Should circumcision be allowed?

An illustration of a dilemma facing democracies and a proposal for responsibly cutting the knot.

 

Intro

Judgment of Solomon

Physical integrity

Token of the Covenant

Dilemma

Religious freedom

No freedom of choice

The dilemma revisited

Cutting the knot

Descent and future

Bibliography

 

Intro

Who do children 'belong' to? Who is to decide how they areto be cared for, brought up, educated and instructed? Which division of authority and responsibility is the mostjust and the wisest? These are the central issues addressed in my dissertation Education and politics in deliberative democracy (1995). In liberal and plural democracies a particularly difficult dilemma presents itself in the areas of (in short) child welfare and

education policy. Children's rights may conflict with the rights of (members) of the groups to which they belong. Likewise, the protection of children's interests is sometimes incompatible with respect and acceptance of the life-styles and views held by religious, cultural or ethnic groups. In the dissertation this dilemma is recurrently conceived as an obvious obstacle which must beovercome. It is, however, neither described or illustrated. What I would like to do here is to describe the dilemma in depth, with all its toughness, by analyzinga topical and highly illustrative issue: the question of how circumcision as a traditional (religious, cultural) custom relates to physical integrity and to religious freedom and children's rights. Subsequently, I shall draw a short and broad outline of how such problems are answered in the dissertation.

Judgment of Solomon

Towards the end of 1996 the court in Groningen was called upon to pass judgment in a complicated matter. The father of a six month-old boy requested the judge in summary proceedings to forbid the mother from having the child circumcised. The mother is a Muslim and Islam prescribes circumcision. The father is a Hindu and is against circumcision on religious grounds. Furthermore, it is his belief that circumcision would entail an infringement uponthe physical integrity and religious freedom of the child and ought, for that reason alone, to be forbidden. In particular the parents disagree on the point of which faith their child is to be raised in. The mother would like an Islamic upbringing, while the father wants the child to grow up with both Islam and Hinduism, enabling him to make his own choice later on. Circumcision is the first stumbling block the parents encounter, being conditional for Islamic education (according to the mother), while making a future as a Hindu impossible because a circumcised man (according to the father) can never be a fully fledged Hindu. The judge had to decide.

But he could not reach a decision and judged that the matter was not suited to be settled by summary proceedings. In his opinion the issue warranted further investigation and he ruled on a standard procedure. Also the judge ruled that the little boy may not be circumcisedpending the outcome of the standard procedure, at least not during the next two years.

Little wonder the judge needed more time. In this matter two religious beliefs, annex ways of life, conflict, whileat the same other issues announce themselves: whether circumcision is an infringement upon physical integrity and religious freedom. If this proves to be the case, which consequences follow? I shall return to the matters of physical integrity and the freedom of religion in a moment. As far as the former is concerned, the matter of conflicting religions, reasonable deliberation does not seem to offer a solution, and a middle course or a compromise is out of the question. Allowing circumcision would mean: choosing in favor of the mother and Islam. Disallowing circumcision would entail choosing the father's side against Islam. Postponing circumcision untilthe child is able to choose himself would mean: choosing in favor of the father and against Islam.

In its coverage of the law suit 'The Volkskrant', a Dutch national daily paper, spoke of Solomon's judgment. That istoo much credit. The judgment is not that shrewd, just or wise. The interim injunction due to the postponement of the judgment is to the disadvantage of the mother and (in a certain sense) Islam, in the absence of a satisfactory argumentation to back it up. Would a Solomon's judgment have been possible? The Biblical tale of king Solomon is well-known. Two women went to king Solomon, because they were having an argument about a child. The lived together and both had a son. One of the boys, however, had died andthey both maintained being the mother of the living child.The king must decide.

