New and Improved: The Zero-Sum Game of Corporate Personhood

Biography 37.1 (Winter 2014) © Biographical Research Center

new and improved: the zero-sum game

of corporate personhood

richard hardack

This is how to get free sticks and strings and clothes and gear from Dun-lop, Inc., as long as you let them spraypaint the distinctive Dunlop logo on your sticks’ strings and sew logos on your shoulder and the left pocket of your shorts and use a Dunlop gear-bag, and you become a walking lunging sweating advertisement for Dunlop, Inc; [as long as you keep your rank, the] New New England Regional Athletic Rep will address you as ‘Our gray swan.’ ———DavidFosterWallace,Infinite Jest (175–76)

1. corpography

Inthisarticle,Ifocusonthewaysadvertisinglanguagehashelpedprecipitatetheideaofcorporatepersonhood,andhowcorporatepersonalityhascometosupplanthumanpersonalityinparticularaspectsofU.S.culture.Corporationsuseadvertisingtocreateanimpersonalpersonatoconvincepeopletheyhavearelationshipwiththethings(products)theybuy.1DrawingonSharonCam-eron’sworkregardingimpersonalityinasomewhatdifferentcontext,Iarguethatthemechanismsofadvertising,whichsimulateandmanipulatehumanemotionsandrelations,areintertwinedwiththecreationofcorporateperson-hoodandcorporatebiography.Whilenotingthattheconceptisfluid,Camer-onproposesthat“representationsoftheimpersonalsuspend,eclipseandevendestroytheideaofthepersonassuch,whoisnottreatedasasocial,politicalorindividualentity”(ix).Inadditiontothe“nonhuman”attributesCameronidentifieswiththeimpersonal,Iwouldadd,inthecontextofcorporateper-sonhood,themechanical,generic,andparasitic: that is, impersonalsystemsfunctionassimulacraofthepersonalandsiphonpersonalqualitiesfrompeopleorimitatehumanprocesses(x).Advertising,thecorporatespeechIdepictas

Hardack, New and Improved 37

impersonalanddepersonalizing,providesaprimaryregisterforcreatingcor-porate“autobiographies,”whichIdefineasthenetworksofrepresentationthatreifycorporationsascoherentandpersonalizedentities,ratherthantreatthemaslegalfabrications.Asonewouldexpectinazero-sumgame,theseissuesre-lated toadvertising, language, andcorporationsare intimatelyconnected—onecan’tapprehendthecorporatepersonseparatelyfromthecorporate lan-guageofadvertising.Iarguethat,thoughitismediated,advertisingisthemost(quasi-)autobiographicalutteranceacorporationcanmake;mostbiographicalrepresentationsofa“corporation”embodyandratifyitasacoherententity.

“Corpography”isatermIusetorefertotheformsoflifewritingthatcorporationsusetodisseminatesemblancesofpersonalityandpersonhood,andtoidentifyaseriesofspecificmemesandeffectsinvolvingadvertising,thelegalstatusofthecorporation,andcorporatemodesofrepresentation.But“lifewriting”isanoxymoroninthecorporatecontext—thecorporationhasnolife,self,being,oragency,anditspersonhoodexistsonlyasafictionandcontrivance.2Thecorporationcanberepresentedonlybypartialsurrogates,mostobviouslyadvertisers,officers,accountants,andlawyers.3Noneofthesefiguresarethecorporation,orcanauthoritsautobiography.However,theirexternal“biographical” representations retroactivelycreate thecorporation,inmuchthewayonemightsaypriestscreateagod.Inthissense,advertisingandcorporateautobiographiesandbiographiesdonotdescribeorcorrespondtoexisting“persons,”butgeneratethem.

Becausethecorporationisafictionalcontrivance,itcannotbedescribedliterally,butthroughorevenasaseriesofseeminglyfluidmetaphors.Theapparentinconsistenciesinthesemetaphorsactuallyconstituteanddefinethecorporateforminitsculturalcontexts.Becausecorporationsaren’tcoherententities,butartificialnon-entities,theyrelyonontologicallyandculturallymixedmetaphors,butrelativelystablelegaltropesregardingtheirexceptionalorenhancedrights.Thatis,corporationsarelesscoherentformswithwhollydefined features thanMephistophelean structureswhose legal statusallowsthemtotakeonsuperhumanandoftencontradictoryattributes.Thesimilesthatbestevokethecorporate“person,”however,remainconsistentintheirconnotations; phantoms, shadows, and scarecrows, for example, are eitherghostlyorventriloquizedformsthatlackindependentinteriority.

Ifirstwanttoprovideanoverviewofmyargumentabouttheconnectionsbetweencorporatestatus,corporateadvertising,andsocialpersonhood.ThecorporationrepresentsanongoingmutationofwhatRalphWaldoEmersonfirstformulatedastheimpersonaltranscendentalcollectiveinU.S.culture,whichhedesignatedNature,natural law, theOver-Soul,andtheAll.ThecontemporaryU.S.corporationfunctionsasaunifyingfictionthatreplacesEmerson’s concept of nature. Perhaps surprisingly, when allied with both

38 Biography 37.1 (Winter 2014)

natureandthecorporation,theimpersonalaspectsoftheselfinU.S.culturetend to represent theuniversal, and thepersonal aspectsof the selfonly aformoflessvaluedparticularity.Cameronclaimsthat“theimpersonalspeaksdespiteusthroughus”andtherebydestabilizesthenotionofafixedself(99,emphasis inoriginal).4Myoverarchingthesis is thatcorporatepersonhoodispartofazero-sumgameinwhichhumantraitsandprivileges—includingprivacy, legalrightsandexemptions,andtraditionalformsofcontinuity—arebeingtransferredtocorporations;conversely,actualpersonsarebecom-ing,largelywithouttheirrealization,moreimpersonalandgeneric,andin-creasinglydefinedbytheirrelationstothings.Consequently,muchofwhatIproposeregardingcorporationsbeginswiththepremisethattheirstatusandactionsarerarelycontingent,butaxiomatic.

Inaddition,Itrytoillustratetheskeinbetweenadvertisingandcorporatepersonhoodandassesstheallureofanallegiancewiththeforcesthatoppressus.Thecorporationhererepresentsboththecauseandeffectofasemiotic,ontological,andpsychologicalerosionofcultureandlanguage,aseriesofin-tercalatedphenomena.Tellingly,whilealltheSupremeCourtmajorityopin-ionsaddressingthestatusofcorporationshaveyettomakeexplicitreferencetocorporatepersonhood,theyenforceandextendtheidea;corporateperson-hoodisaghostintheeconomicandlegalmachine,buttheghostofsome-thingthatwasneveralive.IprimarilyaddressthelegalframeworkthatcreatesandprotectscorporationsinthecontextoftheculturalbackgroundIdiscussinitially.Throughoutthisarticle,myanalysistakesasitsbasicunitthelargecorporation:theeffectsIaddressaregenerallyvisibleoratissueonlyincor-porationsthathaveachievedsufficientmarketdominationtooperateacrosstimezonesandbegintoappearalwaysandeverywhere—thatis,beyondcul-tureasaforceofsimulatednature.

Addressing how corporations have been afforded the First Amendmentrightsofpersons,Icontendthatallcorporatespeechshouldbetreatedascom-mercialspeech—itistheonlykindacorporationislegallycapableofmaking,orultimatelyauthorizedtoproffer.Iamnotcontendingthatcorporationshavenopoliticalinterests,orthatcommerceisn’titselfpolitical.Butinthecontextbothofontologyandthelegalframeworkthatcreatesanddefinesit,corpora-tionsarefictionalconstructsengagedinexclusivelycommercialenterprises.IfnaturalpersonsunderU.S.lawandtheU.S.culturalethoswereimbuedbygodornaturewithcertaininalienablerights,corporationsweregrantedthoserightsunnaturally, throughlegalfictionsandvariousformsofgraft(s).Legislaturesandcourtshavedevelopedthelawrelatedtocorporationsinthatcommercialcontext—toallowthemtomakecontracts,ownproperty,andsueandbesued,andtodifferentiatethemfrompeople,especiallytheirshareholders,invirtu-allyallscenarios.Corporations,however,endemicallyinvoketherightof“free


speech”toescapescrutinyforadvertisingandspendingundertheFirstAmend-ment;butbecausetheirformofpersonhoodis,oratleastshouldbedeemed,exclusively commercial, their speech should be wholly regulable under theCommerceClauseoftheConstitution.(UnderArticle1,Section8,Clause3oftheConstitution,congresshastheauthoritytoregulateinterstatecommerce.)ThroughoutthecriticalrecentholdingofCitizens United v. Federal Election Commission, infra,theCourt’smajorityunequivocallyclaimeditwasprotect-ingpoliticalspeech,butImaintainthatcorporationsbytheirverynaturecan-not,unlesstheyrepresentthefourthestate,engageinpoliticalspeech.5

corporate persons as simulacra

Thecorporationthathaslimitedliabilityshouldalsobedesignatedashavinglimitedlabiality—itisanunspeakableandunspeakingthingthatisspokenfor.6Certainpeoplemusthaveauthorityorlegalagencytoactonbehalfofacorporation;butinthevastmajorityofinstances,thecorporationproducescommunicationwithoutanauthenticspeaker,andwithwhichnoonecanbefullyidentifiedexceptthroughfictions.Thisdisruptedlineageofspeechandculpabilityisconnectedtotheissueofthecorporatesimulacra,andthealwaysreifiedcorporatebiography:when,e.g.,Sonydisclaims,“theviewsexpressedinthisproductiondonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheSonycorporation,”itimpliesthattheSonycorporationcouldhavenon-economicviews—ifso,whatwouldtheyentail?“Who”wouldhavethem?Howwouldthoseviewsberatifiedwithoutturningcorporations intosubstantiallydifferententitieswhosepronouncementswouldhave tobe approvedby shareholdermajori-ties,inaprocessthatwouldremainproblematicintermsofthecorporation’scharterandlegalstatus?Wouldsuchviewsbesynecdochic,withsomepartofthecorporationrepresentingawholethatdoesn’texist?Corporateagentsarephantoms,shadowsthrownbynothing.

Exemplifying a poststructuralist principle, corporate speech can neverhaveanactualauthor.Forexample,whenaflightattendantoranycorporatespokespersonsays,weappreciateyourloyalty,thereisno“we,”nolocatableintentbehindtheutteranceevenifthespeakerissincere.7Suchfirstpersonpluralstatementsaresimulacraof simulacra,oftenwrittenbyintermediariesaboutmediaconstructs.Evenwhenonecouldsaythatacorporationisledbyasinglevoiceorintention,assomewouldclaimApplewasunderSteveJobs,aCEOnevercoincideswiththeactualcorporation:someuncontainablesurplusalwaysremains.CEOs,especiallythosewithdistinctpersonalitiesandbusi-nessstrategies,candirectmanyaspectsoftheircompanies,butmostoperatewithinfixedstructuresoflaw,governance,andcorporate“self”-representationoradvertising.AsLauraE.Lyonsdemonstratesin“‘I’dLikeMyLifeBack’:


CorporatePersonhoodandtheBPOilDisaster,”CEOsmustsimultaneous-lypersonifycorporationsanddistance themselves fromtheirdecisions.Shenotes,forexample,thatwithregardstotheGulfoilspill,BPCEO

[Tony]Hayward’sstatement,withitspronominalslippagefromthesingular“I”whospeaksonbehalfofthecorporationtothecollective“we”ofthecorporationitselfandbacktoanindividuated“I”emblematizesthewaysinwhichBP,andcorporationsmoregenerally,enactstrategiesofintimacyanddistance,individuationandcollectiv-ity,astheyattempttomanagepublicperceptionsabouttheiroperations.(96)

AsLyonsconcludes,“Whenhespeaksforhimself,hecan’tsayanythingright;whenhespeaksforBP,underthewatchfuleyesofhislegaladvisors,hecan’tsayanythingatall”(102–103).ThatCEO’sdilemmareflectsavariationofthezero-sumgameofcorporateidentity(aswellasthepolarizationbetweentheuniversalandtheparticular).Incorpography,any“single”voiceisare-ificationofanon-existentcorporateperson,leavingthecorporatebiographyalwaysghostwritten.8

