Measuring Communicative Action for Participatory Communication

Keywords: Habermas, Communicative Action, Participation, Evaluation, Measurement

Measuring Communicative Action for Participatory Communication

Thomas L. Jacobson Department of Communications

School of Informatics 357 Baldy Hall

University at Buffalo, State University of New York Buffalo, NY 14214

Email: [email protected]

Presented to the Intercultural and Development Division at the 54th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association, New Orleans LA, May 27-31, 2004 (Awarded Top Paper in Development Communication).


Abstract

The need to find practical tools for evaluating social change programs that are

participatory is now widely held in the field of development communication. And yet,

few definitions of participatory communication supporting empirical assessment have

been advanced. This paper represents the beginning of a program of research aiming to

determine whether Habermas’s theory of communicative action can be useful in serving

the need to find empirical concepts for program design and evaluation. The paper

reviews the theory’s empirical claims and explores its methodological implications. It

advances an operational definition of communicative action. And it reports an

exploratory study designed to examine the properties of measures based on this

operational definition. Findings of this exploratory study show well-behaved measures

and a potential for predictive validity. Progress on scale design will be required. A

program of continued methodological research is briefly outlined in closing. And a

proposal is made that the theory of communicative action and social psychological

theories of learning be used in complementary fashion in analysis of communication for

social change programs.

Measuring Communicative Action … 1


Introduction

The value of community participation in directed social change efforts has been

generally understood for decades. Paulo Freire’s work in the 1960’s led to the expression

of a position dissenting from diffusion based approaches that subsequently gained a broad

following in fields ranging from communication to adult education to environmental

conservation (Aronowitz, 1993; Freire, 1993; McLaren & Leonard, 1993). More

recently, multilateral organizations, government agencies, global non-governmental

organizations, and foundations have come to accept the idea that self-directed change

offers opportunities for success that transfer-of-expertise does not (Rockefeller

Foundation, 2001; United States Agency for International Development, accessed Nov. 1,

2003; World Bank, 1996). Field techniques useful for facilitating participatory

development have been developed (Chambers, 1994).

Despite this trend, however, the opportunity to benefit fully from this new

mindset depends on defining participation in a way that can facilitate program design,

implementation, and evaluation. Such definition has not as yet emerged. One recent

assessment of work on participation finds a number of points of convergence in thinking

on participation but concludes that fundamental definition is still lacking (Waisbord,

2001). Another recent assessment favorably reviews progress but suggests that clearly

defining participation may be counter productive (Gumucio Dagron, 2001). Dispute over

key ideas is also present. For example, some hold that participation is suitable as a goal

of social change but that participation employed as a means to change can only be

manipulative (Huesca, 2002). The specific issues comprising the discourse, and debates,


over participatory communication have been well documented and will not be covered

here (Jacobson & Servaes, 1999; Servaes, Jacobson, & White, 1996; White, 1999;

Whitmore, 1998).

This report addresses the need to develop measurable indicators of participatory

communication. The approach taken explores the use of Jurgen Habermas’s theory of

communicative action for applied purposes (Habermas, 1984, 1987). It is an attempt to

identify those of his theory’s concepts that are empirically oriented and then to design

measures of participatory communication based on these concepts.

Such an application is similar to what health communication researchers do when

using social learning theory, for example, to design and evaluate health behavior change

programs (Bandura, 1977). Such programs apply the theory rather than test it. Such is

our eventual aim. But there are two significant differences between such health

communication work and this current program. The first is that measures of social

learning concepts used in behavior change programs have been previously designed and

evaluated in theoretically oriented empirical research. In the case of the theory of

communicative action, this empirical and methodological work has not been done.

Despite the vast literature associated with Habermas’s theory, empirical measures of

communicative action have not been developed. The paper’s main burden is to argue the

idea that the theory of communicative action is suitable, in principle, as a conceptual

foundation for studying participation.

The second difference between social learning theory and the theory of

communicative action is a difference in what Dewey called object domains. They focus

on different things. Social learning theory provides conceptual tools for understanding


and facilitating learning, while the theory of communicative action provides conceptual

tools for understanding and potentially for facilitating collective action. This difference

may comprise the basis for usefully complementary roles these theories can play in

understanding. communication for social change.

Neither the social psychological nor communication action approaches alone

addresses the full range of behaviors involved in self directed change. Social

psychological theories already are employed within behavior change programs intended

to be participatory. They explain learning processes that are focal in social change

specific to issue areas such as health behavior, agricultural practices and so on.

Understanding these learning processes is of fundamental importance. However, because

collectively enacted participation is not conceptually internal to the theory of learning

itself, participation must be designed on an ad hoc basis.

The theory of communicative action entirely addresses participatory

communication. However, it addresses learning in specific content areas not at all. So, if

a change program were designed starting with communicative action then anything

needed to achieve community goals beyond collectively enacted participation, anything

such as knowledge of effective message design for targeted behavior change goals, would

have to be conducted on an ad hoc basis.

For this reason it appears that if community based learning processes are to be

conceptualized as participatory processes, then learning theory and communicative action

theory must be used in a complementary fashion. Learning theory would be used to help

beneficiary groups understand psychological barriers to successful change, and to help

design effective message strategies. The theory of communicative action would be used


to determine the extent to which a program’s communication activities were themselves

participatory. The report that follows is part of a larger research program designed to

explore a complementary relationship among these approaches.

