Journal of Public Administration

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administration

Volume 49 Number 1 March 2014

Volume 49 Number 1 | March 2014

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSOUTH AFRICAN ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

(Incorporating SAIPA Tydskrif vir Publieke Administrasie/Journal of Public Administration)

P.O. BOX 14257

Hatfield

0028

South Africa

Tel: +27 12 382 9769 Fax: +27 12 382 9042

EDITORIAL COMMITTEEChief Editor and Chairperson of the Editorial Committee: Prof. M.H. MaserumuleDeputy Editor: Prof. K. Phago Policy Review Editor: Prof. F.M. Lucky MathebulaBook Review Editor: Dr. O. NzewiProf. S. Binza Prof. M.J.D. Matshabaphala Dr. N. MatshilizaProf. D.M. Mello Mr. K. Maimela Prof. M.H. Kanyane Prof.T. Khalo Prof. Y. Penceliah Prof. E. Van RooyenProf. H. Kroukamp Prof. S.M. Madue Prof. MJ Mafunisa EDITORIAL BOARD: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONProf. K. Kondlo, University of JohannesburgProf. S. Vil-Nkomo, University of PretoriaProf. S.R Malefane, Department of Public Administration and Management, University of South AfricaProf. D. Rich, University of DelawareProf. M. Aristigueta, University of DelawareProf. B. Basheka, Uganda Management InstituteProf. K.J. Maphunye, Centre for Electoral Democracy, University of South AfricaProf. L. Mollo, Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA)Dr. Pan S. Kim of Korea, School of Social Sciences, Yonsei University, Kangwon-KoreaProf. B.C Mubangizi, School of Public Administration and Development Management, University of Kwa-Zulu-NatalDr. I. Kabumba, African Association for Public Administration and ManagementProf. M.P. Sebola, Department of Public Administration, University of LimpopoProf. E.O.C. Ijeoma, School of Public Management and Development, University of Fort HareDr. M. Ndletyana, Mapunguwe Institute for Strategic ReflectionProf. K.B. Moeti, Tshwane University of Technology

©2013, SAAPAM Copyright of this journal as a whole is vested in the South African Association for Public Administration and

Management, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without-the-express permission, in writing, of SAAPAM. It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of

the chief editor, editorial committee, editorial board, or any of SAAPAM’s funders or sponsors.

ISSN: 0036-0767

The Journal of Public Administration is accredited with the South African Department of Higher Education and Training, and International Bibliography of the Social Sciences.


EDITORIAL POLICY AND MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS1. The Journal of Public Administration is a quarterly journal issued on behalf of the South African

Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).2. The purpose of the Journal is to further the understanding of the theory and practice of Public

Administration and Management by publishing articles of interest to practitioners and scholars in English.

3. The Journal publishes peer-reviewed articles, review articles, case studies, exemplar prorofiles, viewpoints and research results from practitioners of all grades and professions, academics and other specialists on the broad spectrum of administrative concerns regarding local, provincial, national, and international affairs.

4. All manuscripts are circulated anonymously to specialist referees for evaluation. Reports from referees may be made available to authors but the names of the referees will be withheld. On the basis of the referees’ reports, content and other deficiencies, the Editor reserves the right to make minor alterations or to reject any manuscript.

5. Copyright of articles published in the Journal vests in SAAPAM and may not be published or reproduced in any form without the prior consent of the Chief Editor.

6. Warning: infringement of copyright exposes offenders to criminal proceedings that could result in civil actions and/or a fine/imprisonment and a criminal record. Therefore, authors are advised to acknowledge the origin of any content in an article or other contribution obtained from another source.

7. Reprints of articles can be obtained from the Editor on the payment of a prescribed fee.8. Opinions expressed in the Journal are, however, those of the individual authors, and are not

necessarily subscribed to by the Editor, Editorial Committee or the Editorial Board.9. Authors are required to pay a fee of R500-00 per page for any article or research results printed

in the Journal. Payment is due on receiving confirmation from the Editor that a contribution is to be published in a particular issue of the Journal. Authors should consult their respective faculties or employer to establish the responsibility for the payment. An article will only be published once payment has been received. Payment should be made directly to the Journal of Public Administration, but proof of payment must also be submitted to the Editor to avoid any possible delay in the publication of a contribution.

10. Except in special cases where prior permission has been obtained, articles should not exceed 5000 words. Prospective contributors are specifically requested to ensure that the language and technical aspects of their contributions are of high standard. THREE identical copies of manuscript, typed in 1.5 line spacing, 12pt Times New Roman should be submitted. A disk should also be submitted. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an English abstract of up to 200 words. Since manuscripts are circulated anonymously for evaluation, the name and affiliation of the author(s) should appear on the separate page. If the manuscript is accepted, a computer disk with the text, preferably in MS Word or WordPerfect must be sent to the Editor, unless the Chief Editor grants special permission in exceptional instances.

11. All manuscripts must be accompanied by a covering letter in which the author(s) state(s) that the manuscript has not been submitted or will not be submitted or published or is not being published elsewhere in any form unless rejected by the Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSouth African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM)

Registration Number 039-162 NPO

MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION Membership categories and annual subscription fees payable before/on 30 April:

TYPE Amount Pro Rata AmountMEMBER R350-00 R30-00STUDENT MEMBER R150-00 R15-00CORPORATE MEMBER (5-9 MEMBERS) R1 000-00 R85-00INSTITUTIONAL MEMBER (11+ MEMBERS) R5 000-00 R425-00ASSOCIATE MEMBERS R400-00 R35-00INTERNATIONAL MEMBER US $100-00 US $10-00INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE MEMBER (5-9 MEMBERS) US $550-00 US $50-00INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL MEMBER (11+ MEMBERS) US $2 750-00 US $250-00HONORARY MEMBER

Please complete the following:TITLE SURNAME

First names

Postal Address

Telephone

Cellular

Fax

E-mail

Employer

Department

Position

Qualification

Specific areas of

interestPublic Administration and

Management Theory

Public Administration and

Management HistoryPolicy Analysis and Management Organisational DevelopmentStrategic Management Project ManagementHuman Resource Management Financial ManagementInformation Management International ManagementIntergovernmental Relations Provincial GovernmentLocal Government Development Management

Others

(please specify)

________________________________________ _______________________________________

Signature of Application Date

Subscription deposited directly in Standard Bank Cheque Account Number 012580015, Hatfield Branch Code Number 01-15-45-15. Completed application and proof of payment faxed to +27 12 382 9042 or mailed to SAAPAM, PO Box 14257, Hatfield 0028, South Africa. For additional information please contact Mr Vukosi Mathonsi at (012) 382 9769 or [email protected].

Membership Number (for official use only)


Journal of Public AdministrationVolume 49 Number 1 March 2014

THE PATH TRAVERSED – 20 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 1M.H. Maserumule & K. Phago

CRISIS OF DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTHAFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: REFLECTION ON TWO DECADES JOURNEY IN THE WILDERNESS 2L. Amusan

GOVERNANCE IN WATER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: IS THERE A CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW? 19S. Balkaran

A REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: THE BUFFALO CITY MUNICIPALITY PLATFORM 32E.O.C. Ijeoma & C. Okafor

THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP AS A LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR: CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 49D.B. Jarbandhan

JOB SATISFACTION, SECURITY AND STAFF RETENTION IN PUBLIC COMPANIES: A CASE OF ESKOM 64M. Khoza & M. Kanjere

ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF THE STATE TO FUNCTION BETTER: THE ROLE OF A MASTER’S IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (MBA) QUALIFICATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 75M. Lethoko

DISCOURSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: FOR WHO’S BENEFIT IS IT? 92T.S. Madzivhandila



IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (PMDS) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 104N.I. Makamu & D.M. Mello

COLLECTION OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE IN SOUTH AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 127R.K. Manyaka

SOUTH AFRICA: A UNIQUE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION? PARADOX AND PROSPECTS 140K.J. Maphunye

DEMOCRACY WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY, OR ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT DEMOCRACY? ‘BORN-FREE’ PERSPECTIVES OF PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 161K.J. Maphunye, M.L. Ledwaba & M.K. Kobjana

DEVELOPING AN ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR 180 D. Masiloane & S. Dintwe

LEADERSHIP, ETHICS, AND THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE 199M.D.J. Matshabaphala

ENGAGEMENT OF THE LEPHALALE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY AND ITS COMMUNITY ON WATER SERVICES: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 206V. Mbeki & K. Phago

MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT COMPLIANCE WITH TRAINING POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF GREATER TUBATSE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 217G. Mohlala, K.G. Phago & Z. Mpehle

CHAPTER 12 OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2030: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 229M. Montesh


THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON REFUGEE MOVEMENTS AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA 247Z. Mpehle

THE UNDERLYING FACTORS BEHIND VIOLENT MUNICIPAL SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 261F.G. Netswera & S. Kgalane

THE GOVERNANCE OF RETIREMENT FUNDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS 274L. Nevondwe & K. Ramatji

COMPLICATING COMPLEXITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: STUCK IN THE WORLD OF MODERNITY 287N. Nkuna & M.P. Sebola

THE COMMUNITY POLICING PHILOSOPHY AND THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC PROTEST IN SOUTH AFRICA: ARE THERE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AFTER TWO DECADES OF DEMOCRACY? 300M.P. Sebola

THE NECESSITY FOR AFROCENTRIC CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 314A.A. Olutola

TURNOVER OF HEALH CARE PROFESSIONALS: A FOCUS ON THE LIMPOPO PROVINCE 330M.L. Shipalana & K.G. Phago

MANAGING THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE 349K.I. Theletsane

ETHICS COURSE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CURRICULUM 362K.I. Theletsane




SOUTH AFRICA’S TWENTY YEARS OF “CIVILIZING MISSIONS” FOR AFRICA: FADED CONTINENTAL POSTURE AND AGENDA 375J.P. Tsheola & T. Lukhele

TWENTY YEARS OF FALTERING “DEMOCRACY”: SERVICE DELIVERY PLANNING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 392J.P. Tsheola, N.P. Ramonyai & M. Segage

STUDENT EXPERIENCES OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN AN ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT AT A HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 406E.J. van der Westhuizen

RURAL LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: INSIGHTS FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL COMMUNITY 424K.C. Zulu & B.C. Mubangizi

1

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationJournal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administration

THE PATH TRAVERSED – 20 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

M.H.MaserumuleChief Editor - Journal of Public administration

Tshwane University of Technology

K. PhagoDeputy Editor - Journal of Public Administration

University of Limpopo

2014 marks yet another important milestone in the evolution of the post-1994 South African state. It is a year that democracy in South Africa turns 20 years. In the context of how democracy fared in the post-colonial Africa, some thought that South Africa would not be able to sustain its commitment to democracy. Afro-pessimists argued that South Africa is to go the same route as the rest of the continent, which their false premonition is that the future of Africa is bleak because of a myriad of what is being characterised as intractable problems that arrest her potential to develop. The democratisation path traversed, and the extent to which, subsequently, democracy became consolidated, exposed the Afro-pessimist narratives of Africa as, in the words of Macedo, the “pedagogy of big lies” peddled through the modernisation theories that still largely undergird the epistemological foundation of what is being taught as public administration curricula in most universities.

This 20th year of democracy in South Africa is a moment for reflection on the path traversed, especially on the governance front. The question is: how did we come this far? The attempt to answer it necessarily compels us to historicise the post-1994 South African state, especially from the governance perspective. Another important question is: what is the implication of the 20 years of democracy in South Africa on the state of governance in Africa? From the perspective of governance as a science, further questions are: what are the theoretical paradigms that disciplined the epistemological evolution of the discipline in the post-apartheid state? Are they appropriate to sustain the relevance of the discipline in the contemplation of its future in the 21st century? If the answer to this question is not in affirmative, a follow-up question is: what are the alternative paradigms of knowledge for the discipline? These are fundamentally important questions that undergird the theme of the 14th Annual Conference of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM). Are they answered in this conference edition of the Journal of Public Administrastion? You be the judge!

M.H.Maserumule & K. Phago

2 Volume 49 Number 1 | March 2014


CRISIS OF DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY:

REFLECTION ON TWO DECADES JOURNEY IN THE WILDERNESS

L. AmusanDepartment of Politics and International RelationsNorth West University

ABSTRACT

Decision-making in any democratic society is complex, cumbersome and tasking when it involves public policy in a new state. Actors involved in policy-making are numerous and in some cases, difficult to discern

in complex interdependent global system. At the theoretical level, two major factors come to play in foreign policy in a state: domestic and environmental. Executive arm of government plays prominent role in policy making and implementation. Despite this, the labyrinth journey to policy formulation in the relatively new democratic state of South Africa is expected to be difficult. Though, several students of South Africa’s foreign policy are of the position that African National Congress (ANC) plays a decisive role in the formulation of the state’s foreign policy during its formative years, but this is hardly possible without carrying along different stakeholders at the domestic and external environments. Though, foreign policy is said to be too sensitive to be left in the hands of non-professionals, for acceptability, opinion of the uninformed matters in foreign policy formulation and implementation. This brings to the fore of the inputs of public diplomacy, kitchen cabinet and other groups into the South African foreign policy issues between 1994 and 2014. This paper x-rays relevant theoretical positions in public policy analysis and examines the relevance of each to the South African peculiarity ‘based on three principles of “subjectivity”, “temporality” and “situatedness”. A conclusion is drawn and solutions to incoherent and inconsistent foreign policy decisions and actions are advanced.

INTRODUCTIONPublic policy is a purposive course of action on the part of an actor or a set

of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern (Anderson, 1997: 3). Decision-making includes an element of choice and the most deliberate and voluntaristic aspect of social conduct (Etzioni, 1967: 385). At the theoretical level and based on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, section

3


83(a) and 85(2c) provision, the head of government, who is the president of the state is accorded power to formulate and implement general policy. The president has power to equally tailor foreign policy of the country through appointment of envoys, ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and diplomatic and consular representatives (1996 Constitution, section 84(2h&i). Conditions that brought about majoritarian government in the country were complex and cumbersome that hardly can one conclude that the government under Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) brought out, single-handedly, foreign policy of the country. The Government of National Unity (GNU) put in place after general elections of 1994 came in amorphous shape as the old guards in the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were members of cabinet. The implication of this is that formulation of foreign policy cannot be of the senior partner totally without taking into consideration the likely inputs of other parties. Mandela foreign policy was a product of ‘competition, coalition building and compromise’ (Viotti and Kaupi, 1987: 192-3). Hence, the notion that from 1994 onwards, South Africa’s foreign policy took a more pluralistic, inclusive and democratic approaches as opposed to the apartheid’s a centralised system failed to capture the political reality within the time frame under consideration.

None the less, there have been much publicised impacts of the first deputy president, Thabo Mbeki and 1955 Freedom Charter of the ANC as the only variables that shaped the foreign policy of the country till-date in the labyrinth foreign policy formulation which are too simple to believe. One of the conditions of accepting majority rule during political transition negotiation between the NP and ANC was to disabuse Mandela’s mind on the issue of Freedom Charter as a departure point of envisaged new South Africa policy positions. The eventual introduction of neoliberal compradorism paved way for the new elite within ANC to dominate economic and foreign policies of the state between 1994 and 2014 (Bond, 2005: 16). Starting from Henry Kissinger’s (2001) conception of the irrelevance of foreign policy formulation, the 21st century international system is too dynamic, misty and unpredictable that foreign policy can hardly be talked about in the developed states, more so in the developing states such as South Africa because of the globalisation processes that are unfolding. This position is concretised by hacked specialists, Edward Snowden and Julian Assange (WikiLeaks founder) who rendered the futility of secrecy in foreign policy to nothing (Farrel and Finnemore, 2013). The implication of this is, among others, that a stricto sensus position on a particular issue cannot be maintained ad infinitum. This brings into focus the criticism that was levied against hypocritical idealist perspective of South Africa’s foreign policy in a relatively realist international system. Issues of the rule of law, human rights and democracy are hardly accommodated in actualising state’s national/core interests. Attempt at building a conflict free society through democratisation as against realist ‘sinister’ interests in unreformed societies is questionable (Smith, 2011: 5)

L. Amusan



The focus of this paper is to examine who make/s South Africa’s foreign policy decision between 1994 and 2014. This will take this study to the issues of theoretical discussion on public policy formulation focusing more on domestic variables as the main determinants of foreign policy. One of the shortcomings of this position is its lacks of pluralist conception that reduces state as the only unit of analysis with less influence of environmental variables in a global village states system. To balance this study, the inputs of various international organisations that South Africa is a member will receive academic discussion. Also worth addressing is the influence of multinational corporations (MNCs), mostly mining sector in determining the state policy-making processes. The study will conclude that decision-making within two decades under discussion followed the same pattern except for the Jacob Zuma’s government of the principle of myownism with changes in nomenclature. Perhaps the introduction of much confused public diplomacy by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) is an attempt to ‘sell’ foreign policies to the uniformed public (Pigman, 2010; Williams, 2004). The study is divided into four main parts. Part one is the introduction, part two looks into the theoretical perspectives in decision making and policy implementation. Penultimate part examines South Africa’s foreign policy decision making between 1994 and 2014; and part four is the conclusion and recommendations.

DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVESDecision-making involves the choice of an alternative from a series of

competing alternatives (Sambo, 1999: 286). Foreign policy making is the interaction between bureaucratic, psychological, domestic and external variables. Though the foreign policy approach involves a democratised push and pulls agreements and disagreement between state and non-state actors such as interest groups and MNCs, it is the most secretive aspect of government activities, even, in the post-Cold War foreign policy. This is, mostly, when it involves security of a state or instances were politicians seek to defend controversial policy actions. One cannot, but appreciate the dynamic of international relations, which sometimes brings about some degrees of variations in foreign policy of different governments, even within the same political party. Level of analysis, a behavioural perspective in the study of foreign policy formulation and implementation, is going to dominate this discussion taking into cognisance of the importance of environmental and domestic factors; having in mind that public policy is the authoritative allocation of values in a society.

Public policy has to do with government allocation of scarce resources and socio-political and economic values based on some certain objectives to be achieved at the domestic and at the global levels. In allocating these resources and values, some issues may be left unaddressed while others become government

5


preferences. Public policy is purposive, goal-oriented action consisting of patterns of action by governmental officials in overt form. It may also be a government policy not to take any action on some issues. Therefore government policy position may be an action or inaction towards a certain issue of interest. ‘Policy as inaction is, however, much more difficult to pin down and analyse than policy as action, since it involves perceived behaviour and intent (van der Waldt, 2001: 87). It is what government actually do as against what it wants to do that is considered public policy usually backed by legal power to prosecute any violator at the domestic level (Sambo, 1999: 283). Foreign policy also considered public policy in democratic societies leaves little room for government to prosecute any violator as it is more of actions and reactions by the state to the global environment polarised by powerful and/or weak state and non-state actors, which dictate state actions and inactions based on the distribution of power principle. To this end foreign policy actions and inactions of states are based on the proportion of political, social and economic importance at the global level. Having explained what public policy vis-à-vis foreign policy is and what it is not, it is the intension of this part to look into some relevant theories that capture foreign policy formulation in South Africa.

Rational-comprehensive theory is based on the identification of decision-maker’s goals, sought for various alternatives in achieving these goals; identified the consequences of each of the alternatives and finally choose the best alternative. The theory believes in total control over decision-making situations. Employment of rational-comprehensive thesis in explaining foreign policy making is being challenged by the pluralists, ‘given their fragmented view of the state, it is assumed that the clash of interests, bargaining and need for compromise do not always make for a rational decision-making process’ (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987: 193; White, 1997: 253). In some cases, individual value may compromise public value and the result may end up in self-serving. Another challenge associated with this theory is the availability of information that makes rational choice a public policy. Several times, information available to decision makers may be scanty due to the self-interest of relevant intelligence units and the quality of foreign mission dispatch sent to the home state. Though, DIRCO is noted for not acknowledge missions positions; the implication of which is lack of interest in alternative ideas from ambassadors/high commissioners and consular officers (Leon, 2013: 33). It is also criticised that in most cases, decisions are made under conditions of ‘bounded rationality’ (satisfice) where final position is based on the alternative that satisfy the president.

Incremental approach is another theory of public policy propounded by Charles Lindblom. This theory is described as successive limited comparison or root method. It believes in functional approach to decision-making where previous decisions need some adjustment to accommodate new developments (Sapru, 2004: 76). The strength of this theory is among others, time saving, less costly and ensures consistency and stability in a political system (Dye, 1997: 29). It is only applicable in a stable environment where emergency decision that hinges on security of state

L. Amusan



is not involved. Any fundamental changes in relations among nations may render the theory obsolete as the decision-makers of both sides need to embark on a new policy for or against each other. In an attempt to address problems of rational-comprehensive and incremental approaches, mixed-scanning theory was offered by Amitai Etzioni (1967, 385) as an amalgam of the two theories which:

reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamentalism decisions and helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives...It provides a strategy for evaluation and it does not include hidden structural assumptions.

The major crisis of this approach is that, in most cases, differences between fundamental and incremental decisions may be misty. System theory is popularised by David Easton derived from natural science which implies high degree of interaction among various units. It is an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society that functions to transform demands into authoritative decisions requiring the support of the whole society (Dye, 1997: 35; Sapru, 2004: 60-62). According to McClelland as quoted from Ojo and Sesay (1988: 12) ‘any system is a structure that is perceived to have some identifiable boundaries that separate it from its environment’. Frankel (1973: 47) sees it as ‘a number units which interact’. It is a theory that responds to its environment and always wants to preserve the status quo. It lapses are that it believes in stability, orderliness and balance of power. It refuses to acknowledge a need for a change in the status quo. It believes that only the environment may supply inputs fails to consider some inputs from decision-makers. Unlike in natural sciences, mostly biology, it is highly voluntaristic and not as highly interdependence as postulated by students of this school.

Another available theory in explaining decision-making in South Africa is the group theory developed within the context of pluralists’ model. It believes in equal power of groups in decision making and that no group is without power. It captures the concept of representation in democracy. The cluster system introduced by the Mbeki government is an example of this theory. It arrogated much power to various committees set up under Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) supervision. Every cognate department were collapsed to a new system of integrated policy-making through six cabinet committees of which international relations, peace and security (IRPS) form a cluster (van Nieuwkerk, 2006: 43). The rationale behind this is to have in-depth discussion on policy issues before it is tabled before the full cabinet, known to have not good at good decision-making, overloaded, unwieldy and comprised non-specialists by the relevant ministers (Butler, 2013: 6). Directors-General clusters under the Forum of Directors General (FOSAD) were equally inaugurated to debate and finalise all the technical issues pertaining to decisions to be taking by the political appointees (cabinet ministers) whose responsibility is to look into the political imperatives of the policies.

7


To address the unwieldy approach to decision-making in foreign policy, another theory, which is directly opposite group/pluralistic theory, is elite model. This approach relies on concentration of political power on minority to perform all the political functions. It ‘assumes a conspiratory character and is to that extent a provocative theory of public policy’ (Sambo, 1999: 294). It is perceived to be a self-centred approach where the interest of a few is considered against the majority interest. Like the systemic and group theories, this approach is orthodox in nature. It lacks scientific explanation and gave little room for external variables, which is a key a consideration in foreign policy formulation. It dominated Mbeki’s foreign policy traceable to the formation of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in 1992 bankrolled by the NP’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Sanlam and Southern Life insurance companies. Through BEE, political elite within the ANC was created to defend the interest of Afrikaners investments when economic and foreign policies are on table for discussion. This group of people also facilitated enabling environment for Anglo-American Corporation and others to move their head offices and primary listings from Johannesburg to London to avoid possible economic and political upheavals in uncertain new South Africa (Mbeki, 2009: 70). Through this, South Africa is being relegated to the producer of mineral resources for the capitalist world and abandoned manufacturing sectors through international economic arrangement. This also facilitated neo-liberal economic policy of unequal exchange and development in the era of ‘obsolescent capitalism (Amin, 2003; Bond, 2005; Mbeki, 2009).

Attempt to involve the civil society in foreign policy formulation was in the area of public diplomacy with all the entrenched lapses. This always received diplomatic setback through president Zuma undiplomatic character and pronouncements. His ‘don’t think like an African’ and ‘this is not Malawian road’ not only brought diplomatic setback, it also question his African Agenda/Advancement and South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) intention to control the mind of many African states. This was approached through utilitarian foreign policy. Zuma laid much emphasis on economic relations (Landsberg, 2011: 246).

Once general guidelines on foreign policy are formed by the President with the help of relevant stakeholders, the interpretation and implementation of it should be left on the bureaucrat. The recent development in DIRCO suggests low morale among the civil servant in foreign policy implementation. This it because of the recruitment of inexperience ANC members who supported Zuma at the Polokwane conference against Mbeki as a thank you gift in a coup well carried out. The PCAS that is a brain box on foreign policy was replaced by ‘generalists’ staff as against ‘specialists’ with little experience and less interest in foreign policy (Georghiou, 2013: 62).

L. Amusan



SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING BETWEEN 1994 AND 2014 IN REALITYPaul Williams (2004: 911) observes that ‘foreign policy is not made in a political

vacuum but is shaped by domestic factors (such as public opinion), globalizing pressures (such as communications technology), integrative tendencies...and transnational forces (such as lobbying from NGOs).’ In any democratic society, the inputs of the above variables are invaluable in decision making; and in some cases decision execution. In 1993, Mandela spelt out South Africa’s foreign policy of the post-apartheid where he emphasised on human rights and democratisation as the cornerstone of the future international relations of the country (Mandela, 1993). What concern this study is how did the foreign policy of the state was arrived at? Who were the major actors that contributed to the shaping of the present foreign policy? The question is too hard to unravel because of the high degree of secrecy in foreign policy making in general because it hinges on state security. The 1998 invasion of Lesotho under the guise of the SADC mandate was for the national interest of Pretoria. The decision to invade the state was taking in Mauritius meeting secretly attended by Mandela, Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Joquim Chissano (Mozambique) and the ailing Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili to doctor the Pius Langa Commission of Enquiry on the 1998 general elections in Lesotho that reported wide irregularities in the elections. It was at the meeting that a decision to invade the state was reached before South Africa relevant security sectors came on board under Operation Boleas (Rosenberg, 2003). Ronnie Kastril, then deputy Minister for Defence, a specialist on intelligence gathering was said to have contributed to the invasion of the tiny Kingdom. The needs to assert effective control of the Highland Water Project at the Katse Dam, to check influx of refugee and to maintain status quo government in power were the reasons behind the invasion.

Jacob Zuma in his State of the nation address on 13th February 2014, maintained that the basis of the country’s foreign policy is the laid down policy position as crafted by Oliver Reginald Tambo (1917-1993 and Johnstone Mfanafuthi Makhatini (1932-1988). The truth of this position calls for academic interrogation. Makhatini that died in 1988 could not have contributed much to the post-apartheid foreign policy compared with Mbeki as the head of international relations units at the Luthuli House, after ANC was unbanned in 1990. The post-Cold War arrangement of capitalism due to elite influence from the blacks and whites South Africans cemented the foreign policy that Zuma inherited. Immediately the government of National Unity was formed, ‘Mandela had decided to delegate more responsibilities to the office of Deputy President Mbeki’; an office that served as mind, eyes, ear and nose of Mandela administration (Chikane, 2013: 32; Gevisser, 2007: 658-9).

When Mbeki became president in 1999, he was surrounded by his trusted friends such as Essop Pahad, Aziz Pahad, Joel Netshitenzhe, Trevor Manuel, Teboho

9


Mafole, Monjaku Gumbi and Frank Chikane who formed his kitchen cabinet. His private group of intelligence operatives headed by Kastril controlled the policy of his government (Calland, 2013; Gevisser, 2007: 658-60; Gumede, 2005: 176). The Kitchen cabinet was so powerful that the de jure ministers had to pass through them to the president for any policy initiation (Leon, 2013: 31). In most cases policy-making between 1994 and 2008 on technical issues were formulated by outside experts and consultants, but the final approval came from PCAS to achieve the 3 Cs of control, coordination and centralisation (Gumede, 2005: 129). Largely, decision under Mbeki was in technocratic centralised fashion (Hicks et al, 2011: 49). Clusters system introduced brought about setting up of six Cabinet Committees under the presidency of which IRPS was one of them that focused on foreign affairs (Daniel, 2009: 273). Based on David Easton input-environment-output system, other stakeholders contributed to foreign policy formulation despite 3 Cs in foreign policy, intermestic policy received inputs from interest groups (such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry), legislators and other subnational actors (Rourke, 2003: 91).

The 1996 Constitution did not state foreign policy objectives, but only accorded the president to formulate policies for the general development of the country. The president power to enter into international treaty, sending and receiving envoys and ambassadors to and from other states implies that he/she is at the driver seat on the issue of foreign policy. This could have accounted for the domineering position of the president on the issue of foreign policy formulation and implementation to the disadvantage of the ministry of foreign affairs and the parliament. Thus the foreign policy actions in the context of the supreme law of the country have down-sized democracy and centralised approach, providing more power to the head of state. The South African foreign policy environment is complex and contradictory, this is because on the one hand the constitution confers more significant role to the president (a centralised approach), while on the other hand DIRCO, Cabinet and parliament specifically through its committee of international relations have significant role to play in foreign policy actions (a democratic approach).

The technical complexity of economic and public policy excludes legislators and citizens from effective power’ in foreign policy formulation coupled with their lack of interest in what appeared esoteric to them (Butler, 2013: 5). Except, when issues become a general discussion by media as was the cases of CAR (2013) and Nigeria (1995 and 2012) that the parliament contributed to foreign policy discussion despite committee on foreign affairs in the house. On several occasions, scanty information on foreign policy issues are sent to the parliament with the main content remains obscured, even to the cabinet ministers. In many occasions, members of portfolio committee hardly attend relevant meetings that lead to foreign policy deliberations.

At the theoretical level, the inputs of the ANC in foreign policy should be the basis of the country’s international relations. Party manifesto in foreign policy of

L. Amusan



the country should play vital roles in explaining foreign policy making. Declaratory policies on international relations from 1994 to 2014 reflect the historical antecedent of the party which hardly stand the contemporary global politics of realist position. The manifestos only reflected more of domestic issues such as unemployment, education, health and land reform. Neo-liberal economic system adopted through elite agenda questions the inputs of the party manifesto in the state’s foreign policy. Swift movement from Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) signifies the haste at which the acclaimed socialist movement changed as a result of forces from the West and its various international financial institutions (Chikane, 2013). ANC manifesto that becomes the basis of electioneering campaign was externally influenced on the advice of American pollster Stanley Greenberg and an image maker British born Tim Bell. (Bond, 2005; Butler, 2009: 72-6). The input of MNCs in the state policy making is also important. Through an ANC Progressive Business Forum (PBF) they were able to donate to the party in exchange for having access to the country’s policy makers who always defend their business interest except for the issue of HIV/AIDS drugs.

By 1998, Mbeki and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) initiated a new direction of the country’s foreign policy. According to the DFA document, national interest of the state was spelt as security and prosperity. Security implies territorial integrity and human security while prosperity is to close the gap of economic inequality between the white and the blacks through neo-liberal economic system. Pillars of the country’s foreign policy are the African Union, SADC, South-South relations, North-South cooperation and multilateralism (Landsberg, 2006: 255). This has become the bedrock of the state’s foreign policy till 2014. The concentric circle of the country foreign is not in line with the reality of international relations. To make SADC as the second ring is unrealistic and an ambitious policy programme in favour of the AU.

To attract domestic and international supports for the country’s foreign policy, and as a sign of departure from Mbeki policy option, public diplomacy was introduced by the Zuma government. One of the major problems is the quality of education of the targeted audience. Attempt to take this to higher institution of learning receives negative success. DIRCO keeps on changing appointment with some institutions of higher learning in a bid to sell the ideas. Conferences, symposia, panel discussions, roundtables and academic seminars are promising in disseminating government policies. These are also avenue to receive feedback on policy positions of government. Some of the challenges attributed to public diplomacy as observed by Hammersley (2012: 218) are among others, that even when the populace of the targeted states ‘are warms to your ideas, that may not amount to much if their government doesn’t’. Many states are currently under one form of authoritarian system or the other and people’s opinion on policy issues may not influence such government’s actions. Even, if citizens from other state are ready

11


to abide by a state ‘soft power’ cultural outreach, it is not necessary to its political agenda. Through social media, publication of Ubuntu journal and newspapers and audio vision, South Africa was able to reach out to the populace in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, but this did not change the targeted states’ political system. Between 2009 and 2014, foreign policy formulation in South Africa could be described as most unwieldy. This is more so when looking into many constituencies to balance because of the way the Zuma government got to power within the ANC. The government had to satisfy many people through political appointments. Many carrier officers were frustrated and resigned from DIRCO because the post-Polokwane brought people with no background in social sciences and appointed them over seasoned diplomats. This could have explained why many vacancies are unoccupied at the Department as pointed by Georghiou (2013:59-61). Not only that there was expansion in the ministries from Mbeki’s 28 to 34, responsibilities kept on overlapping and duplication became the norms than exception. This could have explained why government had to sign a treaty twice unknown. Lindiwe Zulu, Yunus Carrim, Moe Shaik, Mac Maharaj, Lekala Kaunda, Zuma’s chief of staff, and outsiders tagged as ‘brains trust’ who called for political solution to Zuma corrupt charges were variously rewarded irrespective of their administrative competence and political integrity (Basson, 2012: 72; Coetzee, 2009). Other members of Zuma kitchen cabinet with questionable international relations knowledge and interest were Vivian Reddy, Sizwe Shezi, Blade Nzimande, Fikile “Slovo” Majola, Don Mkhwanazi, Cassius Lubisi (DG Presidency) and the ANC treasurer-general, Zweli Mkhize. The appointment of inexperienced to some sensitive positions such as foreign affairs forced the government to tactically follow Mbeki’s policy, though with changes in nomenclature to satisfy the anti-Mbeki ANC members. Changes from African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF, 2000, Act 51, section 2) to SADPA, and DFA to DIRCO are examples with no changes in direction and objectives (Daniel, 2009: 274; Landsberg, 2012). To some extent the Zuma foreign policy approach was informed by the notion of getting rid of the Mbeki legacy as opposed to principled and informed policy actions based on the country’s ability and capability.

