Migrant Integration in SubstateRegions: Bridging Party Discourse and Policy Practice in the Veneto and Sardinia

Eve HepburnUniversity of Edinburgh

ABSTRACTIn multilevel states, control over migrant integration generally rests with the sub-state regional level. This begs the question of whether regions – especially those with claims to autonomy – ‘do’ integration differently from so-called ‘national models’. This paper focuses on the under-studied role of politics in immigrant integration, asking: what is the impact of political parties on integration policy in sub-state regions? In particular, the paper tests two competing hypotheses about integration policymaking: the first is that electorally salient anti-immigrant parties have a significant effect on policymaking; the second is that integration policymaking evolves through incremental adaptation which mitigates against radical policy changes. This paper adds a further hypothesis about the possible effects of regionalism on party positioning and policymaking on integration. These hypotheses are tested in two diverse regions within Italy: Veneto and Sardinia.Whereas Veneto has a strong radical-right regionalist party and high levels of immigration, Sardinia has no anti-immigrant party, a splintered regionalist movement and low levels of immigration. The paper finds that the second and third hypotheses have the greatest explanatoryvalue, whereby integration rhetoric is shaped by

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regionalist concerns but party polarisation does not translate into policy.

WORK IN PROGRESS: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. COMMENTS GRATEFULLY RECEIVED

Senior Lecturer in PoliticsSchool of Social and Political ScienceUniversity of Edinburgh15a George SquareEdinburgh EH8 9LDEmail: Eve.Hepburn@ed.ac.uk

Paper presented at the 11th Annual IMISCOE Conference ‘Immigration, Social Cohesion and Social Innovation’, Madrid, Spain, 27-29 August 2014

Introduction1

With the steady decentralisation of state structures across OECD countries (Marks, Hooghe and Schakel 2008), sub-state regions have been endowed with control over large parts of the welfare state, including health, education, housing and economic development. In devolved or federal multi-level states, sub-state regions have also been granted jurisdiction over the reception and integration of immigrants - and in some cases, selection and admissions (Seidle and Joppke 2012, Hepburn and Zapata Barrero 2014). The importance of sub-state regionsin integrating migrants has been recently recognised by the European Union Committee of the Regions (CoR), which recommended ‘multilevel governance to be the most

1 This research was generously funded by a Research Grant from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, and was conducted while holding a visiting fellowship at the European University Institute in Florence. I am indebted to Tiziana Caponio and FrancescaCampomori for giving me access to their files on regional integrationplans; to Duncan McDonnell for sharing his Lega Nord party programmeswith me; to Veronica Fincati for sharing her valuable insights and research on Veneto integration policy; and all of the interviewees who generously gave their time to this project.

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appropriate method for achieving optimum integration of migrants’ (CoR, 2012). But while European institutions have acknowledged the key role that substate regions playin designing integration policies, scholarship is yet to catch up. The vast amount of scholarly literature on immigrant integration has been influenced by the ‘national models’ thesis, whereby a national approach to integration is seen to be pursued across the entire country. The regional level has been virtually absent from the literature.

Only a small handful of scholars have begun to theorise on the implications of integration policies in highly diverse and fragmented multi-level states, with regard to immigrant relations with society, institutions and political representation at the regional level (Kymlicka 2001; Campomori, 2008; Zapata-Barrero 2009; Hepburn 2011; Ambrosini, 2012; Banting and Kymlicka 2012;Campomori and Caponio 2013; Adam 2013, 2014; Hepburn and Zapata, 2014; Schmidtke and Zaslove, 2014). As these scholars show, migrant integration raises especially pertinent questions in cases where substate regions are seeking to pursue greater autonomy and must identify whatthe ‘distinct’ culture is. Acknowledging this possibilityin a recent essay on migration studies, Bloemraad (2013, 9) posits that ‘a new frontier for migration studies liesin the comparison of sub-national regions’ whereby ‘immigrant integration dynamics might very well differ insemi-autonomous and culturally distinct regions like Catalonia in Spain or Quebec, Canada than in the rest of the country’.

This paper seeks to pick up Bloemraad’s gauntlet by focussing on one aspect of integration that has received only modest scholarly attention: the party politics of integration in substate regions. In the realm of integration, is it true that ‘party politics has an important role in determining the course of policy-making’? (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006, 189). In particular, the paper questions whether has the rise of anti-immigrant parties has pushed integration policy to be more restrictive. But rather than examining this political context at the central-state level – which constitutes the dominant perspective in the literature –

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this essay examines party competition and policymaking through the substate lens. Do substate regions ‘do’ integration differently (from the state and from other regions)? In particular, does anti-immigrant sentiment have a regionalist flavour? And what is the relationship between migrant integration and regional autonomy claims?Do regionalist parties view the arrival of migrants as a threat to their distinct regional culture, or is welcoming newcomers perceived as a ‘badge of legitimacy’ for these parties?

To answer these questions, the paper begins by exploring two competing hypotheses about integration policy that have developed within the ‘national models’ framework, to see if these assumptions are applicable within the substate context. The first hypothesis draws from the literature on the rise of anti-immigrant partiesand their ‘contagion effect’ on the policy platforms of mainstream parties (Mudde 2007, Manatschal 2010; Van Spanje 2010; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2012). The second hypothesis draws from migration studies and its emphasis on the gradual and incremental development of integration policy, which mitigates against radical changes in policy (Freeman 1995; Boswell 2003; Geddes 2008; Banting and Kymlicka, 2012). Given the substate context, the paper also adds a third hypothesis, on whether regionalism and claims to distinctiveness have any effect on integration policymaking, and if so, whether the effect is to restrict immigrant rights, or toexpand them in a vision of cosmopolitan regionalism (Kymlicka 2001, Zapata-Barrero 2009, Hepburn 2014). Thesehypotheses are tested in two ‘most different’ regions in one of Europe’s most diverse and fragmented multi-level states: Italy.

The paper is organised into three parts. Part I develops a theoretical framework for the analysis. It examines the literature on ‘national models’ of migrant integration, the role of parties in policymaking, and thedecentralisation of integration policy, from which three hypothesis are developed. Part II comprises the empiricalmeat of the paper. Following an overview of Italian immigration policy, it examines (a) party discourse and competition on immigration, and (b) policy outcomes on

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integration in a comparative analysis of Veneto and Sardinia. The final section, Part III, considers case-specific and general factors affecting integration policymaking at the substate level, and suggests some routes for further research.

Integration Policy in Multi-level States: A Framework forAnalysis An extensive body of theoretical and empirical literaturehas examined the development of migrant integration policies, which has been strongly influenced by the ‘national models’ approach. This term has been employed by scholars to refer to the different ‘philosophies’ or ‘cultures’ of migrant integration amongst Western states,which have exhibited a path-dependent manner (Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Schain 2008). Trying to explain the different modes of immigrant incorporation in a cross-national perspective, scholars have argued that integration policies are influenced by a nation’s self-understanding, political culture and identity. Thus, France has identified as a ‘republican’ country with a state-centric assimilationist model, Germany has been viewed as an ‘ethnocultural’ nation with ascriptive criteria for membership, and the Netherlands has been viewed as ‘multicultural’ with an open interpretation of belonging (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans 2010).

However, one problem with the national models framework is that in multilevel states, there is no ‘one’homogenous model of integration. Instead, there are several, which take place in different territorial locations. So, as Bloemraad (2013, 9) states, “Immigrants’ lives are very different in Berlin compared to a small town in Bavaria, despite their common locationin Germany.” Thus, in multi-level states it may be more compelling to refer to different regional models of integration within states (given regional jurisdiction inthis area) rather than national models.

Yet talk of path-dependency, be it at the national or regional level, has come under pressure due to certainchanges taking place in the European discourse on migration. Scholars have identified a ‘retreat of multiculturalism’ and the ‘return of assimilationism’ in

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integration policy – not only in individual nation-states, but across Western Europe as a whole in the last twenty years (Joppke, 2007; Ambrosini, 2012). State-specific path dependency – exemplified by France, Germanyand the Netherlands mentioned above – has given way to a general trend towards coercive civic integration policiesacross Europe (Joppke 2004; Goodman 2010). Immigration and integration policies have generally become more restrictive in all states, erecting harsher barriers for migrants to enter and naturalise in their host country ofchoice, and reducing the social, economic and politics rights of immigrants after they arrive.

