“Linguistic landscape as a tool for interpreting language vitality: Arabic as a ‘minority’...

6 Linguistic Landscape as a Tool for Interpreting Language

Vitality: Arabic as a 'Minority' Language in Israel

Elana Shohamy and Marwan Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh

Introduction: Arabic as a minority language in Israel

Much of the research in linguistic landscape (LL) focuses on the presence and/or absence of

languages in public spaces; the main reason being to detect systematic patterns which can

lead to new understandings of various language and social phenomena. Thus, in a study by

Ben Rafael et al (2006), different bilingual patterns within Jewish and Arab communities in

Israel were identified. These findings showed that the study of language in public space

does not replicate patterns used by individuals in speech, leading to new insights as to the

nature of LL as representing language as ‘symbolic construction of the public space’. These

findings were then interpreted within theories of collective identity, self presentation and

rationale choice.

This chapter reports on a study which examines dimensions of LL in relation to the

Arabic language in Israel, a language that is institutionally defined as a minority language.

It documents LL in two spaces - an Arab city and a University campus demonstrating that

there is high representation and vitality of the Arabic language in the city while there is total

lack of the Arabic language in the LL of the University campus; this is so in spite of the

large number of Arab students who attend the University. The documentation was

accompanied by interviews with a number of Arab students who attend the University

inquiring about their attitudes toward the LL patterns on campus. They interpreted it as lack

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of recognition, marginality and exclusion while still complying with this reality given the

general political context.

These results led us to a critique of the institutionalized and nationally defined term

‘minority’ in relation to the Arabic language in the very context of Israel, given the vitality

and functionality of the language in the areas where Arabs reside. Specifically, it led us to

challenge and question the sweeping bureaucratic definition of ‘a minority language’ when

it is based on criterion of ‘number of speakers’ in the very context. It is through the analysis

of the LL data in the two locations and the stark difference between them, that we argue that

the term ‘minority’ may not be appropriate to all language situations in similar ways. The

term minority in this situation delivers a message of hierarchy and marginality. It therefore

may defy the historical context, current tensions of Jews and Arabs, and future expectations

of co-existence. It is thus argued that in this very politically and ideologically charged

context, criteria of functionality and vitality in open and fluid spaces, should be used rather

than those made up by in bureaucratic territories of ‘nation state’. As will be described

below, Arabic is loaded with strong marginalizing connotations because it used to be a

’majority’ language for Arabs in the past, while today, it has been pushed aside given that it

is associated with people who are viewed by many Jews in Israel as marginalized and not

truly belonging to the ‘Jewish’ state. At the same time, Arabic is an important language in

the Middle East and in Israel and it is used as the main language of instruction in schools

and in public, in most towns and cities where Arabs reside. It is the political and historical

chain of events that brought about a situation whereby Arabs in Israel turned into a minority

‘group’ in relation to the Jewish population using Hebrew. Based on the LL data we

collected we attempt to bring forward notions of less bureaucratic views of language in

spaces and enclaves which are more open and fluid and at the same time focus on

Arabic as a ‘minority’ language in Israel 128

functionality and vitality; these views may be instrumental in delivering a more positive and

empowering message of inclusion, equality and rights.

Arabic in Israel

Reference to Arabic as a ‘minority language' in Israel began around the time of the

establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 (Spolsky and Shohamy, 1999; Amara and Mari,

2002). The association of the term minority with the Arabic language and not with Hebrew

is somehow ironic as Hebrew had been a language which was in the process of revival since

the end of the 19th

century and throughout the first half of the 20th

century in Palestine, later

Israel. At that time, Hebrew was a second language for most of the Jewish population who

arrived there speaking a variety of other territorial and/or Jewish languages. During the 20th

century, mostly as a result of active promotion by the Zionist movement, Hebrew turned

into the dominant language and the only language of instruction in schools. While equal

numbers of Arabs and Jews were living in Palestine at the end of the British Mandate, a

shift in the demographic situation was brought about after the establishment of the state of

Israel in 1948 when many of the Arabs living in Palestine were deported and/or fled the

area. The demography of the state of Israel changed radically in terms of numbers. As of

today the proportion is: 80 per cent Jews and 20 per cent Arabs, out of a total population of

7 million. It is important to note here that for many of the Jews arriving in Israel from the

Middle East and North Africa, Arabic or some variety thereof was their first language.