Yetitispreciselythisconflationbetweencorporealpersonsandcorpora-tionsthatJusticeScalia,joinedbyJusticeAlitoandJusticeThomas,supposesinhisconcurrenceintheCitizens United case.Becausetheyemploypeopletoactontheirbehalf,Scaliabelievesthatcorporationscanalsospeakforthoseemployees:

Thedissent says that “‘speech’” refers tooral communicationsofhumanbeings,andsincecorporationsarenothumanbeingstheycannotspeak.(Citationomitted).Thisissophistry.Theauthorizedspokesmanofacorporationisahumanbeing...justasthespokesmanofanunincorporatedassociationspeaksonbehalfofitsmem-bers.Thepowertopublishthoughts...belongsonlytohumanbeings,butthedis-sentseesnoproblemwithacorporation’senjoyingthefreedomofthepress.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,130S.Ct.876,928n7(2010).(Anysuchprivilegingofspeechoverthewrittenwordwouldindeedbemisguided.)Howisacorporationdifferentfromatradeassociationoranyotherunincor-poratedgroup? It isnot simply that a corporation is typicallyownedby itsshareholders(whocanusuallyselltheirinterestinthecorporation)andrunbyaboardofdirectors,butthatithasnocenterbydefinition;theshareholdershavenoliability,andinmostinstances,thecorporationexistsindependentlyofthosewhoownit.Thelawcreatesthecorporationtobe,asMelvillemightputit,“diffusedthroughtimeandspace”(Moby-Dick 159).Eveninthecaseofclosely-heldcorporations,whichareownedbyasmallgroupof“insiders,”thelegalstructureallowsthecorporationtomaintainaseparate,virtuallyven-triloquizedidentity.Inboththe legalandculturalspheres,almostallrepre-sentationsofcorporationsrelyonaperniciousformofprosopopoeia.Judges


especiallytendtoengageinakindofcategorymisprisionwhentheyaddresscorporatespeech.Theartificiallyconsolidatedcorporatepersoniscreatedsole-lyforcommercialactivity,andbestowedwithcertainrights,immunities,andrestrictionsexclusivelyinthatcontext.Yetcourtsusuallytreatcorporationsasiftheycouldselectivelyattainthepositiveattributesofactualpeoplewithoutre-linquishingtheartificialprivilegesthelawaffordstopurelycorporateentities.

advertising as corpography

While not the only form of corporate life writing—which includes suchgenresascorporatebiographies,CEOautobiographies,pressreleases,andar-chivesandotherhistoricalormaterialcommemorations—advertisingistheonlyonethatmightbesituatedastrulyautobiographical.Theseothergenresfunction,Iwouldargue,asformsofbiography.AsIaddressit,advertisingiscloselyrelatedtotheconstructionofcorporatebiography,butadvertisingalsoillustratestheparadoxthatnocorporate“auto”exists.Thoughnotattribut-abletoanyindividualconsciousnessorconsciousnessinanyform,advertisingisthelifewritingorautobiographyofacompany—itisacentralcomponentofitspublicpronouncementsandself-representation.Thecorporationhasnoselffromwhichtowriteanautobiography,soIcontendthatmostwritingorspeechallegedly“by”acorporationotherthanadvertisingpertainstoaspe-cifickindofbiography,whichIhavebeencallingcorpography.9

Advertisingisofcoursealwaysamediatedexpressionor“self-representa-tion”ofacorporationfortworeasons:one,becausemostcorporationsout-sourcetheiradcampaigns,andtwo,becausethereisnocorporation,intra-ditionalontologicalterms,beyondtherepresentationtheadcreates.Whileadvertisingseeminglyoriginatesfromanactualperson’sagency,itemanatesfromanadagencyandreifiestheideaofcorporate(spokes)personhood.Im-personalandreplaceableintermsoftheirinteriority,advertisingspokesper-sonscanonlybesimulacra:s/hecouldbeaCGIcreation,anditwouldmakelittledifference.Thespokespersonisnotthepuppetofarealmaster,butofanemptyconstellationofspace.10

Oneconsequenceoftheexigentcorporaterelianceonadvertisingisthedegradationof linguistic consistency, neutrality, and nuance, and of whatonemightcallareliablematrixofcommunicationincontemporaryculture.Bymanipulatinglanguageandthepreceptsofontology—forexample,byincessantly assuring consumers thatnovelty andnostalgia, and excitementandfamiliarity,canbecommensurate—advertisinghelpsfashionaselfthatisascorporatizedas itself.Althoughthemeaningsofwordsalwayschangeaspartof a vibrant culture,our language and conceptual vocabularyhavebeenlargelyco-optedbycorporationsinunprecedentedways;inmainstream


culture,forexample,progressivehasbeentransformedintoawordprimarilyconnotinginsuranceratherthanapoliticalmovement.Thisprocessoflin-guisticappropriationanddisenfranchisementisalsoanintegralpartofaper-vasivecorporatizationofwhatwasoncepublicspaceandrhetoric,especiallyin politics. In an array of contexts, language itself has become sponsored.WhentheDemocratsmetinAugust2008,forexample,oneheardthephrase“PepsiCenter”atleastasoftenas“DemocraticNationalConvention”:thatcenterunfortunatelycanonlyhold.

Inaddition,anadvertisementisbynecessityfungible:ithasnoinherentconnection to theproduct itpromotes, and in fact that structurally insur-mountablegapisallthatallowsadstowork.Adcampaignsthatsoughttobepurelyinformational(orfunctionaslabels)couldneverworkasads.Imag-ine,forexample,acorporationtryingtosellabeerbrandbylistingonlyitsingredients,nutritionalinformation,price,andwhereandhowitwasmade.Advertisersgenerallydonotsellaproduct,butafantasyandaseriesofrela-tions surrounding aproduct involving self-perception, envy, status,desire,andsoforth.Thatdissonancebetweenthematerialityofthecommodityandthefantasiesthecommodityembodiesechoesthedisconnectionbetweenacorporationandits“biography.”Thegapbetweenadandproductisalsoho-mologoustotheonebetweenthecorporationanditsemployees.Towork,theadcanhavenothinginherentlytodowiththeproduct.Thesameappliestocorporatepersonhood,sinceacorporatepersoncanberepresentedonlyby/asafiction.Inotherwords,corporatelanguagehastofunctionlikeanad-vertisement:what’sonthepackageorinthead,orthecorporatesignifier—whichincludesanycorporaterepresentationofanaspectofthecorporation’sfunctions—hasnointrinsicrelationtowhat’sinside,orsignified.

ManyU.S.courtsinthetwentiethcenturyhaveacknowledgedthehighlyartificialnatureofthecorporateentity;asoneholdingnotes,““Theword‘cor-poration’isbutacollectivenameforthecorporatorsormemberswhocomposeanincorporatedassociation,”andtheprotectionsassociatedwiththatdesigna-tioncanbesetasidewhenthenotionofsuchas“legalentity”isusedto“defeatpublicconvenience,justifywrong,protectfraud,ordefendcrime,thelawwillregardthiscorporationasanassociationofpersons.””United States v. Milwau-kee Refrigerator Transit Co.,142Fed.247,255(C.C.E.D.Wis.1905).Stan-dardtreatisesadd,“whereitissaidthatacorporationisitselfaperson,orbe-ing,orcreature,thismustbeunderstoodinafigurativesenseonly”(Morawetz,sec.1).Becausecourtsstressnotonlytheartificialityofthecorporation’ssta-tus,butitsfictivenature,itisappropriatetoconsiderfictionalaswellaslegalrepresentationsofcorporations.Whatdoesthisfictionalityofthecorporationentailintermsofcorporatebiography?AsIexplaininthenextsection,corpog-raphybecomesthenarrativejustificationforimmortalityandimpersonation.


2. immortality and impersonation

BeginningroughlyinthetwodecadesbeforetheCivilWar,thecorporationstartstotakeoverthefunctionofnatureinU.S.culture—itbecomesubiqui-tousandimpersonal,and,mostoddly,seemstospeaktoandinsteadofpeo-ple.Theemblematically-artificialcorporationisthefinalmaterializationofacommercial,historical,andepistemologicalteleologybeguninantebellumAmerica.Itisthecorporation’simpersonality,whichisrelatedtoamyriadoflegalcontrivancesaffordedtoit,thatallowsittomanipulatepersonaldesire.Thoughthecorporationpreciselycanhavenobody,inanumberofsenses,itisdefinedbyits“incorporation,”amagicalandpseudo-numinousterm;inlawandliterature,themostcriticalenablingfictionorartificeisthatthecor-porationcanbelocatedgeographicallyandpersonified.

ThisfictionistetheredtoatropethatsituatestheU.S.astheapotheosisofthenewworld,developedinandasaseriesofpropositionsthatweregen-eratedaspartofacorporateoriginfantasywhosepurpose,asEdwardSaidmightputit,istoelidehistoricalbeginnings(10,13,19–24).Asitwasiniti-atedandenacted,theideaofthenewworldcontainsboththeallureandtaintof thecorporateenterprise fromits inception.Thatenterpriserepresentsasecond,lessovertorexplicitformoftheslaveryonwhichthenewworldwasbuilt—amoresocially-acceptable,moderate,andsustainablevariationoftheslavetrade,particularlyinthecontextofdebt,hierarchy,anddepersonaliza-tion.Further,ifpre-CivilRightslegislationandJimCrowlawsundulynar-rowedthedefinitionofcitizenshipandpersonhood,thecorporatehighjack-ingoftheFourteenthAmendment,whichwasusedtocodifytheideathatcorporationsshouldbetreatedaspeopleunderthelaw,undulywidenedit.ThistraversalisallthemoreironicsincecivilrightslegislationintheU.S.wasconstitutionallyvalidatednotundertheaegisofequalprotection,butundertheregulationofinterstatecommerce,akindof“anymeansnecessary”legalmaneuver.It tellsusagooddealaboutourculturethatcorporationswereable to invoke theFourteenthAmendment to achieve equal protection as“persons”underthelaw,whilecivilrightsadvocateshadtorelyonbusinesslaw—theCommerceClause—toachieveequalprotectionforminorities.11

Distinguishedfrompartnerships,whichgenerallyarerunbyasmallnum-berofpeoplewhohaveincentivestomonitortheirbehaviorandrisks,corpo-rationsareimpersonalnotonlyintheiroperativeorganization,buttheirchar-teredcreation.Inlegalcontexts,thephrase“corporateveil”referstotheschemathatcorporationsinvoketoattainakindofimmunityfromliability;beneaththatscreen,theindividualswhoruncorporationsgenerallyarenotpersonallyliablefortheactionstheytakeontheirbehalf.Inlegalterms,acourtcanpiercethecorporateveilonlyifitfindsindividualsinmanagementactingoutside,or


incontraventionof,theirroleinrunningthebusiness.Butatasocialandonto-logicallevel,nooneisbehindtheveil—intermsofbiography,thecorporationemergesas theultimate trickster,adummywithoutaventriloquist,aconfi-denceperson,apersonwithoutqualities—dependingonone’sperspective,thefulfillmentorfinaldegradationoftheRepublicantradition.Inunusualinstanc-es(e.g.,wherefiguressuchastheKochBrotherscloselycontrolthem),corpora-tionscanserveaswhatwemightcallpersonhoodexoskeletonsthatenhancein-dividualrights,andallowspecificindividualstoactwithminimalliabilityandaccountability.Butinthevastmajorityofcases,onecouldsayofthecorpora-tionthatthere’snotheirthere.Bothscenariosposeinvidioussocialproblems.

