"Nothing More to Lose": Ashwaayat and Land Governance in Egypt

Nothing More to Lose 2014 WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY, 24-27 March

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"Nothing More to Lose": Ashwaayat and Land Governance

in Egypt

Ahmed M. Soliman, Prof.

Architecture Department, Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University, Egypt

Email: [email protected]

Paper presented in

Integration Land Governance into the Post-2012 Agenda

Harnessing Synergies for Implementation and Monitoring Impact

Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington DC, March

24-27, 2014


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in Egypt

Abstract

The dynamics of informal urbanisation, rapid population growth, lack of urban planning

framework, arbitrary housing policies, and absence of land governance were among the

causes that led into the appearance of an "emerging urbanism" in Egypt, known as ashwaayat,

or indiscriminate forms of urbanity. Based on two case studies located in two Egyptian cities;

Cairo, and Alexandria, this article explores two folds. One is ashwaiyyat results from

exclusionary pattern of urban development, and land governance, by which has been

informally locked it into (in)visible urban enclaves within the built environment. Another

highlights the rights of everyone to own property, have a fundamental importance in the urban

poor own right. The results found have been widely disseminated and diverged according to

the history of land reform, types of land ownership, security of tenure, and to the ways land

being developed. Egypt has to adopt a proper land governance that supports what people do,

what people are willing to do, what people are able to do, how the law is perceived by people,

to regulate the collective resources by which enabling a practical and logical land governance

system, rather than systems so unfeasible that leave most of land in ashwaiyyat unregulated.

Key words: Ashwaiyyat, land governance, Land reform, Land ownership, Security of land

tenure.


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in Egypt

1- BACKGROUND

Flying by plane over Cairo city, it is clearly to recognize the degree of deterioration and

breakdown of urbanity. The belt of urban informality is surrounding the parameter of Greater

Cairo Region, as well as became a common phenomenon in most of Egyptian cities. This

cancer of urban informality, or ashwaiyyat 1, has been infesting Cairo and Alexandria since

the 1900's and 1930's, respectively, where squatters' areas were found in El Matryhia area

North West of the city of Cairo (GOPP, 2012), and other were found on the edge of El

Mahmoudyia canal in Alexandria (Soliman, 2013), although it has multiplied to large scale

and complexity through the last six decades (Soliman, 2004). Agricultural land conversion to

housing informality (ALCHI), or Ashwaiyyat, is not developed through established or state-

regulated procedures, and it does not utilize the recognized institutions of housing and

housing finance. It is developed on land for which the owner has some sort of legal tenure and

a formal occupation permit. Ashwaiyyat is generally established in areas of essentially rural

character located on the urban fringe that are interspersed with, surrounded by, or adjacent to

undeveloped sites or sites that remain in agricultural use, and spread in advance of the

principal lines of urban growth.

During the last three years, and after the two revolts of 25th of January 2011 and 30th of June

2013, Egypt witnessed the loss of 100-120 thousands Fadden (one Faddan is equal 0.42

hectare) of precious fertile agricultural land illegally by urban sprawl (Soliman, 2013).

Combined with the spreading of ashwaiyyat, multitude of urban challenges are emerged; the

increase of Egypt's population to nearly 86 million people (CAPMAS, 2014), deterioration of

economic situation, decrease of forex reserve (from 36$ billion USD to under 17$ billion

USD), rising of unemployment (more than 15% national wide), deprivation, lawlessness, lack

of security, disintegration of social conduct, erosion of human behavior, and rapid increase of

informal economy. What has happened to the Egyptian built environment? Chaos, the

swelling of ashwaiyyat and urban disorder became a phenomenon of urban life within the two

cites landscape.

The agglomeration of ashwaiyyat in Cairo and Alexandria began to appear in the 1960's and

expand in the 1970's where was little interest in what was at first a very marginal and not very

1 Ashwaiyyat, the plural for ashwaiyya (literally meaning ‘half-hazard’), is the term used in public to refer to the informal communities in Egypt, and is referring to illegal housing development on agricultural land (see Bayat, A. and Denis, E. ,2000) .


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visible phenomenon, neither from government nor academic. The result is a growing

divergence in Egyptian cities: between the old and the new part of the urban agglomeration, a

“Great Divide” between "establishing", “struggling” and “emerging” urban spaces. The

former space is the new gated communities of the elites of the society, the middle, is the

formal city and symbolizes the community that follows the prevailing laws, while the latter is

the peri-urban informal settlements, or ashwaiyyat, and mirrors the marginal groups. Cairo

and the other Cairos within the city, the formal city, informal city and desert city in “The

Egyptian landscape" (Silver, 2010; Sims 2010; AlSayyad 2009).

Between 1982 and 2004, an estimated 1.2 million faddans of agricultural land has been

decimated through ashwaiyyat development (World Bank, 2007). Agricultural land is being

lost at an estimated annual, daily, and hourly rate of 54545, 149.4, and 6.22 faddans

respectively. During the inter-census period (1996–2006), the annual urban housing

production is conservatively thought to have grown to reach 263,838 units. Of these, 55.6

percent were formal and 45.4 percent informal. In Cairo, 81 percent of informal units sit on

privately owned agricultural land, with 10 percent on government owned desert land and the

remainder on state-owned agricultural land (World Bank, 2007; Cities Alliance, 2008; UN-

Habitat, 2010). According to the 2006 census, the total number of unused units in urban areas

in Egypt reached 4.58 million units, of which 1.18 million are closed and 3.40 million are

vacant. An estimated 42 percent of the housing stock in Greater Cairo is frozen under rent

control. Much housing is poorly located, especially for moderate- and low-income families

(City Alliance, 2008).