On the foreign policy formulation, the inputs of foreign political parties and various governments continue to contribute to the international relations of the country. For the twenty years under consideration, political parties like the Indian National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party and the ruling parties in Libya, Angola and Equatorial Guinea donated generously to the 2009 electioneering campaign of the ANC (Butler, 2009: 74; Dawes et al, 2007). This explains why the first official visit of Zuma outside South Africa was Angola in August 2009, partly to say big thank you and to present a total departure from Mandela and Mbeki policy toward the Luanda government (Landsberg, 2012 : 84 and 2004: 163-4). The visit appeared to have confirmed ‘special relationship’ between Zuma and Angola which led to the Browse Mole ‘intelligence’ report. The normalisation of

L. Amusan



relationship between the two, therefore is understandable.1 Other quarters that influence foreign policy of South Arica are different think

tanks in the country, South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) and Anglo American Brenthurst Foundation. Despite apartheid history of Anglo American, the company’s opinions on economic and diplomatic issues always receive listening ears of every government in the country (Roberts, 2007).

ANY NEED FOR FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?This is a position of an American Secretary of States, Professor Henry Kissinger

(2001: 18-9) when he observed that ...pre-eminence evolved less from a strategic design than a series of ad hoc decisions designed to satisfy domestic constituencies while, in the economic field, it was driven by technology and the resulting unprecedented gains in...productivity. All this has given rise to the temptation of acting as if the United States needed no longer-range foreign policy at all and could confine itself to a case-by-case response to challenges as they arise.

Based on the above quotation, is there a need to embark on foreign policy in the era of globalisation where environmental variables, rather than domestic influence largely determine state’s foreign policy? Examples are bound on this development. The metamorphosised General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) not only checkmates the degree of manoeuvrability of participating states. It also dictates to a large extent of their international economic relations.

Through political socialisation, America was able to control the country’s foreign policy through the backdoor. The appointment of Frank Chikane as the super-Director-General in the office of the president and charged to coordinate other directors-general from other Departments and physically controlled the mind of the cabinet ministers and provincial governments captured rational-comprehensive actors model in the country’s foreign policy. This is coupled with his ten-month crash programme at Harvard University in the US that exposed him to the way America does it to capture the global system (Chikane, 2013: 38-9). In essence, the respect he commanded between 1995 and 2009 in the Union Building promoted the neo-liberal political and economic arrangement which formed the basis of the country’s foreign policy-making. South Africa is noted for joining any international organisation, even when the promotion of the state’s acclaimed Africa Advancement is not noticeable. This implies that all the norms and values of these international regimes dictate the state’s foreign policy when domestic policies are crying for attention.

13


CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATIONMaking decision on foreign policy issue in South Africa can hardly escape some

continuity in the country’s international relations because of some immutable variables that bestows some duties on the state. From the apartheid era till date, different Pretoria governments believe in her ordain/destiny to ensure strict adherence to a regional leader and a regional protector because of policymakers’ national role conceptions (Bates, 1975; Destradi, 2010; Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990). To ensure continuity, Mandisi Mpahlwa, Charles Nqakula and Welile Nhlapo were appointed by Zuma as economic, political and African peace and security advisors respectively. They were equally prominent in the Mbeki government.

It is being argued that foreign policy of every state, big or small remains the same (Crabb, 1972: 1). This statement is more prominent in the uni-polar system or what is being described as non-polarity international system. At the same time, some scholars (Holsti, 2011: 229) argued that ‘in other cases fundamental changes in government personnel necessitated’, what appeared to be a radical changes in decision-making, which ultimately impacted on the content of ego conception. From the perspective of the country’s national interests, which remain vague till date, an attempt was made ‘to improve the quality of lives of the people of South Africa, especially the poor’ before the issue of Africa as the centre-piece of the state’s foreign policy through African Renaissance (Chikane, 2013: 53). Possibly because the issue of African Renaissance was a baby of the ANC from 1993 as contains in the party document. It was promoted by Mandela when he addressed the OAU Tunis summit in June 1994. This could have explained why Zuma government had to promote it as the cornerstone of his foreign policy. This could have explained, at different times, why America’s relations with South Africa were at low ebb because of the quiet diplomacy Pretoria embarked on Harare political crisis. Zuma displayed the same as a result of the invasion of Libya by the NATO, despite the support South Africa gave the United Nations Security Council Res. 1970 and 1973, tactically employed to invade and overthrown Ghaddafi in 2011.

Decision-making in the ANC from Mandela to Zuma could be said to have taken the same pattern. The foundation that was laid by Mbeki as the first deputy president and eventually, the president between 1994 and 2008 was followed by the Zuma administration. This could be as a result of near absence of experienced international relations specialists in the ANC international relations unit (ANC, 2012: 46). The low quality of decision-making in the ANC and DIRCO resulted from the great purge immediately after the Polokwane 2007 Conference which made the best think-tank among the ANC left the National Executive Committee, except for Naledi Pandor, Joe Netshitenshe (policy guru, who later resigned), S’bu Ndebele, Jeff Radebe, Pallo Jordan, Zola Skweyiya, Jeremy Cronin and Trevor Manuel (Butler, 2009: 69-70). At the presidency, the same was experienced. Though Trevor Manuel

L. Amusan



controlled National Planning Commission (NPC), his role continued to be observed by the ‘loyalist’ of Zuma as a probable continuation of Mbeki agenda, therefore he could not be seen playing vital roles in decision-making. The same could have explained why he was not shortlisted by the party for 2014 general elections. Collins Chabane occupied a prominent role at the Union Building as Minister in the Presidency in control of Department Performance Monitoring and Evaluation as well as Administration (DPME). He is less experienced in international relations. Splitting of PCAS to two aimed at avoiding Mbeki imperial rule that subjected ministers to the mercy of Frank Chikane. Lindiwe Zulu, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Mandisi Mpahlwa, Moe Shaik and Mac Maharaj as members of IRPS cluster cabinet might not be able to come up with dynamic foreign policy.

There are several areas that the ANC government keep as sacrosanct when it comes to decision making. Though, some believe that the foreign policy in operation since 1994 is the handiwork of the Luthuli House, but the implementation of some appears to be a total departure from the party, during the Mbeki government, it was reduced to a fundraising centre for the party (Hicks et. al, 2011: 4). Perhaps because of how Zuma got to power, he tends, based on various pronouncement of DIRCO Minister, differ in some policy areas with Mbeki. Some of these issue areas are the recognition of one government over the other. The Angola issue has discussed above is one of the examples. This could have caused by the generous financial donation during electioneering campaign between 2008 and 2009. On the issue of Libya, a state that wanted to be a primus inter pares in Africa through the AU, but diplomatically checked by Mbeki and Obasanjo became a darling in the Zuma government. Not that the relationship came from the financial support for the candidature of Zuma, the alleged transferred of some fund into accounts of some Zuma acolyte came to limelight when Libya government in the post-Ghaddafi era demanded for the repatriation of such fund, an allegation that was not denied. Zuma involvement in the CAR crisis questions his public diplomacy and the employment of smart power against soft power among the warring parties (Lansberg, 2004: 162-3). This eventually boomerang which subjected Pretoria government to ridicule as an undue interference in the internal affairs of other states, over stepping sphere of influence, lack of consultation with the AU and violation of Article 53 of the UN that called for consultation with the UN Security Council for any military exercise in other state/s.

Africa as the centrepiece of South Africa foreign policy, SADC, South-South, North-South and peaceful settlement of conflict at the global level continue to be the cornerstone of the state international relations. South Africa relations with the Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies (MPC) continue to be frosty despite their alleged contribution to the electioneering campaign in 2009. The need to opt for generic AIDS drugs was promoted by the Mbeki government which Zuma continue to abide with (de Wet, 2014; Gevisser, 2007). Some questioned the need for a

15


change in the name from DFA to DIRCO. The explanation from Maite Nkoana-Mashabane was that it was in tune with the new foreign policy reality where, as against, the employment of hard power, what Joseph Nye (2004) describes as soft power will determine the state’s international politics. This position hardly hold water because immediately South Africa diplomatic misadventure in Nigeria, the country embarked on soft (quiet) diplomacy in Sudan, Burundi, Cote d’Ivore and Zimbabwe.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSIt is evident from discussion above that South Africa foreign policy for the

past twenty years remain elusive based on the promotion of human rights and democracy at the global level. These twin issues are the pacifists approach to international relations. One cannot claim that the perspective to the formulation of South Africa foreign policy is derived from a certain theoretical perspective, but rather it is amalgamation of various policy formulation paradigms. Mixed-scanning, systemic, group and elite perspectives played major roles in explaining policy decision within the country under consideration. This could have confirmed lacked of coherence in the state international relations. This paper also discussed what is described as double standard in the operationalisation of foreign policy. Promotion of human rights in Nigeria on the one hand and the introduction of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in Zimbabwe on the other, calls for academic investigation. Invasion of Lesotho and diplomatic solution to Cote d’Ivore political logjam is another area of inconsistency.

Africa as the centre of the country’s foreign policy receives several blows. The 2013 military misadventure in CAR is directly opposite to the declaratory foreign policy of peaceful solution to political conflicts in Africa. Not only that South Africa did not ignore the unspoken sphere of influence on the continent and the need to consult with the AU and sought approval of the UN Security Council before its military involvement in the CAR, it economic ambition as prime inter pares eventually led to ignominious withdrawal of troops from Bangui. Changes in government in a radical way between 2009 and 2014 left a wide gap in the quality of the country’s foreign policy. Most of the experienced civil servant and politicians left the government because of the recruitment of pro-Zuma loyalists to DIRCO and presidency that were said to have performed below expectation in policy-making and implementation. This reduced the quality of diplomacy to low ebb recently. This explained why between 2009 and 2014, South Africa could not change the economic structure left by the elite which started in 1992. This has continued to perpetuate economic underdevelopment, high rate of unemployment and political instability as experienced in the incessant strike in the mining sector and over-reliance on the importation of manufacturing goods. High turnover and lack of experience by some of the directors general is another source of concern. Experienced civil servants, with strict adherence to specialisation as against

L. Amusan



generalisation, with less of political consideration should occupy such position (Georghiou, 2013: 62). Addressing this will reflect on the question of contradictory public diplomacy and possibly impact on the undiplomatic pronouncement of the president between 2009 and 2014. Possibly to avoid more of diplomatic blunders, as supported by Olivier (Mangcu, 2009), the president should come up with broad diplomatic policies and left the rest for bureaucrats to implement. Also, the government should embark on proactive diplomacy so as to avoid the March 2014 Rwanda diplomatic face-off.

NotesThe Browse Mole ‘intelligence’ report that implicated Angola intelligence

establishment in a bid to support Zuma against Mbeki because of Mbeki attempts ‘to enforce First World policies and Western values on African countries’, and his refusal to support and supply munitions against UNITA rebel (Dawes et.al, 2007).

LIST OF REFERENCESAmin, S. 2003. Obsolescent Capitalism: Contemporary Politics and Global Disorder.

London and New York: Zed Books.ANC.2012. Unity in Action. Towards Socio-Economic Freedom: Report of the 53rd

National Conference Held 16-20. December 2012 at Mangaung, Free State. Johannesburg: ANC.

Anderson, J. E. 1997. Public Policy-making. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.Basson, A. 2012. Zuma Exposed. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.Bates, T. R. 1975. “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, in Journal of the History of

Ideas, 35(2), pp. 351-6.Butler, A. 2009. “The ANC’s National Election Campaign of 2009: Siyanqoba!”, in R.

Southall and J. Daniel. Eds. Zunami!: The 2009 South African Elections. Johannesburg: Jacana and Konrad Adenauer, pp. 65-84.

Butler, A. 2013 “The State of the South African Presidency”, The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation. Issue 71, 1 November, pp. 4-9.

Bond, P. (2005) Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Calland, R. 2013. “Why Zuma is no Mbeki”, City Press. http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/why-zuma-is-no-mbeki/ Accessed on 7 February

2014.Chikane, F. 2013. The Things that Could not be Said: Form A{ids} to Z{imbabwe}.

Johannesburg: Picador Africa.Coetzee, T. 2009. “Who is Moe Shaik?” http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/

page71654?oid=145444&sn=Detail Accessed on 6 March 2014.Crabb, C. V. 1972. American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Harper &

Row.Daniel, J. 2009. “Glancing Back, Looking Ahead: Tilting Left?” in R. Southall and J.

Daniel. Eds. Zunami!, pp.270-79.Dawes, N., Sole, S. and Brummer, S. 2007. “Inside the Browse ‘Mole’ row”,

Mail&Guardian. http://.\m.mg.co.za/index.php?view=article&urlid=2007-08-03-inside-the-browse-

17

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationmole-row#.UxAiqqOMfF. Accessed on 27 February 2014.

De Wet, P. (2014, January). ‘Motsoaledi: Big pharma’s ‘satanic’ plot is genocide’, accessed on 29 January 2014, from http://mg.co.za/article/2014-01-16-motsoaledi-big-pharmas-satanic-plot-is-genocide/

Destradi, S. 2010. “Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony and Leadership”, in Review of International Studies, 36(4), pp. 903-30.

Dye, T. 1997. Understanding Public Policy. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.Etzioni, A. 1967. “Mixed-Scanning: A “Third” Approach To Decision-Making”, Public

Administration Review. Vol.27(5), pp. 385-392.Farrel, H. And Finnemore, M. 2013. “The End of Hypocrisy: American Foreign Policy in

the Age of Leaks”, Foreign Affairs. November/December, pp. 22-6.Frankel, J. 1973. Contemporary Theory and the behaviour of States. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.Georghiou, C. A. 2013. “Professional Diplomacy: A Call for its Reinforcement”, Africa

Insight. 42(4), pp. 59- 70.Gevisser, M. 2007. Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred. Johannesburg and Cape Town:

Jonathan Ball.Gumede, W. M. 2005. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape

Town: Zebra Press.Hammersley, B. 2012. 64 Things You Need to Know Now and Then. London: Hodder &

Stoughton.Hicks et al, 2011. “The Executive”, A. Venter and C. Landsberg. Eds. Government and

politics in South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik, pp. 44-58.Holsi, K. J. 2011. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” in

W. Carlsnaes and S. Guzzini (Eds.). Foreign Policy Analysis Volume 1. London: Sage Publications, pp. 219-250.

Ikenberry, G. J. & Kupchan, C. A. 1990 “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”, in David P. Rapkin. Eds. World Leadership and Hegemony: International Political Economy Yearbook. 5. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kissinger, H. 2001. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward Diplomacy for the 21st Century. New York: Touchstone.

Landsberg, C. 2012. “The Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: Association or Dissociation?” Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations. 1(1), 75-102.

Landsberg, C. 2011. “South African foreign policy formulation, 1989-2010”, A. Venter and C. Landsberg. Eds. Government and politics... pp. 231-256.

Landsberg, C. 2006. “Foreign policy-making and implementation in post-settlement South Africa’, in A. Venter and C Landsberg. Eds. Government and Politics in the new South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, pp. 250-267.

Landsberg, C. 2004. The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation. Johannesburg: Jacana.Leon, T. The Accidental Ambassador: From Parliament to Patagonia. Johannesburg:

Picador Africa.Mangcu, X. 2009. “A New Foreign Policy for Jacob Zuma’s South Africa.” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/20-south-africa-mangcu#.

Accessed on 7 February 2014. Mbeki, M. 2009. Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing.

Johannesburg: Picador Africa.Mandela, N. “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Affairs, 72(5), pp. 86-97.Nye, J. S. 2004. “The Decline of America’s Soft Power”, in Foreign Affairs. May/June ,

pp.60-73.

L. Amusan


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationNye, J. S. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” in The Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science. 616(1), pp. 94-109.Roberts, R. S. 2007. Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki.

Johannesburg: STE Publishers.Rosenberg, A. 2003. “Nelson Mandela Invasion”, FrontPageMagazine.com http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=16330 Accessed on 25

February 2014.Rourke, J. T. 2003. International Politics on the World Stage. Guilford, USA: McGraw-

Hill. Sambo, A. 1999. “What is Public Policy?” in R. Anifowose and F. Enemuo. Eds.

Elements of Politics. Lagos: Sam Iroansi Publications. pp. 281-310.Sapru, R. K. Public Policy: Formulation, Implementation and Evaluation. New Delhi:

Sterling Publishers. Smith, S. 2011. “Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview,” in in W.

Carlsnaes and S. Guzzini (Eds.). Foreign Policy Analysis, pp.3-23.Sole, S. 2008. “Mbeki: Browse Mole was Right”, in Mail&Guardian. http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles13/browse.html. Accessed on 26 February

2014. South Africa Year Book 2010/2011. Pretoria: GCIS.Republic of South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

1996. Ptretoria: Government Printer.Van der Waldt, G. 2001. “Public Policy and Policy Analysis’, D. van Niekerk, G. van

der Waldt and A. Jonker. Eds. Governance, Politics, and Policy in South Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.86-114.

Van Niekerk, D. 2001. “Foreign Policy’, in D. van Niekerk, G. van der Walt et al. Governance, Politics, pp. 86-114.

Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2006. “Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process”, in W. Carlsnaes and P. Nel. Eds. In Full Flight: South African foreign policy after apartheid. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 37-49.

White, B.. 1997. “Diplomacy”, in J. Baylis and S. Smith. Eds. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 249-262.

Williams, P. 2004. “Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?”, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, pp. 911-929.

19


GOVERNANCE IN WATER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: IS THERE A CASE FOR A

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW?S. Balkaran

School of Governance Walter Sisulu University

ABSTRACT

Water and sanitation are constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights in South Africa. Comparatively South Africa has delivered on its constitutional obligation in providing water and sanitation. It is argued

that the reasons for water related service delivery protests can be rationalised by applying the Theory of Rising Expectations. Constitutional provisions give local government municipalities extreme levels of autonomy insulating it from national or provincial interference. Municipal failure to fulfil their governance and constitutional obligations has provoked debate for a constitutional review. National government has the legislative and executive authority to ensure that municipalities effectively perform their functions, contrasting with the constitutional framework within which the government needs to govern, where the central principle guiding intergovernmental relations is cooperative governance. If systematic support is provided, which is curative rather than reactionary, there would not be a need for interventions. This paper fundamentally argues that there is adequate legislation which allows for all stakeholders to implement strategies and deliver the outcomes that citizens deserve. This paper further argues that calls for a constitutional review are premature as the existing legislative framework is inclusive. Nonetheless existing water management legislation needs to be reviewed, aligned and fortified to prevent a cataclysmic failure of national proportions.

INTRODUCTION Justice Kate O’Reagan in her Constitutional Court judgment of Mazibuko and

Others v City of Johannesburg and Others ruled, “Our Constitution entrenches the right of access to water”.

Zuma (2014) reflected in his State of the Nation Address that his government is satisfied with what has been achieved in the past 20 years. South Africa had to undergo a lot of social reconstruction following decades of oppressive rule but accepts that its citizens had the right to speak out about the level of service delivery where they felt that basic services were too slow to reach them. Zuma accepted

S. Balkaran



though that there were still many challenges and that it was valid for some people to complain in some parts of the country. Quality public services, at their best, are the tools used by responsible and democratic governments to serve the best interests of their citizens. People seem to be losing confidence in democratic institutions and are turning to public protest as a way of drawing the Government’s attention to their grievances. The management of access to freshwater, basic water services and access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation has brought into sharp focus the recent 2014 “water related service delivery protests” in South Africa’s urban townships with protesting communities alleging corruption, pollution and fortunes being made through selling clean water.

The Constitution gives authority to local government to exercise its powers and functions and subject to national and provincial legislation, norms and standards. Where local government is failing, the national and provincial governments have an obligation to intervene. It is argued that national and provincial government have failed the communities despite the provisions of the National Water Act and the Water Services Act that provides for government to promote, support and strengthen the capacity and authority of local government while creating mechanisms that will allow monitoring its performance in the water management.

This paper contrasts the current water management legislation and interrogates the need for a constitutional review, the roles of national, provincial and local government in water management against the Theory of Rising Expectations.

THEORY OF RISING EXPECTATIONS The Theory of Rising Expectations is the belief that human beings ultimately

yearn for more than they have so they are never completely satisfied. After they get what they want, they yearn for a little bit more or something else (Natarajan, 2011:88-99). A solution that can be meaningfully applied in one place cannot be applied in another place unless the essentials of the problems are the same.

Laws of Development Rising expectations are the principal driving force for social development.

However, the faster and higher aspirations rise, the greater the gap between expectations and reality. That gap promotes a sense of frustration, depravation and aggression leading to social unrest and violence. Society is an organic, integrated whole which is in constant movement and that movement seeks progress. No nation needs to take centuries to attain high levels of development as even backward nations can develop quickly.

Managing Public PerceptionsThis level of disenfranchisement should be of great concern to those in power.

Molefe (2014:27) contends that citizens’ claims for water or toilets is first negated by government citing where it has provided these basic services. It trumpets and enumerates how many houses it has built for other people, none of which is of

21


any comfort to the affected. This is an act of managing public perceptions, playing the role of a caring government but the people who are protesting are not “that” public. The question that begs to be asked - Why then, given government’s long list of accomplishments would people become so angry that they barricade the streets?

LEGISLATION Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Water, sanitation and hygiene are vital components of sustainable development

and the alleviation of poverty. South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that formally recognise water as a human right. Its national water and sanitation programme, which is one of the largest national programmes in Africa, aims to deliver sustainably on that right. Section 27 (1) (b) of the 1996 Constitution, states that everyone has the right to sufficient food and water. Section 27 (2) adds that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. In outlining the basic fundamental rights the constitution stipulates that ‘the national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions”. Further, the constitution does not allow national government to intervene directly in local matters. According to section 139 this superfluous competency falls to provincial government; which do not have water supply and electricity functions and therefore cannot intervene in the provision of these services (RSA, 1996).

Water Management LegislationIn addition to the Constitution, there are currently four policy documents which

underpin the legislative framework of the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and Water Services Act (1997); namely the White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994), White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (1997), White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation (2001) and the Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003).

The Water Services Act (1997) sets requirements for local government tariff structures and other water related issues in local government. Some of the objectives of the Act are to: set out the rights and duties of consumers and those who are responsible for providing services; promote, support and strengthen the capacity and authority of local government while creating mechanisms that will allow national and provincial governments as well as consumers to monitor its performance; and promote the effective and sustainable use of financial and natural resources.

WATER PROVISIONING AND CONSUMPTION All countries, especially developing countries, need a water management

system that is flexible, adaptive and responsive to the changing needs of society

S. Balkaran



(Likhotal, 2013:85). It is common knowledge that South Africa faces challenges in some municipalities with a professional ethos that is uneven and sometimes lacking. South Africans have become used to certain departments of the state being efficient and others plagued by chronic inefficiency and as a rule, those aspects of the state that are revenue generating are hyper-efficient, while those aspects that are revenue absorbing are not (Duncan, 2013). The failings of municipalities in meeting their constitutional obligations are becoming all too familiar. Water management is a simple administrative issue. Moe and Rheingans (2006:41) posit that providing safe water and basic sanitation to meet the MDGs requires substantial courageous political will.

Pre-1994 planning legislation was control orientated and sectoral, rather than integrated which encouraged separate land uses leading to fragmentation along racial zones, geographical areas and tribal authorities. There is a growing recognition among South African water researchers of the need to deal with social problems in the water sector. South Africa inherited high levels of poverty and it continues to be confronted with unequal and often inadequate access to resources, infrastructure and social services. According to the most recent data available from the World Bank, nine G20 economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and the United States) have already passed the 0.4 threshold, implying dangerous levels of inequality.

Figure 1 - Gini CoefficientIn Figure 1 above, 0 represents a state of perfect economic equality, and 1

represents total inequality. The United Nations rates coefficients greater than 0.4 to be indicative of dangerous levels of inequality. South Africa currently is in the extremely dangerous region of 0.6 and above. Water demands in South Africa

23


have been growing at 4% to 5 % per annum and it is predicted that by 2030, the country’s water resources would be fully utilised under current growth and consumption patterns (UNESCO, 1998). At international level, there has been some symbolic progress to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce by half the proportion of the world’s population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2015, yet billions of people have no ready access to safe water.

The Bill of Rights commanded that the state must take reasonable measures to achieve the progressive realisation of its fundamental human rights. South Africa has made significant strides since 1994 to reduce extreme poverty by providing basic services, such as water, electricity, sanitation and housing to large segments of its population (StatsSA, 2014).

Table 1 - Access to Piped Water and Sanitation in 2012Source: StatsSA (http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=739&id=2=2)

Table 1 clearly reflects that South Africa has provided 77% of its population with basic sanitation as compared to the world average of just 60%. This is above the world standard. South Africa has achieved a phenomenal 91% delivery of running water to its citizens by 2012 but the latest statistic according to Zuma (2014) is that it has achieved 95%. While the drinking water target has officially been met according to the United Nation’s criteria (based on the number of pipelines) and statistics, in reality the existence of a pipe does not necessarily mean there is clean water reliably flowing out of it; and even if there is, it may be very far away, or priced at a rate which some people cannot afford.

S. Balkaran



WATER RELATED SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTSViolent anti-government protest action in South Africa has increased

dramatically in recent months. Communities are not interested in which sphere is doing what, or whose fault it is that services have failed. What they care about is the services they receive, and the quality and reliability of those services (de la Harpe, 2014). Data from the South African Police Services (SAPS) shows that the country is averaging around four to five violent anti-government protests a day. People can see and understand the economic disparity around them and they do not believe the economic system in which they live can offer a solution. Eagle (2014) therefore believes that when people become marginalized, they take to the streets. These protests are a symptom of the many challenges faced in building the society envisaged in the Constitution. The country seems to be witnessing the development of a protest movement of poor communities expressing anger and frustration at the performance of the Government (Cronje, 2014).

In January 2014, after several significant periods without water, people protested. They were shot at by the police and the deaths of people protesting against the lack of access to water brought into sharp focus the failure of some municipalities (Mothulung Township, Madibeng Municipality, Thembisile Hani Municipality, Ekangala, Rethabiseng and Zithobeni Townships) to fulfil their constitutional obligations (De Vos, 2014) and (Masilela, 2014).

Figure 2 - Protest AreasGordhan (2014) concedes in his budget speech that in some areas, there was

“widespread waste and inefficiency”, or slow service delivery. Inspirational public sector leadership is critical, but on its own, it is not enough if provinces and local government are failing to implement their strategies and deliver the outcomes

25


that, their stakeholders deserve (van Pittius, 2012). It is asserted that public sector institutions, especially local government are failing in their constitutional obligations to provide basic service delivery. Municipalities are failing to build the capabilities they need to overcome the challenge of execution in several key areas. The deterioration of municipal infrastructure in a number of South African municipalities post-1994 and the concomitant trend towards private collaboration in infrastructural development, has led to the review of the effectiveness of decentralization and the possibility of the privatization of municipal services. Deputy Director General at the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs Trevor Balzer blames historic problems and migration patterns of communities, the legacy of run-down infrastructure, a lack of engineers, technicians and artisans in the municipalities for their inability to deal with the breakdown of infrastructure (Infrastructure news, 2014).

CIVIL SOCIETYCamay (2013) claims that civil society is considered to be an important

stakeholder in any country that seeks to deepen its democracy. Successive presidents in South Africa including Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and even more lately Jacob Zuma have attacked civil society and have gone on record as saying that civil society interferes with the functioning of government. Government should accept the reality that this is a contested terrain and therefore that civil society have the right to speak out loudly very often on issues that they believe government is going wrong on. Human Settlements Minister Connie September has appealed to communities to take ownership and to participate in all the processes regarding development in their area and to be active participants in their own development claiming that “mistakes have been made and sometimes there is a lack of proper consultation with communities when making decisions that would affect them and their families”. September also emphasised the need of strengthening community consultation and engagement by all three spheres of government (GCIS, 2014).

THIRD AFRICA PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM) COUNTRY REVIEW REPORT In presenting South Africa’s Third Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

Country Review Report at the 20th Summit of the Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) from 28-30 January 2014, President Jacob Zuma acknowledged that his government still faced some challenges in consolidating democracy and political governance, which included service delivery (DPSA, 2014:99).

In reflecting on service delivery achievements in the context of the achievements made, in 1994 only 59% of citizens had access to clean and safe drinking water. Eighteen years later, the national average of 94.7 % of access to basic water services for all South Africans has increased 35.7%. The backlog now stands at

S. Balkaran



5.3%, or some 710 000 households compared to 3.9 million households in 1994. Zuma does not believe that the recent spate of service delivery protests, which have been seen in several parts of the country, were an indication of a failing state. South Africa had achieved a lot in the past 20 years. South Africa has delivered water to 95 percent of people and the five percent can no longer wait and argues that “…it doesn’t say we have failed to deliver… If so many houses have been built in [a certain] part of a community, people will say, ‘Why not here? We want them now’.” President Zuma claimed the good delivery record of government led people to have high expectations, and this had led to an increased impatience. Zuma agreed that corruption was affecting service delivery but said government was acting against corrupt individuals.

CALL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEWAgainst the landscape of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights

par excellance, the existence of adequate water management legislation and water delivery mechanisms delivering on its mandate to 95% of the total population which surpasses international benchmarks and exceeding standards, begs the vital question that needs to be asked: is there a need for a constitutional review in terms of water management?

The right to a healthy environment is enshrined in the Constitution with all local government (municipalities) directly responsible and accountable for water management and water quality and the effective implementation of national initiatives. It is argued that South Africa has excellent water management plans, but there have been insufficient implementation and accountability at a local level. It is further contended that service-delivery failure is inevitable where political interests or corruption interfere with the proper execution of municipal functions. Recent wide spread service delivery protests and the failure of municipalities to provide water to its residents have provoked debate for a constitutional review as national government is blamed for responding too slowly. There has been a clarion call from activists such as Smith (2014:20), Govender (2014:13) and Muller (2012) who believe that the state has not been successful in solving the governance of natural resources, which is an issue of increasing concern. This has led to a call to amend the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) to allow national government to take more control of managing South Africa’s water supply and distribution. They have proposed that the purpose of intervention is to take away the water services function from those municipalities that are failing?

The South African constitutional provisions give municipalities an extreme level of autonomy that protects local government from national or provincial interference. This in turn prevents effective intervention resulting in a climate of impunity and insulation for such municipalities. This sharply contrasts with the constitutional framework within which the government needs to govern, where the central principle guiding intergovernmental relations is cooperative governance.

27


Clause 41 of the Constitution outlines the principles of cooperative governance. The principles of cooperation, namely that no sphere of government may “encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere”. The intent of this clause is not to prevent the government from taking action, but rather to prevent any form of obstruction or hindrance to a municipality performing its functions.

The government/minister has a guardian role in the system of cooperative governance. Section 154 of the Constitution requires the government to “support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities so that they can manage their own affairs, exercise their powers and perform their functions”. This obligation exists not only in its responsibility to ensure coherent governance, but also in its oversight role to ensure that norms and standards are followed. Muller (2014:30) argues that such constitutional fortification will lead to a complete failure of the water management system in certain municipalities of cataclysmic proportions, prompting this call for a constitutional review. Govender (2014:13) supplicates this argument that the National Water Act (NWA) empowers and enables the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs to intervene where there are clear water emergencies/crises at a local level as was the case in Madibeng and similar municipalities and informal settlements.

National Development PlanThe National Development Plan (NDP) proposal also supports Govender´s

(2014) call where regional organisations such as water boards should be used where the municipalities cannot perform effectively.

Lack of Service Delivery

Madibeng Municipality - Section 139 Constitutional Intervention A Section 139 Constitutional intervention report that was completed in February

2013 by a Ministerial Task Team (MTT) from the office of the erstwhile Minister of Local Government and Traditional affairs, Richard Baloyi. Service delivery by the Madibeng Local Municipality has deteriorated dramatically and taxpayers’ money is being used to fund criminal and financial misconduct. The report was handed to the senior management of the Madibeng Local Municipality in Brits in May/June 2013 by the office of the Minister. Since the report was given to the Madibeng Management it had not served at the Municipal Council until February 2014, thus no action had been taken regarding misconduct, both criminal and financial, that took place in the Municipality and uncovered by the Ministerial Task Team.

Other MunicipalitiesAccording to Nyaka (2014:27) the Thembisile Hani Municipality is dependent

on other municipalities for its water supply as it does not have its own source of water. The municipality was purchasing water from other municipalities like the city of Tshwane, Dr JS Moroka as well as Rand Water. Due to the municipality failing its

S. Balkaran



residents in the villages of Leratong, Moloto, Mathyzensloop and Mandela, residents are forced to endanger their lives by crossing the dangerous Moloto highway to fetch water from other areas. The municipality was hard at work to ensure access to water by supplying them with water tankers. The reason for the non-supply of water in the northern region was that the water pump at Bronkhorspruit water treatment plant was broken. Water shortages were also experienced in the southern areas which were supplied by the DR JS Moroka municipality. Further negotiations were being undertaken with the Nkangala district municipality. The municipality had budgeted R36 million for the KwaMhlanga water scheme project which entails the replacement of an ageing bulk water supply pipeline around KwaMhlanga and the construction of two water storage reservoirs at Phola Park and Mountainview.

Review of Water Management Legislation There are currently four policy documents which underpin the legislative

framework of the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and Water Services Act (1997); namely the White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994), White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (1997), White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation (2001) and the Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003). Based on this framework, a decision has been taken to bring the National Water Act and Water Services Act into one, seamless piece of legislation governing the entire water chain. These two separate acts were promulgated for practical reasons and due to the need to get the Water Services Act through parliament as fast as possible in order to facilitate the delivery of safe drinking water to the 14 million people lacking this service at that time in 1994 (DWA, 2013:5).

The 2003 Strategic Framework for Water Services reaffirms national governments constitutional responsibility to provide regulatory support to local government to ensure effective performance of its water and sanitation services duties, through the development of legislation governing the provision of water and sanitation services.

