David Chadwick Words: 3965

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Why have Singaporeans accepted an illiberal form of democracy?

Following the death of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first Prime Minister, the true nature of

Singapore’s political system is as pertinent an issue as ever. The answer seems to remain a

mystery for many academic observers. Larry Diamond has noted that “it is now widely

acknowledged that Singapore is by any standard a massive anomaly” (Diamond 2012, 7). On

the one hand Singapore is often lauded for its stunning economic transformation in the fifty

years since independence. Its impressive development has seen it go from being a poor nation-

state with no natural resources to one of the world’s richest per capita. However, Singapore is

also criticised for having a stunted form of democracy (Fukuyama 2012, 241).

Lee Kuan Yew was a lionhearted figure who imposed and maintained limitations on

some democratic rights. He justified his motivation for doing so by saying it was the only way

to create the stability and prosperity Singapore needed. It is a good thing that abject poverty

was eradicated but it remains a normative concern that some Singaporean citizens may have

been repressed. This puzzling contradiction makes it difficult to conclude whether or not Lee

Kuan Yew’s means justified the end.

One aspect that has been often overlooked in this debate are the opinions of Singapore’s

people. In the name of democratic research, the desires of Singapore’s citizens have been

passed over. Polls have shown that almost half of respondents in Singapore value stability and

social harmony as more important than press freedom; indicating that Singaporeans have

different ideas as to what is important in society (Whiting 19). We shall explore this hypothesis

further with the research question: Why have Singaporeans continued to accept democratic

limitations?

Literature Review

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The academic literature surrounding Singapore’s not-quite-liberal democracy can be grouped

into three main trains of thought. The first concentrates on the democratic infringements of

Singapore’s political system. Its proponents say that Singapore’s illiberal form of democracy

has helped perpetuate the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) power through making

effective opposition very difficult. Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky believe that Singapore

remained a dictatorship because of the absence of a level playing-field on which free and fair

electoral contestation could occur. But Levitsky and Way, along with other scholars such as

Gilbert and Mohseni, focus more on the technicalities of elections than the opinions of the

people. Additionally, their approaches are not universally transferable. For example, Gilbert

and Mohseni have argued that a government can be classified as ‘authoritarian’ if there has

been no change in the ruling party within four electoral cycles (Gilbert and Mohseni 276).

Applying this hypothesis elsewhere means that the United Kingdom was run by an

authoritarian government between 1979 and 1997. Although this line of thinking may have

some relevance, it is also incomplete.

Line of thinking number two, advocated by authors such as Dan Slater and Anjali Puri,

posits that an ‘informal pact’ existed; Singaporeans accepted a curtailment of some democratic

rights if it meant that the government provided peace and security. Dan Slater articulated this

argument using a Hobbesian theoretical framework in his book Ordering Power. Slater’s

theory stems from Thomas Hobbes’ 17th Century work, The Leviathan. Hobbes wrote that

when confronted by a shared threat, citizens should band together to counter it. To do so they

will be happy to surrender some freedoms to a protector, the Leviathan, who can prevent

anarchy and impose order.

Slater applied Hobbes’ theory to Singapore, with the PAP as the Leviathan. He said it

explained why cohorts of Singapore’s ‘elites’ originally banded together in a political party,

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first to overcome British colonial rule and then the threat of a communist insurrection (Slater

234). Such an Authoritarian Leviathan methodology may have been more effective if it had

been extended further and was not only applied to the elites; Slater’s approach largely excludes

mention of the electorate, who are presumed to have been nothing more than puppets on strings.

Puri also asserts that Singaporeans accepted democratic limitations in exchange for peace (Puri

352). They may not be too enamoured with some of the overprotective rules, she writes, like

not being allowed to dance on tables in nightclubs, but this was never enough of a motivation

to galvanise them into challenging the PAP and its Hobbesian pact (Puri 351). There was a

need for a Hobbesian pact because when Singapore gained its independence in 1965 it was an

extremely volatile place (Oei 2005; Hui 1996). Race riots were common and an underground

communist movement stirred discontent.

The third line of thinking is similar to the second but differs in that it omits mention of

peace and stability. It focuses solely on the relationship between the acceptance of restrictions

and the prosperity produced by a high quality of governance. It suggests that the democratic

concerns of Singaporeans are alleviated by the ruling party’s efficient administration and

impressive results. Scholars such as Charron and Lapuente believe that people continue to

accept the legitimacy of their government if it administers the country effectively and in a non-

corrupt manner (Charron and Lapuente 403). Singapore is known for being corruption-free and

well-run so it sounds like an approach that could concretely answer the question of why

Singaporeans still support the PAP. But it raises a troublesome point: If people can be truly

satisfied through effective governance and its ensuing economic growth alone, then why do we

bother with liberal democracy?

Chapter 1

1.1 The Leviathan’s allure

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This paper’s research question contains a claim: Singaporeans did accept democratic

curtailments. For this to be so they had to know about them. Here we shall look at the evidence

to support the claim.

Lee Kuan Yew was able to become Prime Minister before Singapore achieved its full

independence because a degree of self-autonomy had been granted to Singapore in 1953.

Infringements on the democratic rights to the freedoms of speech and assembly had already

been imposed by the British by the time the PAP came to power in 1959. Four years later

Singapore left the British Empire, under the condition that it agreed to merge with Malaya.

However, rifts developed between the two and within a couple of years Singapore had been

ejected from the new Federation of Malaya.

After initially being elected as Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew gave a speech in which

he said “there is nothing which we cannot solve in Singapore, provided the economy is forging

ahead” (Lee 1959). He told the crowd that they had a choice, they could support the government

and the interests of the community, or they could deliberate, contest their rights, and fail. In his

own words: “[We should] make up our minds to smack down people who speak evil things

which will lead us to disaster” (Lee 1959). Nobody can claim Lee was coy about his intentions.

He did what he said and said what he did.

