Male biasnes in anthropology

Male Bias in AnthropologyAuthor(s): Kay MiltonSource: Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 40-54Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801639 .

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MALE BIAS IN ANTHROPOLOGY

KAY MILTON

Queen's University, Belfast

In some of the recent writings focusing on women, the presence of a male bias, both in anthropological tradition and in the societies studied by anthropologists, has been treated as axiomatic. This bias has been conceptualised both in terms of 'male dominance' and in terms of 'male prevalence'. The bases of the assumed existence of male bias in anthropology and in society are rarely made clear, but are discernible from the evidence that is consistently put forward to illustrate its existence. Taking only those writings in which male bias forms a central issue, or in which its assumed existence forms a basis for further analysis, this article examines the definition of the concept and the assumptions on whose basis it has been formulated. It is argued that a lack of precision and consistency in these areas deprives the concept of any usefulness as an analytical tool in anthropology. The point in question here is not whether or not there is a male bias in anthropology or in society, but simply that before such questions can even be raised we need to make it clear precisely what it is we are talking about.

During the last few years there has been a considerable amount of attention given by anthropologists to women. This appears to stem, at least in part, from a growing recognition that, in the past, anthropologists have concentrated overwhelmingly on the male sector of the populations they have studied, leaving the female sector almost completely missing from their analyses or, rather, 'there in the same way as were the Nuer's cows' (E. Ardener 1972: 140). The argument is often put forward that anthropology has long suffered from a male bias and that some effort should be made to correct this.

Male bias in anthropology is often seen as having a dual character; it exists in the theoretical frameworks that have been formulated and used by anthropologists, and in the ethnographic data they analyse. The bias in theory is seen primarily as a product of a scholarly tradition that has been influenced mainly by men, this influence in turn being related to a wider bias in the society of which this tradition is a part. In so far as theoretical frameworks have been influenced by the type of material to be analysed, the bias in theory might also be seen as a product of male bias in the societies being studied. The bias in ethnography is a product both of the biased theoretical frameworks that anthropologists take to the field, and of any male bias that might be present in the society being studied in so far as this affects the collection of data by the ethnographer. All this is expressed in various ways and to various degrees by many anthropologists paying attention to 'the problem of women' (see, for example, E. Ardener 1972; 1975; Friedl 1975: 4; Rosaldo & Lamphere 1974: 2; Reiter 1975: 13; Rohrlich-Leavitt et al. 1975; Slocum 1975: 37). It is not my intention in this article to survey all the anthropological literature focusing on women and I am omitting most of it from

Man (N.S.) I4, 40-54.



KAY MILTON 4I

consideration.1 Rather than presenting a critique of this entire literature my intention is to examine critically the concept of male bias as it has been formulated and employed by some of those anthropologists who have turned their attention to women. Consequently, I here take into account only those writings in which the assumed existence of male bias, either in anthropological theory, or in society, or both, forms either a central issue of discussion or a starting point of the analysis.

For some authors a dissatisfaction with the current state of anthropology, as regards the treatment of women, is coupled with a dissatisfaction with the status of women in western industrial society and a determination to do something about it; a number of female anthropologists have declared themselves to be in sympathy with the feminist movement and acknowledge that it has been a strong influence in their studies (see Friedl 1975: 6; Reiter 1975: ii). In the work of these anthropologists, the male bias in anthropology is explicitly identified with a male bias in our society as a whole:

... anthropologists in writing about human culture have followed our own culture's ideological bias in treating women as relatively invisible and describing what are largely the activities and interests of men (Rosaldo & Lamphere I974: I).

In attempting to correct the male bias in anthropology, the feminist anthropologists are contributing to the efforts of the feminist movement in two ways: they are doing something towards the overall elimination of sexism in western society by eliminating it in one particular field, that in which they are, themselves, professionals; and they are hoping, through their studies, to find explanations for the status of women in our own and other societies, and to be able to suggest ways in which that status might be changed. The interests of the scholar wishing to contribute to her subject and the citizen wishing to improve women's status are combined (see Friedl 1975: 6; Ortner 1974: 67) and both contribute to the choice of problems for study:

Within the field of anthropology, a concern to understand and to change women's position has generated a number of important questions (Rosaldo & Lamphere I974: 2).

The questions which have been generated have been questions about fundamental principles of social organisation on which all cultural products, including male bias in society and anthropology, are assumed to be based.