23 The king said, "This one says, 'My son is alive and

your son is dead,' while that one says, 'No! Your son is dead and mine is alive.'" 24 Then the king said, 'Bring mea sword." So they brought a sword for the king. 25 He thangave an order: "Cut the living child in two and give half to one and half to the other." 26 The woman whose son was alive was filled with compassion for her son and said to the king, "Please my lord, give her the living baby! Don'tkill him!" But the other said, "Neither I nor you shall have him. Cut him in two!" 27 Then the king gave his ruling: "Give the living baby to the first woman. Do not kill him; she is his mother.(Kings 3: The Holy Bible, New International Version, International Bible Society, Hodder & Straughton, London/Sydney/Aukland, 1984.)

Solomon's strategy would not work for the circumcision case. From the outset one of the parties supported 'division': that was the very reason the father went to court. It certainly does not follow that he values religious education less than the mother. We can hardly maintain that the mother, with her clear-cut Islamic education, shows she takes religious education seriously, while the father offers proof of the opposite, with his more liberal outlook on faith education - "It won't be mine and it won't be yours" -. It is simply that Islam andHinduism make alternative demands on faith education: Islam, in contrast to Hinduism, is incompatible with a kind of education demonstrating and practicing different faiths and ways of living.

Physical integrity

Apart from as a conflict between religious convictions thecase may also be viewed in terms of human rights or children's rights. The father did not only appeal to his own religious convictions as opposed to the mother's, but he also drew attention to the child's physical integrity and religious freedom. Is the circumcision of boys a reprehensible violation of physical integrity? The

circumcision of girls is generally perceived as mutilationand is forbidden on those grounds, or ought to be so as itis unacceptable notwithstanding parental rights and the rights of those groups whose tradition, norm and ideal it is - in spite of their religious freedom parental rights and cultural rights. Some conceive the circumcision of boys as similar to that of girls and so equally condemnable. Among others the sociologist Van Veen-Viëtor:"In both cases healthy erotogeneous tissue is cut away. Inboth instances the integrity of the body is violated and amedically unnecessary operation is performed. The genitalia of minors is subjected to an irreversible 'mutilation'". This equation is dubious as it ignores the obvious differences in the severity of both the surgery itself and its consequences. Often girl's circumcision entails more than just removing the foreskin of the clitoris or glans clitordis. The widely shared condemnation particularly concerns the more serious procedures clitoridectomy and infibulation, which are not only extremely painful, but also blatantly damaging and cause serious functional disorders, both short and long term. The only kind of circumcision boys undergo is the removal of the foreskin of the penis, exposing the glans. It hurts for a while, but is not harmful. Its bearing on sexual functions is disputable; furthermore, some experts believe it improves sexual perception, while others claim the opposite. It is just as much a matter of controversy whether it is beneficial to hygiene and health.

In the US., where eighty to ninety percent of boys are circumcised, "Routine Neonatal Circumcision", as it is labeled, is a standard element of "preventive medicine". It used to be seen as a remedy for masturbation, a supposed cause of a whole array of ills. Nowadays it is believed to reduce the risk of for example: cancer of the penis, urinary tract infections and even AIDS. Outside theUS. little currency is given to the preventive effects of circumcision, including by the medical profession. Empirical research underlines such doubts. In Europe

circumcision is as marginal as it is normal in the US. In Europe the effects of circumcision are questioned and one is inclined to reject it as "medically unjustifiable practice" or even as "child abuse".

The pros and cons are debatable, but it is generally agreed that boys' circumcision is reasonably harmless compared to that of girls. But not everyone draws the conclusion that it is therefore permissible. The internistVan der Burg, for instance, admits there is a difference between girl's and boy's circumcision, but maintains that boys' circumcision, too, entails "an anatomical,... an erotic-sexual and an aesthetical mutilation", which ought to be outlawed as a condemnable violation of physical integrity. The operation ought to be postponed until the boy has reached the age of 18 and expresses the wish to have the operation performed, and for both sexes parental rights and religious freedom would have to be waved aside,along with the cultural rights of the groups to which the parents belong. The psychiatrist and medical sexologist Musaph (1991) takes an entirely different view. In his opinion there is no mutilation involved in boys' circumcision because it causes no disorder. Condemning or forbidding it would subsequently be entirely inappropriate, and not solely on the grounds of the surgery being so harmless, but especially in the light of its cultural significance and traditional value.