Singaporeans must have liked what they heard. For in 1963, the PAP won almost 47%

of the popular vote and 37 out of the 51 seats in parliament; a decrease from 54% and 43 seats

in 1959. The PAP’s communist arm had broken-off in 1961 to form the Barisan Sosialis party,

taking some of the PAP’s voters with it (Vasil 29). The 1963 parliamentary elections were

thus a two horse race between the PAP and the Barisans. Lee Kuan Yew managed to defeat the

Barisan Sosialis only five years after believing a majority of Singaporeans were communist

sympathisers (Lee 1998, 217). He successfully persuaded voters to see the value in democratic

limitations and support the PAP.

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The large number of Singaporeans still voting for the PAP in 2011 vindicates the notion

that voters continue to regard its methods as valid and valuable (Puri 352). Reports indicate

that issues regarding ‘liberal political rights’ were not salient during the 2011 political

campaigns. Singaporeans said that they were more concerned with “bread and butter” matters

instead (Ong and Tim 771). The existence of these modern day attitudes is relevant because

they show that the support for democratic restrictions has been enduring. Of course it is

plausible that unique circumstances meant democratic concerns were not salient in 2011, but

if they were not seen as an issue in 1963 either, then it seems more likely that they have never

been high on the list of priorities for Singaporeans. Or, it might be because Singaporeans have

not been allowed to complain.

1.2 A history of suppression

Political repression has been a feature of Singaporean politics for the past fifty years. Singapore

is a democracy and yet it is a not-quite-liberal one. Even the PAP itself does not deny that

freedom of speech is limited in Singapore (George 2). Academic literature and news reports

pertaining to the country are often baffling and contradictory. It is acknowledged that the PAP

has undoubtedly improved the lives of its people while openly stifling democratic principles

(Schedler 378). Reporters Sans Frontiéres, a NGO that promotes the freedom of expression,

PAP’s % of popular vote PAP’s Seats in Parliament

1959 54.1% 43/51

1963 46.9% 37/51

1984 64.8% 77/79

1997 65% 81/83

2011 60.1% 81/87

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ranks Singapore’s media as ‘not free’ (RSF 2014). But bracketing Singapore alongside

countries like Russia, Iraq and Congo, who share the same ranking, obfuscates our

understanding of it.

For a liberal democracy to work smoothly, citizens should have the freedom to

assembly and to express themselves as they see fit (Diamond 1994, 5). This means that they

can criticise the government and each other. The aim of this principle is to constrain a country’s

leaders and thus prevent the emergence of tyranny. Another necessary ingredient of a liberal

democracy is equality. Regardless of their race or calibre, a democratic country’s people should

be given equal rights (Beetham 352). But the freedoms of speech and assembly have been

restricted in Singapore (Puri 352). Furthermore, Lee Kuan Yew was often dismissive of the

principle of equality; confidently proclaiming that “The Human being is an unequal creature”

(Online Video Clip 2013).

1.3 Democratic restrictions in action

A recent example has shown how restrictions on the freedom of speech have been enforced.

Following the death of Lee Kuan Yew in March 2015, one Singaporean teenager made a video

blog in which he condemned the dead leader (Groll 2014). Amos Yee called Lee Kuan Yew a

dictator and made many other lewd accusations. His video spread like wildfire on social media

platforms used by Singaporeans. An official report was issued by the police which stated that

several outraged citizens had reported Amos Yee and they therefore had no option but to arrest

him. Media outlets around the world became interested in the story and loudly condemned his

arrest. Yee’s incarceration has been seen as a violation of a person’s democratic right to protest.

Amos Yee was just a blogging teenager, which made his case unusual; such measures

have usually only been taken to deal with official members of the opposition or media outlets

(Barr 2007, 308). J.B Jeyaretnam was a prominent figurehead of the political opposition to the

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PAP. He was repeatedly sued into bankruptcy following charges pressed against him for

allegedly libellous comments (Barr 2007, 300). Having to declare bankruptcy prevents one

from standing for political office in Singapore and so this was a form of political repression.

The official line given for the necessity of such sanctions has been propagated by the PAP for

fifty years. Many Singaporeans have imbibed it as an internalising ideology (George 25). As

can be read in Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs, the story is normally given as follows:

‘At Singapore’s beginning, Lee Kuan Yew was confronted with the challenge of

defeating his internal enemies, the communists, who were hell-bent on trying to overthrow the

democratic system. Democratic infringements were necessary to defeat them’.

What is troublesome here for absolute believers in democracy is that Lee Kuan Yew

acknowledged that the communists had enough support amongst the population to win the

elections (Lee 1998, 217). Based on the notion that the sovereignty of liberal democracies rests

with the popular opinion, he was thus denying people their democratic right to choose how

they are governed. The PAP was faced with criticism from a subversive communist movement

while, at the same time, reputable Singaporean newspapers such as the Straits Times were also

voicing their discontent through more official-looking public channels. This made for an

unstable political environment. Singapore’s urgent need for foreign capital further worsened

its predicament. Political stability was needed to attract foreign investors (Baber 289).

Upon entering office, democratic restrictions leftover from the British colonial days

were maintained and new ones created. Cherian George has described the PAP as a “media-

control hoarder”, in that it slowly accumulated favourable prohibitive legislation (George 27).

One such curtailment was the 1974 Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) (Terence Lee

29). This prevented the foreign ownership of newspapers, who Lee had blamed for stirring up

social discontent. Although at first glance this may seem a draconian measure, the United States

has a similar law. Again, this means that it cannot necessarily be regarded as anti-democratic.

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But the NPPA did not just prevent foreign ownership of newspapers, it restricted the percentage

one person could own in a media company to 12% (George 30). Lee Kuan Yew justified this

measure by claiming that it was dangerous for one unelected person to have control over the

political discourse (Lee 2000, 213). His rationale was that such an arrangement would not be

conducive for realising the best interests of the nation.

The strict enforcement of prohibitive laws has not been reserved for Singaporean

citizens. The PAP is infamous for charging foreign publications with defamation and contempt

of court (George 41). As recently as 2010, the well-known ‘International Herald Tribune’ was

humbled by a charge of defamation, which it settled before proceedings could be brought to

court. There is more to these “sledgehammer” laws than meets the eye (George 40). The PAP

has been keen to show that its concerns were not financially motivated. Its mantra emphasised

the responsibilities of the press for protecting Singapore’s vulnerabilities (George 36).