In the work of anthropologists with a declared feminist interest, male bias in society is most often conceptualised in terms of male dominance, i.e., the domination of men over women in terms of status, power, authority and prestige. It is crucial to the feminist viewpoint that male and female are given different values and that male is given a higher value than female. Beyond these rather broad terms, however, it is difficult to establish precisely how anthropologists of a feminist persuasion conceptualise 'male bias'. Not only is it left largely undefined, but also its existence in any particular society is simply taken for granted, as something that requires no proof (see Reiter 1975: I I;

Ortner 1974: 71; Kessler 1976: 12-13). I would suggest that precisely because feminist anthropologists treat the existence of male dominance as a dogma, it is difficult to establish what, in their terms, is the existential status of the phenomenon, and what, precisely, it consists of. Because its existence is simply



42 KAY MILTON

assumed, any evidence in support of this assumption tends to be presented as illustrating dominance rather than as a systematic account of how it might be recognised.

It would appear that male bias or male dominance is seen by feminist anthropologists as part of the actors' culture, i.e., something that they themselves know about and express in ways recognisable to the observer. It is commonly seen as lying in the values placed on things associated with men and women; men are dominant in so far as members of a society value male activities more highly than they value women's activities:

... we define male dominance as a situation in which men have highly preferential access, although not always exclusive rights, to those activities to which society accords the greatest value, and the exercise of which permits a measure of control over others (Friedl I975: 7).

A further indication of how male dominance is conceptualised is given in the fact that, in considering the possible value of elaborate female burials as evidence for the past existence of a matriarchy, Rosaldo and Lamphere argue that, if these women were rulers, they might only have been so in the absence of male heirs. This indicates that dominance is seen as existing, not at the level of social activity, but at the level of cultural rules. The dominant sex is not that which is in the highest position of power and authority at any one time, but that which generally has prior claim to such positions. There might never be a male heir, but the society would remain male-dominated as long as the rule of succession gave priority to men (Rosaldo & Lamphere 1974: 3).

That male dominance is cultural rather than social is more explicitly stated by Ortner, who divides female subordination into three levels:

(i) The universal fact of culturally attributed second-class status of women in every society ...

(2) Specific ideologies, symbolizations, and socio-structural arrangements pertaining to women that vary widely from culture to culture ..

(3) Observable on-the-ground details of women's activities, contributions, powers, influence, etc., often at variance with cultural ideology (although always contained within the assumption that women may never be officially pre-eminent in the total system) (Ortner I974: 68-9).

Ortner is particularly concerned with the first level and considers the second level an important field of study. Her attitude to the third level is as follows:

As for the third level, it will be obvious from my approach that I would consider it a misguided endeavor to focus upon women's actual though culturally unrecognized and unvalued powers in any given society, without first understanding the overarching ideology and deeper assumptions of the culture that render such powers trivial (I974: 69).

In other words, if women have power over men at the level of social interaction, this is not to be taken as an indication that they are not subordinate. Their subordination lies at the level of cultural evaluations in terms of which such powers are trivial (for a similar view see Kessler 1976: 17).

If male dominance, seen in this way, is to be empirically recognisable, then it needs to be made clear precisely what observable facts constitute a cultural devaluation of women and on what grounds they might be treated as such.



KAY MILTON 43

This is, more often than not, left unstated, and we are presented instead with a number of illustrations. Rosaldo, for instance, cites, among other things, the fact that among the Iroquois, although women may appoint and depose chiefs, the chiefs themselves are men. In treating this as an indication of the devaluation of women she is assuming that the Iroquois value their chiefs more highly than they value the people who appoint and depose them. Since she makes no attempt to justify this assumption, it would appear to derive, not from a study of Iroquois values, but from the European concept of a chief as the highest authority.

Ortner, again, is more explicit. She suggests that three types of data might be taken as evidence that 'a particular culture considers women inferior':

(i) elements of cultural ideology and informants' statements that explicitly devalue women, according them, their roles, their tasks, their products, and their social milieux less prestige than are accorded men and the male correlates; (2) symbolic devices, such as the attribution of defilement, which may be interpreted as implicitly making a statement of inferior valuation; and (3) social-structural arrangements that exclude women from participation in or contact with some realm in which the highest powers of society are felt to reside (Ortner I974: 69).