However, upon arriving in Israel, they were forced into the Hebrew language as a symbolic

and practical act of nation building. While many of these Jews continued to use Arabic at

home, the language disappeared within one generation as no recognition was given to home

languages because Hebrew was promoted as the single legitimate language of the new state.

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The historical developments and the attitude of the British Mandate regime towards

the status of the two languages throughout their ruling years are highly relevant. As early as

1922, leaders of the Zionist movements in Palestine convinced the British Mandate

authorities to recognize the Hebrew language (spoken by a small number of people at the

time) as an official language. Thus, three languages were viewed as official: English, the

language of the British Mandate, Arabic, the language of the Arab population residing in the

area, and Hebrew as the language of the Jewish population. The campaign for reviving

Hebrew within the Jewish community was very binding and entailed fierce battles against

other languages such as Yiddish, German and other territorial languages (Shohamy, 2008;

Spolsky and Shohamy, 2001). It thus involved a variety of imposing and oppressive

mechanisms that were exercised in private and public domains: at home, at the workplace

and in education as Hebrew was chosen as the single language of instruction in all Jewish

schools. This trilingual official situation where Hebrew or Arabic were functional languages

within each of the communities and English as the language of the British administration,

continued throughout the British Mandate years accompanied by active campaigns by

groups such as 'the Organization for the Defence of the Hebrew Language', or 'the

Committee for the Hebrew Language'. The policy can be defined as subtractive bilingualism

as it demanded that home languages should not be used and not be granted legitimacy in

public spaces (and often even at homes). It was after the rejection of the UN proposal of

partition of two states, in 1947, the establishment of the state of Israel as an independent

state in 1948 and the deportation and/or escape of huge numbers of Arabs to neighbouring

countries that the number of Arabs living in the newly established state fell drastically. It is

around that time that Arabs were referred to as ‘a minority’ population using a ‘minority’

language. Among the first language policy acts carried out after the establishment of the

state was the abolishment of English as an official language, leaving both Hebrew and


Arabic as the two official languages of the state (Amara and Mari 2002; Spolsky, Shohamy,

1999; Shohamy, 2006).

As of today Hebrew is the main language of the Jewish population in Israel in all

domains of life, while Arabic continues to be vibrant and functional in Arab towns, cities

and villages and as a language of instruction in all Arab schools. Most Jews are not

proficient in the Arabic language although it is compulsory to study the language for three

years (grades 7-9) in Hebrew speaking schools. In the public space Arabic has limited

visibility outside these territories and little LL-representation in Jewish areas. Almost all

street names use Hebrew and these names are associated exclusively with Jewish history

and culture. The situation is somewhat different in a number of mixed towns where Arabs

and Jews share the same space as per a Supreme Court decision stipulating that street names

in mixed cities and in major freeways need to include Arabic as well (Ben Rafael et al,

2006; Trumper-Hecht, 2009). Already in the early days, during the Mandate years and

especially after the establishment of the state most towns were assigned Hebrew names as

per a strict policy of Prime Minister Ben Gurion in order to transform, or rather to erase the

places where Arabs used to – or still do – live. Thus, it is evident that the official status of

Arabic does not carry with it any significant meaning. Indeed the language of the public

space represents a contested arena where tensions between Jews and Arabs are manifested.

It is this tension that led to the 1999 Supreme Court decision, a result of an appeal by the

Arab activist group ‘Adala’ (Trumper-Hecht, 2009).

As to the status and use of the Arabic language, in spite of massive transfer of lexical

and other linguistic elements from Hebrew to Arabic, the effect has been additive. This

means that most Arabs adopted a bilingual Arabic-Hebrew pattern. Thus, while most Arabs

were monolinguals in Arabic before the establishment of the state of Israel, they maintain

Arabic along with adding Hebrew to their linguistic repertoire. At the same time there has

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been a decrease among Arab students in their motivation to study Arabic as there is no

recognition or economic reward for knowing the language within Israel. This is most clearly

manifested at Israeli Universities where all courses are taught through Hebrew, most texts

are presented in English, while Arabic is virtually non-existent. The effect has been that

many Arab students, already in secondary school, request the use of Hebrew in a number of

school subjects and courses as science and mathematics. This demand is further enhanced as

no textbooks in Arabic in these subjects are available. Further evidence of the representation

of the two languages in the public space in Israel, along with English, can be obtained from

a study by Ben Rafael et al (2006) which documented LL in Arab and Jewish areas in Israel

and is presented in Figure 6.1 below.