While best known for its macro-theoretical and philosophical propositions, the

theory of communicative action has generated a number of applied studies. Generally,

these assess conceptually the extent to which communicative action, or participatory

communication, might take place in a given setting such as urban, regional or

environmental planning (Forester, 1988; Phelps & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000; Tait &

Campbell, 2000; Webler & Tuler, 2000). Various aspects of health care service delivery

and environmental risk communication have been examined (Barry, Stevenson, Britten,

Barber, & Bradley, 2001; Santos & Chess, 2003; Sumner, 2001). A number of studies

have been conducted in Third World settings. These include studies of community

decision-making in Ethiopia (Hamer, 1998) and promotion of adolescent sexual health in

Peru (Ramella & De La Cruz, 2000).

Despite the growing amount of applied research very few studies have been

conducted that attempt to measure communicative action. Webler & Tuler use the theory

to help develop classifications used for coding discourses in public planning meetings

(Webler & Tuler, 2000). Sulkin & Simon use the theory to justify the design of a game

theoretic experiment testing the relationship between deliberation and political decisions

(Sulkin & Simon, 2001). In both these studies Habermas’s emphasis on fairness in

discourse is highlighted but his stricter empirical claims do not play a role.

Unlike what has been attempted previously, the approach employed here is

intended as a straightforward matter of deriving operational measures from key empirical


categories. The paper begins by briefly reviewing the theory, focusing on those of its

theoretical concepts that are empirically oriented. Next, methodological implications of

the theory are explored, and an operational definition of communicative action is

presented. Illustrative measures of communicative action based on its empirical

concepts are also proposed. This comprises the bulk of the paper i.e. a conceptual

analysis of certain empirical prospects for the theory. Such an extensive conceptual

analysis is required due both to certain unique aspects of the theory and because it has not

been operationalized in this way previously.

However, data from an exploratory survey using the proposed measures are also

presented. The aim here is to further illustrate the approach outlined conceptually, as

well as to provisionally assess properties of, and relations among, the proposed measures.

A hypothesis is employed for use in examining predictive validity. In closing, a

discussion section explores complementary features of social psychological and

communication theories and then proposes next steps for research.

Conceptual Framework

Communicative Action

Validity Claims. Action oriented toward understanding, communicative action

strictly speaking, is understood in relation to reciprocal expectations that underlie human

communication. These are claims to the assumed validity of communicative behaviors,

or utterances, and are called validity claims. On Habermas’s view, speech acts are

exchanged with the presumption that utterances are: 1) true, 2) normatively appropriate,

3) sincere, and 4) comprehensible. And they are received with this expectation. These

expectations are usually of an unconscious nature, and such unconscious expectations are


what make possible the coordination of behavior among individuals. (Note: The first

three validity claims share properties the fourth does not. In much of his later work,

Habermas focuses on the first three. For applied purposes, all four can be important. The

discussion that follows sometimes treats three and sometimes all four.)

Although validity expectations operate in an unconscious way as a substructure of

communication, they can also be made conscious. If conscious doubt arises as to an

utterance’s validity then one or more claims can be raised for discussion, or

“thematized.” Understanding, as an outcome, is determined through yes/no answers to

propositions amounting in practice to agreement. Good faith action oriented to reaching

understanding regarding a thematized claim is communicative action strictly speaking.

“…I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are

coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching

understanding” (Habermas, 1984, pp. 285-6).

Speech Conditions. The theory analyzes acts of reaching understanding at length,

with particular regard for speech conditions that must obtain for action to be

communicative. Habermas explains that participants in communication must be free to

“call into question any proposal” … to “introduce any proposal” … and to “express any

attitudes, wishes, or needs.” There must be a “symmetrical distribution of opportunities

to contribute” to discussion. There must be adequate time to arrive at agreement.

Outcomes must be determined through “good reasons,” or the “force of the better

argument” (Habermas, 1990, pp. 88-89).

The theory recognizes that deceptive communication is common, but treats

deception as a process that plays upon this deeper level of reciprocal expectations. When


we lie, we play upon these expectations by giving people to understand, or feigning, that

we are acting truthfully, appropriately, and/or sincerely when in fact we are not. Action

oriented towards deception is a type of strategic action that aims for success. Success

refers to aims that are egocentric in the sense that they are pursued for self-interest and

without regard for the interests of others. Figure 1 presents a breakdown of action types,

showing how the theory differentiates communicative from strategic action, and breaks

both of these down into subtypes Strategic action has two subtypes, and one of these

subtypes comprises two additional subtypes.

_______________ Figure 1 about here _______________

Given that deception and all other forms of communication play upon reciprocal

validity expectations, the validity basis of speech is treated as a theoretical reconstruction

of the necessary conditions for all communication. The conditions specifying

communicative action are collectively referred to, for the sake of convenience, as the

ideal speech situation, and in-process they are referred to as discourse.

Despite appearances that may be given by the theory’s abstractness,

communicative action is not a rarified process and normal behavior only approximates it.

It takes place during daily interactions among parents and children, between friends, and

in workplace debates. It is institutionalized in fields such as law and the sciences. Of

course, deception is practiced regularly in interpersonal interaction, but appropriateness

and sincerity are seen as the necessary ingredients of ties that bind in healthy family

interaction, friendships, and working relationships. Deception also occurs in the

professions of law and science, but professional norms in such fields approximate


communicative action. Violations of procedural embodiments of these norms carry

specified forms of sanction or criticism.

