Mexico: A New Democracy in the Shadow of the United States

Mexico is considered by many one of the Latin American success stories of neoliberalism and

economic growth. The country enjoyed significant stability and economic growth spanning the

20th century, and is today considered one of the best countries in Latin America in which to do

business. Primary influences on the country’s political, social, and economic development

include its corporatist and clientilist past that dates back to the founding of Mexico, and its

shared border with the United States. Because of its proximity to the United States, the economy

is more diverse and less oil dependent than other large Latin American countries like Brazil and

Venezuela. Meanwhile, the corporatist paradigm continues to shape Mexico’s politics and

institutions even as the country moves towards democracy. Two issues which dominate the

news in both Mexico and the United States right now are the drug violence, and migration from

the poor rural southern areas to the north and to the U.S. These inter-related issues have an

influence on the economy and politics of Mexico, and are in turn greatly influenced by Mexico’s

corporatist past and by the country’s dependence on the United States.

Mexico Overview

Demographics

Mexico is the 2nd largest economy in Latin America, and second most populous, after Brazil.

Mexico’s population is 113 million, and is younger, and growing at a faster rate than that of the

United States (1.4% growth rate vs. 0.6%). Life expectancy is 76 years old, among the highest in

Latin America, and close to that of the United States (78 years). 1

The population is approximately 60% mestizo (of mixed European and indigenous descent), 30%

indigenous and 9% white. The indigenous population is most heavily concentrated in the

1 World Bank data sets: http://data.worldbank.org/country/mexico, Population Reference Bureau, 2010 World

Population Data Sheet: http://www.prb.org/pdf10/10wpds_eng.pdf

Mexico 2011 page 2 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

southern states of Mexico, which also is the poorest part of the country.2 As discussed in more

detail later, poverty in the southern Mexico states plays a significant factor in both drug

trafficking and migration patterns in Mexico. The southern half of Mexico also includes the

most densely populated states, particularly the Federal District, which includes Mexico City.3

Catholicism is the predominant religion in Mexico, as in much of Latin America. Mexico is a

relatively traditional country in terms of values, according to the World Values Survey. On the

World Values Survey cultural map of 2005-08, Mexico ranks similarly to other Latin American

countries, but is ranks highest in values of self-expression among Latin American countries

(actually similar towards Belgium and Luxembourg). On the traditional/rational values axis,

Mexico tends towards traditional values – while Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina all tend

towards more secular / rational values than Mexico.

4

Historical Context 1920’s – 2000: Political Stability, Economic Growth, and Increasing

Ties to the U.S.

Among Latin American countries, Mexico is considered to have had one of the most stable

histories since its Revolutionary period ended in the late 1920's.5 Unlike many other countries in

the region, for the past 90 years, Mexico has experienced a period without revolution, and a

stable transition from one leader to the next. As a result, economic growth was greater than it

might have been otherwise - though this does not mean that the political stability was an

outgrowth of democracy, or that the economic growth has been shared among all parts of

society. In addition to its long history of political stability, Mexico's growth is credited to a great

degree to its location next to the United States, a major trading partner and influence on Mexico's

policies and economy.6

2

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html 3 See map in Appendix B or at: http://geo-mexico.com/?tag=population-density 4 Ingelhart, Ronald, Welzel, Chris, “The World Values Survey Cultural Map of the World 2005-2008”, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54 5 Javier Santiso, 2007. "Latin America's Political Economy of the Possible: Beyond Good Revolutionaries and Free-Marketeers," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press 6 ibid

Mexico 2011 page 3 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Mexico’s constitution of 1917 set forth a relatively progressive system of government, with

checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches, the nationalization of oil

and mineral rights, and protection of communal land ownership. However, “the organization of

real power bears little resemblance to the formalities of the…Constitution.”7 Mexico developed

in the context of its Spanish history, with a system that was particularly traditional, hierarchical,

and corporatist. Social and political systems were organized around group interests rather than

around individuals, as a means for keeping various interest groups under the control of the

State.8

The violent period of the Mexican Revolution ended around 1928, with the assassination of

General Obregon. From that period forward, presidents left office relatively peacefully, without

violence. The

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) party was started in 1928, and from

1940-2000, a succession of PRI candidates won presidential elections every six years. These

elections were not particularly free or open, as the incoming president was generally handpicked

by the exiting president, and there was not any meaningful opposition from other parties.

Mexico’s institutions, labor unions, and civil society had developed in this climate of

corporatism, so every PRI president controlled the legislature and policy-making, and handed out

favors to the various interest groups. The policy of the government developed according to the

views of the leader at the time (as opposed to the Mexican constitution or the will of the people).

"In spite of belonging to the same partisan dynasty, for decades each new president tried to

differentiate his new reign from his immediate predecessor in successive autonomous gestures in

order to consolidate his authority not only over the state but also over the party,” "alternating

between interventionism and laissez faire policies."9

This top down system allowed Mexico’s economy to grow during the first half of the 20th

century through protectionist policies and import substitution.

10

7 Grayson, George, “Mexico, the PRI, and Lopez Obrador: The Legacy of Corporatism”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Spring 2007, p280.

Inefficiency, poor management,

and corruption began to threaten the political system however as the growth failed to benefit

http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5102/grayson.mexicopriobradorcorporatism.pdf 8 ibid 9 Santiso, pp 139-140 10 Grayson, p288

Mexico 2011 page 4 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

others besides the elite. In the 1980’s the party began to adopt some market reforms, and allowed

an opposition candidate to win a mayoral election in Baja California.

In 1994, a financial collapse resulting in devaluation of the peso, and the implementation of

NAFTA marked a shift towards greater openness in the economy and in elections, and towards

neoliberal policies. The US’s bailouts of Mexico after the liquidity crisis, and the

implementation of NAFTA significantly influenced Mexican economic policy, and made the

country even more dependent on its ties with the U.S. As a result, the economy is now

considered more linked to the United States economy than that of the rest of Latin America.

"The economy has slowly achieved a great transformation of its productive machinery," and its

risk premium has been delinked from other Latin American countries”11

This stability and growth is not only due to Mexico's relationship with the United States. As the

country has moved towards a more democratic system, it is also strengthening its institutions,

including the federal election commission, and an autonomous central bank.

. As a result of Mexico's

increasing ties to the U.S. market through NAFTA, Mexico has grown its non-oil exports,

helping it to escape the dependence on oil of other Latin American economies, and the "Dutch

disease" of heavy reliance on global demand for commodities. However, analysts say that much

more needs to be done towards transforming Mexico's oil industry to a market-driven one in

which the state plays a significantly smaller role, and improving the government's tax collection.

21st Century Politics, Institutions, and Civil Society – Gridlock and Violence Threatening

Democracy

Mexican institutions had developed in a corporatist, clientilist system of system of representation

between the state and institutional “interests”, which dated back to the feudal-like societies

developed by Spanish settlers. This system continued to dominate Mexican politics through the

20th century. But in 2000, after 70 years of rule by the PRI party, the center-right PAN party

won the presidential election. This has been hailed as evidence of the democratization of

Mexican politics and a move away from the more authoritarian style of the one party

11 Pp 154-155

Mexico 2011 page 5 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

government. Yet, "if democracy is fundamentally a system of governance based on the

participation of citizens in the public realm, it follows that democratization involves more than

the institution of competitive elections. Democratization also requires the transformation of the

institutions of the state, economy and civil society into public spaces that reflect a culture of

citizenship, in which there is a recognition, encouragement and protection of the rights of

citizens and their ability to participate in all spheres of public life." 12 In Mexico, the corporatist

influences of the past continue to dominate institutions, for example the unions, the church, the

state-controlled oil industry, and monopolistic sectors of the economy such as banking.13

Further institutional reforms since 2000 have been difficult. The PRI controls Congress, and the

division between the parties has made the process of cooperation difficult. Vicente Fox was not

considered an effective president during his 2000-2006 term, though he claimed that he had

shifted away from the authoritarian rule of past presidents and instituted greater transparency and

democratization.

14

After Fox’s administration, there was much speculation that Lopez Obrador of the leftist (and

more corporatist/authoritarian) PRD party could win the 2006 election, but the PAN candidate,

Felipe Calderon won and continued PAN’s control of the presidential office. Institutional reform

continued to be nearly impossible with the legislature controlled by the PRI party. With only the

military firmly under his control, Calderon shifted Mexico’s policy of fighting the drug cartels,

by deploying federal army troops to battle drug criminals.

Fox expected that he would be able to work with the Bush administration in

the US to improve the immigration process and allow more workers from Mexico into the US,

but after September 11th, 2001, the Bush administration turned its focus to fighting terrorism and

to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and border-crossing difficulties and anti-immigration sentiments

in the U.S. only grew. As a result, Fox was not able to point to significant reforms that

benefitted Mexico either within the country or externally in U.S. policy.

12 Brickner, Rachel, Journal of Latin American Studies, 42.4 (November 2010); 749-777 13 ibid 14 Wiarda, Howard J. and Kline, Harvey F., [ed.]. 2007. Latin American Politics and Development. Sixth Edition. Bolder : Westview Press, 2007, p 398.

Mexico 2011 page 6 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

The effectiveness of Calderon’s decision has been widely criticized. In 2009, public policy think

tank Mexico Evalua found that public sector spending on security increased by seven-fold

compared to the previous administration, however the increased spending has not resulted in

either a reduction in the crime rate or a more effective justice system.15 In fact, violence has

increased dramatically, and there is growing evidence that many casualties are innocent citizens

– both from army and cartel violence – despite Calderon’s claim that almost all of those killed by

the army have been criminals. As discussed later, the schism between the PRI and PAN parties,

and the breakdown of the corporatist system of strong presidential control has actually led to

increased violence and decreased control of the drug cartels.16

Many Mexicans believe that they do not have the power to hold government officials

accountable, and that the war on drugs is a losing proposition. La violencia is spreading to

previously peaceful parts of the country. In Monterey, killings related to organized crime have

risen from 22 to 178 in 3 years. As many as 40,000 people have been killed over the past 5

years, and the vast majority of these deaths are never investigated. While the government claims

that those killed are connected with the drug trade, activists say that many being killed are

civilians, and often by the military as well as cartels. Many are calling for a scaling back of the

militarization of the drug war that has escalated since 2006 when President Calderon declared

war on the cartels and deployed tens of thousands of military troops for this purpose. Estimates

on the value of the drug trade to Mexican cartels are as high as $30 billion annually. The US has

pledged $1.4 billion in aid to Mexico's military over 3 years in comparison. Some are calling for

legalization of drugs as a means to stem the violence.

