Master thesis: Informal Institutions and Protracted Social Conflict – the Case of Libya

Global Political Studies - Peace and conflict track (FK631L) One-year master’s programme 15 credits Spring semester 2015 Supervisor: Stephen Marr

Informal Institutions and Protracted

Social Conflict – the Case of Libya

Đorđe Đorđević

Pnr: 890829T472

I

Abstract

This thesis aims to examine the influence of Informal Institutions of Political

Participation (IIPP) on the perpetuation of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) in

the case of Libya. It does so by utilizing the theoretical framework of Hans-

Joachim Lauth who isolated three “destructive” types of informal institutions:

clientelism, corruption and threat of violence. It follows Edward Azar’s claim

that PSC is caused by deprivation of basic communal needs, and I focus on the

limitation of political access in particular. By using the interpretative case

study, I determine that the Libyan conflict can be marked as PSC and I isolate

the presence of IIPP. The key finding is that IIPP can influence the

perpetuation of PSC directly, by radically limiting the space for political

participation and indirectly, by obstructing the state institutions and eroding

their legitimacy. The thesis calls for further investigation on this topic.

Informal Institutions and Protracted Social Conflict – the Case of Libya 1

Table of contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. I

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 2

1.1 Research Problem .................................................................................................. 4

2. Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 5

2.1 Literature Focusing on Protracted Social Conflict ..................................................... 5

2.2 Protracted Social Conflict and Institutions ................................................................. 7

2.3 Literature Focusing on Informal Institutions .............................................................. 9

2.4 Informal Institutions and Political Participation ....................................................... 12

3. Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 15

4. Libyan case background .............................................................................................. 17

4.1 Debate on the Libyan Case ....................................................................................... 19

5. Research Method ......................................................................................................... 22

5.1 About the Case Study ............................................................................................... 22

5.2 About the Case Selection .......................................................................................... 23

5.3 About the Data .......................................................................................................... 24

5.4 About the Steps of the Analysis ............................................................................... 25

6. The Analysis................................................................................................................ 28

7. Conclusion................................................................................................................... 35

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 36


1. Introduction

The influence of informal institutions that represent “unwritten codes embedded in

everyday social practice” (Bratton, 2007, p. 96) has long been neglected in the debate of

institutionalism (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003, p. 1). The primary focus was given to the

formal institutions, which were usually observed in developed democratic societies. However,

in countries that are still struggling to build a stable and functioning democratic system,

formal institutions often yield to informal institutions that have been deeply rooted in “[social]

conventions and codes of behavior” (North, 1990, p. 4). A typical example is the institution of

tribes, which can, in certain societies, take over the central role in political decision making,

displacing the state institutions.

Informal institutions are anything but a cohesive phenomenon. They represent a wide

array of different non-codified norms and rules that determine the behavior of various social

actors. Their influence on political processes can therefore also be very different. Some

informal institutions can contribute to the stability and effectiveness of formal institutions.

These may assist democratic processes in developed democracies and hybrid political

systems: informal institutions of trust, solidarity, tolerance and fairness, for example, have a

positive influence on formal institutions, by increasing their stability and giving them more

legitimacy (Lauth, 2004, p. 11). On the other hand, certain socially rooted informal

institutions can have significant negative effects on the functioning of state institutions and

peacebuilding efforts in fragile political systems: forms of clientelism, corruption and the

threat of violence can significantly undermine the legitimacy and strength of formal

institutions by drastically narrowing down the space for political participation (Lauth, 2004, p.

40). Lauth named these institutions “Informal Institutions of Political Participation” (IIPP).

Their influence is further amplified with a presence of a protracted conflict, which could

contribute even more to conflict’s perpetuation. This thesis will examine the impact that

Informal Institutions of Political Participation have in conflict situations. More specifically, it

will focus on the direct effects of these institutions on Protracted Social Conflict.

Protracted Social Conflict (PSC), or “the prolonged and often violent struggle by

communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to

political institutions and economic participation”, as described by Edward Azar (Azar, 1990,

p. 93), always coexists with Informal Institutions of Political Participation, since they can

always be observed in conflicting societies, when formal institutions often “subordinate

themselves” to the logic of informal institutions (Lauth, 2000, p. 33). However, I will


demonstrate that the influence of IIPP on PSC has so far not been studied directly. There are

many aspects of PSC that could be affected negatively by IIPP, and this thesis will try to

discover if and how these influences are manifesting.

For this purpose, I will examine the case of Libya, which possesses significant

characteristics of PSC and has a strong base of IIPP. This case is also interesting for

observation since it is very current, still developing and threatening to destabilize not only the

whole region of North Africa and Middle East, but Southern Europe as well. As the violence

in Libya was sparked by the Arab Spring events, and with the still-ongoing conflict, this case

could provide a unique opportunity for future observations of the negative implications of

IIPP on the development of the Arab Spring events on a larger scale.

The crisis in Libya has entered its fourth year of violence with the new spotlight being

cast on this country after the Egyptian president Abdel-Fattah Sissi called for United Nations

military action in Libya, following the February 2015 beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts by the

branch of the terrorist organization ISIS in Libya (The Guardian, 17th February 2015). This

violent trend continued with the April 2015 execution of 26 Ethiopian Christians (Aljazeera,

19th April 2015) and Italy’s Foreign Affairs Minister Gentiloni calling for “targeted strikes”

against ISIS in Libya (Giornalettismo, 16th April 2015). Furthermore, new information has

come to light, discovered by the first counter-extremism UK-based think-thank Quilliam: a

plan of the Islamic State to use Libya as its new base, with high potential of utilizing its

proximity to Southern Europe in order to commit new terrorist attacks on European soil

(Quilliam, 18th February 2015).

Libya is a country where informal institutions play a great role in everyday life.

Clientelism through tribal connections and a high degree of corruption represent important

factors in Libyan political life. With over 140 tribes (Yilmaz, 2012, p. 53) who have actively

participated in the initial confrontation against Gaddafi’s regime, tribal organizations in Libya

have a larger influence on security structures, decision making and political participation than

any other country of the North Africa (Hweio, 2012, p. 112).

The Libyan state institutions are having trouble with establishing efficient control on the

territory of the whole country. At this moment, many authors, as well as the members of the

African Union identify Libya as a failed state (African Union Peace and Security Council

press statement, 23rd April 2015). This is due to the inability of its formal institutions to

provide basic services to its citizens, such as security, infrastructure, education, justice, etc.

The institution-building has not gone far after the new government took over in late 2011,

only 8 months after the anti-Gaddafi protests started. Efforts of the state to finally take over


and secure the monopoly over the use of force from the armed militias and other formations

that participated in the revolution against Gaddafi have been so far equally unsuccessful, or

with very limited success (Mattes, 2014, p. 86). Formal institutions basically have no

legitimacy and people are forced to satisfy their needs through their informal counterparts

(Bratton, 2007, p. 99). Threat of violence, corruption and connections through tribal

membership are very developed and often provide the only way for political participation,

since regular access is significantly narrowed down. We can see this in the example of May

2013, when the armed brigades forced the General National Congress (GNC), the main

legislative body in post-Gaddafi Libya, to pass the Political Isolation Law by occupying

several ministry buildings and threatening with the use of force (Mattes, 2014, p. 90). At the

same time, the high number of conflicting tribes has contributed to a lot of internal bigotry

and numerous social confrontations and clashes for recognition, influence and more resources

even before the main conflict in Libya started in 2011 (Boduszynski, 2013, p. 88). This

situation shows classical characteristics of the Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) theory as

explained by Edward Azar.

1.1 Research Problem

With this complex web of high influence of IIPP, weak formal institutions and elements

of Protracted Social Conflict, this thesis will try to answer the following question: How do

Informal Institutions of Political Participation such as clientelism, corruption and threat of

violence contribute to the perpetuation of Protracted Social Conflict in Libya?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to answer the following operational

questions: Can the current situation in Libya be categorized as Protracted Social Conflict?

Can IIPP such as clientelism, corruption and the threat of violence be observed in Libya?

I am expecting to discover that IIPP can directly contribute to the perpetuation of PSC

by radically limiting the space for political participation. As Lauth noted, IIPP have “direct

impact upon political participation” (Lauth, 2000, p. 26), which is one of the basic communal

needs whose absence leads to communal struggle, as illustrated by Azar (Azar, 1990, p. 93).

This approach has the potential to be a decent contribution to the Peace and Conflict

studies field as it will try to prove the existence of an important PSC catalyzer by bridging the

concept of informal institutions with the PSC theory. Connecting informal institutions and

PSC and testing their correlation could indicate new sources of PSC that have not been taken

into consideration so far. As Azar himself noted, PSC can only be resolved through


development that will help address the needs of the conflicting parties that are located in the

center of the conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 155). The following question arises: how can these needs

be satisfied if we do not know all the causes that lead to their deprivation? In this particular

case, if all the sources of political access limitations (such as IIPP) are not identified, how can

we offer solutions for addressing the deprivation of that need?

