -ve years. His laboratory thus sat at the center of autarky in rice. His main goal, however, was not so much to carry out his boast (although one single variety produced at the EAS came to represent *$ percent of the total production) as to demonstrate the remarkable capacity that geneticists had established within the autarkic state. ,is new role became a key component of the National Vertical Union of Cereals. In short, agriculture scientists were active agents within the corporatist political economy, promoting their plans for the nation and for rice improvement at the same time.2

!. ,e situation changed after !"$% with the state’s relative liberalization of this economic sector and its abandonment of the politics of agricultural autarky in relation to European markets; Fernando Guirao, “Spain and the Green Pool: Challenge and Response, !"$+ to !"$$,” in "e Green Pool and the Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy, ed. Richard T. Gri.ths and Brian Girvin (Bloomsbury: Lothian Press, !""$), !/"–%+(.

%. ,is article is part of a larger research project in which I follow laboratory products, includ-ing seeds, out of the laboratory to assess the signi-cance of scienti-c and technical research in

HSNS4004_04.indd 500 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 0 1

,e questions posed here for the case of rice production do not revolve around those of failure or success so commonly found in the historiography on early Francoism.3 I aim to show the speci-c nature of the relationship be-tween genetic science and state institutions inside the vertical organization of the early Francoist political economy.4 At certain points, however, I will note the tangible e&ects of this new constellation, including the importance of re-search on genetics for agriculture in Spain from the !"#+s to the !"$+s.5 Again, I am interested in how agricultural scientists participated in the regime rather than in how they came to work “under” it or “despite” its o.cial policies and rhetoric.6 Political economy not only imposes constraints upon science, but also presents motivations and resources for scientists and their research.7 ,e authoritarian and hierarchical nature of Francoism made room for various

shaping the landscape and political economy of early Francoism; Lino Camprubi, “Los estándares como instrumentos politicos: ciencia y Estado franquista a -nales de los años cincuenta,” Empiria !/ (%++"): /$–!!).

#. For instance, see two con'icting views: Carlos Barciela, ed., Autarquía y mercado negro: el fracaso económico del primer franquismo, #$%$–#$&$ (Barcelona: Crítica, %++#); José M. Sumpsi Viñas, “La modernización de la agricultura y el desarrollo económico,” in Tribuna joven: los nuevos historiadores ante el desarrollo contemporáneo de España, ed. Papeles de Economía Española (Ma-drid: Fundación de Cajas de Ahorros Confederadas, !""*), !)"–$". For a structural account of the relationship of agrarian capital accumulation and labor force transfer with Spain’s industrial-ization in the !")+s and !"$+s, see José Luis Leal, Joaquín Leguina, José Manuel Naredo, and Luis Tarrafeta, La agricultura en el desarrollo capitalista español, #$'(–#$)( (Madrid: Siglo XXI & Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, !"/().

). In Franco’s regime there were no serious eugenic programs, racial or otherwise, but there were other types of connections of genetics to the state; see Raquel Álvarez, “Eugenesia, ideología y discurso de poder en España,” in Eugenesia y darwinismo social en el mundo latino, ed. Marisa Miranda and Gustavo Vallejo (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI de Argentina Editores, %++$).

$. Few historians of Spanish agriculture have investigated genetic research, although they have stressed the “chemical revolution” of fertilizers in the !"$+s, the “machinery revolution” in the !"(+s and, of course, the “green revolution” from then onwards; see Jaime Lamo de Espinosa, “La agricultura y la agronomía en los últimos !$+ años,” in #&( aniversario de la Escuela de Ingenie-ros Agrónomos, ed. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino (Madrid: Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino, %++/), )#–*/, esp. (*.

(. For this perspective, focused on the dictatorship as an obstacle for research, see Susana Pinar, “,e Emergence of Modern Genetics in Spain and the E&ects of the Spanish Civil War (!"#(–!"#") on Its Development,” JHB #$ (%++%): !!!–)/.

*. On this view as a methodology for the study of science and technology, see M. Norton Wise, “Work and Waste: Political Economy and Natural Philosophy in Nineteenth Century Britain, Parts I, II and III,” History of Science %* (!"/"): %(#–#+!, and #"!–))", and %/ (!""+): %%!–(!, respectively. For a discussion on the integration of contexts and resources into the struc-ture of a science, see Gustavo Bueno, Teoría del cierre categorical, vol. ! ($ vols., Oviedo: Pentalfa, !""!–!""#), #+!–!%.

HSNS4004_04.indd 501 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 0 2 | C A M P R U B Í

people to utilize their knowledge and skills to shape its organization and to foster their own plans.8 ,is is not to minimize the tragic e&ects of exile, repres-sion, and ideology on science under the new regime.9 It does take seriously, however, the emphasis the regime placed on “applied science,” which gives us an insight into the actual interconnectedness of research and the Francoist political economy.10 Many authors have shown how scienti-c institutions after World War II turned toward state-funded science, where the limits between applied and pure science became blurred.11 ,e agricultural scientists who ap-pear in this paper had strong university training and intellectual seriousness, but they also employed their knowledge in relation to the immediate needs of the state, plant breeders, and producers.12 Important to this story is their role as mid-level decision makers.13

/. On how the historiography on science within authoritarian regimes has moved away from the assumption that no true research is possible in those conditions, see Carola Sachse and Mark Walker, eds., Politics and Science in Wartime: Comparative International Perspectives on Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, %++$); for a similar revision applied to genetics, see Susanne Heim, “Research for Autarky: ,e Contribution of Scientists to Nazi Rule in Germany,” preprint, submitted %++!; http://xserve+%.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/kwg/publications.htm0Ergebnisse (last accessed !" Aug %+!+).

". Francisco Giral, La ciencia española en el exilio:*el exilio de los cientí!cos españoles (#$%$–#$+$) (Barcelona: Anthropos, !"")); and Luis E. Otero Carvajal, ed., La destrucción de la ciencia en España: depuración universitaria en el franquismo (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, %++().

!+. ,ere are, however, some excellent publications on technical research in Franco’s Spain, e.g, Antoni Roca i Rosell and José Manuel Sánchez Ron, Esteban Terradas (#++%–#$&(): ciencia y técnica en la España contemporánea (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial, !""+); Santiago López García, El saber tecnológico en la política industrial del primer franquismo (PhD dissertation, [Madrid] Universidad Complutense, !"")).

!!. For a review, see Dominique Pestre, “Science, Political Power and the State,” in Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Dominique Pestre (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, !""*), (!–*(.

!%. For the complex interplay between genetics and agricultural sciences in the -rst half of the twentieth century, see Diane B. Paul and Barbara A. Kimmelman, “Mendel in America: ,eory and Practice, !"++–!"!",” in "e American Development of Biology, ed. Ronald Raigner, Keith R. Benson, and Jane Maienschein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, !"//), %/!–#!+; Paolo Palla-dino, “Between Craft and Science: Plant Breeding, Mendelian Genetics, and British Universities, !"++–!"%+,” Technology and Culture #), no. % (!""#): #++–%#; Kathy J. Cooke, “From Science to Practice, or Practice to Science? Chickens and Eggs in Raymond Pearl’s Agricultural Breeding Re-search, !"+*–!"!(,” Isis //, no. ! (!""*): (%–/(; ,omas Wieland, “Scienti-c ,eory and Agricultural Practice: Plant Breeding in Germany from the Late !"th to the Early %+th Century,” JHB #" (%++(): #+"–)#; Christophe Bonneuil, “Mendelism, Plant Breeding and Experimental Cultures: Agriculture and the Development of Genetics in France,” JHB #" (%++(): %/!–#+/.

!#. For the importance of studying mid-level decision makers during the Francoist autarkic period, see Fernando Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, #$'& –&): Challenge

HSNS4004_04.indd 502 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 0 3

Finally, rather than drawing out the intense di&erences among the regime’s political families regarding the corporatist political economy, I focus here on where the laboratory stood in a system that de facto included both the chief of the state and minor landowners.14 ,e argument is akin to that of Tiago Saraiva (in this issue) for Italy and Portugal and can be regarded as an extension of it to the Spanish case. Saraiva argues that the Italian Battle for Wheat, whether a failure or a success, was “one of the -rst materializations of the fascist regime” and that geneticists played a very active role in it. ,e similarities and connec-tions between the two cases are not coincidental; they reveal the international dimensions of economic nationalism.15

TH E R ICE OF VICTORY

In the !")+s, shortly after the Civil War that made General Francisco Franco the Spanish chief of the state, new laws forced all Spanish rice producers to join their respective regional union, in turn a.liated to the National Vertical Union of Cereals.16 It was one of the -ve vertical unions (Sindicatos Verticales) that, unlike trade unions, hierarchically uni-ed the government with capital and labor, and thus were the backbone of the corporatist state.17 ,e goal was to re-organize existing unions (both of workers and owners) into a system of

and Response (New York: St Martin’s Press, !""/). For a similar argument about other authoritarian regimes, see Robert O. Paxton, "e Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, %++)).

!). Ismael Saz, España contra España: los nacionalismos franquistas (Madrid: Marcial Pons, %++#).

!$. Without denying historical speci-cities, investigating the connections that Spanish scien-tists had with those working in other countries help us to understand the period better. For in-stance, the Italian Novalli Novelli appears in both Saraiva’s and my papers; there was a Spanish “battle of wheat,” and in !")" the journal Genetica Iberica was founded; Pinar, “Emergence of Genetics” (ref. (), !#". For scienti-c relations with Germany during early Francoism see Albert Presas i Puig, “Technoscienti-c Synergies between Germany and Spain in the Twentieth Century: Continuity amid Radical Change,” Technology and Culture $! (%+!+): /+–"/.

