JOURNAL

STUDY

RELIGIONS

IDEOLOGIES

for theof&EDITOR:

Sandu FRUNZA, B.B.U.

EXECUTIVE EDITORS:Michael JONESTemple UniversityMihaela FRUNZAB.B.U.

MEMBERS:Diana COTRAU, B.B.U.Codruta CUCEU, B.B.U.Alina BRANDA, B.B.U.Nicu GAVRILUTA, U. Al. I Cuza, IasiAna-Elena ILINCA, B.B.U.Petru MOLDOVAN, B.B.U.Adonis VIDU, Emanuel Univ.Adrian COSTACHE, B.B.U.

MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:Horatiu CRISANLiviu POP (html version)

ADVISORY BOARD

Aurel CODOBAN, B.B.U.Aziz AL-AZMEHAmerican University of BeirutIoan BIRIS, West Univ., TimisoaraIoan CHIRILA, B.B.U.Teodor DIMA, U. Al. I Cuza, IasiMichael FINKENTHAL, HebrewUniversity of JerusalemLinda FISHERCentral European Univ., BudapestMircea FLONTA, U. BucharestLadislau GYEMANT, B.B.U.

• No. 7 • spring 2004

Edited by S.C.I.R.I. & SACRIhttp://www.sacri.ro

ISSN: 1583-0039

Zev HARVEYHebrew University of JerusalemMoshe IDELHebrew University of JerusalemAdrian-Paul ILIESCU, U. BucharestMarius JUCAN, B.B.U.Ioan-Vasile LEB, B.B.U.Mircea MICLEA, B.B.U.Adrian MIROIU, SNSPA, BucharestCamil MURESANU, B.B.U.Toader NICOARA, B.B.U.Dorothy NOYES

Ohio State UniversityLiliana POPESCU, CEPDan RATIU, B.B.U.Traian ROTARIU, B.B.U.SALAT Levente, B.B.U.Leonard SWIDLERTemple UniversityPeter van der VEERUniv. of UtrechtLeon VOLOVICIHebrew University of JerusalemVERESS Carol, B.B.U.

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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

PETER VAN DER VEER

Transnational Religion; Hindu and Muslim Movements • 4

LEONARD SWIDLER

Toward a universaldeclaration of a global ethic • 19

JOHANNES MICHAEL SCHNARRER

The challenge of the globalization of the worldeconomy or - is the social and ecological misery inthe so called Third World something of our con-cern? • 46

ANTON CARPINSCHI, ANDREI ILAS

Criza politica si constructia institutionalademocratica. O analiza comparata a douazeci si opt deconstitutiiPolitical Crisis and the Democratic InstitutionalConstruction.A Compared Analysis of Twenty-eight Constitu-tions • 54

EMIL MOISE

Relatia Stat-Biserica în privinta educatieireligioase în scolile publice din RomâniaChurch-State Relation in the Religious Educationin Romanian Public Schools • 77

DMITRY A. GOLOVUSHKIN

On the issue of religious tolerance in modernRussia: national identity and religion • 101

MARINA GASKOVA

The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shap-ing the Political Culture of Russia • 111

FUAD B. ALIYEV

Framing Perceptions of Islam and the ‘IslamicRevival’ in the Post-Soviet Countries • 123

J. C. ACHIKE AGBAKOBA

Traditional African Political Thought and the Cri-sis of Governance in Contemporary African Soci-eties • 137

BÜLENT ÖZDEMIR

Political Use of Conversion in the NineteenthCentury Ottoman Context: Some Cases FromSalonica • 155

LILIYA SAZONOVA

The role of interfaith dialogue in the process ofprotection and implementation of Human Rights• 170

ION CORDONEANU

O radiografie necesara – Ortodoxie si GlobalizareA Necessary Radiography: Orthodoxy andGlobalisation • 182

Con

tents

3J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

SCIRI CONFERENCES

MARIUS JUCAN

Secularizare/ desecularizare. Un rezumat deetapa

Secularization/ De-secularization • 192

BOOK REVIEWS

VASILE CATALIN BOBB

C. G. Jung, Opere complete. Arhetipurile siinconstientul colectivC. G. Jung, Complete Works. Archetypes andCollective Unconsciousness • 204

AUREL BUMBAS-VOROBIOV

Stefan Iloaie, Nae Ionescusi ortodoxia românaStefan Iloaie, Nae Ionescu and the RomanianOrthodoxy • 206

RALUCA CIURCANU

Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives. Modernity andIts Outcasts • 208

SANDU FRUNZA

Ioan Chirila, Fragmentarium exegetic filonian II.Nomothetica. Repere exegetice la Decalog • 210

OTILIA HERMAN

Bryan Wilson, Religia din perspectiva sociologicaBryan Wilson, Religion. A Sociological Perspective• 212

CHRISTIAN SCHUSTER

Constantin Radulescu-Motru, Scrieri PoliticeConstantin Radulescu-Motru, Political Writings •217

SANDU FRUNZA

Leonard Swidler, Dupa absolut. Viitorul dialogic alreflectiei religioaseLeonard Swidler, After the Absolute. The dialogi-cal future of religious reflection • 224

AUREL CODOBAN

Gal Laszlo, Societate si LogicitateGal Laszlo, Logic and Society • 226

4J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

Peter van der Veer

Transnational Religion;Hindu and Muslim Movements

This paper deals with transnational Hindu and Muslim

movements. It rejects the common assertion that migrant

communities are conservative in religious and social mat-

ters by arguing that ‘traditionalism’ requires considerable

ideological creativity that transforms previous practices and

discourses considerably. It suggests instead that religious

movements, active among migrants, develop cosmopolitan

projects that can be viewed as alternatives to the cosmo-

politanism of the European Enlightenment. This raises a

number of challenges concerning citizenship, integration

and political loyalty for governmentality in the nation-states

in which these cosmopolitan projects are carried out. The

paper suggests that instead of looking at religious migrants

as at best conservative and at worst terrorist one should

perhaps pay some attention to the creative moments in

human responses to new challenges and new environ-

ments.

1. Introduction

Religion is a conceptual category that, like similarcategories such as ‘culture’ and ‘ritual’ and ‘society’, or-ganizes understandings of social practices in a novelway from the beginning of the 19th century (Asad 1993,van der Veer 2001). As a modern category it emergestogether with nationalism as an ideology in discoursesthat oppose the ‘modern’ to the ‘traditional’. Theoriesthat emphasize the trans-historical universality of ‘reli-gion’ and the particular historicity of the nation under-estimate the extent to which the nation form isuniversalised in modern history and determines the lo-cation of religion. Societies assume the nation-form inthe historical transformation that we refer to as ‘moder-nity’ and it is this form that determines what is under-stood as the religious or the secular. This assertion is

PETER VAN DER VEER

Professor of ComparativeReligion, University ofUtrecht. His most recentbook in English is Impe-rial Encounters: Religion,Nation, and Empire.

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not a re-phrasing of the secularisation-thesis since thereis not much evidence for the disappearance of religionor its marginality in public life in most societies. Rather,it emphasises the importance of the nation-state for thelocation and nature of religion. Again, theories, such asthose of Durkheim or of recent authors like Gellner andAnderson, that argue that religion is replaced by nation-alism neglect the continuing importance of nationalizedreligion in modern identity.(Anderson 1991, Bellah1973, Gellner 1983). In Western Europe, at least, de-nominational differences are not completely obliteratedin the process of national unification, but they are oftenhierarchically ‘encompassed’ (to use Louis Dumont’sterm) as forms of national identity (Dumont 1980). Thisencompassment is in many plural societies expressed inwell-worn slogans, such as ‘unity in diversity’. In themodern nation-state religious difference does not im-mediately have to lead to questions of loyalty to the na-tion, although, as we shall see, this continues to be adelicate issue in relation to immigrant minorities thatpractice religions that seem difficult to assimilate.

Nation and trans-nation belong together in a moreintimate way than is often realized. (van der Veer 1995)Processes of globalisation have been intrinsic to pro-cesses of state-formation both in colonizing and colo-nized societies. This is not taken sufficiently into ac-count in theories of globalisation that posit thedissolution of the nation-state today as a consequenceof the development of trans-national governance andthe global economy. In fact, from the 19th century na-tions have been formed as a consequence of transfor-

mations in the world-system. The fundamental changesthat we see over the past few decades, undeniably, dohave important consequences for the political and eco-nomic capacities of nation-states, but they do certainlynot imply the dissolving of this societal form. It is im-portant to remain aware of the great variation of stateformation in the world and the variable effects of globalcapitalist transformations on the nation-state system. Atthe same time there can be little doubt that human in-teraction networks increasingly operate on a global scale(Mann 1999) One of the most important transforma-tions we can point at is that of what is called ‘the deathof distance’, the idea being that communications in thebroad sense (including telecommunications and trans-port) have brought everyone closer to everyone. Mi-grant communities at the end of the 20th century arethus different from those at the end of the 19th century,because telephone, inter-net, television and airplanebring them not only closer to home, but also to mem-bers of the community in other places. Instead of form-ing singular migrant communities that try to keep intouch with home they become diasporic networks witha multiplicity of nodes. Moreover, there is a global pro-duction of the imagination of ‘home’ in media like tele-vision and cinema which affects both migrants andthose who stay behind. The cultural distance with thetraditions of ‘home’ can therefore not beconceptualised in the same ways as before. The notionof ‘culture’ itself has become increasingly problematicsince it is hard to localize in discrete communitieswithin bounded territories (van der Veer 1997)

KEY WORDS:

nation-state, trans-nationalism, Hindu,Muslim, migrants,identity, orientalistimagination, tradition,globali-sation, cosmo-politanism

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The general observations that I have made here aremeant to be introductory to the issues I want to addressin this paper. The first issue is that of the relation be-tween nation-states, nationalism and migrant religiouscommunities. The second is that of the so-called reli-gious conservatism of migrant communities. The final isthat of alternative cosmopolitanisms. These issues arerelated in the perspective presented here, but can be dis-entangled for analytical purposes. My examples concernmainly transnational Muslim and Hindu communities.

2. Nation, Migration and Religion

An important issue often raised in relation to mi-grant religious communities is that of political loyalty toeither the nation-state of immigration or the nation-state of origin. Before the rise of the nation-state in Eu-rope this was an issue that was raised not in relation tomigration, but to religious minorities. The Europeanwars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-ries were fought around the question of political loyalty:Can one be loyal to the state when one is not followingthe religion of the state? As Hobbes and other politicalthinkers realized, it was the nature of the state that wasat issue here. One outcome of the political revolutionsin America and France of the late eighteenth centurywas that political loyalty could rest on citizenship in-stead of membership in the state church. This develop-ment led ultimately, for example in nineteenth-centuryBritain, to the ‘secular’ idea of the enfranchisement of

the Roman Catholics and of dissenting minorities.Therefore the definition of citizenship and its connec-tion not only to rights and obligations but also to cul-tural notions and practices of belonging and communitybecome crucial. 1

One of the central elements in the debate in Europeabout the integration of migrant communities, and es-pecially Muslims, in society is the question of politicalloyalty. Were in the nineteenth century Roman Catho-lics in Protestant countries like Britain or Holland oftenaccused of being loyal to ‘the pope in Rome’, Muslimstoday are either accused of being loyal to Mecca (and re-ceive money from the Saudis) or to their nation-statesof origin. In the Netherlands, where around 700.000Muslims (less than 3 percent of the population) live, arecent report of the Internal Security Agency (BVD) ar-gues that mosques which are supported from ‘outside’are forces which work against the integration of Mus-lims in Dutch society. Suspicions that Muslim migrantshave their loyalties elsewhere has, obviously, beenstrongly reinforced by the terrorist assault on the USAof September 11, 2001. The fact that there are terroristnetworks of radical Muslims operating in many Westernsocieties is justifiably seen as a threat to the security ofthese nation-states. Moreover, the enthusiasm shownby some Muslim youngsters for the actions of BinLaden has been highly publicised and discussed as anunacceptable provocation to the nation-state andthrown doubts on their loyalty. In the Netherlands thedecision of some Moroccan newspaper-sellers in No-vember 2001 to stop distributing a newspaper that had

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a Quranic quotation in Arabic on its cover threw fur-ther doubt on Muslim participation in what the Dutchthemselves perceive to be an open society. In debatesabout religious points of view Muslim citizens are regu-larly requested to show their allegiance to Dutch normsand values, and to the laws of the land. Some of this issimply a juridical demand connected to citizenship, butit does single Muslims out. There is discernible moralpanic that transcends the language of rights and obliga-tions .The general idea behind this anxiety is expressedby the political philosopher Charles Taylor, who arguesthat “secularism in some form is necessary for thedemocratic life of religiously diverse societies”.2 Startingwith John Stuart Mill liberal thinkers have felt that reli-gion is likely to be a threat to freedom and democracy.3

Muslims in particular have often been portrayed as fa-natically pursuing the imposition of Islamic values onnon-Muslims. In Western Europe it was the burning ofcopies of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses that hasdone more than anything else to reinforce the image ofintolerant Islam and to highlight the conflict betweenliberal conceptions of citizenship and religious concep-tions of collective action in the public sphere.4

Besides this general, secularist unease with the roleof public religion in the nation-state there is the prob-lem of dual citizenship and the role of religion in trans-national linkages. Turks and Moroccans in the Nether-lands are often still citizens in their nation-states oforigin. For both Turkey and Morocco the loyalty oftheir transnational communities continues to be of cru-cial economic and political importance. These states

make concerted efforts to control the appointment ofreligious officials, such as imams, in the migrant com-munities, because it is religion that ties these migrants tothe nation.5 Moreover, these states have a vested inter-est in controlling the education of such officials. Onecould speak of transnational state policies not only ineconomic and political matters, but also in religiousones. Migrant communities, therefore, have to negotiatethe religious policies of both the nation of immigrationand the nation of origin.

Questions of multiple citizenship and religion havegained priority on the European political agenda. Hy-phenated identities, which have become of great impor-tance in identity politics in the US, are now also increas-ingly important in Europe and Asia. To illustrate thisdevelopment and to demonstrate that transnational reli-gious movements are crucial in it I want to examine thecase of India.

India has seen the emergence of a special kind ofhyphenated identity: the non-resident Indian (NRI).The Foreign Exchange Regulations Act of 1973 in-cludes in this category: 1. citizens of India living abroadfor the purpose of carrying on a business or career, butdeclaring their intention to stay in India for an indefiniteperiod. 2. Persons of Indian origin holding a passport ofanother country. One is of Indian origin if one has heldan Indian passport, or if either of the parents or grand-parents was Indian. The wife of a person of Indian ori-gin is held to be of Indian origin too. Citizenship norresidence are thus the criteria for deciding who belongsto this category, but ‘origin’ is and in that sense it has

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much in common with the German genealogical defini-tion according to which migrant communities in East-ern Europe belong to the German nation and have theright to return to Germany. One reason for the Indianstate to create this category is to raise foreign exchange,since NRIs are allowed to deposit money in Indianbanks with competitive, guaranteed rates of interest.However, I would suggest that the main reason is noteconomic, but political. It is striking that it is not thelower-class migrant labourers in the Gulf region whoare the primary targets of this policy, although they areamong the migrants by far the most important eco-nomic actors in terms of remittances and other effectson the Indian economy. It is also not the older migrantcommunities of indentured labourers and their descen-dants or even the older merchant communities thatform the target of this policy. Rather it is the newHindu middle-class professional and entrepreneurial mi-grant in especially the USA that forms an important fo-cus for Indian politics. In 1998 the Hindu nationalistBharatiya Janata Party (BJP) proposed further changes,such as the introduction of a PIO card (Person of In-dian origin) with a number of benefits attached to it. In2001 the Indian Government, led by the BJP, an-nounced the appointment of an ambassador at large forNRIs and PIOs in the embassy in Washington. It isironic that a party that derives so much of its politicalgains from a campaign which stigmatises the indigenousMuslim community as ‘foreign” is so interested in Indi-ans who actually live in foreign lands. Such Indians areprimarily perceived as Hindus and Hindu nationalism

mobilizes large groups of Hindu migrants all over theworld. “Achievements” like the nuclear explosions of1998, for example, enhanced enthusiasm under the non-resident Indians (NRIs) in the USA . The announce-ment of international sanctions against India led to suc-cessful fundraising by the Indian government underNRIs in the USA. Transnational investment, globalpolitics and the cultural capital of ‘belonging’ go hand inhand here.6

In his impressive work on the network societyManuel Castells argues that while the legitimizing iden-tities of the state are declining in the information age,resistance identities and project identities (aiming at to-tal societal transformation) are on the rise. In his view,these identities are produced by social movementswhich react against three fundamental threats: “global-ization, which dissolves the autonomy of institutions,organizations and communication systems wherepeople live. Reaction against networking and flexibility.which blur the boundaries of membership and involve-ment, individualize social relationships of production,and induce the structural instability of work, space, andtime. And reaction against the crisis of the patriarchalfamily. at the roots of the transformation of mecha-nisms of security building, socialization, sexuality, andtherefore of personality systems. When the world be-comes too large to be controlled, social actors aim atshrinking it back to their size and reach.”7 Castells’ ob-servations are useful, but, at the same time, things looksomewhat different when one examines Indian socialmovements with a global reach. I want to look at two of

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them, one Hindu, the other Muslim, but both originat-ing in India.

The Vishva Hindu Parishad, founded in 1964 byleaders of the militant Hindu nationalist organizationRashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hinduguru Swami Chinmayanand, is a Hindu revivalist move-ment which simultaneously tries to reach out globally toall Hindus in the world and mobilize Hindus in Indiafor anti-Muslim politics.8 The most important action ofthe VHP has been in the period 1984 to 1992 to mobi-lize Hindus for the destruction of the Babri Masjid inAyodhya, a mosque allegedly built on a Hindu site. Notonly has this action reached its target of destroying the16th century mosque it also has made the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP), a political party allied to both VHPand RSS, the largest party in India. The issue of buildinga temple for the God Rama on the site of the destroyedtemple continues to be raised by the VHP especiallyduring major elections.

What concerns us here are the contradictory facesof the VHP. On the one hand, the VHP is clearly amovement that promotes Hindu nationalism with ananti-secular and anti-Muslim slant and as such it is amovement that continues much of the religious nation-alist rhetoric and methods of such movements since thelate 19th century. It resists westernization and globaliza-tion in so far as they are portrayed as ‘foreign’ threats tothe basic Hindu values of the Indian nation. Muslims asa community signify the ‘foreign’ as ‘the enemy within’.Ideologically, they are portrayed as ‘converts’, havingtheir allegiance outside of India. The VHP argues that

they do not belong to India, but to Pakistan or toArabia and have thus to be either religiously purified byre-conversion to Hinduism or ethnically cleansed byforced emigration.

On the other hand, the VHP is a movement that isvery active globally and one of the prime agents of theglobalization of Hinduism. In the USA it is active since1974, following sizable immigration from India. Theanti-Muslim politics which is central to its activities inIndia, does not make much sense in the USA. Anti-globalization rhetoric which emphasizes restrictions onforeign capital flowing into Indian companies is con-spicuously absent from the VHP propaganda in theUSA and rightly so, since its supporters there are stron-gly in favor of the liberalization and globalization of theeconomy. As NRIs they have also direct personal ad-vantage in the free flow of capital. The focus of theVHP in the USA is, as with many religious movementsglobally, on the family. The great fear of Indian mi-grants to the USA is perhaps not so much the threat tothe patriarchal nature of the Hindu family, since manyof these migrants are well-educated professionals andboth men and women are income-earners. Rather, it isthe struggle to reproduce Hindu culture in a foreignenvironment in order to socialize their children into thehybridity of Indian-Americans. The fear is often thatthe children will lose all touch with the culture of theparents and thus, in some sense, be lost to them. BothInternet-chatgroups and youth camps are organised bythe VHP to keep Hinduism alive among young Indiansin the USA. As Arvind Rajagopal rightly observes, the

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VHP needs different tactics, different objectives in dif-ferent places in order to be able to recruit members. InIndia it is a nationalist movement, but in the US it is aglobal religious movement.9 Arjun Appadurai’s work onglobalization has reminded us consistently how impor-tant it is to keep these disjunctures and differences inglobal flows in view.10

The VHP has benefited from the great success ofthe serialization of the religious epic Ramayana between1987 and 1988 on Doordarshan, Indian national televi-sion. It not only became the most popular program everseen on Indian television but also turned out to be a so-cial and political event of great significance. The esti-mated daily viewership was 40 to 60 million, while some80 to 100 million people watched the most popular epi-sodes. Newspaper reports say that Indian life ground toa standstill at the time of the broadcast. Hindus all overthe country watched with a religious attitude, having infact a darshan, a vision of the sacred. on durdarshan,television. Put on twenty-six videocassettes it becameavailable for worldwide sale. The VHP not only ben-efited from this, but used itself also actively media, suchas video-cassettes, for purposes of propaganda. TheHindu nationalist movement uses a combination of me-dia strategies to promote their views both in India andabroad among the NRIs.11

In the context of current essentialist thinking aboutIslamic politics it is interesting to contrast the VHP, ahighly political Hindu religious movement with a Mus-lim movement, originating in India, which is explicitly a-political. This is the Tablighi Jama’at, a Muslim revivalist

movement founded in Delhi in the 1920s, but globallyspread, especially in areas of Indo-Pakistani migration,such as Britain, USA, Canada, France, Belgium, Ger-many, South Africa and Morocco.12 This is now thelargest transnational Islamic movement, in scale andscope only comparable to Christian Pentecostalism.Marc Gaborieau describes its modus operandi suc-cinctly: “the invitation (tabligh) to Islam is not the affairof religious specialists, but the responsibility of all Mus-lims who must devote their time and money to it; oneshould not wait for people to come to hear the preach-ing, but ether preachers should travel to reach thepeople; preaching is done by self-financing itinerantgroups; the mingling of all social classes is obligatorywithin these groups; the primary objective is to deepenthe faith of those who are already Muslims, proselytismtoward non-Muslims being marginal; and the promo-tion of the unity of Muslims being a primary objective,theological as well as political controversies are prohib-ited inside the movement”.13 The tablighis, then, resem-ble some of the Christian evangelical movements whichsummon their fellow-believers to wake-up and be faith-ful.

The tablighis are professedly a-political and this is avery deliberate stance. In that sense they do not resistany particular state or political formation. Instead theyhave a project in the way Manuel Castells defines it, anobjective of total transformation of society not by thestate but by social actors without political mediation.For the social scientist it makes no sense to call this a-political, since it clearly has political effects. Rather it is

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anti-statist and not involved in democratic politics. Inthat sense it is, obviously, crucial for the tablighis tostate that they are neither interested in the state nor inpolitics. It enables them to work in a great variety ofstates, both Islamic and non-Islamic, without cominginto open conflict with them. The aim of total transfor-mation, however, does conflict in an indirect way withstate-policies of assimilation and multiculturalism, sincethey promote religious enclaves of correct beliefs andbehaviour.

It is fascinating to see that this truly global move-ment which can only be understood in terms of globallabour migration is very much opposed to modern me-dia of communication, like television, cassettes and vid-eos, internet, such as are used almost by any other glo-bal movement of this kind. This resistance toglobalization and to Information and CommunicationTechnologies (ICTs) is quite exceptional amongtransnational Islamic movements. In fact, according to arecent argument by Eickelman and Anderson, atransnational Muslim public sphere is being opened upthrough the use of Information and CommunicationTechnologies.14 The tablighis do not conform to thistrend. The method of communication is oral and theexpansion of the movement works through face-to-faceencounters and the movement of groups who preach.Despite the first impression of an extremely looselyorganised network of groups, there is in fact a clearhierarchy of command, centering on Delhi, but the apexof it is hardly penetrable for outsiders.

Both these movements, the VHP and the TablighiJama’at, operate globally but have different strategies,aims and objectives in different locales simultaneously.The VHP, however, continues to emphasize the inter-mediate, national level, while this level has an ideologi-cally reduced significance for tablighis who stress thetransnational unity of Muslims (‘umma). They have in-teresting and contradictory stances towards globaliza-tion, but it is clear that their transnational politics haveimpact on the projects of a number of states to createcivil societies.

3. Religious Conservatism in MigrantCommunities

It is often asserted and sometimes demonstratedthat migrant communities become conservative in reli-gious and social matters. They would do so to retaintheir identity under the pressures of assimilation. More-over, since they are often challenged in a multiculturalenvironment to explain their beliefs and practices theytend to become more aware of them. Such awarenesscan lead to a receptivity towards ideological reificationsthat take cultural and religious elements out of the dailyflow of life and make them into markers of identity in aplural society. This kind of conservatism or reactionarytraditionalism has been observed in a number of mi-grant groups, such as the Dutch Reformed Church mi-grants in Michigan (USA), Canada and Australia. In de-bates about Muslims in Western Europe it is often

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remarked that they tend to be more religiously conser-vative than their kin who have stayed in the countries oforigin. The observation that migrant groups have tobecome more aware of their religion and culture due totheir constant interpellation by ‘established’ communi-ties is undoubtedly correct. It is also valid to assumethat an ideological apologetics, based on a consciousawareness of one’s ‘culture’ in order to be able to de-fend one’s practices, may follow from this. However,such observations should not be interpreted as the‘freezing’ of an otherwise fluid tradition. In fact, ‘tradi-tionalism’ requires immense ideological work that trans-forms previous discursive practices substantially. Workon arguments about Islam in high school discussions inWestern Europe describes in detail how Muslim stu-dents acquire skills to defend their religion and culture,in ways appropriate to the discursive styles in the na-tion-states of immigration. 15 More broadly, migrantgroups are often required to translate their discursivetraditions into the dominant language of the nation ofimmigration in order to educate the generations born inthese new societies.16 This act of translation is crucial inthe transformation of religious tradition. When Hindusand Muslims in the Netherlands begin to speak abouttheir religious specialists and their religious services byusing Protestant Christian vocabulary they are already ina process of transformation, in which pandits andimams provide guidance in spiritual matters and be-come not-yet secularised social workers.

In a recent contribution Olivier Roy distinguishesseveral responses to the migrant situation by Mus-

lims.17 The first is the so-called ‘salafist’ that stressesthe return to an original and authentic Islam, but in do-ing so goes against the ethnicization of Islam. Mosquesin Europe tend to be ‘Moroccan’, Turkish’, ‘Algerian’,‘Bangladeshi’ or otherwise ethnically specific, but thistendency of ethnic division has been rejected as fitna inIslamic thought and the salafists or ‘new fundamental-ists’ make use of this to preach a global Islam tran-scending ethnic and national divisions. The second is aprocess of individualization in which individual beliefinstead of social conformism is the basis of Islamicbehaviour. To be a ‘true’ Muslim is more a personalchoice and a matter of internal conversion than the re-sult of social pressure. It is here that we can understandthe success of such movements as the Tablighi Jama’atsince they produce a kind of ‘born-again’ Muslims.Thirdly, there is the expansion of web-sites where self-appointed experts on Islamic thought and behaviourteach their version. This creates a new sphere of Muslimcommunication and debate in which the traditional in-terpreters of the tradition, the ‘ulama, play a diminishedrole. In this debate, however, it is not ‘liberal Islam’,promoted by such thinkers as the Algerian MuhammadArkoun, which is prevalent. Rather it is the more literal-ist or even fundamentalist arguments that are dominant.Again, these developments do not show conservatism,but quite significant transformations that bring ‘born-again’ Muslims, so to say, in direct conflict with theirown fellow-Muslims who try to continue some of theirethnic-religious practices in a new environment.

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Crucial is the shaping of the public sphere and thedeployment of Islamic arguments in it. An interesting il-lustration of what may happen in the liberal publicsphere is a recent incident in mid-2001 in the Nether-lands. An important news-program on Dutch televisionhad an item on violence against homosexuals by Moroc-can youth gangs. A Moroccan imam in Rotterdam wasinvited to comment in that program and asked what hethought of homosexuality. He stated clearly on televi-sion that homosexuality was regarded as a terrible aber-ration in Islam and that it was a disease that would ulti-mately threaten Dutch society. He indicated in theinterview that violence against homosexuals was forbid-den and that homosexuals should be regarded with pityand treated, but this part of the interview was notbroadcast. Within a few days the media could not stopreporting on the illiberal and unenlightened nature ofIslam and members of parliament started arguing thatthis imam should be brought to justice and possibly ex-tradited. The Dutch Prime Minister made a very strongstatement that Muslim immigrants should conform tothe norms and values of Dutch society. In the media ademand for state intervention in education of imamswas voiced from different sides, forgetting the secularseparation of state and church for a moment. The rapidtransition from a concern about violence to a concernabout religion was striking in the Dutch debate. It is inthis context that imams are appointed as spokesmen fortheir religious community by the Dutch media and pub-lic opinion and in which the understanding of Islam in

both Muslim and non-Muslim public spheres has to bearticulated.

Imams who state publicly that Islam is against ho-mosexual practice are portrayed as conservative in theliberal public sphere. Moreover, since Morocco is acountry which is known in the partly orientalist imagi-nation as a heaven of homosexual and pederast practicefor at least a century there is a further notion that whatis accepted in Morocco is suddenly not anymore accept-able in the Netherlands because of the growing conser-vatism of migrant Muslims.18 This precisely shows thedifference in the understanding of ‘the public’ in Mo-rocco and the Netherlands. In Holland identity move-ments, such as the Gay movement, have after the sixtiesmade great progress in gaining public recognition oftheir sexual identity. A recent culmination of that is thecivil marriage for homosexuals. In Morocco there maybe substantial gay activity, but no public recognition nordebate about it. Gays should be ‘in the closet’ in Moroc-can society (as in fact in most societies) but in Hollandthis is not possible anymore; positions have to be pub-licly stated and are immediately connected to religion.Everything becomes a subject of public debate and theinvitation to that debate is given under special condi-tions and can hardly be refused. In the Netherlands theleaders of Muslim communities were summoned by theMinister of Urban Policy to explain their views on ho-mosexuality in a meeting at his department. The natureof the liberal public sphere is such that religious pointsof view can be primed and framed by the media asmore conservative than in the countries of origin and

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deeply offensive to liberal sensibilities. In such an atmo-sphere religious leaders can be made into ethnic spokes-men.

4. Alternative Cosmopolitanisms

Instead of looking at religious migrants as at bestconservatives and at worst terrorists one should perhapspay some attention to the positive and creative mo-ments in human responses to new challenges and newenvironments. Transnational religious movements arehardly ever seen as instances of cosmopolitanism, sincecosmopolitanism is very positively valued in socialthought. Secularity is a characteristic of the nineteenth-century trope of cosmopolitanism and it continues to beso in current discussions. Religious allegiances are un-derstood as condemning the believer to parochialism,absolutism and a lack of tolerance.19 Given the impor-tance attributed to the notion of cosmopolitanism incurrent discussions of transnationalism and globaliza-tion I want to complicate this perspective. 20 As I haveargued elsewhere, cosmopolitanism as a concept and anethical ideal is not a view from nowhere.21 It has aclear genealogy in the European Enlightenment and inits development into a liberal, progressive ideal in thenineteenth century it connects nationalism with imperi-alism.22 In my view, it was in nineteenth-century Eu-rope always complemented by a Christian cosmopoli-tanism of both the Catholic and the Protestant kind.Missionary movements in nineteenth-century Britain,

for example, created a public awareness of a largerworld beyond Britain and of an imperial duty towardsthe rest of the world. Liberal Cosmopolitanism andEvangelical Cosmopolitanism developed side by side inthe colonial era. Their commonality was well expressedin the phrase “the white man’s burden” which is still be-hind global charitable and developmental activism. Ifopenness and a willingness to engage are characteristicof cosmopolitanism one has to recognize a number ofdifferent projects of engagement with the world. 23

In the contemporary phase of globalization non-western kinds of cosmopolitan engagements with verydifferent genealogies have come up. There are new per-ceptions of ‘home and the world’ at play in a numberof migrations. The postcolonial cities of today show amassive deprovincialization of the world or, as I wouldargue, a new cosmopolitanism. Clifford Geertz ex-presses this with his usual rhetorical flourish: “As theentanglements of everybody with everybody else havegrown in recent times to the point where everyone istripping over everyone’s feet and everyone is everyone’sface, its disruptive power, its capacity to induce doubtsin those who think they have things figured out, taped,under control, rapidly increases. We live in a bazar, nota cathedral; a whirl, not a diagram, and this makes it dif-ficult for anyone anymore to be wholly at ease with hisor her own ideas, no matter how official, no matter howcherished, no matter how plated with certainty”.24

There are a variety of responses to this situation.One of them is indeed non-interference or even indif-ference. Ulf Hannerz argues correctly that this attitude

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is not cosmopolitanism, since it is the attitude of stick-ing to one’s own,. Genuine cosmopolitanism in his viewis a willingness to engage with the Other. The question,however, is what are the conditions and terms ofengagement in today’s global cities. In an essay on thecultural role of world cities Hannerz uses a quotationfrom V.S. Naipaul as his motto: “Cities like Londonwere to change. They were to cease being more or lessnational cities; they were to become cities of the world,modern-day Romes, establishing the pattern of whatgreat cities should be, in the eyes of islanders like myselfand people even more remote in language and culture.They were to be cities visited for learning and elegantgoods and manners and freedom by all the barbarianpeoples of the globe, people of forest and desert, Arabs,Africans, Malays”.25 This is in fact a nineteenth-centuryBritish view in which the cultural engagement is per-ceived as an attempt to uplift the “great unwashed”,now constituted by groups of very different culturalbackgrounds. Naipaul is, of course, one of the great be-lievers in a universal civilization, rooted in the En-lightenment, and not at all sympathetic to the persis-tence of backward cultures, predominantly of what heperceives as an anti-rational religious kind. He is a rep-resentative of liberal cosmopolitanism. But is this theonly possibility of engagement in the global city?

We see in global cities predominantly a culturalengagement within the context of a politics of immigra-tion.26 These cities are a product of the increased mo-bility of capital and labour and they are the sites of newnotions of citizenship and solidarity, but also violence.

27 Particularly interesting are the new social movementsthat mobilize outsiders to gain access to housing, prop-erty, sanitation, health services, education, childcare,employment, and protection. The established respondto these claims by developing more and more elaboratesecurity measures, creating walled enclaves in the city.Ghettos, ethnic neighborhoods, enclaves are the condi-tions of engagement in the global city. Gendered andcommunal identities are newly constructed in the en-counter with the Other which is often anonymous andindifferent, but sometimes violent when spatial mark-ings of identity are violated. Nothing is fixed and settledin the urban space: outsiders today are the establishedof tomorrow and the demands of the globalized net-work society prevent a reflexive life-planning for mostpeople except a tiny elite.28

Much of the cultural engagement in the global citiesin the world is reactive to the enormous dislocations ofmodern flexible capital and labour. People do try tobuild enclaves of communal identity and stake theirclaims to ownership of the city, sometimes violently.Their engagement with the Other is not necessarilypleasant. Nevertheless, I believe that it is in these urbanarenas that new sources of the self, in religious, gender,and political terms, develop. For migrants a vision of abetter life is one of the most important elements in theirmigration. That vision is partly economic, but it is alsoculturally embedded. The urban space of a mega-city isalready invested with a lot of dream-work, to use theFreudian terminology. The imagination of possibility, ofdynamism, of mobility is fed by cinematic productions

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that imbue the real spaces of migrant labour with anaura of virtuality. It is interesting to see how religious vi-sions try to claim these spaces and are confronted withother imaginative claims, both in the own community,and coming from outside. In the case of South Asians,elements of popular culture, such as cricket andBollywood, have become as global as religious culture.It is this popular culture of media and sports, of ‘fun’and leisure, that religious movements have to come toterm with in the urban context. The cosmopolitanismclaimed in cricket and in some movies has to be con-fronted by them. Pnina Werbner cites the famous In-dian Muslim actor Dilip Kumar at a fund raising in Brit-ain for a cancer hospital in Lahore, set up by theimmensely popular cricketer Imran Khan in 1987: “It isan irony, when the world is growing towards not just in-ternationalism but towards universalness, that we arespeaking about nationalities, we are talking about ethnicidentities: we, the people and some leaders of humansociety talk about religion, practisingirreligiousness…Yes, we’ve had too much of this reli-gion. There is but one religion that is preached by all thegospels, by all the sacred books, and that is the decencyof man towards fellow human beings. And I stand herewith that stamp of Indian nationality to support thecause of my brother [Imran Khan] in this exercise inhumanism, universal humanism…”29 Werbner, rightlyargues that this is not anti-Islamic, but in fact a plea fora certain kind of cosmopolitan religion. Such a plea runscounter to other cosmopolitan projects that are carriedby religious movements.

If we thus are looking for a postmodern cosmopoli-tanism it is the global city we have to examine. I, forone, do not want to be restricted by Jean Baudrillard’sdescription of postmodern culture as immediate andbland, transparent and fast-moving...a blip on thescreen, impelled by commercialism, without depth,without place. In fact, locality is produced by globalforces and the global city is a very real domain in whichcosmopolitanism as a pattern of inclusion and exclusionin the public sphere emerges. Especially, transnationalmovements which help migrants to cope with the con-ditions of migration and labour flexibility as well as thevicissitudes of the world economy, such as the TablighiJama’at in Islam and the Visva Hindu Parishad in Hin-duism, do, to some extent, build religious enclaves, safehavens of the self, but are, at the same time, creativelydeveloping new religious understandings of their pre-dicament, entailing an encounter with the multiplicity ofOthers and with global conditions on their own terms.Both the Tablighi Jama’at and the VHP have strongconnections with Gujarati communities that havelongstanding transnational ties with East Africa, Britain,and the USA. For Gujaratis there is a close affinity be-tween trading and business networks and the network-ing that is central to these religious movements. Thatkind of affinity is even stronger in the case of sectarianbusiness communities like the Jains or the DaudiBohras. 30 But it is not only that religious movementslink up with globalised social configurations, but alsothat religious worldviews engage global issues in an in-novative manner. To mention only one example: if the

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development of the financial markets is one of the mainelements of globalisation, affecting patterns of migra-tion substantially, it is illuminating to look at the specu-lation on Islamic financial alternatives in Muslim circles.Islamic interpretations of interest (riba) in the contextof discussions of derivatives cut to the heart of globalfinance and are, as such, engagements with the worldfrom another discursive tradition.31 It is impossible tosimply call such arguments and the movements thatcarry them closed, confined and confining, provincial asagainst cosmopolitan. They are cosmopolitan projects,but emerge from very different histories than that of theEuropean Enlightenment.

Global cities are located everywhere, fromHongkong to Rio de Janeiro, from Mumbai to Los An-geles; they are not anymore the metropoles of colonialempires. The global imageries which are at play in themare just as multi-centred. I met a Pakistani taxi-driver inNew York who was saving money to study Islamic sci-ence in Teheran and I am regularly travelling inaeroplanes with Hindu grandmothers who are locatedboth in India and the US and connect their grandchil-dren with a religion that is constantly negotiated in NewYork and San Francisco. The 19th century Westernbourgeois project of cosmopolitanism is not anymorepossible in the global cities of today, since the differ-ences are too substantial, the diasporic communicationstoo frequent. And this does not only concern elites. AsPnina Werbner has recently argued about working-classPakistani cosmopolitans, labour migration forges globalpathways, routes along which Islamic and familial

transnational worlds are constituted.32 One does notknow what the postmodern, postcolonial cosmopoli-tanism will look like, but it will be a beast of a differentkind, whether we like it or not.

References

1 Bryan S. Turner, ed., Citizenship and Social Theory. London:Sage, 1993.

2 Charles Taylor, ‘Modes of Secularism’, in Rajeev Bhargava(ed), Secularism and its critics. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

3 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations onRepresentative Government. Ed. Geraint Williams. London: J.M.Dent, 1993

4 Talal Asad, “Multiculturalism and British identity in theWake of the Rushdie Affair”, in Genealogies, see footnote 1.

5 See Rubah Salih, ‘Confronting Modernities; MuslimWomen in Italy’, ISIM-Newsletter, March 2001.

6.Prema Kurien, “Gendered Ethnicity: Creating a Hindu In-dian Identity in the United States”, American behavioural Scientist,42, 4, 1999, 648-670, idem, “Religion, ethnicity and politics:Hindu and Muslim Indian immigrants in the United States”, Eth-nic and Racial Studies, 24, 2, 2001, 263-293.

7 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity. Oxford: BasilBlackwell 1997, p.66.

8 for a general overview, see Peter van der Veer, ReligiousNationalism. Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1994.

9 Arvind Rajagopal, “Transnational networks and Hindu na-tionalism”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 29, 3, 1997, 49-50

10 see Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Minneapolis, Uni-versity of Minnesota Press, 1997.

11 Arvind Rajagopal, Politics after Television. Hindu Nationalismand the Reshaping of the Public in India. Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-

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versity Press, 2001. About Indian television viewers in Britain:Marie Gillespie: Television, Ethnicity, and Cultural Change. London:Routledge, 1995.

12 Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed, Travellers in Faith; Studies ofthe Tablighi Jama’at as a Transnational Islamic movement for Faith Re-newal. Leiden: Brill, 2000.

13 Marc Gaborieau, “Transnational Islamic Movements:Tablighi Jama’at in Politics?”, ISIM Newletter, 1999, 3, 21.

14 Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson (ed) New Media and theMuslim World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

15 Werner Schiffauer, Gerd Baumann, Steven Vertovec andRiva Kastoryano, eds. Civil Enculturation: Nation-State, School, andEthnic Difference in Four European Countries. London: Routledge, inpress.

16 David Pocock, ‘Preservation of the Religious Life: HinduImmigrants in England’ Contributions to Indian Sociology, 10, 1976,341-365.

17 Olivier Roy, ‘Muslims in Europe: From Ethnic Identity toReligious Recasting’, ISIM Newsletter, June 2000.

18 This similar to the Dutch understanding of the Turkishdemand to wear headscarves in schools. Since this is forbiddenin Turkish schools this demand is seen by the Dutch as a sign ofgrowing conservatism. There is a serious neglect of the politicalcontext of Turkey in which a radical secularist government triesto get rid of public Islam but seems to be losing that battle.

19 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Oxford:Blackwell, 1973. Idem: Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London:Routledge, 1992.

20 See for instance, Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds)Cosmopolitics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

21 Peter van der Veer, “Colonial Cosmopolitanism”, inRobin Cohen and Steve Vertovec, eds: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002

22 Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nationand Religion. Perspectives on Europe and Asia. Princeton, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1999.

23 See on these issues: George Thomas, ‘Social Movementsin Rationalistic Contexts: Religions in World Culture’ and ‘Reli-gion in Global Civil Society’, in press.

24 Clifford Geertz, ‘Reason, Religion, and ProfessorGellner”, in The Limits of Pluralism:neo-absolutism and relativism.Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, 1995, 169

25 Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections. London:Routledge, 1996, p. 127.

26 James Holton and Arjun Appadurai ‘Cities and Citi-zenship’, Public Culture, 19, 1996. Saskia Sassen, Globalization andIts discontents: Essays on the new mobility of people and money. NewYork; The New Press, 1998

27 Thomas Blom Hansen, Wages of Violence.Princeton,Princeton University Press, 2001

28 See Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, Oxford, BasilBlackwell, 1997.

29 Pnina Werbner, “Fun Spaces: On Identity and Social Em-powerment among British Pakistanis”,Theory, Culture, & Society,1996, vol.13, 4: 70.

30 Jonah Blank, Mullahs on the Mainframe: Islam and Modernityamong the Daudi Bohras. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2001; Marcus Banks, Organizing Jainism in India and England. Ox-ford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

31 Bill Maurer, “Engineering an Islamic future: Speculationson Islamic financial alternatives”. Anthropology Today, 17, 1, 2001,8-11.

32 Pnina Werbner, ‘Global Pathways. Working class cosmo-politans and the creation of transnational ethnic worlds’, SocialAnthropology (1999), 7, 1, 17-35.

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I. The meaning of religion (ideology)

At the heart of each culture is what is traditionallycalled a Religion, that is: “An explanation of the ulti-mate meaning of life, and how to live accordingly.”Normally all religions contain the four “C’s”: Creed,Code, Cult, Community-structure, and are based on thenotion of the Transcendent.

Humans tend to group themselves in communitieswith similar understandings of the meaning of lifeand how to act accordingly. For the most part, inpast history such large communities, called culturesor civilizations, have tended on the one hand to liveunto themselves, and on the other to dominate and,if possible, absorb the other cultures they encoun-tered. For example, Christendom, Islam, China.

Leonard Swidler

Toward a universal declarationof a global ethic

LEONARD SWIDLER

Professor at Temple Univer-sity, Philadelphia, co-presi-dent of the Global DialogueInstitute, co-editor of theJournal of EcumenicalStudies. Author of thebooks: Dialogue for Reunion(1962), Women in Judaism(1976), Kung in Conflict(1981), Yeshua: A Model forModerns (1993), The Studyof Religion in an Age ofGlobal Dialogue (2000),Dupa absolut. Viitoruldialogic al religiei (2003).E-mail:dialogue@temple.edu

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Creed refers to the cognitive aspect of a religion; it iseverything that goes into the “explanation” of the ulti-mate meaning of life.

Code of behavior or ethics includes all the rules andcustoms of action that somehow follow from one as-pect or another of the Creed.

Cult means all the ritual activities that relate the fol-lower to one aspect or other of the Transcendent, eitherdirectly or indirectly, prayer being an example of theformer and certain formal behavior toward representa-tives of the Transcendent, like priests, of the latter.

Community-structure refers to the relationships amongthe followers; this can vary widely, from a very egalitar-ian relationship, as among Quakers, through a “republi-can” structure like Presbyterians have, to a monarchicalone, as with some Hasidic Jews vis-a-vis their “Rebbe.”

The Transcendent, as the roots of the word indicate,means “that which goes beyond” the every-day, the or-dinary, the surface experience of reality. It can refer tospirits, gods, a Personal God, an Impersonal God,Emptiness, etc.

Especially in modern times there have developed“explanations of the ultimate meaning of life, and howto live accordingly” which are not based on a notion ofthe Transcendent, e.g., secular humanism, Marxism. Al-though in every respect these “explanations” functionas religions traditionally have in human life, because theidea of the Transcendent, however it is understood,plays such a central role in religion, but not in these “ex-planations,” for the sake of accuracy it is best to givethese “explanations” not based on notion of the Tran-

scendent a separate name; the name often used is: Ideol-ogy. Much, though not all, of the following will, mutatismutandis, also apply to Ideology even when the term isnot used.

II. From the age of monologue to the ageof dialogue

1. A Radically New Age

Those scholars who earlier in the twentieth centurywith a great show of scholarship and historical/socio-logical analysis predicted the impending demise ofWestern Civilization were “dead wrong.” After WorldWar I, in 1922, Oswald Spengler wrote his widely ac-claimed book, The Decline of the West1 . After the begin-ning of World War II Pitirim A. Sorokin published in1941 his likewise popular book, The Crisis of Our Age2 .Given the massive, world-wide scale of the unprec-edented destruction and horror of the world’s first glo-bal war, 1914-18, and the even vastly greater of the sec-ond global conflict, 1939-45, the pessimistic predictionsof these scholars and the great following they found arenot ununderstandable.

In fact, however, those vast world conflagrationswere manifestations of the dark side of the uniquebreakthrough in the history of humankind in the mod-ern development of Christendom-become-Western

KEY WORDS:

Global ethics, dialogue,inter-religious dialogue,ideology, declaration ofuniversal ethics

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Civilization, now becoming Global Civilization. Neverbefore had there been world wars; likewise, never be-fore had there been world political organizations(League of Nations, United Nations). Never before didhumanity possess the real possibility of destroying allhuman life—whether through nuclear or ecological ca-tastrophe. These unique negative realities/potentialitieswere possible, however, only because of the corre-spondingly unique accomplishments of Christendom/Western/Global Civilization—the like of which theworld has never before seen. On the negative side, fromnow on it will always be true that humankind could self-destruct. Still, there are solid empirical grounds for rea-sonable hope that the inherent, infinity-directed lifeforce of humankind will nevertheless prevail over theparallel death force.

The prophets of doom were correct, however, intheir understanding that humanity is entering into aradically new age. Earlier in this century the nay-sayersusually spoke of the doom of only Western Civilization(e.g., Spengler, Sorokin), but after the advent of nuclearpower and the Cold War, the new generation of pessi-mists - as said, not without warrant: corruptio optimaepessima - warned of global disaster. This emerging aware-ness of global disaster is a clear, albeit negative, sign thatsomething profoundly, radically new is entering ontothe stage of human history.

There have, of course, also recently been a numberof more positive signs that we humans are entering aradically new age. In the 1960s there was much talk of“The Age of Aquarius,” and there still is today the con-

tinuing fad of “New Age” consciousness. Some may beput off from the idea of an emerging radically new agebecause they perceive such talk to be simply that offringe groups. I would argue, however, that the pres-ence of “the crazies” around the edge of any idea ormovement, far from being a sign of the invalidity ofthat idea or movement, is on the contrary a confirma-tion precisely of its validity, at least in its core concern. Iwould further argue that if people are involved with amovement which does not eventually develop its“crazies,” its extremists, the movement is not touchingthe core of humankind’s concerns—they should get outof the movement, they are wasting their time!

Moreover, there have likewise recently been a num-ber of very serious scholarly analyses pointing to theemergence of a radically new age in human history. Twoof them will be dealt with in some detail. The first is theconcept of the “Paradigm-Shift,” particularly as ex-pounded by Hans Küng3 . The second is the notion ofthe “Second Axial Period,” as articulated by EwertCousins4 . Then, including these two, but setting themin a still larger context, I shall lay out my own analysis,which I see as the movement of humankind out of amulti-millennia long “Age of Monologue” into thenewly inbreaking “Age of Dialogue,” indeed, aninbreaking “Age of Global Dialogue.”

Of course there is a great deal of continuity in hu-man life throughout the shift from one major “Para-digm” to another, from one “Period” to another, fromone “Age” to another. Nevertheless, even more strikingthan this continuity is the ensuing break, albeit largely

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on a different level than the continuity. This relation-ship of continuity and break in human history is analo-gous to the transition of water from solid to fluid to gaswith the increase in temperature. With water there isthroughout on the chemical level the continuity of H2O.However, for those who have to deal with the water, itmakes a fantastic difference whether the H2O is ice, wa-ter, or steam! In the case of the major changes in hu-mankind, the physical base remains the same, but onthe level of consciousness the change is massive. Andhere too it makes a fantastic difference whether we aredealing with humans whose consciousness is formedwithin one paradigm or within another, whose con-sciousness is Pre-Axial, Axial-I or Axial-II, whose con-sciousness is Monologic or Dialogic.

2. A Major Paradigm-Shift

Thomas Kuhn revolutionized our understanding ofthe development of scientific thinking with his notionof paradigm shifts. He painstakingly showed that funda-mental “paradigms” or “exemplary models” are thelarge thought frames within which we place and inter-pret all observed data and that scientific advancementinevitably brings about eventual paradigm shifts - fromgeocentricism to heliocentrism, for example, or fromNewtonian to Einsteinian physics - which are alwaysvigorously resisted at first, as was the thought ofGalileo, but finally prevail5 . This insight, however, isvalid not only for the development of thought in the

natural sciences, but also applicable to all major disci-plines of human thought, including religious thought.For example, the move from the Semitic thought worldof Jesus and his followers into the Hellenistic world ofearly Christianity and then into the Byzantine and Medi-eval Western Christian worlds, and further, generated anumber of greater and lesser paradigm shifts in Euro-pean religion and culture over the centuries.

3. The Modern Major Paradigm-shift

Since the eighteenth century European Enlighten-ment, Christendom-now-become-Western Civilizationhas been undergoing a major paradigm shift, especiallyin how we humans understand our process of under-standing and what meaning and status we attribute to“truth,” that is, to our statements about reality - in otherwords, to our epistemology. This new epistemologicalparadigm is increasingly determining how we perceive,conceive, think about, and subsequently decide and acton things.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of therole in religion, in the “ultimate understanding of realityand how to live accordingly,” played by the conceptualparadigm or model one has of reality. The paradigmwithin which we perceive reality not only profoundly af-fects our theoretical understanding of reality, but alsohas immense practical consequences. For example, inWestern medicine the body is usually conceived of as ahighly nuanced, living machine, and therefore if one

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part wears out, the obvious thing to do is to replace theworn part - hence, organ transplants originated in West-ern, but not in Oriental, medicine.

However, in Oriental, Chinese, medicine, the bodyis conceived of as a finely balanced harmony: “pressure”exerted on one part of the body is assumed to have anopposite effect in some other part of the body - hence,acupuncture originated in Oriental, but not in Western,medicine6 . Our conceptual paradigms have concreteconsequences.

Furthermore, obviously some particular paradigmsor models for perceiving reality will fit the data betterthan others, and they will then be preferred - e.g., theshift from the geocentric to the heliocentric model inastronomy. But sometimes differing models will each intheir own ways “fit” the data more or less adequately, asin the example of Western and Oriental medicines. Thediffering models are then viewed as complementary.Clearly it would be foolish to limit one’s perception ofreality to only one of the complementary paradigms.

Let me turn now to the post-Enlightenment episte-mological Paradigm-Shift. Whereas the Western notionof truth was largely absolute, static, and monologic orexclusive up to the past century, it has since becomedeabsolutized, dynamic and dialogic - in a word, it hasbecome “relational.”7 This “new” view of truth cameabout in at least six different, but closely related, ways.In brief they are:

1. Historicism: Truth is deabsolutized by the percep-tion that reality is always described in terms of the cir-cumstances of the time in which it is expressed.

2. Intentionality: Seeking the truth with the intentionof acting accordingly deabsolutizes the statement.

3. Sociology of knowledge: Truth is deabsolutized interms of geography, culture, and social standing.

4. Limits of language: Truth as the meaning ofsomething and especially as talk about the transcendentis deabsolutized by the nature of human language.

5. Hermeneutics: All truth, all knowledge, is seen asinterpreted truth, knowledge, and hence isdeabsolutized by the observer who is always also inter-preter.

6. Dialogue: The knower engages reality in a dia-logue in a language the knower provides, therebydeabsolutizing all statements about reality.8

In sum, our understanding of truth and reality hasbeen undergoing a radical shift. This new paradigmwhich is being born understands all statements aboutreality, especially about the meaning of things, to be his-torical, intentional, perspectival, partial, interpretive anddialogic. What is common to all these qualities is thenotion of relationality, that is, that all expressions or un-derstandings of reality are in some fundamental way re-lated to the speaker or knower. It is while bearing thisparadigm shift in mind that we proceed with our analy-sis.

0. Before the nineteenth century in Europe truth,that is, a statement about reality, was conceived in quite anabsolute, static, exclusivistic either-or manner. If some-thing was true at one time, it was always true; not only

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empirical facts but also the meaning of things or theoughtness that was said to flow from them werethought of in this way. At bottom, the notion of truthwas based exclusively on the Aristotelian principle ofcontradiction: a thing could not be true and not true inthe same way at the same time. Truth was defined byway of exclusion; A was A because it could be shownnot to be not-A. Truth was thus understood to be abso-lute, static, exclusivistically either-or. This is a classicist orabsolutist view of truth.

1. Historicism: In the nineteenth century manyscholars came to perceive all statements about the truthof the meaning of something as partially the products oftheir historical circumstances. Those concrete circum-stances helped determine the fact that the statement un-der study was even called forth, that it was couched inparticular intellectual categories (for example, abstractPlatonic, or concrete legal, language), particular literaryforms (for example, mythic or metaphysical language),and particular psychological settings (such as a polemicresponse to a specific attack). These scholars arguedthat only if the truth statements were placed in their his-torical situation, their historical Sitz im Leben, could theybe properly understood. The understanding of the textcould be found only in context. To express that sameoriginal meaning in a later Sitz im Leben one would re-quire a proportionately different statement. Thus, allstatements about the meaning of things were now seento be deabsolutized in terms of time.

This is a historical view of truth. Clearly at its heart isa notion of relationality: any statement about the truth ofthe meaning of something has to be understood inrelationship to its historical context.

2. Intentionality: Later thinkers like Max Scheleradded a corollary to this historicizing of knowledge; itconcerned not the past but the future. Such scholarsalso saw truth as having an element of intentionality atits base, as being oriented ultimately toward action,praxis. They argued that we perceive certain things asquestions to be answered and set goals to pursue spe-cific knowledge because we wish to do something aboutthose matters; we intend to live according to the truthand meaning that we hope to discern in the answers tothe questions we pose, in the knowledge we decide toseek. The truth of the meaning of things was thus seenas deabsolutized by the action-oriented intentionality ofthe thinker-speaker.

This is an intentional or praxis view of truth, and ittoo is basically relational: a statement has to be under-stood in relationship to the action-oriented intention ofthe speaker.

3. The sociology of knowledge: Just as statementsof truth about the meaning of things were seen by somethinkers to be historically deabsolutized in time, so too,starting in this century with scholars like KarlMannheim, such statements began to be seen asdeabsolutized by such things as the culture, class andgender of the thinker-speaker, regardless of time. All re-

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ality was said to be perceived from the perspective ofthe perceiver=s own world view. Any statement of thetruth of the meaning of something was seen to be per-spectival, “standpoint-bound,” standortgebunden, as KarlMannheim put it, and thus deabsolutized.

This is a perspectival view of truth and is likewise rela-tional: all statements are fundamentally related to thestandpoint of the speaker.

4. The limitations of language: Following LudwigWittgenstein and others, many thinkers have come tosee that any statement about the truth of things can beat most only a partial description of the reality it is try-ing to describe. Although reality can be seen from an al-most limitless number of perspectives, human languagecan express things from only one perspective at one. Ifthis is now seen to be true of what we call “scientifictruths,” it is so much the more true of statements aboutthe truth of the meaning of things. The very fact ofdealing with the truth of the “meaning” of somethingindicates that the knower is essentially involved andhence reflects the perspectival character of all suchstatements.

A statement may be true, of course - it may accu-rately describe the extra-mental reality it refers to - but itwill always be cast in particular categories, language,concerns, etc., of a particular “standpoint,” and in thatsense will be limited, deabsolutized.

This also is a perspectival view of truth, and thereforealso relational.

This limited and limiting, as well as liberating, qual-ity of language is especially clear in talk of the transcen-dent. The transcendent is by definition that which goesbeyond our experience. Any statements about the tran-scendent must thus be deabsolutized and limited far be-yond the perspectival character seen in ordinary state-ments.

5. Hermeneutics: Hans-Georg Gadamer and PaulRiceour recently led the way in developing the scienceof hermeneutics, which, by arguing that all knowledgeof a text is at the same time an interpretation of the text,further deabsolutizes claims about the “true” meaningof the text. But this basic insight goes beyond knowl-edge of texts and applies to all knowledge. In all knowl-edge I come to know something; the object comes intome in a certain way, namely, through the lens that I useto perceive it. As St. Thomas Aquinas stated,: “Thingsknown are in the knower according to the mode of theknower - cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modumcognoscentis.”9

This is an interpretive view of truth. It is clear thatrelationality pervades this hermeneutical, interpretative,view of truth.

6. Dialogue: A further development of this basic in-sight is that I learn not by being merely passively openor receptive to, but by being in dialogue with, extra-mental reality. I not only “hear” or receive reality, but Ialso - and, I think, first of all - “speak” to reality. I ask itquestions, I stimulate it to speak back to me, to answer

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my questions. In the process I give reality the specificcategories and language in which to respond to me. The“answers” that I receive back from reality will always bein the language, the thought categories, of the questionsI put to it. It can “speak” to me, can really communicatewith my mind, only in a language and categories that Iunderstand.

When the speaking, the responding, grows less andless understandable to me, if the answers I receive aresometimes confused and unsatisfying, then I probablyneed to learn to speak a more appropriate languagewhen I put questions to reality. If, for example, I ask thequestion, “How far is yellow?” of course I will receive anon-sense answer. Or if I ask questions about livingthings in mechanical categories, I will receive confusingand unsatisfying answers.

This is a dialogic view of truth, whose very name re-flects its relationality.

With this new and irreversible understanding of themeaning of truth, the critical thinker has undergone aradical Copernican turn. Just as the vigorously resistedshift in astronomy from geocentrism to heliocentrismrevolutionized that science, the paradigm shift in theunderstanding of truth statements has revolutionized allthe humanities, including theology-ideology. Themacro-paradigm with which critical thinkers operate to-day is characterized by historical, social, linguistic,hermeneutical, praxis and dialogic – relational - con-sciousness. This paradigm shift is far advanced amongthinkers and doers; but as in the case of Copernicus,

and even more dramatically of Galileo, there are stillmany resisters in positions of great institutional power.

With the deabsolutized view of the truth of themeaning of things we come face to face with the specterof relativism, the opposite pole of absolutism. Unlikerelationality, a neutral term which merely denotes thequality of being in relationship, relativism, like so many“isms,” is a basically negative term. If it can no longerbe claimed that any statement of the truth of the mean-ing of things is absolute, totally objective, because theclaim does not square with our experience of reality, it isequally impossible to claim that every statement of thetruth of the meaning of things is completely relative, to-tally subjective, for that also does not square with ourexperience of reality, and of course would logically leadto an atomizing isolation which would stop all dis-course, all statements to others.

Our perception, and hence description, of reality islike our view of an object in the center of a circle ofviewers. My view and description of the object, or real-ity, will be true, but it will not include what someone onthe other side of the circle perceives and describes,which will also be true. So, neither of our perceptionsand descriptions of reality is total, complete - “absolute”in that sense - or “objective” in the sense of not in anyway being dependent on a “subject” or viewer. At thesame time, however, it is also obvious that there is an“objective,” doubtless “true” aspect to each perceptionand description, even though each is relational to theperceiver-“subject.”

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But if we can no longer hold to an absolutist view ofthe truth of he meaning of things, we must take certainsteps so as not to be logically forced into the silence oftotal relativism. First, besides striving to be as accurateand fair as possible in gathering and assessing informa-tion and submitting it to the critiques of our peers andother thinkers and scholars, we need also to dredge out,state clearly, and analyze our own pre-suppositions - aconstant, ongoing task. Even in this of course we willbe operating from a particular “standpoint.”

Therefore, we need, secondly, to complement ourconstantly critiqued statements with statements fromdifferent “stand-points.” That is, we need to engage indialogue with those who have differing cultural, philo-sophical, social, religious viewpoints so as to strive to-ward an ever fuller perception of the truth of the mean-ing of things. If we do not engage in such dialogue wewill not only be trapped within the perspective of ourown “standpoint,” but will now also be aware of ourlack. We will no longer with integrity be able to remaindeliberately turned in on ourselves. Our search for thetruth of the meaning of things makes it a necessity forus as human beings to engage in dialogue. Knowingly torefuse dialogue today could be an act of fundamentalhuman irresponsibility - in Judeo-Christian terms, a sin.

4. The Second Axial Period10

It was the German philosopher Karl Jaspers who al-most a half-century ago in his book The Origin and Goal

of History11 pointed to the “axial” quality of the transfor-mation of consciousness that occurred in the ancientworld. He called the period from 800-200 B.C.E. the“Axial Period” because “it gave birth to everythingwhich, since then, man has been able to be.” It is herein this period “that we meet with the most deepcut di-viding line in history. Man, as we know him today, cameinto being. For short, we may style this the ‘Axial Pe-riod.’”12 Although the leaders who effected this changewere philosophers and religious teachers, the changewas so radical that it affected all aspects of culture, for ittransformed consciousness itself. It was within the hori-zons of this form of consciousness that the great civili-zations of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe devel-oped. Although within these horizons manydevelopments occurred through the subsequent centu-ries, the horizons themselves did not change. It was thisform of consciousness which spread to other regionsthrough migration and explorations, thus becoming thedominant, though not exclusive, form of consciousnessin the world. To this day, whether we have been bornand raised in the culture of China, India, Europe, or theAmericas, we bear the structure of consciousness thatwas shaped in this Axial Period.

What is this structure of consciousness and howdoes it differ from pre-Axial consciousness? Prior tothe Axial Period the dominant form of consciousnesswas cosmic, collective, tribal, mythic, and ritualistic.This is the characteristic form of consciousness of pri-mal peoples. It is true that between these traditional cul-tures and the Axial Period there emerged great empires

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in Egypt, China, and Mesopotamia, but they did not yetproduce the full consciousness of the Axial Period.

The consciousness of the tribal cultures was inti-mately related to the cosmos and to the fertility cyclesof nature. Thus there was established a rich and creativeharmony between primal peoples and the world of na-ture, a harmony which was explored, expressed, and cel-ebrated in myth and ritual. Just as they felt themselvespart of nature, so they experienced themselves as partof the tribe. It was precisely the web of interrelation-ships within the tribe that sustained them psychologi-cally, energizing all aspects of their lives. To be sepa-rated from the tribe threatened them with death, notonly physical but psychological as well. However, theirrelation to the collectivity often did not extend beyondtheir own tribe, for they often looked upon other tribesas hostile. Yet within their tribe they felt organically re-lated to their group as a whole, to the life cycles of birthand death and to nature and the cosmos.

The Axial Period ushered in a radically new form ofconsciousness. Whereas primal consciousness wastribal, Axial consciousness was individual. “Know thy-self” became the watchword of Greece; the Upanishadsidentified the atman, the transcendent center of the self;Gautama charted the way of individual enlightenment;Confucius laid out the individual’s ethical path; the Jew-ish prophets awakened individual moral responsibilityfor powerless persons. This sense of individual identity,as distinct from the tribe and from nature, is the mostcharacteristic mark of Axial consciousness.

From this flow other characteristics: consciousnesswhich is self-reflective, analytic, and which can be ap-plied to nature in the form of scientific theories, to soci-ety in the form of social critique, to knowledge in theform of philosophy, to religion in the form of mappingan individual spiritual journey. This self-reflective, ana-lytic, critical consciousness stood in sharp contrast toprimal mythic and ritualistic consciousness. When self-reflective logos emerged in the Axial Period, it tended tooppose the traditional mythos. Of course, mythic andritualistic forms of consciousness survive in the post-Axial Period even to this day, but they are often sub-merged, surfacing chiefly in dreams, literature, and art.

Following the lead of Ewert Cousins, if we shift ourgaze from the first millennium B.C.E. to the eve of thetwenty-first century, we can discern another transforma-tion of consciousness, which is so profound and far-reaching that he calls it the “Second Axial Period.”13

Like the first, it is happening simultaneously around theearth, and like the first it will shape the horizon of con-sciousness for future centuries. Not surprisingly, too, itwill have great significance for world religions, whichwere constituted in the First Axial Period. However, thenew form of consciousness is different from that of theFirst Axial Period. Then it was individual consciousness,now it is global consciousness.

This global consciousness which is generated on a“horizontal” level through the world-wide meeting ofcultures and religions, is only one of the global charac-teristics of the Second Axial Period. The consciousnessof this period is global in another sense, namely, in re-

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discovering its roots in the earth. At the very momentwhen the various cultures and religions are meetingeach other and creating a new global community, ourlife on the planet is being threatened. The very toolswhich we have used to bring about this convergence -industrialization and technology - are undercutting thebiological support system that sustains life on ourplanet. The future of consciousness, even life on theearth, is shrouded in a cloud of uncertainty.

Cousins is not suggesting a romantic attempt to livein the past, rather that the evolution of consciousnessproceeds by way of recapitulation. Having developedself-reflective, analytic, critical consciousness in the FirstAxial Period, we must now, while retaining these values,reappropriate and integrate into that consciousness thecollective and cosmic dimensions of the pre-Axial con-sciousness. We must recapture the unity of tribal con-sciousness by seeing humanity as a single tribe.

Further, we must see this single tribe related organi-cally to the total cosmos. This means that the con-sciousness of the twenty-first century will be globalfrom two perspectives: (1) from a horizontal perspec-tive, cultures and religions must meet each other on thesurface of the globe, entering into creative encountersthat will produce a complexified collective conscious-ness; (2) from a vertical perspective, they must plungetheir roots deep into the earth in order to provide astable and secure base for future development. Thisnew global consciousness must be organically ecologi-cal, supported by structures that will insure justice andpeace. The voices of the oppressed must be heard and

heeded: the poor, women, racial and ethnic minorities.These groups, along with the earth itself, can be lookedupon as the prophets and teachers of the Second AxialPeriod. This emerging twofold global consciousness isnot only a creative possibility to enhance the twenty-first century; it is an absolute necessity if we are to sur-vive.

5. Globalization

Since the 16th-century European “Age of Discov-ery” the earth has tended more and more to become, asWendell Wilkie put it in 1940, “One World.” This in-creasingly happened in the form of “Christendom”dominating and colonizing the rest of the world. In the19th century, however, “Christendom” became less andless “Christian” and more and more the “secular West,”shaped by a secular ideology, or ideologies, alternativeto Christianity. Still, the religious and ideological cul-tures of the West, even as they struggled with eachother, dealt with other cultures and their religions in thecustomary manner of ignoring them or attempting todominate, and even absorb, them - though it became in-creasingly obvious that the latter was not likely to hap-pen.

As the 20th century drew to a close, however, all ofthose ways of relating become increasingly impossibleto sustain. For example: What happened in other cul-tures quickly led young men and women of the West todie on the volcanic ash of Iwo Jima or the desert sands

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of Kuwait. But more than that, the “West” could nolonger escape what was done in the “First World,” suchas the production of acid rain, in the “Second World,”such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident, or in the “ThirdWorld,” such as the mass destruction of the Amazonrain forest, “the world=s lungs.”

At the same time the world has been slowly, pain-fully emerging from the millennia-long Age of Mono-logue into the Age of Dialogue. As noted above, untilbeginning a century or so ago, each religion, and thenideology - each culture - tended to be very certain that italone had the complete “explanation of the ultimatemeaning of life, and how to live accordingly.” Thenthrough the series of revolutions in understanding,which began in the West but ultimately spread moreand more throughout the whole world, the limitednessof all statements about the meaning of things began todawn on isolated thinkers, and then increasingly on themiddle and even grass-roots levels of humankind: Theepistemological revolutions of historicism, pragmatism,sociology of knowledge, language analysis, hermeneu-tics, and finally dialogue.

Now that it is more and more understood that theMuslim, Christian, secularist, Buddhist, etc. perceptionof the meaning of things is necessarily limited, the Mus-lim, Christian, secularist, etc. increasingly feels not onlyno longer driven to replace, or at least dominate, allother religions, ideologies, cultures, but even drawn toenter into dialogue with them, so as to expand, deepen,enrich each of their necessarily limited perceptions of

the meaning of things. Thus, often with squinting,blurry eyes, humankind is emerging from the relativedarkness of the “Age of Monologue” into the dawning“Age of Dialogue”—dialogue understood as a conver-sation with someone who differs from us primarily so wecan learn, because of course since we now growingly re-alize that our understanding of the meaning of reality isnecessarily limited, we might learn more about reality’smeaning through someone else’s perception of it.

6. The Age of Global Dialogue

Ewert Cousins has basically affirmed everythingHans Küng has described as the newly emerging con-temporary paradigm-shift, but Cousins sees the presentshift as much more profound than simply another in aseries of major paradigm-shifts of human history. Hesees the current transformation as a shift of the magni-tude of the First Axial Period which will similarly re-shape human consciousness. I too want to basically af-firm what Küng sees as the emerging contemporaryMajor Paradigm-Shift, as well as with Cousins that thisshift is so profound as to match in magnitude the trans-formation of human consciousness of the Axial Period,so that it should be referred to as a Second Axial Pe-riod.

More than that, however, I am persuaded that whathumankind is entering into now is not just the latest in along series of major paradigm-shifts, as Hans Küng has

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so carefully and clearly analyzed. I am also persuadedthat it is even more than the massive move into theconsciousness transforming Second Axial Period, asEwert Cousins has so thoroughly demonstrated. Be-yond these two radical shifts, though of course includ-ing both of them, humankind is emerging out of the‘from-the beginning-till-now’ millennia-long ‘Age ofMonologue” into the newly dawning “Age of Dia-logue.”

The turn toward dialogue is, in my judgment, themost fundamental, the most radical and utterly transformative ofthe key elements of the newly emerging paradigm,which Hans Küng has so penetratingly outlined, andwhich Ewert Cousins also perceptively discerns as oneof the central constituents of the Second Axial Age.However, that shift from monologue to dialogue consti-tutes such a radical reversal in human consciousness, isso utterly new in the history of humankind from the begin-ning, that it must be designated as literallyArevolutionary,@ that is, it turns everything absolutelyaround. In brief: Dialogue is a whole new way of thinking inhuman history.

To sum up and reiterate: In the latter part of thetwentieth century humankind is undergoing a Macro-Paradigm-Shift (Hans Küng). More than that, at thistime humankind is moving into a transformative shift inconsciousness of the magnitude of the Axial Period(800-200 B.C.E.) so that we must speak of the emergingof the Second Axial Period (Ewert Cousins). Even moreprofound, however, now at the edge of the Third Mil-lennium humankind is slipping out of the shadowy Age

of Monologue, where it has been since its beginning,into the dawn of the Age of Dialogue (LeonardSwidler). Into this new Age of Dialogue Küng=s MacroParadigm Shift and Cousins= Second Axial Period aresublated (aufgehoben, in Hegel=s terminology), that is,taken up and transformed. Moreover, as Ewert Cousinshas already detailed, humankind=s consciousness is be-coming increasingly global. Hence, our dialogue part-ners necessarily must also be increasingly global. In thisnew Age of Dialogue dialogue on a global basis is nownot only a possibility, it is a necessity. As I noted in thetitle of a recent book - humankind is faced with ulti-mately with two choices: Dialogue or Death!14

III. Need for a global ethic

When the fact of the epistemological revolutionsleading to the growing necessity of interreligious,interideological, intercultural dialogue is coupled withthe fact of all humankind=s interdependency - such thatany significant part of humanity could precipitate thewhole of the globe into a social, economic, nuclear, en-vironmental or other catastrophe - there arises thepressing need to focus the energy of these dialogues onnot only how humans perceive and understand theworld and its meaning, but also on how they should actin relationship to themselves, to other persons, and tonature, within the context of reality=s undergirding,pervasive, overarching source, energy and goal, however

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understood. In brief, humankind increasingly desper-ately needs to engage in a dialogue on the developmentof, not a Buddhist ethic, a Christian ethic, a Marxistethic, etc., but of a global ethic - and I believe a key in-strument in that direction will be the shaping of a Uni-versal Declaration of a Global Ethic.

I say ethic in the singular rather than ethics in theplural, because what is needed is not a full blown globalethics in great detail - indeed, such would not even bepossible - but a global consensus on the fundamental at-titude toward good and evil and the basic and middleprinciples to put it into action. Clearly also, this ethicmust be global. It will not be sufficient to have a com-mon ethic for Westerners or Africans or Asians, etc.The destruction, for example, of the ozone layer or theloosing of a destructive gene mutation by any one groupwill be disastrous for all.

I say also that this Universal Declaration of a GlobalEthic must be arrived at by consensus through dialogue.Attempts at the imposition of a unitary ethics by vari-ous kinds of force have been had aplenty, and they haveinevitably fallen miserably short of globality. The mostrecent failures can be seen in the widespread collapse ofcommunism, and in an inverse way in the resoundingrejection of secularism by resurgent Islamism.

That the need for a global ethic is most urgent is be-coming increasingly apparent to all; humankind nolonger has the luxury of letting such an ethic slowly andhaphazardly grow by itself, as it willy nilly will graduallyhappen. It is vital that there be a conscious focusing of

energy on such a development. Immediate action is nec-essary:

1) Every scholarly institution, whether related to areligion or ideology or not, needs to press its experts ofthe widest variety of disciplines to use their creativityamong themselves and in conjunction with scholarsfrom other institutions, both religiously related and not,in formulating a Global Ethic.

2) Every major religion and ethical group needs tocommission its expert scholars to focus their researchand reflection on articulating a Global Ethic from theperspective of their religion or ethical group - in dia-logue with all other religions and ethical groups.

3) Collaborative “Working Groups,” of scholars inthe field of ethics which are very deliberately interreli-gious, interideological need to be formed specifically totackle this momentous task, and those which already ex-ist need to focus their energies on it.

4) Beyond that there needs to be a major permanentGlobal Ethic Research Center, which will have some ofthe best experts from the world=s major religions andethical groups in residence, perhaps for years at astretch, pursuing precisely this topic in its multiple rami-fications.

