Neurophenomenology: an integrated approach to exploring awe and wonder

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Neurophenomenology: an integratedapproach to exploring awe andwonder1

Lauren Reinerman-Jonesa, Brandon Sollinsa, Shaun Gallagherbcd

& Bruce Janze

a Institute for Simulation and Training, University of CentralFlorida, Orlando, FL 32826 USAb Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, TN 38152,USAc School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield,AL10 9AB, UKd School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University ofWollongong, NSW 2522, Australiae Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida,Orlando, FL 32826 USAPublished online: 17 Dec 2013.

To cite this article: Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Brandon Sollins, Shaun Gallagher & Bruce Janz(2013) Neurophenomenology: an integrated approach to exploring awe and wonder1, SouthAfrican Journal of Philosophy, 32:4, 295-309

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South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(4): 295–309Printed in South Africa — All rights reserved

Copyright © South African Journal of Philosophy

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ISSN 0258-0136 EISSN 2073-4867http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2013.867397

South African Journal of Philosophy is co-published by Taylor & Francis and NISC (Pty) Ltd

Neurophenomenology: an integrated approach toexploring awe and wonder1

Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Brandon SollinsInstitute for Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32826 USA

[email protected] (corresponding author), [email protected]

Shaun GallagherDepartment of Philosophy, University of Memphis, TN 38152, USA

School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, AL10 9AB, UK

School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, [email protected]

Bruce JanzDepartment of Philosophy, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32826 USA

[email protected]

Astronauts often report experiences of awe and wonder while traveling in space. This paper addresses the question of whether awe and wonder can be scientifically investigated in a simulated space travel scenario using a neurophenomenological method. To answer this question, we created a mixed-reality simulation similar to the environment of the International Space Station. Portals opened to display simulations of Earth or Deep Space. However, the challenge still remained of how to best capture the resulting experience of participants. We could use psycholog-ical methods, neuroscientific methods or philosophical methods. Each of these approaches offer many benefits, but each is also limited. Neurophenomenology capitalises on and integrates all three methods. We employed questionnaires from psychology, electroencephalography, electrocardiography, and functional near-infrared spectroscopy from neuroscience, and a phenomenological interview technique from philosophy. This neurophenomenological method enabled extensive insight in experiencers and non-experiencers of awe and wonder (AW) in a simulated space scenario that otherwise would not have been possible. Traditional empirical analyses were completed, followed by individual differences analyses using interview transcriptions paired with physiological responses. Experiencers of AW showed differences in theta and beta activity throughout the brain compared to non-experiencers. Questionnaires indicated that non-experiencers of AW gave more positive responses of religious and spiritual practices than experiencers of AW. Interviews showed that awe and wonder were more likely to occur when watching the simulated Earth view instead of the Deep Space view. Our study is a success-ful example of neurophenomenology, a powerful and promising interdisciplinary approach for future studies of complex states of experience.

BackgroundHouston, we are ready for launch. Ten, nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, two, one. Lift-off! Reading this sequence brings to mind a variety of feelings or experiences. However, research 1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the ‘Phenomenology and its Futures’ conference at the University of Johannesburg,

Johannesburg, South Africa, 29–31 March 2013. This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation (Grant ID #23733). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the offi cial views or policies, either expressed or implied, by the John Templeton Foundation.

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Reinerman-Jones, Sollins, Gallagher and Janz296

about space travel has traditionally focused on crew cohesion, medical repercussions and psychi-atric implications, but examining the experience of being in space has been limited. Astronauts maintain journals throughout their missions. Some descriptions are more extensive than others due to mission duration (e.g. longer stays in space when on the International Space Station [ISS]), individual background, or personal reflection tendencies. The phenomena reported, at first glance, appear varied. A further evaluation reveals some experiences common to astronauts and cosmonauts. These experiences are that of awe and wonder (AW). Even though astronauts come from a variety of backgrounds, including military, engineering and science, the awesomeness of viewing Earth from a shuttle or gazing into the vastness of the universe from the ISS elicits states of AW. Going one step further, many astronauts report a paradigm of feeling that there must be something bigger out there, something holding everything together. Many astronauts have written about these deeply aesthetic, spiritual and religious experiences. Colonel Jeffrey Williams, who served as a consultant for our research team, wrote about these experiences in his book The Work of His Hands (Williams 2010). Our project sought to better understand and explain the experience of awe and of wonder, as well as investigate the relation of these experiences with religious and spiritual beliefs, within a space context.