Token of the Covenant

Musaph expresses and defends the cultural meaning and traditional value of circumcision, the meaning and value of the surgery for the parents. He voices the Jewish pointof view. Circumcision symbolizes the covenant between God and the people of Israel and the child's ties with the older generations. Circumcision is a celebration "of the reception of the younger son into the covenant with of hisparents and forefathers". For today's Jews the following may be added: "The grandparents of the babies who are now

being circumcised, have witnessed a period in history in which one and a half million children were murdered in Auschwitz because they were Jewish children. Every newbornJewish child is a supplanter, whose mark is worn on his body". De circumcision can only do the child good in the long run: "The joy the parents experience with the child that belongs with them, received as part of their family, with the cultural background which are always inherently and immanently present, is an enormous boost to the growthof the baby in all his qualities" and "the emotional climate in which the baby grows up (is) of cardinal significance for his cognitive and emotional development."In other words: circumcision is of great value and meaningfor the parents and groups concerned, and for this reason it is, indirectly, in the best interest of the child. Which is why, it could be concluded, that in this instancerespect for religious freedom, parental rights and cultural rights is reasonable.

Anyone who is somewhat familiar with biblical stories and Jewish or Christian thought will have no problem sympathizing with Musaph's plea and furthering on it, especially as far as the religious aspects are concerned. Consider the significance of the story from Genesis in which God establishes a Covenant with Abraham and later generations, in which circumcision figures as a token of the Covenant. When Abram was ninety-nine years old, the Lord appeared to him and said:

6 I will make you very fruitful; I will make nations of you, and kings will come from you. 7 I will establish my covenant as an everlasting covenant between me and you andyour descendants after you for the generations to come, tobe your God and the God of your descendants after you. 8 The whole land of Canaan, where you are now an alien, I will give as an everlasting possession to you and your descendants after you; and I will be their God. 9 Then Godsaid to Abraham, " As for you, you must keep my covenant, you and your descendants after you for the generations to come. This is my covenant with you and your descendants

after you, the covenant you are to keep: Every male among you shall be circumcised. 11 You are to undergo circumcision, and it will be the sign of the covenant between me and you.(Genesis 17: The Holy Bible, New International Version, International Bible Society, Hodder & Straughton, London/Sydney/Aukland, 1984.)

Circumcision is the token of the Covenant between God and his people. The relation between God and the Israelites asconveyed in the Covenant, is, however not as simple as suggested by Szaz: "The ancient Israelites made a bargain with their God: they gave Jehovah their foreskins, in return for which Jehovah gave them preferred nation status" (Szaz 1996, p. 138). This interpretation fails to do justice to the tradition. It is not a matter of trade between God and Abraham: it is not that God is in need of foreskins and that Abraham is in great want of being chosen along with his descendants and that theirs is a chance meeting in which both parties strike a lucrative bargain. It is neither a symmetrical, nor a strategic or economic 'deal', but a moral bond to which God calls Abraham: God commits himself to the people of Israel and wishes for them to commit themselves to him. The significance of the Covenant could not have been put better than in the words Genesis itself attributes to God:"For I have chosen him (Abraham), so that he will direct his children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing what is right and just, so that the Lord will bring about for Abraham what he has promised him." (Genesis 18 vs 1 9).

Circumcision is the sign of the Covenant, and consequentlyfor the Jews a sign of identity and distinction. This has always remained the case. Circumcision has long since beenan important rite in times of exile and under foreign domination; for instance during the Babylonian exile in the sixth century b.C. ", among the Jews outside Palestine, in the Hellenic-Roman world in the centuries around the beginning of the christian era and under

Seleucid rule in de second century b.C (Fohrer 1969, p. 378 en 380). It is, by the way, just as telling to derive the meaning and value of the rite from the meaning others attribute to it. When, in the second century b.C, the Seleucids discovered that the Jewish people were not prepared to integrate willingly into their oppressor's culture, one of the measures chosen, was to put the death penalty on circumcision. This ban on circumcision was one of the repressive measures towards which the renowned revolt of the Maccabees was directed.

