historiae

Concordia Undergraduate Journal of History

Volume XIII

Students of History at Concordia

Concordia University Montréal, Québec, Canada

2014-2015

Montreal’s Troubles in 1849:

From the Repeal of the Canada Corn Act to the Creation of the Annexation Association

Jeremy Dohan

Jeremy chose to study history as he has always been passionate about the military’s legacy in

Canada. In addition, throughout his time at university, he has developed an interest in political

history with much of his present focus being devoted to mid-nineteenth century Canada. He has

taken several Canadian history courses throughout his program and has thus had the chance to

hear differing interpretations of specific events. When his professors discussed the 1840s and, in

particular, the Montreal riots of 1849, Jeremy was interested in learning more about the political

context of that era. Upon researching the matter, he gained an appreciation for the economic

context of the period which deepened his understanding of the riots in question. He also

discovered that an annexation movement relating to the Tory frustration was born that year. This

work reinforced Jeremy’s determination to research a topic which he believes deserves closer

scrutiny.

40

The year 1849 represents a troubled period in Canadian history, particularly in the

country’s most populous city, Montreal, where much civil unrest took place. The economic

disruption caused by Britain’s adoption of free trade in 1846 financially affected several

Montreal businessmen as it repealed the popular Canada Corn Act which had given preferential

treatment to Canadian merchants and prevented American wheat from competing with the

Canadian product on the British market.1 The Corn Act was abolished following British Prime

Minister Sir Robert Peel’s adoption of free trade which replaced the old protectionist system.2 By

abandoning the traditional Tory position for this classical liberal approach, Peel was ignoring the

Canadian colonists’ economic privileges.3 As a result, the economy declined and, by 1849,

Canada was experiencing an economic depression which threatened to disrupt the continental

supremacy of the “Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence.” 4 This policy thus symbolised the

British economic supremacy over the colonies. Consequently, by 1849, the repeal had resulted in

a “profound depression” and a demoralised business elite.5

Following the Corn Act’s repeal and the subsequent economic depression, merchants

addressed a series of colonial petitions to the British government, but were repeatedly ignored.6

Additionally, the Reformer-led local government’s passage of the controversial 1849 Indemnity

Bill, or Rebellion Losses Bill, further angered many of the English-speaking Tories who made up

Montreal’s business elite.7 Montreal’s businessmen viewed the British government’s approval of

the Indemnity Bill as a reward granted to the Reformers, while their own demands to improve

their living conditions were being neglected. Consequently, a series of riots took place in

Montreal throughout the spring and summer of 1849. Although many scholars, such as Canadian

historians François Deschamps and Lionel Groulx, have emphasised the importance of the

41

1 Donald F. Warner, Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), Electronic Edition, 8.2 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 9.3 Tories were members of the Province of Canada’s Conservative Party. At the time, the Tories rivaled the province’s Reform Party (Reformers). The Reform Party formed the basis of the modern-day Liberal Party. 4 Donald Creighton coined this expression in his 1937 book as a way to emphasise Montreal’s economic influence in North America, particularly between 1760 and 1850, through the St. Lawrence River’s transportation system. With this expression, Creighton perceived the commercial protagonists essentially as heroes with whom he identified as an English Canadian and conservative historian. See Donald G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence: 1760-1850 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937).5 Creighton, Commercial Empire, 358.6 The Montreal Gazette, “To the Honorable Peter McGill, President of the Montreal Board of Trade,” January, 1849 in Extracts of the Montreal Gazette of the 17th January, ed. Clarence MacDonald WarnerBoston (Boston: Harvard College Library, 1917), 4; Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 21; Ibid., 25.7 Richard Adam, “La crise à Montréal en 1849,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Montréal, 1968), 7.

Indemnity Bill in causing the rioting, it is questionable to what extent the bill would have been

protested without the economic crisis.8 Indeed, the depression was undoubtedly at the source of

the tensions leading up to the riots which, in turn, explains how an active annexation movement

emerged later in 1849. By autumn of that year, merchants founded the Annexation Association of

Montreal as a means to support the United Province of Canada’s unification with the United

States.9 This organisation was both a desperate solution to protect Montreal’s economic interests

and an act of political defiance towards the British government for rejecting the annexationists’

earlier requests. The annexationists even created a petition, the 1849 Montreal Annexation

Manifesto, which included the signatures of over a thousand activists.10 Interestingly, some

French Canadian nationalists also supported this movement and even co-signed the Manifesto

due to its republican undertones which reminded them of the former Patriot movement’s own

republican agenda.11 Hence, this Manifesto was politically symbolic for two reasons: first,

because it represented a radical solution to the economic hardships shared by many Montrealers

and, second, because it symbolised an attempt to republicanise Canada from within Montreal,

through an association of cultural and political rivals which underscores the irony of the entire

undertaking.