Approaches to studying experienceThroughout history, humans have been interested in understanding the exact nature of different experiential states. In psychology, a state is distinguished from a trait and is characterised as being temporary and dynamic based on varying internal and external factors (Chaplin et al. 1988). Psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers have utilised different approaches to investigate experiential states, ranging from anxiety (Kendall et al. 1976, May 1977, Heller et al. 1997) to zen (Suzuki 1951, Berger 1962, Cahn & Polich 2006).

Psychological methods for studying experiential states rely on self-report questionnaire data that are practical, easily quantifiable and easy to interpret. This method allows for large amounts of data to be collected and analysed in a timely manner (McDonald 2008). Despite these advantages, self-report questionnaires are subjective and can be influenced by the participants’ willingness to participate, response biases, acquiescent responding, as well as extreme responding that can have a significant effect on the relaibility and validilty of these measures (Paulhus & Vazire 2007). Additionally, self-report state questionnaires are given after a stimulus is presented. Consequently, memory errors that cause skewed responses may occur due to factors that intervene between the stimulus presentation and the adminisitration of the questionnaire (Tourangeau 1999). Overall, self-report questionnaires are practical and are consistently used by researchers, but are limited due to the subjectivity of participant responses.

Neuroscience methods for studying experience rely on psychophysiological systems that record metabolic and electrical signals from the body (Gevins et al. 1975, Wubbels et al. 2007). The majority of these systems have advantages of being objective, unobtrusive and continuous, allowing for signals to be processed in real-time (Dirican & Göktürk 2011). However, psycho-physiological systems are subject to extraneous noise, temporal and spatial resolution limitations, and are difficult to interpret due to the large amount of dependent variables outputted per system (Dirican & Gokturk 2011). In general, psychophysiological systems are beneficial in that they are unbiased and objective, but the information that is collected is challenging to understand without other forms of data such as performance results.

Phenomenological methods for studying experience in others rely on interviews that are used to evoke a description of an experience from the unique perspective of the individual (Dukes 1984). Phenomenological interviews benefit from being able to provide an in-depth understanding of an individual’s experience that would be difficult to obtain from traditional self-report measures. Despite this advantage, phenomenological interviews are difficult and time consuming to analyse, not standard across participants, and are prone to the same limitations of other subjective self-report methods (Lester 1999). Overall, phenomenological interviews provide rich first-person data, but are limited due to the difficulty of analysis and subjectivity of participant responses.

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South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(4): 295–309 297

Each methodology contributes to the understanding of various experiential states, but the individual impact of these contributions is restricted due to the nature and limitations of each approach. To overcome the limitations, the benefits of each method must be exploited. In the fields of neuroergonomics, augmented cognition, and applied neuroscience, solid steps are being taken in combining these disciplines. Neuroergonomics involves the use of physiolog-ical measures to understand behaviour so that performance or cognitive states can be explained, predicted or improved (Parasuraman & Rizzo 2008). Research in augmented cognition aims ‘to create revolutionary human-computer interactions that capitalize on recent advances in the field of neuroscience, cognitive science and computer science’ (Schmorrow 2005: p. 441). In applied neuroscience, researchers study the optimisation of self-regulatory brain function through the integrated analysis of neural, cognitiv, and behavioural responses (Brendan 2011). All three of these mergers acknowledge the importance of assessment at different levels, but these multidi-mensional approaches still only optimise on the benefits of psychological and neuroscientific methods. One approach to overcoming the limitations of each method is to integrate practices from psychology, neuroscience and phenomenology in interdisciplinary studies. Neurophenomenology is a promising approach based on this kind of integration (Varela 1996). Our project prescribed to the neurophenomenological method because it is an integrated and holistic approach for understanding and exploring experience.

