Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg

Cluster of Excellence – Asia and Europe in a Global Context

Seminar: Postwar Japan: The Political Economy of Rapid Economic Growth

Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Christopher Gerteis

Summer Semester 2014

Lara Corsini

Essay 1: Is it ‘easy’ for those Japanese who want to deny Japanese wrong-doing during the Second World War to do so?

Memory and Responsibilities in Japan: between forgetting and remembering

War responsibilities represent one of the most controversial and debated issues in the global

Postwar scenery. In contemporary society, this discourse is all but defined and its ambiguity is

particularly evident in Japanese recent history.

On one hand, after the Occupation years, Japan have focused on shaking off its totalitarian image

and regaining International trust, while stipulating Treaties and trying to present itself as a pacifist

Country. On the other one, though, national identity experienced a curious reshape, obscuring past

shames in favour of an ideal of Japanese uniqueness – a process that ended up with a

reinterpretation of wartime responsibilities and somehow victimized the Japanese themselves. With

this premises, Conservative claims for amending the formal apologies1

, Neo-nationalistic

movements and History revisions have been and still are developed, along with their critique.

But is it really this “easy” for these Japanese who want to deny Japanese wrong-doing during the

Second World War to do so?

Even though a univocal answer is hard to find, the intent of this essay is to trace down the

Historical development of Public Memory and Responsibility after 1945, in the Postwar struggle to

reconstruct Japanese identity, to better understand the perception of war experience among the

Japanese, and thence formulate a possible answer to the question above. I will consider a range of

Scholarship regarding Guilt and Memory in the immediate Postwar, SCAP Occupation policies,

Ienaga Saburō’s Textbooks case, and Apologetics.

“Unrepentant” Japan? Memory and responsibilities in the immediate Postwar

Japan and Germany are two Countries widely affected by their past, particularly in the wake of

World War II. Despite this common ground, global society perceive their response to such heritage

quite differently: while Germany is considered responsible and contrite for its guilts, Japan seems to

maintain an “unrepentant” attitude towards war crimes’ acknowledgment2. This overall impression

was given by several facts, which influenced Japanese interpretation of its recent past.

Some evidence lay within the frame of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far

East, referred to as “Japan’s Nuremberg”3, but substantially different from the German counterpart.

In this historical example of “Victor’s Justice”, while excluding from the prosecutors most Asian

countries damaged by Japanese Imperialism4, the appointment of Japan’s war responsibilities

encountered many obstacles: there was no specific Leader, neither a single group or party within the

institutions to directly blame (unlike Hitler, the SS or the Gestapo in Germany); besides, the nature

of crimes themselves differed from the Nazi’s case and was exposed to Justices’ interpretation,

which focused on a “conspiracy” theory5 above all. After thirty-one months, the Tribunal appointed

a group of War criminals for these actions, but ended up excluding other specific groups that had

contributed to Japanese Imperialism, and minimized the costs of War for Asia itself by ignoring

facts such as the mass mobilization of forced labourers (esp. in Korea and Taiwan) or the

Manchurian 731 research unit. This limited judgement have most probably influenced the general

understanding of war crimes by Japanese people and might have fostered self-victimization, more

than collective national responsibility.

It has to be said, however, that during the initial phase of the Trials (and even before they

began), Japan’s government and Public opinion were actually interested in having an active role in

determining war responsibilities. Not long after the surrender, Allied forces diffused reports over

war crimes and victims perpetrated by Japanese in the conflict6, with a surprising response from the

populace. Despite this, as the Trials went on and SCAP policies were initiated, public attention over

the crimes themselves decreased. Instead, the community developed a “rhetoric of defeat”7 that

looked for responsibilities over defeat rather than collective guilt or repentance on crimes.

Wavering between forgetting and remembering, this process was later concretized in a proper

Foundational Narrative, a popular narrative created during the Occupation in order to determine the

nature of US-Japan relationship8 and mask many incongruous historical developments that could be

counterproductive in the newborn Cold War bilateralism. American control over Japanese

institutions and the focused censorship (formally promoted by the SCAP) were initiated short after

Japanese surrender, and had a leading role in shaping Public opinion and Memory, through an

interpretation of Japan as sole war aggressor9. Both victor and vanquished, in their power relation,

sought after a certain historical continuity, and even if narratives in each country seemed to

contradict the other part10

, they found in the Imperial discourse a common, prolific field. The

Emperor became the embodiment of Japanese-American legacy, as well as the juncture between

past and present that could overcome defeat, with president Truman as American counterpart (and

Gen. MacArthur as spokesperson). This interpretation of Hirohito’s figure, among other things,

contributed to grant him the immunity in the Tokyo Trials, leading then to his symbolic role in the

new Constitution.