Where the Water Services Authorities fail to plan and implement strategies for the universal provision of basic services, and where they fail to provide efficient, effective and sustainable services, national government (together with provincial government) has the right and obligation to intervene to ensure the users are serviced adequately. There is a proactive role for DWA to drive an effective operational system across all spheres of government, for water and sanitation. Where disputes arise between water management institutions or between water management institutions and any other organs of state, after making every reasonable effort to settle the dispute, the Minister may declare the dispute a formal intergovernmental dispute in terms of the Intergovernmental Relations Act (13 of 2005). Govender (2014:13) believes that the structural, systemic problem of inequality and poverty that is still defined by apartheid spatial geography calls for an urgent evaluation of policy and governance. All spheres of Government, beyond political party

29


affiliation, must ensure that South Africa is governed in a way that upholds the rights of all.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Constitutional prescripts cannot be solved through violence and anger and must

be addressed at all levels of society as part of nation building and promoting social cohesion and progress. Violence and protest is no solution to such communal issues. Muller (2014:30) advocates that where there are problems, municipalities need to work with communities to deal with problems collectively and through collaboration instead of waiting for complete failure through overloading the aging infrastructure. This provides an opportunity for citizens to get involved, rather than local government becoming a place where competing groups fight for power and personal gain. Additional concluding remarks include the following:

Interventions are short term, quick fix in nature and hardly ever achieve results. If systematic support is provided which is curative rather than reactionary, there will not be a need for interventions.

There have been a number of implementation challenges arising from the two pieces of water management legislation which in effect requires an improved alignment and articulation of the integration of the two separate pieces of legislation. The Department of Water Affair’s (DWA) mandated function in the domestic water use sector is the monitoring and regulation of water supply and sanitation activities, in accordance with the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996).

Whilst the existing water legislation provides for ministerial intervention at national level in times of crises, it is in conflict with the constitution prescripts. This can best be addressed by reviewing and amending the constitution to include the other two spheres of government (national and provincial).

The Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency (DPME) must ensure continuous improvement in service delivery through performance monitoring and evaluation and allow direct intervention where national government is directly responsible and national ministers can be held to account.

Ultimately, national government has the legislative and executive authority to ensure that municipalities effectively perform their functions. This will strengthen and governance, accountability and democracy.

LIST OF REFERENCES Camay, P. 2013. The State of Civil Society in South Africa [Interview] (4 November

2013).Cronje, F. 2014. Behind the rise of protest action in South Africa, Pretoria: South

African Institute of Race Relations.de la Harpe, J. 2014. A constitutional amendment won’t make taps flow, Pretoria: SA

Local Government Association.

S. Balkaran


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationDe Vos, P. 2014. Water is life, but the struggle for it is deadly. Daily Maverick, 15

January. DPSA. 2014. Third Report on the Implementation of South Africa’s Program of Action -

Broadening Public Participation, Pretoria: Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA).

Duncan, J. 2013. The Politics of State Efficiency, Johannesburg: The South African Civil Society Information Service.

DWA. 2013. Government Gazette 36798 - National Water Policy Review: Updated Water Policy Positions to overcome the water challenges of our developmental state to provide for improved access water, equity and sustainability, Pretoria: Department of Water Affairs - GCIS.

Eagle, N. 2014. The emerging world’s inequality time bomb. [Online] Available at: http://forumblog.org/2014/02/emerging-world-worry-inequality/ [Accessed 1 March 2014].

GCIS. 2014. Citizens urged to be active in their own development. [Online] Available at: www.sanews.gov.za [Accessed 18 February 2014].

Gordhan, P. 2014. 2014 Finance Budget Speech, Pretoria: Department of Finance .Govender, P. 2014. Madibeng: The place of ‘water. The Water Wheel., Volume March/

April, pp. 12-13.Infrastructurenews. 2014. Calls for constitution amendment to deal with water crisis.

[Online] Available at: http://www.infrastructurene.ws/2014/01/28/calls-for-constitution-amendment-to-deal-with-water-crisis/ [Accessed 28 January 2014].

Likhotal, A. 2013. The Future of Water - Strategies to Meet the Challenge. CADMUS, 2(1), pp. 85-92.

Masilela, S. 2014. Residents cry foul over water and power bills. The New Age, 31 January, p. 6.

Molefe, T. 2014. The curious case of the state’s neglect. City Press - Voices, 2 February , p. 27.

Muller, A. M. 2014. Constitutional Crisis - For the taps to flow, government needs to end the sunset clause on local autonomy. City Press - Voices, 2 February, p. 30.

Muller, M. 2002. The National Water and Sanitation Programme in South Africa: Turning the ‘Right to Water’ into Reality, South Africa: Vandana Mehra/UNDP/World Bank.

Muller, M. 2012. Polycentric governance : Water management in South Africa. ICE - Management, Procurement and Law, 165(3), pp. 193-200.

Natarajan, A. 2011. Rising Expectations, Social Unrest & Development. CADMUS, 1(3), pp. 88-99.

Nyaka, F. 2014. No water for residents - Confluence of factors means people have to cross dangerous Moloto road for supplies. The New Age, 31 January, p. 27.

RSA. 1996. Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System (GCIS).

RSA. 1997. The Water Services Act , Pretoria: GCIS.RSA. 1998. The National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) , Pretoria: GCIS.RSA. 2005. Intergovernmental Relations Act (13 of 2005), Pretoria: GCIS.Smith, L. 2014. South Africa “talking left walking right” - The unchanging face of

capitalism ensures that the social ills facing the country will be hard to eradicate. The New Age - Opinion and Analysis, 31 January, p. 20.

31

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationStatsSA. 2014. Household Service Delivery Statistics, Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.UN. 1998. Privatization of Municipal Services in East Africa: A Governance Approach

to Human Settlements, Washington (USA): United Nations Human Settlements Programme UNESCO. 2006. Urban Water Conflicts: An Analysis of the Origins and Nature

of Water-Related Unrest and Conflicts in the Urban Context, France: International Hydrological Programme of UNESCO.

United Nations. 1998. Sustainable Development - Natural Resource Aspects of Sustainable Development in South Africa, New York: United Nations .

van Pittius, J. 2012. Making it happen - A road map for South African municipalities to achieve desired outcomes, Pretoria: PwC.

Zuma, J. 2014. Progress made, although challenges remain [Interview] (18 February 2014).

S.Balkaran



A REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: THE BUFFALO CITY

MUNICIPALITY PLATFORM

E.O.C. Ijeoma & C. OkaforSchool of Public AdministrationUniversity of Fort Hare

ABSTRACT

The South Africa’s National electrification programme was endorsed in 1994 (through the Reconstruction and Development Programme, RDP) to amongst other objectives address the electrification backlog in the Country.

This paper focuses on the extent and impact of the National Electrification Programme in selected areas in Buffalo City Municipality, in Eastern Cape from 1994 to date. Progress of the programme is assessed in the light of achieving universal access to electricity by 2015. The paper further investigates the electrification impact in the context of other national electrification objectives of poverty alleviation and social upliftment. Recommendations are made towards achieving universal access of electricity in the Municipality and using electrification to stimulate a wide range of income generating activities to the indigent/poor households.

INTRODUCTION The National Electrification Programme is undoubtedly, the major policy

reform with the greatest impact on electricity provision in South Africa, especially for the poor (Malzbender 2005:9). The National Electrification Programme (1994) had its roots in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the ANC government (White Paper on RDP 1994:48). The government’s commitment to provide quality and affordable electricity to the people, especially the previously disadvantaged led to other specific electrification programmes and policies. Under the slogan ‘access to electricity for all’ the new ANC government made the provision of electricity to the people one of the cornerstones of its developmental policies. The basic is the Integrated National Electrification Programme that was initiated in 1994. The electrification programme seeks to address the electricity backlog in the country by 2012. It started as an industry funded programme in 1994, and government took responsibility for funding and managing the electrification programme in 2001. In addition, government on the ‘recognition that the provision of electricity is primarily a social welfare function’ introduced

33


the Free Basic Electricity Policy 2003 (EBSST Policy 2003:6). The Free Basic Electricity policy 2003 was developed from the National Municipal Indigent policy framework which was initiated in 2001 and adopted in 2005 as a means of poverty alleviation in the country. The policy objective is ‘…to substantially eradicate those elements of poverty over which local government has control by the year 2012…’ (Department of Provincial and Local Government 2005:1). The municipal services targeted areas by the policy include electricity, water, and sanitation and refuse disposal. Reddy (2000:40) view that poverty alleviation and development depends on universal access to energy services that are affordable, reliable and of good quality. The emphasis of the ‘Free Basic Electricity’ policy is therefore, the provision of 50kWh free electricity per month to the connected poor households.

It is therefore, the concern of the paper to assess electrification progress in the Buffalo City Municipality of Eastern Cape in the context of achieving the National electrification objectives of universal access to service delivery (former President Mbeki in a parliamentary inaugural address in 2004 stated the policy goal of universal access in 2012), poverty alleviation and social upliftment.

BASIS FOR ANALYSISThe National electrification programme is a government financed electricity

initiative (initially, industry funded) designed to extend access of electricity to the previously disadvantaged. The key objective of the programme is to address the electricity backlog in the country by 2012. However, due to limited resources and electricity industry shortcomings, 92% access of electricity by 2014/15 for all formal households is targeted, instead of universal accesses (Magubane 2012:3). This is in contrast to the United Nations Millennium Development target of universal access in 2015. However, to address the affordability issues in the poor connected households’ government also introduced the Free Basic Electricity service in 2003. The decision to provide Free Basic Electricity is based on well-recognized socio-economic benefits of providing affordable basic services to enhance the well-being of the poor. (Guidelines for the introduction of Free Basic Electricity 2003:4). The paper therefore, assesses:

• the extent of achieving universal access of electricity by 2015 in Buffalo City Municipality; and

• the impact of the electricity programme on poverty alleviation and social upliftment.

THE ELECTRICITY-POVERTY INTERFACEThe utility of electricity lies in serving as a means to facilitate human

development. This is why the United Nations is concerned with the provision of quality and affordable electricity within member nations, specifically in Africa and in other developing countries and elsewhere. Its agencies therefore, seek to encourage responsible and sustainable policy development by national governments in this area.

E.O.C. Ijeoma & C. Okafor



The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) adopted a plan that calls on the international community, including the United Nations system, to take joint action and improve efforts to work together at all levels to improve access to reliable and affordable general energy services and electricity in particular for sustained development sufficient to facilitate the achievement of the millennium development goals (MDGs) (UN-Energy/Africa 2004: vii). The United Nations further recognize ‘access to electricity as a basic human right’. This is noted in a colloquium held in Paris in 2005 on the ‘role of electrification in poverty alleviation’. It was thus, noted that ‘although access to electricity per se will not alleviate poverty, greatly increased quality and quantity of electricity services will be required in developing countries as a means of meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ (IEA 2005:1).

Access to quality and affordable electricity is therefore, vital in achieving the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals especially in the crucial areas of service provision and empowerment. These areas include: extreme poverty and hunger eradication, achieving universal primary education, women empowerment, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, environmental sustainability, access to safe drinking water, improvement in the living conditions of slum dwellers (United Nations 2013:4). The target is to achieve considerable improvement in these services in addition to other concerns by 2015.

Reddy (2000) provides a strong link between access to electricity and poverty alleviation:

Poverty is the most fundamental reality of developing countries and the energy (electricity) consumption patterns of poor people tend to add to their misery and aggravate their poverty. A direct improvement in energy services would allow the poor to enjoy both short term and long- term advances in living standards. Required are energy strategies based on increasing the use of energy carriers other than biomass, or on using biomass in modern ways (Reddy 2000:40).

This view shows a relationship between electricity and the global issues which form the bulk of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. Universal access to quality and affordable electricity therefore, has a dependency relationship with these global issues and concerns. Jones (2004:22) writes that the potential impact on the poor may be defined as direct and indirect. It is direct where it is used mainly for lighting, TV, radio at low levels of income and heating, cooking, appliances for self-employment at higher levels of income. The impact is indirect where it leads to reduced energy costs for enterprises encouraging employment creation across wide range of activities and improved health and other activities. Saghir (2005:6) also contends that the energy sector (electricity) has strong links with poverty alleviation through income, health, education, gender,

35


and the environment. These links show that the electricity sub-sector is vehicular in facilitating human development, and essentially offer a means for the socio-economic advancement of the poor.

There are many instances to highlight the link between electricity and poverty alleviation in different countries. Jones (2004: 26-30) contends that electricity as part of general infrastructure has contributed to growth and poverty alleviation in East Asia and the Pacific. In China, Malaysia and Mongolia where the emphasis is on economic growth and poverty alleviation, expansion in economic activities in both the rural and urban areas have resulted in employment opportunities at the industrial, service and agricultural sectors thereby, resulting in income for the poor. Niez (2010) also writes that increased access to electricity has contributed to poverty alleviation in China, Brazil, and South Africa. The 99.4% electrification rate in China has contributed to massive improvements in service delivery and poverty alleviation through income for the poor households. According to the World Bank cited in Niez (2010:20) Brazil has met the Millennium Development Goal of reducing the number of people living in poverty. Through overall 97.8% access to electricity in 2009, the poverty level has reduced. Electricity access in Brazil has led to increase in the number of home businesses and extension of work hours of home businesses leading to more income, increase in farm activities through irrigation system etc. In South Africa, the Integrated National Electrification Programme has contributed in the creation of about 32, 995 jobs (Niez 2010:91). Electricity impacts on the poor in these countries are therefore, direct through self-employed activities and indirect when the provision results in expanded socio-economic activities that benefit the poor (employment in wide range economic activities and access to other improved social services).

The South African government acknowledges the link between access to electricity and poverty alleviation. It is the acceptance of the relationship between poverty alleviation and access to electricity that prompted the government to develop a policy framework on free basic services including electricity (Adam 2010:9). This link forms the basis of the National electrification policy frameworks (RDP 1994; Energy Policy 1998; Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff 2003). Davidson and Mwakasonda (2004:26) agree to this link and further write that for South Africa and the Southern African region to achieve the Millenium Development Goals as agreed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002, it needs a substantial increase in reliable and affordable electricity provision. Increased access to electricity in itself does not directly result in poverty alleviation and economic development but is a vital condition to achieve such. The benefits of electricity from both domestic and other small-scale economic activities results to improved conditions of living in the poor households. Other indirect benefits include improved health-care provision, efficiency in school activities, reduction in indoor air pollutions and fire incidents resulting from the use of firewood etc.




THE ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME: A STATIST APPROACHTaking a clue from the ancient Greek’s view, the state is ‘man writ large’

(Rodee, Anderson, Christol & Green 1983:28). This implies that the state is an inevitable response to human needs and interests. The state exists in the interest of the members such as in ensuring law and order, security and the provision of basic welfare needs. This is summed up in the functional perspective of the state whereby, the state is identified in terms of that set of institutions which carry out particular goals, purposes and objectives (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987:3). Herein, the state implements welfare responsibilities and further mobilizes and directs resources towards achieving the welfare goals. Milliken and Krause (2003:4) admit that irrespective of different accounts, the three core functions of providing security, representation and welfare provide a convenient way for summarizing the functions of a state, and failure to perform these functions is a failure of the state. The state in the context represents an effective means of delivering services which meet the needs and aspirations of the people that constitute the political association.

From a statist approach, the agenda of providing universal access to quality and affordable electricity in the country demonstrates a welfare function of the government. Ginsburg (2004:201) writes that the statist approach is based on the idea that governments, as the manifestation of the state are in the role of bringing about significant improvement in social conditions by introducing a range of social services to raise the living standards of ordinary people. The national infrastructure programme started in 1994 with the advent of democracy. The national programme which has its root in the RDP is aimed to provide basic social amenities to the people, especially the previously disadvantaged. Prasad and Visagie (2006:12) contend that the present socio-economic priorities enable the country to support pro-poor policies to implement the national infrastructure programme (including electricity). Since the country is seriously confronted with the Millennium Development concerns of poverty alleviation, hunger, incidence of diseases, access to medical care, education, housing and sanitation etc access to reliable and affordable electricity is therefore, needed to achieve reasonable improvements in these areas.

Under these conditions Adam (2010:12) writes that access to electricity is viewed ‘an implied right’ through a constitutional court pronouncement. The constitution does not contain a right to access to electricity. However, such pronouncements by the constitutional court suggest that the state is constitutionally obliged to provide electricity to more people, especially to the vulnerable groups such as the poor overtime. The inclusion of electricity in the government’s free services package, and the allocation of 50kWh per month free basic electricity (FBE) to qualifying poor households, is an implicit acknowledgement of a right to sufficient electricity along the same lines as the constitutional right of everyone to access to sufficient

37


food and water (Adam 2010). According to the (Guidelines for the introduction of Free Basic Electricity 2003:4) the decision to provide Free Basic Electricity is based on well-recognized socio-economic benefits of providing affordable basic services to enhance the well-being of the poor. The National electrification programme is therefore, a pro-poor electrification approach designed to induce socio-economic development and achieve poverty alleviation through universal access to quality and affordable electricity in the country.

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMMEThe central objective of the National Electrification Programme is to improve

social equity by specifically addressing the energy requirements of the poor (White Paper on Energy Policy 1998:42). Through a redistributive platform the programme targets access to quality and affordable electricity especially, to the previously disadvantaged households and to achieve service access for all. The electricity programme is therefore, designed to address the government objective of poverty alleviation and induce grass root socio-economic upliftment. According to Mugabane (2012:3) the overall objectives of the programme includes:

• Integrate electrification with other Government Departments programmes with the view of addressing government objective of poverty alleviation and job creation.

• Ensure full participation of Local Government in the planning and implementation process by using municipality’s IDPs.

• To facilitate greater participation of previously disadvantaged communities in the operations and management of sector activities.

• To ensure 92% access to electricity by 2014/15 for all formal households, instead of universal access due to limited resources and electricity industry short comings.

These objectives are fundamental to the government’s commitment of ensuring access to quality and affordable electricity especially at the grass roots. The objectives are further anchored on improving the welfare of the majority poor through electrification (Okafor 2013:269).

RESEARCH COVERAGE, METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSISCoverageThis study was conducted at the Buffalo City Municipality (BCM) in the

Amatole District Area of the Eastern Cape Province. The Municipal land mass is approximately 2,515 with 68km of coastal areas and comprises the towns of East London, King Williams Town, Mdansane, Zwelitsha, Bisho and many other rural areas (Buffalo City Municipality 2011:27). The population is estimated at 755,200 inhabitants with 0.69% annual growth rate (Statistics South Africa 2011). There are an estimated 223.568 households with an average annual growth rate of 3.68




(Buffalo City Municipality 2011:27). However, the numbers of households keep increasing due to increase in family size, rural urban migration etc.

The study population includes Nompumelelo formal settlement in East London, Sweet Waters in King Williams Town and Tyutu in Bisho. Nompumelelo has an estimated I, 900 households and shacks whereas, the number of households in Sweet Waters and Tyutu are estimated at 1,700 and 1,400 respectively (Buffalo City Municipality 2011:27).The study population comprises the households in the three different settlements. The choice of the three areas is purposive and is justified by access and proximity to respondents. In the study context these households represent the expected beneficiaries of the national electrification programme.

Data collection Data was collected through questionnaires and interviews involving community

members, officials from the Buffalo City, Electricity Department. Two different questionnaires were used. The first contained questions on household electricity access and the other contained questions on the impact of the electricity programme on poverty alleviation and social upliftment. In the two instances, both open ended and closed ended questions were asked. Focus group discussions involving 10 community members from each settlement and 2 staff each from schools and clinics were conducted. Discussions were also conducted through semi-structured interviews. These enabled face-to-face interviews with the respondents on both cases of electricity access and impact on poverty alleviation and social upliftment.

Sample selection and size A sample of 100 adults from different households was selected in each of the

three different settlements making a total of 300 respondents. The respondents were considered on age and the ability to understand and respond to the questions. The adults are between 25-65 years old and do not officially earn above R1, 200 per month. In terms of occupational distribution, 31% of the respondents are pensioners and social grants receivers, 35% claim unemployed but sometimes do casual work and get paid, 11% are self-employed and own spaza shops, hair salons and sheebens etc, whereas the remaining 23% are formally employed either in public or private establishments. The choice of 100 adults from each settlement is however, limited by time and resources.

FindingsIn the household survey in Nompumelelo, Sweet Waters and Tyutu the

questionnaires and interviews were structured in two parts. These are:• Electricity access: this includes questions on household access to electricity,

preference of electricity for cooking, heating, lighting and other uses;• Electricity impact: this includes questions and discussions on electricity

impacts on house hold poverty and social upliftment, such as economic benefits, health care and education, reduction of indoor pollutions.

39


According to the Electricity Department, Buffalo City Municipality (2013:iii) about 85% connectivity has been achieved in the whole of Buffalo City Municipality including the areas under study. This excludes the shacks which are common in the informal settlements. This shows that a greater percentage of households in Nompumelelo, Sweet Waters and Tyutu including 754 schools and 106 clinics have access to electricity. In the survey, all the respondents in the three settlements admit full knowledge of the National Electrification Programme including the Free Basic Electricity Programme (FBE). All the respondents also admit knowledge of the programme as a means of achieving poverty alleviation and social upliftment. The general question of electricity access and preferences for cooking, heating and lighting were asked to respondents in the three settlements.

In Nompumelelo 87% of the respondents have access to electricity, the number of households that preferred electricity for cooking is 85%, whereas 12% and 3% preferred paraffin and gas respectively. For heating, 79% preferred electricity for heating and the other 21% preferred paraffin. For lighting and other little domestic uses such as refrigerating and ironing of clothes all the respondents (100%) preferred electricity. In Sweet Waters settlement where there is 91% connectivity, 82% prefers electricity for cooking and 11% and 7% prefer paraffin and gas respectively. For heating purposes, 75% prefer electricity and the remaining 25% expressed their preference for paraffin. All the households (100%) preferred electricity for lighting, refrigerating and ironing. In Tytutu settlement there is 97% access, 71% preferred electricity for cooking whereas, 20% and 8% preferred to use paraffin and gas respectively. For heating, about 70% preferred electricity and the remaining 30% expressed preference for paraffin. All the respondents (100%) also preferred to use electricity for lighting, refrigerating and ironing of clothes.

From the foregoing, average of 89% of all the respondents in the three settlements under study have access to electricity using grid pre-paid meters. The remaining 11% falls under backlog. For preference of electricity for various other uses, average of 79% preferred electricity for cooking, 75% preferred electricity for heating while average of 100% of the respondents expressed preference for using electricity for lighting and other uses such as ironing of clothes and refrigerating food and drinks. The findings further show that there exist some differences in the preference of electricity for these basic uses and the actual ownership/use of electricity appliances. Table 1 shows the electrical appliances in use in the three settlements. The percentage ownership/use of these appliances indicates the level of use of electricity in the households for lighting, cooking, heating and others. From the table, electricity appliance uses (bulbs) for lighting is 85%. The use of electricity for cooking is 42%, and indicates the use of alternative cooking means such as paraffin stove and firewood. The use of electric heater is 28%, and also indicates increased use of paraffin heater during winter. Some of the households do not have access to electricity and do not use these appliances. However, 10% use cellphones which they claim to charge in their neighbour’s houses.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationTable 1: Household electrical appliances in use

S/NO Appliance % Ownership

1 Electric lights 89%

2 Electric kettle 68%

3 Electric stove 42%

4 Electric heater 28%

5 Iron 44%

6 Washing machine 28%

7 Television 74%

8 Radio 58%

10 Music system 32%

11 Micro wave 52%

12 Fridge 62%

13 Video machine 34%

14 Paraffin heater 62%

15 Cellphones 68%

Household Survey (2013)

The second part of the questionnaire addresses electricity affordability and impacts on the households. The questions specifically link to sufficiency of the 50kWh per month free electricity allocation to the connected households, impacts on poverty alleviation, economic/entrepreneurship opportunities and access to health and educational facilities. The Free Basic Electricity (FBE) policy provides for the allocation of 50kWh per month free electricity to all poor households connected to the national grid (Free Basic Electricity Policy 2003:6). According to the Guidelines for the Introduction of Free Basic Electricity Service (2003:5) the level of 50kWh/month of basic electricity was motivated on the following basis:

• On average 56% of households in South Africa connected to the national grid consume no more than 50kWh of electricity per month;

• An amount of 50kWh per month was considered adequate energy to provide basic services for a poor household such as lighting, media access, limited water heating, basic ironing and cooking;

• The level of 50kWh had been generally at national level and has been deemed considerable in respect of the basic electricity provision;

• Using energy efficient appliances can also increase the utility of the 50kWh per month free allocation.

This level of free basic electricity allocation also applies to the connected households in the three settlements. It is assumed that the 50kWh per month free

41


allocation is sufficient to provide for a basic level of service for the use of lighting, cooking, media access, and basic water heating and ironing to the households. However, this assumption was flawed in the ‘Guidelines for the introduction of Free Basic Electricity Service (Department of Energy 2003:4). This is indicated in table 2 below:

Table 2: Tabulation by Department of Energy of basic household needs

Item Watts used/monthly

Hours used per day

Days used/month

kWh Quantity Cumula-tive

Energy saver light

11 5 30 1.7 1

Light 60 5 30 9 3

Light 100 5 30 15 1

TV(b&w) 35 6 30 15 1

Iron 1000 4 6 24 1

Kettle 1000 0.5 30 15 1

Hotplate 1000 1 25 25 1

Fridge(small) 250 6.5 30 49 1

Source: Department of Energy (2003:5).

In the survey, all the respondents admit full knowledge of the Free Basic Electricity service. They also admit that government uses it as a means of addressing electricity affordability in the households. However, as regards the thermal uses of electricity, such as lighting, cooking and heating in the households all the respondents (average of 100%) agree that the 50kWh per month free electricity per month is insufficient to these basic needs.

To determine the quantity (kWh/month) electricity sufficient for the households, the question of how much electricity is paid for was asked. This is indicated in the household distribution on monthly electricity expenditure which is shown in figure 1. The findings shows that 7% of the households claim not to pay for electricity, as they are illegally connected to the grid whereas, another 13% expressed sufficiency on the monthly 50kWh per month free basic allocation. In terms of paying for extra electricity, 21% of households pay R50-R100, 25% pay R100-R150, 24% pay R150-R200, and the remaining 10% pay above R200. This shows that 80% of the households require more than the 50kWh per month free basic allocation for the basic needs of lighting, cooking, heating (especially in winter), refrigeration of food and drinks and ironing, etc.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationFigure 1: Household distribution on monthly electricity expenditure

The issue of electricity impact on poverty alleviation and social upliftment was divided into two parts. The first part concerns the economic benefits such as income generating activities/entrepreneurship opportunities and the possibility of increased expenditure on food and other basic needs arising from savings due to the free basic allocation. The second part concerns indirect benefits of electricity to the households such as access to medical care, education and reduction of indoor pollution. On the question of electricity contribution to household income, only 8% of the respondents agreed to have done some form of casual job when the connections were carried out. Another issue concerns running some electricity dependent economic activities that contribute to household income. In this regard, 14% of the respondents agree to engage in little businesses that contribute to household’s income. Such businesses include spaza shops, sale of alcohol and beverages, hair dressing, dress making, electronic repairs etc. Also in the course of the survey, some people admitted to getting access to electricity through illegal connections. This is rampant in Nompumelelo where shacks are erected next to the RDP houses and rented out. In this regard, 15% of the respondents admit to getting extra income through extending connections illegally to their shacks. On the whole, 37% of the respondents agree that the extra income they make enables them to buy more food for the family and pay for other basic necessities. On the other hand, 63% of the respondents admit to no form of extra household income from electrification.

The second part of the question concerns the indirect benefits of the electrification programme on the households such as improved medical care, education and reduction of indoor pollutions. The first question here deals with whether the electrification of clinics has yielded significant benefits for improved health care

43


provision in the households. As regards this question, 92% of the respondents agreed that the electrification of clinics has brought improved medical care in the communities whereas; the remaining 8% declined comments. During group discussions involving some primary health care workers and community members, it was generally agreed that the electrification of clinics have enabled access to quick and improved medical care. This is because many of the drugs are stored in the clinics under controlled temperatures, coupled with the availability of modern electricity dependent equipments that enhance improved service provision.

The second issue concerns improved efficiency of school operations through the use of modern electricity dependent equipments in the laboratory, the use of computers and photocopiers. In this regard, 75% of the respondents admit to either having child/children at school presently or in the past five years. Another 15% of the respondents do not have children at school presently or in the past five years, while 10% declined comments on the question. On the question of whether electrification has resulted in improved efficiency for school operations, 65% agrees, 25% disagrees, while the remaining 10% is neutral. However, in the group discussions involving some teachers and community members, all the participants agreed that electrification contributes to improved efficiency in school operations.

The other issue concerns indoor pollution in the households. The question here focuses on whether electrification has contributed to the reduction of local and indoor pollutions from the use of firewood for cooking and also fire incidents from the use of paraffin and candles. In response, 72% agrees that electrification has contributed to reduction of indoor pollutions, 18% disagrees and the remaining 10% declined comment.

Discussion of findingsAchieving universal access of electricity in 2015 in the Buffalo City Municipality

remains a challenging task. The findings show that out of 223.568 official households in the Municipality, 190.032 currently have access signifying 85%. The backlog is 33.535 households which represent 15%. According to the Electricity Department, Buffalo City Municipality (2013) the rate of household connections since the past three years has dropped to 1000-1500 per year in the formal settlements as against about 3000 connections in the previous years. As such with the rate of 1000-1500 connections, achieving universal access in 2015 seems not feasible. The challenges are reductions in connection targets resulting from reductions in budgetary allocations, emphasis on connecting schools and clinics, setting of unrealistic yearly targets and increase in the cost of electricity connections and insufficient skilled personnel. The current total cost per connection is about R9, 300 as against R6, 500 in the years 2000-2005 (Buffalo City Municipality 2013:44).

The average household electricity access in the three settlements under study (Nompumelelo, Sweet Waters and Tyutu) is 89%. This is against 25% in 2000 and 55% in 2005(Buffalo City Municipality 2013). Factors responsible for the high




percentage rise in connections include:• Increase in the number of RDP houses.• Increase in Municipal budgetary allocations for electrification in the

settlements.• The strategic location of the settlements (Nompumelelo is located in the

Beacon Bay area of East London and almost all the low income workers that provide labour for the malls and other commercial establishments reside there. This also applies to Sweet Waters in Bisho and Tyutu in King Williams Town where most of the low income group that provide labour to the commercial establishments live).

• The commitment to provide electricity to the indigent population within the Municipality.

The relevance of electricity in the three settlements is noted in the households’ preferences for electricity on basic needs. This is shown in table 3 where average of 79% preferred electricity for cooking, 75% preferred it for heating and 100% expressed preference for lighting.

Table 3: Percentage connectivity and preference of electricity (selected cases)

Access

Households Electrified %

Usages

Cooking Heating Lighting

Nompumelelo 100 86% 85 79 100

Sweet Waters 100 89% 82 75 100

Tyutu 100 91% 71 70 100

Average 100 89 79 75 100

The study also compares household electricity preferences and ownership/ actual use of electricity for the basic needs of cooking, lighting and heating. In the survey, 79% preferred electricity for cooking whereas the actual use is 42%. This shows a difference of 37%. This wide margin is due to the availability of alternative cooking means such as paraffin stove and firewood. The households that use paraffin claim it’s cheaper. The current cost for a liter of paraffin is R10 and lasts a household of three persons for about five days. The use of firewood is occasional and is preferred when large scale cooking is needed. The preference of electricity for heating is 75% while the actual use is 28%. This also shows a difference of 47%. The difference is also due the availability of alternative heating means like paraffin heater. A liter of paraffin also serves a household for about seven days. As regards households’ electricity preferences for lighting and ownership (bulbs)/actual use, 100% indicated preference for the use of electricity for lighting while the actual use is 89%. The 89% ownership/use of bulbs equals the percentage of

45


households with access (89%). The difference in preference and use is therefore, 11% which equals the average backlog.

Table 4: Comparison of households’ preference for electricity and actual use (selected cases)

Preference Uses % difference

Cooking 79% 42% 37%

Heating 75% 28% 47%

Lighting 100% 89% 11%

Table 1 shows the appliances in use in the various households and table 2 is the tabulation by the Department of Energy of basic household electricity needs. The tabulation on basic electricity needs was made on the assumption that the 50kWh per month free electricity is adequate to meet the basic needs (Guidelines 2003:5). However, the research findings show that the 50kWh per month free allocation is insufficient. This is evident in the final column which was blank. An indication of a huge gap between the quantities of electricity needed by the households (appliances in use) as shown in table 1 and the free monthly allocation in table 2. In the three settlements the quantity of electricity needed exceeds the free basic allocation. This is evident in figure 1 where apart from the 7% that are illegally connected, only 13% claim sufficiency. The rest indicate the inadequacy of the 50kWh per month free allocation. This shows that 80% of the households spend at least extra R50 to buy electricity for the month.

In terms of addressing the government objectives of poverty alleviation and job creation, the study assesses the electrification impact on income generation/entrepreneurship opportunities and possible increase on household food basket arising from savings due to free the 50kWh monthly free allocation. From the survey, only 8% of the respondents did admit to getting casual job during the connections. As regards electricity dependent economic activities, 14 % of the respondents agree to engage in such little business like owning spaza shops etc. The income from these activities is used to buy more food and pay for other household bills. Some of the activities are on full time basis and the owners depend on the proceeds for livelihood whereas others do them for supplementary income. However, the 14% that that run electricity dependent businesses fall into the group that pay at least extra R150 on electricity per month as indicated in figure 1. The 15% that earn income through illegal connections to the shacks equally claim to use the additional income to support their household. However, in the group discussions with community members, they claim that they illegally connect the shacks because the free monthly allocation is insufficient. However, the Electricity Department points out that this is a big problem in the settlements. Illegal connections cause a lot of monetary losses and sometimes result in fire incidences.




From the foregoing, 37% of the respondents admit to a form of income/entrepreneurship opportunities through the electrification programme whereas the other 63% claims no extra economic benefit. Besides, this group pays more for electricity since the monthly free basic allocation is insufficient for both basic and commercial uses (at least R150 per month). In figure 1 the 13% that admit sufficiency of the 50kWh per month free electricity and the 7% that are illegally connected also agree to a form of savings through the free allocations and the use of such savings for other household bills. However, the fact that majority of the respondents (63%) admit to no form of further economic benefits is an indication of less impact of the programme on poverty alleviation and job creation in the three settlements.