As of 2007, there were an estimated 8.5 million informal housing units with at least 17

million Egyptians in urban areas. Of which; 4.7 million units on agricultural land within or

outside municipal boundaries; 0.6 million on government-owned desert land within municipal

boundaries; and 3.2 million units (10.2 million Egyptians ) outside administrative village

boundaries (Egypt Human Development Report 2010), with a value around US$ 1218 billion

(the estimated price of an informal housing unit is US$ 14285). About half of the urban

population is concentrated in two major urban centers: Cairo and Alexandria, while the

remaining half is scattered in 226 small and intermediate urban settlements along the Nile

river valley and delta. The total population of Egypt will reach around 151 million by 2050

(CAPMAS, 2014) where 62.4 percent will be urbanized (UN-Habitat, 2008). The question is

where this addition of population will live in? If the current trend of informal urbanization

continues, Egypt will need two thirds of the current built up areas (rural and urban) to be

added to the current urban and rural agglomeration till the year of 2050, and will need an


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investment of 75 billion USD in the next 35 years, more than 2 billion USD a year, can Egypt

afford it.

These statistics reinforce the argument that the urban housing crisis in Egypt is a problem not

of scarcity but instead one of a distorted housing and development policies, corruption, and

violate regulations whereby an accumulation of ill-conceived and inadequate policies have led

over time to a mismatch between supply and demand and to severely curtailed private sector

investment in housing production for the urban poor. The inability of the government to

introduce a proper land governance to facilitate land delivery system for the urban poor has

led many to build homes - semi-legally or illegally - on privately-owned agricultural land.

Thus, ashwaiyyat inevitably became prototype of land delivery system, offering, through

semi-legal and illegal ways, homeownership for the growing population of the urban poor.

Now, most Egyptian cities are surrounded by belts of ashwaayat, which form about 88

percent of housing production in Egypt.

It is important to note that very few scholars study the mechanisms of land governance of

ashwaiyyat, nor measure the influence of ashwaiyyat on cities' growth, emerging urbanism,

and perception of space that allows ashwaiyyat to function regardless of government rules.

The research methodology is relied upon case study approach, in which the sites in both cities

were studied. Also, this study collected data from academic and semi-academic documents,

semi-structured interviews, participatory and non-participatory observations, and group

discussion. The informants were residents within the two sites, municipalities, government,

and private officers related to city development, and NGOs. Spatial analysis using GIS

software was used to analyze data obtained. The results found that the driving forces affecting

rapid urban growth in both sites include; historic events from the various land reform acts;

and the impact of socioeconomic transformation on land ownership. The article is organized

as follows: the second section questions land governance. Section three briefly examines the

two sites within the scope of land governance through scans the two sites' growth and land

reform and typology of land ownership. A concluding section offers directions for further

research.

2- LAND GOVERNANCE QUESTION

The land question is central to economic analysis. Its use in an urban context is crucial in

shaping how effectively cities function and who gets the principal benefits from urban

economic growth (Stilwell & Jordan, 2004). Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights 2 recognizes the rights of everyone to own property either alone or in

association with others, and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of their property. The


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failure of government’s land and housing policies, and the inability of the formal private

sector to provide land for housing the poor, have strengthened the appeal of informal land

markets (Durand-Lasserve, 2005; Payne, et al. 2009; Soliman, 2010) and the plead for a good

land governance. Urban land governance is a key issue in controlling land uses in a given

environment, and the state is the only body that possesses the authority to create a legal, fiscal

and regulatory framework to land governance. Assessing land governance indicators relies on

an accurate information system in land issue that would reflect the reality of land dynamic of

a given environment.

There are different views, definitions and perspectives are given to land governance by

various scholars. Land governance concerns the rules, process and structure through which

decisions are made about access to land and its uses, the manner in which the decisions are

implemented and enforced; the way that competing interest in land are managed (Palmer et

at., 209). However, land governance concerns the property rights to land are defined and can

be exchanged and transformed; the way in which public oversight over land use, land

management, and taxation is exercised; the way the state land is managed, acquired, and

disposed of, the nature and quality of land information available to the public and ease with

which it can be accessed or modified; and the way in which disputes are resolved and conflict

is managed (Deininger, K., et al., 2012). It encompasses statutory, customary and religious

institutions. It includes state structures such as land agencies, courts and ministries

responsible for land, as well as non-statutory actors such as traditional bodies and informal

actors. It covers both the legal and policy framework for land uses as well as traditional and

informal practices that enjoy social legitimacy.

Therefore, the challenges of land governance, especially for the urban poor, are outcome of

unclearly framework for land uses, the absence of institutional framework, weakness of social

institution, the deterioration of economic situation, and lack of attention to the spatial effects

that could affect the city's growth in the future.