The moniker ‘neurophenomenology’ hints at its interdisciplinary nature. As the name implies, the approach merges aspects of phenomenology in the tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty with the empirically supported data-collection techniques of neuroscience. The neurophenomenology described herein is a specific methodology, drawing from a history of successful and innovative studies. It derives from a scientific direction indicated by Francisco Varela (1996) and aims to bridge neurophysiological data and accounts of first-person experience.

In brief, neurophenomenology is a study of mind, experience and consciousness that incorporates tools and techniques from neuroscience and psychology with phenomenologically derived first-person data (Varela 1996). Traditionally, neurophenomenological research has relied heavily on the use of trained participants who could provide the first-person accounts only after extensive training in techniques of mental awareness and direction (cf. Lutz et al. 2002, Lutz & Thompson 2003). The present work is positioned to retain the features of neurophenomenology that merge the tools of psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience, but draw from a specific approach of neurophenom-enology that collects data from untrained participants, an approach that has been used to improve treatment of epileptic patients (Le Van Quyen & Petitmengin 2002, Petitmengin 2010)more precisely here, in epileptology. A number of recent observations have indicated that epileptic seizures do not arise suddenly simply as the effect of random fluctuations of brain activity, but require a process of ‘pre-seizure’ changes that start long before. This has been reported at two different levels of descrip-tion: on the one hand, the epileptic patient often experiences some warning symptoms that precede seizures from several minutes to hours in the form of very specific lived events. On the other hand, the analyses of brain electrical activities have provided strong evidence that it is possible to detect a pre-seizure state in the neuronal dynamics several minutes before the electro-clinical onset of a seizure. We review here some of the ongoing work of our research group concerning seizure antici-pation. In particular, we discuss experimental evidence of ‘upward’ (local-to-global.

As indicated above, the context for our project concerned experiences during space travel. Therefore, the first step of this project was to more clearly understand the experiences of astronauts. A hermeneutical analysis was conducted on the available astronaut journals. More detail of this analysis can be found in Gallagher et al. (in press). The important note is that two of the broader categories resulting were AW. Thus, AW were the primary focus for applying the neurophenomenological method. Awe and wonder were two broader categories that were defined by this analysis, and became the primary focus of our neurohphenomenological study.

Awe and wonderAwe and wonder have been classified as emotions, ambiguous states associated with surprise and fear, as well as peak experiences that can be life transforming (Ekman 1992, Emmons

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2005, Shiota et al. 2007). According to Keltner & Haidt (2003), awe requires perceived vastness and a need for accommodation. Perceived vastness is described as being an experience that is considered both powerful and moving (Keltner & Haidt 2003). This could relate to anything perceived as being larger than oneself, involving physical size, social status or other catego-ries involving magnitude (Bonner & Friedman 2011). Furthermore, a need for accommodation is described as being the inability to incorporate an experience into current mental structures (Keltner & Haidt 2003). As a result, accommodation requires mental reorganisation in order to understand the experience (Bonner & Friedman 2011). Bulkeley (2002) describes wonder as being an abrupt decentring of the self when faced with a novel and powerful experience and a recentring of the self in response to new knowledge and understanding. Awe and wonder both require the experienced presence of something powerful and further cognitive processing to comprehend the experience. Such characterisations suggest that AW involve cognitive aspects and emotional ones. For purposes of the hermeneutical analysis and our study, we defined awe as a direct and initial feeling when faced with something incomprehensible or sublime. In contrast, we defined wonder as a more reflective feeling one has when unable to put things back into a familiar conceptual framework. This is consistent with Keltner & Haidt’s (2003) concept of need for accommodation. In our view, awe motivates wonder, and wonder has the potential to change one’s perspective on life.

To date, few empirical studies of AW exist and the majority of studies investigating these experiences have been conducted within the contexts of religious, mystical, and medita-tive experiences (Emmons 2005, Shiota et al. 2007). To examine AW, researchers have used a combination of phenomenological, psychological and neurobiological techniques. Early psycho-logical and phenomenological contributions to the study of AW focused on theoretical classi-fications of the experience (Bonner & Friedman 2011). These early classifications commonly linked religious and spiritual (RS) experiences with the experience of AW (Leuba 1912, James 1922). More recent contributions showed associations between these experiences and a variety of personality traits (Shiota et al. 2006, 2007), therapeutic change (Elkins 2001, Schneider 2007) and different brain states (Cahn & Polich 2006, Mohandas 2008).