In assessing impacts on social upliftment in the three settlements, the study discusses these in terms of transforming people’s lives. There is currently average of 89% electricity access in the three settlements as against 25% in the year 2000. About 71% of the respondents admit that availability of electricity has contributed to improvements in medical care, school operations and reductions in indoor pollutions in the households. Nompumelelo has two schools and one clinic, Sweet Waters has one school and one clinic and Tyutu has one clinic. All have access to grid-connected electricity. There is also high level of electricity use in the three settlements. This is indicated in table 1 and table 2 where comparatively, the electricity uses (going by the number of appliances in the households) exceeds the 50kWh per month free allocation. Here, the minimum electricity demand is about 100kWh per month (this is only where half of the appliances are not in use). In cases where most of the appliances are in use, the minimum electricity demand stands at 150kWh per month and at least 268kWh per month where there are electricity dependent economic activities.

This shows that there is more demand compared to the free basic monthly allocation. A situation described by Lloyd, Cowan and Mohlakoana (2004:17) as significant demand in excess of the minimum electricity needed to energize the households. However, the availability of electricity is found to contribute to improved operations of the social facilities such as clinics and schools thereby, enhancing the number of beneficiaries. Also the increased demand above the free monthly allocations is an indication of enhanced socio-economic benefits of electricity.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSThe concern of this paper has been to assess the extent of the national

electrification programme and its impact in selected areas of Buffalo City Municipality in Eastern Cape. The focus has been on reviewing electrification progress in the Municipality (with special emphasis on three settlements). This is done by assessing the extent of achieving universal access in 2015 and using electrification as a means of poverty alleviation and social upliftment.

47


The general electricity progress card in the Municipality stands at 85% access and a backlog of about 33,535 households in the formal settlements. Average access in the three settlements under study also stands at 89% with a backlog of about 550 households. This is tremendous progress compared to 25% access in the year 2000. However, with the present rate of 1,000-1,500 connections per year universal access seems not achievable in the Municipality by 2015.

The impact of the electricity programme on poverty alleviation has not been significant. However, it has been a significant means of social upliftment within the indigent/poor households. According to the study findings only 14% of the respondents clearly run electricity dependent economic activity which contributes to household income (another 8% did casual jobs and 15% earn money through illegal connections to shacks). Also the 50kWh per month free allocation by the government has been found insufficient for the basic household electricity needs in most households. This shows that electricity demand is in excess of the free monthly basic allocations thereby, making the households to adjust budgets to buy more electricity for use. However, electrification has transformed lives through improvements in health care, educational operations and in serving as alternative electrical energy for cooking, heating, lighting etc. This has reduced in door pollutions, fire incidents and results in clean and healthier environment.

RECOMMENDATIONSThe paper recommends that achieving universal access of electricity in 2015

in both the formal and informal settlements should be a priority target in the Municipality. This can be achieved through increased budgetary allocations, setting of effective yearly targets and mobilization of human resources. This means that the rate of connections has to increase beyond the present yearly maximum of 1,500.

The 50kWh per month free allocation has been effective since 2003 despite increase in general electricity tariffs. This is presently not suitable for most of the poor households that find it insufficient. The paper also recommends for increased free allocation to the poor households to about 150kWh per month. This is capable of motivating more people to start little income generating activities to boost household incomes.

LIST OF REFERENCESAdam, F. 2010. Free Basic Electricity: A better life for all. Johannesburg: Earth Africa.Africa National Congress. 1994. The Reconstruction and Development Programme: a

policy framework. Johannesburg: Umanyane Publications.Buffalo City Municipality. 2011. Draft Integrated Development Plan Review. East

London.Buffalo City Municipality. 2013. State of the Energy Report. Electricity Department. East

LondonDavidson, O. and Mwakasonda .A. 2004. Electricity access for the poor: a study of

South Africa and Zimbabwe in Energy for Sustainable Development, Vol. viii no 4.http://o-



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationpdn.sciencedirect.com.wam.seals.ac.za. Accessed on 5th September, 2013

Dunleavy, P. and O’ Leary, B. 1987. Theories of the state. United States of America: New Armsterdam Books.

Ginsburg, N. 2004. Structured diversity: a framework for critically comparing welfare states. In Kenneth, P (eds). Handbook of comparative social policy. Chettenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

IEA. 2005. The developing world and the electricity challenge. Workshop summary. http://www.iea.org/workshop/2005/poverty/EletandDevsum.pdf.

Jones, S. 2004. Background Paper: contribution of infrastructure to Growth and Poverty Reduction in East Asia and the Pacific. http://www.opml.co.uk. Accessed on 8th July, 2013.

Lloyd, P., Cowan, B. and Mohlakoana, N. 2004. Improving access to electricity and stimulation of economic growth and social upliftment. http://www.eri.uct.ac.za. Accessed on 15th July, 2013.

Malzbender, D. 2005. Domestic Electricity Provision in the Democratic South Africa. AWIRU, CIPS, University of Pretoria.

Mbeki, T. 2004. Address of the President of South Africa to the first joint sitting of Parliament in Cape Town.

Milliken, J. and Krause, K. 2003. State failure, State collapse and state reconstruction: concepts, lessons and strategies. In Milliken, J (eds). United States of America: Institute of social studies.

Mugabane, N. 2012. Electrification Overview. Department of Energy. http://www.ameu.co.za. Accessed on 2nd July, 2013.

Niez, A. 2010. Comparative study on Rural Electrification Policies in Energizing Economics. Keys to successful policies. International Energy Agency. http://www.lea.org. Accessed on 2nd August, 2013.

Okafor, C. 2013. Electricity generation, transmission and distribution policy: a comparative study of Nigeria (1960-2011) and South Africa (1994-2011). Doctor of Administration Thesis. Department of Public Administration, University of Fort Hare.

Prasad, G. and Visagie, E. 2006. Global Network on energy for sustainable Development. Electricity Access 111 theme: Explicit focus on the poor. http://www.erc.uct.ac.za. Accessed on 5th August, 2013.

Reddy, A.K.N. 2000. Energy and social Issues : in world energy assessment: energy and the challenge of sustainability. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu. Accessed on 5th August, 2013.

Republic of South Africa. 2003. Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff Policy. Department of Energy. http://www.kzncogta.gov.za. Accessed on 7th July, 2013.

Republic of South Africa. 2003. Guidelines for the introduction of free basic electricity. Department of Energy. http://www.energy.gov.za. Accessed on 15th July, 2013.

Republic of South Africa. 2005. Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policy. Department of Provincial and Local Government.

Republic of South Africa: 1998. The White Paper on Energy Policy. Department of Energy. http://info.gov.za. Accessed on 12th August, 2013.

Rodee, C.L., Anderson, T.J., Christol, C.Q. and Green T.H. 1983. Introduction to Political Science. Singapore: Mc Graw-Hill, Inc.

Saghir, J. 2005. Energy and Poverty: Myths, Links, and Policy Issues. In ENERGY Working Notes. http://siteresources.worldbank.org. Accessed on 12th August, 2013.

Statistics South Africa. 2011. Census figures. http://www.statistics.sa UN-ENERGY/AFRICA. 2005. Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for

Africa. http://www.unergy.org/.../un-energy-Africa. Accessed on 2nd August, 2013.United Nations. 2013. The Millennium Development Goals Report. http://www.un.org

49


THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP AS A LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN

PUBLIC SECTOR: CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

D.B. JarbandhanDepartment of Public Management and Governance

University of Johannesburg

ABSTRACT

The leadership debate has gained momentum on the political, social and economic front; however very little has been said on the issue of developing leaders who have a vision of a greener and environmentally

sustainable future for the country. South Africa, and the rest of the African continent, faces tremendous challenges from a climate change perspective due to multiple stresses and low levels of adaptability to changes in the environment. The National Development Plan (NDP) makes it clear that South Africa’s future is dependent on a low-carbon energy sector and an investment in a green economy. Consequently, this paper brings to the fore the need for an environmental leadership agenda, one that puts forward a stewardship philosophy to implement the tenets of the NDP. It is also evident that in South Africa there are adequate resources, there is a plan (NDP), and good leadership role models, but arguably the current cohort of leaders to ensure success of the NDP from an environmental perspective is insufficient. This is also supported by the King III Report on Corporate Governance which implores sustainable business practices which focuses on environmental sustainability and leadership. The burning question that this paper will therefore address is whether the adoption of an environmental stewardship philosophy in the South African public sector will contribute to a future that is environmentally sustainable, whilst promoting economic growth and social development. The paper will also attempt to identify the challenges in the Singaporean and Indonesian national development plans, and will map out the lessons that the South African environmental sector can learn.

INTRODUCTIONWhile great strides have been made in promoting good governance in South

Africa over the last twenty years of democracy, many challenges still remain. This paper focuses on the challenges that emanate from the environment, and the

D.B. Jarbandhan



response to these challenges. The environmental challenges, whether they stem from climate change, water related issues or complex biodiversity are growing in scale. The South African government is aware of the challenges, and the National Climate Change Response White Paper lists the challenges and government’s response to mitigate these challenges. However, a wide chasm exists in that the White Paper and other pieces of legislation do not provide a way forward based on the leadership that is needed to promote a cleaner and greener future. This paper therefore suggests that a possible way of surmounting the environmental challenge is to adopt a leadership philosophy that is based on environmental stewardship. Stewardship is a concept that is rooted in deep religious beliefs that asks of a leader to be “responsible for managing something that was entrusted to him or her”. The anthropocentric view (humans are superior to nature) is being challenged and the new wave that is sweeping in is the ecocentric (anti-anthropocentric) view which argues that human existence should not negate other life forms. In order to promote an ecocentric view the clarion call for environmental stewards has been sounded. This paper will focus on the concept of environmental stewardship to promote good governance in the South African public sector, keeping in mind the challenges identified in the National Development Plan. It will also draw a few examples and parallels from the Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian experience.

DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTSThis section focuses on the definition of concepts commonly used in this paper.Environmental leadershipEgri and Herman (2000:2) define environmental leadership as “the ability to

influence individuals to mobilise organisations to realise a vision of long-term ecological sustainability”. The current global focus on environmental leadership and sustainability has prompted public organisations to think of mechanisms to green their organisations.

StewardshipThe concept of stewardship is not easy to define. Indications in the literature

trace the concept from its Biblical origins, its usage in Greek philosophy and in Calvinist doctrines. A further perusal of the literature also indicates that the word has its roots in Old English and meant “keeper of the house”. For the purpose of this study, the definition provided by Peter Block would be used to provide a comprehensive understanding of the term as choosing service over self - interest (Block 1996: 6). Furthermore, it could be used to represent a leadership philosophy of willingness to be accountable for results without using control as a means of getting them. On the other hand it could be used in quite a different narrow sense – to represent voluntary industry initiatives as an alternative to strict government oversight (Saner and Wilson 2003:1-3).

51


For the purposes of this paper the utility of the concept could be restored, however, if it is understood broadly, as a leadership philosophy towards the good governance process. Such a conception comes very close to the idea of good leadership practice for good governance, and would contain a number of guiding principles for creating effective and legitimate dialogue processes in shifting control and involving the organisation, employees, stakeholders and citizens in a partnership in deciding which measures should be employed to address the environmental leadership challenges at hand.

Environmental stewardshipThe United Nations Global Compact (2010:9) defines environmental stewardship

as a process of effectively managing “critical environmental risks and opportunities related to climate change, emissions, waste management, resource consumption, water conservation, biodiversity protection and ecosystem services”. Furthermore, Azizan and Wahid (2012:592) indicate that environmental stewardship has to be embraced as a guiding philosophy for organisations to focus on “environmental, social and economic contexts” in order improve on their operations.

Environmental governanceEnvironmental governance describes an organisation’s management of its

“environmental impacts, risks, performance and opportunities” (Corporate Environment Governance 2004:3). The core aim of environmental governance is to use best practice to strengthen the governance of an organisation by incorporating environmental values, environmental policies, environmental oversight, environmental processes and environmental performance indicators in its strategies.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIPA search on the Google (including Google Scholar) search engine reveals

that no literature exists on environmental stewardship efforts in the public sector. However, a few sources exist on environmental stewardship with a private sector focus. Borrowing on the theoretical foundations of the New Public Management and the New Public Governance movements it would be wise to comment on the environmental stewardship research that has been done in the private sector and to search for commonalities that could be inferred to public sector scenarios.

Firstly, studies done by the Environment Agency in the UK in 2004 had concluded that there was a link between profits and those companies that invested in environmental sustainability and leadership, which found that “In 85% of the total number of studies assessed, we found a positive correlation between environmental governance and/or events, and financial performance” (Environment Agency 2004:1). Secondly, studies undertaken by Dutta, Lawson and Marcinko (2011:18) indicate that corporate stewards do not necessarily focus on bottom-line profit; they focus on creating “win-win situations (to) enhance profitability and greater

D.B. Jarbandhan



social benefit”. Thirdly, Sookram (2013:1) undertook studies to investigate whether “environmental stewardship is determined by the worldview of managers” based on the attitudes of managers and their ethical foundation. By using a Likert Scale he concluded that an ethically sound focus is central to caring for the environment, that managers should be aware of the “three pillars of development, namely economic growth, social progress and environmental preservation and stewardship to promote sustainable businesses” and the creation of a strong regulatory environment was central to promote “positive environmental attitudes” (Sookram 2013:9). Finally, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in their Resource for Corporate Leaders Environmental Stewardship Strategy outlines a framework for senior managers and board leaders (UNCG 2010:3). The strategy is premised on the idea that a new type of “environmental leader is required to maintain sustainable performance for both the business and planet” (UNCG 2010:8). Furthermore, the strategy was formulated after widespread consultation with senior managers, with the intent of creating management value in relationship with the environment. The strategy is premised on the observation that successful CEOs and Boards observe four “universal approaches to environmental stewardship across organisations” namely:

• Leaders EMBED the concept of environmental stewardship throughout the length and breadth of the organisation,

• They BALANCE short-term targets and long-term targets for organisational success and environmental stewardship,

• They DIFFUSE best practice across all stakeholders, and,• They TRANSLATE best practices into processes in all their operations

(UNGC 2010:10).The lessons that public sector environmental stewards can draw from the

private sector literature survey above can be summarised as follows. Firstly, if the public sector invests in developing an environmental stewardship philosophy there is the likelihood that stewardship could contribute to effective governance by encouraging public participation in government programmes (Van Sant undated: 4). Secondly, if the public sector could adopt an environmental stewardship approach, the chances of providing efficient and effective service delivery would be enhanced. Thirdly, public sector environmental stewards need to think of socio-economic growth alongside environmental sustainability. Finally, public sector organisations should strive to translate policies into tangible deliverables through an environmental stewardship approach.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR CHALLENGE: THE NEED TO ADOPT AN ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP PHILOSOPHYOne of the major challenges for the South African public sector is the

promotion of sustainable development, within the framework of good governance. The government’s current approach to climate change as envisaged in the

53


National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) is both developmental and transformational. The NCCRP sets out a response that results in a resilient outlook for future climate stresses against a sustainable economic and social background (Edna Molewa, The Saturday Star, 25 January 2014). The South African government intends implementing the NCCRP by further investing in:

• Early warning system on changing climate patterns,• Integrating water and soil conservation strategies,• Greater utilisation of renewable resources,• Sustainable farming,• Collaborative efforts between government and society, through the creation

of effective partnerships,• Expanded public works programmes with a green focus, for example

clearing of waterways, and,• Restoration of wetlands through the Working for Land Programme (Edna

Molewa, The Saturday Star, 25 January 2014).The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) further underpins the country’s

challenge in transitioning to a low carbon economy. The challenge that the NDP had identified for South Africa’s future is balancing economic development and moving to a low carbon economy (NDP 2012:179). The NDP also commits to adapting to climate change through following strict emission policies. Furthermore, the NDP calls for “proactive local government climate change programmes in areas such as waste management and street lighting; regulation to promote green building and construction practices; investments in an efficient public transport system; and a robust transport monitoring, reporting and verification system” (NDP 2012:180). Given the challenge of scarce resources the state would have to play a prominent role in managing its assets, extending and promoting public-private partnerships for infrastructure development and improve on its project management and planning capabilities. Given the skills shortages that the South African public sector is facing the challenge becomes more daunting.

Indonesia for example, which is a deeply religious state, promotes a strict religious doctrine together with green growth. Malaysia, on the other hand, links religion to environmental values, beliefs, norms and behaviour. Azizan and Wahid (2012: 587-592) promote an environmental stewardship model for Malaysia which takes into cognisance an environmental stewardship model and religious practice; as religion and stewardship share commonalities. Singapore has also invested in a green economy. The Ministry of National Development (Singapore) (internet source: 2014 www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry of National Development Singapore) invests its resources in promoting planning and research around sustainable and liveable cities. Together with the Singapore’s Civil Service College and the Centre for Liveable Cities, policymakers and experts on development are often brought together to find innovative green solutions to problems facing rapidly expanding cities.

D.B. Jarbandhan



LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA The following policy documents have an impact on environmental stewardship

in South Africa.The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996The Constitution makes it clear that the state must protect, respect and fulfil

its environmental obligations. Section 24 of the Bill of Rights makes it clear that everyone has the right to an environment that is “not harmful to their health and well- being”, furthermore citizens have the right to “have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations through reasonable legislative and other measures” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).

The National Climate Change Response (NCCRP) White Paper, 2011This White Paper of 2011 is government’s response to the climate change

challenge. The vision of the White Paper clearly indicates government’s attempt to mitigate climate change by adopting a “long-term, just transition to a climate-resilient and lower carbon economy and society” (The National Climate Change White Paper 2011). A key driver of this White Paper is to align social transformation and economic development alongside climate change priorities.

The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), 2010The Integrated Resource Plan has as one of its objectives to determine the

country’s long-term electricity demand. This is all the more complex given the stress that is placed on the country’s current grid and the developmental and infrastructure challenges that the country faces. The country’s reliance on non-renewable (85% coal) energy is not environmentally sustainable. Stewards need to set the pace in providing leadership on clean energy.

A NEW PARADIGM TO PROMOTE ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY: A MOVE TOWARDS THE NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM (NEP)It is argued that the current dominant social paradigm (DSP) is not sustainable

in the long run. The DSP is built on the capitalist foundation of production, distribution and consumption (Duffy 2000 and Wilson et al. in Sookram 2013:2). The DSP is premised on the view that man is the master of a universe, in which natural resources are infinite. Scholars are of the view that this perception had to be challenged, and hence the new ecological paradigm (NEP) was mooted (Boiral, Cayer and Baron 2009:481). The NEP has as a strong focus on “econcentricism”, which regards nature as having an inherent value to mankind. Ecocentricism does not view humans as having greater value than nature, but sees humans and nature as having the same intrinsic values. Table 1 below provides a comparison of the DSP and the NEP.

55

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationTable 1: Comparison of DSP and NEP

DOMINANT SOCIAL PARADIGM (DSP) NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM (NEP)

Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.

Humans were created to rule over nature.

Plants and animals exist for exclusive human consumption.

Human ingenuity will see to it that the earth remains liveable.

The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impact and resource demands of modern industrial nations.

The environmental crisis is being exaggerated.

Humans will surmount the environment, master it and control it.

The earth’s carrying capacity is being reached.

The balance of nature is delicate and is easily upset.

Human interference in nature produces disastrous results.

Humans must live in harmony with nature in order to survive.

The earth has limited space and resources.

There are limits to the growth and expansion that industrialisation has brought.

Plants and animals have as much right to exist as humans do.

Source: (Adapted from Dunlap and Van Lierre 1978 and Shafer 2006 in Boiral et al. 2009:483).

Sookram (2013:5) used a Likert Scale to test the attitudes of managers based on the NEP in the private sector in Trinidad and Tobago. One of the key findings indicates that environmental sustainable issues are compromised by the “desire to attain commercial success” in the private sector organisations that were studied. This author, in his findings, suggests that the worldview of managers impact on their attitudes towards environmental stewardship.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP SOLUTIONPresident Jacob Zuma in the 2014 State of the Nation Address made it explicit

that a move towards promoting a green economy was central to the agenda of the current government. The Department of Environmental Affairs in its Strategic Plan for the Environmental Sector 2009-2014 (internet source, www.environment.gov.za/climate) has one of its priority areas as that of “providing leadership and co-ordination of government’s approach to large, complex and cross-sectoral environmental environmental issues –specifically responding to climate change and championing sustainable development”.

Besides its climate change response, the South African government has championed the issue of sustainable development and environmental governance, which resulted in the country hosting the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. One of the outcomes of the Summit for South Africa’s green development was a move to manage the country’s natural resources

D.B. Jarbandhan



more effectively. Furthermore, the National Sustainable Development Framework (NSDF) provides for future sustainability by identifying five key priority focus areas:

• Enhancing systems for integrated planning and implementation,• Sustaining our ecosystems and using natural resources efficiently,• Economic development via investing in sustainable infrastructure,• Creating sustainable human settlements, and,• Responding appropriately to emerging human development, economic

and environmental challenges (internet source,www.environment.gov.za/climate).

What has been noted through surveying the literature is that from a South African point of view, a leadership strategy does not exist for implementing government’s sustainable initiatives. This paper will therefore, champion the role of environmental stewardship as a leadership philosophy to manage the challenges that government faces.

THE LINK BETWEEN GOOD GOVERNANCE AND STEWARDSHIPThe argument was made earlier in the United Nations Global Compact strategy

(see above) that an environmental stewardship philosophy should be permeating the organisation (EMBEDS, BALANCE, DIFFUSE and TRANSLATE). Van Sant (undated: 1) supports the notion of decentralisation when he argues that “Stewardship (…) requires decentralisation that goes beyond administrative and financial measures to a dimension of political power sharing that enhances civil society” especially at the level of local government where local “institutions are the managers of assets ‘owned’ by current and future residents; local officials therefore are responsible for managing those assets for the benefit of residents”.

Saner and Wilson (2003:4) are of the view that stewardship is very closely linked to good governance. They have arrived at this conclusion by arguing that good governance is supported by the inextricable link between industry, the public and government. Stewardship according to these authors “encompasses the three major inputs… namely, innovation, regulation, and citizen engagement,” hence stewardship and good governance are closely linked. This link is tabulated in Table 2 below.

57

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationTable 2: The link between good governance and stewardship

Good governance principles (UNDP) Elements of effective stewardship

Participation – all citizens should participate in decision making

• Full stakeholder involvement• Taking public view/s into cognisance• Developing coalitions among all

stakeholders• Fostering inclusiveness• Creating public trust• Forming multiple stakeholder partnerships

globally

Responsiveness – respond to needs to all citizens

Consensus oriented – broad consensus of all stakeholders on the best way to implement policies and procedures

Effectiveness and efficiency – achieving results without wasting resources

• Information sharing• Monitor and assess performance• Redress

Accountability – government decision makers, civil society and the private sector are accountable to the public

• Collaboration and accountability of all stakeholders

Transparency – free flow of adequate information

• Transparency in decision-making processes

Rule of law – fair enforcement of law; abiding by legal framework

• Consistency and predictability

Equity • Free from bias

Source: (Adapted from Saner and Wilson 2003:5)

ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOREnvironmental stewardship, as a leadership philosophy, could be the South

African public sector’s key to future socio-economic sustainable development. The key challenges as listed in the NDP would require a special type of leader, one who could balance social, economic, political and technological challenges in a sustainable manner. Block (1996 in Jarbandhan 2007:238) suggests that a stewardship philosophy is an alternative to a leadership philosophy, which asks of us to be deeply accountable for the outcomes of an institution, without acting to define purpose of others, control others, or take care of others. It can simply be described as giving order to the dispersion of power, and aims at creating responsible outcomes for institutions (Jarbandhan 2007:239). If stewardship could be an answer to sustainable environmental development, then the South African public sector could benefit from this approach. The following could be the requirements of environmental stewards in the South African public sector.

Change management requirementEnvironmental stewards in the public sector must be capable of managing

change and mobilising employees to “manage environmental incidences” (Boiral

D.B. Jarbandhan



et al. 2009:484). Change management and an orientation towards a sustainable vision of the future require that managers have a well-developed capacity to “anticipate and adapt, in order to be prepared for the emergence of new trends, constraints and opportunities” (Boiral 2009:484). The multi-disciplinary approach to decision-making and the management of change is necessary in order to manage globally competing environmental issues and integrating these issues into policy frameworks. Although a core competency for the senior management service (SMS), change management has to be seen within a broader context of encompassing environmental sustainability.

As far as the macro context of change is concerned, leaders (environmental stewards) as change agents should consider for example the following:

Global mega-crisis issues, including the relationships between: • Global population growth,

º Food and world hunger, º Energy sources (traditional, non-renewable fossil fuels and alternative,

renewable energy sources), º Environmental pollution, º Sustainable development, º Global climate change (including global warming), and, º Other global catastrophes. One could add here the issue of HIV/Aids.

According to South African studies for example 50% of all tertiary stu-dents are HIV positive. In ten years, live expectancy in South Africa will drop to 35 years. The impact on the economy, government taxes, health care, social care and other issues, are tremendous

• Global peace, conflict and war; global governance; and the increasing gap between rich and poor.

• The emergence of larger regional economic blocs, including the Asia/Pacific Region; the European Community (EC); the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA); BRICS, and other regional blocs.

• Global economic trends, including the emergence of a global economy and privatisation.

• Global political trends, including democratisation, and reactions to that (especially by those who feel disenfranchised or left out of all the modern changes happening in the world).

• Societal fragmentation, as old beliefs and identities are challenged by rapid change which creates anxiety in people, fear of change and the future, and hence resistance to change, which sometimes takes the form of fundamentalism, and an attempt to go back to an earlier, so-called better, simpler time.

• Societal restructuring and environmental impacts of new technologies, including robotics, multimedia, Internet, World Wide Web, ‘Virtual Reality’ technology, genetic engineering, DNA and gene splicing; space exploration,

59


and nano-technology. • Educational trends; new scientific paradigms (or overarching worldviews);

changing cultural paradigms; global spiritual/religious/consciousness traditions and trends.

Global evolutionary and revolutionary changes in the public sector portray the following common trends:

• There are efforts to improve the strategic and legislative oversight by over the business of government to facilitate greater accountability and responsiveness

• A focus on value-for-money and an outcomes-based and results-based focus is evident for change programmes in government such as through restructuring, rationalisation, and right-sizing endeavours. The focus on results, on efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service has led to much greater devolution of responsibility on managers, regular review of programmes, greater flexibility in ways of achieving outcomes, and, generally, more stringent reporting and accountability arrangements.

• There is focus on financial management, on reviewing existing programmes, on the identification of real costs of policies and programmes, on prioritising, on approval processes that place clear limits on expenditure and set clear expectations and outcomes, and yet that allow medium-term (operational) planning to occur.

• In a global economy and the impact of globalisation there have been initiatives which have encouraged greater contestability and market competition. Governments need to facilitate greater competitiveness to attract foreign direct investment

• Alternative service delivery mechanisms are utilised with more explicit user charging for government services, commercialisation of internal government service providers, the full or partial privatisation and corporatisation of some government enterprises, outsourcing and contracting out of services, and, in some cases, the use of private sector mechanisms.

• Emphasis on the democratisation of decision-making and greater public participation in governance.

Hence public leaders who intend to adopt an environmental stewardship philosophy have to be aware of changes in both the internal and external environments.

Environmental complexity requirementThe effectiveness of environmental stewardship would be underpinned by

public sector leaders being able to work in an uncertain complex environment. Examples of complex environmental challenges stem from dynamic environmental regulatory frameworks, stakeholder attitudes and providing leadership in reaction to either economic or environmental phenomena. The NCCRP (2011:38) indicates

D.B. Jarbandhan



that “government is committed to sustainable engagement and, where appropriate partnerships with stakeholders from industry” has to be formed to find solutions to complex environmental challenges. The Indonesian government places much emphasis in their National Development Plan on promoting and strengthening public-private partnerships for socio-economic development (internet source: 2014 www.indonesia-investments). Environmental stewards need to have a grasp of the complexities of these partnerships in financial challenged markets.

Problem solving requirementOne of the process competencies for the SMS is that of problem solving

and analysis. This competency relates to the analysis of information, judgment, conceptual flexibility and resoluteness of purpose. In addition, public sector organisations have adapted models from business management, and public sector managers’ as leaders therefore need to focus on problem solving capabilities, which would render them ‘better, faster [and] stronger’ in addressing issues that are faced by communities (Kettl 1997; Lynn 1996 and Box 1999; Carmeli 2006: 157 in Jarbandhan 2009:237). Furthermore, it has also come to light that environmental stewards cannot rely on one discipline or specialisation to solve problems but on a combination of “many skills and knowledge sets” (Boiral et al. 2009:483).

Ethical challenge requirementEnvironmental stewards need to possess the correct ethical foundations to take

and make sound environmental decisions without compromising the developmental challenges that South Africa faces. Saner and Wilson (2003:6) conclude that “both stewardship and good governance have positive connotations because they are tied to noble ethical claims.” The good governance, stewardship and ethics link draws from a common thread in that the ethics code of the International Institute for Public Ethics has its principles responsiveness, accountability and legality as some of its principles. These principles are also common to both good governance and environmental stewardship.

Conflict management requirementIf public sector leaders are to adopt an environmental stewardship philosophy,

they need to manage environmental conflict situations effectively. Environmental stewards need to manage complex challenges with a host of role-players. For example, public sector leaders with a stewardship ethos would have to defend the government’s viewpoint when dealing with difficult choices in respect of environmental concerns (Boiral 2006; Christmann 2000: Hart 1995 and Shrivastava 1995 in Boiral et al. 2009:484).

Environmental stewards as network agent requirementAs network agents public leaders should identify key role-players and establish

a relationship with them. This relationship will eventually lead to a partnership. Leaders should furthermore have excellent collaboration skills to facilitate –

61


• joint planning, implementation, and evaluation of governance endeavours, • collaboration with and between social groups, employees, and other

stakeholders,• partnerships between organisations and entities in different countries, and,• partnerships in relation to knowledge production and knowledge sharing for

environmental sustainability. Technical competence requirementThe technical competence of public sector leaders has to be developed if they

are to function as environmental stewards. They need to understand and implement complex environmental issues such as carbon capture, disaster management and renewable energy as is evident in the National Climate Change Response White Paper of 2011.

Emotional intelligence (EI) requirementEmotional intelligence as a meta-skill refers to a person’s abilities to perceive,

identify, understand, and successfully manage emotions in self and others. Emotional understanding and skills affect our success and happiness in our work as well as in our personal lives. Leaders can harness, and direct the power of emotions to improve employee satisfaction, morale, and motivation, as well as to enhance organisational effectiveness.

One important skill for leaders is to understand the range of emotions and how they manifest themselves. Some researchers accept eight “families” of emotions: anger, sadness, fear, enjoyment, love, surprise, disgust, and shame. People in cultures around the world have been found to recognize these same basic emotions when shown photographs of facial expressions. Leaders, attuned to their own feelings and the feelings of others, can use this understanding to enhance the organisation.

Environmental stewards will have to consider emotional intelligence in their day to day operations with all stakeholders. Understanding the viewpoints of the socio-economic, political and environmental sustainability challenges would help managers achieve their organisational vision and to promote the call to be environmental stewards.

Public sector leaders make the best decisions based on information and not on what is popular. They care about people and bring out and develop their crew’s strengths and identify its weaknesses. They are reliable persons staff can count on and be proud to follow. Leaders make decisions, provide examples for their crew of what they want done or expect to be done, direct and educate co-workers, and are reliable role models. A further challenge for public sector leaders is to function at the level of environmental stewards, where they are required to “be accountable for results without using control as a means to reach them” (Van Sant undated:1). Figure 1 below captures diagrammatically the expected outcomes of public sector environmental leaders.

D.B. Jarbandhan


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationFigure 1: Expected capabilities of public sector leaders

Source: Based on Boiral et al. 2009:488

CONCLUSIONThe quote in Chapter 5 of the NDP clearly captures the challenge that lies ahead:

“We acknowledge that each and every one of us is intimately and inextricably of this earth with its beauty and life-giving sources; that our lives on earth are enriched and complicated by what we have contributed to this condition” (The NDP 2011). The global scientific community has made clear man’s contribution to the climate-change catastrophe that has bedevilled the planet. It is now up to environmental stewards to implement mechanisms to obviate and mitigate the challenges that face future generations from an ecocentric point of view.

LIST OF REFERENCESAzizan, M.H. and Wahid, N.A. 2012. A Proposed Model on Environmental

Stewardship. International Congress on Interdisciplinary Business and Social Science 2012. 65 (2012): 587-592.

63

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationBlock, P. 1996. Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self-Interest. San Francisco:

Berrett-Koehler Publishers.Boiral, O; Cayer, M and Baron, C.M. 2009. The Action Logics of Environmental

Leadership: A Developmental Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics. 85 (4): 479-499.Department of Environmental Affairs. (undated). National Climate Change Response:

White Paper. www.environment.gov.za/climate. Accessed 16 November 2013.Department of Environmental Affairs Strategic Plan 2009-2014. www.environment.gov/

za/climate change. Accessed 18 November 2013. Dutta, S., Lawson, R. and Marcinko, D. 2011. Paradigms for Sustainable Development:

Implications of Management Theory. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management. 19 (2012): 1-10.

Egri, C.P. and Herman, S. 2000. Leadership in the North American Environmental Sector: Values, Leadership Styles, And Contexts of Environmental Leaders and their Organisations. Academy of Management Journal. 43 (5): 571-604.

Environment Agency. 2004. Corporate Environmental Governance. Innovest Strategic Advisors: New York.

Jarbandhan, D.B. 2009. The Influence of Strategic role competencies on change. A model to strengthen the Senior Management Service. Adminisratio Publica. 17 (1): 163-179. January 2009.

Jarbandhan, D.B. The evolution of leadership competencies for the South African public sector. Administratio Publica. 19 (2): 236-249. June 2011.

National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN 2010-2014). Indonesian Investments. www.indonesia-investments.com/projects/government-development plans. Accessed: 25/02/2014.

Ministry of National Development (Singapore). 2014. National development plan. www.wikipaedia.org/wiki/Ministry of National Development (Singapore). Accessed: 27/2/2014.

Molewa, E. 2014. Nature at a tipping balance amid growing degradation. The Saturday Star, 25/01/2014.

Republic of South Africa. 2012 National Planning Commission: National Development Plan 2030. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. (Act 108 of 1996). Pretoria: Government Printer.

Saner, M. And Wilson, J. 2003. Stewardship, Good Governance and Ethics. Policy Brief No.19. December 2003. Institute of Governance.

Shrivastava, S.K. 2007. Green supply-chain management: A state-of-the-art literature review. International Journal of Management Reviews. 9 (1): 53-80.