The vague of the framework for land uses has led many people to illegally convert

agricultural land to another uses. Agricultural land conversion to housing informality

(ALCHI), or ashwaayat, through a peoples’ process (Soliman, 2010), created land, rights,

wealth, and innovation, by which it achieved a realistic land delivery system, facilitated

access to cheap housing plots, and enabled the urban poor to obtain land plots on terms and

conditions acceptable to them (Jenkins, 2004; Soliman, 2010,). The processes of ashwaayat

are attributed to a peoples’ process associated with the key actors who have managed to

develop and transfer farmland use to urban use. In the recent years agricultural land

acquisition or "peri-urban" land has become a fairly secure, convenient, and inexpensive


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option for obtaining housing plots (Jenkins, 2004; Hasan, A. et al, 2005; Soliman, 2010),

despite the fact that it has been characterized by profound overcrowding and physical

compactness. Also, the loss of agricultural land inflicts a major impact on the Green and

Brown Agendas (Duquennois, and Newman, 2009), and, over time, has changed the patterns

of urban morphology in the urban matrix of cities (Rashed, T., et al, 2005)2. Presently there

are more widely used labels such as: "urban-rural fringe", "urban transition zone," "semi-

informal area," (Soliman, 1996) "urban informality," (AlSayyad, 2004), and ashwaayat

(Soliman, 2013) have, to some extent, become interchangeable with "peri-urban". Certainly,

peri-urban refers to the areas of essentially urban character located on the urban fringe,

interspersed with, surrounded by, or adjacent to undeveloped sites or ones with agricultural

uses where urban and rural development processes meet, mix, and interrelate, usually on the

periphery of cities. On the other hand, Cirolia (2012) argues, “Interventions to improve the

functioning of land markets and address urban poverty should recast the politics of

informality and identity as an opportunity for the urban poor to use various forms of capital

and association to incrementally and progressively build pathways to urban citizenship.”

Within this context, it is interesting to consider how the poor acquired land, and how the

actors conducted the land acquisition and subdivision process. The operational complexity of

linkages between the “informal” economy and informal land market are interrelated (De Soto,

2000; Bromley, R., 2004).

The state has institutions and policies in place that allow right holders to easily enforce their

rights and exercise them in line with their values and aspirations and in ways that benefit

society as a whole. The weakness of institutional framework has led into a failure to

recognize existing rights, the creation of tenure insecurity, curb investments in land, increase

the potential for conflict, and divert resources that can be more productively deployed

elsewhere to the defense of property claims, and finally the illegality of recognition of

existing land rights. Institutional obstacles of urban governance and its effectiveness on land

delivery system were noticeable, as well as, constraints embedded in the political order and its

logic of top-down rule were enforced in land supply (Dorman, 2007).

The social institutions and state–society relationships that underpin and regulate transactions

and disputes over land, stress the importance of government policies and regulations that

support and facilitate informal mechanisms of land access (Durand- Lasserve, 2005;

Hendriks, 2008). On the other hand, further agricultural land loss would increase

unemployment and poverty. It would decrease the quality of life and would have irreversible

2 The Office of Rural and Institutional Development used the term “peri-urban” in the late 1980s, when assigning aid activities to priority areas (DEFID, 1999).


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effects on the environment (Toth, O., 2009). There is some theoretical or philosophical debate

as to whether land itself can be ‘owned’, but little dispute that there are Islamic rights to ‘use’

and ‘possess’ land. In principle, the rights to land are linked to land use and the person who

uses the land has priority over another who has failed to use it. Following the same logic, only

productive land should create wealth (UN-HABITAT, 2011),

From the economic point of view, De Soto argued that the formalization of land tenure can

bridge the gap between the informal and the formal economy by bringing, ‘dead capital’ to

life. This message speaks directly to the first and second economy (De Soto, 2000). However,

Gilbert (2012) argued that if the message about titling is popular and influential, its

application has, so far, not been shown to contribute much good or, fortunately, much harm.

On the other hand, both De Soto (2000) and Gilbert (2012) dismissed the alteration of

ashwaayat with land value at low price into urban land value with high price by which this

conversion created wealth and increased the assets of the urban poor, regardless to secure

formal tenure (Soliman, 2010). Gilbert (2012), in his criticism on De Soto's Mystery, claims

six main arguments on the relationship of land title and housing production, but he dismissed

the importance of urban land governance, and people's process of urban informality within

the urban setting which is integrated with informal markets, informal institutions mechanisms,

and the actors who are rolling these processes.

From the spatial point of view, land values and uses are determined by physical

characteristics such as location of land, and by crucial factors such as social, cultural,

economic, and political situations, whether rural, urban, or peri-urban. Extensive research has

attributed the occurrence of physical expansion to problems in input markets, especially in

regard to price distortions caused by restrictive government regulations and laws on land

reforms, security of tenure, financial credit, and building regulations (Renaud, 1987; Doebele,

1994; Pamuk, 2000; Jenkins, 2004; Leduka; 2004; Gelder, 2009, Pritchard, M, 2013).

Therefore, land governance is a continues process that is controlled, formally or informally,

by the state through its institutional and regulatory structure, and it is operated and

implemented by people in a society that is interacted and driven by various market forces

either formal or informal in which the built environment has been shaped.