<<Insert Figure 6.1 about here>>

In summary, a historical chain of events, accompanied by a strong national language policy

in order to create a collective national Jewish identity, meant that the Hebrew language was

used as a major symbol for the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish state. The

Arabs living in Israel at the time, residing in homogenous towns and villages as well as in

some mixed towns, along with the Arabic language they used, were marginalized. Whether

Israel should be defined as a ‘Jewish state’ or as a state ‘for all its citizens’, is still a very

highly debated and politicized topic. In the past few years, strong statements that Arabs do

not fully belong in Israel in spite of having citizenship, are often heard by various political

and religious leaders and are part of the public discourse especially by members of the

current right wing government. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affair, Mr. A.

Liberman argues for the need for Arabs to pass ‘loyalty tests’ as conditions for citizenship

and continued residence in Israel. It is in this very charged context that the term ‘minority’


has been serving as a powerful discursive tool to perpetuate the hierarchy of the low status

of the Arabs in relation to the Jews. According to Spolsky and Shohamy (1999), “Arabic is

a rare case in which a major language, once spread by conquest, has been forced by changed

circumstance to play a markedly secondary role. Arabic in Israel is the second official

language, and not the competing partner in a dyadic bilingual state….It is without a doubt a

minority language, denied in law and in fact many privileges that might be expected to

result from its being second official language(Spolsky and Shohamy, 1999, p. 116-17). The

term minority may have played an important role in the creation of this hierarchy.

It is the transition from the high status of Arabic as a vital and dynamic language in

Arab towns and cities to its marginal, minor and almost non-existent status at Israeli

academic institutions that led Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh (2009) to examine the experiences of

Arab students in their transition process between the two spaces. The examination of the

University space is of special importance given its high status and prestige for paving the

way for societal participation and employment. Using a variety of measuring tools, such as

questionnaires, interviews as well as documentation of the linguistic landscape, Abu

Ghazaleh-Mahajneh examined the process which students at the University of Haifa went

through within a period of seven months, from the beginning of the academic year, when the

students first arrived at the University to the end of the first year of their academic studies.

The specific research questions of the study focuses on the reactions, feelings, attitudes and

perceptions of Arab students regarding the linguistic transition. The specific topics examined

related to the position of the students regarding the use of the three central languages -

Hebrew, Arabic and English. The questions addressed their views of the importance of

possessing a good command of each of the languages, for obtaining access and broadening

their opportunities for profitable employment, their willingness to communicate, their

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methods of coping with the languages and the extent to which these coping mechanisms

affected them emotionally in terms of their self image.

Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used with a sample of 144 students

who had commenced their studies at Haifa University in 2008. The results showed that

participation at the university where all subjects are taught in Hebrew and texts are read in

English had a negative impact on their attitudes towards their L-1, Arabic. At the same time

they developed more respect and positive attitudes towards the other two languages, and

especially towards Hebrew. Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh interprets this as an act of surrender to

the ‘Hebrew only’ policy on the account of their own language. It is this research project that

was the backdrop of the present study.

In this study we focused on the LL manifestation of Arabic in two public spaces: one,

an Arab city and the other, a campus of the University where many of the students are

enrolled. The focus is on the experiences of people in these two spaces where they constantly

participate, moving from one space to another in their daily lives, home and school. The term

language space or language enclave (Creese and Blackledge, 2010) is of special significance

here as it refers to territories beyond municipal and bureaucratic boundaries where certain

linguistic rules are applied. Thus, the focus on language enclaves or on spaces proposes a

way of overcoming traditional definitions of places. We therefore shift attention from place

to space, with emphases on functionality. It is within this framework that we examine the

functionality of Hebrew and Arabic as manifested via LL in these two spaces. LL thus

provides us with a tool to examine the functionality and vitality of the languages and as a

prism through which various sociolinguistic realities can be understood and interpreted.