Aveilisadisguisethatpertainsonlytoagents—thatis,people:onlyaper-soncanbeveiled.Corporateactorscanhidebehindthisveil,inthecontextofdonninganotherdisguiseorinvokinganotherfiction.Thisconceitofthecor-porateveilconveysnotjustadisturbingformofpatheticfallacyinimbuinganentitywithhumanqualities,butmorenefariouslyfostersapretensethataper-sonresidesbehindthecorporateOz.Thetropealsohasanexigent,uncanny,andironicresonancewiththeFourteenthAmendmentandslavery,asW.E.B.DuBoisofcoursesituatedAfricanAmericansasbeingbornbeneaththeveil.12DuBoistreatstheveilasanemblemofalienatedAfricanAmericansubjectiv-ity,anddescribeshissonasbeingborn“withintheveil”:“theNegroisasortofseventhson,bornwithaveil,andgiftedwithasecond-sightinthisAmeri-canworld...[a]doubleconsciousness”(227,46).Thatdoubleconsciousnesshasasecondconsonanceinthecontextofcorporations,whichalsoaffectournotionofpersonal sovereignty andpersonhood: theybecomeour collectiveOthers.Corporationsnoware“born”beneathanewveil,thingsofpropertythathavebecomeuncannyimitationsoflife.Slaveswerehumanbeingslegallytreatedasinanimatethingsandthree-fifthsofhumanbeings;corporationsarethingslegallytreatedasanimateandsuperbeings.13Beyondtheconstraintsofhumanreproduction,thecorporationcaninitiateanever-endingparthenoge-neticexpansionthattranscendslife.Inresonantculturalcontexts,thecorpora-tionadaptssomeofthekeyontologicalandeconomictropesofslavery;14inareifiedconceptionofslavery,thingsofproperty,touseHarrietBeecherStowe’slanguage,simply“growed”—thatis,theycouldself-propagateforever(238).(Anddespitethe“agrarian”veneeroftheSouthandthesmall-scaleoperationofmanyslaveholders,slaverywasinmanywaysacorporateenterprisefromAfricatoEuropeandtheAmericas.)WellbeforeCitizens United,corporationshadachievedpersonhoodbyeffectivelyco-optingtheemancipationofslaves.

Aswehaveseen,thecorporationisbothalegalandafictiveentity,twoseeminglydisparateconsiderations I try toalign in specificcontexts.UnderChiefJusticeJohnMarshall’sdefinitioninDartmouth College v. Woodward,“Acorporationisanartificialbeing,invisible,intangible,andexistingonlyin


contemplationoflaw.”4Wheat.518,636(1819).Becausethecorporationwascreatedasanartificialperson,manypopularculturalreferencestoartificialandmonstrouslifecontainsomecorporateresidue.Thecorporationisakindofsciencefictionentity—anartificial,collectivebeingthatisbothimmaterialandhyper-materialized, like theBorg,but alsopersonifiedandubiquitous,andincessantlyaccretingtoitself.Forexample,theamorphousandseeminglyimmortalcorporation, revenant inmanyguisesyetalways the same,didn’tcreatethealienintheeponymousfilms—itis thealien.(Itisnotaccidentalthatthecorporationispairedwiththealienineachofthosefilms;thealienisalsoakindofcorporatespokesperson.)Intheabovesciencefictioncontexts,acorporationisaninhumanthingorparasitethatmanipulateshumanemo-tionstoalterbehavior(athingtellingmentobemoremasculinebybuyinganimpersonalcorporateproduct,ortoenvy,desire,emulate,andsoon).The“being”thatfomentsthatfantasyeffectivelysiphonsthetraitsofhumanper-sonalityfrompeopletoobjects.Theadcampaigntriestograftahumanper-sonalityontotheimpersonalperson,thething,thatthecorporationmustbe.

As part of the zero-sum game between corporate and human biogra-phy,thepremisesofself-representationattheextremesbecomedestabilizedandsometimesevenchange“position.”Theimpersonalityofcorporatelan-guage,whichisthedominantformofcommunicationinU.S.culture,af-fects the modes of other self-representation: it is like a black hole whosegravity distorts everything around it. In these contexts, PurnimaBose lo-catesthewayscorporationsfostera fantasyof“entrepreneurial individual-ism”(30–31).Ironically,if,asBosesuggests,corporationspromulgatedtheideaof“corporatepersonhoodascitizenship”inthe1950stoachieveaformofsocialcredit,thereverseprinciplemorerecentlyhasoftenshieldedcorpo-rationsfromblame(41).Thisnotionofcorporateexceptionalismwasmorediffuselyappliedduringtherecentbankingscandals,whennotonlythepo-liticalprocessbutthelegalsystemleftfinancialinstitutions,whichwereabletoacceptallcreditandnorisk,protectedfromvirtuallyanyprosecution.IntheU.S.democraticethos,citizenshipgenerallyimpliesanegalitarianstatusanda formof sharedresponsibility to the stateandothercitizens; the re-centfinancialmeltdownconfirmedthatcorporations—atleastlargefinancialcorporations—arenotcitizens,butsubjecttoexceptionalentitlement.Theywerealways“too”somethingtobetreatedascitizens,forexampletoobigtofailorprosecute.Suchanoutcomeagainwaslargelyneithercircumstantialnorincidental,butconstitutivelyineluctable.Anycorporationworthyofitsstatushasbecomeadispersedandinterconnectednetwork.Lyonsobservesthat“Corporatepersonhoodworkstotheadvantageofbigbusinessbycrys-tallizingthecorporateformintoasingularrightsbearingindividualwhile...distributinglegalliabilityacrossandwithinthecorporation”(105).Further,


Iwouldarguethatthefictionalcorporatepersonisnotonlyirresponsible,butorchestratedtobepathological,notsimplyintermsofpursuingprofitregard-lessofsocialharm,butinbeingprogrammedtolie.AsJoelBakannotes,thecorporation’sdrivetoprivatizeiscoterminouswithanattempttoenforceits“particular conceptionofhumanity”asmirroring itself—“anartificialper-sonmadeintheimageofahumanpsychopath”(135,136).Bakanassessesarepresentative“corporateperson”assomeonewhosedefiningcharacteristicsarealackofempathy,antisocialaggression,aproclivitytodishonesty,andaninabilitytoevaluateone’sownbehavior.WhileitmightseemcontradictorytoascribehumanpathologiestocorporationsIsituateasinhuman,mypointisthattheyareengineeredtosimulatetheworstofhumanbehavior:theyarelikeanti-saintswhocommitinfractionsintheirshareholders’names.

Inpractice,thecorporate“personality”emergesasakindofimmortalizedbutalsonormalizedsociopath(apathologywithoutaperson).Here,themar-ketprovideswhatFredericJamesoncalls“aninterpersonalmechanism”thatisactuallyanimpersonalnetworkthat“substitutes”forhumanbehaviorandethics(273).Ifcorporationswerepeople,wewouldconsidermanyofthempathologicalliars,andinsomecasesmassmurderingserialkillers:Exxon,En-ron,UnionCarbide,GE,Haliburton,LockheedMartin,Monsanto,PhilipMorris,Chevron,BP,PG&E,and, lessdirectly, corporations suchasMc-DonaldsandArcherDanielsMidland,areresponsiblefortakingandruiningtensofthousandsoflives.EvenwhenacorporationsuchasGoogleproclaimsitsimperativeisto“donoevil,”ithastheringof“arbeitmachtfrei.”

Personhoodisacontestedsitebetweencorporationsandpeople,withcor-porationsfinally,ineffect,cannibalizingpersonhood.Thoughtheyobviouslyhavepeopleworkingforthem,corporationsusuallyfunctionasimpersonalmechanisms,anditisnoaccidentthatindividualshavebecomeincreasinglydisenfranchisedas corporationsgainmorepower, influence, andespeciallyrights.Increasingly,mostofusarecorporateemployees,paidinwhathasfig-urativelybecomecorporatescrip,workingundercorporaterules,entertainedbycorporateproducts,andlivingincorporatezones.15Aspartofaseriesofbynowfamiliarappraisals,NelsonSchwartzreportedthat in2013,corpo-rateprofitshadreachedanall-timehighasashareofnationalincome,whilethe sharegoing to employeewageshad reached its lowestpoint in almostfiftyyears(1).Corporationsarethecenterofaseriesofsuchpolarizingrela-tionships,throughwhichassets,includingpersonhood,areredistributedinazero-sumgame.Forexample,corporationsincreasinglyoperateassecretlyaspossible,underthepenumbraofprotectingtradesecretsandbusinessinfor-mation;buttheyalsorarelydisclosetheirnon-confidential,non-businessac-tivities,especiallytheirpoliticalcontributionsandacts.Simultaneously,indi-vidualsacrossabroadspectrum,andwithacceleratingfrequency,voluntarily


publicize and consume private information in corporate fora online, andsymbolicallythroughrealityTVshows,evenastheirprivateinformationisminedbycorporationsandthegovernment.Thesponsoredpersonisthefi-nalprogenyofthecorporation,andthemascotofthecorporatebiography—whatindeedisinaname?Peoplehaverecentlybeennamingtheirchildrenaftercorporateproducts,andforawhileweresellingadvertisingspaceontheircars.16Suchcorporatecreeprepresentsnotsimplyanencroachmentonpublicspace,butoneveryfacetofprivatepersonhood.Thereisonlysomuchspace—andinoursociety,somuchpersonhood—togoaround.

Aninverserelationshipthenexistsbetweencorporateandpersonalfree-dom,and,asMelvillemightsay,corporationsguaranteeimmortalitytoim-personality at the expense of individuals; as the corporation’s impersonalrightsandattributesaccrete,personalfreedomsandattributesforindividualsgenerallydiminish.17 In itsverycreation, thecorporationweldsandwieldstwo incommensurate qualities: immortality and individuality. Individualscannotbeimmortal,andcorporations(orothertranscendentallyimpersonalentities)cannotbeindividuals;imbuingasingleentitywithbothqualitiesisitselfmonstrous.Thiskindofcorporateraidingoftheelementsofperson-hoodagainfulfillsanarcMelvilletracedinMoby-Dick,whichsituatesthefail-ingubiquityofnatureagainsttherisingubiquityofthecorporateenterprise.Inthatnovel’ssustainedimageofakindofquantumMobyDick—whichisomnipresentandimmortal,butnevercanbelocatedatspecificcoordinates—theleviathaninpartrepresentsthedemonologicaltransitionbetweenaU.S.conceptionofNatureasanAmericanprovenancethatservestoguaranteeauniversalnaturallaw,anditsconceptionofthetransnationalcorporationthathasnoresidence,existseverywhere,andiseverywherethesame.

Forpurposesofdiversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of thestatewhereitisincorporatedorinwhichithasitsprincipalplaceofbusiness(28USC.§1332(c)),butitcanbesuedwhereveritdoesbusiness.Underafrequentlycitedcaseofcivilprocedure,World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,444U.S.286,297(1980),theCourtheldthatinproductliabil-itycases,acorporationcouldbe intocourtinanystatewherealegalactionwasforeseeablebecauseitwasmarketingitsproductsthere,orpur-posefullyavailingitselfofthatstate’slaws.Thatholdingbenefitsconsumersinavarietyoflocationswhoareinjuredbyacorporation:italsoeffectivelyacknowledgesthatthecorporatepersonhasbecomeomnipresent.

3. corporate exceptionalism

Toosystemic to fail, thecorporation that is too immortal todiecanonlyberebranded.Ithasdisturbingaffinitieswiththeeternal“ubermensch”or

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text

haled

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text

reviewer

Typewritten Text


superman,allthemoreironicallysincethosefiguresarehighlynationalistic,anditbecomesasuperbeingwithsuperrights,exceptionalismembodied.Asakindofenhancedentityorsuperperson,thetypicalcorporationcanbearesidentofeverywhereandnowhere,transnational inscopeandreach,andunlimitedinitsspendingonspeech.Italsoexigentlypervertstheidealsofun-fetteredcapitalistindividualismitputativelyadvances,sinceitispredicatedonaggregation,uniformity,massproduction,andimpersonaldiscoursesthatimpersonatehumancommunication.Legallycreatedasascreenforindividu-als—toshieldthemfromliability—thecorporationactuallyhascometoserveasascreenfortheexpropriationanddemotionoftheindividual.Weagainencounteranewkindofimpersonalimmortality,whichinpopularcultureissometimesconfiguredasaMatrixoffalseconsciousness.18AsChristopherStoneconcludes,“morethanever,weareinthehandsofinstitutions...[that]cantranscendandsurvivechangesintheconsciousnessofindividualhumanswhosupposedlycomprisethem,andwhomtheysupposedlyserve.(Itismoreandmoretheindividualhumanbeing,withhis[orher]consciousness,thatisthelegalfiction”)(47).Ironically,corporationsarethekindofstateless,no-madic, andpost-humanentities that theorists suchasDeleuzemighthaveendorsed.Again,corporationsseemabletoco-optthosehumanqualitiesthatwillbenefitthem,whilemaximizingtheir“post”-humanorsupra-humanat-tributesanddenyingcharacteristicsthatcouldexposethemtoliability.