One key characteristic of Habermas’s theory that is often overlooked is its

empirical orientation. His position regarding ideal speech is advanced in the form of an

hypothesis. Reciprocal expectations regarding validity claims are taken to comprise rules

that all human beings employ in the generation of speech as a pragmatic, real, and

universal necessity. These expectations should in principle be subject to empirical

testing.

Habermas is clear in his intent that this theory should “be capable of being

checked against speakers’ intuitions, scattered across as broad a sociocultural spectrum as

possible” (Habermas, 1984, p. 138). He also suggests a number of strategies that should

be useful for empirical evaluation of the theory. These include “analyzing pathological

patterns of communication in families,” and “examining the ontogenesis of capabilities

for action” following Piaget’s research into the ontogenesis of cognitive capabilities (p.

138). There has been some debate over the scientific status of the theory (Alford, 1985).

But a widely held view maintains that the theory is “fallible” in the face of empirical

evidence. And while as yet untested, the theory remains open to empirical examination

(Chambers, 1996, pp. 110-122; Cooke, 1997, pp. 2-3).

One possible avenue for the empirical examination of this theory is opened up by

a hypothesis Habermas advances concerning legitimation of democratic governments.

The theory holds that democratic legitimacy is grounded in discursive power (Habermas,

1975, 1996). When citizens feel that their own potential challenges to the truth,

appropriateness and sincerity of government actions are given a fair hearing in the


political public sphere, then they are more likely to invest government with legitimacy.

Conversely, when citizens feel their challenges are not heard or are ignored, then

legitimacy is likely to be withheld.

Similar relations might be reasonably expected at smaller scales of social

organization. In settings of organizational change employee morale may be positively

associated with employee belief that their opinions are taken into account. For example,

major changes might be welcomed by none of a cooperatively run organization’s

members. And yet, these changes might be acceptable as a least-worst alternative and

assented to. A collective decision arrived at communicatively is more likely to achieve

assent that one arrived at by management fiat. Whether political or organizational,

compromise is acceptable to the extent it is considered fair. Fairness is determined by

participants insofar as they feel that action conditions are communicative.

In any case, the aim of the present analysis is, also, not to test the theory but is

rather to assess the theory for needs extant in the area of development communication.

Outcomes can be assessed practically, without strict concern for the scientific status of

the theory, with the necessary consequent concern for the theory’s falsifiability. The

utility of the theory’s account of participatory communication, therefore, is temporarily

assumed for methodological purposes. The hopeful outcome will be measures of

communicative action, as participation, that predict assent to collectively determined

community plans. Predictive successes that may derive from such work might possibly

support the theory, but only rather indirectly and not in the form of a test per se.


Meta-Theoretical Characteristics and Empirical Implications

Reconstructive Theory. To summarize, the theory of communicative action

comprises a reconstruction of the conditions required for reaching understanding, i.e. for

rationally motivated agreement. These conditions refer to two sets of attributes. The first

set concerns the validity claims of speech comprising presumptions of truth,

appropriateness, sincerity, and comprehensibility of utterances. This involves as well the

possibility of negotiating validity claims that are called into question. The second set

concerns the speech conditions required of speech if validity claims are to be successfully

negotiated and agreement reached. These include the symmetrical distribution of

opportunities to contribute to discussion, the freedom to raise any proposal, and the

fairness with which each proposal is treated by giving it full and equal consideration.

The conceptual framework of validity claims and speech conditions constitute the

base of the theory of communicative action in the form of an empirical claim and

establish the theory of communicative action as an empirical theory. The validity

categories and the assumptions regarding speech conditions are considered to be real.

They refer not to surface behavior but to pragmatic necessities for the coordination of

behavior. Assumptions regarding validity must be necessary if speech and behavior

coordination are to be made plausible. The same type of theory is exemplified in

Chomsky’s theory of transformational grammar and in Piaget’s theory of cognitive

development (Chomsky, 1968; Piaget, 1971).

For example, Chomsky’s theory offers an explanation of how it is possible that

children so rapidly acquire the ability to produce an infinite variety of well-formed

linguistic expressions in everyday speech. According to Chomsky the speed of language


acquisition and the creativity of speech result from the competence acquired in forming

surface level linguistic expressions by mastering transformations of fixed deep structures

of language. Children do not learn the correctness of individual surface level expressions

through reward, as Skinner proposed. Rather, children develop ontogenetically the

ability to employ deep linguistic structures that are innate. Empirical testing of the theory

is conducted by developing models of deep structures and accompanying

transformational rules that can account for the variety of surface level expressions. The

aim is to reconstruct the underlying conditions and processes that must necessarily exist

if everyday speech is to be possible.

The theory of communicative action offers a parallel form of reconstruction. The

surface level behavior to be explained is action coordination rather than well formed

expressions. Here, Habermas relies on the common language philosophy of Austin and

Searle to show that well formed linguistic expressions are a necessary but not sufficient

part of communication. Speakers’ intensions and interaction situations comprise contexts

in terms of which well-formed expressions find their meanings and uses. Propositional

content is an important aspect of language use, but only one aspect.