3- LAND REFORM AND OWNERSHIP

Land governance in the two sites is examined to mapping the two sites' growth in relation to

legal and institutional framework in the light of land reform, the type of land ownership and

its impact on land governance in ashwaiyyat areas.


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3-1 RESEARCH SETTING

The research covered two ashwaiyyat areas within two cities; Cairo and Alexandria. The first

area is El Matarya area located north east of the city of Cairo. The agglomeration of

ashwaiyyat in El Matarya began to appear in the 1930's and expand in the 1950's as small

rural agglomerations called Ezbs, or hamlets, such as Abu Toyalhia and El Lemon, where

little interest in what was at first a very marginal and not very visible phenomenon, neither

from government nor academics. At the beginning of 1950's, the government was

increasingly preoccupied with creating new socialist society through the modernisation of all

sectors in Cairo, and it could afford to ignore a few informal developments on the periphery.

The total size of of El Matarya area is about 1637.5 Faddan with a population of 0.831

million people with a very high residential density of 507 persons/Faddan (GOPP, 2012).

Today, however, it also includes some good, modern areas, even some beautiful upper-class

neighbourhoods.

The second area is Hagar El Nawateyah area, located five kilometres south-east of

Alexandria's city centre, covers an area of 193.16 Faddan, with a population of 100000 person

with a density of 517 person/Faddan. The site is adjusted El Mahmoudyia canal and

characterised by four major physical features; its location on a flat salt plateau, poor soil, a

high water table and, finally, a high level of housing consolidation. Presently, Hagar El

Nawateyah area became a popular area in Alexandria city in which accommodated low and

middle-income classes, and it linked with a cheap transportation methods to city centre.

Furthermore, the two sites were chosen because they both illustrated the historic

development of ashwaiyyat, the various degree of security of tenure in relation to

landownership, the relationship between urban growth and land reform laws, both reflect

various phases of on-going changes and adaptation processes in the built environment, and

finally, both possessed desirable characteristics for the urban poor such as access to job

opportunities, and access to cheap transport. For ease of analysis the two case study; El

Matarya area and Hagar El Nawateyah area, is referred to in the article by abbreviation

representing its characteristics (i.e. EMA, HNA) respectively.

3-2 MAPPING THE TWO SITES' GROWTH AND LAND REFORM

Historically, most Egyptian agglomerations were not predominantly urban areas and it has

never been classified as distinct by the state. The historic city (medina), such as Cairo and

Alexandria, typically consists of a dense agglomeration of dwellings, with commercial uses

on the ground floor. As illustrated in figure (1) the urban form of the two cities consists of a

series of historic layers, epitomized by relatively homogeneous land markets, each with their


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own rules. The two cities are originally characterized by a compact urban agglomeration,

which formulated the first layer of the urban fabric, by the time, more planned and

modernized district layers were added on. During the Kingdome of Egypt, in both cities the

new added layers were followed the European urban pattern and reflected the colonization

influences. Over time, many properties have deteriorated for lack of maintenance by absentee

owners, or of the conflict of the fragmented ownership patterns, which resulted in the

appearance of slums areas.

Insert Figure: (1)

The disordered of urban pattern in Egyptian cities, started after the 1952 Revolution. A new

agricultural land governance was introduced, where ownership of agricultural land was

heavily concentrated in a few hands. About 0.1 percent of owners possessed one-fifth of the

land and 0.4 percent controlled one-third, in contrast to the 95 percent of small owners with

only 35 percent of the land, and 44 percent of all rural inhabitants were landless (Osman, T.,

2010). The land reform Law No. 178 of 1952, and the subsequent laws No. 127 and No. 15 of

1961, and 1963 respectively limited individual ownerships to 50 faddan per an individual and

a total landholder for a family of 100 faddan. It targeted the property of the upper class of

landowners, dubbed "feudalists" by the government, for distribution to the poorest villagers

and landless. During this era, urban growth on adjacent agricultural land was prohibited, and

planning control was in force.

At the beginning of fifties EMA was dominated with three historical sites; Obelisk site and

Tall El Housen (hill fort) in the northwest and Tree of Mary in the southeast, all of which

were separated by farmland adjacent to them. It was constituted from scattered hamlets (Ezbet

El Saiaada, Ezbet El Lemon, Ezbet Abu Toyalhia and Tall El Hosen), and dominated with

urban agglomeration surrounding Tree of Mary. At the beginning of the sixties significant

improvements to public spaces, streets, markets, historic buildings, and new districts has been

made in the site, which formulated an organized layer with a clear planning framework and

produced planned districts, mostly public housing complex close to Tree of Mary. Around

0.03 of the total size of the site owned by the antiquities authority .

While HEN area, a large part of it was originally a piece of Lake Maryout but was filled on

over a period of years, converted into agricultural land owned by land reclamation authority,

and small land parcels were distributed to landless according to land reform of 1952. Some

small hamlets (Ezbet Banyouti and Ezbet Hagar El Nawateyah) were found in the site. Later

on some scattered houses were built, adjacent El Mahoudeyah canal, to accommodate a few

people who were working or had a connection with the state owned Egyptian railway. Over

period of years, some agricultural land parcels were converted to informal housing.


