Kruglanski, A. W., & Mayseless, O., (1990). Classic and current social-comparison research-...

Psychological Bulletin1990, Vol. 108, No. 2,195-208

Copyright 1990 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0033-2909/9Q/S00.75

Classic and Current Social Comparison Research:Expanding the Perspective

Arie W KruglanskiUniversity of Maryland

Ofra MayselessHaifa University, Haifa, Israel

This article assumes that social comparisons (a) constitute comparative judgments governed by thegeneral process that applies to all judgments, (b) possess a common comparative structure includ-

ing simple judgments of comparison stimuli and their juxtaposition, and (c) possess unique con-

tents that determine the subjective meanings of comparison outcomes and their psychological

implications. Examined in these terms, classical social comparison theory is found wanting in two

respects: (a) It conveys a relatively fixed notion of social comparison in which people are generally

driven to compare and do so mostly with respect to similar others and predominantly for the sake of

evaluative accuracy, (b) Its narrow scope excludes numerous significant issues of interest to social

comparison research today. It is proposed that the present, multilevel approach is useful for order-ing past social comparison research and provides a heuristically rich paradigm for future work.

Although interest in social comparison phenomena haswaxed and waned over the years, Festinger's (1954a, 1954b)theory of social comparison processes has remained the mostinfluential conceptual framework to guide this domain ofstudy (Goethals, 1986). The theory of social comparison restson the assumption that people possess a drive to evaluate theiropinions and abilities. This may take place by reference to physi-cal reality (as in assessing one's ability to lift a weight by actualattempts to do so), or, where objective means of evaluation areunavailable, by comparison with other people. A major tenet ofthe theory has been that similar rather than dissimilar othersprovide the more desirable standard for comparison. Conse-quently, in order to precisely evaluate their opinions and abili-ties, persons were assumed to generally prefer comparisonswith individuals who are similar to themselves.

Over the years, Festinger's theory has undergone a number ofrevisions and extensions. In particular, new domains of compar-ison have been proposed (e.g., emotions, sec Schachter, 1959;and values, see Goethals & Darley, 1977). Similarly, additionalmotives relevant to comparison processes have been enumer-ated, such as the needs for self-enhancement (Cruder, 1971),validation (Goethals & Darley, 1977), maintenance of a positiveself-evaluation (Tesser & Campbell, 1982), closure, and theavoidance of closure (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). Further-more, situations have been identified where dissimilar ratherthan similar others are preferred as targets of comparison(Goethals & Nelson, 1973; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987; Met-tee & Smith, 1977; Wills, 1981). Finally, a reconceptualization

Order of authorship was determined randomly and does not reflect

relative contribution.

We are indebted to Al Goethals, Tory Higgins, John Levine, Jud

Mills, Lee Ross, Bill Smith, and two anonymous reviewers for com-

ments on an earlier draft.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Arie

W Kruglanski, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland,

College Park, Maryland 20742.

of the critical similarity dimension has been proposed, in termsof similarity in attributes relatedto an opinion or a performancerather than similarity in opinion or performance per se (Ber-scheid, 1966; Goethals & Darley, 1977).

Despite these revisions, fundamental aspects of Festinger'soriginal conception have remained intact, notably that (a) an-other person's similarity to oneself (however defined) is a cru-cial parameter of social comparison; (b) if not exactly of a"drive-like" quality, there exists a fairly general and pervasivetendency toward social comparison, and (c) the processes ofsocial comparison differ across content domains of compari-son. For instance, a "unidirectional drive to do better and bet-ter" exists when comparing one's abilities but not one's opin-ions (Festinger, 1954a), and a preference for similar others ismore pronounced in the domain of values than that of opinions(Goethals & Darley, 1977).

Generally, social comparison processes pertain to compara-tive judgments that people render about their various attri-butes. Therefore, most social psychologists would probablyagree that if one applied what is known about the judgmentalprocess to the social comparison domain, there should be nodisagreement. Surprisingly, however, examination of the socialcomparison theory from a general judgmental perspective re-veals several major incompatibilities. One of the goals of thisarticle is to identify these discrepancies and appraise pertinentsocial comparison hypotheses in light of current judgmentaltheory and research.

Furthermore, classical comparison research has focused on arestricted range of topics concerning, in particular, locus ofcomparison issues (e.g., Cruder, 1971) and the role of interper-sonal similarity in the comparison process (e.g., Goethals &Nelson, 1973). Such restriction of focus omits important com-parison concerns that clearly deserve the attention of socialpsychologists. Indeed, in recent years several lines of socialcomparison work have been undertaken that do not readily fitthe traditional molds of social comparison theory. Such re-search includes attempts to map out the diverse types of possi-

195

196 ARIE W KRUGLANSKI AND OFRA MAYSELESS

ble comparisons (Higgins, in press; Levine & Moreland, 1986,1987; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988; M. Ross, Eyman, &Kishchuk, 1986), to explore the affective consequences of com-parison against qualitatively different standards (Higgins,Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Major & Testa, 1989; Olson &Ross. 19X4), and to investigate the psychological significance ofthe distinction between the subject and the referent of compari-son (Holyoak & Gordon. 1983: Houston, Sherman, & Baker,1989; Tversky, 1977). This research is discussed in more detaillater. Ils existence and scope, however, raise the need for abroader conception of social comparison phenomena capableof addressing both the traditional comparison concerns andthose investigated outside the classical paradigm. A major pur-pose of this article is to outline such an integrative conception.

A Three-Level Analysis of Social Comparisons

We define social comparisons broadly as comparative judg-ments of social stimuli on particular content dimensions. Thisframing implies that social comparison phenomena can be ap-proached on three levels of analysis. The most general level isthat of the judgmental process that social comparisons as judg-ments must follow. The second level recognizes that social com-parisons as a category share a special kind of judgmental struc-ture: They represent comparative judgments, including simplejudgments (e.g., of stimulus A and stimulus B) as well as theirjuxtaposition (i.e., A vs. B). The third and most specific levelrefers to the unique contents of a given comparison, including,for example, the specific domain of comparison (e.g., academicachievement) and the specific social stimuli being compared(e.g., self vs. friend). Such specific contents of comparisons mayoften drive both specific affect and overt action instigated by agiven comparison outcome.

We assume that the judgmental process principles apply(among others) to ail social judgments whose structure is com-parative. However, not all phenomena governed by the generaljudgmental process are comparative (i.e, some judgments arenoncomparative). Furthermore, the same comparative struc-ture is common to all possible contents of social comparison;obviously, however, not all comparative judgments share thesame contents ofcomparison. More important, we will attemptto show that each of the foregoing three levels of analysis ex-plains unique aspects of social comparisons and, therefore, thatall arc needed for a complete understanding of comparisonphenomena.

Judgmental Process Factors in Social Comparison

Theory of Lay Episternics

The following portrayal of social judgment is based on ourtheory of lay epistemics described in detail elsewhere (Krug-lanski, 1980, 1989; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983: Kruglanski &Klar, 1987; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987,1988; Mayseless &Kruglanski, 1987). The lay epistemic theory addresses the gen-eral process whereby persons form their judgments. Thus, thetheory aims at identifying the underlying common principlesof numerous midrange social cognitive theories as attribution(Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley. 1967; Kruglanski, 1980), disso-

nance and balance (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Kruglanski& Klar, 1987), notions of judgmental heuristics (Kruglanski,1989b; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Nisbett & Ross, 1980;Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), or attitudes (Kruglanski, 1989a).The lay epistemic theory is outlined briefly below, highlightingaspects germane to the social comparison topic.

