1

Let’s Reimagine the

Intelligence Community

Alexander Schraut

Anglo State University

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Introduction

The United States (US) has created the greatest intelligence collection and analysis

organization the world has ever known. It is capable of utilizing every form of intelligence

collection in virtually any part of the world and does so every day of the week without

interruption. However, this community of intelligence agencies and organizations has developed

over time in an ad hoc manner, leaving us with a structure that is rife with overlapping and often

needlessly redundant responsibilities and capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD)

currently owns the majority of these capabilities despite the fact that diplomatic efforts led by the

Department of State (DOS) require more analysis and intelligence input on a daily basis as they

are engaged in crafting and implementing the country’s national-security goals. On top of this,

lapses in the proper utilization of intelligence, and the failed analyses that often follow, have led

to significant blunders by the US on the world stage. However, the US Intelligence Community

(USIC) must always maintain a professional distance from those in power in order to discredit

frequent claims of intelligence failure and, conversely, the improper influence of policymakers in

driving analysis for political gain. Additionally, policy makers must be ever-vigilant to ensure

that the USIC does not stray from the legal framework they have constructed to ensure American

civil liberties are maintained.

The USIC is an extraordinary entity that has successfully protected this nation and

thwarted the vast majority of threats. However, like any organization (or, more accurately,

collectivity of organizations), from time to time failures occur for various reasons or elements of

the USIC stray from the narrow mandated path of legal constraints. It is at these times that the

cries for intelligence reform are the loudest. Policy makers believe that when mistakes are made,

changes must ensue to ensure that they never occur again. This tendency to engage in reactive,

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top-down, large-scale reforms, rather than incremental and continuous ones, has further

exacerbated the often chaotic nature of the USIC and at times hampered its effectiveness.

To better understand where the USIC is now, this paper will begin with a discussion of its

current structure; some enduring reform considerations; and challenges encountered in any

attempt to reform the USIC. Next, it will focus on prior reform efforts; proposals to restructure

the USIC; and a discussion of the issues faced in implementing these proposals. Finally, this

work concludes with a new way forward for the community, taking into consideration the current

threat environment, needs of the nation, budgetary constraints, and lessons learned from prior

reform proposals and actual reforms.

Intelligence Reform

Since the passage of the National Defense Act of 1947, the mission of the USIC has been

to provide decision makers with the information necessary to form educated policies and plans

whether these individuals are in the military, executive or legislative branch, or law enforcement

(LE).1 Over time, missions drift and groups become more specialized, producing products for

select individuals rather than the community as a whole. The process of community-wide reform

allows missions to evolve and agencies to refocus and reengage the target as required.

The term “intelligence reform” is widely used and often misunderstood. Any change of

policy or structure at any level within an intelligence operation could be considered intelligence

reform. Since the mid-1970's, intelligence reform has often come to mean changes designed to

prevent the recurrence of illegal acts or abuses of authority.2 For the purpose of this paper, the

author will limit the term to mean the high-level organization and policy changes that dictate

1 John Deutch, "The Intelligence Community," Federation of American Scientists (n.d.),

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/npr/vp96_intell.htm (accessed November 11, 2014). 2 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Fourth Edition (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009),

297.

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authority over broad intelligence areas and methods of collection, how agencies relate to one

another, and the laws that govern the collection and analysis of information and dissemination of

intelligence.

Current Structure

For any intelligence reform to be truly successful, the USIC and policymakers must both

embrace the changes and find a way to implement them in a way that will improve the ability of

the USIC to react quickly to emerging threats and provide unbiased requested analytical support

in a timely fashion. The two main impediments to this are internal rivalries within the USIC and

a lack of understanding of the USIC among policy makers.

Intelligence Community

Since 1947, the USIC has grown into a collection of 17 agencies with the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) tasked with management of the USIC. The DOD

manages eight of these agencies which, for obvious reasons, are relatively well integrated and

able to operate cooperatively.3 With the creation of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) and

the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD have

taken a major step forward in integrating and coordinating their human intelligence (HUMINT)

operations.4 Of course, the relationship between the CIA and DOD continue to be strained due to

the agency’s continued expansion of paramilitary operations5 and control over drone strikes.

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3 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC,” Office of the Director of National

Intelligence (n.d.), http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic (accessed November

11, 2014). 4 Greg Miller, "Pentagon establishes Defense Clandestine Service, new espionage unit," Washington Post (April 23,

2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/

pentagon-creates-new-espionage-unit/2012/04/23/gIQA9R7DcT_story.html (accessed November 11, 2014). 5 Central Intelligence Agency, “Paramilitary Operations Officer/Specialized Skills Officer,” Central Intelligence

Agency (April 21, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/

paramilitary-operations-officer-specialized-skills-officer.html (accessed December 4, 2014). 6 Micah Zenko, “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 31,” Council

on Foreign Relations (April 2013), http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434

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The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OIC),

has a unique mission as it is tasked with monitoring and reporting on foreign nuclear weapon

programs. Much of its analysis rests on the collection performed by DOD and CIA elements.