When the PAP capped the circulation of foreign-owned publications that it accused of

inaccurate journalism, it offered to permit the printing and distribution of the publication as

long as its advertisements were removed (George 41). If a newspaper or journal refused to

comply, the PAP responded that the publication’s motivations were thus solely financial and

talk of caring for the ‘freedom of the press’ merely a façade. Aesthetics were important for

Singapore’s rulers because the country’s prosperity relied on the confidence of foreign

investors. The PAP did not want to appear too draconian in case it frightened them off.

Striking workers were dealt with according to the same rationale. Communists were

hugely influential amongst the trade unions and were able to manipulate the workers for their

own purposes (Hui 130). Singapore was repeatedly brought to a standstill by lost labour days.

If the bus drivers went on strike then nobody could get to work. Therefore the PAP devised

The Trade Union (Amendment) Bill, which completely prohibited industrial actions like strikes

in essential services (Vasil 60). Strikes were only possible elsewhere if “approved by the

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majority of a union’s members” (Baber 289). Of course, the problem would have remained as

long as the Trade Unions remained under the influence of communists. So the PAP broke up

the most obstinate examples and instructed the remainder to affiliate with its own state-

sponsored association (Vasil 61).

1.4 Incumbent advantages

It would be misleading to attribute the endurance of the PAP solely to democratic restrictions

on the freedoms of speech and assembly. Other forces were at work too. Some of the means

which helped the PAP to maintain its hegemony were not anti-democratic. Andreas Schedler

attributes the PAP’s dominance to the majoritarian electoral system it contests in (Schedler 97).

But the United Kingdom’s example should show that Singapore’s first-past-the-post electoral

system is compatible with democracy and explains the imperfect correlation between the PAP’s

percentage of the popular vote (61%) and its control of seats in the legislature (90%).

Pork-barrel politics, spending resources on certain constituencies in order to shore-up

support, is a practice utilised by governing parties around the world. For its part, the PAP has

indeed been prone to giving out money and building new public housing to cement its support

in wavering constituencies (Ong and Tim 758). Gerrymandering, the process of redrawing

electoral boundaries in a politically favourable manner, is another ‘authoritarian’ measure of

which the PAP stands accused. The Elections Department in Singapore is responsible for

drawing constituency boundaries and has always operated from the Prime Minister’s office

(Barr 41). The advantages this could possibly bring his party shall be left to the reader’s

imagination. First-past-the-post, gerrymandering and pork-barrel politics have been

highlighted here to show that there are factors behind the PAP’s dominance other than

democratic restrictions.

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Together, the PAP’s incumbent advantages and democratic restrictions show that

Singaporeans did not have access to an arena in which they could openly debate the virtues of

their government. Political repression was used by the government as a means to create

stability. This may have prevented Singaporeans from knowing what ‘true democracy’ should

look like. Nor were they permitted the liberty to bemoan their lack of freedom. Political

repression is therefore a part of the explanation for why Singaporeans have accepted

democratic restrictions. But it is not a complete answer alone. The ballots were cast in secret.

If Singaporeans wanted to vote for another party, they could have, and often did (Vasil 125).

Further explanations for why they continued to vote PAP are required.

Chapter 2

In the fifty years since Singapore became independent, its government has been reluctant to

repeal any of the democratic restrictions, such as the freedom of assembly, put in place during

the British colonial period (George 27). This is against its early promises; the PAP initially

sought supporters by railing against its imperialist overlords and their restrictions. But since

then Singaporeans have repeatedly endorsed the PAP at the polling booth. As evidenced in this

paper’s introduction, there is a great deal of literature dedicated to explaining why Singapore

has not made the transition to a perfectly liberal democracy. One simple factor that explains

why Singaporeans accepted democratic limitations is rarely mentioned: Singapore has enjoyed

a higher standard of living than its neighbours for a long time. Its citizens know quite well that

this is because of their strong and effective government (Puri 352). Singapore’s location plays

a big part in this.

2.1 Neighbours, good governance and geographical pressures

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The geographical proximity between Singapore and its neighbours really reinforces the

gratitude felt towards the PAP; Indonesia is only a short ferry-ride away. The gap in GDP per

capita (Gross Domestic Product divided by population) between the two is startling.

Singapore’s is $55,182 compared to Indonesia’s $3475 (World Bank 2015). It is very visible

when you move between the two. Having countries like Indonesia nearby has meant that

Singaporeans do not lose sight of what their PAP government has done for them. They have

been able to see tangible evidence of the poverty equated with ineffective government.

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As can be seen above, explosive economic growth following independence created the

disparity between Singapore and its neighbours. The PAP’s governance galvanised this

transformation. In 1959 Singapore had an urgent need of foreign capital to create jobs, so it

was important that the PAP fostered stability (Baber 289). Without safe streets foreign

investors may have been deterred. The PAP’s leaders foresaw that the strength of Singapore’s

economy would dictate their electoral fortunes. In particular, they had to address the cynicism

of business owners, many of whom felt threatened by the PAP’s socialist origins (Oei 39).

1 The graph’s data comes from Angus Maddison’s Historical Statistics of the World Economy - http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

1959 1979 1999 2008

GDP per Capita South East Asia (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars)

Indonesia Malaysia Singapore

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Lee Kuan Yew felt that the solution was to provide good governance. The ruling

apparatus eventually assembled by the PAP has proved so efficient that today, even some of

the world’s strongest democracies rank behind Singapore in terms of quality of governance

(Charron and Lapuente 402). The PAP’s efficacy has certainly had an influence on the

endurance of its popularity and accompanying democratic restrictions. Ronald Wintrobe has

described the PAP as ‘Timocrats’; authoritarian rulers who deploy limited methods of

repression and yet command the high loyalty of their subjects (Wintrobe 40). This seems like

a fair description.