This thesis will try to utilize Lauth’s framework on informal institutions in order to

analyze how IIPP in Libya contribute to the perpetuation of the ongoing protracted conflict by

analyzing the parameters of their influence and parameters of PSC and finding their

correlation. I will start with the debate on Protracted Social Conflict, and then move to a

discussion on informal institutions and political participation. I will then provide a short

overview of the Libyan case. After the methodology section, I will proceed with the analysis

part. The first step of the analysis would be to confirm the assumption that Libya is indeed in

Protracted Social Conflict. Next, I will try to identify the presence of IIPP in Libya and how

they are influencing on political participation. Finally, I will then try connecting IIPP and

PSC.

2. Literature Review

Тhe direct negative influence of IIPP on PSC was not examined so far. When the

institutions were mentioned in the PSC debate, it was in the sense of the failure of formal

institutions to provide a satisfaction of basic communal needs and their relation to PSC. The

influence of IIPP could only be indirectly connected with PSC as possible contributing factors

to institutional failure.

In order to demonstrate my claims and to provide answers to the proposed research

questions, I am going to give a short overview of the literature tackling Protracted Social

Conflict, with the specific focus on its relationship with institutions, then I will narrow the

whole specter and go through the literature dealing with informal institutions and their

influence on political participation, which can be linked back to PSC.

2.1 Literature Focusing on Protracted Social Conflict

The theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) by Edward Azar represents one of the

most relevant approaches in explaining internal conflicts, as it has “anticipated many aspects


of what has since become orthodoxy” (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 103). Azar laid out an

important framework for the observation of non-interstate conflicts. Unfortunately, he did not

live to see the major appreciation of his work among peers, since the Clausewitzean approach

to international relations was in the mainstream of peace and conflict studies until the

beginning of the 1990s (Ramsbotham, 2005, p. 110). This prevailing approach observed wars

solely as interstate conflicts with little or no attention to their internal causes, which is highly

inapplicable to the conflicts of today. The pioneering role of Azar’s approach is highly

valuable to contemporary conflict analysis, since a large majority of contemporary conflicts

trace their sources in the “deep-rooted” and internal conflicts. The most prominent examples

of PSC can be seen in the Middle East, the region where Azar was originally from. The Arab-

Israeli conflict, for example, was one of the conflicts he was particularly interested in (Azar,

1978).

Azar defines Protracted Social Conflict as “the prolonged and often violent struggle by

communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to

political institutions and economic participation” (Azar, 1990, p. 93). In this environment, the

state has the ability to either prevent or promote conflict by addressing or not addressing

“basic communal needs”, such as recognition, political rights and participation, security, etc.

This theory was built upon Azar’s extensive Conflict and Peace Research Data Bank, a large

database of external international data, but most importantly, internal domestic data, with a

special focus on the Middle East region (Ramsbotham, 2005, p. 113).

Azar identified protracted conflicts as processes, rather than specific events or clusters

of events (Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, 1978, p. 50). These processes are characterized by

fluctuating outbursts of violence and cooling-off periods. Therefore, in order to determine the

tendencies in these fluctuations, Azar used the tool called Normal Relations Range – NRR

(Ibid, p. 51). This tool represents a range of status quo where these fluctuations happen. When

they reach outside of this range, the violent outbursts are inevitable. However, different forces

involved in the conflict will tend to achieve equilibrium and keep the fluctuations within the

range of NRR. This is why Azar identifies four characteristics of protracted conflict: 1.

Duration (protractedness); 2. Fluctuation; 3. Conflict spillover into all domains; 4. Strong

equilibrating forces; 5. Absence of a distinct termination (Ibid, p. 53). In other words, conflict

needs to last long, have oscillating periods of increased violence and ceasefire, be

comprehensive, self-fueled and have a lack of definitive cessation.

The sources of PSC lie predominately within states and Azar groups them into four

clusters of variables that threaten to transform the PSC into high levels of intensity:


communal content, the depravation of human needs, governance and the state’s role and

international linkages (Azar, 1990, p. 9-12). Basically, for the PSC to exist we need different

identity (communal) groups, some of them deprived of basic human needs (political

participation and security, for example) by the state that is responsible for this deprivation

either intentionally (through monopolization of power by the dominant group and limiting the

political access) or unintentionally due to its weakness to provide them with their basic needs.

In that environment, all actors are more susceptible to foreign influence through “international

linkages” (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 102). I will focus on some of these in more detail later on,

when I examine the connection of PSC and institutions.

The criticism of Azar’s theory focused primarily on the set of issues that became

actualized after Azar’s death in the post-Cold War era – gender equality, environmental

conflicts and economic globalization. However, more explicit criticism came from authors

like Collier and Hoeffler who argued that economic agendas, or greed, are more likely the

cause of conflicts than the deprivation of basic needs in the famous “greed vs. grievances”

debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000, p. 27). This view tries to undermine the importance of

need deprivation as a source for PSC, by emphasizing importance of economic variables, such

as natural resources and per capita income (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p. 588). However,

there are some authors like David Keen who claim that greed and grievances could have equal

attribution to the conflict. Rather than excluding one another, they mutually interact and

enforce each other (Keen, 2000, p. 31). Grievances can legitimize greed, which then creates

more grievances. It is important not to ignore the importance of influence economic

incentives have on the perpetuation of contemporary conflicts, especially in countries with

large reserves of natural resources. We can see that Azar has not devoted enough attention to

the role of greed in PSC. This is particularly interesting for the research at hand, since some

IIPP are products of greed (corruption, for example). However, instead of solely claiming that

greed has a larger role in conflict perpetuation than grievances, I would agree with Keen that

both of them should be taken into consideration when analyzing protracted conflicts.

2.2 Protracted Social Conflict and Institutions

I would like to take a step back and analyze Azar’s view of institutions and their

influence on PSC. In his main definition of PSC, he sees fair access to political institutions as

one of the basic communal needs. The absence of the access contributes to grievances of

underrepresented groups (Azar, 1990, p. 9). He sees weak participatory institutions as key


contributors to PSC (Ramsbotham, 2005, p. 113). If we take a look at the clusters of variables

that contribute to the higher level of conflict intensity, the institutional part lies in the

“governance and state’s role”. This is the part where Azar talks about the institutions the most

and connects them to PSC. He mentions restricted political capacity and weak participatory

institutions, as part of colonial legacy (Azar, 1990, p. 10-11). Weak state institutions are

unable to satisfy basic communal needs, therefore he is primarily focused on examining their

influence on PSC. There is, however, no mention of traditional institutions that can contribute

to the intensification of PSC. One of the possible explanations for this absence could be that

the importance of informal institutions was not examined thoroughly during Azar’s lifetime (I

will talk more about this further on), thus he was unable to consider their effects. However,

now when we have numerous scholars that are dealing with informal institutions, it is

necessary to combine these two concepts and analyze their correlation. It is clear that Azar

focused primarily on the formal institutions within the PSC. Similar position could be

observed in the works of Jackson, Ayoob, Münkler, Ghani and Lockhart (Ramsbotham, 2011,

p. 107), who are emphasizing the role of weak and failed states that had an “erosion of the

capability … to govern” (Münkler, 2005, p. 109) as the major cause of internal wars. Formal

state institutions have always been given priority in the PSC debate. The only example of

connecting the informal institutions and PSC can be seen in the paper of Tonson J. Sango who

examined the positive influence of traditional institutions on the management of PSC. He

argues that “the enduring existence of these institutions can be of invaluable relevance to the

theory and practice of modern Conflict Resolution” (Sango, 2009, p. 1). Indeed, certain

informal institutions can be complementary with formal institutions, as I will demonstrate

later on. As Sango noticed, these institutions can contribute to the strengthening of weak state

institutions, which will have a beneficial effect on the de-escalation of PSC. However, the

analysis of negative effects of the informal institutions could not be found in the existing

literature.

This represents a clear gap that needs to be addressed. The focus on IIPP is especially

important if we know that these institutions play a crucial role in countries affected by

conflicts, as observed by Lauth: “In cases of conflict, formal and informal institutions can

displace each other or, in terms of their way of working, they can be interconnected to the

extent that the functioning logic of formal institutions becomes interfered with” (Lauth, 2000,

p. 25). This shows how their effects are hard to ignore in conflicts, thus the analysis of their

negative side should be investigated. We need to examine how IIPP influence PSC, since the

absence of the analysis leaves a vast area of sources for conflict protractedness uncovered.


Offering any kind of solution for resolving a PSC without considering IIPP would not be far-

reaching since that solution would be incomplete.