17

15

http://www.mexicoevalua.org/descargables/6c9a29_MEX_EVA-INHOUS-GASTO_SEG.pdf, http://bit.ly/tBGJQj - press release (in English) 16 See Appendix B maps for a depiction of the different control of the three political parties over Mexican states 17 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/in-mexico-growing-popular-movement-calls-for-end-to-drug-war/240311/2/ http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/tombs-of-the-unknown-mexicos-mysterious-deaths/241713/

Mexico 2011 page 7 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

The PRI party is expected to benefit in 2012 from the concerns about the drug violence, with

“growing nostalgia for the way things were under PRI presidents”. PRI party governor of the

State of Mexico, Enrique Pena Nieto, is largely expected to be nominated as the PRI's next

presidential candidate. Though the PRI lost two presidential elections, they control a majority of

Congress, and state governorships – allowing them to control significant spending in ways that

can garner votes.18 However, this victory is not completely secure. Just recently the head of the

PRI, Humberto Moreira, resigned over a scandal related to falsified loan documents. “The

scandal threatened to remind voters of the sort of graft that characterized the PRI's 70-year reign

just when it is seeking to promote a fresh, cleaned-up image.”19

The latest Latinobarómetro poll, published by The Economist, shows that popular support for

democracy has declined - those responding positively to the statement "democracy is preferable

to any other type of government" declined 9 points since last year, perhaps due in part to the

violence. Only about 20% responded that they were satisfied with how democracy works in

Mexico.

20

Mexico’s Economy

Mexico’s proximity to the United States has played an ever increasing role in its economic

growth, as well as employment opportunities for Mexicans. This dates back at least as far as the

Bracero program in 1942, an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico which allowed for the

employment of Mexican temporary contract workers north of the border. At the end of this

program, the Mexican government instituted the Border Industrialization Program, which

allowed foreign investors to import raw materials duty-free to Mexico for assembly and re-

18 http://csis.org/files/publication/111019_Wood_2012USMexicoRelations.pdf http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2011/09/crime-mexico http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/beauty-and-the-beast/8626/ 19 Ellingwood, Ken, “Loan scandal topples head of Mexico’s PRI party”, LA Times, December 3, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/03/world/la-fg-mexico-election-20111203 20 http://www.economist.com/node/21534798 http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp

Mexico 2011 page 8 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

export . The resulting “maquiladoras” became attractive to U.S. and global investors and became

a significant employer along the border, and a driver of the Mexican economy. "At the

beginning of the 1980's, oil exports represented more than 2/3rds of Mexico's exports, in 2005,

slightly more than 1/10th."21

This strength in exports is due in large part to Mexico’s shared border with the United States and

its trade agreements such as NAFTA which have strengthened foreign investment in

manufacturing along the border. The signing and implementation of NAFTA has meant that

Mexico has been able to increase its trade significantly – it is the third largest trading partner of

the U.S after Canada and China. The World Bank calls Mexico the easiest place in Latin

America to do business.

Increasingly, high-technology manufacturing has become an

important component of the country's exports.

Though strengthened by foreign investment, trade with the US from NAFTA, and remittances

from the U.S., the economy faces ongoing challenges of deep inequality, over-reliance on

exports to the U.S., a state-controlled oil company

with shrinking production, and extremely low tax

collections.

Mexico’s economy declined by 6% in the 2008-9

recession, and unemployment peaked at 6.4%.

Mexico’s response was to keep its fiscal policy

rather restrictive and focus on keeping budget

deficits low, rather than a Keynesian response of

increasing social spending.22

Today the unemployment rate (official) is 5.4%,

21 Santiso, p 156 22 http://www.economist.com/node/21526899

Mexico 2011 page 9 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

compared to 4.1% pre-recession, and the percentage of Mexicans in poverty has grown to 46.2%

(as opposed to 21.4% of the Brazilian population). As the unemployment crisis continues in the

US, Latinos are more seriously impacted, as well as remittances to Mexico.

Oil’s Role in Mexico’s Economy and Public Sector

PEMEX is the nationalized oil company of Mexico,

controlled by the state. PEMEX accounts for about

40% of Mexico’s public sector revenue through taxes

and dividends, and oil products represent about 15% of

Mexico’s exports. Declining production, large pension

obligations, and mismanagement by the government

which keep the company from making needed capital

investments are all issues for PEMEX’s future.23

PEMEX’s earnings before interest and taxes in 2008

were about $72.7 billion.24

While drug violence and immigration continue to dominate the news, there are stories of

economic opportunity in Mexico, primarily from those seeking further neoliberal market

reforms. Analysts suggest that Mexico is significantly underperforming its economic potential

for growth, and that the next president’s primary objective will need to be bolstering the

economy. A major element of this will be partial privatization of PEMEX, and opening up the

oil sector to greater private investment. This will be difficult however, as it requires approval of

the legislature as well as the president, and state ownership of oil resources is protected by the

Constitution in place since 1917.

25

Social Issues: Inequality and Poverty

23 http://www.economist.com/node/14548839 24 Standard and Poors investment analysis of PEMEX, March 2009 http://www.ri.pemex.com/files/content/PEMEX_SA_0309.pdf 25(http://univisionnews.tumblr.com/post/12510815444/mexicos-economic-challenges-after-the-2012

Mexico 2011 page 10 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Inequality is a longtime intractable issue in Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America, which has

persisted in the face of economic growth. This inequality dates back to the founding of Mexico

and its land distribution which favored those of pure Spanish descent. In 1876, 95% of Mexico’s

land was owned by 5% of the population.

According to the UNDP, a full 43.7% of the urban population of Mexico is employed in the

informal economy, in 2008. This means that a large portion of workers are not eligible for social

supports provided to formal employees. Additionally, there is a gender disparity, with women

generally involved in paid work but also primarily responsible for carrying the burden of unpaid

work.26

According to the UNDP, the Gini coefficient of Mexico is 51, compared to 40 in the United

States (which is high among developed countries), 47 in Costa Rica, and 56 in Brazil.

27

Inequality has an impact on Mexico’s transition to democracy. In the past, Mexicans typically

participated in civic and political institutions, but these were corporatist in their relation to the

State and their leadership.

Inequality rose during the 1980’s and 90’s, and has declined by almost 6% since then in Mexico.

This is attributed in part to higher educational attainments, as well as to improvements from the

country’s conditional cash transfer program. Some experts have suggested that privatization and

free market reforms created greater income inequality (UNDP p 29).

28 Moving forward, democracy will depend on citizens participating to

influence the executive and legislative branches as well as Mexico’s institutions. “Social capital

matters most in promoting political participation in Mexico. At present, social capital is weighted

to the benefit of the more privileged, so the promotion of social capital among the less educated,

the poor, and those in subordinate positions in the workplace would promote greater equity in

political participation.”29

26

http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/reducingpoverty/case/119/summary/mexico-oportunidades%20summary.pdf 27 (a measure of inequality with 100 being perfectly unequal) 28 Klesner, Joseph, “Who participates? Determinants of political action in Mexico”, Latin American Politics and Society. 51.2 (Summer 2009): p 59. 29 ibid

Mexico 2011 page 11 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

While Mexico’s HDI is increasing (0.801 in 2000), there are stark contrasts between regions –

for example the HDI of the Federal District was 0.891 vs Chiapas at 0.703.30 Additionally, there

are deep inequalities based on race – the poverty rate (less than $1 a day) for people of European

descent around 2000 was 12.3%, vs 40.0% for indigenous peoples and Afro descendants. This is

true even after controlling for educational attainment and work experience, suggesting that

inequality has become a structural and institutionalized problem.31

Mexico’s largest social program addressing inequality and the intergenerational transfer of poverty is a cash conditional transfer program called Oportunidades. The program was started in 1997 and was originally called PROGRESA. Today is covers 5.8 million extremely poor households, with a $5 billion budget as of 2010 (representing 46.5% of Mexico’s anti-poverty budget). The program provides cash payments to poor households (typically to the mother) tied to specific actions related to health, nutrition and education for the family.

32 Evaluations of the program consider it to be a highly successful intervention. Additionally, some evidence suggests that the program may have an impact on reducing rural out-migration, particularly to the U.S., as it reduces the burden of extreme poverty in comparison with the risks of migration.33

30

http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Latin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%20HDR/rhdr_lac_en_2010.pdf, p 30. 31 Ibid, p 36 32 “Oportunidades, a Program of Results”, 2010, SEDESOL, Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades: http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/Portal/work/sites/Web/resources/ArchivoContent/623/Oportunidades_a_program_of_results_2010.pdf 33 Stecklov, Guy, et al. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Influence Migration? A Study using Experimental Data from the Mexican PROGRESA Program.” Demography 42.4 (2005): 769,769-790.

Mexico 2011 page 12 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Drug Trafficking in Mexico and the Influence of the US

From the 1990’s until today, the illegal drug business has gained greater importance worldwide,

but most particularly in Mexico. Drugs have become a pressing social issue in all parts of the

world, because of the increasing consumption in industrialized countries and the increasing

production and trafficking in many developing countries. Taking into consideration that each

country has specific requirements and conditions, each country has adopted different standards

and/or policies in order to address the drug problem within their borders: (i) legalization of

drugs; (ii) strong anti-drug policies (with even death penalty); (iii) de facto legalization because

of corruption; or (iv) official “war on drugs.” Mexico, which has adopted the last approach, has

a leading role due to its strategic geography and socio-economic conditions: given its location

next to the United States, the number one consumer of illegal drugs in the world, Mexico has

become a bridge between producing countries in South America and the United States.

Additionally, Mexico has a history and culture of corruption, which – together with the high

levels of poverty – have contributed to the critical situation affecting both the State and its civil

society.

The beginning of the 20th Century

Before 1914 there was no restriction in the United States on the use of drugs imported from other

countries and thus drugs could travel freely from one side of the border to the other. However, in

1914, the United States prohibited opium and other drugs, which were being smuggled into the

U.S. by the Governor of the Mexican State Baja California. Before the American prohibition in

1914, no laws were being violated in Mexico by the trafficking of drugs. Thus, the Government

and the drug trafficking business were united in one branch.

In 1917, the Mexican President Venustiano Carranza, pressured by the U.S., first enacted an

order against opium trading and later another banning marihuana (which before was sold without

any restrictions). Thereafter, drug trafficking became a profitable business and even Governors

Mexico 2011 page 13 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

decided to take control of the drug trafficking business personally.34

The 1960’s and 1970’s saw a conjunction of external and internal factors that began to

strengthen the drug trafficking business in Mexico. First, America’s appetite for psychotropic

substances escalated from marihuana to heroin, and then from cocaine to the hardcore chemical

drugs consumed in nightclubs throughout the country.

Furthermore, the local

smugglers joined with the sellers of firearms, as those were necessary to fight the revolution that

affected Mexico. At that time, the increasing demand from the U.S., together with an armed and

unstable Mexican country, gave birth to the illegal drugs business.