Why have these changes occurred? This is where an analysis of the politics of immigration – and the role ofagency therein – becomes useful. While some have argued that ‘political parties have received relatively short shrift among students on the politics of migration’ (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove, 2006: 171), others have directly blamed changes in the party political landscape of western European states for an illiberal turn in migrant integration policies (Kriesi 2006). This bold assertion gives rise to the main research question of this paper: how have political parties shaped the pursuitof different models of integration? Have parties really had an effect on whether a nation-state has pursued an assimilationist or multicultural approach to migrant integration and citizenship? There are two diverse bodiesof literature that have sought to address this question. The first, to put it crudely, says that parties do matterin policymaking; the second indicates that their impact is less than we think.

The first set of theories derives from the study of political parties. The main question to have emerged in the parties literature is whether anti-immigrant parties – which haveseen a surge in electoral success in the last twenty years – have had any effect on migration policy. According to many scholars, they certainly have (Kriesi 2006; Helbling 2008; Mudde 2007; Koopmans et al 2012). For Kriesi (2006, 216), anti-immigrant parties have had aclear restrictive impact on migration policies, which he describes the ‘driving force’ behind the assimilationist

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turn in western European integration policies. Importantly, this ‘impact’ of anti-immigrant parties can take two forms: either a direct effect (i.e. government participation) or an indirect effect (i.e., influencing the positions of other parties in government) (Schain, 2006).

On the ‘direct effects’ of policymaking, Mudde (2007) argues that anti-immigrant parties’ ability to enter government coalitions gives them a powerful influence on policymaking. But these parties also have an‘indirect effect’ outside government. Numerous scholars have argued that these parties have had a significant impact on party competition, exerting a contagion effect on other parties of both the left and the right (Van Spanje 2010, Alonso and da Fonseca 2012, Odmalm and Bale 2014). For instance, through a large-scale quantitative analysis of the electoral strength of anti-immigrant parties on integration policies across ten EU states, Koopmans et al (2012, 1229) found that a high vote share of right-wing populist parties reduces levels of immigrant rights. They conclude that ‘populist parties have especially been successful in provoking restrictionsin the areas of naturalization and cultural rights. Theirincreased success during the 1990s, and even more so in the wake of September 11, 2001, has contributed importantly to the restrictive turn in immigrant rights policies’ (ibid, 1234). Based on these arguments, a firsthypothesis is that: H1 The rise of electorally salient anti-immigrant parties has, through direct and indirect effects, caused integration policies to be more restrictive.

This is a powerful argument. However, it has also been a bone of contention amongst scholars of migration studies. A competing body of literature posits that policymaking is resistant to major changes – such as partisan changes in government or the rise of anti-immigrant parties - and instead evolves incrementally (Boswell 2003; Thelen 2004; Freeman 1995; Geddes 2008). Immigration policy is subject to various institutional constraints that prevent governments from embarking on radical new programmes (Cetin 2012, Thelen, 2004). These constraints include pressures from employer groups, courts, migration lawyers, NGOs and pro-immigrant pressure groups (Freeman 1995; Boswell 2003). New

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governments that come in, even if they are of different political colours, simply work round existing programmes (Schickler, 2001). This was found by Banting and Kymlicka(2012) in an analysis of integration policies, which showed that multicultural programmes are being incrementally increased (despite the rhetorical backlash against multiculturalism and growth of anti-immigrant parties), alongside the development of new civic integration measures. Based on these theoretical considerations, we can hypothesise that: H2 Migrant integrationpolicymaking is resistant to major changes (i.e. partisan changes in government, rise of anti-immigrant parties) and evolves incrementally.

But before we test these hypotheses in the empiricalcases, there is a third perspective that needs to be taken into account. That is, the degree to which the ‘regional question’ has influenced migrant integration policies in multi-level states. A small body of literature has pointed out that ‘national models’ of integration do not necessarily hold at the substate level(Campomori, 2008; Manatschal 2010; Adam 2013; Caponio andCampomori, 2013; Scholten 2014). Substate regions have adopted their own ‘take’ on immigrant integration, which aligns with their territorial interests, distinct cultureand language and claims to autonomy (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014). However, there is an open question about whether substate actors adopt more restrictive approachesto protect distinct cultures from dilution by foreigners,or more open and tolerant approaches to legitimise the regionalist movement (Hepburn 2009). This gives rise to athird hypothesis: H3 Regionalism has an effect on migrant integration policymaking, causing it to be either (H3.1) more restrictive to protect regional cultures or (H3.2) more liberal to legitimise regionalist movements.

The remainder of this paper seeks to test these hypotheses in a qualitative and comparative analysis of the political discourse and policy on migrant integrationin two regions in Italy: Veneto and Sardinia. Both regions have claims to a distinct culture and identity, and substate nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) are active in both systems, making these cases highly comparable. However, while Veneto is characterised by oneof the wealthiest economies in Italy (and indeed Europe),high levels of immigration and a strong anti-immigrant

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regionalist party (Liga Veneta—LV), Sardinia is one of the poorest regions in Italy, with low levels of immigration and overwhelmingly pro-immigration regionalist parties.

The main research question guiding the analysis is: what is the impact of political parties on integration policymaking in substate regions? In particular, have anti-immigrant parties set the integration agenda (Kriesi2006), or if there is a disconnect between political ‘talk’ and policy ‘action’ on migrant integration (Boswell, 2003; Geddes 2008; Cetin 2010)? The expectationunder H1 would be that Veneto would have more restrictivepolicies on migrant integration than Sardinia owing to the strength of the Liga Veneta-Lega Nord. Under H2 the assumption is that both regions would be immune to the entry of anti-immigrant or regionalist parties in government. And under H3 we would expect the regions to develop distinctive models of integration in line with their territorial interests and regional identity.

In terms of methods and operationalization, ‘political discourse’ will be operationalised through an examination of the rhetoric and party programmes of political parties. Data collected includes: party manifestos and programmes from the leading mainstream, regionalist and anti-immigrant parties during regional and statewide elections; media analyses from regional newspapers and online sources; and a series of sixteen semi-structured elite interviews with party officials, third-sector organisations, academics, and government officials from Veneto and Sardinia conducted during April-June 2014. ‘Policymaking’ is the framing, design and development of government policy, which involves an examination of legislation and government programmes. Thetime period under consideration is the last decade, from 2004-2014. During this period, the government in Sardiniachanged from a centre-left/regionalist coalition (2004-2009) to a centre-right/regionalist coalition (2009-14), then back again (2014-); while in Veneto it changed from a centre-right-dominated coalition with regionalists (2005-10) to a regionalist-dominated coalition with the centre-right (2010-). This period allows us to analyse

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the direct and indirect effects that anti-immigrant and regionalist actors have on policymaking.

Immigration and Integration in ItalyBefore our analysis of Veneto and Sardinia, it is useful to consider the statewide context in which migration policy is debated and developed. Italy has arguably one of the poorest records on migrant integration in the European Union. According to Ambrosini and Caneva (2012, 2), Italy’s citizenship law is one of the ‘most restrictive in the EU15’. Citizenship is based on ius sanguinis and can only be obtained after 10 years of residence for third-country nationals. Immigrants are usually concentrated in the worst-paid sectors of the economy (Reyneri 2008, 113) and restrictive barriers to social benefits means that few immigrants are eligible toaccess the ‘familistic welfare regime’ (Naldini and Saraceno 2008). Furthermore, migrants have few political rights in Italy (Ambrosini and Caneva 2012). Taken together, these factors amount to a form of ‘second-class’ integration for migrants in Italy (Ambrosini, 2001).

This was not always the case. Italian legislation onmigration in the 1980s and 1990s exhibited a strongly economic rationale combined with a ‘light multicultural’ approach (Caponio and Zincone 2011, 15). Indeed, the Turco-Napolitano law of 1998, passed under the centre-left government, still forms the basis of integration in Italy, emphasising the social integration of migrants – including voluntary Italian language and culture courses,access to public services, anti-discrimination, and the adaptation of the host society. However, this approach changed radically from 2002 onwards when the centre-rightgovernment passed a new set of immigration laws that emphasised security, cultural assimilation and coercive integration, demonstrating that parties do matter in immigration policy-making at the statewide level.