!(. FSAAE, Colección Legislativa Arrocera referente a la Federación Sindical de Agricultores Arroceros de España y a sus sindicatos !liales (Valencia: Imprenta Hijo de F. Vives Mora, !")+). For the power struggle that led to the creation of the vertical unions, see Eduardo Sevilla Gúzman and Manuel González de Molina, “Política social agraria del primer franquismo,” in El primer franquismo: España durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ed. José Luis García Delgado and Manuel Tuñón de Lara (Madrid: Siglo XXI, !"/"), !#$–/*, esp. !$*–(+.

!*. For the origins of the Italian corporate state and its characteristics see Adrian Lyttelton, "e Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy #$#$–#$,$ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, !"//), #+/–#%.

HSNS4004_04.indd 503 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 0 4 | C A M P R U B Í

vertical unions, which would restructure the political economy of Franco’s Spain into a centralized hierarchy, making sure that every level of each branch of production was coordinated toward the national interest.18 ,e vertical organization of the unions was deemed best for achieving economic autarky in the country and a means of acquiring, and assuring, political independence in a time of economic scarcity after the Civil War and of political isolation after World War II.19 Although impossible to achieve fully in practice, autarky was a goal that informed economic policies in many areas, including scienti-c re-search, an aspect theorized in a series of conferences by physicist and Jesuit José Agustín Pérez del Pulgar (!/*$–!")+).20

,e aforementioned laws, establishing the mandatory unionization of pro-ducers and their inclusion into the corporatist system, a&ected the Spanish Trade Federation of Rice Planters (Federación Sindical de Agricultores Arroc-eros de España, FSAAE), which had been created in !"##, during the Second Republic, as an association of landowners (i.e., excluding peasants). ,e FSAAE leaders would welcome forced a.liation on Franco’s model, since one of their objectives from the beginnings of the Federation had been to acquire a national scope. In fact, the “Spanish” part of the FSAAE’s name was added right after the Civil War. Before that, its limited regional scope made it very di.cult to ful-ll its goal: to halt the falling price of rice, an e&ect of overcapacity, by im-posing protectionism and establishing minimum prices for the rice sold by its associates. ,is end, a typical demand of farmers’ associations all over Europe, could only be achieved if the Federation could integrate all of the country’s producers.21

!/. Members of the Falange had discussed the adoption of vertical unions in Spain. For in-stance, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “¿Fascismo en España?” in Escritos políticos, #$%&–#$%-, ed. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos (Madrid: Trinidad Ledesma Ramos, !"//). For a detailed history of the Falange, including its transformations and domestications by the regime, see Sheelagh M. Ellwood, Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era: Falange Española de las Jons, #$%-–)- (New York: St. Martin’s Press, !"/*); and Joan Maria ,omàs, Lo que fue la Falange (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, !""").

!". For the Francoist vertical unions and their domestication by the government after the Civil War, see Miguel A. Aparicio, El sindicalismo vertical y la formación del Estado franquista (Barcelona: Ennibar, !"/+), !!*–$+.

%+. José Agustín Pérez del Pulgar, El concepto cristiano de la autarquía (Madrid: Publicaciones de Mecánica y Electricidad, revista de los ingenieros del ICAI, !")!). Economic historian Fer-nando Guirao has shown the importance of distinguishing between the ideology of autarky and the reality of the many international (and, especially, European) aspects of the Spanish economy in early Francoism. Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction (ref. !#).

%!. Vicente de Sebastián, Normas para una política económica nacional: origen, desarrollo y porvenir de la Federación Sindical de Agricultores Arroceros (Valencia: Tipografía Pascual Quiles, !"#().

HSNS4004_04.indd 504 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 0 5

From its beginnings in !"##, the Federation’s promoters wanted it to be more than just a mechanism for regulation and bargaining of prices. Its president, Francisco Rodriguez-Roda, a rice producer from a Valencian noble family, commissioned a book that justi-ed the views of the Federation. Its author, Vicente de Sebastián, argued that the Federation provided a model for the future organization of the Spanish political economy, as opposed to the com-munist Russian economy and the interventionist Italian and German econo-mies.22 ,is opposition to communism and interventionism did not mean that the Federation’s champions supported economic liberalism; rather, these well-established Valencian producers, usually small landowners, called in !"## for domesticating capitalism by regulating it from below.23

After Franco’s victory in !"#", the FSAAE leaders re-construed this early ideology and the Federation’s short history as something more akin to the new regime—in particular, to the new vertical integration of the unions. In !"#$, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, one of those who introduced fascist-like ideas in Spain, had proposed the creation of a National Union of Wheat. From !"#(, the National side in the Civil War (as the military commanded by Franco came to be called before their victory in !"#") founded several such organizations, starting with the National Service of Wheat. ,ey di&ered, ideologically, from the existing Federation of Rice Planters in that the state was to have an absolute monopoly on cereal markets, and these new organizations would defend the national interest, rather than private producers.24 Notwithstanding these sharp contrasts, the FSAAE’s leaders tried after the war to position their history so that the Federation appeared to lead directly to the new vertical unions. In the fall of !"#", the Federation saluted the “Year of Victory” and invited General Franco and other state representatives to Valencia. Rodríguez-Roda, who had been president of the Federation since the days of the Second Republic, did his best to depict the prewar organization of the Federation as a precedent for the corporatist state that Franco was organizing. He narrated to Franco the harvest

%%. Ibid., !+!–+/.%#. According to de Sebastián, private producers should manage the entire economy without

the intervention of the state. In order to avoid the dangers of legalizing a monopoly, he acknowl-edged, the state should keep some prerogatives, but not act intrusively (a view sustained by other prewar landowner associations).

%). Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “Ante el problema del trigo,” La Patria Libre, %# Mar !"#$. On the National Service of Wheat, with a special emphasis on the inconsistencies between its ideology and its performance, see Carlos Barciela, La !nanciación del Servicio Nacional de Trigo, #$%#–#$)# (Madrid: Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España, !"/!).

HSNS4004_04.indd 505 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 0 6 | C A M P R U B Í

of the !"#" crop in Valencia as an epic scene: rice planters had risked their lives harvesting under furious enemy bombing and their infrastructure and supplies had been destroyed in the last stages of the armed confrontation. He argued that this heroic sacri-ce was intended not just to provide the country with the rice it needed, but also, and most importantly, to defend the ideas that had come to characterize the new state’s corporatism.25

In order to capture these alleged a.nities, the Federation o&ered Franco a present, a co&er decorated with symbolically charged motifs containing rice from the Valencian crop of !"#": the “Rice of Victory.” ,e chest (Fig. !) was made of bone, crystal, and stone. Engraved at its center was Franco’s personal emblem, the “Victor,” formed by its six letters, which had been used in the sixteenth

%$. Francisco Ramón Rodríguez-Roda, Una cosecha de arroz: ilustraciones especiales de Genaro Lahuerta y Pedro de Valencia (Valencia: FSAAE, !")+).

FIG. 1 A chest with the Rice of Victory that was offered to Franco by the Federation of Plant-ers in 1939. Source: Rodríguez Roda, Una cosecha de arroz (ref. 25).

HSNS4004_04.indd 506 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 07

century to distinguish recent doctorates from the University of Salamanca. Here it served as a symbol of tradition, wisdom, and victory. It was 'anked by the yoke and the arrows, symbols of the Catholic monarchs appropriated by the new re-gime. Above Franco’s Victor, the artists had placed an haut-relief of the Spanish coat-of-arms used in the Civil War by the National army: an imperial eagle with the coats-of-arms of the main regions. Standing at the eagle’s side were two col-umns representing the pillars of Hercules with the emblem “plus ultra” (far be-yond) that Charles V had used to depict Spain’s expansion of the known world in the -fteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the lower frieze, the Francoist motto “Una, Grande, Libre” (One, Great, Free) was engraved; it referred to the future of a united, strong, and politically and economically independent Spain under the new regime. Rice production was thus fashioned as a political instrument, a weapon at the service of the victorious side’s ideological aspirations.

Up to a point, the strategy of the FSAAE’s leaders was successful and Franco himself acknowledged, when he received the present, that the Federation had been a model for the organization of other branches of the economy and should continue to play that role.26 Ramón Serrano Suñer, one of the early promoters of the vertical organization of the economy, also mentioned the FSAAE as a precedent for the new economy after receiving a present from its president.27 But he was much more cautious than Franco in promoting this view, since he was not inclined to give the FSAAE the entire credit for what he saw as a new era of Spanish economics and politics. In particular, it seems that for Serrano Suñer there was a key di&erence between the structure of the “new state” and the Federation as created in !"##: the new order was founded and organized from top to bottom while the original Federation had been organized from below.28 ,e di&erence was much more than ideological, since it shaped the

%(. Ibid. %*. Ramón Serrano Suñer, “Discurso pronunciado en la Albufera de Valencia, el día %# de

abril de !")+, contestando a unas palabras del presidente de la Federación Sindical de Agricultores Arroceros de España,” in Ramón Serrano Suñer, De la victoria y la posguerra (discursos) (Madrid: Editorial Nacional, !"))), !%#–##. ,e Federation prepared an artistic present for Serrano Suñer: a codex entitled Horas de Luz en la Albufera, a unique copy containing his speech “Discurso pronunciado en la Albufera.” On Serrano Suñer and the Spanish links to Italian Fascism and German Nazism, see Stanley Payne, Fascism in Spain, #$,%–#$)) (Madison: University of Wiscon-sin Press, %+++).

%/. For the organization of the Spanish political economy from above and the “socialist right,” see Gustavo Bueno, El mito de la derecha (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, %++/), %#/–(%; also, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Fascism from Above: "e Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, #$,%–#$%( (Oxford: Clarendon Press, !"/#).