35

In the meantime, in the southern part of the U.S. border, the trafficking business was growing

very quickly, and the commercialization of illegal drugs moved from being a local problem in

the States of Sinaloa and Jalisco to being a national one. On the other hand, the power of the

Colombian cartels was diminishing due to the pressure of the United States. Consequently,

Mexican organized crime took over the illegal trafficking business from the Colombians and

became the first supplier of illegal drugs to the United States. It is worth noting that the

structural differences between Colombia and Mexico means that the eradication of the cartels in

Mexico would be a much more difficult mission for the United States: in Colombia there was

some degree of separation between the politicians and the drug growers and dealers. This factor

did not exist in Mexico because of the high degree of corruption, which has always been

prevalent in this country. Therefore, in Mexico attacking the drug dealers and smugglers was in

fact an attack on the government and therefore to the State itself.

For this reason, the United States

Government thought that a “war” on drugs was necessary and thus intensified and strengthened

the prohibitions.

The Colombians hired and trained Mexicans in the businessof trafficking drugs to the U.S. Of

particular relevance is Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, a well-known Mexican drug smuggler who

“had consolidated many of the small time smugglers of the 1960’s and 1970’s into a single

34 Luis Astorga, THE LIMITS OF ANTI-DRUG POLICY IN MEXICO (UNESCO, 2001), p.427. 35 Peter Braunstein and William Doyle, IMAGINE NATION: THE AMERICAN COUNTER-CULTURE OF THE 1960’S AND 1970’S, (Routledge, 2002)

Mexico 2011 page 14 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

organization and thereafter controlled much of the illegal-drug trade along the border.”36

Furthermore, “the alliance between the Colombian drug lords and the Mexican Félix Gallardo

Organization would produce a formidable drug cartel that operated through most of the

1980’s,”37

The 1980’s and 1990’s

which would come to be known as “the mother of all gangs.” In response to these

developments, the U.S. counteracted with a more intensified “war” against the cartels and in

1989 Gallardo was finally arrested in Mexico City. However, it was not over. Félix Gallardo

continued to run his operation from his prison cell and ordered his “lieutenants” to divide the

border into territories, each one controlling a different smuggling corridor. It was at this meeting

were the most important cartels were to emerge: Tijuana, Sinaloa, Juarez and the Gulf Cartel.

Gallardo was a quiet and peaceful man who did not like to draw attention. However, his

successors would take the opposite direction and have been aggressively fighting for control of

territories along the border, which has created unprecedented violence within the Mexican

Republic. Today, these are the same organizations that transport at least 70% of the drugs that

enter the U.S. and that continue to fight for control not only of the frontier but of the Mexican

market as well.

During these years, the trafficking of drugs expanded to a volume never seen before. Indeed,

social, political and cultural conditions helped ensure that drug trafficking became the most

profitable business in the country. The amount of money generated in the business was so great

that it caused corruption at all levels of the Mexican Government. The connections between the

traffickers and the police agencies became apparent to Mexican citizens, as an example of how

entrenched drug trafficking was in society. Drug trafficking began to reproduce, spread and

diversify even faster than the demand in the U.S. and, of course, much faster than the

Governmental agencies in charge of fighting trafficking.38

36 Tony Payan, The Drug War and the U.S. – Mexico Border: The State of Affairs, SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY (2006), Vol. 105, Issue 4, p. 865.

37 Id. 38 Luis Astoga, EL SIGLO DE LAS DROGAS p. 126.

Mexico 2011 page 15 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

During the 1980’s and 1990’s, Mexico fell into a wave of crime, starting with the assassination

of the DEA agent Enrique Camarera by traffickers (and covered up by the police). Later, it

followed the assassination of Cardinal Posadas Ocampo, and then the murder of both PRI’s

Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colossio and o the brother of the nations’ Attorney General,

Francisco Ruiz Massieu. Consequently, the violence within the country started to rise: in

particular, the northern part of Mexico, especially Sinaloa, became the center of both violence

and growing and transporting drugs.

According to the Secretary of the Interior, in 1995 there were approximately 900 armed-gangs in

Mexico. Half of them consisted of current or retired members of agencies of the government.

Thus, the fight was not necessarily between the police and the “criminals,” but between members

of the security forces. According to the statistics provided to Andres Oppenheimer by the

Secretary of the Interior, more than 60% of the members of Mexico’s police forces were

receiving bribes or had previous criminal records.39

A shift began to take place when the PAN party won its first governorship in Baja California at

the end of the 1980’s and the political opposition began to challenge the authoritarian regime of

the PRI, which had been in power since the end of the Revolution and had created strong

corporatist structures that incorporated and controlled drug traffickers. For the ruling political

elite of Mexico, it would have been unthinkable to give absolute freedom of action in any

profitable business, and much less to allow semi-illiterate ranchers to pocket the profits without

giving anything in exchange.

40 Therefore, as Luis Astorga argues, “it is no accident that the

higher levels of violence connected with drug trafficking in the 1990’s have been observed

primarily in states where the political opposition had gained power.”41

39 Andres Oppenheimer, MEXICO EN LA FRONTERA DEL CAOS , p. 340.

This author adds that

traffickers were not subordinated to the political authorities and thus “enjoyed more greater [sic]

40 Luis Astorga, THE LIMITS OF ANTI-DRUG POLICY IN MEXICO (UNESCO, 2001), p. 427. 41 Id., p. 430.

Mexico 2011 page 16 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

freedom of action locally since an opposition governor did not have the same stretch and was not

backed in the same way by the federation as one belonging to the same party as the President.”42

The “post revolutionary” political system, which gave extraordinary powers to the President,

collapsed in 2000. The democratic elections of that year, when Vicente Fox was elected

president, changed the relationship between the executive branch of government, Congress and

each particular State. In the turmoil, the drug traffickers have achieved greater independence

from the Government since they have been able to escape surveillance. Looking at this from a

historic point of view, we see that the end of 71 years of a corporatist regime destabilized not

only the Government but the drug trafficking organizations as well.

The War on Drugs

During the final years of the last century, most of the old power structures in Mexico which

allowed for a relationship between the government and the drug business were disintegrating.43

The cartels have had to defend their corridors with increased violence, not only against other

“cartels” – constantly competing for control of territory – but now also from the federal

government. From a very basic level, in order to understand the threat the cartels pose to the

national security of Mexico it is necessary to observe their internal structure. Usually, it is

understood that the trafficking business is led by strong and organized “cartels,” which have a

centralized organization, with recognized leaders and a well-established hierarchy. If this were

in fact the case, it would be much easier to fight these organizations and the predominant

Vicente Fox, the new PAN president, was determined not to cooperate with the cartels, which

exacerbated violence within Mexico. The situation changed on December 11, 2006 when

President-elect Felipe Calderon sent 6,500 federal troops to Michoacán in order to stop the

violence unleashed by the “Cartel de la Familia,” which was completely out of control. That

action was considered the first direct step toward the end of violence. Over time, the President

increased the Government’s action against illegal drugs. Unfortunately, a limiting factor

continues to be the corruption at the local and state levels.

42 Id. 43 Luis Astorga, DROGAS SIN FRONTERAS,1994, p. 25.

Mexico 2011 page 17 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Mexican-American strategy of “decapitación” (the murder or capture of the leaders), would be

highly effective. However, in Mexico, cartels have a “semi-organized” structure: a small group

of well-organized cartels join forces with weak, small and short-lived “gangs,” which are in a

state of constant re-organization and transformation.44

This “war on drugs” has created catastrophic consequences for the stability of the nation.

According to official figures, since the beginning of the war, the death toll has reached more than

34,600,

Consequently, this “flexible structure” is

able to survive even if the principal leader or a specific organization vanishes.

45 with the death toll for 2010 alone being 12,237 – the highest so far.46 However, it

would be unfair to blame the President for all this violence. While it is true that the breaking of

corrupt old political structures unleashed violence between the government and the organized

crime, it is important to note that much of the terror and violence that strikes Mexico is due to

intra-cartel violence. In this regard, many analysts point to struggles between “formerly allied

cartels, for example, the split between the Gulf Cartel and its former armed enforcers, Los Zetas,

erupted into bitter fighting in eastern parts of Mexico that had been relatively free of violence.

Additionally, much of the violence in Ciudad Juarez and the rest of Chihuahua is attributed to a

turf war between the Sinaloa and Juarez cartels.”47

The Presidency of Felipe Calderon

Although violence between drug cartels has been occurring long before the war began, the

Government held a generally passive position regarding cartel violence in the 1990’s and early

2000’s. However, in 2006, the newly elected president Felipe Calderón declared a war on drugs

by sending 6,500 federal troops to the state of Michoacán in order to end drug violence. As time

elapsed, President Calderón continued to expand his anti-drug campaign and today, in addition to

44 José Luis Velasco, Drogas, Seguridad y Cambio Politico en México, NUEVA SOCIEDAD, 2005, Vol. 198, p. 94. 45 O. Hidalgo, Mexican Drug Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES, February 1, 2011 (available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_trafficking/index.html?scp=1&sq=drug%20cartels&st=cse). 46 R. Zamaripa, Nuevo año, misma Guerra, PERIÓDICO REFORMA, January 2, 2011, (available at http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa.aspx). 47 Mexico’s drug related violence, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2011 (available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249).

Mexico 2011 page 18 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

state and federal police forces, there are over 50,000 officers involved.48 In 2010, Calderón said

that the cartels were trying “to replace the government” and “are trying to impose a monopoly by

force of arms, and are even trying to impose their own laws.”49

President Felipe Calderon faces a difficult task. There are three main political parties, each one

with different political interests. In fact, this chaotic political situation is the main barrier for the

unification of a country that requires a strong front in order to counteract organized crime. In

this regard, no consensus can be reached – whether on federal or state level – to enact effective

laws to fight against drug-lords. Indeed, the failure by the Mexican institutions to fight as a unit

results in the lack of resources to properly fight back. President Calderón only finds support in

the country’s army, which still remains faithful to him. Consequently, due to low levels of

confidence in the local and federal police forces, the Mexican Government – with help from the

U.S. Government – began to “militarize” some of its leading institutions.

Thus, a stronger army was

needed.

50

The U.S. continued to pressure and attempt to persuade the Mexican authorities to militarize the

security institutions, as well as to give the army a more relevant role. Unfortunately, the military

does not have any way of controlling the U.S. demand for drugs. Additionally, the armed forces

were faced with the same corruption problems as the police. Indeed, history could easily repeat

itself, and the organized crime may thus easily penetrate the command and ranks of the army

(since most of the soldiers come from low-income families and soldiers were born and raised in

the Mexican culture of corruption). However, for the moment, the military is still the main

support of President Felipe Calderon’s Government.