Epistemic Sequence: Hypothesis Evaluation

The process of knowledge formation is assumed to includetwo interwoven stages—hypothesis generation and hypothesisevaluation. The evaluation process consists of considering thehypothesis in light of relevant evidence. In turn, relevancemeans that the hypothesis and the evidence arc linked in theindividual's mind in an "if-then" fashion.' In other words, rele-vance depends on the person's subjective inference rules inwhich a given category of evidence implies the hypothesis. Forinstance, an individual may subscribe to the rule that "the totalon a purchase bill is the sum of the individual prices plus tax."This establishes, for example, that individual prices are relevantevidence for inference of the total; specifically, if the individualprices are x and y, then the total is z (their sum). Alternatively,the individual may subscribe to the rule that "Jane isan arithme-tic genius." which (by implication) establishes Jane's opinion asalso relevant to inference of the total (reasoning that "if Janesays the bill amounts to a given sum, this must be so").

For an opinion to form, the general inference rule invokedmust be instantiated for the situation at hand. Thus, the spe-cific details of the evidence need to be ascertained (e.g., thecomplete list of the individual prices or Jane's specific opinion),allowing the derivation of the specific judgment implied by therule (e.g., that the total bill amounts to a given figure).

hypothesis Generation

Often the individual may have available in memory severaldifferent rules pertinent to the same problem, for example,linking different types of evidence to the same judgment orlinking the same type of evidence to different judgments (or"competing hypotheses"). \et further rules may be constructedby the individual under appropriate circumstances.

The lay epistemic model recognizes two broad categories offactors that govern the amount and type of rules considered bythe individual. These categories relate to considerations of ac-cessibility (e.g, Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins, King, & Mavin,1982) and motivation (Kruglanski, I989a, in press). A givenrule is likely to be invoked if it is currently accessible in mem-ory; for example, because of its recent or frequent activation(Higgins, Bargh, & Lombard!, 1985).

The epistemic motivations relevant lo rule generation are theneed for cognitive closure, reflecting the desire for a definiteanswer on a topic and an intolerance of ambiguity; the need toavoid closure, reflecting the desire to suspend judgmental com-

1 The "logical" if-then structure is assumed lo also apply to statisti-

cal inference in which the antecedent terms (e.g., properties of a distri-bution of scores) imply a probability (e.g., that a score falls within a

given range of values). For a detailed discussion of the common pro-

cess of logical and statistical inference, sec Klar (1989).

SOCIAL COMPARISON 197

mitment; and needs for specific closure or the avoidance ofspecific closure, reflecting the desire to reach or avoid specificanswers to one's questions. In general, the various epistemicmotivations are assumed to bias rule generation toward desiredepistemic end states. For example, the need for cognitive clo-sure may restrict the number of inference rules being consid-ered, whereas the need to avoid closure may increase their num-ber (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987). Furthermore, needs for (orfor the avoidance of) specific closure may bias the generation ofrules toward those presumed to provide the desired answer.

Implications for Social Comparison Processes

We now consider some implications of our epistemic analysisfor social comparison phenomena, starting with the issue ofconditions for comparison.

Conditions for Comparison (the "When" Question)

First, we assume that no social comparison will occur unlessthe individual has at least some interest in comparative knowl-edge on a topic, that is, some degree of the need for closure orfor a specific closure on this issue. Note that not every absenceof comparative knowledge instigates a desire for knowledge.Occasionally, it fulfills a wish to avoid closure and affords awelcome suspension of commitment (Brickman & Bulman,1977; Snyder & Wicklund, 1981; Kruglanski, in press).

Second, we assume that the epistemic motivations are basedon the perceived benefits and costs of attaining an answer (or aspecific answer) to a comparative question (Kruglanski, inpress). In turn, the perceived benefits or costs of comparativeanswers are likely to vary across situations, cultures, or personal-ity types. For instance, attendance at a professional conventionmay make salient to oneself one's career goals. This may en-hance the perceived benefits of knowledge about one's relativeaccomplishments compared to one's peers, setting forth a pro-cess of social comparison. Similarly, a competitive culture mayfoster greater interest in comparisons than a less competitiveculture, and a competitive person may generally have greaterinterest in social comparisons than a less competitive individ-ual. Unlike classical social comparison formulations, then, weare not assuming a general "drive" to self-evaluate leading tosocial comparison, or even a pervasive tendency to sociallycompare. Instead, we assume that interest in social comparisonwill vary, depending on the subjective value for the individualof a given kind of comparative knowledge.

Choice and Impact of the Comparison Other

(the "Who" Question)

Motivational compatibility. A fundamental question raisedby social comparison theory in its original version (Festinger,1954a, 1954b) concerned the type of comparison others2 towhich people normally turn for information and the impactthat information from different such social sources has on peo-ple's opinions. Early social comparison theory answered thequestion by highlighting in this connection the role of the simi-lar other. Specifically, individuals were presumed to exhibit gen-eral preference for information from similar (vs. dissimilar)

others and to derive greater confidence from such information.In contrast, our lay epistemic analysis suggests that no generaltendency to choose or be influenced by similar others should beexpected. Instead, the choice and impact of comparison othersmay be determined by factors that affect those matters for anyinformational source. The likelihood that the source will fur-nish motivationally compatible information is one such factor.Results of social comparison research are generally consistentwith the motivational compatibility hypothesis. Thus, Broad-beck (1956) reported that the tendency to choose a similar otherfor comparison varied as an inverse function of subjective con-fidence. Worchel and McCormick (1963) found greater likingfor an agreeing other after the subject encountered severalprevious disagreements as compared with several agreements.Similarly Shrauger and Jones (1968) found more liking foragreers, and disliking for disagreers. when the answer to a judg-mental issue was unclear (vs. clear) to subjects. In all the forego-ing cases, subjects may have a stronger need to believe that theyare right after their self-confidence has been lowered. Suchneed for specific closure may induce greater liking for, or choiceof, the agreeing other who furnishes motivationally compatibleinformation.

Kruglanski and Mayseless (1987) recently conducted four ex-perimental studies to test the effects of motivational variableson comparison preferences for similarly versus dissimilarlyminded others. In one study subjects' defensiveness wasaroused by instructions that they would have to justify theiropinions to others. In another condition, subjects' "fear of inva-lidity" was aroused by instructions that accurate opinionswould qualify them for a monetary reward. Subjects in theformer condition preponderantly chose to compare with simi-lar others, whereas those in the latter condition preponderantlychose to compare with dissimilar others. Further experimentsreplicated the finding that high (vs. low) fear of invalidity in-duces a tendency to compare with dissimilar others. In addi-tion, these experiments demonstrated that high (vs. low) needfor cognitive closure enhances the tendency to compare withsimilar others.

It appears, then, that either similarly or dissimilarly mindedothers may be chosen for comparison to the extent that theinformation they are expected to provide is compatible with thechoosers' motivation. Similar motivational effects emerged instudies that referred to similarity of general attitudes or attri-

2 In past research the term comparison other has been used indis-

criminately in two separate senses. One sense denotes asocial sourceof

information that may be used to examine any question of interest, for

example, where relevant "physical sources" are unavailable (Festinger,

1954a). In this sense, comparison with a "similar other" amounts to

seeking the information (on any topic) from persons resembling one-self on some dimension. Our discussion of the judgmental process

refers to this sense of (source) similarity. In the second sense, the "com-

parison other" relates the specific content of a question in which peo-

ple may have an interest (Smith, 1981) and that concerns one's standingon some dimension relative to another individual. The similarity issue

here is whether persons are predominantly interested in how they mea-

sure up againstsimilar or dissimilar others. This latter sense of similar-

ity, logically unrelated to the former, is intended in our discussion of

comparison contents.


butes related to the opinion rather than to the similarity of theopinion as such (Goethals & Nelson, 1973). For example, Reek-man and Goethals (1973) found that subjects concerned withaccuracy had equal preference to compare with others dissimi-lar or similar on related attributes. Subjects concerned withcongenial association preferred similar over dissimilar others.Fazio (1979) combined both agreement and similarity in oneexperimental design and found that when subjects' goal wasbelief confirmation (the "motive for validation" condition),their tendency to choose similar or agreeing others was higherthan when their goal was accuracy (the "motive for construc-tion" condition).