HSNS4004_04.indd 507 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 0 8 | C A M P R U B Í

way the union actually worked. Indeed, the Federation had undergone impor-tant transformations after the war as a result of its incorporation into the sys-tem of vertical unions. ,ree new features—national scope, state control, and vertical integration—will begin to suggest how genetic research could come to play a pivotal role in the new state structure.

Rodriguez Roda mentioned the -rst of three new features of the FSAAE after !"#": it now included producers from the entire country. In Roda’s words, it had become “truly Spanish,” including established producing regions left out in !"##, such as certain villages in the provinces of Castellon and Tarragona, as well as new producers such as Seville. A second feature of the FSAAE under the new vertically integrated economy was that its former focus on price regulation was replaced by the state control of production and the market. ,e prewar overca-pacity, which had triggered Valencian producers to establish the Federation, had come to an end. Price controls from the !")+s onwards were no longer devised to keep prices high enough to sustain producers but rather to keep them low enough to meet consumer demand and to avoid in'ation.29

After the Civil War, rice productivity per cultivated hectare had gone down from (,+++ kilos to ),+++ or less. Destruction of lands, factories, and workers during the war and the increasingly strong black market did not represent the largest problems. Rather, planters throughout the !")+s blamed a lack of fertil-izers, owing to the di.culties for European trade.30 In !")+ the government issued decrees of food rationing (some of which remained in force until !"$%) and, in those years of hunger, rice was an important part of the ration coupons. ,e state became the supplier of rice for consumers through the General Com-mission of Supplies and Transportation (Comisaría General de Abastecimientos

%". For the annual decrees establishing -xed prices, see FSAAE, Colección Legislativa (ref. !(), and Rodríguez-Roda, Una cosecha de arroz (ref. %$). ,e situation did not change until the !"$!–$% harvest, when overcapacity made a comeback and the rice market began to be deregulated (with the exception of /+,+++ tons devoted to the army). Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, “Normas por las que se regula la campaña arrocera,” BOE, %( Aug !"$!. Curiously enough, the international decline of prices in the years !"$"–(+ convinced the government to reestablish forced coupons, until further deregulation in !"($. See Florencio Zoido Naranjo, Isla Mínima: aspectos geográ!cos-agrarios del arrozal sevillano (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, !"*#).

#+. Álvaro de Ansorena, “El arroz en España,” Siembra !, no. % (!")$): (/–*!. Álvaro de Ansorena, who -gures prominently below, conducted research on alternative fertilizers; see Álvaro de Ansorena and Gerhard Naunford, “La in'uencia de las hormonas vegetales sobre el arroz: ensayos iniciales sobre tratamientos con substancias de crecimiento, y productos con carácter de substancias de crecimiento, durante las primeras fases del desarrollo del arroz,” INIA /) (!")*): !%$–/*.

HSNS4004_04.indd 508 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 0 9

y Transportes), which was dependent on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.31 In order to ensure enough rice to meet demand while avoiding expensive imports—that is, in order to assure rice self-su.ciency—the authori-ties took over control of the cereal’s production and distribution, as they did with many other agricultural products and industrial goods. ,is did not quite require nationalizing the economy, only integrating its di&erent agents into a structure controlled by the state.

Rice self-su.ciency, or autarky, implied forced production rates for planters (minimum yields per hectare and -nes, or even loss of property, to those who failed to meet them), -xed prices for raw grain (usually referred to as paddy or rough rice) and processed grain (glaze or white rice), as well as control of in-termediaries and transportation from harvest lands to mills and from mills to consumers. ,e government also made sure that su.cient acreage was devoted to rice production through decrees of internal colonization and of areas re-served for rice.32 ,e FSAAE became the state’s agent for these tasks and was placed into a complex new network of commissions and boards, including its integration into a vertical union, the third new feature of the FSAAE after the war, which requires further elaboration.

,e founders of the FSAAE had sought from the beginning to avoid price increases and arti-cial scarcities caused by intermediaries and industrialists, and thus had attempted to integrate processors (factories in which paddy rice was polished into white rice, cleaned, dried, and packed for distribution) into their association. In order to unify the whole cycle of production and processing of rice, the FSAAE obtained in !"## a decree ordering the creation of a Federation of Industrial Processors of Rice (FIEAE, Federación de Industriales Elabora-dores de Arroz Española).

#!. For its establishment and functioning, see Elena Martínez Ruíz, “El campo en guerra: organización y producción agraria,” in La economía de la Guerra Civil, ed. Pablo Martín Aceña and Elena Martínez Ruíz (Madrid: Marcial Pons, %++(), !+*–(+. According to Francisco Ar-güelles, chief of its Special Delegation of Rice, in the -rst year of intervention by the National Service of Wheat (!")!–)%), the harvest of !%+,()/,%+/ kg of rice was distributed as follows: /",#)#,*$! kg to the civil population; !$,#++ kg to the army; $,!*#,/++ kg to miners; /,%+/,+%$ kg to rice producers; %$!,#"$ kg to rice industrialists; and %,#*!,%#* kg to others. Francisco Argüelles, “La producción y el consumo del arroz en España en los últimos años,” El agrario levantino ", no. !%/ (!")$): %#–%*.

#%. Editorial, “Expansión del arroz,” Siembra !, no. ) (!")$); FSAAE, Colección Legislativa (ref. !(). ,ese limitations were very probably seen by the FSAAE as a way of preventing new produc-ers from going into business.

HSNS4004_04.indd 509 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 1 0 | C A M P R U B Í

After the war, this partial integration was subsumed into the new system of vertical unions, as diagrammed in -gure %. A Special Delegation of Rice (Dele-gación Especial del Arroz) was created as a branch of the National Union of Cere-als (Sindicato Nacional de Cereales), one of the -ve main vertical unions for agricultural goods. It was put in charge of the two existing federations (FSAAE and FIEAE) and of the National Union of Rice (Sindicato Nacional del Arroz), which was created after the war and, unlike the federations, was composed of day laborers and workers without property and was made responsible for all social and political issues concerning labor in rice plantation and processing (that is, for the domestication of labor).33 ,e Special Delegation had to coordinate plan-ning on rice production and distribution with the General Commission of Sup-plies and Transportation.34 Their duties included buying paddy rice from producers at a -xed price, transporting it to industrial mills, and then distributing white rice to consumers. ,e Special Delegation of Rice worked hand in hand

##. In !")$ the two federations created a National Cooperative of Rice (Cooperativa Nacional del Arroz), which was soon embedded into the state’s vertically integrated structure and relieved the Special Delegation of Rice from some of its tasks. ,e cooperative’s main promoter was the chief of the National Union of Rice who saw it, in principle, as a body that could be independent from the state. Juan Antonio Gómez Trenor, “Hacia una cooperativa nacional del arroz,” Siembra !, no. ( (!")$): (/.

#). From !")! to !")#, orders regulating the rice harvest were directly issued by the government presidency, although acknowledging the input of the previous two bodies. Presidencia del Gobi-erno, “Orden por la que se -jan los precios del arroz y se regula la campaña arrocera !")#–)),” BOE, " Aug !")#. From then onward, the two bodies signed joint annual decrees regulating the harvest, although the General Commission was hierarchically superior to the Special Delegation of Rice. Both bodies were, moreover, dependent on the ministries of Commerce and Industry and of Agriculture, respectively, rather than on the union’s hierarchy. Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, “Recti-cación a la circular num. #"/,” BOE, $ Sep !")#.

FIG. 2 The author’s schematic organizational chart describing the integration of the rice’s cycle of production into the corporatist state.

HSNS4004_04.indd 510 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 1 1

with the Ministry of Agriculture, which was in charge of technical aspects through its Institute for Agronomic Research.35 ,us, capital, production and processing, labor and technical assistance were all integrated into the state’s hier-archical structure, right up to the level of the President. Political autarchy went hand in hand with economic autarky (see the introduction to this issue).

In this integrated system, the FSAAE had to execute the annual orders re-garding harvest. ,e National Service of Wheat (in charge of most cereals within the National Union of Cereals), through the Special Delegation of Rice, bought the harvest from producers “at a strict but fair price” set by the General Commission. ,en, the National Service of Wheat sold it to the FIEAE after determining, with the help of the Special Delegation of Rice and the General Commission of Supplies and Transportation, which mills were more appropri-ate for which quantities of rice.36 ,is alone turned the FSAAE, as part of this complex economic system of state boards and bodies, into a whole new animal, especially regarding its relationship with producers.37 From !"#" onwards, the FSAAE, through its local unions, was in charge not only of collecting rice from each of their producers, but also of inspecting individual planters and stores to prevent the temptations of the black market, which could be very lucrative for rice producers subject to -xed prices.38 It also had the duty of providing pro-ducers with fertilizers and with monetary advances to prevent them from bank-ruptcy or from “falling into the hands of usurers.”39 ,e Federation had to ensure transportation and social support for workers, such as insurance, reli-gious services, and education for their children. And it provided producers with processed rice for their own family consumption. And crucially for this paper,

#$. Rafael Cavestany, an agronomy engineer and a politician who is often credited with open-ing up the agricultural sector with his ministry in the !"$+s, wrote in !")$ that “the Spanish ag-ricultural sector needs a vertical unity able to establish a plan of well oriented measures; such a plan shall be prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture regarding technicalities and economics and by the unions regarding social organization.” See Rafael Cavestany, “¿Cómo debe ser Siembra?” Siembra !, no. ! (!")$).

#(. Presidencia del Gobierno, “Orden del !% de septiembre de !")% por la que se -jan los precios del arroz y se regula la campaña arrocera,” BOE, !) Sep !")%.

#*. A last attempt, made in !")$, to link the original FSAAE to the origins of vertical organiza-tion was much more nuanced than the one by Rodriguez-Roda and published anonymously, using the botanical name for rice as a cover: Oryza, “Historial Arrocero,” El agrario levantino ", no. !%/ (!")$): !/–%%.