Byendowingcorporationswithubiquityandimmortality,thelawalsoallowsthemtoexistinanexceptionalsphereseparatefromhistoricallyboundpeople.IntheaforementionedDartmouth College v. Woodward,4Wheat.at636,ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallwrotethatbeing

themerecreatureoflaw,[thecorporation]possessesonlythosepropertieswhichthecharterofitscreationconfersuponit,eitherexpresslyorasincidentaltoitsveryexistence.. . .Amongthemostimportantareimmortality,and,iftheexpressionmaybeallowed,individuality;propertiesbywhichaperpetualsuccessionofmanypersonsareconsideredasthesame,andmayactasasingleindividual.Theyenableacorporationtomanageitsownaffairsandtoholdpropertywithout...[the]end-lessnecessityofperpetualconveyancesforthepurposeoftransmittingitfromhandtohand.Itischieflyforthepurposeofclothingbodiesofmen,in succession,withthesequalitiesandcapacitiesthatcorporationswereinventedandareinuse.

ThislanguageechoesthatoftheBillofRights,whichreservestothestatesthoseunenumeratedpowersnotdelegatedtothefederalgovernment.HerbertHovenkampremindsusofthefactthatcourtsoftenforget:that

the corporationhasonly thosepowers granted to itby the sovereign.Already in1880,aMarylandcourtheldthatwhilealegislaturemaynotforbidnaturalpersons


frompayingnon-cashwages,itcoulddosotocorporateemployers,aslongasthestatehadretainedthepowertoamendthecorporatecharter.“Acorporationhasnoinherentornaturalrightslikeacitizen.Ithasnorightsbutthosewhichareexpresslyconferreduponit,orarenecessarilyinferrible[sic]fromthepowersactuallygranted,orsuchasmaybeindispensible[sic]totheexerciseofsuchasaregranted.”

The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,76Geo. L.J.1593,1645-46(1988)(citationomitted)).Thecorporation’sundyingqualitiesmakeitin-comparabletopersonsinvirtuallyallregisters.AsAmyJ.Sepinwallattests,forexample,“Whereas individualhumansdieandhavetheirestatestaxedbeforebequest,corporationscan,inprinciple,existforever,andaccumulatewealthoverthatdurationwithouteverfacingtheequivalentofanestatetax.Thiscapacityforwealthaccumulationshouldindeedgiveuspause.”Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship,44Conn. L. Rev.575,589(2012).Thecorporationrepresentsakindoffamilydynasty,butincreasinglywithouttheactualfamily.

This idea of impersonal immortality affects many spheres, especiallythoseof individualand“familial” subjectivity.RolandMarchandobservesthat in the1940s,U.S. corporations thatwanted tobeperceivedas “cor-porationswithasoul”movedfrominvokingimagesofteamstoimagesofaVictorianfamilytocreateanimageofapaternalistichierarchy,herepar-ticularlyinthecontextofcodifyingworkers’roles(107).AsBoseandLyonscontend,corporatenarratives“invokethe tropeof the family toobfuscatetheactualrelationsofproductionandthedivisionoflaborthattheymustorganizeandregulate”(“Introduction”9).Considerthedissonance,forex-ample,ofrepeatedlyhearingabout“S.C.Johnson,aFamilyCompany,”andthefrequencywithwhichcorporationsrelyonterminologysuchas“parentcorporation.”Ironically,thefamilyissetupasanantithesisorantidotetothecorporation,butitisalsousedtohumanizeorevenauthorizecorporatebehavior.19Blurringtheboundariesbetweenpeopleandthings,thedeadandtheliving,corporationshavefurtherdevelopedanewlyimpersonalpersonal-ityandpersonhoodbyadvertisinganewworld.

4. the whole world is an america, a new world

IntheSecond Treatise on Civil Government (1690),theBritishpoliticaltheo-ristJohnLockeassertedthat“inthebeginningalltheworldwasAmerica”(29).ThoreauthenupdatesLockebyassertingthat“ThewholeworldisanAmerica,aNew World”(Journal 4:421).Inthisarcfrom“was”to“is”to“new,”wecanalsotracethedevelopmentofacriticalaspectofthemoderncapitalisteconomyanditsnotionofthenewworld:itispredicatedonaformofadvertisingthatturnshistoryintoapalimpsestbillboardandidealizesthe


putativelynewas longasitstill feelsfamiliar.Newworldnoveltymustof-ferthefaddishlycurrentaspartofaneconomyofplannedobsolescence,butmustconnectthatnoveltytothecomfortablyrecognizable.Modernadvertis-ing’sobsessionwithnextyear’smodelisconnectedtotheimperativetofindallegedlynewnarratives,butisalsoindistinguishablefromthediscoveryofthenew(andimproved)world.ThisrhetoricofnoveltyisalsoconnectedtotheculturalgeographyofthebravenewworldofAmerica.The“newworld”itselfisakindoffoundationaladvertisingslogan.Thenewworldwassettledinpartbythepredecessorsofcorporations,jointstockcompanies—forexam-pletheVirginiaCompany.(MalickGhachemproposesthatthe“forevercom-panies”oftheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies—quasistateenterprisessuchas theDutch,FrenchandBritishEast IndiaCompanies thatmergedcolonialismandcommerce—werealreadytoobigtoofail).AsIhavearguedelsewhere, it is no longer nature that takes us beyond the time and spaceofnations,buttheubiquitoustranscendentalcorporation—whichrepresentstheimpersonalimbuedwithpersonhood.20

Thequintessentialtagline“newand improved,”whichisattheheartofAmericanadvertising,tellsusagreatdealaboutthemendacityandgullibil-ityofourcultureasitrelatestocorporations.Thephraseiswillfullytauto-logical:bydefinition,somethingcan’tsimultaneouslybenewandimproved.Ifsomethingisnew,nothingexistedtoimprove.Ifit’simproved,italreadyexistedandcan’tbenew.Butadvertisersassumenoonewouldbuysome-thingoldandimproved.Insertsannounceyouhavebeenpre-approvedforacreditcardratherthanapproved.Thephrase“freegift”representsanotherinanearlyinexhaustiblearrayofredundanciesandmisprisionsthatareneces-sarytoadvertising;thegiverofthefreegift,asopposedtotheexpensiveone,asksusfortrustbyexaggerating,repeating,barraging,anddistorting.Suchlanguageisdifferentfromtheadvertisingeuphemism—aclaim,forexample,thatacarispre-ownedratherthanused;intheexamplesIaddress,thelan-guagedoesnotmerelyobfuscate,butenactswhatwemightcallthecircularlogicofcirculars.

Infact,advertising’semphasisonnoveltymasksadistinctlyreflexivemodeofatavism;the“new”largelydependsonanunalterablesetofassumptionsandpractices.Asmanyhavenoted,advertisingtradesonaformofnostalgiaforaworlditcreates.Theword“advertisement”originallyconveyedawarning,re-flectingaculturalambivalenceregardingnovelty.(Advertisementsalsopubli-cizedthenamesandlocationsofamanufacturerorproduct—theydemarcatedthingsasspecificratherthanuniversal,andcorrelatedaserviceorproductwithaperson).ManfredGorlachpointsoutthatatonestage“theproductname,ortheproducer,wastheonlytextleft”inadvertisements—theadwasstillaformofidentification(87).ButasAlanTrachtenbergnotesinThe Incorporation of


America,bythegildedage,“theolderfunctionsimplytoinformhadswiftlygivenwaytoamodeinwhichinformationassuchfusedwithamessageabouttheproduct,togetherwithamessageaboutthepotentialconsumer,thatheorsherequired theproductinordertosatisfyaneedincitedandarticulatedbytheadvertisementitself”(137,emphasisinoriginal).Trachtenbergalsopositsthatadvertisingfullyemergesatthe“criticalpoint”when“societyshiftsfromproductiontoconsumption”(135).Thatshiftcoincideswithanincreasingerosionofbarriersandconflationofcategories—betweenfactsandads,newsandentertainment,privateandpublic,andpersonsandcorporatepersons.Nineteenth-centuryadvertisingoftenattachedspecificproductsandservicestoplacesandindividuals(thatis,itassuredconsumersthatanactualpersonbackedaproduct);butitalsosoonbegangeneratingfictitiouspeoplesuchas“AuntJemima”and“BettyCrocker”asstand-insforcorporatepersons,thatis,assimulacraofsimulacra(see,e.g.,Manring116,112).

5. habeas corporation

Inthissection,Iassesswhatcorporatepersonhoodtellsusaboutindividu-alpersonhood in contemporaryU.S. culture.Oneof themostdisingenu-ousandmisguidedpronouncementsintheCitizens United holdingisJusticeKennedy’sassertionthat“Corporations,likeindividuals,donothavemono-lithicviews.”130S.Ct.at912.AsIarguethroughout,suchviewsaretheonlykindthatacorporationcanlegally,orinmostcasesontologically,have.Butundercurrentlaw,thecorporationcanneverbeheldfullyaccountablefortheactionstakenonitsbehalf;itresidesinsomeparalleluniverseofle-galtheory.Inthefollowingsections,Ibrieflyaddressthelegalprecedents,andespeciallytheprotectionsforfalseadvertising,thatserveasapreludetothejudicialvalidationofcorporatepersonhood.Here,oneshouldnotethatmostadvertisingisconstructedsothatclaimscannotbeevaluatedorveri-fied,whilereadersexpectautobiographiesandbiographiestodocument“thetruth”oftheirsubjects’lives.Corporateadvertisingisthenamutationoflifewritingthatdiffersradicallyfromtraditionalforms.Torepresentthemselves,corporationshave to attach themselves to spokespeople—typically celebri-ties,sincetheycomewithprofilesthepublicalreadyknows,butsometimesequallyfabricatedcartooncharacters,fromaGeckotothemostinterestingman in theworld—virtuallynoneofwhomhaveconnectionswithorau-thentic“biographies”inrelationtothecorporation.

It isalsouseful toconsiderwhocansueacorporationfor falseadver-tising,andwhy, in thecontextof legal standingandavarietyofkindsofpersonhood.That is, thecriticalfictionisnotsimplythatthecorporationisaperson,butthatitisnotaspecificanddelimitedassociationofpersons


(which,inthatcontext,couldnothavepersonhood).Republicansoftenasserttheyopposegaymarriagebecauseitwouldpropelusdownaslipperyslopetoallowingpeopletomarrycowsortrees:yettheyrarelyapplythesameargu-menttocorporations,andparticularlytheirstandingtosueorstatusaslegalpersons.Thisisanimportantcontrast,asJusticeDouglasimpliesinhisdis-senttoSierra Club v. Morton,405U.S.727,742–43(1972).Ironically,theCourtinMortonheldthattheSierraClub,asacorporation,hadnostandingtosuetostopdevelopmentinafederalpark,butthatitcouldfilesuitonbe-halfofanymemberwhohadsufferedindividualharm,inthiscaseanoma-louslydecidingcorporationscouldhavenocollective,“non-economic”inter-est insuchanissue.Id.at734,739–40.Suchassumptionsaboutstandingandthenon-economicinterestsofcorporationshavebeeneroding,asevidentinthespateofrecentlawsuitsregardingthereligiousandmoralrightsofcor-porations.(Inthecontextofreligiousfaith,onemightsaythatthecorpora-tionrepresentsonefictionarguingfortherighttobelieveinanother).Inhisdissent,JusticeDouglasassertedthat

Inanimateobjectsaresometimespartiesinlitigation.Ashiphasalegalpersonality,afictionfoundusefulformaritimepurposes....Theordinarycorporationisa“per-son”forpurposesoftheadjudicatoryprocesses,whetheritrepresentsproprietary,spiritual, aesthetic,orcharitablecauses.So it shouldbeas respectsvalleys,alpinemeadows,rivers,lakes,estuaries,beaches,ridges,grovesoftrees,swampland,orevenairthatfeelsthedestructivepressuresofmoderntechnologyandmodernlife.21

Id.at742–743.AsChristopherStoneelaborates,theworldoflawis“peopledwith inanimate rightsholders: trusts, corporations, joint ventures,munici-palities,SubchapterRpartnerships,andnationstates,tonamejustafew”(5).Butitisdifferenttospeakfor,asaguardianorstand-in,thesubalterninna-tureoraspectsoftheenvironment—forthosewithoutavoice—thantocon-feravoiceuponathing(see,e.g.,Stone25–27).(And,first,wemustalwaysacknowledge thatwe speak for “nature” exclusively from some contestablehumanperspective.)Ifacorporationhasstandingasaperson,whydoesn’tanabusedcowortree,whichatleasthasthedistinctionofbeingalive?Theon-tologicaljustificationforawardingstandingtocorporationsisnotflimsy,butpurposefullycontradictoryandarbitrary,andutilitarianatbest,fromalegalandphilosophicalperspective.Itisacritical,foundationaltenetofourjuris-prudencethatwehaveawardedstandingtotheartificiallycreatedconstructsofbusiness,butdeniedittoalmosteveryaspectofnature,howeverwesituatethemasculturalconstructs.