Organizations

During the 1990’s, after the capture of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo (a.k.a. “The Godfather”) in

1989, a division of the most powerful drug organizations took place in Mexico. As mentioned, 48 Id. 49 Associated Press, Mexican cartels move beyond drugs, seek domination, MSNBC NEWS, August 4, 2010 (available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38565051/ns/world_news-americas). 50 Carlos Fazio, EL TERCER VINCULO; DE LA TEORIA DEL CAOS A LA TEORIA DE LA MILITARIZACION (Joaquín Mortiz-Planeta, 2004)

Mexico 2011 page 19 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

from his prison cell, Gallardo divided the most important organizations of Chihuahua, Sonora,

Baja California and Sinaloa to his closest associates. Consequently, his associates from Sinaloa

became the leaders of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico (excluding the

Gulf Cartel which was the only cartel not associated with Gallardo). Currently, the different

cartels are in a constant fight with each other for control of the border with the U.S., as whoever

controls the border, controls the flow of drugs. Additionally, the cartels fight within Mexico in

order to control the transportation routes and the increasing local market. The local cartels,

aware of the strengths of their competitors, have formed alliances between them in order to

become stronger and control more territory. The principal cartels are:

• The Gulf Cartel: Founded by Juan Nepomuceno Guerra and led by Osiel Cardenas

Guillén until his arrest in 2007. It controls the eastern states along the coast of the Gulf

of Mexico.

• Cartel de la Familia: They are located in the states of Michoacán and Morelia. The

founder and leader is Nazario Moreno (a.k.a. “el mas loco,” which means “the crazy”).

They are characterized as a “pseudo-evangelical” organization and justify torture and

murder as “divine justice.”

• The Cartel of Beltran Leyva: Their operational base is in Sinaloa. The Beltran Leyva

brothers were part of the Gulf Cartel until their former boss, “El Chapo Guzman,”

assassinated one of them.

• Juarez Cartel: Founded by Félix Gallardo, Caro Quintero, Fonseca Carrillo and Carrillo

Fuentes. Their operational base is Juarez City, which has now become the most violent

in Mexico.

• Sinaloa Cartel: Founded by the “Guero Palma” and is currently being led by Joaquin “El

Chapo” Guzman. The organization operates within the states of Sinaloa, Durango,

Sonora and Chihuahua.

• Tijuana Cartel: Founded and led by the Arrellano Félix brothers.

• Los Zetas: In 1999, the Gulf Cartel hired a group of corrupt former elite military soldiers

known as “Los Zetas,” who began operations as a private army for the Gulf Cartel. In

Mexico 2011 page 20 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

2010, Los Zetas made a deal with the Beltran Leyva brothers and became rivals of the

Gulf Cartel.

BBC NEWS (available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249).

Drug Production and Trafficking in Mexico

According to the U.N. Drug Report of 2009, Mexico is the second largest cannabis producer in

the world (after Morocco). Moreover, according to the Mexican Secretary of Defense, half a

million people were linked to the illegal drug trafficking and 7 million hectares were dedicated to

the production of cannabis.51

The profits generated by the illegal drug business are very large. Nevertheless, due to the illegal

nature of the business, together with the lack of transparency and objective methodology of

In addition to cannabis trafficking, Mexico is the principal transit

route of cocaine, accounting for 90% of the cocaine smuggled into the U.S.

51 Statement made by Guillermo Galvan, Mexican Secretary of Defense (SEDENA), August 7, 2009, Mexico.

Mexico 2011 page 21 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

current studies, it is almost impossible to know the exact profits generated by the drug trafficking

business. However, some estimates are cited below:

13.8 billion U.S. Office of National Drug Control

Policy (ONDCP)

18 to 39 billon

National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S.

Department of Justice, National Drug

Threat Assessment

25 billion Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State

17.9 to 28.3 billion

David T. Johnson, Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,

Department of State

25 to 40 billion David Robillard, Director General of

Kroll Mexico

Due to the illegal nature of the business, it is very hard to know the exact figure of profits

generated by drug trafficking. These estimates do show that a large quantity of money is brought

back to Mexico from the U.S. The profits can be used to corrupt government officials and

sustain a war between the different cartels or against the Mexican Government. Furthermore, we

should take into consideration that Mexico is a country with high levels of vertical inequality,

where more than 12% of the population lives in extreme poverty conditions and 60% of the

population lives under some level of poverty. By taking this into consideration, together with

corruption, we can see how drug trafficking is not only a matter of national security, but also a

socio-economic factor.

The current situation in Mexico is critical. There are struggles on all fronts: the cartels are

violently fighting each other in order to gain control of an increasing local and international drug

market; the government is fighting against “organized crime,” which has no head, structure or

Mexico 2011 page 22 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

hierarchy and that, due to poverty and corruption, is very well immersed within Mexican society.

President Calderon is fighting a war that is poorly organized, looking to strengthen a weak

Government that is supported only by a faithful army, which is trying to control the ongoing

violence in several states. However, in many cases, the soldiers are causing violence to the civil

society, which finds itself immersed in a national fight against an international problem. Finally,

Mexico’s closest “ally” (i.e., the United States) is not only increasing the demand for illegal

drugs, but also supplying drug traffickers with the necessary arms in order to perpetuate this

“war.”

The American Factor

The U.S.-Mexico border has been the site of America’s longest war: the drug war.52 Since the

beginning of the XX Century, the Mexican counterdrug efforts have been influenced by the

United States, either in a direct way or through the international agreements in which the

American Government has played an important role.53 It all started in the 60’s when America’s

increasing demand for drugs prompted Richard’s Nixon decision to declare a war on illegal

drugs. Consequently, in 1969, the border with Mexico was shut down unilaterally by the U.S

Government action, which resulted in the beginning of an era of illegal drug trafficking and

consumption on both sides of the border. Moreover, these actions taken by the U.S. required

drug traffickers to increase the effectiveness of their operations and thus resulted in “a logic of

escalation between law enforcement and criminal organizations – on that evidence shows U.S

law enforcement has been losing.”54

The drug war on the border is constantly changing and adapting to news laws, enforcement

policies and the technology that the U.S brings into play. Consequently, the drug cartels respond

with even more creative ways to circumvent the latest U.S.’s efforts, which have made these

52 Tony Payan, The Drug War and the U.S. – Mexico Border: The State of Affairs, SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY (2006), Vol. 105, Issue 4, p. 864. 53 Jorge Chabat, Mexico’s War on Drugs: No margin for Maneuver, THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, July 2002, p. 1. 54 Tony Payan, The Drug War and the U.S. – Mexico Border: The State of Affairs, SOUTH ATLANTIC QUARTERLY (2006), Vol. 105, Issue 4, p. 863.

Mexico 2011 page 23 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

organizations flexible and adaptable. In the end, the small-time smugglers are the ones who do

not survive the increasing and sophisticated efforts made by the U.S. The major drug cartels are

not only constantly responding to the logic of escalation produced by the U.S., but also even if

they had a pyramidal hierarchy, they would operate in ways that make them extremely adaptable.

Thus, the main difference between the U.S bureaucracies and the criminal organizations is that,

whereas the former is a structured organization surrounded by ethics or administrative and legal

rules, the latter are flexible and adaptable organizations, which do not follow any handbook and

may easily change their structure.

Corruption is a fundamental component in any illegal industry.55 Drug trafficking is not an

exception. It would be naïve to think that a multi-billion illegal business is only a problem in

one side of the border. Corruption propels the drug trafficking business and assures the flow of

drugs into the U.S., as well as the return of profits to both Mexico and Latin America. The

tremendous amounts of money generated by the increasing consumption of illegal drugs in the

U.S and Europe provides enormous amounts of economic resources to drug traffickers, which

allows them to corrupt and hire thousands of employees – “from buyers to spotters to smugglers

to weapons producers to sicarios (executers for the drug cartels) to accountants – but indirectly it

pays off hundreds, if not thousands, of people, particularly law enforcement officials and

politicians.”56

Additionally, certain studies sustain the view that “70 percent of the firearms recovered from

crime scenes in Mexico were traced to the United States.”

And even though American corruption is less extensive and systematical than

Mexican corruption, a single corrupt American official is enough to allow tons of illegal drugs

and money to pass through a security checkpoint. Furthermore, the increasing efforts of the U.S

Government to stop the illegal trafficking of drugs into the U.S has made the bribing of officials

more expensive – and thus kicking the small-time smugglers out of business.

57

55 Id., p. 875.

Notwithstanding the above, the

United States’ Government continuously argues that enough resources and efforts are being

56 Id. 57 G. Thompson, Justice Department Accused of ‘Reckless Technique’, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/politics/15guns.html).

Mexico 2011 page 24 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

made in order to stop the illegal trafficking of guns from the U.S to Mexico. However, in 2009

an undercover operation led by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives –

named Fast and Furious – was set into motion by sending more that 2,000 arms illegally58 to

Mexico without the knowledge or the consent of the Mexican Government. The official story

states that the governmental agency sent the arms to Mexico in order to have “long periods of

surveillance in which agents watched loads of legally bought weapons move from straw

purchasers to third parties, hoping that the transactions would lead them to bigger criminal

targets.”59 In 2011, the operation was uncovered and the Justice Department was accused of

putting guns in the hands of the Mexican organized crime when “[t]he agency lost track of the

guns, and many were found at the scene of crimes, including two that were recovered at the site

of a U.S. Border Patrol agent’s killing.”60

The relationship between the U.S. Government and the Mexican Government has gone through

rough patches since the beginning of the 21st century. The “war on drugs” has been a constant

subject in the security agenda of both countries, where each government and its civil society has

some responsibility for the current situation. Even though the violent “war” is taking place

within the southern frontier the United States, the latter not only contributes – but also finances –

the “cartels” with the profits provided by the increasing demand for illegal drugs supplies drug

traffickers with arms, which perpetrate the ongoing “war.”

This scandal, which affected many U.S government

agencies and high-ranked officials, entailed not only sending illegal arms to drug traffickers –

and therefore perpetuating the “war” – but also a violation of the sovereignty of the Mexican

State by taking this “enforcement measures” into their own hands.

The United States has admitted some responsibility and offered to help the Mexican Government

with the necessary economic and technological mechanisms to combat drug traffickers, this

program called The Merida Initiative. This initiative is described as follows: “a multi-year 58 Jorge Ramón Ávalos, Con Obama y sin Osama, PERIÓDICO REFORMA, May 8, 2011 (available at http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa.aspx). 59 G. Thompson, Justice Department Accused of ‘Reckless Technique’, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/politics/15guns.html).

60 Richard A. Serrano, More federal agencies implicated in gun-trafficking controversy, THE L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2011 (available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-naw-atf-guns-20110707,0,6997495.story).