Believing that the PAP created consensus for its democratic curtailments by trading

freedom for security is a Hobbesian argument. There is enough evidence to prove that in the

1960’s the greatest concern for Singaporeans was stability. In the run-up to the 1965 elections,

one citizen is reported to have said: “What’s all this about independence? I want to walk the

streets safely at night” (Oei 53). Again, geography ought to be taken into account. Singapore

has never had the fresh water or agricultural supplies to meet the basic needs of its citizens,

which makes them feel vulnerable (Vasil 68). Taking this geopolitical weakness into

consideration, one can imagine why Singaporeans have wanted a strong protector. The

alternative was to starve.

2.2 Vote Winners

Sometimes obscured by the democratic limitations it has imposed, is the fact that the PAP

was democratically elected in 1959. Voters trusted the PAP to represent and further their own

interests. There is a tendency to forget that there was more to this than a Hobbesian pact. The

electorate did so in part because of the PAP’s progressive manifesto. In many ways the PAP

was more liberal than some liberal democracies of the time. For example, one of the PAP’s

1959 campaign promises was a pledge to enact equal rights for men and women (Oei 57).

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The use of contraceptive pills was permitted in Singapore before the United States. And the

PAP’s election results show that people evidently believed in such a progressive manifesto.

Not that they had many other options, the communists boycotted the 1965 elections and

asking the British colonisers to return was hardly a realistic option. Perhaps this adds an

utterly un-romantic edge to the story of the PAP’s initial success: Voters had little other

realistic choice.

2.3 Living in a bubble

Twenty years ago it may have sounded logical to argue that the reason Singaporeans accepted

democratic limitations was because they were living in a bubble and did not know any better.

Singapore’s colonial history meant its citizens had no experience of living in a free and fair

democracy. Additionally, restrictions on the media and freedom of speech limited the options

to discuss how life could be different. What has changed this is the internet, access to which is

extremely high, allowing citizens to educate themselves as they wish (Gomez 179). And it is

said that democratic institutions and human rights are more likely to be championed by

educated people (Best and Wade 258). Yet if a lack of information was previously the cause of

Singaporeans’ acceptance of democratic limitations then they should have changed their tack

by now. They have not done so. As can be seen in the comments section under Amos Yee’s

YouTube video, many Singaporeans proactively defend the democratic restrictions. For this

reason we can discount a lack of democratic awareness as an explanation for why Singaporeans

accepted limitations.

Long after Singapore’s teething problems had been solved, Singaporeans continued to

support democratic restrictions. To say that they did so in exchange for economic growth and

good governance is a strong argument. What falsifies it somewhat is the sustained support for

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the PAP during and after the several financial recessions that have hit Singapore. Singaporeans

were evidently not satisfied by economic progress alone. Francis Fukuyama’s Thymotic theory

contains the answer.

Chapter 3

3.1 Thymos

Human beings share physical characteristics. We must all drink water, eat food and breathe

oxygen in order to stay alive. For thousands of years writers have hypothesised that there is

also a broader human personality. The Ancient Greek philosopher Plato wrote that humans

have an appetite for things (Desire) and that these range from banal needs like the quenching

of thirst, to sexual gratification (Fukuyama 2012, 165). A man may feel a need to hydrate

himself but not drink the water he finds because he recognises it as dirty (Reason). Although

he recognises Plato’s theory as utterly plausible, Fukuyama contends that such an interpretation

misses what makes Mankind distinguishable from animals. After all, wildlife documentaries

will show you that animals drink and lust too. Fukuyama has built an extra layer atop of Plato’s

definitions. According to him, what makes mankind unique is our willingness to die for flags

or ideas, something animals do not do. This means that humans and animals differ for reasons

other than tangible physical characteristics. Fukuyama used Hegel’s work to explain Thymos,

which he sees as the third determining force of human behaviour (Fukuyama, 171).

The definition of Thymos given by Fukuyama is “spiritedness”, a translation from

Ancient Greek (Fukuyama 162). He candidly admits that it is an imperfect translation and

colours in the concept using words and phrases like pride, sense of self-worth, and self-esteem.

Hegel’s ‘Master and Slave’ dialectic is interpreted by Fukuyama as an illustration of the

mechanics behind this third part of the soul (Fukuyama 147). It posits that a person’s desire for

recognition leads to conflict. To prove that he is something more than an animal governed by

rational forces, thymotic man must show a disdain for his own life. Following the fight, one

party is either killed or subjugated by the other, an arrangement which will not be satisfactory

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because of the unfulfilled desire to recognised; Thymos. The slave is unhappy because he is

only recognised as inferior to the master. The Master is not satisfied either, because to him, the

slave is a sub-human and is only deferential to the master out of a fear of death. The Master

does not receive the authentic respect he craves.

Fukuyama believes that Hegel’s theory explains why liberal democracy works. The

desire to be seen as equal to others is called ‘Isothymia’ by Fukuyama (2012, 182). As a

political system, liberal democracy extends equal rights to all of its citizens and so everyone is

recognised as being equal. This partly sates their sense of Thymos. ‘Megalothymia’ is the other

part of Thymos and is best described as a person’s desire to be seen as better than others

(Fukuyama 2012, 182). The presence of capitalist economies within liberal democracies

permits people to forge a career for themselves according to their own motivation and ability.

The success their working life brings them facilitates Megalothymia, and thus satisfies their

need to be seen as superior.

What must be made clear here is the distinction made between citizens being satisfied

with their political system and their more general sense of cultural contentment. Gallup, a well-

respected polling company, has ranked Singaporeans as being the most miserable, least positive

people in the world (Gallup 2015). That Singapore ranks as one of the least happy countries in

the world is an intriguing point but not one that falsifies the hypothesis that Singaporeans are

thymotically satisfied. One can imagine that many citizens of liberal democracies are not

entirely happy with their lives. Being personally unhappy does not provoke them into

overthrowing their democratic system.

What is most fascinating about the Gallup poll is the negative correlation between a

country’s level of economic development and its score on the happiness barometer. Some of

the happiest countries in the world are the least developed ones. Perhaps the necessity of

thymotic satisfaction makes people miserable. If you need to work too hard to buy the nice

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things equated with your sense of status, it may become counterproductive because you would

not have the time needed to enjoy them. Indeed, Vloggers (video bloggers) in Singapore have

made a connection between the culture of materialism and the policies of the PAP (Yee 2015).