Just how concrete and practical a mark of distinction circumcision is sometimes seen to be, is shown by the following story from the Talmud: In the afterlife Abraham is sitting at the entrance to hell. He will not allow circumcised Israelites to pass. But what does he do with those circumcised who have frequently sinned? He removes the foreskin of the newborns who have died before they could be circumcised and attaches them to the sinners. As un-circumcised he sends them to hell ".

Dilemma

Having taken history, tradition, culture and the context of meanings into consideration, it would not be appropriate to lightly qualify circumcision as a violationof physical integrity, and to criticize it in the interestof protecting the child. For those involved circumcision is a mark of physical distinction, a favorable distinctive, a mark of honor on the body, and is in fact in the child's best interest.

Outsiders who are good listeners do not have a hard time understanding this, sympathizing and agreeing wholeheartedly with choices made or at least tolerating the practice in all humility, advocating tolerance, or glossing it over: 'what illusions do we have, anyway?!'. The problem is of course where to draw the line. For instance: why should the African, meaning, significance and justification of girls' circumcision not lead to a

similar perspective?

In an attempt to render girls' circumcision intelligible and defendable supporters have brought forward various explanations and arguments. Circumcision is said to improve the esthetic and hygienic form of the female genitalia, improve fertility, prevent venereal disease, tosuppress the woman's sexual desires, heighten the sexual pleasure of the man, to initiate girls into the women's world, upholding the moral standard of society, to perpetuate tradition and to be an Islamic custom (Boulware-Miller 1988. p. 138). Adding to this, girls can hardly do without circumcision, because circumcision is a requirement for marriageability and there is no life for women outside of marriage, given the economical and societal conditions and the cultural context in which theyusually live (Boulware-Miller 1988. p. 139). Of course outsiders have their doubts, but is debatable whether any consequences ought to be drawn from these. Who do we thinkwe are, anyway, disapproving of girls' circumcision or even forbidding the practice?! Who do we think we are, anyway, to decide and to prescribe what counts as beautiful and healthy, how the relations between men and women ought to be and what functions of sexuality are normal or ideal, who are we to prescribe how women should be prepared for their future as women, what is proper and how to keep things that way or to promote what is considered proper, who are we to prescribe what is truly Islamic, etcetera? Furthermore, we might ask who are 'we' to ask such questions. Yes, who do we think we are? Outsiders or bad listeners? In that case our apprehension may perhaps be ascribed to ignorance, hence rejecting and forbidding circumcision would be unreasonable. Are we outsiders and good listeners? Insiders are bound to deny this, especially when we express our doubts and wish to draw consequences from them. The question that finally comes to mind, is an obvious one. May we attempt to prevent a practice we ourselves would label mutilation by taking measures they would experience as violence? May we

violate cultural and personal-moral integrity in order to protect bodily integrity? The matter of whether de circumcision of boys is a reprehensible violation of physical integrity will remain unresolved for the time being. It is perhaps feasible to defend a negative answer by building an argument leaning heavily on the idea that traditional culture and the activity of construing meaningdeserve respect. But if we accept such an argument, we would be maneuvering ourselves into a position in which itwould be difficult to reject girls' circumcision, while this does indeed involve very serious and harmful surgery,which would be just as hard to tolerate. Which should takepriority: respect for tradition or child protection? And which of the two do we put up with: harming the child or insulting the tradition? There is no decisive reason for choosing either one. A well-known dilemma of liberal and plural democracy is bothering us here. In such a democracyit of course is a frequent occurrence that individual rights conflict with those of (members of) groups to whichthey belong - groups represented by parents (in the case of families) or other authorities (in the case of ethnic, religious, cultural or other groups and minorities) '.