Sookram, R. 2013. Environmental Attitudes and Environmental Stewardship: Implications for Sustainability. Journal of Values-Based Leadership. 6(5): 1-11.

United Nations Global Compact. 2010. Environmental Stewardship Strategy. Overview and Resource for Corporate Leaders. United Nations: New York.

Van Sant, J. Undated. Governance as Stewardship: Decentralisation and Sustainable Human Development. Executive Summary. Research Triangle Institute: place of publication unknown.

D.B. Jarbandhan



JOB SATISFACTION, SECURITY AND STAFF RETENTION IN PUBLIC COMPANIES: A CASE OF ESKOM

M. KhozaEskom

M. KanjereTurfloop Graduate School of LeadershipUniversity of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

Job satisfaction is a central construct that has dominated the attention of both practitioners and social scientists for centuries. It is central to any scope of employment and work attitudes. Its value cannot however be understated

due to its high correlation with important job outcomes. Thompson (2009:2) concluded that there are two types of variables which impact on employee satisfaction, namely, internal workplace factors which are within the control of management and external workplace factors that cannot be controlled by management. The latter can be mitigated by improving internal workplace factors. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to probe the levels of job satisfaction, security and the intention to stay in the Group Customer Services (GCS) Divisions, Contact Centre at Eskom in Polokwane. A questionnaire was used to collect data and one of the main findings in the study was that there are various factors that can lead to job dissatisfaction and which can make an employee leave the organisation. The paper further recommends different strategies and interventions that can enhance job satisfaction in an organisation

INTRODUCTIONSouth Africa is by far the largest and most developed economy in Africa,

generating nearly 40 per cent of the income in sub-Saharan Africa (Reed, 2003). One reason for South Africa’s startling success in the region is its leadership in the area of corporate governance, which in most cases serve as a breeding ground for job satisfaction in most companies. McKinsey Consulting Group found that investors in certain emerging market countries would pay a premium of 23 per cent and 28 per cent for shares in a company with “good” corporate governance, as opposed to a poorly governed company with similar financial performance (Rose, 2003). Corporate governance increasingly affects both a country’s economic stability and its growth prospects. When foreign financial institutions returned to South Africa in 1994 after the birth of democracy, investors demanded reform in

65


both corporate structures and corporate governance practices in exchange for their infusion of capital (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). Investors wanted assurances that corporations practised accountability, transparency and fairness to all stakeholders. Organisations were urged to take care of their employees and that also resulted in the active participation of labour unions in the companies.

Companies began to offer better working conditions for all the workers as mandated by the Basic Work Conditions Act. Better working conditions began to have an impact on the level of satisfaction of employees. Fasang, Geerdes, Schomann and Siarov (2007:1) report that high levels of job satisfaction have been found to positively influence organisational commitment. Thompson (2009:1) concurs that workplace satisfaction is a major component contributing to workplace success. Fasang et al. (2007:1) report job satisfaction as being a way to measure occupational well-being, and conclude that more satisfied employees also tend to be more productive and flexible. It then follows that a satisfied employees is the key element that enables the organisation to retain a committed, motivated and highly qualified workforce.

The empirical study was therefore conducted at Eskom Group Customer Services, Divisions and Contact Centre in Polokwane. Eskom is one of the companies that existed prior to democracy and thus had to transform when new laws governing private companies and work conditions were made. Thus, in reflecting on 20 years of democracy, researchers saw it befitting to investigate the progress made in private companies in as far as working conditions are concerned by focusing on the level of job satisfaction at Eskom as a point of departure. The purpose of the study was to probe into the satisfaction that the workers derived from the company in relation to their work conditions.

ESKOM – A backgroundEskom is a South African electricity public utility, established in 1923 as the

Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) by the government of South Africa. This company is also abbreviated as Eskom, and this is the abbreviation which is used throughout this paper. The utility is the largest producer of electricity in Africa. It is amongst the top seven utilities in the world in terms of generation capacity and among the top nine in terms of sales. The company is divided into the Generation, Transmission and Distribution divisions. Eskom generates approximately 95% of electricity used in South Africa. This electricity is supplied to municipalities, government entities, companies and various households in South Africa. This company was registered as a company in 2002 by the South African government (Ramulifho, 2009).

Like all the other companies which experienced difficulties in 2008 due to global recession, Eskom also experiencing difficulties. In addition to that, Eskom is also finding it difficult to reach its required electricity output due to capacity and financial constraints exacerbated by the current recessionary economy. Customers

M. Khoza & M. Kanjere



and businesses are dissatisfied. As a result, the reputation of Eskom has declined significantly. On the other hand, the government as well as the public at large place significant expectations in Eskom as a state-owned enterprise. Considering these realities, Eskom recognises that continuing with business as usual is not an option. Consequently, the organisation has opted to change so as to remain sustainable (Boonzaire, 2008).

In recent years change in the business environment has become a way of life. Advancements in technology, competition, globalisation, the need to control cost and increase efficiency coupled with increasing customer expectation mean that organisations have to evolve and regenerate in order to survive. Gone are the days when individuals could expect to work with the same customer base for the whole of their career. When organisational change is not effectively and efficiently managed and communicated, it results in some form of resistance by employees. Change creates uncertainty about the future and fear to move out of comfortable habits. Thus, resistance by employees is an organisational challenge that the organisation must address (Stassen, 2006).

The survival, existence and growth of society call for innovation, re-organisation, and changes in the working methods, procedures and practices. Hence change is now a way of life and many people have experienced that change is difficult and everyone is impacted by change. In order to weather difficult periods, a company needs employees who act towards the goals of the organisation and have a strong desire to remain in the company. Committed employees take pride in organisational membership, believe in the goals and values of the organisation, and therefore display high levels of performance and productivity (Nickols, 2007). According to Allen and Meyer (2007) most South African employees experience a lack of job satisfaction resulting in a low level of employee commitment that, in turn, impacts on performance and the achievement of organisational goals.

Reengineering EskomOn the 10th December 1999 the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs

announced that the distribution function of Eskom would be unbundled in the year 2000, and that it would merge with the different municipalities to form a separate enterprise, Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) Holdings. This is in line with the plan to break up the Eskom monopoly. Its three functions of Generation, Transmission and Distribution would in future be separated, as proposed in the 1999 White Paper on Energy (Boonzaire, 2008).

Eskom therefore favoured a restructured electricity distribution model involving the creation of six regional electricity distributors (REDs) based in metropolitan municipalities and a seventh, national, RED. In 1999 Eskom had offices in seven regions (Northern, North East, North West, Northern West, Western, Southern and Eastern). In 2001, Eskom went through restructuring where the Northern and North East regions became one region, moving from seven to six regions. Employees had

67


to change job positions and relocate to different locations in order to align with the operational requirements of the REDs. In 2004, the South African government established the Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) Holding Company to implement these mergers. However, by 2007 very little progress had been made towards the establishment of the REDs (Boonzaire, 2008).

The National Electricity Black out saga – 2008The boardroom upheavals at State power supplier Eskom no doubt have their

roots in the electricity blackouts in early 2008, which came about after the public utility allegedly neglected to maintain appropriate coal stockpiles. However, governance experts and economists agree the major problem lies in the manner Eskom and other public corporations are being governed. Lack of accountability also comes out time and again as the major issue that separates Eskom and other State owned entities from professionally run businesses. The key issue is whether Government, the shareholder in this instance, should allow State-owned enterprises to follow the corporate route in their operations or simply operate as an extension of Government as reported by the Financial, as reported by the Finweek magazine of November 2009.

In August 2010, Eskom had to review its business strategy. The quest to embark into a new future was mandated by the recent challenges of an energy gap over the next five years and in particular the next two years. The operational performance in electricity Generation, Transmission and Distribution were below international standards and customer satisfaction was low and the safety records were unacceptable. Eskom had spent considerable time and effort resolving the funding challenges and could not allow the company to fall back into the position it found itself in 2009, when it was unclear whether it was a going concern (Ramulifho, 2009). Uncertainties in the company also affected the level of job satisfaction of the employees.

JOB SATISFACTION DEFINEDRoelen, Koopmans and Groothoff (2008:434) define job satisfaction as “the

positive emotional reactions and attitudes individuals have towards their job”, whereas Locke (1976:1298) defines job satisfaction “as a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experience.” Job satisfaction has been researched as a multidimensional concept which includes numerous factors that impact positively on employee attitudes towards work (Tosi, Rizzo & Carrol, 1990:93). We therefore define job satisfaction as the extent to which an individual derives contentment from engaging with the given task under specific work conditions.

Thompson (2009:2) notes that there are two types of variables which impact on employee satisfaction with regard to his job. He identified those as internal workplace factors which are within the control of management and external




workplace factors which are not controlled by management. The latter can be mitigated by improving internal workplace factors. Thompson (2009:3) reports further that when employees were probed regarding which types of dissatisfaction lead to their voluntarily leaving a job, the tangible factors such as wages were far less significant than all of the intangible factors such as friendships, high morale and a sense of belonging.

Rondeau (2009), reports that employees who enjoy their work and feel rewarded for their input will ultimately be the most committed and will consequently contribute to the success of the company (i.e. increased productivity and increased employee satisfaction). This results in a higher retention rate and reduced costs of training new employee(s). Bassy (2002:3) emphasises the importance of organisations being aware of what motivates and satisfies employees at work in order to increase productivity and increase retention rates. Bassy further points out that satisfied employees show higher commitment to and lower turnover rates, which leads to the achievement of the company’s goals. Bassy concludes that should management adopt an easy-come-easy-go outlook it leads to inconsistency in that employees will most likely experience job insecurity, which further destabilizes the management-employee relationships and increases intention to leave.

JOB SATISFACTION THEORYThis study is anchored on Herzberg‘s two-factor theory of job satisfaction.

The theory identifies aspects that cause job satisfaction and aspects that cause job dissatisfaction. According to this theory, aspects that cause job satisfaction are referred to as motivators and can include the following:

• Achievement• Recognition• Work itself• Responsibility• Advancement and• GrowthThe above mentioned aspects are the strong determiners of job satisfaction

which every company should consider when designing a job. Furthermore, as researchers we believe that the following aspects that causes job dissatisfaction will have to be addressed promptly if identified in a company. Herzberg‘s two-factor theory (2014) stipulated the following aspects as being the major determinants of job dissatisfaction:

• Company policy• Supervision• Working conditions• Interpersonal relations with peers, subordinates, superiors and others• Status• Job security

69


• Salary• Personal lifeThe Herzberg two-factor theory was tested with 200 accountants and engineers

from different companies who were requested to recall a time in their career when they had felt exceptionally good about their job. Through the investigations, two separate independent dimensions emerged which from the study. One was related to job satisfaction and the other from job-dissatisfaction (Herzberg two-factor theory, 2014).

Other researchers discuss job satisfaction along affective and cognitive elements of job-satisfaction. Affective job satisfaction elements are those elements that focus on pleasurable emotional feelings which an individual derives from his job. The cognitive job satisfaction focuses on the facets which go with a particular job, such as pay, pension arrangements, working hours and many other pecks.

Literature reviewJob satisfaction reflects employees’ feelings regarding their work and has been

found to affect many operations within the organisation. If the level of satisfaction is low, the impact on the organisation may be negative. On the other hand, when employees’ level of satisfaction is high, they are willing to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organisation (Maswanganyi, 2012).

Job satisfaction is a result of an individual’s perception and evaluation of their job influenced by their own unique needs, values and expectations, which they regard as being important to them. Research has indicated that job satisfaction does not come about in isolation. It is dependent on organisational variables such as structure, size, pay, working conditions and leadership, which represent the organisational climate. Job satisfaction among employees is an indicator of organisational effectiveness, and it is influenced by organisational and personal factors. Most employers realize that the optimal functioning of their organisation depends in part on the level of job satisfaction of employees; hence, the emergence of the statement, “happy employees are productive employees.” For performance to be optimal, an employee’s full potential is needed at all levels in the organisations. This emphasizes the importance of employee job satisfaction (Maswanganyi, 2012).

Job satisfaction is a complex concept that can be divided into intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction. Intrinsic satisfaction is associated with the content of one’s job, such as autonomy, degree of responsibility, variety of skills and supervision. In general, intrinsic sources of satisfaction comprise the qualitative attributes of a job. On the other hand, extrinsic satisfaction is associated with one’s work environment (working conditions), such as working hours, safety, promotion opportunities, tangible rewards and other bonuses.

It is necessary, therefore, to adopt a more detailed measurement of satisfaction, where both intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics are taken into account. Apart from the impact of satisfaction on performance and intention to leave, the former also




serves as an indicator of cost saving. In organisations with high rates of turnover, other kinds of costs are expected to be increased. These expenses include the cost of hiring and training the new personnel. Also, for low levels of satisfaction, the effort each employee contributes to the achievement of the organisational goals is decreased and, consequently, leading to a decrease of organisational performance (Maswanganyi, 2012).

Job satisfaction is a main factor for the motivation of employees at their work and is closely related to customer-orientation. Individuals who are satisfied with their jobs are motivated, become loyal to the company and stay longer working for the company. Dissatisfied employees turn to dislike their work, hate to come to work, are unproductive and eventually leave the company. The more an employee identifies himself/herself psychologically with the job and get involved in the job, the higher the job satisfaction seems to be. Job involvement depends on personal factors such as age and growth needs, as well as on job characteristics like autonomy, variety, simulation, and feedback, and social factors such group work. On the other hand, factors that diminish job satisfaction include the existence of rigid procedures, use of surveillance, lack of resource, and restricted control over work procedures (Maswanganyi, 2012).

Turnover IntentionsRetaining employees is critical in today’s business environment. According to Preebhai

(2006) research by Ernst and Young shows that attracting and retaining employees are two of the eight most important issues investors take into account when judging the value of a company. Preebhai (2006) identifies employee turnover as a factor that often jeopardizes organisational objectives. Employee turnover is expensive in relation to employee replacement as well as entailing many hidden costs and consequences. In addition to the financial loss incurred by employee turnover, other losses include declining productivity, lower employee morale and disrupted customer relations, as well as loss of employee expertise and institutional knowledge. In today’s competitive business environment, it is imperative that companies focus on retention, gain commitment from their employees, and manage employee turnover (Preebhai, 2006).

Studies show that managers and supervisors can have a significant impact on employee turnover. According to Preebhai (2006) a Gallup organisation study reports that the length of an employee’s stay is determined largely by his relationship with managers. Preebhai (2006) maintains that supervisor support correlates with an employee’s intention to stay. According to Preebhai (2006) employees want leaders who know them, understand them, treat them fairly and who are supervisors that they can trust.

A study by Stassen (2006) indicates that subordinates whose supervisors are more abusive report higher turnover, less favourable attitudes towards the job, life and the organisation, leading to greater conflict between work and family life, and causing greater psychological distress. Also, as many of today’s organisations have a diverse workforce, supervisory relationships with employees are extremely

71


important for retention. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this relationship is not necessarily observed in all circumstances. Some people remain in their jobs although they do not feel satisfied. This is mainly observed in situations where the unemployment rate is high, few jobs are available and, consequently, the cost of quitting for the individual is high (Van Tonder and Roodt, 2008).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGYData CollectionA quantitative research approach was employed in the study to gather data and

analyse it. Thus, the target population in the study referred to all Eskom employees in different departments and provinces in South Africa. The identified sample was drawn from the entire population and it encompassed Eskom Group Customer Services Divisions and Contact Centre at Polokwane branch of Limpopo Province. This department consists of various staff disciplines, namely, departmental managers, customer care officers, resource planners, quality assurers, coaching officers, outbound staff and inbound staff members called service agents. The GCS-division has a total of 49 full-time employees excluding the temporary employees. Therefore, seven participants were randomly selected to participate in the pilot study. The randomly selection was conducted so as to ensure fair representation of all the employees in the GCS- division. The seven participants who participated in the study, five of them were males and two of them were females. This shows that Eskom still has a high number of male employees as opposed to females.

The questionnaire was divided into three sections, namely the biographical section, Likert Scale and the direct short questions. The table below depict the biographical information of the participants:

Gender Males Females

Age category :

24 years and younger 1 1

25 years to 34 years 2 1

35 years to 44 years - -

45 years to 54 years 1 -

55 years and above - 1

Position; Employee without management positions

5 2

Job Experience; less than 2 years

2years and above

1

4

2

-

Education Background; Post School Qual-ifications

5 2




Data collected through the Likert Scale showed that out of seven piloted participants, six indicated that they were satisfied in the company, only one was not sure whether he was satisfied or not. Participants indicated that they were prepared to spend some more years with the company especially because they felt accepted in their departments. The fear of leaving the company was also alluded to especially in this era of high unemployment and uncertain global economies.

Benefits and other pecks that the company offered made the employees hesitant to leave the company and even to start their own companies. The company offered them the security that they needed.

Data analysisHigh unemployment rate in a democratic South Africa contribute to the high

level of job satisfaction. This is because people are afraid of leaving their current employment or even venture into personal businesses. Employees are satisfied by the minimum benefits offered by companies, to them that is better as compared to being out in the streets without employment or struggling in a personal business.

Eskom still employs a high number of males as opposed to females. This could be due to the nature of work that is done at the company and the way in which their jobs are designed. Jobs may be designed in such a way that they do not attract female employees.

FINDINGSOne of the major findings in the study is that job satisfaction and job

dissatisfaction are two dimensions on a continuum. There are several factors that can lead to job satisfaction and some that can lead to job dissatisfaction. The motivators that are mentioned in the literature in the above paragraphs were confirmed by the participants in the study who reiterated the importance of pecks and job design as contributors of job satisfaction. The study deduced that lack of recognition and the imbalance of workload and remuneration can add to the elements of dissatisfaction in the work environment. Participants were also satisfied by the fact that the company gave them a chance to be of good help to others. This gave the participants a sense of value and they felt that their inputs were contributing to the well-being of the company.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSJob satisfaction in the democratic South Africa can be achieved through internal

factors that have a direct bearing on the company itself, and also by the analysis of external global factors, that do not have a direct bearing on the daily operations of the companies. Individuals within companies do no longer weigh their options against what is offered but also against what the world has in store for them. Mobility across companies has become difficult, and thus employees are basically satisfied with what they have as opposed to what they aspire.

73


Therefore, the attitude of being satisfied with the minimum pecks that the companies can offer may lead to the mediocre mentality amongst the employees. Employees may fail to aspire for Excellency. It is therefore imperative that the government address the issues surrounding high unemployment rates. Nevertheless, employees at Eskom GCS- division have a high level of satisfaction on their jobs. As researchers we therefore recommend that an in-depth investigation at Eskom be conducted to determine the extent to which internal as well as external factors contribute to a high level of job satisfaction.

LIST OF REFERENCES Barrier, M. 2003. Mervyn King: Principles, Not Rules, The Internal Auditor, 60, 68–72.Baue, W. 2004. Into Africa: The Paradox of Socially Responsible Investing in the

Developing Continent. Available at: http://www.socialfunds.com [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Boonzaire, J. 2008. Conserving Electricity. Available from http://www.eskomidm.co.za [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Frémond, O. and Capaul, M. 2003. Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Republic of South Africa. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_southafrica.htm [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Finweek magazine of 19 November 2009. Page 23Kakabadse, A. and Korac-Kakabadse, N. 2002. Corporate Governance in South Africa:

Evaluation of the King II Report, Journal of Change Management, 2, 305–317.Malherbe, S. and Segal, N. 2001. Corporate Governance in South Africa, OECD

Development Centre Online. Available at: http://www.oecd.org [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Mathieson, D., Richards, A. and Sharma, S. 1998. Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets, Finance and Development, 38, 4–7.

McLaughlin, Abraham. 2004. A Continent at Peace: Five African Hot Spots Cool Down. The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0102/p07s01-woaf.html [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Nkomo, S. 2003. Teaching Business Ethically in the “New” South Africa, Management Communication Quarterly, 17, 128–132.

Pinaud, N. and Wegner, L. 2004. African Economic Performance in 2004: A Promise of Things to Come? Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dev/aeo [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Ramulifho, M. 2009. New build projects. Available from <http://www.dsm.eskom.co.za> [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Reed, J. 2003. Investing in South Africa, Financial Times Limited, 6 October, 4.Rose, R. 2003. JSE Responsibility Index to Measure Non-financial Risks, Business Day

(South Africa) Limited, October 16, 17.Rossouw, G.J. 2005. Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Africa, Business &

Society, 44, 94–106.Sethi, S.P. and Williams, O.F. 2000. Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global

Business: The South African Experience and International Codes Today. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic.

Stassen, T. 2006. Change management. Available from: [email protected] [Accessed: 23 February 2014].

Temkin, S. 2004. JSE Raps 16 Companies for Poor Reporting, Business Day.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationAvailable at: http://www.netassets.co.za/equities/nalookbacks/lbPaper.

asp?lookbackID=780 [Accessed: 23 February 2014].Van Tonder, C. and Roodt, G. 2008. Eds. Organisational development. Pretoria: Van

Schaik.

75


ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF THE STATE TO FUNCTION BETTER: THE ROLE OF A MASTER’S IN BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATION (MBA) QUALIFICATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

M. LethokoTurfloop Graduate School of Leadership


ABSTRACT

Recent research from the Association of MBAs (AMBA) found that the number of people who hold the qualification and work in the public sector has doubled over the past three years. The AMBA Careers Survey

2013 showed 10% of all MBA graduates - and 41% of female MBA graduates - currently work in the sector. “‘The skills developed on an MBA - from strategic thinking to policy-making and implementation - are just as relevant to those in public service as they are to private companies, if not more so. According to the AMBA Research Director, public service managers may make highly challenging decisions on a daily basis on matters such as the most effective allocation of public funds” (Murgatroyd, 2013). This paper seeks to investigate the possibilities of having an MBA as one of the major qualifications that can be offered to public service in South Africa in order to enhance their skills in governance. The paper undertakes an in-depth study comparison of the modules offered by major universities in South Africa in the MBA in order to identify the content which is suitable for public service. Finally, the paper makes recommendations in terms of modules which can assist in improving the governance aspect of the public service from MBA qualifications.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUNDOn the 13th February 2014, President Jacob Zuma tabled his State of the Nation

Address before Parliament in Cape Town. In his concluding remarks, he said “It has been an honour for my administration and I to build foundation laid by

the first three democratic administrations, to serve the people of South Africa. As a country we have scored many successes. South Africa is a much better place to live in now than it was before 1994. We continue to face challenges, but life will also continue to change for the better”.

In his speech, the president acknowledged that there are still challenges in

M. Lethoko



government which Vil-Nkomo (2013: 455) succinctly agrees to by saying that “ the creation of democracy in South Africa is not a sufficient condition for development as demonstrated by the challenges that the country faces, twenty years after the political settlement”. This sentiment is echoed by various authors who have listed various problems that the South African public administration faces twenty years later. Some of the challenges include the following:

Raga and Taylor (2005: 22) assert that “in South Africa, the proliferation of ethical codes of conduct, public accountability and the promulgation of a number of pieces of legislation will likely fail to thwart unethical behaviour unless the public and public officials are inculcated with particular dispositions. For example, because public officials operate in a diverse society, their ethical convictions and accountability to the society are bound to be tested”.

In addition, Seemela and Mkhonto (2007: 204) point out that public managers and public institutions have failed to successfully implement performance measurement strategies because of the punitive association that most people make when they hear the words performance measurement. Public managers think and rightfully so based on past experiences, that performance measures will be used against them to make them look bad or sanction them for poor performance”.

Within the local government sphere, Munzhedzi (2013) purports that ‘the South African local government sphere is often characterised by service delivery failures, poor audit outcomes and financial management challenges”.

Ngwakwe (2012: 314) also asserts that “irregularities in public financial accountability and service delivery are not normal; these are an aberration that is caused by human factors and may be corrected if these factors are identified with solutions. There are a myriad of factors inhibiting public financial accountability and service delivery such as limited financial skills capacity, corruption, political god-fatherism, supply chain management and obscured transparency in public financial management”.

From the few examples listed above, it suffices to put forth that “new capacities are needed in the South African public service to exploit new opportunities and to ensure that all public service functions are carried out to the highest professional standard. The skills required in the public service both currently and in the future – in policymaking and analyses, in the management of organisations and public services delivery – put greater demand on public servants and call for more professionalism” (Theletsane 2013).

It is within this background that this paper seeks to answer the following questions: what curricula improvements can be implemented on existing Public management curricula in 10 higher education institutions which were sampled for purposes of this study? What mechanisms should be implemented in order to make the existing public management curricula to be inter-disciplinary by including content from other fields such as Entrepreneurship, Strategic planning and many

77


more? The paper will do an in-depth study comparison of the modules offered by major universities in South Africa in the MBA in order to identify the content which is suitable for public service. Then the paper will make recommendations in terms of modules which can assist in improving the governance aspect of the public service from MBA qualifications.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGYThis paper is focused on 10 Higher Education Institutions (HEI) which offer

both MBA and MPA degrees. The researcher did a desktop study of the curricula of each institution in terms of content of the modules being taught in each degree. The 10 chosen institutions have both a business school and a public management school. These institutions include the following universities: Pretoria, Limpopo, Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Stellenbosch, Free State, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan, North-West and Tshwane University of Technology.

This paper has utilised content analysis as a research methodology in an attempt to do an in-depth study and analysis of the content of curricula in MBA and MPA in 10 HEIs in South Africa. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005: 221) define content analysis as “a qualitative analysis of qualitative data. The basic technique involves counting the frequencies and sequencing of particular words, phrases and concepts in order to identify key words and themes. Babbie and Mouton (2012: 491) define the same concept as ‘a research method which examines words or phrases within a wide range of texts including books, book chapters, essays, interviews, speeches and informal conversations. By examining the presence of repetition of certain words and phrases in these texts, a researcher is able to make inferences about the philosophical assumptions of a writer, a written piece, the audience to which the piece was written and even the culture and the time in which the text is embedded”.

For this paper, the author did an analysis of MPA and MBA subjects in an attempt to determine the common modules that are taught in the MPA. The second objective was to study the contents of the modules in MBAS which can be suitable for utilisation in MPA degrees in order to make MPA more relevant to the present economy in South Africa. Table 1 gives a clear picture of the modules offered by various institutions. From table 1, this paper recommends that institutions should use and integrate some of the MBA content in MPA curricula so as to enhance the capacity of public officials to perform better and improve service delivery.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: THE INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT TRAININGAccording to Kroukamp (2007), transformation and change, coupled with

technological innovation, has shifted economies from industrial production to knowledge-based production of goods and services. Knowledge-based capital means acquiring or generating patents and products through research and

M. Lethoko



development, which in turn requires ensuring increasingly sophisticated skills and knowledge. These sentiments are supported by Theletsane (2013) when they argue that Public Management and administration’s conceptual reflection, theory and research have, in many respects, not reflected sufficient responses to the actual practice and experience of public administration and management.

Hendriks (2011) also argues that “public servants operate in an ever changing environment which involves globalisation, technology, scientific progress and others such as corruption”. This implies that training programmes should respond to appeals for supply-side economics rather than short-term manipulation of demand. Therefore, this paper advocates for interdiscplinarity of MPA whereby its curriculum is “cross-disciplinary or interdepartmental in nature, not independent disciplines and departments, should comprise of specified learning results, not complete study packages” (Kroukamp: 2007).

The paper will do an in-depth study comparison of the modules offered by major universities in South Africa in the MBA in order to identify the content which is suitable for public service. Then the paper will make recommendations in terms of modules which can assist in improving the governance aspect of the public service from MBA qualifications.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (MBA) QUALIFICATION According to the Council of Higher Education (CHE) (2004), “the emergence

of business management as a discipline, beginning with the establishment of the first business school in the United States of America during the late 19th Century, is one indicator of the enormous changes the world economy has experienced since the beginning of the 20th century…Business schools originated in this period because there was a need to educate business people in how to manage businesses, especially industrial production, distribution and marketing…the first business school in the US started in the 1880s.”

In Europe, the first business schools in Belgium and France in the 1940s and 1950s. In the United Kingdom, the first business schools were opened in 1965. In South Africa, the first business school was established by the University of Pretoria in 1949 followed by the Universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Stellenbosch and UNISA (CHE: 2004). Although initially this qualification was meant for people within the business fraternity, a lot has changed since then. Page, Bevelander, Bond and Boniuk (2006) purport that ‘university based management schools play a role to in harnessing the intellect by supporting the development of leaders with the capacity to think critically, to make choices and to facilitate implementation”. Page et al (2006) also ask as to “how can business schools , particularly those offering MBA programmes to students with work experience play a truly value adding role in facilitating management and leadership development for the benefit of society?”

79


This is one of the major questions which this study seeks to answer. In an attempt to answer this question, Gupta and Smith (2007) point out that

“graduate programmes in business schools are presently at crossroads between offering a general MBA programme or an MBA with specialisation. Traditional MBA programmes focus on courses that are aimed at core business disciplines with no specialisation in the functional areas, whereas an MBA with specialisation have more in-depth understanding a specialised function such as Marketing, Environmental management and other fields.

It can be deduced from the above discussion that the field of management has changed since its inception. MBA programmes have changed from being a traditional MBA with a focus on all core business principles to the one with specialisation. The next section discusses relevance of MBA in the public sector with a specific focus on the curriculum that is offered at MBA within 10 SA universities which can assist the public sector.

THE RELEVANCE OF MBA TO THE PUBLIC SECTORPublic sector training has been in the centre of various debates from 2002

as Kroukamp (2007) puts it “what was learnt during the past six years (2002) regarding the transformational process confirms global experiences that public sector transformation and change are complicated processes that need more than just the generation of creative ideas and formalising them in policy documents. It requires a knowledgeable, skillful and dedicated workforce to put ideas into practice”. Kroukamp’s sentiments are echoed later by Kuye (2005) that “in the face of apparently intractable social, political and economic problems, there have been repeated calls for academics and practitioners in Public Administration to become more relevant and address the immediate issues of public concern”. Thani and Disoloane (2012) adds to this discourse by saying that “it is important to note that Higher Education Institutions need to intervene in training public officials in order to promote human development. This in turn poses an interesting paradox for Public Administration. Concerns such as the relevancy of public administration teaching and learning remain a huge challenge”.

It is through these arguments that this paper seeks to propose a new angle of Public Administration training which is business-related. Government is involved in business transactions on a daily basis when they procure services; therefore, it is logical that government should consider an MBA as a relevant qualification in its operations. In the State of the Nation Address (2014), President Zuma pointed out the following essential points:

• Since the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Hotline by Public Service Commission, over 13 000 cases of corruption and maladministration have been referred to government departments for handling;

• Government has recovered more than 320 million rands from perpetrators

M. Lethoko



through the National Anti-corruption Hotline;• The Asset Forfeiture unit paid a total of 149 million rands into the Criminal

Assets Recovery Account and to the victims of crime;• Competition authorities investigated large scale price fixing in the

construction industry and fined guilty companies 1.4 billion rand. The millions that the state loses through corruption is due to amongst others,

the shortage of financial skills. This point is supported by Ngwakwe (2012) when he says that “the fundamental basis for financial accountability is the existence of skills capacity in the core areas of public sector such as finance sector. The importance of financial skills in the public and private sector of any economy cannot be over-emphasised given that finance is the key to service delivery.”

Various authors have suggested different ways in which training and capacity-building can be structured in the public service to address the ills in government. These include the following:

• “The use of private-sector style models, organisational ideas and values to improve efficiency and service –orientation of the public sector “(Basheka, 2012).

• “The business-like performance measures are important in spearheading output and outcome orientations” (Kakumba and Fourie 2007);

• “…adoption of entrepreneurial practices with the view to improve the performance of public organisations; embracing the contemporary managerial notion that seeks to instil a culture of entrepreneurship on public sector managers that will require them to be more innovative and less risk-averse; the focus is that of customer-driven government requiring public agencies to identify their customers and devise their operations to suit their needs; …the private-market oriented service delivery.. (Diale, Maserumule and Mello (2007).

In conclusion, Kroukamp (2007) asserts that “… the South African transformational process confirms global experiences that public sector transformation needs more than just the generation of creative ideas and their formulation in policy documents. It requires knowledgeable, skilful and dedicated workforce to put the ideas into practice.” His sentiments are echoed by Vil-Nkomo (2013) when he asks “Is education, training and development of public servants aligned with the solutions required to address the structural challenges in society?” This implies that training interventions have to be relevant to the needs of the public service even if that is out of the normal armbit of Public Management. Hence, this paper seeks to suggest two ways of dealing with the present situation. Firstly, Higher Education Institutions (HEI) have to consider inclusion of some relevant business modules in Public Management curricula. Secondly, HEI have to develop MBA qualifications with Public sector specialisation. University of Limpopo’s Turfloop Graduate School of Leadership has taken this route from 2014 to roll out an MBA with public sector focus.

81


THE PRESENT CURRICULUM OF EXISTING MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (MPA) CURRICULA FROM SELECTED HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONSAccording to Hendriks (2011) “the democratic reforms witnessed in South Africa

since 1994, as well as globalisation and other changes, impact heavily on the knowledge, skills and understanding of public practitioners to perform the critical responsibilities of government”. In addition, Sindane (2011) purports that “public administration in the new political dispensation requires that practitioners be prepared to engage, firstly in a transformation process, secondly, that they adopt a participatory management style; thirdly, that they ensure that public administration serves a developmental purpose; and lastly, that public administration is practised according to constitutionally prescribed democratic values and principles. This situation implies that the training institutions have must adapt their curricula to reflect the needs of the changing world.

This paper will focus mainly on Masters Degrees due to their fact that the writer’s interest is the capacity of managers and senior management level of government who are at application level of the National Qualifications Framework. This section will discuss the existing Master of Public management and Master Business Administration curricula in 10 HEIs in South Africa.

Table 1 (attached as Annexure 1) shows common modules in various universities. There following is a list of common modules which are offered in all the 10 institutions involved in the study:

1. Public management theories2. Human resource management3. Financial management4. Public policy analysis5. Public administration6. Municipal administration7. Ethics and accountability8. Research methodology9. Local government10. Public administration theory.

Due to the fact that HEIs are autonomous, various institutions have other modules which they offer which are less common but are more relevant and seem to address contemporary issues that public service is facing. These include the following:

1. Public entrepreneurial management 2. Environmental management3. Rural development management4. International administration 5. Organisational analysis.