This dependence creates a close relationship and a desire to be open with its products.7 The

Department of Treasury (DOT), Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), has grown much

closer to its USIC counterparts in large part due to the ongoing war on terror. The power that

resides within OIA to designate entities as terrorists and terror organizations thereby freezing

their financial assets has made them indispensable to the collective fight against these groups.8

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI)

has proven exceedingly useful in the war on terror as it is the repository of over 30 years of drug

cartel tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). These same TTPs are now being utilized by

terror groups to further their plans. ONSI plays a vital role by sharing the lessons learned from

the war on drugs and helping to apply those lessons to the war on terror.9

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for all terror-related matters

within the US.10

In support of this, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Intelligence

and Analysis (I&A), OIA, ONSI, and US Coast Guard Intelligence (USCGI) coordinate their

counterterror efforts with the FBI and in conjunction with state and local authorities utilizing the

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) system based within the various FBI divisions.11

This model

(accessed December 4, 2014). 7 Steven Aftergood, "Department of Energy: Office of Intelligence," Federation of American Scientists (May 12,

2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doe (accessed November 11, 2014). 8 U.S. Department of the Treasury, "About: Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Office of Intelligence and Analysis

(OIA)," U.S. Department of the Treasury (August 16, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/about/

organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx (accessed November 11, 2014). 9 United States Drug Enforcement Administration, "Intelligence," (n.d.), http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/intel.shtml

(accessed November 11, 2014). 10

"28 CFR 0.85 - General Functions" (July 1, 2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title28-

vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title28-vol1-sec0-85.pdf (accessed November 11, 2014), (l). 11

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Joint Terrorism Task Forces," The Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.),

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has proven very effective in responding to and investigating the various tips that are reported to

the JTTF’s member agencies. The investigations are run out of the FBI, but the JTTF squads are

comprised of agents and officers from the member agencies.

The domestic and foreign intelligence systems just described are designed to protect the

US homeland and its interests from attack, but there appears to be a divide between the two

groups. Those involved in foreign intelligence (DOD, CIA, etc.) are prohibited from domestic

collection under Presidential Executive Order 12333.12

Meanwhile, the domestic agencies (FBI,

DHS, etc.) collect and work in the homeland as well as on foreign intelligence matters.13

This

simultaneous overlap and divide creates an unusual separation of responsibilities in the USIC.

The foreign intelligence agencies are responsible for foreign threats, but they do not have the

authority to track them once they contact a US person or enter the homeland. Meanwhile, the

domestic agencies can track them outside of the US as well, but they also have the authority to

track their activities within the US. This has created tensions in the past due to the line that the

majority of the USIC cannot cross. Any intelligence reform must address this matter in a way

that will better balance the responsibilities delegated to the respective agencies. This has not

happened, though, and in fact the recent intelligence reform acts have strengthened the domestic

side’s ability to track targets outside of the US.14

Policy Community

The policy community is the other side of any potential intelligence reform effort. It is

comprised of the various elected and appointed officials in the Executive Branch and Congress

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (accessed November 11, 2014). 12

The President of the United States of America, "Executive Order 12333--United States Intelligence Activities,"

Federation of American Scientists (December 4, 1981), https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf

(accessed November 11, 2014). 13

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Joint Terrorism Task Forces." 14

107th Congress, "United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act )Act of 2001" (October 26, 2001), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/

PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf (accessed November 11, 2014).

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who are responsible for the passage and implementation of laws. In the current two-party

political environment, consensus is difficult to find and compromise even more so. The only

constant is the requirement that the current party in charge make their mark on the government.

A prime example of the lack of cohesion when discussing policy makers’ stances on

intelligence operations can be found with the current President and his senior advisors. Then-

Senator Barack Obama was strongly against President Bush’s application of the expansion of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the Uniting and Strengthening

America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of

2001 (USA Patriot Act or Patriot Act) calling the programs excessive and illegal.15

However, on

December 28, 2012, President Obama signed the latest FISA extension, allowing the act to

remain in effect through 2017 without any reduction in scope or power.16

FISA and other legislation that provide additional authorities to the USIC and LE are

powerful tools that facilitate the collection of vital information and communications. Those in

the USIC understand the utility of such legislation as well as the danger of overreaching. Policy

makers have been informed of this understanding and need for these tools countless times in

Congressional hearings and information papers. Those elected to office that hold the power to

authorize, expand, and/or remove these tools are caught between the need to provide what is

necessary for the USIC to maintain the safety of the country while ensuring that civil liberties are

protected. This delicate balance will always push legislation one way or the other, creating an

15

Caroline Houck, "Barack Obama on surveillance, then and now," Tampa Bay Times: PolitiFact.com (June 13,

2013), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2013/jun/13/barack-obama-surveillance-then-and-now/

(accessed November 11, 2014). 16

Bill Chappell, "President And Congress Extend FISA Wiretapping Act To 2017 [Updated]," NPR (December 28,

2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/12/28/168220266/

congress-extends-fisa-wiretapping-act-to-2017-awaits-obamas-signature (accessed November 11, 2014).