Ironically, corporate personhood requires the serial transfers of assetsfromsomeformoftranscendentalNature,andfinallyfrompeople,to cor-porations; they have taken on the role of personified, impersonal Nature,


becominguniversal,omnipresent,intractable.Inthistrajectory,thecorpo-rationimitatesandsupersedesnature.InhisnovelPierre,forexample,Mel-ville’sprotagonistdeclaimed,“[T]houinconceivablecoxcombofaGoethe....Alreadytheuniversegetsonwithoutthee,andcouldstillspareamillionmoreofthesameidenticalkidney.Corporationshavenosouls,andthyPan-theism[Nature-worship],whatwasthat?”(302).(IinvokeMelvillehereasashorthandtohelplocatethecriticaltransitionfromNaturetocorporationsasaguarantorofidentityinU.S.culture.)Suchlanguagehasatleastapartlylegalorigin.AsRobertSpragueandMaryEllenWellsnote,“In1612,Eng-land’sChiefJusticeCokedeclaredthatcorporationshavenosouls.Nearlyfourhundredyears later, inCitizens United . . . JusticeKennedydeclaredthatcorporationsaredisadvantagedpersonsbecausethegovernmenthadin-trudedupontheirfreedomofspeech.”22MelvillealsoprobablyderivesthislanguagefromJamesFenimoreCooper’snovelThe Bravo,whichvilifiesthe“soulless corporation[s]” of secret deliberative bodies (170). Among otherthings,thepantheismthatMelvillenarrativizesrepresentsafailedattempttomergewithatranscendentalNaturethatturnsouttobepreciselycorporateandindifferenttoindividuals.

InCitizens United,acaselessconcernedthanMorton withstandingandthescopeofacorporation’snon-economicinterests,theissuewaswhetherthegovernmentcan regulateotherwiseunbridledcorporate speech. Inhisconcurrence,130S.Ct.at928,ScaliaclaimsspeechneednotemanatefromanindividualtoreceivestrictFirstAmendmentprotection:

[T]heindividualperson’srighttospeakincludestherighttospeakinassociationwithotherindividualpersons.SurelythedissentdoesnotbelievethatspeechbytheRepublicanPartyortheDemocraticPartycanbecensoredbecauseitisnotthespeechof“anindividualAmerican.”ItisthespeechofmanyindividualAmericans,whohaveassociatedinacommoncause....Theassociationofindividualsinabusinesscorporationisnodifferent—oratleastitcannotbedeniedtherighttospeakonthesimplisticgroundthatitisnot“anindividualAmerican.”

Asconsistentlyinconsistentasever,Scaliaheredoesnotdevelopanyoriginal-istorhistoricalargument;hisclaiminvolvesacategorical,ontological,andepistemologicalassertionthatacorporationisanassociationthatrepresentsindividuals.TheironicallynamedCitizens United ofcoursereflectsthepos-tureandstatusofaunitedcorporationthatcompletelydisplacesindividualcitizens.Inaddition,accordingtoAmySepinwall,“theCitizens United de-cisiondoesnotrestonaconceptionofthecorporationasacitizen;instead,themajorityopiniongroundscorporatefreespeechrightslargelyontherightof listeners to hear speech from as many different voices as possible.” 44Conn. L. Rev.at581(citationomitted).AsMatthewAllmannotes,allthe


moreironicallyanduncannilygiventhetitleat issue,an“interpretationoftheFourteenthAmendment [thatdoesnot include corporations]was like-wiserecognizedbytheCourt,whichheldthat“[t]hetermcitizens...appliesonlytonaturalpersons,membersofthebodypolitic,owingallegiancetotheState,nottoartificialpersonscreatedbythelegislature,andpossessingonlytheattributeswhichthelegislaturehasprescribed.”Paul v. Virginia,75U.S.(8Wall.)168,177(1868).”Note: Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of the Natural Person Theory of Corporate Per-sonhood,38FLA.St. U.L. Rev.387,n135(2011)(citationsomitted).

Scaliaalsodisingenuouslyequatesplacinglimitsonspeechwithanabso-lutedenialofarighttospeak,whichwasneveratstakeinCitizens United,butmoreover legallyunavailing inthecontextof theCourt’svalidationofnumeroustime,place,andmannerrestrictionsonallformsofspeech.23Cor-porationsalsodonotspeakonanyone’sbehalf,eventheirshareholders.Illus-tratingakindofjudicialbootstrapping,theconceptofcorporatepersonhoodhad no originally citable precedent, as the idea effectively emanated fromdictainSanta Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,118U.S.394(1886);itwasaddedtothecaseheadnotesbyacourtreporterwhohadbeenpresidentofarailwaycompany,andshouldneverhavebeenincludedasacit-ablepartofaCourtopinion.24Contingencyhadbeenelevatedtohistoricalnecessity,andthevalidationoftheconceptreflectedakindofpaymentduefortheoriginalbillofrights.

Thefictionofpersonhoodispartoftheapparatusthatgrantsacorpo-ration full rightsofpolitical speech,eventhoughacorporation isapurelycommercialenterprise.Acorporationcannot(officially)holdofficeorvote,andtheserestrictionsonpersonhoodhavenotbeencontroversial;whydoestheCourtsingleoutspeechasanexceptionalrightthatcannotberegulated?Giventhewaycourtsnowtreatcorporationsaspeople,corporatespeech—thoughprimarilyifnotexclusivelycommercial,anddifferentiablewhennotcommercial—cannotbeeasily regulated, ifatall. Inotherwords,corpora-tionsaremistakenlycategorizedasiftheywereinthemarketplaceofideasinsteadofproducts.(Orrather,oneshouldsaythewaytheyaretreatedinthiscontextisquitedeliberate.)Whilesomewouldcontendthatcorporatecommunicationsrelatedtobusinessinvolvepoliticalideasandcomeundertheaegisofprotectedspeech,orthatallassociationshaveabsolutefreespeechrights,suchassertionsrelyonanotherconflationoflawandfiction.Becauseof thenatureof the speakerandthekindofutterances itcanproduce,allthespeechofacorporation—includingitsspending—shouldberegulableaswhollycommercialinnature.

ContrarytotheholdinginCitizens United,courtsshouldbeabletoregu-latecorporatespeechinthesamewaytheyregulatefalseadvertising,because


nearlyallcorporatespeechisaformofadvertising.Acorporation’sspeechpromotesitsownbusiness—thatisacorporation’sonly functionunderthelawthatrecognizesitiscommercial.Indeed,shareholderscan,andoftendo,object tospeechthatdoesn’tpromoteacorporation’sbottomline.Acor-porationistherebygrantedspecificrights,protections,andlimitationsasacommercialenterprise,andshouldnotbeallowedtoclaimsuchstatusonlywhenitisconvenient,whileclaimingfullpersonhoodonlywheneverthatisconvenient.Thecorporation’sstatus,incontext,shoulddeterminethena-tureofitsspeech.

While the Supreme Court recognizes the difficulty in distinguishingcommercial from non-commercial speech, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453U.S.490(1981)(Brennan,J.,concurring),ithasalsoheldthat“speechneednotcloselyresembleatypicaladvertisementtobecommercial.”Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc.,52F.3d108,112,6thCir.1995.CitingtheSupremeCourt,theSixthCircuithereobservedthatin

Bolger[v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.],463U.S.[60],67[(1983)]...theonlyref-erenceto[the]product[atissue]iscontainedattheverybottomofthelastpage....TheCourtdecidedthatthepamphlet’slackofspecificitydidnotrenderitnoncom-mercial.‘Thataproductisreferredtogenericallydoesnot,however,removeitfromtherealmofcommercialspeech.Forexample,acompanywithsufficientcontrolofthemarketforaproductmaybeabletopromotetheproductwithoutreferencetoitsownbrandnames.’

Acorporationparticipatinginanywayinthepoliticalprocess—perhapsof-tenindirectrelationtoits“lackofspecificity”oritsstudiedanonymity—isalso always and only promoting its product—i.e., engaged in commercialspeech.AstheSixthCircuitheldinthiscaseinvolving“informational”busi-nesspamphletsandcommerciallymotivatedpressreleases,

“nolawofmanornaturemakesitimpossible”toexplaintheprocessformanu-facturing...withoutdescribing[amanufacturer’s]ownproducts,history,qualitystandards,safetystandards,andcommitmentto[laborpractices].Suchadditionspromote [the product] and invite commercial transactions, and they representcommercialspeech....[P]roductsortechniquesmayoftenbenewsworthy,butthatstatusdoesnotpermittheirmanufacturerstolie.Thephrase“freeadvertising”...describesthepublicitymanufacturersmayreceiveinpressreleases,newsinter-views,ortradepublications.TheLanhamActdoesnotprohibitorhampersuchadvertising;itrequiresonlythatmanufacturersdescribetheirproductstruthfully.

Id.at113–114.Aswithenvironmentalregulations,restraintsoncorporatespeech—which under Citizens United means spending on political cam-paigns—canbenarrowlytailoredtobecontentneutral;ratherthanstifling


freespeech,suchconstraintsareitsprerequisites.Itseemsunnecessarytoelab-oratethatasamatterofpolicy—aswellasamatterofconstitutionalintentionforthosewhothinksuchajustificationisnecessary—thevastmajorityofin-dividualswillnotbeabletocompetewithcorporatepersonsinvoicingtheirspeech,orinhavingitheard.

Inaddition,courtshaveemphasizedthatcorporationsshouldnotescaperegulationsimplybytryingtoinsulatetheirspeechwithinthecontextofpub-licdebate:“TheSupremeCourthasrepeatedly“madeclearthatadvertisingwhich‘linksaproducttoacurrentpublicdebate’isnottherebyentitledtotheconstitutionalprotectionaffordednoncommercialspeech....Advertis-ersshouldnotbepermittedtoimmunizefalseormisleadingproductinfor-mationfromgovernmentregulationsimplybyincludingreferencestopub-lic issues.””Semco,52F.3dat113(citingBolger,463U.S.at68(citationomitted)).25Acorporationhasnobusinessmakingspeechunlessitiscom-mercial,i.e.,anadvertisement;whileitshouldbeallowedtolobbyforandfreelyarticulateitscommercial interests,asathresholdissue,allacorpora-tion’sacts,includingitspoliticalspendingor“speech,”shouldberegulableundertheCommerceClauseandcommercialspeechdoctrines.Thoseregula-tionsofcoursemuststillbeconstitutional,butcommercialspeechisaffordedlessprotection,andcommercialspeechregulationsaresubjecttolessjudicialscrutiny,thanotherformsofspeechbecauseofthevitalpublicinterestsatstake,whichcourtshavelongrecognized,andbecausecorporationswerenot,untilrecently,consideredfullpubliccitizensunderthelaw.