2.3 Literature Focusing on Informal Institutions

As defined by Douglas C. North, “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that

structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991, p. 97). They can be formal

or informal, and most of the authors agree that the main distinction between them lies in

whether or not they represent a codified set of constraints that people are using to direct their

behavior within society. Formal institutions “…represent structures of codified and explicit

rules and standards that shape interaction among societal members” (North, 1990). On the

other hand, informal institutions are based on an unwritten set of rules and are devised from

society’s culture. They represent sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct

(North, 1991, p. 97). North’s definitions have been widely accepted by many scholars that

examine institutions, their correlation and their influence (Bratton, Williamson, Lauth,

Helmke, Levitsky and many others)

After many years of focusing primarily on official state institutions, many authors have

expressed increased interest and started analyzing the importance and significance of informal

institutions, during the last decades. There was some interest in the informal institutions

before, but as Helmke and Levitsky claim, “informal rules have remained at the margins”

(2004, p. 725). The research about them was scarce and mostly limited to individual case

studies. The increasing trend of researching the informal institutions and their effects has been

evident in the works of prominent scholars of institutionalism.

It is safe to conclude that informal institutions are highly diversified and anything but

monolithic. When it comes to the analysis of relationships between informal and formal

institutions, two opposing approaches can be observed. One approach finds informal

institutions to be “functional, or problem solving” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 728), and

therefore contributing to the efficiency of formal institutions. On the other hand, the second

approach “treats informal institutions as dysfunctional, or problem creating” (Ibid, p. 728).

A number of authors like Holmes Jr. et al. see the informal institutions as positive social

creations and argue that formal institutions are actually a product of informal institutions, as

they “reflect socially constructed reality that shapes cohesion and coordination among

individuals in society” (Holmes Jr. et al., 2013, p. 533). In other words, the formal institutions

that guarantee human rights, rule of law and security in a society cannot exist without the

informal, and they replicate and further reinforce the beliefs, values, norms and priorities


(Ibid, p. 534). A similar view of the positive influence of the informal institutions can be

found in the work of Claudia R. Williamson who concluded that her empirical findings

suggest that the “presence of informal institutions is a strong determinant of development”

(Williamson, 2009, 371). A similar point of view can be observed in the great deal of research

that has been focused on the importance of informal institutions in conflicting states. This led

to the creation of the concepts of hybrid governance and hybrid peacebuilding which explore

systems where boundaries between formal and informal institutions are blurred and where

certain types of informal institutions can help with strengthening formal institutions and the

state’s governance in transition societies (see Reno, Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and others).

This point of view increased in popularity in the second half of 2000s, and has been decently

explored. It tackles forms of informal institutions that have a positive impact on political

participation, democratic institution building and peacebuilding. Since I aspire to examine the

negative impact of informal institutions, I will give more attention to the opposing

perspectives.

For the purpose of this thesis’ research, I will turn my focus primarily on the literature

that deals with IIPP and their negative impact. The practice is often showing rather negative

manifestations of informal institutions. Such concerns are shared by Kate Meagher, who

noticed a large shift of perception towards different non-state violent groups, who are now

seen as “potential sources of order and state formation” (Meagher, 2012, p. 1073). She is

therefore criticizing the essence of perspectives that are advocating for hybrid governance. As

we have already seen before, in problematic regions, the state institutions are coexisting with

the informal institutions and interact with each other. Meagher states that it is necessary to

distinguish which of these informal institutions are constructive and which are corrosive more

clearly (Ibid, p. 1074). She understandably raises the question of the legitimacy of local forms

of non-state order, since that issue has been left unaddressed in previous discussions. After

empirical analysis, she concluded that the “locally embedded form of order ended up

reproducing rather than challenging predatory and unaccountable modes of governance” (Ibid,

p. 1097). In other words, the influence of informal institutions was deepening the instability

and adding to an acceleration of formal institution failure with “disastrous consequences”

rather than contributing to their legitimacy and efficiency. Meagher explores the other side of

informal institutions by giving us more insight into how some of them can have devastating

effects. These findings require further investigation, especially in conflict situations. Overall,

this perspective represents the opposing view to the advocates of hybrid governance we have

seen before and casts doubt on the efficiency of hybrid regime creations.


The author who focused primarily on the negative influence of informal institutions and

whose framework I will be using in this thesis is Hans-Joachim Lauth who sees informal

institutions as a method to influence the political decision making process. He sees them as

“parasitic institutions” who live off formal institutions and weaken them (Lauth, 2000, p. 26).

Their legitimacy lies in auto-licensing, and their main power is the power of sanction, through

social mechanisms of exclusion. If an individual decides not to exploit them, he drastically

minimizes the chances of gaining access to goods and services. Here we come to Lauth’s

main point – some informal institutions have direct impact on political participation and can

lead to radical limitations. He identifies three of the biggest types of informal institutions that

limit political participation. The parameter being used in their classification corresponds to

how they specifically influence the limitation of political participation: 1) through personal

relationships (clientelism), which is undermining the formal channels of participation and

eroding the legitimacy of formal institutions; 2) through material exchange (corruption) –

privileged access to power of political decision making; 3) through the threat of violence

(threat of coup/putsch) – effective protection of particular interests (Lauth, 2000, p. 27). As

mentioned before, he named these Informal Institutions of Political Participation. What is

particularly interesting, the presence of all three of these categories at the same time creates a

big problem, since they tend to mutually reinforce each other and significantly restrain the

corridor of action for political participation.

Helmke and Levitsky offered an upgraded typology consisting of informal institutions

based on Lauth’s work, using the two dimensions that determine their type – degree of

convergence between the outcomes of formal and informal institutions; and the effectiveness

of relevant formal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 728). When combining these two

dimensions, four types of informal institutions become apparent. They are: 1.

Complementary, when the formal institutions are effective and share similar goals with their

informal counterparts, this leads to their peaceful coexistence and cooperation; 2.

Accommodating, when the effective formal institutions have different results than informal

institutions, thus limiting their influence and leading to peaceful opposition; 3. Substitutive,

when the weak formal institutions require informal institutions in order to achieve their

mutual goals; 4. Competing, when the formal institutions are weak and have divergent

outcomes with informal institutions, which leads to an open competition for institutional

dominance (Ibid, p. 729). This typology is important, because it clearly shows that informal

institutions can have very different implications on formal institutions. The fourth type of

competing institutions includes institutions that Lauth calls IIPP. This is exactly what I will be


examining in this thesis. When formal institutions do not possess the strength to enforce

formal rules, and when the informal institutions are seeking different goals, such as

particularistic interests instead of public interest, they are openly trying to “displace” one

another, as Lauth noticed (2007). Still, the unanswered question remains: what is the role of

these competing institutions in the case of conflict?

Some authors like Michael Bratton have focused on the informal institutions that are

particularly present and influential in conflicting countries. Due to many political instabilities

over the past, these countries have been known for their weak and failed institutions which

had to be replaced or supplemented in the institutional vacuum with the informal institutions.

Since the formal rules mandating public accountability are persistently weak, “people turn to

other standards for judging the extent of democratic growth” (Bratton, 2007, p. 109). He finds

similar informal institutions to Lauth that are particularly important in conflicting countries:

clientelism, corruption and “Big Man” presidentialism (Bratton, 2007, p. 98). He also

understands these as an obstacle for development and observes their negative effect on peace

and institution building. However, Bratton also does not focus on the direct negative effect

these institutions might have on conflict protractedness, which leaves an open space for

analysis.

As we established, there are various approaches to analyzing the influence of informal

institutions. The debate between the positive and negative effects of the informal institutions

sometimes tends to be too exclusive. As Helmke and Levitsky noted, the complete picture is

far too complex to reach a straightforward conclusion that informal institutions are either

good or bad (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 728). However, without wishing to undermine the

possible positive effects informal institutions might have in fragile and young democracies

through hybrid peacebuilding and hybrid institutions, in this thesis, I will focus my attention

on the negative effects. This is where the works of Lauth, Meagher and Bratton become truly

relevant and will help me to develop my analysis further by primarily helping me to narrow

down the scope of examined informal institutions to IIPP or “competing type” of informal

institutions - clientelism, corruption and the threat of violence. These hold the potential for the

largest limitations of political access, which is relevant for the research problem of this thesis.

2.4 Informal Institutions and Political Participation

Before seeing how informal institutions affect political participation, it is necessary to

explore the very term of political participation, which has been intensively discussed for the


last fifty years. However, even in ancient Greece, the issue of political participation was in the

center of many debates. The person who would lack interest in public affairs was referred to

as idiotes (Merriam-Webster dictionary), which illustrates how ancient Greeks would look

down upon the absence of political participation. One of the most famous quotes from Plato

deals with political participation: “One of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics, is

that you end up being governed by your inferiors” (Republic I, 347c). In the context of the

political systems of direct democracy that existed in ancient Greece, the term of political

participation subsequently became inseparable from the comprehension of democracy, and

this is still visible in the literature today (van Deth, 2001, p. 2).