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environment where the USIC cannot be sure that the tools required for their mandated missions

will be available.

Enduring Reform Considerations

The USIC is an exceptional collection of agencies capable of extraordinary achievements.

It works every day to ensure the US, its citizens, and allies remain safe and secure. That being

said, there are four critical enduring issues that will spell the success or failure of the USIC in

future: information sharing, USIC-policymaker interaction, duplication of effort, and the ever-

present budget concerns of funding the largest and most capable intelligence apparatus in the

history of the world. Each of these four areas possesses the potential to lead to disaster for the

community and the nation as a whole.

Information Sharing

The 9/11 Commission found that the USIC could have predicted the impending attack as

all the relevant information was collected by the various agencies. The problem was that the

information was not shared between the agencies and therefore no predictive assessment could

be made. The Patriot Act, The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), and Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) were designed to remove the domestic statutory

barriers and enhance the USIC-wide framework for information sharing. Additionally, under

IRTPA the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was given authority and responsibility to

ensure information flowed throughout the USIC.17

The capacity for USIC information sharing was upheld in a White House review of the

2009 Christmas day bombing attempt. The report stated, “Though all of that information was

available to all-source analysts at the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

17

108th Congress, "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004" (December 17, 2004),

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf (accessed November 11, 2014), 8.

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prior to the attempted attack, the dots were never connected, and as a result, the problem appears

to be more about a component failure to ‘connect the dots,’ rather than a lack of information

sharing.”18

This is not a ringing endorsement of the analytical skills of the USIC, but it does have

the silver lining that information did flow as required however restricted it may have been. The

report further details the issues the USIC faces with the large volume of information that it

collects daily and the overwhelming task of attempting to sort through the information to make

the best assessments possible. Information sharing among all the various components of the

USIC has created a situation where, as the ODNI stated, “Terabytes of foreign intelligence

information come in each day, vastly exceeding the entire text holdings of the Library of

Congress, which is estimated at 10 terabytes.”19

“Big data” is, and will remain, one of the central

issues for the USIC. The accumulation of data will necessitate the consolidation of intelligence

databases and new information systems capable of searching and correlating data points in order

to improve the chance that analysis will make the necessary connections.

The flip side to the praise the USIC has received in its efforts to share information

between the various partners, regardless of the overwhelming task of sorting through it all, is the

failure of the FBI to share information in its possession regarding Nidal Hassan leading up to the

2009 Fort Hood shootings. As the FBI’s own internal report on the matter states, “The FBI did

not share the Hassan information with any DOD employees other than…” those assigned to the

FBI task force in San Diego.20

The issue of information sharing, while improving USIC-wide,

appears to remain a challenge at the FBI in spite of the efforts of the FBI’s JTTF program.

18

Office of the Press Secretary, "White House Review Summary Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack,"

The White House (January 7, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

white-house-review-summary-regarding-12252009-attempted-terrorist-attack (accessed November 28, 2014). 19

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Questions & Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11,"

Homeland Security Digital Library (2010), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=21398 (accessed November 11, 2014),

3. 20

William H. Webster et al., "Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau of

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USIC-Policymaker Interaction

Intelligence is consumer driven. The entire USIC exists to provide information and

analysis to those who make decisions. The hope of the USIC is that their work will help guide

those decisions in the direction that is best for the nation without regard to what individual

analysts and senior intelligence officers think that direction should be. One problem with that

view is that policy makers know what decisions they want to make before they receive the

USIC’s analysis. Intelligence, to them, is often a tool to support their political (as opposed to

policy) efforts and derail their political opponents’ plans.21

As the ultimate decision makers, they

must know the direction in which they want the nation to go, but they must not allow party

platform, personal desires, or other political excuses to guide and shape their decisions. The

vision of the potential future course of events that the USIC provides them should be their guide.

Sticking with these political biases can cause policy makers to push the USIC for intelligence

that only fits their view point or ignoring the USIC entirely. Policy makers decide what they are

willing to fund, who will do it, where it will be done, to some extent how it will be done, and for

how long. This makes the relationship between the two sides very lopsided and can lead to a very

adversarial approach to intelligence-reform legislation.

The policy makers know what they want from the USIC, but they do not necessarily

understand what goes into creating those products. The President and his staff only have the

intelligence experience they bring with them into office due a lack of formal and congressionally

mandated intelligence community training for senior policy makers. This can leave a lack of

understanding of what the USIC brings to the table and the context in which policy makers

Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009," The

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/

final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster-commission (accessed November 11, 2014), 73. 21

Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American National Security (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2007), 66-71.