The 2002 legislation in question, the Bossi-Fini law, involved ‘repressive measures’ aimed at reducing illegal immigration (including easing processes for deportation) and making it more difficult to enter Italy (Cetin 2012, 12). This law was made under the auspices of

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the new centre-right government headed by Silvio Berlusconi, with a strong policy design role for Berlusconi’s coalition partners: the anti-immigrant Lega Nord (LN—Northern League). Indeed, numerous authors have pointed to the dominant influence of the LN on the politics of immigration in Italy, both before and after they entered government in 2001 (Geddes 2008; Caponio andZincone 2011; Massetti, 2014). In particular, the LN was instrumental in creating the Security Package of 2008-11 that included a series of legislation that, as the name suggests, linked immigration to security concerns. The centre-right government also introduced a new ‘Integration Agreement’ in 2009, whereby newly arrived migrants were required to sign a document committing themto learn the Italian language and learn about Italian civic life and values. The Agreement lasts for 2 years, during which period the signatory had to accrue a sufficient number of ‘credits’ (through language courses,civic education courses, and so on) in order to fulfil integration requirements and avoid being deported (Caponio and Zincone, 2011). In tandem with increasing moves towards a coercive civic integration policy at the statewide level, Italy was also involved in a process of decentralising other aspects of integration policy towards the substate regions. Following a federal reform in 2001, the regions were endowed with greater control over economic and social (health, education, housing) aspects of immigrant integration. This opened up the possibility that regions could pursue different frames and policies of immigrant integration that diverged from each other, and from the state (Campomori and Caponio 2013). Indeed, scholars havequestioned whether a ‘national model’ of integration exists at all in Italy (Campomori, 2008; Ambrosini, 2012). Importantly, the Integration Agreement – implemented in 2012 – did not challenge regional authority on immigrant access to social benefits and other reception measures (Campomori and Caponio, 2013). However, the regions were also facing large cuts in social policy funds, exacerbated by the economic crisis, which limited what programmes they could offer. Let us now consider how regional actors in Veneto and Sardinia

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negotiated these various constraints in their developmentof an integration policy.

Migrant Integration in Veneto Veneto is one of the wealthiest regions in Italy. At the heart of the industrial districts of the north-east, Veneto is a pioneer of the ‘third Italy’ and the third richest region in Italy in terms of total GDP (Regione del Veneto, 2013).2 Veneto also has a strong cultural identity and language, dating back to its history of independent statehood as the Republic of Venice. When thepostwar constitution of Italy was created in 1948, many Venetians were frustrated not to have been given an autonomous special statute, unlike their neighbours in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Although the inhabitants of Venetowere acknowledged to comprise a ‘people’ in the region’s first statute (art. 2 law 340/1971) a regionalist movement – the Liga Veneta – emerged in the 1970s demanding self-determination (Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2000). In order to increase its electoral reach, the LV merged into the Lega Nord in 1991, whose shared demands were based on economic as much as identity-based arguments: regionalists wanted to put a stop to sending their hard-earned cash to corrupt officials in Rome (Giordano 1999). Despite some setbacks, Veneto regionalism has continued to gain momentum, with the LV-LN currently sitting in regional government. In March 2014, President of the Region Zaia (LV) gave support to an unofficial referendum on independence for Veneto, in which 89% of participants voted yes.3 Zaia quickly announced that he would follow up this result in the regional council. In June 2014 the Veneto Regional Council approved two bills: a proposal for increased autonomy for Veneto in the form of a special statute, andlegislation on an independence referendum.4

2 http://statistica.regione.veneto.it/ENG/Pubblicazioni/RapportoStatistico2013/Numeri.html3 Owing to concerns about the validity about the online poll, the Italian newspaper La Repubblica commissioned an independent poll by thecompany Demos, which found that 55% of Venetians want independence.4Nationalia (2014) ‘Veneto to hold one vote on independence, another one on increased autonomy’, 14 June 2014. Accessed at:

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What of Veneto’s immigration situation? Given its thriving economy of small and medium-sized enterprises, Veneto attracts one of the highest proportions of immigrants in Italy. According to the Regional Observatory on Immigration in Veneto, the number of immigrants in Veneto has increased from 25,000 in 1991 to500,000 in 2010 – now comprising over 10% of the regionalpopulation (Osservatorio 2011). The rapid increase in immigration has resulted in the region having the second highest number of immigrants after Lombardy (Osservatorio2013, 12). In particular, migrants are attracted to work in the industrial districts of Treviso, Vicenza, Verona and Padova (Osservatorio 2013, 14), which has been referred to as ‘civic Italy’ (Putnam, 1993; Cento Bull, 2000). Veneto’s thriving economy has provided labour migrants with high levels of stable employment. However, the ‘labour demand is in large proportion for dirty, difficult and demanding (DDD) jobs’ (Stocchiero 2002: 2),and there is a large number of undocumented migrants working in the black market.

Party Rhetoric on Migration in VenetoVeneto has experienced an extremely high degree of political polarisation on the issue of immigration. This is largely due to the electoral strength of the Liga Veneta-Lega Nord (LV-LN), which has made opposition to immigration its ‘signature issue’ (Woods 2010). The centrality of immigration is acknowledged in the Lega’s volume crema – the party’s handbook, which combines core ideology with party strategy (LN, 2012). As a result of the LN’s preoccupation with immigration and its many perceived problems, these issues have gained salience at the local, regional and national levels over the last twodecades. As one scholar maintains, ‘immigration has been central to the League’s politics in Veneto and the issue has been deemed a significant factor in the party’s conquest of local power in the region’ (Andall 2009: 238).

Veneto has traditionally been part of the ‘white’ political subculture that has characterised the centre-north of Italy (Trigilia, 1986). This refers to the

http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1908

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strength of the Catholic ideology, centred on the dominant Christian Democratic (DC) party. In Veneto, the party had a strong regionalist orientation, playing ‘the functional equivalent of an ethnic party’ (Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2000, 90). With the collapse of the Italian party system in the early 1990s, and with it the demise of the DC party, the LN sought to fill this gap by articulating a centre-right regionalist political subculture (Giordano 2000). To some extent, this has worked, as the LN has embedded itself in civil society and entered regional governments across the north of Italy – though usually in coalition with Berlusconi’s Popolo della Libertà (PdL)/Forza Italia (FI). In particular, the LV has been part of a centre-right coalition government in Veneto with PdL/FI since 2000, initially as a junior partner from 2000-2010, and from 2010 as the leading party in the coalition. In contrast, the political Left – currently represented by Partito Democratic del Veneto (PDV) – has historically been weak in Veneto, achieving on average 20% of vote in recent regional elections.5

The Lega Nord cannot be accused of mincing its wordson immigration. The party is firmly opposed to openings its doors to newcomers, whereby ‘mass immigration constitutes an invasion designed to break-up our society’(LN 2001, 24). The LN has been criticised for making ‘vulgar’ statements on immigration (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007), whereby it blames immigrants for crime, terrorism, the black market, stealing jobs and houses from locals, sponging off the state, trampling over Italian values, and undermining social cohesion (on the LN’s position on immigration, see Giordano 2000; McDonnell 1996; Geddes 1998; Zaslove, 2011; on its position in particular in Veneto, see Calavita 2005; Andall 2009). According to Calavita (2005: 130), the LN and its former leader Umberto Bossi have been the ‘political merchants of fear’in Italy, instrumentalising immigration to play upon, and

5 Figures, obtained from the Regional Council of Veneto’s Elections Observatory, include 12.3% for the DS in 2000; 29% for Ulivo in 2005;20% for the PD in 2010. See: http://doc989.consiglioveneto.it/oe/resources/report_oe_elezioni_politiche_2013_veneto.pdf.

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shape, public anxieties about rapidly increasing flows ofimmigration and their effects on society.