Mexico 2011 page 25 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

program to provide equipment and training to support law enforcement operations and technical

assistance for long-term reform and oversight of security agencies. In 2008, Congress approved

an initial $400 million for Mexico and $65 million for Central America, the Dominican

Republic, and Haiti. In 2009, Congress approved $300 million for Mexico and $110 million for

Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. In 2010, $450 million for Mexico and $100

million for Central America has been requested from Congress.”61

Drug Consumption in The United States

. Nevertheless, even if the U.S

is economically helping Mexico in the “war,” it is important to note that no help is enough if

consumption of illegal drugs continues to fund drug traffickers. Wherever there is demand, there

will always be a need for supply.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that globally between 149

and 272 million people – or 3.3% to 6.1% of the U.S. population – aged from 15 to 64 years have

used illegal substances at least once in the previous year. The overall number of drug users

appears to have increased over the last decade from 180 to 210 million people. However, the

rate of people who form part of the group of “problem drug users,” equivalent to 0.3% to 0.9%

of the population, remain almost unchanged.

61 U.S Department of State, DIPLOMACY IN ACTION, June 23 2009 (available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/122397.htm).

Mexico 2011 page 26 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

The world’s largest illegal drug product is cannabis, followed by cocaine, amphetamines and

heroin. 62

According to the United Nations, North America continues to be the world’s largest

drug market and, while some illegal drugs are produced in the United States and Canada, more

that 70% of such drugs are produced in Latin America and pass through Mexico before reaching

American consumers. As we can see in the table bellow, 70% of global cannabis and ecstasy

seizures were reported in North America between 2005 and 2009.

62 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), WORLD DRUG REPORT 2011, 2011, p. 19 (available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html).

Mexico 2011 page 27 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

The highest levels of illegal drug use in North America are related to the consumption of

cannabis (mainly cannabis herb)63 with a prevalence rate of 10.7% among the population aged

from 15 to 64. Therefore, cannabis use is above the global average.64 North America accounts

for about one fifth of global cannabis users. According to the U.N. report, the relative

importance of North America its larger when it comes to cocaine, where almost 37% of all

cocaine users worldwide are found in North America. Additionally, 1.1% of the population

thereof uses amphetamines and ecstasy. They are – in both cases – above the global average. If

opioids are considered, available estimates suggest that more than 40% of global opioid users are

found in North America.65 Furthermore, North America, has today a significant problem when it

comes to the non-medical use of prescription drugs, which within the United States “has ranked

for some years second after cannabis, with an annual prevalence of 6.4% among the

population.”66

Conclusion

Fifty years after the United Nations launched the global drug prohibition system, and forty years

after President Nixon launched the U.S. war on drugs and thus closed down the Mexico-U.S.

border, it is argued that the bilateral war on drugs has failed. Thus, reforms in national and

international drug control policies are urgently needed.

In 2011, various experts and political figures67

63 Id., p. 37.

created “The Global Commission on Drug

Policy” in order to provide leadership and alternative approaches to current drug policies. The

64 Id. 65 Id., p. 36 66 Id. 67 Carlos Fuentes, writer and public intellectual, Mexico; César Gaviria, former President of Colombia; Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former President of Brazil (chair); George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State, United States (honorary chair); Javier Solana, former European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Spain; Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ghana; Marion Caspers-Merk, former State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry of Health; Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve and of the Economic Recovery Board; Ruth Dreifuss, former President of Switzerland and Minister of Home Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Norway. Among others.

Mexico 2011 page 28 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Commission states that “drug policies were initially developed and implemented in the hope of

achieving outcomes in terms of a reduction in harms to individuals and society – less crime,

better health, and more economic and social development. However, we have primarily been

measuring our success in the war on drugs by entirely different measures – those that report on

processes, such as the number of arrests, the amounts seized, or the harshness of punishments.

These indicators may tell us how tough we are being, but they do not tell us how successful we

are in improving health and welfare.”68

If we take, as a starting point, the initial goal of a “drug free world” implemented 50 years ago,

we now have enough evidence and experience to argue that current approach towards drugs has

failed to meet this target. Today, evidence shows that the vast economic and human resources

directed to the criminalization, marginalization and ongoing repressive measures against both

traffickers and consumers of illegal drugs have clearly failed to reduce demand and supply.

We have learned, through history, that the capture and arrest of leaders in the drug organizations

and/or thousands of people of the lower echelons of the cartels have not had any effect on either

the cost or the consumption of drugs in the US. Additionally, the new security measures

established in the US after 9/11 have had no significant effect on the amount, cost or demand for

drugs. Furthermore, the criminalization and the arrest of traffickers that have dedicated their

lives to drug trade have not dissuaded anyone involved in the business to change their activities.

Despite all the above, the Government still believes that the capture of traffickers is the correct

solution. The Mexican Government, guided and pressured by the U.S, can capture a leader or

thousands of subordinates, but there will always be many more Mexicans willing to do the job.

Capturing and arresting the traffickers does not solve the problem of trafficking of drugs.

Instead, it is a much deeper problem that needs to be addressed from both sides of the border.

Mexico, like the majority of the drug producing countries, is a third world nation with many

economic problems. Therefore, as long as the police forces are poorly paid, the general economy

of the country does not improve, and the public is generally dishonest and corrupt, a large part of

68 Global Commission on Drug Policy, WAR ON DRUGS: REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY, June 2011, p. 5 (available at http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report).

Mexico 2011 page 29 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

the society will continue to participate in any business that is profitable and may generate wealth

quickly.

On the other side of the border, the United States’ repressive efforts geared toward consumers

impede public health measures to reduce HIV, overdose fatalities and other harmful

consequences.69 In fact, evidence shows that the criminalization and stigmatization of drug

consumers has not reduced the consumption if illegal drugs in the U.S. On the contrary,

consumption has increased over the past decade. In reality, drug dependence is a complex

condition that has a mixture of causes – mainly social, psychological and physical. At the end of

the day, industrialized countries (under the leadership of the U.S.) should review their

corresponding societies and analyze how the increase and prevalence of drug consumption

reflects on themselves. In other words, the drug problem should be managed as a set of

“interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, rather than a war to be won.”70

Drug policies must be implemented in order to measure the success in the reduction of harm to

health, security and welfare of Mexican and American societies. Additionally, drug policies

must be implemented within a human rights framework and treat people dependent on drugs as

patients, not criminals. Human and economic resources should be invested in prevention and

treatment instead of punishment and law enforcement.

The growth of a “huge criminal drug market,” financed by drug consumers, has created

enormous profits for the organized crime, profits that finance and perpetuate the existing

violence and corruption in Mexico. Consequently, the war on drugs poses a significant threat not

only to individual and national security, but also to democratic institutions and thus challenging

the social contract that legitimizes the very existence of the State. In short, the legalization of

drugs and regulated markets would not provide the same opportunities for the organize crime to

make vast profits. In fact, the legalization of cannabis may be a a good start and, depending on

its success, legalization of other drugs could follow.

69 Id., p. 2. 70 Id., p. 4.

Mexico 2011 page 30 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Migration in Mexico, and U.S. Influence

Mexican migration to the United States reflects many of the paradoxical elements that

characterize the two countries' relationship, and the impact of U.S. policy on Mexican society.

While the Mexican government encourages migration for remittances that contribute enormously

to GDP, the US goes to great lengths to demonstrate that it is "tough" on illegal immigration.

While the U.S. enforcement is supposed to curb illegal immigration, in fact, the US economy

heavily relies on the labor of undocumented workers' in the informal economy.

Since 9/11 and alongside the ongoing economic challenges facing the US, Mexican immigration

has been on the decline and enforcement at the border and deportations are reaching record high

levels. Some are making the case that Mexican development is achieving greater progress

resulting in less immigration. The state of the international economy, specifically in the US

calling for fewer workers, deportations and more aggressive border controls, and the ongoing

drug cartel violence concentrated along the border are certainly other factors. From a policy

perspective, the US's approach appears rather unintelligent, focusing on reprimands and

punishment rather than a more comprehensive attempt to address the economic underpinnings

that cause Mexicans to migrate North in the first place. Scholars such as Santiso assert that Latin

American countries benefit from pursuing long-term economic and political agendas and I will

assess the institutional support of the Mexican diaspora in light of this theory for the evaluation

as to where this leads Mexican development in the long-term future. Mexico's relationship with

the US presents a multitude of contradictory ideas that date far back throughout history and are

reflected on by scholars who draw parallels with national identity and development. A further

complication in the idea of national identity lies in the strengthening and expansion of

transnational constituencies which I will try to relate to Mexico's political trajectory in its impact

on development.

US Immigration Policies

Mexico’s geographical location with respect to the US is very significant in many aspects of

Mexican foreign policy and history. Before assessing many of the US-influenced development

and political initiatives that interact with migrant populations, it seems necessary to discuss the

Mexico 2011 page 31 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

US rationale in its treatment of Mexico. Before exploring development aspects, we must ask

whether US lawmakers truly aim to curb Mexican immigration, and if so, why the policies

enacted appear to deal solely with the reactionary realm of deportations, criminalization, and

border enforcement without attention to the effect of economic policies, security (especially with

respect to the US perpetuation of drug cartel violence via consumption), and a general tide of

trade liberalization which (arguably) effectively increases the push factors behind Mexican

emigration.

Since the enactment of NAFTA , the dialogue around globalization has created opposing

ideological views with respect to trade policies with the US and the institutional approach to the

political economy. According to critics, Vicente’s Fox’s platform of change did not extend to the

institutional approach to migration and these paradoxes emerge in a lack of hope for a better life

in Mexico. Other scholars contend that Fox sparked the ‘transnational’ link between Mexican

government and migrant communities living in the US. Through an examination of the attempts

to include transnational communities, the paradox of national membership without citizenship

adds to the contradiction permeating the discussion. NAFTA is a prime example of a

paternalistic foreign power seeking to profit with little regard for the people affected directly by

these efforts and the fact that there is no contingency plan for the human resources that have

been highly impacted by the “more open” trade. When the Zapatistas' notion of autonomy

became known, Mexico and the rest of the world began to pay attention to the worth of

decentralization as a means of organization in a new way, and this concept of decentralization

fits well into the transnational remittance structure as well as for international trade. The

autonomic effort calls for a fourth level of government that would link federal, state, and

municipal levels. This concept transcends indigenous communities and is valuable to all of

Mexico. Former president Salinas de Gortari recognized this need saying "we need to fashion... a

decentralized and participatory alliance between public actions and private initiatives."71

71

Grassroots opposition in civil society represents groups responding to globalization efforts like

NAFTA by bringing the issue to a local level. Because civil society must operate in a nation-

state it "... constantly challenges and transcends... and adopts them only as an appropriate

http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/the-market-turn-without-neoliberalism-international-lessons/

Mexico 2011 page 32 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

structure for the transition to a new form of society and democracy."72 Therefore, grassroots

groups and NGOs in Mexico are working around the present system to create a more de-

centralized, de-globalized nation and to preserve community, culture, and their exploited

exportation. An economic-focused NGO in this vein is Barzon. Based in D.F., this organization

seeks to relieve debt and to enlarge the middle class. The constitutional reform effort is one that

"aspires to transform both the ideologies and institutions, not to simply reform them or replace

their administrators."73 Thus, at the country's very foundation a change is being demanded,

similar to the possibilist solution proposed by Santiso.74 Barkin acknowledges the prospect for

better alternatives to migration saying, "The trend is still positive; innumerable groups are

realizing their potential and their need to construct regional alternatives to globalization,

alternatives that contribute to stemming not only environmental disasters but the impoverishment

imposed by centralized accumulation."75

US & Mexico Policy History

This concept transcends the arena of migrants in the

structure of Home Town Associations, harkening back to the decentralized, multi-level approach

being advocated for by other groups within Mexico.