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should approach and use intelligence. The USIC knows its craft better than anyone in the world,

but it does not know what the leadership of the nation wants as an end game for all situations.

This disconnect is fundamental to the relationship. The concept of politicization is the proverbial

kryptonite to a USIC that fears having its products tainted by it. Therefore, the USIC stays out of

politics as much as possible to avoid the calls of bending analysis to the political whims of the

current governmental leaders.22

As long as the USIC is afraid to become involved in the

intelligence-policy process, intelligence reform will be led by those with a lesser understanding

of the USIC.

Duplication of Effort

“The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the elimination of waste and

unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community.”23

As Erwin notes the DNI has

dedicated more time to increasing the USIC’s information-sharing capability and

counterterrorism rather than this statutory requirement to reduce redundancy.24

Tactical efforts

such as counterterrorism, by their nature, require some degree of redundancy to ensure that the

sheer volume of threat reporting is covered.25

At other times, duplicative tactical-level analysis

can simply overtask groups and waste time and resources. One such situation occurs when there

are multiple naval battle groups or independent vessels operating in the same geographic region.

Logically, there should be a single organization that is responsible for the analysis for the region,

but that is not the case in many instances. Often each battle group undertakes the burden of

producing daily analysis of all potential threats in a region independent of any other entity. This

22

Ibid., 74. 23

108th Congress, "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," Title I, Subtitle A, Sec 102A(f)(5). 24

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Issues for Congress, by Marshall C.

Erwin, CRS Report R42061 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 23, 2013),

4. 25

Office of the Press Secretary, "White House Review Summary Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack."

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author experienced this waste first hand and saw what a detriment it was to the overall efficiency

and effectiveness of the intelligence capabilities of the region. One solution that a senior Navy

intelligence officer put into practice was federating the intelligence burden based of the inherent

mission and talents of each element available in the region. Amphibious groups were responsible

for tracking coastal activities; air assets were responsible for tracking threat air targets; etc. It

spread the burden of massive analysis across the entire fleet and reserved the final fusion of all

products at the fleet level ensuring that all areas were covered and all commanders were

provided the same analytical picture.

As the DNI noted, at the strategic level, redundancy in analysis can provide a check-and-

balance system against inherent biases of individual analysts and organizations.26

At a certain

point, however, it is simply a waste of analytical time and resources to have every organization

looking at the same problem set. ISIS is one such current example of analytical over-focus.

Every federal law enforcement agency is utilizing their intelligence assets to assess the potential

threat ISIS poses to the homeland. Additionally, US Central Command’s intelligence assets (as

well as all of their subordinate elements), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), CIA, and US

European Command are all assessing ISIS for potential threats. As the DNI noted, additional

analysis from different organizations can help curb bias, but having essentially every element of

the USIC focused on a single problem that has not yet demonstrated an ability to strike heavily at

or even reach the US is a waste of resources.

26

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Questions & Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11,"

The Atlantic (July 19, 2010), http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/politics/question_and_answer_ic.pdf

(accessed November 28, 2014), 1.

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Budgetary Concerns

After the Cold War, the USIC was reduced by 23% throughout the 1990s.27

Since 9/11,

the budget of the USIC nearly doubled that of the height of the Cold War.28

However,

sequestration is now the law of the land and will require a 7% budget cut to the USIC. This will

mandate reduced manning, system updates, collection capability, and analytical training. It took

10 years to generate the capacity that is now available within the USIC to combat terror

organizations, and if that capability is again decimated through budget reductions our nation will

once again be open to anther intelligence failure such as the one that led to 9/11.

Under sequestration, the USIC budget has been significantly reduced $75.4 billion in

FY12 to a requested budget of $67 billion for FY15.29

Part of the problem is that the USIC

budget is it is split into two components: the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the

Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The DNI requests the NIP and the DOD requests the MIP

in addition to defense appropriations. The intention of the NIP is to focus the nonmilitary

intelligence community efforts on strategic level analysis and decision maker support. The

problem is that 90% of the NIP goes to support DOD controlled programs.30

With the continued

threat of sequestration cuts to the overall federal budget, the DOD has found a method to avoid

some of the cuts by having the NIP fund a large portion of their intelligence programs. The

purpose of the USIC is not solely to support military efforts. The USIC has a war component, but

the overall mission is to support all decision makers to ensure the safety and security of the US

27

Senate Select Committee for Intelligence, "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States

(Video)," United States Senate (March 12, 2013),

http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?comm=intel&type=live&filename=intel031213&stt=22:25&dur=135: (accessed

November 13, 2014), 47:08. 28

Erwin, Intelligence Issues for Congress, 4. 29

Steven Aftergood, "Intelligence Budget Data," Federation of American Scientists (n.d.), http://fas.org/irp/budget/

(accessed November 28, 2014). 30

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for

Congress, by Marshall C. Erwin and Amy Belasco, CRS Report R42061 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional

Information and Publishing, September 18, 2013), 11.