However, the concept of political participation, and the circumstances around it have

changed drastically since the period of ancient Greece. Many authors offered numerous

definitions of political participation, but Jan W. van Deth managed to summarize most

influential definitions into four undisputed mutual points in all of them: 1. Political

participation deals with people in their role as citizens (as opposed to politicians and civil

servants); 2. It is understood as citizen activity or action; 3. These citizen activities should be

voluntary; 4. Political participation concerns government and politics in a broad sense (Ibid,

p. 5). From this we can conclude that political participation is a voluntary activity of citizens

aimed at influencing government and politics, while van Deth offers even simpler definition:

“[political participation represents] citizens’ activities affecting politics” (van Deth, 2014, p.

351).

But what are these actions that can be considered political participation? Many scholars

have noticed a drastic increase over the last decades in what is considered to be political

participation. For example, Marc Hooghe talks about an “inflation” in the number of activities

that are included as political participation, hence drastically complicating the analysis of the

subject (2014, p. 338). The appearance of new ways of political participation followed the

adoption of new technologies – internet and social networks now represent a very important

form of political participation that was not present only a decade ago (Ibid, p. 338). As van

Deth notes, “the list of modes of political participation is long and gets longer almost daily”

(van Deth, 2014, p. 349). To illustrate this, we can now even see the development of

smartphone applications that are used for political participation (Democracy Alert smartphone

application released by Young European Federalists in April 2015). The impact of internet

and social networks on the Arab Spring events in Tunisia and Egypt was so large that it

produced a great body of literature on the topic – Howard et al. (2011), Khondker (2011),

Eltantawy and Wiest (2011), Gerbaudo (2012), Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) and many others.


There were many attempts to provide efficient typologies of political participation,

which were indeed difficult tasks. As Hosch-Dayican claims, van Deth “proposes one of the

most comprehensive conceptualizations of participation ever” (2014, p. 342) in his

“Conceptual Map of Political Participation”. He distinguished three main modes of political

participation, while omitting all “non-political activities used for political purposes” as less

relevant (van Deth, 2014, p. 358). These three modes are: 1. Formal/conventional political

participation, which includes voting, party membership, petitions and contacting politicians;

2. Non-institutional political participation, including demonstrations and protests; 3. Civic

engagement, which represents volunteering (Ibid, p. 361). Even though he received a lot of

criticism concerning the fact that he did not include internet activism as a separate category

(Hoch-Dayican, 2014, p. 345) and that he omitted non-political activities (Hooghe, 2014, p.

340), this typology still remains one of the most current and clear. Van Deth himself defends

his approach by saying that internet activities can be listed within the first (contacting

politicians) or second of his categories (protests) (2014, p. 348), while he argues that

participation can “only exist if the participant explicitly endorses the political goals” (Ibid, p.

347).

I will focus on the first mode of political participation, or the formal participation as van

Deth calls it, for the research in hand. There are three reasons for that. First, both Azar and

Lauth are focusing on formal participation when they talk about political access (in the case of

Azar) or about political participation in general (in the case of Lauth). Azar is talking about

the deprivation of political access to formal institutions that is manifested through the inability

of communal groups to grasp it in a formal way that is equal for all groups (Azar, 1990, p.

11). When talking about participation limitations by informal institutions, Lauth talks about

IIPP providing alternative channels of political participation beyond formal modes of

participation, leading to their limitations and relativization (Lauth, 2000, p. 26). Second, due

to the long-term isolation of Libya during the Gaddafi era, new technologies and trends had a

hard time finding their way into Libyan society. To illustrate this, Libya had only 16.5

internet users per 100 people in 2013, which is nearly three times less than the neighboring

countries of Tunisia (43.8) or Egypt (49.6) (The World Bank, 2014). Third, I am considering

the availability of data for the research – indicators of formal participation tackling elections,

petitions and party membership are plentiful and widely accessible, which will help me with

my analysis.

To conclude this chapter, I will look at how IIPP can affect political participation. As

Lauth claims, they have direct impact upon it, “acting as a constraining force” (Lauth, 2000,


p. 26). Clientelism highly affects the protection of rights by the state, including the rights for

political participation - and primarily the passive election right, by narrowing down the

eligibility criteria for candidacy for the members of certain groups (Lauth, 2004, p. 51).

Furthermore, it can influence the freedom to vote within members of clientelistic structures

and restrict the right of political organization. Corruption can significantly influence the

equality of elections, especially when there are many irregularities present in the election

process (Ibid, p. 52). It also limits political organization by opening or closing the political

process for privileged interests. The threat of violence can have one of the strongest impacts

for all forms of formal participation – it can reduce the liberty of elections drastically, by

physically preventing citizens from voting (Ibid) and even violently encountering political

opponents directly.

3. Theoretical Framework

We can note that the influence of IIPP on Protracted Social Conflict was so far not

explicitly analyzed. Azar unfortunately did not have the opportunity to expand his theory

within an institutional framework, since the widespread analysis of institutions started after

his death and after the Cold War ended. In an unstable and fragile environment, which is a

fertile ground for PSC, as we have already seen, informal institutions sometimes play a

crucial role in everyday political life. This is why it is important to examine the connection

between them and PSC. Do they contribute to further protractedness or rather do they help

with a stabilization and termination of the conflict?

Before proceeding further, I must take another look at the PSC theory and its main

characteristics. As Azar claimed in his definition of PSC, the presence of different communal

groups that are deprived of their basic needs is essential for the existence of PSC. This means

that certain groups have a privileged position in society at the cost of other groups. These

could be ethnic groups, religious groups, political groups, clans, castes, or, in the case of

Libya, tribes. The deprivation of their basic needs creates a sense of inequality which,

consequently leads to group grievances that motivate the group to commence their struggle.

But what does Azar see as these basic needs? He lists security, recognition and

acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (Azar, 1990, p. 93).

So, we can see that one of the main reasons for communal group dissatisfaction is the absence

of fair access to political institutions. This could be an underrepresentation in the decision-


making and legislative bodies, an inability to fulfil passive and active election rights, a

prohibition or limitation of the freedom of political association, etc. Most of the time, the fair

access to political institutions is limited by intentionally ignoring the demands of certain

groups to be implemented due to various reasons, including nationalism, racism and other

forms of discrimination.

However, as we have seen, certain informal institutions also have a very strong power to

drastically limit political participation. They can significantly contribute to the privileged

access of certain individuals or groups at the cost of others, while destroying the legitimacy of

the formal institutions and sabotaging the official routes of fair participation. This can be

particularly devastating for the protractedness in the systems where these “parasitic” informal

institutions are deeply rooted. As Hans-Joachim Lauth noted, different informal institutions

can further strengthen one another if they exist at the same time, which in practice creates a

vicious closed circle of political participation which in turn produces potential for more

violence caused by grievances of communal groups that are excluded. It is also necessary to

identify which informal institutions we are talking about exactly. The institutions Lauth

marked as IIPP: clientelism, corruption and the threat of violence, are the three most

destructive ones that have the capability to entangle together and create a highly impenetrable

web of political access limitations (Lauth, 2004, p. 12-16). These are also highly relevant

when studying cases in Africa and the Middle East, since they are widespread and notable

throughout these regions.

I am primarily expecting to find that IIPP have a direct influence on PSC by limiting

political participation and creating the deprivation of the basic communal need. This does not

exclude the possible existence of the two-way relationship, since manifestations of PSC such

as violence could also enforce the strength of IIPP.

Lauth was one of the few scholars to directly connect informal institutions with political

participation, which is highly important for the research scope of this thesis. In addition to

that, I have decided to rely on Lauth’s approach also because he presented a clear distinction

between informal institutions with positive effects and IIPP, and provided their coherent

classification that provided a base for further work of several other authors such as Helmke

and Levitsky.


4. Libyan case background

In order to facilitate the upcoming analysis and to give more information about the

examined case, I will present a short overview of the events that led to the current situation in

Libya.

Shortly after World War II, Libya declared independence in the large decolonization

wave that swept across Africa. The established constitutional monarchy only lasted 18 years

before the triumph of the revolution which was led by an army officer Muammar al-Gaddafi

in 1969, who later became the supreme leader of Libya for the following 42 years. (Robinson,

2011, p. 27) During that period, the country changed its political system to an experimental

form of socialism that Gaddafi named “Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”.

The essence of this ideology was in the rejection of certain contemporary democratic

institutions such as parliaments and political parties and focusing on direct democracy

through local people’s committees and popular congresses. (al-Gaddafi, 1976, p. 24)

However, this was just a disguise for an authoritarian dictatorship that limited human rights

and liberties, while opposing opinions and dissidence were often violently crushed. (Eljahmi,

2006, p. 12) Gaddafi’s regime found a great source of power in controlling Libya’s vast

natural resources, namely oil. The oil export income was largely used to provide great social

programs for citizens, which was helping the regime to sustain itself for such a long period of

time. (Ross, 2011, p. 3) However, frequent confrontations with the United States and other

western countries led to Libya’s isolation and a set of internationally imposed sanctions.