While there were other guest worker programs dating back to before the Bracero Programs of

1917-1921 and 1941-1964, the second wave of this guest worker program made an indelible

impact that is still felt today in the original sending communities and states in Mexico and to

their destinations in the United States. This Mexican Farm Labor Program came to be known as

the Bracero Program contracted Mexican laborers to relive sectors in need in the US. While

economic issues are generally the most influential in the decision to migrate to the US, political

and social factors also play a role. The Bracero program set into play the specific paths that

would be re-charted for some families through the years and through the generations. During the

Bracero programs, the Mexican government worried that migrants would settle in the US and

72 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/the-meaning-and-scope/ 73 Id. 74 Santiso, Javier, "Latin America's Political Economy of the Possible", MIT Press, 2006. 75 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/incorporating-indigenous-epistemologies-into-the-construction-of-alternative/

Mexico 2011 page 33 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

actually policed the border and provided incentives for migrants to return. Mexico even financed

the selective return of Mexican migrants “to avoid a humiliating confrontation with the coercive

apparatus of the U.S. government.”76 While tensions between federal, local and state

governments may have differed, the general attitude of Mexico was that of a “territorial” view of

the country, where, as is thought of traditionally, the nation consisted of those living within its

borders. It is also important to note that though these two waves of guest worker programs

existed, during periods of economic troubles, immigration (legal and illegal) subsided

accordingly. The fact that the US essentially reversed its view from the period of the 1930s being

marked by massive deportations, immediately following a mass importation of migrant labor due

to demand for labor “…contradicted the federal policy immediately before aiming to legalize,

channel, and control Mexican migration.”77 Because migration overall increased with the

increase of contracted migrant workers, the Bracero program became less of a need since the

corresponding influx of immigrants sufficed. This abrupt change in attitude is somewhat of a

landmark for the relationship between Mexico and the US in that it went from a bilateral

relationship to a unilateral one, and this paradigm persists and has enormous impact today.

Furthermore, Operation Wetback’s occurrence in 1954 resulted in the deportation of 1.1 million

Mexicans from Texas through raids of U.S. businesses.78

76 Michael Peter Smith and Matt Bakler, (citing Fitzgerald), Citizenship across Borders, The Political Transformation of El Migrante, Cornell University Press (2008), p. 29.

Interestingly, it appears as though the

nature of “illegal” immigration changed after the enactment of Immigration and Nationality Act

of 1964, which changed the immigration system in the US of one from accepting only quotas

from particular countries to re-unifying families and providing quotas for certain types of visas

(mainly for professionals). It is my observation that prior to the 1964 immigration law, “illegal”

immigration occurred far more as an incidence of overstaying a visa or legal contract through the

Bracero program and afterwards evolved into the illegal border crossing we see today. In the

same year the Immigration law was passed, the Bracero Program was brought to an abrupt end

by the US unilaterally. While the Mexican government sought to re-instate the program at first,

by the 1970s it was experiencing such high levels of population and consequently unemployment

77 Id. 78 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/patterns-of-mexican-migration-to-the-united-states/

Mexico 2011 page 34 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

that it began to accept and appreciate the remittances being sent back to sending-communities on

a regular basis. This marked the beginning of the “policy of no policy” where the Mexican

government simply turned a blind eye to the growing fleet of mostly young men leaving the

country. Mexico’s removal of penalties for leaving without a contract in 1974 “…amounted to a

deregulation of emigration controls.”79

The Carter administration wanted to develop their foreign policies in order to address

Latin America’s integration into the world economy, secondly to address the increase of

illegal immigrants, and U.S. interest to obtain oil from Mexico…Mexico, on the other

hand, wanted to ensure human rights protections for all legal and illegal Mexicans in the

U.S., cease its dependence on the U.S. for economic and political issues, increase

nationalism in Mexico, and wanted U.S. bilateral policies to be sensitive and responsive

to Mexico’s position over issues in a manner that would "reflect the bilateral character"

of their issues.

Though it was not a marked difference from prior

attitudes toward US domestic policy, it is notable that from the 1970s and ending with Fox, the

general approach to the US’s draconian measures to keep Mexican immigrants out went widely

un-commented on by Mexican officials. Rosenblum comments on the conflict of the two

countries focuses in terms of their foreign relations,

80

Basically, Mexico wanted to be consulted in the policy making process in regards to bilateral

issues. With the peso crisis of the 1980s in Mexico, economic disparity between the two

countries widened and thus increased emigration. With the Immigration Control and Reform Act

of 1986, the Regan administration aimed at curbing immigration through amnesty, reasoning that

once amnesty was granted, more stringent enforcement would keep more immigrants from

coming, but the law was completely unsuccessful in that regard. IRCA legalized undocumented

migrants who had entered the U.S. before January 1, 1982 and provided amnesty for those that

had worked ninety days in agriculture in the year preceding May 1986 .

81

79 Id.

“Studies tend to argue

that IRCA only increased illegal immigration to the United States... Statistics by the U.S. Census

80 Id (citing Rosenblum). 81 Id.

Mexico 2011 page 35 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

and the INS do not reflect a decrease…IRCA failed because employers did not want to comply

with the IRCA requirements.” 82

As previously stated, the economic disparity between the US and Mexico was so great that

Mexican immigration has continued to grow exponentially since the 1950s.

83

Migration Patterns Today

With the

inauguration of Fox a more vocal criticism of human rights issues, border issues, and treatment

of Mexican immigrants became more common. Calderon has also made criticisms of the US to

this effect (though he has been criticized for not being as aggressive as Fox). Still, Fox brought a

new approach about the treatment of Mexicans in the US and, as had the PRI administrations of

the 1980s, continued to make efforts to incorporate migrants into Mexican politics and, more

pointedly, in economics. These topics will be examined in greater depth later in this paper.

As previously mentioned migration patterns from Mexico were heavily impacted by the Bracero

program and continue to maintain a heavy influence on migration patterns today. The states of

Jalisco, Michoacan, Zacatecas, Durango, and Oaxaca are all predominantly rural states that have

been sending high proportions of its population for the last century. (Between 1926-1931, 60%

of Mexican emigration to US was from Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Jalisco, and Michoacan .84

82 Id.

Recent studies, however, are signifying record low numbers of first time migrants from these

regions and indeed in all types of migration from Mexico. The change observed from 2009 is, in

my view, due to the lessening disparity between wages and jobs between the two countries as a

result of the financial crisis. Other scholars attribute the slowing of Mexican migration to the US

to the many draconian measures being taken in states like Arizona and Alabama, where children

are forced to prove their status when enrolling in school and routine traffic violations easily

devolve into immigration status inquiries. It is my view that these measures result from the

precarious economic climate directly and indirectly. Not only are US citizens fearful of losing

83 For an interactive illustration of the influx of Mexican immigration over the last century, see http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/15/interactive-map-from-ny-times-illustrating-influx-of-mexican-immigration/ . 84 Patterns of Mexican Migration…

Mexico 2011 page 36 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

more jobs, as was seen during the Great Depression, but since president Obama’s political

agenda has virtually removed immigration reform from the political agenda, local and state

governments experiencing high levels of immigration make misguided and xenophobic attempts

to take control themselves. And so we see a continuation of a paradox of policies within both

countries and further between the two. Still, the ramifications of re-incorporating migrants in the

US in the Mexican political and economic spheres in Mexico are central with respect to the

concentrated nature of sending-communities in Mexico and I will return to this later in this

examination.

Remittances

Mexican immigrants to the U.S. remitted more than 16.5 billion to Mexico in 2004 clearly

making an enormous impact on both the economy and the social fabric of Mexico.85 Since there

is such disproportion of migrant-sending communities in Mexico, the remittances that come back

are disproportionate as well. Remittances go to local communities rather than to federal funds.

The five mostly rural states that make up 1/3 of Mexico’s population receive 44% of remittances

and this is important to the distribution of the remittances sent for development projects in

Mexico.86

Annual remittances to Mexico grew substantially between 2001 and 2008, from $8.9

billion to $25.1 billion, an increase of 182.0%. The annual growth rate reached a high of

26.3% in 2003, then continued at a slower rate until 2009. There is an interrelationship

between remittances to Mexico and economic growth in the United States… Although

the relationship between GDP growth and the level or remittances is not very clear, the

Mexican government attributed the 2009 decline to the global financial crisis.

87

85 Santiso, Javier, "Latin America's Political Economy of the Possible", MIT Press, 2006, p. 162.

86 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/disparities-between-the-us-and-mexico/ 87 For a table of remittances see http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/disparities-between-the-us-and-mexico/

Mexico 2011 page 37 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Remittances have an important impact on the Mexican economy in some regions more than

others.88 For some states and communities, remittances make up almost all of the consumption

and “one study estimates that 80% of the money received by households goes for food, clothing,

health care, and other household expenses. Another study estimates that remittances in Mexico

are responsible for about 27%, and up to 40% in some cases, of the capital invested in

microenterprises throughout urban Mexico.”89

Transnational Communities & Keeping it Corporatist

Therefore, a disproportionate amount of resources

are sent to poor states although not necessarily the poorest. In the next section I will discuss

Mexican government sponsored matching programs that gear collective remittances toward

infrastructure and investment instead of consumption.

In 2007 Calderon said “Mexico does not end at its borders” and “Where there is a

Mexican, there is Mexico.”90 These statements are a testament to the PRI stance with regard to

the reincorporation of migrants and have been maintained by the two administrations that

followed PRI rule. Hometown Associations in the US are community and social centers where

the various concentrations of Mexican immigrants meet for primarily fundraising events such as

rodeos, dances, and dinners to raise money to send back to their home communities. In the 1980s

the PRI governor of Zacatecas visited migrant communities in the US regularly and solidified

ties with the Mexican government to the point of institutionalization of a federation of hometown

associations in California in 1988.91 In turn, the PRI financed a program called “Dos por Uno”

whereby the state financed a matching fund to go toward development projects in Zacatecas. In a

speech given by the governor, he said one of the aims was to invest in infrastructure that would

create employment (underscoring the contradiction of creating jobs by sending residents away).