Once the need for extra-linguistic analysis of communication is established

Habermas finds in George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1934) and Talcott Parsons (Parsons,

1977) the framework of an approach to action theory that provides categories of action,

e.g. behavior, which must be mastered if individuals are to be able to fully develop

individual identities and to function in relation to social norms (Habermas, 1987).

Validity, appropriateness and sincerity conditions refer to claims that are negotiated

through language but cannot be reduced to syntax and semantics or even Chomsky’s


competence in relation to well-formed expressions. The acquisition of communication

skills therefore includes acquisition of “interactive competence” in addition to acquisition

of these other competencies.

Tests of this interactive competence have been discussed in a number of fields,

but actually pursued in none. This is perhaps due to the fact that the theory’s object

domain falls outside the core areas of individual fields. In any case, it is fundamental to

the theory that the conceptual framework of validity and speech conditions is empirical.

This is Habermas’s path out of Kantian transcendentalism to which elements of his

thought are indebted, and into social science. It is also his path away from philosophical

foundationalism more generally, toward the fallibalism of scientific investigation. If there

has been a dearth of empirical research into communicative action it is not by

Habermas’s design. His contribution is theoretical, but he very much hopes for

empirical corroboration and his theory requires it.

Action vs Behavior. The theory of communicative action makes a number of

metatheoretical assumptions that have methodological consequences. Two require

treatment here. One of these concerns the theory’s being a form of “action theory”

(Habermas, 1987; Habermas, 1988, pp. 223-243).

A number of strands of action theory can be found in sociology today. One

reaches back through rule theory to the late Wittgenstein (Harre & Secord, 1972).

Another reaches back through methodological implications of verstehen to Weber

(Cicourel, 1964). And still another is based in symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969).

These strands of action theory vary considerably among themselves and Habermas has

his differences with each of them. His analysis of the “limits of linguistically oriented


interpretive sociology,” takes issues chiefly with the relativism and lack of explanatory

power in much action theory (Habermas, 1988, pp. 175-184).

Side stepping these differences for present purposes, action theory holds that

understanding human behavior requires understanding something of actors’ frameworks

of meaning. This is contrary to classical behaviorism’s black box approach to

understanding behavior. In action theory, to understand what someone might do, what

they are doing, and what they may have done, requires, in part, taking account of what

they think and feel, or more specifically their meaning frameworks. In terms of action

oriented toward understanding, it is necessary to understand actor validity claims as they

themselves experience them.

This has methodological implications. For, validity claims can only be ascertained

by participants themselves. An outside observer cannot judge for a research subject, for

example, whether he or she trusts his or her interlocutor. Nor can an outsider determine

whether a research subject believes that the behavior of his or her interlocutor is

normatively appropriate. These things can only be learned directly from the subject.

Therefore, observation and measurement of communicative action can only be obtained,

in principle, from “self-reports.”

Formal Pragmatics. The action theoretical nature of Habermas’s theory is one

characteristic that has methodological consequences. Another concerns the theory’s

having been advanced as a “formal pragmatics.” As noted, the theory of communicative

action is reconstructive in nature. It endeavors to explain behavior by specifying certain

capabilities that are required to make behavior possible. The reciprocal expectations

regarding validity and speech that underlie communication behavior are treated as being


necessary and real, but they are not necessarily evident themselves in a direct way. Using

the Chomskian metaphor, they comprise a deep structure of communicative interaction.

What happens at the surface expresses an empirical complexity that derives from the

overlapping of practical contexts in daily life with interpersonal differences as well as

historical and cultural values.

Habermas characterizes this theory as a “formal pragmatics,” as compared to

“empirical pragmatics.” The latter includes narrative analysis, ethnolinguistics, and other

richly descriptive accounts of language in use. In contrast, a formal pragmatics attempts

to explain how any of this surface level complexity is possible. The methodological

implications of this attribute of the theory also concern the design of indicators of

communicative action.

The formal nature of the theory means that indicators of action must vary by

behavioral context, and indicates why this is so. Even while embodying formal claims,

every expression containing a challenge to a validity claim, and every expression

responding with a justification, embodies a specific language with all the idiom and

idiosyncrasy that comprises an individual’s use of language. As interpersonal behavior,

validity claims are made differently than they are made in the public sphere. This means

that every empirical study of communicative action must use different questionnaire item

wordings. Studies must refer strictly to validity claims and speech conditions, but these

must be embodied variously at various levels and contexts of interaction, as illustrated

below.


Methodology and Procedures

We have attempted to provide thus far a specification of the theory’s key

empirical concepts, along with some meta-theoretical assumptions and their

methodological implications. It will now be possible to briefly summarize and specify

procedures for observation and measurement.

1: Indicators of communicative action must derive from the theory’s key empirical

concepts. This represents a straightforward approach to deriving operational definitions

from conceptual ones. Two sets of conditions are specified: the validity basis of speech

and the speech conditions required to negotiate validity claims. Both sets of concepts

require indicators. Table 1 indicates these two sets of conditions.

_______________ Table 1 about here _______________

It should be noted that the mere fact of the freedom to contribute to a discussion

comprises the condition of communicative action regardless of whether contributions are

actually made. This conceptual feature bears on operational design. Actual challenges to

validity claims are not required for communicative action, but only the availability of

opportunities to raise challenges. Conversely, the act of challenging a validity claim alone

is not an indicator of fully communicative conditions. For it is possible to speak out even

in threatening or otherwise non-communicative conditions.