The generalization that a choice of an informational source isa combined function of the chooser's motivation and of (thecontent of) motivationally compatible information should ap-ply to numerous additional variables besides agreement andattribute similarity. A case in point is recent research by Taylorand her associates on "downward" and "upward" comparisons(Taylor & Dakof, 1988; Taylor, Falke, Shoptaw, & Lichtman,1986; Taylor & Lobel, in press). Specifically, these investigatorsfound that cancer patients often self-evaluate by referring toless fortunate others (downward comparison) even as they pre-dominantly affiliate with and seek information from more for-tunate others (upward comparison). A likely interpretation ofthese data is that patients might be interested in (at least) twoquestions; (a) How well are they coping relative to other pa-tients? and (b) How likely are they to recover? Note that a desir-able answer (closure) to the first question is that they are copingrelatively well; this answer is provided by a downward compari-son. In contrast, a desirable answer to the second question isthat they are highly likely to recover and is served by an upwardcomparison (which may increase the perceived base rate of re-covery). In short, upward as well as downward comparisons(interestingly, both with dissimilar others) may reflect the ten-dency to choose sources perceived likely to yield motivationallycompatible information.

The above discussion suggests that the nature (or content) ofinformation compatible with a need for specific closure ishighly dependent on the context: Occasionally, it may comefrom a similar other, and at other times, from a dissimilar other.Occasionally, it is yielded by a downward comparison and, atother times, by an upward comparison. Such contextual depen-dence of motivationally compatible information is further illus-trated by Tesser's (1988) work on self-esteem maintenance. Spe-cifically, whereas Festinger(l954a) implied that for abilities, theindividual would be pleased only on knowing that she or heoutperformed similar others, Tesser (1989) theorized that thismay hold only forabilities relevant to the self-concept. On irrele-vant abilities, the individual may be quite pleased, in fact, if acertain type of similar other (with whom one has a unit relation)did better than most people, including oneself. Research byTesser and colleagues (Tesser & Campbell, 1982; Tesser, Camp-bell, & Smith, 1984) as well as by Cialdini and Richardson(1980) and Cialdini et al. (1976) suggests that such situationsallow one to "bask in reflected glory" and can be quite reward-ing emotionally:

In fact, the contextual dependencies involved could be evenmore intricate than Tesser's hypothesis suggests. Thus, for sometypes of close relations the reflected-glory phenomenon mightextend to self-relevant abilities as well. It seems plausible toassume that parents may often feel proud when they are outper-

formed by their children, even (and, perhaps, especially) whenthe ability is self-relevant (hence considered valuable and im-portant). Teachers outperformed by their favorite studentsmight feel the same way. Thus, in some contexts doing less wellthan another person might be motivationally compatible withdesirable closures such as "I have been a good parent (teacher)"or "my child (student) is likely to succeed."

Role of relevance. Beyond motivational considerations, thechoice and impact of the comparison other may be affected bythe degree to which the information she or he is expected toprovide appears relevant to the judgment at hand (in the senseof being linked to the judgment by one's subjective rule of infer-ence). We will review some evidence concerning this notion.

In a study by Olson, Ellis, and Zanna (1983), male subjectstended more to seek consensus information when judgments(of physical attractiveness) were depicted as objective ratherthan subjective. Presumably; in dealing with objective judg-ments subjects may entertain the hypothesis that their impres-sions are colored by personal bias. Consensus information isrelevant to testing such a personal-bias hypothesis; thus, it maybe sought out under those circumstances. This may affect notonly who will be chosen for comparison but whether compari-son will take place at all.

In an earlier study on the effects of comparison, Goethals(1972) found that agreement from a dissimilar other raised sub-jects' confidence more than agreement from a similar other.This finding was qualified by results of Goethals and Nelson(1973) indicating that in the realm of value, subjects' confi-dence rose more following agreement from a similar (vs. a dis-similar) other. On the basis of those findings, Goethals andDarley (1977) theorized that when people make value judg-ments, agreement from a similar other has greater impact thanthat from a dissimilar other, because someone with divergentvalues may not seem relevant as a source of information. On theother hand, when people evaluate their beliefs, agreement froma dissimilar other is given greater weight, as it is more informa-tive than agreement from a similar other. The last prediction isderived from Kelley's (1967) attributional analysis that similarothers may share one's own biases. In such a case, they may notprovide diagnostic information indicating whether the judg-ments represent bias or the true nature of the entity. Broadlyspeaking, the dissimilar other in this case has more relevantinformation than a similar other, where relevance denotes in-formation diagnosticity (Trope & Bassok, 1983) that allows oneto confidently make a given judgment.

In other words, both the greater impact of agreement by thesimilar other when the topic is values and the greater impact ofagreement by the dissimilar other when the topic is beliefsseem mediated by the general judgmental variable of perceived

relevance. Specifically, a source seen to possess more relevantinformation therefore has more impact on the individual's con-fidence than a source with less apparently relevant informa-tion. The question, however, is whether similarity and dissimi-larity are uniformly related to relevance in the domains of val-ues and beliefs. On close examination, the answer would seemto be negative for both domains. Instead, whether the similarother is also the relevant other may depend largely on the spe-cific context.

Consider the domain of values, first using Goethals and Dar-ley's (1977, p. 271) following example:


Someone wants to decide which of two novels to take with him ona short vacation. He is familiar with the authors of both booksfrom other works they have published. He makes the tentativeevaluation that he would enjoy the book by author A more thanthe one by author B, but would like to check it.

Goethals and Darley compellingly argued that in this case, onewould be more likely to seek the advice of a similar (vs. adissimi-lar) other, someone who is likely to share one's literary tastesand preferences. In other words, in evaluating what is "good" or"worthwhile," people are likely to consult others who sharetheir criteria for "goodness." Hence, when choosing a book oneis more 1 ikely to consult with a friend who shares his or her tastefor political biography (i.e, a "similar other") than one forwhom good reading is primarily science fiction.

However, when similarity of criteria can be assumed, onemay seek the advice of someone with special ability to deter-mine how a given object measures up against those criteria.Thus, in selecting the films they are planning to view this sum-mer, people may often heed the advice of the Times' critic (adissimilar other) over and above that of a friend who, althoughsharing their criteria for good entertainment, may be less reli-able in determining whether the criteria are met by a particularmovie.

Occasionally, people might worry that their preference for agiven entity has been biased by situational factors. In such acase, they might prefer to consult someone who has not beensubjected to the same kind of influence, and in this sense is adissimilar other. For example, Paul might suspect that his lik-ing for an expensive car has been unduly affected by the cha-risma and persuasion techniques of the salesperson at hisneighborhood dealership. To check up on his impressions, hemight prefer to consult with John, who has not accompaniedhim on his car shopping visit (using an inference heuristic of"objectivity"), rather than with Dave, who has.

The foregoing examples suggest that in the domain of values,similarity is not uniformly related to relevance. Depending onthe context, a similar or a dissimilar other could appear to havethe more relevant information, and hence be selected for com-parison purposes. The same conclusion seems to apply to be-liefs. Admittedly, people concerned about bias in their ownbeliefs may seek an opinion of someone not sharing the samebias, that is, a dissimilar other (Goethals & Darley, 1977). How-ever, the hypothesis of bias (whether in preferences or beliefs)need not be invariably accessed by the individual (Higgins &King, 1981), and when it is not, a person exposed to a differentsource of potential bias need not be preferred over one exposedto a similar source of bias.