Looking at the party rhetoric, it is clear that the LN is (1) more focussed on immigration control (that is, the number of migrants allowed in to the country) rather than integration (how newcomers are incorporated into society), and (2) it is more focussed on illegal immigration than regular flows. For instance, in 1998, the Lega Nord warned against ‘a new criminality that increasingly speaks with a foreign accent, expropriates our own citizens from their territory, depriving them of their freedom and tranquillity’ (cited in Zaslove 2004: 104). In response, the LN organised a demonstration against illegal immigration in Bergamo (LN 2000, 3), while in Veneto, the Mayor of Treviso ‘proposed to dress up immigrants as hares ‘and declare open season’, and to deport illegal immigrants ‘in sealed wagons’ (cited in Zincone 2006: 357–8). Leader Umberto Bossi continued withthe ‘vulgar’ language in 2002, stating that canons shouldbe fired at boats carrying illegal immigrants to Sicily (Geddes 2008; Woods 2010). In subsequent party discourse,the overwhelming focus has been on illegal immigration, including its 2009 ‘Proposals and Objectives’ document that highlighted ‘the sad phenomenon of clandestinità and allof the degrading and criminal situations that are often linked to this’ (LN, 2009, 9).

However, while the LN is obsessed with illegal immigration, less attention is paid to the integration oflegal migrants. In 1990 former LN leader Umberto Bossi blustered that ‘the blackest of the black should have thesame rights as my next-door neighbour. But in his own home’ (cited in McDonnell 2006). The LN much prefers to see the return migration of Veneto descendants from LatinAmerica (LV-LN 2004). As Zaslove (2004: 105) argues, the LN believes that ‘if and when immigrants must be accepted…those who are able to integrate culturally must be given priority’ and those of Venetian descent are particularly encouraged to come ‘home’. Yet something oddis happening in more recent rhetoric on migrant integration. In 2009 the LN articulated a surprisingly moderate view on integration, which the party said ‘should be understood as a ‘process intended to promote

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the coexistence of Italian and foreign citizens, and their mutual engagement and participation in the economiclife and social and cultural development of society’ (LN 2009, 10). The Veneto branch went one (considerable) stepfurther in recognising the multiple benefits of regular migration in its 2010 ‘programme for government’ for the Veneto elections (LV-LN, 2010). It is worth quoting the passage in full:

‘Legal immigration brings variety and advantages to all types of local economies because it compensates for structural deficiencies that the local communityis itself unable to overcome, and therefore the phenomenon of immigration must be valorised and analysed from the point of view of the opportunitiesthat it provides the economic system. For Veneto, this manifests itself in the supply of unskilled labor, in re-balancing the population rate (to compensate for the drop in the local population), and in maintaining levels of the population active in the labour market (in the presence of a rapidly ageing population). These are all factors or motors of development caused by ‘diversity’ and which constitute a richness for future generations, as well as representing an expression of international openness for the Veneto from a socioeconomic point of view.’ (Liga Veneta-Lega Nord 2010, 63)

This astonishing rhetorical u-turn reveals that the LV has done what the mainstream Lega ‘still refuses even to consider, i.e. the idea that immigration is economically necessary’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005, 962). Moreover, the Veneto branch has recognised that immigration is a demographic necessity, something that the media and centre-right have pushed off the agenda in Veneto. Indeed, the LV’s position on integration sounds uncannily similar to that of its centre-right partner, FI/PdL, which has a strong economic interest in increasedregular migration, but is opposed to irregularity (Geddes2008: 351). For the centre-right, ‘The freedom of movement of people across the planet is a natural right. But every society has just as strong a right to protect

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its own interests, their own identity, their own future... The best way to prevent the possible spread of xenophobic sentiments is a serious control illegal immigration’ CdL (2001: xii). In contrast, the Partito Democratico Veneto (PDV) strongly favours the creation ofa diverse Venetian society. In 2010, the PDV convened a Forum on Immigration, committing itself to ‘constructing a new Veneto community, the fruits of exchange between the receiving community (with their own history, traditions, cultures, attitudes, cooking…) and the community that is received. We are trying to go our ‘own way’, because the new community must be constructed in the civic space, with shared duties’ (PDV 2010, 2).

This analysis of party competition and rhetoric reveals that immigration is a strong cleavage in Veneto politics. But whilst the main focus has been on illegal immigration (a competence of the state), fewer battle-lines have been drawn on the issue of integration (a competence of the region), which has received considerably less attention. One explanation is that the LN must not alienate the powerful pro-economic immigration interests of northern industry (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). This may account for why the LV-LN tends to ignore issues related to regular migration (and more recently, to acknowledge the economic benefits thereof), and instead focus on the more fear-inducing phenomenon of clandestinità. Another explanation is that ‘blaming immigrants became an easy way of attracting electoral support’ (Cetin 2012, 9). The focus on illegal migration allows parties to exploit public attitudes, whereby ‘the [Liga Veneta] manipulate and feed anti-immigration sentiments in order to create an imagined common Veneto identity, and with it, the idea of the defense of ‘their’ territory’ (interview with Veneto Lavoro official, 7 June 2014). So how does this polariseddiscourse affect policy development on integration?

Integration Policy in VenetoAs part of several regional coalition governments in Veneto (from 1994-5 and 2000-2015), the LV-LN has had been able to exert both direct and indirect effects on policymaking in the Veneto. While the LV’s rhetoric

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focuses on the link between criminality and immigration, in the world of integration policymaking they must work on less contentious issues of schooling, professional training and healthcare within the parameters of the coalition government’s policy programme In fact, one senior civil servant in the Veneto migration department argues that there is a great deal of consensus once parties are in government: ‘all of the parties in the centre-right giunta are agreed on integration; they all want more integration and inclusion, which is better and seen as a resources of society’ (interview with the author, 29 April 2014). This is reflected in LV-LN President Luca Zaio’s comments that ‘Veneto is a land of welcome for those who want to learn about our culture, integrate into our community, learn the language, work bythe rules, and pay taxes’ (Osservatorio 2011, 5).

Veneto’s policies on migrant integration – implemented by the centre-right and the LV-LN - have beenconsidered highly successful by national standards. According to the annual indices on migrant integration inItaly published by the National Council for Economics andLabour (CNEL), Veneto is regularly ranked as one of the top three regions in Italy for high levels of integration(CNEL 2005, 2007, 2010). Indeed, in 2005, Veneto was placed in number-one spot, enjoying the highest levels ofintegration for the migrant population’ (CNEL 2005). Former President Giancarlo Galan (PdL) put the accolade down to the ‘collective effort of an entire region and its social and economic institutions, on the basis of itsvalues and traditions …they have demonstrated an ability to work well for the quality of integrating new citizens from third countries’ (cited in Osservatorio 2005, 9).

The CNEL reports measure the conditions that favour the welcoming of immigrants in the social and economic spheres, and assess the potential for migrant integrationin each region. The CNEL attributes Veneto’s success to its economic dynamism:

‘it is only partially surprising to find the Veneto region in the first place, which is at the “peak” ofthe rich and productive northeast and considered… asone of the “locomotives of Italy” mainly due to the

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leading role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the manufacturing industry … the Veneto… was for an immigrant, still the most promising context in terms of achieving their integration’ (CNEL 2005, 31-3)

CNEL’s conclusion is that integration ‘takes place mainlywhere there is economic growth’ (ibid, 33). Veneto has the highest potential for employment, and labour migrantswho have lived elsewhere in Italy believe that the Venetoalso offers one of the most advanced models of local citizenship (Andall, 2009). Furthermore, the region also has one of the highest rates of permissions, thereby ‘indicating a higher immigrant stability and social integration’ (Stocchiero 2002: 2).

How has Veneto achieved this enviable status? Each year the Regional Council of Veneto produces an annual plan on migrant integration, the strategy of which is informed by their Triannual Guidelines on Immigration. The plans identify the main priorities for the year, and allocate funds to each sector, whereby the detailed design and implementation of policies is devolved to local authorities. By far the most important priortity islabour market integration, but significant attention is also paid to housing, social services, healthcare, children’s integration in schools and, in recent years, more emphasis has been put on fostering inter-cultural mediation.6

Furthermore, Veneto spends a large amount (in relative Italian terms) on migrant integration. Over the period of analysis, the budget for integration has rangedfrom €3.5million (in 2008) to €6.8million (in 2003), on average amounting to about €5million per annum. The Regional Council has also made a substantial investment (€250,000 per year) in a Veneto Regional Observatory on Immigration, which undertakes detailed analytical research on migration trends within the region.