UnderthetesttheNinthCircuitadoptedinAssociation of National Ad-vertisers v. Lundgren,44F.3d726,731(1994),holdingthatinformationalpamphletsmakingfactualclaimsaboutaproduct’senvironmentalattributesconstitutedregulablecommercialspeech,fourfactorsgovern

whether commercial speech enjoys the protection of the First Amendment: (i)whether the speechrestricted isdevoidof“intrinsicmeaning”;Friedman v. Rog-ers, 440U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (ii) the “possibilities fordeception[,]” id. at 13; (iii)whether“experiencehasprovedthatinfactsuchadvertisingissubjecttoabuse,”In re R.M.J.,455U.S.191,203(1982);(iv)“theabilityoftheintendedaudiencetoevaluatetheclaimsmade.”Id.

Themistakeofthisapproachisthatittriestosiphonoffthecorporation’spo-liticallyprotectedspeechfromitsadvertising.Thethresholdissueiswhetheronecanclassifyallacorporation’sspeechassubjecttoevaluationunderthistest,notwhethersomeutterancesfallafoulofit.Allacorporation’sspeechiscommercial.InthesamewaythattheCourtallowstime,place,andman-nerrestrictionsonmanykindsofpublicspeech,itcouldregulatecorporate


speechinacontent-neutralmanner,notthroughanynexusormultifactortests,butbyidentifyingwhetheraspeakeriscorporate,whichcanbeeasilydeterminedasamatteroflaw.

InVirginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,425U.S.748,770(1976),theCourtheldcontent-basedrestrictionson thedisseminationofpharmaceuticalpriceswereunconstitutional.TheCourtstressed,however,that

Untruthfulspeech,commercialorotherwise,hasneverbeenprotectedforitsownsake.Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,418U.S.323,340(1974);Konigsberg v. State Bar,366U.S.36,49,andn.10(1961).Obviously,muchcommercialspeechisnotprovablyfalse,orevenwhollyfalse,butonlydeceptiveormisleading.WeforeseenoobstacletoaState’sdealingeffectivelywiththisproblem.TheFirstAmend-ment,asweconstrueittoday,doesnotprohibittheStatefrominsuringthatthestreamofcommercialinformationflow[sic ]cleanlyaswellasfreely.

Id.at771.Ifthestreamofcommercialinformationcan,andneedsto,bereg-ulated,thesamereasoningshouldholdforcorporatespendingmasqueradingasspeech.IftheCourttreatedcorporatepoliticalspendingascommercial,itwouldneverneedtoaddressitscontent,unlessaregulationonitsfaceorasappliedfavoredorpenalizedcertainpointsofview.JusticeStewartwrotepersuasivelyinhisconcurrencetoVirginia State Bd.that

Sincethefactualclaimscontainedincommercialpriceorproductadvertisementsrelatetotangiblegoodsorservices,theymaybetestedempiricallyandcorrectedto reflect the truth without in any manner jeopardizing the free disseminationof thought. Indeed, the eliminationof false anddeceptive claims serves topro-motetheonefacetofcommercialpriceandproductadvertisingthatwarrantsFirstAmendmentprotection—itscontributiontotheflowofaccurateandreliablein-formationrelevanttopublicandprivatedecisionmaking.

Id.at780.TheSeventhCircuithasalsoheldthat“thepublicandprivatebenefitsfromcommercialspeechderivefromconfidenceinitsaccuracyandreliability.Thus,theleewayforuntruthfulormisleadingexpressionthathasbeenallowedinothercontextshaslittleforceinthecommercialarena.”Nat’ l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,570F.2d157,161(7thCir.1977).Thesameprincipleshouldapplyevenmoreforcefullytotheregulationofcorporatespendingonpoliticaladsorcampaigns,aswellasotherkindsofcorporatespeech,mostcriticallytoaddressissuesofsaturation,domination,andmediacontrol.Butwhataboutcorporatespeechoutsidethecommercialarena?Tomakesuchadistinctionbetweenkindsofcorporatespeechcreatesinvidious problems and misapprehends the legal and ontological limits of


corporatepersonhood.Whenacorporationsubsidizespoliticalcampaigns,itisnotengagedinpublicdebate;itisavoidventriloquizingcommercialspeechaspoliticalspeech.

Toassesswhatonemightcall the leviathaneffectofcorporate speech,onecanconsidertheconsequencesofallowingacorporationanunfetteredrighttopoliticalspeech,firstbylookingatthedeleteriouseffectsofcorporatespeechevenincommercialcontexts.26Courtshavebeenbetterataddressingwhattheyviewasidentifiableadvertisementsthanotherformsofcorporatespeech,inpartbecausetheymakespeciousthresholddistinctionsregardingthekindofspeechcorporationscanmake.InLundgren,44F.3dat727–728,theNinthCircuitnoted the“potential for abuse” raisedby the increasingpopularityofsociallyconsciousadvertising,andthe“growingconfusionsur-roundingmanyenvironmentalmarketingclaims”(citingAss’n of Nat’l Adver-tisers, Inc. v. Lundgren,809F.Supp747,750(N.D.Cal.1992)).Thecourtfoundthat

editorializing[i]snotessentialtoproductadvertising.Lundgren,809F.Supp.at753(“whilestatementsthatafirmsupportsrecycling,forinstance,areundoubt-edlyincludedinadvertisementsasamarketingtoolandmayinfactaugmentsales,firms can nevertheless sell their wares without editorializing about the environ-ment”).Conversely, thedistrict courtpersuasively reasoned that afirmcan edi-torializeabouttheenvironment, lambast[e]thestatuteor laudrecyclingwithoutadvertisingorotherwisemakingcommercialrepresentationsaboutoneofitsprod-ucts.[Id.]at754.

Lundgren,44F.3dat730.Suchastrategytoseparatekindsofspeechmighthelpregulatefalseclaimsifitwereproperlyenforced.Butsuchanapproachcarvesoutacriticalanduncontainableareaofunregulatedcommercialac-tivity—asweempiricallyknow,manycorporationswillexploitanyloopholetoavoidtaxorliabilities,ortotrytobuyelections.Onestraightforwardleg-islative solutionwouldbe to treatall corporate speech involvingcampaignspendingasaformofadvertising,andcorporatepersonhoodasapurelycom-mercialformofbeing.

Courts,however,instrumentallyandill-advisedlytendtodifferentiateal-legedlydiversekindsofcorporatespeechonthebasisofcontent,ratherthanthestatusofthespeaker.Theydosoinpartbecausetheyhavenocoherentdefinitionofpersonhood,butalsotojustifyendsandoutcomesalreadyde-terminedtobedesirable.AccordingtoRezaDibadj,“Nothavingatheoryofconstitutionalpersonhoodisunsettling....WhatJusticeBlackoncepointedoutinthecontextoftheFourteenthAmendmentappliesmoregenerally:“[i]trequiresdistortiontoread‘person’asmeaningonething,thenanotherwithin


thesameclauseandfromclausetoclause.”Putbluntly,“theCourthasneversetforthaspecifictesttodeterminewhataconstitutional‘person’is.”(Mis)Conceptions of the Corporation,29Ga. St. U.L. Rev.731,749-50 (2013)(citations omitted). As Kathleen Sullivan comments, “These different ap-proacheshaveraisedthequestionwhethertheCourt’scorporatepersonhoodjurisprudenceispurelyresultoriented.”Note: What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction,114HaRv. L. Rev.1745,1754(2001).27Regardingarelatedinconsistency,MatthewAllmanobservesthattheCourt’s“mantra is that“theGovernmentcannotrestrictpoliticalspeechbasedonthespeaker’scorporateidentity”underthestricturesoftheFirstAmendment.”38FLa. St. U.L. Rev.at402.ButasAnneTuckerpro-poses,“TheCourt’sassertionthatthelawdoesnotmakedistinctionsbasedontheidentityofthespeakerispatentlyfalseinthecontextofcorporatelaw;infactagreatdealofspeechisregulatedorcompelledbaseduponthecor-porateidentityofthespeaker.Thecorporatecharterfilingrequirements...alongwiththerequisitecontinuingdisclosuresandsecuritiesregulations...createaslewofcorporatespeechbasedsolelyonthecorporateidentityoftheentity.”Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Cor-porate Personhood in Citizens United,61CaSe W. ReS.497,543-44(2010)(citationomitted).Thestatusofthespeakershouldbethethresholdissueinthecontextofcorporations,becausethespeakerisnotaspeaker:thereisnopersonoridentityaboutwhichtomakedistinctions.

AsJusticeStevens,withwhomJusticeGinsburg,JusticeBreyer,andJus-ticeSotomayorjoined,bothconcurredanddissentedinpart,thestatutorybanatissueinCitizens United had

noapplicationtogenuineissueadvertising—acategoryofcorporatespeechCon-gressfoundtobefarmoresubstantialthanelection-relatedadvertising,(citationomitted)ortoInternet, telephone,andprintadvocacy.Likenumerousstatutes,itexemptsmediacompanies’newsstories,commentaries,andeditorialsfromitselectioneeringrestrictions,inrecognitionoftheuniqueroleplayedbytheinstitu-tionalpressinsustainingpublicdebate....[Thestatute]functionsasasourcere-strictionoratime,place,andmannerrestriction.Itappliesinaviewpoint-neutralfashiontoanarrowsubsetofadvocacymessagesaboutclearlyidentifiedcandidatesforfederaloffice,madeduringdiscretetimeperiodsthroughdiscretechannels.

130S.Ct.at944.However,evenif(even)thesemembersoftheCourtfailtounderstandhowcorporatepersonhoodaffectsthestatusofallcorporatespeech,theydidobjectthatthestatutetheCourtstruckdownsimplyregu-latedcorporationsinthesamepermissiblewayitcouldhavelegallyregulatedindividuals.Inotherwords,corporationsunderCitizens United don’thavethesamerightsaspeople—theyhavefarmore.Ifweonceatleastclaimedto


beanationoflawsratherthanpeople,wearenowanationofcorporations.IftheU.S.considersitselfexceptionalintheworld,Citizens United confirmedthatcorporationsareexceptionalinthiscountry.

Thoughbeyondthescopeofthisarticle,thefullimplicationsofthislegalcorporateexceptionalismforhumanpersonhoodaremyriadandmortifying.Thelawreliesonaseriesofofteninchoatetheoriesofpersonhoodbecauseoursocietyhasnocoherent,accepteddefinitionofwhatapersonisorwhathis/herrightsare.Oneofthemostdisturbingbutlessobviouscorollariesoftheunprecedented transferof rights,power, influence, status,onceprivateinformation,andmoneytocorporationsistheconcomitanttransferofmanyaspectsofhumanidentity.Forexample,inthezero-sumgameI’vebeende-lineating,aspeopleidentifywithorbecomeads,corporationsandtheirprod-uctsseemtobecomemorehumanorgainpersonalities.Andundercorporatecapitalism,desiresaregenerallynotspontaneous,butdevelopedaspartofastructureof envyandmanipulation,one increasingly regulatedby increas-inglyunregulatedcorporations.Insuchasystem,biographycanlargelydocu-mentonlyroteandpredeterminedpatternsofimpersonalbehavior.Insomewaysdisplacingboththeartistandthecommunity,thecorporationhasbe-comeourchorus,thecollectivevoiceofourculture,dramatizedintherealityTVshowsthattypicallyinculcateacorporateethosofcompetition,whichisappliedtoeveryaspectofwhatwasonceatleastostensiblypersonalandpri-vatelife.Astheseemblematiclivesareexposedforpublicconsumption,andeffectivelyhollowedout, their subjectivities are symbolically transferred tothecorporation,orcontortedtosatisfythepremisesofcorpography.

Toputitbluntly,corporationsarewritingourlives.Theregulationsandbehaviorsthatcodifycorporatepersonhoodhelperaseandinvertboundar-ies—betweenprivateandpublic;personalandimpersonal;politicalandcom-mercial;interestedanddisinterested;andhumanandsimulacra.Itmightbetoolatetodistinguishamongprivatespeech,politicalspeech,andcommer-cialspeech;corporationsmightalreadyhavebecomeourshareholders.

notes

aUtHoR’S note:MythankstoToniWeinforherextensivecommentsonadraftofthisar-ticle,andtoPurnimaBose,LauraE.Lyons,CynthiaG.Franklin,CraigHowes,StanleySchab,andtheparticpantsintheBiography seminarheldattheUniversityofHawai‘iatMänoainAugust2013,fortheirhospitality,generosity,andinsights.AversionofthispaperwasalsopresentedtotheLegalBodiesConference,LeidenUniversityCentreforArtsinSociety,inMay2014;mythankstoYascoHorsman,Frans-WillemKorsten,NanneTimmer,andtheconferenceparticipants.