Ortner has stated that female subordination is part of culture ('a culture considers women inferior'); in other words, it is something known about and expressed by the actors. In the second two types of evidence the actors are making explicit, not their knowledge of the inferiority of women, but their knowledge of defilement, of where the highest powers of society reside and of the rights of women in relation to such powers. To see such evidence as indicating knowledge of female subordination requires, as Ortner says, some sort of interpretation. If it were the actors who interpreted their own cultural phenomena in this way, they would somehow have to make their interpretations explicit, in which case we would have evidence of the first type, explicit statements, and the second two types would be redundant. We must assume, therefore, that such interpretations are those of the observer. If we are to accept the proposition that an observer's interpretations of a people's cultural phenomena are part of the culture of those people, then we have to assume that culture lies, not in people's statements and actions, but at some other level which it is possible for an observer to infer. In that case it would have to be made clear on what grounds such inferences are made and on what grounds they can be taken to be part of the actors' knowledge. If, on the other hand, we treat culture as existing in the statements and actions of people, then we are forced to the conclusion that an observer's interpretations are part of his cultural world and not that of the actors, in which case Ortner's second two types of evidence are unacceptable as indications of the actors' inferior valuation of women.

Feminist anthropologists assume that the cultural devaluation of women exists in all societies (see Rosaldo & Lamphere 1974: 3; Ortner 1974: 66-71; Kessler 1976: 12). It is therefore as much a part of our own society as it is of the societies we study. Its presence in our own culture is seen as the basis of male bias in anthropology. Female subordination is manifest in the way anthropologists have treated women in their studies. More specifically,



44 KAY MILTON

anthropologists have been accused of treating women's lives as less important than those of men:

Too often, women and their roles are glossed over, under-analyzed, or absent from all but the edges of the description. What women do is perceived as household work and what they talk about is called gossip, while men's work is viewed as the economic base of society, and their information is seen as important social communication (Reiter I975: I2).

Our own cultural bias is seen as having coloured everything we have seen as ethnographers in other societies. Because ethnographers see women as inferior, they do not consider them worthy of much attention. Consequently, anthropological tradition has suffered what Rosaldo and Lamphere call 'a genuine deficiency'. The lack of interest in women 'has led to distorted theories and impoverished ethnographic accounts' (Rosaldo & Lamphere 1974: vi).

At the same time, the bias in anthropology has been contributed to by the bias that exists in the societies being studied (see Reiter 1975: I3; Friedl 1975: 4). The tendency for anthropologists to treat women as unimportant derives not only from the fact that their experience of their own culture has taught them to accept this view, but also from the fact that members of the society being studied present the ethnographer with a similar devaluation of women which reinforces his own assumptions.

The feminist anthropologists regard anthropology as male-biased whether it is practised by men or women (see Slocum 1975: 49); however, this is inconsistent with their arguments regarding male dominance in society. They see the devaluation of women as a phenomenon pertaining to a culture or society as a whole; in other words, it is not something that is expressed by one sector of society about another, it is a notion generally shared by all. Hence it is possible to talk of a culture considering women inferior (Ortner 1974: 69), and the belief that women are inferior to men being a prevalent trait of human culture (Friedl 1975: 5). The feminist argument, both within anthropology and outside it, rests on the assumption that the inferiority of women is a notion shared by men and women alike. It is suggested that women have accepted a view of themselves as inferior and have helped to perpetuate it (see Rosaldo & Lamphere I974: I); this goes for female anthropologists as much as for anyone else, hence the androcentric nature of their work.

Most of the evidence for the cultural devaluation of women is taken from existing ethnographies. For example, Ortner uses Lowie's material as evidence of male dominance in Crow society (Ortner 1974: 70); Rosaldo cites Kaberry, Mead, Lloyd and Murdock, among others, as her sources to support her claim that male dominance is a widespread cultural phenomenon. The use of this evidence in this way is, however, inconsistent either with the claim that anthropology has long suffered from a male bias, or with the claim that male dominance is a notion generally shared by all members of a society. If anthropology, as it has been practised up to now, contains a bias that has led all anthropologists, male and female, to concentrate overwhelmingly on men's models, then the material produced by anthropologists contains this bias. In other words, the existing ethnographies (with a few admitted exceptions) are one-sided; they present society from a male point of view (see



KAY MILTON 45

Rosaldo & Lamphere I974; Reiter I975). From this, it logically follows that whatever is taken from these ethnographies as evidence for the existence of male dominance in a given culture is biased evidence. If the ethnography is biased, then what is being presented as a notion shared by men and women alike is derived largely from the male sector of the population. Ironically, the feminists are guilty of the bias of which they accuse their colleagues. In using information which they themselves argue is derived from men, and presenting it as the cultural expression of the society as a whole, feminist anthropologists are effectively ignoring the female point of view.