Furthermore, commonality of potential biases constitutesbut one similarity dimension. On alternative dimensions, a sim-ilar (vs. a dissimilar) other may appear to possess the morerelevant information, and therefore be preferred for a beliefcomparison. Thus, for an expert, other (similar) experts may beperceived as more relevant sources of information than nonex-perts. Furthermore, a person with an interest in an activity (e.g.,football or the stock market) may expect persons who share hisor her interests (i£., similar others) to keep abreast of develop-ments in that field, and thus possess more relevant informationthan persons not sharing those interests.

It appears, then, that similarity is not uniformly related torelevance in the domains of values or beliefs. Furthermore, it

seems that relevance would play the same role in inferenceacross possible alternative classifications of comparison do-mains. For example, a relevant other may be preferred as asource of information in the domain of emotions (Schachter,1959), the domain of motor behaviors (e.g, the tennis pro, theballet instructor), and so forth. In these alternative domains aswell, there does not seem to exist a uniform relation betweensimilarity and relevance.

Rule accessibility and comparison choice. As implied earlier,the choice of the comparison other could often depend on con-siderations of rule accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981; Higginset al, 1985; Wyer & Srull, 1981). Thus, accessibility of the rule"peers know best," probably held by many teenagers, may di-rect comparison choices toward similar others, whereas accessi-bility of the rule "expert knows best," or "grown-ups knowbest," may bias comparison preferences toward dissimilarothers. To our knowledge, no direct evidence exists for suchaccessibility effects, but they could be profitably explored infuture comparison research.

Domain Differentiation of Soda! Comparison

Phenomena (the "What" Question)

Classical social comparison theory has typically implied thatsocial comparison processes differ across domains of compari-son. Thus, Festinger (1954a) drew the widely known distinctionbetween the comparison of opinions and abilities; Schachter(1959) identified the domain of emotion comparisons; andGoethals and Darley (1977) distinguished between the compari-son of values and beliefs.

Interestingly, alongside the trend of domain differentiation,an opposite trend toward integration was apparent. Specifi-cally, several analysis addressed social comparison processesoccurring across domains and treated them from more generalperspectives. For example, Singer (1966) proposed that peoplecompare with others in order to generally evaluate their self-es-teem rather than assess only an isolated opinion or ability. Petti-grew (1967) proposed to include social comparison theorywithin a general theory of social evaluation. Mettee and Smith(1977) suggested incorporating the theory of social comparisonwithin a more comprehensive theory of self-knowledge, andGoethals (1986) proposed that social comparison theory dealwith the general question of self-evaluation.

Our lay epistemic analysis of social comparison phenomenacontinues the latter integrative trend. As noted earlier, we as-sume that the judgmental level of analysis is applicable acrossdifferent contents (or content domains) of social comparisonand beyond, to all kinds of noncomparative judgments. Allsocial comparisons are assumed to deal with persons' attemptsto form judgments or opinions. In this sense, abilities compari-son is a special case of opinions comparison, namely of opin-ions about one's abilities (Jones& Gerard, 1967). In like fashion,emotional comparisons (Schachter, 1959) concern people'sopinions about their emotions, and value comparisons (Goe-thals & Darley, 1977) concern opinions about people's values.We will consider what this analysis implies for putative distinc-tions in process assumed to separate different comparison do-mains.

Abilities versus opinions: The unidirectional drive upward.Festinger (1954a, p. 124) assumed the existence of "a unidirec-


tional drive upward in the case of abilities which is largely ab-

sent in opinions." As already noted, this "drive" represents a

need for specific closure, notably that one is superior to similar

others on some dimension. If so, (a) appropriate counterparts of

the "drive upward" should exist outside the abilities domain, as

needs for specific closure may arise with respect to diverse con-

tent domains of knowledge, (b) Even within the abilities do-

main, the drive upward need not operate invariantly, as needs

for specific closure are assumed to often be context dependent.

(c) Directly opposite tendencies to the upward drive (i.e., "drives

downward") might occasionally exist in the abilities domains,

as opposite contents of closure may be occasionally preferred in

different circumstances.

In support of the first implication, "false consensus" re-

search (Campbell, 1986; Marks, 1984) suggests that a counter-

part of the biasing "drive upward," namely a biased preference

for the conclusion that one was right, may affect'the compari-

son of various opinions (not necessarily related to one's abili-

ties). Relevant to the second implication, work by Trope (1975,

1980) has demonstrated that in the abilities domain people may

often be interested in accurate assessment rather than exhibit-

ing an upward bias. As for the third implication, it seems plau-

sible that occasionally people might find it desirable to con-

clude that their ability in a domain is lower than that of others.

For instance, a high status person may find it desirable to admit

to personal weaknesses (e.g., poor memory or indifferent culi-

nary skills) that his or her coworkers might find endearing (cf.

Aronson, Willerman, & Floyd, 1966), or a judgment that one's

fitness is poor may excuse one from volunteering for a strenu-

ous activity. The foregoing need not represent inauthentic "ex-

cuses" that one tends to doubt privately. In particular, where

self-misrepresentations are seen to carry distasteful moral over-

tones (e.g, of shirking an obligation one considers of major ethi-

cal importance), a person may he strongly motivated to actually

adopt the convenient beliefs rather than cynically misleading

others about their validity.

The remaining epistemic motivations (e.g., the need for [non-

specific] closure or the need to avoid closure) are also assumed

to affect the formation of opinions in general, and thus to be

equally applicable to various content domains of comparison.

For example, under a high need for closure a person may

"freeze" on a momentarily accessible evaluation of his or her

ability even if it is an unflattering one (L. Ross, Lepper, &

Hubbard, 1975). Similarly, under a high need to avoid closure

(e.g., induced by accuracy concerns) a person may be ready to

"unfreeze" a positive self-assessment and pay close attention to

information inconsistent with such an assessment.

Malleability of abilities and opinions. Accord ing to Festinger

(1954a, p. 125), "there are non-social restraints which make it

difficult or even impossible to change one's ability. These non-

social restraints are largely absent for opinions." Note that this

juxtaposition of abilities and opinions does not really apply if

the social comparison of abilities actually concerns opinions

about relative abilities. Therefore, an alternative interpretation

of the distinction at issue might be that opinions about one's

abilities are generally less malleable than opinions about other

objects. On reflection, however, this may strictly depend on the

ability or the object in question. For instance, L. Ross et al.

(1975) effected a quick change in subjects' opinions about their

ability (to accurately identify authentic suicide notes) through

simple experimental feedback. By contrast, opinions about ob-

jects other than abilities (e.g., about ethical and aesthetic values

or ideological doctrines) may be extremely rigid and refractory

to change. In general, one's readiness to change one's opinion is

assumed to depend on cognitive and motivational factors (c.g.,

accessibility of alternative opinions or need for closure) that

affect the epistemic process at large rather than on the contents

of specific opinions (e.g, concerning abilities or alternative ob-

jects).

Value-belief distinction. From this perspective, recall Goe-

thals and Darley's (1977) distinction between the comparison

of values versus beliefs. As already implied, it is possible to

think of value comparisons as referring to beliefs about values.

Furthermore, the proposal that similar (vs. dissimilar) others

are preferred as a source of information for values but not for

beliefs was reconceptualized earlier to mean that a source with

more seemingly relevant information on a topic is preferred

over a less relevant source. Such generalization is assumed to

hold across values and beliefs, but in neither domain should a

necessary correlation between relevance and similarity be ex-

pected. In short, the (judgmental) process of comparison (e.g.,

the role of variables such as relevance or the role of epistemic

motivations) seems uniform across content domainsof compari-

son (e.g., those of values, abilities, or other topics).

Summary

Our judgmental analysis of social comparison phenomena

reveals several major discrepancies from classical comparison

theory. First, rather than assuming a pervasive tendency

("drive") to engage in (self-evaluation leading to) comparison,

we have assumed that interest in comparative knowledge de-

pends on the individual's epistemic motivations that may vary

as a function of situational, personality, and cultural factors.