1. Applehereservesasausefulexampleofanentirecultofimpersonality.


2. Iwouldcontendthatfictions,suchasPhilipK.Dick’s1969novelUbikandRichardPowers’s1998novelGain,areoftenmoregermanetocorporationsinthecontextoflife-writingthanotherformsofbiography.Gain,forexample,presentsaJoyceanhis-toryofadvertisinglanguageasitevolvesfromthepersonalandfamilial—startingwithaperiodwhenafamilycouldostensiblyown,runandrepresentacompany—tothecorporateform,underwhichonlythefamilynameremained.

3. Itisworthreflectingonthefactthatmostpeoplewouldseeexecutives,yetnotemploy-ees, as representing a corporation,but thatperception conflates formsofownershipwithformsofidentity.

4. Corporationsventriloquizeor“speakus”inmuchthewayNatureoncedidinaspecificbut influential strainof transcendentalU.S. culture. In the contextof corporations,however, I situate the impersonal as thedeficit, rather than anyLacanian excess, ofindividuality.

5. However,asChiefJusticeRobertswritesinhisconcurrence,onemustconsidermediacorporationsseparately.Citizens United,130S.Ct.at917,924.Theirspeechwouldbecategoricallydifferent,inpartbecausetheirbusiness,unlikethatofmostcorporations,is,atleasttheoretically,speech.

6. IherethinkofthetitleandnarratorofHarlanEllison’sshortstory“IHaveNoMouthandIMustScream”asapplyingperverselytothecorporateperson.

7. Thecorporateself-representationIaddressisdifferentfromthatoftheCEObiogra-phies(thatnowoverlapwithcelebritybiographies)thatPurnimaBoseandLauraE.Lyonsdiscussin“TowardaCriticalCorporateStudies,”andthatmanyauthorsaddressintheircollection,Cultural Critique and the Global Corporation.

8. As Paola Catenaccio and Chiara Degano also indicate, corporate speech often triestoreconcileincommensurategoalsorvoices, leavingspokespersonstryingtobalance“twoopposingorientations: investorsmustbepersuaded thatCSR[corporate socialresponsibility]willnotbepursuedtothedetrimentofprofit,andatthesametimethedoubtsofactivistsmustbeassuagedbyprovidingconvincingproofofthecompany’scommitmenttosocialresponsibility”(85).

9. Itisworthnoting,forexample,thatastudybytheAmericanAssociationofAdvertisingAgencies,morethantwentyfiveyearsold,indicatedthatanaverageconsumerviewed1,600advertisementsdaily,whichnowhaslikelyreachedover3,000(Fox328;Sivulkaxiii).Whatmanyofussee,hear,andreadmostarenottheutterancesofpeople,butofcorporations.

Corpographyherealso representsafinalmanifestationof theU.S.genreof theconfidence autobiography or forged memoir. As I elaborate in “The Franklin-SteinMonster,”akindoftricksteruseofthethird-person,impersonalimpersonation,andoutrightventriloquismareendemictooneconfigurationofU.S.autobiography,begunbyGovernorJohnWinthropandperfectedbyBenFranklin.Aspartoftherepublicantradition,theU.S.autobiographeroftensituatedhimself—andthiswasalargelygen-deredtropeuntilthetwentiethcentury—usingconstitutionallanguagetoconstructa(sometimesmock)publicdiscoursethatembodies“wethepeople.”AsInote,“fromWinthrop to Franklin, Emerson, Henry Adams and Gertrude Stein, one strain ofAmericanautobiographychroniclesthesubjecttryingtobearepresentativeAmerican,


or,asJosephFichtelbergsaysofFranklin,tolivea“corporatelife””(17;Fichtelberg83).Butthesewritersalsowillfullyconstructedselves,andventriloquizedothers,tostandinfortheirownlives;theywroteofthemselvesinthethirdperson,asothers,andasimper-sonations.Theybeganadisplacementoftheself,whichtheyoftentreatedasanobject,ratherthanthesubject,ofautobiographicalrepresentation.Inthissense,thesewritersbeginthecorporateconflationofbiographywithautobiography.

10.Corporations need to maintain the fanciful premise that their spokespeople are rep-resentative surrogates, anda scandal canquicklyendanendorsementdeal.But suchspokespeople are simplyand solely actors:onecannot identify their interioritywiththatofacorporationinthesamewayonecannotidentifyanactor’slifewiththelifeofacharactersheportrays.Toassumethatascandalinaspokesperson’slifesomehowreflectsnegativelyonacorporationistovalidatethefantasyofcorporatepersonhood—it is theequivalentofblamingJonHammfor falseadvertising.Corporationsbenefitfromsuch“guiltbyassociation”becauseitbolstersthesuppositionthattheycangainpersonhoodbyassociation.Whileitmightgainmarketshare,acorporationdoesnotgainathleticprowessorcredibilitybypayinganOlympicathletetowearitsheadband,norisitmorallytarnishedifthatathleteusesthatheadbandtoshootheroin.Likethatofthepresident’spresssecretary,thejobofsuchactorsiscategoricallynevertoindicatewhat theyactually think,but impersonally topromote the interestsof their employ-ersthroughtheirpublicpersonae.Inthissense,inaformofontologicalprostitution,spokespeople—perhapsonlytoagreaterextentthananycorporateemployee—sellthesemblanceanduseoftheirpersonhoodtoathingthatcanneverhaveitsown.

11.RespondingtoachallengetotheCivilRightsActin1964,forexample,theCourtstatedthat“Section201(a)ofTitleIIcommandsthatallpersonsshallbeentitledtothefullandequalenjoymentofthegoodsandservicesofanyplaceofpublicaccommodationwithoutdiscriminationorsegregationonthegroundofrace,color,religion,ornationalorigin;and§201(b)definesestablishmentsasplacesofpublicaccommodationiftheiropera-tionsaffectcommerceorsegregationbythemissupportedbystateaction.”Katzenbach. v. McClung,379U.S.294,298(1964).Ineffect,theCourthadtoaddressthedistrictcourt’sassertionthatitwasnotrequiredtoprotectcivilrights,buttofinda“demonstra-bleconnectionbetweenfoodpurchasedininterstatecommerceandsoldinarestaurantandtheconclusionofCongressthatdiscriminationintherestaurantwouldaffectthatcommerce.”Id.at297.Becauseofprecedent,theCourtdecidedthatitcouldupholdthelawonlyonthegroundsthatdiscriminationcumulativelyaffectedinterstatecommerce.Eveninthe1960s,theCourtremainedconstrainedbyaperceivedlackofcongressionalauthoritytolegislateissuesofcivilrightsasissuesofrightsratherthancommerce.

12.InherintroductiontoHarrietJacobs’sIncidents in the Life of a Slave Girl,LydiaMariaChild already associated the veil with slavery, observing that “this peculiar phase ofSlavery[theabuseofwomen]hasgenerallybeenkeptveiled;butthepublicoughttobemadeacquaintedwithitsmonstrousfeatures,andIwillinglytaketheresponsibilityofpresentingthemwiththeveilwithdrawn”(xii).

13.As Ishmael Reed writes in his 1976 novel Flight to Canada, paraphrasing FrederickDouglass,“Isn’titstrange?Whitmandesirestofusewithnature,andhereIam,invol-untarily,thecomradeoftheinanimate,butnotbychoice....Iamproperty.Iamathing”(75).Reedalsonotes thatHarrietBeecher’sStowe’snovelUncle Tom’s Cabin


wasoriginally subtitled“TheManWhoWasaThing” (93).Again,wecanglimpsetheprocessinwhichthepropertiesofnatureandcorporationsareconflated;insteadof“fusing”withortranscendingthelimitedindividualselfinnature,onecan“transcend”thelimitedindividualselfbybecomingacorporateperson.PivotingaroundtheFour-teenthAmendment,thelawtreatedslavesasthings,ordegradedimitationsoflife,butnowtreatscorporations,whicharethings,asenhancedimitationsoflife.

14.Regardingthewayscorporationsdevelopedmanagementtechniquesderivedfromtheoperationsofslaveplantations,seetheworkofCaitlinRosenthal,whoargues,forex-ample,that“thepowerofmastersovertheirslavesgavethempowerasmanagers.Plan-tationsbecamelaboratoriesforagriculturalexperimentation,andplantersandoverseersmeasured and monitored human capital with great precision. Through accounting,humanfiguresbecamefiguresonpaper,appearingasinterchangeableinputsofproduc-tion”(735).

15.IncertainpartsoftheU.S.,withregardtocertainkindsofgoods,corporationshavebecomeeffectivemonopolies—thecorporateproductistheonlyavailableoption,andevenmanygovernmentservices,fromfoodstampstoaMedicareappeal,canbeob-tainedonlythroughacorporateoutsource.Inthatsense,ourmoneyhasincreasinglybecomeafigurative formofcorporatescrip,somethingthatwecanuseprimarily incorporatecontexts.

16.Suchpracticesgobackfatherthanonemightthink.PeterZheutlinrecentlycomment-edinalettertoThe New Yorker thatin1894hisgreat-grandaunt,AnnieKopochovsky,whowasaprofessionalcyclist,“traveledunderthenameAnnieLondonderry”whenshewasbeingsponsoredbythemakersofthatspring-water(5).

17.AsMichaelD.Kennedydemonstratesinhisessayinthisvolume,“RewritingtheDeathand Afterlife of a Corporation: Bethlehem Steel,” corporations historically can die,sometimesslowlyandthenallatonce,buttheyarelegallyandconceptuallyfoundedtobeimmortal.

18.Becausethecorporationwascreatedasanartificialpersonunderthelaw,manypopularculturalreferentstoartificial life invariousformscontainsomecorporateresidue.ItisofcoursepartofcorporatesymbolismthatacorporationnowusestheaptlynamedAgentSmith,thevillainfromThe Matrix,whoisalsoacorporateproxy,toadvertisehealthcare(ofallthings).ThismoveisakintomembersofthefinalversionofthebandStarshipcomplaining,inasongnoneofitsmemberswrote,thatcorporationsarealwayschangingtheirnames.

19.Thoughoutsidethescopeofthisarticle,inthezero-sumgameofpersonhood,Iarguethatsomewidely-proliferatingcontemporaryconfigurationsoftheundeadandzombiesarecathectedtotheundyingaspectsanddisenfranchisementsofcorporatepersonhood.Likecorporations,zombiesare,forexample,depersonalized,immortal,andcollectiv-ized;havearelentlessdrivetoaccrete;andcannotreproduce,butreplacethe family(“Inverted”).Inarecentradioad,forexample,anannouncerproclaims“AAAlivestohelp”:figuressuchasColonelSandersandOrvilleRaedenbacherachieveacorporateimmortalityinpersonifyingundeadanimation.

20.See“ThePan-AmericanZone:ImperialisminTranscendentalAmericanGeographies,”anonlinechaptertobereadbetweenchaptersthreeandfourofNot Altogether Human.


21. Inhisdissent,JusticeDouglasproposesthat“Thosewhohavethatintimaterelationwiththeinanimateobjectabouttobeinjured,polluted,orotherwisedespoiledareitslegiti-matespokesmen.”Sierra Club v. Morton, 405U.S.at745.JusticeDouglas’sapproach,however,reliesonaformofcommodityfetishism,ashejustifiesattributinghumanper-sonalitynotonlytoaspectsofnature,buttothingssuchasships.See, e.g., id.at753,n2.Itmakeseminentsense,asJusticeDouglasargues,that“Permittingacourttoappointarepresentativeofaninanimateobjectwouldnotbesignificantlydifferentfromcustomaryjudicialappointmentsofguardiansad litem,executors,conservators,receivers,orcounselfor indigents.” Id. JusticeDouglasdoesnot seem towant to confer the same“highlyartificial”statusoninanimateobjectsthatcorporationsachieve,butrathertoallowsur-rogatestospeakforthem.Id.Expandingstandingrightstothenaturalworldthroughthismechanismcouldhavesignificantenvironmentalbenefits,butmightnotprovideabasisforremediatingtheeffectsofcorporatepersonhood.IndigenouspeoplesoutsidetheU.S.havetriedtohavepersonhoodgrantedtoaspectsofthenaturalworldinordertogainthenlegalprotections,butitisunclearhoweffectivethatstrategywillprove.