When the Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic is fi-nally drafted - after multiple consultation, revision andeventual acceptance by the full range of religious andethical institutions - it will then serve as a minimal ethi-cal standard for humankind to live up to, much as theUnited Nation=s 1948 Universal Declaration of HumanRights. Through the former, the moral force of the

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world=s religious and ethical institutions can bebrought to bear especially on those issues which are notvery susceptible to the legal and political force of thelatter. Such an undertaking by the Religions and Ideolo-gies of the world would be different from, but comple-mentary to, the work of the United Nations.

After the initial period, which doubtless would lastseveral years, the “Global Ethic Research Center” couldserve as an authoritative religious and ideological schol-arly locus to which always-new specific problems of aglobal ethic could be submitted for evaluation, analysisand response. The weightiness of the responses wouldbe “substantive,” not “formal.” That is, its solutionswould carry weight because of their inherent persuasive-ness coming from their intellectual and spiritual insightand wisdom.

IV. Principles of a universal declaration ofa global ethic

Let me first offer some suggestions of the generalnotions that I believe ought to shape a UNIVERSALDECLARATION OF GLOBAL ETHIC, and then of-fer a tentative draft constructed in their light:

1. The Declaration should use language and images that areacceptable to all major religions and ethical groups; hence, its lan-guage ought to be “humanity-based,” rather than from authorita-tive religious books; it should be from “below,” not from “above.”

2. Therefore, it should be anthropo-centric, indeed more, itmust be anthropo-cosmo-centric, for we can not be fully human ex-cept within the context of the whole of reality.

3. The affirmations should be dynamic in form in the sensethat they will be susceptible to being sublated (aufgehoben), that is,they might properly be reinterpreted by being taken up into alarger framework.

4. The Declaration needs to set inviolable minimums, butalso open-ended maximums to be striven for; but maximums maynot be required, for it might violate the freedom-minimums of somepersons.

5. It could well start with - though not limit itself to - ele-ments of the so-called “Golden Rule” : Treat others as we wouldbe treated.

Excursus: the “Golden Rule”

A glimpse of just how pervasive the “Golden Rule”is, albeit in various forms and expressions, in theworld=s religions and ideologies, great and small, canbe garnered from this partial listing:

a) Perhaps the oldest recorded version - which iscast in a positive form - stems from Zoroaster (628-551B.C.E.): “That which is good for all and any one, forwhomsoever - that is good for me...what I hold goodfor self, I should for all. Only Law Universal is trueLaw” (Gathas, 43.1).

b) Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.), when asked “Isthere one word which may serve as a rule of practice for

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all one’s life?” said: “Do not to others what you do notwant done to yourself” (Analects, 12.2 & 15.23).Confucius also stated in a variant version: “What I donot wish others to do to me, that also I wish not to doto them” (Analects, 5.11).

c) The founder of Jainism was Vardhamana, knownas Mahavira (AGreat Hero - 540-468 B.C.E.); the vari-ous scriptures of Jainism, however, derived from a laterperiod: “A man should wander about treating all crea-tures as he himself would be treated” (Sutrakri-tanga1.11.33). “One who you think should be hit is none elsebut you.... Therefore, neither does he cause violence toothers nor does he make others do so” (Acarangasutra5.101-2).

d) The founder of Buddhism was SiddharthaGautama, known as the Buddha “Enlightened One” -563-483 B.C.E.); the various scriptures of Buddhismalso derived from a later period: “Comparing oneself toothers in such terms as ‘Just as I am so are they, just asthey are so am I,’ he should neither kill nor cause othersto kill” Sutta Nipata 705). “Here am I fond of my life,not wanting to die, fond of pleasure and averse frompain. Suppose someone should rob me of my life.... If Iin turn should rob of his life one fond of his life.... Howcould I inflict that upon another?” (Samyutta Nikayav.353).

e) The Hindu epic poem, the 3rd-century B.C.E.Mahabharata, states that its “Golden Rule,” which is ex-pressed in both positive and negative form, is the sum-mary of all Hindu teaching, “the whole Dharma”:“Vyasa says: Do not to others what you do not wish

done to yourself; and wish for others too what you de-sire and long for for yourself - this is the whole ofDharma; heed it well” (Mahabharata, Anusasana Parva113.8).

f) In the biblical book of Leviticus (composed in thefifth century B.C.E., though some of its material may bemore ancient) the Hebrew version of the “GoldenRule” is stated positively: “You shall love your neighboras yourself” (Lev. 19: 18).

g) The deuterocanonical biblical Tobit was writtenaround the year 200 B.C.E. and contains a negative ver-sion - as most are - of the “Golden Rule”: “Never do toanyone else anything that you would not want someoneto do to you” (Tobit 4:15).

h) The major founder of Rabbinic Judaism, Hillel,who lived about a generation before Jesus, though hemay also have been his teacher, taught that the “GoldenRule” - his version being both positive and negative -was the heart of the Torah; “all the rest was commen-tary”: “Do not do to others what you would not havedone to yourself” (Btalmud, Shabbath 31a).

i) Following in this Jewish tradition, Jesus stated the“Golden Rule” in a positive form, saying that itsummed up the whole Torah and prophets: “Do forothers just what you want them to do for you” (Luke6:31); “Do for others what you want them to do foryou: this is the meaning of the Law of Moses [Torah]and of the teachings of the prophets” (Matthew 7:12).

j) In the seventh century of the Common EraMohammed is said to have claimed that the “GoldenRule” is the “noblest Religion”: “Noblest Religion is

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this - that you should like for others what you like foryourself; and what you feel painful for yourself, holdthat as painful for all others too.” Again: “No man is atrue believer unless he desires for his brother that whichhe desires for himself.”15

k) The “Golden Rule” is likewise found in somenon-literate religions: “One going to take a pointed stickto pinch a baby bird should first try it on himself to feelhow it hurts”16

l) The eighteenth-century Western philosopherImmanuel Kant provided a “rational” version of the“Golden Rule” in his famous “Categorical Imperative,”or ‘Law of Universal Fairness”: “Act on maxims whichcan at the same time have for their object themselves asuniversal laws of nature.... Treat humanity in every caseas an end, never as a means only.”17

m) The late nineteenth-century founder ofBaha’ism, Baha’ullah, wrote: “He should not wish forothers that which he doth not wish for himself, norpromise that which he doth not fulfill.”18

n) In 1915 a new version of Buddhism, Won Bud-dhism, was founded in Korea by the Great MasterSotaesan. In the teachings he left behind are found vari-ants of the “Golden Rule”: “Be right yourself beforeyou correct others. Instruct yourself first before youteach others. Do favors for others before you seek fa-vors from them.” “Ordinary people may appear smartin doing things only for themselves, but they are reallysuffering a loss. Buddhas and Bodhisattvas may appear tobe stupid in doing things only for others, but eventuallythey benefit themselves.”19

It is clear that the core of the world=s major Reli-gions, the “Golden Rule,” “does not attempt the futileand impossible task of abolishing and annihilating theauthentic ego. On the contrary, it tends to make con-cern for the authentic ego the measure of altruism. ‘Donot foster the ego more than the alter; care for the alter asmuch as for the ego.’ To abolish egoism is to abolish al-truism also; and vice versa.”20

Authentic egoism and authentic altruism then arenot in conflict with each other; the former necessarilymoves to the latter, even possibly “giving one’s life forone’s friend.” This, however, is the last and higheststage of human development. It is the stage of the(w)holy person, the saint, the arahat, the bodhisattva,the sage. Such a stage cannot be the foundation of humansociety; it must be the goal of it. The foundation of hu-man society must be first authentic self-love, which in-cludes moving outward to loving others.

Not recognizing this foundation of authentic self-love is the fundamental flaw of those idealistic systems,such as communism, that try to build a society on thefoundation of altruism. A human and humanizing societyshould lead toward (w)holiness, toward altruism, but itcannot be built on the assumption that its citizens are(w)holy and altruistic to start with. Such an altruismmust grow out of an ever developing authentic self-love; it cannot be assumed, and surely it cannot beforced (as has been tried for decades - with disastrousdehumanizing results).

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6. As humans ineluctably seek ever more knowledge, truth, sotoo they seek to draw what they perceive as the good to themselves(that is, they love). Usually this self is expanded to include thefamily, and then friends. It needs to continue its natural expan-sion to the community, nation, world and cosmos, and the sourceand goal of all reality.

7. But this human love necessarily must start with self-love,for one can love one’s “neighbor” only AS one loves oneself; butsince one becomes human only by inter-human mutuality, lovingothers fulfills one=s own humanity, and hence is also the greatestact of authentic self-love.

8. Another aspect of the ‘Golden Rule” is that humans arealways to be treated as ends, never as mere means, i.e., as subjects,never as mere objects.

9. Yet another implication of the “Golden Rule” is that thosewho cannot protect themselves ought to be protected by those whocan.

10. A further ring of the expanding circles of the “GoldenRule” is that non-human beings are also to be reverenced andtreated with respect because of their being.

11. It is important that not only basic but alsomiddle ethical principles be spelled out in this Declara-tion. Although most of the middle ethical principles thatneed to be articulated in this Declaration are alreadyembedded in juridical form in the United Nations’ 1948Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is vital thatthe religions and ethical traditions expressly state andapprove them. Then the world, including both adher-ents and outsiders of the various religions and ethicaltraditions, will know what ethical standards all are com-mitting themselves to.

12. If a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic is to bemeaningful and effective, however, its framers must resist the temp-tation to pack too many details and special interests into it. It canfunction best as a kind of “constitutional” set of basic and middleethical principles from which more detailed applications can beconstantly be drawn.

V. A plan of action

Such general suggestions need to be discussed, con-firmed, rejected, modified, supplemented. Beyond that,it is vital that all the disciplines contribute what fromtheir perspectives ought to be included in the Declara-tion, how that should be formulated, what is to beavoided - and this is beginning to happen. The year1993 was the 100th anniversary of the 1893 World Par-liament of Religions which took place in Chicago andmarked the beginning of what became world-wide inter-religious dialogue. As a consequence, a number of inter-national conferences took place and in the center ofthem was the launching and developing of a UniversalDeclaration of a Global Ethic.

The first was held in New Delhi, India in February,1993; the second in August of the same year in Banga-lore, India and the third that year in September in Chi-cago. For that huge (over 6,000 participants) September1993 Chicago “Parliament of the World’s Religions”Professor Hans Küng drafted a document entitled

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“Declaration Toward a Global Ethic,” which the Parlia-ment adopted.21

Beyond that, the text given below, after having beencommissioned by the January 1992 meeting in Atlanta,Georgia of the “International Scholars’ AnnualTrialogue-ISAT@ (Jewish-Christian-Muslim), wasdrafted by Professor Leonard Swidler and submitted toand analyzed at the January, 1993 meeting of ISAT inGraz, Austria; it was focused on during the spring 1993semester graduate seminar Leonard Swidler held atTemple University entitled: “Global Ethics-HumanRights-World Religions”; it was also a major focus ofthe “First International Conference on Universalism” inAugust, 1993, in Warsaw; a Consultation of the Ameri-can Academy of Religion in November, 1993, in Wash-ington D.C. was devoted to the topic; the sixth “Inter-national Scholars’ Annual Trialogue” in January, 1994,concentrated for a second year on the Universal Decla-ration; in May, 1994, it was the subject of a conferencesponsored by the “International Association of AsianPhilosophy and Religion - IAAPR@ in Seoul, Korea;the “World Conference on Religion and Peace –WCRP” in part focused on it in its fall, 1994 World As-sembly in Rome/Riva del Garda, Italy; and on June 20-21, 1995, it was the subject of a conference in San Fran-cisco in honor of the “Fiftieth Anniversary of theFounding of the United Nations,” entitled: “Celebratingthe Spirit: Towards a Global Ethic.”

In March, 1997, the Philosophy and Ethics Divisionof UNESCO held in Paris the first meeting of its newlyestablished committee to work toward a “Universal

Ethic.” Its second meeting was held December, 1997 inNaples in conjunction with the Instituto Italiano degliStudii Filosofici. Both the above two Drafts (as well as theone described next) were submitted to this UNESCOcommittee.

More recently Professor Küng drafted a third text(also contained in this volume), this time within thecontext of the InterAction Council, entitled “A UniversalDeclaration of Human Responsibilities.” The InterActionCouncil is a committee made up of former heads ofstates, chaired by retired Chancellor Helmut Schmidt ofGermany. All three of these texts have been subjectedto numerous consultations and comments by scholarsand thinkers from multiple philosophical, religious andother backgrounds.

It is vital that we study this matter seriously, but wealso need to act. We must not dally, for the changes inthe world are mounting not only in arithmetic but ingeometric fashion. We must hurry with our global ethi-cal guiding light to “get ahead of the curve,” lest SamuelHuntington=s grim prediction of the “Clash of Civiliza-tions” and worse, comes true. On the other hand, adocument merely handed down from above will lackthe “ownership” of those who it is to influence andguide.

In this matter we can learn from the methodologyemployed by the Earth Charter Project headquartered inCosta Rica and chaired by Professor Steven Rockefeller.They did indeed initially “prime the pump” with textualinput from leading scholars and thinkers, but have thenput their bread out on the water of a vast network of

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Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), religious,secular, political and semi-political organizations and in-dividuals, urging them to bring insights and formula-tions up from below, which the headquarters is thensynthesizing.

To summarize: It is imperative that various religiousand ethical communities, ethnic groups and geographi-cal regions work on discussing and drafting their ownversions of a “Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic,”that is, what they consider their own basic ethical principles,which they at the same time believe people of all other religious andethical traditions could also affirm. The three already existingdrafts should certainly be made use of in this process.But all communities and regions need to make theirown contributions to the final Declaration, and in theprocess of wrestling with the issue and forging thewording, they will make the concern for a global ethictheir own, and will thus better be able to mediate it totheir “constituents” and enhance the likelihood of theDeclaration in fact being adhered to in practice.

What needs to be stressed is that such a projectcannot be carried out only by the scholars and leadersof the world=s religious and ethical communities,though obviously the vigorous participation of these el-ements is vital. The ideas and sensitivities must alsocome from the grassroots.

Moreover, it is also at the grassroots, as well at thelevels of scholars and leaders, that, first,consciousnesses must be raised on the desperate needfor the conscious development of a Global Ethic, andthen once drafted and accepted, the conviction of its

validity must be gained. The most carefully thought outand sensitively crafted Declaration will be of no use ifthose who are to adhere to it do not believe in it. AGlobal Ethic must work on all three levels: scholars,leaders, grassroots. Otherwise it will not work at all.Hence, I urge:

! first, all religious, ethical, ethnic and geographicalcommunities and organizations (either alone or in con-cert with others, but always in a dialogic spirit) - andmost especially the myriad NGOs of the world - needto move seriously but quickly to the drawing up of theirown Draft of a “Universal Declaration of a GlobalEthic”;

! second, these groups need to strategize on how tomaneuver their Drafts to gain the greatest influence inall the theaters each operates in: the UN, other NGOs,scholarly groups, religious groups, the vast world of theinternet, myriads of grass-roots organizations - in short,wherever aroused imaginations will lead;

! third, each group should send their Draft of a“Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic” to the Centerfor Global Ethics (Professor Leonard Swidler, Journal ofEcumenical Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA19122; FAX: 215-204-4569; E-mail:dialogue@vm.temple.edu), which will serve first as acollection and distribution center, and when the time isappropriate, a facilitator in the process of synthesizing a

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final Draft and devising in as democratic manner aspossible a process of world-wide adoption.

In sum, having studied, listened and thought, I chal-lenge us all to take up this vital task and act!

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF A GLOBALETHIC

I. RATIONALE

We women and men from various ethical and reli-gious traditions commit ourselves to the following Uni-versal Declaration of a Global Ethic. We speak here notof ethics in the plural, which implies rather great detail,but of ethic in the singular, i.e., the fundamental attitudetoward good and evil, and the basic and middle prin-ciples needed to put it into action.

We make this commitment not despite our differ-ences but arising out of our distinct perspectives, recog-nizing nevertheless in our diverse ethical and religioustraditions common convictions that lead us to speak outagainst all forms of inhumanity and for humaneness inour treatment of ourselves, one another and the worldaround us. We find in each of our traditions:

a) grounds in support of universal human rights,b) a call to work for justice and peace, andc) concern for conservation of the earth.

We confirm and applaud the positive human valuesthat are, at times painfully slowly, but nevertheless in-creasingly, being accepted and advocated in our world:freedom, equality, democracy, recognition of interde-pendence, commitment to justice and human rights. Wealso believe that conditions in our world encourage, in-deed require, us to look beyond what divides us and tospeak as one on matters that are crucial for the survivalof and respect for the earth. Therefore we advocatemovement toward a global order that reflects the bestvalues found in our myriad traditions.

We are convinced that a just global order can bebuilt only upon a global ethic which clearly states uni-versally-recognized norms and principles, and that suchan ethic presumes a readiness and intention on the partof people to act justly - that is, a movement of the heart.Secondly, a global ethic requires a thoughtful presenta-tion of principles that are held up to open investigationand critique - a movement of the head.

Each of our traditions holds commitments beyondwhat is expressed here, but we find that within our ethi-cal and religious traditions the world community is inthe process of discovering elements of a fundamentalminimal consensus on ethics which is convincing to allwomen and men of good will, religious and nonreli-gious alike, and which will provide us with a moralframework within which we can relate to ourselves,each other and the world in a just and respectful man-ner.

In order to build a humanity-wide consensus wefind it is essential to develop and use a language that is

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humanity-based, though each religious and ethical tradi-tion also has its own language for what is expressed inthis Declaration.

Furthermore, none of our traditions, ethical or reli-gious, is satisfied with minimums, vital as they are;rather, because humans are endlessly self-transcending,our traditions also provide maximums to be striven for.Consequently, this Declaration does the same. Themaximums, however, clearly are ideals to be striven for,and therefore cannot be required, lest the essential free-doms and rights of some thereby be violated.

II. PRESUPPOSITIONS

As a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic, whichwe believe must undergird any affirmation of humanrights and respect for the earth, this document affirmsand supports the rights and corresponding responsibili-ties enumerated in the 1948 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights of the United Nations. In conjunctionwith that first United Nations Declaration we believethere are five general presuppositions which are indis-pensable for a global ethic:

a) Every human possesses inalienable and inviolabledignity; individuals, states, and other social entities areobliged to respect and protect the dignity of each per-son.

b) No person or social entity exists beyond thescope of morality; everyone - individuals and social or-ganizations - is obliged to do good and avoid evil.

c) Humans are endowed with reason and conscience- the great challenge of being human is to act conscien-tiously; communities, states and other social organiza-tions are obliged to protect and foster these capabilities.

d) Communities, states and other social organiza-tions which contribute to the good of humans and theworld have a right to exist and flourish; this right shouldbe respected by all.

e) Humans are a part of nature, not apart from na-ture; ethical concerns extend beyond humanity to therest of the earth, and indeed the cosmos. In brief: thisDeclaration, in reflection of reality, is not just anthropo-centric, but cosmo-anthropo-centric.

III. A FUNDAMENTAL RULE

We propose the Golden Rule, which for thousandsof years has been affirmed in many religious and ethicaltraditions, as a fundamental principle upon which tobase a global ethic: “What you do not wish done toyourself, do not do to others,” or in positive terms,“What you wish done to yourself, do to others.” Thisrule should be valid not only for one=s own family,friends, community and nation, but also for all other in-dividuals, families, communities, nations, the entireworld, the cosmos.

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IV. BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Because freedom is of the essence of being hu-man, every person is free to exercise and develop everycapacity, so long as it does not infringe on the rights ofother persons or express a lack of due respect for thingsliving or non-living. In addition, human freedom shouldbe exercised in such a way as to enhance both the free-dom of all humans and due respect for all things, livingand non-living.

2. Because of their inherent equal dignity, all hu-mans should always be treated as ends, never as meremeans. In addition, all humans in every encounter withothers should strive to enhance to the fullest the intrin-sic dignity of all involved.

3. Although humans have greater intrinsic valuethan non-humans, all such things, living and non-living,do possess intrinsic value simply because of their exist-ence and, as such, are to be treated with due respect. Inaddition, all humans in every encounter with non-hu-mans, living and non-living, should strive to respectthem to the fullest of their intrinsic value.

4. As humans necessarily seek ever more truth, sotoo they seek to unite themselves, that is, their “selves,”with what they perceive as the good: in brief, they love.Usually this “self” is expanded/transcended to includetheir own family and friends, seeking the good forthem. In addition, as with the Golden Rule, this loving/loved “self” needs to continue its natural expansion/

transcendence to embrace the community, nation,world, and cosmos.

5. Thus true human love is authentic self-love andother-love co-relatively linked in such a way that ulti-mately it is drawn to become all-inclusive. This expan-sive and inclusive nature of love should be recognizedas an active principle in personal and global interaction.

6. Those who hold responsibility for others areobliged to help those for whom they hold responsibility.In addition, the Golden Rule implies: If we were in seri-ous difficulty wherein we could not help ourselves, wewould want those who could help us to do so, even ifthey held no responsibility for us; therefore we shouldhelp others in serious difficulty who cannot help them-selves, even though we hold no responsibility for them.

7. Because all humans are equally entitled to holdtheir religion or belief - i.e., their explanation of the ulti-mate meaning of life and how to live accordingly - astrue, every human=s religion or belief should begranted its due freedom and respect.

8. In addition, dialogue - i.e., conversation whoseprimary aim is to learn from the other - is a necessarymeans whereby women and men learn to respect theother, ceaselessly to expand and deepen their own ex-planation of the meaning of life, and to develop an everbroadening consensus whereby men and women canlive together on this globe in an authentically humanmanner.

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V. MIDDLE PRINCIPLES

The following “Middle Ethical Principles” are infact those which underlie the 1948 United Nations Uni-versal Declaration of Human Rights, formally approvedby almost every nation in the world.

1. Legal Rights/Responsibilities:Because all humans have an inherent equal dignity,

all should be treated equally before the law and pro-vided with its equal protection.

At the same time, all individuals and communitiesshould follow all just laws, obeying not only the letterbut most especially the spirit.

2. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Conscience and Reli-gion or Belief:

Because humans are thinking, and therefore essen-tially free-deciding beings, all have the right to freedomof thought, speech, conscience and religion or belief.

At the same time, all humans should exercise theirrights of freedom of thought, speech, conscience andreligion or belief in ways that will respect themselvesand all others and strive to produce maximum benefit,broadly understood, for both themselves and their fel-low humans.

3. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Speech and Informa-tion:

Because humans are thinking beings with the abilityto perceive reality and express it, all individuals andcommunities have both the right and the responsibility,as far as possible, to learn the truth and express it hon-estly.

At the same time everyone should avoid cover-ups,distortions, manipulations of others and inappropriateintrusions into personal privacy; this freedom and re-sponsibility is especially true of the mass media, artists,scientists, politicians and religious leaders.

4. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Participationin All Decision-making Affecting Oneself or Those for

Whom One is Responsible:Because humans are free-deciding beings, all adults

have the right to a voice, direct or indirect, in all deci-sions that affect them, including a meaningful participa-tion in choosing their leaders and holding them ac-countable, as well as the right of equal access to allleadership positions for which their talents qualify them.

At the same time, all humans should strive to exer-cise their right, and obligation, to participate in self-gov-ernance as to produce maximum benefit, widely under-stood, for both themselves and their fellow humans.

5. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning the Relationship be-tween Women and Men:

Because women and men are inherently equal andall men and women have an equal right to the full devel-opment of all their talents as well as the freedom tomarry, with equal rights for all women and men in livingout or dissolving marriage.

At the same time, all men and women should act to-ward each other outside of and within marriage in waysthat will respect the intrinsic dignity, equality, freedomand responsibilities of themselves and others.

6. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Property:

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Because humans are free, bodily and social in na-ture, all individual humans and communities have theright to own property of various sorts.

At the same time, society should be so organizedthat property will be dealt with respectfully, striving toproduce maximum benefit not only for the owners butalso for their fellow humans, as well as for the world atlarge.

7. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Work and Leisure:Because to lead an authentic human life all humans

should normally have both meaningful work and recre-ative leisure, individuals and communities should striveto organize society so as to provide these two dimen-sions of an authentic human life both for themselvesand all the members of their communities.

At the same time, all individuals have an obligationto work appropriately for their recompense, and, withall communities, to strive for ever more creative workand re-creative leisure for themselves, their communi-ties, and other individuals and communities.

8. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Children and Educa-tion:

Children are first of all not responsible for theircoming into existence or for their socialization and edu-cation; their parents are. Where for whatever reasonthey fail, the wider community, relatives and civil com-munity, have an obligation to provide the most humanecare possible, physical, mental, moral/spiritual and so-cial, for children.

Because humans can become authentically humanonly through education in the broad sense, and todayincreasingly can flourish only with extensive education

in the formal sense, all individuals and communitiesshould strive to provide an education for all childrenand adult women and men which is directed to the fulldevelopment of the human person, respect for humanrights and fundamental freedoms, the promotion of un-derstanding, dialogue and friendship among all humans- regardless of racial, ethnic, religious, belief, sexual orother differences - and respect for the earth.

At the same time, all individuals and communitieshave the obligation to contribute appropriately to pro-viding the means necessary for this education for them-selves and their communities, and beyond that to striveto provide the same for all humans.

9. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Peace:Because peace as both the absence of violence and

the presence of justice for all humans is the necessarycondition for the complete development of the full hu-manity of all humans, individually and communally, allindividuals and communities should strive constantly tofurther the growth of peace on all levels, personal, inter-personal, local, regional, national and international,granting that

a) the necessary basis of peace is justice for all con-cerned;

b) violence is to be vigorously avoided, being re-sorted to only when its absence would cause a greaterevil;

c) when peace is ruptured, all efforts should be bentto its rapid restoration - on the necessary basis of justicefor all.

At the same time, it should be recognized thatpeace, like liberty, is a positive value which should be

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constantly cultivated, and therefore all individuals andcommunities should make the necessary prior effortsnot only to avoid its break-down but also to strengthenits steady development and growth.

10. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning the Preservation ofthe Environment:

Because things, living and non-living, have an intrin-sic value simply because of their existence, and also be-cause humans cannot develop fully as humans, or evensurvive, if the environment is severely damaged, all indi-viduals and communities should respect the ecospherewithin which Awe all live, move and have our being,@and act so that

a) nothing, living or non-living, will be destroyed inits natural form except when used for some greatergood, as, for example, the use of plants/animals forfood;

b) if at all possible, only replaceable material will bedestroyed in its natural form.

At the same time, all individuals and communitiesshould constantly be vigilant to protect our fragile uni-verse, particularly from the exploding human popula-tion and increasing technological possibilities whichthreaten it in an ever expanding fashion.

Notes:

1 Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes (Munich:Beck, 1922-23), 2 vols.

2 Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York:Dutton, 1941).

3 See among others, Hans Küng, Theologie im Aufbruch(Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987), esp. pp. 153 ff.

4 See especially Ewert Cousins, AJudaism-Christianity-Islam:Facing Modernity Together, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 30:3-4(Summer-Fall, 1993), pp. 417-425.

5 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1970).

6 I am grateful for this exemplary comparison to HenryRosemont, who I met when he was the Fulbright Professor ofPhilosophy at Fudan University, Shanghai, 1982-84.

7 Already two millennia and more ago some Hindu andBuddhist thinkers held a nonabsolutistic epistemology, but thatfact had no significant impact on the West; because of the rela-tive cultural eclipse of those civilizations in the modern periodand the dominance of the Western scientific worldview, theseancient nonabsolutistic epistemologies have until now played nosignificant role in the emerging global society-though in the con-text of dialogue, they should in the future.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century Eastern thoughthas become increasingly better known in the West, and propor-tionately influential. This knowledge and influence appears to beincreasing geometrically in recent decades. It is even beginningto move into the hardest of our so-called hard sciences, nuclearphysics, as evidenced by the popular book of the theoreticalphysicist Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics (Boulder, CO:Shambhala, 2nd ed., 1983).

8 For a full discussion of these epistemological issues and re-lated matters, see my After the Absolute: The Dialogical Future of Reli-gious Reflection. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990

9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 1, a. 2.10 I am in this section especially indebted to Ewert Cous-

ins= essay AJudaism-Christianity-Islam: Facing Modernity To-gether, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 30:3-4 (Summer-Fall, 1993),pp. 417-425.

11 Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (Zurich:Artemis, 1949), pp. 19-43.

12 Ibid., p. 19; trans. Michael Bullock, The Origin and Goal ofHistory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 1. For the

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ongoing academic discussion of Jaspers= position on the AxialPeriod, see Wisdom, Revelation, and Doubt: Perspectives on the FirstMillennium B.C., Daedalus (Spring, 1975); and The Origins and Diver-sity of Axial Age Civilizations, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (New York: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1989).

13 For a more comprehensive treatment of Cousins= con-cept of the Second Axial Period, see his book Christ of the 21stCentury (Rockport, MA: Element, 1992).

14 Leonard Swidler et alii, Death or Dialogue (Philadelphia:Trinity Press International, 1990).

15 Hadith: Muslim, chapter on iman, 71-2; Ibn Madja, Intro-duction, 9; Al-Darimi, chapter on riqaq; Hambal 3, 1976. Thefirst quotation is cited in Bhagavan Das, The Essential Unity of AllReligions (1934), p. 298.

16 A Yoruba Proverb (Nigeria), cited in Andrew Wilson, ed.,World Scripture (New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. 114

17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, A 54; andGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Ethics, BA 66f.

18 Gleanings from the Writings of Baha=u=llah, trans. by ShoghiEffendi (Wilmette, IL: Baha=i Publishing Trust, 2d ed., 1976).

19 The Scripture of Won Buddhism (Iri, Korea: Won KwangPublishing Co., rev. ed. 1988), pp. 309f.

20 Bhagavan Das, The Essential Unity of All Religions (1934), p.303.

21 Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., A Global Ethic(New York: Continuum, 1993).

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Johannes Michael Schnarrer

The challenge of the globalizationof the world economy or - is thesocial and ecological misery in theso called Third World somethingof our concern?

In a speech at the Independence Hall in Philadelphia(Pennsylvania) held on 4th of July when he wasawarded with the „Peace Medal”, President VaclavHavel has exemplified the meaning of the postmodernage as follows: a Bedouin, sitting on a camel, wearingjeans under his traditional clothes, drinking Coke andlistening to a walkman with a Coca-Cola ad stuck ontothe camel. True indeed. Closed cultures are breakingup and become westernized, and along with thisdevelopment many ecological and social problemshave occurred. From the standpoint of the givenexample, we could ask, where did the Bedouin get allthis? Where can he recycle his empty tins? Let usdiscuss these social and ecological difficulties.

Our postmodern age is characterized by changes ofvalues and viewpoints, kinds of labour, flexibility andmobility, mix of cultures, ethnic conflicts and new alli-ances. Something is going towards an end (like theplanned market economy of communism), other newthings are coming into existence by the painful processof trial and error.

1. Concern of ecological aspects

The term “ecology” is defined as the scientific studyof the interactions that determine the territorial distribu-tion and abundance of organisms.1 It was first used sci-

JOHANNES MICHAEL

SCHNARRER

Prof., Ph.D., Ph.D., visit-ing-professor of theUniversity of Cluj, Roma-nia, professor at theUniversity of Karlsburg,and at the University ofVienna. Author of thebooks: Arbeit undWertewandel impostmodernenDeutschland: Einehistorisch, ethisch-systematische Studie zumBerufs- und Arbeitsethos(1996), The commongood in our changingworld (1997), Allianz fürden Sonntag (1998).

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entifically in 1866 by the German biologist ERNSTHÄCKEL in a study of plant ecology and is etymologi-cally derived from the Greek “oikos” or “household”.Each living species is assigned its own proper place innature; its own specific type of food, geographicalrange, and population, within a harmonious pattern ofinterdependence between the different species.

Modern ecology is centrally concerned with the cy-cling of nutrients through ecosystems, and with patternsof energy flow and interchange. The economic meta-phor by which the “functions” of different groups oforganisms within an ecosystem are classified- ‘produc-ers’ (mainly green plants), consumers (herbivores= ani-mal that feeds on plants, and their predators= plunder-ing or exploiting others) and decomposers (mainlymicro-organisms)-carries a clear resonance of the earliernotion of an ‘economy of nature’. The concept of “eco-sphere” means that the planet is considered as an im-mensely complex global system of ecosystems. The shiftfrom metaphorical to direct, literal application of eco-logical concepts to human social life was establishedonly in the 1960s, following the globalization of theecological perspective in the form of the concept of the“ecosphere”. If we take out one factor of the naturalcircle of the environment, we are going to lose our eco-logical balance. The catastrophe of Tschernobyl in 1986showed that it is not only a matter concerning theUkraine or Russia but also other parts in the world aswell. Similarly, pollution in the Third World should con-sider our thinking, too.

2. The problem of globalization

This is the process whereby the population of theworld is increasingly bounded into a single society. Glo-balization as term came only into wide use in the 1980s.The changes it refers to are highly charged politically,and the concept is controversial because it suggests thatthe creation of a world society is no longer the projectof a hegemonic nation-state but the undirected outcomeof social interaction on a global scale. The term has es-tablished itself in fields as diverse as economics, geogra-phy, marketing and sociology, which suggests that itsuse is more than a matter of passing fashion. Cultureand market combined in the 1970s in the activities ofmultinational corporations seeking to maximize theworldwide sales of products through global advertising.Globalization is attacked by those who see it as a newform of homogenization of culture, an extension of themass culture which ironed out the variety of nineteenth-century local European cultures. The sense of a com-mon fate for humanity is enhanced by recognition ofglobal environmental issues, and political activism in-creasingly crosses national boundaries with the world-wide mobilization of social movements.

3. Guidelines for international businessactivity

Economic factors exert a profound and lasting in-fluence on the life of all human beings. They can en-

KEY WORDS:

globalization, economy,ecosphere, subsidiarity,justice, value

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courage, alter or question basic human values. This ap-plies in particular to the effects of the international busi-ness activities of companies in areas where different cul-tures meet. Therefore, the responsibility of businessgoes beyond immediate entrepreneurial concerns andextends to primary human and social values. The firstand most important principle is that of responsibility. Itis much better for countries in the Third World to getfair trade conditions with partners from the northernhemisphere than getting gifts. One goal of the richercountries should be the clearly oriented help which in-duces new little initiatives or small enterprises in theparticular country of the Third World.

Business activities are governed by the respectivenational legislation. Companies should co-operate infighting corruption and they should also observe theprinciple of non-interference in the political affairs of ahost country, because their very economic presence haseffects on man and society. Therefore, co-operationswith national authorities and local economy should beconducted in the spirit of fairness and good faith. Infulfilling their responsibilities, especially in economicallyunderdeveloped countries, companies should orienttheir activities towards a development beneficial to allpeople concerned. Companies should inform the publicabout their activities and the economic and social con-sequences in a way consistent with their social impor-tance. Dominating market positions should not be mis-used to the detriment of the economy of the hostcountry or of its development. Decisions concerning

important changes within companies must be made af-ter careful evaluation of the social consequences.

4. Solidarity and subsidiarity

The basic notion of solidarity comprises interrelatedconnection and duty. It has its foundation in the humandignity of each individual and the social tendency of be-ing with others, and also the need of other people. Soli-darity is an ontic and ethical principle. And in the globalsense we can say that we are responsible for one an-other. The individual is only thinkable as a dialogical be-ing and therefore in need of solidarity. This idea is par-ticularly important in the postmodern age and in thecontext of the philosophical thinking of existentialismwhich often fails to see it. Yet, MARTIN BUBERwrites, “Man becomes an I through a You.” A lack ofsolidarity (=egoism) destroys a community and is inhu-man in itself. Individuals grow in encounter with others,in interrelated service and dialogue with sisters andbrothers. Solidarity is a responsible and loving accep-tance by a person based on the fact of human interde-pendence on the global scale today, based on the factthat one’s own life and the lives of the countless otherswhom one never comes to know personally are inter-twined for good and for ill.

The principle of subsidiarity requires that the stateleaves to individuals and intermediate bodies what theyare able to achieve by their own capabilities and inter-

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venes only to the extent where they are unable to secureimportant needs of the citizens (cf. CA 48).

Solidarity is expressed by the love of the other. In avery concise way love of neighbour has been defined as‘willing the good of another’. Willing the good of an-other means first of all to accept and appreciate thegood endowments a neighbour possesses as naturalgifts or as acquired facilities. It also means wishing himthe good which he ought to possess and to develop orperhaps regain. But merely wishing good to another isnot enough where one is in a condition to actually helphim. One must also commit oneself to the active pro-tection of the good endowments of the other and workfor the restoration or promotion of what is lacking ingoodness according to one’s possibilities. Integratingthese various aspects, love of neighbour could be de-fined as the sincere esteem for one’s neighbour’s gifts ofbody and soul and their active protection and further-ance in accordance with his calling by God. Theneighbours to be loved include all men, relatives andoutsiders, nationals and foreigners, friends and enemies,individuals and groups, the families, communities andnations.

Love of self, rightly understood (and not in the ego-istic sense), calls for the realization of the same objec-tives as love of neighbour and is motivated by the samemotives. God wills his likeness in us as much as he willsit in our neighbour. Again, love of self has to realize thesame objectives as those pointed out in love ofneighbour: acceptance of oneself and promotion ofone’s divinely willed growth in accordance with one’s

calling within the all-comprising scope of God’s eternaldesign. Love must be interior, i.e. sincerely affirm andaccept another person’s value and good endowmentsand talents without envy and curtailment. It must be ac-tive by an effective concern for the welfare of other.The political thrust of love orients the ethos towardssocial horizons. Another, most indispensible quality oflove appears to be humble, reverent respect for the per-son or community who is loved and helped.

5. Justice in the world

Evaluations of the basic and political institutions,particularly with respect to the consequent distributionsof benefits and burdens, are standardly expressed interms of justice and injustice. Justice is often held to bethe priority social value which overrides all other nor-mative considerations. In its most general sense theconcept of justice requires that each individual havewhat is due to him or her. Within this formula we maydistinguish formal and material justice. Formal justicerequires distribution which are in accordance with exist-ing or agreed criteria or rules. It is often identified withlegal or individual justice. Material (or substantive) jus-tice concerns the identification of the appropriate dis-tributive criteria (such as rights, need or choice) thatconstitute competing conceptions of justice.

John Rawls argues in his “Theory of Justice” (1971)that the principles for determining the basic institutionsof a society which would be chosen in a procedurally

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fair situation, and which are endorsed by our firmest re-flective intuitions as what is just, are (A) each person isto have an equal right to the most extensive total systemof basic liberties compatible with a similar system of lib-erty for all (cf.p.250); and (B) social and economic in-equalities are to be arranged so that are both [a] to thegreatest benefit of the least advantaged and [b] attachedto offices and positions open to all under conditions offair equality of opportunity (cf.p.83).

The justice question is linked to the human rights.Realities of political life often do not correspond withthe pledges made by the declarations of human rightsand not seldom stand in glaring contrast to them. Nev-ertheless the recognition of a common moral authorityis in itself a reason for hope. The Church considers it asher prophetic mission to defend justice and right in thesocial, national and international domain and to de-nounce injustice where the basic rights of man and hissalvation require it. The Church, especially today, isjudged by her own practice. The Church´s prophetic de-fence of human rights can only be credible if she herselfis perceived by others to be just and merciful. Her ser-vice to human rights thus pledges her to a constant ex-amination of conscience and a continuous purificationand renewal of her own life, her own laws, institutionsand conduct. The service that the Church can performfor the realization of human rights consists not merelyin verbal appeals, however important they may be, butalso in setting an example herself by doing right. Leastof all by the Church must the thirst for justice and theyearning for humanity in our world be disappointed.

6. The concept of values

We live in a time of competition of interests andvalues (i.g. helping my own national economy and/orsupporting Third World countries), and in changingvalue systems around the world. Therefore, let us lookto the values, its means and its different understandings.

The term values may refer to interests, pleasures,likes, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, attrac-tions and many other modalities of selective orienta-tions. Values are found in the large and diverse universeof selective behavior. The limits of value may be con-ceived very broadly or quite narrowly, but the limitsshould never be arbitrarily set, and their location oughtto be justified in any particular case. Values regulate ‘im-pulsive satisfaction’ in accord with the whole array ofhierarchical enduring goals of personality, the require-ments of both personality and sociocultural system fororder, the need for respecting the interests of othersand the group as a whole in social living. Values serve ascriteria for selection in action, and they become criteriafor judgement, preference and choice.

In ordinary speech the term “value” is used in twosenses: in one meaning, we refer to the specific evalua-tion of any object. Here we are told how an object israted or otherwise appraised, but not what standards areused to make the judgements. The second meaning ofvalue refers to the criteria, or standards in terms ofwhich evaluations are made. Value-as-criterion is usuallythe more important usage for purposes of social scien-tific analysis. It is often difficult in specific instances to

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distinguish between values and such related concepts asbeliefs, needs, or motives, reasonably clear distinctionscan be drawn in general terms. Needs derive from defi-ciency or disruption. Desires are wishes or appetitionsdirected toward certain objects and states. Values arenot motives. A given value may have a strength that isrelatively independent of any particular motive. Somevalues are freedom, equality, honesty, humanitarianism,authority. Most of them are questioned today, becausethe standards and evaluations are not clear enough.There is a main problem: many norms are multivalued,relating simultaneously, for example, to hedonic criteria,considerations of efficiency, and values of social integra-tion. Values enter into each of the four great systemshuman action: organism, personality, society and cul-ture. Both philosophical analysis and social science of-ten fall into serious error by paying attention to a singlekind of value while ignoring or underestimating others.

I gave this philosophical consideration, because theawareness of differences in other cultures is a presuppo-sition for dealing with people from different continents.On the one hand, we are changing not only our behav-ior (in the Second World), but our value system as well.So that it seems helpful to me thinking about roots andbackgrounds of values. On the other hand, dealing withother cultures means knowing the system of the brotheror sister. Contextual analysis is a necessary corrective incomparisons. Health, security, wealth, enjoyment, faithin the supernatural, knowledge, and other values thatfigure prominently in the value systems of many cul-tures are similar in name only. In different cultures,

knowledge refers to such divers contents as revealed re-ligious doctrine, traditional formulas, and modern sci-ence. Context is needed also to locate value judgementsthat do not contain explicit value terms, the counter-parts in other languages of the English “That simply isnot done!” Verbal explanation as well as context isneeded to understand nonlinguistic signs of evaluation,including sanctions. Not every spanking is a punish-ment. Not every smile is a sign of joy: it may only ex-press incomprehension. Since no value system is a per-fect fit to life conditions, each contains sociallyacceptable alternatives to formally established prin-ciples. These secondary rules and norms permit indi-viduals to come to terms with reality without runningafoul of society. Cross-cultural perspective is perhapsthe most promising single factor for refining and en-riching our comprehension of cultural value systems.

7. Democracy as precondition for a stablesociety

The term “democracy” is difficult to define, notonly because it is vague, like so many political terms, butmore importantly, because what one person would re-gard as a typical example or paradigm case anotherwould deny was a democracy at all. However, there isstill this much agreement: democracy consists in ‘gov-ernment by the people’ or ‘popular self-government’.

Obviously, the conditions of face-to-face democ-racy, with direct participation, cannot be fulfilled within

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the political structure of modern states, both because ofthe size of their populations and because of the special-ized knowledge needed to govern them. The idea ofmaking decisions raises the difficulty of how many dif-ferent individual decisions can be combined into onecollective decision. A decision by the whole peopleamounts to something more than a decision by the ma-jority and must involve compromise and consensus.Near universality of approval is a salient feature of de-mocracy today. The other key feature is that modern de-mocracies are indirect or representative rather than di-rect.

The dominant form of democracy today is liberaldemocracy. The term ‘liberal’ applied to governmentalsystems usually implies a concern with protecting indi-vidual freedoms by limiting the power of the govern-ment (which is until today one of the biggest problemsin the Second and Third World, where governments arestill too powerful and often enough, they don’t have po-litical oppositions).

Another feature of democracy is equality. There is aconnection between the ideas of democracy and equal-ity because, apart from anything else, the idea of thewhole people making a decision involves the notion -summed up in the slogan ‘one man, one vote’ -of eachindividual having an equal say. On the other hand, thenotion of liberal democracy is usually associated withimportant ideas about further kinds of political struc-tures and processes that are necessary for limiting gov-ernmental power and providing electoral choice. Promi-nent amongst these is the concept of a multiparty

system and the associated idea of parties whose func-tion is to oppose the government. These can be seen ascomponents in the overall idea of pluralism. This cen-tres on the concept of a plurality of political/interestgroups, as well as parties, as being important both forproviding sources of power alternative to and limitingthat of the government, and for creating choice for theelectorate. The one-party systems of the former com-munist world and of many Third World countries areno alternative to the liberal and democratic system ofthe western world. Another difficulty is the undemo-cratic tribalism in many countries all over the world, butparticularly in the southern hemisphere.

Somebody could ask, why do I say something aboutdemocracy in this connec-tion: I think it is necessaryspeaking about it, because only with democracy startsthe change in a bad economic and ecological situation(cf. South Africa). Therefore it is very important to con-sider it in that way and to look at the foundations or thephilosophical background of political stability.

8. Conclusion

The Third World is still far away for the most of ourfellow citizens in the northern hemisphere. But it is ourduty as human beings and Christians to consider themisery of other parts in the world, in the decades com-ing more than we did in the past. One presupposition isthe change in our narrow European and profit-orientedattitude. The other has to be towards a responsibility ofglobal thinking taking into account not only the difficult

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situation of our home countries but particular countriesof the poorer world as well.

If it is not possible to help solving the even biggerproblems of social and ecological distress in the ThirdWorld, we will suffer more because the distance be-tween the “different worlds” is getting smaller. Chris-tians have to influence the world in the positive sensebecause all people are equal in front of God, and we areresponsible for one another.

Notes:

1 This speech has been given by: The Conference of theChristian Democratic Academy for Central and Eastern Europeabout “Democracy and Market Economy” Budapest, April 25th,1995. And at the International Ecumenical World-Meeting inMinsk/Belarussia, October 1t to 3d, 1996. The whole text inGerman is published in the online-journal under the title „DasPhänomen Globalisierung und seine Auswirkungen auf unserLeben.“ http://www.aurora-magazin.at/gesellschaft/global_schnarrer.htm

54J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

1. Criza politica în constructiaconstitutionala democratica

Oricare ar fi tipul de inferenta, descriptiv sau cauzal,ales pentru o cercetare a socialului, prima sarcina acercetatorului rezida în conturarea unui cadru teoretic.Acesta nu trebuie sa se reduca la simple trimiteri spreuna sau mai multe teorii. Alegatia se justifica, pe de oparte, prin fragmentarea si nuantarea teoriilor dinstiintele sociale si, pe de alta parte, prin gradul decomplexitate ridicat al acestora. În acest context,apreciem ca o abordare sistemica a crizei politice raspundedeterminantelor precizate si poate oferi o explicatiecomprehensiva cu valente integratoare. Lansata lamijlocul secolului al XX-lea si, beneficiind de un largpotential de modelare, paradigma sistemica a cunoscut

This article examines the political crisis that has appeared

in the constitutions of 28 democratic states. The units of

analysis have been chosen using the criterion of a

modern and formal constitution. Using the systemic

paradigm, the article proposes an institutionalist ap-

proach. After explaining the role of the main institutions,

the article focuses itself on identifying the mechanisms of

crisis as they are provided by constitutions (i.e. the vote

of no-confidence, the motion of censure, the vacancy

etc.). We have observed that the correlation between the

institutional arrangement and the number of crisis

mechanisms is not very strong one. The article concludes

that in order to explain the reaction of a political system

towards a crisis situation it is not sufficient to draw on the

constitution, an understanding of the political tradition

and of the recent political experiences being absolutely

necessary.

Anton Carpinschi, Andrei Ilas

Criza politica si constructiainstitutionala democratica.O analiza comparata a douazecisi opt de constitutii

ANTON CARPINSCHI

Prof., Ph.D., “Al. I. Cuza”University, Iasi, Romania.Author of the books:Contemporary PoliticalDoctrines. A TypologicalSynthesis ( 1991);Orientari ideologiceactuale. Tendinte sisemnificatii, (1991);Doctrine politicecontemporane. Tipologii,dinamica, perspective(1992); Deschidere si sensîn gândirea politica,(1995); Stiinta politicului.Tratat, vol. I (1998).

ANDREI ILAS

Assist. Lect., “Al. I. Cuza”University, Iasi, Romania.E-mail:andan_i@yahoo.com

55J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

rafinari continue prin aportul diverselor zone alecunoasterii. Dezvoltata în ultimele doua decenii îndirectia modelarii organizarilor complexe, a joculuiordine-dezordine, a turbulentei în relatiile politice,paradigma sistemica poate oferi cadrul analitic pentru oteorie a crizei politice.

Democratia se arata a fi un regim politic failibilîntrucît, în epoca moderna, un mare numar de statelansate la un anume moment dat pe orbita democraticas-au dovedit incapabile sa-si mentina altitudinea. Repub-lica de la Weimar, Romînia interbelica, diferitele statesud-americane sunt cîteva dintre numeroasele exemple.Alte state, întîmpinînd diverse obstacole, s-au vazutnevoite sa-si modifice, definitiv sau temporar, tipul dedemocratie practicat. Cea de a patra republica francezace adoptase o democratie cu un pronuntat caracterparlamentar este înlocuita, în 1958, de un sistemprezindential. Sistemul politic britanic a fost modificattemporar în perioada critica a celui de-al doilea razboimondial prin crearea unui cabinet bazat pe coalitiadintre cele doua mari partide. Toate acestea justificamiza prezentului demers: o radiografie a modului în caredemocratiile actuale înteleg sa raspunda, printr-o anumeconstructie constitutionala, eventualelor amenintari laadresa stabilitatii si durabilitatii lor.

Însa, pentru a întelege forma pe care o iauconstitutiile statelor democratice este necesar, mai întîi,a face cîteva precizari privind substanta regimului politicdemocrat.

Ca obiect de studiu, democratia admite aplicareaunei multitudini de paradigme la toate nivelurile:

ontologic, metodologic si epistemologic. Adeseori, îninteriorul aceleasi paradigme, exista un numar ridicat devariante la dispozitia cercetatorului. Optiunea pentruuna sau alta dintre aceste tine de unghiul de abordare side problema specifica aflata în atentie. Avînd în vederescopul propus, pare potrivit a contura democratia prinidentificarea tensiunilor ce se regasesc atît înfundamentarea structuro-functionala - tensiuni statice, cîtsi în dinamica starilor – tensiuni dinamice.

Astfel, pe lînga functia de coordonare, sistemuluipolitic democratic îndeplineste, tot ca functie principala,si pe aceea de reprezentare a intereselor tuturor . Celedoua functii intra în opozitia clasica dintr putere sireprezentare. Din aceasta dialectica se nasc cele douamodele ale democratiei asa cum le-a identificat ArendLijphart: modelul majoritarist (de tip Westminster) simodelul consensualist. În timp ce modelul majoritaristpune accent pe concentrarea puterii prin reprezentareacelor mai multi dintre cetatenii unei democratii, înmodelul consensualist accentul cade pe ridicareagradului de reprezentare prin împartirea puterii.Tensiunea “concentrare a puterii versus crestereagradului de reprezentare” este, însa, prezenta în ambelemodele chiar daca în forme diferite.

Din perspectiva structurii, sa observam, mai întîi, cademocratia poate fi caracterizata prin neîncrederea pub-lica în capacitatea sistemului politic de a-si stapîniexcesele. Spre deosebire, în monarhiile absolutiste sistatele totalitare încrederea în actiunile sistemului politiceste maxima nefiind justificate supravegherea sicontrolul. De aceea, în structura intima a democratiilor

KEY WORDS:

comparative politics,constitutionalism, insti-tutionalism, politicalcrisis, mechanisms ofcrisis, democratic theory,index of institutionalpotentiality, theory ofcrisis

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trebuie sa regasim modalitati interne si externe deponderare si delimitare actionala. Astfel, analizareapîrghiilor si contraponderilor (checks and balances)existente între diversele institutii politice reprezinta unloc comun în conturarea oricarei democratii. Pe de altaparte, sistemele sociale coordonate de politic (E.g.sistemul societatii civile, sistemul mass-media, sistemuleconomic etc.) exercita, la rîndul lor, un controlcontinuu asupra acestuia. Toate acestea implica oridicare a complexitatii sistemului politic democrat.

Însa, cu cît un sistem este mai complex cu atît cresteprobabilitatea ca, în fata imprevizibilului, sa sedovedeasca incapabil de un raspuns suficient de rapid.În situatii similare, sistemele de un nivel de complexitatemai scazut au avantajul de a produce un raspuns - chiardaca acesta nu este unul pe deplin adecvat – si sa-siasigure, astfel, supravietuirea. De aici, deducem casistemele democratice baleiaza între o tendinta naturalade crestere a complexitatii si necesitatea asigurarii unorraspunsuri prompte. Aceasta tensiune complexitate ver-sus celeritate este, la rîndul sau, definitorie pentrustructura democratica.

Tensiunile dinamicii starilor pot fi relevate prinanalizarea relatiilor dintre gradul de deschidere, nivelulfluxului informational-energetic, si mobilitatea partilorcomponente ( actori politici).

Democratiile sunt adesea caracterizate dreptsocietati deschise. Din perspectiva sistemica, comparativcu alte tipuri de regimuri politice, democratia prezintaun grad de deschidere mult mai ridicat deoarece,postulînd politica drept bun public, permite tuturor

participarea. În particular, sistemul politic poate fi“accesat” de orice cetatean fie direct prin implicarea caactor politic, fie indirect prin intermediul informarii,discursului ori discutiilor desfasurate în varii spatiipublice.

Pe de alta parte, societatile contemporane, prezintanivele ale fluxului informational-energetic mult mairidicate decît în orice epoca anterioara datoritadezvoltarilor tehnice si tehnologice din secolul al XX-lea. Pentru cazul democratiilor, datorita deschideriinaturale a acestora, cantitatea de informatie si energierecunoscuta si procesata tinde sa devina enorma.Conchidem ca, în democratii, relatia dintre deschidere siflux informational-energetic este una tensionata întrucîtdeschiderea cu un grad a sistemului poate provoca ocrestere exponentiala a nivelului fluxului informational-energetic.

Orice crestere a nivelului fluxului informational-en-ergetic pune în scena mobilitatea partilor componente,respectiv capacitatea de adaptarea continua si rapida lanoi realitati societale. Cu toate acestea, deseori actorii siinstitutiile politice dau dovada de o mobilitate scazuta,din diverse motive (E.g. teama de a pierde electoratul,nerecunoasterea necesitatii de a modifica, inertia,atasamentul fata de o ideologie etc.). Consideram ca oalta tensiune sta în relatia dintre fluxul informational-en-ergetic si mobilitatea partilor întrucît actorii politici nuse arata întotdeauna dispusi sa opereze schimbari.

De asemenea, poate fi usor sesizata tensiunea dintremobilitatea actorilor politici si deschiderea sistemului.Lipsa de mobilitate ce conduce la refuzarea unei

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necesare deschideri sau operarea unei deschiderii pecare sistemul nu o poate gestiona sunt exemplele ce punîn evidenta prezenta acestei tensiuni.

Conchidem ca tensiunile statice si dinamice,identificate mai sus atît la nivelul proiectarii cît si alevolutiei unui sistem politic democrat, ar trebui sa seregaseasca in orice secventa a unei democratii, inclusiv,în constitutie. Astfel, atît institutiile constitutionaledemocratice cît si raporturile dintre ele sunt modelate deaceste tensiuni, dupa cum tot ele conduc la aparitiacrizelor. În consecinta, a analiza criza politica înconstructia constitutionala democratica înseamna, pe deo parte, a cerceta institutiile constitutionale si atributiileacestora din perspectiva tensiunilor creatoare si, pe dealta parte, a reliefa modalitatile de detensionare –mecanisme ale depasirii crizei. Într-un sistem politicputem regasi, deopotriva, mecanisme informale si mecanismeformale de depasire a crizei. Prin mecanisme informaleîntelegem acele procese de detensionare ce apar caurmare a vointei actorilor politici. Mentionam ca uneleprocese se bucura de repetabilitate si stabilitate în timp,iar altele sunt unice – expresie a unor situatiiexceptionale ce necesita rezolvari neuzuale. Prinmecanisme formale de depasire a crizei – pe care le vomnumi în continuare mecanisme ale crizei -întelegem aceleprocese de detensionare ce sunt înscrise într-un actnormativ. Prezenta cercetare se concentreaza numaiasupra mecanismelor formale incluse în constitutiilestatelor. Scopul nostru este de a releva cît de sensibilesunt constitutiile fata de diversele crize politice si de acerceta daca este o corelatie între tipul de aranjament in-

stitutional si numarul de mecanisme ale crizei. Pentruaceasta este necesar, mai întîi, sa precizam care suntinstitutiile supuse studiului si care sunt mecanismelecrizei prezente în constitutii.

La baza constructiei constitutionale democratice afost asezat, înca din secolul al XVIII-lea, principiulseparatiei puterilor în stat. În baza acestuia, exercitareaputerii este împartita între mai mult institutii în asa felîncît “puterea sa fie înfrînata de putere”. Aceastasegregare a facut ca o institutie – Parlamentul - sa detinaca obiect al activitatii adoptarea legilor, o alta –Guvernul – sa fie însarcinata sa le puna în aplicare, întimp ce o a treia – Instanta judecatoreasca - sa poatasanctiona nerespectarea legilor. Este necesar sa adaugamimediat ca între Parlament si Guvern, pe de o parte, siinstanta de judecata, pe de alta parte exista diferenteprofunde. Despre acest lucru ne atentioneazaMontesquieu care scrie ca într-un fel putereajudecatoreasca nu este o putere. Si aceasta pentru caParlamentul si Guvernul sunt institutii eminamentepolitice, în timp ce o instanta judecatoreasca e oinstitutie a-politica. Cele doua institutii politice îsicentreaza actionalitatea asupra prezentului si alviitorului, în vreme ce o instanta re-actioneaza cu privirela evenimente deja desfasurate. Parlamentul si Guvernulse bucura de un grad de libertate decizionala ridicata pecare instanta, tinuta de lege sau de precedent judiciar,nu o are.

Prin urmare, a fost firesc ca evolutia democratiilormoderne sa graviteze în jurul raporturilor Parlament-Guvern. Înainte de a explicita dezvoltarea acestor

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raporturi se impun cîteva precizari privitoare la nastereademocratiei moderne. Drumul care a condus laconceptualizarea si implementarea acestei formule deregim politic a fost unul sinuos. Astfel, unul dintre ceimai importanti filosofi ai Antichitatii, Aristotel,considera ca democratia nu este decît o “pervertire” abunei guvernari. În Politica, Stagiritul ofera o analizasuccinta si precisa a democratiei asa cum era înteleasa înperioada antica. Din aceasta descriere, retinem alaturi deDavid Held, conditiile pe care trebuie sa le îndeplineascaun stat pentru a adopta acest regim politic: oras-stat miccu terenuri agricole în vecinatate; economie bazata pemunca sclavilor, care asigura timp liber pentru cetateni;serviciul casnic, adica munca femeilor, care daposibilitatea barbatilor sa se ocupe de îndatoririlepublice; cetatenie restrînsa la un numar relativ mic depersoane. În ciuda idealului generos al egalitatii politice,democratia clasica a fost considerata, vreme îndelungata,potrivita doar pentru statele mici, statele-cetate. Însa,diminuarea rolului monarhului si augmentarea celuijucat de starile generale au impus, treptat, conturareamodelului democratiei reprezentative. Acest tip preiaprincipiul deplinei egalitati politice, dar îl face posibilprin intermediul mandatarii - cetatenii participa laguvernare prin intermediul reprezentantilor.

Astfel, institutia centrala si fara de care nu e posibilademocratia moderna este Parlamentul. Acestea pot fiunicamerale si bicamerale. În principiu, statele unitare artrebui sa detina Parlamente unicamerale, în timp cestatele federale ar trebui sa practice bicameralismul.Exista însa si exceptii datorate unor diversi factori. De

exemplu, în Parlamentul bicameral al Marii BritaniiCamera Lorzilor, mentinuta datorita traditiei, joaca unrol minor. De altfel, Parlamentul Marii Britanii esteconsiderat un “unicameralism bicameral”.

Daca Parlamentul este piatra de bolta a constructieidemocratice, atunci Guvernul - institutia abilitata sapuna în executare legile – poate fi înteles ca un instru-ment de lucru, “mîna lunga” a acestuia. Prezenta uneiinstitutii precum Guvernul, organ colegial construit peprincipiul raspunderii solidare si de dimensiuni mult maireduse decît Parlamentul, pare fireasca din perspectivaasigurarii unitatii si rapiditatii de actiune înimplementarea legilor. Pozitia sa este clar precizata: întimp ce Parlamentul ales, direct sau indirect, de cetateniicu drept de vot, se bucura de legitimitate deplina,Guvernul, învestit de Parlament, ramîne un simpluexecutant.

Cu acest model pare sa fi început aventura modernaa democratiei. De aceea, în a doua jumatate a secoluluial XIX-lea si prima jumatate a secolului al XX-lea,Parlamentele au uzat de legitimitatea lor sporita si aucreat o presiune puternica asupra guvernelor. Esteperioada lungilor dezbateri parlamentare bazate pe orevigorare a retoricii antice. Excesul de parlamentarisma dus la o instabilitate ridicata si o viata scurta aGuvernelor, complexitatea sistemelor crescînd în daunacapacitatii lor de a raspunde prompt la provocarilemediului social.

Pentru a contracara fenomenul, în Constitutiilestatelor democratice din perioada interbelica si, mai ales,dupa al doilea razboi mondial, au aparut mecanisme

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care au rationalizat parlamentarismul în scopul de a cresteputerea decizionala a Guvernului. Însa, aceasta solutieputea conduce si la efecte nedorite întrucît Guvernul erasituat într-o pozitie favorabila abuzului de putere.Pentru a înlatura noul neajuns, forta Guvernului a fosttreptat redusa, pe de o parte prin desprinderea unorinstitutii, pe de alta parte, prin crearea unor institutiimenite sa-i controleze activitatea.

Între institutiile desprinse din Guvern pot fimentionate: Reprezentantul statului (în anumite state),Banca Centrala (Nationala), Administratia locala, iar cainstitutii menite sa sanctioneze activitatea Guvernului:Avocatul Poporului si Curtea Constitutionala (CurteaSuprema). Vom analiza aceste institutii preponderentdin perspectiva rolului jucat în reamenajarea sistemelorpolitice democratice de dupa 1945, reliefînd aspectelelegate de “minarea” fortei Executivului.

Institutia care ridica cele mai importante dificultatiîn argumentarea teoretica este cea a Reprezentantuluistatului. Si aceasta deoarece rolul sau – de reprezentare astatului în relatiile cu alte state - este mai usor dejustificat prin referiri la traditie si istorie decît la teoriademocratica.

Pentru conturarea unei tipologii a acestei institutii,putem porni de la doua modele diametral opuse: unulde inspiratie britanica si un altul de inspiratie nord-americana. Urmare a unui lung proces de democratizare,în Marea Britanie monarhul a ajuns sa joace un roleminamente simbolic fiindu-i distribuit un rol minor însistemul politic. El se bucura de o legitimitate scazutaîntrucît ocupa functia respectiva pe criterii ereditare si

nu este învestit cu atributii executive. Modelul poate firegasit în statele din Commonwealth precum si in unelestate europene. Asimilam acestui model si sistemuldemocratic în care, în loc de monarh exista unpresedinte care este ales de Parlament si care nu detineatributii executive importante. Acest tip de regim estedenumit, în mod curent, regim parlamentar.

La polul opus se situeaza modelul american în carefunctia de reprezentare a statului si cea de prim-ministrusunt detinute de presedinte. Acesta se bucura de olegitimitate deplina deoarece este ales prin votulîntregului popor. Acest model a fost exportat în uneletari sud-americane: Columbia, Venezuela si Costa Rica.Acest tip de regim este regimul prezidential.

Între cele doua modele poate fi identificat un modelhibrid în care presedintele are unele atributii executivesi, mai important, o legitimitate ridicata datorata alegeriisale de catre întregul popor. În acest model, presedintelepoate fi vazut ca o contrapondere la Guvern mai ales însituatia în care nu are aceeasi orientare politica cu cea amajoritatii. Desi, de jure, presedintele în acest model -regimul semi-prezidential - are atributii de guvernare ce-l propulseaza în calitatea sui generis de membru alCabinetului, în situatia anvizajata, el iese de facto dinGuvern prin neparticipare la decizia politica si devine unfiltru al activitatii guvernamentale. În Franta, spreexemplu, aceasta situatie se numeste coabitare si s-aintîmplat de cîteva ori.

Banca Centrala (Nationala) a devenit independentaca o consecinta a globalizarii relatiilor economice, pe deo parte, si pe de alta parte, a integrarii statelor în

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organizatii financiare supra-statale. De exemplu, BancileNationale ale statelor din Uniunea Europeana fac partedin Sistemul European al Bancilor Centrale ce are caprincipal obiectiv “mentinerea stabilitatii preturilor”.Realizarea obiectivului poate stopa anumite actiuniinflationiste cu substrat politic ale Guvernului cum ar fiacelea din anii electorali. Rolul important jucat de BancaNationala îl determina pe Arend Lijphart sa o includa cavariabila a cercetarii efectuate la sfîrsitul anilor ’90 ( desinu o inclusese în analiza, avînd acelasi subiect, de lamijlocul anilor ‘80) constatînd ca: “A oferi bancilorcentrale independenta este înca o modalitate deîmpartire a puterii si se încadreaza în setul decaracteristici ale puterii împartite [...]”.

Tot în subordinea Guvernului s-au aflat si organeleadministratiei locale. Tensiunea dintre necesitatea de arezolva cît mai repede o problema aparuta si drumulanevoios al actelor a favorizat aparitia himereibirocratice. De aici s-a ajuns la solutia descentralizariiserviciilor publice, desprinderii de autoritatea centrala,apropierii de contribuabil si aproprierii cetateanului.Reprezentînd interesele comunitarilor, administratialocala a devenit o structura de incomodare a initiativelorGuvernului. Autonomizarea serviciilor publice este unalt pas de desprindere fata de administratia publiccentrala a unor institutii, desi acestea ramîn, încontinuare, controlate de reprezentanti teritoriali –prefectii - ai acestuia.

Institutia Avocatului Poporului (Ombudsman) areatributii în exercitarea unui control asupra actelor deguvernamînt. A aparut în Suedia la începutul secolului al

XIX-lea, dar face cariera abia dupa al doilea razboimondial cînd o suma de state adopta, pe rînd, aceastainstitutie. Ombudsmanul trebuie sa apere spiritul legilorsi sa protejeze drepturile si libertatile individului.Patronat de Parlament, Avocatul Poporului are dreptscop urmarirea actelor Puterii privitoare la promovareasi protejarea drepturilor individului si, prin aceasta,limiteaza libertatea de actiune a Guvernului.

Curtea Constitutionala a aparut întîia data în Austriasi Cehoslovacia în 1920, dar principiul pe care sebazeaza - controlul constitutionalitatii legilor a fostconturat într-o celebra decizie a Curtii SupremeAmericane din 1803. În cauza Marbury vs. Madison,Curtea Suprema a Statelor Unite ale Americii a statuatca “fara îndoiala, cei care au elaborat Constitutii scrisele-au conceput ca reprezentînd legea fundamentala sisuprema a natiunii si, în consecinta, principiul oricareiguvernari de acest fel trebuie sa fie ca o lege aParlamentului contrara Constitutiei este nula”. Astfel s-anascut modelul american de control alconstitutionalitatii legilor realizat de instantelejudecatoresti. Exercitarea controlului de catre o instantaoarecare prezinta doua incoveniente majore: riscul unui“guvernamînt al judecatorilor” si posibilitatea aparitieiunei practici neunitare în aplicarea legilor. Pentrueliminarea neajunsurile a aparut “modelul european” cepresupune crearea unui organ special si specializat de“justitie constitutionala”. Existenta unei constitutiilimiteaza la spiritul si litera ei activitatea Parlamentului,dar nu întotdeauna Legislativul gaseste calea optimizariiraportului constitutie/ lege/ necesitate. Curtea

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Constitutionala sau Curtea Suprema amendeaza aceastaeroare prin declararea ca neconstitutionala a unei legi oria unui segment de lege.

Dintre aceste institutii numai unele sunt, prin modulîn care iau nastere si prin atributiile pe care la au,institutii politice. Astfel, Parlamentul, Guvernul,Reprezentantul statului pot fi considerate institutiipolitice pline. Curtea Constitutionala (Curtea Suprema),Avocatul Poporului, Banca Centrala nu sunt institutiipolitice. Administratia locala are, prin modul în care iase constituie, o dubla natura - politica si birocratica, daratributiile sale cele mai importante nu sunt guvernate deprincipii si interese politice.

O cercetare completa privind criza politica ar trebuisa ia în consideratie toate aceste parti ale sistemului poli-tic prezente în majoritatea democratiile contemporane.Din cauza ca ar necesita un volum de munca mult mairidicat care ar fi posibila numai în urma unei colaborariinternationale, am decis sa ne concentram cercetareaasupra institutiilor ce constituie nucleul tare aldemocratiilor moderne si care, de altfel, produc sau suntimplicate în majoritatea crizelor politice. Aceste institutiisunt Parlamentul, Guvernul, Reprezentantul statului siCurtea Constitutionala (Curtea Suprema). De altfel,Avocatul Poporului, Banca Centrala si Administratialocala sunt, cel mai adesea, implicate în crize ale output-ului politic - politicile publice.

Cele patru institutii identificate pot fi implicate încrize fie pentru ca reprezentantii lor nu mai doresc orinu mai pot sa-si continue activitatea, fie pentru ca apardiferende în privinta adoptarii unei pozitii comune fata

de anumite legi, programe politice, problemeeconomice, sociale etc. Constitutiile nu relevaîntotdeauna motivele aparitiei unei crize, dar stabilescmecanisme care sa raspunda acestor situatii. De aceea,apropierea de criza politica institutionalizata constitu-tional nu poate fi facuta decît studiind mecanismele deraspuns si aratînd cauzele ce o pot provoca. Asupraacestor mecanisme ne vom concentra, în continuare,atentia.

Vacanta unei functii importante precum cea dereprezentant al statului ori de prim-ministru poate fiprovocata de demisia sau imposibilitatea de exercitarea aatributiilor. Demisia poate reprezenta un mecanism deiesire dintr-o criza politica ( E.g Demisia lui RichardNixon fortata, în 1974, de afacerea Watergate).Imposibilitatea de exercitare a atributiilor poate fiinvocata pentru a acoperi un motiv determinat de ocriza politica.

Presedintele sau Primul-ministru pot fi pusi subacuzare (impeachment) de catre Parlament pentrucomiterea unor infractiuni grave. Acest mecanismîncearca sa raspunda unei crize provocate de actiunilecontrare intereselor nationale comise de persoaneîndeplinind astfel de functii.

În majoritatea statelor democratice, parlamentarii sebucura de imunitate în sensul în care nu pot fi urmaritipenal decît în urma autorizarii prealabile venite dinpartea Camerei respective. Procedura de ridicare aimunitatii poate fi interpretata ca mecanism de iesiredintr-o criza politica atunci cînd apar speculatii privindposibila implicare a unui om politic într-o infractiune de

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o anume gravitate. O astfel de situatie poate apareadeopotriva cu privire la un om politic apartinînd unuipartid de guvernamînt cît si cu privire la un reprezentantal opozitiei.

Comisiile de ancheta reprezinta un mijloc de control alactivitatii altor institutii, în special a Executivului. Eleapar, de multe ori, în urma unei crize politice. Sesiunileextraordinare pot fi convocate pentru ca a aparut uneveniment neasteptat pe parcursul vacanteiparlamentare, eveniment care poate sa fie si o crizapolitica (E.g. neîntelegeri între reprezentantii coalitieiaflate la guvernare).

În cazul Parlamentelor bicamerale este posibil ca înprocesul de adoptare a unei legi sa apara un dezacordprivind textul unei legi. În aceasta situatie, Constitutiileprevad o procedura, care include adesea o comisiemixta, prin care este depasita criza si se ajunge la ovarianta acceptata de ambele Camere sau votata, deobicei cu o majoritate calificata, de Camera inferioara.

Pierderea încrederii concretizata într-o motiune decenzura sau un vot de neîncredere reprezintamecanisme care raspund unei crize politice generate deo deteriorare a raporturilor dintre Parlament si Guvern.Motiunea de cenzura este supusa unor conditii sirestrictii. Astfel, aceasta trebuie sa fie semnata de unnumar destul de ridicat de deputati si senatori. Mai mult,senatorii si deputatii ce au initiat o motiune de cenzuranu mai pot face acest lucru în respectiva sesiuneparlamentara. Unele state (E.g. Germania, Spania)prevad motiuni de cenzura constructive: odata cu motiunea

de cenzura este propus sau chiar trebuie desemnatviitorul prim-ministru.

Angajarea raspunderii Guvernului cu privire la un pro-gram, declaratie politica sau lege permite acestuia saverifice în ce masura se mai bucura de raspundereaParlamentului. Daca actul propus nu a fost votat,Guvernul va fi demis. Acest mecanism permiteconsolidarea relatiilor dintre Guvern si Parlament atuncicînd a aparut o situatie critica.

Invocarea starii de urgenta legislativa de catre Guvernconstituie o cale de a grabi Parlamentul sa voteze o lege.Dar poate fi folosita si ca un mijloc de a fortaParlamentul sa voteze o lege în forma pe care o doresteExecutivul.

În cazul în care coalitia aflata la guvernare îsi pierdeunitatea si o alta coalitie nu poate fi formata, iesirea dincriza o reprezinta dizolvarea Parlamentului si organizareade alegeri anticipate. De mentionat, ca dizolvarea poatereprezenta o manevra politica prin care cei aflati laputere încearca sa evite erodarea provocata de perioadaprea lunga de guvernare.

Sesizarea Curtii (Curtea Constitutionala sau CurteaSuprema) de catre Guvern, de un grup de parlamentarisau de Presedinte survine atunci cînd se considera ca olege este neconstitutionala. Practica arata ca în spateleacestei sesizari ce urmareste, aparent, un bine public seascunde frecvent o criza. Cei ce sesizeaza Curtea suntparlamentari ai opozitiei sau Presedintele – daca are ocoloratura politica diferita de cea a coalitiei saupartidului aflat la guvernare.

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Delegarea legislativa extraordinara acopera situatia de vidlegislativ în care Guvernul considera ca se afla într-osituatie speciala si poate promova un act cu valoare delege. Lasînd la o parte n posibilitatea ca acest fapt sa seîntîmple ca urmare a unui vid real putem sa luam înconsideratie posibilitatea ca Guvernul sa încerce saoblige Parlamentul: în momentul în care un act cuvaloare de lege a intrat în vigoare si a produs efectepentru o perioada de timp, modificarea sa în mod sub-stantial poate provoca mai mult rau.

Trimiterea legii în Parlament spre reexaminare de catrePresedinte reprezinta un alt mecanism de depasire aunei crize politice. În acest caz este vorba de odiferenta privind modul în care ar trebui sa arate o legeîntre Parlament si Presedinte.

Mentionam ca “înghetarea”, în diferite trepte, asistemului politic determinata de starea de urgenta,starea exceptionala si starea de asediu nu poate ficonsiderata un mecanism de raspuns la o criza politica.Prelungirea mandatului Guvernului si a Parlamentului,actiunile exceptionale ale Guvernului, activarea “celuleide criza” (precum Consiliul de Stat sau Consiliul Supe-rior de Aparare a Tarii) sunt raspunsuri firesti ale unuisistem confruntat cu un flux informational-energeticridicat. Pe acest fond pot aparea mai usor crize politicedeoarece sistemul devine mai instabil si opozantii puteriiîncearca sa profite. Într-o astfel de ipoteza devinincidente mecanismele pe care le-am descris anterior.

Ne propunem, in continuare, “testarea” conceptuluide criza politica, prin analiza comparata a celor 28 deconstitutii avute in vedere. Ce ne vor spune, oare,

constitutiile: eficienta si stabilitatea unui sistem constitu-tional se ating prin structuri simple sau prin structuricomplexe, cu ajutorul mecanismelor formale sau al celorinformale?