As will be demonstrated later, materialism is one of the means that makes thymotic satisfaction

possible in Singapore. The Gallup poll tells us one other thing of note; Singaporeans cannot

feel too repressed by their government, as presumably citizens would not admit unhappiness

to random pollsters if they thought there was a chance of repercussions for doing so.

3.2 Fukuyama’s Progression

Fukuyama has acknowledged that the world has changed since he penned his end-of-history

hypothesis in 1989. He has said that he understands more about political development than he

did sixteen years ago (Fukuyama 2014). Despite this, Fukuyama is adamant that “the

underlying idea remains essentially correct” (2014). ‘The End Of History and The Last Man’

is a book that takes a very long-term teleological approach to history, tracking the development

of democracy back to Ancient Greece. It is to this abiding point that Fukuyama turns when he

argues that critics should not completely discount his hypothesis. What he described in 1989

was a long-term process dating over several millennia. He believes that the democratic

recession of the last decade should not overshadow that. Middle-classes in China and Thailand

may genuinely support their authoritarian regimes but he cannot see them doing so forever

(Fukuyama 2012, 6). After all, Fukuyama declares, the world undoubtedly has more

democracies than it did forty years ago (Fukuyama 2014). Even in entrenched authoritarian

regimes like China and Russia protests for democracy can be witnessed. Such manifestations

show that the demand for democracy is universal, although its implementation is not.

It is noticeable however that Fukuyama’s tone is much less optimistic than before.

Perhaps this is not surprising: His hypothesis has been the subject of much ridicule over the

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past fifteen years. Samuel P. Huntington is one prominent author who rejected Fukuyama’s

supposition. He described the time at which Fukuyama was writing (1989) as a “moment of

euphoria which generated an illusion of harmony” (Huntington 31). In his book, ‘The Clash Of

Civilisations’, Huntington went on to say that mankind is not heading towards a homogenous

form of society. Rather, he posited, cultures shall replace ideologies as the fulcrum of future

conflicts. “The non-Wests see as Western what the West sees as universal” (Huntington 66).

Robert Kagan has written a more recent rebuttal of Fukuyama’s work: ‘The Return of

History and The End of Dreams’. Kagan does not believe in a universal human personality

either. He justifies his opposition to Fukuyama through arguing that “the Chinese and the

Europeans live in different centuries” (Kagan 35). He goes on to talk about the apparently

inseparable differences between Russians, the Chinese and The West. Like Huntington, Kagan

discards Fukuyama’s hypothesis because of the “unique set of international circumstances”

during the period ‘The End of History’ was written (Kagan 10).

For Kagan, it is national differences that prevent the world envisaged by Fukuyama

from becoming reality. In response to Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy is the only

ideology with universal pretensions, Kagan wrote that “it is a mistake to believe that autocracy

has no international appeal” (Kagan 69). He then elucidates his point further by providing

evidence of simulacrum between Russian and Central Asian styles of autocracy. What these

disagreements show is that there is a real need for deepening our knowledge of Thymos.

Huntington’s argument that the conflicts of the future shall be driven by differences in identity,

rather than ideology, is not actually opposed to Fukuyama’s. Huntington does not realise that

by acknowledging that man is not a solely rational creature, he is in fact agreeing with

Fukuyama (Huntington 97).

On the other hand, Kagan’s supposition that Fukuyama is proved wrong because of

countries like Kazakhstan mimicking Russia, is a Straw Man argument. Fukuyama’s

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hypothesis is that liberal democracy could be accepted anywhere in the world because it is

thymotically satisfying, something every human being needs. Russia’s style of autocratic rule

may prove attractive to the rulers of neighbouring countries it shares geographical and cultural

links with, but is it really an ideology with universal pretensions? Could the citizens of The

Netherlands be happy if they woke up tomorrow to discover that they lived in a Russian-style

authoritarian regime? No. One cannot imagine that political system lasting very long. By

testing Fukuyama’s hypothesis in Singapore, we can determine whether or not citizens can be

thymotically satisfied in political systems he did not discuss. If the answer is yes, then

according to Fukuyama’s own logic it would be possible that an alternative to liberal

democracy could satisfy human beings worldwide.

Chapter 4

4.1 A Thymotic Man

Lee Kuan Yew understood Thymos. He may not have known it by that name but his words and

actions show that he recognised it as a force. In an interview with Foreign Affairs magazine he

stated that the PAP had factored “the ambitions of a person” into their planning (Zakaria 114).

Shaping Singaporean society into a mould that facilitated the thymotic satisfaction of its

citizens helped him to perpetuate his rule. For example, on an individual level, the introduction

of the ‘profit motive’ as an incentive to control the media’s agenda was an appeal to man’s

thymotic nature. It created ‘opportunity costs’ (Greene 60). If an editor decided to publish

unfavourable accounts of the PAP then he would lose his high position in Singapore’s

hierarchical society (George 5). The decision whether to publish and be damned would thus

require more than a solely rational economic calculation of what financial benefits he stood to

19

lose. This shows that Lee Kuan Yew deployed Thymos for repression, proving that Singapore

is a ‘thymotic’ society.

As previously mentioned, Thymos has two elements; Isothymia, the desire to be seen

as equal and Megalothymia, the desire to be seen as superior. Fukuyama believes that liberal

democracy sates Thymos through the equal rights it confers on its citizens. The question that

needs to be addressed here is how can Singaporeans see themselves as equal when they live in

an illiberal democracy? The answer shall be provided in two parts. The first of which shall

focus on how Isothymia is sated through mechanisms like national service, education and

immigration. Like liberal democracies, Singapore has a capitalist economy which permits

Megalothymia. It presents itself in other realms of society too, which we shall look at in part

two of this section.

4.2 Isothymia

Education is one of the means by which the PAP created Isothymia in Singaporeans.