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and its citizens. Statutory changes must be made to ensure the intelligence budget goes where it

is needed and all parties are accountable.

Post 9/11 Reforms

Since 9/11, there have been three main acts passed by Congress in an attempt to correct

the structural and procedural issues that they believe lead to the attacks. The Patriot Act was

designed to provide the USIC and LE with broader authority and more tools to combat terrorism

both domestically and abroad. The Homeland Security Act (HSA) was designed to change the

structure of the domestic LE and intelligence agencies to provide for greater coordination and

consolidated oversight. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was the

capstone structural change following the 9/11 and Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

investigations. The following sections will discuss these acts in greater detail.

USA Patriot Act

Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress accused the USIC of a lack of coordination and

information sharing, which it asserted had directly led to the tragedy of 9/11. To ensure that

another attack of this nature would not occur due to the LE and USIC’s ability to gather and

share required information, Congress passed the Patriot Act, which eased restrictions on

collection of personal information communications in domestic criminal cases and foreign

intelligence operations and eliminated the statutory barriers which limited information sharing

within the USIC.31

These expanded authorities initiated a debate regarding the need to protect the

civil liberties enjoyed in the US and the requirement to conduct thorough national-security

investigations.32

31

107th Congress, "USA Patriot Act of 2001." 32

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Government Collection of Private Information:

Background and Issues Related to the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, by Anna C. Henning, Elizabeth B. Bazan,

Charles Doyle, and Edward C. Liu, CRS Report R40980 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and

15

The First and Fourth Amendment issues with the Patriot Act continue to be of serious

concern. In particular, this includes the fear of a government restriction on First Amendment

rights stemming from the collection of private information or a stifling of public discussions, and

the non-disclosure requirements that are attached to LE orders for business records.33

The Fourth

Amendment concerns stem from the issue of collection of communication records without a

warrant.34

All of these issues are of valid concern to the public and continue to lead policymakers

to question whether the Patriot Act is of enough utility to trump these concerns.

Homeland Security Act

The HSA was enacted following the 9/11 attacks and established the DHS as an executive

branch department. The mission of DHS was to prevent another terrorist act in the US. To that

end, multiple agencies were consolidated under the DHS umbrella, including US Customs and

Border Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), US Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), US Coast

Guard (USCG), and Secret Service (USSS).35

Originally, many called for the FBI’s placement in

DHS, but those efforts did not come to fruition. Further, the HSA tasks DHS with the mission of

preventing further terrorist acts within the US, but the Attorney General assigned primary

authority to investigate and prosecute terror cases to the FBI. Any case that is started with a DHS

agency that is found to have ties to terrorist must be turned over to the FBI as the lead agency.36

The original intention of the HSA was to consolidate the agencies responsible for the

protection of the homeland and provide for a more streamlined system. The DHS continues to

Publishing, March 2, 2010), 1. 33

Ibid., 3-4. 34

Ibid., 2-3. 35

107th Congress, "Homeland Security Act of 2002" (November 25, 2002),

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf (accessed November 11, 2014). 36

"28 CFR 0.85 - General Functions," (l).

16

have issues with coordination and information-sharing with agencies within and outside the

department. The issues that brought about the need for the HSA continue.

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

The IRTPA was enacted in response to the 9/11 Commission report and the intelligence

failure regarding WMDs in Iraq. The IRTPA created the position of the DNI, designated DHS as

responsible for preflight watch list screenings, and established the NCTC.37

The DNI position was created in response to the 9/11 Commission’s assessment that the

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) could not adequately manage the USIC while also leading

the CIA. Therefore, the DNI position was created in an effort to separate the nominal head of the

USIC from any one agency to foster impartiality towards all agencies’ analysis.38

The IRTPA was a good start at reorganizing the USIC in order to consolidate and

strengthen the entities responsible for protecting our country, but the DNI’s position remains

weak without any true control over the USIC. The elements of the USIC remain disparate

agencies answering to multiple masters, and the DOD maintains control over the bulk of

intelligence agencies, allowing for the dominance of military matters in the larger intelligence

effort.

The National and Defense Clandestine Services

On October 13, 2005, DNI John Negroponte and Director of the CIA Porter Goss

announced the creation of the NCS within the CIA. The NCS was created to bring HUMINT

operations under a single umbrella. The NCS is responsible for coordination, de-confliction, and

37

108th Congress, "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004." 38

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), http://www.9-

11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed November 11, 2014), 399.