2. “Harta” crizei în constitutiile a douazecisi opt de state

Pentru a realiza cercetarea comparativa areglementarilor crizei politice în constitutiile unor statedemocratice, sunt necesare cîteva precizari privindmetodologia folosita. Plecînd de la cercetarile lui ArendLijphart asupra modelelor democratiei si de la cei 20 de anide practica democratica neîntrerupta recunoscuti dreptcriteriu pentru selectia unitatilor de observatie, noi ne-am fixat asupra 28 de constitutii. În cercetarea de fataprin constitutie întelegem sensul formal (organic) alacesteia, si anume, de lege ce cuprinde “ansamblulregulilor, indiferent de obiectul lor, adoptate în formeprocedurale specifice, distincte, exclusive”.

În analiza prezenta nu au putut fi incluse toate cele36 de tari studiate de Lijphart, din diferite motive. Unelestate nu au o constitutie în sens formal. Precizam, însa,ca aceste state au o constitutie în sens material, adica osuma de prevederi scrise sau cutumiare ce se regasesc îndiverse legi. Întrucît, de multe ori, cunoasterea exacta acontinutului acestor constitutii ridica dificultati chiar sispecialistilor din tarile respective, am considerat ca,pentru acuratetea cercetarii este necesar sa excludemaceste state din analiza. În situatia mentionata se afla:

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Regatul Unit, Israel si Noua Zeelanda. Constitutiile altorstate sunt foarte vechi si, desi au fost amendate saumodificate, nu se armonizeaza cu teoria separatiei suplesi a colaborarii puterilor. Este cazul Statelor Unite aleAmericii (1787), al Norvegiei (1814) si al Canadei(1867), ale caror constructii institutionale au ramasneschimbate. Spre exemplu, în ceea ce privesteconstitutia americana, unele amendamente ulterioare auavut drept obiect institutiile, dar schimbarile produse nuau fost de substanta. Cu mult mai semnificative suntmodificarile produse la nivelul practicilor politice, astfelîncît textul Constitutiei SUA ne poate spune foarteputin despre ceea ce se petrece în sistemul insitutional alacestui stat.

În ciuda eforturilor depuse, constitutiile unor state,Papua Noua Guinee si Botswana, nu au putut fi gasite.

În urma acestor precizari, unitatile de observatiesunt constituite din urmatoarele state: Austria, Australia,Bahamas, Barbados, Belgia, Columbia, Costa Rica,Danemarca, Elvetia, Finlanda, Franta, Germania,Grecia, India, Irlanda, Islanda, Italia, Jamaica, Japonia,Luxemburg, Malta, Mauritius, Olanda, Portugalia,Spania, Suedia, Trinidad-Tobago, Venezuela.

Pentru consultarea constitutiilor acestor state amaccesat siturile oficiale ale guvernelor sau aleParlamentelor. De asemenea, am consultat situri aleunor universitati prestigioase care au construit baze dedate ce includ constitutii si traduceri ale acestora.

O problema cu care se confrunta o cercetarecomparativa, din orice domeniu, este aceea a limbii si alimbajului. În acest caz, aducerea la numitorul comun s-

a realizat prin intermediul limbii engleze datorita maimultor motive. Frecventa de utilizare si raportare lalimba engleza atît în dreptul international public cît si înrelatiile internationale fac din aceasta o lingua franca. Deasemenea, o serie de state studiate au drept limbaoficiala engleza, iar cele mai multe situri oficialecuprindeau o varianta si în aceasta limba.

În ceea ce priveste limbajul, cercetarea s-a bucuratde atuul gradului destul de ridicat de formalizare de lanivelul institutiilor juridice din dreptul constitutional alstatelor democratice.

În consecinta, construirea unor travelling concepts afost mai usoara. Operatiunea are în vedere realizareaunei definiri echilibrate a unui concept care sa ia înconsideratie atît precizia logica cît si aplicabilitatea sa laspatii politice atît de diferite. Conceptele construiteteoretic, în prima parte, au rezistat testului, dovedindu-se destul de flexibile în raport cu fiecare constitutiecercetata.

Pasul urmator în analiza a constat în identificareainstitutiilor din fiecare constitutie. În urma acesteioperatii am constatat ca unele state au aceleasi institutii,însa, pozitia constitutionala a acestora este sensibildiferita. Aceasta ne-a sugerat ca simpla identificare ainstitutiilor este insuficienta si ca este necesar a construio analiza care sa releve capacitatea de actiune si inter-actiune a acestora. Pentru aceasta am apelat la descriereasi acordarea de valori numerice institutiilor cercetate înfunctie de doua dimensiuni: dimensiunea legitimitatii sidimensiunea atributiilor. Cele doua dimensiunioperationalizeaza conceptul denumit de noi, potentialitate

65J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

institutionala. Prin potentialitate institutionala, întelegemcapacitatea actionala a unei institutii. Am considerat cadimensiunea legitimitatii este cea care prevaleaza într-unsistem politic construit pe principiul forte alreprezentativitatii. O institutie puternic legitimata poateactiona politic dincolo de limita atributiilor recunoscute,întrucît poate pretinde ca actioneaza în numelepoporului. Spre exemplu, experienta comuna ne arata caun presedinte puternic legitimat prin votul întreguluipopor are tendinta de a juca un rol mult mai importantdecît un presedinte ales de Parlament chiar daca acestadin urma ar avea atributii mai importante. În functie decele doua dimensiuni, am construit urmatorul tabel:

Tabelul 1 Atribuţii

reduse importante

redusă 1 2 Legitimitate

puternică 3 4

procesul adoptarii legilor, în speta de posibilitateaacesteia de a se opune vointei Camerei inferioare.

Am apreciat ca Executivele au atributii importante,dar, nefiind alese prin vot direct, detin o legitimitateredusa. Exceptie fac regimurile prezidentiale undelegitimitatea este puternica deoarece Presedintele esteales prin vot direct. În Columbia, Venezuela si CostaRica functia de reprezentant al statului si de primministru sunt îndeplinite de Presedinte. În cazul acestorstate, am considerat ca exista o singura institutie –Guvernul – ce îndeplineste prin liderul sau si functia dereprezentare a statului. În consecinta, Executivului i-afost acordata valoarea 4. Franta constituie o exceptie laexceptie întrucît, desi presedintele este ales direct si con-duce politica externa, nu îndeplineste si calitatea deprim-ministru.

Reprezentantii statului au legitimitate puternica dacasunt alesi direct. În cazul în care sunt alesi de Parlamentsau ocupa functia pe criterii ereditare, legitimitatea loreste scazuta. Majoritatea reprezentantilor statului auatributii reduse.

Membrii Curtilor ce realizeaza control deconstitutionalitate sunt numiti si nu alesi, fie ca e vorbade Curti Constitutionale, fie ca e vorba de Curti Su-preme. Am considerat ca un organism special constituitva tinde sa fie mai activ decît unul care îndeplinesteaceasta atributie alaturi de cea obisnuita de jurisdictie. Înconsecinta, Curtilor Constitutionale le-a fost atribuitavaloarea 2, în timp ce Curtilor Supreme valoarea 1.

In urma acestei operatiuni, fiecare institutie aobtinut o valoare. Însumarea valorilor, utilizarea mediei

În continuare, pe baza acestui tabel, vom evalua celecinci institutii pe care le-am ales pentru analizacomparata: Camera inferioara, Camera superioara,Executivul, Reprezentantul statului, Curtea carerealizeaza controlul de constitutionalitate. Parlamentelorunicamerale si Camerelor inferioare le-a fost acordatavaloarea 4 întrucît au atributia majora de adoptare alegilor si sunt deplin legitimate în urma votului direct. Încazul Parlamentelor bicamerale, Camerele superioare aufost considerate cu legitimitate puternica în cazul alegeriiprin vot direct. Atributiile Camerei superioare au fostconsiderate importante în functie de rolul jucat în

66J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

aritmetice simple sau a celei ponderate nu ne conduc larezultate concludente. De aceea, este necesar sa folosimo formula de calcul care sa scoata în evidenta diferentelesemnificative dintre constructiile institutionaledemocratice. Dupa cum am precizat la începutul acesteisectiuni, proiectarea cercetarii noastre este centrata perelevarea diferentelor dintre democratii. Aceasta nesugereaza ca formula de calcul a indicelui constructieiinstitutionale trebuie astfel conceput, încît sa ajute laevidentierea specificitatii fiecarui stat. O formulamatematica menita sa scoata în evidenta diferentele estemedia patratica ponderata.

unde a este valoarea conferita Camerei inferioare, beste valoarea conferita Camerei superioare, c estevaloarea conferita Guvernului, d valoarea conferitaReprezentantului statului, e este valoarea conferita Curtiicu atributii de control al constitutionalitatii. Precizam ca,pentru cercetarea noastra, a are, întotdeauna, valoarea 4,c are, cu exceptia regimurilor prezidentiale, valoarea 2, bsi d pot lua valori în multimea {0,1,2,3,4}, în timp ce epoate lua valori în multimea {0,1,2}. Într-o primaacceptiune, indicele potentialitatii institutionale poate fi definitca, media patratica ponderata a potentialelor institutiilor statului.

Dupa consultarea constitutiei fiecarui stat, acordareade valori fiecarei institutii în conformitate cu Tabelul 1si calcularea indicelui constructiei institutionale, a fostconstruit urmatorul tabel:

Tabelul 2 (vezi pagina urmatoare)Precizam ca în Tabelul 2, în coloana statelor, a fost

înscris, alaturat, anul în care a fost adoptata constitutiala care facem referire. În coloanele institutiilor a fosttrecuta valoarea asignata acestora conform Tabelului 1,între paranteze fiind consemnate articolele pe care ne-am sprijinit în apreciere. Absenta institutiilor a fostnotata cu x. Ultima coloana cuprinde valoarea indiceluipotentialitatii institutionale (I) obtinut conform formulei(2).

Privind Tabelul 2 se pot face cîteva observatii. Asacum era de asteptat, avînd în vedere formulamatematica utilizata, regimurile semi-prezidentiale sicele prezidentiale care au mai multe institutii cu valorimari, obtin scoruri mai ridicate decît cele parlamentare.Regimurile parlamentare se regasesc în intervalul de la

Pentru a utiliza aceasta formula, trebuie sa atribuimcoeficienti valorii fiecarei institutii. În consecinta, luîndîn considerare ordinea logico-istorica a aparitiei lor,vom acorda Camerei inferioare coeficientul 1, Camereisuperioare coeficientul 2, Guvernului coeficientul 3Reprezentantului statului coeficientul 4, Curtiicoeficientul 5. Pe baza acestor valori, utilizînd mediapatratica ponderata, am realizat un indice al potentialitatiiinstitutionale (I):

67J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

1,61 la 2,14, în timp ce regimurile semi-prezidentiale si

Cam era Inferioară

Cam era Superioară

Guvern Reprezentantul statului

Tip de control constituţional

I

State Australia-1900 4(art.24-40) 4(art.7-23) 2(art.61-70) 1(art.2-4) 1(art.71-80) 2,14 Austria-1929 4(art.24-32) 1(art.32-37) 2(art.69-78) 3(art.60-68) 2(art.137-148) 2,39 Baham as-1973 4(art.46-51) 1(art.39-45) 2(art.71-92) 1(art.32-37) 1(art.93-97) 1,61 Barbados-1966 4(art.41-47) 1(art.36-40) 2(art.64-79) 1(art.28-34) 1(art.80-82) 1,61 Belgia-1970 4(art.61-66) 1(art.67-73) 2(art.96-114) 1(art.85-95) 2(art.142) 1,89 Colum bia-1991 4(art.176-

178) 3(art.171-175) 4(art.188-201) x 2(art.239-245) 3,04

Costa Rica-1949 4(art.105-129)

x 4(art.130-151) x 1(art.152-167) 2,76

Danem arca-1953 4(art.28-58) x 2)(art.13) 1(art.5-27) 1(art.59-65) 1,68 Elveţia-1998 4(art.149) 2(art.150) 2(art.174-187) x x 2,44 Finlanda-1999 4(art.24-53) x 2(art.60-69) 3(art.24-53) x 2,82 Franţa-1958 4(art.24-33) 1(art.24-33) 2(art.20-23) 4(art.5-19) 2(art.56-63) 2,75 Germ ania-1949 4(art.38-48) 1(art.50-53) 2(art.62-69) 1(art.54-61) 2(art.93-94) 1,89 Grecia-1975 4(art.30-50) x 2(art.81-86) 1(art.30-50) 1(art.100) 1,68 India-1950 4(art.81) 2(art.80) 2(art.77-78) 1(art.52-62) 1(art.124-147) 1,73 Irlanda-1937 4(art.15-17) 1(art.18-20) 2(art.28) 3(art.12-14) 1(art.34) 2,17 Islanda-1944 4(art.31-58) x 2(art.13-30) 3(art.3-13) 1(art.59-61) 2,30 Italia-1947 4(art.56) 1(art.57) 2(art.92-100) 1(art.83-91) 2(art.134-139) 1,89 Jam aica-1962 4(art.34-67) 1(art.34-67) 2(art.68-96) 1(art.27-33) 1(art.97-102) 1,61 Japonia-1946 4(art.41-64) 3(art.41-64) 2(art.65-75) 1(art.1-8) 1(art.79-91) 1,91 Luxem burg-1868 4(art.50-75) x 2(art.76-83bis) 1(art.33-45) 2(art.95ter) 2,00 M alta-1964 4(art.51-57) x 2(art.78-94) 1(art.48-50) 2(art.95) 2,00 M auritius-1968 4(art.31-5/) x 2(art.58-68) 1(art.28) 1(art.76-84) 1,68 Olanda-1983 4(art.54) 2(art.55) 2(art.42-49) 1(art.24-41) x 2,00 Portugalia-1976 4(art.150-

184) x 2(art.185-204) 3(art.123-143) 2(art.223-226) 2,54

Spania-1978 4(art.66-80) 1(art.66-80) 2(art.97-107) 1(art.56-65) 2(art.159-165) 1,89 Suedia-1978 4(cap.3) x 2(cap.6) 1(cap.5) 1(cap.11) 1,68 Trinidad-Tobago1962

4(art.39-73) 2(art.39-73) 2(art.75-88) 1(art.22-27) 1(art.99-111) 1,73

Venezuela-1999 4(art.186-224)

x 4(art.225-237) x 1(art.262-266) 2,76

68J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

prezidentiale se regasesc în intervalul de la 2,17 la 3,04.Întrucît indicele potentialitatii institutionale este unul

nou-creat, va trebui sa stabilim ce anume determinacresterea si descresterea valorilor sale. Observam cavaloarea minima (1,61) este obtinuta de state - Bahamas,Barbados si Jamaica – în care toate cele cinci institutiiau valori minime. Daca privim în tabel doar statele ce aucinci institutii, observam ca indicele acestora cresteodata cu cresterea valorii acordate institutiilor. Astfel,Belgia, Germania, Italia si Spania obtin 1,89 deoarecesunt diferite de cele trei tari ce obtin indicele cel maimic, prin prezenta Curtii Constitutionale în locul CurtiiSupreme. Între statele cu cinci insitutii cea mai marevaloare o obtine, în mod firesc, Franta care are atît unpresedinte puternic cît si un organ specializat de controlal constitutionalitatii legilor. Conchidem ca indicelepotentialitatii institutionale creste, ceteris paribus, odata cucresterea atributiilor si legitimitatii institutiilor. Consideram caaceasta concluzie este fireasca, indicele nefacînd altcevadecît sa “aseze” regimurile politice pe axa regimparlamentar - regim prezidential într-o ordinecrescatoare.

În continuare, vom urmari în tabel ce se întîmpla cuindicele atunci cînd numarul de institutii scade. Pentruaceasta, vom porni tot de la statele ce obtin valoareaminima - Bahamas, Barbados si Jamaica – si le vomcompara cu statele ce au o structura ce difera doar prinabsenta unei institutii. Astfel de state sunt Danemarca,Grecia, Mauritius si Suedia. Structura lor difera doarprin absenta Camerei Superioare. Observam ca scorulobtinut – 1,68 – este mai mare decît cel al statelor de

referinta (Bahamas, Barbados si Jamaica). Asemanator,Luxemburg difera de Germania si Italia prin absentaCamerei superioare. Desi are un numar mai mic deinstitutii, Luxemburg obtine un indice mai ridicat (2 fatade 1,89). Aceeasi situatie o întîlnim si în cazul a douaregimuri semi-prezidentiale. Finlanda si Portugalia austructuri asemanatoare. Diferenta este data de faptul caPortugalia are o Curte Constitutionala, în timp ceFinlanda nu are. Statul ce are doar trei institutii –Finlanda – obtine un scor mai ridicat 2,82, decît statulce are patru institutii – Portugalia – care obtine doar2,54.

Putem concluziona ca indicele potentialitatii institutionalepoate sa creasca si în cazul scaderii numarului de institutii. Dacaprima concluzie privind cresterea indicelui potentialitatiiinstitutionale a aparut ca fireasca, cea de a doua necesitaunele clarificari. Partile unui sistem tind sa devina maiimportante atunci cînd sunt mai putine. Implicit,scaderea numarului de institutii conduce la oredistributie a rolurilor si, astfel, la o crestere apotentialitatii actionale a fiecareia.

Un indice mai mare indica o propensiune mairidicata a institutiilor spre actional si, de aici, aparitiaunui numar mai mare de divergente între institutii. Înconsecinta, ne asteptam ca o crestere a acestui indice safie însotita de un numar mai ridicat de mecanisme alecrizei. De aceea, pasul ulterior al cercetarii a constat înidentificarea mecanismelor de criza din fiecareconstitutie. Numarul total al acestora este înscris înpenultima coloana a Tabelului 3. Pentru a obtine valoricomparabile am împartit numarul total de mecanisme la

69J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Total indm ec

State AUL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 53 57 - - 2 0,4AUS - - 68 - - 140a

l.1 142lit.b

- - 53 28al.2 57 74 140al.1

42 29al.1 - - 10 2,0

BAH - - - - 74al.2

- - - - - - - 74al.1 - 61al.1 66al.2 - - 4 0,8

BAR - - - - 66 - - - - - - - - - 55 61al.2 - - 3 0,6BEL 94 - - - 96al.

2 - 103a

l.1 - - 56 44al.4 59 - - 78al.5 46 - 54 9 1,8

COL - - - 166 173 167 175 - x - 138 - 135pct.7

- - - 150pct.10

- 8 2,0

CR - - - 125 - 128 151 - - - 118 110 - - - - - - 5 1,67DEN 9 - 60al.

2 - - - 16 - - 51 - 57 15al.2 - - - - - 6 1,5

SW I - - - - - - - - 165 153al.4

151al.2 - - - - - - - 3 1,0

FIN - - - - 64 - 101 44al.2

- 35al.1 26 30al.3 43al.2 - - - - - 7 2,33

FR 7al.4 61al.4

68 10 8 61al.2

68-1 49al.1,4

- - 29 26al.2 49al.2 61al.2 45 12 - 41,45 16 3,2

GER 57 - 61 - - 93al.2

- - 81 44 - 46al.4 67 93al.2 77 63al.4 - - 10 2,0

GR 32al.1 - 49al.2

35litd

- - 86 - - 68al.2 32al.5 61al.2 84al.2 - - 32al.4 44 - 10 2,5

IND 62 - 61lit.b

- - - - - - - - - - - 108 85al.2lit.b

123 143 6 1,2

IRE - 26al.1pct.1

12al.10pct.1

26al.5

13al.2pct.3

- - - 24al.1

- - - - - - 13al.2pct.1

- - 6 1,2

ICE 7 - - 26 - - 14 - - 29 - - - - - 24 28 - 6 1,5ITA 86al.2 - 90 74al.

1 - - - - - 82al.2 62al.2 68al.1 77al.2 - - x x - 9 1,8

JAM - - - - 71 - - - - - 64al.4 - 64al.5 - - 64al.1 - - 4 0,8JAP - - - - 70 - - - - 62 53 - 69 - 59 54al.1 - 67 7 1,4LUX - - - - - - 82 - - 64 72 69 - - - 74 - - 5 1,25M AL - - 76 - - - - - - - - - 81 - - 55 - - 3 0,75M AU 88 - 30 - - - - - - - - - 57al.1 - - 57al.1 - - 4 1,0NED 25 - - - - - - - - 70 - - - - - 64 - - 3 0,75POR 126al.

1 - 133 139a

l.1 198 - 199 196 173 181al.

1 136pct.

c 160al.2

197 - - 136pct.e

- 137pct.c

13 3,25

SPA 57 - - - 101 162al.1

102 - - 76al.1 73al.2 71al.2 113 162al.1

90 115al.1

86 74al.2,99al.5

13 2,6

SW E cap.5art.4

- - - cap.7art.7

- - - - - - cap.4art.8al.1

cap.6art.5

- - - - - 4 1,0

TRI 27 - 36 - 77 - - - - - - - - - - 68al.1 - - 4 0,8VEN - - - 214 233 214 233 - - 222 - 200 - - - - - - 6 2,0

70J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

numarul efectiv de institutii. Indicele astfel obtinut –indicele mecanismelor – a fost înscris în ultima coloana aTabelului 3.

Tabelul 3 (vezi pagina precedenta)Legenda:1 - vacanta functiei de Reprezentant al statului2 - sesizarea Curtii la initiativa Reprezentantului

statului cu privire la neconstitutionalitatea unei legi3 - punerea sub acuzare a Reprezentantului statului4 - trimiterea legii spre reexaminare5 - vacanta functiei de Prim-Ministru6 - sesizarea Curtii de catre Guvern cu privire la

neconstitutionalitatea unei legi7 - punerea sub acuzare a Primului-ministru8 - angajarea raspunderii9 - urgenta legislativa10 - comisii de ancheta11 - sesiuni extraordinare12 - ridicarea imunitatii parlamentarilor cu acordul

Camerei13 - pierderea încrederii14 - sesizarea Curtii de catre parlamentari cu privire

la neconstitutionalitatea unei legi15 - dezacord între Camere pe un text de lege16 - dizolvarea Paramentului17 - delegare legislativa extraordinara18 - alteleCercetînd Tabelul 3 se pot face cîteva observatii.

Sunt putine statele care sa aiba un numar mare demecanisme ale crizei: Franta -16, decît Spania -13,Portugalia -13. Multe state (12) au sub 6 mecanisme alecrizei înscrise în Constitutie. Dintre acestea, majoritatea

o reprezinta statele ce se înscriu în modelul majoritaristde inspiratie britanica. Tot aici se înscriu si statele (CostaRica, Venezuela, si, într-o masura mai mica, Columbia)ce au fost influentate de modelul american.

Ne-am astepta ca tarile ce se înscriu în modelulconsensualist, bazat pe cooperare si multipartidism, safavorizeze introducerea unui numar mai mare demecanisme. Aceasta afirmatie nu este valabila întrucîtsuficient de multe state (Elvetia, Olanda, Danemarca,Islanda, Luxemburg) ce se înscriu în modelulconsensualist nu o confirma.. Aceasta ne sugereaza caexista doua modalitati prin care sistemul politic întelegesa preîntîmpine criza: una ce se bazeaza pe capacitateade negociere si compromis a actorilor politici –mecanisme informale si o a doua ce construieste unsolid esafodaj constitutional de mecanisme ale crizei –mecanisme formale.

Privind indicele mecanismelor observam ca unelestate cu regim parlamentar (Spania, Grecia) obtin indicimai ridicati decît state cu regim prezidential (Costa Rica,Columbia, Venezuela).

Daca în cazul indicelui potentialitatii institutionaleam putut remarca o serie de regularitati, în cazulindicelui mecanismelor observam ca acestea lipsesc.Aceasta ne sugereaza ca între cei doi indici nu exista ocorelatie ridicata asa cum se poate observa din Figura 1:

Figura 1. “Harta” crizei în constitutiile a 28 de state(vezi pagina urmatoare)

Coeficientul de corelare este de 0,50 care estesemnificativ din punct de vedere statistic la nivelul de 1procent. Figura 1 prezinta o dispersie importanta, ceea

71J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

ce arata ca si alti factori determina puternic numarul demecanisme.

Dintre cazurile deviante – Finlanda, Franta, Grecia,Portugalia, Spania – cele mai multe sunt state ce au avutnefaste experiente democratice sau totalitare dupa aldoilea razboi mondial. Aceasta sugereaza ca un elementimportant în introducerea mecanismelor crizei înconstitutii îl reprezinta si istoria recenta a spatiului poli-tic respectiv. De cealalta parte a liniei de regresie,regasim ca si cazuri deviante Australia a carei pozitiepoate fi explicata prin vechimea constitutiei (1900) siElvetia care, desi a adoptat o noua constitutie recent(1998), pastreaza, la nivel institutional, traditia de secolXIX.

Modelul predominant este cel al statelor cu regimparlamentar si cu numar redus de mecanisme ale crizei.Aceasta situatie se datoreaza, pe de o parte, vechilordemocratiilor europene care se bazeaza pe stabilitateasistemului politic si pe capacitatea acestuia de a gestionasi rezolva, informal, crizele. Pe de alta parte, fostelecolonii ce au preluat modelul britanic si care auconstitutii, în buna masura, asemanatoare au ramasfidele traditiei mostenite.

Conchidem ca aceasta “harta” arata, odata în plus,ca o Constitutie este o imagine a experientei si traditieipolitice din statul respectiv si ca nu se poate vorbi de unmodel valabil oriunde si oricînd.

Indicele potentialitatii institutionale

3,2 3,0 2,8 2,6 2,4 2,2 2,0 1,8 1,6 1,4 1,2 1,0

Indicele mecanismelor

3,5

3,0

2,5

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

72J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

3. Spre o teorie a crizei ca metoda decunoastere si dezvoltare societala

Secolul al XX-lea poate fi considerat unul exemplardin perspectiva numarului mare de crize si al efectelorglobale produse de acestea în toate domeniile. Iatanumai cîteva exemple dintr-o lunga lista: Crizaeconomica din 1929-1933, Criza Berlinului din 1948-1949, Criza Ciprului din anii ’50-’60, Criza Suezului din1956, Criza rachetelor cubaneze din 1962, Crizadolarului de la începutul anilor ’70, Criza petrolului din1973, Criza ostatecilor din Iran si Liban din anii ’80,Criza determinata de crashul bursier din 1987, CrizaGolfului din 1991, Criza economiilor asiatice din anii’90 etc.

Termenul de “criza” este, în mod curent, asociat nudoar unor evenimente cu durata determinata în timp, cisi unor fenomene trenante: criza petrolului, crizatermica, criza claselor sociale, criza mediului etc.

De asemenea, o serie de termeni frecvent utilizati demijloacele de comunicare în masa induc, într-o masurasau alta, ideea de criza: antagonism, clivaj, conflict,coruptie, deficit, deficienta, diferenta, greva, minoritate,nationalism, opozitie, recesiune, tranzitie, segmentare,segregare, stres.

Ce semnificatie ar trebui sa acordam acesteiabundente? Se poate concluziona ca suntem în criza sauca traim într-o lume a crizei? Daca pornim pe filieraetimologica aflam, folosind dictionarul Larousse, ca în

greaca veche krisis însemna decizie. Astfel, putem schita oparadigma în care accentul cade pe momentul alegerii, algasirii si aplicarii unei solutii pentru problema aparuta.Însa, avînd în vedere experienta secolului recentîncheiat, criza nu este doar o metoda de raspuns latensiunile aparute, ci si o metoda de cunoastere si dezvoltaresocietala. Astfel, dupa fiecare criza majora sistemelenationale sau internationale s-au modificat, fierecunoscînd prezenta unor noi entitati în spatiilesocietale proprii, fie întelegînd necesitatea unormodificari esentiale. Practic, dupa fiecare criza, mediulsocietal s-a îmbogatit si niciodata nu a mai putut fi adusîn situatia anterioara. Acest lucru diferentiaza fenomenulde criza din secolul XX fata de cel din alte perioadeistorice. Crizele pot fi identificate în orice epoca istoricasi, atunci ca si astazi, impuneau luarea unei decizii. Însa,obiectivul final era acela de reîntoarce la momentul ini-tial, de restabilire a status quo –ului.

Evident, ne întrebam de unde provine deosebirea.Un posibil raspuns ia în consideratie lipsa unui modelgeneral-acceptat, lipsa datorata celeritatii progresului so-cial. Trecerea de la societatile rigide, de tip victorian, lacele deschise, tolerante la diferenta, însotite dedestructurarea claselor sociale traditionale au facutimposibile stabilitatea si continuitatea.

Istoria Statului si a teoriilor despre acesta, în secolulal XX-lea, reflecta aceasta lipsa a modelului. Poate si deaceea statul totalitar în diversele sale forme, de la celfacist pîna la cel comunist, a putut parea multorintelectuali de marca drept o solutie rezonabila. Abiacaderea comunismului din ultimul deceniu al veacului

73J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

produce ruperea definitiva a valului si triumful statuluidemocratic.

Cu atît mai mult devine necesara studierea statelorcu vechime neîntrerupta în practica democratica dinperspectiva modului în care au înteles sa reglementezeconstitutional mecanisme de raspuns la criza.

Nu de putine ori se spune despre Constitutie, într-oabordare institutionalista, ca ocupa locul cel mai impor-tant în ansamblul legislativ si ca stabileste regimul political unei tari. Însa, dintr-o perspectiva neo-institutionalista, o constitutie reprezinta doar unul dintreelementele importante ce contribuie la conturareaordinii juridice si a sistemului societal. Adeseori, intervinfenomene ce fac ca prevederile constitutionale sa fie fu-tile. Astfel, Pierre Pactet observa ca proceduriledestinate evitarii instabilitatii guvernamentale s-audovedit a fi destinate esecului. În constitutiile diverselorstate, dupa primul razboi mondial si, mai ales, dupa celde al doilea au fost introduse institutii precum motiuneade cenzura si votul de încredere menite sa limitezelibertatea de actiune a Parlamentului. Aceste proceduris-au aratat inutile, spune P.Pactet, fie pentru caechilibrul a fost asigurat de sistemul de partide, fiepentru ca, în ciuda prevederilor constitutionale,stabilitatea guvernamentala a fost erodata defragmentarea multipartidica.

Aceste remarci merita, însa, nuantate. Este adevaratca în Germania, spre exemplu, stabilitatea sistemului departide a jucat un rol important si ca motiunea de

cenzura constructiva prevazuta de articolul 67 nu a fostfolosita decît în anul 1982. În acelasi timp, nu vom stiniciodata ce s-ar fi întîmplat daca în legea fundamentalaa Germaniei nu ar fi fost prezent acel articol. Afirmatiaare substanta daca luam în consideratie atitudinea unuiactor politic care constient de prevederile dinConstitutie si de cerintele statului de drept îsi vaconstrui strategia în consecinta.

Observatia este importanta întrucît releva raportuldintre reglementarile constitutionale si sistemul politic.Este vorba de o dubla determinare, o dialectica în caresistemul politic se construieste în functie de constitutie,dupa cum constitutia ia forma pe care i-o da sistemulpolitic. Acestea fiind luate în considerare, se poatespune ca în constitutii regasim, în buna masura, o formade canonizare a politicului asa cum a fost sarjata desistemul politic respectiv. Consecinta este unaimportanta si a fost, nu odata, iterata: nu existaconstitutii care sa fie bune în mod abstract, ci doarconstitutii adecvate realitatilor societale. Ceea ce putemadauga în urma acestui studiu este ca adecvarea privesteatît configuratia institutionala cît si mecanismele decriza.

Din perspectiva sistemica, se poate spune caîntelegerea modului în care se pregateste sistemul fata deo potentiala criza echivaleaza cu întelegerea sistemuluiînsusi.

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Bibliografie

Carpinschi, Anton si Cristian Bocancea, Stiinta politicului.Tratat, Editura Universitatii “Al.I.Cuza”, Iasi, 1998

Carpinschi, Anton ,”Paradigma complexitatii si sistemulactiunii concrete” în volumul colectiv Mentalitati si institutii,coordonat de Adrian Paul Iliescu, Editura Ars Docendi,Bucuresti 2002

King, Gary, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, Fundamentelecercetarii sociale, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000

Lijphart, Arend, Democratii. Modele de guvernare majoritara siconsensuala în douazeci si una de tari, Editura Sigma, Chisinau, 1999

Lijphart, Arend, Democratia în societatile plurale, EdituraPolirom, Iasi, 2002

Lijphart, Arend, Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare sifunctionare în treizeci sisase de tari, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000

Lijphart, Arend, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,în “The American Political Science Review”

Pennings, Paul, Hans Keman si Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Re-search in Political Science, SAGE Publications, 1999

Sartori, Giovanni, “Comparing, Miscomparing and the Com-parative Method”, în Comparing Nations. Concepts, Strategies, Sub-stance editat de Mattei Dogan si Ali Kazancigil, Blackwell, 1994

Vile, M.J.C. , Constitutionalism and the separation of powers, Lib-erty Fund, Indianapolis, 1998

Situri accesate

http://confinder.richmond.edu/http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/forcons.htmlhttp://www.findlaw.com/01topics/06constitutional/

03forconst/http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/usconst.htmhttp://tcnbp.tripod.com/indexi.htm

Note:

1 Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, Fundamentelecercetarii sociale, Editura Polirom Iasi, 2000, pp.21-23.

2 Prin tensiune întelegem divergenta vectoriala a doua saumai multe fenomene

3 Sistemele totalitare nu îndeplinesc decît aceasta functie4 Arend Lijphart, Modele ale democratiei, Editura Polirom, Iasi,

20005 Într-o democratie de tip Westminster se vor cauta metode

de ridicare a gradului de reprezentativitate, în timp ce într-una detip consensualist se vor cauta metode de concentrare a puterii

6 Anton Carpinschi, “Paradigma complexitatii si sistemulactiunii concrete” studiu publicat în volumul colectiv Mentalitati siinstitutii, coordonat de Adrian Paul Iliescu, Editura Ars Docendi,Bucuresti 2002, pp.319-338

7 Drept exemplu, poate fi data implementarea Legii accesuluiliber la informatii- 544/2001. Aceasta lege aduce o deschideresuplimentara a sistemului. Desi fireasca într-o democratie,aplicarea legii întîmpina dificultati întrucît sistemul politic nureuseste sa raspunda nivelului informational-energetic extrem deridicat. În particular, reprezentantii Parlmentului Romîniei auafirmat ca nu au posibilitatea de a da raspuns tuturor cererilorînaintate de ziaristi datorita numarului covîrsitor al acestora.

8 Generalul Charles de Gaulle s-a aratat incapabil sa operezeo deschidere a sistemului în sensul cerut de miscarilemuncitoresti si studentesti din mai 1968

9 Aparitia unei crize este posibila doar daca este depasitalimita superioara a tensiunii

10 Charles de Montesquieu, Spiritul Legilor, vol. I, EdituraStiintifica, Bucuresti, 1964, p.195

11 idem, p.19812 Nuantare: instantele sunt independente (nu raspund în

fata unei alte institutii), dar nu sunt libere fiind supuse ordiniijuridice ce le învesteste; institutiile politice au libertate

75J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

decizionala, dar nu se bucura de independenta (raspund în fataaltor institutii si a alegatorilor)

13 Aristotel, Politica, Editura Antet, 1999, pp.218-21914 David Held, Modele ale democratiei, Editura Univers, p.4715 Poate purta diverse alte denumiri: Adunare Nasionala,

Congres, Dieta16 Pentru rigoare, sa precizam ca Prima Camera, cea care

asigura reprezentativitatea populara, este denumita Camerainferioara, în timp ce a doua Camera, cea care includereprezentantii statelor federate, este denumita Camera superioara

17 Aceasta institutie poate purta diverse denumiri: Guvern,Executiv, Consiliu de Ministri. Cel ce o conduce se numeste, deobicei, prim-ministru, dar se poate numi si presedinte ( Spania)ori cancelar (Germania, Austria)

18 Exista si în aceasta privinta exceptii (cel putin la nivel for-mal) – cf. Constitutiei SUA Executivul este reprezentat dePresedinte

19 Drept exemplu poate fi invocata atitudinea Frantei dinperioada de început al celui de al doilea razboi mondial

20 Asupra rationalizarii parlamentarismului vom reveni înmomentul discutarii mecanismelor

21 Folosim aceasta formula si nu pe aceea uzuala în limbajuldiplomatic de Sef al statului întrucît aceste functii au, cel maiadesea, atributii de conducere limitate

22 De exemplu, nimic nu opreste ca reprezentarea statului safie atributie a Primului-Ministru, unui membru al Parlamentuluietc.

23 Mai mult, conform Constitutiei SUA , Executivul esteuni-personal fiind alcatuit din Presedinte. În fapt, presedintiiSUA se bucura astazi de un aparat complex si numeros formatdin ministri (secretari de stat) si consilieri.

24 Între 1986-1988 are loc prima coabitare între unpresedinte de stînga –François Mitterand si un prim-ministru dedreapta Jacques Chirac. Între 1993-1995 se petrece a douacoabitare presedinte–François Mitterand si primul-ministrugaullist Édouard Balladur, în timp ce a treia coabitare, 1997-

2001, a avut ca presedinte pe Jacques Chirac si ca prim-ministrupe socialistul Lionel Jospin.

25 Art. 2 al “Protocolului privind Statutul Sistemului Euro-pean al Bancilor Centrale si al Bancii Centrale Europene” înDocumente de baza ale Comunitatii si Uniunii Europene, EdituraPolirom, Iasi, 1999, p.191

26 Lijphart, Arend, Democratii. Modele de guvernare majoritara siconsensuala în douazeci si una de tari, Editura Sigma, Chisinau, 1999

27 Lijphart, Arend, Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare sifunctionare în treizeci si sase de tari, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000,p.217

28 Apare în Finlanda în 1919, în Norvegia în 1952, înDanemarca în 1954, R.F.Germania în 1957, în Marea Britanie în1967, în Irlanda de Nord 1969, în Franta în 1973, în Italia în1974, în Portugalia în 1975, în Austria în 1977, în Spania în 1981.

29Ovidiu Tinca, Constitutii si alte texte de drept public, EdituraImprimeriei de Vest, Oradea, 1997, p.702

30 M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the separation of powers, Lib-erty Fund, Indianapolis, 1998; p.85

31 Este adevarat ca atît judecatorii de la CurteaConstitutionala, cît si Avocatul Poporului ori guvernatorul BanciiCentrale sunt numiti,în realitate, pe criterii politice. Însa, în celemai multe state, criteriile formale sunt bazate pe îndeplinireaunor conditii de merit si vechime în activitate.

32 Vezi “Carta europeana a autonomiei locale” adoptata deConsiliul Europei la Strasbourg, 15 octombrie 1985

33 Unele institutii nu apar în Constitutii si ar fi necesaraconsultarea minutioasa a unor legi interne.

34 Acestea pot fi mai putine daca ne aflam, de exemplu, însituatia unui regim prezidential sau mai multe daca este vorba deun Parlament bicameral

35 Este ceea ce i s-a întîmplat lui William Jefferson Clinton,al 42-lea presedinte al Statelor Unite ale Americii, care a fost pussub acuzare de Camera Reprezentantilor, pentru “perjury and ob-struction of justice” (marturie mincinoasa si obstructionare ajustitiei) în decembrie 1998 în legatura cu depozitia sa din cadrul

76J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

unui proces civil. Senatul Statelor Unite l-a achitat, însa, înfebruarie 1999. Acesta a fost al doilea presedinte supusprocedurii de impeachment, dupa Andrew Johnson.

36 Arend Lijphart, Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare sifunctionare în treizeci si sase de tari, Polirom, Iasi, 2000. Precizam caaceasta cercetare a fost initial publicata în anul 1999.

37 Ion Deleanu, Drept constitutional si institutii politice, vol. II,Editura Fundatiei Chemarea, Iasi, 1996, p.59

38 Desi actul din 1982 a adus modificari importanteconstitutiei canadiene, aceasta nu se înscrie în limitele teoriei pecare se funamenteaza aceasta cercetare

39 E.g. Amendamentul XII privitor la procedura de alegere aPresedintelui, Amendamentul XXII privitor la limitareanumarului de mandate, Amendamentul XXV privitor la decesulsau demisia Presedintelui

40http://confinder.richmond.edu/;http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/forcons.html; http://www.findlaw.com/01topics/06constitutional/03forconst/;http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/usconst.htm

http://tcnbp.tripod.com/indexi.htm

41 Pentru problema “conceptelor calatoare” vezi MatteiDogan si Dominique Pelassy, Cum sa comparam natiunile, EdituraAlternative, Bucuresti, 1993, pp.28-35

42 Aceasta asumptie este una destul de buna daca luam înconsideratie rezultatele obtinute de Arend Lijphart cu privire laintensitatea controlului constitutional vezi Arend Lijphart, op .cit.p.210, Tabelul 12.2

43 Nu exista Curti Constitutionale sau Curti Supreme aleseprin vot direct, deci acestea nu pot lua valorile legitimitatiiputernice, adica 3 sau 4.

44 E.g. S-a spus, adesea, ca dupa 11 septembrie 2001 lumeanu mai arata la fel.

45 apud. Jean-Claude Masclet si Jean-Paul Valette, Droitconstitutionnel et institutions politiques, Ed. Dalloz, 1997, p.125

46 Guvernul Partidului Social Democrat condus H.Schmidta fost abandonat de Partidul liberal care s-a asociat cu PartidulDemocrat Crestin pentru a forma un guvern sub conducerea luiH.Kohl

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Emil Moise

Relatia Stat-Biserica în privintaeducatiei religioase în scolilepublice din România

Moto:„Nu biserica se transforma în stat, va rog sa luati

bine aminte. Spre asta nazuia Roma în visurile sale! Ceade a treia ispita a diavolului! Dimpotriva, statul setransforma în biserica, se ridica pâna la ea pentru apastori asupra întregului pamânt ceea ce este …suprema menire a credintei pravoslavnice (ortodoxe,n.m., E.M.) pe lumea asta. Si luceafarul acesta se vaaprinde în Rasarit”.1

„Ne confruntam cu întrebarea privind rolul religieiîn viata publica a „democratiilor care se nasc”, sinecesitatea vitala ca organizatiile religioase sa devinaparte a emergentei societati civile în loc sa caute aliantepolitice nesanatoase cu statul”.2

EMIL MOISE

Ph.D. candidate, SNSPA,Bucharest, RomaniaE-mail: emimfil@k.ro

In this paper I will deal with the question of the religiouseducation in the public schools in Romania, from the pointof view of the relationship between Church and State. Myquantitative and qualitative analysis of the bills concerningreligious education, the way in which law has been appliedand some of the consequences of this application wants tocircumscribe the meaning of some concepts such asreligious liberty and the new religious forms. The basicconsequence of this I hope will be the redefining of thenotion of public space and of the role played by religionwith its characteristic aspects: the relationship betweenstate and religious organizations. This will clearly show theessential bond between two main aspects of religiousliberty: the formal aspect - legal and institutional - and theinformal aspect – an aspect connected to the personal andsocial attitudes regarding the new forms of religious

behaviour.

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Viziunea personajului citat în prima parte din moto-ul acestei lucrari implica nu o coexistenta a BisericiiPravoslavnice (Ortodoxe) cu Statul ci, mai mult, orespingere a acestui rau prin reconstructia Statului peprincipii crestine.

În aceasta lucrare voi analiza relatia Bisericii cu statulîn privinta educatiei religioase în scolile publice dinRomânia. Analiza cantitativa si calitativa – a legislatieivizând educatia religioasa, a modului în care legislatia afost aplicata si a unora dintre consecintele acestora –urmareste probleme care circumscriu termeni precumlibertatea religioasa, noile fenomene religioase3 , si careconduc la o redefinire a spatiului public si a roluluireligiei, cu aspectele caracteristice: relatia dintre stat siorganizatiile religioase.

Se vor evidentia astfel întrepatrunderea siinterrelationarea celor doua aspecte principale alelibertatii religioase: aspectul formal, institutional, legal siaspectul informal, conectat cu atitudinile personale sisociale fata de noile forme si manifestari religioase.

Cea mai exploatata terminologie în încercarea de adefini situatia religioasa contemporana depinde denotiuni precum sincretism, secularism, eclectism si plu-ralism.

Ipoteza de lucru care sta la baza acestui studiu esteaceea conform careia România este (sau ar trebui sa fie)un stat secular, ipoteza justificata si de art. 29, alin. 5 dinConstitutia României: cultele religioase sunt autonome fata destat. Am ales ca definitie a secularizarii – „procesul soci-etal în care un sistem religios transcendent este redus la

un subsistem al societatii printre alte subsisteme si alecarui sustineri au o audienta scazuta”4 .

În principal, lucrarea este structurata în doua parti: oanaliza normativa a legislatiei privind educatia religioasaîn România si un studiu de caz.

I. Legislatia privind educatia religioasa.Analiza normativa

În România, relatia religiei cu educatia (scolara) afost reglementata prin Legea 84 din 24 iulie 19955 –Legea învatamântului – modificata si republicata în19996 :

Art. 9(1) Planurile-cadru ale învatamântului primar,

gimnazial, liceal si profesional includ Religia cadisciplina scolara, parte a trunchiului comun. Elevul, cuacordul parintilor sau al tutorelui legal instituit, alegepentru studiu religia si confesiunea.

(2) La solicitarea scrisa a parintilor sau a tutorelui le-gal instituit, elevul poate sa nu frecventeze orele dereligie. In acest caz situatia scolara se încheie faraaceasta disciplina. În mod similar se procedeaza sipentru elevul caruia, din motive obiective, nu i s-auasigurat conditiile pentru frecventarea orelor la aceastadisciplina.

În varianta initiala, din 1995, în art. 9, alin. (1), teza adoua, Religia era reglementata ca disciplina obligatoriepentru învatamântul primar, optionala pentru

KEY WORDS:

legislation, genderdiscrimination, Roma-nia, religious educa-tion, public schools

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învatamântul gimnazial si facultativa pentru învatamântulliceal si profesional7 .

În data de 25 iunie 1995, 57 de deputati au sesizatCurtea Constitutionala asupra neconstitutionalitatiiprevederilor art. 9 alin (1), teza a doua, sustinând, înesenta, ca prin instituirea obligativitatii studiului religieiîn ciclul primar se aduce atingere prevederilorconstitutionale ale art. 1, alin. (3), teza privind „liberadezvoltare a personalitatii umane”, ale art. 26 alin. (2)care prevad ca „persoana fizica are dreptul sa dispunade ea însasi”, ale art. 29 alin. (1), (2) si (6) privindlibertatea constiintei si ale art. 45 alin. (5) privindobligatia autoritatilor publice de a contribui „laasigurarea conditiilor pentru participarea libera atinerilor la viata politica, sociala, economica, culturala sisportiva a tarii”.

În temeiul art. 19 din Legea nr. 47/19928 privindorganizarea si functionarea Curtii Constitutionale, CurteaConstitutionala a solicitat si analizat punctele de vedereale presedintilor celor doua Camere ale Parlamentului siGuvernului. În baza art. 5 din aceeasi lege si a art. 11alin. 2 din Regulamentul de organizare si functionare a CurtiiConstitutionale9 aceasta a solicitat si analizat informatiileMinisterului Învatamântului, iar prin Decizia 72 privindconstitutionalitatea unor prevederi ale Legii învatamântului10 , astabilit ca prevederile art. 9 alin. (1) din Legeaînvatamântului sunt constitutionale (sub aspectulanalizat), întrucât art. 9 alin. (1), teza finala, din Legeaînvatamântului, „permite o interpretare conformaprevederilor constitutionale”: Elevul, cu acordul parintelui

sau tutorelui legal instituit, alege pentru studiu religia siconfesiunea.

În interpretarea (putin fortata) a CurtiiConstitutionale, desi mentionata în textul legii ca atare,Religia nu trebuia înteleasa ca disciplina obligatorie,obligativitatea constând numai în introducerea acesteidiscipline în planurile de învatamânt.

Pe de o parte, interpretarea Curtii Constitutionaleofera o varianta de îmbinare a legii învatamântului culegislatia internationala si nationala într-un cadrulegislativ coerent, eliminând astfel interpretarile con-form carora disciplina Religie este obligatorie; pe de altaparte însa, terminologia folosita de legiuitor – în cazuldiscutat, al Legii învatamântului, este una care poate(usor) contribui la interpretari abuzive în privintalibertatii de alegere a frecventarii orelor de Religie(referinta este, în special la clasele din învatamântulprimar) – „e greu de presupus ca fiecare director va fidotat cu o copie a deciziei Curtii pentru a o aplicaîntocmai, si ca va reusi acest lucru”11 . Analiza mea vaviza argumentul folosit de Curtea Constitutionalapentru a demonstra ca obligativitatea din textul legii nuse refera la obligativitatea studierii Religiei.

Astfel, în opinia Curtii Constitutionale, dreptul de aalege (religia si confesiunea) „semnifica si posibilitatea de anu avea nici o optiune religioasa”12 .

Analizând prin analogie, consider ca argumentulfolosit de Curtea Constitutionala este unul falacios,întrucât daca coroborarea tezei conform careiaînvatamântul religios este obligatoriu (premisa 1 – art. 9, alin1, teza a doua) cu teza conform careia elevul, cu acordul

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parintelui…, alege pentru studiu religia …, (premisa 2 – ibid.,teza finala), semnifica posibilitatea de a nu avea nici o optiunereligioasa, (concluzia C – concluzia CurtiiConstitutionale) atunci coroborarea tezei conformcareia învatamântul primar si gimnazial este obligatoriu(premisa 1' – art. 6 si art. 15, alin 10) cu teza conformcareia. parintele …, are dreptul de a alege forma de învatamântsi felul educatiei copilului (premisa 2' – art. 178, alin 113 ) vasemnifica posibilitatea de a nu alege nici o forma de învatamântsau educatie (concluzia C’), argument pe care , cred, nicimacar Curtea Constitutionala nu ar fi fost de acord sa-lconsidere valid14 .

În decembrie 1996, Sinodul Bisericii OrtodoxeRomâne si Adunarea Nationala Bisericeasca au înaintatSenatului propunerea legislativa cetateneasca, sustinutaprin semnaturile a 1.049.853 de „credinciosi”, privindmodificarea art. 9 alin. (1) din Legea învatamântului nr.84/1995.

Potrivit propunerii legislative, acest alineat urma saprimeasca urmatoarea redactare:

“Planurile învatamântului primar, gimnazial, liceal siprofesional includ religia ca disciplina scolara de baza15 .Participarea la orele de religie se va face în functie deapartenenta religioasa si confesionala.”

Propunerea nu a fost adoptata în varianta solicitataîntrucât, cu referire nemijlocita la obiectul initiativei leg-islative, prin adresa nr. 9.304/ 1997, MinisterulÎnvatamântului a precizat, urmatoarele:

“1. În Legea învatamântului nu exista notiunea de„disciplina de baza”. Art. 127 alin. (2) prevede ca

planurile de învatamânt cuprind discipline obligatorii,optionale si facultative.

2. Introducerea religiei ca disciplina obligatorie nu vaavea consecinte negative asupra elevilor care nu apartinunei credinte si confesiuni dintre cele recunoscute,potrivit legii. Exista posibilitatea ca acestia - foarteputini - sa primeasca spre rezolvare, în scoala, individualsau în grup fiverse sarcini didactice16 . “

Din nou, sustinerea privind disciplina Religie(punctul 2 al anexei) este cel putin confuza: pe de oparte legiuitorul a stabilit ca elevii „care nu apartin uneicredinte sau confesiuni dintre cele recunoscute oficialsunt foarte putini (!)”17 ; pe de alta parte din text reieseca daca un elev apartine uneia dintre „credintele sauconfesiunile recunoscute oficial” este obligat (prin lege)sa frecventeze orele disciplinei Religie 18 (ca si cum prinlege o persoana poate fi obligata sa participe la slujbelereligioase din biserica).

În varianta modificata si republicata a Legiiînvatamântului, din 1999, caracterul disciplinei Religieeste, din nou, unul ambiguu, aceasta figurând caobligatorie (parte a trunchiului comun, art. 9, alin 1) dar custatut de optionala (elevul poate sa nu frecventeze orele dereligie, art. 9, alin 2).19 Nici statutul de disciplina optionala,pentru Religie, nu este însa suficient clarificat întrucâtoptiunea de a nu frecventa aceasta disciplina nu esteconditionata de alegerea altei discipline din pachetul dediscipline optionale din planul de învatamânt, existândposibilitatea – conform art. 9, alin. 2 – încheierii situatieiscolare fara aceasta disciplina, ceea ce îi confera sicaracterul de disciplina facultativa.

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Este evident, în urma analizei sub aceste trei planuri,cã Religia are caracter de disciplina facultativa.Mentionarea, în textul legii, a celorlalte doua variante nuface decât sa îngreuneze optiunile în privinta alegeriiacestei discipline, mai exact în privinta renuntarii lafrecventarea orelor acestei discipline.

Ambiguitatea legislativa este continuata si în uneleacte normative cu caracter de lege, prin care se atenteazala mecanismul de asigurare a libertatii religioase. Astfel,Ordinul nr. 3670/17.04.200120 cu privire la aplicareaPlanurilor-cadru de învatamânt pentru liceu în anulscolar 2001-2002, în contradictie cu Legeaînvatamântului (art. 9), anuleaza caracterul de disciplinafacultativa pentru disciplina Religie:

“(…) Luând în considerare faptul ca învatamântuldin România trebuie sa contribuie la formarea la elevi aunei personalitati active, motivate si creative, capabile deoptiune si de decizie, Ministrul Educatiei si Cercetariidispune:

(…) Art.5. Conform art. 9 din Legea învatamântului,„planurile-cadru ale învatamântului primar, gimnazial,liceal si profesional includ Religia ca disciplina scolara,parte a trunchiului comun. Elevul, cu acordul parintilorsau al tutorelui legal instituit, alege pentru studiu religiasi confesiunea. La solicitarea scrisa a parintilor sau atutorelui legal instituit, elevul poate sa nu frecventezeora de religie.” În aceasta ultima situatie, elevul îsi vaalege, în locul disciplinei Religie, o disciplina optionala.”

În unele dintre anexele Ordinului Ministrului Educatieise prevede21 , printr-o nota sub un tabel ca „elevii carenu studiaza Religia îsi vor completa, în mod obligatoriu,

schema orara cu un optional ales în urma procesului deconsultare”.

Desi invoca, în preambulul Ordinului, „formarea uneipersonalitati capabile de optiune si decizie”, MinistrulEducatiei si Cercetarii, printr-o nota în subsolul unuitabel, care contrazice chiar Legea învatamântului,restrictioneaza libertatea religioasa: daca un/ o elev/eleva (la solicitarea scrisa a parintilor…) va dori sa nu maifrecventeze orele disciplinei Religie (sa presupunem ca si-a schimbat religia) la mijlocul semestrului al II-lea, nu vaputea sa-si mai aleaga un optional, ceea ce va determinacontinuarea disciplinei Religie, împotriva dorintei (si avointei) legitime a elevului/ elevei.

O situatie ilegala de ascensiune (cel putin în privintaputerii) Bisericii, cu sprijinul institutiilor publice, esteevidentiata si în scoaterea la concurs, în fiecare an22 , aposturilor titularizabile pentru disciplina Religie. Pentru aputea fi oferita spre titularizare, în conditiile legii, ocatedra trebuie sa prezinte garantia viabilitatii pentru operioada de cel putin 4 ani. Mai mult decât atât, nu potfi oferite spre concurs catedrele pentru disciplineoptionale.

Pe de o parte, asa cum prevede legea, disciplinaReligie are caracter de disciplina facultativa deci nu poatefi titularizabila (decât ilegal); pe de alta parte, existândgarantia libertatii religioase, asigurata de reglementarileinternationale23 si de Constitutia României, nu poate fiasigurata viabilitatea unei catedre pentru disciplina Religie– oricând o persoana îsi poate schimba religia sau poaterenunta la ea, a gândi si a legifera altfel însemnând odiminuare (considerabila) a acestei libertati.

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În alin 3 al art. 9 din Legea 84/1995, republicata în1999, se prevede ca, la cererea cultelor recunoscuteoficial de stat, organizarea învatamântului teologic spe-cific pregatirii personalului de cult si activitatii social-misionare, în subordinea Ministerului Educatiei Nationale,se face „proportional cu ponderea numerica a fiecaruicult în configuratia religioasa a tarii, potrivitrecensamântului oficial reactualizat”.

Aceasta restrictie24 nu este corect justificata întrucât,pe de o parte, în cadrul recensamântului, la întrebareaprivind religia „raspunsul nu este obligatoriu. Cel careeste întrebat poate sa declare religia de care apartine,poate sa declare ca este ateu sau poate sa spuna ca este oproblema personala – si atunci se va consideranedeclarat. Adica, spre deosebire de celelalte întrebari,are dreptul de a nu raspunde la aceasta întrebare”25 .

Însa nici aceasta situatie nu este reglementata destulde clar întrucât, prin art 21, alin (1), lit b), si alin (2), dinHotarârea Guvernului nr. 680/2001, privind organizarea sidesfasurarea recensamântului populatiei si al locuintelor dinRomânia în anul 200226 , se stabileste ca refuzul de a furnizapersonalului de recensamânt informatiile prevazute în formularelede înregistrare sau furnizarea de date eronate sunt consideratecontraventii pentru care se aplica o amenda între 2 000 000lei si 10 000 000 lei.

De asemenea, pe coperta I a formularului pentrurecensamânt, 2002, este trecuta mentiunea „Cetatenii auobligatia de a furniza recenzorului informatii completesi corecte”, iar la capitolul IV: Date privind persoaneleînregistrate în gospodarie, la pct. 17. Religia, exista doar doua

rubrici (Ortodoxa si Alta religie) fara a fi specificata siposibilitatea neapartenentei la una dintre religii.

În interviurile realizate cu recenzori, acestia mi-auspus ca au existat persoane care nu stiau ce sa raspundala întrebarea privind religia sau persoane care dadeauraspunsuri de tipul „treceti ce este toata lumea”, sau„treceti ce au zis si ceilalti”27 .

Mai mult, desi 84% din populatia României sedeclara ca apartinând confesiunii crestin-ortodoxe,sondajul Gallup din septembrie 2003, „Intoleranta,discriminare si autoritarism în opinia publica”,comandat de Institutul de Politici Publice arata ca (doar)49,8% dintre respondenti/ respondente cred în viata dedupa moarte, iar 42,3% considera ca este mai importantsa fii om bun decât sa crezi în Dumnezeu, ceea cecontravine principiilor de baza ale crestinismului28 .

Pe de alta parte, Conferinta Generala a OrganizatieiNatiunilor Unite pentru educatie, stiinta si cultura, a adoptat laParis, la 14 decembrie 1964 Conventia privind luptaîmpotriva discriminarii în domeniul învatamântului, care, la art.3, lit d, sustine urmatoarele:

“În scopul de a elimina sau preveni oricediscriminare în sensul prezentei Conventii, StateleParticipante îsi iau angajamentul sa nu admita, în cazulunui ajutor eventual, dat sub orice forma, de catreautoritatile publice institutiilor de învatamânt, nici opreferinta sau restrictie bazate exclusiv pe faptul caelevii apartin unui grup determinat”.

România a devenit parte la aceasta conventie prinDecretul 149 din 2 aprilie 1964 pentru ratificarea Conventiei

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privind lupta împotriva discriminarii în domeniulînvatamîntului29 .

Restrictia impusa prin art. 9, alin (3), teza întâi a fostreglementata din august 1999 prin adoptarea Legii 151din 30 iulie 199930 privind aprobarea Ordonantei de urgenta aGuvernului nr. 36/1997 pentru modificarea si completarea Legiiînvatamântului nr. 84/ 1995:

“Cultele recunoscute oficial de stat pot solicitaMinisterului Educatiei Nationale organizarea unuiînvatamânt teologic specific pregatirii personalului decult si activitatii social-misionare a cultelor, numaipentru absolventii învatamântului gimnazial sau liceal,dupa caz, proportional cu ponderea numerica a fiecaruicult in configuratia religioasa a tarii, potrivitrecensamântului oficial reactualizat”.

II. Studiu de caz

Voi continua lucrarea cu un studiu de caz, o analizaa modului în care s-au facut demersurile introduceriieducatiei moral-religioase în învatamîntul de stat31 , câtevadintre etapele parcurse si unele dintre consecinte.Alaturi de instrumentele mentionate în introducerealucrarii – analiza cantitativa si cea calitativa – am folositinterviuri cu elevi/ eleve, parinti ai acestora, profesori/profesoare, inspectori scolari. Materialele – proceseverbale, dari de seama, informari, adrese, cereri – au fostpreluate din arhivele Episcopiei Buzaului si aleSeminarului Teologic Liceal din Buzau.

II.1 Predarea altor discipline, în afara religiei, decatre absolventi ai institutiilor de învatamântteologic, în scolile de stat

Absolventii seminarelor teologice, ai seminarelormonahale si ai institutelor teologice au fost angajatipentru predarea si a altor discipline în afara disciplineiReligie.

În 22.02.1991, Ministerul Învatamântului si Stiinteisi Secretariatul de Stat Pentru Culte au emis o Notacomuna cu numerele 32443, respectiv 1448 (vezi anexa),privind posibilitatea utilizarii absolventilor de seminariisi ai institutelor teologice de grad universitar caînvatatori, respectiv ca profesori cu studii superioare,pentru predarea unor discipline în scolile de statîncepând cu trimestrul al II-lea al anului de învatamânt1990-1991.

În 26.02.1991, prin adresa nr. 1693, CancelariaSfântului Sinod din cadrul Patriarhiei Române solicitaEpiscopiei Buzaului selectionarea, de urgenta, apreotilor care, conform Notei MinisteruluiÎnvatamântului si Stiintei si Secretariatului de Statpentru Culte, corespund pentru a preda în scolile destat, cu precadere din mediul rural, disciplinele: muzica,limba româna, limba latina, limbi moderne.

Recomandarile eparhiilor urmau a fi trimiseinspectoratelor scolare teritoriale care „aveau nevoie” decadre didactice.

În urma solicitarii Episcopiei Buzaului32 ,protopopiatele din judetele Buzau si Vrancea, auîntocmit tabele cu numele preotilor care corespund (atât

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ca pregatire cât si ca metodologie) pentru a putea predaîn scolile de stat, „cu precadere în mediul rural”,disciplinele prevazute în nota comuna:

- Protoeria Buzau33 : 71 preoti – 17 cu seminarteologic (notati, în continuare, cu ST), 54 licentiati înteologie (notati, în continuare, cu LT);

- Protoeria Patârlagele34 : 14 preoti – 14 LT;- Protopopiatul Râmnicu Sarat35 : 12 preoti – 12 LT ;- Protoeria Panciu36 : 44 preoti – 35 LT, 1 ST;- Protopopiatul Focsani: 44 preoti – 40 LT, 4 ST;Ulterior, listele au fost trimise Inspectoratelor

Scolare Judetene Buzau si Vrancea.

II.2 Predarea religiei în scolile de stat: “Scapacine poate!”

Desi în institutiile de învatamânt teologic s-a oferitoportunitatea pregatirii în scopul predarii Religiei(existând clase cu aceasta specializare în instituteleteologice, seminarele teologice si seminarele monahale),din paragraful final al Notei reiese prioritatea care a fostacordata preotilor în predarea acestei discipline37 . Deasemenea, desi predarea acestei discipline are loc în scoliale Ministerului Educatiei – scoli publice, prioritatea îndecizii, în privinta încadrarii suplinitorilor, o detinSecretariatul de Stat pentru Culte si „conducatorulunitatii centrale de cult” (aceste aspecte constituindunele dintre sursele neîntelegerilor în privinta alegeriicadrului didactic, în unele scoli; vezi infra, pp. 27-28).

În adresa Cancelariei Sfântului Sinod al B.O.R., nr.5331/ 14.06.1990, catre Episcopia Buzaului, se aduce lacunostinta ca Sfântul Sinod în sedinta sa de lucru din08.06.1990 a luat în examinare referatul CancelarieiSfântului Sinod privind organizarea cursurilor demetodologie si didactica pentru preotii care vor predareligia în scolile din învatamântul de stat în anul scolar1990-1991.

În urma concluziilor la care s-a ajuns, Sfântul Sinod ahotarât (printre altele):

- la aceste cursuri vor participa câte un preot dinfiecare protopopiat, rânduit de Chiriah, dintre preotii cupregatire si vocatie didactica, consilieri culturali de lacentrele eparhiale si profesori de la seminariile teologicecare predau Omiletica si Catehetica;

- organizarea cursurilor de metodologie si didacticava avea loc la Institutul Teologic Universitar dinBucuresti în perioada 16-27 iulie 1990, într-o singuraserie;

- în cursul lunii august, a.c., eparhiile, la rândul lor,vor organiza, pe protopopiate sau grupe de preoti,seminarizarea acestor prelegeri folosind în acest scop pepreotii, consilierii si profesorii de seminar care auparticipat la cursurile de metodologie si didactica laInstitutul Teologic Universitar din Bucuresti.

Din cuprinsul Eparhiei Buzaului au participat lacursurile de metodologie si didactica, organizate deInstitutul Teologic Universitar Bucuresti, 8 preoti38 .

În Protocolul încheiat între Ministerul Educatiei siStiintei39 si Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte40 , la11.09.1990, privind introducerea educatiei moral-

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religioase în învatamântul de stat, la pct. 3, se prevede ca„educatia moral-religioasa accentueaza asupraelementelor de etica si istorie culturala. (…) Elaborareaprogramelor de învatamânt si predarea se vor face înspirit irenic, tinând seama de principiile vietii comuneîntr-un stat modern”, iar la pct. 2 se mentioneaza caeducatia moral-religioasa este obiect de învatamânt si„are statut de disciplina optionala si facultativa”. Esteinteresant de remarcat ca nici una dintre prevederile cheieale acestui Protocol initial nu au fost respectate41 : educatia„moral-religioasa” nu s-a concentrat pe elemente deetica si istorie culturala, programele de învatamânt sipredarea nu au respectat (si nu respecta) spiritul irenic,iar despre „principiile vietii comune într-un stat mod-ern”… se pare ca tendinta este de a le combate si nu dea le promova.

În urma sesizarii celor 57 de deputati asupraneconstitutionalitatii prevederilor art. 9 din Legeaînvatamântului, în punctul de vedere al presedinteluiCamerei Deputatilor se considera ca textele în discutiesunt constitutionale. În acest sens, se arata, în esenta,urmatoarele:

“Studiul religiei, în conformitate cu optiunea elevuluisi acordul parintelui sau tutorelui legal, în masura în careobiectul materiei si modalitatea de predare se integreazaprocesului normal de învatamânt si se axeaza peprezentarea unor elemente de cultura religioasagenerale, abordate într-o maniera neutrala (sic!), nupoate fi considerat, ca si în cazul altor discipline, omodalitate de constrângere a subiectilor în aderarea la oanumita religie42 ”.

Afirmatiile presedintelui Camerei Deputatilor suntfalse întrucât, în contextul educational dat, studiulreligiei, în scolile de stat din România, nu se axeaza peprezentarea unor elemente de cultura religioasa generala,iar prevederile punctului 3 din Protocol au fost încalcatede B.O.R., respectiv prin nerespectarea caracteruluiirenic al disciplinei educatie moral-religioasa chiar dinprograma analitica43 . Astfel, pentru fiecare clasa, de laclasa I pâna la clasa a XII-a, programa începe cu SemnulSfintei Cruci (semn specific Bisericii Ortodoxe si care, încadrul altor confesiuni crestine este neacceptat). ÎnAbecedarul micutului crestin, Bucuresti: Editura Didactica siPedagogica, 1992, aparut cu aprobarea ComisieiPatriarhale Române pentru Învatamânt si cu avizulMinisterului Educatiei Nationale nr. 32530/ 17.06.1990,se prezinta explicit, cu detalii în imagini, cum se facesemnul crucii, caracteristic confesiunii ortodoxe.

Din interviuri cu eleve/ elevi de diferite clase44 , areiesit ca la toate orele de religie li se solicita sa facaacest semn, cu fata orientata catre o icoana – apartinândtot confesiunii ortodoxe si care ramâne în clasa tottimpul, nu numai la orele de religie – care este prezentaîn toate salile de clasa (icoanele ortodoxe nu lipsesc nicide pe peretii cancelariilor sau ai birourilor persoanelordin conducere, fiind însotite, nu de putine ori, si deCalendarul crestin-ortodox); acceptarea, de catre conducereascolilor publice, a icoanelor pe peretii claselor si aicancelariilor este o încalcare a libertatii religioase si opromovare a intolerantei, sanctionate prin Conventiaprivind lupta împotriva discriminarii în domeniul învatamântului,la care România este parte.

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În una dintre scolile din Buzau45 , la clasele primare,în anul scolar 2001-2002, profesoara de religie le spuneaelevelor/ elevilor ca „daca nu vin la scoala cu cruciulitala gât o sa apara diavolul si vor pati numai lucruri rele”.La una din clasele I, mama unei eleve mi-a spus caaceasta se trezea plângând noaptea, întrucât, la ea înclasa, pentru a fi mai convingatoare, profesoara le-adesenat diavolul pe tabla. În discutiile purtate, printr-oelocventa pentru care ar fi invidiat-o si cei patruevanghelisti, profesoara respectiva mi-a spus ca atâttimp cât Fecioara Maria – care vegheaza la bunadesfasurare a activitatii ei -, nu i-a atras atentia, înseamnaca nu a gresit46 .

Un exemplu similar s-a întâmplat si la alta scoala47

unde mama unei eleve a trebuit sa mearga cu aceasta lapsiholog în urma unei povesti predata la ora de religie(probleme similare având si alti copii, ceea ce i-adeterminat pe parinti sa solicite schimbarea profesoruluirespectiv).

Tot la aceeasi scoala, la clasele primare, în cadrulorei de religie, profesorul le-a spus elevelor/ elevilor ca„pe umarul drept aveti un îngeras, iar pe umarul stângun drac, prin urmare aveti grija cum va închinati: dacaîncepeti cu partea stânga, va închinati dracului”. Tot laclasele primare li s-a spus elevelor/ elevilor: „daca intratiîntr-o biserica adventista da tractorul peste voi” (înimediata vecinatate a scolii respective se afla unasezamânt al confesiunii adventiste de ziua a saptea).

Într-un liceu din Buzau48 , la orele de religie,profesorul le-a spus elevelor/ elevilor, în anul scolar2001-2002, ca unele dintre confesiunile care nu sunt

ortodoxe (dar care sunt printre confesiunile acceptate,legal, în România) sunt secte49 . Este interesant deobservat ca dintre confesiunile acceptate în România s-areferit numai la cele care au reprezentanti/reprezentante în Buzau.

Bisericile care nu apartin confesiunii ortodoxe, suntprezentate ca fiind un pericol pentru cei/ cele care intraîn ele. De asemenea, unele dintre confesiunile respectivesunt prezentate ca denigratoare ale confesiunii ortodoxe;(din caietul de religie al unui elev de clasa a IX-a50 ):„(…) adventistii denigreaza Biserica Ortodoxa, (…)pentru ei biserica este stapânita de diavol iar singuruladapost de acesta este casa lor”; sau: „Martorii luiIehova este una dintre cele mai periculoase secte (…)este una dintre formele de fanatism religios”.

La una dintre scolile din Buzau51 , în clasa a V-a (anscolar 2003-2004), profesoara de Religie le-a spuscopiilor ca Dumnezeu îi iubeste numai pe ortodocsi.Din colectivul clasei fac parte si doua eleve care nuapartin confesiunii ortodoxe si care participa la ora deReligie: una apartinând confesiunii evanghelice iar altaapartinând confesiunii iudaice. Desi una dintre colege aprotestat chiar în timpul orei: „doamna profesoara, eucred ca Dumnezeu ne iubeste pe toti – nu numai peortodocsi, ci si pe colegele noastre”52 , reactia negativanu a întârziat sa apara, unii/ unele colegi/ colegeîndepartându-le, în pauza, pe cele doua fete spunând casunt „spurcate”. Problema s-a discutat în sedinta peclasa, mama uneia dintre cele doua eleve solicitându-idirigintei sa discute cu profesoara de Religie pentru a-simodifica discursul, cel putin în cadrul scolii.

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La mai multe scoli si licee din (judetul) Buzau53 ,profesorul de religie (preot) le solicita elevelor/ elevilor,la ora de religie, sa prezinte aspecte din slujba tinuta launa dintre bisericile ortodoxe în duminica precedentazilei în care are loc lectia. De asemenea, unele dintreeleve54 mi-au spus ca li se solicita ca la ora de Religie sanu stea cu capul descoperit. La acelasi liceu, la deschidereaanului scolar, directorul a propus ca toate zilele descoala sa înceapa si sa se încheie cu o rugaciune.

Obligarea elevelor si a elevilor de a merge la bisericaeste întâlnita frecvent în scolile din mediul rural: înGrup Scolar Industrial (G.S.I.) Berca, în scoala dinPlescoi55 , în scoala din Sageata, în scoala din Cândesti(anul scolar 2003-2004). Daca nu merg la bisericasaptamânal, elevelor/ elevilor li se scad puncte lanotarea din cadrul orei de Religie. Asemenea situatii suntîntâlnite si în alte judete56 . În comuna Sageata, pentruastfel de „abateri” copiilor li se dau note sub nota depromovare a clasei, iar în Cândesti copiii sunt obligati sacumpere si trei lumânari. La scoala din Joseni,profesorul (preot) de religie a pedepsit un elev57 în clasaa IV-a tinându-l în picioare toata ora (în prezentacelorlalti copii) pentru ca, în preajma sarbatorilor dePaste a vizionat un fim difuzat în localitate de membriiunei confesiuni protestante58 . Astfel de comportamentesunt considerate infractiuni si sunt pedepsite ca atare delegislatia din România. Astfel, Codul Penal sanctioneazacu închisoare de la o luna la 6 luni sau cu amenda „faptade a obliga o persoana, prin constrîngere, sa participe laserviciile religioase ale vreunui cult, sau sa îndeplineascaun act religios legat de exercitarea unui cult”59 .

În G.S.I. Berca, unul dintre profesorii de Religie(preot) obliga copiii ca, în scoala, sa i se adreseze cuapelativul Prea Cucernice Parinte. De asemenea, pentruacelasi profesor (preot) formula de salut trebuie sa fie,obligatoriu, Saru’ mâna.

În procesul verbal al Conferintei preotesti, ProtoeriaBuzau, încheiat în data de 28.08.199060 se mentioneazaca „acest subiect (al educatiei moral-religioase, n.m.,E.M.) ne da mult de gândit si ne întrebam daca noiputem acoperi atâtea ore de religie, daca putem fi înacelasi timp si preoti si profesori”.

Prin adresa nr. 3407/ 12.09.1990 EpiscopiaBuzaului informeaza Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod ca, încadrul întrunirilor organizate pe protopopiate, la cea dea treia parte, care a constat în discutii pe margineatemelor prezentate, s-au facut sugestii si propuneri,printre care:

- reintroducerea religiei în scolile de stat „e oproblema care trebuie sa mobilizeze nu numai pe preotici si pe parintii copiilor, care parinti sa solicite acestlucru”;

- oficierea, în cadrul fiecarei institutii scolare, laînceperea noului an scolar, a slujbei de Sfestaniei si a Te-Deumului (specific ortodoxe, n.m., E.M.);

- înfiintarea la Bucuresti, în cadrul Patriarhiei a unui„post national de radio prin intermediul caruia sa seexpuna învataturile Bisericii noastre, sa se faca oinformare exacta si la timp asupra tuturor evenimentelorcu caracter bisericesc”;

În primele zile ale anului 1991, Secretariatul de Statpentru Culte a emis un Apel-Invitatie61 la dezbateri în

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cadrul unei sesiuni stiintifice cu tema „O bresa întretrecut si viitor; impactul religiei crestine în societatearomâneasca contemporana”. La sectiunea a II-a, Religiesi Educatie, problematica de discutat era: Criza moralei.Criza educatiei… Introducerea educatiei moral-religioase în scolileînvatamântului de stat62 .

Pentru „organizarea de întâlniri si dezbateri,activitati metodice si lectii deschise în vederea unei bunedesfasurari a orelor de educatie moral-religioasa” au fostemise Circulara Sfântului Sinod nr. 641/ 1991 siComunicatul Ministerului Învatamântului si Stiintei siSecretariatului de Stat pentru Culte, din 01.02.1991

La propunerea Comisiei învatamântului pentrupregatirea personalului bisericesc, Sfântul Sinod aaprobat63 ca în cadrul primei întruniri preotesti, din lunaiunie 1991, sa se trateze subiectul „Educatia moral-religioasa a tineretului”.