By the eighteenth century, the St. Lawrence River had become Canada’s “natural

commercial interior” route integral to the fur trade, as Donald Warner points out.12 The Montreal

based North West Company, wish was founded in 1779 by Anglo-Scots, established a network of

trading posts and improved the transportation system, “offering stiffer resistance to competition

from the Hudson’s Bay Company,” as historian Paul-André Linteau discusses.13 Fur trading

competition meant that a significant industry was taking root in Canada, and more specifically in

Montreal, by the late eighteenth century. In its best years, the North West Company had an

annual trade worth about 100,000 pounds sterling.14 The fur trade attracted many Scots who

42

8 François Deschamps, “L’incendie du parlement et le manifeste annexioniste: la face cachée du torysme montréalais (1832-1849),” Bulletin d’histoire politique, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2013): 32; Lionel Groulx, “Le choix de la capitale du Canada,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1952): 524.9 Committee of the Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto of 1849,” Reprinted from the Original Pamphlet, with the Names of the Signers. Montreal: D. English & Co., 1881: 6.10 Annexation Association, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 10-4.11 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 69.12 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 4.13 Paul-André Linteau, The History of Montréal: The Story of a Great North American City, trans. Peter McCambridge, (Montreal: Baraka Books, 2013), 57.14 Jennifer S. H. Brown, “North West Company,” in Canadian Encyclopaedia, Historica Canada, 1985–, Article published June 6, 2007, last edited June 25, 2014, accessed October 30, 2014.

migrated to Canada after the British conquest, Loyalists who fled the American Revolution, or

American ‘carpetbaggers’ who were simply searching for business opportunities in Canada.15

These Anglophones, notably James McGill and Simon McTavish, administered the fur trade,

while relying on French Canadian labour and their geographic experience.16

In 1821, Montreal began the construction of its first artificial waterway: the Lachine

Canal. As Gilbert Tucker notes, the canal, which extended from the village Lachine to Montreal,

was completed in 1825 at a cost of over 100,000 pounds sterling.17 A group of approximately

fifty merchants further enhanced Montreal’s flourishing empire by founding the Montreal Board

of Trade in 1822 to promote the city’s development.18 With the Lachine Canal and its

venturesome businessmen, Montreal would have an efficient system allowing for the

transportation of various export commodities.19 However, that year, the completion of New

York’s Erie Canal threatened Montreal’s control of interior trade.20 Montrealers realised that they

would surpass this competition if the British government could allow free admission of

American raw materials in Canada. The Crown agreed to do so.21 Though the new Canadian

system made the St. Lawrence route to Montreal faster and cheaper, port charges in Montreal

were more expensive than in New York.22 From that point on, the empire’s continental

domination would fluctuate because of the neighbouring competition.

Warner notes that two years after the 1846 Corn Act’s repeal, “certain classes of exports

showed declines of 50 to 70 percent” and supports his findings with a report illustrating a decline

in oats, wheat, flour and peas exports.23 For his part, the Earl of Elgin, James Bruce, at the time

Governor General of Canada, wrote to the colonial secretary that "property in most of the

Canadian towns, and more especially in the capital, has fallen fifty per cent in value within the

last three years. Three-fourths of the commercial men are bankrupt, owing to [British] free

trade."24 Therefore, Montreal was undeniably experiencing an economic crisis which Canadian

43

15 Brown, “North West Company,” Canadian Encyclopaedia.16 Ibid.17 Gilbert N. Tucker, The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 1845-1851 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964), 26-27.18 Way Back Machine, “Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal: History,” https://web.archive.org/web/20120826053820/http://www.btmm.qc.ca/en/boardoftrade-history. 19 Creighton, Commercial Empire, 116-42. 20 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 7.21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 8.23 Ibid., 10.24 Elgin to Grey, October 6, 1850, Elgin-Grey Papers, Vol. II, 10-11.

historian Richard Adam makes clear in the title of his thesis “La crise à Montréal en 1849.”