The focus on LL in various places in Israel is not new because a number of studies

were carried out that examined various dimensions of LL in the public spaces which serve as

arenas of participation and contestation. For example, Trumper-Hecht (2009, 2010)


examined contestation of Arabic and Hebrew in a number of mixed towns in Israel with a

special focus on the complexity of the implementation of the Supreme Court decision

mentioned above. Signs in public spaces in Israel provide an effective index and tool for

examining issues of identity, exclusion, colonialization and group hierarchies and status.

The study

The study compares LL in the town of Ume El Pahem whose inhabitants are Arabs with the

LL of the campus of Haifa University, one of the seven major Universities in Israel. The

University is located in the north of Israel and attracts a large number of Arab students who

come from towns and villages in the area; the Arab students on campus make up 25 per cent

of the students body and Arabs make up 9 per cent of the city of Haifa. The city of Ume El

Pahem is located in Vadi Ara in the north of Israel; its population consists of 48,000 people,

all Arabs.

The LL data in Ume El Pahem was collected in four locations, two schools and two

shopping areas. The schools consisted of one high school, grades 9-12 and one middle

school, grades 6-8. As to the shopping area, LL was documented in stores and buildings in

the downtown area and similar sites in the streets that connect the town with the main

freeway which leads to areas where Hebrew speaking Jews reside. The data at the Haifa

University campus was collected in two areas: one is the main buildings of the campus and

the other is the housing area where many of the Arab students reside during the school year,

both the LL of the outside buildings and the inside of the rooms were recorded. The data

was collected via pictures of all the signs in the areas, top down and bottom up. All together

405 signs were documented in Um El Pahem and 430 signs at the university. This

documentation was accompanied by a set of partially structured in-depth interviews with

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eight interviewees who were questioned about their reactions to the LL representations

based on their personal experiences.

Results

The LL documentation points to stark differences between the LL representation of Ume El

Pahem and Haifa University. As can be seen in Table 1 below, Arabic is a vivid and vital

language in Ume El Pahem. The Arabic language is represented in about 90 per cent of the

signs in the internal road, 82 per cent in the connecting road to the main freeway, 87 per

cent in secondary school and 100 per cent in the middle school. Hebrew appears in

substantially lower number of signs than Arabic. With regards to locations, Hebrew signs

are present slightly more in the high school than in the middle school, possibly reflecting

the situation that students in high school are approaching higher education and are

beginning to engage more with Hebrew in preparation for their academic studies at

University where Hebrew is the language of instruction. Hebrew has more frequent

existence in the LL in the road connecting to Hebrew territories (69 vs. 82 per cent). English

does exist in these areas but in substantially lower numbers.

As can be seen in Table 1 as well, in contrast, at Haifa University, LL in Arabic is

literally non-existent. There were only 2 signs on campus, and these were mostly of

forbidden acts which students are expected not to do as in the sign of 'no smoking' (Figure

6.2), i.e., 3.2 per cent. Hebrew is represented in 100 per cent of the signs on campus (62

signs) and English is very dominant as well. Arabic appears in 9.6 per cent of the signs

only. Even on emergency and warning signs referring to locations of shelters or a safe area

to escape to during bombing attack, there is no Arabic (Figure 6.3). The only place where


Arabic can be found is in some of the rooms of the students’ housing area (Figure 6.4)

alongside with additional languages.

<<Insert Table 6.1 about here >>

- - - -

<<Insert Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 about here>>

In what follows, we discuss the reactions of eight first year University students to the LL

displays in the public space of the campus. These students were selected randomly from the

larger sample of students who participated in the Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh (2009) study.

They were questioned twice during the year, at the beginning and at the end about their

emotional reactions regarding the LL on campus with a special focus on their attitudes

towards the representation of the three languages in the public space of the University.