Religious freedom

It has been argued more than once that circumcision ought only be allowed once the boy has turned eighteen en chooses it of his own free will. This was also the wish ofthe father in the law suit in Groningen. Besides physical integrity he gave an additional reason: the religious freedom of the child. Is circumcision at an early age at odds with religious freedom? I don't think so. Even thoughit is, medically speaking, unnecessary surgery, it doesn'tin any way restrict the child's possibilities and capacities. Being circumcised does not hinder the child inany way and does not hold him to a certain future: withouthis foreskin the child still has all religious and life options open to him.

Circumcision is of another order than, for instance, castration. The boys who were castrated in the seventeenthand eighteenth centuries to become male soprano's there was little more for them to do but to study music and to seek employment as a soprano in a choir. It is perhaps somewhat exaggerated to state that castration "irrevocably" decided "on the fate of the man", as Barbierdoes in his Triomf en tragiek der castraten (1991, p. 9), because although the boys were irreversibly altered, they could still do lots of things with their lives- they did not even have to enter the world of music. However, emasculation at the age of eight to ten with all its physical and mental consequences, was a very costly investment, so much so that it would have been foolish fora eunuch not to use it to his advantage. In this sense castration did indeed determine his future. In short: emasculation was less determining for the choice of vocation than circumcision is for one's religious future.

There is only one conceivable manner in which circumcisionmay restrict a child in a religious sense. According to the father in the law suit in Groningen there are variations within Hinduism which refuse circumcised men. Having been circumcised debars the child from choosing such a movement and from being admitted. The father, however, overlooks that is no settled matter as to what itis that restricts the religious freedom. Is the restriction due to the circumcision or rather to the admission requirements of the religious movements in question? The answer is obvious: the requirements. Imaginea religion which is only open to people who still have their tonsils. It would not make sense to state that having one's tonsils out is at odds with religious freedom.

Having been circumcised, alone, is of no consequence. However, an indoctrinating religious education, the possible context of religious freedom, does indeed seem toclash with religious freedom. Circumcision can be part of an upbringing which imposes a certain religious future

upon the child. Perhaps this was the crucial point de father in the law suit in Groningen wished to make. After all, the dispute with the mother was mainly about religious education: the mother wanted the child to have an Islamic upbringing, while the father wanted the child to grow up with both Islam and Hinduism, enabling him to choose for himself later on. According to the father the latter option would guarantee the child's religious freedom. He suggests that the kind of religious education supported by the mother would tend to push religious freedom aside. Such a suggestion reflects a perspective onthe relation between freedom and education known as 'liberal' in political and social philosophy and also in the philosophy of education. For liberal philosophers and educationists the aim of education is self-determination. Archard summarizes aptly what education boils down to according to liberal doctrine: "(It) requires at least twokinds of thing. First, the child must have developed certain basic cognitive skills such as the capacity to reflect, to deliberate and argue as well as the ability toacquire knowledge about itself and its. Second, people's autonomy is greater the larger the number of options open to them. The child should be given knowledge of the choices it may make in its later life, and provided with the means to realise them" (1993, p. 55). The second requirement, in particular, is echoed in the notion that when the child is brought up within one religion only, hisreligious freedom will suffer for it. The child is not familiarized with alternative possibilities and even failsto learn of the existence of alternatives, which means that its freedom of choice is limited. The argument voicedby LaFollette is exemplary: "(I)ndoctrination can harm thechild, most notably by effectively closing off the alternatives for the adult the child will become. An individual can choose only among the options of which she is both aware and can consider seriously. If parents limitthe child's exposure to religious and moral views identical to their own, then the child will see only one option and choose it; she will likely hold the same

beliefs when she becomes an adult" (1989, p. 84).

No freedom of choice

Several critical objections may be made against applying the liberal line of reasoning to the relation between religious education and religious freedom. The most important of these concerns the underlying concept of religious freedom. Religious freedom is perceived as freedom of choice: according to the liberals one chooses one religion or another, as one would choose an 'image of the good life', a 'life-plan' or a 'way of life'. Such a choice therefore ought to be as free as possible, freedom being conceived in terms of the absence of coercion and the presence of alternatives from which to choose: the lesser the force and the more alternatives from which to choose, the more free the choice and therefore the greaterthe freedom. This interpretation is debatable.