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As illustrated in figure (2) in both sites, the old urban fabric was compact scattered hamlets

separated with farm land, which represented the first layer of development. 84.3% and 89.5%

of the total size of EMA and HEN, respectively, were agricultural land owned by the agrarian

land reform organization, and around 6.08% and 4.2% of EMA and HEN were owned by

awqaf foundation, respectively. No antiquities land was found in HEN.

Insert Figure: (2)

The second layer is the scattered-urban informal urbanization that started in the mid 1970s

and has accommodated a large proportion of the two site's sustained annual urban

demographic growth rates of 2 to 3 percent since the 1980s. Most of this expansion occurred

on privately owned land that was distributed according to Agrarian land reform of 1952. From

1975 to 1985, urban land values doubled every three to four years while prices on agricultural

fringes rose up but by less than the prices of urban land. Because of low revenue of

agricultural production, many of small landowners sold their properties for private developers

who converted these areas into informal residential development. This suggested that land

fragmentation worsened, because of the continual division of land among heirs in accordance

with Islamic inheritance laws. The number of landless families also rose up due to the

population growth.

Between the 1970's and 1980's, the Open-Door Policy of Sadat and the privatization policy of

Mubarak was diminished as the government relaxed its controls over agricultural land.

However, land reforms resulted only in the redistribution of about 15 percent of Egypt's land

under cultivation, and by the early 1980's, the effects of land reforms in Egypt drew to a halt

as the population of Egypt moved away from agriculture. The issuance of law 96 in 1992

revoked the former Agrarian Land Reform of 1952 that had given tenants security of tenure

and legalized the right to inherit tenancy agreements. The new law fully enacted in October

1997 after a five-year transition period, but the rent after 1992 was increased from 7 to at least

22 times the fees of the land tax. After the enactment of the new law, all landowners could

take back their land and charge tenants market-based rent, which in some cases increased to

300–400 percent. Despite contract renewal, the tenants remain vulnerable and insecure

because of threats of eviction from proprietors. During this era, the third layer appeared by

which the peri-urban informal urbanization was dominating the new fabric of both sites. This

trend was facilitated by traditional tenure systems where the privately owned land was

subdivided into five types, as will explain in the next section. With this type of urban

informalization, land parcels are therefore encumbered with three instances of non-

compliance: (a) illegal agricultural land subdivision; (b) change in use; and (c) unauthorized

construction.


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Arbitrary urban extensions, outside the old urban fabric of both sites was introduced, and

formulated the fourth layer. It is characterized by fill in “(in)visible” urban enclaves within

both sites by which became consolidated and overcrowded. This layer of development

represents "an arbitrary add on process" towards the immediate needs and reflects how the

irrationally is operating the urban land governance in Egypt rather than to conduct a proper

future plan for urban land development. This development directly and indirectly has played a

major role in spreading ashwaiyyat and in increasing the agricultural land prices.

Several factors have historically been associated with urban informalization on agricultural

land in both sites, and in Egypt as a whole. Firstly, the government, either directly or

indirectly, had played a major role in all cases. Due to the land reform measures of the early

1960's, and changes in economic policies in the mid 1970's have taken economic power away

from the traditional landholders and spread ownership across a wider section of the society.

The original owners of the allocated land, who received land parcels according to law No.

178, after so many years died and left his/her land to his/her heirs, who were always in a

conflict and were forced to put in sale their land shares to other people, but this often results

in parcels being abandoned when multiple progeny cannot agree over subdivision or sale.

Alternatively, if a proprietor dies without children, his property is transferred to Nasser Bank

(Bait-Elmaal). Most of these lands have converted to housing informality, and fragmentation

of ownership became inevitable. Secondly, the enactment of land policy in the early 1990's

has stimulated greater inequality in land holdings, and it has been seen as a far safer

investment in uncertain times than industrial production. Finally, further instability was

created by the Agrarian Land Reform which resulted in the change of large ownership areas

from a private freehold to a public title, then to a private ownership, and vice-versa. This had

a major impact on the agricultural land patterns, and led to the insecurity of land tenure.

It could be said that the various land reform laws, socioeconomic and political

transformations associated with the absence of land governance have contributed directly or

indirectly in changing agricultural land pattern by which opened the door for land speculators

and private developers to conquer agricultural land and changed its use into illegal residential

areas. Also, the dynamic process of urban land informalization has reflected in various ways

on urban spaces in which ashwaiyyat became the dominant features of urban landscape

3-3 TYPOLOGY OF LAND OWNERSHIP

In general, two types of land ownership exist in Egypt; public and private land. It covers

agricultural and desert land, where the latter owned by the State, and the former varied on its

ownership between public and private sector (see Table 1). All public land are controlled by


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the National Centre for Land Management which is directly connected with Ministries

Cabinet.

As illustrated in Table (1) typologies of land ownership in the two study areas, as well as

most ashwaiyyat areas in Egypt, are classified agricultural land into four main categories, and

desert land is categorized into four types. As the two case study areas are established on

agricultural land, therefore, the research will focus on type (A) only. This typology is divided

the ownership of agricultural land into four types; privately owned agricultural land (A1),

state-owned agricultural land (A2), Nasser bank land (trust land or Bait-Elmaal) (A3), and

seized land (Herasa) (A4). The first type (A1) is subdivided into five subtypes, while state

agricultural land (A2) is subdivided into seven subtypes.