By and large these students claimed that they thought there was a need to translate

the signs around the University into Arabic. The main reason they gave was not their lack of

understanding of the messages the signs were conveying, but rather that they felt there is a

need to grant Arabs symbolic recognition at the University as this has implications for their

identity and gives them a feeling of belonging. Half of the students noted that they saw the

present situation of lack of Arabic LL in the public space as violation of their human and

personal rights. The students also reacted to the electronic signs, and especially to the aural

announcements such as those heard over the loudspeakers at the library and in the students'

housing area. They stated that their cultural identity is lessened since they view the LL

around the campus as a symbolic act of marginalizing them. They were very pessimistic

about the future indicating that they cannot see how this situation will ever change. This

view about the future, they noted, led them to become less active and engaging in taking

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any steps to try to affect a change in the language of the signs. It seems that the policy of

'Hebrew only' in the public space of the University or the bilingual policy of

Hebrew/English reinforces and confirms their feelings that this is a permanent reality that

will never change. These reactions seem to indicate that they internalized the notion that

their university is a ‘Jewish’ university where they are marginalized and have no

participatory role to play, in other words they surrender to the reality and comply with de

facto policy rather than act.

Since the data was collected from the students two times, it is especially meaningful

to point to the observation of the students at the beginning of the first academic year in

comparison with their reactions at the end of that year. While at first they felt that their

language had a more major role to play, at the end of the year they saw it as totally

marginalized. Below are quotes from some of the students interviewed along these two

timelines.

At the beginning of the year Achlam said that ‘The signs at the university need to

represent the Arabs as well. The university needs to translate the signs for the Arab students

in order to show respect, even if we understand the meaning when it is written in Hebrew’.

At the end of the school year she said: ‘I understand the meaning of the signs, but prefer that

these signs will be translated in order to provide us with some rights at the university’. At

the beginning of the year Nizar said: ‘The signs at the university are mostly in Hebrew,

since this is the dominant language, but there is a need to put these in Arabic as well. This is

so since more than a fifth of the students at this university are Arabs’. At the end of the year

he said: ‘We need to grant the Arab students respect and translate the signs into Arabic. It is

true that Hebrew is a dominant language, but at least the signs can be translated into Arabic,

this is the least they can do.’ These examples demonstrate that at the beginning of the year,

there is support in translating the signs into Arabic, not only in order to understand the


language, but for empowerment, and grant symbolic value as putting the signs in Arabic can

also show respect. It is important to note that in both times these students speak of “rights “

and “respect” that Arab students should be given.

Nizar noted the need to translate the signs into Arabic as ‘the least they should do’.

‘They’ here refers to the Jewish authorities of the University. Said said that it is important to

translate in order not to harm the language right of the students; and ‘the need to show the

presence of the language in public’. Said claimed that the translation is needed ‘to provide

legitimacy to the speakers of the language on campus’. Ahmed said that: ‘Yes, there is a

need to translate the signs into Arabic, despite of my understanding of the Hebrew, as we

have to show that the Arab students are an integral part of this university, and hence our

language needs to gain respect and importance.’ He then added that: ‘There is a difference

in the balance of power between schools and university. In schools everything is handled in

Arabic, even in the Hebrew and English classes. And although many of the books are in

Hebrew, the Arabic language is exclusive and totally dominant, no questions asked. But the

situation at university is very different, the Hebrew and English languages are dominant

while Arabic has no presence and significance at all. This creates a total language shock and

trauma for students that lasts a very long time and it is very difficult to ever overcome’.

Avir noted that: ‘I prefer that the signs will be in both languages in order to expand the use

of Arabic on campus, this will demonstrate the existence of the language’. Rim said that:

‘There is a need to translate the signs into Arabic as Arab students are a critical mass at this

university and they have a right to read signs in their own language’. Ahlam said that ‘The

signs need to represent the Arab people to give us rights, at least in the signs’. Finally

Muhammad said that ‘I am very hurt from the type of signs I see at the university, for me

they have taken away all the rights of the Arabs. I want to speak Arabic, but I do not have

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any opportunity to express myself. The signs are meant to weaken the status of the Arabic

language and this is why I am interested in translating the signs into Arabic’.