M. Lethoko



6. Communication and customer focused strategies 7. The South African economy in the global environment 8. Professional Ethics for Public Managers9. Applied Conflict Management Skills10. Organisational analysis 11. Intergovernmental relations 12. Macro-economic policy formulation in South Africa13. Anti-Corruption 14. Sustainable Development and Governance

According to Hendricks (2011), “educational institutions which are preparing and equipping students for their future careers should ask themselves whether or not the training and development that they provide is still relevant and appropriate”. This paper seeks to propose that Public management training should be interdisciplinary. For instance, Thani and Disoloane (2012) point out that “students cannot study public finance in vacuum; academics from public management and can collaborate with academics from financial management or accounting to develop curriculum that will enhance students’ skills. It is necessary for academics to acknowledge the fact that there is co-existence in a number of disciplines”. Hence, this paper seeks to postulate that MPA curricula can include modules which are traditionally business-related modules from MBA as part of their curriculum.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSIn an paper entitled “Determining the role of academics in teaching and

improving of public administration in the 21st century” Thani and Disoloane (2012) point out that there is an urgent need for more relevant, appropriate and effective capacity building for service delivery in South Africa. This was already identified nearly two decades ago in the Mount Grace 1 resolutions which stated that current theory, teaching and learning of Public Administration in South Africa is in crisis. This crisis includes amongst others that Public Administration curriculum ignores other dimensions and approaches in government.” Hence, the objective of the paper is to recommend that Public Administration curricula should include more modules and content that is business-related because the business of government is service delivery which in itself is a business activity between suppliers/service providers and government.

In addition, Appendix 1 (attached at the end) has listed various modules from various institutions which could be adapted to Public administration and form part of the curricula. These modules include the following:

1. Microeconomics: Prices and Markets2. Macroeconomics: National Competitiveness3. Global Business Strategy4. Corporate Finance

83


5. General Management in Dynamic Markets6. Entrepreneurial Process7. Entrepreneurial Thinking8. Managerial Economics 9. Governmental and Legal Environment of Business 10. Strategic Management11. Entrepreneurship12. World Class Manufacturing & Strategy Supply13. Entrepreneurship14. Conflict Management15. World Class Manufacturing & Strategy Supply16. Economics for a sustainable World17. The human Factor in sustainable Organisations18. Strategic and Responsible Innovation Management19. Global Strategic Analysis and Management20. Environmental and Waste Management21. The Entrepreneurial Process: Starting Successful New Ventures22. Managing around the World23. Corporate Governance24. Black Economic Empowerment 25. Business Intelligence: Cornerstone of Competitive Advantage 26. Contemporary Business Issues 27. Leading in a Complex Environment

In conclusion, 2014 marks yet another important milestone in the evolution of the post 1994 South Africa. The South African public service is plagued by public protests for service delivery, corruption, crime and many other ills. In order for government to counteract its problems, the public service needs to be well-capacitated in relevant and recent content which will assist them to perform better. It is through this premise that this paper set out to recommend an integration of business-related content into Public Administration curriculum in South Africa. As the CHE (2004) puts it “The status of an MBA as a postgraduate degree, its multidisciplinary nature, its practical orientation, its purpose in relation to the world of business and to the society’s broader needs to be emphasised”. This implies that an MBA is not only useful for business world, but also for the public since the adoption of entrepreneurial practices can also improve public sector performance. Hence, this paper has advocated for inclusion of MBA content in Public management curriculum so that the MPA is more responsive to government and societal needs.

LIST OF REFERENCESBabbie, E. & Mouton, J. 2012. The practice of social research. Cape Town. Oxford

Publishers.

M. Lethoko


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationBasheka, B.C. 2012. The paradigms of Public Administration examined: A reflection.

Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 47, Issue no.1, pp. 25 – 67.Council of Higher Education. 2004. The state of provision of MBA in South Africa.

Pretoria, Government printers.Diale, A., Maserumule, H. & Mello, D. 2007. Public sector administrative reforms and

accountability: “A marriage of inconvenience”. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 42, Issue no. 7, pp. 638 – 649.

Gupta, P. B. & Smith, J. 2007. Traditional Master of Business Administration (MBA) versus the MBA with specialisation: A disconnection between what business schools offer and what employees seek. Journal of Education for Business, August 2007.

Hendriks, C. 2011. Linking Public Administration and Management theory to practice: An integrated approach to training public servants. Administratio Publica, Vol. 19, Issue no. 2, pp. 61 – 75.

Kakumba, U. & Fourie, D. J. 2007. Revitalising accountability in public management reform: issues and challenges for developing countries. Journal of Public administration, Vol. 42, Issue no. 7, pp. 650 – 663.

Kroukamp, H. 2002. Skills training: A prerequisite for the changing position and status of public servants in South Africa. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 37, Issue no. 4, pp. 453 – 474.

Kroukamp, H. 2007. Public sector training in South Africa: Vehicle towards good governance: Fact or fallacy? Journal of Public Management, Vol. 42, Issue no. 5, pp. 71 – 81.

Kuye, J.O. 2005. The state of research and scholarship in public administration. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 40, Issue no. 4, pp. 525 – 537.

Mugatroyd, G. 2013. Public sector means Business. AMBA, Unpublished paper.Munzhedzi, P.H. 2013. Financial viability of the South African municipalities: some

observations on legal compliance. Paper presented at the International Conference on Development Finance and Economic Transformation. Unpublished paper.

Ngwakwe, C.C. 2012. Public sector financial accountability and service delivery. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 47, Issue no. 1, pp. 311 – 329.

Page, M.J. , Bevelander, D. & Boniuk, E. 2006. Businesss chools and lifelong learning: Inquiry, delivery or developing the inquiring mind. South African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 37, Issue no. 4, pp. 1 – 5.

Raga, K. & Taylor, D. 2005. Impact of accountability and ethics on Public service delivery: A South African Perspective. The Public manager, Summer 2005.

Seemela, P. & Mkhonto, X. 2007. Fundamentals for good governance in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 42, Issue no. 5, pp. 200 – 211.

Sindane, A. M. 2011. Adding public value in teaching the subject and practice of Public Administration and Management. Administratio Publica, Vol. 19, Issue no. 3, pp. 5 – 19.

Thani, X.C. & Disoloane, V.P.P. 2012. Determining the role of academics in teaching and improving of public administration in the 21st century. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 47, Issue no. 1, pp. 148 – 160.

Theletsane, K.I. 2013. The South African Public Administration as a profession. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 48, Issue no. 1, pp. 175 – 187.

Vil-Nkomo, S. 2013. The future of public service: A political economy approach. Journal of Public Management, Vol. 48, Issue no. 3, pp. 455 – 465.

Welman, C., Kruger, F. & Mitchell, B. (2005). Research methodology. Cape Town. Oxford University Press.

Zuma, J.G. 2014. State of the Nation address. Pretoria, Government printers.

85


Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1:MBA VS MPA CURRICULUM

Institution’s name MPA Curriculum MBA Curriculum

1. GIBS/University of

Pretoria

• Public management theories, • Human resource management, • Financial resource manage-

ment, • Research methodology and a

mini-dissertation:• Public administration,• Development theories and

practices, • Modern management tech-

niques, • Municipal government and

administration,• Urban development manage-

ment, • Public policy analysis, • Public entrepreneurial manage-

ment, • Environmental management, • Rural development manage-

ment,• International administration

and • Organisational analysis.

CORE MODULES• Microeconomics: Prices and Markets• Human Behaviour and Performance in SA• Analytical Tools and Techniques• Financial Accounting• Macroeconomics: National Competitiveness• Marketing• Management Accounting• Operations Management • Human Resource Strategy• Research Methodology• Strategy• Leadership• Global Business Strategy• Corporate Finance• General Management in Dynamic Markets• Organisational Development and Transfor-

mationELECTIVES • Information and Knowledge Management

(half course)• Business Finance• Entrepreneurial Process• Entrepreneurial Thinking



2. University of North

West Graduate School

of Business and Leadership

15. Research for senior managers 16. Change management 17. Communication and customer

focused strategies 18. The South African economy in

the global environment 19. Mini- dissertation

CORE MODULES20. Human Resource Management 21. Information Technology Management 22. Change Management and Organisational

Behaviour 23. Managerial Economics 24. Governmental and Legal Environment of

Business 25. Financial Management 26. Marketing Management 27. Business Research Methods and Statistics

Strategic Management and Business PolicyManagement Accounting

28. Project Management 29. Operations management• Leadership negotiation strategyELECTIVES • Finance• Human Resources management• Public sector management• Business and governmental relations• Entrepreneurial management• Operations and decision management• Marketing management

87


3. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Busi-ness School

COMPULSORY MODULES• Research theory and

application• Advanced administrative

theories• Advanced Personnel

administration• Advanced Financial

Administration• Advanced Personnel

Management Skills and Techniques

• Advanced Financial Management Skills and Techniques

• Advanced Municipal Administration

• Advanced Provincial Administration

• Advanced Sector Governance *• Advanced Project ManagementELECTIVES• Advanced Public Policy

Analysis and Planning• Administration for

Development• Advanced Administrative

Technology• Integrated Development

Planning Skills and Techniques• Advanced Public Policy

Analysis Skills and Techniques• Advanced Public Sector

Information Technology *• Professional Ethics for Public

Managers• Applied Conflict Management

Skills

CORE MODULES• Marketing Management• Organisational Behaviour• Financial Management• International Management• Management Accounting Aspects• Quantitative Techniques for Management• Operations Management• Research Methodology• Management Economics• Human Resource Strategies• Strategic Management• Leadership• Leadership ProjectELECTIVES • Quality Management• Project Management• Entrepreneurship• Conflict Management• World Class Manufacturing & Strategy

Supply• Business Ethics• Integrated African Leadership• Management of Technology• Economics of the Motor Industry*• E-Marketing*• Environmental Management*• HIV and AIDS Strategic Management*• International Financing*• Supply Chain Management*• Tourism Management*• Public Management*• Information management*• Advanced Agriculture Management*

Appendix 1



4. Turfloop Grad-uate School of Leadership

• South African Public Manage-ment

• Public Management Theories • Public Financial Management • Research Methodology • Ethics and Accountability in

Administration and • Organisational Theory• Public Policy Analysis • Performance Management • Rural Development and Project

Management • Human Resources Management

and • Strategic Management.

CORE MODULES• The Changing Business Environment• Integrated Accounting• Finance and Responsible Investment• Marketing and Customer Engagement• Managing Strategic Resources & Operations• Research Methodology• Leadership Development• Economics for a sustainable World• The human Factor in sustainable Organisa-

tions• Strategic and Responsible Innovation Man-

agement• Global Strategic Analysis and ManagementELECTIVES• Environmental and Waste Management• The Entrepreneurial Process: Starting Suc-

cessful New Ventures• Managing around the World• Corporate Governance

5. University of Free State Busi-ness School

• Public policy and service delivery

• Public financial administration and

• management • Research methodology in

public• administration and

management (advanced) • Public human resource

management • Organisational analysis and

intergovernmental• relations • Comprehensive dissertation

CORE MODULES• Business conditions analysis• Strategy and company analysis• Human resources management• Financial and managerial accounting• Marketing for managers• Analytical methods• Organisational behavior• Corporate and business law• Financial management• Economics for managers• Managing society and the future• Leading innovation and change• Business research methods• Corporate governance and ethicsELECTIVES• Tax and estate planning• E-commerce• International business and marketing• Investment and portfolio analysis• Operation management and logistics• New venture creation• Project management• Risk management• Services marketing and management• Management of HIV and Aids• Managing information technology• Managing BBBEE

89


6. University of Stellenbosch Business school

• Integrated Public Management • Integrated Community-based

Development • Integrated Public Policy

Management and Analysis • Municipal Management • Monitoring and Evaluation • Comparative and Contemporary

Public Management Innovation Studies

• Capita Selecta • Advanced Project Management

or • Anti-Corruption

CORE MODULES• Business fundamentals• Personal skills development• Research methodology• Decision analysis• Management accounting• Leadership• Economics for managers• Business finance• Marketing management• Operations and Information management• Strategic management• Research methodology• International management• Business in society

MBA International visit

7. University of Kwa-zulu Natal Business school

CORE MODULES• Research Methodology and

Applied Techniques • Public Administration and

Development Management:• Theory, Processes & Practice • Advanced Public Sector

Financial Management ELECTIVES• Advanced Public Sector Human

Resource Management • Project Planning and

Management • Legislative and Ethical

Foundations of Public• Administration and

Development Management • Advanced Provincial & Local

Governance • Sustainable Development and

Governance • Managing Rural Development • Dissertation

CORE MODULES• Management• Financial Accounting• Human & Organisation Behaviour • Marketing Management • Economics for Management• Human Resources & Industrial Relations • Management Information System• Operations Research• Supply Chain Management• Business Law• Corporate Finance• Statistics• Management Accounting• Strategy• Research Methodology ELECTIVES• Applied Strategy• IT Management & Strategy• Product Development and Brand

Management• Taxation• Advanced industrial relations• Entrepreneurship• Investment and portfolio management

Appendix 1



8. TUT Business school

CORE SUBJECTS • Research Methods in Public • Management • Advanced Public Management

V • Research Report: Public

Management V

ELECTIVES• Contemporary Issues and

Approaches in Public Management V

• Financial Management for the Public Sector V

• Information Studies for the Public Sector V

• Organisation Development for the Public Sector V

• Policy Studies for the Public Sector V

• Project Management for the Public Sector V

• Human Resource Management for the (0,080)Public Sector V

CORE MODULES• Business Statistics • Managerial Finance • Marketing Management • Managerial Economics • Organisational Behaviour • Operations Management• Business Strategy • Change Management • Financial Management • Human Resources Management • International ManagementELECTIVES

• Environmental Management • International Financing • Management of Technology • Project Management • Quality Management • Technological Entrepreneurship

91


9. UCT Graduate school of Business

CORE MODULES• Public Policy• Public Management• Policy Evaluation and

Implementation• Administrative ethics• Comparative public

administration• Democratic governance• Intergovernmental relations• Local government politics and

administration• Macro-economic policy

formulation in South Africa• Public administration theory• Public sector budgeting and

budget reform• Public sector reform• Regulation• Utility regulationELECTIVES• Public Culture in Africa• Development Economics• South African Politics• Comparative Public

Administration• Democratisation• Policy Evaluation and

Implementation• Public Sector Reform• Political Behaviour and

Research• Public Administration Thought• Political Ethics (Not offered in

2014)• Development Theories

CORE MODULES• Accounting• Business, government and society• Evidence-based practice• Leadership• Economics• Marketing• Finance• Manufacturing and operations• Innovation and entrepreneurship• Strategic people management• Strategy• Company analysis project• Professional developmentELECTIVES• Advanced Corporate Finance • Advanced Leadership • Black Economic Empowerment • Business Intelligence: Cornerstone of Com-

petitive Advantage • Business Planning 1 & 2 • Coaching • Company Valuations • Consumer Behaviour • Contemporary Business Issues • Corporate Social Responsibility • Designing and Implementing Operations

Systems • Doing Business in China • Depth Consulting and Facilitating • Economics of Financial Markets 1 & 2 • Emerging Enterprise Consulting • Game Theory • Global Marketing • International Finance • Knowledge Management • Management Control Systems • Marketing Strategy • Modern Finance • Negotiation • Option, Futures and Other Derivatives • Project Management • Strategic Cost Analysis

10. Wits Business School

• Public Policy Analysis and Management

• Scenario planning• Political environment of public

policy• Macro-economic policy• Public finance,• Project management,• Applied public sector monitor-

ing and evaluation• Advanced Research Methods• Dissertation

CORE MODULES• Leadership Development• Social Responsibility• Career Management• Contemporary Business Thinking• Numeracy Competence • Micro and Macro Economics• Accounting• Organisational Behaviour• Marketing• Corporate Finance and Statement Analysis• Operations and Decision Science• Ethics and Governance• Strategy• Information and Systems Management• Leading in a Complex Environment

Appendix 1



DISCOURSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: FOR

WHO’S BENEFIT IS IT?T.S. MadzivhandilaDepartment of Development Planning and Management University of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

The emergence of climate change in recent years is seen as an extension to the continuous focus on sustainable development, whose governance created ideological contestations about the relevance and irrelevance

for developing and developed nations. When sustainable development was codified at the Stockholm conference in 1972, the underlying complexities and contradictions surrounding it created contestations, controversies and mistrust among first and third world countries. Developed countries expressed dire need to conserve and preserve natural resources for the future generations; whereas, developing countries emphasised the need to maximise socio-economic emancipation through exploitation of the environment as a resource-base for development in order to address the multiple prospects of poverty affecting the majority of their citizens. Currently, climate change which is thought to be influenced by concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere through, for example industrialisation, threatens the development of socio-economic and agricultural activities of most nations. However, the governance efforts through, among others, the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have yielded negligible progress. Instead, developed countries have continued emitting according to unchanged patterns of their unfettered consumerism and production while imposing limitations on developing countries’ access to environmental resources. At best, this ambivalent and ambiguous governance of the hegemonic discourse of climate change and sustainable development is solipsistic.

This paper argues that the oxymoron of climate change governance has borne exclusively deleterious impacts on the economic development of developing countries wherein the prejudicial and quixotic discourse of sustainable development amplified suspicions and mistrust between first and third world countries. The paper discusses the discourses of the governance of climate change and sustainable development in order to elucidate complex context and expose its spectre of irrelevance for the third world countries. In this way, the paper dovetails the examination of governance challenges of climate change with the predisposition

93


of sustainable development at both the international and national scales. The paper concludes that the ongoing governance of climate change is founded on the developed countries’ development solipsism and that it circumscribes the diversity and complexities of economic development, technological upgrade and socio-economic transformation needs and aspirations of the developing countries. Given the overt reflexivity of climate change governance, the paper ventures to project that sustainable development shall remain a pipedream.

INTRODUCTION The quest to achieve sustainable development and to mitigate the impact of

climate change has always been derailed by power relations and misunderstanding between first and third world countries. In pursuit for continuous sustainable economic growth, developed countries have constantly rejected proposals to reduce gas emissions from their economic dependent industries. Moreover, developing countries have always raised concerns for the need to accelerate economic development of their societies faced with high rate of poverty, unemployment and many other social ills. Robinson & Cohen (2003) wrote that the fundamental contradictions between the renewed call for economic growth in developing countries; that is, the need to enhance levels of ecological conservation and power relations among the local and global actors and institutions supporting sustainable development has been in the forefront of challenges facing the world today. For many years, international policy prescript including those governing climate stabilisation have developed largely within the institutional, economic, and political context of industrialised countries, rather than within developing countries (Heller & Shukla, 2003; Robinson & Cohen, 2003; Mkandawire, 2011). For example, the adoption of the phrase sustainable development stems from the western countries philosophies and their inherent obsession with nature. This is a cause of concern as developing countries are also required to implement these policies, whereas, there was no thorough contextualisation of the socio-economic circumstances of these countries. Understandably, fostering an inclusive and resilient economy means that developed and developing countries alike will need to undergo a transformative process and shift to environmentally sustainable policies integrating greater equity as a pressing concern (Heller & Shukla, 2003). However, the current socio-economic conditions within developing countries do not permit strict obligations to control greenhouse gasses. Developing countries should pursue policies to address more pressing concerns such as hunger, malnutrition and economic stagnation, but in such a way that the process does not neglect the need to limit emissions. The paper commences by laying out the debate about the discourse of sustainable development in the third world countries. It also address the connection between climate change, economic and sustainable development, looking at pressing issues to prioritise particularly in developing countries amid myriad of socio-economic challenges faced. The paper also tackles

T.S. Madzivhandila



the complexities surrounding the governance of climate change, looking at both power and economic relations between first and third world countries. The paper concludes by proposing amicable solutions towards achieving economic and sustainable development measures to reduce impacts of climate change.

DISCOURSES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIESPost-1990 has seen a momentous intensification of the debate about development

and the environment in the third world countries. This was due to the reenergised efforts stemming from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit where issues of development and sustainability were discussed intensively. The need to continuously protect the environment whilst facilitating equitable economic development particularly in rural areas of these countries have remained a big challenge which has been apprehended by conflicts and contradictions amongst development planners and environmental experts (Adams, 2001; Swart, Robinson & Cohen, 2003; Redclift, 2005; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007). The progress towards achieving sustained and impartial development is proving to be the greatest challenge facing the human race (Swart et al., 2003). One of the striking factors to this conundrum is the contradictory signals emerging from the so called “developed” Western countries. On one hand, the idea of developmentalism indicated that for developing countries to be developed, they should imitate or emulate the progressive stances taken by the ‘West,’ emphasising that the adoption of modernisation theory and recreation of industrial world could help grow economies of the third world countries. In such an instance, it is perceived that development can be possible only if developing countries accept and allow for “the imposition of the established world order” of the developed countries (Adams, 2001; Redclift, 2005; Mkandawire, 2011). On the other hand, environmentalist ideology on the discourse identifies preservation and conservation of environmental resources as a preferred model of development (Adams, 1990). To facilitate this process, particularly in the third world countries, sustainable development is seen as the solution not only for environmental protection goals but also the integration of development activities into environmental planning. However, sustainable development to a large extent is seen as the infusion of environmental concerns into development discourse by Western environmentalists (Desai & Potter, 2002). Despite the limited understanding of the phrase sustainable development and what it is aimed for, its facilitation gained currency beyond “the confines of global environmental organisations to the new jargon phrase in the development business” (Adams, 1990: 2). The implication of Adam’s (1990) view is that the attempt by environmentalists to use the phrase sustainable development and other related terms such as eco-development & green development to capture the vision and rhetoric of development debate appeared to be founded on a lack of understanding of their context or complexity. The conception of this phrase has been controversial and has remained contested, without any identifiable coherent

95


theoretical core (Adams, 2001; Beg, Morlot, Davidson, Afrane-Okesse, Tyani, Denton, Sokona, Thomas, La Rovere, Parikh, Parikh & Rahman, 2002; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007). This has led to a missed opportunity to have clear coherent strategies towards the solutions to the problems of poverty and environmental exploitation.

The evolution of sustainable development thinking has always been linked to the Western ideas about nature and its conservation and how these ideas were expressed on the developing countries in the 20th century, first as colonies and then as independent developing countries (Adams, 1990; Adams, 2001; Mkandawire, 2011). As defined by the Brundtland Commission of 1987, sustainable development is seen as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. The simplicity of this definition allowed for the abuse of its implementation and prompted a continued debate about the question of what is to be sustained and what is perceived to be the most sustainable course of action (Redclift, 2005; Robinson, Bradley, Busby, Connor, Murray, Sampson & Soper, 2006; Sneddona, Howarthb & Norgaardc, 2006). Redclift (2005) argue that, it is both the present and future levels of production and/or consumption that need to be sustained. The argument is that the growth of global population will lead to increased demands on the environment, thus the ideas of sustainable development should incorporate that. Adams (2001) alluded to the fact that the abuse of the phrase ‘sustainable development’ was and still is intricately linked to the ‘simplistic’ yet ‘slippery’ definition that is generally accepted.

The concept of sustainability seemed to exist mainly within quotation marks; it does not have a clear meaning. Its powers are found to be based much on the discourses surrounding it, rather than in any shared substantive value it should have (McGuigan, Reynolds & Wiedmer, 2002; McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002). The fact that different people identify different objects of sustainability is, among other things, the reasons why there are many contradictory approaches to sustainable development. Thus, the differences in approaches will reflect differences in underlying social commitments from different actors of sustainable development. In other instance, this has led to issues to be forcibly associated with the phrase ‘sustainable development’ in order to justify and/or embellish particular actions which are found to be unsustainable in the long run (Adams, 2001). For instance, in developing countries it is more likely to find resistance on the idea of preserving resources for the future because of the need to service the current social-ills affecting the majority of communities; more so that the environment is considered to be a resources base of development. The poor in these areas understandably value the present above the future. In other words, for the poor, present challenges of survival are more pressing than the sustainability of resources for future consumption (Desai & Potter, 2002; Heller & Shukla, 2003). The short and long term results of this misunderstanding will mean that environmental costs will continue to be passed from one generation to another, within and between societies, with the

T.S. Madzivhandila



poor likely to be worsened of their deprivation. Because of power and control, the “industrialized western countries will continue to dump its toxic wastes in non-industrialised countries”, while simultaneously drawing most of its energy, food and mineral needs from them (Redclift, 2005). Many natural resources will continue to be dedicated exclusively to the service of the western ‘elevated lifestyles of the rich and middle-class people’ in ways that perpetuates intergenerational and intra-generational inequalities among developed and developing countries (Adams, 2001; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007). Sustainable development discourses suggests that the perceived need for global management of the environment stemmed, in part, from the assumption that it provided a way of correcting the anomalies of economic and trade policy, with climate change challenges at the forefront.

CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC EMANCIPATION: SEARCHING FOR THE RIGHT COURSEIn recent years, the goals of sustainable development have not only focused

on preservation and conservation of environmental resources but also on establishment of the fastest growing debate about climate change and its impact in the third world countries. The underlying discourse of climate change is the fact that it is presumably caused by human activities (Howarthb & Norgaardc, 2006). The anthropocentric nature of this understanding of climate change is in line with the debate about sustainable development which emphasise the need to limit human interaction with nature and reduction of development activities that create carbon emissions. There is a direct link between climate change policies and the sustainable development agenda in that both deal with issues of energy efficiency, renewable energy, transport and sustainable land-use policies among others (Cohen, Demeritt, Robinson & Rothmon, 1998). However, the two concepts have been addressed largely in separate circles of both research and policy. The link between the environment, social justice and governance had become increasingly vague in both climate change and sustainable development discourses, and the structural relationships between power, consciousness and the environment had become blurred. Nevertheless, there is a general agreement that sustainable development has economic, social and environmental objectives and that development should be made more sustainable (Adams, 2001). Future economic development should not be prejudicial to the process of environmental protection and visa verse. It is evident that, ecosystems are victims of massive market and governance failures and the true worth of their services and costs of their degradation are persistently ignored by economic and development strategies (Beg et al., 2002; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007). The negative impact of these failures is felt hardest by the most vulnerable groups, particularly those in rural areas of the developing countries. As such, most disturbing aspects of climate change impacts are projected to fall disproportionally to these areas, thus, increasing existing development inequality

97


not only amongst household of third world countries but also political economies of the developed and developing counties (Robinson et al., 2006).

Third world country’s economies are still less progressive and require serious interventions and strategies to grow in order to promote socio-economic development compared to first world countries. In this sense, the efforts to adopt measures to promote sustainable development and reduce human activities contributing to climate change will remain a challenge (Robinson et al., 2006). For the developed countries, there is no inherent problem in pursuing sustainable development within the logic of the market economy of the developing countries (Redclift, 2005). However, for developing countries the measures to promote reduction in greenhouse gas emissions will result in a shift of production and employment creation with social, economic and demographic consequences. Thus, halting development efforts aimed at creating industrial employment and growing livelihood activities of the previously discriminated rural populations. Ironically, there is a paradox link between climate change, and socio-economic problems. To this oxymoron, efforts to control human induced climate change may prove to limit socio-economic transformation of the society on one hand and on the other hand, the direct indicators of climate change in the form of floods and drought may have adverse effects on the lives and livelihoods of the rural communities (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Redclift, 2005). Additionally, health-influence of vector-borne diseases, through heat waves, increased weather variability, and deterioration of local air quality and water shortage are found to be the most devastating impacts of climate change in rural areas (Redclift, 2005).

The underlying conflicts have always been that different national and international scientific bodies studying climate change and sustainable development have tended to focus only on its global environmental crisis without paying much attention on its social, cultural and political problems such as hunger, poverty and inequality (McGuigan et al., 2002). As a result, these narrow naturally-based formulation of the problem; there has been an unanswered question of how global environment change can reduced from a wide-ranging holistic perspective in an uneven political game of modern capitalist development with the western countries continuing to benefit at the cost of third world countries deprivation. The irony is that in order to move towards achieving climate change targets and has on-going economic growth; there should be a significant decoupling or delinking of greenhouse gas emissions from economic growth which is difficult to adopt particularly dealing with poor countries that are still struggling to provide their communities with socio-economic transformation and development needs. The reality is, even though social and environmental awareness have increased and there are many good examples of sustainable development at the small scale; the world has become dangerously more unsustainable over the past two decades (Robinson et al., 2006; Sneddona et al., 2006). The challenges of sustainable development and climate change may require a substantial rethinking of the

T.S. Madzivhandila



present economic development model, analogous to the transition economies underwent with the industrial revolution (Beg et al., 2002; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007). Like all transformative processes, this shift may alter and change the comparative advantages of nations, industries and communities. In other words, the feasibility of stabilising greenhouse gas concentration is dependent on general socio-economic development paths (Sneddona et al., 2006). Thus, climate policy responses should be fully placed in the larger context of technological and socio-economic policies of development rather than been viewed as an add-on to those broader policies.

The question is which policy intervention and on what level of governance can lead to a sustained economic growth while there is reduction of the carbon footprint? Can green capitalism or implementation of green economy/business reverse the impact of rapid industrialisation and market forces which has put the earth at the brink of climate calamity? Green capitalism is perceived as a set of responses to environmental challenges and environmentalism that relies on harnessing capital investment, individual choice, and entrepreneurial innovation to the green course (Heller & Shukla, 2003). According to Prudham (2009), green capitalism is only a possibility rather than a reality. Indeed, for some business interests and representatives of corporate business, sustainable development was a necessary further stage in the development of capitalism, to be embraced rather than denied. The reforms for improving governance and greening the economy are often opposed by important stakeholders both rich and poor who are negatively affected in the short term. There are glaring problems associated with green capitalism that are mash-up of environmentalism with capitalism (Heller & Shukla, 2003). One of these is the tethering of environmentalism to a political economy whose stance is growth for growth’s sake rather than making a contribution towards protecting the environment and growing livelihoods for the poor.

Successfully limiting global climate change to “safe” levels in the long-term is likely to require connecting climate change policies to economic and sustainable development strategies in both developing and industrialised countries (Robinson et al., 2006). This approach towards harmonisation of the three processes, limiting climate change, promoting economic and sustainable development should go beyond Kyoto Protocol agreements and understandings. In terms of treating climate stabilisation and economic development as separate and equal, there should be an adoption of strategy to re-integrate the two global policy goals input by separating responsibility and funding from action (Cohen et al., 1998; Desai & Potter, 2002). The aim should be to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentration with a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. From an economic perspective, there should be structural change in production patterns to do with a variety of causes including changing consumption patterns, responses to fuel price rises, energy and emissions efficiency gains facilitated through policy

99


interventions (Heller & Shukla, 2003). There is a need to go beyond thinking of unidirectional effects of climate change on economic and sustainable development. The relationship should be viewed as part of a complex system of interactions, ranging from concrete issues of technology choice and innovation, to question of institutional design and management, through to more abstract questions related to identity, agency, control and power (Robinson et al., 2006). Measures to promote sustainable development policies and to protect the climate systems against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Redclift, 2005; Sneddona et al., 2006). A successful solution to the climate problem will have to come from within the development process; hence it should begin, rather than end, with developing countries, and be based on a deep understanding of how development occurs in these countries (Sneddona et al., 2006). In other words, developing countries that adopt greenhouse gas friendly sector policies must ensure that these policies are not implemented at the costs of reduced economic development. For this to happened, the complexities of governance of climate change in developing countries need to be clearly understood.

COMPLEXITIES IN GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (WANTS) VS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (NEEDS)In search for a more inclusive view of sustainability, political rhetoric has often

replaced the discussion of environmental issues (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Redclift, 2005: Robinson et al., 2006; Sneddona et al., 2006; Prudham, 2009). Development and sustainability processes have been capitulated to the western hegemony towards the management and control of resources in the third world. Economic and political inequalities in access to opportunities have dramatically increased within and between most societies, making pragmatic governance toward social and environmental goals increasingly difficult (Redclift, 2005: Robinson et al., 2006). Thus, climate change is found to have been a major driving force behind accelerated vulnerability of the poor in the third world. While climate change is perhaps the best known aspect of current global challenge, it has also contributed to loss of biodiversity and changes in atmospheric composition. Redclift (2005) argue that, climate change is a reality and will affect the poor in developing countries in many ways. “Africa will suffer most from climate change, not only because its climate will be the worst affected, but because its underdevelopment will leave no room for coping” (Mkandawire, 2011:10). Thus, the avoidance of virtually every predicted disaster associated with climate change will require high levels of technological and social capability on behalf of the African continent. However, the most concerning aspects of the management of climate change is the

T.S. Madzivhandila



power relations between developed and developing countries. Most of developed countries continue to be stumbling blocks towards common agreements to curb and control the release of gas emissions, stating the interference of such actions to the progressive route towards sustainable economic growth. For example, United State of America which is estimated to emit 35% of greenhouse gas annually has persistently refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, developing countries are repetitively pressurised to adopt measures suitable for greening of their development process to avoid the consequences of climate change.

The social dimension of sustainability raises a number of important “fairness” issues in the context of climate change. On a per capita basis, greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries remain far below those of the developed countries well into the future (Adams, 2001; Beg et al., 2002; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007). The increase of disparities in wealth between developed and developing world and redistributive impacts are some of major reasons for concern about the climate change phenomena. Also, globalization has contributed to an increase in economic inequality and environmental deterioration by concentrating power in the hands of those who benefit from unsustainable forms of growth and resource use. For instance, ongoing negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have so far produced the Kyoto Protocol, a deeply flawed agreement that proved to be both economically inefficient and politically impractical (Beg et al., 2002). Since Kyoto agreement, there has been a less desire on the quest towards control of gas emissions. The challenges of greening the economy and having good environmental governance in place have several facets and require a series of changes that may not be easy to carry out in a current economic and political context. Furthermore, the failure to stem the tide of unsustainable human activities has always been linked to both ineffective institutions and a general lack of political will on the part of governments and citizens at multiples scales (Beg et al., 2002; Banuri & Opschoor, 2007).