(Eljahmi, 2006, p. 13) The increased authoritarian tendencies and further limitations of civil

liberties, together with economic hardship led to the larger dissatisfaction among citizens of

Libya. Sparked and inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt, the protests against

Gaddafi’s regime started in February 2011. In the attempt to crush the rising threat for his

regime, Gaddafi started using increasing force against his citizens, (The Telegraph, 21st

October 2011). The diversified opposition was gathering under the so-called National

Transitional Council (NTC) in the northeastern city of Benghazi, which many western

governments recognized as the only legitimate representatives of the Libyan people (Reuters,

15th July 2011). The violent civil war broke out throughout the whole country, resulting in

large number of casualties. The government’s use of force led to the UN Security Council’s

resolution establishing a no-fly zone which opened a way for foreign intervention (Aljazeera,

18th March 2011). This intervention helped the opposition movements in capturing the capital,

Tripoli, and soon after Gaddafi was caught and executed.


However, the ousting of the previous regime was just the beginning of the violent

struggle for power between numerous different armed fractions. The unity of NTC soon

disappeared and the country was pushed back into the institutional and political turmoil as the

officials struggled with disarming the armed groups who continued to pursue their goals

through violence. Restoring public security showed to be a more difficult task than expected

and the violence resumed. The institutions have failed to “enforce the state’s monopoly over

the use of force” (Mattes, 2014, p. 86), leaving the political process susceptible to violent

threats by the different “thuwars”, or brigades of Libyan Freedom Fighters, most of them

being organized around tribal affiliation (Ibid, p. 87). Even the highest legislative body, the

General National Council (GNC) was itself several times under direct pressure from thuwars

to adopt certain laws (Smith, 2013). There was periodic violence throughout the country in

the period between 2011 and 2014, as different thuwars were fighting for dominance over

territory, oil fields and political influence. One of the notable events was the 2012 Islamist-led

attack on the United States consulate in Benghazi, when the US ambassador was killed,

among other consulate staff (BBC, 12th September 2012).

The overall anarchy and chaos led to the drastic rise of radical extremism, and some

fundamental Islamist groups have gained strong support and have increased their influence

within the GNC. After losing the June 2014 elections, the Islamists decided to seize power by

force and they managed to successfully take over Tripoli, forming the so-called “New General

National Council”. Their groups created alliance named “Libyan dawn” which is strongly

supported by Qatar, Sudan and Turkey (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, 2015, p. 8). On the other

hand, the newly elected government in the 2014 elections had moved to the northeastern city

of Tobruk, and is currently the only internationally recognized Libyan authority (Gartenstein-

Ross and Barr, 2015, p. 29). The situation is even further complicated with the emergence of

what is currently the largest terrorist group in the world, the so-called Islamic State.

The current situation remains tense and violent. The main two competing factions are at

open war with one another, disproving each other’s legitimacy. At the same time, numerous

armed groups are spread throughout the country, frequently changing sides and often acting

on their own when fighting for their personal interests. With the appearance of the terrorist

organization ISIS, varied international support of different actors and a large number of

violent thuwars who are refusing to lay down their arms, this conflict does not show any

tendency for de-escalation, but rather threatens to increase in intensity.


4.1 Debate on the Libyan Case

A large part of the literature that is dealing with the conflict in Libya focuses on the role

of natural resources on its protractedness. Some authors try to find causal relationships

between the large oil reserves in Libya with the ongoing violence. Some are even questioning

the causes of military intervention in Libya, by expressing their concerns that it was inspired

by the large quantity of oil reserves. However, due to the pre-set goal of this thesis, I will omit

these perspectives, as they are not relevant to the research at hand. The impact of the

resources on the perpetuation of conflicts has been studied extensively before (see the works

of Humphreys (2005), Samset (2009), Ross (2011), Bove et al. (2014), Hughes and Long

(2015) and others), which makes it less attractive for analysis.

For the purpose of this thesis, I will mostly focus on authors that are dealing with

Libyan institutions and its internal conflicts. This will provide me with additional data,

information and understanding for further analysis. By covering these different perspectives, I

also expect to identify the gap in the existing literature that is dealing with the Libyan case.

Many authors offer an explanation about the prolonged violence in Libya through its

lack of effective governing institutions that is, in part, caused by Libya’s colonial legacy. (St

John, Boduszynski, Engel, etc.) The source of the prolonged conflict can be found in the

inability to create solid democratic institutions as a consequence of almost non-existing

democratic experiences due to colonization and Muammar al-Gaddafi’s subsequent

dictatorship that lasted for 42 years.

St John finds it necessary to analyze the earlier history of Libya because “the evolution

of its economy and society in the colonial and post-colonial eras strongly influenced the

socioeconomic and political policies in [Gaddafi’s] regime” (St John, 2011, p. XI). This is

why Mieczyslaw Boduszynski finds the source of instability in the “weak groundwork” for

democracy, since Libya did not have any democratic experience to build upon, mostly due to

its colonial status and its subsequent autocratic government. Indeed, Gaddafi himself rejected

the ideas of political parties and contemporary parliaments by accusing them of undermining

the real democracy (Gaddafi, 1976, p. 7-12), and supporting direct democracy instead, but in

his own interpretation. During Gaddafi’s rule, the whole state of Libya was a personification

of himself, “he [Gaddafi] was the system” (Boduszynski, 2013, p. 87). The contradictory

networks and a confusing system was the way of ruling in Gaddafi’s Libya – confusion was

used as an instrument of rule. Hweio agrees that the state of chaos was one of the strategies

that assisted Gaddafi in holding a strong control over Libya. She omits Gaddafi’s ideology as


experimental and a big contributor to the creation of stateless society and weak institutional

system (Hweio, 2012, p. 119). Mieczyslaw Boduszynski gives an interesting observation that

can be connected with the PSC theory regarding the central role of the state in sparking or

calming the internal conflict that was seen in Gaddafi’s Libya. He claims that Gaddafi

cunningly broke peace between some of the conflicting tribes by bribing them and giving

them benefits, while he used the “divide and rule” principle on others (Boduszynski, 2013, p.

88). This is the clear connection to Azar’s argument regarding the state’s role in the internal

conflicts. By addressing the communal needs on one side and not addressing them on the

other, Gaddafi was using his central role to maintain the status quo that guaranteed him stable

governance, at the same time creating communal grievances.

After overthrowing Gaddafi, the new regime was eager to completely reject “all things

past”, leaving almost no surviving or functioning institutions. Libya was indeed unique in that

compared to other Arab Spring countries that had inherited most of the institutions from the

previous governments, without rejecting them instantly.

However, the building of new institutions in Libya is not going as planned. Even though

the new regime wants to completely distance itself from the previous one, the aforementioned

lack of democratic capacity, as well as prevailing “post authoritarian impulse to reject top-

down authority” (Boduszynski, 2013, p. 89) is slowing, if not halting the whole process down.

Justified trust issues are a big problem that have to be dealt with in order to continue with the

stabilization of the country.

Shortly after the revolutionaries took power after toppling Gaddafi, Muzaffer Yilmaz, a

PhD alumni from George Mason University offered a possible peacebuilding process for

Libya that consisted of six steps: transitional justice, representative government, strong

security, new constitution, economic reconstruction and national reconciliation. (Yilmaz,

2012, p. 47). Unfortunately, today we can see that this optimistic prognosis never materialized

on the ground. Transitional justice was conducted selectively (Mattes, 2014, p. 90), legitimacy

issues are preventing a representative government (Boduszynski, 2013, p. 89), security reform

has pretty much failed (Mattes, 2014, p. 86), and economic reconstruction and national

reconciliation are not even in sight.

The concept of failed state is often mentioned when it comes to Libya. Andrew Engel is

also focused on the institutional approach in his paper from November 2014, by analyzing the

causes of Libya’s state weakness and the causes for the civil war. He focuses on Libya’s

inability to monopolize the use of force, control people and borders and provide public goods

to citizens (Engel, 2014, p. 4-6). In that environment, it is logical that various groups will try


to influence various political processes, often using violence to achieve those goals. When

talking about failed states and failing institutions, the questions of legitimacy and sovereignty

come into focus, as observed by Halupka and Star. In a country run by warlords, “sovereignty

is [a] powerful commodity” (Halupka and Star, 2012, p. 74), and it is often influenced highly

by the external forces, as it can be seen in Libya, where different factions received support

from different foreign countries (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, 2015, p. 8).

Gartenstein-Ross and Barr are describing the competition between the two biggest

conflicting fractions in their newest research paper from February 2015. They conducted a

thorough analysis of the regional press, which was often ignored by Western scholars, hence

providing some more insight into the current situation. The importance of this article concerns

the very significant amount of fresh and relevant information about the conflict, which is

portrayed through the perspective of Libya’s failure to establish reliable security forces.