Conclusions

A number of findings can be generated from this study. First, the documentation of LL in

various enclaves of the city, both educational and commercial, points to the dominance,

vitality and functionality of the Arabic language. When the criterion is not the nation state

territory but rather a differently defined space, the city, different conclusions need to be

reached - in the city of Ume El Pahem Arabic is not a minority language; other languages

are, Hebrew and English. Expanding further the notion of ‘spaces’ to include other types of

territorial spaces such as regions or neighbourhoods, lead us to re-think this widely used

term. The special context, its history, current vitality and collective identities need to be

incorporated into the meaning of the term ‘minority’. In other words, there is a need raise

questions about the meaning of the term ‘minority language’ in this context and especially

with regards to its connotations and consequences.

The second finding refers to the lack of LL representation of Arabic at the Haifa

University campus. Despite the fact that the Arabic student population make up 25 per cent,

that Arabic is an official language in Israel, and that the city of Haifa is one of the mixed

cities obliged to follow the Supreme Court decision regarding Arabic signage, the language

has no representation and is totally ignored and erased from the public space. This is also in

strong contrast to the municipal territory of the city of Haifa itself which by and large

follows the signage Supreme Court decision and includes Arabic on all road signs. In fact

Haifa is the only town in Israel where Arabic has been included in public signs even before

the court decision. It is clear that Haifa campus has very different rules and regulations,


which are detached from the city in which it is located. This provided further evidence as to

the need to focus on micro spaces such as workplaces, universities, neighbourhoods,

shopping areas, which establish and create their own language rules and policies, often

totally detached from the macro geographical spaces. There is a special importance to

follow micro spaces to obtain deeper understanding of language patterns; the focus on the

macro overlooks important phenomenon and even by doing research on the macro

researchers face the risk of overlooking important patterns and they may also buy into

bureaucratic political categories.

Thirdly, it is clear that the low presence of Arabic at Haifa University does not go by

un-noticed by the students who attend the University. Rather, the LL pattern conveys

important messages to the Arab students on that campus as can be concluded from the

interview. The students clearly perceive the LL situation as further evidence and

perpetuations of their feeling of lack of rights, and as transmitting them with messages of

exclusion that are here to stay. They state that they adopt a strategy of compliance and

acceptance while still viewing the policy as unjust and discriminatory.

A number of questions need to be raised: given the situation with regards to Arabs

and the Arabic language in the context of Israel, loaded with history, unresolved political

conflicts, yet with aspiration of co-existence, should the term ‘minority’ even be used to

define status of language? Are we not ‘shallowing’ the rich and complex phenomenon of

language use by adopting a bureaucratic criterion such as numbers, especially in politically

charged situations as those of nation-states in which contestations and reveries exist. Should

we not seek fuller criteria to examine and judge languages situations such as visibility,

functionality, appreciation, vitality, respect, or energy before categorizing languages?

In the case of Arabic in Israel and based on the data collected in this study regarding

one city, it is clear that Arabic has all these characteristics - vitality, visibility, functionality,

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energy, aspiration to continue to exist and many more. Clearly, comparisons of one

language, Arabic, in relation to ‘the other’, Hebrew within the territory of a given nation

state with its loaded national ideologies and agendas may have negative discursive effects .

It is suggested that we avoid terms which are reinforcing the nation states in relation to

other arenas, which are less political, less ideological as they are used in more fluid spaces.

Arabic is clearly not a minority language in the Middle East and Hebrew is not a majority in

that area as well. The term minority language may have been relevant in the era when

nations wanted to convey dominance of certain languages and people and as symbolic acts

of creating homogenous national societies of ‘one language, one state; these may no longer

be relevant in this day and age of multiculturalism, diversity and multilingualism.

Nowadays there is a need to accept the diversity of languages and people and avoid the use

of hierarchical terms which have discriminating connotations. Assigning the term majority

to some languages and minority to others, perpetuates hierarchical categories and prioritize

some groups on the account of others. This argument may not apply to all ‘minority

situations’ especially when languages that have been severely endangered are gaining

strength and functionality.