În adresa nr. 1519/ 08.05.1991, emisa de EpiscopiaBuzaului catre Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod, se mentioneazaorganizarea unor întruniri si dezbateri, în cadrulEparhiei Buzaului, de comun acord cu cele doua inspec-torate scolare judetene, Buzau si Vrancea. Au avut locdiscutii cu privire la modul cum se desfasoara ora deeducatie moral-religioasa în învatamântul de stat,greutatile întâmpinate în acest sens si propuneri pentruviitor. Printre „greutati”, este mentionat si faptul caorele de religie au fost programate la începutul sausfârsitul orelor, problema fiind nu lipsa de interes aelevilor/ elevelor pentru aceasta disciplina (întrucât înprocesele verbale, ale reprezentantilor B.O.R., estementionat „un interes larg” al acestora pentru Religie) ci

faptul ca nu se respecta Protocolul încheiat întreMinisterul Învatamântului si Stiintei si Secretariatul deStat pentru Culte, în care este precizat ca ora de religiesa fie „inclusa în orar”64 .

Printre propuneri:- organizarea de întruniri cu preotii în probleme de

metodologie si didactica;- interventia în vederea schimbarii denumirii

disciplinei educatie moral-religioasa;În adresa se precizeaza ca reprezentantii celor doua

inspectorate scolare judetene s-au angajat sa rezolve„favorabil” problemele sesizate (care revin unitatilor re-spective).

De asemenea, se mentioneaza ca în cadrulInspectoratului Scolar Judetean, la data de 30.04.1991,toti directorii de scoli au fost îndrumati sa „includaaceasta disciplina în orar, sa aiba rubrica în catalog si safie notata, iar lectiile predate sa fie mentionate încondica”.

În privinta „interesului larg” acordat de eleve/ elevidisciplinei Religie, diriginta unuia dintre liceele dinBuzau65 a solicitat acestora (clasa a XI-a), dupaînceperea anului scolar 2002-2003, sa scrie pe o foaie dehârtie optionalele pe care le-ar fi ales daca li s-ar fi dataceasta posibilitate (de regula optionalele sunt deja alese –dar nu de eleve/ elevi sau parintii acestora – atunci cândîncepe scoala). Fiecare trebuia sa aleaga trei optionale.Nici un/o elev/a nu a ales Religia. Consider ca acest as-pect este foarte important si cred ca ar trebui sa seinsiste pe alegerea propriu-zisa a optionalelor de catreeleve/ elevi, dupa ce aceste optionale sunt afisate la un

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avizier însotite de o descriere a lor. De asemenea, un as-pect la fel de important este si faptul ca nici un/ o elev/eleva nu stiau ca Religia este disciplina optionala.

În interviurile realizate cu eleve/ elevi de clasele aIX-a, a X-a, a XI-a si a XII-a66 , doar în doua clase (din19 analizate) procentul celor care au ales ca disciplinaoptionala Religia a fost 30%, în rest situându-se sub20%, în unele clase existând o singura preferinta pentruaceasta disciplina, iar în altele chiar nici una. 90% dintreelevele/ elevii intervievate/ intervievati nu stiau caReligia este disciplina optionala si chiar facultativa(poate sa nu fie aleasa fara a se face o alta în loc)67 .Dintr-un total de 366 eleve/ elevi, doar 51 au ales cadisciplina optionala Religia (le-au fost indicate 9 disci-pline, din care trebuia sa îsi aleaga, fara precizareanumelui elevei/ elevului, 3 optionale), reiesind astfel, unprocent de 13,93% (din totalul elevelor/ elevilor înclasele respective, au fost absente/ absenti în timpulinterviurilor 29 eleve/ elevi).

Nici cadrele didactice, în majoritate, nu stiu cadisciplina Religie are caracter facultativ, ceea ceafecteaza informarea elevelor/ elevilor si a parintiloracestora (nici o/ un diriginta/ diriginte, din scolileanalizate nu a anuntat copiii sau parintii de posibilitateanefrecventarii orelor de Religie). De altfel,reglementarea acestei discipline reflecta o duplicitatecare, macar în Legea învatamântului ar fi trebuit evitata:Religia apare ca obligatorie în oferta, iar cei/ cele caredoresc sa nu frecventeze orele respective trebuie sasolicite, în scris, acest lucru68 . Varianta corecta ar fitrebuit sa prevada solicitarea celor care doresc sa

frecventeze orele de Religie si nu a celor care doresc sanu frecventeze aceste ore.

În scoala unde predau69 , dupa ce am anuntat, latoate clasele unde am ore, ca frecventa acestei disciplinenu este obligatorie, aproximativ 30 de elevi/ eleve si-auanuntat intentia de a nu mai participa. Este usor deimaginat de ce intentiile lor nu s-au regasit în practica.Doi dintre elevi (în vârsta de peste 18 ani) au anuntatînsa renuntarea la aceasta disciplina. Ambii au fost însadeterminati, de majoritatea cadrelor didactice care lepredau, sa reia frecventarea orelor de Religie. Ceea ce s-asi întâmplat, dupa nici trei saptamâni70 . Din discutii cuelevi/ eleve de la diverse scoli a reiesit teama acestora dea alege sa nu frecventeze ora de religie; cu alte cuvinte,varianta aleasa de legiuitor poate fi încadrata în formula“Scapa cine poate!” în locul celei corecte “Beneficiazacine doreste!”.

În procesul verbal încheiat în data de 18.06.199171 laconferinta preoteasca din cadrul Protoieriei Buzau, cutema „Educatia moral-religioasa a tineretului si aîntregului popor” se mentioneaza ca „educatia rece,scolastica, trebuie evitata sau, cel putin, trecuta pe loculdoi…. Sfânta Scriptura trebuie sa aiba primul rol îneducatie: a ajunge asemenea lui Dumnezeu, iata tinta deatins”.

Nu lipsesc exprimarile sexiste (si, evident,discriminatorii): „Educatia având la baza omul ca chip allui Dumnezeu va trimite în lume barbati capabili sacugete si sa lucreze cu putere, care sa fie stapânii si nurobii împrejurarilor, barbati cu idei largi, cu idei clare siavând curajul convingerilor lor”. Un asemenea exemplu

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de sexism în limbaj îl putem întâlni si în practica predariiacestei discipline – la una din scolile din Buzau72 laclasele a doua, profesoara de religie le-a explicat elevelorsi elevilor, la lectia „Iubirea si purtarea de grija a luiDumnezeu fata de lume” ca Dumnezeu se poarta cu noi caun tata cu fiii lui73 .

Se recunoaste totodata ca desi este creataposibilitatea predarii religiei în scoli, „o problema care seridica acum este pregatirea noastra din punct de vederepedagogic pentru aceasta deosebita lucrare cu tineretultarii”.

În referatul conferintei din 20.06.199174 , parohiaUnguriu, se dau ca exemple de educatie pasajul dinVechiul Testament în care femeia este citata printreproprietatile barbatului, alaturi de boul, asinul si altedobitoace ale acestuia si pasajul în care este promovatametoda razbunarii – „ochi pentru ochi, dinte pentrudinte…” – sugerându-se ca „influentele educative” aleprofetilor asupra poporului evreu ar putea fi transpuse în„adevarate manuale de educatie”:

“Sa nu doresti femeia aproapelui tau, nici ogorul lui,nici sluga lui, nici slujnica lui, nici boul lui, nici asinul luisi nici unul dintre dobitoacele lui (…)!

Iar de va fi si alta vatamare atunci sa plateasca sufletpentru suflet, ochi pentru ochi, dinte pentru dinte, mânapentru mâna, picior pentru picior.”75

Se mentioneaza ca Vechiul Testament este o carte (sic!)puternic educativa.

Este, cred, interesant de mentionat ca exemple carereflecta acest tip de educatie, prin pedeapsa, se regasescsi în manualele religioase ale confesiunii ortodoxe. În

abecedarul ortodox (vezi supra), un baiat, care esteprezent si în imagini si în text, fiindu-i specificat sinumele (Vasilica), este pedepsit de Dumnezeu pentru caa vrut sa strice cuibul unei rândunici. Pedeapsa ilustreazao metoda educativa care nu este tocmai în acord cunormele Ministerului Educatiei si Cercetarii si nici,macar, în acord cu învatatura crestina, aceea a dragosteisi a recompensei: scara, pe care baiatul s-a „catarat”încercând sa strice cuibul rândunicii, a alunecat, „Vasilicaa cazut si toata vara a zacut bolnav în spital”. În imagineVasilica este prezentat cazut la pamânt, cu scara pesteabdomen, peste membrele inferioare si peste unul dinmembrele superioare (în lectia Fiti buni cu vietuitoarele,pp. 36-37); în aceasta prezentare se poate identifica oierarhie de putere, tendinta putând fi considerata ca fiindaceea de a dezvolta un caracter razbunator;subsumându-se temei sugerata în titlu, continutul lectieiputea fi unul în care sa se explice copiilor cum ar putea fibuni cu vietuitoarele (oferind acestora hrana,construindu-le un adapost, sau protejându-le împotrivapericolelor s.a.m.d.) si nu unul în care sa poata fiidentificat un conflict între copii si animale, conflictsolutionat de Dumnezeu în favoarea animalelor76 .

Tot o ierarhie de putere care poate ilustra metodaeducatiei prin pedeapsa este identificata în una dintreimaginile lectiei Sfântul Nicolae, prietenul copiilor, pp.14-15, (manualul confesiunii ortodoxe) în care, unuiadintre copii (baiatului) Sfântul Nicolae i-a adus în darcâteva nuiele; în text se mentioneaza explicit ca „SfântulNicolae împarte daruri copiilor cuminti si credinciosi”(p. 15). În Pravila Bisericeasca, se mentioneaza ca

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pentru copii „în anumite împrejurari, o bataie chibzuitasi parinteasca le este de mult folos”77 , dându-seurmatorul citat din Biblie (Proverbe 13, 24): Cine-sicruta nuiaua, îsi uraste copilul, iar cine-l iubeste, îlpedepseste.

În procesul verbal încheiat în data de 20.06.199178 laconferinta preoteasca cu tema „Educatia moral-religioasa a tineretului” în cadrul Protoieriei Panciu,preotul din Rotilesti considera ca „nu s-a procedat bineprin înfiintarea multor facultati de teologie în carepatrund tineri nepregatiti si cu vicii, care vor facegreutati bisericii. De ce ierarhii Bisericii noastre sireprezentantii preotimii din Parlament nu iau pozitiefata de strainii care vin în tara la noi si fac propagandareligioasa pe stadioane? De ce nu ne aparam mai cucuraj religia noastra ortodoxa stramoseasca?”79

Din acelasi proces verbal, consider ca suntinteresante unele dintre precizarile protopopului care si-a centrat discursul pe „marea misiune a predarii religieiîn scoli”:

“Criza morala în care se zbate astazi poporul nostrueste în buna masura urmarea propagandei ateiste.Consideram ca iesirea din aceasta criza nu va fi posibilafara ca tânara generatie sa cunoasca adevarurile crestinesi sa se deprinda cu practicarea valorilor morale crestine.Alaturi de Biserica, scoala îsi poate aduce un mare aportîn acest sens daca va reveni la predarea religiei. Îninteresul viitorului moral al copiilor nostri, al neamuluinostru, va trebui sa apelam la parintii copiilor siîmpreuna sa solicitam reintroducerea religiei. Generatiilenoastre nu stiu ce vor pentru ca nu stiu ce cred. (…)

Educatia laica se adreseaza intelectului iar educatiareligioasa se adreseaza inimii. Religia nu trebuie sa fie uncompendiu de definitii, ea trebuie sa fie traire. E nevoiesa se dea educatiei religioase rolul ei primordial. Deeducatia religioasa au nevoie copiii dar si adultii. Enevoie de o catehizare a tuturor fiilor Bisericii noastre”.

În opinia reprezentantilor Bisericii OrtodoxeRomâne singura sursa morala, necesara pentru „viitorulmoral al copiilor nostri si al neamului nostru” estereligioasa – crestin-ortodoxa.

La încheierea lucrarilor conferintei, protopopulanunta ca la începerea anului scolar se poate oficia, decomun acord cu conducerea scolii, Sfestania si Te-Deumsi, de asemenea, se poate pune în clase câte o icoana.

II.3 Unele dintre rezultatele introduceriieducatiei religioase în scolile de stat

În data de 10.10.1990, la Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod,este înregistrata, la nr. 10809, o reclamatie a unoradintre credinciosii din parohia Canesti, care, împreuna cupreotul din parohie sunt nemultumiti din cauza„acutelor greutati întâmpinate în privinta reintroduceriireligiei în scoala din cauza conducerii scolii, reprezentataprin doamna directoare Iordan Florica, ce face parte dinvechea nomenclatura comunista, fosta secretar adjunctla primaria comunei noastre si instalata în mod abuzivca director al scolii dupa revolutia din decembrie 1989”.

Astfel, pentru a discredita persoanele care nu eraude acord cu initiativa de a se preda religia în

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învatamântul de stat, se foloseau sintagme care faceaureferire la regimul comunist anterior anului 198980 . Însamecanismele folosite de cei nemultumiti erau tot unelecaracteristice sistemului comunist întrucât în cerere sesolicita interventia la forurile superioare:

„Smeriti apelam la Prea Fericirea Voastra a ne ajuta,intervenind la Guvernul României, ca în scoala din satulnostru sa se reintroduca religia cum a fost pâna în anul1948, fiind un drept ce ni se cuvine. Aceasta masura vacontribui la educarea sanatoasa a noii generatii de copiisi tineret, în spiritul moralei crestine si cinstei,adevarului, dreptatii, al tuturor virtutilor, mostenite de lastramosi spre binele Patriei noastre, spre slava SfinteiBiserici si bunastarea întregului popor român”.81

Înca o data se observa cum „educarea sanatoasa acopiilor si tineretului, binele patriei si bunastareaîntregului popor român” erau considerate nemijlocitdependente de morala crestina (se întelege, ortodoxa).

De asemenea, este interesant de observat ca seconsidera element de critica apartenenta la vecheanomenclatura comunista iar scrisoarea îi era adresatapatriarhului Teoctist caruia, dupa decembrie 1989, nu deputine ori, i s-au adus critici similare82 .

Prin adresa înregistrata la Episcopia Buzaului, la nr.4346/ 11.10.1990, preotul din parohia Canesti ofera maimulte explicatii: directoarea scolii nu a permis oficiereaTe Deumului, aplicarea în scoala a unei icoane si predareareligiei. Mai mult, respectiva directoare „a avut acelasicomportament ca si în regimul trecut când a fostsecretara adjuncta si a persecutat poporul”.

Desi nu a avut acordul conducerii scolii, slujba a fostoficiata, la 1 octombrie 1990, iar icoana a fost prinsa înperetele din holul scolii, însa „în scurt timp a disparut”.

Evenimentele s-au soldat cu diverse petitii,întocmite de „credinciosi”, adresate patriarhuluiRomâniei, primului-ministru, presedintelui României, încare se solicita reintroducerea religiei în scoli, iar în altepetitii retragerea din functie a directoarei.

În discutiile purtate de preot cu un reprezentant alInspectoratului Scolar acesta (din urma) îi da dreptatedirectoarei, spre indignarea preotului care încheieinformarea atentionând ca „starea de nemultumire sementine în parohia din Canesti”.

Solicitându-i-se explicatii, preotul comunei adeclarat83 ca, între timp, la „presiunea credinciosilor”,directoarea „a fost nevoita sa primeasca reintroducereareligiei în scoala de la data de 29.10.1990”.

Dintre problemele evidentiate la conferinta lunara84

a preotilor din Protoeria Buzau, conferinta la care aparticipat si un reprezentant al Inspectoratului ScolarJudetean Buzau:

- neasigurarea de catre conducerile anumitor scoli atimpului si spatiului necesare desfasurarii orelor deeducatie moral-religioasa;

- interpretarea deformata, în majoritatea scolilor, acuvintelor din Protocol „facultativ” si „optional”.

Reprezentantul Inspectoratului Scolar a promis totsprijinul „luând act de situatiile negative ce s-au ivit lanivelul unor scoli si a asigurat de interventia sa înpunerea la punct si intrarea pe un fagas normal”.

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Printre problemele evidentiate la întâlnirea dintrereprezentantii Protopopiatului Râmnicu Sarat sireprezentanta Inspectoratului Scolar Judetean Buzau, lasediul Protopopiatului:

- majoritatea preotilor a raportat ca ora de educatiemoral-religioasa nu este trecuta în catalog si este fixataori prea dimineata (ex. Posta Câlnau), ori la ora cândcopiii trebuie sa mearga acasa;

- la scolile nr. 1 si 2 nu se pun la dispozitie clase dinlipsa de spatii, în aceste scoli învatându-se în treischimburi;

- „având în vedere ca aceasta ora este optionala sifacultativa acest lucru facându-se cunoscut elevilor chiarde diriginta lor, frecventa nu este satisfacatoare” (dininterviurile realizate în diverse scoli si licee din Buzau,reiese ca 90% dintre elevele/ elevii intervievate/intervievati nu stiu ca ora de religie este facultativa,putând fi încheiata situatia scolara fara a se alege o altadisciplina în loc85 );

- învatamântul moral-religios se desfasoara mai usorla tara, acolo nefiind problema spatiului si nici a claselorparalele.

Inspectoarea a luat nota de cele semnalate de preotisi s-a angajat ca va lua legatura cu directorii de la toatescolile pentru „a se da concursul preotilor de a putea sa-si desfasoare activitatea în bune conditii”.

Probleme similare au fost sesizate si în alte unitati deînvatamânt. În Darea de seama asupra desfasurarii procesuluide învatamânt moral-religios în scolile din cadrul ProtopopiatuluiBuzau86 se preciza ca:

- „cu toata prezenta preotilor în scoli, în unele dinacestea ei au fost primiti cu oarecare retinere si chiar cuostilitate; la insistente de 2-3 saptamâni orele de educatiemoral-religioasa au demarat, în unele scoli mai usor, înaltele mai greu”;

- „problema cea mai grea este ca în orarul scolilor nua fost prevazuta ora de educatie moral-religioasa”;

- „realitatea din teren este la aceasta dataurmatoarea: în mediul rural toti preotii au intrat în scolisi-si desfasoara activitatea didactica fara problemedeosebite; problema mai dificila este în scolile dinmunicipiul Buzau – aici actiunea a demarat mult preagreu atât din motive obiective cât si subiective”;

- „la majoritatea scolilor din oras se învata în treischimburi; daca ora de educatie moral-religioasa eraprinsa în orar situatia ar fi fost mult mai usurata, dar lanici una din scoli nu s-a întâmplat acest lucru; dacaInspectoratul Scolar s-ar fi implicat mai mult, sarcinapreotilor ar fi fost usurata”.

Exista, de asemenea, numeroase informari si rapoarteprivind modul în care s-a deschis anul scolar – informarifacute de parohii sau protopopiate în care sunt descriseslujbele oficiate cu ocazia deschiderii anului scolar.

Prin adresa nr. 4121/ 02.11.1995 protopopulProtoieriei Focsani anunta episcopului din Buzau ca laScoala Generala din Tâmboiesti, Vrancea, InspectoratulScolar Vrancea a repartizat pentru orele de religie oprofesoara „calcând planificarea pe care CentrulEparhial Buzau o înaintase în 07.09.1995” (desi încererea preotului din Parohia Tâmboiesti sementioneaza ca profesoara respectiva este calificata prin

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absolvirea Institutului Teologic din Bucuresti). Osesizare asemanatoare este facuta si de preotul dinparohia Floresti87 , Vrancea, în care se precizeaza capreotul respectiv nu preda religia în scoala deoareceinspectorul de specialitate „a numit o tânara care are uncurs de pregatire de o luna de zile”; o asemenea situatieeste sesizata si în parohia Câmpineanca.

Pe spatele adresei 4485/ 23.11.1995 la care esteanexat raportul unui preot din Ruginesti care „a fostîndepartat din scoala, orele de religie fiind repartizateunui tânar”, este scrisa propunerea de a se face „o nouainterventie la domnul Prefect al judetului Vranceapentru reglementarea situatiei”.

Astfel de situatii mai sunt întâlnite si în prezent: înscoala din parohia Fundeni – Zarnesti, la angajareacadrului didactic pentru predarea Religiei, în anul scolar2002-2003, prioritate a avut preotul din comuna, desipentru post a candidat si o absolventa a unui seminarmonahal si care în baza rezultatelor scolare foarte bunea obtinut avizul conducatorului unitatii centrale de cult(în exemplul nostru, Episcopia Buzaului). Din interviulcu inspectorul scolar de specialitate a reiesit ca ar fi fostde preferat ca postul respectiv sa fie ocupat deabsolventa seminarului monahal, dar prevederile legale,în astfel de situatii, dau prioritate preotilor motivându-secu „prioritatea studiilor superioare”. Consider ca aceasta„prioritate” nu este bine întemeiata întrucât scopulstudiilor superioare ale unui preot este catehizarea si nuprofesoratul, pe când, în exemplul prezentat, scopulstudiilor monahale a fost acela al predarii Religiei.

III. Concluzii

Pe baza analizei întreprinse se poate evidentia ceeace statul considera a fi continutul libertatii religioase,dezvaluind nu numai ceea ce este libertatea religioasa însine, ci si atitudinea statului în privinta drepturilor fiinteiumane.

Urmarind legislatia din România, cât si situatiileprezentate în studiul de caz, putem concluziona caeducatia religioasa, departe de a promova toleranta,inoculeaza comportamente de respingere, aliantelepolitice între Biserica si stat neputând fi descrise – înrezonanta cu pasajul citat în moto –, decât canesanatoase.

Este relevanta, cred, opinia lui Olivier Gillet:“Pot fi întelese astfel, în contextul „renasterii

crestine”, tendintele „fundamentaliste” pe care le-amputea defini drept vointa unei parti a Bisericii de arestaura „credinta” ortodoxa ca unic punct de referintaîn noua societate pe cale de a fi edificata. Credintaortodoxa ar fi singurul element motor, unificator simobilizator, si ar determina soarta Bisericii, a statului sia natiunii, unite într-un mesianism în afara caruia nu arexista mântuire”.88

Analizând atât reglementarile legislative cât si situatiade facto putem spune, urmând-o pe Ina Merdjanova, caîn perioada postcomunista tendinta celor careelaboreaza prevederile constitutionale în privintalibertatii religioase este de a interpreta notiunea de„religie” în termeni crestini si, mai mult, în termenii

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bisericii crestine traditionale. Aceasta tendinta „estealimentata de o lipsa comuna a culturii religioase, ca sanu spun o ignoranta în chestiuni religioase, de întelesdupa 45 de ani de îndoctrinare ateista, dar greu dejustificat la nivelul politicii de stat”89 .

Unii autori considera ca prapastia dintre tendintagenerala din continutul constitutiilor, pe de o parte, siparticularitatile religioase, pe de alta parte, sugereazaimportanta chestiunilor religioase pentru eliteleguvernamentale care incearca sa-si însuseasca religiapentru legitimitate politica90 . Riscul de a adânci aceastaprapastie devine si mai mare atunci când pentru aceastalegitimitate este folosita – în sensul peiorativ altermenului – educatia. Cu atât mai mult consider camasurile legislative corective trebuie adoptate cât maiurgent, orice întârziere implicând pierderi denerecuperat.

Bibliografie

Andreescu, Gabriel „Investitia în religie nu e o investitie încivilizatie”, Ziua, Bucuresti, nr. 2937, an X, 13 februarie 2004.

Andreescu, Gabriel „Cele doua Românii: Parcul Carol siBiserica Ortodoxa Româna”, Ziua, Bucuresti, nr. 2972, an X, 25martie 2004.

Andreescu, Gabriel „Logica <<mântuirii neamului>> eanacronica”, Observator Cultural, Bucuresti, nr 213, 23. 03 –29.03.2004.

Buzea, Gianina „Recensamâtul 2002”, Interviu cu AurelCamara, presedintele Institutului National de Statistica, 22,Bucuresti, nr. 13, an XIII (629), 26 mar.- 1 apr. 2002.

Dostoievski, F. M. Fratii Karamazov, Bucuresti: CarteaRomâneasca, 1986.

Jigau, Mihaela coord. Învatamântul rural din România, conditii,probleme si stategii de dezvoltare, Bucuresti, Ministerul Educatiei siCercetarii: MarLink, 2002.

Olivier Gillet Religie si nationalism. Ideologia Bisericii OrtodoxeRomâne sub regimul comunist, Bucuresti: Compania, 2001.

Kamaras, Istvan „New Religious Phenomena and the Catho-lic Church in the Postcommunist Countries”, versiunepreliminara, publicata în reader-ul cursului Religion, Globalisation,and the State, Central European University, Budapesta, 2003.

Merdjanova, Ina „Religious Liberty, New Religious Move-ments and Traditional Christian Churches in Eastern Europe”,Religion, State & Society, vol. 29, No. 4, 2001.

Sachelarie, Nicodim Pravila Bisericeasca, Buzau: Editura SfinteiEpiscopii a Buzaului, 1999.

Weber, Renate „Legea învatamântului: între contestare si su-pra-apreciere”, Revista Româna de Drepturile Omului, Bucuresti, nr.9, aprilie-iunie, 1995.

*** Abecedarul micutului crestin, Bucuresti: Editura Didactica siPedagogica, 1992

*** Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptura. Bucuresti: Institutul Biblic si deMisiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1988.

*** Programa analitica pentru predarea religiei în scoala (aparuta cuaprobarea Sfântului Sinod al B.O.R.). Bucuresti: EdituraInstitutului Biblic si de Misiune al B.O.R., 1990.

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Note:

* Cercetarea care sta la baza acestei lucrari face parte dinproiectul Harta actorilor si problemelor aderarii la UniuneaEuropeana, proiect derulat de Fundatia pentru o SocietateDeschisa. Textele studiilor si anexele acestora pot fi accesate pepagina de internet a Fundatiei, la adresa www.osf.ro. Rezumateletiparite ale studiilor sunt disponibile, atât în limba româna cât siîn limba engleza, la dresa Fundatiei, str. Caderea Bastiliei nr. 33,Bucuresti.

1 Parintele Paisie, personaj din F. M. Dostoievski, FratiiKaramazov, Bucuresti: Cartea Româneasca, 1986, pp. 20-21.

2 Ina Merdjanova, „Religious Liberty, New Religious Move-ments and Traditional Christian Churches in Eastern Europe”,Religion, State & Society, vol. 29, No. 4, 2001, p.272.

3 Urmându-l pe Istvan Kamaras, în locul notiunilor „secta”sau „cult”, care, de regula, sunt folosite în sens peiorativ, si inlocul notiunii „noile miscari religioase”, care se refera la un cercrestrâns, am preferat termenul „noile fenomene religioase”; veziIstvan Kamaras, „New Religious Phenomena and the CatholicChurch in the Postcommunist Countries”, versiune preliminara,publicata în reader-ul cursului Religion, Globalisation, and the State,Central European University, Budapesta, 2003.

4 Karel Dobbelaere, „Secularization theories and sociologi-cal paradigms: convergences and divergences”, Social Compass,vol. 31, no. 2-3, 1984, p. 200, apud Ina Merdjanova, op. cit., p.279.

5 Publicata în Monitorul Oficial nr. 167 din 31 iulie 1995 sirepublicata în M. Of. nr. 1 din 5 ianuarie 1996.

6 Publicata în M. Of. nr. 606 din 10 decembrie 1999.7 O analiza critica a acestei variante initiale, din perspectiva

drepturilor fiintei umane, este realizata de Renate Weber înarticolul „Legea învatamântului: între contestare si supra-apreciere”, publicat în Revista Româna de Drepturile Omului, nr. 9,pp. 16-27; aspectele analizate de autoare vizeaza libertatea de

constiinta, în legatura cu obligativitatea studiului religiei si accesulla educatie al persoanelor apartinând minoritatilor nationale.

8 Publicata in M. Of. nr. 101 din 22 mai 1992.9 Publicat in M. Of. nr. 190 din 7 august 1992.10 Publicata in M. Of. nr. 167 din 31 iulie 1995.11 Renate Weber, op. cit. p. 20.12 Ceea ce ar însemna ca art. 9, alin (1) nu este coerent

întrucât în teza a doua se stabileste ca religia (în ciclul primar)este obligatorie, iar în teza finala se ofera posibilitateainterpretarii conform careia religia este facultativa. Desigur,exista si varianta de interpretare, data de Curtea Constitutionalaîn preambulul Deciziei 72/1995, în care se precizeaza ca „princoroborarea tezei a doua cu cea finala din structura art. 9 alin. (1)rezulta ca << obligativitatea>> priveste includerea religiei cadisciplina in planurile de învatamânt, religia si confesiunearamânând sa fie alese sau nu”; însa, pe de o parte, aceastaprecizare putea fi facuta explicit în textul legii, iar pe de altaparte, introducerea religiei ca disciplina obligatorie în planurile deînvatamânt, fara precizarea explicita în textul legii, poate fiinterpretata ca obligativitatea studierii acesteia.

13 Toate articolele citate în aceasta (ultima) sustinere a measunt preluate din Legea învatamântului, nr. 84 publicata în1995.

14 Cu alte cuvinte, sustinând un argument similar celuifolosit de Curtea Constitutionala, am ajunge la concluzia ca leeste permis parintilor sa nu aleaga nici o forma de învatamânt saueducatie pentru copiii lor, în conditiile în care sistemul legislativdin România obliga la un învatamânt general obligatoriu (pâna înclasa a X-a).

15 Aceasta pretentie de acordare a unui statut privilegiatdisciplinei Religie, evident exagerata, a B.O.R., confirma intentiade transformare a statului în biserica („suprema menire acredintei ortodoxe”), asa cum sustine parintele Paisie, personajulcitat în moto-ul acestei lucrari; pentru o analiza a ascensiuniiBisericii (în privinta bogatiei si a puterii) vezi si GabrielAndreescu, „Investitia în religie nu e o investitie în civilizatie”,

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Ziua, Bucuresti, nr. 2937, an X, 13 februarie 2004, p. 4, „Celedoua Românii: Parcul Carol si Biserica Ortodoxa Româna”, Ziua,Bucuresti, nr. 2972, an X, 25 martie 2004, p. 4.

16 Se observa caracterul (pronuntat) ambiguu si totodataspecial pe care, conform acestei precizari, îl capata statutuldisciplinei Religie, despre care nu se poate spune ce este ci, maidegraba ce nu este: disciplina obligatorie nu este, pentru ca sepoate renunta la frecventarea orelor acesteia, disciplina optionalanu este pentru ca nu este prevazuta posibilitatea poate fi înlocuitacu o alta, disciplina facultativa nu este pentru ca nu existaposibilitatea ca elevilor/elevelor care nu opteaza pentru studiereaacestei discipline („foarte putini”!!!) sa li se încheie situatia scolarafara aceasta disciplina, urmând a rezolva „diverse sarcinididactice”.

17 Cel putin doua sunt problemele generate de o astfel desustinere: nu legiuitorul stabileste numarul persoanelor careapartin uneia sau alteia dintre confesiunile religioase, iar daca, dedragul argumentului, am accepta ca numarul acestor persoaneeste, într-adevar mic, a preciza acest aspect în textul unei legiconstituie un atentat la mecanismul libertatii religioase, limitândlibertatea persoanelor de a-si schimba convingerile religioase.

18 Situatie paradoxala în care, de mai multe drepturibeneficiaza persoanele care nu apartin unor confesiunirecunoscute oficial.

19 Aceasta situatie se reflecta si în practica: În cataloagelescolare, în dreptul disciplinelor optionale se afla trecutamentiunea „C. d. s. – Curriculum la deciza scolii”, mentiune carenu se afla si în dreptul disciplinei Religie; de asemenea, Religia estetrecuta direct în planul disciplinelor de studiu al elevilor/elevelor,fara acordul acestora sau al parintilor acestora, si nu figureaza înoferta disciplinelor optionale.

20 Ordin valabil înca în anul scolar 2003-2004.21 La specializarile: Stiinte sociale, Matematica-informatica,

Stiinte ale naturii, Turism si alimentatie publica, Administrativ,Posta, Economic, Industrie alimentara, Protectia mediului,Chimie alimentara, Agricol agromontan si veterinar, Silvic si

prelucrarea lemnului, Telecomunicatii, electronica, automatizarisi electrotehnica, Mecanic, Lucrari-publice, constructii, Textile sipielarie s.a..

22 Posturile sunt scoase la concurs de InspectorateleScolare Judetene dar sunt afisate si pe adresa de site aMinisterului Educatiei si Cercetarii, prin urmare existând siacordul acestui minister.

23 Amintesc numai prevederile corespunzatoare ale PactuluiInternational cu privire la Drepturile Civile si Politice, ConventiaEuropeana a Drepturilor Fiintei Umane (art. 9) si Declaratiaprivind Eliminarea Tuturor Formelor de Intoleranta siDiscriminare pe baza de Religie sau Credinta.

24 În varianta initiala a legii învatamântului, publicata în1995 si republicata în 1996, nu exista aceasta restrictie. Astfel, înart. 9 alin (2) se preciza despre cultele recunoscute oficial de catrestat ca pot solicita Ministerului Învatamântului organizarea unuiînvatamânt specific, corespunzator necesitatilor de pregatire a personalului decult, iar în Ordonanta de Urgenta 36 din 10 iulie 1997 pentru modificareasi completarea Legii invatamantului nr. 84/1995, publicata în M. Of.nr.152 din 14 iulie 1997, se preciza ca pot solicita MinisteruluiÎnvatamântului organizarea unui învatamânt specific, corespunzatornecesitatilor de pregatire a personalului de cult, precum si înfiintarea sifunctionarea unor structuri de învatamânt laic, în sistemul national deînvatamânt, sub coordonarea si controlul Ministerului Învatamântului.

25 Gianina Buzea, „Recensamântul 2002”, Interviu cu AurelCamara, presedintele Institutului National de Statistica, 22,Bucuresti, nr.13, an XIII (629), 26 mar.-1 apr. 2002, p. 6; citatulîi apartine lui Aurel Camara; acelasi gen de probleme au generatsi întrebarile privind etnia si intimitatea personala; este, cred,interesant de observat ca interviul în care se mentioneaza acestdrept de a nu raspunde la anumite întrebari apare în penultima zide desfasurare a recensamântului – perioada în care s-adesfasurat recensamântul a fost 18 – 27 martie 2002.

26 Publicata în M. Of. nr 439, din 06.08.2001.27 Întrucât ne-am angajat în asigurarea deplinei

confidentialitati a informatiilor obtinute în baza interviurilor,

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persoanele intervievate vor fi identificate astfel: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5si S6. Informatiile mi-au fost furnizate de subiectii S1, S2, S3.

28 Vezi si Gabriel Andreescu, „Cele doua Românii: ParculCarol si Biserica Ortodoxa Româna”, Ziua, Bucuresti, nr. 2972,an X, 25 martie 2004, p. 4.

29 Publicat in Buletin Oficial nr. 5 din 20 aprilie 1964.30 Publicata în M. Of. nr. 370 din 3 august 1999.31 Sintagma „învatamânt de stat” este cea folosita de

legiuitorul român în textul Legii învatamântului, sustinând astfelrelatia de putere între învatamântul centralizat si initiativa localasau învatamântul alternativ; vezi si Renate Weber, op. cit. p. 16.

32 Prin adresa nr. 629 din 27.02.199133 Adresa nr. 876.34 Adresa nr. 52/22.03.1991.35 Adresa nr. 114/26.03.199136 Adresa nr.1168/29.03.1991.37 Preferinta pentru preoti, în predarea disciplinei Religie a

ramas valabila pâna astazi, desi, pe de o parte, exista specializari,cu absolventi/ absolvente, în acest sens (pe profil pedagogic) înseminarele monahale si în institutele teologice, iar pe de alta partepregatirea preotilor are o alta menire, de multe ori acestia fiindincompatibili (ca timp) – din cauza obligatiilor pastorale –, cupredarea la catedra.

38 Adresa nr2647/ 06.07.1990.39 Înregistrat la nr.150052.40 Înregistrat la nr. 7758.41 Aceasta sustinere anticipeaza, de fapt, una dintre

concluziile prezentei lucrari; premisele care conduc la aceastaconcluzie se regasesc în cuprinsul studiului.

42 Decizia 72 din 18 iulie 1995 privind constitutionalitateaunor prevederi ale Legii învatamântului, publicata în MonitorulOficial nr. 167 din 31 iulie 1995.

43 Programa analitica pentru predarea religiei în scoala (aparuta cuaprobarea Sfântului Sinod al B.O.R.), Bucuresti: EdituraInstitutului Biblic si de Misiune al B.O.R., 1990.

44 Scoala generala nr. 1, Scoala generala nr. 15, LiceuPedagogic, Grup Scolar Costin Nenitescu, Grup Scolar IndustrialContactoare, Grup Scolar Servicii si Meserii, Colegiul AgricolConstantin Angelescu, Liceul de Arta, Liceul B.P. Hasdeu (toatedin Buzau), Scoala generala Plescoi, Scoala generala Sageata,Grup Scolar Industrial Berca.

45 Liceul de Arta.46 Am prezentat aceasta problema patologica inspectorului

de specialitate (preot), care a avertizat profesoara în cauza.47 Scoala generala nr. 1.48 Grup Scolar Industrial Contactoare.49 Concept caruia (în cadrul orei respective, de religie) i s-a

dat o definitie peiorativa: „grupare de credinciosi ce s-au rupt deBiserica pe baza unor învataturi întelese gresit”.

50 Grup Scolar Industrial Contactoare.51 Liceul de Arta.52 S5.53 Scoala generala Sageata, Scoala Generala Plescoi, Scoala

Generala Cândesti, Grup Scolar Costin Nenitescu, G.S.I. Berca.54 G.S.I.Costin Nenitescu.55 În anul scolar 2003-2004, am atras atentia asupra acestor

aspecte în sedintele Consiliului Profesoral; motivatia unui preot-profesor, erijat în avocatul colegului sau (care obliga prezentacopiilor la Bisericã), a fost una în directia considerarii bisericii calaborator (sic!) pentru ora de Religie; pentru a contura tabloul, dardeparte de a-l completa, as dori sa mai mentionez ca aceluiasipreot i s-a permis, tot în Consiliul Profesoral, sa-si exprime dubiile(si obsesiile) în privinta orientarii mele sexuale (!) si sa chestionezene/ apartenenta mea la confesiunea crestin-ortodoxa (!).

56 vezi Mihaela Jigau, coordonatoare, Învatamântul rural dinRomânia, conditii, probleme si strategii de dezvoltare, Bucuresti,Ministerul Educatiei si Cercetarii: MarLink, 2002, p.114.

57 Subiectul S5; marturiile lui au fost confirmate de colegii/colegele de clasa.

58 Pentru ca nu de putine ori am întâlnit exemple similare,voi mentiona doar unul dintre articolele de lege care sunt

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încalcate prin astfel de comportamente: „Nimeni nu poate fisupus torturii nici pedepselor sau tratamentelor inumane oridegradante” – art. 3 din Conventia Europeana a DrepturilorFiintei Umane.

59 art. 318 Cod Penal, publicat in Monitorul Oficial nr. 65din 16 aprilie 1997.

60 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzau la nr. 3808/ 10.09.1990.61 Înregistrat la nr. 11304/ 03.01.1991.62 Initiatorul si coordonatorul lucrarilor sesiunii era prof.

dr. Meroiu Grigore, insp. Gn. Secretariatul de Stat pt. Culte;apelul era semnat de Gheorghe Vladutescu.

63Adresa este înregistrata la Patriarhia Româna la nr. 138/06.02.1991 si la Episcopia Buzaului la nr. 521/ 14.02.1991.

64 Consider ca aceasta este o falsa problema, întrucâtincluderea „în orar” înseamna de la prima pâna la ultima ora.Mergând pe rationamentul reprezentantilor B.O.R., daca pentrufiecare disciplina s-ar solicita în mod similar includerea, înaceasta varianta, „în orar”, concluzia ar fi una imposibil deaplicat: scolile nu ar mai avea prima si ultima ora.

65 Grup Scolar Industrial Contactoare.66 Interviurile au fost realizate la Grup Scolar Contactoare

Buzau si Grup Scolar Servicii si Meserii Buzau, în anul scolar2002-2003.

67 Din acest punct de vedere, situatia a rãmas neschimbata:elevi si eleve cu care am discutat, de la cel putin 8 scoli si liceedin Buzau, înca nu stiu ca Religia are statut de disciplinafacultativa si mi-au spus ca nimeni nu le-a transmis informatii înacest sens; de altfel, din nou surprinzator, nici cadrele didacticenu cunosc acest lucru si nu putine au fost exemplele în care nicipersoanele din conducerea scolilor nu cunosteau statutul (ce-idrept ambiguu) al acestei discipline.

68 Este evident un proces care îngreuneaza mecanismulprin care se asigura libertatea de constiinta.

69 An scolar 2003-2004.70 Adus în discutie, mai mult tangential, în Consiliul

Profesoral, subiectul a fost evitat, sau a fost sustinut în termeni

care vizau mai mult imaginatia preotului/ profesorului de religiedecât prevederile legale; desi eram buni prieteni (ne scriammesaje periodic), unul dintre elevi mi-a transmis ca ar fi mai binesa întrerupem legaturile (din cauza presiunilor la care este supus),ceea ce s-a si întâmplat; de asemenea, situatia se reflecta si înnotele mai mici si dezinteresul lui pentru disciplina pe care opredau, elevul încercând sa ma evite, cerându-si scuze, desi i-amaratat aceeasi deschidere pentru prietenie.

71 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzaului cu nr. 2544/01.07.1991.72 Liceul de Arta.73 Textul este preluat din caietul unei eleve de clasa a doua

(S6), care nu a putut întelege prea bine cum stau lucrurile cuiubirea Domnului: pe de o parte pentru ca ea este fiica si nu fiu, iarpe de alta parte nu vedea cum profesoara (ca femeie) puteaîntelege, si totodata transmite, iubirea unui tata pentru fiii lui –profesoara neputând fi nici tata nici fiu.

74 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzaului cu nr. 2408/21.06.1991.

75 Pasajele sunt din Vechiul Testament, Iesirea, 20, 17,respectiv, 20, 23-24, Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptura , Bucuresti:Institutul Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române,1988.

76 În discutiile pe care le-am avut cu inspectorul-preot dinInspectoratul Scolar Judetean Buzau, acesta mi-a spus carespectivul manual fusese retras din circulatie dar ca mai era folositca auxiliar. Dupa ce a fost retras, în urma discutiei avute, dinscolile buzoiene, a aparut din nou, dupa doua luni. Manualul afost reeditat în 2002, cu acelasi continut.

77 Nicodim Sachelarie, Pravila 136, în Pravila Bisericeasca,(Buzau: Editura Sfintei Episcopii a Buzaului, 1999), p.30.

78 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzaului cu nr. 2837/03.07.1991.

79 Este des întâlnita aceasta tendinta de transmitere aopiniei conform careia exista o relatie de identitate întreapartenenta religioasa (crestin-ortodoxa) si apartenenta nationala(româna); vezi, de exemplu (dar nu singurul) numirea principalei

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ctitorii ortodoxe Catedrala Mântuirii Neamului (ma simt cel putindator sa mentionez articolul lui Gabriel Andreescu, „Logica<<mântuirii neamului>> e anacronica”, Observator Cultural,Bucuresti, nr 213, 23.03 – 29.03.2004, pp 4-6). Consecinteletransmiterii acestei opinii în educatie sunt dezastruoase: amîntâlnit nu putine situatii în care elevii sau eleve mi-au spus cacine nu este ortodox nu are ce cauta în „aceasta scoala”, sau (unexemplu extrem, dar nu neaparat rar) situatii în care elevi saueleve au afirmat ca daca ar avea o putere ar omorî toatepersoanele care nu apartin confesiunii ortodoxe (în exempluloferit, elevul si eleva care au sustinut asemenea afirmatii erau înclasa a IX-a, dupa 8 ani de frecventare a disciplinei Religie); sunt sicadre didactice, nu neaparat de Religie care sustin, violent, aceastaopinie: când am solicitat retragerea icoanelor de pe peretii (pub-lici) ai scolii, pe motiv ca erau si copii ai altor confesiuni înscoala, un profesor mi-a raspuns: „daca nu le convine, sa plece întara lor, de unde au venit”.

80 În documentele din arhiva Episcopiei, astfel de sintagmesunt frecvent întâlnite atunci când o persoana (în special) publica,nu raspundea favorabil cererii de introducere a religiei în scoli.

81 Din aceeasi scrisoare.82 Vezi în acest sens, Olivier Gillet (2001), Religie si national-

ism. Ideologia Bisericii Ortodoxe Române sub regimul comunist,(Bucuresti: Compania), p. 13, 30 s.a., dar nu numai.

83 Declaratia a fost înregistrata la Episcopia Buzaului la nr.510/ 13.02.1991.

84 Înregistrata la Episcopia Buzau cu nr. 1593/01.05.1991.85 vezi supra, nota nr. 28.86 Înregistrata la Episcopia Buzau cu nr. 244/ 25.01.1991.87 Înregistrata la nr. 4301/ 15.11.1995, Episcopia Buzaului.88 Olivier Gillet (2001), Religie si nationalism. Ideologia Bisericii

Ortodoxe Române sub regimul comunist, Bucuresti: Compania, p. 275.89 Ina Merdjanova, op. cit., p. 274.90 John Markoff and Daniel Regan, „Religion, the state and

politics: legitimacy in the world’s constitutions”, in ThomasRobbins and Roland Robertson (eds.), Church-State Relations: Ten-sions and Transitions (Transactions Books, New Brunswick, 1987),pp. 161-82, apud Ina Merdjanova, op. cit. p. 278.

101J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

Dmitry A. Golovushkin

On the issue of religious tolerancein modern Russia: nationalidentity and religion

The sources of religious tolerance but also of religiousnationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically inthe group identification of nationality and religion. In crisissituations, the historical religion of the Russian society -Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying thenational identity. However, despite the fact that themajority of Russians in our times consider themselvesOrthodox, many of them are not believers. The observableeffect of the “external belief” results in the fact that thereligion tends to become a matter of personal choice andan individual value. It assumes a nationalistic function andto become an ideology. As a result, the political eliteconsiders religion as a means of achieving different non-religious purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church, theofficial church, is compelled to take this fact into consider-ation and even support it. This is why religious intoleranceand religious nationalism in modern Russia are often

directed towards religion.

One of the best ways of ensuring the successful op-eration of democratic procedures in any society is tostrengthen social peace by means of assimilating civicsolidarity into the culture and by encouraging dialogue.This is an especially urgent task for post-communistcountries, which have chosen the path of democraticdevelopment. Thus, the major task for the churches isthat of strengthening fundamental moral values, form-ing relations of solidarity and consensus in society.However, sociological surveys of the last ten years1

show that religious conflicts and religious fundamental-ism, however dangerous these tendencies might be, in-creasingly determine the atmosphere in modern Russiansociety.

One can name a variety of reasons for the increaseof religious intolerance. However, before examining

DMITRY A. GOLOVUSHKIN

Senior lecturer, Ph.D.,Chair of Religious Stud-ies, Dept. of SocialSciences, A. I. HerzenState Pedagogical Uni-versity, St. Petersburg,RussiaE-mail:golovushkinda@mail.ru

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them, it is necessary to define clearly the limits of reli-gious tolerance, because without knowing these, onecannot defend the victim, nor identify the aggressor. J.Schpies, leader of the largest German Christian Organi-zation of Students and Academics, says: “It makes senseto speak about religious tolerance in terms of moralityand not in terms of pure knowledge”. Religious toler-ance always ends wherever one teaching has an ambi-tion to monopolize the Truth and the right to expendit. But the Truth should never be imposed by force, andfrequent violations of this principle (including use of re-ligious freedom and tolerance as instruments of domes-tic or foreign policy) lead to a false understanding of thevery nature of religious tolerance2 . In this case, the stateshould be religiously intolerant towards the falsely un-derstood tolerance. Positive discrimination is the basisfor religious policy in most European cultures. Such‘discrimination’ does not threaten basic freedoms,which should always be protected by law, regardless ofwhat the contents of the religious doctrines are (apartfrom those religious doctrines, which endanger the pub-lic order or the democratic values, and therefore shouldbe banned). Thanks to such a policy, religious tolerancein industrially developed Western countries is based onsolid national and supranational values, which ensuresthe protection of both old traditional churches and newimportant religious movements, while at the same timeguaranteeing basic religious freedom for every indi-vidual. Interaction between these two levels makes itpossible to reconcile interests of the church and thestate as well as ensuring better understanding of the na-

ture of a multi-confessional society. However, in mod-ern Russia the limits of religious tolerance and the ob-jective criteria of positive discrimination are blurred andsometimes non-existent. This sad fact is evidence of thelow level of political culture and cultural pluralism inRussia, and it is one of a whole series of factors thatcause the prevalence of religious intolerance in the Rus-sian society.

According to public opinion polls conducted by theRussian Center for the Study of Public Opinion(RCSPO) in 1999-2002, the Gorbachev-era‘perestroyka’, the ‘false democracy’ and ‘imperialism’have been usually named as the main reasons for givingbirth to post-Soviet xenophobia. Such sentiments reallyexist in the society, but they are only partly to blame.Religious intolerance in Russia has deeper social, cul-tural, political and ethnic roots.

First of all, the theoretical base for religious intoler-ance is present in every religious teaching. All religionsare rooted in special experience, in an encounter withthe Sacred, and presuppose the existence of supernatu-ral goals and realities. That is why, in historical perspec-tive, religions by no means encourage tolerance. For ex-ample, in Christianity, universalism gave way to thenational tradition. In the West this culminated in theemergence of alternative states (secular kingdoms) andalternative (Protestant) churches. As for the East, wherethe concordance of church and state became a specialform of their union, the Christian State retained its glo-bal ambitions. However, under the double pressurefrom the Western and Islamic worlds, these ambitions

KEY WORDS:

Religious intolerance,Post - Soviet Russia,religious nationalism,national identity, free-dom of conscience, Anti-Cult Movement, multi-confessional society,state-church relations,religious fundamentalism

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mutated into the feeling of exclusiveness and isolationin the hostile environment. Later, according to Prof. D.Obolensky, “after the collapse of the Byzantine Empireand of the ‘Commonwealth of Orthodox states’, localOrthodox churches became increasingly isolated in theirnational shells and with more readiness demonstratedtheir supremacy over others”3 . This attitude resulted inRussia regarding itself, for many centuries (until themonarchy was overthrown), as the only country pos-sessing the true – that is, Orthodox – faith.

Second, religious intolerance may also be formed ina person’s consciousness and become part of his/herworldview as a result of the need to re-evaluate the re-mote and recent past, as well as the present. Economichardships, the drop in social status of whole strata ofsociety, the feeling of bitterness for the fall of Russia’sprestige as compared to the USSR, and, finally, the fearof globalization and the dictatorship of consumerism,— all this develops in Russians an ‘inferiority complex’and makes people look for those who can be held re-sponsible for what has happened to the country, to thesociety and to every single person. As a result, even thepeople who were initially indifferent to religion havestarted to identify themselves with certain confessions.The historical confession – Orthodoxy – becomes a cri-terion of national identity, of ‘being Russian’. The Rus-sian Orthodox Church is consequently regarded as thekeeper of the cultural tradition, and membership in it asan integral feature of national character. In other words,we see a pronounced tendency for strengthened con-nection between the national and the religious self-iden-

tification. This results in religion ceasing to be a value initself and acquiring a nationalistic function.

Third, an important reason for the increased reli-gious intolerance is the growing gap between the secu-larity of the modern society and the traditional spiritualvalues. The research project “Religion and Values afterthe Fall of Communism”, which was carried out in1991-1999, found that despite the fact that 82% of Rus-sians considered themselves Orthodox, only 4 % were‘real’ practicing believers4 . Therefore, non-Orthodox re-ligions also inevitably address the same, extremely nar-row social stratum. This also means that if, for instance,the number of practicing Baptists (and all Baptists aresuch) grew by just 1%, this would be tantamount to theloss of 20% of potential or actual parishioners for theRussian Orthodox Church. For the society in general,these figures are insignificant, but they are a serious pre-cedent in the struggle for believers, and thereby maylead to the rise of intolerance and aggressiveness.

Fourth, an important source of religious intolerancein modern Russia is the system of relations between thestate and the church, which increasingly reminds one ofthe model used before the Revolution, when Orthodoxfaith was the official state religion. (Religious freedom inRussia has been on the retreat since 1994, when districtand federal authorities, acting in the interests of theRussian Orthodox Church, began to more openly ig-nore the constitutional clauses which guaranteed reli-gious freedom in accordance with the legislation of1990 and the Constitution of 1993). Religious climate inmodern Russia has been influenced by attempts of sev-

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eral political groups to make use of the authority of dif-ferent churches and of the absolute trust that the publicput in them. This use of religion for political and ideo-logical purposes lead to the emergence of an image ofnon-Orthodox denominations as “an enemy” and con-tributed to the increase in religious intolerance.

Thus, religious intolerance in Russia exists at fourinterrelated levels – religious, social-political, govern-mental and routine everyday level.

What can be said about the position of the RussianOrthodox Church? According to Metropolitan Filaretof Minsk and Slutsk, it has always been too preoccupiedwith self-reflection and constant efforts to understandand realize its own unique character. Here finding thedifferences became predominant and Orthodox self-un-derstanding was formed along the principal “whoever isnot with us, is against us.” Thus, for instance, the Guide-lines for the Russian Orthodox Church’s Attitude to Non-Ortho-doxy, worked out in 2000 by the Theological Commis-sion of the Russian Orthodox Church, lay emphasis onthe fact that the Russian Orthodox Church does notequate itself to the Christian world in its entirety and re-jects the notion that any Christian unity may exist be-yond confessional barriers. This document states thatthe Orthodox Church differentiates between variousnon-Orthodox denominations and would not cooperatewith non-traditional churches on Russian territory, orinside the CIS and the Baltic States. In other words, theRussian Orthodox Church has rejected the idea of“Christian universalism” with its various “branches”,which has created a potential basis for Orthodox funda-

mentalism. This is, however, not to say that all Ortho-dox believers are aggressively adherent to this under-standing of piety: there are a lot of believers who sup-port liberal reforms. Still, the right radical wing of theRussian Orthodox membership numbers quite a fewclergymen as well as believers.

The latter find their aim in the fight against all non-Orthodox denominations, thereto using the conceptformulated by the anti-liberal ideologist MetropolitanIohann of St. Petersburg and Ladoga (Snytchev) and thetheory of “canonical territory”. According to thistheory, the territory of Russia belongs to the MoscowPatriarchate, and other denominations, especially theCatholics, have no right to preach here. If this preach-ing does take place, then it is regarded not as such, butas “common proselytism on a foreign territory” and itcan and should be fought against. To implement thesepolicies, all right-wing Orthodox organizations, theMoscow Patriarchate included, are trying to gain sup-port from various political parties, social structures, fed-eral and regional authorities. These activities culminatedin the Anti-Cults Movement, which was established atthe beginning of the 1990s and united all those whowere actively opposing any display of non-Orthodoxthinking.

It is an interesting fact that the Anti-Cults Move-ment in Russia took its final shape partly owing to theinfluence of such West European anti-cults groups as,for instance, the Dialog Center based in Aarhus (Den-mark) and Berlin (Germany), as well as the AmericanFamily Fund. Unfortunately, Russian anti-cultists were

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very selective in using the debates held in the West onthe issue of the New Religious Movement and its influ-ence on modern society. Most surveys were held on thebasis of deliberately arranged fragmented theories andconcepts, many of them already seriously discredited inscientific and legal circles. Some of the key works anddocuments have not even been mentioned, while otherswere presented in such distorted manner that their ma-jor ideas proved to be either omitted or discarded.Thus, for example, A. Dvorkin, head of the Informa-tion-Consultation Center of St. Irenaeus of Lyons, com-pletely disapproves of the NRM, over-generalizingabout its nature and putting into the category of “totali-tarian sects”5 a number of groups, radically different incharacter, ranging from Baptists and Mormons toHerbalife International. Among those who hold thesame opinion are members of the Center for Rehabilita-tion of Victims of Heterodoxy, St. Petersburg Commis-sion for Protection of the Family and Individuals, Mos-cow Committee for Salvation of Young People, ananti-cults center “Civil Security” in Yaroslavl as well asnumerous anti-sectarian missionary centers created withthe help of the Moscow Patriarchate. These organiza-tions have enlisted the support of some psychiatristsand psychologists who have adopted and later providedscientific “justification” for the originally vague con-cepts of “mind control” and “brainwashing”, whichsometimes leads them to unjustified conclusions. Thus,for example, you can come across the opinion that“new religious movements and structures threaten the

interests of the state, to the point of using their follow-ers as spies and perpetrators of terrorist acts”6 .

Analyzing the role of the religious factor for the po-litical agenda and activities of various political move-ments, we can also see the role it plays and how itscharacter varies from party to party. The most intoler-ant attitude towards non-Orthodox denominations andnew religious movements is characteristic of national-patriotic political parties: the Liberal Democratic Partyof Russia (LDPR), the Congress of Russian Communi-ties, the Russian National Union, the Social-PatrioticAssociation Derzhava. Thus, for example, V.Zhirinivskiy, leader of the LDPR, formulated a geopo-litical concept that the current crisis in Russia has twounderlying reasons. First, political power in Russia hasbeen seized by anti-national and anti-Russian forces thatimposed upon the Russian society an alien pro-Westernideology of the “free market” and “human rights”. Sec-ond, Orthodox spiritual values have been replaced byconsumerism. V. Zhirinivskiy claims that the Orthodoxfaith in the course of its millennial presence on Russianterritory has succeeded in developing concepts that arebest for the Russian national character and traditions.That is why the LDPR looks upon Orthodoxy as a ma-jor source of Russian national thinking. Similar conceptsof the “Holy Orthodox Russia” predominate in theideological makeup of the Social-Patriotic AssociationDerzhava, which proclaims as its key objective the resto-ration of the former “natural” borders of the Russianstate, that is, the borders of the USSR. Derzhava hopesthat that Orthodoxy will enjoy absolute government

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support in this new Russian State, while non-Orthodoxconfessions, such as Islam or Buddhism, would be sup-ported only “on the territories densely populated bytheir members”.

Russian national-patriotic movement also has itssupporters of fundamentalism. Among the movementsthat see themselves as fundamentalists one will find theRussian National Unity, the Russian National Counciland the National Republican Party of Russia. “Their fi-nal objective is to develop a ‘Russian civilization’ basedpredominantly on Orthodox thinking.”7 . Thus, for ex-ample, the Resolution of the December Convention ofthe National Patriotic Front Memory (1994) contains adirect request for the legislature that would establishrightful, legal pre-eminence of the Russian OrthodoxChurch over non-orthodox denominations. The politi-cal agenda of the People’s National Party, apart fromproclaiming the Orthodox faith as the established reli-gion, claims that non-Russians and members of non-or-thodox churches should have no right to be citizens ofRussia. Russian state officials should be ethnically Rus-sian and should profess Orthodoxy, while religious free-dom can only be permitted as far as this or that teachingdoes not contradict moral doctrines inherent to theRussian Orthodox faith.

No less conservative in their attitude to religious tol-erance are various Marxist groups and parties such asthe Communist Party of the Russian Federation(CPRF), the Russian Communist Laborist Party(RCLP), the Union of Communists, the ‘Working Rus-sia’ Party and others.

However, religious intolerance is most dangerous atthe government level. One should bear in mind that thedecisive step towards recognition of the fight for reli-gious freedom in the modern world was taken not byreligious, social or political organizations but by consti-tutions, legislative assemblies and courts. The very con-cept of human religious rights is inseparably connectedwith the democratic values and the culture of pluralism.Unfortunately, the current situation with the right to re-ligious freedom and its protection by the government inRussia is a serious cause for concern. In his analysis ofthe current situation, A. Pchelintsev, director of the In-stitute of Law and Religion, states that “the Russian so-ciety has abandoned its former liberal attitude in thesphere of relationship between the state and religionthat was characteristic of the beginning of the 1990s,and now moves towards a neo-conservative view of theissue”8 .

The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associa-tions adopted by the State Duma in 1997 is evidence thatthe state has no intention to make protection of humanrights proclaimed in the Constitution its top priority.The text of the preamble of the Law contains the recog-nition of the special role of one denomination – namely,Orthodoxy – in the history of Russia, as well as a list ofconfessions “respected” by the state. This violates theconstitutional principle of equal protection of all reli-gious associations by the law (Article 14, RF Constitu-tion). According to Article 2 of the UN Declaration on theElimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief, the expression “intolerance and

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discrimination” means any distinction, exclusion, re-striction or preference based on religion or belief. Ar-ticle 10 of the RSFSR Law on Religious Freedom, of Octo-ber 25, 1990, used to contain this conceptuallyimportant provision stipulating that “the state will main-tain neutrality as regards the issue of freedom of con-science and religious beliefs”. However, this provisionwas not only excluded from the new legislation, but theconcept itself was radically transformed. In fact, thenew law is practically giving Orthodoxy the status of thestate religion. The Russian Orthodox Church, ratherthan playing the role of an institutionalized religion, isproclaimed to be the basis for the restoration of Russiannational identity, which in itself is the restoration of im-perial ideology.

As a result, ever since the adoption of the Law onFreedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, oppositionto the “expansionism of foreign missionaries”, threaten-ing the “spiritual renaissance of Russia” has become anintegral part of religious policies of the Russian state.According to the prominent English specialist in reli-gious studies P. Jenkins, the fear of sects has often beena deliberately created phobia. Such phobias have a con-siderable unifying force, since they create an image of a“common enemy”, which enables the general public tojoin forces against the common threat and reinstateonce again the universally accepted standards and be-liefs.9 Thus, the Doctrine of Informational Security of the Rus-sian Federation, adopted September 9, 2000, clearly statesthat “one of the major directions for ensuring informa-tional security in the sphere of spiritual life, should be

the opposition to the influence of foreign religious orga-nizations and missionaries.” However, the documentfails to give a clear definition what should be considered“religious fundamentalism” or a “totalitarian sect”.What one clearly finds lacking in the document are anyserious studies of a possible classification of new reli-gious movements and structures and definition of theirnegative or positive influence on society. Similar termi-nological vagueness and groundless xenophobia ismanifest in the majority of documents issued by the au-thorities in charge of registering new religious associa-tions, as well as in local legislation on missionary activi-ties. Thus one gets an impression that the laws areaimed at creating new myths and new “enemy images”,rather than at stabilizing the religious situation in Russia.

It is worth mentioning that all efforts to legitimizethe state anti-sectarian policy in Russia are often ex-plained by appealing to the situation in the West. Whileit is true that Europe has no uniform legislation on reli-gious issues, it is also a fact that they have adopted theEuropean Convention on Human Rights, and somegovernments have already faced a lot of criticism for theunsatisfactory situation of religious freedom in theircountries, having to alter their legislation accordingly.Now religious legislation in Europe is evolving towardspromoting personal rights and freedoms of citizens inall, including the religious, spheres, and only Russia iswalking backwards.

The analysis given above shows that heterodoxy inRussia is primarily seen as a threat to national valuesand state interests. For that reason, religious intolerance,

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as a rule, is aimed at a religion that is considered false bythe established religious community, that is seen asthreatening the foundations of the society, since itsteachings threaten the political authority and policies ofthe government and finally, a religion that is equatedwith an alien political and social-economic system. Sincethe borders between the Islamic, the Buddhist and theChristian worlds are not transparent for mutual “expan-sion”, the main lines of confrontation will be the fol-lowing:

a) opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church toCatholic and Protestant “pretensions” to the “Russiancanonical territory”;

b) joint fight of the Orthodox Church and the stateagainst foreign and new local religious movements thatare automatically declared “totalitarian sects”;

c) opposition of the established Orthodox Churchto any expansion of alternative Orthodox churches - theForeign, the Catacomb and the Renovated - and theirinfluence, as well as opposition to the Russian Protes-tants, whose activity deprives the Russian OrthodoxChurch of its “monopoly” for Russian religious life;

d) opposition of the Moscow Patriarchate to the“secession of local national churches” in the “new for-eign countries”, that is, in Ukraine, Estonia and othercountries, which deprives Moscow of its own EasternRome.

Defeat in any of these tasks threatens to bring upradical changes in the established position of the unsuc-cessful party. This worries both the church authoritiesand some political leaders, since the official position of

the Orthodox Church in Russia is connected with thepolitical situation in the country (history shows that to-talitarian regimes are no exception to this rule) and,moreover, it serves as basis for “national identity”. Re-organization in this sphere will require changes not onlyin the religious tradition, but also in the character of po-litical power and the sentiment of the public. However,if these changes do not take place, resulting religious in-tolerance might lead to deplorable consequences, thefirst signs of which are already manifest in modern Rus-sian society.

Firstly, there exists a danger of a definite turn to-wards the anti-liberal Russian “special way”, i.e. a totali-tarian imperial regime using nationalist-clerical ideology.

Secondly, there are social and economic conse-quences. In the atmosphere of pre-dominance of “reli-gious nationalism”, social order and consensus in theRussian society will be broken. This will lead to the fail-ure of modernization programs and will be an obstacleon the way out of the crisis the country is now trying toovercome.

Thirdly, if Russia does not have religious freedom, itwill face a lot of problems on the international arena.This might damage Russia’s international relations andresult in isolation instead of the desired equality.

Fourthly, religious nationalism is dangerous not onlyfor the society, but for the Russian Orthodox Church aswell. The latter is rapidly assuming the character of aconservative social institution, defending the old tradi-tional order and becoming a political instrument in thehands of the reactionaries.

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It is clear that such tendencies are highly dangerous.However, one cannot yet say that in modern Russia “re-ligious orthodox” nationalism has already firmly estab-lished itself, along with its classical, parity, economicand defensive varieties. Besides the above mentionedfactors that encourage its development, there is a num-ber of factors that oppose and resists its dissemination.

The first and most important factor is the processof social modernization in the Russian society, whichbroadens the worldview of the people. Religion in itstraditional forms is losing its role as a predominant ver-tical line of the world conceptualization and we witnessthe rise of new sub-cultures that no longer coincidewith national borders but are determined by personalchoice and interests. According to the independentjournalist Ye. Ikhlov, “the Russian society that hasmoved far enough from the traditional lifestyle and gotused, in the past couple of dozen years, to the increas-ingly predominant climate of spiritual and intellectualpluralism, can no longer be satisfied with the leadershipof a structure that is socially passive”10 . As a result, de-spite the fact that 82 % of Russians today regard them-selves as Orthodox, overwhelming majority of thepopulation is against building the state system alongethnic-confessional lines. Besides, it is highly doubtfulthat the Russian State today will agree to share its powerwith anyone, let alone the Orthodox Church. All politi-cal processes active in our society since 1991, in fact,lack any religious constituents. And, finally, we canclearly see the changes in the very sentiment of Ortho-dox believers and the appearance of so-called “new or-

thodox believers” with their active social attitude, pragma-tism, ecumenism, dissatisfaction with their current spiri-tual counseling, personal spiritual experience and adher-ence to the values of democracy.

It might seem a paradox but religious intolerance inmodern Russia is to a great extent based on the national“inferiority complex” and the wish to prove to the worldthat Russia will survive on account of its “spiritualwealth”. However, no one today understands what thiswealth is and how it can be used in contemporary life, andspiritual tradition is no more than a symbol. In the finalanalysis, misgivings about non-Orthodox denominations’influence in Russia have no solid ideological base, nor le-gal authority behind them, and their actualization remainsfragmentary and inconsistent.

In conclusion, the real “return to one’s roots”, the dis-covery of one’s national identity based on religious tradi-tion cannot in itself be the source of conflict. On the con-trary, it facilitates the dialogue between cultures andpromotes religious tolerance. It’s a known fact that peoplewith a strong feeling of national and religious identity tendto be tolerant towards the “others” and their “strangeways”. In other words, tolerance does not mean rejectionof one’s views and beliefs but rather their further develop-ment and amplification.

Notes:

1 See Papers in Sociological Research (1990 - 1992; 1996).Institute of Sociological Research, Russian Academy of Science.Moscow, 1996. 74 p.; Papers in Sociological Research (1995;1997) Russian Independent Institute of Social and National

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Problems. Moscow, 1997. 183 p.; Papers in Sociological Re-search (1994 - 1995) Russian Academy of Science. Institute ofAnthropology and Ethnography. Moscow, 1997. 85 p.; Papers ofSociological Research (1993 - 1997) Moscow State University;Center for Social Studies. Moscow, 1997. 151 p.; State, Religion,Law: Sociological Analysis // Religion and Law. 2001. N 1. pp.26 - 29.

2 The case in point is the so-called “tactical tolerance”,which is mostly used by totalitarian political systems with thepurpose of promoting their own ideology. – author’s remark.

3 Qtd. in Pospelovskiy D. V. The Russian Orthodox Churchin the 20th Century. Moscow, 1995. p.18.

4 See Old Church, New Believers: Religion in Public Per-ceptions in Post-Soviet Russia. St. Petersburg, Moscow, 2000.pp. 7 - 15.

5 Dvorkin A. Introduction into Sect Studies. NizhniNovgorod, 1998. p. 24.

6 Kondratiev F. K. Medical and Social Consequences ofDestructive Activity of Totalitarian Sects: an Analytical Survey.State Research Center of Social and Legal Psychiatry of V.P.Serbskiy. Moscow, 1998. p. 4.

7 See Ovsienko F. G., Trofimchuk N. A. Confessional Fac-tor in Russian Political Process: Place and Essence // Religionand Culture. M., 2000. p. 81 – 82.

8 Pchelintsev A., Ragozina L. State, Religion, Law: Socio-logical Analysis // Religion and Law. 2001. N 1. p. 29.

9 Jenkins P. Pedophiles and Priests: Anatomy of a Contem-porary Crisis. Oxford, 1996. p. 158.

10 Ikhlov Ye. V. Difficulties for Inter-Confessional Dia-logue in Russia // Nationalism and Religion. Moscow, 2000. p.149.

111J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

MARINA GASKOVA

Institute of Economicsand Industrial Engineer-ing, Russian Academy ofSciences, Department ofSocial Problems,Novosibirsk, RussiaE-mail:mgaskova@yahoo.com

Marina Gaskova

The Role of the Russian OrthodoxChurch in Shaping the PoliticalCulture of Russia

Besides other changes that have taken place in theRussian Federation in our times, the process ofconstitution of an ideology, which is accompanied bydifferent competing value-systems, is one of thecrucial tendencies. This process also occurs in thearea of the development and construction of religiousinstitutions and religious consciousness. Historically,the Russian Orthodox Church has had a dominantposition among the other religious institutions in thecountry. Unfortunately, it has not and does not servethe role of promoting a democratic change, but israther an “echo” of the authoritarian and totalitarianpast of the Russian history. In my paper I will analyzedifferent factors that contribute to these characteris-tics of the Orthodox Church, and their influence on thepolitical culture of Russia.

In spite of the fact that, officially, a course towardsdemocratization has been adopted in Russia sincePerestroika, there are some tendencies, rooted deeply inthe consciousness of the Russian people, which are con-tradictory to the idea of democracy. The Russian Or-thodox Church is one of the oldest institutions in Rus-sian society. In my paper I will argue that the RussianOrthodox Church is the body, which simultaneously re-flects and shapes the reactionary, extremely conservative“interpretation of reality” of Russia. Paradoxicallyenough, even though the Church was persecuted duringthe communist regime, some members of the priest-hood, who have become politically active today, associ-ate themselves with the communist ideas. To some ex-tent, the Church is an “echo” of the totalitarian past ofthe country.

112J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

Thus, some of the questions I would like to answerin the paper are: Which factors of the Russian culturework for and against the formation of legitimacy of theChurch in the society? Can we say that the activity ofthe Russian Orthodox Church serves as the “root para-digm”, or as the ideology that can potentially “win”against the competing ones (for example, liberalism)? Isthe claim of the Russian Orthodox Church to becomethe “civil religion” (Bellah), the symbol of nationalunity, a realizable one? Will the Church be able to fill inthe spiritual void existing in Russia; Will it be able to be-come the moral symbol of authority of the nation?

In my opinion, there are several aspects that havecontributed to the formation of the Church as it is to-day: 1) the essence of the doctrine itself (extremely tra-ditionalist); 2) the history of the relationship betweenstate and Church in the Russian history. There has al-ways been a symbiosis between Church and state inRussia, and over the time this has resulted in mutualprotection. Russian Church does not have a history ofindependent development, of struggle for human rights,for liberty or freedom, as it is the case with the RomanCatholic Church in Poland; 3) the situation of great in-stability and change in Russia (“unsettled lives”, usingthe term of Swidler), which led to a greather need forspiritual security, support, and determination amongpeople. The economic instability and the standards ofliving are also important factors that have contributedto the formation of a certain type of religiosity.Inglehart’s ideas concerning the values of traditionaland postmodern societies are very useful here.

My paper will be organized according to these as-pects: 1) Firstly, using the works of Swidler, Aronoff,Inglehart, Berdiaev, and others I will discuss the basisand the forms of religious ideology in the political cul-ture of Russia; 2) Secondly, I will touch upon the politi-cal activity of the Church and its ideological premises. 3)Thirdly, I will take a look at the history of the develop-ment of the relationship between Church and state; 4)In the end I will deal with the legal aspect of religion,because, as we can see by comparing two Russian Fed-eral laws adopted after the transformation period, in thelaws towards religions we can find a discriminatory ba-sis, other than Russian Orthodox. This, undoubtedly, isa step back on the road (imposed by Gorbachev) fordemocratic changes in the field of law making and poli-tics.

In this paper I will use mainly the assumptions ofthe semiological approach proposed by Kubik (forth-coming). This approach focuses on the dynamic inter-play of attitudes, discourses, and institutional settingswhere power is actualized. (Kubik forthcoming, p.13).Consequently, it allows the researcher to combine dif-ferent dimensions, such as the psycho-social one (whichfocuses mainly on attitudes), the semiotic dimension(focusing on the study of symbols); and the socio-politi-cal or the dimension of power (which concentrates pri-marily on the study of institutions and power). It is alsonecessary to point out the dynamic character of the cul-tural representations and the evolving character of theirmeanings in contrast to the understanding of culture asa static phenomenon. Religion is potentially one of the

KEY WORDS:

Russia, OrthodoxChurch, political cul-ture, traditionalism,postmodern society,church ideology,cultural representa-tions

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most powerful system of symbols, able to reshape thepolitical culture, and this is why, I think, it is best to ap-proach it from the four angles mentioned above.

1. The social, cultural, and ideologicalpremises for the formation of the ideologyof the Church. Some characteristics of theChurch today

The period of social transformations that started inthe 80s and 90s in the countries from Eastern Europeand the former Soviet Union has completely shaken thefoundations of the settled lives in every aspect – eco-nomically, ecologically, politically, etc. In the field ofculture, the established rules and customs began to bequestioned. The old ideological schemas, propagated bythe communist regime ceased to have an influence onpeople, and, consequently, a new political discourse hadto be found by political entrepreneurs to explain the re-ality. A great spiritual need and a search for meaning ischaracteristic for such periods. Aspirations for a newand brighter future have been expressed in the demo-cratic reformation and the dethroning of the cult of thetotalitarian regime introduced by Gorbachev duringPerestroika. Unfortunately, the shadows of the past, andthe ideological form that political culture takes today arenot new in the history of Russia. They were selected fromthe existing “tool kit”, the repertoire of possibilities(Swidler) that Russian culture had, and that is why thereare different types of “democracy” in the former Soviet

countries. The historical past is differently molded withthe choices of the present.

As Swidler wrote, in unsettled societies, ideologieshave a stronger control over people’s actions than in the“settled lives”. If in a stable social order culture is takenfor granted, and religion often plays the role of tradi-tion, changing societies are much more sensitive to cul-ture. Doctrine, symbol, and ritual shape action directly.Undoubtedly, the religious revival in Russia is of greatimportance not only for the spiritual life of the indi-vidual (I agree with the thesis of M. Eliade, C.G. Jungand others according to which “religious thinking” is anessential part of human consciousness that can take dif-ferent forms), but also for the formation of a politicaland legal culture. The ideology of the Russian OrthodoxChurch has looked back upon the tradition of conserva-tive nationalism, and its representatives have under-stood and cooperated with the ideas of the “new” com-munists. Using Swidler’s terminology, fewer resourceswere needed to be spent for this already trodden path ofhistory. “Culture in this sense is more like a style or setof skills and habits than a set of preferences and wants”(Swidler, p.275). To some extent, one can say that thedevelopment of the Church was frozen during the sev-enty years of repressions, and now the Church is beingrebuilt, copying its own image from the pre-revolution-ary times from the beginning of the twentieth century.This was the strongest tool to choose from in shapingthe religious ideology of our times.