According to Wood & Belzen (2005), meditation is a commonly reported trigger of experi-ences that can be studied in the laboratory and as a result several researchers have used medita-tion to investigate brain responses related to AW/RS. A variety of brain imaging techniques have been used to monitor brain activity during religious, spiritual, and awe inspired states including positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Several authors have found activation in the prefrontal cortex, frontal cortex, parietal cortex, temporal lobe, and limbic system during AW/RS states (Azari et al. 2001, Newberg et al. 2003, Muramoto 2004, Previc 2006). The anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsal prefrontal cortex were found to be activated during mindfulness and concentrative-based medita-tion practices (Cahn & Polich 2006, Holzel et al. 2007, Ivanovski & Malhi 2007, Chiesa & Serretti 2010). The activation of these sites is attributed to the increased attentional focus, increased intentional effort and increased self-regulation required during meditation (Cahn & Polich 2006). Using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIR), several authors have also found increased activation in the anterior prefrontal cortex, which is consistent with other neuroimaging studies (Cheng et al. 2010, Yu et al. 2011). Further linking the temporal lobe and limbic system to AW/RS experiences, electrical stimulation and seizures in the temporal lobe have been shown to evoke AW/RS experiences (Britton & Bootzin 2004, Devinsky & Lai 2008). In contrast, only weak correlations have been found between AW/RS behaviour and lesions to the temporal lobe (Muramoto 2004, Mohandas 2008). Additionally, hyperre-ligiosity due to a temporal lobe epilepsy is considered rare and infrequent (approximately 2% occurrence rate; Ogata & Miyakawa 1998, Muramoto 2004). Despite the conflicting nature of these findings, there is some evidence that both the limbic system and frontal cortex may be involved in AW/RS experiences, with areas of the temporal cortex and limbic system indicating the emotional component of the experience, and the frontal cortex indicating theattributional/cognitive component.

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Investigating awe and wonder in a space environmentThese findings in the literature provide some insight for our expectations in investigating AW using a neurophenomenological approach. However, the existing results might not match our findings as closely as anticipated because the majority of AW research has depended on medita-tion to elicit states of AW. Our study sought to elicit AW through the experience of a simulated, mixed-reality space flight, which relies on an external visual stimulus to elicit feelings of AW. As a result, we might see significant changes in the occipital cortex as opposed to the frontal cortex due to the increased visual stimuli (Gevins et al. 1997). Due to the limited number of studies utilising this paradigm, the results should be considered exploratory in nature.

However, the neurphenomenological approach used was expected to compensate for some of the exploratory nature of the physiological responses, as it enabled investigation of all levels of objective and subjective experiences of AW. Psychological methods were incorporated by administering questionnaires to assess the psychological traits and states associated with experi-ences of AW. Neuroscience methods were used by connecting several sensors to participants to investigate the physiology behind the experiences of AW. Phenomenological methods were incorporated to identify participants feelings and thoughts experienced during the experimental scenarios. It was expected that (1) during states of AW there would be correlated physiolog-ical metrics, (2) trait and state variables would differentiate between AW experiencers and non-experiencers identified from the interviews, and (3) a stimulating environment would influence feelings of AW.

MethodParticipantsEight males and 11 females (mean age = 20.94, SD = 3.73) were recruited using the University of Central Florida’s Psychology SONA System website. Each participant was screened prior to the experimental task for handedness, colourblindness, nicotine and alcohol usage, decongestants, antidepressants, antipsychotics, Tylenol and similar medications. Participants were compensated with class credit.

Independent variableA repeated measures design was employed to present participants an Earth view and a Deep Space (DS) view. In the Earth view, participants saw Earth and slowly traveled away until it looked like a blue marble. In the DS view, participants traveled through space while observing stars in the distance. Each view lasted 12 min to provide sufficient time for participants to reflect on what they were experiencing. Participants received both conditions, and the conditions were counter-balanced and randomised across participants.

Figure 1: A connected Advanced Brain Monitoring EEG/ECG system.