Instead, the new central government tried to “include [militias] into the security structure,

[which is] a largely futile approach” (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, 2015, p. 7). Jörg Fedtke

agrees that the stable security situation in Libya is a precondition for the building of efficient

state institutions (Fedtke, 2014, p. 19).

Hanspeter Mattes explores the real influence of various armed forces on political life in

post-Gaddafi’s Libya. He claims that revolutionary brigades play a central role in Libyan

political development, and they do so by using violence and threats to put political pressure

on formal institutions (Mattes, 2014, p. 90). The largest concern is the inability of the state to

conduct their demilitarization, especially since data shows there are 400-500 different

brigades operating in different areas of the country with as much as 110 to 130 thousand

combatants (Mattes, 2014, p. 87). Many of these brigades were organized on a tribal basis

and some of them used the opportunity of a large-scale conflict to resolve their pre-war

rivalries in a violent way (Ibid, 2014, p. 87). This article gives an important overview of

importance of paramilitary formations in the current conflict.

On the other hand, Igor Cherstich states that the war in Libya cannot be seen as the

tribal conflict. One of his main arguments is that the tribes in Libya are not “monolithic

entities”, but rather “diversified groups” (Cherstich, 2011). According to him, the conflict in

Libya is solely a national revolution, not a tribal clash. The question of the dichotomy of

tribal/national identity is highly complex in Libya and Cherstich claims that the bigger role of

the tribes is present solely because political activism and civil society were non-existent

during the Gaddafi rule. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Cherstich rejected the importance of

the tribal conflict too easily, especially when we know that certain fractions and tribes have


grown so strong that they are in complete control of certain parts of Libya, even patrolling

borders and running the prisons on their territory, under contract with the Government

(Boduszynski, 2013, p. 88).

These different views of the Libyan conflict will provide as a solid basis for data on the

current situation for my further analysis. We have seen that the authors mostly examined the

effects of weak formal institutions, which were a result of colonial and dictatorial legacy. The

large focus was directed at the failed security system reform, as one of the main reasons of

prolonged violence. However, we can see that there was little or no consideration for the

influence of informal institutions per se on the protractedness of conflict in Libya, which I

will try to address in the following chapters. As we have seen before, formal and informal

institutions are interconnected and interdependent. This is why the influence of both should be

analyzed, especially in cases where the presence of informal institutions that could

compromise regular political processes is visible.

5. Research Method

In order to answer the proposed research question and examine the influence of IIPP on

PSC, I will conduct an interpretative case study of Libya that will consist of three steps: 1.

determining if Libya is in Protracted Social Conflict; 2. indicating existence and importance

of IIPP in Libya; 3. drawing conclusions on the relationship between IIPP and PSC.

5.1 About the Case Study

Yin defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary

phenomenon within its real life context” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). This research method is being

used when predicting outcomes of examined phenomena.

The strength of this method lies in its ability to simplify complex concepts, and help

with the illustration of complicated theoretical assumptions. It is very flexible in terms of data

usage, as it allows for both quantitative and qualitative analyses of data (Zainal, 2007, p. 4).

With the complex framework that includes PSC, informal institutions and political

participation that I am trying to examine, the case study should prove very useful for

connecting these different aspects together and helping us understand their relationship.


One of the largest disadvantages of case study research most frequently discussed is that

case studies provide little basis for generalization (Yin, 2009, p. 16). Indeed, a single case can

hardly provide information that could be applicable for the wide specter of other groups of

cases, no matter how similar they might be. However, Yin compares case studies with natural

science experiments, which are also hard to generalize from. This is why he claims that the

goal of case studies are to “expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not

enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Ibid).

This is exactly what I will be doing with the case of Libya. The primary goal is not to

use the results received from examining the Libyan case as the example for other countries,

but rather to test the proposed hypothesis and theoretical framework that is behind it and to

provide basis for future research. This thesis is trying to bridge the gap in the existing research

and this is why it is important to test the proposed hypothesis so it could be used in a further

analysis of the issue.

5.2 About the Case Selection

The case of Libya was chosen since it possesses important parameters that could help

with confirming the presumption that IIPP can directly contribute to the perpetuation of

Protracted Social Conflict by radically limiting the space for political participation. Moreover,

the case is getting more attention daily with the outbreak of new violence and an increasing

threat of terrorism. The conflict in Libya is very complex and provides a very wide spectrum

of different layers that can be very fruitful sources for different types of analysis. Still, due to

the apparent neglect of this case by the media and a large part of academia for the past 2

years, the conflict has developed into a new level of complexity without being analyzed

thoroughly. This leaves a lot of room for different approaches and makes this case attractive

for exploration.

With the rising concerns of terrorists using the ever growing refugee migration routes

from Libya to Italy and Malta to infiltrate their fighters in Western European countries and

commit terrorist attacks, we can see why it is urgent to devote more attention to this case. The

new photos that appeared on social networks on the 18th of May suggest that ISIS fighters

have already reached Rome from Libya and are already planning their activities (Daily Mail

Online, 18th May 2015). Libya, in its current state, represents a very fertile ground for

terrorism that could represent a large threat for both the Middle Eastern and North African

(MENA) region and Europe. Its geographical location provides a great connection between


these regions, and this is another specificity that makes this case unique. Another important

characteristic is that the conflict is a part of the larger event known as the Arab Spring, which

shook the foundations of many states within the whole of the MENA region. By using this

case we can reach important conclusions that could be observable for the whole region that is

currently shaken by numerous conflicts.

5.3 About the Data

For the purpose of this analysis, I will be using quantitative data from several renowned

sources: Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem), Democracy Index (DI), Fragile States

Index (FSI), Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Global Peace Index (GPI).

Varieties of Democracy is a relatively new project initiated by University of

Gothenburg and Kellogg Institute and gathers a large number of scholars around the world.

The main goal of V-Dem is to conceptualize and measure democracy. It does so by examining

over 329 variables grouped in different components of democracy from over 160 countries

(V-Dem 2014). It provides the largest amount of data regarding different aspects of political

participation (elections, freedom of expression, inclusion of different groups, etc.). The data

from V-Dem will be useful for analyzing both the existence of PSC and IIPP in Libya.

The Democracy Index provides an overview of different categories of democracy in

over 165 countries: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; functioning of government;

political participation; and political culture (DI 2014, p. 1). According to the total score, it

classifies countries into four types of regimes: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid

regimes and authoritarian regimes. This data will serve as a good addition to V-Dem data, by

helping me identify the state’s weakness and participatory levels in the examined case.

The Fragile States Index deals with large numbers of indicators that contributed to state

fragility for over 10 years. Nearly 180 countries are graded by their total score which they get

by summing up individual scores for 12 different parameters. The score scale is 1-10 with

larger numbers indicating a worse score. It represents an invaluable source of data for

determining state legitimacy, security apparatuses, the ability of the state to provide services,

the influence of external actors and many others (FSI 2014).

The Corruption Perception Index has long been the largest source for determining the

level of corruption in different countries. By covering 175 countries, it ranks them according

to the perceived levels of public sector corruption. It is still a very valuable and irreplaceable

source for the measurement of corruption.


The Global Peace Index has been published for the last eight years by the Institute for

Economics and Peace (IEP). This index ranks 162 independent states according to their level

of peace using 22 qualitative and quantitative indicators (GPI, 2014, p. 1). The parameters

that will be useful in proving the presence of certain IIPP are violence containment costs and

societal safety and security.

Like with any quantitative data, there is the risk that the numerical data does not provide

much interpretation, and therefore is subject to the bias of the researcher. However, the

sources I will be using possess developed and precise explanations of their parameters, which

leave little room for bias interpretation.

5.4 About the Steps of the Analysis

Step 1

I have based the case selection on my presumption that Libya is in PSC. I will start the

research by confirming this presumption by using the four clusters of variables that Azar laid

out for determining the presence of PSC – communal content, the deprivation of fair political

access, governance and the state’s role and international linkages. (Azar, Jureidini and

McLaurin, 1978, p. 53).

Communal content will be investigated through the utilization of information from

literature sources that were tackling the significance and influence of tribal groups in Libya. I

will also measure the communal content using the data of power distribution between social

groups and the representation of disadvantaged group parameters from the Varieties of

Democracy project. These will help me determine the presence of conflicting “identity

groups” that have unequal treatment and unequal access to power. For the purpose of this

research, I will focus only on the deprivation of fair political access, instead of the whole set

of basic needs. This cluster will be investigated by observing the political participation

parameter from the Democracy Index, and the wide scope of participatory democracy index

parameters from the Varieties of Democracy project: free and fair elections, civil society

organizations consultations, freedom of academic and cultural expression, citizen initiatives

and representation of disadvantaged social groups. In other words, these parameters measure

the mode of formal participation that I intended to test. This data will provide me with the

insight about the current state of formal political participation in Libya and give me the

answer if we can isolate the deprivation of need for fair political access or not. The role of the


state will be examined by using data from the Democracy Index and the Fragile States Index

parameters: the functioning of government, security apparatuses, state legitimacy and its

possibility to provide public services. These parameters are trying to determine if the freely

elected representatives determine the government policy, if the legislature is the supreme

political body, if the government is free of influence by the military or the security services

(DI 2014), and thus, if the formal institutions are able to perform their role in their full

capacity or not. Here, I will determine if the state is able to satisfy basic communal needs.