#/. One can grasp the importance of the parallel black market economy to the system in of--cial -gures: about )+ percent of the wheat consumed in Spain in !")% was acknowledged to be undeclared; Servicio Nacional del Trigo, Cosechas, comerio y consumo de trigo durante las veinticinco campañas #$%$ –#$'(, #$-%–#$-' (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, !"()).

#". De Ansorena, “Arroz en España” (ref. #+).

HSNS4004_04.indd 511 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 1 2 | C A M P R U B Í

it had to supply appropriate seeds for producers and to test the quality of exist-ing seeds.40 From !"#", seed testing, production, and distribution by the FSAAE, transformed by its integration into the system of vertical unions, gave geneticists a much more central role in rice production than they had ever had before. Geneticists, in turn, provided the FSAAE with material arguments for their struggle for power and for the de-nition of the Spanish economic orga-nization. I turn now to how agricultural scientists became an active and integral part of the corporatist system.

B R E E D I NG EXPE RTS

In Spain, genetic research on rice was mainly conducted at the EAS, which was located in one of the traditional areas of rice production in Valencia, where the famous Paella was born. As for the Federation, the EAS was also transformed with the new regime, and its geneticists both shaped, and adapted to, the new agrarian organization. In the words of one of the genetic researchers at the EAS, vertical unions uni-ed “the complete cycle of rice production and its activities, from its planting to its supply to the consumer.”41 Agronomist Álvaro de Ansorena y Saénz de Jubera was the director of the EAS from !"#$—the last days of the Second Republic—until about !"$%. In an interview with the of--cial journal of the agricultural vertical unions, Siembra, de Ansorena described the relationship of the EAS and the FSAAE in the early Franco regime: “,e position of director of the Rice Station of Sueca entails a position as technical assistant to the Federation of Rice Planters. ,us, the research centre and its technical labor and resources for research and for distribution of information belongs to the Union, contributes to the Union task1.1.1. and it provides plant-ers with the best possible seeds and fertilizers.”42 Agronomists specializing in rice genetics at Sueca not only certi-ed the quality of seeds sold by others, but also produced their own seeds and distributed them by means of the Federa-tion. Both activities made them key actors in rice standardization and homog-enization in the service of autarky. Politically and economically unifying the cycle of rice production and consumption provided de Ansorena and his team

)+. FSAAE, Memoria de la Federación Sindical de Agricultores Arroceros de España (#$%%–#$-&) (Valencia: FSAAE, !"(().

)!. José María Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (Valencia: Editorial Guerri !"$%), )!*.)%. A. García Romero, “Entrevista a Álvaro de Ansorena, La Estación Arrocera de Sueca

(Valencia),” Siembra !, no. / (!")$).

HSNS4004_04.indd 512 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 1 3

of researchers with new opportunities to develop their work and to make it relevant outside the laboratory.43 In this context, I want to show how agrono-mists devoted to rice genetics were able to use the vertical structure of the new regime to claim competences denied to commercial breeders (and thereby to gain control over them as well as over producers and their activities).

,is had not been the case in earlier periods of the history of the EAS. In !"!!, Valencian rice producers had lost almost two thirds of their annual crop. Most of their plants simply failed to blossom and produce grain due to the degeneration of their variety. To prevent this from happening again, they urged the government to create a center for rice research.44 As a result, in !"!# a rice station was placed at a former charity hospital in the town of Sueca, already one of the main rice producers in the Valencia region.45 In fact, the opening of the Sueca station responded not only to producers’ needs but also to a general policy by virtue of which the number of agricultural stations rose from thirty--ve in !"!+ to seventy-seven in !"!*.46 At the head of each station there would be at least one agronomist trained in agricultural science, a discipline introduced in the Spanish university in !/$$.47 From the outset, students at the agronomy school could either be trained as “agricultural ex-perts” (expertos agrícolas)—with an education close to day-to-day agricultural practice—or as “agronomy engineers” (ingenieros agrónomos)—whose training met the highest scienti-c standards.48 Although agronomy engineers were highly trained scientists, their objective was to engage in raising the produc-tivity of the country’s agriculture. Until the !"$+s, all graduates were expected to build their careers as state servants: once they graduated, they entered the State Corps of Agronomy Engineers, created in !/*", and were assigned to di&erent grades within it, according to years served. Many important policy

)#. De Ansorena, “Arroz en España” (ref. #+).)). “Real Orden, !/ de octubre de !"!!,” GM, %) Oct !"!!. )$. “Nota Presidencia INIA declinando responsabilidad,” %( Sep !"$/, AGA (!!), !.*, Box

(!/+)+*#. )(. Agricultural stations were created by Royal Decree in !/*(, explicitly inspired by the works

of Justus von Liebig, in an attempt to introduce experimental methods in specialized agricultural and biological areas; see Jordi Cartañà, Agronomía e ingenieros agrónomos en la España del siglo XIX (Barcelona: Ediciones del Serbal, %++$), %%"–#(, on %$!.

)*. Escuela Técnica de Ingeniería Agronómica, Historia de las Escuelas Técnicas de Ingeniería Agronómica #+&&–#$+(: CXXV aniversario de su creación (Madrid: Escuela Técnica de Ingenieria Agronómica, !"/+).

)/. Cartañà, Agronomía (ref. )(), !%)–#$. Since agronomy engineers did not specialize in machinery, a better translation might be “agricultural scientist.”

HSNS4004_04.indd 513 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 1 4 | C A M P R U B Í

makers and other actors relevant to the political economy of the country were trained there.49

Although the EAS opened its facilities in !"!#, it was only in !"%% that it received the resources necessary to perform its activities. In that year, agronomy engineer Rafael Font de Mora y Llorens was appointed director of the EAS and put in charge of organizing its laboratories and experimental -elds. He had recently graduated from the university and had two years of state experience as the director of an experimental farm specializing in oranges at Burjasot, also in Valencia.50 In !"%$, the Ministry of Public Works (Fomento) granted Font de Mora a fellowship to spend some months in Italy visiting Novalli Novelli, chief of the Italian Experiment Station of Rice Agriculture at Vercelli, in order to learn not only about the scienti-c manipulation of rice done at the station but also about the organization of production in that country.51 Afterward, he established chemical laboratories at the EAS equipped for the analysis of dis-eases and how to combat them as well as preparation and study of fertilizers. He also commissioned laboratories for macro- and microscopic analyses of seeds and for the conservation of seeds and plants. Outside of the main build-ing, there was a greenhouse and a parcel of land divided into numerous small breeding grounds, or nurseries, of two square meters each. ,ey were made of concrete and set up to test methods of planting, watering, and fertilizing, as well as testing di&erent varieties.52

)". Juan Velarde, “La participación de los ingenieros agrónomos en el conocimiento de la economía española,” in #&( aniversario (ref. $), %*–)%.

$+. Madrid Cientí!co %%, no. !++" (!"%+): %+. Font de Mora was born in Valencia in !/"# and graduated in agronomy engineering in !"!"; José del Cañizo y Gómez, Cien promociones de Ing-enieros Agrónomos, #+$#–#$-( (Madrid: Ediciones del Centenario Agronómico, !"(!), $/. In !"%+, when Font de Mora entered the Corps, #%# agronomy engineers belonged to it, of whom seven-teen were state administrators, sixty-two were in charge of the province’s policies, -fty worked as directors of experimental farms and forty--ve as directors of agricultural farms, twenty-nine taught at general schools or had other positions, and !%+ worked as cadastral inspectors. Cartañà, Agronomía (ref. )(), !$$.

$!. “Real Orden, !( de abril de !"%$,” GM, %% Apr !"%$. From that trip, Font de Mora learned not only about breeding rice, but also about, for instance, how to breed carp in watered rice -elds: Rafael Font de Mora, “La carpicultura en el arrozal,” Hoja divulgadora %!, nos. #–) (!"%*): !%–!). In !")", the Vercelli station became world-famous through the -lming of the Italian classic Riso Amaro. In !"%/ Font de Mora obtained a second fellowship to travel to Vercelli this time, in re-sponse to an invitation from Novelli to participate in the jury of a contest on rice machinery. “Real Orden Num. !#$,” GM, %+ Jun !"%/.

$%. ,e building was well enough equipped to receive, in !"%$, a visit from the son of King Alfonso XIII and !$+ other guests and to serve them all a typical paella. It was the perfect ending

HSNS4004_04.indd 514 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 1 5

Font de Mora was also involved in organizational projects, “going out of the laboratory,” as he put it, to help create two chambers of commerce for rice producers (at Sueca and Amposta) and to promote the establishment of other associations of producers. ,ose two chambers of commerce were the point of departure for the Federation of Planters created in !"##; thus, Font de Mora’s contributions demonstrate an early role of university-trained agronomists in shaping the organization of rice production and distribution. In return, the Station bene-ted from the chambers’ resources and from its new links with producers, assuming tasks of consultancy, education, and inspection.53 ,ese links among scientists, producers, and the state would not only increase but also change in nature in the early Franco regime.

Font de Mora’s work on rice genetics also aimed at the world outside the laboratory. Around !"%", and in close collaboration with Novelli, Font de Mora perfected a method for crossing rice varieties that was to change the activities of the Station.54 According to Font de Mora, it had been hitherto thought that rice fertilization depended on self-pollination inside a closed 'ower (cleistog-amy or automatic self-pollination), which would have made manipulation virtually impossible using the techniques of the time, due to the di.culty of accessing the interior of the 'ower. ,is, together with the enormous natural variability of rice, explains why commercial breeders were slower in developing rice improvement than they had been for other plants. However, several research-ers showed in the !"%+s that the most common varieties cultivated in southern Europe reproduced with open autogamy: the 'ower opened up before self-pol-lination. ,at meant that the process of self-fertilization could be manipulated, as with other cereals.55 Although rice hybridization was not a long-established

for a one-day visit by the prince to the Valencia countryside; “El Príncipe de Asturias en Valencia,” La Época, !# Jun !"%$.