A further conclusion that can be reached from this study relates to the definitions of

places and space. The fact that the campus of Haifa University does not follow the pattern

of the city, as stipulated by the (national) Supreme Court decision, demonstrates that other

spaces (often called ‘micro’ spaces), need to be further researched and documented. The

contradiction between the official status of Arabic in Israel and the lack of LL

representation challenges the meaning of nation and state governed language policy rules in

favour of other types of spaces. Thus, there is a need to adopt more fluid and open

definitions of various territories and to examine them in deeper ways. The focus on enclaves

and different types of spaces – cities and campuses and the study of LL within these spaces,


can be used to gain deeper, new and innovative meanings of language in a variety of

territorial contexts within and beyond the nation-state. One even wonders if the

marginalization of Arabic at the University may be a signs of contestation against the city’s

more tolerant policy and the political activism of the student body at this University, given

the large number of Arab students on campus which is larger than in other Universities.

As can be seen from the data, while the Arab students at the University comply with

the minority category and on the surface accept the power of the dominant language, it does

not mean that they are happy with it; they clearly comply as they have no choice given the

strong pressure. Yet, they are clearly aware of the inequality. Their strong emotional

reactions should be a warning sign to the University authorities and to the civil agents that

something needs to be done. The picture that emerges from the interviews is that this

situation is accompanied by negative consequences on the part of Arabic speakers and

feelings of lack of representation, marginality and exclusion. The fact is that the language

they are most proficient in does not exist in the public space at all has strong implication as

an offensive act, lack of respect, exclusion and a form of denial and erasure of their own

presence. According to May (2001, p. 164) ‘linguistic consequences cannot be separated

from socioeconomic and socio-political consequences.’ This is an especially significant

finding, given that the marginalized status of the language is a result of political

colonialization and continuous public talk by some prominent government representatives

regarding the need for Arab citizens in Israel to pass loyalty tests as a condition of their

continued residence, as mentioned above. Arabs in Israel are compelled to learn Hebrew in

order to gain the basic right of participating in higher education, which seems to be

symbolic buy also an act of delegitimization. In this case the deletion of Arabic from the LL

of the campus needs to be viewed as an act of institutional deletion which has both symbolic

and practical meanings; symbolic in terms of erasing of a speech community and functional

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as in the case of Figure 6.2 where Arabic is excluded in situations of high security and

safety.

Finally, regarding the use of LL as a tool: LL data can provide us with a useful

device, an instrument that we can use to examine also status and vitality of languages with

different spaces, biases and discriminations especially when they are accompanied by

interviews with speakers of the community who share their experiences, feelings, reactions

and emotions about the situation. It is recommended here to further use LL not only as a

research tool but also as an activist tool to bridge between communities in order to create a

more harmonious co-existence, participatory situations and transformation. This use of LL

may provide a necessary, obviously not sufficient, act that will provide greater recognition

of the people and a just society versus the continued use of the term minority which may

work against it. Relating back to May (2001, p. 163): ‘Meanwhile, the association of

modernity with one “common” language and culture needs to be recognized as the

nationalist myth-making that it is. Only if language change is separated from the current

hegemonic imperatives of the nation-state can the prospect of more representational

multinational and multilingual states be secured’. …”both national and minority languages

remain, for many of their speakers, important indicators of individual and collective

identity. To accept this principle for one and not the other is clearly unjust”. We clearly

accept this notion of May but also take it further as to critiquing the term minority (as well

as national or majority), and to promote and propose lack official terms for both; the change

need to be made both in the term as in the meaning. The two are closely inter-related. This

could improve the life chances of groups who are presently disadvantaged in their access to

and participation in public services, employment and education.

Relating this to the current context, LL can serve as a transformation tool as well as a

descriptive one. In the case of Arabic in Israel, the term minority cannot be detached from


politics, context, history, struggle and the conflicts of Arab and Jews as well as the future

visions of co-existence. The terms 'minority and majority' represent a propaganda tool to

delegitimize one group and to elevate another, especially in times of fierce tensions. The

absence of Arabic, an official language in Israel from the space especially from state

environments as Universities, and from language of instruction at university, in spite of its

official status, is not a neutral nor natural act. It does not reflect the reality in terms of the

LL in many areas. Thus, the study of LL can be used as an empirical yardstick and as an

activist and transformational tool to challenge these notions, to question and contest

acceptable terms and categories and to look for descriptions of language which are more

relevant to how languages are viewed in this day and age. LL is a useful tool to examine

language in such contexts.