Since then, “Mexican state agencies have…pursued a coherent framework for action that may be

characterized as a transnationalization of the long-standing corporatist strategy of the PRI.”92

88 For a map demonstrating remittance flows, see

http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/09/remittance-flows/ 89 Id. 90 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/mexico-blasts-u-s-immigration-policies/ 91 Citizenship across Borders, p. 30. 92 Id, p. 31.

Mexico 2011 page 38 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Hometown associations under Fox and subsequently Calderon appear to be moving toward co-

option by elite groups that do not contribute monetarily as much as the migrant groups do,

underscoring another contradiction in the arrangement. “They have developed policies toward

the Mexican diaspora in order to favorably reposition Mexico in the emergent international

economy and vis-à-vis the United States.” 93 Former president Zedillo called it the “Mexican

global nation.” The concept of national identity in the PRI’s switch to a more regional approach

to garnering the support of the migrant communities can be attributed to the migrants partial

blaming of the PRI for having to leave, and many viewing the PRI as corrupt. Because many

migrants (and Mexicans generally) have more regional senses of identity, the various HTA’s in

the US vary accordingly. While political rule of the states differ in approach with respect to

neoliberal or social-philanthropic logic regarding remittances, these approaches transfer to what

drives the development projects and what kind of incentives there are for migrants to participate.

The Zacatecas’ governor’s Dos por Uno plan served as a precursor for the Program for Mexican

Communities Abroad (PCME) which was instated by president Salinas in 1991.Salinas

organized meetings with municipal authorities, industrial leaders, and migrants and tried to

promote cultural “Mexicaness” to strengthen Mexican identity abroad. The foundation of these

matching programs on the federal level have significance in their corporatist roots. PCME began

to work with SEDESOL (the transnational arm of the National Solidarity Program) and garnered

public-private partnerships between migrants as well as private capital for development projects.

Some scholars view the ideological nature of this partnership as a priming for NAFTA, “These

efforts to create a space for the migrant in Mexico’s political development were driven as much

by the PRI’s interest in maintaining its long-standing control over the state apparatus as they

were by its proclaimed objectives of reducing poverty, modernizing the countryside, and

legitimating NAFTA.”94

93 Id (citing Guarnizo).

In 1997 the Mexican congress passed an amendment holding that

birthright citizenship cannot be revoked, promoting dual citizenship and an absentee voting

system (that was not instated until 2005). However, the widespread assumption regarding voting

from abroad is that it has not been substantial because of complicated registration processes and

corruption. Fox maintained PRI initiatives with respect to the reincorporation of migrants in the

94 Id, p. 37.

Mexico 2011 page 39 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

US in spite of being the candidate of change, and created the Presidential Office for Mexicans

Abroad (OPME) and had lobbyists vying for immigrant rights in the US as well as promoting

investment by migrants in Mexico. Foreign Affairs Minister Jorge Castanada and Juan

Hernandez (the director of OPME) had a number of conflicts and Hernandez was fired and

OPME dissolved in 2003. While OPME operated independently of the consulate, a new agency

formed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out policies of the National Council for

Mexican Communities Abroad and coordinate with 14 federal agencies that deal with migrant

communities. The Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) is directed by the president of Mexico

and gets policy recommendations from a third body, a council consisting of “corporatist clients

and collaborators.”95

• 110 migrants or Mexican descendents

Smith and Bakker list the components;

• 10 representatives of major U.S. Latino organizations

• Consultants

• 32 state representatives (paraphrased)

The IME has focused on developing relations with “local and regional U.S government officials

and Mexican-origin community leaders in the United States as a means of developing the

Mexican government’s much-coveted Mexican lobby within the United States.”96 This is one of

the ways that the Fox administration has been more vocal about criticizing US domestic policies

that affect immigrants, but at the same time the lobbies appear to have more to do with

maintaining immigrants already in the US rather than immigration policies at the border. We can

also see Fox’s neoliberal motivations to use collective remittances from HTAs toward business

prospects rather than philanthropic or infrastructure as they had historically. Fox emphasized

entrepreneurial involvement and moved from infrastructure development to productive

investment.97

95 Id, p. 39.

In November 2006, after visiting Canada and several Latin American countries

Calderon criticized the re-invigorated efforts to amp up fencing at the border and said that it was

an issue that complicates US-Mexico relations. He noted that job creation in Mexico and

96 Id. 97 Id.

Mexico 2011 page 40 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

increased investment would be more effective in reducing illegal migration from Mexico than a

border fence.98 “Calderón signaled a shift in Mexican foreign policy when he noted that while

immigration is an important issue in the bilateral relationship, it is not the only issue, as trade and

economic development are also important.”99

Another important shift in the relationship between Mexican government and migrants has been

in the consulate system. Consulates have been offering additional services besides the traditional

legal protection and paperwork and now offer life skills courses, socialization events and other

activities to garner national identity. One of the efforts of the consulates is the “matricula” which

is an id card issued by the Mexican consulate, used to keep count of migrants and is seen as an

effort to increase and maintain remittances to their respective regions of origin. Some local

governments in the US accept the id, so it can strengthen migrants against deportations for minor

violations. Smith and Bakker point to another motivation behind the matricula though, “A telling

indicator of the role of remittances in driving the matricula issue is the Mexican government’s

high profile campaign to convince major banks to accept the document as an acceptable form of

identification for opening new accounts. Fully consistent with the neoliberal ‘remittances to

development’ agenda being driven by states, development banks and the international financial

institutions.”

100

A 2001 report by state agency Guanajuato state population council aimed to make

‘productive financial flows’ and said public policies must… ‘(a) promote inexpensive

remittance services to reduce ‘unproductive losses’ due to high transaction costs; (b)

establish a framework encouraging the migrant to save and invest to ensure an eventual

Smith and Bakker argue the aim of the program is to incorporate the migrants

into formal banking institutions which extends to the collective remittance matching system in

place.

98 Patterns of Mexican Migration… 99 Id. 100 Citizenship across Borders, p. 40.

Mexico 2011 page 41 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

‘dignified return’ to his community of origin; and (c) channel the migrant’s investment

dollars into various microenterprises in his native community’101

This state government, as others, can be viewed as trying to channel remittances into state-run

and state-designed social and educational policies financed by migrant populations with a neo-

liberal bent. This is to say that the HTAs are akin to other corporatist entities in its relationship

with the federal and state governments and fall prey to politics and corresponding investment

initiatives, which have been neo-liberal over the last decade. Again, we see the convergence of

the social, political, and economic realms with “…the long-standing assumption that it is the

state’s role to provide the infrastructure investment on which the economic development of a

region depends is… recast as the transnational citizen’s ‘opportunity’ or even duty to share in

this role.

102 There is somewhat of a social pressure, atop the political and economic to continue

to send remittances, especially in the HTAs that have institutionalized government connections.

Smith and Bakker go on to point out the paradox of Mexican inequality extending to migrant

communities abroad, “Likewise, migrants as transnational taxpayers are expected to ‘volunteer’

funds to support their extended families through contributions to health, educational, and social

security programs that the state could not or would not otherwise provide to the poorer citizens

of rural Mexico by taxing ore privileged segments of the Mexican population.”103 For some

small communities supported by HTAs, these funds can make up “more than 50 percent of the

money in municipal public works budgets.”104

Though much of the money remitted to home communities benefits the poor, HTAs are not

organizationally equipped to address the structural issues that perpetuate poverty, and this is

essential to keep in mind when evaluating the development work the HTA does in conjunction

with the Mexican government. Scholars also note that “HTA money often fails to create financial

In some cases the HTA far outnumbers the public

works budget the community would have otherwise.

101 Id, p. 49. 102 Id, 51. 103 Id. 104 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/migrant-hometown-associations-and-opportunities-for-development-a-global-perspective/

Mexico 2011 page 42 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

security for households or sustainable development in a community.”105 Though concentrated

pockets may experience great benefits, the very constitution of the remittance-sending population

makes the system untenable in the long term. Effectively, it seems that while the HTAs vastly

improve Mexican communities, the need for perpetual migration persists. Orozco and Rouse

further highlight that much of the leadership of the HTAs are inexperienced and lack

implementation, training, and evaluative skills. Additionally, they cite an inability to “work

effectively with local community stakeholders.”106

Impact of NAFTA

The general consensus of NAFTA’s impact on migration has been that while the trade agreement

has improved the Mexican economy overall, the fundamental disparities between the US and

Mexico persist so migration does as well. Many studies suggest investment in education,

infrastructure, and institutional strengthening to better benefit from free trade.107 When NAFTA

was first proposed, one of the main tenets was that it would narrow the disparities between the

two countries. “One study argues that NAFTA is not enough to help narrow the disparities in

economic conditions between Mexico and the United States and that Mexico needs to invest

more in education; innovation and infrastructure; and in the quality of national institutions.” 108

NAFTA has shown little evidence to have benefitted national institutions in Mexico and that is a

key part of the emigration issue. Villarrea, quoting a World Bank study notes, “the wage

differential within the country increased as a result of trade liberalization.”109 This issue stems

from the economic inequality that is so rampant and devastating.110

105 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/migrant-hometown-associations-and-opportunities-for-development-a-global-perspective/

Another conclusion with

respect to NAFTA has been its skewed effect on rural farm workers who would most likely need

to migrate to another region in Mexico at a minimum. NAFTA is one of the few and by far the

most prominent effort toward a bilateral agreement between the two countries, and its impact on

migration has arguably been from a level of increasing emigration to negligible effects on

106 Id. 107 Patterns of Mexican Migration… 108 U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations… 109 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/nafta-and-the-mexican-economy/ 110 Patterns of Mexican Migration…

Mexico 2011 page 43 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

curbing the phenomenon. NAFTA has largely been beneficial to the US in disproportionate

terms and has ultimately been a poor model for bilateral agreements between the two countries.

Conclusions

In the years since the financial crisis of 2008, drastic drops in Mexican migration are occurring.