$#. Rafael Font de Mora y Lloréns, El arroz: su cultivo, molinería y comercio (Barcelona: Salvat, !"#"), prologue. For the EAS consultancy fees: “Orden, %$ de octubre de !"#$,” GM, * Nov !"#$. For the origins of the EAS as inspector: “Orden, $ de abril de !"#),” GM, !+ Apr !"#).

$). Font de Mora emphasized Novelli’s collaboration, but he also acknowledged that other rice researchers were publicly or secretly testing similar methods. De Mora, El arroz (ref. $#), )". ,e dates of this state of the art are con-rmed by Pierre Van Der Eng, “Development of Seed-Fertilizer Technology in Indonesian Rice Agriculture,” Agricultural History (/, no. ! (!"")): %+–$#, on %/; and by Harro Maat, Science Cultivating Practice: A History of Agricultural Science in the Netherlands and Its Colonies, #+-%–#$+- (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, %++!), !)#–*#.

$$. De Mora, El arroz (ref. $#). He credits Heide with the classi-cation of the varieties of rice according to their systems of self-pollination. ,is manipulation was not an easy one and it took years to perfect in the late !"%+s. Maat, Science Cultivating Practice (ref. $)), !(+.

HSNS4004_04.indd 515 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 1 6 | C A M P R U B Í

practice and its results were not well established in the late !"%+s, it was being introduced in experiment stations all over the world.56

In !"$%, José María Carrasco García, an agricultural expert recently retired from the EAS, published a book aimed at researchers, commercial breeders, and producers in which he explained how arti-cial pollination worked (Fig. #).57

Carrasco García also explained how the Mendelian and chromosome theo-ries ensured that this operation produced stable varieties. For instance, he ex-plained, one might want to cross a variety having a short stem AA (which meant greater resistance to lodging, that is, to be beaten down by its own weight) but an excessively long cycle of reproduction BB, both characters being dominant, with one having too long a stem aa but a shorter cycle of reproduc-tion bb (which o&ered greater productivity). Assuming that both were homo-zygous (genealogical selection, explained below, was normally required before hybridization), one could arti-cially cross them (AABB " aabb) and select the descendents generation after generation in order to ultimately obtain a new stable variety with a short stem and short cycle of reproduction. ,e -rst gen-eration of descendants (F!) would phenotypically display the dominant char-acters (short stem and long cycle of reproduction) while the second generation (F%), ideally of about two hundred plants, would have, according to Mendel’s laws, the probability of displaying the characters AB, Ab, aB, and ab in the ratio ":#:#:!. ,e desired phenotype of the example was short stem and short cycle of reproduction but the genotype of the population displaying it would be divided between homozygous (AAbb) and heterozygous plants (Aabb). By crossing and backcrossing them in di&erent plots and selecting the ones dis-playing the desired characters (an appreciation which included visual and met-ric analyses of the seeds), performers of this method could hope to obtain a fairly stable variety in a few generations.58

$(. Together with Sueca, de Mora and his successors mentioned researchers from the rice station of California, the Java station at Tjikeumenh, a Japanese station, and the Italian station of Vercelli.

$*. Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), "+–!+!. In order to cross two varieties of rice with especially attractive traits, the breeder would choose one plant from each of the two varieties, use his forceps to cut o& the anthers carrying the pollen of one of them, and pollinate its stamens with the pollen of the other. ,e plant chosen to receive the alien pollen was usually the one with better chances of germination; its male organs needed to be removed before self-fertilization started, which usually happened when the stamen had grown beyond two thirds of the length of the 'ower.

$/. Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), !!(–%%. Carrasco does not always distinguish between phenotype and genotype when discussing homozygous o&spring. However, it is clear from his discussions on Mendelian genetics that he took the di&erence into account.

HSNS4004_04.indd 516 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 17

FIG. 3 Crossing two rice varieties: the breeder used forceps to remove the male organs of the plant chosen to be the “mother,” cut off the anthers carrying the pollen of the other plant, and used them to fertilize the mother. Source: Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. 41), 100.

HSNS4004_04.indd 517 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 1 8 | C A M P R U B Í

In the hands of “an able geneticist or a practical and outstanding planter,” success was attained for about (+ percent of hybridizations (failure occurred when, for example, the desired traits did not show up in the o&spring).59 As a result, this new technique introduced in Spain by Font de Mora spread quickly among rice producers and commercial breeders, so much so that geneticists found it di.cult to distinguish themselves from experienced breeders. Of course, the mutual nourishment between the two groups has often been identi--ed by the literature for other countries and periods.60 After all, the EAS’s rice agronomists considered their own work as an aid to producers and therefore di&erent from, say, what a geneticist working in a university laboratory could be expected to do. ,e intersections and overlaps between the work of the EAS’s agricultural scientists and that of experienced breeders were obvious not only in crossing and in classifying varieties, but also in the methods for select-ing new varieties. Both geneticists and able breeders could take the seeds of the plants they wanted to breed, separate them from the rest until the next season, and plant them in a specially well-suited soil. ,en, they just needed to wait until the plants had grown to about #+ cm, divide them into smaller clusters, and have a team of workers plant them with the desired separation in the -eld. For this process of mass selection, university-trained breeders did not have special quali-cations over commercial breeders; rather, they could only improve some of the latter’s techniques.61

However, after some years of experience, from !"%* onwards researchers at Sueca could claim that the speci-c value of their work lay in a genealogical or pedigree selection, which, contrary to mass selection, made relatively pure lines of heredity possible.62 According to them, mass selection, as described above,

$". Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), "/.(+. See, for instance, Jean-Marc Drouin, “Mendel in the Garden,” in A History of Scienti!c

"ought: Elements of a History of Science, ed. Michel Serres (Oxford: Blackwell Reference, !""$), $+(–%$. See also references in footnote !%.

(!. For instance, Novelli and Font de Mora took responsibility for training breeders in the technique of transplanting and other practices, which often had e&ects on labor organization: transplanting required more operations than just spreading the seeds. Also academic breeders at the EAS distanced themselves from commercial breeders by means not only of genetics but also of other sciences, such as statistics. See Ricardo Pérez Calvet, Métodos estadísticos para la comparación de gran número de variedades (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agronómicas, !")(). ,e de-ni-tion of breeding as a scienti-c discipline has been linked to the social di&erentiation of scientists and private breeders. Deborah Fitzgerald, “Farmers Deskilled: Hybrid Corn and Farmer’s Work,” Technology and Culture #), no. % (!""#): #%)–)#; Wieland, “Scienti-c ,eory” (ref. !%).

(%. Tiago Saraiva also mentions the signi-cance of pedigree selection for the corporatist politi-cal economy. For one of the several re-discoveries of this type of selection during the nineteenth

HSNS4004_04.indd 518 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 1 9

was achievable by anyone but failed to yield stable genealogical lines, whereas properly scienti-c individual or genealogical selection could produce stability, since it relied on the botanical speci-cities of rice reproduced through multiple generations.63 After carefully selecting a single, specially well-suited mother plant with the desired traits, its descendents with the desired characters (F!) were planted in di&erent small plots and the grains they produced (F%) were studied individually (so that their characteristics could help in detecting prob-able un-t seeds in future generations) and planted. By F) the lines reproduced would tend to display the desired characters and one could speak practically of a pure line (albeit reversions were not uncommon, requiring expurgations every year).64 ,us, genealogical selection allowed one to derive an entire variety from a single plant.

Arti-cial breeding combined with genealogical selection allowed state breed-ers to obtain homogenous varieties of particular interest. In addition to allow-ing the practical eradication of such genetic variations as red grains (disliked by consumers), homogeneity could bring numerous harvesting e.ciencies, such as a short cycle of reproduction and a crop of uniform grain. It also re-duced costs. If all plants matured at around the same time, harvest labor would be more predictable for rice producers, easier to organize, and require fewer working hours. Finally, because genealogical selection ensured that homogene-ity could be preserved over generations, it avoided the deviances that usually a&ected new varieties.65 ,is homogeneity of a new line could be achieved in about -ve years, after which production tests were feasible with a focus on multiplication while preserving homogeneity. In theory, breeders using genea-logical selection and taking advantage of the natural exponential increase of seeds in successive generations, could produce numbers su.cient for com-mercial production of a new hybrid variety in only eight years. Vertical unions would be key in weaving this scienti-c possibility into the actual political and economic organization of Spanish rice, to which I now return.

century, see Jean Gayon and Doris T. Zallen, “,e Role of the Vilmorin Company in the Promo-tion and Di&usion of the Experimental Science of Heredity in France, !/)+–!"%+” JHB #!, no. % (!""/): %)!–(%, esp. %)$–$%.

(#. Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), !+*–!+. (). On the connections and con'icts of Wilhelm Johannsen’s “pure line” theory with genea-

logic selection from the beginning of the twentieth century to well into the !"%+s in Germany and elsewhere, see Nils Roll-Hansen, “,e Genotype ,eory of Wilhelm Johannsen and Its Rela-tion to Plant Breeding and the Study of Evolution,” Centaurus %% (!"*/): %+!–#$. Carrasco was well aware of those debates; see Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), !+*.

($. Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), !+".