Adam explains that Montreal businessmen felt these repercussions more acutely than merchants

elsewhere in British North America because of Montreal’s dual role as Canada’s commercial and

political centre. As such, the Parliament of the Province of Canada was constantly forced to

address merchants’ grievances.25

Before the crisis, in February of 1840, Lord Durham officially proclaimed the Act of

Union, uniting both Upper and Lower Canada into the Province of Canada, although the

province was still geopolitically divided into Canada East and Canada West.26 As such, Tories,

who now represented an Anglo-Protestant majority in the newly united Canada, supported this

Act. The Tories’ rivals were nonetheless eager to challenge them and, in 1842, Canada West

politician Robert Baldwin founded the Reform Party with Canada East Reformer Louis-

Hippolyte La Fontaine, a former member of the Patriot Party.27 The party won the election in

1848 with fifty-four seats compared to twenty for the Tories.28 This victory was significant for

several reasons: it pushed the Tories out of power, it made a French Canadian (La Fontaine) co-

prime minister of Canada, and it established a responsible government with the Crown’s

consent.29 As Canadian political scientists Leslie Seidle and Louis Massicotte describe, the

concept of responsible government was essentially “a combination of democratic aspirations

tempered by loyalty to the Crown and the new attitude of an Empire resigned to losing its

absolute powers.” 30 The Rebellion arguably played a pivotal role in achieving responsible

government since it is unclear to what extent England would have otherwise loosened its ties

with her colonies. Canada in 1848 was, overall, quite politically evolved; its government was

divided into three parts: the Legislative Assembly (House of Commons), the Legislative Council

(Senate) and the Executive Council (Cabinet). In addition, a British-appointed governor-general

was put in charge of the colony.31

44

25 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 7.26 “General Election,” Quebec Gazette, February 10, 1841,http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=F_tUKv7nyWgC&dat=18410210&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.27 Jacques Monet, “La Fontaine, Sir Louis-Hippolyte,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 9, accessed December 21, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/la_fontaine_louis_hippolyte_9E.html.28 F. Leslie Seidle and Louis Massicotte, Taking Stock in 150 Years of Responsible Government in Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Study of Parliament Group, 1998): 8, Electronic Edition. 29 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 15.30 Seidle and Massicotte, Taking Stock, 11.31 John Boyko, Blood and Daring: How Canada Fought the American Civil War and Forged a Nation (Toronto: Random House of Canada Limited, 2013), 38.

Although this new government may have appeared to be a cultural and political

reconciliation between former enemies, Tories were displeased with the increased democratic

structure of the system as it caused them to lose their longstanding political supremacy which

they viewed as their “birth right.” 32 Previously, in 1832, Montreal had witnessed the British

military’s deadly shootings of three French Canadians during a mild protest against Tory leader

Stanley Bagg’s militant supporters who were forcefully keeping partisans away from voting for

the Patriot Party.33 This moment typified the Tory political supremacy that prevailed in the city.

As Warner explains, with La Fontaine’s Reformers now in power, many Tories in Canada East

disliked the idea of French Canadian leadership as they “were certain that their [Tory] wealth and

influence would be ground out between the upper millstone of French domination and the nether

millstone of economic desperation.” 34 As a result, colonial activists sent various economic

reform requests to Britain. For instance, in January 1849, the Council of the Montreal Board of

Trade created a petition which begged England “to continue protection of Canadian grain.” 35

This petition—whose claims were unaddressed—included fifty-seven signatures including John

Molson, Jr’s.36 A contributing element to the Montreal merchant fury was La Fontaine’s

introduction of the Indemnity Bill which was intended “to provide for the indemnification of

parties in Lower Canada, whose property was destroyed during the rebellion in 1837 and

1838.” 37 Through this bill, La Fontaine hoped to enlarge the representation of the people from

Canada East with a majority of Reformers which would, in turn, ensure the future of responsible

government.38 The bill specified that even “the particulars of such losses having been charged

with high treason [...] shall be entitled to any indemnity of losses sustained during or after the

said rebellion, or in consequence thereof.” 39 La Fontaine himself was part of those wanted for

45

32 “The heritage of being Englishmen, this chivalrous and impassioned devotion I admire and respect, emanates from the same feeling which actuates us to show our attachment to her [England’s] institutions and laws, and that freedom and independence - the possession of which is our birthright.” Annexation Association, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 29.33 James Jackson, “The Radicalization of the Montreal Irish: The Role of the ‘Vindicator’,” The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 Irish-Canadian Connections (Spring, 2005): 92-93.34 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 16.35 “To the Honorable Peter McGill,” Montreal Gazette, January, 1849, in Extracts of the Montreal Gazette of the 17th January, 4.36 Ibid., 4.37 Legislature of the Province of Canada, “Rebellion Losses Bill,” 7, http://0-eco.canadiana.ca.mercury.concordia.ca/view/oocihm.9_01121. 38 “By Telegraph: Reported Exclusively for The Quebec Gazette and Morning Chronicle,” Quebec Gazette, March 9, 1849, http://news.google.com/newspapersnid=FtUKv7nyWgC&dat=18490309&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.39 Legislature of the Province of Canada, “Rebellion Losses Bill,” 1849, 3.