However, there are some researchers who affirmthat the historical reality has very little or nothing in

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common with the construction of an ideology (Petroforthcoming). Additionally, “there is no cultural or his-torical disposition toward any particular type of policy”(Ibid, p.52). What really matters, in Petro’s opinion, isthe preference of elites, who take the decisions on whatkind of symbols to evoke in a given political situation.Pursuing certain political interests, elites (re)construct acertain myth from the history of a country. If the publicaccepts a given myth, it helps to achieve the legitimacyof the regime, and serves as a strong cohesive factor,forming (national) identity. This means that the roleplayed by the Orthodox religion today in the politicalculture of Russia was and is determined by the purposeorientated actions of the political leaders.

Petro’s position on the role of elites could be con-tradicted from the standpoints of some other scholarswho say that elites are rather subconscious recipientsthan conscious manipulators of culture. These research-ers consider that the explanations are to be found takinginto consideration the uniqueness of the history andculture of every country (Petro pp.47-48).

From the comparative perspective of the macro-his-torical approach, one can speak of different types of so-cieties only in terms of their economic and cultural de-velopment and, consequently, in terms of differentsystems of values and religious through which this arecharacterized. I fully agree with the distinction made byInglehart between people’s values in the traditional andmodern societies. The sense of great insecurity, instabil-ity, and low economic standards of living determinepeople to look for absolute standards, security, a

greather power, and a rigid set of (religious) unitingnorms. The Russian Orthodox Church satisfies theseneeds perfectly. Additionally, it is worth mentioningthat, according to Inglehart, people, especially in theformer countries of the Soviet Union, did not start feel-ing happier, more satisfied with life after the beginningof the transformation period. As a result, one cannotspeak about the legitimacy of the democratic regime,which was established in Russia (Inglehart 1999). Thisfactor rather forms the basis for authoritarianism, andin the religious sphere – for a dominant traditional reli-gion. It pushes people towards criticizing the existingregime, and thinking that the earlier (for example, com-munist) times were better. If we can speak of the emer-gence of new social and religious movements, which ex-press the set of “post-materialist” values (tolerance,belonging, self-expression, participatory role in society)in the Western countries, in Russia the situation is dif-ferent. I think that pluralism and acceptance of differentreligious forms is a matter of things to come in the caseof Russia. Unfortunately, one can say that, to a certaindegree, the legitimacy of monotheistic religion goesalong well with the support for the strong authoritariansecular power in Russia today. These are two facets ofthe same type of political culture. Undoubtedly, West-ern countries have the longest tradition of monotheisticreligion; but the modern post-industrial regimes of thesecountries are also characterized by the existence of newsocial movements, including new religions, some ofwhich even non-Christian (Inglehart 1999, Balagushkin1999).

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Besides the cultural and socio-political factors thatformed the basis for the legitimation of the Russian Or-thodox Church, it is worth mentioning that there hasbeen an ongoing debate about the “nature” of the Rus-sian culture. Can Russia can be considered a part of Eu-rope, Asia, or is it an independent “Eurasian” country?These discussions can be traced back to the Slavophilesand Westernizers which have become very importanttoday due to the global geopolitical changes taking placeall over the world, the shifting of the borders and thereshaping of the cultural identities of the people. Theanswers to such questions like: “who are we and wheredo we go?” are not provided by the cultural “tool kit”anymore. This questions are rather posed than an-swered. Russians do not perceive themselves as Sovietcitizens; they need to identify themselves in differentterms and being engaged in different relations with therest of the world. Today the Church is claiming to be-come a symbol of a Russian nation. Some of its fea-tures, its ideology, is similar to that one of the neo-Slavophiles. The Church claims to play a uniquemessianic role for Russia, being extremely hostile to ev-erything that comes from the West, including the ideasof liberalism and democracy, tolerance to other reli-gions, cosmopolitism, Enlightenment, etc.

The fundamentalist wing of the Church perceivesperestroika, started by Gorbachev, negatively, as theevent that pushes the Russian nation away from God.The representatives of the Church, using terminologyfrom the Middle Ages, defines Europe and America as

being possessed by evil forces, as the countries that willinevitably burn in hell soon (Shenfield 2001).

There are some strong anti-Semitic tendencies thatcan be noticed in the activity of the Church. Books andpamphlets which describe the dangers of the satanic se-cret movement are being published. On 9th of March2000, the Holy Synod of the Russian Church issued adeclaration, in which the Ministry of Taxes and Dutieswas accused of using satanic symbols in some tax docu-ments (Shenfield 2001, p. 63). Additionally, a revival ofthe medieval belief that Jews commit ritual murders, us-ing Christian children has also been noted. Some believethat the Jews, who perceived it as a ritual slaughter,killed the tsar’s family in 1918. Many members of theChurch believe that there is the Judaeo-Masonic plotagainst Russia. Adherence to the tradition and thestrong secular power (preferably in the face of a mon-arch) are the main points of Church’s ideology today. Ithink that one of the most characteristic features of theChurch is its resistance to change, to accept moderniza-tion in any form. Its rituals and attitudes toward worldhave remained unchanged for centuries. Some authorshave shown that the ideas of neo-Slavophilism areclosely connected with the communist ideology today.(Kubik “Cultural Legacies of State Socialism…”). It wasnoted also that the members of the Russian OrthodoxChurch associate themselves with communism and neo-Slavophilism (Balagushkin, Shenfield). Some of themeven cooperate with fascist organizations such as Rus-sian National Unity. On the other hand, communiststhemselves are very eager to be associated with Russian

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Orthodoxy. For example, the leading figure of the Rus-sian Communist Workers Party, Viktor Tyulkin, hasbeen characterized as an “orthodox internationalistcommunist” (Shenfield 2001, p. 60). Undoubtedly, it isnevertheless an overstatement to put the political activ-ity of the Church on the same level with fascist organi-zations or analyze it within the framework of fascism as,for example, S. Sheffield1 and Steeves did (Steeves,1994).

The image of the Russian Orthodox Church wouldbe misleading if the liberal aspects of its ideology wereto be let aside. Politically this liberal wing stands forChristian democracy and a separation of the Churchand the state. There are some Christians believers whohave preserved their faith during the religious repres-sions of the Soviet regime; at the same time they re-mained open and welcoming to democratic changes.The appreciation of one’s nation can be combined withappreciation of other, different cultures. Likhachev, forexample, noted that it is necessary to distinguish be-tween patriotism and nationalism. The first means lovefor one’s nation and for one’s neibour, and its roots canbe found in Orthodoxy and in the Russian nationalcharacter. It is important to note that the liberal wing ofthe Orthodox believers identifies its forefathers with theideologist-philosophers of the Silver Age. I think thatthese thinkers (such as Florensky, Berdiaev, Bulgakov,Frank and others) have contributed greatly to the spiri-tual heritage of Russians. Several generations havefound inspiration and answers to the question about themeaning of life in their books. These writers considered

Russian Orthodoxy to be the essence of the Russiansoul, but at the same time they often criticized bothsome aspects of the regime and the weaknesses of theRussian character. For example, N. Berdyaev wrote thatOrthodoxy was embedded in the spirit of the Russiansoul. He noted that religion and nationality were understood asa symbiosis by the Russians. “Narod” (common people)always loved its tsar and saw nobility as the cause of itsproblems. The tsar was at the same time a secular and aspiritual authority. Berdyaev discussed the “feminine”nature of the Russian nation, its passivity, its collectivisticcharacter, the lack of determination and discipline. Irra-tionality and contradictions are also qualities that werepointed out by him. Berdyaev thought that even Marx-ism and nihilism were easily accepted by the Russians inaccordance with the Russian nature.2 He also notedthat Church’s nationalism is a characteristically Russianphenomenon. In my opinion, many of these ideas arevery relevant today (a century after Berdyaev’s workshave been published), when we talk about Church andits influence on the development of culture and politicsin Russia. For example, if one can underline the impor-tance of Protestantism in the formation of the ethicsand the culture of the American society (started byWeber’s works), this is not the case with the Russian re-ligious tradition. The crucial features of religious, andlater economic ethics of Western societies are lacking:individualism, rationality, and the idea of the divisionbetween the secular and the spiritual powers. This be-comes clear if we take a look at the history of RussianChurch.

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Many writings of the philosophers of the Silver Ageare deeply democratic by nature; they value human dig-nity and the uniqueness of the human being. The writ-ers of the Silver Age saw themselves as philosophers,independent from the Church. Unfortunately, this lineof thinking did not develop into the mainstream of theRussian religious thought due to the fact that the Bol-sheviks destroyed the Church’s activity, including themost positive beginnings. Some consider this fact asone of the main reasons why today’s Church is reaction-ary, conservative, and hostile to the idea of the freedomof (religious) thought. The murder of A. Mien, who, inmy opinion, was one of the most outstanding religiousliberal thinkers of our days, is the best illustration of thisfact. Even though one cannot say that ideologically allthe members of the Church are affiliated to fundamen-talist extremism, the majority of the clergymen could becharacterized as conservative and politically loyal to thegovernment today. (Shenfield 2001).

I will focus on this matter in the next part of my pa-per.

2. The Relationship between Church andState in the Russian History

Historically, the Church has always been associatedwith the secular power. The Church has no tradition ofindependent functioning, but only a history of loyaltyand glorification of the rulers. On the one hand, onecan say that during the times of troubles, wars, and for-

eign invasions throughout twelve centuries it served as astrong moral authority, giving spiritual strength to thenation in order to fight the enemies. On the other hand,its constant dependency and support of the authoritiesbrought about strong reactionary and anti-liberal ten-dencies in this institution. There were times in Russianhistory when its status was inferior to that of the state(during Ivan the Terrible, for example), and times whenthe Patriarch was basically ruling the country (PatriarchNikon, in 1662, claimed that the Church is superior tothe secular power). There was also a tragic period inChurch’s history when it was almost completely de-stroyed (during communist regime), and only once re-vived by Stalin to use it as a source for motivatingpeople in the struggle with fascist Germany.

Nevertheless, one cannot find in the history of theChurch the idea of the separation of powers (as it couldbe found in Protestantism and Catholicism, often bring-ing deep Church reforms, which influenced society as awhole). There was no Enlightenment or modernizationof the Russian Orthodox Church. Rather, one of itsmain characteristic features is the dogmatic adherenceto Tradition. The forms in which tradition is understoodby the members of the Church are: the Bible, the SevenEcumenical Councils, the Later Councils, the Fathers,the Liturgy, the Canon Law, and the Icons. Nothing haschanged in the Church of today, and the spirit of antiq-uity is consciously preserved in its liturgy, which is stillbeing held in the ancient Russian language with a veryimpersonal character, in the ancient form of baptizing,

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etc. The Church is extremely loyal to the past, often in-cluding the past of the secular powers.

The already-mentioned claim is sustained by the factthat some of the Russian rullers were canonized (PrinceVladimir, Tsar Ivan I, etc.). If the main mythologemasof the Poles, for example, are connected with the namesof Saint Stanislaw and Saint Wojciech, who were associ-ated with the resistance to the royal power, in Russia, incontrast, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, a per-son devoted to absolutism, was canonized. He wascharacterized by religious formalism and ritualism, glori-fication of the power of the prince, and desire to defendthe Church’s wealth. The conflict between Church andstate, connected with his name, was symbolical. In the15th century a monk, Nil Sorskii, and his followers(“nestiazhateli”) have started to defend the idea that theChurch and the monasteries (which owned one third ofthe land at that time) should have no property. At firstthey gained the support of the prince, but in the endstatus quo of the Church and the state was preserved,and Joseph, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, wascanonized.

The relationship between Church and state at he be-ginning of the 21st century follows its typical path inRussia. If in the case of Poland, Catholicism served asthe main catalyst of democratic change from the com-munist regime, in Russia the Church withdrew itselfback to conservative nationalism. The visit of John PaulII in 1979 transformed Poland. It influenced public dis-course, individual attitudes, and the rules of interactionof people. It evoked great psychological response,

which served as one of the factors in forming the legiti-macy of the new political regime (Kubik 1994). In Rus-sia, during the period of Perestroika. lots of actionswere taken by Gorbachev in order to find a basis for ademocratic regime. The freedom of speech and religiouspractices, stipulated in the law were only one of themany reforms of that time. Thousands of churches ofdifferent denominations (Russian Orthodox, RomanCatholic, Muslim, Protestant, Armenian Apostolic, etc.),as well as seminaries were opened, and the publishingactivity of the churches expanded, during theGorbachev’s time. These are all former demands, ex-pressed by religious activists, satisfied at that time. Ad-ditionally, it was the time when new religious move-ments appeared, some of them coming from abroad,and some being formed from the roots of differentRussian national traditions and beliefs. Most important,this has led to the change of status of religion. If previ-ously, due to repressions, it was stigmatizing to speakabout faith, after Perestroika officials found it increas-ingly useful to show their belonging to the church. Theattitudes of people changed as well.

However, the religious situation changed againwhen Boris Yeltsin was alleged President. Slowly,mainly due to Church’s activity, the religious situation inRussia has shifted towards intolerance for all other reli-gions. Undoubtedly, this has had a certain effect on theformation of a political and legal culture. The demo-cratic orientation that started with Gorbachev has failedto produce the long-term effect that was expected. Thiswas also reflected on the Federal and local laws on reli-

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gions (at the end of the 80’s the Orthodox clergy werebeing elected as deputies in the Russian parliament).

On 1st October 1990, a law concerning religion(“On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organi-zations” for the USSR) was adopted by Gorbachev. Atthe end of October, another law concerning the “Free-dom of Worship” in Russian Federation was signed(Witte 2000). Both of them prohibited religious dis-crimination. The foundations of religious liberty, free-dom or religious expression were stipulated in thesedocuments. Additionally, they stated the separation ofstate and religion. These two institutions were expectednot to interfere with each other in any way. The RussianConstitution from 1993 confirmed these provisions.However, since then the Russian Orthodox Church hasstarted an active campaign against all other religiouspractices, because, first of all, they were bringing aboutthe context for a contest for souls, so to speak. WesternChurches also represented the ideology of individualismand liberty, which is inherently alien to this Church. Fi-nally, the Russian Orthodox Church claimed that theforeign religious denominations posed a threat to soci-ety by breaking up families, using brainwashing tech-niques, etc. It should be mentioned that the Church ac-cused all other religious denominations of this, withoutmaking any distinctions. The idea, being supported byPatriarch Aleksii II, was to ban all of them. The Churchhas published numerous proclamations against the ac-tivities of the other religious denominations; the Mos-cow Patriarchate requested restraint for several times,and even a one-generation moratorium on foreign mis-

sion activities in Russia. In 1993 the Moscow Patriarch-ate joined various nationalist groups in order to make apressure on the Russian Parliament to amend the Fed-eral Law from 1990 (Witte 2000). As a result, in 1997 anew Federal Law was adopted by President Yeltsin, af-ter long discussions and protests (Western representa-tives, including the Presidents Clinton and Carter alto-gether with 160 senators and representatives in the U.S.Congress, several Western European heads of state andCouncil of Europe, Pope John Paul II). The new lawdiscriminates against all religious denominations otherthan the Russian Orthodox Church. They are all subjectto several restrictions (the right to juridical personality,to hold a collective property, to access to the state’s ma-terial benefits to religion, and many other were re-voked). The Orthodox Church is protected by the stateand granted all kinds of support according to the newlaw. More than one third of Russia’s eighty-nine provin-cial governments also adopted laws limiting the rights offoreign religious organizations (Witte 2000, p.10). Onecan come to a conclusion that these changes, made inthe Federal and local laws of Russia, are a step back onthe road to constructing the civil society, protecting thehuman rights, and guaranteeing legal equality for all reli-gious denominations. But, certainly, the Church doesnot have the potential to be the spiritual force thatstimulates people for civil activity towards democraticreformation.

But it still has the potential for becoming the “civilreligion” (Bellah) of Russia. There is no doubt that thisinstitution has a highly moral authority, in comparison

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with the situation before Perestroika. First of all, it isnoticeable that people, holding power positions showtheir respect, interest, and participation in religiouspractices of the Russian Orthodox Church. The mass-media always pays attention to the visits and meetingsof Putin with the Patriarch; images of Putin’s atten-dance to church ceremonies are often present even onthe first-covers of the magazines. Gorbachev and Eltsinhave worked for themselves the same public-image. Hi-erarchs attend official state ceremonies, and Orthodoxpriests serve as chaplains in the armed forces and blesssubmarines, armaments, and boundary posts, etc. Thedepartments of Orthodox theology are opened in stateuniversities; Orthodox sermons are often covered onTV, etc. Thus, one can say that, at an official level, thecenturies-long symbiotic relationships between Churchand State are restored. At the level of public opinion,according to the statistical research, one can clearly see agrowing interest in religion in Russia. In a poll con-ducted in early 2000 by the Russian Independent PublicOpinion Research Center, 57 percent of the respon-dents said that they trusted the Russian OrthodoxChurch; 32 percent said that they mistrusted it. Accord-ing to the survey, the Church is trusted more than the centraland local governments, the Duma, the police and the judiciary sys-tem, the media, and the banks; only the Federal SecurityService and the army had better ratings (Shenfield 2000,p.60). However, according to other surveys (ISSP-91;Vorontsova 1997, etc.) it cannot be said that a great ma-jority of people go to church regularly (only about onepercent of the population). Also, there is a growing in-

terest in non-traditional religion in Russia now. Therewas noted lately a shift away from Orthodoxy inpeople’s religious preferences, especially a shift awayfrom the Church as institution, and an orientation to-ward “Christianity in general” and a vague “New Agespirituality” (Filatov and Furman 1992).

Most important, one could notice a considerable draw-back of both theoretical and empirical research of theauthors presented in this essay, mainly their lack of atten-tion to age and occupational factors. My assumption isthat the same category of people, circumscribed from thestandpoint of these factors, are communists and activefollowers of the Russian Orthodox Church. Many ofthe former communists still adhere to this ideology,which combines nationalism and anti-liberalism, today.They also want to be associated with the (reactionary ul-tranationalist) part of Russian Orthodoxy. These are thekind of people who are not satisfied with their life dueto their low standards of living (they have low salariesand unfulfilling jobs or are retired). They have livedmost of their lives in the totalitarian regime, and wereformed in the conditions of state control and indoctri-nation. According to one research undertaken by S.Kliger and Paul H. De Vries in the nineties, almost halfof the population between 57 and 76 years old are stilldevoted communists. Such devotion is strong alsoamong the uneducated. 45.8% of people with elemen-tary school education are dedicated communists. Addi-tionally, 53.1% of all the followers of communism arepresently unemployed (Ramet 1993, p. 199-200). Unfor-tunately, I did not find the data on these factors for the

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conservative fraction of Orthodox ideology, but my as-sumption is that extreme Orthodoxy appeals to such acategory of people and finds response in it.

So, if one takes a look at the problem of the forma-tion of legitimacy of Church today, it becomes clearthat, even though the potential of this institution is con-siderably strong due to the already-discussed factors, itis nevertheless limited. Such a (extreme ultranationalist)form of religiosity does not appeal to other categoriesof people (educated, young, financially successful). Theyshare views that are more similar to the values of theWestern societies with post-materialistic ethics. Thus,my second main assumption is that democratic changes willcome not from the purely ideological traditional institutions (suchas Russian Orthodox Church), but from the flexible or glo-bally integrated economic structures of society (for ex-ample, private business owners, employees of the inter-national companies, etc.). Unfortunately, they do notrepresent a notable part of the Russian population to-day.

Conclusion

One can say that there are objective circumstancesthat predetermine the ideological form of the RussianOrthodox Church today. Due to the historical andsocio-cultural reasons, as well as to the economic situa-tion in Russia, the Church has strong authoritarian andnationalistic tendencies today. Using Swidler’s terms, itcould be said that the Church did not have the liberal

ideology as a choice in its “tool kit”. Church’s activity issimultaneously a model “of” and “for” (Geertz) the po-litical and legal culture in Russia, which is to a certaindegree non- and anti-democratic in our times. However,it is important to note that one cannot generalize theconclusion at the level of society viewed as a whole. Thealready-mentioned aspects are only a part of the wholepicture. There are other tendencies, which are worthmentioning. The new generation does not have the cul-tural experience of communism, and it has started toconstitute different patterns of social and political be-havior. It is much more open than the previous ones.Additionally, factors such as the globalization processand the economic growth in Russia should be men-tioned. They form a different type of system of values.

Every theory assumes some agreed-upon limitationsof its representation. However, there is a part of truththat is always reflected. What could be said with agreater sense of certainty in the case of functioning ofthe Church in Russia and its relation to culture and poli-tics is that at a given moment the democratic traditionin this country was very weak. It is contradicted by amuch larger part of totalitarian consciousness (bettersaid, the unconscious part of the human psyche) – thisfact can be observed in the activity of the Church.

Bibliography:

Balagushkin E. Netradicionnyie religii v sovremennoi Rossii Mos-cow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999.

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Berdyaev N. Istoki I smisl russkogo kommunizma. Rysskaiareligioznaia ideja I russkoje gosydarstvo. http://www.philosophy.ru/li-brary/berd/comm.html

Filatov S.B., and Furman, D.E. 1992. “Religia I politika vmassovom soznanii”. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no.7, pp.3-12.

Inglehart, Ronald “Globalization and Postmodern Values,”The Washington Quarterly 1999, 23(1). http://www.twq.com/win-ter00/231Intlehart.pdf

John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux (ed.) Proselytism andOrthodoxy in Russia. New York, 2000.

Kubik, Jan The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power.The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. Univer-sity Park: The Penn State University Press, 1994.

Kubik J. “Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History-mak-ing and Cultural-political Entrepreneurship in PostcommunistPoland and Russia” In Capitalism and Democracy in Central and East-ern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule edited byGrzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, forthcoming.

Likhachev, D. Zametki o Russkom, 2nd edn. Moscow:Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1984.

Petro N. “Symbols at Work” forthcoming.Ramet P. (ed.) Religious Policy in the Soviet Union. Cambridge

University Press, 1993.Shenfield D. Stephen Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies,

Movements. Armonk, New York, 2001.

Steeves, Paul D. 1994. “Russian Orthodox Fascism AfterGlasnost”. Paper presented to the Conference on Faith and His-tory, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, October 8.

Swidler, Ann “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies”,American Sociological Review, 1986, 51 (April).

Vorontsova, L.M.; Filatov, S.B.; and Furman, D.E. 1997.“Religion in the Contemporary Mass Consciousness”. Russian So-cial Science Review, January-February, pp. 18-39.

Ware Timothy The Orthodox Church. Penguin Books, 1967.

Notes:

1 Shenfield identifies similar features between these twoideologies: cooperation of the Church with some fascist organi-zations; rejection of Enlightenmen, democracy, and belief inJewish conspiracy; public burning of the books that are consid-ered anti-religious (including the ones, written by liberal Ortho-dox theologians). (Shenfield 2001, p. 69).

2 Berdyaev wrote that, for example, Russian Marxism hasaccepted a messianic, mythological form of Marxism rather thanits scientific, evolutionary part. Nihilism , paradoxically as itmight seem, has also grown on the soil of the Russian Ortho-doxy: it is based on denial of the world as it is, seeing it as cor-rupt and sinful. (Berdyaev Istoki I smisl russkogo kommunizma.Rysskaia religioznaia ideja I russkoje gosydarstvo. http://www.philosophy.ru/library/berd/comm.html).

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Fuad B. Aliyev

Framing Perceptions of Islam andthe ‘Islamic Revival’ in the Post-Soviet Countries

This paper discusses the main directions and trendsin framing the perceptions of Islam in the post-Soviet countries engaged in the process of so-called“Islamic Revival”. It focuses on the NorthernCaucasus region of Russia, Azerbaijan and thecountries from Central Asia - a geographical areagoverned by the tension between the local Muslimtraditions and the imported Islamism. It argues thatIslamic revival in post-Soviet countries is associatedeither with the revival of local pre-modern traditionsand thus with the localization of post-socialist Muslimspace, or with the spreading of Islamism, which isabsolutely alien for local Muslim traditions and it isintroduced from abroad.

Introduction

The Post-Communist transition has been accompa-nied not only by political, social, and economic changes,but also cultural ones. After collapse of 70 years of offi-cial atheism and the Communist value system, religionstarted to revive and play an important role in differentspheres of social life, politics, and economics. A brightexample of such revival is the mainly Muslim populatedex-Soviet republics. Building of new and modernizationof old mosques, an increasing number of Islamic studycenters, schools and universities, thousands of pilgrimsgoing to Mecca for Hajj every year as well as fallingprofits of alcohol producing facilities can be more orless observed in all of these republics. Islam to some ex-

FUAD B. ALIYEV

Researcher, PhD Candi-date, Center of Eco-nomic Reforms underthe Ministry of EconomicDevelopment, Baku,Republic of AzerbaijanE-mail: f.aliyev@cer.az

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tent could manage to fill the void left after the collapseof Communism.

The processes of religious revival have played a tre-mendous role in the lives of the people of the formerSoviet Union. Islam does not separate secular life fromthe spiritual. This is the reason for its active involve-ment and influence on the course of political events inthe Northern Caucasus. The concepts “Islamic” and“National” are closely intertwined in Muslim percep-tion. During the years of Soviet atheism, people contin-ued to follow Islamic customs and rites, understandingthem as national and not religious.

This paper will focus on the Northern Caucasus re-gion in Russia, Azerbaijan, and the countries of CentralAsia, since to some extent they became the battlefield ofthe tensions between local Muslim traditions and im-ported Islamism. I will try to answer the following ques-tion: What are the main directions and trends in framingthe perceptions of Islam in the post-Soviet countries.

It can be argued that Islamic revival in post-Sovietcountries has been associated either with the revival oflocal pre-modern traditions and thus with the localiza-tion of post-socialist Muslim space, or with the spreadof Islamism, which is absolutely alien to local Muslimtraditions and introduced from abroad. This situationhas resulted in certain tensions between these forms ofIslam. In the northern Caucasus and Republics ofUzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan these tensionshave even turned into military conflicts. Very often suchconflicts are considered to be between Islam and secu-

larism, whereas “the real dispute lies within Islam”(Cornell and Spector 2002: 195).

Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asiaduring the Soviet Era

During the Soviet rule and the time of militant athe-ism there were still official “independent” Muslim reli-gious administrations: the Muslim Religious (Spiritual)Board for the European USSR and Siberia (centered inUfa, Bashkir ASSR); the Muslim Religious Board forCentral Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent, Uzbekistan);the Muslim Religious Board for the North Caucasus (inBuinaksk; later in Makhachkala, Daghestan); and theMuslim Religious Board for Transcaucasia (Baku,Azerbaijan). The strongest position and hidden leader-ship were granted to the Muslim Religious Board forCentral Asia and Kazakhstan, situated in Tashkent andmainly headed by Uzbek nationals. Existence of thesame institutional structures for the various local Is-lamic traditions can be evaluated as a process of ho-mogenization. These Boards did not oppose the Sovietrule, and even tried to find similarities between Com-munist ideology and Qur’anic values, such as equality ofnations and sexes, freedom of religion, security of hon-orable work, ownership of land by those who till it, andothers that were put in practice after October Revolu-tion (Saroyan 1997).

As our focus is the regions of the NorthernCaucasus, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, it will be benefi-

KEY WORDS:

Islam, Post-Soviet Coun-tries, Islamic revival,Central Asia, NorthernCaucasus, Azerbaijan,radical islamists

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cial to see what the position and specific features of Is-lam was in each of the above-mentioned regions.

Central Asia

First of all I must mention that, traditionally,Uzbeks and Tajiks have been more religious thanKazakhs, Turkmens and even some Kyrgyzs (Hiro1994, Rashid 1994). The main reason is that the latterhave had a nomadic life-style while the former weresettled. During the Soviet era (up to Gorbachev’s re-forms) the main role in framing of the perception of Is-lam in this region was played by the Muslim ReligiousBoard for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, situated inTashkent. This religious body had more rights and ad-vantages than other boards. It issued the only officialMuslim journal, “Muslims of the Soviet East,” and wasresponsible for other literature and publications aboutIslam. In fact, there emerged and developed a Muslimadministrative elite, which tried to promote its own au-thority and undermine any alternative authority.

Perestroika and changing sociopolitical and eco-nomic circumstances brought to life the reconstructionof Islam, not only in terms of theological debates be-tween isolated Muslim elites but also reinterpretationsof Muslim identity in Central Asia.

Fragmentation and regionalization replaced homog-enization. Saroyan highlights fragmentation along ethnicand sectarian lines within the Muslim community in theUSSR as one of the most important institutional

changes in Muslim religious organizations (Saroyan1997). In 1990 an assembly of Muslim clerics in Alma-Ata declared the establishment of a Muslim Board forKazakhstan. Central Asian boards based in Tashkentdid not recognize the legitimacy of this new board.

The establishment of a new medresa also allowedfor the development of differentiation and further di-vided Muslims by nationality in Central Asia. For ex-ample, the inauguration of new training centers for theclergy in the various republics meant that TurkmenMuslims studied in Turkmen medresa and Tajiks stud-ied in Tajik medresa. Moreover, the Tajik medresa,along with religious subjects, also provided instructionin Tajik history and culture, which clearly meant stresson national issues. Thus, without the bonds of a com-mon institutional experience and educational process,Muslim clerics increasingly had contact only with mem-bers of their own nationality and preached a more local-ized form of Islam.

The rapidly changing political environment also cre-ated conditions for new forms of Muslim religious asso-ciation. In the past, the Muslim religious boards couldrely in part on the coercive power of Moscow to pre-vent the emergence of independent Muslim religiouscenters. In the perestroika era, however, liberalizationallowed for the emergence of several new Muslim reli-gious movements. The Muslim Religious Boards notonly confronted a new set of religious and political chal-lenges, they also increasingly faced a challenge from be-low - from Muslim religious movements that operatedindependently from the boards (Saroyan 1997). The

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first strong challengers in Central Asia were theTurkestan Islamic party centered in Uzbekistan’sFerghana Valley and the Islamic Renaissance Party inUzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Muslims in the Ferghana town of Namangan nearthe Kyrgyzstan border began their movement with thetakeover of a mosque that had been used as a storagefacility for wine. After making renovations to the build-ing, the Namangan Muslims chose an imam andmosque council and opened the mosque for regularworship. In this way, the mosque became the first in thepostwar Soviet Union to operate outside the jurisdictionof a Muslim Religious Board. In the ensuing months,local activists began the construction of a medresaalongside the mosque. Most significant about theFerghana Valley movement and other independent reli-gious movements that emerged in the late perestroikaera was the nature of their challenge. Their target wasnot the secular Soviet state, but self-serving and corruptMuslim boards.

The collapse of the USSR and the gain of indepen-dence intensified “Islamic revival”; especially in thesouthern part of Central Asia, namely Uzbekistan,Tajikistan, and the Ferghana valley region ofKyrgyzstan. Islam has deeper roots there than in thewestern republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.Radical Islamist movements opposed any official reli-gious elite or authoritarian regimes in these countries.Authoritarian governments in turn tried to suppress theradical Islamist element.

Northern Caucasus

The multiethnic community of the NorthernCaucasus has traditionally been poly-confessional. Here,along with the autochthonous pagan beliefs, in varioushistorical periods Christianity, Judaism, and Islam havebeen widespread. Since the XVII-XIX centuries SunniIslam has became the indisputably dominant religion inthe region. In the first half of the XIX century Islamwas a flag for a national movement for the indepen-dence of the mountain people of the NorthernCaucasus, which strengthened the position Islam in theminds of those who previously were very oftenIslamicised only on the surface (excluding the inhabit-ants of Southern and Central Daghestan). Exceptionsinclude the Ossetians, a people of Indo-European lan-guage who were and are predominantly of the Ortho-dox Church, and the Tats in the northern part of theCaucasus, who for a long time were referred to as “themountain Jews,” because Judaism was the dominantfaith among them.

In Soviet times the Muslim Religious Board for theNorth Caucasus was the main official religious center ofthis linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous region.There have traditionally existed two versions of SunniIslam (Khanafit and Shafit), a number of Sufi orders,and various small Shiite communities (mostly in South-ern Daghestan). Historically the primary expression ofreligiosity in the region has been Sufism (Bobrovnikov2001). Unlike orthodox ideology the “mosque ten-dency” is relatively weak in Sufism. Originating from

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the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya Sufi lineages, thewidespread network of Sufi orders links the NorthCaucasus’s disparate ethnic, linguistic, clan, and villagecommunities. Sufism is especially important in the re-gion since most mosques in the area were destroyedduring the deportation of Chechens and Ingushes inWorld War II (Saroyan 1997). Thus, the NorthCaucasus religious board most clearly fits the descrip-tion of official Muslim elite isolated from the people. Italready had a challenger in framing a perception of Is-lam among population: the Sufi movements.

Thus the religious board’s definition of Islamic iden-tity and practice is orthodox and exclusionary. TheNorth Caucasus board emphasizes mosque worship andthe religious authority and primacy of the official cleric.Pilgrimages to local shrines (mazar), traditional meetingplaces of Sufis, are discouraged, and the believing popu-lation is encouraged to participate in religious ritualsperformed by official clerics in the state-registeredmosques. The North Caucasus clergy has issued a fetwaprohibiting women from leading religious associations.This can be understood as a measure aimed against thenumerous Sufi orders that are led by women and whosemembership is entirely female (Ibid).It can be arguedthe North Caucasus administration adopted the dog-matic variant of Islamic identity articulated by theTashkent Muslim establishment in response to the cul-tural particularities and Sufi opposition.

However, here the weakening of the Soviet Unionhas had results like in Central Asia: fragmentation of theofficial board. Changes in the North Caucasus were

even more striking and confusing. A conference of reli-gious leaders from the region declared the dissolution ofthe North Caucasus board. In its place they proposedthe formation of “religious centers” for each of the eth-nic autonomous regions in the area. Like in the case ofCentral Asia, Makhachkala refused to recognize the de-cision to dissolve the North Caucasus board, but couldnot stop this process.

There was also a third power, which had been in ashadow for a long time - “Caucasus Wahhabis.” Theirroots go back to the 1970s, when proselytizing Muslimgroups appeared in many Daghestan and Chechen vil-lages of Terek-Sulak lowlands (Bobrovnikov 2001).They had secret meetings in houses of local radicalMuslim scholars taking classes of Arabic and Qur’an. Infact, such unlicensed schools carried out missionarywork among the village youth. The most famous teach-ers have been Bagauddin Kebedov and Ahmad-qadiAkhtaey (who died in 1998).

According to Bobrovnikov, the movement of NorthCaucasus Wahhabis appeared as a reaction to anti-Is-lamic socialist reforms. They were more popular in thelowland regions of Daghestan and Chechny,a wherecollectivization and “cultural revolution” were success-fully implemented from 1930-1970s.

Azerbaijan

According to Motika, 4% to 6% of the populationof Azerbaijan may be called ”active” believers, which

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means that they obey the various Islamic behavior regu-lations; 87% to 92% consider themselves as Muslimsbut comply with only a (quite often small) part of thereligious regulations. Only about 3% call themselvesatheists (Motika 2001).

In contrast to the North Caucasus administration,the Transcaucasus Muslim elite have operated underdifferent conditions. Aside from its jurisdiction overMuslims in Armenia (before they were massacred anddeported) and Georgia (where in any case most Mus-lims are ethnic Azerbaijanis), the Baku religious board isstaffed by Azerbaijanis and serves an Azerbaijani com-munity. The administration can be characterized as anAzerbaijani national institution. In Azerbaijan the over-lapping of religious and national customs and identitiesis more common and likely since “Muslim” is cotermi-nous with “Azerbaijani.” (Hadjy-zadeh 1997, Safizadeh1998, Shaffer 2000, Motika 2001). Another importantfactor is that the Baku administration is also heir to a re-ligious administration established during the Tsarist pe-riod and thus may have some historical legitimacy forthe population. Probably even more important, how-ever, is that Azerbaijan’s Muslim community is pre-dominantly Shiite. In contrast to Sunni Islam, formal re-ligious hierarchy is not foreign to the historicaldevelopment of Shiite Islam. Thus the operation of of-ficial institutions regulating religious life can be seen aspart of Azerbaijan’s Shiite heritage (Saroyan 1997).

Since in this sense it enjoys a greater degree of legiti-macy in popular eyes, it can more easily accommodateparticular popular traditions by appropriating them as

its own legitimate religious traditions. For example,while visitations to saints’ tombs or other holy siteshave been criticized as heretical by the Tashkent andNorth Caucasus establishments, the Baku Muslim elitehas encouraged such visitations by organizing pilgrim-ages under its auspices to holy sites in Azerbaijan(Ibid.). Thus it can be argued that the intensity of Is-lamic reconstruction is much less pronounced in theAzerbaijani administration. The Baku elite’s appropria-tion of popular Azerbaijani traditions serves its quest toconsolidate its socio-religious authority and legitimacy.

In fact, the Baku board is the only one that suc-ceeded in surviving and developing after the Gorbachevreforms and the collapse of the USSR. It is also the situ-ation where there was the least observed activity oftransnational Islamic movements, and perception of Is-lam was mainly framed by “specific circumstances ofthe republic” (Motika 2001).

During the post-Soviet transition, however, theMuslim Religious Board for Transcaucasus was not theonly actor in Islamic revival. I think one can highlightthe following “competitors”:

- Popular and recognized Shiite religious leaders, op-posing the official center, e.g. Haji Ilqar Ibrahimoglu -Imam of Djuma Mosque, Azerbaijani representative ofthe International Religious Liberty Association and hu-man rights defender. He does not obey the board, criti-cizes it and the government. At the moment, Haji Ilqaris under 5 year suspended sentence of deprivation ofliberty and his issue is under the rapt of many human

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rights defenders, international organizations and someWestern Governments.

- Self-declared mullahs and religious leaders oppos-ing Shiism and thus the board. I can mention by nameHamet Suleymanov, who is considered to be Wahhabi.They have their own mosques where followers gathertogether.

- The Pro-Iranian Islam party, officially registered in1992. In 1996 leaders of the party were arrested underthe accusation of spying for Iran and sending youngpeople to IRI for military training. The Party has up to70,000 members, but is not supported by the board andintellectuals.

- The following can be defined as actors as well:muslim intellectuals who might be seen as reformistsand modernizers of Islam. This would include personslike Haji Ilqar.

As we can see, Islam in the Soviet republics was un-der control of local official religious boards (to a lesserextent in Northern Caucasus), which in turn were con-trolled by the state. One of the most important featureswas the fact that Islam became a part of national iden-tity, which resulted in strengthening traditional Islam inall of the republics. However, lack of religious knowl-edge among the population and a high level of igno-rance as well as corruption among clergy created fertileground for the emergence and strengthening of new re-ligious movements and sects, and these not only of Is-lamist persuasion.

Radical Islamists: Who Are They?

The notion of “Islamic Fundamentalism” has be-come so strongly entrenched in the Western mind,thanks to the efforts of mass media, that it might seemdifficult to imagine that fundamentalism can be some-thing different. The concept itself appeared at the be-ginning of the 20th century in conjunction with themovement of conservative Protestants directed againstrationalism and modernism. Similar movements do existin Judaism and in some non-monotheistic religions,such as Hinduism, where there are calls for the resurrec-tion of what had never historically existed - a pure, unal-loyed Hinduism (Chanishev 1974). However, it shouldbe mentioned that Islamic fundamentalism has made it-self visible on the largest scale and seems to be the mosthighly organized form of fundamentalism. The reasonsfor this are hidden in the peculiarities of Islam, which isnot only a religion, but also a “modus vivendi,” and thisfact very easily transforms it into one of the factors inthe political game playing out on many levels(Yarlykapov 1999).

I already mentioned that after the collapse of SovietUnion there was a heyday of radical Islamic move-ments. For a better understanding of this problem weshould, fist of all, define who are the Wahhabis, if thereare any.

Radical Islamist movements demand a return to theoriginal Islam of the days of the Prophet and His firstsuccessors. The basis for Islam should be only theQu’ran and Sunnah of the Prophet; the majority of

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what was achieved through Muslim thought involvingother resources and implicit in the life of the Muslimcommunity (including beliefs as well as everyday prac-tices) is declared to be prohibited innovation and is re-jected. It is worth mentioning that such movements arenot a product of the XX century, as it might appear toan unsophisticated contemporary observer. This ideahas a long history and even a particular symbol in Islam:those supporting “fundamentalist” ideas are namedSalafits (as-salafiya). In Sunni Islam such ideas foundexpression in one of the four renderings of KhanbalistMazkhab (which was originally formed as a religious-political movement in the IX century, and only later wastransformed into a dogmatic legal school at the begin-ning of the XI century). Later, in the XVIII century,Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab elaborated his ownteachings based on the Khanbalist ideology and tried toimplement them.

The followers of the movement call themselves‘Muslims’ or ‘brothers’ (ikhwan) and consider their con-gregations the only communities of the faithful (jamaat).They are also known as salafs or salafits, making refer-ence to the first followers of Prophet Mohammed,whose way of life they claim to imitate. They prefer tocall themselves “true Muslims” or “monotheists” whohave returned to the purity of the original Islam. Themovement was named ‘Wahhabi’ by its opponents.

The Wahhabis, accusing traditional Islam of depart-ing from the original teachings in their innovations(bida) reject many customs and rites entrenched in theminds of people as Islamic. Thus it is forbidden to read

the Qur’an over a grave or in the house of the deceased,to read “Yasin” sura on funerals, to use beads, etc. Notacknowledging the special virtues of the Prophet, theWahhabis are against the celebration of the Mavlid, thebirthday of Muhammad. A special target for attacks isSufism, cults of the saints, and Ziyarat (pilgrimage) toholy places, which is closely linked to Sufism andShiism. These practices are sharply condemned as poly-theism (shirk).

It should also be mentioned that even in spite of aquite radical agenda, different movements differ ontheir repertoire of contention, which ranges from peace-ful religious propaganda to the above-mentioned acts ofmilitant extremism and terrorism. A good example ofsuch a difference is two movements in Central Asia: the“peaceful” Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the militant IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan.

A very important fact is that the radical ideas havebeen disseminated mainly in those areas where the eco-nomic and social situation is unstable: Chechnya andthe foothills of Daghestan, and poor and war-torn re-gions of the Central Asian republics (Yarlykapov 1999,Rashid 1994, Hiro 1994, Cornell and Spector 2002).The main target group is the youth. The young peoplehave not yet become integrated into the life of the com-munity. They have not yet fully perceived the traditionalculture, or even protest against some of its components.In the course of teaching, great attention is given tolearning the Arabic language, and to studying theQu’ran and Khadises in the original language. In thisway they are being trained for forthcoming discussions.

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It is no secret that Wahhabis receive significant financialsupport from abroad. People of Daghestan have evenchristened Wahhabism as “Dollar Islam” (Yarlykapov1999).

The Struggle for Islam in the Post-SovietRepublics

Post-Communist transition in Muslim regions is no-ticeable for the activation of different religious groupsand movements (which are not only Islamic). Thou-sands of missioners and preachers from abroad withbriefcases full of dollars together with local “fighters forfaith” started to actively challenge existing perceptionsand traditions of a religion as well as a commonlifestyle.

The main target of their criticism was, first, localclergy, and then local governments. The clergy has beencriticized and accused of ignorance, corruption, betrayalof religion for indulgences from the side of oppressiveand corrupt governments, as well as cooperation withthe atheist Soviet power and KGB. The latter was saidabout all the Muslim religious boards and their adminis-trations. For example, a head of the Spiritual Board ofMuslims of the Caucasus since 1980, Sheikh ul IslamAllakhshukur Pashazade, is said to be a KGB colonel,though he rejects these accusations.

It would be wrong to say that only Wahhabi move-ments have been active. Local traditional Muslims aswell as Sufi orders did their best to resist imported Is-

lam. The most obvious and tragic manifestation of sucha clash has been military conflict in Northern Caucasusand Central Asia.

In Northern Caucasus Wahhabism started to spreadin the 1970s, but its regional activization started in 1991in Daghestan and Chechnya (Bobrovnikov 2001). Bythe mid-1990s Wahhabi congregations, though small insize, emerged in Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia,and Kabardino-Balkaria. First, they concentrated onlyon missionery work, by imparting Qur’anic educationand literature based on Islamic practices such asBagauddin Kebedov’s book Namaz (Prayer). The centerof the movement was located in the Daghestani town ofKizliyurt, famous for its largest Wahhabi madrasa al-Hikma. Connections were established with foreign mis-sionary Islamic foundations, which began to sponsortheir activities (Bobrovnikov 2001).

Radicalization started in the mid-1990s. From 1994-1998, a number of armed conflicts occurred betweenWahhabi and traditionalists in the towns and villages ofDaghestan and Chechnya. Since the mid-1990s, theWahhabis have been subjected to systematic repressionby the local official Muslim clergy. Gradually, outbreaksof fighting within village and town communities werereproduced at the level of the republic and subsequentlyexpanded to the regional level. This was also the periodwhen the first Russian-Chechen war started, and regionbecame militarized as a result.

In December 1997, Bagauddin Kebedov had toleave Kizilyurt for Urus-Martan in Chechnya. This exileand some other factors resulted in a rapid politicization

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and radicalization of the movement in terms of its formand programs. “Islamic Jamaat”, established byBagauddin Kebedov in 1998, announced a holy war (al-jihad al-asgar). This war was to be waged against the“unbelieving secular government” of Daghestan and forthe establishment of an “Islamic caliphate in theCaucasus”. With the support of Chechen field com-manders, the Wahhabi leaders organized “Islamicpeace-making troops”. An interesting fact is that mili-tant ideas and practices are shared by both Wahhabisand their religious and secular opponents.

In Central Asia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to lesserextent Kyrgyzstan also turned into arenas of the clashbetween traditionalists and radicals for control of mindsand power. It is worth mentioning that these countrieshave weaker economic performances thanTurkmenistan and Kazakhstan. We can observe somenegative association between economic performanceand spread of religious fundamentalism.

Shortly after independence, Tajikistan became in-volved in a civil war that pitted the former Communistelite against an opposition force containing strong Is-lamist groups. This conflict led political regimes in fourother regional countries to outlaw many opposition par-ties and religious movements, halting the developmentof political opposition (Rashid 1994, Cornell andSpector 2002).

It should also be mentioned that different Islamistmovements (e.g. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Ahle-Sunnah, and others) act not onlywithin the territory of one state, but in the whole re-

gion. This is the most underdeveloped part of the re-gion, and did not have strong Sufi tradition. The “hot-test” place of spread of militant groups is the FerghanaValley and the surrounding regions where three repub-lics border with each other. The Wahhabi movement inthe Ferghana Valley is the most determined and orga-nized of all the radical movements (Rashid 1994). Theycondemn Sufi tradition, Shiites, secular governments,and official “Islam”.

As I already mentioned, militant Islamist move-ments discredited themselves in the eyes of the public.They now have challengers in the form of organizationslike Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT). This is a secretivetransnational network of different movements workingon the local level in the Middle East and Central Asia.Having the same goals as do militants, it has a com-pletely different repertoire: it tries to achieve its objec-tives by propagating its tenets through leaflets and fliersrather than the use of force (Botobekov 2001,Babadzhanov 2001). The lack of secular opposition(where the most active opposition is in exile or in jail)contributed to the fast rise of HuT (Cornell and Spector2002).

The Uzbek government of Karimov is consideredto be the most anti-Islamic government in Central Asia.However, while suppressing radical movements, theUzbek government has maintained very good relationswith the global network of the most prominent Sufi or-der - Naqshbandiya (Cornell and Spector 2002).

Turkmenistan’s Islamic revival was relatively weak.The Government was able to control a process of fram-

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ing and foreign influence was minimal. Kazakhstan isthe least Islamicized country in the region.Kazakhastanis have also undergone large-scale“Russification” and have the largest Russian population.They also experienced a revival of religion, but it wasnot as strong as in other countries and local clergy couldsatisfy it easily. As Rashid mentions in his book “manyof the faithful who come to pray every Friday at localmosques belong to non Kazakh minorities, who see Is-lam as an effective means to distance themselves fromboth the Kazakhs and the Russians and as means to as-sert their ethnic identity with their national homeland”(Rashid 1994: 133). I would also like to mention thatKazakhs and Turkmens have traditionally been nomads,which might be negatively correlated with the role of re-ligion in their lives.

Azerbaijan includes different elements of the “Is-lamic Revival” in other regions of the Post-Soviet space.Radical Wahhabi movements came later and could notachieve such progress as they had in Central Asia andthe Northern Caucasus. Financed by Iran groups alsotry to challenge existing status quo. But unlike other re-publics nobody openly and extremely opposed the ideaof a secular state. At the same time, Islamic movementswere not as weak and unpopular as in Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan. In the first chapter I mentioned the mainactors in the framing of the perception of Islam inAzerbaijan. But what are the main trends in this pro-cess?

The prestige and influence of Azerbaijan’s officialreligious “establishment,” the Spiritual Board of Mus-

lims of the Caucasus, which has been headed since the1980’s by Sheikh ul Islam Allakhshukur Pashazade, isreportedly rapidly evaporating, while that of some othermembers of the unofficial Muslim clergy is on the rise.Those developments suggest that Islam is becoming arallying point for the dispossessed, impoverished, andunemployed, and even simply for those Azerbaijaniswho reject many aspects of Western culture. As co-chairman of the Social-Democratic party of Azerbaijan,Zardusht Alizade, argued in his interview with theTuran information agency: “The politicization of Islamhas helped drive the secular opposition into a corner. Aholy place is never empty, and the population hasreached out for the mosques...The politicization of Is-lam was the reaction of the lower classes to the intro-duction of such attributes of Western mass culture asbeauty contests, the cult of eroticism, the legalization ofsexual minorities, and the provocative consumption ofthe upper classes. The ethical puritanism of the conser-vative sectors of the population manifested itself in theform of devotion to the Islamic behests of their fore-bears.” Unsolved problems in Karabakh, the approxi-mately one million refugees and internally displaced per-sons, as well as thousands of veterans of war andfamilies of martyrs, also create a fertile ground for suchtrends.

As Motika argues, the intellectuals might have aconsiderable influence in framing the future outlook ofIslam in Azerbaijan since most of Azerbaijanis considerIslam a part of their identity (despite of lack of knowl-edge of their own religion). All actors (except some

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radical Wahhabis and small extremist Shiite groups) tryto minimize the differences between Sunni and ShiiteIslam and find ways to unite the different sects andmovements within Islam (Motika 2001).

The state has established a certain committeeheaded by one of the so-called Islamic intellectuals andmodernists, Rafiq Aliyev. That committee is currentlycompleting the process, which it began last fall, of re-registering all religious communities in Azerbaijan. Allmissionaries and preachers from abroad will be regis-tered and tested by experts of the committee. It also isgoing to check the financial base of all existing religiousorganizations.

Azerbaijan’s opposition parties are well aware thatthe burgeoning popularity of Islam could both destabi-lize the domestic political situation and undercut the de-gree of support they currently enjoy. Some parties, e.g.the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, have amended theirprograms to give greater emphasis to the role of Islamin Azerbaijani society.

I would also like to mention the regional diversity ofIslamic ideas in Azerbaijan. Baku and the surroundingregions are more pro-Shiite, though Wahhabis are get-ting more support in Baku and Sumgait. Wahhabis arestrong in the northern parts of Azerbaijan, where differ-ent Sunni Daghestani minorities reside compactly. Re-gions bordering Iran are influenced by ideas and sup-port of the Iranian Shiite model of Islam.

Conclusion

After examination of the processes that have takenplace in the regions of our interest, some conclusionscan be drawn. The first conclusion is that it is still tooearly to make any clear-cut conclusions, as the processof “Islamic Revival” and the Post-Communist transitionitself are still ongoing.

However it is obvious that the main conflict iswithin Islam. Different movements and groups struggleto influence the framing of the perception of Islam. Insome countries this conflict turned into open militaryclashes. However, there is a trend toward demilitariza-tion and change in the (sometimes contentious) strate-gies of these movements towards more peaceful meth-ods.

The long tradition of secularism as well as other So-viet legacies also played a role in framing the percep-tions of Islam. On the one hand, it framed a kind of“national” Islam in these countries; on the other hand,it creates the fertile ground for framers to influence un-employed and poor youth. In this respect, corrupt anddiscredited local clergy from the Soviet period also con-tribute to the disillusionment of the public and the turntowards puritan Islamists.

For most of the Muslims of the post-Soviet nations,Islam serves as a component of their ethnic and re-gional identity, but is not their primary collective iden-tity (Hadjy-zadeh 1997, Safizadeh 1998, Shaffer 2000,Suleymanov 2001). Solidarity on an Islamic basis withMuslims abroad is minimal, although it has begun to

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emerge among movements, especially in the NorthCaucasus and Central Asia. Most members of the regionhold in high regard their local cultures, and they are notparticularly susceptible to intensified identification withthe broader Muslim world.

Islamist movements are supported from abroad.Rich Muslim countries try to create and supportthrough different charity and religious organizations akind of “advocacy network” in order to develop theirtype of Islam and to have strong influence in the Post-Soviet countries. It is clear that radical ideas are spreadmore successfully in the regions that are worst in theireconomic performance.

One could roughly say that the above-mentionedprocesses in the post-Soviet countries are just anotherillustration of the centuries-old conflict betweenWahhabism, Sufism, and traditional Islam; and one willbe right, in a way. However, this view of the probnem istoo simplified. In fact the processes going on are moresophisticated and not just religion is involved. Eco-nomic and political interests, socio-cultural and politicalfactors, geopolitics, and others influences contribute tothe complication of this issue.

In writing this paper I could not conduct a preciseexamination of all the possible and relevant factors.Deeper study of such issues as interconnection betweenpoverty, unemployment and radicalism, whetherIslamism is more developed in urban or in rural areas,among which strata of society, connection betweensecular authoritarianism and Islamism, regionalism (trib-

alism) and Islamism, and many others, would be veryuseful and helpful for better understanding the processof “Islamic Revival” in the post-Soviet countries.

Bibliography

Babadzhanov, Bakhtiyar (2001) „On the Activities of Hiz-ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan” in Islam in the Post-Soviet Newly Indepen-dent States; The View from Within, eds. Alexei Malashenko andMartha Brill Olcott, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, July2001.

Bobrovnikov, Vladimir (2001) “Post-Socialist Forms of Is-lam. Caucasian Wahhabis”, Regional Issues elctronic magazine.

Bobrovnikov, Vladimir (1999) “Muslim Nationalism in thePost-Soviet Caucasus: The Daghestani Case” Caucasian RegionalStudies, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1999.

Botobekov, Uran (2001) “Spreading the Ideas of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir in South Kyrgyzstan”, in Islam in the Post-Soviet Newly In-dependent States; The View from Within, eds. Alexei Malashenko andMartha Brill Olcott, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, July2001.

Chanishev A.N. (1974) “Fundamentalism”// Sovetskayaistoricheskaya entsyklopedia (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia)vol. 15, Moscow.

Cornell, Svante - Spector, Regine (2001) “Central Asia: Morethan Islamic Extremists” The Washington Quarterly, 25:1, Win-ter 2002.

Hadjy-zadeh, Hikmet (1997) “Azerbaijan: In Search Of ANational Idea” Center for Economic and Political ResearchMonitoring Group.

Hiro, Dilip (1994) “Between Marx and Muhammad. TheChanging Face of Central Asia” Harper Collins Publishers.

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Motika, Raul (2001) “Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan” Ar-chives de sciences sociales des religions (web-site) http://www.ehess.fr/centres/ceifr/assr/Sommaire_115.htm accessedin March 2002.

Muslim Peoples. A World Ethnographic Survey; 2 volumes.Edited by Richard Weekes. Greenwood Press: Westport,Connectitut 1984.

Rashid, Ahmed (1994) “The Resurgence of Central Asia. Is-lam or Nationalism?” Zed Books: London & New Jersey.

Safizadeh, Fereidoun (1998) “On Dilemmas of Identity inthe Post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan” Caucasian RegionalStudies, Vol. 3, no. 1, 1998.

Saroyan, Mark (1997) “Minorities, Mullahs, and Modernity:Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union” Universityof California, Berkeley Institute.

Shaffer, Brenda (2000) “It’s not about ancient hatreds, it’sabout current policies: Islam and Stability in the Caucasus”, Cau-casian Regional Studies Vol. 5, No. 1 & 2, 2000.

Suleymanov, Elin (2001) “Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis and theSearch for Identity”, web-site of the Assembly of TurkishAmerican Associations, accessed in February 2002.

Yarlikapov, Ahmet (1999) “Islamic Fundamentalism in theNorthern Caucasus: Towards a Formulation of the Problem”Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1999.

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J. C. Achike Agbakoba

Traditional African PoliticalThought and the Crisis ofGovernance in ContemporaryAfrican Societies

The aim of this paper is to show the relationshipbetween the normative outlook and political philoso-phy of traditional societies on the one hand, and thecrises of governance and leadership in contemporaryAfrican Societies, particularly sub-Saharan states, onthe other. Although there are quite some differencesin the quality of leadership and governance amongsub-Saharan African states because of the differentpolitical and economic circumstances, this part ofthe globe taken as a whole remains underdevelopedin terms of having the will to institute and maintainstable polities with responsive, responsible and effi-cient governance.

1. Introduction

Most of the time, the colonial and neocolonial expe-riences of African societies as well as other internationalpressures are adduced as explanations of this problem -all of which amount to an externalist approach to thisproblem; an approach that explains the problem, virtu-ally, in terms of the impact of external factors on Afri-can societies. This paper while not denying the impor-tance of external factors altogether, tries to show thatcertain internal factors, particularly, the nature of thenodal organizing principles in traditional societies andthe attitudes, motivations and moods which sustainthem as well as the worldviews, normative outlook andpolitical philosophy from which they all derive, play an

J. C. ACHIKE AGBAKOBA

Senior Lecturer, Ph.D.,Dept. of Philosophy,Nigeria University.Author of the books:The theories of mind: acase for interractionism(2001); Philosophicalissues in development(2003)E-mail:jocagbakoba@yahoo.co.nz

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important, perhaps a more important role, in determin-ing the current state of governance and stability in thecontinent.

The aims of this paper and the method by which Iseek to accomplish them represent a third alternativeconceptualization of purpose and methods of AfricanPhilosophy (the general research programme of Africanphilosophy). This alternative, very well discussed bySegun Oladipo in his Idea of African Philosophy finds boththe traditionalism and relativism of the ethno-philo-sophical school and the ahistorical universalizm of theuniversalistic school not only unsound, but also inad-equate and irrelevant in contributing to solving theproblems of the day1 . The traditionalist school comingfrom the angle of patriotism and nationalism wants toprocure and secure an unimpeachable African identity.The main problematic it addresses is the claim by somenotable foreign scholars in the past, especially from theWest (which could be said to be, to a large degree, thegeneral belief of many foreigners - Westerners and non-Westerners) that Africans have no history, no philoso-phy, no culture, etc; and by extension no humanity orhuman identity. The objective of African Philosophy, inthis regard, is to extract authentic African philosophy,which has been buried by the colonial experience andcultural imperialism (and the African identity that goeswith it); to secure an equal position for this philosophyand identity amongst the philosophies and identities ofthe peoples of the world; and to preserve this philoso-phy and identity in this respected status2 .

These are interesting objectives; and at least one ofthe things traditionalists have accomplished so far is ac-quainting the world with traditional African thoughtand philosophy. But this approach is not geared to-wards solving the life threatening problems of Africans.In the first place, it does not address a problem formu-lated by Africans, but one formulated by foreigners andone which when solved will satisfy the intellectual curi-osity of the foreigner; provide him/her with alternativethought patterns from which he/she could personallydraw in developing theories to understand and solve lo-cal, regional and global problems; and possibly makehim/her amenable to understanding foreign cultures.The argument that, by procuring and securing a respect-able identity based on historical achievement, Africanswill have the psychological prop they need to tackle theproblems of development - political, economic local, etcdevelopment - is not sound. To mention just a fewproblems with this argument: pride in the accomplish-ment of ones ancestors and building ones identityaround such accomplishments does not necessarily (inany way) lead to the order and rational creative (genera-tive) energy that brings about and sustains modern de-velopment; it does not see the identity of a people as adynamic thing which they are free to create and recreatein order to sustain their dignity, survival and advance-ment; and, therefore, makes it difficult for the Africanto engage his/her received identity in a critical dialoguewith a view to transforming the African’s world for thebetter.

KEY WORDS:

African politicalthought, colonization,globalization, commu-nal power, authority

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As a matter of fact, the traditionalists frequentlyfight against such critical dialogue with the authentic Af-rican past for fear of unearthing or exhibiting uncompli-mentary facts which may reduce the accomplishmentsand therefore status of traditional thought in the sightof the foreigner; and, therefore, the equality of Africanphilosophy and identity with other philosophies andidentities. Consequently, the traditionalist approach fos-ters an uncritical and inexact approach, much of the re-sult of which can pass as philosophy only when they aretaken as species of the record of African philosophy/thought3 . The traditionalist does not quite see that theproblematic has changed from the questions posed byforeigners (which was used in part as justification forcolonization the answering of which, therefore, is partof the de-colonization process) to questions about whyindependent African states should terrorize their citi-zens, misgovern them, steal and/or waste their re-sources, etc; questions about why Africans are under-developing Africa. These new problematic requirethorough examination of the self, of the nation and herinheritance both indigenous and foreign; by discourag-ing, critical evaluation, traditionalists are discouragingAfrican philosophers and intellectuals from discoveringand addressing the true basis of Africa’s underdevelop-ment, and to this extent are doing Africa a terrible dis-service.

The ahistorical universalists rightly emphasize criti-cal evaluation of received ideas from African tradition,but they erroneously hold that there are universal philo-sophical notions, ideas and concepts that are not the

products of any given culture at a given time; suchideas, notions and concepts according to them can bediscovered and it is the task of philosophy to do so bythe faithful application of its neutral scientific method.The ahistorical universalist, however, is hard put inpointing at any philosophical idea, notion or conceptthat cannot be shown to be the product of a given cul-ture and epoch (including the laws, or principles of logicapart from the law of non-contradiction).

It does not seem that there are any historical univer-sal philosophical ideas, notions and concepts apart fromthe capacity to reason and develop patterns or systemsof logic based on the principle of non-contradiction4 .Apart from this, there are associated problems for theuniversalist. The universal ideas, notions, etc these phi-losophers speak of are invariably from the West: so thequestion arises, if there are universal philosophical no-tions, ideas, etc. how is it that only Westerners have dis-covered them? How would these philosophers provideanswers that will not play into the hands of the culturalimperialists and racists? To get out of this dilemma,ahistorical universalists have concentrated a great dealof their effort on showing that the universal ideas, no-tions, etc. that have floated in from the West also existin Africa. Much of what they do, however, is forcing thefacts to fit the theory; raising in some cases questionsconcerning, why Africans did not articulate these ideasfully or emphasize them prior to contact with theWest5 . The ahistorical universalists by accepting the no-tion of cultural universals they way they do (that is with-out the knowledge of how these ideas are generated,

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verified and validated) condemn Africa to cultural de-pendence; of the type in which foreign cultural productsmay be uncritically accepted. This approach does notaid the development of African societies because it doesnot rely on the critique of African ideas based on the al-ternative choice of philosophical values that were fore-gone, and therefore does not make for the organicgrowth of the stock of philosophical values in Africa. Inother words there has to be clear and adequate philo-sophical demonstrations based on truth or verisimili-tude (not on mere appeal to the possibility of materialadvancement or aesthetics, etc) in favour of a givenchoice of philosophical values(s) in any area - ontology,epistemology, ethics, etc. This is the proper relationshipbetween theory and practice, in which theory informsand guides practice and vice- verse.

The third alternative represented in this work rejectsthe relativism and parochialism of traditionalism as wellas ahistorical universalism. The basis of the rejection ofthese two schools lies in the fact that we can have his-torical-cultural products - particularly systems ofthought - that are universally valid or, rather, more uni-versally valid than other competing systems. The relativ-ist/traditionalist on the contrary holds that we can lookat the internal consistency of a system and establish thecoherence of such a system, thereafter we can do nomore because every coherent system is of equal statuswith respect to truth. This, however, is not correct, be-cause we can show that a system possesses more of theprinciple of consistency than another system. The prin-ciple of consistency is the basis of the coherence theory

of truth - truths obtained as valid inferences frompremise(s) regardless of the existential status of suchpremise(s) - they therefore pertain to the logical orderand provide us with logical truths. However they bearon existential truths, this is because whatever we areconscious of as existing - by way of our intelligence, rea-son, intuition, senses, etc - we are conscious of becausesuch a thing remains consistent long enough (and thismay be tiny fractions of a second) to register in our con-sciousness as being (of whatever order).

Consistency, therefore, is at the root of our con-sciousness of being; since this is the case, it follows thatthe converse is also the case: inconsistency is at the rootof non-being. It follows from this that where there is in-consistency in thought reality cannot be as conceived. Italso follows from this that the more the principle ofconsistency is exhibited in a system of thought, themore likely that such a system of thought approximatesbeing; that is, the more likely that it is true, the moreverisimilitude.

Given the above, a major task of philosophy is theexhibition of the occurrence of consistency, particularlythe level of manifestation of the principle of consis-tency, in a system or sub-system of thought, a belief,etc. This task is an open ended one, more or less; phi-losophers have to keep striving to develop ways of ap-prehending the principle of consistency in a system ofthought, belief, etc. The approach followed in this papermay be described as the method of analysis of consis-tency.

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The third alternative in African Philosophy we arepursuing may be described as formal universalism. It isuniversalistic in the sense that there an identifiable uni-versal reality that can be known (or known approxi-mately as best as possible), that links our thought andknowledge with existence. This reality is essentially for-mal. Its concrete embodiment takes place in historicalsettings (cultures) but the ontological compositions thatmake up this historical setting (that is the stuff of thisembodiment) is not seen as a necessary part of the uni-versal essence. In the sections below, I have tried to ex-amine traditional and contemporary African societieswith respect to politics, particularly the use and misuseof power. Before we go on, let us note that the use ofpower is more or less invariably stalked by the misuse(abuse) of power arising from the fact that humans havea tendency to seek for self-centred purposes and per-sonal advantages; Kant states it thus:

“Man is an animal that, so long as he lives amongstothers of his species, stands in need of a master. For heinevitably abuses his freedom in regard to his equals;and although as a reasonable creature he wishes for alaw that may set bounds to the liberty of all, yet do hisself-interested animal propensities seduce him into mak-ing an exception in his own favor whensoever hedares6 ”.

There are basically two types of abuse of power,namely; the use of communal power for purposes itought not to be used for. And, secondly, refrainingfrom the deployment of communal power for purposesit ought to be deployed. An example of the first type is -

in a modern Western type society - the arrest and deten-tion, without trial, of dissidents. An example of the sec-ond type is refraining from arrest and or prosecution ofa person who embezzled state funds. It is the duty ofevery society (country) to ensure that the state expressesgovernance in a self-regulatory manner that will keepout (minimize as much as possible) the abuse of power;thus there is the need for the proper management ofcommunal power to accomplish desired goals and ob-jectives. Following from the above we can say that onecan estimate the intelligence (purposive intelligence orreason) of a society by looking at, among other factors,a society’s level of success (or failure) in managing itscommunal power.

A society expresses reason at two levels: the level ofthe rationality of its goals - this deals with the logical re-lations of the goals (the extent to which they are contra-dictory - or non-contradictory); the level of the rational-ity of the society - this deals with the effectiveness andefficiency of the organization and actions of society inaccomplishing its accepted goals. We may regard this asthe macro-rationality (reason) of a society; and thisshould be distinguished from the micro-rationality of asociety. Whereas the macro-rationality of a society is therationality of a society as such (that is a society as asingle unit); micro-rationality is the rationality of the in-dividuals and groups that make up society in respect oftheir individual and group goals; and their efficiency andeffectiveness in accomplishing such goals. There is ap-parently the need for a harmonious balance between themacro-reason and micro-reason of society, otherwise

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the one may undermine the other, as in when fissipa-rous tendencies of individuals and groups makes it diffi-cult for a society to effectively pursue its societal goals,such as security and justice for its members (here theexpression of micro-reason stifles that of macro rea-son); or, as in when society is so totalitarian as to stifleindividual creativity (here the expression of macro-rea-son is suffocating that of micro reason). The problemof the management of the communal power of a soci-ety, given the above, thus centres around the issue ofthe enhancement of the macro-reason of a society in anauspicious relationship with the micro-reason of society.Let us now look at African societies to see how theyhave fared in respect of the management of communalpower.

2. The Management of Communal Powerin African Societies

To understand the management (or rather misman-agement) of communal power in contemporary Africansocieties, we have to look first at the management ofcommunal power in traditional African Societies; in or-der to do this, however, we have to look at the sourcesof communal power and some of the ways by whichthey are controlled.

Usually, the government and the leaders of govern-ment are in control of the physical coercive power of astate (society). The State may be seen as an associationthat is meant to see to the security and welfare of itsmembers, hence the need for it to control the physicalcoercive power of a society. Apart from the physical co-ercive power of a society, there is the moral coercivepower of a society; this is expressed through ostracismand other forms of social rejection. The communalmoral coercive power of a society may be expressedthrough the institutions of the state or through non-state associations such as religious organizations, or viaa non-institutionalized manner, some of which may bespontaneous, for example, the spontaneous protest of amob. Apart from expressing some communal moral co-ercive power, some non-state associations, particularlyreligious ones express spiritual (or metaphysical) powerwhich may be very potent and very significant, if such anon-state association commands society wide member-ship or the membership of a sizeable part of a society;an example of this is the power of excommunication inthe Catholic Church. Form the above, one may say thatthere are three types of mutually influential communalpower; physical, moral and metaphysical power. Let usnote that the way each of these forms of power mani-fests (including the way one may influence the expres-sion of other forms of communal power) depend insome circumstances, in some degree, on the nature ofleading personalities.

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2.1. The Management of Communal Power inTraditional African Societies

In traditional African Societies, the basis of the pre-vention of the abuse of the communal power vested instates and governments lay in the metaphysical power(mainly religiously based metaphysical power) that couldbe depended on by a society or a significant section of it(this, as we shall see, clearly latter, is in contrast with themore secular and moral basis of contemporary Westernsocieties which serve as models in many ways for mod-ern African Societies). In what follows below, I shallshow why this is so with some illustrations.

In the traditional African society, political power/authority derived from the possession/control of the vi-tal force of a given political unit (which may be the fam-ily, clan, tribe, or nation). The vital force of a commu-nity is the source of vitality of such a community as acorporate body as well as the ultimate source of vitalityof its individual members. It may be taken as the genus(or genii, as the case may be, of a community); it is es-sentially a spiritual (non-physical) force, which can exertits influence on both physical and non-physical nature.The rules by which people determine that a given per-son or persons are legitimately in possession of the vitalforce of a political community differ. However, once aperson(s) is deemed to be in proper possession of thevital force of a political unit, the basis of limiting thispower from below (that is, by those it is supposed togovern) ceases to exist. This is because those below de-rive their vital force from above (that is, that controlled

the ruler controls) and, therefore, cannot limit it; inother words, they have no power (vitality) over andabove that which the ruler controls, with which to con-trol him/her. Mbiti’s observation about the principlesthat underlie morality in traditional Africa generally ap-plies to political morality and action; he points out that:

“The principle of hierarchy is most helpful here. Asa rule, a person of a lower rank, status or age commitsan offence against another person or being of a higherrank or age. One may also offend against a person ofthe same status. Never or rarely does a person of higherstatus do what constitutes an offence against a personof lower status? What is considered evil or offence arefunctions from a low level to a higher level… the kingor ruler does not offend against his subjects, the elder inthe village does not offend those who are younger orunder him, and parents do not offend against their chil-dren.”7

Given the above, it should be clear that power flowsfrom the top downwards; hardly the other way round.The body that constitutes authority at a given level neednot be composed of one person or a few persons; itmay for example be an assembly of the adult male, as inthe village or village-cluster democracies of the Igbo.Whatever the composition of the ruling body, the rela-tionship between the ruler and the ruled is authoritarian.Even in traditional democracies, such as the Igbo de-mocracies, women and children cannot have their way,or indeed their say, in many situations. The male assem-bly demand total obedience from them and there ishardly any legitimate way by which women and children

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as groups can overturn the decisions of the male assem-bly; the same is also the care at the sub-unit level wherethe male head of family rules. So, although there werevarious types and sizes of states in traditional Africa -for example, monarchies with hereditary aristocrats asin Benin; monarchies without hereditary aristocrats as inOnitsha; democracies, which in some cases, as withmany 1gbo communities, for example, were in effect amixture of plutocracy, gerontocracy, and democracy -the authoritarian principle is more or less common8 .

To check the abuse of power built around the au-thoritarian principle, Africans relied largely on gods,spirits (especially ancestral spirits) and other spiritualforces upon which the vital force of the political unit ul-timately depended. Consequently, abuse of power waschecked by the following:

(1) Taboos that surrounded an office(2) Fear of incurring the wrath of a patron deity

(deities) or spirit that protects and oversees the welfareof a group or an individual.

In this regard, Mbiti’s observation about parents aspersons in authority applies to the various offices in astate:

“If parents do something which hurts their childrenand which constitutes an offence against the children, itis not the children as such who experience it as offence:rather, it is the community, the clan, the nation or thedeparted relatives who are the real objects of the of-fence, since they are the ones in higher status than theparents. Consequently, it is not the children themselves

but the offended community or clan or living-dead,who punish the parents9 ”.

From taboos and the wrath of gods and spirits, dif-ferent types of control of the power of rulers were de-veloped. For example, in some places, taboos madekings to live in near total seclusion (for example, theObi of Onitsha and the Aku-uka of the Jukuns); com-pelling such rulers to rely a great deal on their deputiesand representatives whose assessment of situations andcounsels were all they could get (they could not goabove these representatives to deal with the people di-rectly). And, if a ruler seriously goes against a god(s) orspirit(s) in his/her community, it is expected that such agod(s) or spirit(s) will punish such a ruler; in this regardthe people may act as representatives of the god(s) orspirit(s) in getting rid of such a ruler10 .

The system of checking the abuse of power in tradi-tional African societies, given the above, may be de-scribed as divinely-limited-authoritarianism. It is, there-fore, wrong to thing that abuse of power was checkedin traditional African societies largely by the constitu-tional rights of the people or groups of persons11 . Letus deal with this error by looking at a particular case: thecity - state of Onitsha12 .

Onitsha is a monarchy with a king (Obi) at the apexof political power. The Obi after going through the se-lection and installation rituals becomes divine. He be-comes the personification of the sky-god Igwe (Igwekaniogo: the sky-god who is more generous than theearth-goddess, Ani); hence his assumption of the titleIgwe as a personal title. As Igwe he is above the ethical

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standards required of all the other members of the com-munity because these standards are injunctions from theearth goddess, Ani, whose suzerainty he is no longer di-rectly under; R.N Henderson correctly records this:

“The King is freed of ordinary behavioral proscrip-tions, not only with regards to ordinary free men butparticularly with regards to his own immediate agnates.It is said, “the king does not experience judgment orguilt”; because he is identified with spirit and cannot beaccused of abominations or required to take ordinaryoaths, he is free to attempt things, which others cannotessay13 ”.

And he also notes that: it is said that he is above ac-cusations of violating land custom, for “the sky is higherthan the land”14 . Consequently, no one may condemnthe decision or action of the Obi (disapproval of his ac-tions may, however, be conveyed by way of courteousadvice on how to conduct himself better); similarly, theking’s children( and by extension his close relations arerather above the law - the proverb, “ ikpe ama nwa eze(a king’s son is not found guilty in his father’s court)”expresses this; it shows that the rule of law is not heldas an ideal in respect of the office of the king and by ex-tension other offices of the state15 .