This argument is supported by some of their own findings. Some of the recent studies have indeed presented very different views of society and culture from those presented in the supposedly male-biased ethnographies. For example, women are often presented in ethnographies as dangerous and polluting to men and to certain male activities, especially during men- struation. Faithorn's analysis of the concept of pollution among the Kafe of New Guinea (I975) indicates that, in this society at least, the bodily substances of a woman are not only polluting to men but also to herself and other women. Similarly, male substances can be polluting to men and women alike. Moreover, the concept of pollution in terms of which something is seen as dangerous or unclean is misleading in this case. Such substances as semen or menstrual blood are not so much unclean as powerful; they create children as well as causing sickness. They are dangerous, not per se, but when they are not properly controlled by the individual concerned. Whether or not this is the case in all societies in which women are presented as polluting can only be tested empirically. But if this were the case, and such ethnographies are, as the feminist anthropologists suggest, male biased, then much of the evidence that feminists have used to support their claim that male dominance is a universal cultural phenomenon would have to be treated as suspect. It would be difficult to argue that the Kafe concept of pollution implies the cultural devaluation of women, not only because men, as well as women, are polluting, but also because pollution is not conceptualised in terms of the distinction between men and women.

Ortner, in discussing the interpretation of certain facts as evidence of female inferiority, in fact allows for such a case:

... in a few cases in which, say, men and women are equally polluting to one another, a further indication is required-and is, as far as my investigations have ascertained, always available (Ortner I974: 70).

What she does not allow for, however, is the possibility of there being statements that explicitly devalue men. She regards 'explicit cultural ideology devaluing women' as sufficient evidence for the devaluation of women by the society as a whole. Evidence that men, or things associated with men, might also be devalued is provided in Reiter's study of Colpied, a French village. In Colpied, women:

... are quick to demean the public sphere in which men operate as having less value than their own.... They are secure within their realm and do not experience their position as inferior to men (Reiter I975: 272).

It would appear that, if men in Colpied regard women as inferior, the women



46 KAY MILTON

have not accepted this view of themselves (as feminists claim women in Western society have done), rather, they themselves look down on the sphere of male activity. Again, it would be difficult to argue here that the culture regards women as inferior. If anyone does, it is the male sector only. This is not to deny that male dominance is a part of their culture, it is simply to point out that female dominance is also present, and that men cannot, therefore, be regarded as dominant in the absolute sense in which the feminists suggest they are.

This is further substantiated by Briggs's study of Eskimo women (Briggs 1974) and Richards's study of Onondaga Iroquois women (Richards 1974). Eskimo men and women fulfil different and complementary roles. The men are leaders with regard to hunting and travelling, but in the home, women are leaders (Briggs 1974: 276). Neither sex denigrates the other and each is respectful of the other's expertise in the appropriate sphere of activity:

I have asked Eskimos, both men and women, whether men are considered to have more intelligence or betterjudgement than women, and I am consistently told no: men have better judgement concerning the things they have been taught and women have better judgement concerning the things they have been taught. The fact that the man makes certain kinds of decisions for his family and is its public spokesman is not rationalised in terms of his inherent superiority over the women, it is just 'appropriate' that way (Briggs I974: 288).

The view expressed by Richards of the status of an Onondaga woman is in sharp contrast to the feminist view expressed by Rosaldo (Rosaldo 1974: 20 and above pp. 42-3):

If a role is closed to her, it is not because she is inferior; it is because maleness is an essential part of the role. For her to try to be a chief would be as ludicrous as for her to try to be a father, or as foolish as a man to try to be a clan mother. But clan mothers appoint the chiefs, tell them what to say, and can remove them if they do not perform properly, so a woman can hardly feel inferior because she is restricted by her sex to being a clan mother rather than a chief (Richards 1974: 40I-2).

Further evidence against the treatment of male dominance as a notion shared by all members of the society is provided by what is often cited as one of the exceptions to male bias in anthropology, Kaberry's study of Aboriginal women (1939), in which male dominance is asserted by the men and denied by the women (see Reiter 1975: I5). There are several such writings that are mentioned as exceptions to the male bias in anthropology. By examining what is considered to be exceptional about these cases, it should be possible to get a clearer idea of how this bias is conceptualised. Kaberry's study and Goodale's Titvi wiives (I971) are discussed in a paper that deals specifically with the question of androcentrism in anthropological perspective (Rohrlich- Leavitt et al. 1975). This discussion of Australian ethnography examines the difference. between the work of male ethnographers and the work of these two women. It is argued that men tend to interpret Australian culture in terms of their own categories (etic terms), while the two female ethnographers take into account the natives' view (emic terms). The argument is based on the fact that male ethnographers present the society as male dominated, with the



KAY MILTON 47

women being treated as pawns in a men's game, while:

Kaberry and Goodale present a totally different picture of aboriginal women. They describe their crucially important economic roles, refuting the male view that women are excluded from the sacred state (Rohrlich-Leavitt et al. I975: I I4).