Singaporeans have been imbued with a sense of patriotism through citizenship education over

fifty years of PAP rule (Chia 203). A Singaporean identity has been cultivated which allows

the disparate multi-ethnic groups to form a cohesive society. Fearing that teaching history in

an ethnically diverse country could encourage ethnic chauvinism, the PAP initially opted

against teaching history until the mid-1980’s. It was worried about the Western identity its

younger citizens were thought to have been adopting and so history was returned to the

curriculum as a way of ‘connecting’ them to Singapore (Chia 197). Yet it was only ‘history’ in

a modern sense. It did not cover events before Singapore’s independence in any great detail.

The focus was on inculcating pupils with the sense of a shared future rather than a common

past.

20

By not allowing Singaporeans to bask in the achievement of their antecedents and

putting the emphasis on the future, Singapore’s education system has encouraged its pupils to

go into the world and make a mark for themselves (Chia 196). They have been spurred on to

thymotic satisfaction. Singaporeans have been taught that they are exceptional, that everyone

is required to pull their weight, and that they need to continue to do so for Singapore to survive.

This means that from a young age they are instilled with a sense of collectivism. So whereas

in a Liberal Democracy we know that we are equal in our rights, Singaporeans consider that

they are equal in terms of ‘counting’ for the nation. This appeases their need for Isothymia and

is why it is equally important that Singapore has topped international tables for years (Nylander

and Ye 12). Singaporeans have needed a country to be proud of to attain proper thymotic

satisfaction

Another mechanism that makes Isothymia possible in Singapore is national service.

Universal male conscription of two years reinforces the principle of equality in responsibility.

Exemptions are very rare and so it really is a case of everyone ‘mucking in’ together (Walsh

275). The PAP’s official justification for the imposition of national services was that “nothing

creates loyalty and national consciousness more speedily and thoroughly than participation in

defence and membership in the armed forces” (Walsh 273). The Malay minority population of

Singapore perceives national service favourably, which shows that all Singaporeans can buy-

in to the idea of a shared nation (Walsh 275). What this demonstrates is that the PAP created a

system where equality is measured in terms of the commitment individuals were prepared to

make to the nation.

4.3 Megalothymia

“Man derives satisfaction owning property not only for the needs that it satisfies, but because

other men recognise it” (Fukuyama 2012, 195). Hegel’s work has been used by Fukuyama to

incorporate property ownership as an element of Thymos. What he was describing is now

21

known as materialism, the “measure of importance that a consumer attaches to money and

worldly possessions” (Mehta and Keng 326). A strong correlation has been identified between

materialism and a Thymotic sense of status (Mehta and Keng 330). Here, property is defined

as anything one might own, rather than solely referring to housing. That said, the relationship

between Megalothymia and Real Estate in Singapore is a good place to start.

People generally want to live in grand houses and pleasant neighbourhoods. They do

so because of desire, humans just like to have nice things. But the satisfaction they get from

owning such homes is thymotic in nature too. Imagine how certain neighbourhoods develop

reputations. As humans, most of us do care about how we are perceived by others and get a

kick out of the prestige associated with living somewhere nice. Understanding this thymotic

urge contributes to the prosperity argument. For human beings to be thymotically satisfied they

need to be able to afford desirable things. Without the economic growth provided by the PAP,

Singaporeans would not have been thymotically satisfied.

Lee Kuan Yew grasped this: “I believed this sense of [home] ownership was vital for

our new society” (Lee 2000, 117). He had spotted that people work harder if they have personal

incentives and will directly benefit from the fruits of their labour. At its leader’s bequest, the

PAP initiated policies that re-distributed wealth through asset-enhancement rather than welfare

payments (Lee 2000, 126). Housing was seen as the best way to do it. Lee was perturbed by

the idea of a society living in low cost rental-flats, and so Singaporeans were incentivised into

buying their own homes (2000, 117). By 1990, Singapore had a staggeringly high Home

Ownership rate of 87.5%, one of the highest in the world (Singstat). To put that figure in

perspective, the equivalent figure for The Netherlands is just 67.1% (Eurostat). The point here

is not that people only buy houses for recognition; there are many other motives for getting

oneself onto the property ladder. However, once basic requirements have been fulfilled, it is

22

the thymotic struggle for recognition that takes over and drives Singaporean home-buyers

onwards and upwards towards bigger houses and nicer neighbourhoods.

Singapore’s property market has been designed to bridle this ambition. It can be thought

of as like a giant monopoly board. Generally speaking, Singaporeans want to buy their first

home as soon as they can, wherever they can. Some neighbourhoods like the Orchard district

and Bukit Timah are more expensive and illustrious than others. The goal of the game is to

reach them. A materialistic culture like this does not only apply to the pursuit of real estate.

Observers have noted that many Singaporeans lust after the “Five-C’s”; Cash, Credit Card,

Country Club (membership), Car and Condominium (Coclanis 2). Possession of these things

defers status on the owner and thus sates his sense of Thymos. Ex-Prime Minister Goh Chok

Tong once even proclaimed, perhaps laconically, that “life for Singaporeans is not complete

without shopping” (Coclanis 2). A well-structured property market and a materialistic

consumer culture provide legitimate channels for all Singaporeans to achieve Megalothymia,

which helps explain why they have not risen-up against the PAP.

You should remember that Thymos and a person’s sense of self-worth are

interchangeable, they are determined by the individual. Fukuyama’s theory holds that slaves

developed a conception of self-worth through their capacity for work. The slave accepted his

position in return for being given security by the Master. When the slave realised he was

actually capable of making things the Master needed, he began to see himself as equal. In

Singapore there has long been a focus on meritocracy, which means that everyone should be

rewarded according to his or her performance (Barr and Skrbis 59). This meritocratic mantra

is instilled in children from the first years of their life. In alignment with exam results,

Singaporeans have been ‘streamed’ into separate classes from an early age (Barr and Skrbis

128). We can picture what effect this may have on an individual. Let us say you were one of

the poor performers in school. Throughout the formative years of your life you are told

23

repeatedly that your place in society is at the bottom. The empirical facts that are your exam

results support this claim. Eventually you would begin to agree and accept your diminished

sense of status. Despite being thymotically satisfied you would have a good reason to feel

drastically unhappy.