References

Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh, M. (2009) Attitudes Towards the Status of the Arabic, Hebrew and

English Languages among Arab Students at the University. M.A. Thesis, Tel Aviv

University (in Hebrew).

Amara, M. and A. Mari (2002) Language Education Policy: The Arab Minority in Israel.

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing.

Ben Rafael, E., E. Shohamy, M.H. Amara, and N. Trumper-Hecht (2006) ‘Linguistic

landscape as symbolic construction of the public space: The case of Israel’.

International Journal of Multilingualism, 3, 1, 7-31.

Creese, A. and A. Blackledge (2010) ‘Translanguaging in the bilingual classroom: A

pedagogy for learning and teaching?’. The Modern Language Journal, 94, 1, 103-115.

May, S. (2001) Language and minority rights: Ethnicity, nationalism and the politics of

language. New York: Routledge.

145

Shohamy, E. (2006) Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches. London:

Routledge.

Shohamy, E. and D. Gorter (eds.) (2009) Linguistic landscape: Expanding the scenery.

London: Routledge.

Shohamy, E., E. Ben Rafael and M. Barni (eds.) (2010) Linguistic Landscape in the city.

Bristol: Multilingual Matters.

Spolsky, B. and E. Shohamy (1999) The languages of Israel - Policy, ideology and practice.

Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Spolsky, B. and E. Shohamy (2001) ‘Hebrew after a century of RLS activities’. In J. A.

Fishman (ed.) Can threatened languages be saved: Reversing language shift, revisited:

A 21st century perspective. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Trumper-Hecht, N. (2009) ‘Constructing national identity in mixed cities in Israel: Arabic

on signs in the public space of Upper Nazareth’. In E. Shohamy and D. Gorter (eds.)

Linguistic Landscape: Expanding the Scenery. London: Routledge.

Trumper-Hecht, N. (2010) ‘The perspective of the walkers in an Israeli mixed city’. In E.

Shohamy, E. Ben Rafael, and M. Barni (eds.) Linguistic Landscape in the city. Bristol:

Multilingual Matters.

Yitzhaki, D. (2008) Minority language and language policy: The case of Arabic in Israel.

PhD Thesis. Ramat-Gan: Bar –Ilan University.

6 Linguistic Landscape as a Tool for Interpreting Language Vitality:

Arabic as a 'Minority' Language in Israel

Elana Shohamy and Marwan Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh

1 table, and 4 figures


Table 6.1: LL representation in the city of Um el Pahem vs. Haifa University in various areas

of each

English language as

first/second/third

Hebrew language as

first/second/third

Arabic language as

first/second/third

Areas

Ume el Pahem

8.39

(43)

48.64

(791)

86.91%

(453)

Total Ume El Pahem

405 signs

0%

(0)

0%

(0)

700%

(33)

Percentage and

numbers of signs in

Middle School (11%,

44 signs)

1.85%

(1)

33.59%

(23)

71.03%

(47)

Percentage and

numbers of signs in

High School (13%, 54

signs)

15.5%

(31)

99%

)747)

73%

(793)

Percentage and

numbers of signs in

connecting road to

main highway

(49% , 200 signs)

University

22.7%

(98)

92.3%

(397)

10.9%

(47)

Total university:

430 signs

23.75%

(76)

98.13%

(314)

10.3 %

(34)

Percentage and

numbers of signs on

academic buildings

147

22.92%

(11)

43.75%

21 ))

22.92%

(77 )

Percentage and

number of signs in

students’ rooms on

campus area (56%, 48

signs)

17.74%

(11)

100%

(62)

3.2%

(2)

Percentage and

number of signs of

buildings in housing

area (44%, 62 signs)


Figure 6.1: The bilingual patterns of languages in Jewish and Arab communities in Israel and

East Jerusalem (Ben Rafael et al, 2006)

149

Figure 6.2: No smoking sign in three languages


Figure 6.3: Emergency signs in student housing: no Arabic (emergency exit; safe area and

name of street at entrance to a building)

151

Figure 6.4: LL in the students’ rooms

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