2: Direct indicators of communicative action must be obtained through self-

reports. The assessment of validity conditions that hold during communication can only

be performed by participants themselves. Outsiders cannot do this for the same reason it

may be said that one person cannot “speak for” another. Thus, the most direct kind of


indicator would be one that asks participants themselves whether they feel during a

program the freedom to raise validity claims, and have the expectation that their voice

will be heard. It is of course possible to design indicators the assessment of which is

conducted by non-participants. These indicators would involve such things as counting

attendance at meetings and contributions to discussion. However, such assessment can

only be of a secondary nature. The direct measure of communicative action requires, in

principle, a self-report. For illustrative purposes prompts soliciting validity and speech

condition assessments in Table 2 are indicated in a dyadic context.

_______________ Table 2 about here

_______________

3: Indicators of communicative action vary by scale and context of analysis. As

noted, the formal pragmatic requirements of communication are expressed somewhat

differently in different action contexts and at different scales of interaction and analysis.

In small groups the goal of collective decision-making processes can potentially be

consensus. As interaction conditions increase in scale this possibility is lost. In large-

scale democratic institutions validity assessments concern weather the actor could

challenge a claim and be heard if they chose to do so. This can take the form of assessing

whether or not the actor’s position is represented in public debate. Nevertheless, at any

scale of interaction, expectations regarding validity are operant and can in principle be

assessed by participants. Also, relations of varying duration are relevant at each scale of

interaction (See Table 3).

_______________ Table 3 about here _______________


4: Validity and speech measures are dimensional and additive. The

reconstruction of the validity basis of speech and of the ideal typical speech conditions is

formal. Therefore, action oriented toward understanding is in daily operation an

approximation, or matter of degree. During typical interaction a hearer will treat a

speaker as being “correct for present purposes,” “appropriate enough not to raise ire,”

“sincere but not perhaps caring very much.” Furthermore, although the criterion for

understanding is acceptance of propositions admitting of yes/no answers, assent to

propositions offered is also a matter of degree ranging from grudging to enthusiastic.

Therefore, it is suitable to measure both self-reports of communicative action attributes

and also outcomes at an ordinal level of measurement or higher.

Action characterized by the satisfaction of a greater number of communicative

conditions is more communicative than is action characterized by a fewer number. At a

very general conceptual level, this claim should be unobjectionable. Whether the

individual attribute scales can be combined additively on an interval, for example, basis

remains to be determined through methodological research.

An Operational Definition

Based on the foregoing, it is possible to specify an operational definition of

communicative action. Due to the character of the theory it is not possible to provide

exact wording for item designs. However, it is possible to specify operational procedures

required for designing individual items and item banks that indicate communicative

action, as follows. Communicative action can be operationally defined as self-reports

regarding the extent to which respondents in a given action situation feel that they


themselves, or surrogates, are free to engage in discourse characterized by all three

speech conditions regarding all four validity claims.

Exploratory Study

Aim and Justification

An exploratory study was conducted to examine the properties of measures based

on the methodological considerations presented above. One aim was to examine the

properties of measures individually and in relation to one another. Another was to begin

exploring the reliability and validity of these measures. Given the broad scope of the

theory of communicative action this was necessarily a very limited study in a substantive

sense, using a single context of interaction. A hypothesis was employed to explore

predictive validity.

Design

The study comprised a survey using validity claims and speech conditions as

independent variables to predict an outcome that features centrally in Habermas’s work

as mentioned briefly above, i.e. democratic legitimacy. This is a macro-social political

expression of the reciprocity expectation enacted in speech. The theory of discursive

democracy holds that citizen acceptance of a decision will be a function of the extent that

they believe all viewpoints, including theirs, were taken into account. Even a decision

against a citizen’s wishes is more likely to be acceptable if the citizen feels his or her

viewpoint was heard. In the language of communicative action, citizens will grant the

legitimacy of a decision if they believe key decision-makers were correct on the facts

they used in formulating the decision, if it was an appropriate decision for them to make,

if the decision-makers were sincere in expressing their positions, and if citizen positions

were fairly heard and considered. Citizens are most likely to believe this if they believe


they had an opportunity to contribute to debate or if those with like positions had such

opportunities.

The applied context for this study was a decision taken in a northeastern state to

raise tuition dramatically over the course of a single year. Tuition was raised by $950.

This decision was made by the governor, trustees of the state university system appointed

by the governor, and the state legislature. Many students and their parents felt this

increase to be too large. Students raised statewide protest including demonstrations on

campuses across the state as well as in the state capital. Student newspapers were replete

with criticism of such a dramatic increase in a single year.

Precedures and Hypothesis

A convenience sample of 86 undergraduate students was administered a

questionnaire with 21 question items. Students were allowed 15 minutes to complete the

survey. Two items reflected each of the four validity claims. The pairs were summed to

create four validity scales. A single item reflected each of the three speech conditions.

Two items were designed, and summed, to measure the degree to which students

accepted as legitimate the decision to raise tuition. Remaining items solicited

demographic information to serve as control variables (See Appendix 1). The test

hypothesis was: Legitimacy would be positively associated with validity and speech

conditions, individually and jointly.

Findings

Given the study’s methodological purposes its measurement outcomes are of

principle note. Distributions and variances of all communicative measures were well

behaved in terms of distribution and variance (See Appendix 2 for descriptive statistics).