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assessment of all HUMINT operations across the USIC.39

On April 23, 2012, the Washington Post leaked the DOD’s plans to create a similar entity,

the DCS, under the DIA. The article stated that the DCS would work closely with the NCS on all

HUMINT matters.40

This consolidation and promise of coordination will hopefully increase the

ability of the USIC to obtain verifiable HUMINT, increase the professional capabilities of all

HUMINT professionals, and ensure validated targets are not tasked by multiple organizations for

collection.

Prior Proposed Reforms

For decades, there have been calls to reorganize the USIC into a more modern and

focused entity. Many of these plans have called for centralized control by one entity or another

based on the proposer’s experience and personal desires. One item these proposals have in

common is recognition that the current Cold War structure of the USIC does not fully meet the

needs of the current threat environment or budget constraints. The following sections will discuss

three prior proposals for setting the USIC on a new path for a new era.

The Lederman Proposal

In 2005, Gordon Nathaniel Lederman wrote an article discussing the history of reforms

within the USIC and the future direction that must be taken in order to ensure the integrity and

relevance of the community in the future. In his vision, the DNI must take a strong role in

controlling and directing the USIC backed by a supportive President.41

Specifically, he called for

the DNI to develop common security requirements for the community, common and modern

39

Central Intelligence Agency, "Establishment of the National Clandestine Service," Central Intelligence Agency

(October 13, 2005), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/

press-release-archive-2005/pr10132005.html (accessed November 11, 2014). 40

Miller, "Pentagon establishes Defense Clandestine Service, new espionage unit." 41

Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, "Restructuring the Intelligence Community," in The Future of American

Intelligence, ed. Peter Berkowitz, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2005), 100.

18

information systems, and personnel procedures and policies to transform the community into a

network. The ultimate end state of Lederman’s vision is not a community at all but a

transformation into a unified network where the heads of each agency report to the DNI and

through him to the president.42

Further he viewed the way forward for a US Intelligence Network

as the National Intelligence Centers.43

Lederman understood that the USIC is more than simply

collection and analysis. It must be utilized to formulate and inform diplomacy and economic

programs.44

His plan calls for a more powerful DNI who is able to control personnel actions,

policies, operations, and provide direction and guidance throughout the 17 agencies that for the

USIC without any real structural changes to the existing organization. This plan is likely the

simplest to implement as it only requires the President to entrust more authority into an existing

position which already has nominal control over the noted areas. The real issues exist where the

rubber meets the road: How likely are the various agency heads to allow an outsider control over

their personnel and programs, especially the DOD? This proposal requires the 17 agencies,

including the 4 military services, to subordinate their plans to those put forth by the DNI.

The Raschke Proposal

Diana Raschke provided an innovative set of recommendations for the future of the USIC

in 2008. Her view of the current state of the USIC is that it is a hold-over structure from the Cold

War where the US built organizations and established programs to match and compete with the

USSR without regard for the future or other concerns in the world. This created a community

comprised of specialists who only focus on their specific “INT” within their agency, with little

coordination or information sharing. Further, she states that within agencies, they keep a close

hold on their data and analysis, only releasing redacted database access or tearlines to their

42

Ibid., 101. 43

Ibid., 101. 44

Ibid., 102.

19

products, promoting a sense of distrust within the community.45

If we are all members of the

same community, tasked with the same mission, and possess the same clearance, why do we not

have access to the same information and analysis? Compartmentalization has its uses, but when

propriety approaches become the norm, the USIC and our national security suffer. Radschke’s

solution to the problem is a complete reorganization of the USIC into two groups: collectors and

analysts. In the center of this new system a technical core of collection capabilities and personnel

would serve an analytical corps as their sole customer. With this technical core all processing and

dissemination activities would be centralized thereby significantly reducing costs and redundant

processes. The analytical corps of this new intelligence apparatus would be organized by

mission, both geographical and functional. There would exist, as currently does in many major

agencies, geographically focused analytical groups as well as those focused on specific mission

areas such as cyber threats or threat finance. This reorganization would be dissimilar to previous

reshufflings that have focused more on efficiency for efficiency’s sake or to appease Congress.

This plan seeks to remake the community based on the current future threats to this nation.

Raschke claims that the current IC structure is not prepared for the current asymmetric threat,

and that her plan will provide a much-needed nimbleness that the community currently lacks.

The most innovative and potentially game-changing component of her plan is the removal of the

need-to-know requirement for intelligence for those possessing the required clearance. In her

plan, any analyst with the proper clearance would have access to all available information on any

target.46

This single change would revolutionize the way the community creates analytical

products. All analysts, regardless of parent organization, would have the capability to produce

more complete analytic products using information fused from many sources.

45

Diana Raschke, "Asymmetric Warfare Requires Intelligence Community Reorganization," AFCEA (April 2008),

http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1553 (accessed October 31, 2014). 46

Ibid.