Second, rather than assuming a general preference for, and

greater impact of comparison with, the similar other, we have

argued that both preference and impact depend on presumed

motivational compatibility, perceived relevance, and rule acces-

sibility, none of which seem generally correlated with similarity.

Third, rather than assuming that the comparison process

differs across content domains of comparison, we have argued

that the process is essentially uniform across domains.

Discrepancies from classical notions aside, the present judg-

mental analysis affords testable hypotheses concerning the

conditions for engaging in comparison, the preferred source of

comparison information, and the likely course of the compari-

son process. For instance, it should be possible to assess chronic

individual differences in the perceived benefits of comparative

knowledge and to investigate whether such differences are re-

lated to the tendency to compare. In addition, perceived bene-

fits or costs of comparative knowledge and perceived discrepan-

cies between actual and desired confidence in such knowledge

should have systematic effects on comparison tendencies that

could be studied experimentally. The suggestion that persons'

subjective rules of inference (inference heuristics) may govern

the choice of comparison information, and of its source, could

be fruitfully investigated, possibly through preassessment of

chronic differences in the accessibility of various such rules (cf.


Higgins et al, 1982) or through situational priming. Finally, we

are predicting that the number and types of rules being ac-

cessed, and the consequent duration and direction of the com-

parison process, will depend on the individual's epistemic mo-

tivations: need for cognitive closure, need to avoid closure, and

needs for specific closures and the avoidance of specific clo-

sures (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). These notions too seem

well deserving of further study. In short, the epistemic analysis

of the judgmental process has novel implications for the study

of conditions for comparison, preferred sources of comparison

information, and the duration and direction of the comparison

process. It thus represents a useful conceptual framework for

future comparison research.

Comparative-Structure Considerations

Whereas the process discussed above is assumed to apply to

all types of judgments, social comparisons represent a unique

category of judgments: They arc distinguished by their com-

pound structure denning the requisite evidence for a compara-

tive conclusion. For instance, evidence that John has more of an

attribute X than Dave requires that one determine a (John's

standing on X) and b (Dave's standing on X), and then juxta-

pose a and b. The unique structural properties of comparative

judgments imply effects that are not predictable from mere

consideration of the general judgmental process. Below we dis-

cuss some such structural effects, specifically those related to

(a) contextual differences in encoding the separate comparison

stimuli, (b) determinants of coacccssibility, and (c) feature-

matching processes.

Contextual Differences in Encoding Comparison Stimuli

Systematic differences in contexts of encoding individual

comparison stimuli can qualify as structural determinants of

the comparison outcome. Several relevant aspects of such dif-

ferences deserve mention, including differential accessibility of

the "data" to be encoded, differential accessibility of con-

structs, and presence of situational standards for encoding the

data (Higgins & Stangor, 1988).

Thus, in assessing the relative performance of two basketball

players, one may be swayed by the readily accessible outcomes

of their recent games. Such data may serve as anchors that are

insufficiently adjusted (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) to ulti-

mately yield inappropriate comparison outcomes. For in-

stance, even if Johnson's and Bird's seasonal per game scoring

averages are equal, one might evaluate the former as superior to

the latter if he had scored higher in the last two games.

Even if the perceived data were identical, the comparison

stimuli could still be encoded differently depending on mo-

mentarily accessible constructs. For instance, if in interpreting

Bird's 30-point average per game the accessible construct was

"effort," whereas in interpreting Johnson's identical average the

accessible construct was "ability," one might conclude that Bird

is more motivated than Johnson, or that Johnson is more tal-

ented than Bird.

Whereas construct accessibility is typically considered a fea-

ture of the perceiver's internal state, encoding may vary also as

a function of the external context. Differences in such contexts

between the comparison stimuli could, therefore, appropri-

ately affect the outcome of the comparison. The work of Hig-

gins and his associates on the formation and change of judg-

mental standards has important implications in this regard. For

example, in a study by Higgins and Lurie (1983), subjects read

about Judge Jones, who gave moderate sentences, and other

trial judges who gave either higher sentences (harsh context

condition) or lower sentences than did Judge Jones. A contrast

effect obtained such that subjects judged the sentencing deci-

sions of Judge Jones as more lenient in the harsh encoding

context and as harsher in the lenient encoding context. The

extrapolation of such findings to social comparison effects

seems straightforward: If subjects were to compare the relative

leniency of a judge previously encountered in a lenient context

with that of a judge previously encountered in a harsh context,

they might conclude that the former judge is harsher than the

latter even though their actual sentencing decisions may have

been similar. Those notions could be profitably pursued in fur-

ther research.

The foregoing example assumes that (a) the context of recall

in which the social comparison took place did not further affect

subjects' judgmental standards, and (b) it did not do so for

either comparison stimulus (i.e., either judge). Neither of the

foregoing conditions needs to hold. Thus, in a study by Higgins

and Stangor (1988), subjects read about the moderate sentences

given by Judge Jones in the context of harsher or more lenient

judges, and were asked to assess Judge Jones's relative leniency.

One week later, they read about Judge Cohen, whose sentencing

decisions were similar to those of Judge Jones, also in the con-

text of more lenient or harsher judges. Subjects then were asked

to recall the sentencing decisions of Judge Cohen and also those

of Judge Jones. When the context in which subjects rated Judge

Jones's decisions (harsh or lenient) differed from the context in

which they rated Judge Cohen's decisions, recall of Judge Jones's

sentencing decisions was affected by (a) assessment of his harsh-

ness or leniency dependent on the context of judgment, and (b)

a general norm reflecting decisions that subjects reconstructed

from both the context of judgment and that of recall. Conse-

quently, the sentencing decisions recalled for Judge Jones were

strikingly different than those recalled for Judge Cohen, for

whom the context of judgment was also that of recall.

The implications of these findings for social comparison out-

comes are intriguing. Consider a situation in which Judge Jones

gives moderate prison sentences (averaging 5 years) in a harsh

context (of judges averaging 7 years), leading to his assessment

as "lenient," whereas Judge Cohen gives the same moderate

sentences in a lenient context (of judges averaging 3 years), lead-

ing to his assessment as "harsh." The outcome of comparing the

two judges' decisions should vary depending on the norm ex-

tant at the time of comparison. Thus, if the comparison norm is

a diluted standard combining the two contexts (i.e., 5 years on

the average), the reconstructed decisions for (the "lenient")

Judge Jones should be below that norm (e.g., 3 years on the

average), whereas the reconstructed decisions for (the "harsh")

Judge Cohen should be above that norm (e.g, 7 years on the

average). If judgments of relative leniency followed the recall of

sentencing decisions, an exaggerated difference should result,

with Judge Jones being perceived as considerably more lenient

than Judge Cohen. This difference should be less if for at least

202 ARIE W KRUGLANSK.I AND OFRA MAYSELESS

one of the judges the recall was constrained by the undilutedjudgmental context (leading to an accurate recall of 5 years ofsentencing for that judge). The difference between the recon-structed decisions and the subsequent judgments of relativeleniency should be least if for both judges recall was con-strained by the respective judgmental contexts (leading to anaverage recalled sentence of 5 years for both judges). Thosenotions too could be profitably investigated in future compari-son research.

To summarize, contextual differences in judgments of indi-vidual comparison stimuli could have important effects on theultimate comparison outcome. Such differences could arise be-cause of differential data or construct accessibility processesand the formation of separate standards for the comparisonstimuli.

Determinants of Coaccessibility

A necessary condition for a social comparison is that theseparate judgments of the comparison stimuli be concomit-tantly accessed. Recent or frequent concomitance in primingthese stimuli could increase the likelihood of such coaccessi-bility (Higgins et al, 1985). For instance, a professor who hasrecently written recommendation letters on behalf of Dr. Smithand Dr. James, both former students, may be more likely tocompare their relative performance than one who has recentlywritten for one of the two but not the other, or for neither.