The region’s definition of its integration priorities has varied only slightly under the period under study. Indeed, according to one Veneto politician,

6 See the annual plans of integration 2004-2013 and the triennial plans 2004-6, 2007-9, 2009-11.

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‘There has been no change in integration policy during the change in the coalition government between the PdL and the LV’ (interview with Stefano Fracasso, 30 April 2014). The primary focus has been on strengthening the legality of flows (therefore excluding irregular migrantsfrom integration measures), the pursuit of social cohesion, emigration rates of return, and structural (economic) factors, which pervades all programmes duringthe period (see Regione del Veneto, 2004). Yet the tone has changed over the years, with the derogatory language ‘extracomunitari’ being dropped after 2003 (see also Campomori and Caponio, 2014), and a greater emphasis on the value of migrants. For instance, the region has recently sought to ‘promote the integration of immigrantslegally residing in the regional territory as a constituent element and valuable resource in the transition from economic crisis to recovery’ (Regione delVeneto, 2010, 4).

Furthermore, while in the early 2000s, Veneto clearly pursued a strong labour-market focussed approach to migrant integration, which treated immigrants as individuals (with regard to housing and vocational training), from the mid-2000s there is more attention to the sociocultural aspects of integration, such as the integration of migrant children in schools and inter-cultural mediation. Zincone and Caponio (2006, 12) describe these two approaches as ‘individual integration’and ‘collective recognition’. Traditionally, Veneto fell squarely into the ‘individual-focussed’ integration camp,with its focus on housing, employment and vocational training, which received the lion’s share of funds (Campomori and Caponio, 2014). However, with its new budget lines for schooling, language support, and cultural mediation, Veneto has moved towards a parallel (though secondary) group-based approach.

However, there still remain a number of restrictive,coercive and discriminatory aspects to Veneto integrationpolicy that are not entirely captured in the CNEL indices. The most notable of these is the region’s support – which runs parallel to its integration activities – for the return of migrants to their country oforigin. Veneto has put a large sum of money aside to

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support projects that re-insert migrants back into their countries of origin (i.e. Regione del Veneto, 2007, 7). Several scholars have noted the paradoxical nature of theVeneto region welcoming and integrating (economic) migrants on one hand, and encouraging them to leave with the other (Andall, 2009; Campomori and Caponio 2013). Second is the ethnically-driven approach of privileging Venetian return migrants over all other categories in granting access to certain social benefits, which was nevertheless stopped in 2004 (see Campomori and Caponio, 2013).

Third are the unsavoury aspects of integration policies being pursued by local governments, which includesremoving park benches from parks so that immigrants couldnot congregate there (in the centre-right controlled townof Vicenza – see Campomori, 2008). Local authorities, which have a large degree of autonomy in implementing integration measures, have often diverged from the integration principles laid down by regional plans (interviews with Fracasso, Bottacin). Finally, in Veneto we see an emphasis on coercive integration – imposed by the Italian Integration Pact – in particular, the need for immigrants to learn the Italian language. There have also been LV-LN proposals for immigrants to learn the Veneto language, which remains largely a spoken dialect and may act as a barrier to integration (interview with civil servant, 29 April 2014). In short, the main theme in the Veneto regional integration model is ‘you can come, but you must abide by our rules’. This view was underlined by Daniel Stival, LV Minister of Migration, when he referred to, on one hand, ‘the tradition of hospitality that has always characterized the people of Veneto, on the other hand the awareness on the part of the foreigner to be in a region and in a country with itsown traditions, its own culture, its own laws, and to understand and respect them’ (cited in Osservatorio 2013,5).

There are several reasons why the Veneto regional government may pursue a relatively moderate integration policy despite containing anti-immigrant parties. One is the effect of social organisations, such as the Catholic Church, trades unions and immigrant associations, which

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have acted as powerful advocates of immigrants and government lobbies (Campomori, 2008). In particular, the government is subject to pressure from powerful industrial groups (Stocchiero, 2002: 6). As Albertazzi and McDonnell (2005, 962) note, ‘the industrialists of the party’s north-eastern heartland have campaigned for larger visa quotas and more immigrant labour’ and the Veneto government would be foolhardy to turn its back on them them. Another factor may be the general moderating effect that government incumbency has on radical-right parties, which was clearly seen in the LV’s changing discourse. As Ambrosini and Caneva (2012, 88) argue, ‘Unlike those who think the Northern League is racist, the party is in favour of the integration of immigrants but only under certain conditions, i.e. immigrants have to respect Italian rules and laws’.

Migrant Integration in SardiniaDespite being an island that lies 500miles west off the Italian coast in the centre of the Mediterranean, Sardinia has been classified as part of the mezzogiorno – the Italian south. It is also one of the five regions in Italy that enjoys special recognition of its distinctiveness as a separate people. In the 1948 ItalianConstitution, Sardinia was granted a Statuto Speciale owing tothe strength of the nationalist movement in the pre-war era (Hepburn, 2010). Yet it is also one of the poorest regions in the country, whereby the island was granted a unique commitment from the Italian state to the ‘economicand social renaissance of the island’ (Clark, 1996). Sardinia’s economic dependence on Rome fuelled networks of political patronage throughout the postwar years, which have been heavily criticised by its fragmented nationalist movement.

Sardinia’s weak economic position has resulted in high levels of emigration and low levels of immigration. According to CNEL reports, Sardinia has the lowest numberof immigrants per capita in the whole of Italy (CNEL, 2013). The total immigrant population in Sardinia accounts for only 2.3% (compared to 7.5% nationally), though this number of higher in some cities, reaching 6-10% in Cagliari and Olbia (Cagliari Province, 2011; CNEL,

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2013). At the same time, while Sardinia has experienced low levels of immigration relative to the rest of Italy, there has still been an increase on the island over time.With the approval of the Bossi-Fini law on immigration in2002, the number of foreign residents in Sardinia more than tripled within a decade, from 11,686 to 37,853 (Centro Studi e Ricerca Idos, 2011).

The Bossi-Fini law also changed migration patterns to Sardinia, with an increase in the number of people arriving from Eastern Europe (the largest groups of immigrants in Sardinia come from Romania (26%), followed by Morocco, Senegal, China and Ukraine). Immigrants tend to be concentrated in three provinces – Cagliari and Sassari (the island’s main cities) and Olbia Tempio in the north. As Sardinia does not boast a strong industrialsector, foreign residents tend to be employed in the tourism sector, commercial services (legal and illegal, i.e. street trading) and domestic services, where employment is ‘precarious and seasonal’ (Gentileschi, 2003). In particular, the recent economic crisis has madethe economy even more unstable and ‘has changed the general attitude towards immigrants in a negative way, who are increasingly accused of taking jobs from Sardinians and/or are invited to return to their country of origin, given that there is not enough jobs even for Sards’ (interview with Carla Turacchi, Cosas, 7 June 2014). This lies at the heart of the problem of immigration to Sardinia; newcomers are arriving to look for jobs in an already structurally weak labour market, which contrasts significantly with the thriving industries of Veneto. Furthermore, Sardinia – unlike Veneto – is becoming an increasingly attractive ‘point ofentry’ for immigrants fleeing conflict in North Africa. Sardinia now has a reception centre in Elmas, near Cagliari airport, with plans to build more centres acrossthe island (interview with Alessandro Columbu, 6 June 2014).

Party Rhetoric on Migration in SardiniaDespite the fact that ‘even in Sardinia, there are attitudes of fear towards immigration’ (interview with Ilenia Ruggiu, 4 June 2014), in political terms the

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island has experienced low levels of polarisation on immigration. Indeed, issues of immigration (control, irregular, integration) have barely registered in Sardinian political discourse. Where it has received someattention is in the discourse of substate regionalist andnationalist parties (SNRPs), which have generally articulated a positive stance (see iRS 2010; Partito dei Sardi, 2014; ProgReS, 2014; Murgia, 2014). Other mainstream parties in Sardinia have also maintained sympathetic attitudes to immigration. For instance, the centre-left Partito Democratico Sardegna (PD Sardegna) welcomesand supports newcomers to integrate into society on the basis of equal opportunities (Pigliaru, 2014). Even the centre-right Forza Italia Sarda (FI Sarda) acknowledges the importance of immigration for the Sardinian labour market(Cappellacci, 2014). To a great extent, the Sardinian party system has escaped the highly polarising dynamic ofimmigration at the Italian statewide level, which is replicated in Veneto.