A measure of the sort of power the Obi possessescould be seen in some of his titles or cognomens; apartfrom Igwe already mentioned, they include:

1.Agbogidi (voice of thunder)2. Agu (Leopard)3.Akenyikolua (“The hand of the elephant that is

mightier than its hind-leg)

4.Ogbu Onye mbosi ndu ya nagu ya (He who kills aperson on a day he desires life)

5.Okwue obe e (supreme Judge; final arbiter)6. Onye okwu nana n’onua (He who has the final

word on any matter)16 .In addition, the nature of the Obi’s powers can be

seen in the fact that he is the repository of the vitalforce of the community as such and consequently thechi of the Onitsha people (the divinely appointed des-tiny of the people, which is itself a spirit)17 . It is in thiscontext that one can properly understand BenChukwudebe’s assertion that “when he (the Obi) is cap-tured in battle the war ends”; the war ends because withthe Obi in captivity the people can hardly find the spiritto continue the fight18 . This explains the necessity ofconcentrating power in the person of the Obi. He hasto be in control of the community in order to bear per-sonal responsibility for the fate of the collective vitalforce (and hence destiny of the people).

Clearly, from the foregoing the Obi possesses des-potic powers. But he does not act arbitrarily or despoti-cally in practice. The reason for this, as I have alreadyhas been attributed to his being a constitutional mon-arch by Azikiwe, Nwala and others but this is errone-ous19 . Let us look at Azikiwe’s case to demonstrate thissets out the arguments that should show that the Obi isa constitutional monarch thus:

1.”It was customary that the Obi should consult theNdichie [chiefs] who in turn, should, by previous ex-change of views, reflect public opinion as expressed bythe Agbala n’Iregwu [male and female commoners].

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Having ascertained what is public opinion, it is manda-tory that the Obi should act on advice”?20

2.“Secondly, the office of Onowu lyase (traditionalprime-minister) was to be confined exclusively to thenon-royal lineage of Ugwu na Obamkpa”21 .

3.”Finally, in appointing Ndichie, the Obi was en-joined to have regard to the composition of each collegeso as to correlate as near as possible a reflection of thedichotomous nature of the Onitsha clan”22

First, the Obi is not known in Onitsha tradition tobe bound to take the advice of the Ndichie (the chiefsthat he appoints to represent him and perform adminis-trative, judicial and military functions on his behalf);their power is essentially advisory23 . If the Obi goesagainst the advice of the Ndichie and the will of thepeople, he was not committing any constitutional crime.If he persists in such acts it does not seem that it wouldinevitably lead to his deposition as Milne thought (pro-vided, of course, he was not offending the gods by hisacts)24 . The reason for this is that the Obi can only bedeposed when the most dreaded of the incarnate dead(masks), the Muo-Afia or Muo-Ogonogo (tall ghost) en-ters the kings square after passing under the traditionalarchway that guard the entrance to the palace. And, theMuo-Ogonogo being agents of the collective incarnatedead can only embark on this mission (it should be ob-vious) if there is a grievous offence against the god(s)and ancestors. No Obi of Onitsha since the over threehundred years history of the city-state has ever been de-posed; an indication that they know their duties in re-spect of the gods and ancestors.

Secondly, although the Onowu lyase title should, astradition indicates, go to the Obamkpa clan, it has beenheld by people outside this group for far more timesthan members of the Obamkpa group since the time ofObi Eze Aroli who reigned around the later part of the18th century (of the fourteen or so Onowu Iyaseles inthis period only 4 are Obamkpa men). The acceptanceof these irregularities show how much the king can havehis way.

Thirdly, the need to evenly spread the Ndichie tittlesamong the various units that make up Onitsha, is an ad-ministrative need that works to the advantage of theObi. Indeed, he should desire to spread them evenly toenhance the effectiveness of his administration, such anact in no wise limits the power of the Obi.

Why then does the Obi consult his people exten-sively via the Ndichie as well as directly during publicassemblies in the palace (an example of the later is citedas the key factor that shows that the Onitsha kingdomoperated democratically with a limited monarchy inElizabeth Isichei’s Igbo Worlds. 25 )? Why does he act ina not so overtly arbitrary, tyrannical and oppressivemanner (his agents, for example, could forcibly take –virtually seize - a woman; present her to the Obi; where-upon she will become one of his wives, living in aclosely guarded seraglio; the Obi however, usually sendssome gifts to the parents of such women in lieu of brideprice 26 )? It is because his power/authority is limited bydivine sources. He has to consult with his people andobtain their consent so that if misfortune comes as a re-sult of a decision (say, the acceptance of Christian mis-

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sionaries, as in the case cited in Igbo Worlds), the gods,and spirits, that protect and oversee the fortunes of thepeople will not hold him entirely responsible for inflict-ing disaster on their wards, rendering him indefensibleagainst their wrath. Similarly, he will send compensat-ing gifts to parents whose daughter he has forciblytaken to appease their personal and family gods. Thereis what one may call a spiritual logic in the actions ofthe Obi in relation to his people, which is aimed atmaintaining a favourable cosmic and spiritual balance -the check upon his power, thus rests clearly on meta-physical sources.

As it is with the Obi so it is with other levels of au-thority right down to the family unit. The Omu (Queen- she is not the Obi’s mother or his wife; rather, she is awoman chieftain appointed by the Obi to look after theaffairs of the womenfolk; including, especially trade andmarket affairs which was one of the special domains ofwomen; actually she ran a synonymous structure of gov-ernment with that the Obi, complete with a council oftitled women: “Otu Ogene”); Ndichie; Nze n’Ozotittled men; Iregwu (untitled men); Agbala (IkporoOnitsha - married or once married women). All theselevels of power and authority were hedged by taboosand the need to ensure a favourable balance of cosmicand spiritual forces in the conduct of ones affairs.

The Ndichie and Nze na Ozo titled men (the lattertitle is “a precondition for taking the politically highertitle of Ndichie), for example, observed elaborate ta-boos that governed their movement; eating habits; mo-rality in terms of lying to, stealing from, or killing a

member of the lineage group to which one belongs aswell as sexual relations with females belonging to thisgroup either as wives or daughters. The Iregwu had toobserve taboos which all men whether they where titledor not observed; some of such taboos ensured that thecommunity was organized along gender lines in whichwomen though subordinate to men ultimately, had theirown sphere and dignity; and that children were treatedwith fairness and some dignity. Henderson captured ele-ments of this in respect of the latter in his documenta-tion of the relationship between a father and his eldestson (diokpala):

“The senior son serves as a model of appropriate fa-ther-child relationships, and his interaction with his fa-ther is constrained by numerous proscriptions of actsthat are defined as forbidden (Nso). He must neverovertly challenge his father, lest he be thought eager toreplace him. Of all members of the parental household,he alone is forbidden to enter his father’s private “trea-sure room” (Òlisiliókù) so long as the father is alive forit is believed that by doing so he might learn the extentof his father’s wealth and wish to succeed him immedi-ately, since the father and senior son interact in a con-text defined by the imperative of strict truth (Ofo) theirrelationship should concern matters of moral knowl-edge and responsibility, not possibilities of future eco-nomic gain... .many behavioral prescriptions bind fatherand son (especially senior son), and most emphasizethat a son should submerge his personal will and inter-est in the will and interests of his father...

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However, certain beliefs limit this submergence ofthe senior son in collectivity with his father. First, it issaid that a father must exercise extraordinary care in di-recting his senior son; should he chastise the son exces-sively the son may fall into a “prideful lament’ (calledakwa alili or ifu alili), and, it is thought, pine away anddie. That would jeopardize the spiritual health of thehousehold and deprive the father of his most reliablesupport for his old age... Third, the Onitsha father mustrespect the right of his son to accumulate his own per-sonal property even though the son should voluntarilycontribute the wealth obtained from such property pri-marily in the furthering of his father’s glorification.”27

A crucial element of traditional African politicalthought, as could be seen from the above, is non-oppo-sition to properly constituted authority on the part ofsubordinates. A major reason for this is that all author-ity is god-given (it is at least given by the chi of such aperson) and consequently it is in some way a divineright; the various offices in the State and the power andauthority that go with them, are thus indistinguishablefrom the persons that hold them; a ruler owes no obli-gation to his/her subordinates as persons qua personsfor he/she is conceived in the manner of the lord ormistress, not the servant of, his/her people; he/shehowever owes the powers above his/her level, whetherthey are human or divine, some obligations; the duty ofthe subordinate is to align himself/herself to the will ofthe ruler as much as possible hoping for the best (thatis, that the interests, inclinations and dispositions of the

ruler will be to ones own interest and welfare; and theintervention of the god(s) and spirits in ones favour).

We may summarize the principles and practices thatunderlie the nature and management of communalpower in the traditional African society thus:

1. Occupation of a political office is ultimately ex-plained in terms of selection (or allotment) by thegod(s) or spirit(s), involving at least ones personal god(chi among the Igbo; ori among the Yoruba) who con-trols the fortunes and destiny of a person. This personalgod, however, operates in some accord with other spir-its and gods; and it appears the higher the office themore involvement of other gods and spirits. Corollariesof this are that offices are highly personalized; and aperson in power/authority is ultimately accountable tothe god(s) and spirit(s).

2. Responsibility in essence is taking care of the in-terests of the powers above ones office, including divinepowers and interests, so that one will maintain a cosmicand spiritual balance that is favourable to ones personaladvancement. Responsibility thus flows from bottomupwards.

3. A person in authority/power is essentially a col-lector of obeisance; one of the outward signs of whichis the payment of homage (Ife nru, among the Igbo) – awidely accepted practice, rendered, for example by a sonto his father, by the head of a nuclear family to the headof the extended family; by the head of an extended fam-ily to the head of the patrilineage group; by a chief tohis king.

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4. 1-3 above fosters a culture of non-opposition topower/authority by subordinates irrespective of themanner by which power/authority is exercised. In addi-tion, the cost of opposition could be very high, becauseit is readily conceived in a personalized manner and so iteasily becomes a do or die affair. Consequently, opposi-tion is not organized or institutionalized in a mannerthat can benefit society maximally.

5. The apparently authoritarian and despotic tenden-cies above are mitigated (controlled) by the requirementof those in authority to observe taboos set out by thegod(s) and spirit(s) as well as avoid incurring the wrathof the divine beings; both of which are divine provi-sions to ensure the welfare of devotees and wards.

6. The divinely demanded limitations in 5 above isthe ultimate basis for curbing abuse of power and en-suring some level of responsive and responsible gover-nance. Thus there is heavy reliance on metaphysicalsources in the management of communal power.

2.2. The Management of Communal Power inContemporary African Societies

The management of power in contemporary Africansocieties is most of the time the mismanagement ofpower. The basis of this mismanagement of communalpower lies largely in the fact that contemporary Africansocieties are societies that are based on what one maydescribe as mutually distorting parallel frameworks: thetraditional African framework and the modern Western

framework. Each of these frameworks (composed ofsupreme beliefs, derivative beliefs, derivative values, in-stitutions and practices) function in a way that preventthe abuse of communal power to a significant degree.The existence of these parallel frameworks can betraced back to the colonial period when the colonial sys-tem of administration (with its alien legal system andvalues) was superimposed on traditional institutions andvalues either with the aim of destroying and replacingthe traditional system as with the French policy of as-similation or with the aim of rearranging the traditionalsystem just enough to make it deliver cheap and effi-cient local administration to the colonial system as withthe British policy of indirect rule, which was given someideological backing in the notion of the dual mandate).We have already seen the nature of the traditional sys-tem let us now look at the modern Western system.

First, let us note that the colonial administration wasimperialistic and authoritarian while it lasted, its legacycould still be seen in elements of the legal and securityspheres. However, the colonial systems from the 1950’sonward have been replaced by conscious adoption ofthe political institutions and practices of modern west-ern societies. There are various types of institutions andpractices borrowed from modern western societies.however, there are common features which show thatthey belong to a common framework. Let us now lookat the features of this framework.

The basic features of modern Western system as it istoday (we need not deal with the stages of its evolutionhere) may be summarized thus:

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1. Occupation of a political office depends ulti-mately on election by citizens who have the right andthe power to put people in office and remove themfrom office after a period. Thus, political power is ulti-mately bestowed by the citizens of a state; this replacesthe notion of divine selection or allotment and anyother conception of divine right. Corollaries of this arethat offices are less personalized; and a person inpower/authority is ultimately accountable to the citizensof a state (the electorate).

2. Responsibility in essence is taking care of the in-terests of the powers (the electorate) that put one in of-fice. Responsibility, thus, flows from top downwards.There is some sort of contractual relationship (a sort ofsocial contact) in which a person takes political office(authority/power) in return for serving the interest ofthe electorate.

3. A person in authority/power is essentially a ser-vice provider. One of the outward signs of this is thatthere is a more or less clear separation of personal inter-ests and official interests (interests of the state) in amanner that makes it illegal for one to use ones officefor personal gains over and above those stipulated bylaw.

4. 1-3 above fosters a culture of opposition topower/authority. Indeed, opposition is a necessary ele-ment of this system, because through it the leadership(the quality of services) provided by those in power isscrutinized to make sure that they conform to the termsof the contract, Opposition is organized and institution-alized in a manner that will make it effective without

generating disorder and chaos; and in a manner that canenable society benefit maximally.

5. Abuse of power, as could be seen from 1-4 aboveis checked by the constitutional powers and limitationsof offices as well as rights of persons; and the activeparticipation of citizens (civil society) in the exercise ofsuch rights through opposition, lobbying, campaigns ofvarious types, etc.

6. The ultimate basis for curbing abuse of powerand ensuring a significant level of responsive and re-sponsible governance lies in the moral force of thecommunity by which it determines occasions for posi-tive sanction (including rewarding some people withsuch things as political offices via the ballot) and nega-tive sanctions (including denying some people politicaloffice via the ballot). This system of management ofcommunal power thus relies heavily on the moral coer-cive power of a community.

The type of conscience and moral activism that isnecessary for the successful operation of the modernWestern system is not in African at the moment; in part,because Africa had not relied on moral coercive powerin the past, but rather on metaphysical sources, for themanagement of communal power. In addition, themodern Western system came with a worldview (or per-haps worldviews) that are grounded in Christianity, hu-manism, naturalism, etc. all of which are opposed to thekey elements of the supreme beliefs of the traditionalAfrican worldview; and have succeeded in eroding thefoundation of the traditional system of managingpower: the belief in commonly held gods and spirits

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that actively Supervise human affairs at the communaland sub-unit levels.

The erosion of the beliefs that affects the policingactivities of the gods and spirits followed the generalabandonment of commonly held god (s) and spirits,such as the earth goddess (Ani, among the Igbo), butmany people still privately hold on to personal gods andspiritual powers, which they believe will aid them inprocuring power. The result is that many people still be-lieve that power is to be acquired by the favour of somespirit(s) or god(s); this explains the widely believed useof “medicine”(magic) and fetish related sacrifices, thatinclude human sacrifices at times: it also largely explainsthe widespread rigging and abuse of the electoral pro-cess – politicians do not really believe that the people’swill matter, rather it is the will of some spirit or god andthis is often known after one has tried to again powerby hook or by crook. The notion of divine allotmentthus remains and with it the upward flow of responsibil-ity and the culture of non-opposition. In other words,the authoritarian and despotic elements remain but thedivinely based limitation in the exercise of power isgone. This is the fundamental asymmetry of values andinstitutions in Africa.

The effects are gross abuse of power at all levels andgovernance that is highly nonresponsive and irrespon-sible. The institutional arrangements and practices thathave delivered responsible governance in the West arenot working here because the citizens whether they areoperating as the led or as leaders are to a large degreeunwilling to respect these institutional arrangements or

engage in the practices required by the modern Westernsystem.

3. Concluding Remarks

Let us first note that the management of communalpower is culture and history specific; and the object ofthe management of communal power is the curbing ofthe recurrent features and tendencies in the abuse andirresponsible exercise (or non-exercise) of power in agiven historical and cultural context. From our analysis,it should be clear that the abuse of power in contempo-rary Africa runs very deep, arising from the inability ofthe traditional African system and the modern Westernsystem to impose any check on the all out pursuit ofnarrowly defined self interest. We saw in the previoussection why politicians in Africa are not checked by thetraditional system of managing communal power nor bythe Western system. This unfettered African politiciansreadily terrorize and underdevelop Africa.

In order to deal with this situation, there is a need todevelop functional ways of managing communal powerin modern African. In this regard, it seems that a returnto the metaphysical basis of managing communal poweris not feasible, because the gods and spirits have beenabandoned at least at the communal level; and Chris-tianity that replaced traditional religion in many places ishobbled with sectarian divisions (that make religiousleaders and their doctrines to have little or no influenceoutside their followers).

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Africans, therefore, have to kick-start the manage-ment of communal power based on moral coerciveforce. The constitutions of Western countries whichmany African states have borrowed cannot do this be-cause African communities do not share in the histori-cal and cultural contexts out of which they evolved. Forexample, these constitutions do not address the in-grained sense of non-opposition that makes it difficultto mobilize people in many places to deal with abuse ofpower via legitimate means – a case in point was thenon payment of the salaries of civil servants for manymonths by the government of Anambra state of Nigeriaduring the tenure of Governor C. Mbadinuju 1999-2003; there were little or no major rallies, demonstra-tions, etc to oppose this. African societies need to de-velop constitutions that can raise, strengthen and directconstructive opposition as well as oppositional-tenacity.For example, if there was constitutional provision stat-ing that a government that cannot pay its workers’ sal-ary for up to two months automatically forfeits its termof office, then opposition groups would have found abetter basis to mobilize and get the Governor out.

Consequently, the constitutions of African statesmust be founded among other things on a charter of re-sponsibility, which will set out a minimum standard ofservices, rights, conduct, etc. which a government mustmeet to avoid impeachment, recall or automatic termi-nation of a term of office - some of the items that maybe included in such a charter are non- payment of sala-ries of government workers over a given period of time;inefficiency in dealing with easily solvable health hazard

such as disposal of refuse and the filling in of potholeson highways; a code of conduct that reflects commit-ment and patriotism; punctuality (this is not a light mat-ter at all, the lack of punctuality by high officers of thestate reflect the general inefficiency of government); agiven level of job creation; a given level of free flow offactual information about the activities of the state.These items are largely founded on the right to life - anindividual’s right to preserve his/her life. The respect ofthis right is the ultimate justification for the duty, on thepart of an individual, to obey an authority in a politicalunit and this is because political power exercised by aperson(s) on behalf of a political unit must necessarilyinclude the preservation and promotion of the lives ofthe individuals that make it up; a political unit that ne-glects this, or actively works against this, is simply tellingits members to seek alternative ways of preserving theirlives or face death in some way; the individual has noreason to remain in such a political unit indeed he/sheis obliged to seek an alternative arrangement.

Finally, let us conclude this examination of the man-agement of communal power in Africa by saying thatfrom the above examination, the formal structure of theproper management of communal power can be statedthus: the communal goals are deduced from the welfareand interest of the public; the purpose and pursuits ofpolitical leaders are derived from the communal goals;therefore, political leaders serve the welfare and interestof the public. This is more or less the universal formalstructure of the proper use of communal power; it istherefore the formal universal every human political

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unit sets it eyes on (or should set it eyes on). However,the way (institutions, practices, etc) by which this formaluniversal is made concrete depends on the history, cul-ture and circumstances of a given society. Consequently,the fashioning of a viable constitution that can galvanizeand move African Societies forward is a task for Afri-cans themselves because it is an exercise that drawsheavily on the perceptiveness of the people about theirattitudes, values and motives for action.

Notes:

1 Olusegun Oladipo, The Idea of African Philosophy, (Ibadan:Hope Publications, 1998), pp.13-28

2 Ibid, pp 29 – 30.3 Ibid, pp. 36 – 48.4 Stephan Korner, Metaphysics: Its Structure and

Functions,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). pp 53–54.

5 See for example J.C Ekei’s attempt to show that “the Igboand Africa in general have an ethics, an ethic that is quite differ-ent from their religion… a rational ethics”. J.C. Ekei, Justice inCommunalism, (Lagos: Realm Communications Ltd, 2001) p. 2.

6 I. Kant, “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopoli-tan Stand Point” in Alburey Castell, An Introduction to Modern Phi-losophy, Third Edition (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc,1976) p. 382.

7 J. S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, (London:Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1969). p. 208

8 Azuka. A. Dike, Tile Resilience of Igbo Culture (Enugu:Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985). p. 109

9 J.S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophies, p. 208.10 Ibid.

11 See for example in respect of the Igbo, T.U. Nwala,IgboPhilosophy, (Ikeja, Lagos: Literamed Publications, Nigeria Ltd,1985). pp. 172; Nnamdi Azikiwe, Onitsha Market Crisis (Nsukka:Zik Enterprises Ltd, 1976). p. 4.

12 A similar examination of Yoruba and Benin communitiescan be made from, among other materials, Johnson, S. History ofthe Yoruba, CMS (Book Shops) 1960; Fadipe, N.A. The Sociology ofthe Yoruba ( Ibadan, Ibadan University Press 1970); Biobaku, S.O.Sources of Yoruba History (Oxford University Press, 1973);Egharevba, Jacob A Short History of Benin (Ibadan UniversityPress, 1960)

13 R.N. Henderson, The King in Every Man (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1972). p. 274.

14 Ibid. p. 308.15 S.I. Bosah, Groundowrk of the History and Culture of Onitsha

(No 1: Bosah Street, Onitsha: Self Published, Undated). See alsoHenderson. The King in Every Man, p. 285.

16 N. Azikiwe, Onitsha Market Crisis, pp. 4 - 5. I have fol-lowed Azikiwe’s translation of tittles 1, 3, and 5.

17 R.N. Henderson, The King in Every Man, p. 275.18 Ben. N. Chukwudebe, Onitsha Quo Vadis, Second Edition

(Self Published, 1986) p. 1119 See T.U. Nwala, 1gbo Philosophy; p 172; N Azikiwe Onistha

Market Crisis, p. 4. In disusing Umuezechima Kindgoms fromwhence Onitsha migrated some three and half centuries ago, LU.Ejiofor says that “the Ezechima Obi is neither absolute nor auto-cratic. He rules his people with a ‘constitution’ to guide him.Themany constraints of customs and traditions combine with the es-tablished powers of lineage heads and cabinet chiefs to clip vis-ible traits of absolutism and autocracy”. Igbo Kingdoms (Onitsha:Africana Publisher Ltd, 1982). p. 256. It should be noted that thelineage heads and cabinet chiefs on their own cannot cheek theObi; it is the customs and traditions that make it possible andthese in turn are founded, ultimately, on metaphysical grounds.

20 N. Azikiwe, Onitsha Market Crisis. p. 5.21 Ibid.

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22 Ibid.23 W.R.T. Milne. Intelligence Report on Onitsha (Enugu: Gov-

ernment Printer); reproduced in N. Azikiwe, Onitsha Market Cri-sis, p. 65.

24 Ibid, p. 64.

25 E. Isichei Igbo Worlds, (London: Macmillan EducationLtd, 1977) pp. 256 – 259.

26 R.N. Henderson, The King in Every Man, p. 285.27 Ibid. pp. 147 – 149.

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Bülent Özdemir

Political Use of Conversion in theNineteenth Century OttomanContext: Some Cases FromSalonica

The purpose of this study is to shed light on a period oftime in Ottoman history when conversion policies andpractices, influenced by the changes of times and,resulted in unprecedented socio-political directions. Inorder to do that, some conversion cases from theOttoman society in Salonica will be presented. Conver-sion to Islam is of central importance in explaining therise of empire and its formation in many scholarlystudies. It was usually presented as an official policy ofOttoman administration throughout the centuries. Thedevshirme system and Sufi preaching were considered tobe the major instruments of mass conversion toIslam. On the contrary, I propose to look at the conver-sion issue in the nineteenth century context from a

different angle.

As is the case in Islam every religion has naturallysought to attract people to"its own system of teachingsand life style. For this purpose, Islamic faith set somerules to promote conversion to Islam. For instance, inthe Koran prospective converts are inclwded among thepeople who can receive the income of zekat (obligatoryalms).1 According to Islamic understanding, one’s con-version to Islam is not the embracing of a new religionbut the return to his original faith, because everybody isregarded to be born in a Muslim faith and without anysin. Therefore, the one who converted to Islam simplyreturns or reverts to his nature.2 Another importantpoint is that after the conversion all the previous sins ofa convert are forgiven by God. The convert is regardedas innocent as a new-born baby. This understanding of

BÜLENT ÖZDEMIR

Assistant Professor,History Department,Balikesir University,TurkeyE-mail:ozdemirb@balikesir.edu.tr

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Islam helps a lot for the promotion of Islam and at-tracts the people who committed crimes but wanted torepent.3 Since there is not such an institution as theclergy in the Islamic faith, all the believers in Islam areresponsible to introduce Islam to non-Muslims.

No doubt, conversion was the basic process of thespread of any religion. Thus, the history of the phenom-enon of conversion to Islam goes back to the early yearsof the expansion of Islam, when the peaceful convinc-ing of individuals prevailed against the use of force. Onthis matter Koran says: “Call to the way of your Lordwith wisdom and godly exhortation, and have disputa-tions with them in the best manner; surely your Lordbest knows those who go astray from His path, and Heknows best those who follow the right way.”4 The be-lievers in Islam multiplied rapidly in a very short periodof time not because of forced conversion but becauseof the tolerant and convincing nature and simplicity ofIslamic teachings.

Like all great religions, Muslims wanted to converteveryone to the faith that they believe to be the onlytrue one. According to Islam, the people of the bookare those who still follow one of the older revelationsgiven before Islam, that is Jews and Christians, each ofwhom have a book to show for their belief. They maykeep all their customs and social arrangements, and arequite free with regard to their religion. From the time ofthe first conquests of Islamic state the tolerant treat-ment of the non-Muslims was set as a rule in whichforced conversion or extermination of non-Muslimswas prohibited. The prevailing policy was the attitude of

aloofness to the conquered people because the teach-ings of Koran commend it.5 Thus, this tradition wasfollowed by almost all of the Muslim successor states.As in the case of Ottoman Empire, for instance, onecan find so many Christian and Jewish contemporaryand academic accounts which clearly pointed out thetolerant nature of treatment to the non-Muslims.6

After the conquest of Constantinople, the Otto-mans continued the previous Islamic states’ generalpolicy of granting and recognizing the non-Muslimcommunities’ extensive privileges respecting to their in-ternal organization and communal affairs.7 Since Islamregards Christianity as a religion and respects the Chris-tians as the “people of the book” and the Bible as a holybook and Jesus Christ as a prophet, the Orthodoxchurch was recognized as an official body to superviseboth the religious and civil affairs of the community inthe Empire. According to Professor Ýnalcýk, protec-tions of the rights of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Em-pire were considered “a command of God and a duty ofthe State” by the Ottomans from the beginning.8 More-over, the Orthodox Church was particularly recognizedas the most respected religious community in the hierar-chical structure of the Empire.9 Before the eighteenthcentury, traditionally the candidate for the Patriarchatewas proposed to the Sultan by the holy synod of the Pa-triarchate, which was believed to be composed of Met-ropolitans who were mostly close to Istanbul, andthereafter an imperial berat (permit) was issued for theconfirmation of appointment.10

KEY WORDS:

Islam, Koran, conver-sion, Islamization,Jews, Christians, Mus-lims, Apostasy

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Conversion as a Nineteenth-centuryphenomenon

Since social, political, cultural and economic condi-tions of the nineteenth century were changed radicallynot only in the Ottoman Empire but also all over theworld, the phenomenon of conversion to Islam in thenineteenth century Ottoman context was also differentfrom the earlier centuries.

Conversion was a common incident in a plural soci-ety such as Salonica, which was divided into several reli-gious groups in the nineteenth century.11 There is onlyone condition for conversion to Islam, which requiresone to attest that “there is no god but Allah andMuhammad is his messenger.” However, it became atradition to have two witnesses present during the attes-tation. The convert has to learn the basics of Islam inthe first place. He/she does not need to change hisname but for the male converts circumcision was ad-vised.12 Although there is no need to do this as a cer-emony or before any religious institution or authority, inthe nineteenth century Ottoman context, when a personwanted to convert to any other religion, he had to do itin front of the local authorities, including the mufti,heads of the Orthodox and Jewish communities andsometimes the foreign consuls.13

I have selected four registers of conversion dated inthe early nineteenth century from Prime Ministry Otto-man Archives in Ýstanbul (BOA) in order to analyzethe structure and the process of conversion. Each docu-ment refers to persons from different religious groups,

Catholic, Jewish, Armenian and Greek Orthodox. Thestructural style of the documents is typical. All of themwere registered for the purpose of requesting kisve baha(value of clothes). The depiction of the former religionof the converts was not severe. Most of the time, theterms: “batýl dinden ihraç” (exclusion from an unreasonedfaith), “bu ana kadar kefere hilalinde kalup” (to this time re-maining in the circle of infidels) were used in order toexplain the former religion of the converts. There arenot much information about the special position, age,marital status of the converts. It can be grasped fromthe documents that these persons had already convertedto Islam at another time and place but wanted to regis-ter themselves as the new converts to qualify to get kisvepaha. We know that the amount of kisve baha was 150guruº in the early nineteenth century. Two important cer-emonial acts were performed during the process of reg-istry: one was the declaration of conversion by sayingthe attestation before the judge and the scribes; anotherone was the circumcision.14

Conversion was predominantly an urban phenom-enon in the nineteenth century context. Cultural interac-tions and acculturations were best realized in the cities.Both the mind and the interests of urban people com-pared to those of rural population were predominantlymore assertive and well developed. Therefore, occur-rences of conversion cases mostly among the urbanpopulation were very normal. On the contrary, the sim-plicity and conservativeness of rural population in itslife style and belief in a way prevented them from be-coming pragmatic-interest seekers.

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In the nineteenth century context, conversion wasan individual private act. If one wanted to convert toany other religion, one could do it in his limits of pri-vacy. However, it was not that clear cut. Most of thetime, change of social status, of marital status, the pur-pose of prevention from abuse, of getting rid of thedebts were some of the several most common reasonsthat affected the process of conversion. When we talkabout any purposeful act, we should see politics behindit. We cannot say that the converts were not sincere intheir acts and always carried an agenda behind theirthoughts and deeds. In fact, we have to give credit tothe righteousness of Islam and what it offers to theneeds of people. But, when we take the subject of con-version into account as a historical phenomenon, wehave to deal with the causes and effects, which directlylead us to the political use of conversion in the nine-teenth century Ottoman context.

Was Conversion Forced or Voluntary?

Apart from some nationalist historians of theBalkan states, scholars, after having done much researchon the subject concluded that Ottoman state did notcoerce the conversion and nor followed the policy offorced-conversion. Conversion to Islam was perceivedas an individual’s own decision by the state which alsosaw its role as legitimating and registering the conver-sion cases. As Eyal Ginio noted rightly at the conclu-sion of his article on conversion of minors to Islam that

external pressures with social and economic consider-ations always constituted some forms of coercion.15

When we look for common features of human motiva-tions among converts in the nineteenth century context,political and practical ones prevailed against the emo-tional and intellectual ones. Although we cannot gener-alize the economic aspects as the sole causes of conver-sion, they played a significant role in the process ofhuman motivations. The conversions made under theinfluence of economic causes were not rejected by theIslamic faith. While the Koran set the rule by allowingthe prospective converts to receive the zekat, theProphet Muhammed practiced this rule by providing fi-nancial support to some non-Muslims in order to attracttheir attention to Islam.16

This was not a process of forced conversion butthat of institutionalized conversion says S. Vryonis.17

Exercise of social function with an efficacy by the Is-lamic institutions over the Christian and Jewish institu-tions provided prestige and propaganda for the pro-spective converts to Islam.18 The rise of sufizm andspread of the derwish orders in these appropriate condi-tions could be seen as an example of the institutionallywell-organized conversion in the fourteenth, fifteenthand sixteenth centuries. Nehemia Levtzion also pointsout that since the conditions following the conquestsprovided a kind of psychological superiority to the Mus-lims, conversion to Islam became a positive-cultural-phenomenon among the conquered people.19

Vryonis equates the Ottoman conquest of theBalkans with the so-called Islamization. According to

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his point of view, the sole purpose of Ottoman con-quests in the Balkans was to gain converts to Islam or inmore general terms for the spread of Islam. Naturally,he sees “a picture of cultural change and of a single linemovement of Christians and Jews into the fold of Is-lam.”20 However, to assert that the ideology of Otto-man expansion in the Balkans was Islamization is totwist the historical facts. The centuries following theearly conquests clearly reflected that the Ottomans didnot use the state’s means and efforts to transform allthe peoples of Balkans into Muslims. The movement ofmass conversion was realized in certain areas where ei-ther there was not an institutionalized religious order orthe people were under religious persecution. Anotherpoint which has been made in the studies is that mostof the time conversions were realized for the worldlyadvantages or to escape from mostly religious persecu-tion. (like in Cyprus and Crete).21 Religious alienationwas another factor which induced some Christian sectsto convert to Islam, like the Bogomils. For instance,some religious groups such as the Nestorians, theMonophysites and the Copts living on the borders ofByzantine Empire were under serious religious persecu-tion during the spread of Islam.22 Most importantly, theOrthodox Church, which must have been seen as thebiggest obstacle that stood in front of Islamization, wasnot destroyed but rather strengthened by the reviving ofthe ecclesiastical seats in the Balkans. The highest au-thority of the Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate ofÝstanbul was made an administrative body of the Otto-

man state. Therefore, the issue of conversion should beviewed as simply an individual and private act.

Generally speaking, the literary historical characterof a Christian child who was converted to Islam is not anew symbol of the depiction of the Islamization processin the modern Balkan literature.23 The popular mind inthe most part of the Balkans with the help of actualisthistory textbooks has seen the issue of conversion as aprocess of official coercion imposed upon the people ofthe region by the Ottoman rule. According to MariaTodorova, the process of conversion to Islam duringthe five centuries of Ottoman rule has to be seen mainlyas the result of the voluntary decisions made by indi-viduals.24 In the nineteenth century, conversion to Is-lam became more and more an individual experienceand a personal choice. Most of the time issue of conver-sion remained a hidden phenomenon and completelyindividualistic private experience. Since Islam does notrequire one either to make official his/her conversionor to make it publicly known, converts chose to remainunknown unless they had some political agenda or eco-nomic interest. We learn of their existence from thesummaries of lawsuits and brief registrations of con-verts’ names on the ºer’iye sicils (Ottoman judiciary courtrecords). Since conversion changes one’s legal status al-most completely, the ties of paternity, inheritance, mar-riage and the ownership of slaves are also abolished ac-cordingly. In fact, these registers of conversion refer tothe converted people who one way or the other neededto make official declaration of their conversion in thecourt. There are several reasons behind their intention

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of registration. At this point, I argue that individualisticpolitical implications occupied an important part ofthese reasons. Registering his/her conversion in the Ot-toman Muslim court consolidated the convert’s beliefand involvement in the Muslim community. “The decla-ration in the court was probably made as a result of thewish to have documentary proof to hand, possibly toshow to persistent poll-tax (cizye) collectors”25 says EyalGinio about the conversions in the eighteenth centurycontext. However, for the nineteenth century the rea-sons to register in the Muslim court were various. Thesewere political sympathies, cultural similarities, admira-tion for Islamic morals, social advantages, political pro-motion, exemption from taxes, admiration for doctrinalclarity and social pressure.

Causes of Conversion

In a general sense, conversion requires a process ofpreparation in which environmental causes were veryactive. The personal motivation and the state of mindof the new converts in the changing political and socio-economic conditions of the nineteenth century Otto-man Empire have to be taken into account. The pro-spective convert’s social status, economic condition,intellectual capacity, religious indoctrination, worldly in-terests and marriage were the basic aspects of causes forconversion.26 Richard Clogg cited the following ten rea-sons from a contemporary account, which induced theChristians voluntarily to embrace Islam:

“1) for the love of civil liberty, 2) in consequence ofthe fatigues of slavery and particular vexations, 3) to en-joy the luxurious privileges of polygamy, 4) to preservetheir property from Muslim usurpation, 5) to enjoy free-dom in their manner of dressing, 6) to get rid of a capi-tal condemnation, 7) to free their children from slavery,8) from want of religion, a sentiment of honour, 9)from a taste for arms, and often with a design to avengehimself on a Turk who has ill treated him, 10) from de-spair, or from a state of drunkenness”.27

We look first at the impact of money given to theconverts as kisve baha (150 guruº in the early 19th cen-tury). This should be considered as a gift of honor fromthe government rather than an instrument of appeal forconversion. Kisve baha which was awarded upon conver-sion given for buying clothes was not other than a sortof financial grant handed out to the new converts. Theamount of sums normally awarded was varied accordingto the conditions of time (such as inflationary processesin the Empire) and the social status of the converts.28

Nikolay Antov asserts that Ottoman government’streatment to the new converts differed and more moneywas allotted to converts “who had higher social statusprior to their conversion and some who were of specialimportance to the Porte.29 The amount of kisve baha inthe early 19th century economic conditions of OttomanEmpire was a great amount of money for the converts,since the amount of kisve baha as 150 guruº was exceed-ing the rate of poll-tax (for the middle category of cizyepayers the rate was 24 guruº) five or six times. It is gen-erosity toward non-Muslims, care for the needy and

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pretended holiness of life that especially promoted theconversion in the cities. Making the religious charitybuildings (like imarethanes) even more active centers forrelief and needs of the poor people regardless of theirreligious etiquette in the cities provided suitable spacefor the promotion of Islam.

As was the case in other parts of the Empire, con-version cases in Salonica were quite frequent particularlyin the early nineteenth century, since the population ofthe city consisted of three different religious groups.30

Converts (both Christians and Jews) to Islam were pro-vided with financial and moral support in the form ofeither paying all the debts of the converts or providinggreat security and protection against all offences. Thisprotection and practice of paying of debts were fre-quently exploited by the non-Muslim population, whenthey needed either to get rid of enormous debts or toget protection against their own community’s ratherstrict rules. It was very easy for a Christian or a Jew inthose cases to declare that he had converted to Islam,because when he said that he had become a Muslim, hisformer community had no authority over him.31

Consul Blunt reported the following incident relat-ing to Christian apostasy from Salonica:

“A Greek reaya who presented himself to the Pashasaying that he wished to embrace the Mohammedanfaith. His Excellency told him to go and reflect, andgave him a week to consider. The man who is a nativeof Ionina returned still resolved to abandon his faith,but the Pasha having in the meanwhile made inquiriesrespecting this individual, and finding that he wished to

become a Muslim purposely to escape the payment ofsome trifling debts. His Excellency rejected him”.32

In former years, all the debts of a prospective con-vert had generally been paid by the Muslims; after thatthe individual was accepted as a true convert to Islam.33

The above apostasy case clearly defines the position ofthe Ottoman authorities towards the status of Christianpeople in Ottoman society. In other words, depiction ofthe Ottoman authorities’ aggressive behavior towardsthe Christian reaya in which the former perceive the lat-ter as potential candidates for Islamisation, as found in anumber of accounts, need closer examination. Islamdoes not allow conversion of Christians to Islam by thesword or by persecution, but rather recognizes bothChristians and Jewish people as the “people of thebook” and allows them to continue to exercise theirfaith undisturbed as long as they acknowledge their sub-mission to the authority of the state. On this issue,Kemal Karpat says:

“The government regarded itself as the protector ofChristians and of their right to abide by their chosenfaith, and infringements of the right by Muslim subjectswas punished. If, indeed, the Ottoman government hadwished to force non-Muslims to convert to Islam dur-ing its four hundred years of absolute rule over theBalkans, it had the means to do so. The intact survivalof a great variety of non-Muslim groups in the Empire… is the best proof of the freedom of religion and cul-ture that existed during the Ottoman rule”.34

Another factor was the desire to avoid payment oftaxes. It has been pointed out in some studies that espe-

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cially the cizye35 (poll-tax) was used as an instrument bythe Ottoman state to force non-Muslims to convert toIslam. Since cizye tax required to be paid in cash, insome regions, it was difficult for the people to pay it.That is why, it has been said, mass conversion was real-ized in some poor districts in order to avoid this tax.Ottoman government’s adoption of a new collectionmethod which “the community leader of a particular re-gion or town was appointed to collect the tax and de-liver it to the treasury in lump-sum” was a proof thatthe Ottomans did not use the cizye tax as an instrumentto force non-Muslims to convert to Islam.36 Noblemenwere the first to embrace Islam in the Balkans in orderto retain their property and social status.37 However,they had to pay 2.5 percent of their property as zekat tothe state or poor people. Also, male converts had totake the obligatory military service into account whenthey embrace Islam. From the conquest of the Balkansin the 15th century to the end of the Empire, there wasno policy of forced conversion. “Most of the greatBalkan families and smaller týmar holders converted toIslam during the 16th century not as the result of Otto-man pressure, but in consequence of their realizationthat this was a necessary first step on the road to be-coming full Ottomans” says Stanford Shaw on this is-sue.38

When in the 19th century the Ottoman governmentdecided to abolish cizye tax and to apply compulsorymilitary service also upon the non-Muslim subjects ac-cording to the Tanzimat reforms, they protested againstthe new regulation saying that the cizye tax was prefer-

able to the military service.39 The argument which as-serts that the non-Muslims of the Empire choose toconvert to Islam because of the heavy tax burden upontheir shoulders is nonsensical. On the other hand, thefact that the amount of cizye tax in the nineteenth cen-tury was not a heavy burden on the non-Muslims wasdealt with by several studies.

Indeed, the cizye tax continued to be exacted underthe name of bedel-i askerî, the tax for the exemption ofnon-Muslims from military service, which was mademandatory to all citizens of the Empire after theTanzimat. When voices were raised against the newmeasure of compulsory military service for non-Mus-lims by the leaders of Christian and Jewish communi-ties, the old cizye tax was re-named as the bedel-i askerî.According to an Ottoman document dated 1835, thenumber of non-Muslims held responsible for the cizyetax in Salonica was as follows:40

Table 1 The number of non-Muslims held respon-sible for the cizye tax in Salonica in 1835.

Non-Muslims Alâ, (rich)

48 guruþ

Evsat (medium rich)

24 guruþ

Ednâ (lower)

12 guruþ

Total

Christians 250 1280 655 1185

Jewish 205 862 2840 3907

Total 455 2142 3495 6092

According to the document in the sicils of Salonica, Sicil,

229:110, 3 ªevvâl 1250.

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ordinary times, apostasy from Islam was unspeakableand even a crime which required the punishment ofdeath penalty. According to the traditional Islamic lawof apostasy, being an apostate requires one to denyAllah’s divinity and attributes partners to Allah, denythat Muhammad is the Prophet and reject the holybook, the Koran.

In the case of an apostate being a woman, the pun-ishment would be imprisonment until she repents to Is-lam. As is the case of conversion to Islam, apostasyfrom Islam was also a private individual act and doesnot need to be made public. However, its reflectionsand practices in the Ottoman society did not supportthis. Most of the time, apostates wanted to declare theirintention of apostasy from Islam in public or before thecertain authority or to the people under social, eco-nomic, political and moral pressures, even though theyhad already known that the consequences will be severeaccording to the Islamic law. The following case is veryillustrative:

“A monk of the Oriental Church named PappaIsaiah, presented himself before the Council at Serres,about two months since, and apostatized to the Muslimfaith, and took the name of Isa Efendi. He repentedshortly after and went to Mount Athos and from thereto Greece. He returned a few days since to Serres, andpresented himself to the Greek bishop of that place andtold him of his determination of recanting before thewhole Council. The Bishop advised him not to do this.The monk would not however follow the Bishops ad-vice but presented himself before the Council, dressed

Now, from the above numbers, we can draw someconclusions. In 1835, the number of rich Christianpeople who paid 48 guruº was greater than the numberof rich Jewish people. Most of the Jewish cizye tax pay-ers were categorized lower level, while most of theChristians were in the medium rich category. If wecompare the numbers with the overall numbers of theChristian and Jewish population of Salonica in 1839,1,185 out of 13,000 Christians (9 percent) were held li-able for cizye tax while the rate for the Jewish populationwas 3,907 out of 25,000 (15.6 percent). The above facts,which are based on contemporary sources, clearly showthe fair division of the cizye tax collection in the Empirein the nineteenth century even before the Tanzimatchanges. These figures also refute the overlapping asser-tions and generalizations about unjust measures in cizyetax collection system in the present literature.

Apostasy from Islam

Another important subject was the apostasy fromIslam. Though this was a rare occurrence, in some spe-cial periods of the history of Ottoman Empire such asthe Greek uprising and under extraordinary conditions,there occurred some Muslim apostasy cases particularlyin Crete.41 The practice of allowing the literally con-verted Christians to repent under the condition of pub-lic manifestation of their repentance goes back to theearly 14th century when the first wave of Islamic con-quests occurred in Anatolia and the Balkans.42 In the

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as a monk, and declared himself a Christian. Ömer Pa-sha and the Council were horror-struck and orderedthat the monk should be immediately beheaded. Thebishop reminded the Pasha of the Sultan’s promise infavor of the Christians, and the Monk was impris-oned.”43

In this later case, two important facts can be dis-cerned according to Consul Blunt: first, the monk ac-cepted Islam in order to protect himself against the un-just persecution of the Greek Bishop of Serres, andsecondly, many of the Bishops and clergy of the GreekChurch were warm advocates of martyrdom.44 There-fore, since the clergy wanted to expel him from thechurch when the monk converted to Islam, they had noinfluence over him. After he decided to return to hisfaith, the clergy purposely let him present himself as aconvert from Islam before the Council, although theyhad already known what the decision of the Councilwould be.

One who converted to Islam had made himself sub-ject to Muslim law. Thus, since his legal status waschanged, it was illegal for him/her to return to his origi-nal faith. If this does happen, he becomes an apostate inthe eyes of his adopted religion, and the Islamic law wasenforced against him. In the case of a woman embrac-ing Islam, it was also illegal to marry a non-Muslimman. If the conversion of a woman had happened aftermarriage, she had to persuade her husband to convertto Islam in order to legalize the marriage. If she failed todo, the contract of marriage would not be valid. How-ever, the opposite arrangement was not illegal. A Mus-

lim man was free to marry with a Christian or Jewishwoman without renouncing of her faith. The change oflegal status after conversion to Islam according to theIslamic law provided opportunities for the non-Muslimsto use conversion for political purposes. Most of thetime, conversion to Islam was used by the non-Muslimwoman who wanted to end the marriage contracts. Bythis way, a woman not only divorced from he husbandeasily, but also got a new legal protection for herself dueto her inclusion to the Muslim community.

Conversion from Islam to the Christian or Jewishfaith was prohibited; and if this would have happened,the punishment according to Islamic law was the deathpenalty. When a person who converted to Islam, de-cided to return to his previous faith and declared it infront of the authorities, the first act was to persuadehim or her by giving meaningful and convincing an-swers to the questions raised by the person. If this ef-fort failed and the person insisted on his apostasy fromIslam, the punishment of the death penalty was carriedout by the authorities.45 In 1844, with the continuousefforts of British Ambassador to Ýstanbul Lord Can-ning, new effectual measures were taken by the Otto-man government to remove the punishment of thedeath penalty for apostasy cases, replacing it with im-prisonment.46

The misperception by Westerners of apostasy casesand of severe punishment for apostates results fromWesterners’ established background and perception ofapostasy in their own religion, that is, in most cases,Christianity. In Christianity, apostasy was not an act

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which calls for the death penalty, as it does in Islam.The perception was that in the Christian religion, onecould convert from one sect to another very easily (forinstance from Orthodoxy to Protestantism); this wascalled apostasy and in the nineteenth century did notmerit a severe punishment. Maybe the apostate was ex-communicated from his own community. Since theboundaries between the Christian sects (Catholic, Or-thodox, Protestant) had been drawn precisely, the con-version from one sect to another was a serious act butdid not require the death penalty in the nineteenth cen-tury context.47 However, in Islam, while conversionfrom one sect to another is not a serious matter mainlybecause Islam is not divided into several sects in termsof the fundamentals of faith and accepting or changingthe sect is not regarded as apostasy. The term “apos-tasy” in the Islamic context is used only for the cases ofconversion to any other religion; and the punishment ofthis action is death. Now, in this context, the accountsin Western literature about apostasy cases in Islammight most probably seem severe and the critiques ofIslam and of Islamic rules might also be excessively se-vere. Generalizing from their own background and un-derstanding of the issue, they might look at apostasycases, say, in the Ottoman Empire, from a distance andmight not comprehend the issue in its Islamic context.As a result, the punishment for apostasy in Islam con-tinued to be regarded as a very cruel practice in theminds of the Westerners.

According to Islam, apostasy from Islam to anyother religion is the most serious attempt and is consid-

ered as a total rejection of the truthfulness of the Is-lamic faith and consequently requires capital punish-ment. On the contrary, conversion from Christianity toany other religion and even within Christianity from onesect to another is very common and to some extent ac-ceptable. This difference in perception and also the pro-tective measures established by the Islamic state forconverts from other religions might have been confus-ing for Lord Canning who tried too much to change thepractice of Islam wholeheartedly.

Apart from being an individual action, conversionto and apostasy from Islam, especially in the 19th cen-tury, became an important political and diplomatic issuebetween the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. BritishAmbassador to Ottoman Empire, Lord Stratford Can-ning, used the issue of apostasy from Islam as a politicalinstrument to gain the sympathy of the non-Muslimsubjects of the Empire. His intention was to induce theOttoman government to abolish the law which requiredthe death penalty for apostasy from Islam. At the end,“although Canning did not achieve the abolition of thelaw, he did obtain an agreement that it would not beused in future.48

Generalizations reached under the influence of cur-rent politics, observable in many Greek books regardingOttoman practices need to be clarified in light of con-temporary evidence. For example, the following casecited by Blunt was a very good indication of changes inthe thinking of the people in Salonica:

“In a recent case of a Greek woman’s embracing Is-lam, prior to the ceremony, Vasif Mehmet Pasha called

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the Molla and told him to speak with all due respect forthe Greek bishop, who would be present, and thatwhen asking the woman if she with free will left her reli-gion, he must say the ‘Christian religion’ and not the re-ligion of ‘gâvur’”.49

Conversion of Jews to Islam and Christianity wasanother problem that the Ottoman government becameinvolved in. Though forced cases were not encouragedbut prohibited by Islamic law and the Ottoman govern-ment, social and economic considerations paved theway in some cases of conversion to Islam.50 In cases offorced conversion, the Ottoman policy was precise andfurther strengthened by the Tanzimat reforms. Localofficials were ordered to prevent forced conversion andforced converts were liberated by government interven-tion.51 Similarly, there occurred, though very rarely,conversions from the Jewish faith to Christianity underthe influence of growing Protestant missionary activitiesin the Empire.52 In such cases, the Jewish opposition totheir renegades was apparent. Since the Jewish religiousleaders had power and authority over all sorts of inter-nal affairs in the community, their response was tocounterbalance apostatic tendencies by persuasion,threat of excommunication, corporal punishment anddetention. It is also clear that the Jewish authorities gotthe Ottoman government help for enforcement and in-tervention whenever they needed.53

We should not disregard genuine spiritual transfor-mation as one of the motives for conversion to theMuslim faith. The role of the impact of simplicity,moral and doctrinal clarity of Islam embodied by der-

vish orders have to be taken into account. However, itis hard to speculate about these motives by showing evi-dence from the conversion registers. The standard ex-pressions like “I saw light” in the registers most prob-ably referred to the common format of the document.54

Another point was the Ottoman’s policy of the accep-tance of skilled or high status converts to thegovernment’s ranks regardless of the sincerity of con-versions. In some cases, the social position of a non-Muslim was used by the Ottoman authorities to obtainthe sympathy of the non-Muslims. The case of the con-version of Sabbatai Zevi best illustrates this. The apos-tasy of Sabbatai Zevi was a well-known story of con-version to Islam. An article55 written by Geoffrey L.Lewis and Cecil Roth discusses the political aspects ofthe cause of Sabbatai Zevi’s embracing Islam. I wouldlike to mention it here because of the assertion’s rel-evance to the subject of this paper. According to the au-thors, Ottoman government in some way induced himto accept Islam ostensibly of his own free will in orderto have achieved a mass conversion of the great body ofOttoman Jewry, “a feat which had baffled evenMuhammad.” By presenting his conversion “as the re-sult of his having suddenly seen the light”, Ottomanswanted to show the correctness of the Islamic faith. Onthe other hand, this occasion provided an opportunityfor Sabbatai Zevi to “present the conversion as a spon-taneous action within a messianic setting, as a part ofthe necessary fulfillment before the ultimate gloriousconsummation.” Thus, we can see in this seventeenth

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century conversion story the collateral use of the con-version issue as a political instrument.

Conclusion

One thing which is clear in the accounts which dealwith the conversion issue in the Ottoman Empire isthat conversion to Islam neither followed a process ofindoctrination nor did it utilize force. Ottomans also didnot choose to employ force for the propagation of Is-lam. There is a clear need to distinguish the phenom-enon of conversion in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-turies from the one in the nineteenth century. Theprocess of conversion to Islam during the conquest ofAnatolia and the Balkans can be viewed as “Islamiza-tion”, it involved a communal or group conversion witha vast territorial expansion. However, in the nineteenthcentury Ottoman context, conversion was a rather slowprocess, involving individuals and families in mostly ur-ban settings. This was a process of interaction and ac-culturation in which the converts either consciouslychose to undergo a meaningful change as “reorientationof the soul” or accepted Islam under the impact ofmostly socio-economic and socio-political reasons.

Notes:

*Paper presented at the Fourth Mediterranean Social andPolitical Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme 19 –23 March 2003, organised by the Mediterranean Programme of

the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the Euro-pean University Institute.

1 See the related works of eminent Turkish historians suchas Ö. L. Barkan, I. H. Uzunçarþýlý, M. T. Gökbilgin, H. Ýnalcýkand K. Karpat who most of the time emphasized the role ofstate policies and Turkic colonization in the Balkans Koran, sura9, verse 60.

2 Koran, sura 7, verse 172.3 I would like to mention here a contemporary phenom-

enon which is the spread of Islam in the US prisons especiallyamong the Afro-American inmates.

4 Koran, sura 16, verse 125.5 Arnakis, “The Greek Church of Constantinople and the

Ottoman Empire”, Journal of Modern History, v. 24, n. 3, (Septem-ber 1952), p. 238.

6 T. Papadopoulos, Studies and Documents Relating to the His-tory of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination, 2nd edi-tion, (Hampshire G.B.: Variorum, 1992) pp. 1-26. StevenRunciman, The Fall of Constantinople, 1453, (Cambridge, 1965),C.A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 1-8.

7 See H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and theWest: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilisation on Muslim Culture inthe Near East, vol. I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).pp. 215-16. Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs, (New York, 1951) p.716. There are several explanations of this issue in the literature:that Mehmet the Conqueror granted the privileges because of hispolicy over Europe which served to split Christianity into twocamps or his financial considerations which served to collectmore tax from the non-Muslims or that Constantinople was notcaptured by force but surrendered by capitulation. For the elabo-ration of the above arguments see T. Papadopoulos, Studies andDocuments Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People underTurkish Domination, 2nd edition, (Hampshire G.B.: Variorum,1992) pp. 1-26. On this issue see also G. Georgiades Arnakis,“The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Em-

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pire”, Journal of Modern History, v. 24, n. 3, (September 1952), pp.235-251, Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople, 1453, (Cam-bridge, 1965), C.A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and IndependentGreece, 1821-1852, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1969) pp. 1-8. According to Inalcik “from the beginning Otto-mans followed a policy of tolerance and protection of the Ortho-dox Church. This policy proved to be beneficial to both theChurch and the new rulers.” See, Halil Ýnalcýk, “The Turks andthe Balkans”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, v. 1, (1993), p. 20.

8 Halil Ýnalcýk, “The Turks and the Balkans”, p. 18.9 Gülnihal Bozkurt, Gayrimüslim Osmanli, p. 32. Timothy

Ware, Eustratios Argenti, A Study of the Greek Church under TurkishRule, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) p. 2.

10 Gülnihal Bozkurt, Gayrimüslim Osmanlý, p. 29, T.Papadopoulos, Studies and Documents, p. 41.

11 For more details of the Salonican society in the early19th century see, Bülent Özdemir, Ottoman Reforms and Socail Life:Reflections from Salonica, 1830-1850, unpublished PhD thesis, (TheUniversity of Birmingham, 2000)

12 “ihtida” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfý Ýslam Ansiklopedisi, v. 21,pp. 554-558.

13 Bülent Özdemir, Ottoman Reforms, p. 268. See also, ÝlberOrtaylý, Osmanlý Toplumunda Aile, (Ýstanbul: Pan Yayýncýlýk,2000) p. 94.

14 BOA, Cevdet Adliye, No.1115, 2083/I, 2083/II, 1735.15 Eyal Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conver-

sion to Islam in the Ottoman State” in Byzantine and Modern GreekStudies, n. 25, (2001) p. 115.

16 “ihtida” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfý Ýslam Ansiklopedisi, v. 21,pp. 554-558

17 Speros Vryonis Jr., “Religious Change and Continuity inthe Balkans and Anatolia from the Fourteenth through the Six-teenth Century” in Speros Vryonis Jr. (Ed.) Islam and CulturalChange in the Middle Ages, (Wiesbaden, 1975), p. 135.

18 Saying that devºirme system was another means of con-version appears to be a false assertion, especially for the Greeksbecause Greeks were not taken as devºirme until the late 17th cen-

tury. As it was the case for the Jewish subjects. If the devºirmesystem is considered to be the instrument of conversion, why didit target only the rural population and almost all Slavs and Alba-nians? See, P. Wittek, “Devshirme and Shari’a” in Bulletin of theSchool of Oriental and African Studies, n. 17, (1955), pp. 271-278 andV. L. Menage, “Devshirme”, EI, v. 2.

19 N. Levtzion, “Towards a Comparative Study of Islamiza-tion” in N. Levtzion (Ed.) Conversion to Islam, (London, 1979), pp.1-9.

20 Speros Vryonis Jr., “Religious change”, p. 138.21 Stavro Skendi, “Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area

under the Ottomans”, in Slavic Review, v. 26, (1967), p. 229.22 Ali Köse, “Ýslamýn Ýlk Devirlerinde Yayýlýþ Þekilleri”

in Akademik Araþtýrmalar Dergisi, n. 2, (1999), pp. 45-75.23 Eyal Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conver-

sion”, p. 91.24 Maria Todorova “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans”,

in L. Carl Brown, (Ed.) Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on theBalkans and the Middle East, (New York, 1996) p. 65. See alsoother articles in the same volume, Carl Brown (Ed.), ImperialLegacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, (NewYork, 1996)

25 Eyal Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conver-sion”, p. 97.

26 Hüseyin Peker, Din Deðiþtirmede Psiko-sosyolojik Etkenler,unpublished PhD thesis, (Anakara Üniversitesi, ÝlahiyatFakültesi, 1979) pp. 28-46.

27 Cited in Richard Clogg, “A Little-known Orthodox Neo-Martyr, Athanasios of Smyrna, 1819”, Eastern Churches Review, v.5, n. 1, (Spring, 1973) p. 30.

28 Nikolay Antov, Aspects of Balkan Islamization in the Light ofPetitions for Conversion, 1670-1750, Unpublished MA thesis,(Bilkent University, 2000)

29 Ibid., p. 21.30 It is interesting to note that according to a statistics made

on Bursa, numerical density of conversion cases was in the high-est level between 1800 and 1850. See, Osman Çetin, Sicillere Göre

169J S R I • N o. 7 / Spring 2 0 0 4

Bursa’da Ýhtida Hareketleri ve Sosyal Sonuçlarý (1472-1909), (Ankara:TTK Yayýnlarý, 1999) p. 34.

31 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.32 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.33 For the practices in the 17th and 18th centuries see,

Nikolay Antov, Aspects of Balkan Islamization, p. 30.34 Kemal Karpat, “The Situation of the Christians in the

Ottoman Empire: Bulgaria’s view”, International Journal of TurkishStudies, v. 4, n. 2, (1983), p. 261.

35 The cizye was a religious poll-tax introduced by the Otto-mans upon conquest. Cizye was levied upon adult males. Chil-dren, women, poor people, crippled, blind and old men, clericswere exempted. See, H. Ýnalcýk, “Djizya”, EI 2, II, p. 562.

36 Halil Ýnalcýk, “The Turks and the Balkans”, p. 23.37 Halil Ýnalcýk, “Stefan Duþan’dan Osmanlý

Ýmparatorluðuna: XV. Asýrda Rumeli’de Hristiyan Sipahiler veMenþeleri”, in Osmanlý Ýmparatorluðu: Toplum ve Ekonomi,(Ýstanbul: Eren Yayýnlarý, 1993) p. 93.

38 Stanford J. Shaw, “The Ottoman View of the Balkans”,in Charles and Barbara Jelavich, (Eds.), The Balkans in Transition,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) p. 65.

39 See, Bülent Özdemir, Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Re-flections from Salonica, 1830-1850, unpublished PhD thesis, (TheUniversity of Birmingham, 2000) p. 84.

40Salonica Sicils, 229:110, 3 Þevval 1250.41 See, A. Nükhet Adýyeke and Nuri Adýyeke, “Yunan

Ýsyaný Sýrasýnda Girit’te Ýrtidat Olaylarý” paper was presentedin XIVth Congress of Turkish Historical Association, 9-13 Sep-tember 2002, Ankara.

42Stavro Skendi, “Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Areaunder the Ottomans”, in Slavic Review, v. 26, (1967), p. 228

43 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.44 For the importance of the advocacy of neo-martyrdom

by the local clergy in the nineteenth century, see, Richard Clogg,“A Little-known Orthodox Neo-Martyr, Athanasios of Smyrna,1819”, Eastern Churches Review, v. 5, n. 1, (Spring, 1973), pp. 28-36.

45 According to Kemal Karpat, if one willingly converts toIslam that makes one subject to Muslim law, which can naturallybe enforced against one when one decides to return to one’s pre-vious faith. See Kemal Karpat, “The Situation of the Christiansin the Ottoman Empire: Bulgaria’s view”, International Journal ofTurkish Studies, v. 4, n. 2, (1983), pp. 259-266.

46 FO 78 / 555, Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844.47 See Timothy Ware, Eustratios Argenti, A Study of the Greek

Church under Turkish Rule, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) pp.16-33.

48 For the discussion of the issue see, Turgut Subaþý,Anglo-Ottoman Relations and the Reform Question in the Early TanzimatPeriod 1839-1852: With Special Reference to Reforms Concerning Otto-man non-Muslims, unpublished PhD thesis, (The University of Bir-mingham, 1995).

49 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 3 May 1844.50 It was clearly stated in a ferman dated 1836 that the

forced conversion to Islam was strictly prohibited by the Otto-man government. See Sicil 232:21, 14 Cemaziyelevvel 1251.

51 There are several cases in Consul Blunt’s reports regard-ing forced conversion and liberation according to the govern-ment regulations. For instance, “A boy of nine years of age,taken by some Turks and persuaded to apostatise. When he wasbrought before the Council he declared that he was a Christianand was liberated.” See FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 Au-gust 1845.

52 Hayyim J. Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East, 1860-1972,(Jerusalem: Keter Press, 1973) p. 167.

53 Albert E. Kalderon, “Turkish Jews of Istanbul and Mis-sionary Activities During the Reign of Mahmud II”, Turcica, v.14, (1991), pp. 91-109.

54 BOA, Cevdet Adliye, No: 1735, 2083/I, 2083/II, 1115.55 Geoffrey L. Lewis and Cecil Roth, “New Light on the

Apostasy of Sabbatai Zevi”, The Jewish Quarterly Review, v. LII, n.3, January 1963, pp. 219-225

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Liliya Sazonova

The role of interfaith dialogue inthe process of protection andimplementation of Human Rights

The main thesis of this essay is that the inter-religiousdialogue gives us some unique mechanisms for protect-ing and implementing human rights. This alternative wayof implementation of the basic provisions of the interna-tional human rights law includes several practices.Among them there are organizing demonstrations, infor-mational campaigns, lobby campaigns for the ratificationof certain legal means, monitoring, educational pro-grams, declarations etc. These activities define the inter-religious dialogue movement as a civil society phenom-enon that acts both at the level of international and localNGOs on the one hand, and at the level of the highreligious authorities on the other. In this regard, in orderto illustrate the inter-religious potential for accomplishingthe protection and the implementation of the interna-tional standards, the analysis encompasses the relationsbetween different religious systems as well as between

the religious bodies and the state itself.

Introduction

The contemporary process of globalisation and theaccelerating process of international communicationsmake the investigation of interfaith dialogue a criticallyimportant issue. Religions in other ages lived in separateterritories. Their divisions resulted from their occur-rence in different spaces. However, this lack of commu-nication has changed radically in recent decades. Todayreligious offers cannot be made from a monopolisticstandpoint and this fact explains the importance of thedialogue between them. Thus, the new social and eco-nomic conditions in the world mandate a change of theold scheme of interactions (or their absence) betweenreligions.

In this regard, the main argument of the followingessay is that interfaith dialogue1 offers several unique

LILIYA SAZONOVA

M.A. in Democracy andHuman Rights in South-East Europe at BolognaUniversity / SarajevoUniversity. Teacher inPhilosophy of Law, part-time journalist, consultanton a help-line in Sofia,BulgariaE-mail:liliya_sazonova@yahoo.co.uk

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mechanisms of protecting and implementing humanrights. This alternative for implementing the basic pro-visions of international human rights law includes sev-eral practices: organizing demonstrations, informationalcampaigns, lobbying for the ratification of certain legalinstrument, monitoring, educational programs, declara-tions, etc. These kinds of activities define the interfaithdialogue movement as a phenomenon of the civil soci-ety that acts on the level of international and localNGOs.

We follow this line of reasoning to identify the un-usual nature of interfaith dialogue and thus explore thetopic by starting with the definitions of three key con-cepts in our essay. Therefore the first chapter analyzesthree terms: “interfaith dialogue,” “protection” and“implementation.”

The second chapter elaborates on the two main lev-els on which interfaith dialogue accomplishes the pro-tection and implementation of international standards.The one is on the level of religious rights while theother encompasses human rights as a whole.

The third and final chapter presents the role of in-terfaith dialogue as redefining the official attitude of cer-tain religious systems towards human rights issues. Inthis regard, at least two main obstacles are addressedconfronting the enforcement of international standardsof human rights. Namely, they are the “problem withreservations” regarding women, and the freedom tochoose or change one’s personal beliefs.

In order to achieve more objectivity we have usedboth legal instruments and the literature of interfaith

dialogue. Additionally, we have employed three types ofapproaches – analytical, polemical, and interpretative.

Finally, in accordance with the topic of the essay wehighlight the protection and implementation of humanrights. However, in order to create a clearer picture ofthe so-called “culture of human rights”, some aspects oftheir promotion, fulfillment, and enforcement are men-tioned as well.

Definition of the key concepts used in theessay

A credible exploration of the role of the interfaithdialogue in the protection and implementation of hu-man rights requires a clear definition of the three coreconcepts used in the exploration. These three key termsare “interfaith dialogue”, “protection” and “implemen-tation.”

Since there is no agreed upon definition of “inter-faith dialogue,” in what follows the concept will be usedas an umbrella term covering various kinds of activities.These different types of inter-religious interaction (dis-cussions, joint appeals, shared projects, etc.) take placeat different levels, ranging from governmental to grass-roots. Broadly defined, there are six forms of dialoguepeople engage in: parliamentary dialogue, institutionaldialogue, theological dialogue, community dialogue,spiritual dialogue, and inner dialogue.2 Although the lasttwo types of communication channels underlie all otherdiscussions, they do not bear significantly on the pur-

KEY WORDS:

Interfaith dialogue,religion, state-church,protection, humanrights, internationalstandards, non-govern-mental organizations

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pose of the present essay. When it comes to the contri-bution of interfaith communication to the improvementof human rights status as a whole it is both the parlia-mentary dialogue and the community dialogue thatshould be particularly explored. Consequently, in thechapter on this issue the term “interfaith dialogue” ex-presses the above mentioned two types of religious in-teraction even when not overtly indicated.

The first type of dialogue - the parliamentary dia-logue - refers to the large assemblies created for inter-faith discussion such as those organized by the WorldConference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) and WorldCouncil of Churches (WCC).3 These worldwide organi-zations do not focus on particular agendas, but rathertend to explore broader concerns, such as the possibilityfor better cooperation between religions, or global is-sues such as peace, poverty, the environment and hu-man rights. Covering such complicated and fragileproblems, the parliament dialogue is important since ittakes place at the level of International NGOs. Thus itserves as a regulator of state decisions and governmentpolicies. We further investigate how and to what extentthe discussion between high-ranking religious leaderscan influence and shape the governmental policy to-wards human rights protection.

The second type dialogue – the community dialogue– concerns the less structured interaction betweenpeople of different religions. It also includes cooperativesocial projects organized by religious groups in responseto local problems and practical matters. Its involvementin the course of civic or humanitarian projects is on a

more unofficial level then is true of the first type of dia-logue. However, this kind of informal interaction be-tween representatives of various beliefs assumes its ownplace and “responsibility” for the human rights situa-tion. It encompasses numerous local and regional initia-tives for the promotion of both conflict prevention andconflict resolution. In this sense, the peace-keeping andpeace-building role of the “Clergy for peace” in theMiddle East or the “Council of grace” in South Indiacould be mentioned.4 Moreover, these unofficialstreams within society often function as indicators ofpeople’s awareness of human rights.

In addition, the valuable role that both institutionaldialogue and theological dialogue have specifically in theprocess of implementation of religious freedom couldbe pointed out. The one is important for including theorganized efforts of particular religious institutions thataim at initiating and facilitating various other dialogues.The other refers to the process of representatives of dif-ferent religious communities discussing theological andphilosophical issues in a structured format. These twotypes are also explored further on.

The second term to be elaborated is “protection.”As stated in “Understanding Human rights,” protectingcertain human rights means that the state must “preventviolence and other human rights violations amongpeople on its territory.”5 With regard to interfaith dia-logue, protection refers to the important role to beplayed by inter-religious communications in conflictprevention, conflict management, conflict transforma-tion and post-conflict peace-building. For instance, on

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the one hand, this can be connected with the specificrole of varied religions providing food security, healthservices, etc., which corresponds directly to economic,social, and cultural rights as ascertained by ICESCR. Onthe other hand, it encompasses the protection of civiland political rights. For example, in wartime Bosnia andHerzegovina when freedom of movement was limited,some local religious leaders were useful in acting as es-corts to refugees returning as minorities in their com-munities. Apart from this, the interfaith dialogue dimen-sion of the protection of human rights entails attemptsboth to articulate respect and to promote religious toler-ance within society.

Finally, the third concept explored is “implementa-tion.” Essentially this means that the state has a duty toprotect, fulfill, and implement human rights. On theone hand, civil and political rights “implementation”means that the state and its authorities have to respectthe rights accepted. Therefore, these so-called “nega-tive” rights require less energetic state action. On theother hand, to implement economic, social, and culturalrights means that the government should initiate certainpositive actions.6

Apart from the process of implementation as awhole, the implementation of religious freedom in par-ticular is elaborated in the second chapter of this essay –“The role of the interfaith dialogue in the protectionand implementation of religious rights.”

The role of the inter-religious dialogue inthe protection and implementation ofhuman rights

Inter-religious communication offers an alternativeway of implementing human rights. The role of cross-religious cooperation in promoting and preventing hu-man rights could be investigated from several differentperspectives. The input is visible in the pivotal roleplayed by religion in the moralization of society. Thus itinfluences in a positive way the perception of mankindtowards the delicate human rights issue. There are vari-ous examples that could be pointed out. For instance,the moral support for the non-violence movementgiven by the church on the 17th of April 2003 could bementioned. This date was promulgated as a day forprayer and fasting for peace throughout the world in or-der to raise social consciousness and indicate the viola-tions of basic human rights caused by war crimes.

Nevertheless, the role of interfaith dialogue in pro-moting human rights within society is all the more es-sential. There are at least two main levels on which itscontribution is noticeable. On the one hand, it can beachieved through mutual understanding and tolerancebetween various religious systems, involving more ef-fective protection and implementation of the freedomof thought, conscience and religion. From this point ofview interfaith dialogue particularly assists the imple-mentation of religious rights. On the other hand, its in-fluence can be observed within a larger framework. Cer-tain political and civil rights, as well as economic, social,

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and cultural rights, are successfully encouraged and ad-vocated by the NGOs dealing with interfaith dialogue.

There are several arguments that prove the fact thatinter-religious co-operation is of specific importanceconcerning the promotion and protection of humanrights. One of them is illustrated by the Bucharest Meet-ing in 2000 of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Eu-rope. It was aimed at addressing the needs for democra-tization and respect of human rights, human dignity andreconciliation.7 The official report states that the con-tribution to the objectives of the Stability Pact of inter-religious dialogue is bound with the exploration andpreparation of the grounds for co-operation betweenthe confessions and religions in the region. Such an in-terpretation of the connection between interfaith dia-logue, on the one hand, and the protection of humanrights, on the other, is based on the understanding ofreligious rights as guaranteed by international law.

The role of inter-religious dialogue in the pro-tection and implementation of religious rights

The three basic legal instruments encompassing theissue of religious freedoms are Article 18 of the Univer-sal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the In-ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, andArticle 9 of the European Convention on HumanRights. The other legal document dealing especially withreligious freedoms is The United Nation Declaration onthe Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-

crimination Based on Religion or Belief. As stated in theICCPR, under the term “religious freedoms” oneshould understand everyone’s “right to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion. This right shall in-clude freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief ofhis choice, and freedom, either individually or in com-munity with others and in public or private, to manifesthis religion or belief in worship, observance, practiceand teaching.”8

However, the role of the relation between differentreligious factions in the process of implementation ofreligious freedoms and the principle of non-discrimina-tion in particular provides the possibility for overcom-ing a problematic situation within the international stan-dards. The obstacle is caused by the lack of a legallybinding treaty protecting the realization of religiousrights. In this regard, The UN Declaration on the Elimi-nation of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-tion Based on Religion or Belief should be mentionedagain. Although it has some legal effect, especially undercustomary international law, it is still only a declarationbearing no officially authorized obligatory status.

The fact that there is no internationally enforceableinstrument that would safeguard the free exercise ofpersonal beliefs makes the inter-relations between vari-ous systems of beliefs especially important. As it doesnot promote a singular religious perspective but ratheris based on the respect of one’s free choice of faith, itassists the state’s obligation to implement religious free-doms. Inter-religious dialogue offers a mutual self-con-trolling mechanism within the religious organism itself

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through placing all religious systems on equal ground.Additionally, it could also serve as a monitoring body.Along with the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intoler-ance and other regional instruments dealing with theimplementation of the freedom of religion on locallevel, interfaith dialogue provides a unique possibility toobserve and regulate the implementation from within.Therefore, the more powerful the multi-lateral religiousdialogue movement, the more reliable the safeguard foridentifying the incidents and the avoidance of violenceof religious rights.

A good example of the above-mentioned interde-pendence is the formal discussion “Nurturing a Culture ofDialogue: A Journey from Violence to Cooperation” held underthe patronage of Boris Trajkovski, the President ofMacedonia. By clarifying points of differences, themulti-lateral dialogue carried out by a group of religiousleaders in the midst of the recent 2001 crisis inMacedonia facilitated the building up of trust and open-ness between religious groups. One outcome of theconstructive discussion was that the two deans of theOrthodox and Islamic theological seminaries made acommitment to cooperation between the two schools.Additionally, a plan to rebuild mosques and churchesthat had been destroyed or vandalized during the con-flict was accepted. In conclusion, they made a signifi-cant commitment to creating a Council on inter-reli-gious cooperation appointed by religious leaders toreplace the one previously directed by political parties.The concluding provision presents a significant stepahead towards religious independence from the ruling

elites and turns religion away from being a factor in in-terethnic conflicts.

However, the role of the interfaith dialogue move-ment is not only that of mediator between various reli-gions. As summarized in “Understanding humanrights,” international and local NGOs dealing with theinterfaith dialogue issue, together with secular organiza-tions, have “an equally clear role in pointing out viola-tions by states and others, in defending the persecutedand promoting tolerance through information cam-paigns, awareness raising, educational programs andteaching.”9

Moreover, one of the key principles of interfaithdialogue as stated by Abbot Thomas Keating in“Guidelines for Inter-religious Understanding”10 is thata difference among belief systems should be presentedas facts that distinguish them rather than as points ofsuperiority.11 This main postulate resolves the long-standing problem concerning the relationship betweenthe state and religion. More precisely, the phenomenonof the “state-church” or “official belief” is often asource of violation of religious freedom. Although theinternational standards do not require the separation ofchurch or religion from the state, such relationship re-peatedly results in discrimination against those who donot belong to the recognized faith. Further on, abusesof the freedom of belief could affect breaches of theother rights as well. Among them are the rights to em-ployment, accommodation, access to social services, etc.