Coaccessibility may also be determined by the way relevantcognitions are organized in memory. Assuming a networkmodel of memory organization (e.g, Anderson, 1984), the twocomparison stimuli might be closely linked so that accessingone would immediately bring the other to mind. For instance,if Maria Callas is closely linked in one's memory with RenataTebaldi, thinking of Maria may render Renata accessible (andvice versa), increasing the likelihood of a comparison betweenthe two. Alternatively, a given stimulus (e.g., the self) could beclosely associated with a given dimension (e.g, academic perfor-mance). Activating the dimension through judging anotherstimulus (e.g., judging the academic performance of a politicalcandidate) may render the first stimulus accessible and increasethe likelihood of comparing the two, even though they are notnormally linked in one's memory.

Alternative linkages in memory might exist, for instance,temporal linkages. In this vein, Levine and Moreland (1986, p.289) noted that "intratemporal comparisons are more commonthan intertemporal comparisons, because outcomes and re-lated attributes that occur al the same point in time [italicsadded ] are easier to compare than are those that occur at differ-ent points in time."

It is noteworthy that mere Coaccessibility of judgments is notpresently considered a sufficient condition for comparison. Asemphasized earlier, comparison requires that a goal of compara-tive knowledge be in place. At the same time, easy accessibilityof the relevant evidence may increase the likelihood of adopt-ing such a goal (given its general attractiveness) in that its attain-ment would not require considerable investments of timeand effort. Further research could profitably explore the fore-going notions concerning Coaccessibility effects in socialcomparison.

Feature Matching Processes

Given that the separate judgments of the comparison stimulihave been rendered and that they are coaccessible in the ind ivid-uaFs mind, the question still remains of how the comparison iscarried out. Important advances in understanding these phe-nomena were based on Tversky's (1977) model of similaritycomparisons. In that model, judgmental asymmetries are pre-dicted in accordance with the distinction between the subjectand the referent of the comparison. The subject of the compari-son is the starting point, or the object being compared; thereferent is the target of the comparison to which the subject iscompared. Thus, in comparing a Nissan with a Toyota, theNissan is the subject and the Toyota the referent.

According to Tversky, comparison is carried out throughmapping the features of the subject onto those of the referent.In such a process the subject's features predominate, and thereferent features are considered to the extent that they corre-spond to the subject's. An intriguing implication of this analysisis that when the subject has more unique features than thereferent, the two objects will be judged as less similar than if thereferent has more unique features than the subject. This predic-tion was borne out in Tversky's research using judgments ofsimilarity between prominent countries (like the USSR) andless prominent ones (like Poland). Assuming that subjects havemore unique knowledge about prominent than nonprominentcountries, Tversky was able to demonstrate that when theformer are the subject of the comparison, judged similarity islower than when they are the referent. Extending this logic,Srull and Gaelick (1983) found that comparisons of self (aboutwhich one has ample unique knowledge) with others (aboutwhom one has less unique knowledge) resulted in judgments ofgreater dissimilarity than comparisons of others with self. Ad-ditional studies reporting asymmetries in similarity judgmentsin accordance with the subject/referent distinction were per-formed by Holyoak and Gordon (1983) and by Read (1987).

The distinction between the subject and the referent of com-parison has implications for dimensions other than similarity.Agostinclli, Sherman, Fazio, and Hearst (1986) found thatwhen an object viewed a second time is used as the subjectcompared against (the referent of) first viewing, additions (i.e,features present the second time but not the first) are betternoticed than deletions (features present the first time but notthe second). Similarly, when the first viewing is used as thesubject, deletions are better noticed than additions. Finally,Houston et al. (1989) demonstrated in a series of four experi-ments that when the unique features of the subject arc negative,the referent object is likely to be preferred, even though it maycontain equally negative unique features. Similarly, when theunique features of the subject are positive, it is likely to be pre-ferred over a referent containing equally positive unique fea-tures. As Houston et al. (1989) noted the subject/referent asym-metry is probably applicable to other domains of comparisonbeyond similarity, change, or preference, including compari-sons of objects and categories, comparison of present with pastor future selves, and comparisons of one's actual state with astandard of attainment (Higgins, Straumann, & Klein, 1986).

A general process possibly underlying the subject/referentasymmetry in comparisons is people's tendency to neglect


those features of the referent that are not represented in thesubject. Potential boundary conditions for these effects couldbe motivational. Thus, one might expect that when thecompari-son outcome is consequential (vs. inconsequential), personsmay engage in a more thorough search and switch the positionsof subject and referent between the entities compared, thuseliminating the assymetry. Further motivational effects may de-termine the importance of features' primacy in comparisonsand of the relative weight attached to common versus uniquefeatures. For instance, a person highly motivated to reach cog-nitive closure concerning a comparison may reach a differentconclusion depending on whether the subject's unique featureswere considered before the common ones, or vice versa: If theunique features came first, the closure striving individualmight be more likely to conclude, forexample, that the compari-son stimuli are different than if the common ones came first. Incontrast, a person highly motivated to reach an accurate judg-ment may not be as affected by the features' primacy (Freund,Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund,

1983). Finally, a person highly motivated to avoid closure (e.g, aparent refusing to decide which of her children is more intelli-gent) may give greater weight to the common features of the twostimuli (e.g, as reflected in better recall or greater perceivedimportance of those features) than to the unique features.Those issues could be profitably pursued in future, structurallyoriented research on social comparisons.

Summary

In the preceding section we discussed the comparative struc-ture of social comparisons. Such structure includes judgmentsof the separate comparison stimuli and their juxtaposition.This has numerous implications for the determinants of com-parison outcomes. Some such determinants relate to judgmen-tal context differences in encoding the individual stimuli.These contextual differences may pertain to the differentialaccessibility of data about the comparison stimuli, as well asconstructs and situational standards in which terms the dataare encoded.

To be manifest, comparison effects based on encoding dif-ferences depend on the stimuli being juxtaposed in the firstplace. A major determinant of such a juxtaposition is coaccessi-bility of the separate judgments, in turn assumed to be affectedby the recency and frequency of their joint activation and by thenature of their structural interconnections in a memory struc-ture. Any coaccessibility may set in motion a comparative pro-cess given the appropriate motivation. The juxtaposition itself

may be carried out in a feature matching fashion, as describedby Tversky (1977). Such a procedure assigns major significanceto the structural distinction between the subject and the refer-ent of comparison, whereby the unique features of the subjectexert a predominant influence on the comparison outcome.The structural level of analysis opens up numerous new avenuesof possible comparison research, only some of which have be-gun to be recently explored.

Contents of Social Comparisons

A great deal of variability in social comparison phenomenamay be accounted for by the particular contents of comparison.

By contents we mean the specifics of the comparison "ques-tion" (Smith, 1981), including the domain of the comparison,the person or standard with whom one compares, and the sub-jective meaning that the comparison outcome has for the per-son as a guide to self-regulation or evaluation (Higgins, 1987).According to the present conception, the contents of possiblesocial comparisons are highly diverse. This follows from ourassumptions that social comparisons are a type of judgment,and that the contents of judgments are free to vary on an unlim-ited number of dimensions. Thus, not only should persons becapable of seeking comparisons in different possible domains,but they might seek them against diverse types of comparisonothers. Such implication constrasts with the classical compari-son notion that people's pervasive interest is in their standing incomparison to a similar referent (Festinger, 1954a). We willreview some research evidence pertinent to this issue.

The heterogeneity of possible self-evaluations has been notedby early workers in the field. In 1966 Singer summed up a spe-cial issue of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology de-voted to social comparison by commenting that "if a personwishes to evaluate himself on an ability X there are severalkinds of evaluations he can make" (p. 107). Indeed, specificstudies in that journal issue illustrated some of the types ofpossible comparison, including comparison with a positive ex-ample (Thornton & Arrowood, 1966) and with someone doingbetter (Wheeler, 1966) or worse (Hakmiller, 1966) than oneself.