Correlations among measures were not high enough to suggest the likelihood of problems

with multicollinearity.

Levels of association among the pairs of measures comprising validity claim

variables were modest and Conbach’s alpha coefficients were low, with an average of

.39. To serve suitably in scale construction items should produce much higher

coefficients. The low alphas here were in part a function of the small number of items in

each scale, and should be improved with the addition of other items as well as other

design improvements.

A linear regression model was fitted to the data entering both sets of

communicative action variables simultaneously, producing an R2 = .49 (F (7,77) = 10.46,

p. < .001 (See Table 4). Beta weights indicate that Truth and Appropriateness variables

were the strongest predictors, both achievng statistically significant t values. The

Comprehension variable had no apparent effect. The speech condition variables each

appeared to have modest if any effects.

Preliminary examination of control variables indicated that the communicative

action variables accounted for substantial variance over some standard demographic

measures. A hierarchical model was fitted to the data entering control variables in step

1: party leaning, gender, family income, ethnicity - white/non-white (R2 = .12, F 4,78 =

2.5, p. < .05). Validity and speech condition variables were entered in step 2 (R2 Change

= .39, F Change 7,71 = 7.8, p. < .001). The hypothesis was substantially supported.

Communicative action conditions as a block substantially predicted student positions on

the legitimacy of the state’s decision to raise tuition. Predictive success tentatively

supports construct validity.


_______________ Table 4 about here _______________

Summary

The need to find practical tools for evaluating behavior change programs that are

participatory is now widely held. And yet, while definitions of participatory

communication vary widely none has been advanced with empirical research design in

mind. The theory of communicative offers a conceptual framework that can in principle

be operationalized. This paper represents the beginning of a program of methodological

research aiming to determine whether this is in fact the case.

The paper reviews the theory’s empirical claims and explores its methodological

implications. It advances an operational definition of communicative action. And it

briefly reports an exploratory study designed to examine the properties of measures based

on this operational definition. While the theory of communicative action rests on an

empirical foundation, it has attributes whose methodological implications determine

options for operationalization. The bulk of this paper addresses these implications and

options.

To summarize, as a theory with empirical claims, measures must be designed to

indicate key empirical concepts. These chiefly refer to communicative presumptions

regarding four validity claims and three speech conditions. As a reconstruction of

communicative presumptions the theory concerns something similar to deep structures of

communication rather than surface behaviors. Therefore, indicators must address these

deep structures. At the surface level these will be expressed variously, and the design of

indicators must take this into account. For one thing these presumptions apply in all


action contexts at all scales of possible change, so measures must be adapted for use with

each application.

As a version of action theory the theory of communicative action makes

participant, or research subject, viewpoints focal. Therefore, data must be gathered in the

form of self-reports. Finally, these presumptions serve to regulate behavior, not to

determine it. They are seldom if ever expressed purely. So, they must be treated as being

in some way dimensional. Measurement should take place at an ordinal level or higher.

An operational definition of communication has been advanced taking these meta-

theoretical and methodological characteristics of the theory into account. Communicative

action can be operationally defined as self-reports regarding the extent to which

respondents in a given action situation feel that they themselves, or surrogates, are free to

engage in discourse characterized by all three speech conditions regarding all four

validity claims.

The study reported here explored this operational definition by designing

communicative action measures suitable for political discourse over state level

educational policy. The measures exhibited well-behaved properties that may be

considered promising. The communicative action measures in this data set predicted

outcomes fairly strongly as a block. Effects of individual variables were uneven. The

comprehension variable had no effect. Apparently, the respondents in this sample felt no

compunction about assessing policy legitimacy even when they admittedly knew little

about the policy issue in question. Low alphas for the two-item scales comprising validity

measures were unsurprising and indicate need for further work. Subsequent instruments


will include a larger number of indicators for each scale and more detailed analysis of the

contributions of individual scales.

The choice for a study of state level political discourse was based on convenience.

A number of subsequent exploratory studies will continue to be conducted in the context

of the United States, with other populations on other issues. One or more of these should

include action contexts smaller in scale than state politics, contexts in which citizens are

actually able to debate and/or to get involved in some sort of planning and evaluation

themselves.

Continuing to examine the kinds of measures and relations explored here will

comprise part of continued studies. In addition, other matters that are theoretical in

nature must be explored. For one, the constructs comprising Habermas’s action theory

have been treated here as being of a piece, predicting legitimacy in an additive manner as

a block, i.e. as if all validity claims and speech condition indicators score high or low in

predicting an outcome. However, the theory pertains as well to empirical conditions in

which validity of one type might be high, while another is low. For example, one could

trust a friend’s intentions but believe their grasp of the facts is weak, or believe a

politician’s grasp of the facts is good but also that he or she is stepping beyond the

bounds of their office in making a certain decision. There would seem to be much to

explore here.

Another matter concerns the issue of reciprocity in expectations. In the case of

political legitimacy, standard political theory holds that democratic legitimacy obtains

when citizens support a government, believing it represents them, regardless of whether

this government is earnestly listening to its constituency or whether its decisions are


smart. Thus, Habermas holds that legitimacy accrues to a government to the extent that

citizens believe they are being heard regardless of whether they are in fact being heard,

and regardless of whether or not the government is effective in discharging its technical

responsibilities. Citizens will learn whether the government is sincere and effective or not

over time, in principle, and this will eventually bear upon legitimacy. But the connection

between legitimation and actual performance is indirect. This means that validity and

speech conditions can be ascertained singly from citizens.