The narrative proposed also other physical images, in particular of sutured, democratic bodies11

(opposed to war-scarred ones), in an attempt to make sense of the trauma and motivate a national

recovery. But in any case, when speaking of or figuring bodies, people commonly referred only to

Japanese people, or to Americans as the corresponding other, the victor. Rarely different Asian

individuals were involved in the discourse, if not as background or strangers12

. There’s no need to

say that this focus on Japanese own suffering omitted a proper discussion on the most heinous war

crimes. In fact, such approach had an ambivalent nature: it deviated from the impact itself, since the

foundational narrative prohibited a direct confrontation with the past; but, on the other side, it

created materialized, embodied memories that could be camouflaged within the literature, even in a

critical perspective (as it was done, at some extent, during the 1960s13

).

The cultural discourse over memory was carried on also by five organized social groups14

,

which were founded between the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although these Associations focused

mostly on issues of the domestic sphere (at least until the 1980s), it is remarkable to notice the

existence of such “interest groups”, supported by a network of members in the political and

religious fields15

. A central theme was the Public culture of Memory, in particular through its

historical interpretation, deemed incomplete. The goals differed from one another, depending on the

social groups each Association referred to (representing different war experiences). Anyway,

1952’s historical turning point – the end of Occupation – determined a new range of discussions

that postponed the pursuit of war responsibilities, in order to focus on three main issues: San

Francisco’s Peace Treaty (considered partial and exclusive); the US-Japan Security Treaty and its

1960’s renewal; the Korean war (affecting public sphere). These key events concerned Japanese

public opinion also in terms of memory of war victimization16

and favoured a political polarization

within the five Associations: the ultraconservatives or more nationalist ones distinguished

themselves from the liberals and left-winged, in a very Cold-war-style categorization. The state was,

in most cases, the target of public controversies on war interpretation, which didn’t include

responsibilities toward Asia or an internationalised perspective until a couple of decades later.

The cultural reconstruction and the above mentioned issues came along with Japan’s material

recovery and rapid economic growth period, allowed by the low military effort, with defence

delegated to the US forces. Japanese gained the ideal conditions for moving away from wartime

experience, obscuring responsibilities as long as no external claims were made, and suspending

concerns about memory17

.

Memory comeback, Textbooks and Revisionism

Expressing national sentiment in a political context, in the first years of the Postwar, couldn’t

conceal the trauma. This affected significantly the emphasis on cultural recovery and material

wealth after the Occupation, and left the question of war responsibilities pending.

Therefore, as the newly constructed image of prosperity was undermined by the Oil Crises in

the 1970s, Past Memory experienced a revival and amplification. Japan’s version of History was

questioned in the subsequent years, and a higher Media and Public attention revolved around war

issues in Asian territory18

. The most influential causes, apart from the end of rapid economic growth,

concerned the normalization of relations with South Korea (1965) and China (1972), the anti-

Vietnam war protests, and the official reversion of Okinawa in 1972.

Moreover, in 1971 Honda Katsuichi published a series of reports on violence perpetrated by the

Japanese military from the 1930s19

. It was only the first of various publications that took place

between the 1970s and 1980s, concerning war crimes of Japan’s Imperial Army, such as Unit 731 in

Manchuria, forced labour, and comfort women, and it provoked the first notable reactions from the

former Colonies.

Even if it might seem so, these developments did not actually come all of a sudden. A very

important premise took place from 1965, when Ienaga Saburō’s long trial against the Ministry of

Education began20

. Ienaga was one of the progressive intellectuals and scholars that since the first

Postwar decade assumed a critical position over the Foundational Narrative and its transmission

though History Textbooks. With claims of unconstitutionality and illegality, for the subsequent

thirty years the historian carried on this lawsuit (with its multiple appeals) for the reversal of

Monbushō’s decision to censure his books, which were either published with severe restrictions and

his personal withdrawal of specific opinions, or totally rejected21

. On the ground that the right of

Education should be entrusted to the State in the Constitution, the Supreme Court supported the