high treason in 1838 which, in the eyes of Tories, only helped their claim that the bill was an

illegitimate act.40 Thus, the bill’s controversial component was that it placed everyone on equal

footing, regardless of one’s previous allegiance. The local government compensated people at a

total cost of 85,300 pounds sterling and this indemnity only took effect in March of 1852, almost

fifteen years after the end of the Rebellion.41 In a time of economic hardship, it is arguably

surprising that the British government allowed the local government to distribute such a large

sum to the habitants who fell victim to the civil unrest of the 1830s, rather than to the cash-

strapped Tories of the late 1840s whose agitation, by then, should have represented a more

pressing concern.

Enraged by the idea, Tories decided to circulate a petition during a Tory rally at

Montreal’s Bonsecours Market on February 21, 1849, in favour of dissolving Parliament and

convoking people to new elections.42 Indeed, from a Tory perspective, compensating former

rebels was like rewarding traitors since, as Warner explains, “many who claimed this

compensation had been rebels and, at the time when their property had been destroyed, were

bearing arms against their government and their Queen.” 43 Thus, from a Tory standpoint, this bill

legitimised the Rebellion. Tories had attempted to prevent the bill’s passage by trying to persuade

Lord Elgin to veto it, but to no avail. During a parliamentary session held on March 9, 1849, the

bill passed by a wide margin.44 On the same day, an advertisement in The Quebec Gazette

claimed that the Village of Industry Company “with the perspective of communicating next year

by a railroad now in construction offers great advantages to capitalists and other enterprising

persons who would wish to make use of the several water powers [of the St. Lawrence River].” 45

Therefore, while Montreal’s St. Lawrence merchants were complaining about their financial

situation, this advertisement demonstrates that, due to the railway industry’s growth, there were

nonetheless new investment and business opportunities available. In any case, protesters who had

been so deeply affected by the depression did not share this entrepreneurial enthusiasm.

46

40 Deschamps, “L’incendie du parlement,” 30.41 Gilles Laporte, “La loi d’indemnisation de 1849: surtout pas pour les anciens patriotes,” Bulletin d’histoire politique, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2013): 77.42 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 21.43 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 15.44 “By Telegraph,” Quebec Gazette, March 9, 1849.45 Ibid.

Clearly, the negative response to the Indemnity Bill coincided with an overall sense of

economic frustration since the main reason why the rioters protested against the Indemnity Bill

was because their conditions for accepting this new political reality had been ignored by the

British government. Consequently, this issue resulted in an uneven balance of power which the

merchants blamed on the British government. Lord Elgin was forced to show support for the

local government’s policies and, consequently, he had become quite unpopular with Canadian

Tories and was often the target or slurs and projectiles when he passed through the streets of

Montreal.46 Under pressure from the colonists, Elgin urged Britain to consider enacting a

Montreal-backed reciprocal treaty between Canada and the United States, but England refused.47

Paradoxically, just as the British government had ignored the Patriots’ Ninety-Two Resolutions

manifesto for responsible government in 1834, by 1849 it was ignoring the demands from its

own Tory subjects who protested against the encroachment on their traditional economic

advantages. 48 Hence, one could understand why the Tories were not inclined to adhere to a

Reformer-inspired responsible government. The notion of a second insurrection in Canada began

to take shape from within Montreal and, this time, the 1837-38 English Canadian

counterrevolutionaries were the new threat. In Warner’s words: “the British government had now

doubly forfeited their loyalty by plunging Canada into a depression and by delivering the English

of Montreal into the hands of their enemies the French.”49 The idea of annexation as a solution to

Tory problems had circulated by March of 1849, although not yet by any significant degree.50

The Indemnity Bill had been officially proclaimed on March 15, 1849, but Lord Elgin’s

signature was required to enact it. He went on to do so on April 25, 1849. Rumours had quickly

spread across Montreal that Elgin was going to sign the Bill in Parliament, with or without a

majority of Tory support.51 At approximately eight in the evening on April 25, a furious group of

at least six-thousand Montrealers had assembled at Montreal’s Champ de Mars before marching

on Parliament roughly an hour later.52 Unsurprisingly, these protesters were from the merchant

47

46 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 16.47 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 25.48 Allan Greer, The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 137.49 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 16.50 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 6-7.51 William Tetley, “Cornelius Krieghoff, the Shakspeare Club and the Annexation Manifesto,” 1, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/krieghoff.pdf. 52 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 33.