HSNS4004_04.indd 519 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 2 0 | C A M P R U B Í

S E E D S FOR TH E NATION

Although the combination of arti-cial breeding and genealogical selection was practiced at the EAS from !"%", it was Álvaro de Ansorena, an agronomy en-gineer and the successor of Font de Mora as head of the EAS in !"#$, who made it into the main activity of the institution.66 Between !"#$ and !"#( he com-missioned the EAS’s enlargement through the addition of a second 'oor, a signi-cant part of which would be devoted to a new genetics laboratory de-voted to hybridization and the study of heredity traits (Fig. )).67 Between !"#* and !"#/, during the Civil War, de Ansorena was forced by the Republican government to abandon his position as the EAS director, but when he returned he stressed research on, and production of, new varieties of rice.68 ,e new political and economic situation favored this choice. In the !"#+s Font de Mora had already celebrated the fact that the two chambers of commerce he had helped to create at Sueca and Amposta allowed researchers at the EAS to test the varieties they bred on a massive scale and therefore to select them and to promote them among planters. Planters associated with the chambers used their storage facilities to unify the organization of distribution and the bargain-ing with industrialists (they stored all the rice together and negotiated from there). Meanwhile, Font de Mora used the chambers to make research at the EAS relevant to rice production in the whole of Valencia. However, he had complained that, because distribution depended on private breeders, the EAS lacked the resources necessary to get the varieties it tested out to the markets for planters to buy them.69

((. Álvaro de Ansorena and Saenz de Jubera, “Las variedades de arroz cultivadas en España y los trabajos de la Estación Arrocera de Sueca hasta el año !"$%,” Anales del INIA #, no. % (!"$)): /"–%"!, on "". After the Civil War, Font de Mora continued working for the Corps of Agron-omy Engineers as a -rst-rank engineer, published several scienti-c and popular papers and, in the !"$+s, was appointed chief in Valencia of SOIVRE (Servicio O!cial de Inspección, Vigilancia y Regulación de las Exportaciones Agrícolas al Extranjero), an organization created in !"#) to control the quality of agricultural exports. Asociación Nacional de Ingenieros Agrónomos, Escalafón del Cuerpo, destinos y direcciones (Madrid: ANIA, !"$/), %%. He kept that position until his retirement in !"(#, see “Personal ingenieros agrónomos !"(#,” AGA (!!), !.!$, Box (!/+"+($.

(*. “Proyecto de reforma de la Estación Arrocera de Sueca,” !"$/, AGA (!!), !.*, Box (!/+#/%#.(/. Álvaro de Ansorena to Director General de Agricultura, !+ Oct !"#", AGA (!!), !.!#, Box

(!/+(+"). (". Font de Mora, El arroz (ref. $#), (). In fact, after the Civil War, Font de Mora advocated for

the vertical organization of agriculture: Rafael Font de Mora y Llorens, “La organización cooperativa sindical del campo,” in Conferencias organizadas por la Asamblea Nacional de Ingenieros Agrónomos, n #, ed. Asamblea Nacional de Ingenieros Agrónomos (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, !")%).

HSNS4004_04.indd 520 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 2 1

FIG

. 4

Afte

r 193

6, a

floo

r was

add

ed to

the

EAS

and

a ge

netic

s la

bora

tory

pla

ced

at it

s ce

nter

. The

bui

ldin

g w

as s

urro

unde

d by

nur

serie

s fo

r ric

e br

eedi

ng.

Prin

ted

with

per

mis

sion

of A

rchi

vo G

ener

al d

e la

Adm

inis

traci

ón. S

ourc

e: “P

roye

cto

de re

form

a,” 1

958,

AG

A (r

ef. 6

7).

HSNS4004_04.indd 521 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 2 2 | C A M P R U B Í

After the Civil War, that situation changed owing to the new political and economic con-guration of the Franco regime. In !")+, the EAS was integrated into the National Institute for Agricultural Research (INIA, Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agronómicas).70 ,e INIA belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture, and it had been reformed in !"%*, during the Miguel Primo de Rivera dictatorship, with the explicit goal of putting science at the service of Spain’s agriculture.71 After the Civil War, the new regime reorganized the INIA once again with an eye on national coordination and unity in the service of the autarkic economy (this included the closing of those stations that were not considered a priority). INIA’s scienti-c laboratories and experiment stations would be coordinated with, but not dependent on, Spain’s main centers for academic and technical research, such as universities and the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientí-cas).72 ,e INIA was in charge of the research side of the vertical structure for the country’s agriculture (see Fig. %).73 Due to this reorganization, the EAS was integrated into the new structure. As a result, and in de Ansorena’s words quoted above, the EAS carved out a place for itself within the vertical union as the site for technical decision-making. ,e EAS leaders’ advice on technical issues seldom found opposition within the Federation, and the EAS’s techni-cians became mediators in commercial exchanges of rice, certifying the varieties and the products’ good condition.74 Testing and certifying seeds, two activities performed by the EAS before Franco’s seizure of power but transformed within the corporatist structure, were tools for standardization. ,ey were key in shap-ing farmers, industrialists, and consumers’ choices, and they became even more important when the Union became the only legal consumer.

,e relationship goes further, and de Ansorena’s biography as a scientist and administrator provides a nice example of the EAS’s niche in the corporatist ecology. Born in Madrid in !"+) (possibly !"+$), de Ansorena graduated as an

*+. Ministerio de Agricultura, “Decreto de " de marzo de !")(,” BOE, !* Mar !")+. *!. “Real Decreto Num. $$(,” GM, %( Mar !"%*.*%. For CSIC, María Jesús Santesmases and Emilio Muñoz, Los primeros años del Consejo

Superior de Investigaciones Cientí!cas, una introducción a la política cientí!ca del régimen franquista (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Avanzados, !""#).

*#. “Ley !+ de febrero de !")+ reorganizando el INIA,” BOE, !* Feb !")+; and “Decreto del " de marzo de !")+ -jando los centros del INIA,” BOE, !* Mar !")+. For an earlier history of some of the INIA’s centers, see José García Martínez, “Aportaciones a la Historia de la Genética Española (!"%+–!"#()” (PhD dissertation, [Madrid] Universidad Complutense, !"/)).

*). García Romero, “Entrevista” (ref. )%): “the Station at Sueca has a service of seed certi-ca-tion that mediates in any seed transaction. Its dictates are tacitly taken as uncontestable.”

HSNS4004_04.indd 522 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 2 3

agronomy engineer in !"#+, for which he went through a new curriculum ap-proved in !"%) stressing scienti-c expertise and courses on political economy.75 In !"##, de Ansorena was appointed third class agronomist of the Corps (he would be promoted to second and -rst class as he gained seniority in the Corps, composed in the !")+s by about three hundred agronomy engineers). In that same year he was appointed the director of a secondary orange experimental center in the Murcia region and in !"#$ went to Sueca as the new director of the EAS.76 After the Civil War, in !")) he obtained two important positions within the planned political economy. On the one hand, he was put in charge of the Special Delegation of Rice, which was the main link between rice pro-duction and the system of vertical unions through the National Union of Cere-als (see Fig. %). On the other hand, he was appointed Commissioner of the Eastern Zone Resources (Comisario de Recursos de Levante), a regional branch of the General Commission of Supplies and Transportation, but he was in charge of rice planning and distribution throughout the country.77 ,ese posi-tions allowed de Ansorena to become a key -gure in establishing, and forcing upon producers, minimum rates of production, tons of rice for consumption, areas reserved for rice plantation, and prices. Since the prices were -xed accord-ing to varieties, this tool allowed de Ansorena to favor the hybrid seeds ob-tained at the EAS over competing varieties.

Although his two positions con-rmed de Ansorena as the main state repre-sentative in the rice sector, already in !")$ he announced in Siembra a time when state intervention would no longer be necessary in rice production.78 In

*$. Del Cañizo y Gómez, Cien promociones (ref. $+), /%. A new curriculum required new students to have taken university courses in the sciences prior to admission; the degree included six academic years of theoretical and practical training in those scienti-c -elds relevant to the agricultural sciences. ,e -rst year included, among others, in-nitesimal calculus, descriptive geometry, organic chemistry, and mineralogy. Second-year courses were botanical sciences and geographical plant analysis, rational and applied mechanics, analytical chemistry, and meteorol-ogy. In the third year students had to take courses on advanced physics, geodesy, and topography, chemistry applied to agriculture and, of course, genetics. ,e remaining three years were intended to allow students to specialize in agricultural engineering (electricity, engines, etc.), as well as in the di&erent sub-disciplines of agronomy and their particular applications (tropical crops, cereals, etc.). ,is was accompanied by three years of German language, courses on legal aspects of Span-ish agriculture, statistics, and a course on political economy applied to the Spanish agricultural sector. “Reglamento de la sección de enseñanza del Instituto Agrícola de Alfonso XII,” GM, !! Dec !"%).

*(. Madrid Cientí!co )+, no. !##) (!"##): %%#; Madrid Cientí!co )+, no. !##* (!"##): %*%.**. “Decreto del %% de enero de !")),” BOE, * Feb !")).*/. García Romero, “Entrevista” (ref. )%).

HSNS4004_04.indd 523 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 2 4 | C A M P R U B Í

the meantime, however, he could take advantage of state intervention to foster both his administrative career and his research on rice genetics. Moreover, he could use his knowledge as an agronomist to actually shape and organize this state intervention. ,us, in !")* de Ansorena left his previous jobs—except, of course, the direction of the EAS —in order to accept the position of Techni-cal Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, one of the highest ranks of techni-cal decision-making within the agrarian vertical hierarchy.79 ,ree years later, in !"$+, scienti-c expertise and vertical political economy merged in de Ansore-na’s own career as he was appointed National Delegate of the National Service of Wheat.80 Clearly, de Ansorena, like other genetic researchers and scientists in general, was not simply mobilized by the state or working under its dictato-rial political pressure. Rather, they took the opportunity a&orded by the new regime to give a new agricultural relevance to their work and orchestrate sup-port for it through their own administrative positions.