Insert Table: (1)

Insert Figure: (3)

As illustrated in table (1) and figure (3 ) the sub typologies of the privately owned land (A1)

is analyzed in relation to the level of security, and constituted five sub typologies. Privately

registered owned land (A1a) is an area satisfied full land registration and has a permanent

security of tenure, and represented 17% and 14.3% in HNA and EMA respectively. Privately

registered owned land without tenure (A1b) represented 5.05% and 4.7% in HEA and EMA

respectively. It is an area with people have official land registration documents with Hiyazah

(land holding), but they are living outside the two sites, and can not claim for their right of

land security. The current occupancies have built their homes illegally on other people's land

in the absence of time. Privately owned with de jure tenure recognition (A1c), but has not full

security of tenure, indicated 20.5% and 13.5% in HEA and EMA respectively. These areas

have the privilege of having some sort of official documents, usually court's order documents

(Hokom), such as, seiht wa nafaz, It is an official document, and issued from the Shar El

Aquary (the Property Declaration Department), and presenting official documents stating the

size and location of land plots, and the name of their original owner (register documents). A

declaration from the property-tax department must also be presented showing the details of

the plots and the amount of property tax owed. After several months, an applicant may then

obtain approval to register the land from the Property Declaration Department without

investigating the details of previous land transactions. The applicant may then present this

notice from the Property Declaration Department to the local municipality to obtain a building

license, but seldom happened. This phenomenon of land transaction accelerated housing

development within both sites and attracted newcomers from outside the two cities.

Privately with de facto tenure recognition (A1c) is an area with de facto recognition but has

not full security of tenure, and constituted 26% and 15.3% in HEA and EMA respectively. It


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only gives enough custom security for the purchaser and seller to place their signatures on a

preliminary contract (orfi sales contract or aqad abiad) by which the purchaser can obtained

seiht twequeh, as a court approval for a preliminary land sale contract. This does not,

however, provide legal grounds for a final transaction.

Privately with Wad El Yad (lay a hand) or squatting (A1e) represented 3.3% and 14.2% in

HEA and EMA respectively. Some form of legal documentation normally exists for land

claims. These have involved various paper chases, including obtaining electricity and water

connections or paying property taxes (awayyid) or land rents.

Erection of housing on such land in the above sub typologies is generally illegal subdivided

and converted from agricultural land into illegal residential use. Building activities of this

nature increase considerably when agricultural areas are incorporated into the municipal

boundaries, or as soon as municipalities install basic services to an outlying area as it

happened in both sites. At the root of the problem is the fact that both sites never possessed a

complete land registry, many transactions have simply never been formally recorded. In other

areas, while records have been kept by lawyers and landowners, they have been kept in ways

that conceal identities so as to evade property taxes. And nearly always land transactions have

been conducted in private, with the prices quoted rarely being those actually paid. While

Egyptian legislation nominally regulates such private development, it has been powerless to

influence events.

The second agricultural land ownership is state land, which is subdivided into seven subtypes.

Agrarian reform land (A2a), presented 10.8% and 15.2% in HEA and EMA respectively. This

land is confiscated and redistributed to peasants after land reform act of 1952, which has been

formally subdivided and sold to peasants and individuals as an agricultural land, and then

converted illegally to another use (see the previous section). It was either sold to investors for

reclamation, or was reclaimed by farmers under wada’yad (squatted), and was subsequently

informally subdivided and built upon. Awqaf land (A2b) is administered by the Awqaf

Authority, represented 4.2% and 6.08% in HEA and EMA respectively. It rented to farmers,

which has subsequently been illegally subdivided and sold to individuals. Such areas have

usually been distributed by religious institutions through official announcement and been

illegally converted by private developers into housing sites. Railway land (A2c) represented

0.1% and 1.84% in HEA and EMA respectively. It is purchased by an official decree to the

Railway authority in the mid 1800's, but compensation paid directly to the peasants, who have

since occupied a part of it and hired it to individuals. Irrigation land on Nile/lake/canal edge

(A2d) represented 5.4% and 0.3% in HEA and EMA respectively. It is “thrown up” by

changes in the Nile’s riverbed, Lakes, or canals, which were farmed or used as storage by


15

private developers, who have subsequently illegally subdivided and sold it to individuals.

Land owned by the Ministry of agriculture (A2e) represented 6.12% and 2.39% in HEA and

EMA respectively. It is legally subdivided by public agencies and that is then used for

agricultural purposes. Later, some private developers are squatted some parts of it, illegally

subdivided it into small plots, and sold it to people looking for housing plots.

Municipality land (A2f) was not found in HEA while constituted 2.32% in EMA. This land is

located inside both sites' boundary, but its function is agricultural use, and its ownership

return to "feudalists" system. People who built their housing on it illegally occupied some

parts of it. and controlled (owned) by governorates and their local units. This land is usually

located where the governorate has no interest in it, or where it is too expensive to be publicly

developed. Such areas are usually located within municipality boundaries, and land ownership

may be in doubt.

Antiquities land (A2h) constituted 7.04% in EMA only, and there is no kind of such land in

HEA. It is belonging to the Ministry of Antiquities, and has been neglected for so many years,

by which opened the door for squatters to occupy illegally a part of this land.