class and other respected elements of Montreal society.53 These groups insisted that no such

Indemnity Bill was to be signed before their own urgent requests were addressed.54 The

following day, the newspaper described the scene noting that “the proceedings of the Committee

were interrupted by continued volleys of stones and other missiles thrown from the streets,

through the windows, into the Legislative Assembly Hall, which caused the Committee to rise

and leave the building, which had been set fire to on the outside.” 55 Through the destruction of

Parliament’s two libraries, worth a total of about 100,000 pounds sterling, up to 25,000 books

were burned, including a large amount of juridical, historical and parliamentarian archives.56

This riot was only the beginning as the following day, crowds ransacked Montreal Reformers’

properties, namely those of La Fontaine, Francis Hincks and Dr Wolfred Nelson, a former Patriot

leader.57 Critics have blamed the police and military for not reacting swiftly at the onset of the

riots.58 This problem can be explained by the fact that many off-duty militia officers were among

the rioters.59 Thus, ironically, those who had offered compensation to people who had had their

properties destroyed in the 1830s were in turn having their own properties vandalised in 1849.

Realising the extent of the damage, the government required that all public documents be

copied and recopied with one copy being stored in the newly established Parliament building in

Toronto and the other behind the walls of the Quebec Citadelle.” 60 To a certain degree, the

decision to store documents in Toronto and Quebec City was significant for it diminishing

Montreal’s role as the province’s intellectual hub to the benefit of other Canadian cities. A third

protest erupted, on April 27, 1849, but the now well-organised Montreal police force managed to

disperse the crowd.61 In August, following the news of the arrest of several of the protesters who

had rioted in April, a mob attacked La Fontaine’s home for the second time, resulting in a gun

battle between La Fontaine’s guards and the rioters during which one protester was mortally

wounded.62 Hence, while public memory is fixated on the riots of April 25 to April 26, 1849,

48

53 Ibid., 34.54 Ibid. 55 Montreal Gazette, April 26, 1849, in The History Blog, http://www.thehistoryblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Journal-of-Legislative-Assembly-Province-Canada.jpg. 56 Gilles Gallichan, “La nuit de feu des livres et des archives du Parlement,” Bulletin d’histoire politique, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2013): 180-6.57 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 16.58 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 34.59 Deschamps, “L’incendie du parlement,” 29.60 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 41.61 Ibid., 37-38.62 Ibid., 56.

they were only the first in a series of future incidents which added up to the growing level of

anarchy in Montreal at the time.

If the British government had properly addressed its traditionally loyal subjects when it

had the chance, the Indemnity Bill would have been much less of an issue, as the bill’s passage

alone did not directly affect anyone’s wealth. On the other hand, the economic depression had

eroded the wealth of the majority of Montreal’s businessmen, resulting in many wealthy

individuals becoming desperate and angry at the British government who had chosen to ignore a

series of petitions demanding economic reform. Lord Elgin received much of the blame as the

Crown’s official representative. Due to the Crown’s refusal to remedy the economic situation,

local Tories saw him as having personally failed to respond favourably to their economic

demands while simultaneously approving the Indemnity Bill. Elgin’s unpopular course only

resulted in making him into a British scapegoat. As the events unfolded, Parliament was attacked

just when he was inside signing the bill. His duty in Parliament that day could not have occurred

at a worse moment for him, or for the Reformers and the British government. Hence, rather than

only targeting the local government, the riot should also be seen as directed towards the British

government whose closest political representative was, at the time, in Parliament finalising a deal

with the Reformers’ local government. In addition, it is important to consider that during this

period, the British government approved the actions of all political institutions. As such, one

could argue that Elgin was simply executing the directives of the British Crown and failing to

comply would have caused him even more trouble. Therefore, for Elgin the situation proved

impossible, or, at the very least, it placed him in a very awkward position.