The individuality of the Sardinian political system,which contains a number of small substate regionalist andnationalist parties, an autonomous and a currently ‘small-n’ nationalist centre-left PD party, a centre-right party (FI) that perceives itself as a Sardinian party (Hepburn, 2010) and no significant Lega Nord presence, means that many political and policy issues – including immigration – are seen through a territorial lens. Indeed, immigration is strongly tied to the island’s self-perception as a small, historically diverse, and welcoming nation. As one party official maintains, ‘the prevailing feeling among the Sardinian parties is one of tolerance, openness and a willingness to welcome others. The positions are different among the Italian parties’ (interview with Alessandro Columbu, 6 June 2014). The parties who advocate the most liberal andpositive approach to immigration are the SNRPs. This party family includes: the Partito Sardo d’Azione (the oldest nationalist party, which has recently been in coalition with the centre-right); the iRS (a younger independence-seeking party), the Partito dei Sardi (whichsplit from iRS and is currently in coalition government with the centre-left) and the left-leaning ProgReS

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Progetu Republica (which made an independentist bid for the regional presidency in 2014).

In addition, a regionalist centre-left movement called Sardegna Insieme (Sardinia Together), which brought together centre-left parties under the leadership of media baron Renato Soru, entered (and exited) Sardinian politics in the 2000s. When Soru won the regional election in 2004, the movement was renamed Progetto Sardegna (PS) and over the following years it initiated afar-reaching programme of economic reform and cultural recognition (see Hepburn, 2009, 2010). PS also articulated a strongly pro-immigration position, seeking to provide support for immigrants ‘which could allow a dignified stay for those in transit in our region, and atthe same time ensure the integration of those who stay here permanently. This requires real efforts at cultural acceptance, interventions aimed to improve relations withthe mother country, and educational assistance to the children of residents [and] labour market incorporation, on equal terms as native Sardinians’ (Soru, 2004: 65).

The three younger nationalist parties – iRS, Partitodei Sardi and ProgRes – have also taken an overwhelminglypositive approach to immigration, valuing the international linkages and cultural richness that immigration brings to Sardinia. Theirs is an overtly ‘civic’ brand of nationalism, which supports multiculturalism and is wary of overtures to ethnicity. For instance, an iRS spokesperson stated that: ‘inclusiveness is the basis upon which we do politics; for us, whoever comes from outside is considered a resource… for us, the idea of immigration is viewed as anabsolute asset’ (interview with Ornella Demuro, 12 July 2010).

This view, of immigration as a resource for Sardinia, is also echoed by the Partito dei Sardi, which seeks to create a ‘cosmopolitan form of independence, which is based on social inclusiveness and multiculturalism; an independent Sardinia that recognisesboth internal and external diversity…a Sardinia for everyone’ (interview with Franciscu Sedda, 16 June 2014).This positive perception of immigration tallies with the party’s open interpretation of Sardinian identity:

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‘Identity is not given by either history or traditions, but by design and the political and civil pact that a person makes to make sense of the past, the present and the future’ (Partito dei Sardi, 2014: 5), thereby firmly warding off any accusations of ethnic exclusivism. The other young autonomist party, ProgReS Progetu Republica, takes a similar stance, declaring that:

‘we are culturally open, socially inclusive and opposed to nationalism, if that nationalism is basedon ethnic discrimination ... We reject any form of cultural essentialism, any imposition of a rigid andstatic identity, preferring instead a sense of belonging and a common dynamic process of collectiveidentification’ (ProgRes, 2014: unpaginated). 7

ProgRes are supportive of the diversity that immigration brings, and they also believe that newcomers should be able to adopt the Sardinian identity: ‘From our point of view, it should be possible [for an immigrant] to become Sardinian due to the will of the individual. We have to overcome the legacies of legal ius soli and jus sanguinis, whichare both obsolete’ (interview with Alessandro Columbu, 6 June 2014). ProgRes supported the presidential campaign of the novelist Michela Murgia in the 2014 regional elections, who received 10% of the vote. Murgia’s position is very similar to the nationalist parties described above, arguing that ‘we want to welcome people and plan cohabitation, knowingly increasing cultural, social and economic interactions... In the future it willnot be blood or soil that determines membership, but the free choice of the people. We call it “jus voluntatis”’ (Murgia, 2014: 35-36).

Breaking from the ranks somewhat, the only SNRP party that has made negative overtones about immigration has been the Psd’Az, which was recently in coalition withthe right-wing Forza Italia Sarda. While this author has been unable to find any references to immigration in Psd’Az party programmes, a news release on the party’s website gives some indication of its position. In a pieceentitled ‘Importing Foreign Workers’ (Psd’Az, 2012), 7 http://progeturepublica.net/manifesto/

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National Secretary of the Psd’Az Giovanni Angelo Colli was quoted as saying ‘It is really a shame that major companies like E.On and Valtur have only thought to bringworkers from Germany and Romania to Sardinia’. The party criticises the decision to deprive Sardinians of jobs by bringing in foreigners, revealing an economic protectionist position with regard to immigration. What of the immigration positions of regional branches of statewide parties? Former assessor in the Progetto Sardegna government, Francesco Pigliaru, won thepresidency of the region in the 2014 regional elections for the PD Sardegna. Unsurprisingly, given his involvement in the Soru government’s immigration plans in2004-9, Pigliaru dedicated the greatest amount of attention to immigration in his campaign. And unlike manyother parties, he focussed specifically on integration policy. His approach is broadly supportive of immigrationand cultural diversity:

‘The Region of Sardinia…has a duty to promote and protect fundamental rights related to the living conditions and health of foreigners arriving in our territory, whether they are regular or irregular… The difficulties related to diversity … are often aninsurmountable barrier to access to educational, social, health and employment services. The result is the placement of these individuals in a state of social marginality, squalor and degradation …. Looking at the multi-ethnic reality of our region itis necessary … to promote and/or enhance the services of reception, information and guidance, giving cultural mediators a formal recognised role in supporting various aspects of social and health networks’ (Pigliaru, 2014: 28).

Meanwhile, Pigliaru’s centre-right opponent from Forza ItaliaSarda, former President of the Region (2009-2014) Ugo Capellaci, was generally silent on integration in his campaign, with the exception of some references to the need to improve the welfare of immigrants and other vulnerable groups (Capellaci, 2014: 35). One reason why FI Sarda takes a more moderate position on immigration

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and integration (and in contrast to the Italian FI) may be due to the ‘tradizione Sarda’ of the party and also due to the strong Catholic component of the party, which is sympathetic to the needs of vulnerable groups (interview with Francesco Sedda, 16 June 2014). Furthermore, while there may be a growing uncertainty amongst the public on immigration, interviewees indicatedthis is not on the same scale as other parts of Italy; there are few social tensions and a perception that integration has worked well (interviews with Franciscu Sedda, Columbu). Unlike Veneto, parties have not sought to capitalise on public concerns about increasing migratory flows; instead they have expressed a tradition of openness and island hospitality.

Integration Policy in SardiniaLet us put Sardinia’s levels of integration into nationalcontext. Drawing on CNEL data, in the year that Veneto came first amongst all regions in Italy for its successful levels of migrant integration, Sardinia came near the bottom of the list – 17th out of 20 (CNEL, 2005: 22). Along with Sicily, it also had the lowest number of long-term immigrants, in terms of length of residence (ibid, 117), it was near the bottom of the list for labour market absorption, and it experienced high levels of unemployment and immigrant homelessness (CNL, 2005). On the plus side, Sardinia often came at the top of the list for high levels of immigrant entrepreneurship, schooling and citizenship acquisition (CNEL 2005, 2007). By 2010, Sardinia had dropped in the regional rankings, in particular with regard to social integration and job placements (CNEL, 2010; Province of Cagliari, 2001) but in 2013, it rose to an impressive 7th place across Italy for general levels of integration (CNEL, 2013: 11).