The assumption underlying this argument is that male dominance is something that belongs to the anthropologist's conceptual framework, while the relative importance of women is part of the folk model of the community being studied. The differences that are found between the work of male and female ethnographers do no more than uphold that assumption. At the same time, the assumption runs contrary to the feminist argument that at least some of the bias in anthropological literature derives from the tendency for ethnographers to concentrate overwhelmingly on men's statements and activities; Rohrlich-Leavitt et al. place the bias solely in the anthropologists' interpretations of their material and not in the material itself. If we accept, as many feminist anthropologists have argued, that what have been presented in ethnographies are men's models of society, derived largely from talking to male informants, then there is no reason to suppose that the male-dominated view of Australian -society derives from the conceptual world of male ethnographers; it may be derived from the statements of male informants. At the same time, the exceptions to androcentrism in anthropology, as represented by the work of Kaberry and Goodale, would appear to be studies carried out by women and about women; in other words, an overwhelming female bias. That such studies take more account of the natives' point of view than do those studies that present the society as male-dominated would have to be supported by more evidence than simply the observation that women, in these studies, are regarded as important.

A different view on the representation of women in anthropological literature, and one which, although it has had considerably less impact than the feminist perspective, has nevertheless provoked a certain amount of discussion, has been presented by Ardener (see E. Ardener 1972). Ardener and those who have adopted his framework are concerned more with the way women have been regarded in anthropology than with the way they have been treated in society. They see male bias, not as the active domination of women by men, but as an overwhelming presence of men as ethnographers, as informants, and as people about whom anthropologists write, contrasted with a relative absence of women. Ardener makes a distinction between dominant and muted groups, dominance here being used in the sense of prevalence rather than domination. Male dominance in the societies studied by anthropologists rests in the tendency for men's models of society to be more readily available to those entering the community from the outside than models formulated by women. This tendency is seen as a consequence of the different activities and experiences of men and women. Men engage more frequently in political activities and public discourse, and tend to be more mobile than women, who are largely confined to the domestic sphere (see also Kessler 1976: 9). In view of their greater mobility, men more frequently come into contact with members of other communities and other societies than



48 KAY MILTON

their own, and consequently face the definitional problem of bounding 'themselves-and-their-women' off from 'other-men-and-their-women Such bounded models of society may be exchanged and made available to less mobile members of the community who may invoke them when the appropriate situation arises. Ardener suggests that, when faced with the same definitional problems as men, women may adopt the bounded models of society formulated by men (E. Ardener 1972: 142).

In so far as it is their models of society, and not those formulated by women, which achieve public expression, men constitute a 'dominant' group, in contrast to which women are seen as 'muted'. Any models that women may formulate, independently of men, on the basis of their own experience are not made the object of public discourse and so do not find expression through the same mechanisms of communication and in the same situations as do men's models:

The muted structures are 'there' but cannot be 'realized' in the language of the dominant structure (E. Ardener I975: 22).

The higher degree of expressibility achieved by men's models makes them more accessible to ethnographers visiting the society. Moreover, from a purely technical point of view, men are often easier for ethnographers to communicate with than are women. Due to their greater mobility, men are more likely to be able to speak a particular language or act as interpreters (E. Ardener 1972: 137). Certain conditions prevalent in the societies being studied are thus seen as contributing to a predominance of men and of the male viewpoint in anthropological literature.

Male bias in anthropology is also seen as having other sources. The same bias also exists in societies from which the ethnographers come (E. Ardener I972: I55), and it is implied that, either due to a predominance of male anthropologists, or due to its perpetuation through public discourse, anthropological theory has incorporated what are largely male concepts. In other words, the theoretical frameworks that anthropologists take to the field are male' in character:

Our women ethnographers may then be expressing the 'maleness' of their subject when they approach the women of other societies (E. Ardener I972: I55).

Ethnographers, especially those who have adopted a functionalist approach, tend to be attracted to the bounded models of society with which they are presented, mainly by men and occasionally by women. These models accord well with functionalist theory and so tend to be presented as the models of society.

In view of the way it is conceptualised here, male bias in anthropology can, to a certain extent, be corrected by finding some way of getting at and analysing the models women hold of society which are generally left unexpressed, or rather are not expressed in ways that are readily available to and attractive to functionalist ethnographers. Ardener suggests that this way might lie through studies of ritual and symbolism. Ethnographers of these areas of culture have found women easier to communicate with, have found



KAY MILTON 49

that many of their data are about women, and that what is expressed in this material very often does not accord with the bounded models of society which Ardener sees as male. He suggests that it is through symbolism and ritual that women's models of society are expressed, and that by concentrating on such data, anthropologists may have a means of getting at women's models and so making their analyses more complete.