In this regard Florian Bieber in his report on “Mi-nority rights and the freedom of religion in Balkan

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countries” enumerates several kinds of such violationsof religious rights that reflect on economic, social, andcultural rights.12 As a rule, they refer to the efforts ofgovernments to establish the predominant religion as aformal or informal state-church, thus violating therights of other faith communities. As a consequence ofthis discriminatory policy the dominant religion usuallyreceives a privileged status in the state structure, whilethe smaller communities are viewed with suspicion bythe authorities.

Related to the topic of this paper, the above men-tioned problem has reference to the violation respec-tively of the right to cultural and religious identity.Moreover, the intervention of the “authoritarian” reli-gious community in the political sphere manipulatesgovernment decisions.13 This reflects not only on cul-tural rights but also on the right to proper educationand sometimes even on the right to work. For instance,in the educational system some minorities are exposedto stereotyping. When in schoolbooks Islam ischaracterised as a “religion of warriors” it affects thequality of education and hence its positive influence onthe rising generation is questionable.

Furthermore, he points out that a lack of dialogueand constructive relations exists even among these in-jured religious groups. The outcome of this “hierarchy”is that many religious units are confronted with registra-tion problems as religious communities. For example, insome cases new religious groups must be registered atthe ministry of the interior instead of the ministry of re-ligious affairs. This lack of legal personality for the new

religious entities further complicates the ownership ofproperty, and contracts (i.e. employment) are made im-possible. Therefore it seems that the existence of dia-logue and more constructive relations among religiouscommunities is important from a religious standpoint aswell as for the realization of the key provisions of theinternational treaties.

The role of interfaith dialogue in protecting andimplementing human rights as a whole

Although the role of the inter-religious dialogue inthe protection of human rights as a whole is not as ob-vious and direct as the role of the state, it does have itsown unique and specific position. The interfaith dia-logue movement’s means are different from the tradi-tionally used mechanisms for the promotion and pro-tection of human rights – reports, recommendations,individual complaints, etc. As a factor within the civilsociety it acts through demonstrations, informationcampaigns, educational programs, appeals, calls, notes,urges, and encouragement. Thus the promotion of hu-man rights can be accomplished through several strate-gies.

One of these strategies is cooperation between vari-ous religious systems. Their members urge politicalleaders to uphold the principles of democracy, goodgovernance, and human rights. In this respect, interfaithdialogue succeeds in promoting and protecting humanrights using the symbolic value of religion. Furthermore,

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through guiding policy-making it can partake in thestructure and make its presence felt in the content andimplementation of human rights instruments andmechanisms. Additionally, campaigns can be organizedto lobby the ratification of certain international instru-ments.

Therefore, at the level of religious leadership the in-ternational interfaith NGOs, as part of the non-govern-mental network, contribute to the visible developmentof civil society. As such they can influence both the for-mal governmental policy and public opinion. In this re-gard an evident example is the legal experts workinggroup with multi-religious representatives, established inMay 1999 within the Inter-Religious Council (hereafterIRC) in BiH. Since the representatives of all the majorfaith communities in BiH were dissatisfied with the leg-islation concerning religious freedom currently in forcein BiH, the above-presented experts working group hasbeen assigned to draft a new law on the freedom of reli-gion and the legal status of the religious communities inBiH. As an outcome of its activity on October 10, 2002,the agreed on text for a Law on Freedom of Religionand the Legal Position of Religious Communities andChurches in BiH was presented by the prominent law-yers from the four traditional religious communities andchurches (the Islamic Community of BiH, the SerbianOrthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the JewishCommunity).14 Thus the draft law presented stands agood chance of being adopted and implemented in theparliamentary procedure.

The role of interfaith dialogue in the protection ofhuman rights as a whole is visible in wartime as well. Insuch cases as divided cities or conflict prevention andpost-conflict peace building, the leaders of different reli-gious communities having broad concerns about peoplebeyond their own groups “can use their authority tolead the way to inter-ethnic co-operation … and on apractical level they can play an extremely important rolein civil society building.”15 Apart from the non-govern-mental initiatives that will be explored further on in thischapter, we could hardly ignore the role of religiousleadership. In this respect, the role of joint efforts to-wards reconciliation undertaken by the religious leadersin BiH is even more important considering that the tra-dition of grassroots activism and strong civic engage-ment is usually lacking in the Balkan area. As BrankaPeuraca points out, faith authorities can foster reconcili-ation not only through formal joint statements but alsothrough personal example. For instance, she points outthat such a simple act as an Orthodox priest and aFranciscan monk sharing coffee publicly in a café inTuzla received attention as a demonstration of over-coming rifts between faith traditions and influencedsome of the local people.16

In addition to the above-mentioned, Marc Gopinproposes a valuable analysis of the role of the cross-be-lief discussion as a specific form of inter-religious dia-logue. According to him, both “official” dialogue at thelevel of religious leadership and interpersonal communi-cation between believers from dissimilar systems of be-lief are a powerful means of reconciliation. As he puts

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it, “to the degree that one can get enemies to use theirwords one will move closer to peace and away fromconfrontation.”17 The idea is that during the interfaithencounter, by articulating deep envy, the shame of thecollective humiliation of one’s group, the desire to takerevenge or to see the enemy suffer, one will move theintense emotions of hatred into a different mode of in-teraction.18

Furthermore, it is the grassroots interfaith dialogueinitiative that has the important mission of preparingthe grounds for reconciliation. Without this essential ba-sis, international assistance could be insufficient. Toprove this statement Peuraca indicates several caseswhere the early initiatives toward promoting interfaithreconciliation undertaken by international actors weremisconceived and counterproductive. From amongthem we can mention the efforts to rebuild mosques inthe predominantly Serbian cities of Banja Luka andTrebinje that led to an unfortunate death. Thusgrassroots inter-religious initiatives can assist the workof international organizations so that their efforts arenot perceived as an outside pressure to reconciliation.

The role of the inter-religious dialogue asredefining the official attitude of certain religionstowards the issue of human rights

So far we have elaborated the functions of multilat-eral religious dialogue as a self-regulatory mechanismpreventing both religious discrimination and the viola-

tions of religious freedoms. Moreover, interfaith dia-logue was presented as independent from the state’s in-fluence as a monitoring body. Apart from this, inter-re-ligious dialogue has a crucial role as a redefiningmechanism which transforms the official attitude of cer-tain religions towards the issue of human rights.

This aspect of communication between religions isof particular significance for the present essay, sincemany breaches of human rights still stem from religiousintolerance, ignorance, or one-sidedness. In this respect,the interfaith debate, based on the principle of mutualunderstanding among world religions, offers a greatpossibility to overcome certain negative approaches tohuman rights through discussion. As mentioned before,it is the theologian dialogue that can be perceived as anopportunity for redefinition. Furthermore, the 8th prin-ciple of the “Guidelines for Inter-religious Understand-ing” could be used as a reliable foundation for the ef-forts of re-thinking. This postulate states that: “In thelight of the globalization of life and culture now in pro-cess, the personal and social ethical principles proposedby the world religions in the past need to be re-thoughtand re-expressed.”19 However, this attempt is groundednot only in the theoretical apparatus of interfaith dia-logue but also in its practical activities. For instance, therelationship of religion to the family, to education, tothe state, to women’s rights, etc., has been one of thetopics of discussion encouraged by the WCC betweenChristians and Muslims in recent years.

Thus, interfaith dialogue offers a possibility for en-tering the dialogue with Muslims on the restrictions on

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fundamental human rights that are imposed in manycountries with Islamic majorities. However, it is impor-tant not to single out freedom of religion or belief, be-cause other fundamental rights may also be threatened.One of the fundamental postulates of interfaith co-op-eration is not to criticized and neglect but to inspirenew common perspectives on a given issue throughmutual understanding and interaction. Using this basicprinciple for resolving the difficulty with the teachingsof Islam it is essential not to characterize Islam as re-pressive. Thus, it would be possible to enter into a dia-logue with Muslims about the application of interna-tional law in pluralist societies with Islamic majorities.

Religious NGOs can also help encourage both otherbelievers and governments to enforce human rightsstandards with respect to the gender issue. Several basicrights recognized by the international standards are vio-lated even to this day. For instance, Sheriah20 limits therights of women to a fair trial since they do not have theright to access the court on an equal footing with men.In this regard, the Global Network of ReligiousWomen’s Organizations should be mentioned. Its goalis to develop internal guidelines for the purpose ofmainstreaming gender concerns in all religions. TheNetwork aims to bring together women of differentfaith traditions in order to promote understanding, theobservance of human rights, and the political status ofwomen among followers of different religions. One ofthe general problems of the human rights treaties – the“problem of reservations” - could be addressed throughsuch activities. As a consequence, better conditions for

the implementation of the basic human rights ofwomen in Islamic countries could be provided.

Along with women in Muslim states, another targetgroup is the adherents of other religions. Thus apostasy– the freedom to choose or change one’s faith, could besafeguard in future through common discussions. Thisstep would be in accordance with international law,which states that every person has the right to chooseand convert his or her beliefs freely and without any re-strictions or oppressions. In the UDHR it is stated that“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-science and religion; this right includes freedom tochange his religion or belief.”21 At the same time, thecurrent situation is that Islam questions the act of con-verting to another religion (apostasy). For instance, aperson who exercises his/her freedom of apostasy insome countries where society is based on the Shariahlaws is still severely punished.

Therefore, interfaith dialogue has the important taskof defining a common canon of values acceptable to all.Facilitating the most problematic spheres of life withinwhich human rights seem to be frequently disregarded,the inter-religious exchange of ideas assists the imple-mentation of the international standards. However, thelatter is frequently connected with redefining the per-ception of human rights of some religions, which per-ceptions are inherited from the past.

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Conclusion

It is a fact that religious leaders have recently beentoo easily manipulated by nationalist politicians. More-over, religious motives were used not only in theBosnian violent conflict but even during the recentevents that took place in New York and Washington onSeptember 11th 2001. Thus different religious traditionswere misused for secular goals. They were involved inan inhumane violation of basic human rights. For in-stance, in ex-Yugoslavia the power of established rever-ence for religious authorities existing for centuries wasused first by the former communist regime and later bythe political leaders during and even after the war. Therole of religion, a powerful instrument used both in apositive and negative way, raises the question of howco-operation between different religious communitiescan protect and implement human rights.

In the light of the above-mentioned, the present es-say had the objective to explore the role of interfaithdialogue in the process of protection and implementa-tion of human rights. To this end, an attempt was madeto elaborate their interdependence and the various alter-native “mechanisms” for the protection and implemen-tation that inter-religious communication offers to thetraditional legal procedure.

In the course of elaboration, several ways of protec-tion and implementation of human rights were demon-strated. They were thematically developed in the respec-tive chapters.

In order to make the exploration clearer in the firstchapter the three key concepts – “inter-religious dia-logue,” “protection,” and “implementation” were de-fined. Since the concept of the interfaith dialogue canhave different interpretations, we have insisted on spe-cific definitions of these key terms. In the second chap-ter, the role of interfaith dialogue in the protection andimplementation of human rights was presented fromtwo perspectives. The one illustrated its impact espe-cially for religious rights, while the other focused on hu-man rights as a whole – their civil, political, economic,social, and cultural dimensions. Finally, in the last chap-ter the role of the interfaith dialogue as redefining theofficial attitude of certain religions towards humanrights issue was explored.

Future research on this topic could lead to an ex-amination of the role of interfaith dialogue in the pro-cess of reconciliation. Such an exploration is of interestsince it covers a violation and, consequently, the pos-sible protection of many rights. These rights include theright to life and personal security, the right to property,to free movement, and economic, social and culturalrights. This offers a unique perspective towards the roleof interfaith dialogue in protecting and implementinghuman rights in the post-war context.

Notes:

1 In the following, inter-religious dialogue and interfaithdialogue are used as synonyms. This use of these terms is in ac-cordance with widely accepted practice.

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2 Eck, D. What do we mean by ‘Dialogue’?, in: Current Dia-logue, vol. 11, 1986, pp. 14-15.

3 Other similar international NGOs dealing with the Inter-faith dialogue issue are The World Parliament of Religions, TheGlobal Ethic Foundation, The World Fellowship of Inter-Reli-gious Councils (WFIRC), etc.

4 See World Council of Churches inter-religious relations & dialogue,http://wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/interreligious/index-e.html

5 Benedek, Wolfgang and Nikolova, Minna. 2003, p. 24.6 Ibid., p. 24.7 Rondos, Alexandre. Bucharest Meeting. Stability Pact for South

Eastern Europe Working Table I, http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/home.nsf/Toate/pactstabil/$File/agenda26_en.htm

8 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm.

9 Benedek, Wolfgang and Nikolova, Minna. 2003, p. 165.10 Keating, Thomas. Speaking of Silence: Christian and Bud-

dhists on the Contemplative Way. Edited by Susan Walker. Mahwah,NJ: Paulist Press, 1987, pp. 56-57.

11 Abbot Thomas Keating and his organization, theSnowmass Conference, made up of fifteen religions, each repre-sented by one person. The Snowmass Conference has beenmeeting for nearly ten years, and the fifteen spiritual leaders havearrived at a consensus on the principles of inter-religious dia-logue.

12 Bieber, Florian. “Minority rights and the freedom of Re-ligion in Balkan Countries”, 1999, pp. 7-14, http://www.immi.se/irf/invandraren/inva991/minority.htm.

13 In this respect, one could mention the role that theSerbian Orthodox Church played in promoting nationalist ten-sions in Serbia.

14 For further details see: “Law of freedom of religion andthe legal position of religious communities and churches inBosnia and Herzegovina”, in: “Building civil societies in South-east Europe,” http://www.wcrpp.org/RforP/SOUTHEASTEUROPE_MAIN.html.

15 Bieber, Florian and Daskalovski, Zidas. Religion in Kosovo– blessing or curse? in: Understanding the war in Kosovo, London:Frank Cass, 2003, p. 275.

16 Peuraca, Branka. “Can Faith-based NGO Advance In-terfaith Reconciliation?: The case of Bosnia andHerzegovina,” in: United States Institute of Peace, N. 103, 2003.

17 Gopin, Marc. “The use of the word and its limits: a criti-cal evaluation of religious dialogue as peacemaking,” in: Smock,David, ed., Interfaith Dialogue, Washington: USIP, 2002, pp.155.

18 Ibid., p. 152.19 Keating, Thomas. 1987, p. 57.20 Sheriah is the Islamic codification of law.21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://

www.udhr.org/UDHR/default.htm.

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Ion Cordoneanu

O radiografie necesara –Ortodoxie si Globalizare

The two works this paper focuses on (AnastasiosYannopoulos, Orthodoxy and the Problems of Con-temporary World and Georgios Mantzaridis, Globaliza-tion and Universality. Phantom and Truth) represent athorough analysis of contemporary history, in whichglobalization is the direction and purpose of the newvision in human relations and community. The lost ofthe individuality of these relations is considered to bea disease which has very strong religious and anthro-pological effects. The common feature is the reaffir-mation of community in the perspective of Easternanthropology.

În cartea sa, La mondialisation, aparuta în 1997 laPress Universitaire de Frances, Philippe MoreauDefarger afirma: “Mondializarea pare sa deschidaumanitatii doua cai extreme. Da oamenilor impresia casunt închisi într-o închisoare, pamîntul… Sau nasteconstiinta unitatii umanitatii… Mondializarea nu estedecît un produs al progresului tehnic. Desigur, nu eîntîmplator faptul ca mondializarea se realizeaza în clipaîn care omul se afunda în doua infinituri: în infinitul mical materiei si în infinitul mare al astrelor” (p. 124-125).Un sentiment înrudit, dar de sens opus celui declaustrofobie produs de mondilizare, îl avea în secolul alXVII-lea Pascal care contempla spatiul infinit (problema

ION CORDONEANU

Assistant Lecturer, Ph.D.,Department of Philosophyand Theology, Faculty ofLetters, History andPhilosophy, University ofGalati, RomaniaE-mail:theosisro@yahoo.com

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infinitatii lumii devine una de mare dezbatere în acestsecol), imaginîndu-si acest bulgare de pamînt care-lpoarta pe om fara directie si fara sens prin univers.Aceeasi gravitate ca atunci infinitatea lumii o are astazidiscutia privitoare la fenomenul globalizarii, unfenomen pe cît de complex, pe atît de interpretat sievaluat, într-o dezbatere generalizata care este înca înplina desfasurare.

Spatiul rasaritean a intrat în algoritmul acesteianalize din doua perspective, ca personaj si ca actor1,ambele dînd la iveala doua viziuni care, indiscutabil,sunt, daca nu contradictorii, cel putin diferite. Dininteriorul crestinismului rasaritean doi autori sunt ceicare ne atrag atentia prin analizele pe care le întreprindasupra fenomenului globalizarii; este vorba despreprofesorul Georgios Mantzaridis, a carui judecatadeosebit de transanta catalogheaza, în Globalizare siuniversalitate – himera si adevar (Editura Bizantina, 2002),globalizarea drept “numai o înselatoare fata auniversalitatii”; si despre Anastasios Yannoulatos,Arhiepiscop al Tiranei si a toata Albania, al carui studiu,Ortodoxia si problemele lumii contemporane (EdituraBizantina, 2003) reprezinta o perspectiva clara siconvingatoare asupra unor probleme majore precumcomunitatea mondiala, Ortodoxia si drepturile omului,crestinismul si celelalte religii etc.

I

Profesorul de morala si sociologie a crestinismuluide la Tesalonic, Georgios Mantzaridis, expune un punctde vedere foarte critic în analiza fenomenuluiglobalizarii care, în opinia sa, nu este decît o ideologiepolitica promovata de noua ordine mondiala.

Alaturi de tendinta globalizanta în care esteangrenata lumea contemporana si provocata de aceastatendinta, îsi face simtite efectele miscarea deautolimitare promovata de nationalismele militante,ambele orientari luînd adesea dimensiuni amenintatoare.Autorul remarca o situatie paradoxala: apoteozaglobalizarii a coincis cu disolutia comunismului. Trecîndprin comunism, popoarele respective se întorc la fondullor etnic, în timp ce statele care nu au avut experientainternationalismului promoveaza globalizarea. Ambelemiscari arata ca nu exista sinceritate pentru adevaratauniversalitate nici de o parte, nici de cealalta. Totusi,Mantzaridis opteaza pentru o atitudine critica la adresaglobalizarii care “duce la transformarea popoarelor înmase de indivizi, la nivelarea culturilor, la amesteculreligiilor, la omogenizarea înfatisarii si acomportamentului oamenilor, la americanizareamodului de viata”1. Trebuie remarcat ca GeorgiosMantzaridis simpatizeaza chiar din primele rînduri cudefinitia data globalizarii de K. Melas într-o carte

KEY WORDS:

Globalization,uniformization, deper-sonalization, religiousand anthropologicalcrisis, personal commu-nity

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publicata în 1999, Globalizarea. O noua faza deinternationalizare a economiei. Mituri si realitate, conformcaruia globalizarea reprezinta “raspunsul american laîncercarile europenilor si japonezilor de a se gasi caparteneri de dialog la aceeasi masa cu SUA”, o definitiepe cît de tendentioasa, pe atît de reductionista.

În radiografierea fenomenului, autorul manifestapreferinta pentru individualizarea elementuluieconomico-financiar, afirmînd ca “la nivelul economieisi mai ales la nivelul economiei financiare, globalizarea aprezentat o evolutie impetuoasa”2.

Însa, adevaratul motivul pentru care globalizareaeste tematizata, si de obicei lucrul acesta se face în sensnegativ, este pentru ca ea are, printre multitudineaconsecintelor si pozitive, si negative, ca urmare gravaanihilarea omului ca persoana, atît la nivel religios, cît sila nivel antropologic. Urmare a acestei realitati, religiilesunt promovate si întelese ca “mijloace de reglarepsihologica”, viziune aflata la antipodul abordariicrestinismului drept cunoastere a adevarului despreDumnezeu ca Persoana si comuniunea Sa cu creatia.

În viziunea lui Mantzaridis, globalizarea aduce cusine o anumita imagine a lumii întelese ca materialomogenizant, nesocotind principiile, valorile siparticularitatile sale si consfintind domnia banului3.Reclamînd drept imperativa redescoperirea adevaruluipersoanei, teologul grec considera optiuni necugetatedeopotriva idolatrizarea trecutului si aderarea necritica lafenomenul globalizarii. “Provocarea globalizarii nu duceîn mod fatal la omogenizarea oamenilor”4, afirmaMantzaridis, în opinia caruia acest fenomen complex ar

putea chiar, daca nu determina, atunci cel putin înlesnirenasterea comunitatii de persoane. El vede înglobalizare o provocare din confruntarea cu care înBiserica ar putea renaste motivatia pentru o constiintacritica în vederea experierii universalitatii eclesiologice5.

Parafrazînd cartesiana îndoiala metodica,Mantzaridis dovedeste un optimism metodic exprimatîn speranta ca impasul contemporan nu trebuieconsiderat fara solutie6. Acest impas ar putea foarte binesa functioneze ca motivatie si punct de plecare pentrupregatirea unei renasteri fundamentale care sa aiba încentru persoana umana, neîngradita de sisteme simetode formale. Autorul opune globalizariiuniversalitatea crestina care are ca premisa abandonareaegoismului. Ea se construieste în interiorul lumii, lanivelul persoanelor, “înlauntrul omului si al istoriei, prinstradanie si jertfa de sine”7. Prevazînd ca, daca persoanaumana nu va lupta împotriva epidemiei globalizarii,atunci acest sistem impersonal va distruge viatapersonala si comunitara, fiind astfel lichidatacomunitatea omeneasca reala si concreta, Mantzaridis îsiafirma credinta ca o societate mondiala “nu seconstruieste pe omogenizarea oamenilor, ci prinînaltarea lor la demnitatea persoanei”8 si animate de unduh universal.

Aceste idei constituie premisele unei viziuni mainuantate si, de ce sa nu o spunem, mai putin alarmiste,care va fi dezvoltata în cartea Arhiepiscopului Tiranei sia toata Albania, Anastasios Yannoulatos, careia i-amacordat un spatiu mai larg din acest comentariu.

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II

Principala exigenta care se poate desprinde dintruînceput în lectura lui Anastasios Yannoulatos este aceeaca globalizarea nu înseamna relativism, ea trebuieînteleasa ca dialog. În privinta Ortodoxiei, aceastatrebuie sa depaseasca prejudecatile si crisparilecontractate în confruntarea cu modernitatea, sadepaseasca logica vechi simfonii si sa paseasca în logicadialogului.

Dincolo de aceste prescriptii de ordin general,Anastasios Yannoulatos întreprinde o exigenta analiza afenomenului globalizarii ca expresie a secularizarii careneglijeaza sau submineaza religia, ocupîndu-se de alteteme. Totusi, în ciuda conditiilor impuse de secularizare,se impune situarea “în aria acestor noi forte de unitateale umanitatii, fara complexele superioritatii sauinferioritatii”2, iar factorii “nereligiosi”, precum miscareasocialista sau miscari ale caror idealuri au fost initialreligioase, dar ulterior s-au laicizat (egalitate, libertateindividuala, dreptate), trebuie tratati drept parteneripentru înfaptuirea idealurilor universale. Chiar si asa, înrelatie de colaborare fiind, religia nu-si va putea ignora rolulcritic, necesitatea unei exprimari îndraznete si a unei viziuniprofetice3, precum si identificarea pericolelor sidegenerarilor culturii contemporane4.

Imperativului unitatii, asa cum este ea înteleasa decatre protagonistii contemporani reuniti în functie deinterese sau organizare tehnocrata, deci ca realitateimpusa din exterior dupa ratiuni economice si politice, îi

este opusa o viziune inteiorizata, bazata pe comuniuneapersonala care determina unitatea organica.

Pentru iesirea din criza si realizarea unei reale unitati,religiile sunt chemate sa ofere din inspiratiile si intuitiilelor spirituale, sarcina lor fiind dubla: 1. depasireablocajului si a sterilitatii dialogului5; 2. descoperireapunctului vital, semnalarea pericolului iminent al creariiunui amestec social eteroclit si lipsit de forma deodatacu oferirea solutiilor pentru realizarea unitatii, deosebitecalitativ de unitatea politica si economica, preconizatade organismele internationale, si într-o cu totul altaordine, cea transcendenta.

AnastasiosYannoulatos crede ca, în conditiiletehnocratiei si a societatii informationale de azi în carese contureaza o veritabila criza de identitate a omuluisau a comunitatii, religia crestina are o cotributiehotarîtoare care consta în „descoperirea persoanei si anevoii de integrare a acestei într-o comuniune deiubire”6. Evaluarea crizei umanitatii la sfîrsitul mileniuluial-II-lea si începutul mileniului al-III-lea este facuta dinperspectiva principiilor crestine, însa autorul esteconstient ca „solutia nu poate fi aceea conform careianoi, ca individualitati, sa transcendem cercul la niveluldiscursului propriului cerc religios închis pentru a-iîntîlni pe ceilalti, ci toti sa deschidem usile si ferestrelesistemelor noastre religioase din interior, pentru aînlesni adevarata comuniune cu toti oamenii”7. Îninterpretarea teologului, fenomenul globalizarii nu poatefi despartit de o filosofie a comuniunii personale al careifundament este, în opinia autorului, comuniunea cucreatia si comuniunea cu Dumnezeu. Cauza separatiei

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dintre oameni o reprezinta ruperea relatiei dintreDumnezeu si om.

Crestinism si comuniune universala

Anastasios Yannoulatos arata ca religia crestina areîn sine disponibilitatea pentru dialog, afirmîndnecesitatea pastrarii constiintei scindarii si a concilieriiuniversale. Credinciosului “nu îi este permis sa seizoleze în nici un fel de suficienta de sine, nici sasocoteasca izbavirea în Hristos drept mîntuire exclusivaa infimului sau ego”8. Eliberata de orice sentiment salposesiunii (a adevarului, a doctrinei etc.), Biserica esteînteleasa ca semn al unitatii umane care depasestegranitele sensibile ale comunitatilor eclesiale si caslujitoare a umanitatii. Pentru Arhiepiscopul Anastasios,unitatea nu trebuie sa fie nivelatoare, ci organica; înaceasta unitate, persoana se dezvolta în armonie cuîntregul, iar Biserica, în universalitatea ei, trebuie sadovedeasca capacitatea de cuprindere, nu de excludere.

Afirmîn ca întelegerea istoriei începe de la modelulcomuniunii care este Sfînta Treime si se sfîrseste cuacest model, Anastasios sustine proiectul unei“democratii a responsabilitatii”, în care fiecre esteresponsabil de directia pe care o urmeaza istoria.Modelul argumentativ este pe cît de simplu, pe atît derevelator: persoana este celula, comunitatea – istoria esteorganismul de viata caruia celula nu doar se bucura, cicontribuie la împlinirea ei9. Afirmînd ca indiferentacrestinului pentru ecumenism nu este conforma cu

esenta credintei crestine, Anastasios sustine afirmarearesponsabilitatii asupra întregului si a mobilizarii tuturorfortelor individuale, fiind depasita astfel orice filosofiepolitica individualista sau a statului de tip asistentialpromovate în prezent în Occident.

Ortodoxia si drepturile omului. Local si universal

Împotriva unor puncte de vedere conform caroraspiritul rasaritean ortodox ar fi incompatibil cu ideologiadrepturilor omului, teologul grec pune în discutieaceasta tema, afirmînd ca istoria Bisericii si cugetareateologica ortodoxa ofera material pretios în abordareadintr-o cu totul alta perspectiva a temei drepturiloromului.

Convingerea ca ignorarea drepturilor omuluiconstituie, din perspectiva crestina, “denaturarea firiiumane, negarea principiului unitatii neamului omenesc,a izbavirii în Hristos a întregii firi umane”10, trebuie, înopinia autorului însotita atentia în ceea ce privesteacceptarea fara discernamînt a uniformizarii pe care opractica un tip de internationalism uniform si amorf lamoda, care ignora mostenirea si specificul national. Lafel de critic se dovedeste a fi cu încercarile de integrare acrestinismului sub lozinci nationaliste (pentru ca, astfel,se neaga firea comuna a oamenilor) sau sub idealuricapitaliste (care neaga particularitatea persoanei sispecificul fiecarui popor).

Viziunea ortodoxa asupra drepturilor omului esteastfel integrata în discutia mai larga a echilibrului dintre

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universal si local, importanta pentru armonizarearespectului pentru traditiile religioase locale cudescoperirea sensului universal pe care îl ascundspecificul lor11. Pornind de aici, religiile, fara a neglijadiferentele, pot identifica sarcina comuna în încercareade a oferi o dimensiune verticala alternativa la civilizatiatehnica lipsita de profunzime si altitudine, acest demers fiindcu atît mai important cu cît autorul sustine ideea carezolvarea problemei raului nu se poate limita doar ladimensiunea sociala.

În cadrul aceleiasi discutii referitoare la problematicadrepturior omului din perspectiva ortodoxa este siimportanta distinctie dintre credinta si politica: oricetentativa de considerare a drepturilor omului dinperspectiva ortodoxa este datoare sa mentina explicitaconstiinta perspectivelor diferite si a diferentei deplanuri dintre cele doua12. Ca rezultate ale politicii, toatedeclaratiile referitoare la drepturile omului urmarescimpunerea principiilor prin instrumente legislativeconstrîngatoare, în timp ce crestinismul actioneaza înlume ca forta spirituala care elibereaza, transfigureaza sirenaste omul la o noua viata duhovniceasca13.

Este recunoscut faptul ca principiul drepturiloromului se sprijina pe o antropologie indiferenta lacoordonatele tainei persoanei, motiv pentru care secolultrecut a fost martorul atîtor tragedii si esecuri. În acesteconditii, optimismului simplificat al declaratiilorprivitoare la drepturile omului (pe fondul actiunilorcontradictorii ale celor care le sustin, al contradictiilordintre cunoastere si vointa), îi este propusa caalternativa antropologia ortodoxa, în viziunea careia

“exista o antinomie înnascuta în existenta umana”14,constînd în tensiunea dintre tragedia pacatului siposibilitatea transcenderii lui.

Drepturile omului si responsabilitate umana

Perspectiva unilaterala a afirmarii drepturilor trebuieastazi corelata cu accentuarea îndatoririlor siresponsabilitatilor. Si pentru ca unilateralitatea drepturilorindividuale conduce la individualism, nu trebuiepierduta din vedere armonizarea lor cu cele comunitare.Aceasta armonizare este exprimata în formulaevanghelica iubeste pe aproapele tau ca pe tine însuti, fiindvorba aici despre “transcenderea eu-lui si a tu-ului, învederea ridicarii la comuniunea persoanelor”15. Seimpune, astfel, o redefinire a drepturilor fundamentale aleomului pornind de la fundamentele teologice aleantropologiei rasaritene, redefinire în care demnitateaumana, legata de constiinta maretiei umane si a limitelorsale, sa reprezinte certitudinea ca omul este creatiaDumnezeului personal, libertatea sa fie considerata înlegatura cu responsabilitatea pentru faptele proprii, fiindlimitata de poruncile dumnezeiesti, iar egalitatea sa fiecircumscrisa conform declaratiei paulinice “nu mai esteelin si iudeu, barbar, scit, rob ori liber, ci toate si întrutoti Hristos” (Col. 3, 11)16. Peste acestea trei, AnastasiosYannoulatos aseaza, fundamental, dreptul de a iubi si de afi iubit, la care nu face referire nici un document, nici odeclaratie. În acest drept se împlinesc organic sidinamic, demnitatea, libertatea si egalitatea crestine.

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Autorul pune în valoare adîncimea acestei conceptiicrestine despre drepturile fundamentale, remarcîndcum, în epoca idolatrizarii drepturilor omului, “gîndireacrestina si trairea crestina scot în evidenta dreptulomului de a-si jertfi în mod liber, de dragul iubirii, chiarsi propriile drepturi. Lucrul acesta nu este impus, ci estedecis în mod liber. Iubirea ramîne o decizie dinamica ceîsi raspîndeste razele sale dincolo de cadrele înguste alestructurilor juridice, ce daruieste libertatea nu numai fatade o lege ipocrita, ci si fata de orice lege omeneasca”17.

Ultima consecinta a antropologiei crestine rasariteneo constituie afirmarea supremului drept al fiecarui om,acela de a deveni ceea ce a fost creat sa fie, adica sa împlineascaceea ce este mai profund în el si sa devina fiu al lui Dumnezeu.

Îngrijorarea Arhiepiscopului este aceea ca declaratiiledrepturilor omului sa nu ramîna texte juridice aride, iar,în privinta aceasta, “constiinta ortodoxa crestina oferaposibilitatea unei aprofundari si mai mari a sensuluidrepturilor omului”18.

La nivelul dialogului interreligios, exista acordul caproblema drepturilor fundamentale, indiferent de otraditie religioasa ori alta, este o problema importantapentru majorotatea religiilor lumii si, în special, alemarilor curente religioase (hinduism, budism, iudaism,ortodoxie, catolicism, protestantism, sintoism si islam)care accepta sacralitatea fiintei umane, demnitatea ei siînteleg sa colaboreze cu organismele internationalespecializate.

Fenomenul mondializarii si religiile

Caracterizînd-o ca ideologie politica a celor puternicieconomic si exprimîndu-si temerile cu privire la vitezacu care se desfasoara si actioneaza în schimbareastructurilor lumii, Anastasios Yannoulatos afirma camondializarea nu mai este un fenomen autonom, cireprezinta un proces care produce schimbari radicale înviata oamenilor, atît pozitive, cît si negative.“Mondializarea nu este doar un proces economic. Estevorba despre o directa sau indirecta impunere a unuisistem de gîndire care ignora sau distrugeparticularitatile fiecarui popor si om în parte si izgonestesau dizolva valori ca prietenia, onestitatea, cumpatarea,proiectînd un prototip consumist cu o neîncetataurmarire a cîstigului, sub influenta caruia relatiile umanesunt adesea strivite”19.

Însa, fenomenul mondializarii este specific oricareiadintre marile religii care au avut viziunea comunitatiimondiale si au încercat sa realizeze mondializareaspirituala si, implicit, culturala prin raspîndirea credintei.Se pot identifica trei etape în evolutia religiei la nivelmondial: mai întîi, este vorba despre impunerea uneireligii (etapa razboaielor religioase), apoi de abolireafenomenului religios (corespunzatoare instaurarariiideologiei comuniste) si, în sfîrsit, spre sfîrsitul secoluluial XIX-lea se constata revigorarea religioasa. Acumsuntem în plina desfasurare a celei de-a patra etape, cîndconstatam “invazia relativului” care tinde sa sesubstituie absolutului religios20.

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Date fiind conditiile desfasurarii procesului demondializare, se impune observatia ca fenomenulreligios are o importanta deosebita în configurareaacestui secol. Interesanta este analiza, chiar daca sumara,a tezelor pe care Samuel P. Huntington le lansa înCiocnirea civilizatiilor, unde cultura rasariteana esteasimilata, dupa o schema a priori, Islamului, fiindignorate, în fapt, fundamentele teologice si diferenteledintre cele doua religii. Aici Yannoulatos crede ca înspatele argumentarii lui Huntington se ascunde arogantaculturii americane “superioare” si instinctulautoconservarii. În opinia lui Yannoulatos, religia arepropria ei dinamica nesusceptibila “planificatelordelimitari strategice ale celor mari”.

Mondializarea impune readaptarea relatiilor dintrereligii, a caror existenta este provocata fie de nastereaunei noi religii (de tip new age), fie de o atitudine auto-conservatoare.

Este limpede ca discutia despre “religia mondiala”este mai prezenta ca oricînd, data fiind similitudinile cufenomenul mondializarii. În atari conditii, trebuierecunoscuta importanta comunicarii si a dialoguluireligios, fie doar pentru întelegerea reciproca, daca nupentru respectarea libertatii celuilalt, a specificuluialteritatii, a coexistetei pasnice si colaborarii înproblemele comune, precum dreptatea sociala,rezolvarea conflictelor21.

Întelegerea mondializarii se îndeparteaza tot maimult astazi de imaginea în care un centru, o cultura seimpun, în detrimentul celorlalte comunitati. În acestsens, comunitatile religioase se constituie în “centre de

rezistenta” si “fortarete ale identitatii”. Împotrivamondializarii abuzive, Yannoulatos întelege religiile casingurele insule de siguranta unde oamenii se repliaza.

În acest fenomen destul de complex, Ortodoxia arecontributia si responsabilitatea ei, dar legitimareatraditiei milenare ortodoxe este data numai de o traireautentica si pura care sa contribuie la oferta pozitiva aevolutiei mondiale.

Credinta ierarhului grec este ca, în raport cumondializarea, ortodoxia nu se afla în impas22.Universalitatea (ecumenicitatea, în limbaj teologic) estecomponenta fundamentala a traditiei ortodoxe iarînvatatura crestina are dimensiune universala sieshatologica. Cultural, viziunea holistica s-a articulat înprocesul sintezei dintre cultura greaca si continutulrevelat al credintei crestine. Aceasta viziune esteprezenta si în reprezentarile liturgicii ortodoxe carecultiva un orizont global, o viziune pancosmica:rugaciunile sunt “pentru pacea lumii”, iar Biserica estedatoare sa orienteze “renasterea duhovniceasca aomului, mîntuirea în Hristos, conferirea unui sensvietii”23. În centrul preocuparilor ei Biserica aseaza omul(caracterizat de tenacitate si iubire nefatarnica, caresprijina dreptatea împotriva egocetrismului individual,national sau rasial) si vesteste, alaturi de ecercitareafunctiei profetice si critice la adresa oricaror forme dedecadenta umana, comuniunea mondiala de iubire. “Bisericanu poate apartine clubului celor puternici si bogati.Puterea Ortodoxiei nu s-a identificat, nici nu s-a sprijinitpe exercitiul puterii lumesti”24.

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O viziune mondiala crestina, diferita de orice altaforma de mondializare, este circumscrisa în Epistola adoua soborniceasca (ecumenica) a lui Petru: “Dar noiasteptam, potrivit fagaduintelor Lui, ceruri noi si pamîntnou, în care locuieste dreptatea” (3, 13) (vezi despresensul dreptatii, nota 16 infra.). Aceasta viziune are încentrul ei relatia cu Dumnezeul cel Viu, relatie în careBiserica, în ecumenicitatea ei, difera de orice alt sistemreligios. Revelatoare este lectia si credinta pe careArhiepiscopul Anastasios le aseaza în încheierea cartiisale: “Ecumenicitatea este în sîngele ortodocsilor, careeste purificat neîncetat de sîngele lui Hristos, Izbavitorullumii. În locul unei mondializari care transformapopoare si oameni într-o masa utila doar scopuriloreconomice ale unor oligarhii anonime, trairea si viziuneaortodoxa propun si cheama la efotul pentru ocomuniune de iubire”25. Lectia aceasta marturisestecredinta în Ortodoxie, una a secolelor viitoare, deschisaevolutiei, si nicidecum la marginea istoriei, ci înavangarda ei, spre asigurarea libertatii si unicitatii persoaneiumane si a integritatii creatiei lui Dumnezeu.

Note la partea I

1. Globalizare si universalitate, himera si adevar, EdituraBizantina, Bucuresti, 2002 (Tesalonic, 2001).

2. op. cit., p. 10. Elementului economic îi corespundeprocesul similar pe plan cultural si la nivel duhovnicesc.

3. op. cit., p. 7.4. op. cit., p. 8.

5. Constiinta critica a Bisericii se afla si ea în deriva, deoarececonstiinta eclesiala, universala în esenta ei, se confrunta cu un fenomenconcurent ale carui aspiratii sunt universaliste.

6. Conform unui model de argumentare asemanator, înspatiul românesc H. R. Patapievici preconizeaza iesirea din impasa Ortodoxiei prin reconsiderarea din partea Bisericii a relatiei cumodernitatea.

7. op. cit., p. 29.8. op. cit., p. 19.

Note la partea a II-a

1. Ca personaj, spatiul rasaritean (Crestinism ortodox, Islam,Orient îndepartat) este unul dintre factorii cu care civilizatiaoccidentala se confrunta, atît în ordinea politica si economica, cît,mai ales, în cea religioasa (conform Samuel Huntington, Ciocnireacivilizatiilor). Ca actor, Rasaritul (aici este vorba despre Ortodoxie,în mod strict) vrea sa fie partener egal la configurarea noilorcadre ale geopoliticii euro-atlantice.

2. Anastasios Yanoulatos, Ortodoxie si problemele lumiicontemporane, Editura Bizantina, 2003, p. 20.

3. Anastasios Yannoulatos nu pierde din vedere functiametanoica pe care si-o asuma teologia crestina în dialogul ei culumea. Aceasta functie este presupusa si îndeplinita de rolul critical religiei, critica fiind înteleasa în sensul etimologic al cuvîntuluigrecesc: krinein=a discerne. Discernerea este urmata de optiune,fiind conditia necesara pentru a putea întelege si alege binele.

4. Alaturi de sentimente contradictorii ca putere-neputinta,libertate-oprimare, este identificata si izolarea (sentimentul tragical izolarii în multime).

5. Textul este redactat în anii 70 si prezentat ca referat încadrul Conferintei Interreligioase Internationale din Colombo(Ceylon, 17-27 aprilie, 1974). La vremea aceea, cel putin dialogulîntre romano-catolici si ortodocsi era la început. Astazi, chiardaca suntem înca în faza ceremonioasa a relatiilor, evolutia încomunicare este evidenta.

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6. op. cit., p. 25. Autorul constata, la nivelul tuturorstructurilor societatii, înmultirea „mastilor” (ðñïóùðåßá) sidisparitia „persoanelor” (ðñïóùðá), iar pierderea identitatii„personale” a unui individ este un proces în care, la nivelulexistentei sociale individuale, o masca este înclocuita cu alta.

7. op. cit., p. 27.8. op. cit., p. 33.9. op. cit., p. 36. Responsabilitatea crestinului acopera nu doar

istoria prezenta, ci si pe cea trecuta si viitoare, pentru ca doarresponsabilitatea asupra întregului constituie ratiunea pentrupromovarea comunitatii mondiale. Principiul responsabilitatiiasupra istoriei este considerat fundamental în literatura crestinarasariteana.

10. op. cit., p. 44.11. În acest sens, trebuie amintita interpretarea pe care a

dezvoltat-o Mircea Eliade asupra culturilor traditionale arhaice,în care religiologul român a accentuat asupra semnificatiiloruniversale ale culturilor locale, sustinînd ca suntem cu atît maiuniversali, cu cît coborîm pe filonul specific în identificareasemnificatiilor originare ale unui fenomen religios.

12. op. cit., p. 6213. Trebuie, însa, remarcata maniera mai putin

convingatoare de a cauta “radacinile” problematicii drepturiloromului în textele Evangheliei, carora lumea apuseana, în opiniaautorului, le-ar datora multe. Fermentul care a înlesnitdezvoltarea ideilor evanghelice l-ar fi constituit, în perioadaRenasterii, gîndirea greaca. Se pierde din vedere faptulcacrestinismul si-a formulat propria viziune cu privire la locul sirolul omului în lume si relatia lui cu statul, viziune atît de diferitaatît de cea greaca, cît si de cea a Renasterii, aceasta o miscare cuvadite accente de autonomizare a existentei umane în raport cuDumnezeu (fara a mai discuta si amestecul substantial de magie,

astrologie si alchimie care strabate toata aceasta perioada, pîna înzorii obscuri ai modernitatii). Modernitatea, la rîndul ei, vadesavîrsi opera de autonomizare a Ratiunii, începuta cuDescartes si încheiata cu Iluminismul si Revolutia franceza,curente si evenimente ale caror principii, dupa parerea mea, cugreu pot fi echivalate principiilor crestine. (v. p. 64 si nota 29 in-fra.)

14. op. cit., p. 66.15. op. cit., p. 67.16. Nerespectarea acestei egalitati este numita în textele

patristice nedreptate.17. op. cit., p. 84-85.18. op. cit., p. 89.19. op. cit., p. 221-222.20. Teologul grec considera drept portagonist principal în

impunerea realtivismului gîndirea indiana a carei conceptieasupra pluralismului religios este caracterizata de ideea“absoluturilor alternative”.

21. În aceasta ultima chestiune, Biserica romano-catolica si-aformat un bun obicei de a interveni sau, macar, de a-si faceauzita vocea, atunci cînd comunitatea internationala este în impasla masa negocierilor sau unele conflicte tind sa se agraveze.

22. Aceasta împotriva multor voci exaltate din spatiulortodox care prevad conspiratii oculte, atacuri subterane,subminari de autoritate, comploturi etc., toate acestea pentru adiscredita în fata comunitatii internationale si pentru a o aruncaîn afara procesului integrarii tarilor est-europene în structurileeuro-atlantice.

23. op. cit., p. 234.24. op. cit., p. 235. Cu ispita puterii lumesti s-a confruntat

Apusul.25. op. cit., p. 237.

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Marius Jucan

Secularizare/ desecularizare.Un rezumat de etapa

The author attempts to sketch a general survey on theissue of secularization and de-secularization, as itappears in various present-day interpretations of themeaning of cultures, as well as in the comprehensionof modernity. Taking as guiding point the process ofsecularization in Western Europe, but also consideringthe rebirth of religious life in Eastern Europe, theauthor looks at the flexible ways in which the relationsbetween secularization and de-secularization shouldbe dealt with in a permanent global transition.

Textul de fata reprezinta pentru autor, dupa cumeste înscris în titlu doar un „rezumat de etapa“, ceea ceînseamna doua lucruri, primul ca o etapa a fost parcursaîn elucidarea unor chestiuni privind rolul secularizarii înîntelegerea modernitatii în general, al situarilor culturaleprezente. Al doilea, ca schita de fata este un posibilpunct de pornire pentru o analiza interdisciplinara arolului secularizarii în diverse compartimente alesocialului, culturalului si politicului contemporan. Unanume eclectism al abordarii este evident, dar pe de alta

MARIUS JUCAN

Assoc. Prof., Ph.D.,Faculty of EuropeanStudies, BBU, Cluj, Roma-niaAuthor of the books:Singuratatea salvata(2001), The ComplexInnocence (2001),Fascinatia fictiunii saudespre retorica elipsei(1999)E-mail:marjucan@yahoo.com

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parte, tendinta de a folosi o cercetare pentru a lansa ometoda, nu este în momentul de fata preocupareaautorului. Ceea ce nu însemna în vreun caz,desconsiderare fata de „taietura“ metodei. Acesta esteprobabil rostul etapei, cel de a nu declara decît un sfîrsitprovizoriu al cercetarii.

Un prim pas pentru abordarea temei pe care o tratezaici într-o schita a unui proiect mai larg despresecularizare/ de-secularizare este cel în care încerc sa marefer la secularizare/ desecularizare ca la un proces cul-tural în care este angrenata notiunea de cultura în sensuldat acesteia de Clifford Geertz,: „culture is best seen notas complexes behaviour patterns – customs, usages, tra-ditions, habit clusters - as has by and large, been thecase up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms,plans, recipes, rules, instructions, (what the computerengineers call „programs“. The second idea is that manis precisely the animal most desperately dependent uponsuch extragenetic qutiside-the skin control mechanisms,such cultural programs for orderin his behavior” (Inter-pretations of Cultures, Selected Essays, Basic Books, 1973,p.44-45). Într-alta definitie asupra culturii, PierreBourdieu vorbeste despre „conditionarile asociate cu oclasa particulara de conditii de existenta“ care „produchabitusuri, sisteme de dispozitii durabile si transpozabile,structuri structurante predispuse sa functioneze castructuri structurante, adica în calitate de principiigeneratoare si organizatoare de practici si reprezentaricare pot fi adaptate obiectiv la scopul lor fara apresupune urmarirea constienta a unor scopuri sistapînirea expresa a operatiilor necesare pentru atingerea

lor, reglate si regulate în mod obiectiv, fara a fi cu nimicprodusul supunerii fata de unele reguli, si fiind toateacestea, orchestrate în mod colectiv, fara a fi produsulactiunii organizatoare a unui dirijor” (Simtul practic,Institutul European, 2000, p. 82-83). Un al doilea pas estecel de a urmari o perspectiva culturala genealogicaasupra ceea ce numim în general un proces desecularizare ca trasatura a modernitatii si instaurariispecifice, acesteia în Occident. Occidentul ofera ovarianta explicativa a modernizarii prin modelul saureligios cultural, impactul stiintei si tehnologiei siorganizarii ierarhiilor sociale. În acest loc, as mentionade asemenea ca secularizarea apare ca proces reversibil,din nou în Occident, unde interesul pentru institutiaclericala ca purtatoare de cuvînt a unei culturi a omuluieste recunoscut azi, mai degraba decît ieri. Pozitiareligioasa dogmatica din trecutul Bisericii se transformaîntr-o „aparare” a omului. Secularizarea/ desecularizareoccidentala trebuie constata într-o forma de opozitieinclusiva cu ceea ce se petrece în afara lumii occidentale,în culturi a caror modernitate a fost indusa oriprovocata de modelul occidental, dar în caresecularizarea nu a avut loc decît partial. Perspectivagenealogica culturala origineaza în perspectivismulnietzscheean, dezvoltînd o critica a organicismului ro-mantic, vazut ca esentialism fals care obscurizeazaperceptia adevarului. Un al treilea pas urmaresteipostazierea adevarului în secularizare/ de-secularizare,ca proces de adeverire a unei forme istorice de cultura,de pilda cultura moderna/ postmoderna, ca forma detraire autentica care îsi masoara performantele într-un

KEY WORDS:

secularization, de-secularization, culturalstudies, postmodernism,Theo-morphosis

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stil adecvat recunoscut de societate. În acest sens oschematizare a evolutiei unor tipologii umane si socialeeste sugerata de diagramele de la sfîrsitul articolului.

O perspectiva culturala genealogica se confrunta cuimpasul survenit în economia reprezentarilor desprecultura, cu pluralitatea decupajelor despre reprezentare,si de asemenea cu tensiunea anti-reprezentationalismuluicare caracterizeaza postmodernismul. Perspectivaculturala genealogica este o perspectiva a crizei, a dubleifiliatii a crizei, venind pe de o parte dintr-unfragmentarism cultural pe care îl pune în dispozitieavangarda si proiectul ei de producere de noutate con-tinua, iar pe de alta parte din figuralitatea incompleta areprezentarilor culturale însasi, care în momentulrecunoasterii lor au depasit o buna parte din noutatealor. Un asemenea exemplu este dat de rapiditateaclasicizarii avangardei. În alta ordine de idei,postmodernul nu mai recunoaste ierarhia uneicentralitati absolute, iar daca o admite, o face doar înrelatie cu o marginalitate înzestrata cu un rol la fel deimportant cu cel al centralitatii. Astfel, mitulrecunoasterii se desface în versiuni posibile alerecunoasterii circumstantiate de contextul cultural, adicaîn versiuni ale unor recunoasteri.. Perspectiva culturalagenealogica nu este chemata sa dea seama despre unimpas peratologic, despre escapisme milenariste, oridespre adevarurile modernitatii ca adevaruri naturale aleomului, ci sa arate dincolo de programul ideologic aloricarei emancipari (cum a fost gîndita programaticsecularizarea) intuirea posibilului uman, reînnoireadefinitiilor despre aceasta viziune postmoderna asupra

omului ca om posibil, fata de om universal. Pornind de larasturnarea cronologica nietzscheana (chronologischeUmdrehung), perspectiva culturala genealogica pe care oinvoc aici urmareste sa dea seama despre un sens alsecularizarii/ desecularizarii în circumstantele culturaleactuale, care sunt însa inevitabil cricumstantiate de otraditie. (de pilda, relatia dintre scripturalitate/ oralitate)

O asemenea perspectiva îsi pune întrebarea despreimportanta adevarului despre secularizare/desecularizare, cum spune Bernard Williams, genealogistbritanic, vorbind despre efectul filosofiei nietzscheeneasupra limpezirii calitatilor primare ale adevarului, cumar fi exactitatea, autenticitatea, („Virtutile adevarului“ înRespectul. De la stima la deferenta : o problema de nuanta“,coordonator, Catherine Audard, Editrua Trei, 2003,pp.186-199), pe care le folosim atunci cînd ne ocupamde secularizare/ de-secularizare. Privesc secularizarea/de-secularizarea ca pe un produs eminamente cultural,care nu poate fi abordat din unghiul unei singure surse,al carui înteles trebuie condus spre o comprehensiune aactualului, prin interpretari pluridisciplinare. Tentatia dea privi secularizarea/ desecularizarea doar prin prismaunei unice surse de iluminare, pentru a spune asa, nucreeaza doar un monopol nedorit al unei singure disci-pline asupra problemei, ci ofera un exemplu monological hermeneuticii despre secularizare/desecularizare. Desiprin aceasta afirmatie nu neg importanta originariistudiului secularizarii desecularizarii înca de la nivelulunor texte patristice, sunt mai înclinat în aceasta schitasa observ secularizarea/ de-secularizarea în ceea ceapare ca secularismul societatii civile occidentale, ca

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existenta reala politica, sociala, nu în ultimul rîndculturala, si mai apoi ca proiectie universala dusa spreimplementare în procesul de globalitate culturala în carene aflam, proces conditionat nu în ultimul rînd decontextualitatea globalizarii economice si tehno-stiintifice a lumii actuale. Privesc, cum am mai afirmat,secularizarea/ desecularizarea ca un aspect major alcomunicarii în lumea contemporana, a tranzitiei de laoralitatea premoderna la scripturalitatea moderna simodernista, pentru ca apoi în postmodernitate sa se ob-serve o renastere a interesului pentru oralitate, dar sipentru figurarea completitudinii simturilor încomunicarea mediatica.

Mentionez acestea pentru ca de fiecare data unanume stil al comunicarii a adus ideea unui sfîrsit alcomunicarii, asa cum s-a întîmplat cu oralitatea, si asacum se asteapta a se petrece acum cu scripturalitatea alcarei obiect al comunicarii, cartea este considerata deunii a fi în „pragul“ sfîrsitului. În aceste „secvente“ alesfîrsitului, oferite de un stil de comunicare, fie cel oralori cel scriptural observ semnalarea procesului desecularizare/ desecularizare a chiar mijlocului decomunicare, care dupa cum stim nu este doar un simpluvehicul de comunicare, ci adauga comunicarii un sens alexistentei comunicatorului. Perspectiva culturalagenealogica da în vileag, ca nemaiavînd nimic de ascuns,arhitectura modernitatii ca sistem de habitus-uriculturale apte sa produca noi constrîngeri culturale.Modernitatea celebreaza în constiinta superioritatii eifata de „cei vechi“ ori în „cearta“ cu cei vechi,producerea de noi constrîngeri culturale, care în

noutatea lor consumabila de fapt, nu sunt decît însemneale unei supleante a sfîrsitului. Semnul ruperii de antiquus,producerea neîntrerupta, concurentiala de noutate(culturala, în sens generic, în care includ si noutateatehno-stiintifica) duce la uitarea voita a vechiului, deci lao vointa de nou, la perceptia acesteia si la celebrarealibertatii acestei vointe, care se desfasoara în intuitiaposibilului, a cunoasterii acestuia. Rememorareavechiului (a trecutului) vazuta în postmodernitate cafiind forma de noutate care tine de parodic ori de ironiceste o demonstratie ca producerea noutatii este undiscurs despre creatie, mai precis, vointa de creatie, casemn al existentei, nu neaparat al puterii, dar desigur alputerii de a exista, al carui autor deleaga reprezentarea unuisfîrsit în reprezentarea noutatii. Altfel spus, creatia noutatiiîn modernitate în general se face dintr-un loc alauactorialitatii, al asumarii acestei functii auctoriale defiecare individ care traieste sub emblema cognitiva acunoasterii de sine prin inter-actiunea cu ceilalti.

Omul modern ca „autor” al propriei sale vietisupuse constrîngerilor culturale se gaseste mereu încompania, ori mai degraba în umbra unui autor „vechi“,al carui negative este împrumutat pentru a fi distrus lafiecare gest cultural de crearea a noutatii. Desprevizibilitatea functiei auctoriale a omului modern,invizibilitatea autorului „vechi “ tin neaparat seama,devreme ce creatia culturala, (literara, muzicala, depilda), îmi apar ca niste creatii dialogice.

Tema majora a secularizarii este încapsulata de tezahegeliana. Între timp însa, différance-ul derridean ne arataca, desi produs, sensul cuprins în pliuri hermeneutice

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întîrzie sa se arate, adica sa se ierarhizeze într-oreprezentare, ceea ce demonstreaza impasul vointei de aiesi în deschisul adevarului, al intentiei de a gasi,exprimînd, adevarul. (Intentio – încordare, intendo-ere, tendi,tentum, a încorda, întinde coarda, a întinde deasupra, aacoperi, a pune, a mari, a spori, îndrepta, a tinde, aintentiona). Expresia adevarului în vorbire, apoi în scriseste pusa la îndoiala, ca forma de reprezentare recurentacare tradeaza ceea ce se petrece în lipsa de„interioritate” ori de „adînc”. De aici, sarcina oricaruidiscurs de a veghea asupra fixarii limitelor , din ce în cemai „moi“, si de a recunoaste în pluralitatea vocilor carese întretaie, relativizarea vocii însasi care exprimaadevarul ca reprezentare. Cred ca între moartea religieica logos relevant si moartea logosului din logocentrism,exista o retea de legaturi ce surprinde critica vointei cametafizica depasita. Drama vointei romantice devine înmodernismul avangardist si utilitarist o legitimare aputerii, de unde delegitimarea acesteia prin analizasubterfugiilor vointei, a vointei de a spune adevarul/ de aspune adevarat, în cele din urma. Perspectiva genealogicarepusa în termenii ei nietzscheeni trebuie sa discearna încreatia unei noutati impactul unei intentii (vointe) carese emancipeaza de vointa de creatie, de formeleinstrumentale ale creatiei, daca urmarim creatia noutatiiîn analogia ei cu creatia artistica. Vointa de creatieeliberata de datoria unei imitatio Christi, cunoaste înautonomia ei, sa remarcam niciodata anarhica ci mereucontrolata de un canon, o de-solidarizare cu propriulprodus, vazut doar în aceasta ipostaza, ca noutate.Numai de-solidarizîndu-se de produsul creat, vointa

creatoare umana poate recunoaste noutatea operei(folosesc mai departe analogia cu opera artistica), opoate repeta, revenind mereu la momentul unei fracturidintre o vointa si obiectul nascut din ea. În aceastarepetare a unei rupturi, care imita despartirea luiDumnezeu fata de lume, remarc, tocmai datorita de-solidarizarii de mai sus, singuratatea si singularizareavointei, aura ei de putere semi-fictiva deci semi-reala,între o imaginarea a ei ca pro-iect, si actualizarea a ei, caprogram pragmatic pentru producerea de nou sinoutate.

Un exemplu la îndemîna pentru ideea de noutate pecare Europa crestina l-a pus în actiune, ca efect alsecularizarii treptate este „secularizarea razboinicilor”despre care scrie Norbert Elias. Suprimarea sisublimarea violentei în procesul de „curtenizare” arataconstrîngerea violentei si rusticitatii vietii în formeculturale noi, desigur artificiale, pentru a crea un spatiual rusinii publice si al apararii pudorii, vazute ca produceale interioritatii. Vointa de noutate civilizatorie si deconstructie a unei asemenea noutati nu a încetat safoloseasca de fapt violenta în diferite forme deconstrîngeri culturale, în care expresia unei „libertati” devointa este contracarata cu estetismul, formalismulacestei libertati. Conteaza de la un moment datfrumusetea care înnobileaza libertatea unei vointe.Constrîngerea culturala profunda care a modelat Europaeste habitus-ul crestinismului, al vointei de fi crestin, defapt dupa reprezentarile care s-au succedat în istoriaereziilor dar si a reformei. Universalizarea ratiunii de acrede în Dumnezeu si rationalizarile succesive ale

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credintei în Dumnezeu au constituit „vointe” de areprezenta ceea ce ramînea de fapt imuabil in misterulcredintei. În timp ce ratiunea de a crede în Dumnezeuse centreaza în lege, misterul credintei este iubirea„nebun” de Dumnezeu, pentru a-l cita pe Evdokimov.Legea crestina este iubirea, dar nu orice fel de iubirepoate sapa în inima credinciosului legamînt „noutatii”vietii. Între ratiunea de a crede si iubirea de Dumnezeuremarc o legatura procesuala, care „înnoieste” traireacelui ce cauta adevarul sub genericul teomorfozei.

Teomorfoza crestina a Europei ilustreaza conflictulsi/ sau unitatea dintre lege si iubire în iconofilie siiconoclasm, în asteptarea mîntuirii care se transforma învointa de despartire de lume (Augustin), pentru a aveaconstiinta unei lumi de care omul sa se poate desparti.Despartirea în comunitati umane monastice si laicepune în valoare vointa unei constiinte ca vointa deadevar interior sadit prin actul creatiei. În acest mod aladerentei vointei umane la proiectul depasirii conditieiumane, se întrevede reprimarea „libertatii” de a voi, cîtsi salvarea existenta pentru om, aceea de a nu vrea„altfel”. Întrebarea care se poate formula de îndata ceinvestigam imaginile noutatii în procesul de teomorfoza,înfatisarile diferite ale lui Dumnezeu în imaginarulcrestin, este cea despre raportul dintre teomorfoza sisecularizare. Sa mentionez înainte de a încerca saraspund, ca teomorfoza are radacini europene stravechi,teogoniile, care ilustreaza un proces teomorfotic re-gresiv, în cautarea si exprimarea unei origini. Imaginareaoriginaritatii lumii în actul creatiei ei poate fi urmarita siîntr-un sens al pro-gresiv, în utopiile care apar ca semn

limpede al secularizarii. Dar probabil, mai întîi, merita sastim ce este secularizarea, ori mai degraba, cum se vavedea mai jos, ce nu este ea.

Dupa Bruce Stevens (God is Dead. Secularization in theWest, Blackwell Publishers, 2002) secularizarea nu este oîncercare de a explica din punct de vedere istoric sigeografic un set specific de schimbari. Secularizarea nuare un caracter inevitabil, nu este cum spune autorul,„teoria progresului travestita“. Secularizarea nu este unproces uniform si nici universal, iar sfîrsitul secularizariinu este ateismul. Nu exista o teorie a secularizarii. Sestie ca deceniul sase sustinea ca viitorul religiei esteextinctia ei. Constatarea principala venea din faptul camodernizarea a creat dificultatile religiei în mai toatedomeniile ei simbolice si performative. Trecerea de lacomunitate la societate a însemnat declinul institutiilorreligioase, cresterea ca prestigiu a autonomieiindividului, a experimentului în masa culturala aindivizilor, triumful unei orientari rationale,instrumentale si apoi hedonistice, care a subminaultimele reprezentari ale unui stil de viata ascetic.Separarea dispozitiilor evaluative de cele emotive, acelor experientiale cotidian vorbind, de cele cognitive adus si mai rapid la rationalizarea culturii sireprezentarilor culturale, adica a noului si noutatii, caprodus legitimator al unei lumi seculare. Industrialismulsi industrializarea, pentru a vorbi de alti termeni aiconstrîngerii culturale, altii decît credinta religioasa, auprodus în unda de soc cunoscuta un alt tip de nivelareculturala, desi secularizarea nu trebuie confundata cusensul modernizarii, ceea ce ar însemna ca apogeul

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modernitatii este, cum am mai aratat ateismul. Un autorca Gellner vorbeste despre importanta valoriloregalitarismului, desigur altele decît cele ale vietiicomunitare crestine, fara de care industrialismulesueaza, ori stagneaza, ca în societatile care se conducînca dupa traditia patriarhala, inapte de ceea ce secheama mobilitate sociala. Am mentionat aceste date alesecularizarii cu preponderenta occidentale, deoarece înacest leagan al secularizarii care este Occidentul auaparut odata cu industrialismul si primele reconstructiiale credintei religioase moderne.

A insista asupra acestor caracteristici ale secularizarii,ofera, cred o întelegere din perspectiva multiplicariinoului si noutatii dintr-o cu totul alta directie decît ceapreconizata de transformarea omului, si anume detransformare a lumii si naturii odata cu cea dintîi. Maimentionez tot în acest loc ideea ca societalizarea (dupaWilson) este privita ca actionînd de sus în jos, prinpoliticile de modernizare care disemineaza efectelesecularizarii, prin rolul distinct al factorului coercitiv deputere în structuri administrative si legale. Consecintadirecta a implantului societal în modernizare, ca de pildaîn cazul modernizarii, sovietizarii, al re-europenizariipentru România de pilda, este ca de fiecare data culturatraditionala a trebuit sa îsi restrînga arealul, ca paznic alcredintei religioase. Se pretinde ca societalizarea armoniasociala deasupra apararii credintei religioase, care nu armai putea efectua acest deziderat. Berger si Luckmannau ilustrat remarcabil faptul ca societalizarea sicompartimentarea sociala creeaza constrîngerea de a traifragmentar si fragmentat, simultan, în mai multe lumi.

Amenintarea religiei nu a venit însa din partea uneicompartimentari progresive a societatii, si nici din parteastiintei cu care religia s-a deprins sa convietuiasca, fara adovedi antagonismul funciar de care erau siguriiluministii. Dupa Berger si Kellner, dezvoltareatehnologica ar produce o constiinta tehnologica, „un stilde gîndi ireconciliabil cu sensul sacrului”. Constiintatehnologica ar însemna de asemenea înlocuirea seturilorde practice religioase, si diseminarea atributelorconstiintei tehnologice, care ar fi componentialitatea,reproductibilitatea, asteptarea schimbarilor constante,insistenta asupra inovatiei.

Secularizarea prezinta dupa Steve Bruce cîteva con-tra-tendinte principale, care ar putea trece dreptsimptome ale de-secularizarii produse chiar în interiorulprocesului de secularizare. Se arata în acest fel, careprimata pe terenul social, al structurilor de prestigiusocial, religia îsi regaseste vechea semnificatie culturala,în ceea ce s-ar numi o „aparare culturala” a omului sireinventare al unui patrimoniu al societatii umane, chiarmai mult, al umanitatii vazute în pericol (exemplulclonarii). Rolul Bisericii în apararea unei naturalitati aomului ca fiinta „creata” nu se refera numai laargumentele ontologice ale creatiei, ci la dreptul traditieicrestine de a revendica o proprietate morala de neatinsasupra umanitatii omului, vazuta ca loc al traditieiumanismului universal. Identificarea etnica sustinuta deinstitutia clericala din aceleasi ratiuni defensive serasfrînge si asupra comportamentului industrial alindividului contemporan, considerat a fi de catreBiserica „maximalizant“, fara a aduce foloase reale

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umanitatii omului, de aceea consumativ si alienant.Aceasta identificare a religiosului cu domeniile de maremiza culturala dar si politica ale omului, precumeducatia, cultura nationala, efectul mass-mediei, criticahedonismului, si in general critica lipsei de idealism asocietatii consumeriste demonstreaza revenirea înactualitate a religiosului, fapt datorat în primul rîndscaderii dramatice a idealismului social, ori utopismuluicultural. Prin cele doua notiuni, cele ale idealismului so-cial si utopismului cultural, înteleg forme ale imaginatieisociale care au antrenat schimbari profunde încomportamentul cultural al individului în trecerea, depilda de la o cultura a oralitatii la una a scripturalitatii, dela comunitatea rurala la societatea industriala. Dar pe dealta parte industrializarea si urbanizarea au condus laaparitia unor miscari de renastere si reforma religioasa,exemplul metodismului si evangelicalismului britanicfiind urmat în secolul douazeci de alte tari din AmericaLatina, Europa de Est etc. Astfel, daca admitem casecularizarea nu este o ruptura definitiva de lumea„vrajita“ a religiei si a credintei religioase, mai de parte,chiar de un spirit al religiozitatii care se rasfrînge în altedomenii decît cel al religiosului, ca mai curînd se poatevorbi de episoade de secularizare, se ajunge la ideea casecularizarea ca proces, trebuie revizuit.

În schita de fata, intentionez sa arat ca secularizarease prezinta ca o supleanta variabila a procesului deteomorfoza, care are un sens îndreptat spre o dezvoltaremaximala, exhaustiva, acompaniata de o tendinta de de-secularizare (revrajire), prin care înaintarea secularizariieste dependenta de un habitus. Ca supleanta a

teomorfozei, secularizarea retine formalismul unorsimboluri teomorfotice pe care le goleste de sensuloriginar, cu alte cuvinte le degradeaza, fara a le eliminaîn totalitate. Un exemplu al urmei teomorfotice prezenteîn comuniunea de sentimente, în primul rînd, apoi decredinte, si în cele din urma de interese, este constructiaîncrederii sociale ca liant al societatii civile. S-a remarcattrecerea de la credinta religioasa la încredere sociala,prin în-credintarea pe care individul o cîstiga în pregatireasi apoi înflorirea iluminismului, prin autonomizareavointei. În antagonismul modern (occidental) între statsi societate, diminuarea importantei statalitatii fata desocietatea civila, si accentul relevant al unei „religiicivile”, urmeaza, cred, modelul teomorfic al uneicredinte sovaitoare, al acelui fides fluitans, care are nevoiede un suport volitiv intern, pentru a putea depasivulnerabilitatea umana, vazuta ca îndoiala, facînd dincredinta si nu din vointa un instrument al „noutatii”vietii sociale, prin care dupa preceptul crestin seinstaureaza armonia sociala. De remarcat, rolul vointeiîn separarea moderna a credintei de „îndrazneala de asti”, în emanciparea vazuta ca iesire din minoratulmiturilor si credintelor, care conserva un mod degradatteomorfic. Nu doresc aici decît sa spun cacontractualismul care fundamenteaza încrederea socialamoderna disuadeaza în societatile civile occidentale„sovaiala sociala“, si dimpotriva aceasta ramîne completneschimbata (în sens de pasivitate sociala) în societatileîn care simbolurile teomorfotice degradate exista înreligiozitatea fata de stat ori lider politic. Cazulsocietatilor asa-zis „ne-democratice”, cu mult mai

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numeros decît al celor democratice, evidentiaza faptulca grupurile societatii civile nu pot se realizeze ocoerenta a expresiei unei vointe politice, reprezentare aunui exercitiu de idealism social si a unui utopism cul-tural.

Mi-am pus întrebarea de ce teomorofoza pe care amprezentat-o în schita de fata ca factor generativ alsecularizarii/ de-secularizarii este supusa unui proces desupleanta. Raspunsul ar fi ca supleanta este generata destructura teomorfozei, mai precis de o contradictie totmai activa de la un moment dat în lege si iubire ca traire acredintei religioase, a plenitudinii oferite de traireaindividuala si comunitara teomorfa. Habitus-ul cultural,în sensul lui recent, reactualizat de Bourdieu dovedesteca producerea noului si a noutatii lumii crestine a fostdivizarea lumii de la Augustin încoace prin celebra for-mula a „celor doua spade” o prima si importantadiviziune între o viziune culturala sacra si una profana.Rolul demersul genealogic pe care l-am schitat laînceput este cel de a vedea discriminarea pe caregenealogistii, daca mi-as permite sa spun asa, o fac întreadevar si veracitate. Accentul care cade pe veracitate, peacea „asemanare adevarata” cu un prim model, duce laideea producerii de similaritati canonice strictcontrolabile ale unei trairi adevarate care sa legitimezeîntrutotul adevarul. Fidelitatea fata de reprezentarea

adevarului credintei este dominanta care produce mereuforme sociale noi de fidelitate, ajustînd comportamentulindividului pe masura acestora si gasind în acestearealizarea posibilitatii neconsumate de adevar alcredintei. Meister Eckhart spune ca : „Nimic nu-ti valipsi daca posezi o vointa adevarata si dreapta : niciiubirea, nici umilinta,.nici oricare alta virtute. Dar,posezi ceea ce vrei cu putere si cu toata vointa si niciDumnezeu, nici vreo creatura nu-ti poate lua acel lucru,daca vointa îti este în întregime si cu adevarat divina sifolosita în prezent”. (Jeanne Ancelet-Hustache, MeisterEckhart si mistica renana, Univers enciclopedic, 1997).Cum poate exista însa adevarul credintei decît printr-ointuitie a vointei de a crede, o experiere a aptitudinii, deunde si producerea unei atitudini care sa înlesneascaacest procedeu, reluat continuu, de a sesiza ceea ce nueste conform acestuia, prin vointa ? Dar în acelasi timp,adevarul credintei nu poate fi confundat cu proba sa deveracitate, de unde un model al experierii continue sinesfîrsite, o „scara” a experientei practice nesfîrsite..

Închei aceasta schita, mentionînd ca secularizareaeste constructie culturala care trebuie citita în laturileadiacente ale culturalului si politicului, si în care „re-vrajirea”, reinstaurarea fascinatiei, nu doar a religiei ci sia ideologiei se petrece, cum arata J.F. Lyotard subsemnul unei alte perceptii a timpului.

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SECULARIZAREA CA SUPLEANTA TEOMORFICA (2)

Secularizarea ca

1. SUPLEANTA TEOMORFICA A LOGOSULUI

Logos teomorfic

Discurs stiintific, filosofic, artistic, critic

Flecareala mediatica

Secularizarea ca

2. SUPLEANTA A COMPORTAMENTULUI UMAN

Omul ca “imitatio Christi”

Sfîntul

Curteanul

Gentleman-ul

Artistul

Managerul

Secularizarea ca

3. SUPLEANTA A FORMELOR DE STATALITATE

Teocratie

Monarhie/Imperiu

Dictatura

Republica dem

ocrata

Desvrăjire

Revrăjire

Desvrăjire

Revrăjire

Desvrăjire

Revrăjire

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Secularizarea ca 1. SU P L E A N T A IN V IA T A C O T ID IA N A

E tica crestina

E tica bunului sim t (rezerva, reticenta, respect, am înarea gratificarii)

E tica libertatii (destituirea m iturilor,

suspiciunea ierarhiilor) E tica m uncii ca unica em ancipare (m it m eritocratic)

E tica consum erista (C onsum , deci exist)

Secularizarea ca 2. SU P L E A N T A IN C O M U N IT A T E A U M A N A

Sfera com unitatii crestine prim are

Sfera com unitatii crestine prim are universale C livajul B iserica/Stat Sfera Statului autonom , statul natiune,

federatia statala Sfera societatii civile nationale vs. sfera

statului national Sfera societatii civile transnationale

Desvrăjire

Desvrăjire

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Vasile Catalin Bobb

C. G. Jung, Opere complete.Arhetipurile si inconstientulcolectivEd. Trei, Bucuresti, 2003

În Seven theories of religion D.L. Pals considerainoportuna introducerea lui Jung alaturi de nume cele-bre care au studiat fenomenul religios în complexitateasa. Explicatia acestei ne-alegeri este una pur formala, demetoda, întrucît diversitatea analizelor jungiene asupramaterialului oferit de fenomenul religios, din punct devedere psihologic poate fi cu greu restrînsa la cîtevaconsiderati principale. Este vorba despre imposibilitateacuantificarii materialului oferit de Jung în cîteva clasesau subclase edificatoare în raport cu ceea ce vrea sa nespuna autorul. Dificultatea survine în momentul în carepsihologia analitica aplicata se combina inexorabil, caîntr-un fel de încrengatura combinatorica, cu multiplelefiguri mitologice, eroi salvatori, tricksteri, fiintesupranaturale, mandale, demoni, îngeri etc., pusi, sademonstreze existenta inconstientului colectiv si aelementului sau constitutiv, arhetipul.

Laudabila intentia Editurii Trei de a publica operelecomplete ale psihanalistului elvetian C. G. Jung, pentrua putea avea în fata primul volum din cele 18 (!) propusecititorului român, si, astfel, pentru a spera într-o

recuperare completa a gîndirii unuia dintre cei maiimportanti oameni de cultura ai secolului trecut.

Arhetipurile si inconstientul colectiv suntprincipalele descoperiri jungiene în psihologia analiticasi trebuie înteles, din capul locului, ca baza analizelorsale este una pur fenomenologica, întrucît studiul de cazconstituie preambulul întregii constructiiepistemologice. Fiecare pas facut de Jung în marilesisteme mitologice ale culturii universale este dublat,imediat, de exemple clinice ale indivizilor reali pe care îitrata. Orice aluzie metafizica este înabusita decorespondente ale materialului empiric, digresiunea înspeculativ este mereu reprimata, astfel încît totalitateateoriilor propuse de Jung pot fi verificate cazuistic.