In other behavioral contexts it may be necessary to observe both parties to an

interaction rather than just one. This would be necessary especially when either latent

strategic or systematically distorted communication occurs, i.e. when one or more parties

are lying or when unrecognized and unacknowledged power differentials affect

communicative opportunities.

If results continue to bear out overall then research might be justified in the

context of directed social change efforts. The way this might be accomplished can be

considered in closing. It was noted in the introduction that the theory of communicative

action might complement social psychological theories such as social learning theory in

program design and evaluation. Now that the applied relevance of communicative action

has been outlined in some detail this can be considered more fully.

As stated earlier, social psychological learning theories can be employed within

behavior change programs intended to be participatory. However, in such cases the

concept of collectively enacted participation is not internal to the theory of learning itself

and must be imported from outside learning theory. Alternatively, collectively

determined participation entirely comprises the scope of the theory of communicative


action. And thus, correspondingly, if a change program were designed starting with

communicative action, then anything beyond collectively enacted participation that was

needed to achieve community goals, anything such as knowledge of effective message

design, would have to be imported from outside the theory of communicative action.

For example, social learning theory explains behavior change through learning by

specifying social learning’s antecedent conditions, including behavioral models, efficacy

assessments, and so on. These conditions are antecedent to behavior change in a wide

variety of settings, in relation to a highly general set of possible learned behaviors

(Bandura, 1977). When employed for the purposes of applied behavior change,

theoretical constructs regarding these conditions can be used to design communication

strategies that are likely to induce behavior change in desired directions toward more

reflective and effective family planning, the practice of oral rehydration, or new

agricultural practices. The theory explains under what conditions behavior change toward

such goals might be achieved based on predictable aggregate changes in the behavior of

individuals.

The theory of communicative action is not a theory of behavior change. It is an

action theory that explains how self-directed collective activity can and sometimes does

take place, i.e. when participation is taking place and when it is not. The theory can be

used to generate some predictions and it can also be used to facilitate communicative

interaction by design. However, both predictions and the interactions facilitated are

limited to those regarding action relations among participants, not learned behaviors in

general. Thus, the theory’s relevance to applied change projects lies not in its

conceptualization of learning and behavior change generally speaking, but rather in its


ability to determine when behavior change is collectively self-determined. As

exemplified in the data reported here, the theory is intended to discriminate whether

change is democratically legitimate as compared to being imposed through political and

administrative momentum.

The theory could similarly be used to discriminate whether family planning or

new agricultural programs are implemented in a manner that is participatory as compared

to being imposed through something like political and administrative momentum, e.g. the

momentum of money channeled from the North through ministries of Southern

governments into local communities. There may be no reason to assume that all, or even

most, programs are animated this way. There may be no reason to assume that all, or

even most, programs are contaminated in part this way. However, without relevant

concepts and measures there is no systematic way to assess beneficiary views.

The participation movement has been much concerned with such questions, but

the theory of communicative action can be used in a unique way to directly address them,

i.e. systematically and operationally. The theory suggests that regardless of program

designers’ intentions, skills, and backgrounds, the only way to know whether program

related interaction is participatory is to ask local residents their opinions regarding the

full range of validity and speech conditions. Therefore, in applied settings the theory of

communicative action can be used to complement the work covered by social

psychological theories of learning. Social learning theory can be used with participatory

intent to determine when, how, and why to employ message strategies whose design is

informed by the concepts of social learning. The theory of communicative action might

be helpful in determining the extent to which such a participatory intent has been


fulfilled. Just as importantly, the theory’s concepts might be used as guidelines to

facilitate participation, i.e. through communicative action.


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Appendix 1: Communicative Action Survey Questionnaire

Sample Questions from Tuition Hike Survey Questionnaire

(Note: These variables can be adapted to any kind of intervention including community health discussions, the design of literacy programs, or land use management, etc.) To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Please mark an X beneath the most appropriate answer.) 1) How correct are the reasons given by the state government for the tuition hike? (Please mark an X beneath the most appropriate answer.) (Truth Validity Claim)

Completely

Somewhat

Completely Incorrect Incorrect Correct Correct Correct _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

1 2 3 4 5

2) How appropriate was it for the SUNY trustees and the governor to make their proposals? (Note: You may or may not like their proposals, but is it appropriate for them to make such proposals?) (Normative Appropriateness Validity Claim)

Completely Somewhat Very Inappropriate Inappropriate Appropriate Appropriate Appropriate

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 1 2 3 4 5

3) How sincere was the governor in stating that he was attempting to protect the interests of students in this matter. (Sincerity Validity Claim)

Very Somewhat Very Insincere Insincere Sincere Sincere Sincere

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 1 2 3 4 5


4) How well do you believe you understand the decision and the basis upon which it has been made? (Comprehensibility Validity Claim)

Not at all Not Very Somewhat Very Well Well Well Well Well

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 1 2 3 4 5

5) How fairly have students been treated in terms of having an equal number of opportunities to contribute to the decision making process as compared to state officials? (Speech condition measure #1)

Completely Somewhat Completely Unequal Unequal Equal Equal Equal _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

1 2 3 4 5

6) When students have made proposals or raised issues, how equally have these proposals and issues been treated as compared to proposals or issues raised by other stakeholders in the decision-making process?) (Speech condition measure #2)

Completely Somewhat Completely Unequal Unequal Equal Equal Equal _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

1 2 3 4 5

7) How fairly have students been treated in terms of being able to raise all specific issues they would want to raise? (Speech condition measure #3)

Not at all Somewhat Completely Able Unable Able Able Able

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 1 2 3 4 5

8) Was the state decision to raise tuition a legitimate, i.e. a good and fair, decision? (Outcome Variable, could be related to community estimates of the legitimacy of any intervention.)