Of course, the same principle can be applied to high-achievers, who by contrast perhaps

end-up with an inflated sense of self-worth. Singapore has a capitalist economy which, like

Fukuyama suggested, serves as an outlet for the Megalothymia of these elites. It seems fair to

say that Megalothymia is even more pronounced in Singapore. That said, talk of Singaporean

meritocracy is dismissed by Barr and Skrbis, who see it as a façade through which a Chinese

elite perpetuates its control over Singapore (Barr and Skrbis 47). Regardless of whether or not

they are right, it does not matter. It is the belief in meritocracy that is important, rather than

whether the meritocracy exists.

4.4 Singapore’s Helots

In Ancient Sparta, the population was divided into two categories: Citizens, the Spartiates, and

Slaves, known as Helots (Finley 240). The ownership of the Helots was communal, as

ultimately it was only the Spartan state that could free a slave. Helots were primarily used as

domestic servants but were occasionally called upon to fight alongside the Spartan army

(Chambers 273). The slaves formed an underclass of Spartan society and were entirely

subservient to the needs of the nation. It may seem like a fairly one-sided arrangement but

without the Helots, the Spartans would not have been able to sustain themselves (Chambers

272). Therefore the two groups were mutually dependent. At the beginning of the 1990’s, in

response to low fertility rates, the PAP permitted the inflow of foreign workers who could fill

the job vacancies Singaporeans found undesirable (Cheah 218). Filipina/Indonesia maids,

South Asian construction staff and Chinese sex workers came to Singapore in their droves.

They were not conferred with ‘full’ citizenship either.

24

Singapore’s massive foreign worker population has performed a similar role to the

Helots of Sparta. The two groups rely on each other. Foreign workers coming to Singapore

have quite a simple aim; to earn a living (Cheah 215). Yet Singapore needs them for two

reasons; the first being related to economic growth, the economy cannot keep growing without

the influx of foreign workers (Cheah 218). The second factor relates to Thymos. We can

imagine that their presence may have served to imbue ordinary Singaporeans with an almost

permanent form of superiority. It would not matter what position you obtained in Singapore’s

elitist society, the foreign workers were still inferior to you. In this way, all Singaporeans

received a boost to their thymotic sense of self-worth. This helps explain the enduring

Thymotic satisfaction of Singaporeans.

It seems that Lee Kuan Yew’s focus on home-ownership and meritocracy in Singapore

was in accordance with Fukuyama’s belief that a political system shall endure if it proves

thymotically satisfying for its citizens. Over the years the Singaporean government has shaped

the thymotic sense of self-worth felt by its people, most noticeably by delegating certain types

of immigrant foreign workers a subservient role in society. The PAP’s policies are largely

responsible for thymotically satisfying its citizens, whom have thus not felt the need to press

too firmly for the rescindment of democratic restrictions. One other factor should be taken into

consideration and may explain why citizens in a non-liberal democracy can be satisfied in a

way Fukuyama did not think of.

Chapter 5

5.1 More than semantics

25

Singaporeans are likely to have a different interpretation than Fukuyama as to what liberty and

equality mean. This is important as it explains why Thymotic satisfaction has remained

possible in Singapore despite the democratic restrictions. Fukuyama’s thymotic theory is drawn

from a link he makes with Christianity. He believes that the principle of equality, which

constitutes the foundations of liberal democracy, owes its conception to the bible’s teaching of

all men being equal in the eyes of God (Fukuyama 198). The first liberal democracy is thought

by Fukuyama to have emerged in France following the revolution there in 1789 (Fukuyama

42). This could be seen as contradictory for his own hypothesis as Christianity had existed for

nearly 1800 years by the time the French Republic emerged in 1792. Why does he say it took

so long for a liberal democracy to emerge and how is this relevant to Singapore?

5.2 Equality

Fukuyama’s answer suggests that only upon the advent of Protestantism did the conditions for

the equality of rights associated with liberal democracy emerge. It advanced the Christian

doctrine of everyone being equal in their capacity for moral choice and removed the need for

a separate class of priests to act as intermediaries with God (Fukuyama 217). The French

Revolution then performed the next step in bringing the free and equal society of the heavens

down to earth (Fukuyama 198). Applying this understanding of liberal democracy’s Christian

beginnings, it is not surprising that Singapore did not develop a similar form of liberalism to

that seen in The West. Lee Kuan Yew was not a Christian. He was heavily influenced by

Confucianism (Zakaria 125). Confucianism is a way of thinking inspired by the Chinese

philosopher Confucius (Arbuckle and Taylor 347). Fukuyama has described its teachings as

“inegalitarian and hierarchical” (Fukuyama 217). Singaporeans have not been ingrained with

the same Christian morals as those in the West and this has meant that they are not too troubled

by democratic limitations because they do not accord the same values to them.

26

Resistance shown to the PAP’s curtailments on democracy seem to support this

conclusion. J.B. Jeyaretnam was identified earlier as one of Singapore’s prominent opposition

leaders. He spent over thirty years of his life and all of his money challenging the PAP. Having

been bankrupted he died destitute in 2008. His motivation cannot be interpreted as rational; he

lost all of his money and his place in society. Jeyaretnam’s struggle can thus be understood as

a thymotic undertaking. Strong Christian beliefs are said to be the reason he embarked on his

lifetime in opposition. He was a devout Protestant whose religious beliefs were intertwined

with his political ones (Barr 2003, 302). Jeyaretnam’s conflict with the PAP supports

Fukuyama’s assertion that an attachment to Protestantism makes a person more likely to

support liberal democracy. This may explain why Lee Kuan Yew seemed to have identified

the conflation of religious and liberal values presented by Jeyaretnam as a threat to the PAP

(Barr 2003, 315).

Furthermore, Fukuyama’s description of Confucianism as “inegalitarian” certainly

corroborates with several authors’ descriptions of Singaporean society. For instance, Barr and

Skribis’ impression of Singapore as an elitist country governed by a ruling ethnic Chinese elite.