Representatives of traditional religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity argue in favor of the classic interpretation: originally religious freedom is conceived as the right to hold a religious conviction, to profess and to practice without being restricted or impeded by others, by the government and public bodies. Religious freedom does not require freedom of choice, because religion is not something one chooses as one would a mortgage, a pet or a hobby, but rather something to which one belongs on the basis of history, descent, conveyance, ingrowing, initiation, education etcetera. Religious freedom means that those who belong to a religion, taken in this sense, are not impeded in their effectuation and expression of their religion. Indoctrinating kinds of religious education are not necessarily incompatible to religious freedom; on the contrary. It is even defendable to state indoctrinating faith education as conditional forthe applicability of religious freedom. For, it is only when the child belongs to a religion that it has a need for religious freedom, and indoctrinating faith education

assumes that a child belongs to a religion and is geared towards bringing about such belonging.

This is the spirit in which for instance both Muslims and Christians reasoned in discussions on article 14 of the UN-Treaty on the Rights of the Child. During the preparatory work on this treaty, there was initially a proposition to give children similar freedom to that whichadults are afforded by the International Treaty on Civil and Political Rights (article 18) in which there is granted "the right to freedom... to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice" - religious freedom partly as freedom of choice. In the negotiations the Islamic countries made great efforts to get a certain interpretation of children's religious freedom affirmed which does not figure the freedom of choice while emphasizing faith education as preparation for exercising the right to religious freedom. As a consequence the treaty article now reads (partly) : "(1) States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of... religion. (2) States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents... to provide direction to the childin the exercise of his or her right". When the treaty was discussed in Dutch parliament in the middle of 1994 a discussion got underway on the interpretation of article 14. The Dutch government attempted to re-establish, as it were, the freedom of choice and was resolved to expressly and officially declare it would interpret the article as if it reads: children do not only have the right to have areligion, but also have a right to choose a religion for themselves. The Christian parties (CDA. GPV. SGP and RPF) argued in favor of keeping to the literal, unabridged text. They also introduced, to no avail incidentally, a motion to obstruct the government's interpretive declaration.

The classic interpretation of religious freedom can very well coincide with educational practices which do not prepare or equip the child for choosing a religion on the basis of personal free choice. When one brings a child up

(with)in one religion alone, the chance increases that thechild will remain a member and that his religious freedom will be meaningful. The very things LaFollette warns us ofwith an eye to religious freedom, turn out to be recommendable in the interest of religious freedom in thisperspective: "If parents limit the child's exposure to religious... views identical to their own, then the child will see only one option and choose it; she will likely hold the same beliefs when she becomes an adult" (1989, p.84). This having been said the kind of faith education favored by the Islamic mother in the law suit in Groningen, is not necessarily less compatible to religiousfreedom than the religious upbringing advocated by the father. It all depends on what is understood by religious freedom.

The dilemma revisited

It is here that the dilemma rooted in liberal and plural democracy yet again becomes apparent: once more individualrights conflict with those of (members of) groups to whichthey belong. The religious freedom of the child clashes with that of the religious group to which the child belongs, represented by the parents or other authorities. Representatives of traditional religions interpret religious freedom in the classic way: as the right to hold, to testify to and to practice a religious convictionwithout being hindered or impeded. Some consider the very circumstance of bringing up their children (with)in their belief alone to be an inherent part of testifying to theirbelief and to its practice. In their opinion such an upbringing contributes to the religious freedom of the child. Outsiders, on the other hand, are inclined to conceive religious freedom as freedom of choice. When children are brought up solely (with)in their parent's faith, faith education will come at the expense of religious freedom. Now, if the government were to interfere with educational practice in the interests of children's religious freedom, as freedom of choice, then

the parents' (classic) freedom of religion, together perhaps with that of other members of their religion, may suffer as a result. If, on the other hand, the government were to leave upbringing and education entirely in the hands of those involved, in favor of their religious freedom in the classic sense, then the government can neither promote nor protect children's religious freedom as freedom of choice.