„Arhetipurile si inconstientul colectiv” analizeazamai întîi conceptul de inconstient colectiv al caruicorolar indispensabil este arhetipul. Definirea stricta acelor doua elemente se impune imperativ întrucît oriceincursiune in opera marelui gînditor clacheaza fara oprealabila analiza metodologica. Se poate presupuneantecedenta inconstientului colectiv, ca matriceuniversala specifica întregii umanitati, asupra arhetipului,numai ca elementul definitoriu ramîne tocmai acesta dinurma. Fara arhetip nu exista inconstient colectiv siviceversa. Trebuie distins în interiorul arhetipului întrearhetipul natura si reprezentarile arhetipale. Astfel,arhetipul (ceea ce putem numi reprezentari arhetipale)este ca realitate a psihismului colectiv jumatatea pe careo posed apriori (în masura în care aprioricul poate tinede experienta speciei scoasa din osmoza materie – spirit,în timpuri imemoriale printr-un rapt cosmogonic), iar

VASILE CATALIN BOBB

MA in Culture and Com-munication, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj,Romania

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arhetipul natura este dezvaluit de “viziunile onirice”,“imaginatia activa”, “fantasmele în stare de transa”,fiind jumatatea pe care o caut. Imposibilitateacuantificarii gnoseologice a “arhetipului in sine” îlsitueaza în linia marilor concepte metafizice: prim mo-tor, divinitate, fiinta. Numai ca marea diferentiere întreaceste concepte si arhetip ramîne pozitionarea spatiala;daca primul motor, divinitatea, fiinta comporta situaritranscendente, arhetipul face drum invers situîndu-seînauntrul individului. Totusi, avem în acest momentnumai o ipoteza, întrucît arhetipul în sine “poate filasat” în transcendent fara a deraia de pe firul gîndiriijungiene - Jung nu face nici o precizare clara asupraacestui aspect.

Aceasta scurta prezentare a arhetipului s-a impus cafiind necesara întrucît cartea propune apoi o incursiuneîn lumea arhetipala a culturi, si putem lesne observa capeste tot, de la antichitatea greaca, indiana, egipteana laepoca medievala crestina regasim diferite forme siîntrupari ale arhetipului. De la arhetipul mamei laarhetipul infans, de la arhetipul animei reprezentat dezeita Kore, la psihologia figurii trickster-ului, toateacestea vin sa sprijine constructia edificiului arhetipal.

Desigur, nu putem eluda în prezenta recenzieelementele de psihologie analitica care apar în capitoleleX si XI, unde sunt explicitate pe larg conceptele deconstiinta, inconstient, individuatie. Inedit este capitolulV, „Despre renastere” în care se pot regasi diferiteforme ale renasterii si diversele aspecte psihologice ale

acesteia. Cele cinci forme ale renasterii sunt:Metempsihoza, Reîncarnarea, Învierea, Renasterea, siParticiparea la procesul transformari. Iar ca evenimentepsihologice care stau la baza renasteri regasim:experienta transcendentei vieti si transformareasubiectiva. Individuatia, în teoriile jungiene ocupa un loccentral întrucît apare ca proces psihologic de unire acontrariilor, sub stindardul elementului central alpsihismului individual anume Sinele. Este un fel depunere în ordine cu tine însuti, de explicitare acomplexelor care inhiba descoperirea arhetipurilor, unmecanism de recunoastere, printr-un travaliu continuu,a idiosincraziilor personale.

Unul dintre cele mai inedite capitole ale actualeieditii îl reprezinta ultimul capitol, „Despre simbolisticamandalei”, în care este prezentata o întreaga paleta deimagini edificatoare. Exemplificarile si interpretarilefiecarei imagini dau savoare cartii si în acelasi timp lasacale libera interpretarii personale – hermeneutica „înca”mai functioneaza.

Întreaga teorie dezvoltata de Jung nu face altcevadecît sa descrie structura sufletului personal prinintermediul inconstientului colectiv care poate fi regasitîn cultura umanitatii, iar instrumentul de cautare estearhetipul. Este vorba despre un travaliu continuu, simi-lar cu cel regasibil în procesul de individuatie, careurmareste identificarea, în decursul istoriei, aelementului „transistoric” riguros, si în acelasi timpdivers, care formeaza structuri comune, anacronice, înculturi diferite.

KEY WORDS:

Religious phenomenon,Jung, archetype, psy-choanalysis, hermeneu-tics

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Aurel Bumbas-Vorobiov

Stefan Iloaie, Nae Ionescu siortodoxia românaEditura Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2003

Unele figuri ale culturii române interbelice audevenit astazi incomode, mai ales prin faptele celor carele-au recunoscut ca maestrii spirituali. Printre ele senumara si „Profesorul”, filosoful român Nae Ionescu(1890-1940). De aceea a scrie o carte despre o asemeneapersonalitate este un curaj, dar si un risc, mai ales atuncicând te desprinzi din liniile deja consacrate. Cartea d-luiStefan Iloaie, parinte arhidiacon, intitulata Nae Ionescu siortodoxia româna, vine sa suplineasca o dubla lacuna înceea ce priveste interpretarea operei si vietii lui NaeIonescu, mentor al generatiei intelectuale interbelice dinRomânia, generatie a carei membrii au rodit înmajoritate peste granitele, dupa ce în interiorul tarii s-aasezat totalitarismul comunist si tendintele prosovietice.Una din cele doua lacune este legata de absenta uneibibliografii consacrate a operei „Profesorul”-ului, iar ceade-a doua este legata de distanta care se deschide întrecriticarea orientarii nationaliste a filosofului, acreditareasa ca ideolog al miscarii legionare, implicit al

extremismului nationalist si asumarea necritica a opereisale de catre tendintele nationalist-xenofobe de azi.

Studiul, care precede o bibliografie a scrierilornaeionesciene, încearca sa argumenteze în favoareaimportantei caracteristici teologice a gândirii„Profesorului”, stabilind un sens al interpretarii dupacare „ toata gândirea graviteaza în jurul problemeimântuirii, a necesitatii ei”(35). Acest fapt constituie opremisa care îl determina pe autor sa raspundaadversativ afirmatiilor lui Cioran, în conformitate cucare: „Esecul în experienta absolutului este izvorulpasiunii în imanenta”( Emil Cioran, Nae Ionescu si dramaluciditatii) si sa sustina argumentat ca „posibilitateaîntoarcerii lumescului spre cele sfinte, convertireamundanului si regasirea lui în axiologia cerescului, luptapentru indicarea caii spre Adevar l-au determinat peNae Ionescu sa guste „tentatia timpului”, sa participeintens la evenimentul cotidian din jurnalistica si din viatapolitica prin prezenta activa în disputele de ideicontemporane lui”(31).

Fara exces de citari se construieste treptat, princumul de argumente, concluzia dupa care „traireaexistentei istorice si participarea afectiva si efectiva ladefinirea structurii etnice ramân trasaturi dominante alenationalismului profesat de Nae Ionescu”(40),întregindu-se apoi cu viziunea unui caracter teologic alscrierilor „Profesorul”-ului. Se constituie astfel un con-text de interpretare care ne ajuta sa construim un punctde sprijin între parerile extremele deja afirmate înpublicistica, referitoare la scrierile si viata filosofului.

AUREL BUMBAS-VOROBIOV

Ph.D. Candidate, Depart-ment of Philosophy, BBU,Cluj, RomaniaE-mail:tindanboom@yahoo.com

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Curgerea textului în directia amintita înglobeaza treptat,ca argumente, elemente specifice vietii si operei lui NaeIonescu, intrate deja în viziunea comuna asupra sa, cumar fi: caracterul socratic al cursurilor sale, refuzul de aconstitui un sistem prin carti, înclinatia catre traire,considerarea iubirii ca cel mai înalt grad de cunoastere,identificarea „natiei” cu credinta, influenta avuta asuprageneratiei ’27, scandalurile financiare etc. Pornind decide la un fond comun si asumându-si premisele amintiteautorul reuseste în acest scurt text sa ne convinga capoate exista si o altfel de lectura pertinenta asuprascrierilor lui Nae Ionescu si a celor despre el, mizând înacelasi timp si pe angajamentele în plan teologic alefilosofului.

În acelasi timp tendinta de a identifica spiritul na-tional cu ortodoxia, întâlnita în opera lui Nae Ionescu,este specifica perioadei interbelice, dupa cum afirma siLucian Boia în Istorie si mit în constiinta româneasca eapoate fi întâlnita la Blaga, Crainic, Vulcanescu, slujindideii de unitate spirituala a românilor, care ar fi precedatorice unitate geopolitica. În articolele pe care NaeIonescu le publica în Cuvântul la sfârsitul anului 1930,sub titlul A fi „bun român”, duce atât de departeconsecintele identificarii dintre natiune si credinta încâtafirma ca a fi „român pur si simplu, însemneaza a fi siortodox”, iar „catolicism si ortodoxie nu sunt numaiconfesiuni reprezentând anumite deosebiri dogmatice siculturale, ci doua valorificari fundamental deosebite aleexistentei în genere”. Pune chiar în coprezentaoriginanta ortodoxia si faptul de a fi român prin

afirmatia: „Suntem, ca atare, ortodocsi pentru ca suntemromâni si suntem români pentru ca suntem ortodocsi”.Ceea ce reuseste cu prisosinta nu stim daca estedemonstrarea corelativitatii dintre ortodoxie si faptul dea fi român sau circumscrierea unei identitati romanestiautentice, ci mai de graba comunicarea unei atitudiniradicale si separatiste, care se sustrage unei puneri încomun cu cei de o alta „plamada sufleteasca”. Vinefiresc întrebarea care este atunci caracterul teologic alscrierilor lui Nae Ionescu si în ce sens putem regasi„lucrarea dragostei fata de aproapele” când tendinta estede a ne exhiba mai de graba dorinta de izolare fata decei cu o alta „plamada sufleteasca”? Stefan Iloaieraspunde indirect si acestei întrebari, într-o formaspecifica formatiei sale teologice, îndreptându-ne gândulde la o polemica cu arme logice, catre o întelegeresituata în paradigma iertator-iubitoare a crestinatatii, necalauzeste ca un preot intelectual dinainte sortitortodoxiei si faptului de a fi român.

Cu totul remarcabila este bibliografia care strângenominal, în aproape 1800 de articole, atât scrierile luiNae Ionescu cât si parte din cele referitoare la viata siopera sa, structurându-le astfel: 1.Volume, 2. Articole în„Cuvântul”, 3. Articole în alte reviste si în volume, 4.Despre Nae Ionescu. Munca depusa pentru strângereabibliografiei este de apreciat în mod deosebit, iar aceastacarte merita consideratia publicului si pentru bunul simtcare razbate din înlantuirea textului si pentru faptul cava face mai usoara munca celor ce vor cerceta scrierilefilosofului român.

KEY WORDS:

Orthodoxy, bibliography,Nae Ionescu, inter-warculture, theology andphilosophy

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Raluca Ciurcanu

Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives.Modernity and Its OutcastsPolity Press, Cambridge, 2004

Recenta carte a sociologului Zygmunt Baumanvorbeste despre ceea ce, în termeni mai putin delicati, sepoate numi „productia de deseuri umane” sau, mai pre-cis, de vieti irosite – un efect datorat actualelor conditiiale industriei modernitatii, ce vizeaza noi forme deprogres economic si de ordonare constructiva asocietatii. Functia manifesta a primei ramuri a acesteiindustrii este aceea de a produce si reproduce ordinesociala. Orice model de ordonare este selectiv si necesitadecuparea, segregarea, separarea sau chiar excizareamaterialului uman care este nepotrivit sau nefolositornoii ordini. În finalul procesului, aceste parti suntetichetate ca deseuri umane, distincte de cele ce suntprezentate ca fiind folositoare, în conditiile în careacestea din urma sunt „produse” intentionate. Deseurileumane nu sunt considerate a fi productii dezirabile alesocietatii si, din acest motiv, ele trebuie înlaturatecumva.

Zygmunt Bauman considera ca pe masura ce partimari ale lumii au ramas în totalitate sau partial

neafectate de modernizare, au fost tratate de catresocietatile modernizate ca zone capabile de a absorbiexcesul de populatie din tarile dezvoltate; era vorba de ase gasi solutii globale la probleme locale, iar aceastasituatie a fost caracteristica pentru perioada colonizarilordin secolele trecute. Pe masura ce modernizarea a atins,prin acest proces, si cele mai îndepartate tinuturi aleplanetei, populatia redundanta este produsa peste tot, sitoate zonele se confrunta cu suita de consecinte aletriumfului global al modernitatii. Aceasta creeaza acutanevoie de a cauta, de data aceasta, solutii locale laprobleme produse în mod global.

Sociologul arata ca raspîndirea globala a modernitatiia condus la productia unei cantitati în crestere deoameni lipsiti de mijloace de supravietuire, dar planetase confrunta cu lipsa unor locuri în care acestia sa fieplasati. De aici pornind, noile anxietati legate deimigranti, de cei care cer azil si de rolul crescînd jucat dedifuzia de temeri legate de securitate, prezente înagenda politica contemporana.

Bauman afirma ca planeta noastra este „plina”, însanu în termeni fizicalisti sau geografici, în conditiile încare zonele depopulate sau locuite temporar si etichetateca fiind nelocuibile sau incapabile de a sustine viataumana, par sa se mareasca, nu sa scada.

Tehnologia, în progresul ei ne ofera (la costuriridicate) noi sensuri ale supravietuirii în habitate careînainte erau catalogate ca fiind incapabile de a sustineasezari umane. Pe de alta parte, aceeasi tehnologiedistruge posibilitatea multor habitate de a sustinepopulatii pe care anterior le acomodase si le hranise. În

RALUCA CIURCANU

Department of Philoso-phy, BBU, Cluj, RomaniaE-mail:danaida21@personal.ro

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noua constructia sociala exista o distinctie calitativaîntre doi termeni: somaj si redundanta; primul semnifica ostare de ne-angajat (în sensul pe care îl ofera termenulenglez - unemployed), de anormalitate, de abatere de lanorma (ca în cazul unui „nesanatos”- unhealthy), dareste o situatie reversibila, întrucît destinatia someruluieste aceea de a fi rechemat si reîncadrat în munca. Încazul redundantei asa ceva este exclus; redundanta nueste o conditie temporara, ci exprima permanenta. A firedundant înseamna a fi dat la o parte datorita faptuluica poti fi dat la o parte, ai aceasta disponibilitate - ca si osticla pet de plastic, sau o seringa folosita o singura data.Redundanta îsi împarte spatiul semantic cu rejectarea,lenea, gunoiul, refuzul, cu irosirea.

Cea de a doua ramura a industriei modernitatii este,pentru Zygmunt Bauman, progresul economic carevizeaza, în principal, anihilarea unor moduri deconservare a formelor de productie si introducereainovatiei, a cresterii continue a standardelorproductivitatii si profitabilitatii. „Practicantii” vechilorforme de productie nu pot, de regula, sa se acomodezeîn masa la noile forme de activitate, mult maisimplificate si mai bine gîndite. Aceasta duce, inevitabil,la interzicerea accesului la aceste forme de productie si,simultan, la crearea de deseuri (umane) ale progresuluieconomic.

Progresul economic este privit de autor ca,metaforic vorbind, o istorie a distrugerii creative. Înacest întreg proces factorul uman este tratat în termeni

de cerere de piata, schimb, competitie, productivitate,eficienta, simple notiuni care nu au nici o legatura cuoamenii reali, posesori de nume si adrese. Pe de altaparte, acest factor uman este destinat dezasamblarii sireasamblarii, în functie de cererea pe piata productiei.

Un alt aspect pe care autorul îl surprinde în cartea saeste legat de implicatiile pe care statul le are în rîndulpopulatiei. Daca înainte statul reprezenta un garant si unprotector al intereselor membrilor societatii, în fatadezechilibrelor economice datorate jocurilorcompetitionale pe piata libera, acum acest lucru nu maiconstituie o practica, în conditiile în care piata libera estedefinita ca o afacere privata. Acest fapt a condus la odiminuare continua a încrederii populatiei în valorile siactiunile statului, la o apatie politica, o descalificare con-tinua a legii, si la o mare retragere a populatiei în fataparticiparii la politica institutionalizata.

Prin urmare, statul trebuie sa intervina cu noimetode de a crea starea de vulnerabilitate si nesiguranta,iar una dintre acestea o reprezinta accentuarea ideii denesiguranta la nivel personal, în fata activitatilorcriminale, manifestarilor anti-sociale ale clasei de jos si,mai recent, terorismului global. Se pare ca un nou stattrebuie sa se nasca, pe fundatiile vulnerabilitatiipersonale si a sigurantei personale, în locul precaritatiisociale sau protectiei sociale.

Vieti irosite este o carte care puncteaza, dinperspectiva sociologica, actualele probleme globale, lanivel de populatie si de productie.

KEY WORDS:

Wasted lives, modern-ization, ZygmuntBauman, outcasts,sociology

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Sandu Frunza

Ioan Chirila, Fragmentariumexegetic filonian II. Nomothetica.Repere exegetice la DecalogEd. Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2003

Am fost mereu rezervat în ceea ce privesteîncercarile teologice de a citi printr-o grila exclusivcrestina opera unor filosofi sau gînditori apartinînd unorcurente sau traditii religioase dintre cele mai diferite.Astfel de rezerve sînt în chip major diminuate atuncicînd acest tip de valorizare teologica este facut pefondul unei întelegeri profunde si prin utilizarea tacita aunui instrumentar intercultural circumscris unei traditiicomune. O astfel de interpretare e facilitata de aceastadata si de stereotipurile cultivate de exegetii evrei ai luiFilon, care considera ca cea mai mare parte a mosteniriifiloniene lasate evreilor nu a fost valorificata secole de-a

rîndul, ea servind în schimb la modelarea unei partisemnificative a tipului de ideatie teologica crestina.

Asa cum se întîmpla si în cazul primului volum deexegeze filoniene, parintele Ioan Chirila devine cuusurinta convingator în analizele de profunzimepropuse în micul tratat de „nomologie” pe care îlschiteaza acest al doilea volum de exegeze filoniene.Cartea de fata încearca, de fapt, sa scoata Decalogul dinsfera unei simple interpretari juridice si sa înfatisezeprefigurarea legii si Legea prin permanenta raportare lamaniera de interpretare filoniana, patristica si moderna.

Hermeneutica initiatica la care recurge distinsulteolog are drept referential înaltimea sperantei care îlînvaluie în calitatea sa de slujitor al Legii. Astfel, nu edeloc întîmplator faptul ca putem citi în paginile acestuivolum fraze precum: „Mergînd spre o zare care necheama cu stralucirea ei vom trai o vreme nadejdea cavom ajunge cîndva si acolo, ca ne vom satura setea dinambrozia îngerilor care tin hlamida cea albastra acerului, ca ne vom aprinde din strafulgerarea lor carearde si ne mistuie”. Exista o poarta care privilegiazaacest acces: puterea de a vedea „fiecare apropiere princuvînt de semenul nostru ca pe o încercare a noastra dea ne regasi întrînsul chipul si în urma acestei gasiri saînceapa hora chipului în îmbratisarea Lui” (pp.6-7).

Ioan Chirila este convins ca o astfel de cautare desine însusi în Dumnezeu a întreprins si Filon Iudeul.Este unul dintre motivele pentru care se apropie deFilon ca de unul care are intuitia perfecta a faptului ca“punctul maxim al întîlnirii omului cu Dumnezeuînainte de Hristos este dialogul-rugaciune” (p. 12).

SANDU FRUNZA

Assoc. Prof., Ph.D., Dept.of Systematic Philoso-phy, BBU, Cluj, Romania.Author of the books: Oantropologie mistica(1996), Iubirea sitranscendenta (1999),Experienta religioasa îngîndirea lui DumitruStaniloae (2001),Fundamentalismulreligios si noul conflict alideologiilor (2003)E-mail:sfrunza@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

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Moise este situat de Filon în acest dialog si în felulacesta obiectivitatea poruncilor pe care le aduce înnumele divinitatii reverbereaza din unicitatea celui ce seconstituie drept sursa a rostirii.

Îmbinînd cu deosebit talent frazele poetico-liturgicecu învatatura plina de subtilitate si cu discursul aca-demic, Ioan Chirila reuseste o expunere exegetica deînalta tinuta si de intensa vibratie sufleteasca. În felulacesta, parintele carturar este el însusi un fel de personajfilonian. Avînd deopotriva apetenta pentru discursulfilosofic, cel teologic si pentru cel cultural, Ioan Chirilaporneste pe urmele lui Filon, despre care ne spune ca“Din aceasta familie spirituala face parte si Filon din Al-exandria, formatia lui spirituala înscriindu-se pe linia luiSocrate, Platon si a altor întelepti, numai ca el depasesteacest tip de interpretare deoarece se plaseaza în sînuldinamicii revelatiei si a întelegerii acesteia în spirituliudaic” (p. 18). Cu toate riscurile ce pot surveni de aici,ne permitem sa afirmam ca într-o asemenea dinamica îsiînscrie Ioan Chirila scrierile sale, doar ca perspectiva saeste cea a unui spirit iudaic care este integrat de spiritultotalizator crestin. În felul acesta cred ca putem întelegemai bine gîndirea autorului si modalitatile prin carelectureaza în perspectiva crestina interpretarile laDecalog si opera lui Filon în general.

Cu toate acestea, teologul nu risca nici un momentsa stearga diferentele între traditii. Este destul sa sesizamca cel putin într-un punct esential – perspectivadialogului – Ioan Chirila traseaza clar distinctiile. Unadintre acestea releva diferenta fundamentala dintremodul în care Iudaismul si Crestinismul înteleg

structura revelationala “Lege-Cuvînt”. Pentru evrei“cuvîntul cel mai important nu este cel care vesteste, cicel care îndruma, sub forma legii … legea este în modabsolut cuvînt al lui Dumnezeu” adresat evreilor, ceeace are drept consecinta faptul ca “Vechiul Testament nucunoaste un concept general sau global al revelatiei”(pp.57-58). Pentru crestini, cuvîntul legii este înglobat înNoul Testament si dezvoltat în teologia crestina careporneste în principal de la premisa ca “este revelatieceea ce Dumnezeu a revelat”.

În aparenta, drumul propus este deja unul batatorit.Însa, pentru a întelege semnificatia legii si a legii celeinoi în perspectiva pe care o deschid sfintii parinti, IoanChirila propune o noua directie de interpretare a Legii:“Dorim sa propunem o lecturare care sa plece strict dinplanul dialogal. Poruncile sînt exprimate la singular, deciDumnezeu vorbeste cu fiecare dintre noi. Dar maipropunem o schimbare a sensului de lecturare. Vrem sasugeram citirea Legii începînd cu porunca a zecea siapoi, progresiv în descrestere valoric numerica, saajungem la prima. Aceasta din dorinta de a realiza si aconstientiza drumul restaurarii proprii”(p. 68).

Lecturînd cartea, putem observa cu usurinta caexegeza propusa de Ioan Chirila este una interesata. Eacauta sa serveasca disciplinei academice pe care teologulclujean o preda. Totodata, este o maniera deinterpretare pusa în slujba îndemnului de cautare adrumului ce a dus la desavîrsirea legii. Lectura interesataa lui Ioan Chirila e facuta însa deschis, si este întreprinsaspre a fi oferita îndeosebi tipului uman pe care parinteleîl cuprinde sub metafora “hotului de suflete”. “Hotul de

KEY WORDS:

Hermeneutics, theol-ogy, Philon, IoanChirila, Old Testament,New Testament, Law

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suflete, ne spune Ioan Chirila, este cel care s-a pierdutpe sine în mrejele individualizante ale celui care seamanaexagerata parere de sine, adica pizmasul cel rau, carefurînd s-a furat pe sine însusi de la tot ceea ce este înveci Dumnezeu”(p. 131).

Dincolo de poetizarile care fac lectura maiapetisanta, volumul propus de Ioan Chirila este olucrare academica ce reprezinta o apropiere crestinaadecvata fata de opera lui Filon Iudeul. Fara îndoiala,este o repunere în discutie a gîndirii acestuia menita sadea tonul unor noi studii teologice, care sa stea subsemnul interculturalitatii.

Otilia Herman

Bryan Wilson, Religia dinperspectiva sociologicaEditura Trei, Bucuresti, 2000

Religia a constitumt un subiect central in teoriasociologica clasica, si se mentine inca si astazi in miezultematic al sociologiei. Valoarea lucrarii de fata constaatat in noutatea problemelor tratate, cat si in modulcvasi-exhaustiv de tratare a problemelor analizate.

In primul capitol al lucrarii autorul trateazaproblematica sociologiei religiei ca stiinta.

Religia nu este numai o formulare intelectuala acerintelor de baza ale ordinii sociale. Ea si-a indeplinitfunctiile sociale prin mobilizarea unor dispozitii evalua-tive si afective si prin raspandirea de motivatii adecvate,ingloband un spectru foarte larg de experiente umane. Aavut afinitati cu arta si cu poezia, de fapt cu tot ceea ce,in om, tine de imaginatie si de creatie. Religia a starnitsimpatie, altruism si dragoste, insufland sau sugeranddeziderate de amanunt si deseori subtile care au modelatcomportamentul uman. Sociologul este in mod necesarpreocupat de subiecte precum ar fi controlul social,consensul social, relatiile inter-umane si pastrarea unuiechilibru adecvat in exprimarea emotiilor umane.

OTILIA HERMAN

Faculty of Sociology,Babes-Bolyai Univer-sity, Cluj, RomaniaE-mail:Ottilia.Herman@personal.ro

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Autorul considera ca sociologia religiei este inca intr-o oarecare masura prizoniera conceptelor sale, conceptede provenienta crestina. Orice critic din exterior insatrebuie sa recunoasca doua lucruri: ca acesta este unprizonierat si nu un angajament voluntar si ca cel putinunii dintre sociologi sunt constienti de el.

B. Wilson sustine si faptul ca, in ochii publicului,sociologul profesionist al religiei reprezinta ocuriozitate. Oamenii il percep ca pe o persoana profundinteresata de religie si care s-ar parea ca detine informatiideosebite in acest domeniu. Si cu toate acestea, el nueste, pentru ca nu vrea sa fie, un ins religios, sau celputin nu atunci cand isi exercita meseria de sociolog. Încontemporaneitate, cerinta neutralitatii axiologice acercetatorului si-a pus amprenta si asupra sociologieireligiei.

Capitolul secund trateaza problematica functiilorreligiei in societatea contemporana. B. Wilson consideraca “functia explicita si manifesta a religiei consta in aoferi oamenilor speranta mantuirii si a le da indrumarilenecesare pentru a se mantui” (p. 38). Insa intelesulmantuirii difera de la o cultura la alta si de la o religie laalta. In decursul istoriei mantuirea a fost perceputa catriumf asupra mortii, migrare a sufletului intr-un taramde existenta superior, sau invierea miraculoasa a trupuluicandva, in viitor. Acestea sunt elemente pe carecrestinismul le-a luat de la predecesorii ebraici. In alteculturi aspiratia la mantuire se materializeaza inincercarea de a scapa de raul care predomina in viatapamanteasca. Masura in care mantuirea esteconceptualizata ca avand un caracter particular si indi-

vidual, comunitar si local sau national si societal variazade asemenea de la o cultura la alta, iar uneori ininteriorul aceleiasi culturi.

Autorul sustine faptul ca in toate religiile importantese considera ca mantuirea se obtine prin actiune etica ceeste de asa natura incat raportul dintre efort si rasplatanu este calculat cu precizie. Numai credintele cvasi-magice functioneaza dupa reguli care desemneaza uncastig calculat. Desi religiile majore au tentatia de aingloba intreaga omenire in categoria aspirantilor lamantuire, acest universalism nu trebuie sa faca uitatfaptul ca mantuirea vizeaza indivizii. Aceste religii punaccentul pe raspunderea proprie a individului de a-sicauta mantuirea, iar in traditia iudeo-crestina-musulmana fagaduinta mantuirii se adreseaza directindividului. Astfel, mantuirea este o vocatie universala,dar fiecare individ trebuie sa depuna un efort personalsau sa faca o alegere personala. Wilson subliniaza camodul personal de a concepe mantuirea este influentatde experienta sociala individuala privitoare la conditiilenecesare bunastarii. Ideea pe care o detine o persoanadespre bunastare este conditionata social la randul ei. Incontinuare se precizeaza si alte functii ale religiei printrecare regasim: organizarea societatii, mentinerea coeziuniisociale, oferirea unei identitati unor indivizi, factor deexprimare si reglare al emotiilor.

In continuare, autorul propune o paralela Occident-Orient in privinta culturii si religiei. “La natiunileavansate, atat din partea estica, cat si din cea vestica aglobului, cultura generala a vietii cotidiene nu are uncaracter pronuntat religios” (p. 67). Tarile occidentale se

KEY WORDS:

Religion, sociology ofreligion, secularization,sects, Western culture,Eastern tradition,Bryan Wilson

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gasesc in cadrul unui proces de secularizare. In trecut,religia a exercitat o influenta determinanta asupraprofilului general al acestor culturi. Interesul diminuat aloamenilor pentru supranatural si redusa importanta aacestuia in organizarea societatii contemporane arata caatat conceptiile despre o ordine transcendentala, cat sipreocuparea pentru valorile ultime sunt din ce in ce maiputin relevante pentru viata moderna.

Progresul stiintei si dezvoltarea societatilor statalesunt doua dintre cele mai importante procese care audus la instrainarea culturii occidentale de trecutul saureligios.

Wilson considera ca, spre deosebire de religiileorientale caracterizate de politeism si implicit printr-ungrad de toleranta ridicat, religiile occidentale, iudaismul,crestinismul, islamismul s-au considerat fiecare ca fiindreligie adevarata. Exclusivismul si cerinta ca dogmelereligioase sa fie expuse intr-o forma logica, faracontradictii, a determinat, in cazul crestinismului aparitiasi dezvoltarea unui sistem teologic cu o riguroasa tinutaintelectuala. Se poate afirma ca acest demers intelectuala pus o punte distincta si unificatoare pe culturaoccidentala.

In cazul religiilor orientale, mentioneaza B. Wilson,formularea unui ansamblu de propozitii launtricconstient si sistematic ordonat nu a constituit opreocupare majora nici pentru carturari nici pentruclerici sau laici. Surse de intelepciune extrem de variateau fost acceptate de catre numeroase culturi orientale.

Un capitol aparte al acestei lucrari il reprezinta“sociologia sectelor”. Autorul prezinta caracteristicile

acestora: caracterul exclusivist (nu admit dualitateaafilierii religioase), pretentia detinerii monopoluluiasupra adevarului religios in totalitatea sa; faptul de a fiorganizatii seculare; respingerea diviziunii muncii pecriterii religioase (obligatiile religioase sunt aceleasipentru toti); voluntarismul (un individ decide personalsa devina sectant); preocuparea fata de mentinerea unornorme morale ridicate in randul membrilor lor (este unfapt obisnuit ca sectele sa aplice sanctiuni celor care auun comportament inadecvat sau refractar, sanctiuni cepot merge pana la expulzare). In general sectele secaracterizeaza prin faptul ca pretind membrilor lor undevotament total. In viata cotidiana un membru aloricareia dintre bisericile conventionale din tarileoccidentale poate sa nu para mult diferit de oamenii faraconvingeri religioase. Insa faptul ca o persoana estemembra al unui anumit grup sectant, constituie cea maiimportanta trasatura a sa.

In continuare, lucrarea trateaza problematicadeclinului religiei in societatea moderna, aparitia unornoi miscari religioase, gradul ridicat de atractivitate alacestora. Autorul remarca faptul ca asupra acestora nuse pot emite teorii unitare, capabile sa explice printr-unset de propozitii teoretice toate aceste fenomene actuale.“Nu se poate ajunge la o astfel de concluzie decatignorand importanta dovezilor empirice si divesitateaistorica a societatilor si a culturilor acestora sisubsumand continuturile faptice diferite unorproprozitii condensate, foarte abstracte, care, desiarunca oarecare lumina asupra realitatii sociale, nuizbutesc sa o dezvaluie in mod adecvat, tocmai din

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pricina gradului lor de abstractizare. Noile religii dinintreaga lume au, indiscutabil, unele caracteristici sifunctii comune, insa exista intre ele si multiple diferente,este de asteptat ca rolurile pe care ele le indeplinesc indiferitele societati sa fie la fel de diferite intre ele ca sisocietatile respective, concluzioneaza autorul.

Ultimul capitol al acestei lucrari este dedicatsecularizarii. Termenul secularizare trimite la un set depropozitii enuntate adesea in termeni vagi si formandaproape un ansamblu teoretic, privitor la anumiteprocese de schimbare sociala care au loc de-a lungulunei perioade nespecificate din istoria omenirii.Secularizarea nu este numai o modificare petrecuta insocietate ci si o transformare a societatii in organizareaei de baza.

Autorul considera ca unele schimbari seculariza-toare au fost deliberate si constiente, cum ar fi, deexemplu, desprinderea de putere a factorilor siorganismelor religioase sau laicizarea proprietatilorbisericesti, pentru desemnarea carora acest termen a fostinitial utilizat. “Secularizarea se refera la diminuareaimportantei religiei pe plan social. Ea acopera omultitudine de fenomene printre care: sechestrarea decatre puterile politice a pamanturilor si a altor bunuridetinute de autoritatile religioase de catre detinatoriiputerii politice; trecerea de sub controlul religios sub celsecular a numeroase activitati si functii indeplinite dereligie; diminuarea cantitatii de timp, efort si resurse pecare oamenii le dedica preocuparilor supraempirice;declinul institutiilor religioase; in privinta chestiunilorlegate de conduita, inlocuirea preceptelor religioase cu

cerinte adaptate criteriilor strict tehnice si inlocuireatreptata a unei constiinte specific religioase (mergand dela credinta in farmece, ritualuri, vraji sau rugaciuni) cu oorientare empirica, rationala, instrumentala;abandonarea interpretarilor mitice, poetice si artistice alenaturii si ale societatii in favoarea unei descrieri sobre siprozaice.”

B. Wilson alatura acestor caracteristici alesecularizarii si urmatoarea definitie:”prin termenul desecularizare inteleg procesul prin care institutiile,actiunile si constiinta religioasa isi pierd din importantasociala”(p. 173).

Importanta sociala a religiei in viata omului eraodinioara mult mai mare decat acum. Culturile sisocietatile din trecut, asa cum ni le dezvaluie ramasitelelor arheologice, par a fi fost profund preocupate desupranatural. Este de remarcat faptul ca si in societatiletraditionale cladirile cele mai impunatoare erau celededicate activitatilor religioase. Definitia data de Wilsonapare intr-un sens mult mai larg decat la alti autori careau studiat crestinismul si care, explicit sau implicit aupus semnul egalitatii intre secularizare si decrestinizare.Religia, prin care autorul intelege invocareasupranaturalului, era ideologia comunitatii. Religia ledadea oamenilor siguranta in privinta puterii pe care odetineau, le punea la adapost statutul ideal, le justificaavutia sau ii consola pentru saracia lor. Autorulconsidera ca toate aceste functii de odinioara ale religieisi-au pierdut din importanta pe masura ce implicareaumana a incetat sa mai fie in primul rand una la nivel lo-cal, iar asocierile umane au incetat sa mai fie

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comunitare. Societatea industriala in care mijloacele desubzistenta nu sunt locale, nu mai are nevoie de zei sausfinti locali, de retete sau leacuri tamaduitoare locale.

In sistemul societal actual, supranaturalul nu joacanici un rol in ordinea perceputa, traita si instituita.Astfel, in Occident si in alte tari puternic modernizatereligia traditionala a cedat in fata transformarilorproduse in organizarea sociala. Noile miscari religioaseincearca sa revigoreze viata religioasa in carepersonalitatea si anonimatul sa fie depasite, iarcomunitatea de simtire sa renasca, fie si efemer.

Cartea se incheie intr-o maniera destul de sceptica.Autorul subliniaza ca:”aceste tentative sunt,deocamdata, cel putin in Occident, doar niste marturii

neoriginale ale nelinistilor noastre si firave sperante de ale alina. Nu se vede vreo posibilitate ca oamenii sarecladeasca lumea pe care au pierdut-o.(...)Pana acum,tentativa de recuperare a dimensiunii religioase nu aavut succes decat la marginile si in intersectiile societatiisi in principal in sfera vietii private, permitandu-le unorasa-si depaseasca cel putin nemultumirile prezente, sidand nastere, prin raspandirea inclinatiilor sprebunavointa si solidaritate umana, la acea <<sare apamantului>> de care ordinea sociala are atata nevoie.”

Perspectiva sociologului Bryan Wilson este unaincitantã deoarece vizeaza tocmai problemele care audeterminat cele mai vii dispute si care, cu certitudine,vor genera si in viitor numeroase framantari.

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Volumul ofera cititorilor o selectie de texte ale luiConstantin Radulescu-Motru publicate între anii 1904 si1942: Cultura româna si politicianismul (1904), Nationalismul(1909), Sufletul neamului nostru (1910), În zilele noastre deanarhie (1910), Psihologia ciocoismului (1911), Psihologiaindustriasului (1911), Din psihologia revolutionarului (1919),Conceptia conservatoare si progresul (1924), Taranismul, unsuflet si o politica (1924), Demagogia scolara (1927), Ideologiastatului român (1934), Românismul (1939), Etnicul românesc(1942). Astfel, el cuprinde practic cele mai importantecontributii ale autorului, din toate sferele sale deactivitate stiintifica (filosofie, politologie, sociologie,psihologie) si parcurgînd întreaga perioada de creatie.Volumul se remarca, pe lînga realizarea incontestabila arepublicarii în sine a textelor lui C. Radulescu-Motruîntr-un volum atît de cuprinzator, si printr-un studiuamplu dedicat întregii creatii a autorului (Un totalitarismpe potriva sufletului românesc, de Cristian Preda). Studiulvine în sprijinul cititorului care, parcurgînd doar textelelui Radulescu-Motru, se afla în pericolul unei lecturiinfluentate de receptarea ideologizata a acestor lucrari

pe parcursul schimbarilor cultural-politice dramatice dinultimii 150 de ani din România. Selectia de texte dinprezentul volum surprinde într-un mod exceptionalchiar aceste schimbari, vazute prin prisma unui autorcare nu s-a rezumat la o simpla observare si consemnarea evenimentelor epocii sale, ci a încercat sa ofereexplicatii si solutii la problemele timpului.

În prezentarea de fata m-am oprit asupra unuisingur text, Cultura româna si politicianismul, primul dinaceasta selectie, dintr-un considerent care tine atît deaspecte cronologice, cît si de continut: textul, fiind editatînaintea celorlalte, prezinta în forma mai mult sau maiputin incipienta toate aspectele pe care C. Radulescu-Motru le dezvolta pe parcursul întregii sale activitati. Înplus, el sustine foarte bine ideea pe care doresc sa oredau în continuare, si anume cea a actualitatii scrierilorpolitice ale lui C. Radulescu-Motru.

„Reformele savîrsite în România de catre politicienisunt, unele, spre folosul aparent al generatiunilor deastazi, si toate spre paguba reala a generatiunilor demîine.”1

Cu aceste cuvinte îsi începea Constantin Radulescu-Motru lucrarea Cultura româna si politicianismul, publicatapentru prima oara acum o suta de ani, în 1904. Unîntreg secol ne desparte de aceasta data, un secol care aprodus mult mai multe evenimente – multe dintre eledezastruoase – decît putea sa prevada atunci marelefilosof si psiholog român. Întreaga sa viata pare ca stasub semnul trecerii secolelor: nascut în anul 1868, cu osuta de ani înaintea miscarilor studentesti care auzguduit Europa (printre altele si prin atitudinea lor

Christian Schuster

Constantin Radulescu-Motru,Scrieri PoliticeEditura Nemira, Bucuresti, 1998

CHRISTIAN SCHUSTER

PhD. candidate, Depart-ment of EuropeanStudies, Babes-BolyaiUniversity,Cluj, RomaniaE-mail:schuster@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

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politica explicit anticonservatoare) si decedat în 1957, lao suta de ani dupa preluarea puterii în Prusia de catreWillhelm (regent care, sub influenta sotiei sale, renuntala conceptiile puternic conservatoare în favoarealiberalismului), Radulescu-Motru si-a dedicat activitateapolitica reabilitarii conceptiei conservatorismului dinRomânia acelor vremuri. Conceptia sa filosofica îsi areradacinile în filosofia lui Kant, dar contactelepermanente cu viata spirituala, filosofica, psihologica,sociologica si artistica deopotriva, din Germania siFranta timpurilor sale i-au facilitat autorului elaborareaunor idei proprii, cu aplicabilitate la realitatile românesti.

Profesor la Universitatea din Bucuresti si membru alAcademiei Române (din 4 iunie 1923), vicepresedinte(31 mai 1935-3 iunie 1938; 31 mai 1941-2 iunie 1944) sipresedinte (3 iunie 1938-31 mai 1941) al prestigioaseiinstitutii, repus în drepturile sale de membru titular (la 3iulie 1990) dupa ce calitatea de membru îi fusese retrasade catre conducerea comunista, Constantin Radulescu-Motru este, cum bine remarca Cristian Preda,coordonatorul reeditarii textelor sale în volumul Scrieripolitice din 1998, „un autor neîndreptatit”2 . Printreautorii de lucrari filosofice ai perioadei sale de activitate,si îi numim aici pe Nae Ionescu, Conta, Blaga, mai tîrziuMircea Eliade, Noica, Cioran, Vulcanescu si multi altii,Radulescu-Motru nu s-a bucurat de aceeasi apreciere,nici în epoca si nici mai tîrziu. Nu pot sa-i dau dreptateaici lui Gabriel Stanescu, care în 2001 scria în Cotidianulca „daca ar fi scris într-o limba de circulatie universala,un Lucian Blaga, un Noica, un Petre Tutea sau unMircea Vulcanescu, opera lor s-ar fi bucurat de

recunoastere europeana.”3 Nu limba i-a împiedicat peacesti oameni de cultura sa intre în „circuitul european”,ci mai degraba un lucru pe care Radulescu-Motru îlsesiza, tragînd în acest sens un semnal de alarma, înlucrarea din 1904 Cultura româna si politicianismul: estevorba în primul rînd, spune autorul, de urmarile nefasteale mimetismului social si cultural din a doua jumatate asecolului al XIX-lea. Atît de mult s-au lasat coplesititinerii care au studiat prin tarile „culte” ale Europei dediferentele fata de conditiile din propria lor patrie, încît,întorsi acasa, nu au fost în stare sa creeze – lipsiti fiindde mediul favorabil din Apus – valori care sa se impunacu adevarat. Critica sa se îndreapta totusi catre trecut,pastrînd înca, printre ironiile fine si atacurile severe laadresa sustinatorilor îndîrjiti ai idealului pasoptist, ourma de speranta pentru viitor: „Secolul al XX-leagaseste mimetismul nostru social într-o vaditadescrestere. Pe de o parte, cauza care-l provocase, acel ceva zice Europa, pierduse mult din misterul de altadata:Europa, cînd i-a fost dat sa vorbeasca, a vorbit ca oricenegustor capitalist, fara înconjur si fara farmec; pe dealta parte, si elita noastra sociala nu mai era aceea care afost în trecut.”4

Ideea principala care se desprinde din lucrarea luiRadulescu-Motru este exprimata chiar de catre acestaprin cuvintele lui Nicolae Iorga: „O noua epoca decultura trebuie sa înceapa pentru noi. Trebuie, sau altfelvom muri!”5 Importanta acordata culturii, ca si conditieindispensabila pentru evolutia sociala a unui stat, îsi facesimtita prezenta în fiecare capitol al lucrarii, însotitafiind pe tot parcursul de critica îndreptata împotriva

KEY WORDS:

philosophy, ConstantinRãdulescu-Motru,politics, nationalism,Romanian culture,politicianism

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elitei politice. „Cultura este o conditiune indispensabilapentru dezvoltarea popoarelor iesite din starea debarbarie.” – Aceasta fiind starea în care Radulescu-Motru considera ca se aflase pîna nu demult (e vorba,bineînteles, de timpul în care traia...) cultura româna –„În cultura se oglindeste finalitatea constiintei sociale;prin ea, faptele dobîndesc un înteles mai înalt, devinistorice.”6 Dar ce îl deranja atît de mult, la modulconcret, pe Radulescu-Motru la cultura prezentului sau,încît sa o disece prin toate mijloacele care îi stateau ladispozitie: prin mijloacele psihologiei, ale filosofiei, alesociologiei si politologiei, si nu în ultimul rînd printalentul sau de literat? Raspunsul ni-l da chiar el, în modrepetat: politicianismul.

Radulescu-Motru defineste conceptul de„politicianism” drept „un gen de activitate politica –sau, mai bine zis, o practicare mestesugita a drepturilorpolitice – prin care cîtiva dintre cetatenii unui Stat, tindsi uneori reusesc sa transforme institutiunile si serviciilepublice, din mijloace pentru realizarea binelui public,cum ele ar trebui sa fie, în mijloace pentru realizareaintereselor personale.”7 Doua sunt originile pe care lepoate avea politicianismul, în acceptiunea lui C.Radulescu-Motru: odata, printr-o degenerare aadevaratei politici, sau dintr-o nepotrivire întremecanismul vietii politice si fondul sufletesc alpoporului chemat sa-l practice. Primul lucru implicapreexistenta unei practici politice functionale, pe cîndcea de-a doua se aplica vietii politice ale unor statetinere, aceasta din urma fiind si situatia la care se referaautorul cînd vorbeste despre politicianismul din

România timpurilor sale. Si tot acest lucru este cel care îiconfera textului citat o actualitate cu care putine lucrarise pot lauda, dupa trecerea unui întreg secol de lapublicare.

La fel ca multe alte „-isme”, politicianismul, ca sinotiune teoretica, tine de domeniul ideologic. PentruRadulescu-Motru însa, el are o conotatie practica cît sepoate de reala, practicantii fiind cei pe care îi ataca,uneori cu dispret, alteori cu aversiune: politicienii dinRomânia. Aceasta critica dura la adresa clasei politice dedinaintea primului Razboi Mondial vine sa certificeconvingerea pe care o avea autorul în legatura cu roluldecisiv pe care personalitatile individuale, si în specialelitele culturale ori politice, îl joaca în viata unui stat. Caun real sustinator al individualismului, Radulescu-Motrustie ca „individul, luat în sine, ar fi o aratare fara deînteles, daca în viata sociala nu i-ar fi dat lui sa seasocieze si sa contribuie la existenta bunurilor sufletesti,la cultura poporului din care face parte”.8 Aceasta esteadevarata natura a individului, care nu poate trai în afarasocietatii – este, putem spune acum de la distanta pecare ne-o ofera secolul trecut între timp si prin evolutiastiintei de pîna în zilele noastre, un început de gîndire degenul teoriei generale a sistemelor. Actualitatea luiRadulescu-Motru trece de dimensiunea ideologico-istorica în cea a stiintelor sociale. Cum spuneam însa sila începutul lucrarii, el a fost un autor neîndreptatit,fiind remarcat mai ales pentru realizarile sale dindomeniul psihologiei si mult prea putin pentruconceptiile sale politologice sau sociologice, care,întrecînd capacitatea de comprehensiune a

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contemporaneitatii sale, au fost trecute cu vederea înepoca si privite ca învechite la momentul redescopeririisale.

Un alt aspect care vine sa confirme aceasta afirmatieîl gasim tot în Cultura româna si politicianismul, undeRadulescu-Motru face (deja la începutul secolului al XX-lea) o diferentiere pe care multi sociologi nu au reusit sao faca decît foarte tîrziu, si anume cea dintre conceptelede „cultura” si de „civilizatie”: „negresit, e mai usor adobîndi o civilizatiune, decît o cultura. Si multepopoare, cu toate ca rasa lor este apta de cultura, totusi,din cauza conditiunilor istorice, sunt condamnate laspoiala civilizatiunii. Caci civilizatiunea se împrumutaprin imitatiune si se raspîndeste cu o iuteala uimitoare,cum se si pierde de altminteri tot asa de repede.”9

Aceasta „spoiala de civilizatiune” pe care o observaRadulescu-Motru la clasa politica de dupa 1848 semanifesta prin „împrumutarea” sistemelor de legi, deorganizare institutionala, ba chiar a modei, din tarileEuropei occidentale în detrimentul culturii indigene,condamnata la o moarte lenta prin absorbtia tot mainumeroaselor elemente culturale straine. Astfel, el îlciteaza amplu pe I. C. Bratianu, pe care îl acuza ca„avusese bunavointa sa-i ofere [pa români], înca de la1853, Frantei. «Constituirea Statului român, zicea el [I.C. Bratianu] într-un memoriu, ar fi cea mai frumoasacucerire ce a facut vreodata Franta afara de teritoriulsau. Armata Statului român ar fi armata Frantei în ori-ent, porturile sale de le Marea Neagra si de pe Dunare arfi întrepozitele comertului francez, si din cauzaabundentii lemnelor noastre de constructiune, aceste

porturi ar fi tot deodata magazinele de constructiune(chantiers) ale marinei franceze; produsele brute a acestoravute tari ar alimenta cu avantagiu fabricile Frantei, carear gasi în schimb un mare debit în aceleasi tari. În fine,Franta va avea toate avantagiile unei colonii, fara a aveacheltuielile ce aceasta ocazioneaza. Compararea nu esteexagerata. În lipsa de o metropola, am adoptat de multFranta de a doua noastra patrie; ea a devenit sorginteavie din care tragem viata noastra morala siintelectuala»10 .” Cu privire la aceasta atitudine apoliticienilor români, în general a gînditorilor de la 1848,Radulescu-Motru are de spus doar atît, evident cuironie: „Dati-le cetatenilor români libertatea si drepturilepolitice, si cu aceasta i-ati fericit pentru totdeauna!Pretentiunile lor la o cultura autonoma si originala suntminime de tot. Daca drepturile politice sunt asigurate,daca politicianul îsi are idealul sau realizat, sufletesteRomânii s-ar vinde oricui.”11 Chiar si în zilele noastre,discutia privind departajarea conceptelor de cultura si decivilizatie este departe de a se fi încheiat.12 „Deosebireaîntre cultura si civilizatiune ne face sa întelegem (...)faptul ca Statele cele puternice ale Europei suntneobosite în ceea ce priveste raspîndirea civilizatiunii, siindiferente în ceea ce priveste cultura. (...) Operacivilizatoare primeaza pretutindeni.”13 Efectele socialeale politicii de colonizare si ale economiei capitalistesunt criticate de Radulescu-Motru, fara ca acest lucru safaca din el un adept al ideologiei marxiste (din contra, seexprima foarte vehement împotriva socialistilor) saunationaliste. El analizeaza doar, critic, „schimbarile dedecor venite dupa 1848”, schimbari care au adus, pe de

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o parte, beneficiile unei civilizatii apusene superioare,periclitînd însa, pe de alta parte, evolutia naturala a uneiculturi române unitare, dar totdeauna în cunostinta decauza ca aceste schimbari erau, pentru multi dintrecontemporanii sai, „o îndrumare spre ideal, daca nuchiar idealul”.14

Prin urmare, aceasta este marea problema care sepune în Cultura româna si politicianismul, marea întrebarela care C. Radulescu-Motru încearca sa raspunda: „oareaceste schimbari de decor, începute la 1848 sicontinuate în tot cursul jumatatii a doua a secoluluitrecut, patruns-au ele în firea poporului român, pentru aconstitui cu aceasta o unitate sufleteasca, din care saizvorasca motivele unei activitati viitoare? Asimilat-aoare poporul nostru în firea sa obiceiurile, institutiunile,cultura Apusului, pe care în aparenta le imitam atît dedocil? Desteptat-au formele civilizatiunii apusene, înmijlocul carora noi ne învîrtim, si fondul sufletesc carele sustine aiurea? Sau, sub aceste forme de împrumut,traieste mai departe fondul nostru propriu mostenit dinveacuri?”15

Analizînd în maniera neokantiana diverse aspecte cetin de cultura sociala, politica, religioasa a poporuluiromân si folosind metoda comparatismului prinprezentarea aspectelor echivalente din Apusul Europei,C. Radulescu-Motru ajunge la concluzia oarecumparadoxala ca în România totul – justitia, institutiilepublice, pîna si lumea artistica – functioneaza doar prinintermediul unui individ abstract, „omnipotentulcineva”.16 Paradoxul acestei concluzii izvoraste dinconvingerile individualismului si, uneori, elitismului, pe

care autorul le sustine cu consecventa în mai toatelucrarile sale, ajungînd pîna la a fi exclus din Academiedin pricina acestor convingeri.17 Acest „cineva” estemotorul politicianismului, iar cei care apeleaza la el suntcei care-l întretin. „Prin ce mijloace au izbutit politicieniinostri sa robeasca într-un timp atît de scurt sufletuluipoporului român? Prin ce farmec au stiut ei samomeasca atîtea capete, care s-au alipit lor si ne-au adusastfel în starea de pseudo-cultura în care ne gasimastazi?”, se întreaba Radulescu-Motru. Si tot el nelumineaza: „Raspunsul la asemenea întrebari mi se parea fi numai unul; acela care, în teza generala, s-a adeverita fi o lege urmata în dezvoltarea tuturor popoarelor cares-au aflat în conditiunile în care ne-am aflat si noi.Adevarul anume: ca orice popor (...) se robeste cuusurinta unui gen nou de viata, de cîte ori în acest gennou de viata se exalta viciile sau relele sale deprinderidin trecut. Virtutile sau deprinderile bune sunt cazidurile de aparare ale individualitatii unui popor; elesunt greu de darîmat si în toate cazurile greu dereconstruit; viciile sau deprinderile rele însa sunttotdeauna ca niste porti, deschise oricarei inovatiunivenite din afara. (...) Noul mod de viata pe care tu-laduci este un simplu decor, care vine sa poleiasca sau sarafineze o veche slabiciune. Asa se explica si izbîndapoliticianismului nostru.”18

„A împrumuta tiparul extern al vietii Statelorconstitutionale, fara a împrumuta si sufletul acestorstate; a avea pe hîrtie alegeri libere pentru parlament siîn fapt a fura urnele chiar prin mijlocirea jandarmilorcare trebuiau sa le pazeasca; a înfiinta mii de slujbasi si

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apoi a constata ca exactitatea acestora la serviciu estedependenta de culesul viilor si de lasarea secului; a votalegile cele mai liberale din lume în care sunt înscrisetoate drepturile pentru cetateni, si în fapt sa se tolerezeabsoluta iresponsabilitate a puterii executive, acesteatoate nu constituie un progres, ci o falsificare aprogresului.”19

Politicianismul din România nu este, dupa cum amvazut prin intermediul lui Radulescu-Motru, o aparitie aepocii postcomuniste. Se poate chiar spune ca avem olunga si bogata traditie în ceea ce priveste aceasta formadevianta de manifestare a actului politic, pe careRadulescu-Motru o denumeste fara inhibitie o boala asocietatii. În rolul sau de parazit („parazitii nu pot saprospere decît în corpurile intrate în descompunere”20 )îl întîlnim pe politician pretutindeni: în România si încelelalte state balcanice, în America de Sud sau noilestate africane, în Extremul Orient sau în fostelerepublici sovietice – „El este o aparitie necesara înpolitica lumii întregi.”21 Descrierile pe care ConstantinRadulescu-Motru le face multora dintre aceste regiunipar sa arate ca din acest punct de vedere nimic nu s-aschimbat în acest secol ce a trecut. Rolul „civilizator” almarilor puteri economice a ramas acelasi, la fel ca simecanismul politicianismului în tinerele democratii.Unde ramâne progresul acestui ultim secol, unde suntsalturile culturale si de civilizatie pe care omenireaconsidera ca le-a efectuat în acest timp? Radulescu-Motru îsi încheie discursul din Cultura româna sipoliticianismul pe un ton optimist, dupa ce pe sute de

pagini a însirat sute de motive ce îndeamna la pesimism,dînd prin aceasta un sfat care transcede bariereletimpului: „Sa avem încredere.”

Note:

1 Citatul se regaseste aici: Constantin Radulescu-Motru:Cultura româna si politicianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed.Nemira, Bucuresti 1998, pag. 177.

2 Cristian Preda: Un totalitarism pe potriva sufletului românesc,studiu introductiv în: C. Radulescu-Motru: Scrieri politice, Ed.Nemira, Bucuresti 1998.

3 Gabriel Stanescu: Nae Ionescu fata-n fata cu reactiunea, înCotidianul, martie 2001.

4 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Cultura româna sipoliticianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti1998, pag. 83.

5 Semanatorul, No. 20 (1903), citat dupa Scrieri politice, pag. 84.6 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Cultura româna si

politicianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti1998, pag. 72.

7 Ibidem, pag. 65.8 Ibidem, pag. 73.9 H.S.Chamberlain: Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten

Jahrhunderts, pag. 809, citat dupa Scrieri politice, pag. 111.10 I. C. Bratianu: Memoriu asupra Românilor dat Împaratului

Napoleon III (publicat în Romanulu, 6 Decembrie 1861), citat dupaScrieri politice, pag. 81-82.

11 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Cultura româna sipoliticianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti1998, pag. 81.

12 Bunaoara, culture din engleza corespunde în oarecaremasura conceptului de Zivilisation din germana, si invers,civilisation este mai degraba apropiat de Kultur. Nici limbafranceza, nici alta limba nu ofera o echivalare perfecta a

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conceptelor. Încercarea de a face totusi o distinctie clara întrecele doua notiuni este, pentru momentul respectiv, un act demare importanta stiintifica pentru stiintele sociale. Ce pacattotusi ca receptia acestui fapt s-a lasat atît de mult asteptata.Asemenea dificultati apar mai ales în momentul încercarii de atraduce scrieri stiintifice importante, erorile de traducere ducînddeseori la întelegerea diferita a autorilor în limbile diferitelorpopoare. Exemplul pe care-l consider foarte elocvent în acestsens este traducerea cartii lui Samuel P. Huntington Clash ofCivilisations în diferite limbi.

13 Constantin Radulescu-Motru, departe de a fi un ignorantîn ceea ce priveste valoarea reala a civilizatiei si culturii europene,exprima în Cultura româna si politicianismul o pozitie similara cu ceaa „euroscepticilor” sau a miscarii anti-globalizare ale începutuluide secol XXI.

14 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Cultura româna sipoliticianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti1998, pag. 121.

15 Ibidem, pag. 122.16 Ibidem, pag. 153.17 Bineînteles, nu acesta a fost unicul motiv al excluderii

sale. Mult mai greu în balanta a cîntarit probabil argumentulsustinerii de catre el a Germaniei fasciste. Pentru aceasta, veziConstantin Radulescu-Motru: Conceptia conservatoare si progresul, învolumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998, pag. 331-336.

18 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Cultura româna sipoliticianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti1998, pag. 161.

19 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Conceptia conservatoare siprogresul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998,pag. 329.

20 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: Cultura româna sipoliticianismul, în volumul Scrieri politice, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti1998, pag. 181.

21 Ibidem, pag. 67.

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Sandu Frunza

Leonard Swidler, Dupa absolut.Viitorul dialogic al reflectieireligioaseEd. Limes, Cluj, 2003

Leonard Swidler is one of the most significantthinkers and promoters of the dialogue in the context ofa perpetual redefining of contemporary religious identi-ties. He is a Professor at Temple University, Philadel-phia, co-president of the Global Dialogue Institute and co-editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies. He is also theauthor and coordinator of over 60 books among whichwe can mention: Dialogue for Reunion (1962), Women in Ju-daism (1976), Kung in Conflict (1981), Yeshua: A Model forModerns (1993), Theoria ? Praxis. How Jews, Christians, Mus-lims Can Together Move From Theory to Practice (1998), TheStudy of Religion in an Age of Global Dialogue (2000) andmany others.

The first Romanian translation of the well-knownAmerican Catholic theologian, After the Absolute. The dia-logical future of religious reflection was published by the no-table Limes Publishing House from Cluj -Napoca .Thetranslation made by Codruta Cuceu, a conversant withLeonard Swidler’s work, is to be remarked due to theharmonic literalism of the text and to the accuracy of

expression. The total deciphering of the English phraseembedded in the dialogical reflection of the book wasobtained by Codruta Cuceu after a thorough work andvery long discussions with some of the most importantscholars in the field.

One of the most original perspectives framed in Af-ter the Absolute, is that a religious reflection on religion’sdialogical future has to go beyond the strict level of in-ter-confessional and inter-religious dialogue. The cul-tural and religious context of modern world requires theextension of the discussions of the worldviews that tryto comprehend the meaning of life and to circumscribea way of living according to the new dialogical stan-dards.

Assuming as a standpoint a broad dialogical per-spective, Leonard Swidler considers that the task of ourtimes is to discover the necessary openness to engage inthe dialog between religions and ideologies at the gen-eral level of contemporary mentality but also at the par-ticular level of some communities’ customs. In order tomake possible such a dialogue, the Catholic theologianholds that the two terms –religion and ideology –haveto be connected to a broader category drawn by thetheological paradigm. Theology is defined by the authoras a systematic religious and ideological reflection. If weaccept that theology – considered as the search for themeaning of live and for the means to live accordingly –is a “worldview and way”, we find ourselves confrontedwith a system in which the two basic categories - reli-gion and ideology – coexist.

SANDU FRUNZA

Assoc. Prof., Ph.D., Dept.of Systematic Philosophy,BBU, Cluj, Romania.Author of the books: Oantropologie mistica(1996), Iubirea sitranscendenta (1999),Experienta religioasa îngîndirea lui DumitruStaniloae (2001),Fundamentalismulreligios si noul conflict alideologiilor (2003)E-mail:sfrunza@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

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Such a “worldview and way” always includes the“four Cs”: the creed as a system of beliefs, the code asan ethical system, the cult as a celebratory system, andthe community as a social system.

The author distinguishes between two species oftheology in accordance with the place taken by tran-scendence. A conception based on an entity which tran-scends humanity and world as such, belongs to the cat-egory of religion. On the other hand, an explanationbased only on a reality intrinsic to our world, an expla-nation that excludes the idea of transcendence, belongsto the category of ideology.

This paradigm shift assumed by the theological ap-proach of the perspectives upon life is needed by theCatholic theologian in order to circumscribe the frame-works for advancing a dialogue not only between differ-ent confessions or Christian Churches, but also betweenthe religious groups and those groups that take as an“explanation of the meaning of life and how to live ac-cordingly” a perspective more or less religious or la-icized and engage themselves in an inter-religious or in-ter-ideological dialogue.

For a traditional theological perspective it is clearthat it would be difficult to accept that such an inclusionunder the same category of religion and ideology is pos-sible. The experience of ideology as a secularized reli-gion helps us to make a clear distinction between reli-gion and ideology and to consider theology not as amore comprehensive category, but as the most elabo-rate form of reflection from the standpoint of the con-stituted religions. It is true that ideologies, considered as

the models of a reality globally constituted, presupposeconstructs based on the experience of the world and onthe efficient action, while theologies – themselves imagi-native creations – are always the result of an assemblyof structures of the sacra which belong equally to thetranscendent and to the transcendental. In other words,religion, altogether with its more refined expression,theology, is the creation of an icon/incarnate which it-self and its consequences surmised by the theologicalmodel of the world cannot be understood outside thebiblical testimony. It is an icon which, as an originalmeeting constantly actualized, is strengthen by thepower of an Archetype which circumscribes it to astructural figuring in an interpersonal dynamic under-pinned by the immanence-transcendence unity.

But besides all prejudices concerning the nuances ofthe term ideology, it is clear that the option for a secu-larized existence reduplicated by the need of a religiousrenewal, which cannot be ignored by the traditionalecclesiastic institutions, are part of our experience ofthis century. In his effort, the remarkable Americanthinker manages to find an original and very efficaciouscompromise that is necessary for a Christian resetting ofthe significances and the possibilities of cohabitation inthis century. Such an intellectual game has some specialconsequences at the level of a practical meeting betweenconfessions, religions, and religions and ideologies. Theempirical field, the cognitive field, and the spiritual onecan thus find the way of a common approach.

In a systematic and very creative reflection, LeonardSwidler proposes a broad discussion of some theoretical

KEY WORDS:

Leonard Swidler, interre-ligious dialogue, abso-lute, ideology, religion

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subject-matters for dialogue that appear in the Christiancontext, but also of the dialogue with Judaism, Islam,Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism or of the dia-logue with Marxism. The ideal goal of the author’s ap-proach is to translate the religious reflection in an Ecu-menical Esperanto that gives us the means needed for areal inter-religious and inter-ideological dialogue, start-ing with the basic of dialogue generally accepted.

Leonard Swidler’s book is one of the most impor-tant appearances in Romanian culture after 1989. I be-lieve that this book cannot be left aside, being a mustboth for theologians dealing with inter-religious dia-logue or ecumenism, and also for scholars in politicalsciences, communication, philosophers and sociologists.

In times when the religious element is reaffirmed asa force within the context of globalization, the scholarsfrom all fields of scientific and cultural research findthemselves in need of searching a dialogical paradigmthat avoids the conflicts bearing a religious dimension.

Aurel Codoban

Gal Laszlo, Societate si LogicitateEd. Cartimpex, Cluj, 2004

Aceasta carte are o tema de mare actualitate, sau celputin mie mi se pare foarte actuala din cauza cîtorvamotive importante1 . Ma marginesc aici si acum laaceasta carte desi cunosc si teza de doctorat din care arezultat o excelenta carte care pune în conjunctie limbasi logicitatea. În ambele carti m-a interesat foarte multcontinutul de idei si în numele acelui continut, amîndraznit sa ma avînt în prezentarea acestei carti, ceeace, trebuie sa recunosc, e o dificultate pentru minepentru ca a trecut multa vreme de cînd mi-am încercatcapacitatile logice, ca student, în contextul cursurilor siexamenelor si m-am temut ca lectura va fi un test delogica într-adevar solicitant. Partea de logica formala,prezenta în aceasta carte, este însa strict limitata la ceeace este necesar, nu este în exces si este foarte clarprezentata, asa cum trebuie sa fie într-o carte, pe careoricine din publicul larg o poate citi.

Sa va explic de ce cred ca este foarte importanta sitema si cartea: În contextul logicii se întîmpla acest lucrucred, este o miscare pulsatila, adica o miscare care

AUREL CODOBAN

Prof., Ph.D., Departmentof Systematic Philosophy,BBU, Cluj, Romania.Author of the books:Repere si prefigurari(1982), Structurasemiologica astructuralismului (1984),Introducere in filosofie(1995), Sacru si ontofanie(1998), Teoria semnenlorsi interpretarii (2001),Amurgul iubirii. De laiubirea pasiune lacomunicarea corporala(2004).E-mail:codoban@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

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oscileaza între formalizare excesiva si tendinta de aaborda ceea ce este de abordat logic concret, tendinta deaplicare. În cele ce urmeaza, am sa încerc sa explicsensul în care, autorul gîndeste, relatia dintre societate silogicitate si sensul în care gîndeste logica, ca disciplinaaplicativa. Ma marginesc sa parcurg ideile acestei carti,idei care mi se par si importante si interesante dinperspectiva aceasta a unei logici care doreste sa se aplice,a unei logici care merge într-o tendinta pulsatila contraraformalismului în care logica a excelat. Logica pe care noio cunosteam, era logica care tindea tot mai mult sa seformalizeze. Logica pe care domnul profesor Gal ne-opropune, este o logica care vrea sa revina la viata, vreasa devina cumva aplicativa. Acuma lucrurile sunt un picmai complete si mai complexe. E un text din care asdori sa citez pe urmele lui Kurt Goedel, care gîndeste cîtde paradoxala poate deveni formalizarea si care neîngaduie sa spunem ca: “Nici un sistem nu va puteacuprinde în sine toate adevarurile”. Directia aceastaaplicativa pe care, domnul profesor Gal o initiaza cuaceasta carte mi se pare foarte importanta, pentru camerge împotriva formalismelor.

Dati-mi voie sa examinez cîteva dintre ideileprezente în carte. Mai întîi de toate titlul: Societete siLogicitate, trebuie sa ne imaginam din perspectivaparadoxului pe care l-am citat, societatea seamana cu unfel de biscuite si logicitatea seamana cu ceaiul sisocietate si logicitate nu înseamna de fapt ca toatasocietatea devine logica. Înseamna ca ea poate fiinfuzata cu logicitatea, acesta este sensul aplicativitatiilogicii, ca diferite domenii, diferite aspecte ale vietii

noastre pot fi infuzate cu logicitate. Biscuitele ramînebiscuite, dar este patruns de ceaiul tare al logicii. Carteami se pare suplimentar interesanta pentru ca atunci cîndscrii o carte precum este teza de doctorat, atunciorientarea este omogena, efortul si intentia ta suntoarecum unitare si coerente. E foarte greu sa-ti daiseama cum gîndeste un om daca îi citesti doar o singuracarte, putem folosi si în acest sens formula ca: “ma temde omul unei singure carti”, e foarte greu de descoperitcum este. În schimb aceasta carte, care este un fel deculegere de texte, publicate, prezentate cu diferite ocaziide domnul profesor Gal, ne ofera ocazii diferite în careaceeasi atitudine logica se manifesta, contextele suntdiferite, deci aici exista o contextualizare si atunci cu atîteste mai relevant felul în care el îsi prezinta ideile saucare este tendinta lui adevarata în directia aplicativitatii.Îmi place foarte mult sa descopar ca are un obiectpredilect de analiza, acesta a fost unul dintre motiveleinteresului; am si dat ca bibliografie cartea domnuluiprofesor din acest motiv, interesul lui pentru proverbe.Mi se pare pentru un logician, extrem de interesant siilustrativ în ceea ce priveste logica aplicata, acest interespentru proverbe si ele nu apar doar într-un loc sau altul.Chiar atunci cînd vrea sa foloseasca exemple didacticepentru a-si ilustra ideile, adesea domnul profesorrecurge la astfel de proverbe care sunt instrumente decomunicare si interpretare. Exista înca o linie pe care asvrea sa o desprindem si pe care vreau sa o folosesc la“crosetat”, aceasta linie rezulta dintr-un citat pe care totasa l-am ales, el suna asa: “proverbele ofera solutii sipoate, resemnare, si nu eficienta”.

KEY WORDS:

applied logic, GalLaszlo, communication,interpretation, society

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Un alt obiect predilect de analiza, pe lînga proverbe,sunt si modurile de gîndire. Îmi place aceasta formula amodurilor de gîndire si regasesc aici o preocuparecomuna care priveste diversitatea moderna. Exista unpasaj foarte bun care spune ca, aceasta diversitatemoderna, aceasta pluralizare a diversitatilor moderne,este cea care conduce la comunicare si în cele din urmala inventia sau invocatia alteritatii. Modurile de gîndirereprezinta din nou o maniera concreta în care logica secere aplicata în aceasta infuzie între logica si societate pecare o descriam înainte.

Exista în aceasta carte si asta este ceea cesuplimentar o face interesanta, exista o anumita formulade întelepciune. Cu filozofia se întîmpla ceea ce s-aîntîmplat si cu logica - a devenit metafizica, i-a placut sase retraga într-un “turn de fildes”, sa devinahiperabstracta în limbaj si foarte departe de ceea ce esterealitatea temîndu-se de un fel de murdarie. Or, adevaruleste ca si filozofia si logica prima ca forme efective aleîntelepciunii erau legate de viata cetateanului grec dincetatea greaca. Aceasta carte este de asemenea legata deviata noastra, de viata noastra din acest oras chiar si înformula în care se petrece ea, cu toate detaliile ei con-crete. Ca sa revin, sa fac un fel de miscare dubla, voitrece imediat la Goedel cu o alta formula care mi se parefoarte înteleapta si care deriva efectiv din acest paradoxgoedel-ian si care as pune-o alaturi de celelalte citate,înainte fata de proverbe, sa vedeti ce deductie scoateaplicînd paradoxul goedelian domnul profesor GalLaszlo, el spune: ”nici o societate nu poate realiza bineletuturor ”, aceasta este o fraza efectiv filozofica scoasa

dintr-un paradox logic si e unul dintre acele semne pecare le indicam ale întelepciunii. Asta este ceea ce îmiplace sa regasesc în aceasta carte, este foarte interesantsa vezi la un logician, pîna unde merge cu aplicareaparadoxului goedelian, admitînd si aici interesul nostrupentru proverbe ar trebui sa fie similar, al meu dinpartea hermeneuticii sau semnificatiei, a dînsului dinpartea logicii, merge pîna acolo încît observa ca exista opretentie de universalitate a acestor proverbe si caaceasta pretentie de universalitate a proverbelor implicacaracterul lor contradictoriu. Ceea ce este realitateaproverbelor, la fel ca si societatea care nu poate realizabinele tuturor, nici proverbele nu pot realiza un sistemlogic strict coerent pe contradictoriu.

Am trecut cu mult interes, dar pot vorbi mai putinde schitele de istorie a logicii. Îmi era cunoscut ApacaiCsere Ianos, m-a interesat foarte mult studiul despreBohm Karoly, care îmi era mai putin cunoscut si vamarturisesc ca ar trebui mai multa lume dintre noi sa-lciteasca, pentru o buna cunoastere reciproca. E o foartesubtila si buna prezentare si convine foarte mult unuidialog cultural autentic realizat aici în contextultransilvan. Mai este aici un set de idei în care ma simtfoarte aproape de domnul profesor Gal Laszlo; esteideea pluralitatii logicii contemporane. Problema estedaca exista mai multe logici sau exista o logica unitaracare, desigur, atît pe orizontala cît si pe verticalacunoaste o dispersie. Înclin sa cred, asa cum într-un altarticol am vazut ca si domnul profesor Gal înclina sacreada ca exista mai degraba o pluralitate a logicilorcontemporane.

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Ajungem în sfîrsit la partea care mie mi se pare ceamai interesanta si anume la logica dialogului rational si lalogica argumentarii juridice. Aceste parti sunt efectivparti de logica aplicata si parti care leaga logica de ceeace este teoretizarea dialogului si comunicarii în clipa defata. Într-adevar, aceste texte dau masura stilului degîndire: logica aplicata pe care domnul Gal Laszlo vreas-o promoveze si mi se pare de nivelul efectiv alultimelor realizari occidentale, este la punct si esteadmirabil ca se poate înscrie pe o astfel de traiectorie derealizari de vîrf în ceea ce priveste partea aplicata alogicii.

Ultimul dintre textele acestei carti mi se pare foarteinteresant si daca am început cu aspectul acesta teoretic,problematic si de formalizare, as vrea închei cu acesttext care se numeste “Gratuitate, alternare si viitor “,pentru ca pune în discutie una dintre ideile nascute înscoala filozofica clujeana, aceea legata de problemagratuitatii si felul în care o trateaza, e felul întelept încare revede, reia pur si simplu ideea aplicativitatii, atît alogicii cît si a filozofiei. Observatia la adresa filozofiei cucare sunt de acord este ca: în întregul ei filozofia nu sepoate aplica, ea poate crea doar un mediu de dialogcivic, politic si social si ca aplicabile sunt teoriile luatebucata de bucata, în acest sens vorbim de o aplicativitatechiar si în logica. Domnul profesor Gal Laszlo seîntîlneste cu cele mai interesante si noi teorii care sustin

ca ceea ce este cultura este implicat în schimburile depiata. Am putea vorbi într-un sens foarte larg despreeconomia bunurilor simbolice. Ceea ce sustine domnulprofesor Gal este aceasta: ca trebuie sa gîndimprodusele noastre culturale de aici înainte, fie ca suntemlogicieni sau filozofi, în maniera în care piata nepropune sa le gîndim. Adica gratuitatea nu mai arecirculatia pe care o propunea profesorul D.D. Rosca altadata si noi trebuie sa ne înscriem în aceasta forma acomunicarii care este structura pietei. În ceea ce îlpriveste pe autor, as vrea sa-l felicit, sa subliniez la elceea ce gasesc ca este adevaratul stil logic.

E o carte de mare transparenta, care are claritatea decristal a logicii, dar fara sa aiba îndepartarea rece, cumau cristalele logice, de gheata. E o carte în care existamulta viata, într-adevar, si multa aplicabilitate, dar existao structura logica impecabila foarte clara si asta esteîndeosebi de apreciat; întreaga carte este nu numai ocarte de logica, dar si o carte de filozofie care face defapt ca ceea ce este stilul emfatic al metafizicii sa nu maiaiba circulatie.

Note:

1 Textul reprezinta prezentarea de la lansarea cartii la PolulCultural Clujean.