Pro-annexationism became a more high profile issue in Montreal with the establishment

of the Annexation Association on October 11, 1849. An issue of The Quebec Gazette published

on October 12 stated, “the Montreal people unite to procure annexation. [...] There are a great

many who would like to see the [Canadian] union dissolve.” 63 In that issue, an extract from The

London Economist featured the debate over the Navigation Act’s repeal which was to be

proclaimed on January 1, 1850.64 Canadian merchants opposed the Navigation Act since it would

prevent foreign commercial vessels from reaching Canada, and, consequently, limit Canadian

49

63 “By Telegraph,” Quebec Gazette, October 12, 1849, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=F_tUKv7nyWgC&dat=18491012&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.64 “Effects of the Repeal of the Navigation Laws,” London Economist, in Quebec Gazette, October 12, 1849, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=F_tUKv7nyWgC&dat=18491012&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.

imports to only British products.65 Colonial merchants had already lost their preferential duties

on exports sent to the motherland due to the Corn Act’s repeal. To these merchants, the

Navigation Act was thus another telling example of a colonial lack of economic freedom since its

purpose was to increase wealth in Britain by limiting trade to the colonies. Consequently, as a

result of Canadian trade lanes and business opportunities being dramatically reduced by the

British government’s preferential trading system, many Canadian merchants believed that their

businesses were doomed.

On October 29, 1849, The Quebec Gazette confirmed that 997 Montreal men openly

supported annexation versus 622 who did not.66 By this time, however, Tory newspaper The

Quebec Gazette was unsupportive of the annexation movement, stating, “we resume our

criticism of the Montreal ‘Declaration of Independence’,” clearly mocking the annexationists and

Americans. 67 Even though support for annexation was strong in Montreal, it was weaker

elsewhere in British North America.68 Some opponents believed that annexation would force

Canada into absorbing the public debt of a country whose practice of slavery threatened to break

it apart as, of course, it did several years later.69 Other Montreal Tories, such as businessman and

politician George Moffatt, formed the Montreal branch of the British American League which

opposed annexation and suggested other alternatives including a loyalist confederation of British

North-American provinces.70 Interestingly, the British American League’s idea of confederation

thus contradicts the common idea that Alexander Galt was the first to propose Confederation in

1858.71

The zealous annexation activists adopted the official version of their Manifesto on

December 7, 1849.72 In it, the authors inform the British government that steps have been taken

to obtain annexation, including discussions with the American government who would only

accept Canada’s entry into their union with England’s consent.73 Men of various professions and

50

65 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 87-88.66 “The Annexation Manifesto,” Quebec Gazette, October 29, 1849, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=F_tUKv7nyWgC&dat=18491027&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.67 Ibid.68 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 59.69 Ibid.70 Gerald Tulchinsky, “Moffatt, George,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 9, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/moffatt_george_9E.html.71 Jean-Pierre Kesteman, “Galt, Sir Alexander Tilloch,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 12, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/galt_alexander_tilloch_12E.html.72 Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 2.73 Ibid., 6.

from several Canadian regions were among the signatories of the Manifesto.74 Of the 1,116

signatures, most of which were English, Canadian lawyer William Tetley informs us that 325

were powerful Montreal Tory businessmen including, for example, Alexander T. Galt, future

Father of Confederation and the Dominion’s first Minister of Finance; Edwin Atwater, glass-

manufacturing pioneer and cofounder of the Montreal City and Districts Savings Bank; John

Abbott, a railway entrepreneur and lawyer, and a future Father of Confederation who would be

knighted as the third Prime Minister of the Dominion in 1891; John Redpath, a real estate

developer, future founder of the Redpath Sugar family business, president of the Annexation

Association and co-author of its Manifesto; John Rose, a banker and commercial lawyer, and

later knighted as high commissioner in London; William and John Molson Jr, founders of the

Molson Bank; and even Stanley Bagg, the aforementioned former Tory leader who was also the

founder of the English Workingmen’s Benefit Society, a veteran of the Battle of Saint-Eustache

and the largest landowner in Montreal after the Sulpician monks.75

French Canadians were also invited to support this movement. The Manifesto included

around 191 French Canadian signatories, thereby representing roughly seventeen percent of the

supporters. French Canadian influence in the movement’s administration and the support it

received from former Patriot leaders, including Louis-Joseph Papineau, exemplified the existing

balance of power between anglophones and francophones.76 Adam explains that a major reason

for nationalist-leaning French Canadians to support the Annexation Manifesto was its republican

aspect which they viewed as “the best exposition of principles found in the 1834 Ninety-Two

Resolutions manifesto.”77 Moreover, the leadership of the Association - which had written the

51

74 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 58-60.75 Tetley, “Cornelius Krieghoff,” 1; Galt was later knighted for his role as a high commissioner in London. Jean-Pierre Kesteman, “Galt, Sir Alexander Tilloch,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 12, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/galt_alexander_tilloch_12E.html; Pierre Landry, “Atwater, Edwin,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 10, accessed December 21, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/atwater_edwin_10E.html; Carman Miller, “Abbott, Sir John Joseph Caldwell,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 12, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/abbott_john_joseph_caldwell_12E.html; Gerald Tulchinsky, “Redpath, John,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 9, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/redpath_john_9E.html; David M. L. Farr, “Rose, Sir John,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 11, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/rose_john_11E.html; Alfred Dubuc, “Molson, William,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 10, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/molson_william_10E.html; Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 11-14; Pierre Landry, “Bagg, Stanley Clark,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 10, accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/bagg_stanley_clark_10E.html.76 Fernand Ouellet, “Papineau, Louis-Joseph,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 10, accessed December 7, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/papineau_louis_joseph_10E.html.77 Adam, “La crise à Montréal,” 69.