It might appear from this account that de Ansorena functioned simply as a bureaucrat and that science had little to do with his role in the corporate state. But this reading would miss the fact that Sueca researchers under de Ansorena’s direction took pains to distinguish their work from that of private breeders by identifying themselves as men of science. In fact, about half of the forty-one books and articles related to rice published in Spain between !"#" and !"$) were written by the EAS’s sta&.81 In particular, everything related to rice genetics published in the country in that period was produced by researchers

*". “Decreto del %/ de noviembre de !")*,” BOE, ) Dec !")*./+. “Decreto del %/ de abril de !"$+,” BOE, %" Apr !"$+. In !"$% he left his positions as Techni-

cal Secretary of the Ministry and as National Delegate of the National Service of Wheat. “Decreto del !* de Julio de !"$!,” BOE, %( Nov !"$!. In !"$# he was awarded the Orden Civil del Mérito Agrícola, by the Ministry of Agriculture, a distinction created in !"+$ for individuals who had contributed to the improvement of agriculture in Spain. “Decreto del !/ de mayo de !"$!,” BOE, #! May !"$!. In !"$#, coinciding with the relative liberalization of rice production and distribution, de Ansorena left the EAS and moved to Madrid to work at its agronomy administration; he was then given a position at the National Institute for Industry in !"$$, entered the Ministry of Ag-riculture’s Service against Fraud in !"$", and was appointed its chief in !"(+. Before retirement, in !"(%, he was sent to Paris as part of the sta& of Spain’s embassy in France. On de Ansorena’s appointments after !"$#, see “Personal ingenieros agrónomos” for !"$#, !"$$, !"$", !"(+, and !"(%, all in AGA (!!), !.!$, Box (!/+"+($. Also, “Orden de %% de noviembre de !"(+,” BOE, # Jan !"(!. I have been unable to -nd any records of de Ansorena’s activities at the National Institute for Industry (INI) or the Spanish embassy in France.

/!. José del Cañizo y Gómez, Bibliografía agronómica española: #+&&–#$&& (Madrid: Centenario de las carreras de Ingeniero Agrónomo y Perito Agrícola y de la Escuela Central de Agricultura, !"$*), %/)–/".

HSNS4004_04.indd 524 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 2 5

working there. ,is research was closely related to the EAS’s practical work on rice production so that the prestige of one nourished the other.82 Rather than being state servants with only a marginal technical knowledge, it was the scienti-c status of the EAS’s agricultural scientists, and of de Ansorena in particular, that allowed them to become active agents within the state’s structure.

In !"$), as a sort of scienti-c legacy coinciding with his leaving the EAS, de Ansorena published a special issue of the INIA journal concerning varieties of rice in Spain written in collaboration with three other researchers at the EAS.83 ,is %++-page issue included, after a survey of the relevant literature, a history of the rice varieties cultivated in Spain in the nineteenth and -rst half of the twentieth century. It then described both the rice varieties imported by the EAS and those it obtained by hybridization and genealogical selection since the late !"%+s. Finally, it provided a detailed account of the activities performed at the EAS in relation to rice improvement in !"$%. ,e work constituted essentially a botanical classi-cation that took into account capacity for germination, resistance to plagues and to lodging or stem breaks, length of the grain according to con-sumers’ preferences, and dates of germination and harvest. All of these

/%. Even a recent book on agronomy and agriculture that devotes only a paragraph to Spanish agronomic improvements does not fail to mention rice seed improvement at EAS. José Vicente Maroto Borrego, Historia de la agronomía: una visión de la evolución histórica de las ciencias y técnicas agrarias (Madrid: Ediciones Mundi-Prensa, !""/), #%!.

/#. De Ansorena, “Las variedades” (ref. ((). ,ese three researchers were the agricultural expert Fernando García Meseguer (who was substituting for Carrasco at the EAS), agronomy engineer José de Oyanguren y Garcés de Marcilla, and chemist and pharmacist Juan Castells. De Oyan-guren (!"!$–!"(#) replaced de Ansorena as the EAS’s director in !"$#. He had been appointed second agronomy engineer at EAS in !")(. On Oyanguren see “Personal ingenieros agrónomos” for !")( and !"(#, AGA (!!), !.!$, Box (!/+"+($. Oyanguren specialized in rice botanic classi-ca-tion and genetics at EAS; see José de Oyanguren y Garcés de Marcilla, “Variedades de semillas actualmente utilizadas, necesidades de su renovación y medios de lograrlo,” in Congreso nacional arrocero (Valencia: Congreso Nacional Arrocero, !")/). In the late !"$+s he traveled three times—twice to Italy, including a stop at Vercelli’s station and once to Washington to attend a UN confer-ence on rice standardization. “INIA a Ministerio de Agricultura,” !/ Jan !"$/ and “INIA a Ministerio de Agricultura,” %! May !"$/, AGA (!!), !.*, Box (!/+)+*#. Juan Castells was a chemist and a pharmacist (holding an academic degree which, from !")+ onward, included training in soil sciences); see “Especialistas en ciencias químicas, destinos año !"$),” AGA (!!), !.!$, Box (!/+"+((. Castells is mentioned as an example of the good work developed at the INIA in Maroto Borrego, Historia de la agronomía (ref. /%), #%+. On how and why José María Albareda introduced soil science as a part of the pharmacy curriculum, see Pere Sunyer Martín, La con!guración de la ciencia del suelo en España, #)&(–#$&(: la delimitación de un nuevo objeto de estudio y el proceso de institucionalización de una nueva comunidad cientí!ca (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación y Ediciones Doce Calles, !""(), )$!.

HSNS4004_04.indd 525 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 2 6 | C A M P R U B Í

agricultural traits were directly related to productivity. ,us, the classi-cation put the political economy of rice production and consumption inside botanical and genetic research.84

From !")$ to !"$#, the EAS sta& included two agronomy engineers, at least one agricultural expert, an expert in the chemical sciences, at least two research assistants, a foreman, and a team of planters that was hired seasonally (although, as shown below, the EAS used producers as planters).85 Although these research-ers and their assistants had a variety of functions at the EAS, such as research on fertilizers, insecticides, and industrial uses of rice, it was the breeding and distribution of new varieties that de Ansorena and his team were most proud of and published most widely. ,ey were constantly testing di&erent varieties and negotiating their distribution with rice producers. According to de Ansorena, varieties bred at the EAS were to be preferred to imported ones. Even though he had traveled to Italy in !")% to buy #+,+++ kg of new seeds, he showed that out of about #++ varieties imported from abroad in two decades from the !"#+s onwards, only a few had actually been adopted by planters.86 ,ere were two main reasons for this alleged unsuitability of foreign varieties: -rst, there were di.culties in adapting foreign grains to the Spanish soil and climate; second, there were problems in adapting foreign varieties to Spaniards’

/). Already in the !"#+s Font de Mora had acknowledged that “unapologetically arti-cial classi-cations” of rice varieties were becoming mainstream all over the world (De Mora, El arroz (ref. $#), !"). One of these classi-cations was available in Carrasco García, Compendio arrocero (ref. )!), ))&. In !"$%, de Ansorena’s classi-cation took into account the age of the varieties, their homogeneity, and their adaptive capacity and graded varieties from zero to four according to -ve partial evaluations: vegetative characteristics of the plant (the highest grade being given to short cycle and 'ourishing in late July); size and morphology of the plant (rewarding short stems, -ne straws, and high germination); morphology and biometry of the panicle; form and length of the grain (and their capacity to meet demand and behavior in the mill); and, lastly, resistance to plagues. De Ansorena, “Las variedades” (ref. ((), !!).

/$. Data obtained from the following INIA sta& documents: “Auxiliares de laboratorio, des-tinos !"$!”; “Auxiliares de laboratorio, bajas !"$%”; “Auxiliares de laboratorio, excedencias !"$%”; “Especialistas en ciencias químicas, destinos año !"$)”; “Auxiliares de laboratorio, destinos !"$)”; all in AGA (!!), !.!$, Box (!/+"+((.

/(. ,e Italian varieties Balilla and Stirpe !#( had made their way directly into the Spanish landscape; others had -rst received modi-cation at EAS. Jefe del Servicio Nacional del Trigo (Gómez Trenor) to Ministro de Agricultura, % Sep !")%, AGA (!!), !.+#, Box (!/+!*!/. Of course, Spain’s commercial relations with the Axis diminished from !")# onwards. In the -rst years of World War II, the EAS sent samples of rice seeds to other stations around the world, including Portugal, Switzerland, and India. See, for instance, Director General de Agricultura to Director General de Comercio y Política Arancelaria,” #! Jan !")+, AGA (!!), !.+#, Box (!/+!*!/.

HSNS4004_04.indd 526 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 2 7

views about productivity and quality. National rice performed better.87 With this autarkic approach to rice, from !"#$ to !"$% geneticists working at the EAS had developed and tested over %++ new varieties and distributed the successful ones among producers. ,e EAS’s seed distribution service stopped in !"$% as a result of agricultural recovery and liberalization.88 In the meantime, the seeds distributed to planters by the EAS increased from *)+,!%# kg in !")+ to !,("%,!$$ in !")%, %,$#!,")$ in !")(, and over three million kilograms of seeds from !")/ onwards.89

ON E G RAI N, ON E NATION

,e original, albeit modest, scienti-c research conducted at the EAS not only was strongly linked to agricultural production, but also, and more particularly, was completely dependent on the vertical integration of Spanish rice production and distribution, which, in turn, was fed by research on seeds. Rather than depending on a large budget, the EAS’s successes depended on the state orga-nization.90 ,e FSAAE relied on the EAS for acquiring the seeds it distributed among its associates.91 Both organizations announced jointly the new seed dis-tribution service in December !"#" in a 'yer sent to regional Unions in which Rodríguez-Roda explained prices and how to order seeds and de Ansorena de-scribed the di&erent varieties o&ered.92 In exchange, the EAS used the FSAAE

/*. De Ansorena, “Las variedades” (ref. ((): "/–"". A complete list of the %)# imported variet-ies is found on pages %!)–%$, most of them coming from Italy and Portugal, but also from the U.S. and the Soviet Union. ,ey were obtained through the international FAO catalogue.