22.SeealsoSpragueandWellsregardingattemptstoregulatecorporatecampaignexpen-ditures. As many critics have noted, Edward Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of Englandandmemberofparliamentattheendoftheeighteenthcentury,alsoassertedthatthecorporation“hasnosoultobedamnedandnobodytobekicked.”

23. See generally, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,447U.S.557,558–559(1980)(holdingthatregulationsofcommercialspeechservingasubstantialgovernmentinterest,andnotmoreextensiveorburdensomethannecessary,areconsti-tutional);see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,515U.S.618,628(1995)(holdingthatsuchrestrictionscanbejustified“basedsolelyonhistory,consensus,and‘simplecom-monsense’”).

24. Infact,theCourtdidn’tdecidethevalidityofthepersonhoodconceptatthatpoint;instead,forminganotherperfectlyclosedloop,it later incrementallyadoptedandex-panded the general principle and legitimized it retrospectively, which was a bit likevalidatingtheresultsofadiscreditedelection.

25. Courts, however, attempt to parse the content of corporate speech, rather than firstevaluatingthenatureofthespeaker.TheCaliforniaSupremeCourt,forexample,hasnotedthattheCourtexplained“inRiley[that]“thecommercialspeech(ifitwasthat)[atissue]was‘inextricablyintertwined’[only]becausethestatelawrequiredittobein-cluded”andthatcommercialandnoncommercialmessagesarenot“inextricable”unlessthereissomelegalorpracticalcompulsiontocombinethem.(citationomitted.)Nolawrequired[abusiness]tocombinefactualrepresentationsaboutitsownlaborpracticeswithexpressionsofopinionabouteconomicglobalization,norwasitimpossible...toaddressthosesubjectsseparately.”Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,27Cal.4th939,967(2002).In-steadoffocusingonhowthesourceaffectsspeech,inthecontextofcorporationscourtsoftenmisguidedlyevaluatespeechwithoutcontext.

26. AsJusticeStevens,withwhomJusticesGinsburg,Breyer,andSotomayorjoined,con-curredinpartanddissentedinpartinCitizens United,“Thelegalstructureofcorpora-tionsallowsthemtoamassanddeployfinancialresourcesonascalefewnaturalpersonscanmatch.[Italso]drawsalinebetweenthecorporation’seconomicinterestsandthepoliticalpreferencesoftheindividualsassociatedwiththecorporation;thecorporation


mustengagetheelectoralprocess...“toenhancetheprofitabilityofthecompany,nomatterhowpersuasivethearguments””forotherpriorities.130S.Ct.at974.Eveninthatlimitedregard,thecorporation’sspeechwouldbecommercial.

27. Sullivanprovidesausefulprécisofthe“haphazard”theoriescourtsusetojustifycorpo-ratepersonhood:

Americancourts—particularlytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt—haveem-ployedvarioustheoriestoconceptualizecorporatepersonhood.Insomecases,courtshave emphasized the artificialityof corporations,holding that rightsthatinhereinhumansashumansmaynotbeextendedtononhumanentities.. . .Alternatively, courtshave emphasized thehuman individuals that [sic]constitutethecorporation,deployingthecorporatepersonhoodmetaphorasameansofprotectingthoseindividuals’rights....Athirdapproachconceivesofthecorporationasanautonomousentity,withanexistencepriorto—oratleastseparatefrom—itscreation....Thistheoryprovidesthemostrobustversionof corporatepersonhood, and courts invoke itwhen attempting toextendtocorporationsthefullpanoplyoflegalrights.

114HaRv. L. Rev.at1752-54(citationsomitted).Bycontrast,Allmannotesthata““naturalpersontheory”or“naturalentitytheory,””whichIargueliteralizesandreifiesafiction,“proposes that theexistenceofacorporation isnodifferent thanthatofanatural-bornperson.Underanaturalpersontheory,acorporation“isa full-fledged,livingrealitythatexistsasanobjectivefactandhasarealpersonalityinsociety.”38FLa. St. U.L. Revat395(citationomitted).

works cited

Allman,Matthew. Note: Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of the Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood.38FLA.ST.U.L.REV.387(2011).Print.

Bakan,Joel.The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power.NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2005.Print.

Bose,Purnima.“GeneralElectric,CorporatePersonhood,andtheEmergenceoftheProfes-sionalManager.”BoseandLyons,Cultural Critique 28–63.

Bose, Purnima, and Laura E. Lyons, eds. Cultural Critique and the Global Corporation. Bloomington:IndianaUP,2010.Print.

———.“Introduction:TowardaCriticalCorporateStudies.”BoseandLyons,Cultural Critique 1–27.

Cameron,Sharon.Impersonality: Seven Essays.Chicago:UofChicagoP,2007.Print.Cooper,JamesFenimore.The Bravo: A Tale. Venice:W.A.Townsend,1859.Print.Catenaccio,Paola andChiaraDegano. “CorporateSocialResponsibility as aKey to the

RepresentationofCorporateIdentity:TheCaseofNovartis.”Discourse and Identity in the Professions: Legal, Corporate and Institutional Citizenship.Bern:PeterLang,2011.79–102.Print.

Dibadj,Reza. (Mis)Conceptions of the Corporation. 29GA.ST.U.L.REV.731 (2013).Print.

Dick,PhilipK.Ubik.London:Granada,1978.Print.


DuBois,W.E.B.The Souls of Black Folks.NewYork:Signet,1969.Print.Ellison,Harlan.“IHaveNoMouthandIMustScream.”IF: Worlds of Science Fiction 17.3-

112(Mar.1967):24–36.Print.Emerson,RalphWaldo.The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson1–12.Boston:Hough-

tonMifflin,1904.Print.Fichtelberg,Joseph.The Complex Image: Faith and Method in American Autobiography. Phila-

delphia:UofPennsylvaniaP,1989.Print.Fox,Stephen.The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising and Its Creators.New

York:WilliamMorrow,1984.Print.Ghachem,Malick.“TheForeverCompany:HowtoNarratetheStoryofanEighteenth-Cen-

turyLegalPerson(TheCaseoftheCampaignie des Indes).”PaperdeliveredtotheLegalBodiesConference,LeidenUniversityCentreforArtsinSociety,May,2014.Address.

Girard,René.Deceit, Desire and the Novel.Trans.YvonneFreccero.Baltimore:JohnsHop-kinsUP,1965.Print.

Görlach,Manfred.“ALinguisticHistoryofAdvertising,1700–1890.”Sounds, Words, Texts and Change,Ed.TeresaFanego,BelénMéndez-NayaandElenaSeoane.Amsterdam:Benjamins,2002.83–104.Print.

Hardack, Richard. “The Franklin-Stein Monster: Ventriloquism and Missing Persons inAmericanAutobiography.”Writing Lives: American Biography and Autobiography. Ed.HansBakandHansKrabbendam.Amsterdam:VUUPofAmsterdam,1998.16–28.Print.

———.“InvertedRevenants,orthePosthumousPosthuman:U.S.LiteratureandTheDeadWhoDoNotKnowTheyAreDead.”PaperdeliveredtotheAmericanComparativeLiteratureAssociationConference,Mar.-Apr.2011,Vancouver,Canada.Address.

———.“Not Altogether Human”: Pantheism and the Dark Nature of the American Renais-sance.Amherst:UofMassachusettsP(2012).Print.

———.“ThePan-AmericanZone:ImperialisminTranscendentalAmericanGeographies.”Onlinech.of“Not Altogether Human.”ScholarWorks@UMassAmherst.UofMassa-chusettsatAmherst.2012.Web.9May2014.

Hovenkamp,Herbert.The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought.76GEO.L.J.1593(1988).Print.

Jacobs,Harriet(LindaBrent).Incidents in the life of a Slave Girl. Ed.LydiaMariaChild.In-trod.LydiaMariaChild;introd.WalterTeller.NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1973.Print.

Jameson,Frederic.Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham:DukeUP,1991.Print.

Kennedy, Michael D. “Rewriting the Death and Afterlife of a Corporation: BethlehemSteel.”Biography 37.1(Winter2014):242–74.Print.

Locke,John.Second Treatise on Civil Government. 1689.Ed.ThomasReardon.Indianapolis:BobbsMerrill,1952.Print.

Lyons,LauraE.“I’dLikeMyLifeBack”:CorporatePersonhoodandtheBPOilDisaster.”Biography 34.1(Winter2011):96–107.Print.

Manring,M.M.Slave in a Box: The Strange Career of Aunt Jemima.Charlottesville:UPofVirginia,1998.Print.


Marchand,Roland.Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business. Berkeley:UofCaliforniaP,1998.Print.

Melville,Herman.Moby-Dick.1851.Ed.HarrisonHayford,HershelParker,andG.Thom-asTanselle.Evanston,Il:NorthwesternUP,1988.Print.

———.Pierre. 1852. Ed.HarrisonHayford,HershelParker,G.ThomasTanselle.Evan-ston,Il:NorthwesternUP,1968.Print.

Morawetz,Victor.A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations other than Charitable.2vols.Boston:LittleBrown,1886.HeinOnlineLegalClassicsLibrary.2008.Web.9May2014.

Powers,Richard.Gain. NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,1998.Print.Reed,Ishmael.Flight to Canada. NewYork:Avon,1976.Print.Rosenthal,Caitlin.“FromMemorytoMastery:AccountingforControlinAmerica,1750–

1880.”Enterprise & Society 14.4(2013):732–48.Print.Said,Edward.Beginnings: Intention and Method.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1985.Print.Schwartz,NelsonD.“RecoveryinU.S.isLiftingProfits,butNotAddingJobs.”New York

Times 4Mar.2013:A1,3.Print.Sivulka,Juliann.Soap, Sex and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising. Bel-

mont,CA:Wadsworth,1998.Print.Sprague,Robert,andMayEllenWells.The Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing Life into

the Corporate Supercitizen.49AM.BUS.L.J.507(2012).Print.Stone,ChristopherD.Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects.

Berkeley:UofCaliforniaP,1974.Print.Stowe,HarrietBeecher.Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 1852.NewYork:Dodd,Mead,1952.Print.Sullivan,Kathleen.Note: What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language

of a Legal Fiction. 114HARV.L.REV.1745(2001).Print.Thoreau,HenryDavid.Journals 1–4.GeneralEd.JohnC.Broderick;ed.ElizabethHall

Witherelletal.Princeton:PrincetonUP,1992.Print.Trachtenberg,Alan.The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age.

NewYork:HillandWang,1982.Print.Tucker,Anne.Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate

Personhood in Citizens United. 61CASEW.RES.497(2010).Print.Wallace,DavidFoster.Infinite Jest. Boston:LittleBrown,1996.Print.Zheutlin,Peter.“ProductPlacement.”The New Yorker 18Jan.2010:5.Print.

caselaw

Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lundgren,44F.3d726(9thCir.1994).Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lundgren,809F.Supp747(N.D.Cal.1992).Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,447U.S.557(1980).Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,130S.Ct.876(2010).Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,4Wheat.518(1819).Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,515U.S.618(1995).


Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,27Cal.4th939(2002).Katzenbach. v. McClung,379U.S.294(1964).Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,453U.S.490(1981).Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 570F.2d157(7thCir.1977).Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.,118U.S.394(1886).Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52F.3d108(6thCir.1995).Sierra Club v. Morton,405U.S.727(1972).United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142Fed.247(C.C.E.D.Wis.1905).United States v. Stanley, et al.,109U.S.3(1882).Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425U.S.748(1976).World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,444U.S.286(1980).

New and Improved: The Zero-Sum Game of Corporate Personhood

Documents

Transcript of New and Improved: The Zero-Sum Game of Corporate Personhood