Manifesto - was culturally and politically diverse. While most of the twenty-one coauthors were

Anglo-Scottish Protestant Tories, Benjamin Holmes was an Irish-Catholic Reformer, Jacob De

Witt was a Reformer of Dutch-American descent, John Donegani was of Italian descent, and

D.E. Papineau, Joseph Papin, Rodolphe Laflamme and Antoine-Aimé Dorion were all French

Canadian nationalists, Dorion being a former Patriot and the future Parti Rouge leader.78 This

culturally and politically diverse leadership reveals just how influential the secessionist

movement became outside of Montreal’s Anglo-Tory community. In signing onto the Manifesto,

French Canadians seized on Tory discontentment as a tool for their own purposes. This

unexpected alliance arguably represents the biggest irony of 1849 since along with a fierce

opposition between both groups during the 1837-38 Rebellion, most Tories had never concerned

themselves with the politico-cultural interests of French Canadians. Therefore, when it came to

safeguarding individual wealth and financial interests, English Canadian businessmen were not

only ready to remove their economic borders with the United States, but also to put aside their

political differences with French Canadians and other politico-cultural groups. Pragmatism

prevailed over sentimentalism, in what amounted to a case of moving political landscapes.

The authors of the Manifesto clearly laid the blame for the troubled Canadian economy

on the British government by stating that the repeal of the Corn Act was the source of their

problems. They argued that “the reversal of the ancient policy of Great Britain, whereby she

withdrew from the Colonies their wanted protection in her markets, has produced the most

disastrous effects upon Canada.” 79 Their justifications for annexation included the following:

our banks are depreciated, our mercantile and agricultural interests alike [are] unprosperous, our unrivalled rivers, lakes and canals [are] almost unused; whilst commerce abandons our shores, the circulating capital amassed under a more favourable system is dissipated, with none from any quarter to replace it [...] and our present form of government is cumbrous and so expensive.80

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78 Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 2; Lorne Ste. Croix, “Holmes, Benjamin,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 9, accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/holmes_benjamin_9E.html; Jean-Claude Robert, “De Witt, Jacob,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 8, accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/de_witt_jacob_8E.html; Brian J. Young, “Donegani, John Anthony,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 9, accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/donegani_john_anthony_9E.html; Jean-Claude Soulard, “Dorion, Sir Antoine-Aimé,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 12, accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/dorion_antoine_aime_12E.html.79 Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 3. 80 Ibid., 3-4.

They also defended themselves against accusations of treason by pointing out that “public men in

the mother-country were daily urging the colony to depart from the empire.” 81 Staunch British

imperialists referred to these men as ‘Little Englanders’. As Canadian author John Boyko puts it,

Little Englanders “argued for a reduction or perhaps even a severing of colonial ties.” 82 This

English liberal school of thought was, unsurprisingly, a strong British proponent in creating

responsible government in Canada. The Reformers naturally followed this doctrine.83 Yet, as the

justifications for annexation show, the authors of the manifesto were complaining about the new

local government’s financial cost which, in turn, suggests that they and their followers cared to

secure their financial prosperity before anything else. In their minds, such prosperity would be

regained with annexation, rather than the confederation alternative that the British American

League proposed.

Proponents of the Manifesto believed that, through annexation, Canadian merchants

would profit from: American foreign investment into Canada, the availability of the American

West’s raw materials, the elimination of tariff barriers between Canada and the United States,

Canadian manufacturers’ protection under the American tariff, an appreciation of Canadian land

values, and an increase in the Canadian population.84 They also insisted that the repeal of the

Corn Act had “grounded [sic] the labouring classes to abject misery, to increase the revenues of a

landed aristocracy.” 85 Their reference was to the French-founded seigneurial system which

would continue until the Reform Party officially abolished it in 1854.86 One strongly worded

passage in the Manifesto declares: “we may admire, we may love England; but our people cannot

starve for the honour of her protection.” 87 Clearly, the writers of the Manifesto were expressing

desperation, along with self-serving interest. However, from their perspective, the British

government had been egoistic first, by repealing the Canada Corn Act for its own economic

benefit. Furthermore, many Canadians believed that annexation was Canada’s “inevitable”