Finally, I intend to investigate international linkages by utilizing the information about the

foreign military interventions in Libya that happened in the period between 2011 and 2015. I

will also use the data of the external intervention parameter of the Fragile States Index which

illustrates the level of foreign imposed interventions, such as sanctions or military invasion

(FSI 2014). This will help me conclude if the international linkages are still strong in Libya.

Step 2

When trying to indicate the existence and influence of informal institutions, researchers

are faced with the problem of how to measure them, since they cannot be traced in written

form and have no measurable indicators. Lauth suggested three possible methods of

operationalization of informal institutions: 1) measurement of good governance – relying on

the assumption that a weak performance of good governance can be an indicator of strong

informal institutions; 2) using special indices on informal institutions as the Corruption

Perception Index and 3) using the quantitative method by using a questionnaire (Lauth, 2004,

p. 43-44).

The weakness of the first method lies in the requirement to take other factors that can

contribute to a state’s poor performance into consideration and that can influence the results.

The analysis through CPI is relying on a perception of the informal institution. This

perception could be stimulated with numerous other factors, hence it cannot be completely

reliable. The questionnaire allows the assessment of the spread of informal institutions inside

the whole society (Lauth, 2004, p. 43).


Type of

informal

institution

Questions Answer possibilities

Clientelism 1. Are the relevant political decisions made

by parliament and government?

2. Does one need personal protection, if one

wants to influence a political decision or

reach an administrative position?

3. Where is the center of political power?

Always – sometimes –

never

Government/Parliament

– informal circles

Corruption 1. If one wants the administration staff to do

their duty, does one need to blackmail?

2. If one wants the administration staff to do

their duty, is one willing to bribe?

Always – sometimes -

never

Threat

perception

1. Does one have to consider the interest of

powerful groups while voting?

2. Are the elections free of external threats?

3. Can all relevant issues be treated in

parliament?

Always - sometimes –

never

Yes - no

Table 1: Questionnaire about informal institutions (Lauth, 2004, p. 45)

These three methods are not exclusive. They can be used interchangeably and they

supplement one another. I will test the presence of clientelism, corruption and the threat of

violence by combining these methods and using them to supplement one another: where

answering the questions from questionnaire is not possible, I will try using the other two

methods to indicate existence of the IIPP.


The data I will utilize in this part of the analysis will be from the Varieties of

Democracy project (power distribution between social groups parameter, public sector

corruption exchanges and executive bribery and corruption exchanges), Corruption Perception

Index and Global Peace Index (societal safety and security parameter, violence containment

costs). These will show me the important indicators of analyzed informal institutions.

Step 3

Using the findings from the first two steps and Lauth’s theoretical framework I will

draw conclusions on the relationship between IIPP and PSC.

6. The Analysis

1. Can the current situation in Libya be categorized as Protracted Social Conflict?

- Communal Content

As mentioned before, Libya is a country with a large number of tribes that have a high

political significance and a strong group identity (Hweio, 2012, p. 120). The exact number of

tribes and their subgroups has never been precisely determined, but some sources are

operating with the number of 140 tribes and clans (Yilmaz, 2012, p. 53). As tribes became

one of the most important forms of political organization, due to the ban on political activism

during the Gaddafi era (Cherstich, 2011), their large diversity, different size and access to

power and their strong group identity in current situation leads to the unequal position of

many groups.

Libya scores very low on the V-Dem power distribution between social groups

parameter, indicating that political power is monopolized by several of the strongest social

groups. Subsequently, representation of disadvantaged groups shows that they are highly

under-represented relative to their proportion (V-Dem 2014). FSI notes a high intensity of

conflict and competition among local and national leaders by giving Libya the score of 8.1 out

of 10.0 (FSI 2014), which indicates a very high level of potential conflict between diversified

groups.

This data indicates that communal content is very strong in Libya. There is a large

number of identity groups that are unequally represented and have uneven power distribution,


which leads to numerous conflicting situations not only within the state, but between each

other as well.

- Need Deprivation (Political Access Deprivation)

The Democracy Index 2014 shows a very low political participation score of 3.33 out of

10.00 (DI 2014, p. 7). This score indicates a low level of formal participation: low voter turn-

out for national elections, weak autonomy of minorities in the political process, trivial women

representation, low membership in political parties and non-governmental organizations and

overall minor efforts of authorities in promoting political participation. This makes Libya

among the worst-rating countries that went through the Arab Spring movement in this

category. The fluctuation of political participation in previous years shows that after having

its peak of political participation in 2012 (3.89), one year after the official regime change, this

indicator is constantly decreasing and today is back to the level of 2011. The electoral process

and pluralism score which demonstrates freedom, fairness and transparency of electoral

processes, as well as possibilities of political organization is worryingly low – 2.25, falling

down more than two whole points since 2012 (4.33). This indicates that the electoral process

cannot be considered free, transparent and fair and that there are significant obstacles for the

freedom of political organization.

Varieties of Democracy findings also show low scores on multiple indicators within the

Participatory Democracy Index: free and fair elections (significant irregularities, presence of

electoral violence), civil society organizations consultation (high degree of insulation of the

government from CSO input), freedom of academic and cultural expression (weakly respected

by the authorities) and citizen initiatives (not allowed). Representation of disadvantaged

social groups indicates that they are highly under-represented (V-Dem, 2014).

Overall, main indicators of political participation in Libya are low and indicate the

deprivation of political participation. Elections and voting rights are problematic, minorities

are not included in the process, freedom of political organization is low and civil society is

almost completely excluded. This suggests a clear deprivation of political access, one of the

basic communal needs according to Azar, which leads to communal grievances.

- The State’s Role

As mentioned before, some authors describe Libya as a failed or weak state. The

Democracy Index confirms this claim by giving Libya a score of 2.50/10 in the functioning of


government indicator. This indicates that the state institutions are unable to perform their role

in their full capacity. The Fragile States Index 2014 puts Libya on the very high 41st position

out of 178 countries. One of the main contributors of this bad ranking are the indicators

showing a low security apparatus (9.2), indicating an inability of state institutions to take over

the monopoly over the use of force from the other actors; legitimacy of the state (8.5),

showing high distrust in the state institutions and public services (7.4), demonstrating an

inability of state institutions to provide public services. (FSI 2014)

These results are expected. The unsuccessful security reform and inability of the state to

establish security forces represents one of the largest issues Libya is facing (Mattes, 2014, p.

87). The development and rebuilding of almost all spheres of Libyan society are being

delayed by the urging security issues (Mattes, 2014, p. 97). This means that the resolving

major deficiencies of the Libya’s state security apparatus is a condicio sine qua non

strengthening of other state institutions is impossible.

The official authorities lack legitimacy and are unable to provide basic services to its

citizens. The state does not exercise control over the security forces and it is safe to conclude

that the Libyan state is unable to satisfy basic human needs in this current situation.

- International Linkages

Libya was the only country within Arab Spring events that had foreign intervention.

NATO led strikes that lasted for over 7 months which helped the opposition groups in

capturing Gaddafi and taking over Libya’s government (BBC, 31st October 2011). However,

even after the foreign intervention officially ended, foreign influence remained very strong in

Libya. We can observe a strong influence of regional actors such as Qatar, Turkey and Sudan

supporting the Islamist-led New General National Council based in Tripoli, while Egypt and

the United Arab Emirates and the large part of international community supports the displaced

Government based in Tobruk (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, 2015, p. 8). With the rising threat

by ISIS at the beginning of 2015, Egypt started bombing strikes against this terrorist

organization on the territory of Libya (Washington Post, 16th February 2015). Fragile States

Index gives Libya a very high score of 9.0 out of 10, noting a very strong level of foreign

influence, the largest in North Africa (FSI 2014).

As Azar noted: “[the] formation of domestic social and political institutions and their

impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage within the

international system” (Azar, 1990, p. 11). Many regional actors are trying to increase their


influence in Libya by supporting different conflicting groups, and that still has a large impact

on the Libyan conflict. With two foreign interventions in the scope of 4 years, it is safe to say

that Libya is highly influenced by international linkages.

1st conclusion:

I have demonstrated that the four clusters of variables that determine the presence of

PSC – communal content, need deprivation, the state’s role and international linkages are all

visible and present in the case of Libya. The existence of these clusters indicates that Libya is

currently in PSC.