The third agricultural land ownership is Nasser bank land (trust land or Bait-Elmaal) (A3),

represented 1.35% and 1.29% in HEA and EMA respectively. This land is private property

when the owner died and left no heir, it automatically transferred to the Nasser Bank, and it

became public property. As the ownership of land became in doubt, some people is seized this

land for a certain period, later on were subdivided, and illegally sold to others.

The fourth agricultural land ownership is seized land (Herasa) (A4), constituted 1.27% in

EMA, and nothing found in HEA. This land is private property when the landowner was sent

in sanction due to a certain crime related to the corruption or harm the public fund, and did

not obey the Egyptian law, all his land is taken by the government. Some people are squatted

parts of this land and later on claimed for land tenure. These areas are usually scattered on

both sites, where municipalities had no interest in development.

To sum up, the above discussion shows that land ownership in both sites, as well as in the rest

of Egypt, is widely disseminated and complicated, and the weakness of land governance led

to this diversity, many public and private land being robbed, or illegal subdivided, and/or

squatted by people who are aware how the land can be illegally acquired. Also, there is a

difference between land tenure (Hiyazah- land holding) and land ownership (Miluk- property

owned), where the former is the use value, and the latter is the exchange value. The swelling

of ashwaiyyat is not only in relation to the use value, but also to the exchange value, and that

logic is in practice through accumulation of wealth by creating an asset to secure the

economic status of the residents' future.


16

On the other hand, public agricultural land is mainly controlled by the state. Nevertheless, it is

the "State" which has the sale and disposition? Here we find ourselves dealing with a strange

and varied list of ministries, government institutions, provincial and local bodies. There is no

clarity or equal treatment for land delivery system as there is no legal basis for a specific

statement of the terms of reference and procedures. It is therefore not surprising that the deal

is with one of these public bodies and the contract is released, and before the implementation

starts surprised the buyer other public body - may be conservative or another ministry - as the

owner, claiming that its consent is required to complete the transaction. In particular, there is

no clear definition of who has the legal right to act as the "State" in this land and real estate,

and that reflected the absence/weakness of land governance in Egypt.

4- THE WAY FORWARD

The persistence of ashwaiyyat in Egypt, despite the adoption of various regulatory reform

measures and targeted programs to curb them (e.g. formalization of informal settlements by

installing basic services and lowering standards), continue to be a puzzle for land delivery

policy in Egypt, and are due to a lack of a national urban planning framework and absence of

a clear land governance policy. Ashwaiyyat also undoubtedly created a major servicing

problem and additional expenses for the servicing authorities, which could have been

avoided, had a more rational means of organizing land for the poor been available. No doubt,

ashwaiyyat also leads to a distortion of fertile agricultural land that cannot be, a considerable

amount of corruption, and favoritism of clients. It has destroyed its spatial and agrarian

context. Ashwaiyyat in all its forms and practices as a habitual national customs, has become

truly deplorable and utterly condemnable. It has become alarmingly a national phenomenon;

an epidemic threatening public order, legal framework and the national pride in its heritage of

civility legality, governability, meanings of urbanity, and informality (ashwaiyya'a) has

become a way of life in the Egyptian environment.

Throughout the growth of both sites, ashwaiyyat has begun as a use value, and by the time

changed into exchange and use value, regardless land tenure status, in which a custom land

ownership was a prime concern for the residents, thus, ashwaiyyat became a matter for an

economic investment and accumulation of capital. Second, ashwaiyyat is not only for housing

but it is a way to formulate "a new space in the city within the city" to squeeze the growing

population where various strata of the society find their way out to reproduce a reasonable

land delivery system to meet their social and economic needs. Ashwaiyyat became a matter of

investment in land and it has a fundamental importance in the urban poor’s own rights, for it

brings other developmental benefits (for instance, access to services and credit or political


17

voice). In other words, ashwaiyyat became an issue of "Social and economic Struggle" for

meeting the basic human needs that the state could not tackle for the vast majority of the

population in Egypt. In this sense, ashwaiyyat became an expression of class power, and in

time, commanded for different infrastructures, social service, enforced formalization of land

ownership, and legitimacy in slums areas. People involved in ashwaiyyat have created their

distinguished urban pattern which formulates "a new urbanity" different than the one

produced by the state. It is a totally crucial mechanism in a wholly private formal and

informal land market that is being integrated with the socioeconomic and political

circumstances of the country. Therefore, it is the time to understand the philosophy of

ashwaiyyat and direct this mechanism into a sustainable way to be social, physical, and

economically feasible for future urban growth to benefit the whole society.

It is worth to learn from the past to avoid the problems in the future. Going back to the mid

sixties, when the government initiated an ambition plan to enlarge the two sites adjusting

agricultural areas were illegally invaded by the speculators and illegally sub-divided into land

plots without planning regulation or planning control. This typical model process continued to

the most of the Egyptian cities. As soon as, a new scheme or a state-planning project was

implemented, new ashwaiyyat backed by the state were emerged. It is often the power of the

state that determines what is informal and what is not. This means that ashwaiyyat is not an

unregulated domain but rather is structured through various forms of extra-legal, social, and

discursive regulation.