20

The Kindsvater Proposal

Larry Kindsvater stated in his 2007 proposal that the USIC, despite numerous calls for

fundamental change, is essentially the same as it was in 1947, focusing on collection rather than

the analytical and support requirements of national security. He believed that the greatest issue

within the community was the focus on type of collection rather than on supporting any

particular analytical mission. Therefore, his proposal seeks to wrest control of the USIC away

from a primarily DOD-focused effort and return power and authority to the CIA. He envisions

the DCI as the head of the USIC with mission centers under his control. Within these mission

centers, representatives of the various collection agencies would work with expert analysts in

order to support the specific mission of the center. Each center would report directly back to the

DCI and not to any other agency. Further, Kindsvater proposed that each USIC agency head be

appointed by and report directly to the DCI and not to the DOD or other department heads as the

community currently works.47

As a career CIA officer, he has an obvious and understandable

CIA bias, but his mission-center concept is in line with others’ proposals and provides the

community with a flexible and powerful system to continue to combat the current and future

threats the US faces.

Challenges to Prior Proposals

As Kindsvater noted in 2007, every attempt to place a functional figure with real and

substantial community-wide authority at the head of the USIC has been ignored.48

Committee

after committee and expert after expert has trotted out their solution to the obvious issues within

the community, but all of them have been ignored. Why will the President, DNI, DCI, DOD, and

47

Larry C. Kindsvater, "The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community," Central Intelligence Agency (May 8,

2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol47no1/html/v47i1a03p.htm

(accessed October 31, 2014), 34-7. 48

Ibid., 34.

21

Congress not act to fix the systematic issues present in the USIC? Richard Best stated that one of

the largest issues in instituting any significant changes to the USIC is the predominance of the

DOD in community matters.49

Since the DOD receives 90% of the entire intelligence budget and

reform efforts would prove problematic without revamping the way the military engages as part

of the USIC.50

Further, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees would lose significant

authority over intelligence activities due to this type of reorganization.51

These three groups

provide a significant and weighty roadblock to any meaningful change. Another significant

community commentator, Richard Betts, stated in 2004 that any attempt to remove the

intelligence agencies from the DOD would result in a political bloodbath in Congress, the DOD,

and White House.52

Simply allowing the situation to continue, however, is not a solution either.

There must come a time when Congress and the President recognize that the USIC cannot

continue in its current configuration and hope to provide the required analysis and support to

national security. Hopefully, that time will come prior to another significant failure and loss of

life.

Recommendations

Intelligence failures have happened and will continue to happen in the future. The goal of

any intelligence reform should be to minimize those failures in frequency and scope, not to

eliminate them entirely—an objective that is simply impossible to achieve. With this

understanding, the following USIC structural realignment recommendation is based on the

premises that the USIC knows how to train analysts and collectors to hold themselves and those

49

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential

Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies, by Richard A. Best Jr., CRS Report RL32515 (Washington, DC: Office of

Congressional Information and Publishing, December 21, 2004), 10. 50

Erwin, Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress, 11. 51

Best, Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies, 9-10. 52

Richard K. Betts, "The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?" Foreign Affairs 83,

(May/June 2004), pages 2-8., 6.

22

around them to the highest professional standards while avoiding all of the potential cognitive

biases.

The “spread” of the USIC across 17 agencies in 7 departments without a clear leader in

charge of budget and direct management of the community will continue to lead to infighting and

a failure to coordinate efforts and share information and analysis. The following sections of this

work will outline, in broad strokes, a plan to create a new Executive Branch Department, the

Department of Information Management (DIM), to consolidate intelligence operations under a

single leader capable of coordinating and directing the actions of the USIC.

Secretary of Information Management

The first and most fundamental aspect of this proposal is that the current Office of the

Director of National Intelligence will transition to the Secretary of Information Management

(SIM) creating a single cabinet member in charge of the entire USIC, including budgetary

matters. This will give the SIM the authority to direct the USIC in a way that the current DNI

does not possess. Additionally, the removal of the various intelligence agencies from their home

departments will reduce the burden on the agencies in terms of reporting and support since they

will have a single chain of command.

Department of Information Management

The DIM, under the leadership of the SIM, will be a unique Department in the Executive

Branch where members of the other departments will transfer and work in the various agencies

for set periods of time or entire careers. The first set of agencies that will be brought under the

DIM will be the DOD USIC agencies: DIA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA),

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Security Agency (NSA). The obvious

problem with bringing the service-element agencies into the new construct, at least initially, is

23

that it would be extraordinarily difficult to accomplish without an entire overhaul of the DOD

and USCG. Nonetheless, the transfer of the above-named agencies will place the major elements

of defense intelligence under the authority of the DIM. The service members who support these

agencies for their designated tours will continue to do so, but it will be considered an inter-

agency tour instead of the current designation as a joint tour.

The DCS program will be removed from DIA and brought entirely into the CIA. The

CIA’s HUMINT mission will continue as currently executed with the expansion to include

defense HUMINT requirements. This consolidation will provide a single agency in charge of all

HUMINT operations worldwide, minimizing duplication of sources and mission sets.