In January 2010 the Banco de México “reported that remittance inflows fell 16.0% in 2009.”111

While NAFTA was not able to meaningfully impact emigration, the 2008 financial crisis has

curbed immigration significantly and currently the US is experiencing record low levels of

Mexican immigration of all kinds. A New York Times study reveals that first time border

crossings have sputtered from some century-old sending communities and that new and

progressive tactics by consulates have been able to shift from illegal to legal migration through

the increased number of visas permitted to be issued.112

111 U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations…

The same study holds that some local

communities have benefitted from remittances to the point that their infrastructures are now in

place and educational systems up to a standard that is allowing for would-be migrants to pursue

work at home. It is my view of this contention that the increases in these capacities are most

likely only applicable to small pockets and concentrations of regions, as is the case with all

remittances. It is one of my conclusions that the slowdown has to do with economic conditions

in the US narrowing the disparity in finding work at all. Furthermore, draconian measures being

taken at state and local levels are a reaction to the financial crisis, similar to the xenophobic

reactions we saw in the 1930s and 1950s. These local attitudes toward immigration and

immigrants themselves seem to me also a reaction to Obama’s failure to pass meaningful

immigration reform. Obama himself appears to be reacting to a standstill of immigration reform

in his record deportations and detentions. His adoption of a “policy of enforcement” has to do

with political pressures to be seen as “tough on immigration” while it is no longer a legislative

priority. Ultimately, trade and profit will be the motivators behind US relations with any country

and “The productivity of immigration law in creating and sustaining distinctive forms of

pronounced and protracted legal vulnerability for particular migrants, therefore, is inextricable

112 To read the New York Times article, see http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/11/14/better-lives-for-mexicans-cut-allure-of-going-north/.

Mexico 2011 page 44 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

from the specifically economic profitability of migrant deportability.”113 In 2004, Bush

proposed an overhaul of the U.S. immigration system to permit the matching of Mexican

workers with U.S. employers but Bush’s proposals for guest workers, the dream act, and state

attacks on civil liberties of undocumented migrants represented a “more fundamental and general

‘revolving door’ pattern of simultaneous deportations coupled with an overall mass importation,

which has long been the defining feature of Mexican migrant labor.”114 And here we return to

the ultimate paradox of these policies. The US is not particularly concerned with the well-being

of Mexico nor its migrants in its midst or on within its borders. Rather, “what the history of

Mexican migration to the US makes abundantly clear and irrefutable is the crucial relation

between migrant ‘illegality’ and labor subordination.” 115

Critics of some of the attempts at bilateral agreements point to this reality as well. Delgado-Wise

points to Mexico’s structural dependence on the US economy and the US economy’s reliance on

Mexico’ excess of labor for “short-term advantage” as one of the key paradoxes withholding the

advancement of development in Mexico.

116 A further testament to the precarious and US-

dominated relationship between the two countries was through the Partnership for Prosperity

which was a forum consisting of business and political leaders to discuss bilateral initiatives to

accompany NAFTA. This program existed from 2005 to 2009and was unilaterally ended by the

US. Some analysts view these programs as benefitting extreme poverty but to “also

institutionalize the asymmetric integration of Mexico with the US economy.”117 Many scholars

also point to “asymmetric economic integration” process as contributing to adverse conditions

for Mexico’s development. According to de Janvry, this inequality is sometimes “reinforced by

the same government programs that intend to reduce poverty.”118

113 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/11/07/abstracts-from-the-production-of-culprits-from-deportability-to-detainability-in-the-aftermath-of-homeland-security-nicholas-de-genova/

114 Id. 115 Id. 116 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/migration-and-development-lessons-from-the-mexican-experience/ 117 http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/can-mexicos-social-programs-reduce-poverty/ 118 Migration and Development…

Mexico 2011 page 45 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Civil Society has conclusions and suggestions for government institutions in the policy arena.

The first is to move the discussion from the militarization of the border and the criminalization of

immigrants to an emphasis on development and human rights. In 2010 The Global Forum on

Migration met in Mexico and issued a report deploring “the heavy emphasis on security,

enforcement, militarization, detention, border controls and deportation. Criminalization is a

serious obstacle to undocumented migrants being protected from violence and accessing

essential public and support services, and justice and redress.”119 The change the GMFD is

discussing is one that we can logically trace back to the merging of INS into ICE in 2002

pursuant to the Department of Homeland Security. Civil society is imploring both governments

to change the direction of the discussion to one more sensitive to the rights of migrants to work

in addition to their traditional human and development rights. Civil society is also proposing a

negotiation of “a temporary labor program”120 and “urged governments to develop policies

regarding the family, and not only focus on the individual worker, in order to protect families left

behind by migration.”121 The impact broken families will have on development and crime in the

future is significant and is a topic that governments should prioritize for the sake of human

rights. Programs such as Frontline have documented the criminalization of hardworking parents

being detained, abused, and ultimately deported, leaving their American citizen children alone in

the US.122 Clearly, this is a broken system. Delgado-Wise captures the relationship between bi-

national agreements such as NAFTA and the affects these agreements have on workers, “In light

of the insecurity and social exclusion prevailing in the binational arena, new legal and political

instruments are needed to protect the living and working conditions of workers.”123 Other ideals

suggested by civil society are “jointly building a viable border region…, cracking down on

criminal smuggling organizations and saving lives by preventing dangerous border crossings,”124

119

and generally moving toward a more bi-national approach to the issue. Both migration and

http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/fourth-meeting-of-the-global-forum-on-migration-and-development-8-11-november-2010-puerto-vallarta-mexico/ 120 Patterns of Mexican Migration… 121 Fourth Meeting of the Global Forum on Migration… 122 For more information on the separation of Mexican families and detainment see: http://mexicovista.wordpress.com/2011/12/15/frontline-program-on-detainment-and-deportation/. 123 Migration and Development… 124 Id.

Mexico 2011 page 46 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

development in Mexico are hugely impacted by macroeconomic stability and economic growth.

Inequality within the country is one source of migration and civil society also seems to point to

reforming the distribution of tax revenues for the richest sector of the country. Ultimately, it is

“the lack of coordination between the different ministries [that] leads to incompatible social and

economic investments.”125

This problematic organizational structure is one that goes back to

corporatism and underscores the far-reaching changes called for in the structure of Mexican

governmental institutions.

Summary There are benefits and drawbacks to Mexico stemming from its close ties and geographical

proximity to the United States. Both this geographical context and the influence of Mexico’s

corporatist past continue to weigh heavily on Mexico’s institutions, policies, and future as a

democracy. These factors are seen particularly in two of the most pressing issues of Mexican

society and current events – drug trafficking and migration. While Mexico develops significant

programs such as PROGRESA (now Opportunidades) to fight the intergenerational transmission

of poverty, and makes progress in developing its civil society and institutions, all of its policy

and programmatic developments take place in the shadow and context of United States policies,

programs, and economic developments. Whether it be immigration reform, or drug legalization,

Mexico must find a way to unite its institutions and political parties to play a meaningful role in

policy-making and bi-national agreements, rather than be subject to unilateral U.S. policy.

Otherwise, Mexico’s young democracy will be unlikely to be able to develop further in the face

of inequality and violence, and citizens may opt for the more authoritarian systems of the past in

a search for stability.

125 Do Mexico’s Social Programs Reduce Poverty?

Mexico 2011 page 47 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

APPENDIX A: Mexican Historical Timeline

Mexican War of Independence from Spain

• Started in 1810 by priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, who was captured and executed in 1811

• Was in many ways a civil war between indigenous, criollos, and peninsulares. • José María Morelos assumed leadership of the rebel army • 1813 convened the Congress Chilpancingo, which issued the first official declaration of

independence. • In 1821 a military coup in Spain led to conservative criollo forces in Mexico allying with

rebel armies for independence. The Treaty of Córdoba was signed with Spain, recognizing Mexican independence. Iturbide was named "emperor"

1824-72 First Mexican Republic. Mexican American War took a large amount of northern territories from Mexico. Conservatives and Liberals clashed over the role of the church in government, and of large landowners vs. workers and peasants.

1876-1911 Porifrio Diaz in power. Diaz instituted land laws that restricted peasants from claiming land without formal legal title. 95% of Mexico’s land was owned by 5% of the population.

1910 Mexican Revolution begins when Madero was jailed for running a campaign against Diaz. Madero wrote a letter from jail calling for “free suffrage and no re-election” and called for Diaz to be overthrown.

1911 The federal army is defeated. Madero signs the Treaty of Ciudad Juarez with Diaz. Madero wins a new election. Fighting continued when Madero failed to return lands to peasants and implement social reforms.

1913 Madero forced to resign, and then assassinated in a coup led by Madero’s former commander in chief Victoriano Huerta. Huerta installed as president. Revolutionary groups led by Zapata and Pancho Villa continued fighting, and Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize Huerta’s government.

1914 Huerta left office as fighting continued and US forces seized the port of Veracruz. Venustiano Carranza took the presidency.

1917 New Mexican Constitution instituted many social reforms regarding agrarian land and labor.

Mexico 2011 page 48 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

1920 Carranza assassinated under a revolt led by General Obregon and other military leaders. General Álvaro Obregon elected president.

1928 Obregon assasinated, marking the end of the violent "revolutionary period"

1929 National Revolutionary Party begins (renamed PRI in 1946)

1934-1940 Lázaro Cárdenas president. Instituted sweeping reforms returning land to peasants, and nationalized the oil industry.

1940-2000 Relatively peaceful succession of PRI presidents every 6 years. In response to protests for meaningful elections (as opposed to handpicked successors of the outgoing president), presidents instituted various reforms, ultimately including mayoral elections where the PAN party won in Mexico City and Baja. 1930-70 economy considered the “Mexican Economic Miracle”

1968 Tlatelolco massacre of students and protesters

1994 Economic crisis (Tequila crisis) from the devaluation of the peso

Zapatista rebellion uprising in Chiapas

2000 PAN candidate Vicente Fox won the election and took over the presidency from Ernesto Zedillo. Fox was followed by PAN candidate Felipe Calderon, whose term expires in 2012.

2006 PAN candidate Felipe Calderon wins the presidential election

Mexico 2011 page 49 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

APPENDIX B: Maps

Population Density of Mexico: http://geo-mexico.com/?tag=population-density

Mexico 2011 page 50 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Appendix C: Works Cited (Migration)

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Cave, Damien. "For Mexicans Looking North, a New Calculus Favors Home - Interactive Feature -

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<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=581>.

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Mexico 2011 page 51 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

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Orozco, Manuel, and Rebecca Rouse. "Migrant Hometown Associations and Opportunities for

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Santiso, Javier. Latin America's Political Economy of the Possible: beyond Good Revolutionaries and

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Smith, Michael Peter, and Matt Bakker. Citizenship across Borders: the Political Transnationalism of El

Migrante. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008. Print.

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Print.

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Congressional Research Service, 2011. Print.

Mexico 2011 page 52 Beatriz Larrea Zepeta, Lauren Santorso, Amy Kenyon

Weintraub, Sidney. "Impacts of Migration in Mexico." 11 Jan. 2002. Web. 14 Dec. 2011.

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