The culprits are both the government ministries and municipalities who violate regulations

and their inability to tackle the problem from its roots. Their public performance and practice

testify to their abundant share of ashwaiyyat practices and irresponsible conduct. They are the

very ones who have disregarded what they preach. The future picture of Egypt is scary and

dangerous, unless a future visionary national comprehensive development plan is occurred,

one of the main components of this plan should be good land governance to facilitate land

delivery system and upgrade ashwaiyyat in a sustainable way to accommodate the growing

population.

In contrast, when the state and the market are as weak as in Egypt, both historically and

presently, informal land markets and ashwaiyyat are flourished. New approaches to land

governance system and to development in general need to be based on the very social

mechanisms and structures whereby the majority of the populations manage their survival.

Good land governance needs a comprehensive set of policies, or a complete package of

policies rather than a piecemeal approach in which one issue is tackled while others are

ignored. It needs to be formulated in line with socioeconomic reforms and poverty alleviation


18

strategies with the context of socioeconomic needs of the bottom of the pyramid of the

society, as well as, with the top of the pyramid.

Insert Figure: (4)

As illustrated in figure (4) good land governance should cover major areas for policy

intervention in the land sector as follows; legal and institutional framework, land use

planning, and dispute over land ownership. Land governance is a part of governance; it is the

spatial component of the act and process within given environment. The Egyptian government

should adopt a proper land governance as a process orderly by a number of institutions,

organized by a set of laws and operated by various actors that supports what people do, what

people are willing to do, what people are able to do, how land governance is perceived by

people, and to regulate to the benefit of the collective resources by which enabling a practical

and logical land governance system, rather than systems so unfeasible that leave most of land

in ashwaiyyat unregulated. Thus, suggestions that work on the basis of these concepts can

permit a more nuanced and appropriate analytical basis for understanding the perception of

Egyptian urban dwellers, as well as mechanisms for consolidating ashwaiyyat.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere thanks to Institute of International Education (IIE) in Ford Foundation for the encouragement and financial support that made possible the research for this article and for securing an individual grant in order to attend the 2014 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, 24-27 March, in Washington DC, USA.

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21

Figure1: above, left to right, urban development of Cairo city in various phases, housing informality in Cairo city, below left, urban development of Alexandria city, below right, housing informality in Alexandria city. Source: GOPP, 2012


22

A- Old Urban Fabric

B- Scattered Urban informal urbanization

C- Peri- Urban Informal Urbanization

D- An Arbitrary Add on Process

E- Existing condition

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Semi-organised Pattern 21%

Agricultural Sub devision pattern 21%

Organic Pattern 27%

Organised Pattern 32%

Compact Pattern 12%

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23

Figure (2) illustrates the four layers of development for both sites; the old urban fabric,

scattered-urban informal urbanization, peri-urban informal urbanization, and "an arbitrary

add on process" .

Source: author survey

Figure (3): Illustrates typologies of land ownership in the two study areas; left EMA in Cairo

city, right HEA in Alexandria city.


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Land OwnershipA1a privately registered owned land

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A1e privately with Wad El Yad (lay a hand or squatting)

A2a Agrarian reform land

A2b Awqaf land

A2c Railway land

A2d Irrigation Land (Nile/lake/canal-edge land

A2e Ministry of agricultural land

A2f On municipal land

A2h On antiquities land

A3 On Nasser bank (Bait-Elmaal) land

A4 On Herasa land

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Land Ownership

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24

TYPE A HEA EMA TYPE B

on Agricultural land Area M2

% Area M2

% on Desert land

A1a privately registered owned land

138439.08 17.06 983665.19 14.30 B1a By assignment to development company


40985.19 5.05 327122.29 4.76 B1b By assignment to public-sector company


166199.88 20.49 929026.08 13.51 B1c By assignment to cooperative


210988.30 26.01 1055276.62 15.34 B1d On antiquities and cemetery land

A1

On

priv

atel

y ow

ned

land


27296.72 3.36 979217.78 14.24 B1e On armed forces land

A2a On Agrarian reform land

87792.20 10.82 1048078.50 15.24

B1

On

Dec

ree

dese

rt la

nd

B1f On police forces land

A2b On Awqaf land 34306.52 4.23 418202.32 6.08 B2 On State domain land

A2c Railway land 783.60 0.10 126598.89 1.84 B3 On Municipal land

A2d On Irrigation Land (Nile/lake/canal-edge land)

43898.10 5.41 26245.09 0.38 B4 On Reclaimed land

A2e On Ministry of agricultural land

49637.42 6.12 164358.97 2.39

A2f On Municipal land 0.00 0.00 159358.95 2.32

A2

On

Stat

e L

and

A2h On Antiquities land 0.00 0.00 484186.88 7.04


10967.99 1.35 88969.45 1.29

Sub

Typ

e

A4 On Herasa land 0.00 0.00 87232.63 1.27

Total 811294.98 100.0 6877539.63 100.0

Table (1) illustrates the typolog3025

ies of land ownership in the two study areas; left HEA in Alexandria city, right EMA in Cairo

city



25

Figure (4): illustrates the three O's of a good land governance process.

Source: author

"Nothing More to Lose": Ashwaayat and Land Governance in Egypt

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Transcript of "Nothing More to Lose": Ashwaayat and Land Governance in Egypt