Cutting the knot

In two ways the circumcision case has illustrated the dilemma which liberal and plural democracies are up against in the fields of (in a nutshell) child protection and educational policy. Children's rights may conflict with those of (members of) the groups to which they belong. This can lead to especially tricky situations whensuch a group holds particular truths and values from whichprivate definitions and evaluations of interests, rights and freedoms follow. Failure by insiders and outsiders to reach agreement on what is good for children and what is not and on the consequences for rights and freedoms will promptly prove an unbridgeable gap due to the incommensurability of underlying principles and frames of reference. When outsiders believe something is harmful to children and should therefore not be allowed, while insiders are convinced that it is good en should thereforebe permitted, and agreement is not reached due to fundamental ideological differences, it is not possible for outsiders to do full justice to their conception of the interests of the child and to simultaneously accept the ways of life and perspectives of the insiders. In liberal and plural democracy one would like to protect both the interests of child and respect the group's own ways of acting and thinking. But given the contradiction one has to choose. In the case of conflict there are two options of which only one can be chosen:

• either one sees the children of insiders as part of the

insider-group, defines their interests in private terms, defined by the group itself, and leaves the group to its own resorts, including the controversialaspect of caring for and bringing up children,

• or one does not count a single child as a group member and invites insiders to participate in the public deliberation and decision-making (ideally spanning the entire political community) in relation to the controversial aspect of caring for and bringing up children, the outcome of which applies to all children.

The first option entails maximal honoring of the claims ofparents and groups and the highest consideration for traditional and contextual truths and values. The second option amounts to maximum acceptance of communal responsibility and maximum recognition of the debatabilityof truths and values. It is one of the two, but the choicedoes not have to be the same for every aspect of caring and education, not even for every controversial aspect: some things would then be left up to the distinct groups (first option) while others would be subject to political-communal interference (second option). In my dissertation (Van der Ploeg 1995) I defend a certain division of pedagogical authority which is, in this sense, a combination of the first and the second option. For deliberative democracies (the ideal liberal and plural democracy ) I support and justify a certain division of authority when it comes to children's learning. Children'slearning may be partially left up the parents and their ethnic, cultural, religious, or other relations -, but children's, all children's, learning is also to some extent a matter of public interest and communal responsibility. Everything children learn outside school, and on top of that some of the things they might learn in school, are up to the parents and their social connections. Most of what they learn at school is a publicconcern. The argument leans on political-philosophical

(chapters 3, 5 and 7) and anthropological and pedagogical considerations (chapters 4 and 6), and in this context on assumptions about what is expected and desired of people (what community, society, and culture demand) and on the other hand what people are potentially able to do (what they are able to do thanks to their capacity to know, think and reason).

This is naturally no way out of the dilemma facing liberaland plural democracies; it is, however, a reasoned approach to cutting the knot. It applies to all learning. It also solves the problem of friction between belief education and the freedom of religion. Following from the division of pedagogical authority put forward in my dissertation, belief education may be completely entrustedto the parents and their fellow believers, and in additionthis religious upbringing may be indoctrinating (at home, as well as at church and at school). There is but one snag. It is not admissible that children be exposed to religious educational practices which hinder the child in other areas of his life (learning outside faith education), which would tend to rob the child of the opportunity to improve his reasoning and practical abilities sufficiently and to adequately exercise his powers of reflection. Children are entitled to be protected against such practices. A consequence is that, on the subject of faith education, private authority cannot be used as a basis for contesting public authority towards the main part of school education: parental authority concerning faith education may be maximal, but this is no reason for maximizing educational freedom or for isolating children, for shielding them or for keeping them on a short leash.

Descent and future

Not every dilemma-like problem of liberal and plural democracies in the fields of (in short) child protection and educational policy has to do with learning. What about

other conflicts which arise between children's rights and the rights of groups to which they belong? I am convinced that, in these cases too, the solution lies in combining both options. Once more this seems to me to offer a rational way of cutting the knot. I shall show why in a few strokes of the pen. This will be no more than a brief explanation. Finally, I will demonstrate its usefulness byapplying it to the relation between circumcision and physical integrity.