Monbushō’s position, even though Ienaga kept on appealing. The rejected contents of these

textbooks were Historical interpretations that didn’t follow the major national narrative – not only

in the interwar and Second World War scene, but also to previous historical phases. Contestations

regarded mainly the choice of images, terminology and the selection of historical facts. This lawsuit

helps in comprehending to which extent pre-1945 legacies survived in the Postwar institutional

asset, along with a conservative vision of History. The Monbushō’s Textbooks section represents

probably the most significant revisionist case in the interpretation of historical Memory and war

responsibilities. Ienaga argued that the main problem of official textbooks was the very poor

presence of “remorse for the past”22

. Most of his work tried to give a genuine overview on the real

effects of the “Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” during Japanese Imperialism, providing a wide

documentation over themes such as Colonial policies, atrocities (Nanking massacre, comfort

women, forced labour, deportations…) and discriminations23

.

This historical approach characterizes part of the discourse on Public Memory and War Crimes

after the 1970s, which develops almost in parallel with an increasingly neo-nationalist trend. The

latter was fostered by the reintroduction of some pre-war national commemorations in the late

1960s and substantially denied Japanese wrong doing, from an ideological rather than a historical

point of view. The most famous and probably most important representative of this panorama is the

Nihonjinron’s rhetoric, which implied the existence of a Japanese uniqueness, based on a-historical

categories such as biology and ethnicity24

. The ideological aim was to transcend historical

conditions and assure Japanese superiority through a cultural device.

Beginning with Nihonjinron, Nationalism came back on the public scene, more than ever after

the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989. This was a turning point commonly associated with the end

of the Cold War as well, and the beginning of a fast sequence of events. Japanese society faced the

loss of a national symbol, which increased public interest over the Emperor’s direct responsibilities

in the war, along with self-reflection over other neglected themes (such as the repression of war

memories)25

. Moreover, the incumbent Gulf War brought a great international pressure over

rearmament, pointing out the inadequacy of the post-colonial political and administrative

framework26

. These facts provided a basis for a new, elegiac Nationalist narrative, which interpreted

the loss of national Identity after 1945 as the main cause of contemporary problems, a “decaying

period of peace” in need of restoring nationalism instead of a rotten democracy27

.

In this context, part of the Public sphere genuinely faced the issue of war responsibilities, with

particular attention on Government’s policies over formal apologies for war crimes (comfort

women among all)28

. On the other hand, revisionism spread quickly within right-wing parties and

the Government itself, supported by a decisive rightward shift in Japanese LDP Leadership in the

last decade29

.

Conclusions

Denial of Japanese wrong doing might not be the most diplomatic strategy to adopt nowadays,

but it constitutes a political and ideological option for many Conservatives and Neo-nationalists.

Still, is it correct to define such denial as an “easy” practice?

As we look back at the Postwar historical developments, excluding some voices emerging from

liberal-left and pacifist groups, the bases for a reactionary Wartime interpretation can be found in

many aspects of Japanese behaviour. Nonetheless, we should also remember that Japan is part of a

globalized system that have come to recognize the role of History in World’s politics, while giving

an increasing attention to present and past issues in Human Rights. Nowadays, contentious memory

and social life are part of the public Japanese opinion as well.

It is surely possible for Japanese to ignore or minimize their Country’s crimes during the Asia-

Pacific War and find enough literature in support of their thesis. Nihonjinron and neo-nationalist

movements, along with the historical continuity in Japanese institutions, constitute realistic

examples. However, such denial brings negative consequences to Japan in terms of international

image and regional interests, especially if we consider Chinese, Korean and South-Asian

developing countries’ importance in contemporary global politics.

An apologetic discourse has been developed ever since Japan have normalized relations with

these Countries, although constantly confronting with the nation’s apparent inability to overcome its

own victimhood30

, or even with public actions highly contested by Asian victims of Japanese

Imperialism31

. Speaking of formal apologies, in 1995 the Diet promulgated a very debated

Resolution that actually formulated a proper reflection on war crimes and Asian victims32

. In the

following years, many summits were held in order to promote regional reconciliation and continue

the Resolution’s purpose, but formal apology statements soon became much more a diplomatic

etiquette than a sincere practice.

