Lecture: Realist Theories of International Relations, 2014-15

Lecture 1b Realist Theories of International Relations:

A World of Conflict

International Relations Theory

2014/2015

Andreas Warntjen Department of Public Administration

Structure of the lecture

• Introduction: The Ubiquity of War

• Neo-Realism: The Perils of Anarchy

• Offensive Realism: Striving for Hegemony

• Defensive Realism: Overcoming the Security Dilemma

• Power Transition Theory: The Perils of Rising Powers

• Application: The Rise of China

Ubiquity of War

Estimate for 3600 B.C. to 1960 (5560 years):

• Only 292 (5%) years of universal peace

• 14,513 armed conflicts

• 1.24 billion dead (Osmanczyk 1990: 1018)

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Figure 1: Number of ongoing Wars per Year, 1817-2007

Source: Correlates of War Project (Interstate-War), Version 4.0, own calculations

Number of ongoing Wars per year, 1817-2007

Number of ongoing wars Frequency (percentage)

0 69 (36%)

1 75 (39%)

2 29 (15%)

3 12 (6%)

4 4 (2%)

5 1 (0.5%)

6 1 (0.5%)

TOTAL 191


Realist explanations of conflict

Realist variant Level of analysis Main cause(s) of conflict

Classsical (e.g, Morgenthau 1948)

Individual Domestic

Human nature (e.g., desire for power)

Neo-realism (e.g., Waltz 1979)

Systemic Anarchy

Power transition theory (e.g., Gilpin 1981)

Systemic Anarchy Struggle for hegemony

Defensive structural realism (e.g., Glaeser 2010)

Systemic Anarchy Offence-defence balance Signalling intentions

Offensive structural realism (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001)

Systemic Anarchy Self-help Struggle for survival Uncertainty

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Any questions?

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• The Rise of China

Neo-realism

“Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence.”

(Waltz 1979: 102, my emphasis)

“A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves … will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.”


Absolute and relative gains

‘When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must aks how the gain will be divided. They are polled to ask not “Will both of us gain?”but “Who will gain more?”.’


Absolute gains: the gains each state receives from international cooperation (e.g., trade agreement) Relative gains: relationship between absolute gains across states involved in an international agreement/effect on power balance

[email protected] 10

Neo-realism: polarity, uncertainty and conflict

“In multipolar systems there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries … In a bipolar world uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make.”


Polarity and conflict:

• Bipolar: most stable/peaceful

• Multipolar: less stable/conflict-prone


multipolar bipolar unipolar

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Number of ongoing wars Average number of ongoing wars

Figure 2: Number of Wars and Polarity, 1817-2007

Any questions?

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Offensive Realism

“Ultimately, great powers live in a fundamentally competitive world where they view each other as real, or at least potential, enemies and they therefore look to gain power at each other’s expense.”

(Mearsheimer 2001: 52, my emphasis)

“… powerful states should seek regional hegemony whenever the possibility arises.”



[email protected]

Basic premises and main conclusions

• States=primary actors in world politics

• States=rational actors

• Survival=basic aim of states

• Anarchy of international system

• Stopping power of water prevents global hegemony

► States are maximizing power

► Reliance on self-help

► Cooperation is difficult

► Striving for regional hegemony (given resources)

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The historical record Country Time period Main rivals Wars

Germany 1862-1945 France, Russia Franco-Prussian War (1870/71), WW I (1914-18), WW II (1939-45)

Japan 1868-1945 Russia, China Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Russian-Japanese War (1904/5), WW I (1914-18), Sino-Japanese War (1931-37), WW II (1941-45)

Soviet Union 1917-91 Germany, United Kingdom, France, Japan, China

WW II (1941-45), Cold War (1945-90)

Italy 1861-1943 Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire

War against Austria-Hungary (1866), North Africa (1880/90s), war against Ottoman Empire (1911), WW I (1915-17), war against Ethopia (1935/36), WW II (1940-43)

Source: Mearsheimer 2001

Germany’s foreign policy, 1862-1945

“Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was driven mainly strategic calculations. Security was always a burning issue for Germany because of geography… Consequently, German leaders were always on the lookout for opportunities to gain power and enhance the prospects for their country’s survival.”


Balancing

• States are threatened by a relative increase of power of other states

• States will try to limit the expansion of power of any other state (balancing)

– Increase of capabilities (internal balancing)

– Forming alliance (external balancing)

• Balancing threats (defensive realism) or capabilities (offensive realism)?