Combining the two options will certainly meet with resistence. There will be groups whose representatives claim exclusive authority for the group to which the childbelongs. Such groups would not hesitate to welcome the second option, but the first would be totally rejected, asit would violate the integrity of the group. Division of power? By no means! The following criticism may be directed towards such claims. The fact that a child belongs to a group, with its own way of life and perspectives, is an optical illusion. At the most the child belongs to the group in a manner of speaking. We sometimes speak of the tradition into which a child is born, but it does not follow that people are born as bearers of such a tradition. People are born in the midst of carriers of traditions, and sometimes as carriers of a tradition. The newborn are not yet bearers of tradition. Children may gradually become so through socialization, upbringing, education etcetera. And so some will, as time passes, come to belong to groups with their own way of life and perspectives on life. Whether they will indeed eventually belong to a certain group is therefore partially dependent on care and upbringing. And the question of how children are to be cared for and brought up is the very subject under discussion in the conflicts we are speaking of. It is therefore not right to appoint children to the group from the outset. The group's claim to exclusive authority can hardly be justified on the basis of expected membership, while this expectation is based on the content of the claim. Hence, there is nothing

against subdividing the authority. The next question is how the authority should be divided. What are relevant factors in determining who should have how much say about what? Obviously, the future of the child must be afforded a lot of weight. This conclusion prevails in both theory and practice and also often figures as an assumption in proposals and discussions. Returning to my dissertation I suggest a little more precision. The child is better off, the more future he has, that is to say: the better the child is prepared for the future. As no one can predict anyone's future, which particularly applies to our modern times and to our society, there is something amiss with childcare and child raising practices which only prepare the child for one future, 'his' future according to one specific expectation or aspiration. Certain practices are damaging even, if they serve to take away future from the child, so to speak, by for instance suffocating capacities, or thwarting the development of talent.

It is, by the way, hard to oppose the idea that the child's future ought to be an important factor in matters of educational authority. No one would deny the relevance of descent, which is apparent from group claims, and by the readiness of outsiders to go along with insiders to some extent. So descent matters, as well as the future. Just now it was brought forward that, figuratively speaking, children belong to their descent. In the same figurative sense the child belongs to its future. Why should arguments referring to descent be given more weightthan arguments referring to the future?

It may seem perfectly clear, but it does indeed offer argumentative footing. Take, for instance, the relation between circumcision and physical integrity. Earlier on I concluded: The matter of whether de circumcision of boys is a reprehensible violation of physical integrity will remain unresolved for the time being. A negative answer may be made plausible in an argument leaning heavily on the idea that traditional culture and the acts of giving meaning deserve respect. But if such an argument be

accepted, this would mean that it would be hard to reject girls' circumcision, while this does involve very serious and harmful surgery that it would be just as hard to tolerate. It is clear where we want to end up: with a justification for discrimination. We want to be able to simultaneously allow Jewish and Islamic boys to be circumcised, while disallowing circumcision for African girls. What would justify such an unequal treatment of traditions: consideration for Jewish and Islamic traditions versus violation of African tradition? The simple reason for the distinction lies in the fact that the two kinds of circumcision are very different. What makes this a relevant difference in this instance? Well, the inevitable and permanent consequences are significantly less serious for boys than they are in the case of (most forms of) girls' circumcision. Boys' circumcision is a minor operation of little more than symbolic consequence. If the worst comes to the worst the boy may later decide that it was unnecessary, but - even then - it will hardly bother him, if not at all. Girls' circumcision is a serious operation with severe consequences for the future of the child. In this sense itis more akin to castration than to boys' circumcision. It robs the girl of future, because it entails an enormous investment (pain, risks, medical problems, inconvenience) which only serve to prepare the girl for one specific future, her future according to one specific aspiration and expectation.

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