Figure 2: A Covidien fNIR system.

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Dependent variablesPhysiological measures were employed to capture quantified objective data of states. Advanced Brain Monitoring’s ×10 electroencephalogram (EEG) and electrocardiogram (ECG) system (Figure 1) was used to measure electrical cortical activity, specifically alpha, beta, and theta wave responses, and to measure electrical activity of the heart, specifically heart rate (HR), heart rate variability (HRV), and inter-beat interval (IBI).

Covidien’s fNIR system (Figure 2) was used to record oxygenation of haemoglobin in the frontal lobe, and specifically left and right hemisphere oxygenation was recorded.

A variety of questionnaires were employed to capture quantified subjective data about traits and states. The Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality (BMMRS; Masters et al. 2009) was used to assess religious and spiritual traits. The Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Helton 2004) was used to measure stress. The Levels of Self Concept Scale (Selenta & Lord 2005) was used to assess reflection or thoughts of oneself. The Mini-IPIP (Cooper et al. 2010) was used to identify personality traits. The Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson 1974) was used to indicate the intensity with which one is immersed in an environment or task. The Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance (MSTAT–I; Mclain 1993) was used to assess ones tolerance for ambiguity. The Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides & Furnham 2006) was used to measure emotional intelligence traits.

Phenomenological interviews were employed to understand each participant’s experi-ence during the simulated space flight. Interviews covered various aspects of the partici-pant’s experience during the simulation including their level of attention, their thoughts and/or feelings during their experience, and their bodily awareness before, during and after the simulation. The interview, using open-ended questions, was designed to allow participants to express their experiences in their own vocabulary (by following the method described by Petitmengin 2006) and to determine if participants had similar AW experiences to those described by astronauts.

ProceduresParticipants were first asked to complete a restrictions checklist and the Ishihara colourblind-ness test to determine study eligibility. The narrative provided to participants primed them to feel rushed before launch in order to effect a contrast with the subsequent calmness of observing space. Participants were not informed in the narrative that states of AW were being investigated. Participants entered the mixed-reality ‘space capsule’ (Figure 3) where the EEG, ECG and fNIR sensors were connected to the participant.

After a five-minute resting baseline, participants completed the questionnaires. Participants then passively observed both the Earth and DS views. The sequences were presented in the

Figure 3: The mixed-reality space capsule (left) and a workstation on the International Space Station (right).

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mixed-reality environment that included simulated views through space shuttle portals. Once participants observed both views, the physiological sensors were detached and phenomenological interviews commenced.

ResultsThe results immediately following treat the data in a very traditional psychophysiological or empirical approach, whereby all data is quantified for statistical analyses. Later analyses include a preliminary individual differences analysis of two interviews and correlations with the objective data and phenomenological interviews (Gallagher & Sørensen 2006).

Traditional analysesPhenomenological interview The phenomenological interviews were scored according to the number of AW statements made by the participants during the interview. In other words, if a participant made a statement indicating awe or wonder, then he or she was considered to be an experiencer of awe or wonder. A one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to compare subjective reports of AW between the Earth and DS scenarios. Reports of awe (F(1,18) = 17.286, p = 0.001) and wonder (F(1,18) = 10.500, p = 0.005) were significantly higher duringthe Earth scenario.

Physiological measuresA between-subjects ANOVA was run to compare physiological responses of AW among experi-encers and non-experiencers during the space flight. During the Earth condition, higher levels of left hemisphere theta (F(1,18) = 5.048, p = 0.038) and right hemisphere theta (F(1,18) = 4.725, p = 0.044) were found among non-experiencers of awe compared to experiencers of awe. No significant effects were found during the DS condition. No significant differences were found among the ECG or fNIR responses. A repeated-measures ANOVA was run to compare Earth and DS conditions, with greater levels of frontal lobe beta (F(1,16) = 5.201, p = 0.037), occipital lobe beta (F(1,18) = 5.951, p = 0.025), left hemisphere beta (F(1,18) = 8.235, p = 0.010), and right hemisphere beta (F(1,18) = 5.177, p = 0.036) being found during the Earth condition. No significant differences were found among the ECG or fNIR responses.