Not at all Not Somewhat Completely Legitimate Legitimate Legitimate Legitimate Legitimate

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 1 2 3 4 5


Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Descriptive Statistics

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.

Deviation

legitimacy 85 2 9 5.36 1.689

truth 1 85 1 5 2.92 .711 truth 2 85 1 4 2.14 .833

sum truth 85 2 8 5.06 1.266 appropriateness 1 85 1 5 3.40 .834

apropriateness 2 85 1 5 3.05 .754 sum appropriate 85 2 10 6.45 1.376

sincerity 1 85 1 4 2.36 .871 sincerity 2 85 1 5 2.46 .894

sum sincerity 85 2 9 4.82 1.513 comprehension 1 85 1 5 2.88 .918

comprehension 2 85 1 5 3.14 .888 sum comprehension 85 3 9 6.02 1.291

equal opportunity 85 1 4 1.91 .766 equal treatment 85 1 4 2.19 .627

fair treatment 85 1 5 2.76 1.054


Pearson Correlations ***

Legiti macy

sum truth

sum appropri

ate Sum

sincerity

sum comprehensive

equal opportu

nity

equal treatment

fair treatment

pay & legitimacy

1

.56(**) .000

.56(**) .000

.45(**) .000

-.05 .32

.36(**) .000

.27(**) .01

.30(**) .003

sum truth

.57(**) .000

1

.51(**) .000

.40(**) .000

-.1 .19

.31(**) .00

.27(**) .006

.23(*) .019

sum appropriate

.56(**) .000

.51(**) .00

1

.39(**) .000

.02

.43 .17 .07

.22(*) .022

.172

.058

sum sincerity

.45(**) .000

.40(**) .000

.39(**) .000

1

-.14 .10

.51(**) .000

.51(**) .000

.23(*) .018

Sum comprehend

-.05

.32

-.09

.19

.02

.43

-.14

.104

1

-.13

.12

.11

.153

.07

.276

equal opportunity

.56(**) .000

.31(**) .002

.17

.07 .51(**)

.000 -.13 .12

1 .58(**)

.000 .19(*) .038

equal treatment

.27(**)

.01

.27(**)

.006

.22(*)

.02

.51(**)

.000

.11

.15

.58(**)

.000

1

.32(**)

.001

fair treatment

.3(**)

.00

.22(*)

.029

.17

.06

.23(*)

.018

.07

.28

.19(*)

.04

.32(**)

.001

1

* significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ** significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

*** n = 85


Table 1 Key Concepts for Validity and Speech Conditions

Conceptual Category Concept (from participant/actor viewpoint)

Validity Claims Truth (accuracy)

Appropriateness

Sincerity Comprehensibility

Speech Conditions Symmetric Distribution of Opportunities to Contribute

Ability to Raise Any Proposition

Equal Treatment of Propositions Raised


Table 2 Illustrative Solicitations/Prompts for Key Concepts – Dyadic

Validity/Speech Conditions Illustrative Response Solicitation/Prompts

Val

idity

Cla

ims

Truth (accuracy) To what extent do you feel the other person was correct or right?

Appropriateness To what extent do you feel the other person spoke in an appropriate manner?

Sincerity To what extent do you feel the other person was sincere?

Comprehension To what extent do you feel you understood what the other person was saying?

Spe

ech

Con

ditio

ns

Con

ditio

ns Symmetric Opportunities To what extent did you feel free in having an

equal opportunity to raise questions? Free to Raise Any Proposition To what extent did you feel free in raising any

proposal or idea you wish for discussion? Equal Treatment of Propositions To what extent did you feel your proposal would

be treated equally to others’ viewpoints?


Table 3 Scales of Analysis and Interaction Durations

Unit of Analysis Interaction Duration

Dyadic exchanges A few moments An entire conversation An unending or open-ended relationship Group interactions A few moments An entire meeting An unending or open-ended group Projects Specific meeting Project phase: planning, implementation, evaluation Overall project Public spheres Specific instances, including political debates General treatment of single issues over time Public sphere as a whole


Table 4

Regression of Communicative Action Conditions on Legitimacy

Beta t Sig.

(Constant) -.76 .44

Truth .29 2.83 .01 Appropriateness .34 3.41 .00

Sincerity .13 1.16 .25 Comprehension .01 .103 .92

Symmetric Opportunities .18 1.64 .11 Raise Any Proposal -.09 -.83 .41

Equal Treatment of Props .14 1.61 .11


Figure 1 Types of Action *

Social Actions

Communicative Action Strategic Action Action Oriented to Consensual Open Strategic Concealed Strategic Reaching Understanding Action Action Action Unconscious Conscious Deception Deception (Systematically (Manipulation) Distorted Communication)

* From (Habermas, 1979, pp. 209)

Measuring Communicative Action for Participatory Communication

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