This does not solve the problem of male bias in anthropological theory, and Ardener makes no suggestion as to how this bias might be eliminated, except to issue a challenge to female ethnographers to 'split apart the very framework in which they conduct their studies'. If, as is implied, the entire Western scholarly tradition is to be seen as male in character, it is difficult to see what sort of radical steps would make it female, or even neutral, in character, given that women's models cannot be expressed through the conceptual apparatus developed and employed by this tradition. (This point will be discussed in detail later in the article.)

In' the terms of Ardener's framework, male dominance is not regarded as part of the actors' culture; it is not something that the actors themselves are aware of and express. It is, rather, the relation which the observer sees as existing between the sexes, as evidenced in the degree to which men and women make their models of society known to others. It therefore tells us nothing about how the relation between the sexes may be conceptualised in the society being studied, it tells us only how the observer sees this relation. Ardener's whole argument rests on the assumption that models of society received by ethnographers, those expressed in interaction in the public sphere and with comparative strangers, are, in fact, male models. On the basis of this assumption, he sets about explaining why such models are those expressed in ethnography. As I shall show below, I think the assumption that such models are male can be challenged within the terms of his argument.

As should be clear by now, I am not concerned with whether or not there is such a thing as male bias in society or anthropology; my concern is with the use of the concept of male bias or male dominance as an analytical tool in anthropology. As I see it, there are certain difficulties involved in the use of this concept, as it has been formulated by those authors I have discussed, which have not been taken into account by any of these analysts. Since concepts such as male dominance and female subordination are based on an evaluation, either by actors or observer, of the things men and women say and do, the use of such concepts implies that male and female activities, ideas, etc., are clearly distinguishable, and indeed must be so if the concepts are to have any analytical value. In other words, we need to be able to establish what, in any given situation, are to be taken as male activities, male models, etc., and what are the female correlates. This is rather stating the obvious; obviously we cannot begin to analyse women's models of society unless we have some criteria by which to recognise them as women's models, nor can we begin to explain why men's activities are valued more highly than those of women, unless we have some means of distinguishing between men's and women's activities. Presumably no need was felt to state the criteria since they are rather obvious; male activities consist, simply, of what men do, female activities of



KAY MILTON

what women do. Similarly, male models of society are those formulated and expressed by men, female models are those formulated and expressed by women. As long as the categories male and female are clearly distinguished, as they appear to be in all cultures, then there is no problem in deciding what pertains to men and what to women. I shall argue that some of the anthropologists who have recently turned their attention to women have failed to apply these criteria consistently and so have called into question the basic premiss underlying their studies-that what we take to be male and female activities, models, etc., are, in fact, distinguishable on the basis of sex.

Ardener assumes that the bounded models of society with which ethnographers are presented are male models, while admitting that they may also be adopted and expressed by women when the situation is appropriate (E. Ardener I972: I42). If such models can be and are, however occasionally, expressed by women, it seems pertinent to ask on what grounds they might legitimately be considered to be men's models? If, by definition, men's models are those expressed by men, and women's models are those expressed by women, then at least some of the time those models that Ardener takes to be male are women's models. To label such models as men's models is to imply that such labels can be allocated independently of the sex of the actors. If they are to be regarded as male irrespective of who expresses them, then it should be made clear by what criteria, other than the sex of the actors, male and female models are to be regarded as such. The criteria employed by Ardener are not clearly stated. In regarding the models presented by male informants as male, he appears to be treating the sex of whoever expresses them as definitive. In regarding such models as male even when they are expressed by women, he appears to be treating as definitive the sex of whoever he assumes first formulated them. Clearly, these criteria are inconsistent with one another, since, if we accept that it is the agent of creation and not the agent of expression that defines the type of model expressed, then we have no grounds for calling such models male simply because they are expressed by male informants. If we accept that it is the sex of whoever expresses the model that defines its type, then we have to accept that such models can also be women's models.

In defining models in terms of whoever first created them, Ardener is ascribing to social reality an existence independent of the statements and activities of the actors. He is implying that social reality is created once only and thereafter retains its characteristics independently of how and by whom it is expressed. If we assume that social reality is continually being recreated through people's activities, then we must admit that these models are as much a product of women's activities as of the activities of men, and that even if we take the agent of creation as the definitive criterion, there are no grounds on which they might legitimately be regarded as male.