One explanation for these recent improvements is theamount of funds earmarked for migrant integration, which has steadily risen over the years. In 2004, €341,000 was allocated in the annual plan for integration, which was to be divided between only 4 provinces (€40,000 each) and‘projects’ led by the region, including funding for an international conference on migrant integration (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, 2004). In 2006, this amount

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increased to €1million, with €37,500 given to all 8 provinces in Sardinia, and regional projects focusing on social integration and cultural exchanges (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, 2006). Finally, from 2007 onwards (until 2013) the amount was increased to €1.2m.8

The most useful documents for gauging Sardinia’s integration approach include the Regional Law 24/12/1990 nr 46, the ‘Regulation to Protect the Promotion of the Living Conditions of non-E.U. workers in Sardinia,’ whichprovides an overarching framework for regulating and targeting interventions in order to guarantee equal rights and adequate living conditions for third-country nationals on the island. This law was passed under the centre-right Sardinian Christian Democrat government of Mario Floris. In addition, the Sardinian regional councilalso produces annual guidelines on integration, and it has released one set of substantive three-year guidelineson integration for 2006-8. The triennial guidelines were developed by the centre-left Progetto Sardegna government ofRenato Soru and still remain the primary document on migrant integration principles in Sardinia. Recent annualplans – developed by centre-right FI/Psd’Az governments –explicitly build upon the ‘principles that inspired the 2006-8 Triennial Guidelines’ that were framed and produced by the centre-left PS government (see Regione della Sardegna, 2012, 2).

The aim of the 1990 Regional Law is to ‘promote interventions that ensure the equal treatment of foreign workers and their families compared to that of other inhabitants of the region’ (Art. 3). The law was ‘inspired by the fundamental principles of equality, social solidarity and cooperation’ (Art. 2), and it outlines the rights of non-EU immigrants to educational services, professional training, health services, social services, labour rights, and access to benefits. In particular, the law focuses on the cultural integration of migrants, schooling, preparation of migrants for the labour market, and ‘knowledge of the languages and

8 For more details, please see the annual plans for integration published by the Autonomous Region of Sardinia for 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 when the amount allocated was €1.2m and the plan for 2013, when the amount decreased slightly to €1m.

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cultures of Sardinia in order to improve communication with the social fabric’ of the island (Art. 6). The law also created a Council on Immigration, comprised of representatives from government, migrant associations andthe third sector and unions, in order to advise on integration policy priorities. This organisation lay defunct for several years, but was resuscitated in 2014 by the new centre-left Minister of Labour in the Pigliarugovernment.

Within the parameters of the Regional Law, which outlines a generally positive approach to integration, the triennial and annual reports specify funding priorities. In particular, the 2006-8 Triennial Guidelines (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, 2006) offer the most comprehensive account of the region’s approach:

‘The primary objectives of immigration are to encourage immigrants’ complete integration into the local social fabric in all its aspects and on all levels: civil, political and cultural. The immigration process is also closely linked to self-sufficiency, or social autonomy and the freedom to autonomously participate in civil life. This is clearly a bi-directional process that involves the foreigner as well as the attitudes of the adoptive society, its citizens, their structures and their organizations’ (ibid, 25).

The main priorities of the centre-left Sardinian regionalgovernment for 2006-8 are listed as the following: accessto information and strengthening services, housing, employment, cultural integration, and access to social and health services. In the realm of housing, the regional government guarantees a security deposit fund toassist migrant access to the public and private housing market (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, 2006, 28). On employment matters, the regional government intervenes every year to try and increase quotas for non-EU workers in order to meet labour demand. In particular, the regionemphasises professional training as ‘an effective tool tobreak the professional segregation and workplace ethnicisation mechanisms that are often involved when placing the alien worker in the workplace’ (ibid, 29) and

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it focuses special attention on interventions that encourage entrepreneurship, such as facilitating dialogue, providing access to finance and start-up support services.

Possibly the greatest emphasis, however, is on cultural and social integration. The region strongly promotes knowledge of the Italian language as ‘a fundamental tool for the process of integrating migrants into the socio-economic fabric of the host country’ and in order to facilitate inter-cultural integration, the region stipulates that migrant communities require ‘scholastic tutoring for students; setting up offices that encourage the participation of new citizens for free; spaces dedicated to integration and diversity education (ibid, 30-31). In particular, the centre-right government of 2009-14 introduced ‘study grants’ for immigrants to attend university (Regione della Sardegna, 2012) and projects of cultural mediation to address ‘the difficulties of social integration expressed by immigrants’ (Regione della Sardegna, 2013). Unlike Veneto, support is also provided for irregular migrants, who are guaranteed ‘at least one informal access point inat least one district’ (Regione della Sardegna, 2006, 31). Meanwhile a steady amount of funds has been earmarked by both centre-left and centre-right governments for immigrant associations (usually about €150,000) and for the Regional Observatory on Immigration(between €50,000-100,000).

What is also noticeable in the region’s integration plans is the strong emphasis places on the role of the third sector and municipal authorities. In particular, the triennial guidelines highlight the important role charitable organisations such as Caritas play in integration processes. As one party official commented, ‘in Sardinia many integration outcomes depend on the quality of the third sector’s interventions, which effectively compensates for the lack of public policy’ (interview with Columbu, 6 June 2014). Aside from charities, the region emphasis the ‘central role’ of local governments (Regione della Sardegna, 2012), giving them considerable autonomy in designing and implementing integration interventions, as long as they meet the

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priorities outlined in the 2006-8 triennial plan (i.e., labour market integration, educational initiatives, improving access to information). And in contrast to Veneto, where some municipalities have often implemented discriminatory policies against immigrants (Calavita 2005; Campomori, 2008), in Sardinia local authorities arestrongly supportive of immigrants. For instance, Cagliariand Sassari have organised cultural festivals (such as ETNIKA) that celebrate the cultural presence of immigrants. Cagliari has also created a Council for Migrants, composed of representatives elected by migrants, which advises on municipal integration policy.

However, despite these positive overtures, there aresignificant structural problems with migrant integration policy in Sardinia. The most glaring problem is the lack of a consistent, comprehensive and updated approach to integration. According the founding director of Cosas, a voluntary organisation for immigrants, ‘we have always lacked, even in the last 15 years, a programmatic design of planned activities aimed at a proper recognition and integration of migrants. And so there have been no serious policies on immigration on the part of institutions, even if several things have been done, but always in a piecemeal and unremarkable fashion. There is no Sardinian model of integration’ (interview with Carla Turacchi, 7 June 2014). This lack of a Sardinian model contrasts sharply with the Veneto, which has developed its own meticulously planned model of integration. It hasalso resulted in a number of problems for immigrant incorporation on the island. First, there is simply not enough attention given to immigrant needs by the regionalgovernment. While the Regional Council published annual plans, none of these are particularly detailed on what issues they want to tackle, and all of them are noticeably concise (at least, in comparison to the Venetoplans). The Sardinian government is still using the triennial guidelines from over a decade ago, which preceded the tremendous changes in migration patterns brought on by the Arab Spring and the subsequent shift toan ‘emergency’ approach to refugees. This perception is confirmed by lawyer Ilenia Ruggiu: ‘I do not think there is a specific discourse of integration for immigrants;

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they are mostly ignored. The law is not specific on integration and it tends to delegate the effective management of integration to the third sector’ (interview, 4 June 2014). Herein lies the second problem – the overwhelming delegation of integration policy to the third sector and local governments, which have limited resources to effectively address the needs of immigrants and the receiving society to effect proper integration. In particular, civil society organisations such as Caritas have been the principal actors involved in emergency relief, with a focus on providing temporary accommodation, food and relief, which was not envisaged by the government’s 2006-8 triennial plan.

So while in Sardinia, immigrants may have escaped anenvironment of racism and intolerance that is evident in other regions such as Veneto, they face other perhaps more significant structural barriers, namely the lack of a comprehensive and cohesive plan of integration to ease their way into society and the weak labour market. While Sardinian parties have articulated a positive discourse of the value and contributions of immigrants, this has not translated into providing greater structural support for immigrants to integrate into Sardinia’s economic and social life.

Comparing the Cases As the previous analysis has shown, the weight given to the issue of immigration and integration is diametricallyopposed in Sardinia and Veneto. In Veneto, immigration isthe number one issue on the political agenda, and is pervasive in party programmes and media analysis. Meanwhile, in Sardinia one has to use a fine tooth-comb to find any references to immigration in party political discourse. Party competition on immigration is also worlds apart: in Veneto the tone of political debates aresharply negative and ‘vulgar’; in Sardinia parties are generally, though quietly, positive.