Similar to Raschke’s 2008 plan, the various collection agencies will be collected under

the DIM and provide direct support to the analysts. Collection priorities will be managed and

tasked from within the DIM to ensure collection platforms and resources are properly managed

to meet national-security support requirements.

National Analysis Directorate

The CIA’s Directorate of Analysis (DI) will be removed from the agency and

consolidated with DIA, DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), OIC, OIA, I&A, and

ONSI. The new agency will be named the National Analysis Directorate (NAD), and it will be in

charge of all analysis in support of policy, defense, and national security matters. This

consolidation will ensure a consistency of analysis and reduce much of the redundancy in the

components scattered throughout the USIC.

Within the NAD, centers of excellence focusing on geographic regions (aligned with

DOD Combatant Commands [COCOMS]) and functional areas (cyber, threat finance,

transportation, and space) will provide the specific analytical support to decision makers and

24

military operations. This consolidation will provide the entire US government with a clearer

analytical picture of the threat environment while removing the agency biases and internal

political games that currently plague national-level analysis.

One final item also in line with Raschke’s 2008 proposal is the removal of the “need to

know” requirement for intelligence. All analysts who have the required level of security

clearance will have access to all intelligence at that level. As previously discussed, this flattening

of the field will remove a large portion of the “my rice bowl” mentality that currently pervades

the community. Information, intelligence, and analysis should not belong to any one person,

group, or agency. It must be available to all in the community to ensure that all fusion products

are as complete as possible, providing the best assessments to decision makers.

Federal Counterterrorism Bureau

The FBI stands as the lead agency, clearing house, and coordinating body for

counterterrorism efforts within the borders of the US. Additionally, it is tasked as the premier

criminal investigative body for the federal government. This requires the FBI’s agents to transfer

between two mentalities; reactive and proactive. Criminal cases are reactive in nature, requiring

the agents to gather evidence to identify and eventually prosecute the perpetrators. In

counterterrorism, the goal is to determine who the perpetrators will be and intervene prior to any

criminal act. These two skill sets are often contradictory in nature, and it does not serve the

national good to have individuals bounce between each instead of mastering one. Current FBI

agents are the premier criminal investigative professionals in the world. They should be allowed

to focus solely on criminal matters to further deter those types of crimes and foster an elite cadre

of investigators.

25

A new agency within the DIM must be created to further the nation’s counterterrorism

efforts. This agency would utilize the intelligence provided by the other DIM agencies to track

and deter terrorist acts within the US and have the LE authority to collect evidence for a

prosecutorial case against those individuals. The current FBI Counterterrorism Divisions will be

removed from the FBI and used as the basis for this new agency. The removal of these assets

from the FBI’s current mission would allow the FBI to focus exclusively on criminal matters and

the new agency, the Federal Counterterrorism Bureau (FCB), to focus on the protection of this

nation from current and future terrorist threats. The FCB would carryover the JTTF program

ensuring that the outstanding efforts made by these groups would continue in the future. A

greater cross assignment of agents and officers from other federal investigative and regulatory

agencies must be required as well. To allow the FCB to serve as the counterterrorism agency, the

authorities granted to it would be expanded to include foreign operations as well. Additionally,

the intelligence agencies of the DIM would provide the analytical support necessary to create a

true force against domestic and international terrorism. The FCB should become the premier and

one-stop shop for all matters relating to domestic and international counterterrorism. The

placement of the FCB within the DIM would ensure that the congressionally mandated mission

of countering terrorist threats against the homeland would be upheld.53

As NCTC is the premier counterterrorism watch and analysis organization and is a

component of the ODNI.54

It is only logical that it should continue its mission within the DIM in

support of the FCB’s mission to protect the US from terror attacks.

53

107th Congress, "Homeland Security Act of 2002," sec. 101.b.1.A-G. 54

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Overview,” National Counterterrorism Center (n.d.),

http://www.nctc.gov/overview.html (accessed December 4, 2014).

26

Conclusion

The USIC is a powerful and vital organization that provides support to every level of

government involved in national security. It has served this nation well over the past 67 years

and has the potential to continue doing so. However, the threat environment has changed

dramatically since the founding of the community. The USSR no longer exists and there are no

super-powers seeking to destroy us at every turn. The current and future threat picture is

comprised of small, flexible groups and individuals seeking to conduct asymmetric warfare

against the US and its allies. Regional powers and rogue states, along with international criminal

organizations, round out the list of adversaries. They seek to destabilize the current world order

in order to further their own agendas, and the USIC is not structured to combat this threat. It has

done well over the last 12 years and kept American citizens safe, but the dynamic nature of the

threat demands an equally dynamic and flexible intelligence apparatus. The USIC must change

to meet and defeat the enemy, and those in charge must not only allow it but encourage it.

27

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