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81 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 18.82 Boyko. Blood and Daring, 51, 199.83 Claude Bélanger, “History of the Liberal Party of Canada,” in The Quebec History Encyclopaedia, Marianapolis College, accessed March 4, 2015, http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/encyclopedia/HistoryoftheLiberalPartyofCanada-CanadianHistory.htm.84 Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 7-8.85 Ibid., 21.86 Jacques Mathieu, “Seigneurial System,” in Canadian Encyclopaedia, Historica Canada, 1985–, Article published August 25, 2013, last edited by Maude-Emmanuelle Lambert, September 10, 2014, accessed December 7, 2014.87 Annexation Association of Montreal, “The Annexation Manifesto,” 23.

destiny which only added to the unapologetic stance that the Manifesto’s authors had adopted.88

Nevertheless, the writers refused to acknowledge that their movement remained mostly

Montreal-bound. The annexationists were thus behaving in a restless and cynical manner, more

than anything, while continually urging for annexation.

Some historians relate the frustration in 1849 almost solely to the Indemnity Bill, while

ignoring the fact that from 1846 to 1849, Canadian businessmen saw their local economy

deteriorate due to policies that the British government stubbornly refused to abandon. These

historians tend to look at political and cultural elements as a means to explain why Tories

rejected the Indemnity Bill’s passage, all while overlooking economic factors. For example,

Canadian historian François Deschamps explains that “le manifeste présente l’incorporation de la

province aux États-Unis comme le seul remède en mesure d’oublier les dissensions politiques

encore vives, comme l’incendie criminel du parlement.” 89 However, nowhere does Deschamps’

bibliography directly point towards the Annexation Manifesto itself which clearly indicates that

the economy had been the central issue affecting Montreal Tories all along.90 The late Canadian

historian Lionel Groulx, for his part, paints the English Canadian annexationists as francophobe

‘extremists’ and perceives their movement as a ‘race’-related affair.91 Like Deschamps, he does

not demonstrate a clear understanding of the period’s economic context. Moreover, he fails to

even point out that some French Canadians also supported, and even led, the annexation

movement. Therefore, to look at the Tory frustration in 1849 as a politico-cultural phenomenon,

without investigating the period’s economic reality, is an oversimplification.

Given that the majority of Montreal businessmen had recently suffered from bankruptcy

due to the British repeal of the Canada Corn Act, solidarity within Montreal’s commercial and

financial sectors came easily and was enduring, as the petitions, riots and Annexation

Association’s creation all demonstrated. Just as responsible government had been the rallying

point for Reformers before 1848, economic emancipation had become the new cause célèbre for

many Montreal Tories by the autumn of 1849, giving birth to the annexation movement.

Considering the British government’s failure to address Canada’s economic issues, Canada’s

initial experience with responsible government was evidently negative. Due to the riots, not only

54

88 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 235.89 Deschamps, “L’incendie du parlement,” 32.90 Ibid., 50.91 Groulx, “Le choix de la capitale,” 524.

was the Parliament building destroyed and the prime minister’s house sacked, but Parliament

was relocated in Toronto, Montreal’s economic rival. England and the colonial defenders were

lucky, however, for “the sudden and complete eclipse of the agitation was the natural result of

economic and political developments in the [British] empire, and the depression was practically

gone within a year.” 92 Indeed, Montreal’s exports reached $2,503,916 by 1851 versus only

$1,700,960 in 1849.93 Moreover, the unpopular Navigation Act which the British government

had promised to institute in January of 1850 was instead repealed before the turn of the new

year.94 Consequently, the Annexation Association’s raison d’être became less relevant over the

course of the nineteenth century, as prosperity reestablished a calm and stable society. Had it not

been for this emerging prosperity, the Annexation Association may have had tremendously

affected the fate of Canada, even though its prominent members were a minority within the

colony. After all, this minority group represented colonial wealth which, in turn, gave its

members political influence. Just as a responsible government was unlikely to have been

established without the 1830s Rebellion, one could equally argue that without the 1849 merchant

riots, the British government would not have relinquished some of its economic powers to the

benefit of the colonists. It is for these reasons that the economic reality of the late 1840s ought to

be taken into account when exploring the reasons behind the riots, including the highly symbolic

burning of Parliament itself.

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92 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 28.93 Elgin to Grey, October 6, 1850, Elgin-Grey Papers, Vol. II, 720-21.94 Warner, Idea of Continental Union, 28.

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