Offshore balancers

Great powers • strive for regional hegemony • try to prevent others from achieving regional

hegemony (to prevent threats to their own position) Offshore balancing: assisting great powers in other regions in balancing against a potential regional hegemon Empirical examples: Great Britain (Napoleonic Wars, “splendid isolation” *1816-1904]), United States (end of WW I and II, Cold War in Europe and Asia)

The effect of nuclear weapons

• Great powers strive for nuclear superiority (e.g., due to first strike capability or defensive shield)

• Equal nuclear capabilities (mutually assured destruction) induces stability at nuclear level

• Nuclear weapons decrease (but: do not eliminate) use of conventional military force due to risk of escalation

• Example: Cold War (no great power conflict, but proxy wars between allies of nuclear powers and nuclear arms race)

Any questions?

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The mitigated Effect of Anarchy

“… the anarchic international environment does not create a general tendency toward competititon: under some conditions it can fuel rational competiton between states that lack a fundamental conflict; under other conditions, the international environment can encourage cooperation between such states.”

(Glaeser 2010: 9, my emphasis)

Security Dilemma

• Defensive actions (e.g., balancing) can be mistaken as a preparation for offensive action

• Defensive action might trigger offensive action from other state (e.g., preemptive attack)

►Actions to increase security might have the unintended consequence of decreasing security

►Self-fulfilling prophecy/spiral model


The Security Dilemma and World War I

“The increase of armaments… produces [not security but+ … a sense of fear… till each Government feels it would be criminal … not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent.”

(Lord Grey, British Foreign Minister before World War I, cited in Jervis [1976: 65], my emphasis)

Defensive Realism

• Actions of states depend on – Interests (“security-seeking”/”greedy”)

– Capabilities

– Offense-defense balance

– Offense-defense distinguishability

– Information regarding intentions of other states

• Contrast to offensive realism – Balancing threats (not capabilities)

– Maximimizing security (not power)

Overcoming the Security Dilemma

• Signalling benign intent:

– Arms control (particularly regarding offensive weapons)

– Emphasis on defensive weapons

– Unilateral constraint

• Increasing the security of (potential) adversaries

Any questions?

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The Perils of Rising Powers

“… nations are constantly changing in power… the major ways in which individual nations have increased their power have been through industrialization, imperialism and immi-gration... For the neighbors or potential enem-ies … the increase in strength… is extremely discomforting.”

(Organski 1968: 346, my emphasis)

Source: Bueno de Mesquita (2014)

Probability of Conflict

• Power ratio between challenger and dominant power

• Sources of power: economic growth, population, political capability

• Window of opportunity for challenger (80% - 120%)

• Challenger’s (dis)satisfaction with current status quo

• Similarity of policy goals (e.g., democratic peace)

Source: Bueno de Mesquita (2014)






• Power Transition Theory


The Rise of China

• Largest population (1.4 billion)

• Largest economy (GDP) in the near future

• Significant investments in military power

The Rise of China: Comparative Assessment

Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/16/china_graphs_fastest_rising_power_in_history#_

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/16/china_graphs_fastest_rising_power_in_history

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/16/china_graphs_fastest_rising_power_in_history

The Rise of China

Offensive structural realism

• Struggle for survival

=maximizing power

• More capabilities → expansionary policies

• Expansionary policies

→ counteractions of other

states (balancing)

► Escalation of conflict is likely

Defensive structural realism

• Struggle for survival

=seeking security

• ‘appropriate’ power (security dilemma)

• Balancing threats, not capabilities (signalling)

• defense advantages

► Conflict, but escalation not likely


Any questions?

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References

Elman, C., & Jensen, M. (2013) Realisms. In P. D. Williams (Ed.), Security Studies. New York: Routledge Gilpin, R (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Guardian (2014) China poised to overtake US as world’s largest economy, research shows, 30 April 2014 Glaeser, C. (2010) A Rational Theory of International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperecption in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press Mearsheimer, John (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton Morgenthau, Hans (1948) Politics among Nations, New York: Knopf Nau, H. (2014) Perspectives on International Relations. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press Organski, F. (1968) World Politics. New York: Knopf. Osmanczyk, E. (1990) The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Relations/ New York: Taylor and Francis Shukman, D. (2011) China to ‘overtake US on science’ in two years, BBC News, 28 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-12885271, retrieved 8.7.2014 Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill

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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-12885271








Lecture: Realist Theories of International Relations, 2014-15

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