Referring once again to Lee Kuan Yew’s comment that humans are unequal in their abilities,

it is possible to imagine where they might be coming from (Lee 116). Singapore’s society has

thus been created on the inherent presumption that people are not born equal. Through mediums

like citizenship education, the emphasis has been on having an equal motivation for action

rather than capacity for it (Chia 193). Unlike in the West, citizenship in Singapore embodies

an obligation to shouldering equal responsibilities towards society, as opposed to solely

knowing one’s rights (Chia 193). As has been shown in the investigation of Singaporean

Isothymia, the term ‘equality’ has thus had a different meaning in Singapore than that used by

Fukuyama.

27

5.3 Liberty

In the West, liberal refers to the sanctity of the individual’s freedom. The PAP has

acknowledged that individual liberty is a desirable aim but uses Singapore’s Confucian heritage

to refute it (George 84). Confucianism prioritises the interests of the community over the

individual. Lee Kuan Yew was fond of saying that an ‘East Asian’ priority is to build regulated

societies that provide opportunities for personal freedoms (Zakaria 111). What he meant was

that in order to give people the freedom to buy what they want, you first need to make sure

they have something to spend. To do so, the PAP tasked itself with making sure that citizens

had jobs (Vasil 47). The predominant theory of liberalism in Singapore has thus been economic

in nature, rather than political.

The contested meanings of liberty and equality are indicative of why Singapore is such

a misunderstood country. Important definitions used to analyse it vary widely in their

interpretations. There are numerous examples of this and it shows no signs of stopping. For

instance, Lee Kuan Yew once condemned the U.S for its “breakdown in civil society”, which

implies that he saw civil society as being alive and well in Singapore (Zakaria 111). On the

other hand, James Gomez, a Singaporean academic affiliated to an official opposition party,

disagrees and has written that Singapore’s civil society is extremely restrained (Gomez 177).

Despite using the same term, the two men were not talking about the same thing. The same

goes for Francis Fukuyama. He interpreted liberty and equality as having the same universal

meanings but, as has been shown, they do not. Fukuyama’s Western-centric view of political

theory is what caused him to see liberal democracy as the only solution for man’s thymotic

problem.

Conclusion

28

The British withdrawal from Singapore in 1963 left behind a power vacuum. Singaporeans

accepted democratic limitations upon independence because they wanted the PAP to bring

order and prevent anarchy. The situation on Singapore’s streets was stark enough for the people

to seek a strong protector rather than a ‘full’ democrat. Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP took to the

duties of a Leviathan with a lionhearted relish. Democratic curtailments on the freedoms of

speech and assembly were enforced in order to construct a cohesive nation-state that could

largely fend for itself. The vulnerabilities posed by Singapore’s geographical location and its

paucity of natural resources are indisputable. Their presence allowed the PAP to maintain

popular support for its policies by articulating an ideology of a shared struggle for survival.

Until the arrival of the internet at the end of the 1980’s it was possible to claim that an

explanation for the acceptance of democratic restrictions was ignorance. Singapore’s media

and press agendas were indirectly controlled by the PAP. The majority of Singaporeans living

in Singapore upon independence were immigrants who had never lived in a democracy. Neither

had their predominantly Chinese-born ancestors. There was neither a culture nor knowledge of

democracy amongst the people. Taking these factors into account, it is not surprising that a

large number of Singaporeans did not articulate for, or desire, a full democracy. Empirical data

supports this claim, the voting process is regarded as being private and huge numbers of

Singaporeans kept voting for the PAP of their own volition. In doing so they endorsed the

democratic infringements.

The internet is conducive for the sharing of knowledge and almost all Singaporeans are

connected to it. Rules and regulations governing their online activity do exist but are not too

stringent. It can no longer be said that Singaporeans accept democratic limitations because they

have no idea what is going on in the rest of the world. The opportunities for the diffusion of

knowledge provided by the internet refute that argument. Strikingly, Singaporeans can be

29

witnessed online supporting the enforcement of democratic infringements (Tay 2015). There

is something about their political system that keeps them satisfied: Thymos.

Thymos works in Singapore because its citizens know their style of government is

unique. This allows them to embrace it as their own. They have a sense of pride in it. The nation

plays a vital role in facilitating thymotic satisfaction in Singapore. The cohesiveness of

Singaporean society thus relies on its citizens’ strong sense of patriotic identification. Without

feeling attachment to the nation, Singaporeans could not have sated their need for Isothymia.

At the same time, this isothymic attachment to the nation has doused the fires of Megalothymia.

Singaporean nationalism rests on the idea that it is an exceptional country. Seeing as

nationalism entails superiority over other countries, all Singaporeans can feel like they are

superior to others. The presence of non-citizen foreign workers contributes to this feeling.

Belonging to the Singaporean nation is thus a fully thymotic undertaking.

The concept of Thymos is as applicable to understanding how non-liberal democracies

work as it is to liberal ones. The relevance of Fukuyama’s work has been extended here and

this should contribute to the academic debate surrounding ‘The End of History and The Last

Man’. That said, it is important not to overstate the role of Thymos. A political system would

not work if it is governed by the thymotic struggle for recognition alone. Singaporeans initially

accepted democratic limitations out of a desire for safety, a much more powerful emotion.

Thymos helps to explain the enduring consensus behind those curtailments but it would be

delusional to imagine that that support would still exist if it were not for the presence of other

factors like Singapore’s high quality of governance and its geo-political vulnerability.

The PAP’s endurance should be reassuring. It shows that human beings’ first instincts

are indeed for security and prosperity. Once this has been achieved it is the thymotic struggle

for recognition that takes over. More weight has thus been added to Fukuyama’s proposition

that human beings require a type of government that sates their sense of Thymos. However,

30

Singapore’s political system exposes the myth that liberal democracy is the only way of doing

so. At a time when The West seems to have lost its confidence in liberal democracy, this is a

troublesome finding. Respect for the achievements of non-democratic governments is growing

around the world, especially for the Chinese Communist Party (Nathan 159). But even Lee

Kuan Yew was adamant that democracy is the highest form of government (Hoogerwerff

2007). What Singapore teaches us then, is that liberal democracy’s ability to compete with the

unique ‘authoritarian models’ of countries like China, will depend on the efficacy of its

governments.

31

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