There is a need for future agreements on mitigation and adaptation to recognise the diverse situations of developing countries with respect to their levels of economic development, their vulnerability to climate and their ability to adapt and mitigate (Robinson et al., 2006; Sneddona et al., 2006). Currently, the rate of economic growth is viewed as the pre-eminent policy goal for developing countries; thus, offering genuine hope of narrowing the gap between rich and poor countries (McGuigan et al., 2002). As such, a serious threat to this momentum could also constitute a threat on global stability and mutual trust. In fact, the economic growth of developing countries should increasingly be viewed as a global responsibility because it is the only mechanism that the world can use to address the vast inequality of income, wealth, and access to basic needs, human rights, and political participation (Swart et al,. 2003). So, McKibbin & Wilcoxen (2002) argue that any agreement that would call for a switch to less carbon intensive fuel sources should

101


adequately recognise economic losses that might be occasioned by such a switch. There could be significant trade-offs associated with deeper levels of mitigation in some countries. For example, where developing countries are dependent on indigenous coal and may be required to switch to cleaner yet more expensive fuels to limit emissions. For climate change to be dealt with in a sustainable manner support for developing countries should be in a form of direct aid, technology transfer and debt relief. This will help in the progress towards sustainable forms and levels of production and consumption. In the future, it would be necessary not only to induce adjustment in industrialised countries, but also to re-orientate the growth process in the developing world towards de-carbonisation.

MOVING TOWARDS AN AMICABLE PATH OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY It is clear that issues of global environmental justice are as important as they

were when the concept of ‘sustainable development’ was in its infancy (Swart et al., 2003). There should be rethinking of the power and economic relations between third world developing and first world developed countries. The current material realities of science and the environment in the 21st century demand a re-engagement with the social, political, cultural and economic consequences, something which has largely been ignored by the (market) liberal consensus (Heller & Shukla, 2003). The neo-liberal capitalist intentions of the western countries should be guard against if third world countries are to progress towards socio-economic transformation of their societies. Whereas, the quest towards limiting the impacts of climate change in the third world is necessary, policy adoption will require a distinct way of making decisions at the different levels to bring together economic, social and environmental objectives in a long-term common interest. If there are such close linkages between climate change and other environmental and socio-economic development needs both in the area of causes and impacts, it seems obvious that policies should take these into account (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Prudham, 2009). It is clear that climate policies will mostly impact development objectives in a negative way and that the first priority of developing countries policy makers is to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth. However, such will depend on the strategies, instrument, and context of the development policies adopted.

Climate change mitigation strategies should offer an opportunity to revisit development from a new perspective, for example on issues such as energy, forestry, agriculture, transportation and population (McGuigan et al., 2002; McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Heller & Shukla, 2003). Furthermore, the climate strategies should explicitly address the fundamental needs of developing countries if they are to be constructively and seriously engaged in common responsibilities for climate protection. For instance, the recently adopted green growth strategy in Southern Africa is aimed at helping policy makers keep ahead in the race between

T.S. Madzivhandila



complexity and ingenuity, scarcity and de-materialisation, industrialisation and de-carbonisation, entrepreneurial incentives and inequity (Prudham, 2009). Through this complex process climate change actions should consider a full cycle from socio-economic and technological driving forces, through emissions and concentration of greenhouse gases, physical change in the climate system, impacts on biological and human systems (Prudham, 2009). Technological advancement is essential in this regard. New and cleaner technologies can be utilised effectively by businesses, within a policy framework that is conducive to more sustainable practices at the same time stimulating economic growth without increasing pollution. Technology options to reduce greenhouse gas emission include efficiency improvement, renewable energy and nuclear power (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Heller & Shukla, 2003; Prudham, 2009). The monetary value of this intervention requires a huge investment from governments and international bodies responsible for climate change mitigation particularly in the third world countries.

CONCLUSION Sustainable development and climate change debate has created fragmentation

among and within groups, communities, countries, and international systems when actions designed to implement their proposed commitments prove to be highly controversial and largely ineffectual. The goals of achieving the integration of environment, development, and governance have been met with lot of stumbling blocks pertaining to the misunderstanding, mistrust and complexity of power relations between the rich and the poor. The call to recalibrate institutional mechanisms at global, national and local levels to promote economic development that would guarantee the security, wellbeing, and very survival of the planet is proving to be relevant but difficult. The links between climate change and economic and sustainable development remains sparse, unfocused, and fragmented. The result is that the development process is, at best, a back drop in the evolving climate debate. The solution to this problems lies on the commitment of both developed and developing countries. To create a mutual understanding on priority issues to be considered in order to facilitate sustainable socio-economic transformation particularly in third world. Lot of investment is required for technology that will stimulate economic growth and development while having less impact to the environment.

LIST OF REFERENCESAdams, W.M. 1990. Green Development: Environment and Sustainability in the Third

World. 1st end. London, RoutledgeAdams, W.M. 2001. Green Development: Environment and Sustainability in the Third

World. 2nd end. London, Routledge.Banuri, T. & Opschoor, H. 2007. Climate Change and Sustainable Development. New

York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social AffairsBeg, N., Morlot, J. C., Davidson, O., Afrane-Okesse, Y., Tyani, L., Denton, F., Sokona,

103

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationY., Thomas, J.P., La Rovere, E.L., Parikh, J.K., Parikh, K. & Rahman A.A. 2002. Linkage between climate change and sustainable development. Climate Policy, 2:129-144

Cohen, S., Demeritt, D., Robinson, J. & Rothmon, D. 1998. Climate change and sustainable development towards dialogue. Global Environmental Change, 8(4):341-371.

Desai, V. & Potter, R.B. 2002. The Companion to Development Studies. London: Arnold.

Heller, T.C. & Shukla, P.R. 2003. Development and Climate: Engaging Developing Countries. Arlington: Pew Centre on Global Climate Change.

McGuigan, C., Reynolds, R. & Wiedmer, D. 2002. Poverty and Climate Change: Assessing Impacts in Developing Countries and the Initiatives of the International Community. London: London School of Economics Consultancy Project for the Overseas Development Institute.

McKibbin, W.J. & Wilcoxen, P.J. 2002. The role of economics in climate change policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2):107-129.

Mkandawire, T. 2011. Running while others walk: knowledge and the challenge of Africa’s development. Africa Development, 6(2)1-36.

Prudham, S. 2009. Pimping climate change: Richard Branson, global warming, and the performance of green capitalism. Environment and Planning, 41:1594-1613.

Redclift, M. 2005. Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of age. Sustainable Development, 13:212–227.

Robinson, J., Bradley, M., Busby, P., Connor, D., Murray, A., Sampson, B. & Soper, W. 2006. Climate change and sustainable development: realizing the opportunities. Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 35(1):2-8.

Sneddona, C., Howarthb, R. B. & Norgaardc, R.B. 2006. Sustainable development in a post-Brundtland world. Ecological Economics, 57:253-268.

Swart, R., Robinson, J. & Cohen, S. 2003. Climate change and sustainable development: expanding the options. Climate Policy, 3:19-40.

T.S. Madzivhandila



IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (PMDS) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION

N.I. MakamuTshwane University of TechnologyD.M. MelloNorth-West University

ABSTRACT

Performance management and development system is central to effective and efficient public service delivery. To understand current challenges in performance management, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the

performance management system in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. The envisaged paper probes the challenges encountered during the implementation of the performance management and development system in the Department of Education (Gauteng North District). The method adopted for this study is both qualitative and quantitative. The Department comprised of 202 employees of whom more than 100 employees are Curriculum Staff members who do not form part of performance management and development system. A sample was drawn from the remaining public servants staff (office based) and 60 employees were selected to be part of the study. The questionnaires comprised of 19 questions including six demographic profile questions. The paper further presents findings and recommendations for overcoming challenges in the performance management and development system.

INTRODUCTIONPolicies, programs and projects need to be translated into tangible services and

products. The extent to which a public institution succeeds in satisfying needs of its clientele is dependent upon the acquisition of the best available employees in the market and most importantly the management of their performance in an open and objective manner. The study on which this paper is based asks a number of fundamental questions with regards to the implementation of performance management the Department of Education (Gauteng North District). What challenges are being encountered in the implementation of the performance management and development system? Is the staff satisfied with reward system and the manner in which the system had been is implemented? This paper starts by defining the phenomenon performance management and provides some insight

105


into its evolution. Furthermore, in an attempt to answer the questions above, the paper discusses challenges in the implementation of performance management system, the research methods adopted, analysis of data, interpretation of findings and recommendations for the improvement of the performance management and development system

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT DEFINEDGrobler, Warnich, Carrell, Elbert & Hatfield (2011:293), define performance

management as a process of evaluating how well employees performs their jobs when compared to a set of standards and then communicating that information to the employees, while Trevor & Andrian (2008.286) define performance management as an approach to managing people. They also state that it comprises of a set of principles used by managers to plan, direct and to improve the performance of employees in line with achieving the overall strategic objectives of the organisation. Furthermore, they also argued that it is a process that begins with translating the overall strategic objectives of the organisation into clear objectives for each individual employee.

Travaglion & Verena (2000:184) argue that performance management is difficult to define, unless one combines the three main perspectives or models of performance management. The above-mentioned authors quoted the following researchers as follows: Bredrup and Rogers (1995) who argued that performance management as a system, is to manage organisational performance; secondly, Torrington, Hall et al., 1995) who stated that performance management as a system is for managing employees performance and lastly, (McAfee, Champagne et al., 1993) who argued that performance management as a system is for intergrading the management of organisational and employees performance, within which the management of employee performance takes place within a framework of organisational goals.

Wayne et al., (1999:331) defines performance management as a process of ensuring that individual employees and teams know what is expected of them and that they stay focused on effective performance. This can be done by means of paying careful attention to the three elements which is goal, measure and assessment. Performance management can be described as a way in which employees in organisations are managed when the way in which they undertake their daily activities compared to the required standard of the organisation they serve. Performance can only be managed when there are set standards which one must be guided by or compared to when it comes to the way in which he/she must perform. Performance management is associated with some kind of goals which the organisation expects to achieve within a certain period.

N.I. Makamu & D.M. Mello



EVOLUTION OF THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMThe evolution of performance management across the globe is a bit sketchy.

In the field of Public Administration, attention was focused on documenting the evolution of the subject and its relations to subjects such as amongst others, politics. The consequence of this focus is that little has been documented on performance management in the South Africa Public Service and elsewhere in the world. Sou (2008:3) documents the origin of performance management in the teaching profession and traces it back to 1444 and 1700. During these ancient times, there already concerns regarding the quality of services provided by teachers hence they were held accountable for their services. Payment by results was introduced as far back as 560 years ago in Italy. Teacher salaries were based on the performance of their learners. The intention was noble. The quality of education had to be of a high standard. This system can be seen as the predecessor of the performance bonuses currently being offered to the best performing employees in the public service. The system of payment by results was adopted by a number of countries including United States of America, the UK. The system feel out of favour with the public sector in the 1920’s was subsequently abandoned. Sou (2008:8) believe that the system was mainly abandoned because teacher drove students to cram for formative and summative assessments.

Frederick Taylor’s scientific management theory cannot be ignored when the evolution of performance management is discussed. According to Lues (2014:166) Taylor believed that there is one best way of performing a task. In Lues’ words, “Taylor argued that any task could be divided into constituent units; that there is always a best practice (benchmarking) to achieve a task and that actions or processes that do not contribute to the product should be eliminated”. This was perhaps the best way of managing performance during the Taylors’ time. The idea was to make sure that employees perform at their peak. The downside of this approach was that employees were simple seen as factors of production. The humane side of performance management was ignored to the detriment of employees.

In South Africa, prior and after 1994, employee performance rewards were based on incidents. This implies that employees had to meticulously keep records of instances where they make a significant contribution to the employer’s goals. This could for instance be a number of days on which an employee has worked overtime or taken urgent work home for finalisation. The weakness of this system was that it was not linked to the training and development of employees hence it was replaced by the performance management and development system which places training and development at the heart of the current system. This brief narration of the evolution of the performance management system is by no means comprehensive hence the authors are of the view that a full paper needs to be devoted to the development of the performance management throughout the ages. Particular focus should be on South Africa.

107


CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PERFPRMANCE MANAGEMENTIvancevich (1998:263) writes that performance management can be affected if a

union is present in the organisation. Some unions support while others oppose the formal performance evaluation of the organisation. Some unions oppose the use of immeasurable, non-production-related factors in performance evaluation. These problems are evident mostly in public sector departments. Below are factors which result in challenges during the implementation of a performance management system in an organisation.

Use of technology Werner et al., (2009:292) states that technology is rapidly changing the ability

of the employer to measure where and what their employees say and do as well as the results they produce. On the other hand technology raises some concerns about issue of employee’s privacy and the use of employee information that employers are able to obtain as they monitor their employees. In the private sector managers can monitor their employees by voice recording and video recording. For example, all the calls are recorded at a call centre and the supervisor has the right to monitor any call any time as part of his functions. An employee spends much time unsupervised by their superiors. However, technology has made continuous supervision of an employee’s performance by means of a computer software (Wayne, 2003:350).

Performance management feedback and fear to accountWilliam et al., (1999:372) state that giving feedback is never easy. Individuals

do not want either to give or receive negative feedback. Therefore, constructive criticism may come across as an attempt to undermine one’s self esteem. It is evident in some organisations where inexperienced managers are afraid to account and do not allow anyone to rate him/herself below the average of five. The reason is that they do not want to account for such a score since evidence will need to be provided of such a rating. According to Beaumont (1993:83), feedback should avoid loaded terms, which produces emotional reaction and raises defenses; also it should refer to the relevant performance, behavior, or outcome but not to the individual as a person. While De Cenzo & Stephen (1994:382) state that if feedback, development and documentation are to function effectively, appraisal must have a performance system that is appropriate for their needs, a system that facilitates giving feedback and development information to the employees which permits employee input.

Linking compensation and rewards with performanceMeyer et al., (2006:205) states that linking compensation with performance is

the best way to motivate employees to perform at their level best. Unfortunately, the greater the advancement the greater the challenge. This tool has its own challenge associated with merit pay, which is that it increases the employee’s base




pay. Thereafter the employee receives the additional amount each year and they are placed on the payroll regardless of performance levels. Therefore, it is difficult to justify merit pay increases.

While Werner (2011:244) supports Meyer by stating that compensation comes into play as a way to attract, retain and reward top talent, so that they can achieve the crucial goal that can get them through the economic slump. Every company has three groups. The middle group which is the largest and gets the job done, are those who truly make a difference, and a small percentage at the bottom that are not getting the job done for a variety of reasons.

Measuring and evaluating performanceMeasuring and evaluating performance is one of the major challenges facing

the South African public sector. The supervisors and managers have a major problem when measuring and evaluating performance. The major reason is that most managers or leaders don’t have an understanding of what performance management entails. Consequently, it becomes difficult for them to evaluate performance which they are unsure off. Employees in the organisation have different job description which means that a manager can’t evaluate them because all their jobs are completely different.

Swanepoel et al., (2008:375) agree that measuring and evaluating performance has its own challenges, for instance, in system design issues, there is no single method or format of performance approaches that is not subject to a limitation, for example, the fact that there are so many different formats of varying complexity from which to choose is a direct result of trying to overcome deficiencies of previous conceived formats.

Rater’s problemJohn & Ivan (1998:284) write that during a performance management appraisal,

challenges arise even if the system is well designed. A problem can arise if the raters (usually supervisors) are not co-operative and well-trained. The supervisors may not be comfortable with the process of evaluation which often happens if they are inadequately trained or have not participated in the designing of the programme. Inadequate training of raters can lead to a series of problems in completing performance management evaluation. For example, a manager who is appointed towards the end of the year can create a challenge for both management and employees, because salary increases as usually announced before closure. The new appointee usually does not bother to undergo training so that they can familiarize themselves with the programme or what was the intention of designing such a programme.

Organisational fearAccording to Michael (2008:1-2), departments and agencies are apprehensive

about implementing the performance management system due to fear on how the

109


results will be interpreted, what it may indicate about the department’s performance, and/ or a lack of clarity of how it will affect the department and its employees

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGNQualitative and quantitative research methods were followed in the study.

Qualitative research is an umbrella phrase which covers an array of decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning of naturally occurring phenomena in the social world. On the other hand, quantitative research is an essential descriptive design which is used in investigations among individuals or groups within given community, group or organisations (Welman, et al., 2005:188 - 193). Primary and secondary data were collected for purpose of this study. The secondary data was collected from books, papers, publications, and case studies. The primary data was collected by means of using questionnaires.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDYThe Department comprises of 202 employees, of which 102 are public service

staff. The study was undertaken among the latter personnel. Of the 102 PS staff, a sample of 60 was selected. All the questionnaires were returned although some questions were unanswered. The following tables present the data collected during the study

Figure 1

The above result showed that out of a sample of 60 participants, males constituted 53.33% (32) and females 46.67% (28). This variable was used to cross check all the variables from questions 7- 25 to determine whether this variable had a significant relationship between the two values.




Figure 2

According to the above results, out of the sample of 60 respondents, single employees constituted 28.81% (17), divorced 5.08% (3), married 62.71% (37) and widows constituted 3.39% (2). According to the above results, married employees constituted a high percentage compared to other categories while the widows formed part of the least in the District.

Figure 3

The above results revealed that out of the sample of 60 respondents, junior employees constituted 19.30% (11), immediate 21.08% (12), senior employees 49.12% (28), management 8.77% (5) and others 1.75% (1)

111


Figure 4

The above results showed that during the research, no volunteers and interns participated on the research, only permanent and contract employees participated. The permanent employees constituted 91.67% (55) while contract employees constituted 8.33 % (5).

Figure 5

The above results showed that out of the sample of 60 participants, black employees constituted 95.00% (57), white 1.67%(1) and colored 3.33%(2). The results revealed that blacks form a large part of the district, however, race did not have an impact on the implementation of the PMDS in the Department. More information was provided during the cross tabulation of each variable with V1-V6 to determine its relationship.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationFigure 6

The above chart showed the age category and its classification. The sample size was 60 participants in the research study. Employees between the age of 25-34 constituted 27.59% (14), 35-44 constituted 24.14% (21), 45-54% constituted (10.34%), 55-65 constituted 10.34 %( 6) and lastly > 65 constituted 1.72% (1).

Figure 7

The above question was posed in order to determine whether the employees agreed or disagreed on whether the system had been implemented effectively in the district. The above results revealed that out of 60 participants, employees who strongly agreed with the statement constituted 40%, agree, 43.33%, disagree 13.33% and lastly, those who strongly disagreed with the above statement constituted 3.33%. In total 83.33% of the employees agreed that the system is implemented effectively, while 16.67% do not agree.

113


It is significant that the sample fully agree that the system is implemented effectively. However, the employees who feel that the system is implemented ineffectively can have a negative impact on the system itself. On the other hand the same employees can become affected or lose interest of the way in which the system functions.

Figure 8

The above results showed that out of 60 samples of employees who participated in the study, those who strongly agreed constituted 25.86%, agree 44.83%, disagree 20.69% and finally, those who strongly disagreed constituted 8.62%.

Figure 9

According to the above chart, out of the sample of 60 respondents (100%), those who strongly agreed with the above statement constituted 10.34%, 12.07%




agree, 46.55% disagree, 27.59% strongly disagree and lastly, those who selected do not know constituted 3.45%.

Figure 10

The above results showed that out of the sample of 60 respondents (100%), those who strongly agree with the above statement constituted 41.67%, agree 43.33%, disagree 6.67% and lastly, those who strongly disagree constituted 8.33%.

Figure 11

The above result showed that out of the sample of 60 respondents (100%), those who strongly agree constituted 61.67%, agree 28.33%, disagree 1.67% while those who do not know constituted 8.33%.

115


According to the above results, out of the sample of 60 respondents (100%), those who strongly agree constituted 70%, agree 28.33% and those who strongly disagree constituted 1.67%

Figure 13

The above results revealed that out of the sample of 60 respondents (100%), those who strongly agree with the above statement constituted 33.33%, agree 30%, disagree 28.33%, strongly disagree 6.67% and lastly, those who selected do not know, constituted 1.67%.




The above results showed that out of a sample of 60 respondents (100%), those who strongly agree with the above statement constituted 28.81%, agree 52.54%, disagree 16.95% while those who selected do not know constituted 1.69%.

Figure 15

According to the above chart, out of the sample of 60 (100%) respondents, those who strongly agree constituted 20%, agree 33.33%, disagree 30%, strongly agree 15% and lastly, those who said they do not know, constituted 1.67%.

117


The above results showed that out of the sample of 60 (100%) respondents, 25.42% selected strongly agree, 28.81 agree, 23.73 disagree, 20.34% strongly disagree and those who selected do not know constituted 1.69%.

Figure 17

The above results showed that out of the sample of 60 respondents, 43.10% selected strongly disagree, 44.83 agreed, 6.90% disagreed while those who strongly disagreed constituted 5.17%.




The above results showed that out of the sample of 60 respondents, those who said they do not know constituted 5%, strongly disagree 11.67%, disagree 26.67%, agree 31.67% while those who strongly agree constituted 25%.

Figure 19

According to the above chart, out of the sample of 60 respondents, those who selected strongly agree constituted 44.07%, agree 52.54%, and while strongly disagree constituted 3.39%.

119


Figure 21

The above question was asked to determine whether the staff perceived any challenges in the monitoring and evaluation system in the District. The results showed that out of the sample of 60 respondents, 73.33% of employees selected stated Yes, while 26.67% No. A high percentage of the employees in the Department claimed that there were no challenges in the implementation of the system. On the other hand, 26.67% of the employees claimed that they faced challenges with the manner in which the managers and supervisors measured and evaluated their performance.




According to the above chart, the results showed that out of the sample of 60 respondents, 60% constituted No while 40% Yes. This question was asked to determine whether the employees were satisfied with the reward system put in place in the Department. It is known that employees expect a reward for any service they provide, even if the reward is not in the monetary form, for example, allowing such employees to be part of the strategic meeting with management at a fully paid for lunch depending on the rank and reasons why a manager wants to motivate such an employee.

Figure 23

The above result showed that out of sample of 60 respondents, those who answered yes, constituted 76.67% and those who answered no, constituted 23.33%. The majority of the employees claimed that the system helped and made provision for remedial action against non performers. Variable 23 was cross checked with the demographic profile to determine whether this demographic profile had a relationship with the manner in which the employees viewed the system in question. Below are the results of the cross tabulation of variables.

121


The above result revealed that out of the sample of 60 respondents, the employees who responded Yes, constituted 70.69%, while those who responded No, constituted 29.31%. The majority of the employees agreed that they were involved in the development of their performance plan, while almost 30% of staff claimed that they were not involved. This question was posed in order to determine whether the supervisors and managers involved communicated with their employees about their performance plans and the way in which the employees primed during their term of employment.

Figure 25

On rating the effectiveness of the system in the Department, all points were categorized into three phases which were between 0-4 which constituted 20.37%,

R.K. Manyaka



secondly 5-7 constituted 46.30% and lastly 8-10 constituted 33.33%. The results were classified in these phases to simplify the interpretation of data provided by the respondents. The above chart results revealed that employees in the District believe that the system is effective, although 20.37% deem the system is ineffective.

The majority of the respondent’s claimed that the system was effective but more adjustment needed to be done. The employees admitted that the system was in place but the challenge remained in the implementation phase. Based on the additional information which the respondents provided, the employees claimed that the supervisors and managers did not fully understand how the system should be implemented. This posed a negative impact on its effectiveness. The managers and supervisors still have a responsibility to ensure that they incorporate the 20.37% of the employees and help them understand how the PM system works. Management and employees must communicate in order to create a common understanding of the functions of the system. According to the data provided, 20,37% of the employees who believed that the system was ineffective, were probably those who worked with the supervisors who did not fully understand the way in which the system functioned. There could be many other reasons which led the employees to believe that the system was ineffective. One reason could have been that that employee’s did not understand the purpose of the system. Secondly, the manner in which the managers explained the role of the system could be questioned. For example, an employee who has a problem in operating the PERSAL system, one may find that even after they have requested training during contracting phase no training is provided.

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGSThe findings were discussed and interpreted from the results which were

generated from the research questions. All the research questions from 7-25 were cross-tabulated with the demographic profile of each respondent in order to determine whether such variable has a significant association with the posed question. Full details were provided in chapter four under each question.

How can PMDS be implemented effectively and overcome its chal-lenges?Questions seven and fifteen of the questionnaire attempted to determine what

the employees thought of the above statement in their Department. With reference to the analysed data after the cross tabulation with the demographic profile, the results revealed that 83.33% of the employees accepted that the system had been implemented effectively while 16.66 % of the respondents disagree. The additional information provided by the respondents revealed that for PMDS to be implemented effectively, the managers and supervisors must fully adhere with the implementation of all the stages which need to be followed. With reference to the responses to question number 15, more than 50% of the employees agree that

123


PMDS is a supervisor’s responsibility, which clearly showed that the employees do not know how the system works and that training which they claim was administered, did not have an effect on the way in which the employees viewed the system. Although the employees claimed that the system is in place, they further argued that there is still a challenge associated with its implementation.

Why must the performance management and development system be implemented and which strategies must be used?Some of the objectives of the PMDS are to identify future potential and reward

high performers and take remedial action where poor performance is identified. 29.31% of the employees in disagree that the system in the Department addresses the issue of rewarding high performers, identify future potential and also implement remedial action for poor performers. However, more than 70% of the employees agree that the system addresses issues identified in question 8 and 14. It can be concluded that PMDS is implemented for the right reasons in the Department although there are employees who need to be brought explained how and which strategies are used in the Department to implement the system.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the performance man-agement and development system?Employees in the Department stated that it is true that there are advantages and

disadvantages of the system. Employees stated that adhering to the system was a disadvantage due to lack of training while on the other hand, they agree that the advantage of the system is that it identifies future potential, poor performers and remedial action can be taken to assist them improve the way in which carry out their functions. One major advantage of the system is that it helps identify training needs. These results were derived from the percentage of scores rated by the respondents. All the scores rated more than 70% represent that the study is reliable and the majority agree with the statement.

How are staff consulted and communicated to with regard to the implementation of the performance management and development system? Three questionnaires were cross checked with the demographic profile of all

the respondents in order to determine whether the demographic profile of the employee has significant association with the way in which an employee perceived the above question. 80% of the employees strongly agree that managers, supervisors and employees must work together in order to achieve the PMDS goals.

Question number 22 attempted to determine whether the employees are satisfied with the reward system. Although the employees agree that they must work hand in hand with managers on how the PMDS must be implemented, 60% of the employees revealed that they are not satisfied by the reward system used in the Department. Question 24 attempted to determine whether managers and supervisors communicate and consult employees about the implementation of




the system. The majority claimed that managers and supervisors do consult and communicate with them during the contracting phase. Although they agree in the initial phase of the cycle, the managers and supervisors do not fulfil what they had agreed on as time proceeds, for example, providing training in the areas which need development.

What activities are planned to correct any weak points of the PMDS? The respondents were asked to provide any additional information about the

way in which they viewed the PMDS. The research intended to determine what initiatives the managers and supervisors have to address weak points which may arise from the system although all the employees were allowed to give their views. The respondents stated that there are no weak points in the system, but the challenge was the incumbents who are involved in the implementation of the system. It was further claimed that those responsible for the implementation of the system needed to improve the way in which they conducted the processes. Furthermore, they also stated that although the system makes provision to address all their challenges, their leaders are not following the procedures when implementing the system.

How is the performance management development system organized in the institution?The question on whether PMDS caters for employees at a lower level and

whether there is any support from management, the majority of the respondents agreed that the performance management system was organized suitably in the Department. The results were interpreted in the form of testing whether the system in the Department addressed its goals and objectives. There was a high positive response to the question which indicated that the system is organized properly. Question 25 attempted to determine how many points does the employee rate the effectiveness of the system in the Department. Those who rated the system from 5-10 constituted 79.63% which indicated that the results are reliable. It can be concluded that the system is in place, although certain employees disagree with the statement.

Whose performance should be evaluated and who must undertake the evaluation? All On the measuring and evaluating staff performance, 73.33% claimed

that they still face challenges in the way in which performance is evaluated and measured, although some employees clearly stipulated that they understand that every employee between salary levels 1-12 in their district is evaluated and measured based on their performance using the PMDS. It was further revealed that they understand that each employee is supposed to be evaluated by the supervisors or manager. Even though they had stipulated that they understand whose performance should be evaluated and who must evaluate it, the results indicated that the majority in the Department agree that they face a great challenge with the manner in which performance is evaluated in the Department.

125


RECOMMENDATIONSIt is recommended that:• Proper training and induction of all employees at the beginning of each

cycle must be undertaken annually. This will help new and other employees who don’t fully understand the goal and objective of the system so that they can to be familiarized with it.

• Supervisor and manager must collectively agree on the strategy to use when implementing the system in the Department. This can help eliminate concerns which employees have due them being rated or treated differently by the supervisors per sub-directorate.

• Supervisors and employees must collectively agree on the rewards system which will be applicable to each employee during the cycle based on the performance of such employee. Rewards system such as permitting employee to attend strategic meetings with management or a fully paid luncheon must be made a standard reward in the entire directorate if the managers choose to adopt such.

• All types of rewards must be aligned to the performance management and development system policy in the institution.

• Employees should familiarize themselves with the performance management and development system policy and its requirements, so that they can question their supervisors if they are dissatisfied the way in which their manager had evaluated their performance.

• All training needs identified during the quarterly review must be addressed timeously in order to help employees improve their performance.

• Managers and supervisors must collectively agree on the way in which they consult and communicate with their employees regarding their performance in order to build a common understanding between them.

• Change agents must be utilized to encourage and counsel all employees who perform below the expected level.

• Accountability by managers and employees must be established in the Department and ethical consideration must be followed in order to ensure that the goal and objective of the system is achieved. This could reduce the number of leaders who don’t follow standard procedure when implementing the system in their respective departments.

• Standard procedure of evaluating and measuring the performance of employees according to the performance management and development system policy must be followed correctly by both the manager and supervisors in order to eliminate all grievances which may arise due to errors during the evaluating and measuring the of employee’s performance.

• It is recommended that further research be conducted that will expand on the existing body of knowledge and also address future challenges which can arise because of the current system in the Department.




CONCLUSIONThe study adopted a case study approach and tapped into the qualitative and

quantitative methods. It is important to note that a case study approach has limitation in terms of its implementation. The challenges experienced in the Department of education within the Northern region in Gauteng will not necessarily be the same in other departments. It can therefore be argued that while the study provides a glimpse of what is happening in the public service, the recommendations are specifically for the Department of Education. Studies of this nature need to be conducted in a sample of South African national departments for conclusions to be generalised across the South African Public Service.

LIST OF REFERENCESBeaumont, P.B. (1993) Human Resource Management: key concepts and skills: Britain;De Cenzo, DA and Robbins S.P. (1994) Human Resource Management: concepts and

practices: United State of America: 4th edition; pg 382Ivancevich J.M. (1998): Humana resource Management: 7th edition: p. 263Lues. L. 2014. Career management. in Mello, D.M. ed. Managing human capital in the

public Sector. Pretoria: van Schaik Publishers: 163-178.Meyer, M. & Botha E. (2000), Organisational Development and Transformation in

South Africa. Durban: Butterworth’s.Marius Meyer, et al (2007), Managing Human Resource Development: An outcome

based approach: 3rd edition. South Africa.Schuler, W.S. & Jackson S. (2009) Human Resource Management: (11th ed).Schuler, W.R. & Jackson S.E. (2012), Human Resource Management: 11th international

edition. Canada.Sou, G. 2008. Historical review of program evaluation for educational quality

assurance. Available at: http://www.paper.edu.cn. accessed on 13/02/2014.Werner, S., Schuler RS & Jackson SE (2012), Human Resource Management: 11th

international edition, Canada: pg 303-305Swanepoel B, Erasmus B, & Schenk H (2008) South African Human Resource

Management. 4th Edition. Cape Town. South Africa. : 375Welman, Kruger & Mitchell (2005) Research methodology (3rd):Cape Town: Oxford SA. Schuler, W.S. & Jackson S. (2009) Human Resource Management: (11th ed).

127


COLLECTION OF MUNICIPAL OWN REVENUE IN SOUTH AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

R.K. ManyakaDepartment of Public Administration


ABSTRACT

Collection of own revenue in municipalities is a legislative requirement. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) emphatically states that municipalities need to have access to adequate sources of revenue in order

to enable them to undertake the functional responsibilities assigned to them. In terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act, Act 56 of 2003, the municipal manager, as the accounting officer of the municipality, is mandated with the responsibility to manage the revenue of the municipality. In executing this function the accounting officer is among other things expected to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the municipality has an effective revenue collection system. Collection of own revenue is a critical determinant of the financial viability of municipalities. That is, the abilities of municipalities to collect revenue from own sources is, often times than not, highlighted as an important determinant of the financial viabilities of such municipalities. However, it is worth noting that despite this essential policy pronouncement, most municipalities, particularly those in predominantly rural settings, still struggle to generate their own revenue. This creates vertical imbalances between the functional responsibilities of these municipalities and the financial resources required to finance such responsibilities. It is primarily because of this consideration that service delivery backlogs continue unabated. The paper argues that the major financial problem confronting municipality in South Africa can be attributed to poor collection of own revenue, which undermine their financial viability. The paper concludes by arguing that unless and until there is a meaningful and adequate investment into the local economies of the municipalities that are predominantly rural, it would be difficult to enhance their financial viability through effective collection of own revenue.