2. Can the IIPP such as clientelism, corruption and threat of violence be observed in Libya?

- Clientelism

The existence of clientelism is very hard to indicate. However, some of the data we

already used might prove useful, such as V-Dem’s parameter concerning power distribution

between social groups. As we have already seen, the different social groups, notably tribes, do

not possess the same amount of political power. Stronger groups are monopolizing their

political power, while leaving the other groups under-represented.

How does this indicate clientelism? The fact that the power is monopolized by groups

implies that one has to be a member of a certain group in order to have privileged status. The

group affiliation determines the amount of political power. In order to be able to influence the

political decisions, one must have personal protection from a certain social group. At the same

time, membership to a weaker social group limits the access to decision making. Hweio

introduces more evidence by describing “tribal nepotism”, which is showed in the election of

representatives in local government bodies, where candidates had to “run and get elected by

using tribal channels” (Hweio, 2012, p. 117).

Where is the center of political power? In the government/parliament or informal

circles? We have seen that Libyan state institutions are particularly weak in many aspects.

This is why people are turning to tribes that became “central political actors” (Hweio, 2012, p.

111). The center of political power is therefore shifting from the state institutions to these

informal circles of decision making.


Clientelism can be indicated in the case of Libya through the dominance of certain

social groups, which are, in this case, tribes. Certain tribal membership provides personal

protection and access to the decision making structures. On the other hand, membership in

other tribes limits this access.

- Corruption

In order to indicate the existence of corruption and its influence, I will take the data

from the CPI, with the addition of data from the two relevant V-Dem parameters: public

sector corruption exchanges and executive bribery and corruption exchanges.

The Corruption Perception Index 2014 rates Libya on the very low 166th (out of 175)

position with the low score of 18 out of 100. This rating indicates that corruption is

widespread and recognized by country analysts, business people and the general public. This

gives Libya the third worse rating in the whole MENA region, only to be preceded by Sudan

and Iraq (CPI 2014). V-Dem notices a high corruption rate in both the public sector and the

executive. Small corrupt exchanges in the public sector occur regularly and they involve a

majority of employees, while the members of the executive grant favors in exchange for

bribes and other material incentives more often than not (V-Dem 2014).

This data shows that the institution of corruption is very present and widespread in the

whole society, especially in the political sector. Private individuals, as well as different groups

are using material exchange to gain influence in the political sector at the expense of other

actors.

- Threat of Violence

The number of armed non-state militant groups in Libya is estimated to be between 400

and 500, with close to 130.000 combatants (Mattes, 2014, p. 87). This enormous number in

combination with the weak state security apparatus (see the first part of analysis) creates

numerous security issues. These groups are using the current situation to push their own

agenda with the use of physical power, sometimes by conducting direct pressure on

legislation as we have seen on the example in the case of the Political Isolation Law from

May 2013 (Mattes, 2014, p. 90). This could answer the question from Lauth’s questionnaire if

all the relevant issues could be treated in parliament. The answer is no, since parliament is

largely influenced by violent armed groups. If these groups can influence the adoption of

laws, then it is not hard to presume that they could have a large influence on every other

aspect of the decision making process as well.


We have seen that electoral violence is present in Libya (V-Dem 2014), which means

that the elections are also not free of external threats. The armed groups can use their power to

frighten voters and direct them into voting for their preferred candidate. The Global Peace

Index rated Libya within the last third group of countries for the societal safety and security

parameter. This parameter consists of 8 different indicators: level of perceived criminality,

number of refugees and displaced people, political instability, political terror scale, terrorist

activity, number of homicides per 100.000 people, level of violent crime and likelihood of

violent demonstrations. The given rating indicates that the safety situation is highly

unpredictable and depends largely on numerous armed groups, since the state itself cannot

provide security. With 10.7% of its GDP being spent on direct violence containment costs,

Libya is 15th out of 162 observed countries (GPI 2014, p. 100). This data illustrates just how

big a problem violence is in Libya. In the absence of central security forces, the widespread

threat of violence is highly evident.

These indicators demonstrate that the threat of violence is certainly present and has a

large influence on political institutions in Libya. Various groups are using the state’s weak

security institutions to push their agenda and influence the decision making process directly.

2nd conclusion:

The existence of IIPP is evident in Libya. Clientelism can be observed through the

privileged access of certain tribal groups and its members to the position of political power.

Corruption is widespread and is especially visible in the decision making sphere. Individuals

and groups are using material exchange to gain more influence and more political power. The

threat of violence is present through numerous armed groups that are expanding their

influence on the decision making structures by using or threatening to use violence.

3. Connecting the IIPP and PSC.

I have demonstrated that Libya can be considered to be in the state of Protracted Social

Conflict and that the presence of Informal Institutions of Political Participation can be

indicated. This answered the two operational questions that were presented at the beginning of

this thesis. But how do these IIPP contribute to the perpetuation of PSC?

The fact that we managed to isolate all three IIPP should be noted. As Lauth claimed, in

cases where these three informal institutions are present simultaneously, “the situation has to


be judged as being highly problematic, as due to their compatible particularist orientation they

are capable of mutually reinforcing each other” (Lauth, 2000, p. 44). However, that is not the

only concern, as in this situation they are also drastically increasing their negative effects –

undermining the state sovereignty and breaking the state’s monopoly on power (Ibid, p. 45).

As I have demonstrated, in Libya, the main political decisions are made outside the formal

state institutions, through tribal agreements, violent pressure or favors for material exchange.

Violent armed groups are preventing the building of state security apparatus. This is all

significantly affecting the legitimacy of formal institutions.

At the same time, the coinciding presence of all three IIPP “hinders democratic

processes as a whole” (Ibid), by mutilating the modes of formal political participation, as I

have already demonstrated. Elections, voting, political association, civil society inclusion and

minority representation are all affected by IIPP. Elections are not free nor fair due to

corruption and violent pressures, voting is restricted by tribal affiliation and the threat of

violence, and the minority groups are underrepresented depending on their tribal membership.

By occupying the formal institutions, IIPP control who has the access.

Here we can see two different implications of IIPP, one aimed at weakening state

institutions and the other aimed at limiting political participation. This is why I can

distinguish two ways IIPP can contribute to PSC’s perpetuation:

1. Directly, by drastically limiting the political access which is one of the basic

communal needs whose deprivation causes PSC;

2. Indirectly, by obstructing the state institutions and eroding their legitimacy, therefore

preventing them from performing their role in addressing the deprivation of basic communal

needs.

This twofold impact illustrates how intertwined IIPP and PSC really are. When they

coexist, we showed that their interaction is inevitable. This suggests that an analysis of any

PSC should include a mandatory detection of IIPP and their intensity prior to proceeding

further with research. Not doing so could result in a significant oversight of the important

PSC contributor.

Unfortunately, the limited scope of this thesis does not allow me to examine the reverse

direction of influence in this relationship. The first two steps of the analysis show some

indication that PSC can have a reverse influence on IIPP. However, this would require a

separate in-depth analysis.


7. Conclusion

The existing research of Protracted Social Conflict disregards the role of informal

institutions on its perpetuation. This thesis tends to close that gap by claiming that the

Informal Institutions of Political Participation can have both a direct and indirect influence on

PSC’s perpetuation. Distinguishing these two means of IIPP’s influence on PSC’s

perpetuation was an unanticipated result. It only shows that this relationship is highly intense

and requires far more attention. This important influence of IIPP could indicate that any

analysis of PSC cannot be complete without the consideration of informal institutions, as the

results would be incomplete.

The theoretical implication of these findings is the causal relationship between IIPP and

PSC, both direct and indirect. This opens a pathway for future research that would examine

this relationship even closer.

The usage of Lauth’s theoretical framework brought in a deep insight into the negative

side of informal institutions, with a very valuable typology, in addition to a unique

methodology of measuring existence and strength of informal institutions. In a way, this

thesis also tries to draw attention to Lauth’s work and to show that it deserves more

appreciation.

The selected case of Libya provided a good foundation for the relationship between

IIPP and PSC, with its relevance, attractiveness and a large pool of data suitable for the

analysis.

There are, however, several potential problems with this research. First, as mentioned in

the methodology section, the use of a single case study tends to be problematic when trying to

offer general presumptions. Due to the space and time limitations, conducting a multiple case

study was infeasible. However, this thesis should serve as an invitation for future research that

would be more comprehensive and could include a far larger number of examined cases and,

therefore, provide more convincing findings. Second, the lack of direct empirical research and

the usage of secondary sources can cast doubt on the results. To overcome this problem, I

have used the well-renowned and widely accepted sources that serve as basis for many

scientific studies. Nevertheless, a future empirical study on this issue would provide much

stronger results and perhaps even new data. Third, as indicated several times, the lack of

space resulted in the omission of some interesting observations. This is the case with the

reverse influence direction of PSC on IIPP and their development which also leaves room for

future research.


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Master thesis: Informal Institutions and Protracted Social Conflict – the Case of Libya

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