This notwithstanding, the last decade’s initiative from LDP’s Leadership to promote debates

about the war somehow forces the public opinion to consider war memory’s dynamics. Being it a

political strategy to gain influence and support or not, it underlines once again the duality behind

the Responsibility discourse in Japan, a historically-developed topic, well identified in the paradox

of forgetting and remembering.

Since many revisionist theories consider war memories as a category external to history, and

prefer to focus on a cultural, emotional interpretation of national identity, they might not have to

struggle with such controversies, simplifying the subject by just omitting it. Still, if we consider the

whole evolutional background of Memory, shaped as it is between unresolved conflicts, victimhood

and human rights, denial can be considered all but an easy path to follow.

Notes

1 This particular trend began after the so-called “Kono Statement” in 1993, admitting comfort station operation

during WWII, which recently caught the attention of Abe’s government for a possible re-examination (Kim, Human

Rights, Memory and Reconciliation: Korea-Japan Relations).

2 The distinction is recurrent in Berger’s book War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II; in his comparative

research, while analyzing the impact of history on local politics/policies, he includes Austria’s case as well.

3 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II, 449

4 Between the eleven Justices, the majority represented Western Allied forces (including former Colonial powers in

most Japanese colonies). The only Asian countries involved were China, India and Philippines, the last two after their

specific claim. Others were excluded even after having experienced wartime atrocities – namely Korea, Indonesia,

Vietnam, Malaya and Hong Kong. Dower, 469-70

5 Referring to the count of “Crimes against peace”, it identified a “common plan” of aggression engaged to secure

domination in East Asia, and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Areas. Dower, 456

6 It was part of the initial victor’s propaganda. Dower, 486

7 Explored in Chapter XVI of Dower’s book.

8 Igarashi, Bodies of Memory – Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970, Chapter 1, “The Bomb,

Hirohito, and History: the Foundational Narrative of Postwar Relations between Japan and the United States” (19-46).

9 Seraphim, 5

10 Igarashi, 23 (and following)

11 Igarashi, 13

12 Particularly evident in Kojima Nobuo’s and Ōe Kenzaburō’s literature, which focused on the concept of

“hybridism”, in-between, as a quality of Japanese culture, therefore characterizing a fragmentary national identity.

Igarashi, Chapter III, “A Nation that never is: cultural discourse on Japanese uniqueness”, 73-103

13 See the cases of Mishima and Nosaka, who aim to recuperate the loss caused by the war through repetition, even

if with different patterns. Igarashi, Chapter VI, “Re-presenting trauma in late 1960s Japan”, 164-198

14 The main discussion topic of Seraphim’s book.

15 Seraphim, “Introduction”, 1-31

16 Seraphim, 19

17 A condition exploited by US forces as well, since a stronger Economy was useful in the East Asian context.

Igarashi, “Conclusion”, 199-210

18 Igarashi, “Conclusion”, 199-210

19 These reports analyzed also memories articulation in China. Igarashi, 203

20

Monbushō’s Textbooks were also a topic widely criticized by one of the previously presented “interest groups”,

the Japan’s Teachers Union, analyzed in Seraphim’s text and mentioned in Dore, Textbook Censorship in Japan: The

Ienaga Case

21 Dore, 550-551

22 Bukh, Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization, 684

23 A useful source is a text by Ienaga himself, The Pacific War, 1931-1945: a Critical Perspective on Japan’s role in

World War II, in particular Chapter 8 (“The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Liberation or Exploitation?”).

24 Igarashi, 74 (and following)

25 Igarashi, “Conclusion”, 199-210

26 Seraphim, 26-27

27 Igarashi, “Conclusion”, 199-210

28 Seraphim, “Introduction”, 1-31 – see also Lind, The Perils of Apology: What Japan Shouldn't Learn From

Germany, 135 (and following)

29 Many conservatives wish for a Constitutional revision, far wider than just the much discussed Article 9. A

proposal was published in 2005, with public criticism. Seraphim, 30-31. (another draft was published in 2012)

30 Seraphim, 270 – similar referrals also in Bukh.

31 Such as public and official visits to the Yasukuni shrine, probably the most controversial monument of Japanese

war dead. Since the topic is too wide to be discussed in this paper, a detailed analysis can be read in Seraphim’s book,

in particular Chapter 8 “Patronizing the war dead: the contested Rites of official Memory”, 226-257

32 Maruyama’s government, leading a coalition formed by the Socialist Party and LDP. Seraphim, 277-281

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