//. Only in !"($ was the seed service restarted by the EAS, and then in a very di&erent situ-ation. Editorial, “Un lustro del Servicio de Semillas,” Boletín Arroz !!, no. #/ (!"*!).

/". FSAAE, Memoria (ref. )+): /*–/". "+. I have found records for the EAS’s budgets only for !")+–!")%. In !")+, out of a total of

),#"$,$++ pesetas at the INIA’s disposal, the EAS was granted #+,+++ pesetas. In !")!, when the INIA had (,+#$,$++ pesetas, %,"+#,+++ went to experimental stations and )$,+++ to the EAS. See Presidencia INIA, “Presupuesto INIA,” %( Dec !")+; Presidencia INIA, “Presupuesto INIA !")%,” %# Jan !")%, both in AGA (!!), !.*, Box (!/+)+*%.

"!. In !")* de Ansorena explained (in a paper originally published in New Orleans in the Spanish-speaking journal, Arroz) that the FSAAE had $#,)(# members divided in eighty-six regional unions. Álvaro de Ansorena y Saenz de Jubera, “Organización arrocera de España,” El agrario levantino !#, no. !$* (!")*): !!–!#.

"%. Francisco Ramón Rodríguez-Roda and Álvaro de Ansorena, “Servicio de Semillas” (Va-lencia and Sueca: Ministerio de Agricultura, !/ Dec !"#") (this is a one-page announcement signed by these two authors from Valencia and Sueca respectively, paid for by the Ministry of Agriculture, and distributed among planters).

HSNS4004_04.indd 527 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 2 8 | C A M P R U B Í

to -ll the country with the hybrid varieties they thought best suited for the nation. Moreover, it used the -elds of the FSAAE’s landowners for testing and multiplying its hybrid varieties, which allowed the EAS to test many di&erent varieties at the same time for up to twenty-one generations, something that was normally beyond the scope of any commercial breeder, let alone farmer. ,is made state geneticists’ hybrid varieties unique. Figure $ accompanies de Ansorena’s narration of this in-terconnectedness of genetic research and the corporate state.

FIG. 5 Owing to the integration of the Rice Station of Sueca into the vertical union, the entire national crop could be derived, if desired, from a single hybrid grain. Source: De Ansorena, “Las variedades de arroz” (ref. 66), 189.

HSNS4004_04.indd 528 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 2 9

,e -gure shows how the links between the EAS and the vertical union transformed the theoretical possibilities o&ered by “genealogical” selection into practical realities. At the top, de Ansorena explains, stands a single grain, either a hybrid obtained at the laboratory by arti-cial fertilization (as shown in Fig. #) or an individual selected for improvement. ,e grain grows up into the plant of the -rst generation (F!), the “mother.” It germinates and produces seeds for the next generation (F%). F% plants grow in small containers at the EAS. From them the EAS researchers select the individuals with the desired characters. After the self-pollination of these plants, researchers divide the resulting grains into groups of about twenty-seven seeds and grow them in several concrete breeding plots. ,ey then choose those with the best results (F#). ,e diagonal line in the image that goes out from F# represents seeds saved for preservation of the variety. At this point, the plants occupy small nurseries of two square meters that produce around !.$ kg of seeds each. ,ose seeds grow into the next generation (F)), which goes into the -eld of around #%+ square meters belong-ing to the EAS. Researchers test the plants of generation F) to see if they satisfy the requirements desired in the new variety. If they do, their o&spring will grow into F$ and reproduce themselves in -elds controlled by the EAS but actually belonging to the Federation of Rice Planters. ,e EAS’s institutional position within the vertical union makes this step possible.

Álvaro de Ansorena continues: ,e Federation gives the seeds to specialized planters with well-regarded lands, in particular those of the Sellent region, fa-mous for producing quality seeds. ,ese planters produce the “-rst multiplica-tion” of the variety, which requires about four hectares and produces twenty-four tons. Technicians at the EAS, at the Federation of Planters, and at the Phytopa-thology Station (also part of the INIA) oversee the harvest in order to ensure that everything has been done correctly. ,e resulting seeds, after having been sampled and tested by the EAS’s researchers, are packed in sealed bags certi-ed by the FSAAE. ,ey undergo a “second multiplication” (F() in larger but well-suited terrains chosen by the FSAAE. Finally, the resulting grain is supplied by the Federation at a -xed price to those planters who request it. Although rice planters do not need to renew their seeds yearly, it is in their best interest to acquire improved varieties often because varieties can degenerate in the -eld.93

"#. ,e causes, even when the genetic material was homogeneous, could range from spontane-ous crossing with neighboring plants to changes in climatic or nutritional conditions. Antonio Tinarelli, El arroz (Madrid: Mundi-Prensa, !"/"), %+/.

HSNS4004_04.indd 529 10/11/10 10:38 AM

5 3 0 | C A M P R U B Í

On ($,+++ hectares, F* would ideally produce #*$,+++ tons of homogenous grain to be processed for consumption.94

In the words of de Ansorena that supply the title of this paper and that, inevitably, remind us of the motto “One, Great, Free” with which the Federa-tion engraved the chest of rice they gave to Franco, “one can see that, starting with a single grain and discounting the time spent on its selection and testing, the entire national crop can descend from that grain in just -ve years.”95 All the nation’s rice could in principle be the homogenous result of a grain scienti--cally prepared at the EAS and vertically distributed by the FSAAE. ,e most striking materialization of this possibility was the hybrid Colusa x Nano, which yielded an impressive increase in productivity (up to *,+++ kg/hectare, while the average Spanish production was about ),+++ kg/hectare). ,e hybrid was obtained in !"#( and its distribution begun after its stabilization eleven years later, in !")*. It was so successful among rice producers that, by !"$!, it amounted to *$ percent of the total Spanish rice production.96 Colusa x Nano was as much a technoscienti-c object, a laboratory artifact, as it was a com-modity for Spanish autarkic political economy.97

"). De Ansorena, “Las variedades” (ref. ((), !/*–"+."$. Ibid., %!!."(. Ibid., !*). An important share of rice was occupied by another EAS hybrid, “Precoz

verde.” See also G. López Campos, G. Ballesteros, J. Castells, and J. A. Batalla, Variedades de arroz cultivadas en España (Valencia: FSAAE, !"*!). ,ese levels of homogeneity were higher than those achieved by state-related services of rice seed distribution in other countries at around the same period; see van Der Eng, “Development of Seed-Fertilizer Technology in Indonesian Rice Agri-culture,” and Maat, Science Cultivating Practice (ref. $)); for the United States, see Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: "e Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, #'$,–,((( (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, !"//), ((–"+; for Britain, see Paolo Palladino, “Science, Technology and the Economy: Plant Breeding in Great Britain, !"%+–!"*+,” Economic History Review )", no. ! (!""(): !!(–#(; for a comparative study of Germany, Soviet Russia, and the U.S., see Michael Flitner, “Genetic Geographies: A Historical Comparison of Agrarian Modernization and Eugenic ,ought in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States,” Geoforum #) (%++#): !*$–/$. ,e slogan “one grain, one nation” becomes, therefore, an example of the right-wing “high modernism” (or “reactionary modernism”), denounced by Scott as the marriage between science’s “imperialism” and the state, which pushes for simplifying nature with its conquest by laboratory products (in our case, seeds). James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, !""/), %(%–#+(; Je&rey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and "ird Reich (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, !"/)).

"*. We can apply Wieland’s words to these rice hybrids: “Oscillating between these two mean-ings, i.e., scienti-c vs. commercial object, cereals and other crop varieties served as a means for the academic breeder to mediate between the world of scienti-c theory and agricultural practice.” Wieland, “Scienti-c ,eory” (ref. !%), #"".

HSNS4004_04.indd 530 10/11/10 10:38 AM

O N E G R A I N , O N E N AT I O N | 5 3 1

Álvaro de Ansorena, however, did not mean that the EAS’s -rst priority was to actually unify the entire national crop. Besides the successful Colusa x Nano, eleven other varieties were also being distributed in !"$%, often with special regional demands in mind.98 ,e single grain in the graph is of no speci-c variety. Rather, the graph shows a new possibility for the science and economy of agriculture provided by the new organizational scheme of rice production, distribution, and research. De Ansorena was telling his readers (and patrons) that the EAS possessed an enormous capacity to obtain and e.ciently distrib-ute new varieties of rice. ,e pursuit of autarky entailed the creation of a new structure, within which the laboratory occupied a key position, and which, through the many branches of a vertically integrated state, allowed levels of standardization of seeds and practices otherwise di.cult to conceive.

ACKNOWLE DG M E NTS

The research for this paper was possible thanks to two short-term research fellow-ships from the Institute of European Studies at UC Berkeley and from the UCLA Department of History. I warmly thank Norton Wise and Tiago Saraiva for the invalu-able help and insights they have offered me, as well as Soraya de Chadarevian for her comments. I also sincerely thank the two anonymous reviewers for their many constructive criticisms.

"/. De Ansorena, “Las variedades” (ref. ((), %*). A good example of this concern for regional peculiarities is provided by the Guadalquivir marsh, which became an area for rice production in the midst of the Civil War as a way of providing rice for the army led by Franco. Álvaro de Ansorena, “El cultivo del arroz en Sevilla,” Agricultura !%, no. !#* (!")#): #"%–"$.

HSNS4004_04.indd 531 10/11/10 10:38 AM