Yet despite these contrasting political contexts, the policy outcomes have not been what one might expect. In Veneto, despite the anti-immigrant LV-LN being in centre-right coalition governments for last 15 years, it has one of the best integration records in Italy,

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encouraging migrants from other regions in Italy seeking to settle there (Andall, 2009). So while there are stronganti-immigrant parties in Veneto, ‘the actual integrationof migrants is very high’ (interview with Diego Bottacin,30 April 2014). In contrast, despite positive party rhetoric on immigration in Sardinia, this island region also has one of the poorest integration records in Italy,with the lack of a cohesive approach resulting in considerable structural problems for immigrants to overcome (interview with Turacchi, 7 June 2014). How do we explain this variation?

Variation in party discourse is linked to the diverse regional political cultures in Veneto and Sardinia and, embedded within this, the orientation of regionalist movements. In Veneto the LV-LN has expressed an ethnic and ‘nativist’ form of nationalism (Zaslove, 2011) that constructs the Veneto nation on the basis of ascriptive criteria of belonging. Meanwhile, Sardinian nationalist parties have emphasised the ‘civic’ nature oftheir claims to self-determination, and have broadly welcomed the benefits that cultural diversity and immigration brings. Regionalist actors also operate within diverse political cultures: in Veneto the LV-LN has emerged within a strongly white and Catholic dominated political subculture, and has sought to win thevotes of a largely conservative electorate. In Sardinia, nationalist parties have focussed on making a break with the patronage-bound political culture of Sardinian politics, but have not been required to position themselves in one or another ideological camps (see Hepburn, 2009). So while the LV-LN is tied to the right’sposition, Sard parties are freer to make their own choices (leading to the Psd’Az’s protectionist stance andthe other parties’ far more positive approaches).

Variation in policy approaches may be explained by structural and institutional factors. These include the size of the immigrant population, the strength of labour market and resources of regional governments. One of the reasons that immigration is high on the political agenda in Veneto is because of the high and rising numbers of immigrants that have settled in the region, which have led to public concerns and vast media coverage. In

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contrast, Sardinia has experienced lowest numbers of migrants, which has not become a key public/media concern. Related to this, one of the reasons immigrants have flocked to Veneto is because of the booming industrial sector, by all accounts, migrants have been well-integrated into the regional labour market. Meanwhile, Sardinia suffers from one of the weakest economy in Europe, where local residents, as well as immigrants, are struggling to gain jobs. This partially explains the low levels of integration on the island; as CNEL (2013, 115) noted, Sardinia’s poor integration record should be ‘interpreted in light of the difficulties that these regions attest to its ability to create jobs and/or absorb immigrant manpower’.

A final factor explaining policy difference is the capacity and resources of regional governments. The Region of Veneto, which governs over one of the most dynamic economies of Europe, also enjoys relatively high levels of public expenditure. This may explain why the Veneto regional government has been able to devote approx. €5 million each year to integration interventions. In contrast, Sardinia is heavily dependenton central-government funding and its annual budget is much smaller, leading to lower amounts dedicated to integration policies (€1million per annum). Sardinia is able to do much less, with fewer resources and infrastructure, than its wealthier comparators in the north. This is confirmed by one party official: ‘there are not enough economic resources for a full programme ofintegration’ in Sardinia (interview with Franciscu Sedda,16 June 2014).

ConclusionsThis paper has called for more attention to the substate politics of immigrant integration. In the discipline of migration studies, ‘political parties have received relatively short shrift among students on the politics ofmigration’ (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove, 2006: 171) despite being the central actors involved in designing migration policies. Furthermore, more attention on the substate dimension of migrant integration is required, where a ‘dynamic new frontier lies’ (Bloemraad 2013, 8).

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With the decentralisation of integration policy control to the substate regional level, we should expect greater regional diversity and divergence within states.

This analysis has shown that what political parties say and do does matter, however, there is also a noticeable disconnect between ‘talk’ and ‘action’ on integration policy. What parties say before elections is not necessarily what they focus on when they are given the reins of power. Part of this has to do with the need to moderate radical stances in government, but it also has to do with pressures – from legislative frameworks and external social organisations. As such, the first ‘parties’ hypothesis, which stipulates that anti-immigrant parties have a restrictive effect on integration policy, is not entirely valid in the cases analysed. The anti-immigrant LV-LN in Veneto, despite itshard line on illegal immigration, has been involved in developing a liberal integration policy for the region over the past 15 years. Indeed, one scholar believes thatregional policymaking officials in Veneto have had ‘remarkably comparable integration policies’ to the left-wing and progressive region of Emilia-Romagna (Calavita, 2005: 92). Furthermore, this research found that the Liga’s rhetoric on integration has also changed recently,following its period in government, becoming more favourable towards immigrants and their contribution to Veneto society. This marks a noticeable departure with the general Lega Nord attitude towards integration (McDonnell and Albertazzi, 2005). In contrast, Sardinia has not experienced any substantial anti-immigrant movement and political parties are generally positive about immigration. This would lead one to expect a far more liberal integration policy on this island. But this has not been the case. Pro-immigrant parties in Sardinia have failed to create systematically improve the working and social conditions of immigrations, due to a politicalindifference towards the issue, compounded by a lack of resources and government capacity.

With regard to the ‘public policy’ hypothesis, whichstated that integration policy is resistant to major political changes and instead evolves gradually, this is to a large extent confirmed in both cases. In Veneto,

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with the ascendancy of the LV-LN in various regional governments, we have not witnessed a more restrictive integration policy; instead, we have seen the moderation of LV-LN discourse on integration. In Sardinia, there hasbeen greater variation in government compositions than inVeneto, with elected coalitions alternating between left and right, and with a role for different regionalist parties in all of these governments. However, there was no evidence that integration policy has radically changedunder centre-right or centre-left coalitions. Instead, throughout the period of study, integration has remained a valence issue, with everyone in favour but not committing a great deal of money and resources to it.

The third hypothesis posited that regionalism has aneffect on integration immigrants, which may become more protectionist or more cosmopolitan in line with regional interests. In this case, the hypothesis is verified only with regard to party political rhetoric. Regionalist parties in both cases have taken a stance on immigration – in Veneto this has been a protectionist stance and in Sardinia it has been cosmopolitan – however, their perceptions of immigrants in the construction of the substate nation has not translated into policy choices. The new national legislation on the Integration Pact means that regions in Italy have less scope to alter integration requirements for newcomers (unlike, say Quebec or Catalonia). Hence, regions cannot require that immigrants learn the local dialect/language under the newpoints system.

Furthermore, despite the vast differences between the two regions with regard to the political rhetoric on migration, the size of the immigrant population, and the economic wealth and resources of the regions, there has also been a degree of convergence in migrant integration policies in the last few years (see also Campomori, 2012). Veneto has added more emphasis to schooling immigrant children and fostering inter-cultural initiatives, while Sardinian annual plans have given moreattention to labour market integration and fostering highlevels of entrepreneurship. A line of further research would be to explore the forces of potential convergence in regional integration policies, in particular exploring

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the impact of the European Integration Funds for regions in harmonizing and liberalising policies (as has been considered by Ilke Adam in the case of the Belgian regions: Adam, 2013).

Meanwhile, questions remain about the effectiveness of integration efforts by both regional governments. How have policies affected the lives of migrants themselves? Interviewees believe that regions have aimed for a policyof ‘insertion’ rather than integration per se, whereby inserting newcomers into the labour market is considered more important than fostering a sense of belonging. As a result, ‘I do not think it is possible for an immigrant to become Veneto, not even for the second generation’ (interview with Veneto Lavoro official, 17 June 2014). Despite the positive tone of parties towards immigrants in Sardinia, and the absence of a climate of racism or xenophobia, the same problems hold true there. As Turacchi argues, ‘the traditional Sardinian culture places tremendous emphasis on its sense of hospitality, but a foreigner remains a foreigner even after two or three generations’ (interview, 7 June 2014). These findings call to light the general obstacles to immigrant’s socio-cultural integration in a ‘virtually mono-religious and mon-confessional (Catholic) tradition’(Massetti, 2014). The experience of Italy’s regions with immigration demonstrate that, while there have been strong efforts to integrate newcomers in even the most anti-immigrant contexts, immigrants still face considerable obstacles in being accepted into Italian society, not least due to public concerns that immigrantspose a threat to the national culture (ITANES surveys, cited in Massetti, 2014). It also raises the general question: ‘is the best that Italy can do in terms of integration still relatively poor?’ (Andall 2009: 239). Based on the research conducted for this comparative analysis, the answer remains for the time being: yes.

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