In suggesting that the bounded models of society which he regards as male might be a consequence of the greater mobility of men, Ardener is implying that it is not the sex of an individual that determines how he conceptualises the world, but his experience. This is a proposition with which, I am sure, most anthropologists would agree, including those of a feminist persuasion who



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argue that male dominance and female subordination are not biologically determined but are cultural products that might be changed (Rosaldo & Lamphere I974: I3; see also Martin & Voorhies I975: vii). In accordance with this proposition, I would suggest that the models Ardener regards as men s models might more legitimately be treated as models appropriate for expression in particular situations and derived from particular experiences. It may well be that such experiences are more often met with by men than by women, but this does not justify the definition of such models on the basis of sex.

The same argument applies to the notion that anthropology can be male- oriented even when it is practised by women:

Such is the prestige of males in our society that a woman, in anthropology or any other profession, can only gain respect or be attended to if she deals with questions deemed important by men. Though there have been women anthropologists for years, it is rare to be able to discern any difference between their work and that of male anthropologists. Learning to be an anthropologist has involved learning to think from a male perspective, so it should not be surprising that women have asked the same questions as men (Slocum I975: 49).

It may be that anthropology has been influenced more by men than by women, but if, on these grounds, we are going to regard it as male even when it is practised by women, then, again, we have to make clear the criteria by which we define anything as male or female. If, as is implied, something can be labelled male or female independently of the sex of the actors, then we have to question the grounds on which such things as anthropology and hunting were ever labelled male, and such things as child care were ever seen as female; according to the reasoning of some anthropologists who have concentrated on women, the fact that men do one thing and women do another is irrelevant.

The failure to state clearly the grounds on which 'male' and 'female' cultural phenomena may be distinguished has certain consequences for the solutions that have been sought to the problem of the status of women both in anthropology and in society. If we accept, as do the feminist anthropologists, that male dominance is a cultural product that can be changed, then we might ask, as do the feminists, how such a change could be brought about. Almost invariably, the answers they come up with imply a change in the things men and women do. Dominance is seen by some as based on control over the distribution of wealth (see Friedl I975; Sanday I973), and if some of this control could be diverted to women, then the relative status of the sexes might change. Rosaldo's suggestion that we should 'like the Ilongots, bring men into the sphere of domestic concerns and responsibilities' (Rosaldo I974: 42)

is simply a plea for a change in the activities of men and women. It is not enough for women to enter the public sphere; men must also be made more active in the domestic sphere if our cultural evaluations of the sexes are to be altered. If we accept, however, that the things women do can retain an inherent male quality (like anthropology), then it is difficult to see how a change in the things men and women do would bring about the desired effect. If we can still define something as male, even when it is practised by women, then on what grounds can it be argued that any change in our cultural



52 KAY MILTON

definitions of male and female roles and our evaluations of them might be brought about by men doing things that have traditionally been done by women?

The fact that anthropological theory is itself seen as male-oriented has meant that the solution to the bias in anthropology has been seen to lie, not only in concentrating on women and thereby filling a gap in our knowledge, but also in somehow revolutionising anthropological theory. It is assumed that the theories formulated by women, and/or to explain women's activities, women's models, etc., would somehow be different from those formulated by men. The grounds on which such an assumption is made are not stated, and I would suggest that it is in contradiction to the assumption, crucial to the feminist argument and contained in Ardener's hypothesis, that what men and women do is not biologically determined but depends on people's social experiences. To suggest that theoretical perspectives in anthropology will differ purely on the basis of the sex of whoever formulates them, is to imply that theories in anthropology are biologically determined. I would suggest that it is erroneous to classify theoretical perspectives in terms of sex. Theories are, rather, formulated and perpetuated by men and women on the basis of their common experience as anthropologists. Theoretical perspectives are, like bounded models of society, created on the basis of particular experiences to solve particular problems. Men and women adopt the same theories when, in their capacity as anthropologists, they are faced with similar problems.

If we were to accept the proposition that anthropology, as it has been practised up to now, is 'male' in character, then it would be difficult to imagine how anything that supposedly eliminated that male bias could ever be recognised as anthropology. In accordance with this, the desire for new perspectives has not been fulfilled by those anthropologists who have studied women. In spite of their plea for unbiased theoretical models, the theories they themselves employ in their studies are no different from those which anthropologists have been using up to now in their supposedly male-biased analyses. If there is a male bias in anthropology then that bias has merely been perpetuated by those who wish to eliminate it, simply because they have continued to do what their training in anthropology and their experience as anthropologists have taught them to do.