Psychological traits and states A between-subjects ANOVA was run to compare RS traits among experiencers and non-experi-encers of AW during the simulated space flight. Higher levels of experiential comforting faith as indicated on the BMMRS (F(1,17) = 6.469, p = 0.021) were found among non-experiencers of awe (M = 12.14, SD = 3.43) compared to experiencers of awe (M = 22.75, SD = 10.60) during the Earth condition. In addition, higher frequency of private religious practices as indicated on the BMMRS (F(1,17) = 5.483, p = 0.027) were found among non-experiencers of awe (M = 14.86, SD = 5.39) compared to experiencers of awe (M = 20.58, SD = 4.73) during the Earth condition. No significant differences were found for the remaining BMMRS scales. No significant differ-ences were found for wonder or the other questionnaires (DSSQ, Levels of Self Concept Scale, Mini-IPIP, TAS, MSTAT-I and TEIQue).

Individual differencesThe traditional analyses were limited, but they enabled us to identify experiencers and non-experiencers of AW. Additionally, we found that if participants experienced AW, it was most likely elicited from the Earth view, not the DS view. To better understand the unique-ness of experiencers and non-experiencers, we selected two participants who experienced the Earth view to examine more closely. Participant 30 was an experiencer of AW and Participant 25 was a non-experiencer of AW. The below excerpts from the phenomenological interviews and the EEG, ECG and fNIR responses are chronological according to their experience in the

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Figure 5: EEG results for participants 25 and 30: theta change from baseline for (a) left hemisphere and (b) right hemisphere, where 0 is the baseline. Amplitude is the y-axis and time spent viewing the Earth simulation is the x-axis.

Figure 4: EEG results for participants 25 and 30: beta change from baseline for (a) frontal lobe, (b) parietal lobe, (c) occipital lobe, (d) left hemisphere and (e) right hemisphere, where 0 is the baseline. Amplitude is the y-axis and time spent viewing the Earth simulation is the x-axis.

simulated Earth view. The EEG data shown were based on the waves and brain locations that reflected significant differences found in the traditional analysis (Figures 4 and 5). Because ECG (Figure 6) and fNIR (Figure 7) data showed no significant difference, all parameterswere displayed.

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Participant 30Excerpts from interview‘And it’s getting further and further and you get a sense of how big space is because you feel like you’re getting smaller and smaller. It makes me realize how small we really are.’‘I think as we’re moving farther and farther away where you started seeing the black kind of reach in and you started seeing the whole comparison of the Earth looking at the Moon and to us the Moon is so far away and it looked very small but it’s really not’.‘I guess my mind starts to wander but just about other things that [don’t] pertain to this study’.‘Once I’m getting halfway through my to do list I was thinking about the whole visual aspect of Earth itself is what makes me think of all the people on Earth and that is what triggered the

Figure 6: ECG results from participants 25 and 30: change from resting baseline in (a) heart rate (HR), (b) heart rate variability (HRV) and (c) inter-beat interval (IBI), where 0 is the baseline. Amplitude is the y-axis and time spent viewing the Earth simulation is the x-axis. Scale for participant 30 is on the lefthand y-axis and that for participant 25 is on the righthand y-axis.

Figure 7: fNIR responses for participants 25 and 30: oxygenation change from resting baseline for (a) left hemisphere and (b) right hemisphere, where 0 is the baseline (top and bottom). Percentage change is the y-axis and time spent viewing the Earth simulation is the x-axis.

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emotion. There are so many people on this Earth and all that. Just seeing Earth…it’s small but so big and there’s like awe’.‘I guess when seeing the Earth so far away like I realize how insignificant you really are compared to this whole universe and how there’s so much more out there but we’re all confined to this one area and think that we should venture off and look for more.’‘I guess seeing the world and coming to the conclusion…it’s more like wow that God created all of this, in my view’.