Subsequent research has demonstrated yet other types of pos-sible comparison. For instance, Wheeler et al. (1969) found thatmost of their subjects exhibited a "range-seeking" tendency.Arrowood and Friend (1969) found a comparison preferencefor the "positive instance"; Wilson and Benncr (1971) found apreference for the results of the "best off"; and Friend andGilbert (1973) demonstrated that subjects can be interested inboth the "best off" and the "worst off" cases. Similarly, Cruder(1977) presented evidence that people may seek various kindsof comparative information. As he summarized it:

They want very much to learn about the highest scoring other.. . .They are also interested in the other who best represents a defini-tion of the dimension, the "positive instance." and they want tocompare themselves with others who are better off than they areon the dimension, (pp. 37-38)

Taken as a whole, the above research seems to contradictFestinger's original proposal and to suggest that people are of-ten interested in comparative knowledge about dissimilar aswell as similar others. However, the similarity hypothesis wasrestated in a modified form in Goethals and Darley's (1977)revision of social comparison theory. In this conceptualizationthe critical similarity dimension was assumed to be similarityon attributes relevant to the performance rather than similarityof the performance itself. In support of this line of reasoning,Zanna, Goethals, and Hill (1975) and Suls, Gastorf, and Law-hon (1978) reported a preference for information about the re-sults of similar sex and age groups regardless of similarity in

performance.Goethals and Darley's (1977) influential revision inspired

further research, which indicated, nonetheless, that peoplemay desire diverse kinds of comparative information (Miller,1984; Taylor & Lobel, in press; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver,


1982; Wills, 1981). Although information about others similarin attributes is often sought, people occasionally may be inter-ested in others who are similar to them in performance(Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982), others who are dissimilarin performance (Cruder, 1971; Wheeler & Koestner, 1984), andothers with whom they identify or toward whom they feel abond (Miller et al, 1988), or they may ignore an attribute'srelevance to performance altogether (Miller, 1984). These find-ings are typically interpreted as inconsistent with the notionthat people uniformly prefer information about similar others(Suls, 1986). More generally, the foregoing review s'upports thepresent notion that the types of referent others with whom per-sons might wish to compare arc quite diverse and uncon-strained. As with judgments in all categories, any specific con-tents of social comparison might be of interest to some peoplein some circumstances. Thus, in some conditions people mightbe interested in comparative judgments involving similarothers, whereas in other conditions they may be interested incomparisons involving dissimilar others. Occasionally, peoplemay be interested in comparing with successful and affluentindividuals (irrespective of their similarity to oneself), whereasin other situations they might be interested in comparing withfailing or destitute persons. Furthermore, comparative ap-praisals need not refer to other people. Instead, they can refer tovarious standards of conduct or performance, including stan-dards of duty (ought) and of desire (ideal), one's own standardsor those of significant others (Higgins, Straumann, & Klein,1986), past or present standards (Albert, 1977), and so forth.The importance of internalized standards in social comparisoncontexts was explicitly noted by Oruder (1971).

Domains of Comparison

Not only may the referents of social comparison vary consid-erably, but so may the domains in which comparison is carriedout. As noted earlier, classical social comparison theory distin-guished between the comparison of opinions and abilities (Fes-tinger, 1954a). Subsequently; interest has centered around thecomparison of emotions (Schachter, 1959), values (Goethals &Darlcy, 1977), outcomes (Crosby, 1982: Levine & Moreland,1986,1987; Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986), or features (Holy-oak & Gordon, 1983; Houston et al, 1989; Tversky; 1977). Ourpresent perspective implies more generally that social compari-sons can be made on all dimensions on which people can bedescribed, including status (whether ascribed or achieved), at-tractiveness, attainments, I ife-style. good or bad fortune, taste,and social sensitivity.

Categories and Standards of Comparison

Within each domain of comparison, it should be possible todistinguish between various categories of comparison subjectsas well as referents. Thus, Levine and Moreland (1986, 1987)recently proposed a three-dimensional typology of outcomecomparisons including the factors of (a) comparison type (self-self, self-other, and group-group), (b) social context (intra-group or intergroup), and (c) temporal context (intratemporalvs. intertemporal).

A typology of standards for attribute comparisons proposedby Higgins (in press) distinguishes between three basic catego-ries of standards: (a) factuals. (b) guides, and (c) possibilities./•actuals are defined as "standards that involve a person's beliefsabout the actual performance of one or more persons" (Hig-

gins, in press, p. 21). In Higgins's typology, some major catego-ries of factuals are those related to "social category" "meaning-ful other," "biographical," and "social context."

Guides are denned as "standards that involve representationsof those attributes that from the standpoint of some social ap-praiser . . . are valued or preferred for some social target" (Hig-gins, in press, p. 23). Higgins distinguished between four sub-categories of guides—"self-guides," "other guides," "normativeguides," and "social context" guides. These various subcatego-rics may be further subdivided. For instance, self-guides arcclustered into (a) ideal/own self-guides denoting attributes aperson would ideally like to possess, (b) ideal/other self-guidesdenoting the person's representation of similar attributes thatsome significant other is believed to possess, (c) ought/own self-guides denoting the person's perceived duties and obligations,and (d) ought/other self-guides denoting the person's representa-tion of his or her duties and obligations according to a signifi-cant other.

Finally, possibilities are defined as "representations o f . . .the attributes of a target person (self or other) that are perceivedas non-factual (i.e., to have never actually existed for the target)but are possible (i.e., will exist, could or might exist, could ormight have existed)" (Higgins, in press, p. 29). Possibilities aresubdivided into self-possibilities, other possibilities, and socialcontext possibilities. Each of these is further partitioned into"can possibilities." "future possibilities," and "counterfactualpossibilities."

Whereas both Higgins's and Levine and Moreland's typolo-gies are deduced from conceptual analyses, it is possible toconstruct such typologies inductively. Work by M. Ross ct al.(1986) exemplifies the approach. These investigators set out toexplore the "social standards people use to assess their satisfac-tion" (p. 83). Subjects were asked to indicate how happy orsatisfied they were in various life domains and how they de-cided whether they were happy in a particular domain. It wasfound, among other things, that in evaluating satisfaction withlife at home or work most respondents (89% and 82%, respec-tively) named a familiar other (family, friends, coworkers, orother acquaintances) as the comparison referent. By contrast, inevaluating their life as a whole, a lower proportion of respon-dents (61%) named familiar others, and they were more likely toname unfamiliar others in determining their degree of satisfac-tion. It is also of interest that social comparisons or compari-sons with the past were rather unlikely to be spontaneouslyinvoked by respondents as bases of satisfaction or happinessjudgments. Instead, such judgments were predominantly de-rived from subjects' own affect or perceived discrepancy fromachievement goals.

Psychological Significance of Particular

Comparison Contents

Whether arrived at conceptually or empirically, the utility ofany typology of comparisons presumably depends on the de-gree to which it taps distinctions in significant psychologicalantecedents and consequences, For instance, Levine and More-land (1986, pp. 295-296) hypothesized that self-self compari-sons are likely to be made with greater confidence than self-other comparisons, which in turn are presumed to be mademore confidently than group-group comparisons. Also ac-


cording to these authors, the ease of distorting information isnegatively related to confidence; thus, greater efforts to distortcomparison information should be expended in connectionwith group-group versus self-group versus self-self compari-sons. Although of considerable interest, these hypotheses (aswell as additional ones advanced by Levine & Moreland, 1987)are speculative at this time and in need of further empiricalprobing for their validation.