I have attempted to show that the concepts employed by some of the anthropologists who have turned their attention to 'the problem of women' have been ill-defined, which has resulted in certain inconsistencies in their arguments. Possibly because male and female are clearly distinguishable, on biological grounds, in the terms of any culture, there has been a tendency for anthropologists concentrating on this problem to neglect the definitional procedures that might be regarded as necessary when dealing with less clearly distinguishable categories. I would suggest, however, that this neglect has led to a confusion of categories that were regarded as immutable, and has deprived of any sound basis the very notion that cultural phenomena can be distinguished according to sex.

I would also suggest that the feminist concept of male dominance is of little value in anthropological analysis, not only because it is ill-defined, but also



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because it is based on assumptions that are empirically unsound. Randle has pointed out that:

Behind the feminist movement as well as behind most male chauvinism is the concept that the difference between the sexes is always to be interpreted as inferiority (Quoted from Keesing I975: 68).

Feminists claim that the difference between the sexes is always seen in these terms, and that women are always regarded as inferior to men, which makes male dominance, for the feminists, an objectively existing phenomenon that might be explained in terms of universal principles of social organisation. Studies such as those by Briggs (I 974), Richards (I 974) and Reiter (I 975), and Kaberry's study of Aboriginal women, indicate that the notion of male superiority is by no means universally held and is frequently contradicted by the actors, male and female alike. Not only is the assumption that males are always seen as superior not borne out, but also the assumption that people everywhere conceptualise relations between the sexes in hierarchical terms would appear to be unfounded (cf. Sacks I976: 565). If, as the feminists claim, much of the available ethnography is androcentric, then this might be the case in many other societies as well.

Matthiasson sees the notion of male superiority as a cultural tool appropriate to life in a particular type of society:

Euro-American society and other manipulative societies have many subtle ways of expressing the inferior position of women and regulating the entrance of women into traditionally male preserves. One such technique is the myth-to which many men and women subscribe-of male superiority and female inferiority or male dominance and female submissiveness (Matthiasson I974: 434).

I would suggest that the concept of male dominance formulated by feminist anthropologists should be seen in this light. Far from being a cultural universal, it is simply their own evaluation of the relation between the sexes. As such it is a product of their concern with their position in our own society and has little to contribute to the development of anthropology as a scientific discipline.

NOTE

1 One omission deserves special mention. Alice Schlegel's volume Sexual stratification (Cornell Univ. Press, I 977) was published too late to be considered in this article, and I should like to acknowledge the contributions of this work to the problems dealt with here.

REFEREN CES

Ardener, E. I972. Belief and the problem of women. In The interpretation of ritual (ed.) J. S. La Fontaine. London: Tavistock.

I975. The 'problem' revisited. In Perceiving ivornen (ed.) S. Ardener. London: Malaby Press.

Ardener, S. (ed.). Perceiving ivornen. London: Malaby Press. Briggs,J. L. I974. Eskimo women: makers of men. In Manysisters (ed.) C.J. Matthiasson. New

York: The Free Press. Faithorn, E. I975. The concept of pollution among the Kafe of the Papua New Guinea

highlands. In Towvard an anthropology of wvomnen (ed.) R. R. Reiter. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Friedl, E. I975. Womnen and men. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.



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Goodale, J. C. I97I. Tiwi tvives. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. Kaberry, P. M. I939. Aboriginal tvoman: sacred and profane. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Keesing, R. M. I975. Kin groups and social structure. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Kessler, E. S. I976. Women: an anthropological view. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Martin, M. K. & B. Voorhies I975. Female of the species. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Matthiasson, C. J. (ed.) I974. Many sisters. New York: The Free Press. Ortner, S. I974. Is female to male as nature is to culture? In Woman, culture and society (eds) M.

Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere. Stanford: Univ. Press. Reiter, R. R. (ed.) I975. Towvard an anthropology of tvomnen. New York: Monthly Review Press. Richards, C. E. I974. Onondaga women: among the liberated. In Many sisters (ed.) C. J.

Matthiasson. New York: The Free Press. Rohrlich-Leavitt, R. et al. I975. Aboriginal woman: male and female anthropological

perspectives. In Towvard an anthropology of vomnen (ed.) R. R. Reiter. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Rosaldo, M. Z. I974. Woman, culture and society: a theoretical overview. In Womnan, culture and society (eds) M. Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere. Stanford: Univ. Press.

& L. Lamphere (eds) I974. Woman, culture and society. Stanford: Univ. Press. Sacks, K. I976. State bias and women's status. Am. Anthrop. 78, 565-9. Sanday, P. R. I973. Toward a theory of the status of women. Am. Anthrop. 75, 682-700. Slocum, S. I975. Woman the gatherer: male bias in anthropology. In Totvard an anthropology of

tvomen (ed.) R. R. Reiter. New York: Monthly Review Press.



Male biasnes in anthropology

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