Participant 25Excerpts from interview‘Initially… I didn’t think feel anything. I was more like thinking, processing’.‘What I was trying to do was to fit into a puzzle in my mind I guess like the way it looked’.‘But then after I figured out what was going on as far as where we were positioned, I zoned out again and started thinking about other things’.‘(After recognizing Florida) I was still looking at the screen but I’m not paying attention anymore.’‘Then I started thinking of things that I have to do, the quizzes, the exams and all that stuff.’‘Why do I care what I’m looking at I’m not really in space. But even though I know that I’m not in space, I need to figure this out because what else is there for me to do? [When I zone out] I’m still looking at the Earth but I’m not looking at it like I know it’s there and I’m looking at the stars surrounding me. I was just making sure that there’s nothing random flying by or whatever, but I’m really thinking about food’.‘When the cover starts [closing] I was like oh. It woke me up out of my thoughts, my deep thoughts but I was still staring at it and I was like the questionnaire is about to come up so I’m going to turn this way to get to see it.’

DiscussionIn order to identify physiological markers of AW, EEG, ECG and fNIR metrics were compared among AW experiencers and non-experiencers. Greater left hemisphere theta and right hemisphere theta were found among non-experiencers of awe compared to experiencers of awe during the Earth condition. Increases in widespread scalp theta have been interpreted as representing increased drowsiness and fatigue (Paus et al. 1997). In contrast, increases in frontal lobe theta have been interpreted as representing enhanced cognitive activity/working memory load (Gevins et al. 1997, Smith et al. 2001). Accordingly, higher activation across the left and right hemispheres as opposed to the frontal lobes in non-experiencers of awe during the Earth condition suggests that they experienced greater levels of drowsiness compared to experiencers of awe. According to Schacter (1977), participants who experience a drowsiness-related theta response also have a decreased awareness and ability to actively interact with the environment they are in. However, in order for an AW experience to occur, one’s attention must be directed toward the stimuli (Shiota et al. 2007). As a result, the whole-scalp theta response can be used to differentiate between AW non-experiencers whose attention is not directed toward the stimuli from neutral and AW experi-encers whose attention is directed toward the stimuli.

This finding is also supported by reviewing excerpts of the interviews from an experiencer compared to a non-experiencer. However, the increased theta does not appear to be continuous. It seems that the non-experiencer is not engaged in viewing the virtual Earth very early in the simulation. The non-experiencer exhibited theta waves similar to the resting baseline throughout most of the Earth view, but this was following an initial intense increase in theta from baseline for the first 3.5 min. The experiencer mentions similar thoughts and feelings (‘my mind starts to wander…[to thoughts about] my to do list’), but not until much later in the simulation. This later distraction or boredom reported by the experiencer is likely associated with the intense changes occurring in the physiological measures around the 8–10 min period for time spent viewing the Earth simulation. Theta waves show a spike from baseline at the 8 min mark with a sharp drop-off. This type of change is paralleled in oxygenated haemoglobin response and HR, HRV and IBI. However, it should be strongly cautioned that the changes in oxygenation were within 3% from

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baseline, which is often considered natural variations and not stimulus induced or due to mental activation. These changes from resting baseline resemble a vigilance task. Operators in vigilance tasks are most frequently highly motivated individuals who find it difficult to maintain attention to the task over time and thus workload increases (Reinerman-Jones et al. 2011). The difference between experiencers and non-experiencers of AW might then also be a result of motivation and pre-existing expectations. The minute-by-minute analysis of the experiencer, however, is similar to trends reported in vigilance literature. Therefore, future studies of this nature should reduce the time on task when the visual modality is the primary input to the participant. This might not be relevant to environments outside of simulation or computers, but in those environments, it does seem important to reduce the task to 7 min or less to avoid vigilance-like physiological and self-report (interview) responses.

The finding that beta is elevated from baseline during the Earth view indicates greater attention, alertness and arousal compared to the DS view (Prinzel et al. 2000). Frontal lobe beta does show significant changes from baseline, which is similar to responses seen in meditation-induced experi-ences of AW. However, the beta changes in the occipital lobe and in the right and left hemispheres do indicate more visual, spatial and motion activation, which is perhaps a result of the perception of the Earth view compared to the DS view. These findings indicate that the Earth view is more engaging regardless of experiencing or not experiencing AW. The phenomenological scoring of AW results support this difference. More AW statements were made about the Earth view than the DS view. These findings indicate that participants had greater difficulty accommodating the Earth view into their current mental structures compared to the Deep Space view, which is consistent with Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) model of AW. Therefore it is recommended that the details of this condition be examined more thoroughly and is also the reason that we looked at an experiencer and non-experiencer of AW in this condition.