The significance of Higgins's (in press) typology of compari-son standards is exemplified by work on the affective conse-quences of discrepancies from self-guides. Specifically, Higginsand his colleagues hypothesized that quality of experienced af-fect should differ in accordance with the type of guide fromwhich one is discrepant: A self-discrepancy from an "ideal"guide represents the absence of positive outcomes (i£, a failureto fulfill one's wishes and desires). This should lead to feelingsof dejection such as dissatisfaction, disappointment, or sad-ness. In contrast, a discrepancy from an "ought" guide repre-sents the presence of negative outcomes (i.e., an expectation ofpunishment for failing to uphold one's obligations and duties),leading to agitation-type emotionsof worry, threat, or edginess.Numerous studies by Higgins and his colleagues (Higgins et al,1986; Strauman & Higgins, 1987) provide compelling evidencethat different discrepancies produce different affective experi-ences (i.e, dejection vs. agitation), just as predicted by themodel. Remaining types of comparison standards in Higgins's(in press) typology are also assumed to yield distinct patterns ofpsychological consequences (Higgins, Tykocinski, & Vookles,in press). Similarly, research on "downward" and "upward" com-parisons (e.g, Taylor, & Lobel, in press) shows distinct affectivereactions as a consequence of either comparison.

Standards of Entitlement and Relative Deprivation

A comparison standard of considerable psychological signifi-cance concerns the level of outcomes to which one feels entitled(Austin, 1977; Austin, McGinn, & Sasmilch, 1980; Crosby,1982; Major & Testa, 1989; Masters & Smith, 1987; Olson &Ross, 1984; Olson et al, 1986). In this connection, Olson andRoss (1984) found that perceived entitlement varied positivelyas a function of perceived investments (e.g, practice) or subjects'similarity to comparison others who received a reward for theirinvestment (e.g, were employed rather than unemployed). Ma-jor and Testa (1989, Experiment I) also demonstrated that thecomparison other's outcome may determine the subject's per-ception of the general outcome (wage) standard, and conse-quently their feelings of entitlement and dissatisfaction if theiroutcome fell below the perceived entitlement level.

The foregoing research suggests that for externally awardedoutcomes (e.g, wage level at an organization or employmentopportunity in a profession), social comparison may be used todetermine the subjective entitlement function (i£, how muchand what type of investment is perceived to entitle one to agiven level of reward). Such an entitlement function may thengovern subjects' judgment concerning the fairness of their ownreceived outcomes. In turn, depending on other relevant beliefs(e.g, whether the world generally is or should be just; Lerner,1980), perceptions of fairness may or may not lead to variousreactions (e.g, of resenlmcnt, bitterness, or rebellion aimed atpromoting social change).

Note that not all outcome comparisons need to concern theissue of entitlement. Often, they may be used to deduce alterna-tive contents of judgment in which persons could be interested.Thus, outcome comparisons may provide evidence about one'sdegree of good fortune or one's degree of skill relative to others,one's rate of upward or downward mobility, or the society's ap-parent recognition of one's contributions relative to others'.

Summary

In the preceding section we addressed the content level ofsocial comparison phenomena. It has been noted that the con-tents of social comparisons are highly diverse, including hetero-geneous domains of comparisons, standards of comparison,and different types of comparison others. In this light, the con-tention of classical comparison theory (Festi nger, 1954a, 1954b)that persons generally compare with similar others seems un-duly restrictive. Our conceptual analysis, as wellas extant empir-ical evidence, suggests that people may often compare withdissimilar others, and that the similarity dimension may oftenbe irrelevant to social comparison.

Whereas the possible content features of social comparisonsseem virtually inexhaustible, they are of essential significanceto understanding the psychological antecedents and conse-quences of specific comparisons. For instance, understandingthe affect generated by a comparison, or the action undertakenin response to a comparison outcome, requires analysis at thecontent level in which the subjective meanings of the compari-son context are clearly delineated. In this sense, the content-level analysis of social comparison phenomena seems quite in-dispensible. Simply, the questions it may be able to answer areinappropriate to even raise on the judgmental or comparativelevels of analysis considered earlier.

Concluding Comments

Historically, Feslinger's (1954a, 1954b) theory of social com-parison processes has served the important functions of attract-ing attention to this topic of study and setting its researchagenda for years to come. Not surprisingly, however, three and ahalf decades later, conceptual and empirical developments incognitive social psychology have outstepped the limits of theinitial conception and exposed its inadequacy in handling thecomplex comparison issues of interest today Nor is it likely thatbuttressing the original conceptualization by auxiliary as-sumptions and boundary conditions would suffice to salvagethe framework and extricate it from its fundamental difficul-ties. Essentially, classical comparison theory seems both toofixed and too narrow to readily accommodate contemporaryresearch on the topic. The theory seems too fixed in itsportrayal of people as nearly always driven to self-evaluatethrough social comparison, doing so mostly with similarothers, and nearly always striving to attain evaluative accuracy.In contrast, the present analysis suggests that people may oftenlack the desire to compare and that even when they do not lacksuch a desire, the comparison need not be with similar others.Furthermore, accuracy, though often of importance, may notbe the exclusive or predominant basis of social comparisons(Wood, 1989). Thus, comparison tendencies appear to be

206 ARIE W KRUGLANSK1 AND OFRA MAYSELESS

highly fluid and contingent on the overall psychological con-text affecting human judgment.

The classical theory also seems too narrow in its predomi-nant emphasis on locus of comparison issues and on interper-sonal similarity between subjects and referents of comparison.This excludes a plethora of comparison problems of consider-able relevance to social interaction, including the diverse psy-chological functions of comparison, the fine-grained cognitiveprocesses mediating comparison outcomes, and the multipleaffects and actions engendered by various comparisons.

In fact, the variety of potentially significant comparison is-sues seems so vast that the power of any single theory to do itjustice may be seriously doubted. Instead of attempting to for-mulate such a theory, our analysis explicitly acknowledged the"variance" and "partitioned" it by levels of analysis. Such anapproach offers several advantages. First, it provides a frame-work for systematically ordering the multifarious past researchon social comparisons. Second, it identifies separate problemclusters within the general social comparison domain that mayrequire distinct conceptual handling for their explication.Thus, unlike past research that tied most comparison issuesunder investigation (e.g., issues of entitlement, jealousy, or cop-ing with stress) to the same few classical parameters (c.g., similar-ity of the comparison other), the present approach allowsgreater conceptual independence among comparison prob-lems. According to this perspective, understanding a content-level problem (e.g, the affective consequences of failure to meetone's obligation) involves concepts largely unrelated to con-structs used to depict the judgmental process at large. Similarly,understanding judgmental-level phenomena as accessibility,rules of inference, or epistemic motivations requires conceptsunrelated to (content-level) notions of justice, obligation, and soforth. Thus, our multileveled approach may allow unique socialcomparison phenomena to play a greater role in driving rele-vant theory development than has been the case so far. Addi-tionally, however, our approach recognizcsthalall Icvelsofanal-ysis are inexorably involved in any specific instance of socialcomparison, and therefore that all are needed to fully explicatethe phenomena at stake.

Finally, by casting a broader conceptual net for framing so-cial comparison questions, the present approach promises toopen numerous new avenues for further exploration. For in-stance, the judgmental-process level of analysis suggests re-search questions about conditions for comparison, preferredsources of comparison information, and the course and direc-tion of the comparison activity as affected by factors of accessi-bility, perceived relevance, and epistemic motivations. Thestructural level of analysis suggests questions about the interre-lation of the comparison stimuli, including differences in theirencoding contexts, the simultaneity with which they come tomind, and the order in which they are considered. The contentlevel of analysis suggests questions about the subjective mean-ings people may attach to various comparison outcomes andthe implications these meanings have for self-evaluation andregulation.

In short, a multilevel reorientation of social comparison re-search may afford a richer, less restrictive study of comparisonissues than has been typical within the classical paradigm.Such a reot ienlation seems warranted both by past research

and by the opportunities it extends for future work on this fun-damental social psychological topic.

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Received January 19,1988

Revision received August 3,1989

Accepted September 14,1989 •

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