The experiencer of AW, Participant 30, showed greater variance in changes from baseline and these sharper changes occurred throughout the Earth view simulation compared with the non-experiencer, Participant 25. In addition, the experiencer had a greater immediate increase in beta activity compared to the non-experiencer. This difference in immediate beta increase was particularly prevalent in the frontal and occipital lobes. Therefore, the emotional and visual centres of the brain seem to be important players in experiencing AW.

To tease out the effect of emotion versus visual stimulus on experiencing AW, the alpha bandwidth should be considered. The lack of significant changes in alpha activity might actually be due to being blocked by activity, as is present by the beta waves. This alpha blocking is in contrast to common findings in meditators and thus supports the notion that the visual stimuli are likely leading to different responses than traditionally seen by meditation-induced AW experi-ences. These findings suggest that information-rich and attention-grabbing environments are influential in AW experiences, which are consistent with findings from Shiota et al. (2007). Future research should consider the importance of the visuals and parse these from the rest of the environment. In other words, since we used a mixed-reality environment, it is difficult to discern the impact of the physical environment versus the visual stimuli. It is important to make this distinction in order to understand the impact of only the visual simulation (e.g. shown on a screen or monitor).

The results discussed thus far indicate the importance of the simulated environment and visuals. However, the findings from the BMMRS raise the possibility that pre-existing beliefs influence experiencing AW. Two subscales of the BMMRS, Experiential Comforting Faith (ECF) and Private Religious Practices (PRP), were able to differentiate RS traits between AW experiencers and non-experiencers during the Earth view. The ECF subscale is comprised of religious items that identify an individual’s religious feeling of connection with a higher power, such as ‘I feel God’s presence’ and ‘I believe in a God who watches over me’ (Masters et al. 2009). In addition, the PRP subscale is comprised of items that tapped into an individual’s prayer and medita-tion practices, including ‘How often do you read sacred texts or other religious literature’ and ‘Within your religious or spiritual tradition, how often do you meditate?’ (Masters et al. 2009). Awe non-experiencers were found to have higher levels of RS compared to awe experiencers.

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Although awe experiences have been linked to RS factors (Emmons 2005, Newberg & Newberg 2005), the present results show that space-related awe experiences can occur with the absence of RS factors. This finding corresponds with Keltner and Haidt’s (2003) model of AW insofar as the two prerequisites of AW experiences, perceived vastness and accommodation, do not depend on the presence of RS factors. In addition, this is consistent with a statement made by one astronaut in his journal who said ‘People who had a religious background expressed (awe) in religious terms, and people who didn’t expressed (awe) in more humanitarian terms’ (Lind, interviewed by White 1987: p. 272ff).

Thus, future research should examine the differentiations between AW experience and religi-osity. There are likely more fine-grained distinctions or subcategories worth analysing to better address this relationship. Specifically, our analyses from the phenomenological interviews, to date, focused on experiences of AW very broadly. The hermeneutical analysis of the astronauts’ journals conducted by members of our research team (see Gallagher 2013) separated aesthetic, spiritual or religious experiences into 34 experiential categories, including feelings of connect-edness, appreciation, fascination, physiological responses and surprise. Future analysis will be conducted using these more specific categories.

The present paper illustrates the importance of a multidimensional, multidisciplinary approach to examining and understanding experience. Given that our experiment reflects certain limitations, recommendations have been made for moving forward with this line of work. The neurophenom-enological method proved to be fruitful to exploring the experience or lack of experience of AW in a virtual space environment. New understanding has been brought forth with the work already completed. The traditional analyses provided a starting point to delve deeper into exploring individual differences. The individual differences, made clear by the phenomenological interviews, helped clarify the group findings of the traditional analyses. There is no doubt that neurophenom-enology is a powerful approach to capturing multiple levels of objective and subjective factors that influence the experience of AW. Neurphenomenology promises to be a productive tool for future holistic experience explanation.

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Neurophenomenology: an integrated approach to exploring awe and wonder

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