INTRODUCTIONMost contemporary states have multiple levels of government to provide

services to their diverse communities (Thornhill, 2009: 671). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, makes provision for the three spheres of government namely national, provincial

R.K. Manyaka



and local government. The local sphere of government is given significant developmental responsibilities. Bekink (2005) argues that within the new system of local government that was ushered in by the democratic dispensation in the year 2000, municipalities have been afforded various ways of enhancing local revenue sources. However, it should be acknowledged that most municipalities in South Africa are facing numerous challenges relating financial management. These include but not restricted to service delivery failures stemming from the huge backlogs, inadequate collection of own revenue, poor financial management systems and lack of skilled personnel (Monkam, 2011). As the result of these shortcomings, they find it difficult to provide their communities with adequate, efficient and sustainable services. Bekink (2005:432) further acknowledges that “the success of the new local government system is dependent largely on the availability of resources and more so, financial resources”. It is because of this consideration therefore that the capacities and abilities of the municipalities to raise own revenue becomes essentially critical if the provision of municipal services is to be sustained. For this to happen, the municipality needs to have adequate access to sources of revenue. To realise this end, various legislation and policies have been promulgated and adopted to provide for guidelines and principles of collecting own revenue thereby ensuring sustainability of municipalities in South Africa. To this end, it can be argued that municipalities are empowered in terms of section 229 of the Constitution to impose taxes and rates on properties and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) emphatically states that municipalities need to have access to adequate sources of revenue in order to enable them to undertake the functional responsibilities assigned to them in terms of the constitution. In terms of section 96 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) municipalities, whether rural or urban, must collect all monies that are due to it subject to the provisions of the Municipal Systems Act and any other applicable legislation. The Act further states that municipalities must adopt maintain and implement credit control and debt collection policies that would enable effective collection of own revenue. It is within that context that the collection of own revenue in municipalities becomes a legislative requirement. Hence, the Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review (2008:22-23) emphatically stated that municipalities should largely be self-serving. That is, “the bulk of municipal revenue should be raised from own sources such as property and other local taxes as well as from user or service charges” (Kanyane, 2011: 937). This is considered by Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review (2008:22-23) as one of the salient “features of any democratic local government system”. Such a system seeks to secure the responsiveness to the needs of the residents by municipalities whilst at the same time encouraging residents of a municipality to take responsibility for payment of municipal services. However, despite these essential policy pronouncements most municipalities, particularly those in predominantly rural settings, still struggle to generate their

129


own revenue. Whereas the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 87) points out to the fact that “on average, municipalities have sufficient revenue raising powers to fund the bulk and finance about 90% of their recurrent expenditure out of own revenue”, it should be noted that some rural municipalities are disadvantaged by little or no revenue base. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a critical analysis of the issues and challenges associated with the collection of own revenue in South Africa. It commences by examining the legislative and policy framework that undergirds the collection of own revenue in municipalities. This is followed by the comprehensive discussion of the various sources of own revenue as well as the challenges that municipalities face with regards to collection of own revenue implications of own revenue collection or lack thereof on the financial viability of municipalities in South Africa.

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE COLLECTION OF OWN REVENUE IN SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPALITIESThe policy framework for municipal finance in South Africa consists of

legislation and policy documents that contain government’s intentions with regards to financial management and administration in municipalities. The ensuing discussion provides a thorough analysis of these legislative and policy frameworks regulating municipal finance in regard to sources of municipal revenues. These legislation and policies include, although not restricted to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003; Municipal Property Rates Act, 6 of 2004.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)The South African government determines financial policies which are directed

at specific goals and which are aimed at promoting the general welfare of the society. In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), municipalities are obliged to firstly structure and manage their administration and their budgetary and planning process so as to prioritise the basic needs of the community and to promote socio-economic development of their local communities. Secondly, to participate in national and provincial development programmes (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Section 195(1) of the Constitution provides that the “public administration and management in all the three spheres of government should be efficient and effective regarding the use of resources, economically viable and demand a high level of accountability”. This indicates that the Constitution requires a responsible way of collecting and spending public money. According to Khalo (2007:191) the constitution deals briefly and specifically with the following:-

• Provincial supervision of local government: Section139 (1)• Principles of municipal financial management and administration:

Section195 (1)• Municipality’s share of revenue raised nationally: Section 214 and 227

R.K. Manyaka



• Municipal budget, revenue and expenditure: Section 160 (2), 215and 229• The role of the National treasury in controlling municipal finances: Section

216• Municipal loans and guarantees: Section 218 and 230Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) is a component of the

legislative reforms and transformation framework (Khalo, 2007: 192). The MFMA provides a foundation for an orderly and sound financial management principles and practices in the local sphere of government. It lays down the norms and standards for financial management in the local sphere of government. The general purpose of the MFMA relates to the following:-

• To regulate municipal financial management• To set requirements for the efficient and effective management of the

revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of municipalities and municipal entities

• To define responsibilities with regards to municipal financial management• To determine financial management governance framework for municipal

entities and• To put in place a municipal borrowing framework.Municipal Property Rates Act, 6 of 2004According to Bekink (2005: 439) the constitution entitles municipalities to

impose rates on property in their own areas, subject to a regulation in terms of a national legislation. Municipalities are expected to be developmentally orientated, and must address service delivery priorities as well as to promote economic and financial viability. Local government needs adequate access to sufficient sources of revenue. Property rates have been identified as one of the critical sources of revenue for municipalities in South Africa to achieve their constitutional obligations. In order to ensure the uniformity and simplicity of property rates collection, the South African government has promulgated the Municipal Property Rates Act. The following are the main objectives of the act:-

• To regulate the power of municipalities to impose rates on properties.• To exclude certain properties from rating• To make provision for municipalities to implement a transparent and a fair

system of exemptions, reductions, and rebates through Municiapl rating policies.

• To make provision for a fair and equitable valuation methods of property• To make provision for objections and appeals.

SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR MUNICIPALITIES IN SOUTH AFRICAThe main thrust of this paper is that the major financial problem facing many

131


rural municipalities can be attributed to poor collection of revenue or lack of revenue base thereof. It is critical to note that without appropriate financial capacity most municipalities will not be able to sustain the provision of services to their various communities. The capacities and abilities of the municipalities to raise own revenue therefore becomes essentially critical if the provision of municipal services is to be sustained. Sources of revenue in a municipality are just as important as proper financial management and control. That is, the optimisation of collection of revenue should be given a considerable attention in municipalities in the same way that financial management does. In fact, the revenue management constitutes a critical component of financial management. To this end, it is important sources of revenue for municipalities be identified and comprehensively discussed. According to Schoeman (2011), the main sources of revenue for municipalities in South Africa comprises of property rates or tax and service or user charges on the distribution of services such as electricity, water, sewage and sanitation as well as waste removal. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) categorises sources of revenue for municipalities into two main categories namely: - own revenue and intergovernmental transfers. These types of revenue are discussed below.

Own revenueMunicipalities in South Africa are empowered in terms of section 229 of

the Constitution to impose taxes and rates on properties and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality (Local Government Expenditure Review 2011). All this constitutes the sources of own revenue for municipalities. To this end, own revenue can therefore be defined as the collection of revenue by a municipality or any of its entities from local sources. According to the Local Government Expenditure Review (2008), municipalities are expected to be largely self-financing. This means that the bulk of their financial resources are raised from own revenue sources such as local property taxes and service or user charges. The property tax, which refers to tax which owners of building properties within the jurisdiction of a municipal area pay based on the value of their properties, constitutes a major source of revenue for municipalities in South Africa. This view is supported by Fjeldstad & Heggstad (2012) who argue that there are very few fiscally significant taxes that are more appropriate to local government than property tax. The amount of rates payable on a property is determined by the value of the assessed property. Property tax is commonly levied on real properties that are visible and immovable mostly in urban or semi-urban areas. That is to say properties in most rural municipalities are not taxed in spite of the fact that there have been significant efforts to extent the implementation of property in rural areas through the promulgation of the property rates act. The application of the property tax in South African municipalities has however demonstrated that urban and semi-urban municipalities have an upper hand or advantage over their local counterparts in as far as collection of property rates is concerned. This can be attributed to the fact that people living in urban and semi-urban municipalities

R.K. Manyaka



are better off compared to those in rural areas (Manyaka & Madzivhandila, 2013).The other type of own revenue source for municipalities in South Africa is user

or service charges. There is a growing recognition that property tax alone is not sufficient to match the demand and supply of public services and as a result there is a need to explore cost-recovery charging systems to complement property tax. User or service charges can be defined as a direct amount paid directly to the service received. Collection of own revenue is embedded fundamentally on the neo-liberal principle of cost-recovery, the emphasis of which is to recover the part or the full costs of providing services. Charges levied on for trading services, including but not restricted to water, electricity, sewage and waste removal constitute a major source of revenue that could be raised from user charges in most-urban municipalities in South Africa (Shoeman, 2011; Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012). Whereas Fjeldstad & Heggstad (2012: 20) argues that “the main economic rationale for user charges is not to produce revenue but to encourage the economic use of resources”, it is worth noting that this principle is not only crucial for ensuring that municipalities are directly accountable to local communities for the functions they perform and services they provide, it also entrenches local democracy as it has got the potential to empower residents to play an important role in deciding on the services they prefer and willing to pay for and thus ensuring that municipalities remain responsive to the needs of their residents (Republic of South Africa, 2008). The local government fiscal framework is deliberately designed to raise municipalities’ level of accountability to residents. The fact that most municipalities receive the majority of their revenue from service charges and property rates means that they need to ensure that:

• Residents receive the trading services (so that the municipality can earn income off them)

• The general level of municipal services is adequate to maintain property values (so as to maintain the municipality’s rates base)

• Residents are generally satisfied with the municipalities’ services (so that they are willing to continue paying their rates and service charges).

This revenue-service link means that there is potential for a strong alignment between the municipality’s revenue interests and the service delivery interests of residents that pay rates and service charges (Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2011). According to Schoeman (2011), on average, local governments collect only a relatively small portion of revenue from own sources. It is not surprising therefore that most rural municipalities rely heavily on the intergovernmental transfers as revenue for municipalities.

Intergovernmental transfersIntergovernmental transfers refer to a type of revenue that is raised nationally.

The equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and local spheres of government is a principle embedded in South Africa’s

133


Constitution. Municipalities are entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised by the national sphere of government. Intergovernmental transfers forms an important instrument of fiscal decentralisation in that it intended to enable municipalities to provide basic services and perform functions allocated to it in a sustainable manner. Intergovernmental transfers, which are dispensed in a form of conditional and unconditional grants (Kahn et al., 2011), generally constitute a large and an important source of revenue for most, if not all, municipalities in South Africa. According to the Republic of South Africa (2008: 51), this system of transfers is intended to assist municipalities in combating poverty and strengthening their own capacity to provide services. The African National Congress (ANC) (2012: 15) points out to the fact that municipalities in South Africa differ from each other in a number of ways. Such differences can be expressed in terms of the size and structure of population, poverty levels, backlogs in basic services, economic development, employment, land ownership patterns, spatial characteristics and a host of other factors (ANC, 2012). The combination of all these factors have a large impact not only on the scope and types of services that will be required to be performed but also on the financial viability of most rural municipalities. For example, the Financial Fiscal Commission (2005: 45) argues that “the fiscal health of municipalities in South Africa varies tremendously” in South Africa. Whereas some municipalities are in strong fiscal health, still others have large expenditure needs and very little capacity for raising own revenues. This contributes to a situation wherein municipalities are largely dependent on intergovernmental transfers as a source of revenue.

The ANC (2012:15) acknowledged that a significant number of municipalities in South Africa “are still in deep distress and thus characterised by poor service delivery levels”. This is consistent with the observation by Kahn et al. (2011: 98) who argue that the “municipal dependence on grants [and other intergovernmental transfers] as a source of revenue has risen dramatically” in South Africa. This created what CoGTA (2009) and Kanyane (2011:935) call a “dependency syndrome”. The term “dependency syndrome” is used to describe a situation wherein municipalities are not financially self-sufficient and thus survive on national bail-outs in the form of intergovernmental transfers. This has got the potential of not only exacerbating the gap between the revenue and expenditure needs of rural municipalities; but it also has the potential to compromise the accountability of municipalities to their local citizens. There is a consensus in Public Administration discourse that one of the problematic issues confronting municipalities is lack financial viability of rural municipalities in South Africa (Kanyane, 2011; ANC, 2012). Although it is generally accepted that most municipalities are financially weak, it is however worth noting that “over-dependence on revenue that is raised nationally have got serious impact on the autonomy of municipalities” (McCluskey and Franzsen, 2006: 21). It is for this reason that municipalities should put more emphasis on exploring own revenue sources. It is worth noting however that the collection of own revenue in

R.K. Manyaka



South African municipalities, particularly rural based municipalities is convoluted by a number of challenges. These challenges are briefly discussed in the section that follows.

CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE COLLECTION OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE IN SOUTH AFRICARural based municipalities essentially face numerous challenges in terms of

collecting own revenue required to enhance their ability as self-sustainable units. It is essentially because of this consideration that the financial environment in municipalities in South Africa is a highly problematic area. It is fraught with interrelated set of challenges such as lack of revenue base; lack of capacity; inability to pay and culture of non-payment; lack of commitment; poor delivery of services; poor planning as well as inadequate support from other spheres of government, especially provinces.

It has been indicated in the previous sections that one of the challenges facing municipalities in South Africa, particularly those which are predominantly rural, is the question of little or no revenue base. That is, in most municipalities, there is a lack of adequate tax base due to the number of poor households and unemployment levels. The most areas which have a very limited economic base are predominantly found within the former homelands where unemployment, poor infrastructure and lack of sector diversity have historical roots (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2003; Manyaka & Madzivhandila, 2013). This can be attributed to the fact that according to SALGA (2010), the apartheid government was characterised by a strong focus on central planning and control with little role for local authorities in economic planning and development. This was done with the prime purpose of ensuring that national resources are channelled specifically to white communities. In fact, numerous legislation and policies were promulgated with the purpose of discouraging investments into the local economies of local authorities that were predominantly occupied by Black and to a certain extent Coloureds and Indian communities (Manyaka and Madzivhandila, 2013). However, the new democratic system that was introduced in the year 2000 brought about the significant changes in the manner in which municipalities operate. For example, municipalities are expected to be developmentally orientated with a specific focus on addressing service delivery issues and priorities while at the same time promoting local economic development; which it is envisaged that it has the potential to enlarge the revenue base of municipalities that have been struggling to generate own revenue. In addition, democratic dispensation of local government has allowed for the integration of formerly and predominantly White, Black, Indian and Indian communities as a way of eradicating institutional arrangements of the apartheid government. It is worth noting that in spite of these considerations, the collection of own revenue, as critical determinant of financial viability, remains one of the fundamental problems facing rural municipalities in South Africa. That is, most

135


municipalities especially those in predominantly rural settings, are unable to collect revenue from local sources as a result of lack of revenue base. It is with this context that

Thornhill (2012) argues that one of the fundamental challenges facing municipalities is the consideration that they are required to render services through finances generated from local sources of revenue. However, municipalities that are rural-based do not have a sufficient access to own revenue. The inadequate availability of financial resources effectively and directly complicates the achievement of the developmental goals of local government because some of these municipalities have to strive to achieve their development goals with “limited resources and with a policy of the provision of free basic services to the indigent” (Thornhill, 2012: 323). The majority of households in rural municipalities are poor and therefore cannot afford to pay for municipal services. These households are classified as “indigent” implying that they are exempted from paying any form of municipal services. This also means that municipalities have to bear the costs associated with the provision of those services with little or no prospects of recovering those costs. The national government unfortunately does not factor in this consideration when making national allocations through a process of intergovernmental transfers. All these point out to the fact that there is a lack of revenue base in most rural municipalities in South Africa. The implication of this apparent weak revenue base is that these municipalities simply cannot leverage the funds they need for even moderate municipal functionality (CoGTA, 2009).

One of the fundamental problems confronting most municipalities in South Africa is the question of capacity constraints (Kahn et al., 2011; Manyaka & Madzivhandila, 2013). This point is emphasised by Schoeman (2006:111) who succinctly argues that “in many instances, municipalities lack capacity both in terms of skills and finances”. This is evident in that most municipalities are showing a poor ability to accurately plan and spend their budgets. This problem is articulated by Kahn et al (2011) who argue that there seem to be a problem of urban bias which is manifested in the fact local government tend to be more successful in and around major urban centres while most rural municipalities remain largely underfunded and lacking in requisite skills and expertise required to carry out most of the developmental duties. A worrying trend was identified in Limpopo province which might be indicative of a lack of capacity to adequately plan (budget), particularly the projection or estimation of revenue (CoGTA, 2009). This has got a direct bearing on the ability of the municipalities to optimise the collection of own revenue.

The other challenge the municipalities continue to grapple with in as far as collection of revenue is concerned is the issue of inability of community members to pay for municipal services and the general culture of non-payment of municipal services. Service charges being the main source of revenue to municipalities, challenges experienced with enforcing debt collection and an increase in the aged

R.K. Manyaka



debts (i.e. outstanding debts of more than 90 days), as well as a high level of indigents and the culture of non-payment impact hugely on the ability of municipalities to collect own revenue. This could be attributed to a host of many issues including although not restricted inability to pay, collection and billing methods. The latter is understandable because it could assist households to economise on the use of services such as water and electricity in an effort to control expenses thereof. However, most municipalities in South Africa still do not prefer to use pre-paid systems especially with water and particularly electricity.

For most rural municipalities, there is a limited amount of income that could be generated essentially because the bulk of the electricity is supplied by Eskom on prepaid basis (Gibson, 2004). Most municipalities in predominantly rural areas are not water service authorities and neither do they have licenses and capacity to provide citizens directly with water and electricity. However, it must be noted that in most urban and semi urban municipalities, such services are directly provided by the municipality or its entities. This arrangement further indicates that in as far as collection of own revenue is concerned, urban and semi-urban municipalities will always have an upper hand to their counterparts in rural areas. This is understandable because most rural municipalities have high levels of indigent’s people. Indigent households are those that are exempted from paying municipal taxes and levies as a result of their significant poverty and unemployment levels. Such people are, in terms of local government’s free basic service policy, supposed to receive government services for free without any expectation that they should pay for municipal services. According to Kahn et al (2011: 127), “the culture of non-payment for services, which started during the apartheid days as a way of making the country ungovernable, is still entrenched in the psyche of many South Africans even when they can afford to pay”. In addition, many local municipalities are reporting losses (both water and electricity) due to illegal connections. This renders the majority of local municipalities financially not viable and unable to upgrade and maintain infrastructure (CoGTA, 2009: 59-60).

Developmental local government system was aimed at achieving an integrated planning in South African municipalities. Political tensions coupled with political instability has rendered many municipalities unable to invite private sector in the IDP formulation processes and thus both foreign and domestic investors have been unable to identify investment opportunities (CoGTA, 2009: 61). The other challenge that municipalities are confronted with in as far as collection of own revenue is concerned, is the question of poor planning, which result in poor delivery of services. This should be understood against the background that one of the guiding principles for own revenue collection is the benefit received principle. This principle demands that payments of municipal levies and other taxes be directly linked to the benefits that community members receive from the services provided. This is understandable because customers need to have the sense that they are getting ‘value for money’ for the taxes and charges they pay

137


(Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review, 2011). The other challenge that is mostly neglected is the issue of inadequate support from other spheres of government. To this end, it should be noted that the failures, whatever their form or nature, at local government are indicative of overall failures of government. It therefore make sense that both the provincial and national spheres of government should systematically and continuously provide support to municipalities with the view of strengthening capacities of officials who are vital in realising assisting municipalities to realise their developmental mandate.

IMPLICATIONS OF REVENUE COLLECTION ON THE FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIESWhereas collection of own revenue is a legislative requirement, it is important to

note that the analysis of the trends of revenue collection in municipalities in South Africa indicates that most municipalities do not comply with the requirements that a reasonable amount of current expenditure be formulated by means of own resources (Schoeman, 2011). According to Kanyane (2011: 935), “studies in Public Administration confirm that the majority of rural municipalities in South Africa are not self-viable. Collection of own revenue has got a profound implications on the financial viability of municipalities. The implication of the inability of most municipalities to collect own revenue is that in general, such municipalities will largely rely on subsidies and grants to finance not only capital expenditure but also operational expenditure (Shoeman, 2011). It can be argued therefore that without the adequate revenue base from which municipalities could optimize the collection of own revenue, municipalities will ordinarily struggle to become self-sustainable. Conversely, optimum collection of own revenue would increase the financial viability of municipalities.

STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING COLLECTION OF OWN REVENUEIn view of the challenges that municipalities are confronted with, in as far as

collection of own revenue is concerned, this section seeks to propose strategies that could greatly assist municipalities in terms of enhancing and optimising the collection of own revenue. However, it needs to be indicated outright that the strategies proposed here, are not in any way exhaustive. Furthermore, while the implementation of these strategies could be applicable to some municipalities, such strategies could still be difficult or even impossible to implement in others. The first and most important thing that should be considered by municipalities as part of the holistic process of dealing with the challenges of poor collection of revenue which stem from lack or inadequate revenue base is that there is need to enlarging revenue base through localization of investments. That is to say that the national government needs to rethink their allocation of funding for municipalities to ensure that such funding reflect commitment on part of government to assist

R.K. Manyaka



municipalities in terms of promoting local economic development especially through diversification of economic sectors and activities in predominantly rural municipality. This approach will ensure that municipalities lubricate their own local economic potential thereby creating better socio-economic opportunities through employment creation. This could also conversely enable community members to have adequate access to sources of income which could enable them to afford to pay for municipal services. Providing municipalities with adequate support, both in terms of the human and financial resources, could reduce the growing trend of rural-urban migration, which complicates the distribution and allocation of resources to the increasing population in the metropolitan areas. This could only be achieved if both national and provincial governments could provide necessary and required support to mostly rural municipalities.

As an attempt to stimulate the collection of own revenue in some municipalities, some municipalities have opted for using private sector to perform this functions. This however, varies from a municipality to a municipality and from one type of revenue to another. It is worth noting however that privatised collection of own revenue offers no “quick-fix” for optimising the collection of own revenue. However, when appropriately managed and monitored, it can establish a platform for a more effective and efficient local government revenue administration.

CONCLUSION The paper sought out to examine the issues and challenges relating to the

collection of own revenue in South African municipalities. To this end, it can be argued that the ability of municipalities, particularly those which are predominantly rural, to collect own revenue is constrained by numerous shortcomings including but not restricted to inadequate revenue base capacity constraints, inadequate support, inability to pay as well as the apparent culture of non-payment of municipal services. These, as argued in the paper, make municipalities to be highly dependent on revenue that is generated nationally. The dependence on nationally raised revenue illustrates that municipalities are not financially viable. While the existing local government fiscal framework is designed to fund local government through equitable transfers, dispensed through conditional and unconditional grants, the existence of national and provincial transfers does not absolve any municipality from showing the necessary fiscal effort – and collecting the own revenues available to it. After all, the collecting of own revenue is a legislative requirement. The paper concludes therefore that the inability of municipalities to raise own revenue and ultimately become not viable should be understood within the context of the country’s historical development patterns, which were deliberately designed to discourage investment necessary to lubricate local economic development in former black communities. The after effects of this development pattern are still visible in most rural municipalities in South Africa

139


LIST OF REFERENCES African National Congress (ANC). 2012. Legislature and Governance discussion paper.

Johannesburg. Luthuli House.Bekink, B. 2005. Principles of South African local government law. Durban. LexisNexis

Butterworths.Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). 2009. State of Local

Government in South Africa. Working document. Pretoria: Government Printers.Financial Fiscal Commission. 2005. Submission for the division of revenue. Pretoria:

University of Pretoria.Fjeldstad, O. & Heqqstad, K. 2012. Local government revenue mobilization in

Anglophone Africa. CHR Michelson Institute.Kanyane, M.H. 2011. Financial viability of rural municipalities in South Africa. Journal

of Public Administration, 46 (2): 935-946.Kahn, S., Madue, S.M., & Kalema, R. 2011. Intergovernmental relations in South Africa.

Pretoria: Van Schaik publishers.Manyaka, R.K. & Madzivhandila, T.S. 2013. Implementation of Integrated development

plan for service delivery purpose: Are we there yet? In Sebola MP, Tsheola JP, Phago KG & Balkaran S. Challenges of Local government in South Africa. Conference proceedings of the SAAPAM Limpopo Chapter.

Monkam, N.F. 2011. Local municipal productive efficiency and its determinants in South Africa. Working paper 20. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.

Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa. 1998. White Paper on Local Government. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa. 2003. Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa. 2008. Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review. Pretoria Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2011. Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review. Pretoria Government Printer.

Schoeman, N. 2011. Fiscal performance and sustainability of local government in South Africa: An empirical analysis. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.

Schoeman, N., J. 2006. Rethinking fiscal decentralisation in South Africa. Journal of Public Administration, 41 (2): 110-127.

Thornhill, C. 2009. Intergovernmental relations: the case of co-operative local government. Journal of Public Administration, 44 (3.1): 671-686.

Thornhill, C. 2012. Improving local government transformation in South Africa. Administratio Publica, 20(3): 128-143.

R.K. Manyaka



SOUTH AFRICA: A UNIQUE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION? PARADOX AND PROSPECTS

K.J. MaphunyeUniversity of South Africa

ABSTRACT

Barely two decades ago, many doomsayers and commentators believed South Africa was headed towards possible prolonged civil war or even serious racial conflict. While this never happened, is the country’s post-

1994 situation a sign of political stability? Is South Africa a politically stable and economically prosperous society? How unique or exceptional is the county’s democratic transition? If so, what explains such ‘exceptionalism’ and apparent triumph over so many hurdles the country faced just before its 1994 historic all-race elections? This presents us with an apparent paradoxical situation: is South Africa’s transition to democracy unique? Further, what are the country’s prospects for democratic consolidation? This paper examines South Africa’s transition to multi-party democracy through free and fair, internationally accepted elections. It approaches the subject from an Afro-optimistic but cautionary perspective and acknowledges the positive aspects of this transition while accepting the related hurdles. Afro-optimism highlights the continent’s gains especially in terms of Africa’s political stability and economic prosperity. Drawing on current data, literature and relevant theories, the paper argues that South Africa is economically prosperous compared to many African countries; and that it is also relatively politically stable despite its recent past and current problems. It concludes by examining a few best practices on the country’s experiences and potential lessons from which other African countries could draw as they tackle the challenges and paradox of their political independence.

INTRODUCTIONRecently, an observer made the following statement to remind South Africa’s

what the country experienced barely two decades ago:From being on the verge of a civil war in 1993 (when IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi threatened not to partake in the 1994 polls), to having the ANC having some real or perceived competition in the next elections, we have come a long way. (Tabane, 2013)1

1 ANC: South Africa’s governing African National Congress; IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party

141


Indeed, the South Africa of 2014 is in many ways different to that of 1994 when the country had just emerged from its apartheid past and was thought to be on the verge of a civil war. However, how much of the country has remained the same or even stagnated is a subject of regular public opinion debates and discussions in many academic and policy conferences in the country. A typical example is the recent State of the Nation Address (SONA) made by the President Mr Jacob Zuma in which he essentially underscored the fact that the country had experienced many changes since 1994. After this speech, various commentators, political analysts, opposition parties and ordinary citizens agreed to disagree on the points he made about the current state of South Africa.

Globally, the name “South Africa” is associated with a wide array of sometimes conflicting meanings and perspectives regarding the country’s remarkable socio-economic, political and overall changes which resulted in majority rule in 1994 (Deegan1999; Maphai, 1994; Pinkney 1993). Not so long ago, the country was certainly associated with dictatorial or repressive regimes across the globe, an example of humanity’s inhumanity other human beings, a crime against humanity, and a case example for studying one of the world’s social engineering experiments of separating whites from blacks through the notorious “separate development” policy. Yet, the country has in the last twenty years quickly transcended this difficult past to become what many see as a beacon of hope for those fighting against oppression in the world, a “miracle” democratic transition, and probably a best case example on racial reconciliation, however some of its nationals may perceive such reconciliation.

This paper briefly examines the South African democratic transition, which is now associated with political and economic stability and economic prosperity. Foremost among the elements that promoted such stability and prosperity were the country’s TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) process, the symbolism of a ‘rainbow nation’ and the national conflict resolution or peacebuilding efforts which the country developed in the run-up to its historic political settlement before the April 1994 all-race democratic elections. The paper briefly examines the post-apartheid government’s attempts to establish a “people-centred” democratic state through the ballot box; differing political parties’ ability to accept the outcome of the Electoral Commission’s release of final results, and the post-1994 government’s generally Afro-centric political vision and policies.

In concluding, the paper outlines the country’s problems or challenges. However, unlike the Afro-pessimists and the western inclined media, the paper consciously avoids dwelling on these problems or challenges but highlights them for elucidation purposes. Instead, it suggests possible ‘lessons’ from the South African case example, while acknowledging that these may be irrelevant to other African countries owing to the country’s unique experiences.

K.J. Maphunye



APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGYThe approach adopted in this paper is that of an analysis based on a review of

the relevant literature and theories on democracy, democratisation and democratic transition around the world but with a focus on South Africa. The paper relies on current data from studies in the area as well as on the relevant theories. South Africa’s post-1994 historic changes may be viewed as part of democratic consolidation, especially when analysed at the critical milestone of two decades of transition to democracy. This author agrees with the assertion that “…democratic consolidation heavily focuses on the institutional character of representation, [but] normative values also need to be considered,” (Lehman, 2007: 302). Lehman further states that “…consolidation occurs in a democracy when a ‘complex’ system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become the only game in town,” (Lehman, citing Linz and Steppan, 1996:15). In South Africa, the political culture is gradually inclined towards the absorption of these values and institutions.

NATURE OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN SOUTH AFRICANowadays social scientists, especially economists, are interested in the

relationship between political stability and economic growth including whether such a relationship has positive implications for Africa’s potential for growth (Armah, 2012: 3). The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “stability” as “the quality or state of being stable” and its adjective “stable” as “firmly fixed or established; not easily adjusted, destroyed or altered.” Prosperity is defined simply as “state of being prosperous; wealth or success” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1991).

Furthermore, observers argue that “[i]n the period since South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, the country has been described as a stable, consolidated democracy, emerging from a process of successful transition”, (Booysen and Masterson, 2009: 388). Explained in this way, South Africa may be labelled a stable society which enjoys political stability because it has a relatively peaceful environment, political, economic and other systems or institutions that are “firmly fixed or established”. These include the Reserve Bank of South Africa, the judiciary, South African Revenue Service, and Johannesburg Stock Exchange, to name but a few. Similarly, it is also an economically prosperous society compared to many African countries some of which usually praise the country for its elaborate infrastructure and economic resources which are increasingly used to enhance trans-national development and trade across Africa; making it a leader in many respects continentally.

But in the case of South Africa the two concepts of stability and prosperity might be challenged in some cases given that one first needs to understand where the country was two decades ago (i.e. 1994) before one can criticise it for not

143


having attained stability and prosperity compared to other African countries. In a class-based society and one deeply divided along racial lines, a question could be asked: “Stability for who?” Such a question cannot be answered in simple terms as a whole range of factors first need to be considered in attempting to offer an appropriate response. One of these is that critics from labour federations such as COSATU2 and other left-wing organisations have long argued that South Africa’s liberal democracy and mixed economy in many ways disproportionately favours the owners of the means of production such as the mining bosses and other corporates. Perhaps, in an attempt to deal with this dilemma, the governing ANC thought that the development of BBBEE (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment) policies would be a sustainable solution. However, twenty years into democracy, rather than result in a massive transfer of economic power and resources from white corporates to newly appointed black empowerment bodies and individuals, this policy has apparently enriched a few politically connected black elites (Southall, 2006: 188). Criticising this scenario and the advent of what he terms a “power elite”, Roger Southall observed “…a major disjunction between the wielding of political and economic power, with the state now controlled by new black incumbents and the corporate world still dominated by whites” (Southall, 2006: 190). On a positive note, however, he observed that “[a]lthough the white-dominated corporate culture remains uncomfortable territory for may black managers and professionals, the black elite is making visible progress in scaling the walls of corporate power” (Southall, 2006: 198).

Among the many determinants of political stability, the presence of legitimate authority is probably foremost among the elements of governance which enable citizens or subjects of a polity to accept those who govern in their society. During the apartheid period, lack (or perceived lack) of legitimacy almost always rendered South Africa powerless or vulnerable to incessant popular protests and demonstrations, global condemnation and other anti-racist lobbying. This primarily stemmed from the then valid criticism that the apartheid government’s mandate rested on the views of a tiny minority of whites in the population as blacks were legally barred from voting. Lack of legitimacy in turn undermined the authority and image of policing, intelligence, and other state security apparatus (e.g. “national service” because the use of the term ‘nation’ was always contentious given the fact that it often referred only to whites). Likewise, the army and other security forces were largely viewed as instruments of repression which enforced the illegal and unjust laws of a discredited regime. This applied equally to the country’s “swollen apartheid bureaucracy” (Adam & Giliomee, 1979: 221) which was staffed primarily by supporters of the then ruling National Party.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE History is replete with numerous outlines and accounts of the South African

2 Congress of South African Trade Unions

K.J. Maphunye



experience, which is usually seen or described as a kind of linear and simplistic process; yet, this story is far more complicated given the intricacies of a system that was skilfully designed and orchestrated to undermine specifically the human rights of the country’s black citizens (Adam & Giliomee 1979; Beinart & Dubow 1995; Dubow 1989; Posel 1991; Giliomee 1979; O’Meara, 1996). As Adam and Giliomee (1979: 222) noted, the architect of this system, Hendrik “Verwoerd embarked on the elaboration of the apartheid policy and the creation of a vast bureaucratic structure.” This is probably why attempts to understand South Africa’s transition often encounter binaries: e.g. pre-1994 and post-apartheid era, black versus white politics, racial-non-racial, oppressive and free, to name but a few. In reality, the situation is more complex and frequently involves the interplay of commonly three or more factors or variables such as race, class, and socio-economic status, which might interact to define or locate a person’s life chances or opportunities. Following this logic, black, unemployed and disabled women have been identified frequently as the most disadvantaged sector of the society given the triple disadvantages they suffer in South Africa.

Put differently, it is historically widely recorded that the apartheid system created immense problems for millions of South Africans, especially the black majority who suffered immensely under draconian and exploitative apartheid colonial policies (Adam & Giliomee 1979; Amtaika, 2013; O’Meara, 1996). However, South Africa during apartheid pretended to be politically stable or economically prosperous though the country could not shake off its internationally notorious image of an oppressive system which brutally suppressed the rights of its indigenous majority citizens; a country that battled to maintain peace and stability owing to the continual popular uprisings and resistance to its internationally condemned system.

After apartheid formally crumbled in April 1994, many South African citizens were understandably exhilarated and had lofty expectations about a prosperous life that awaited them. They looked forward to living in a politically stable, legitimate and democratic country at peace with its neighbours and the entire world. The following were arguably more responsible for heightening these expectations above all others, starting with the release of political prisoners.

RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND ADVENT OF CODESAThe release of political prisoners in the run-up to South Africa’s 1994

democratic elections and the surprising willingness of the apartheid state to negotiate transfer of power to a majority-led democratically elected government was a major step towards stabilising the country’s politics. Political stability here refers to the agreement by many protagonists on both sides of the political divide to cease hostilities and enter into dialogue with their opponents; either through a ceasefire or cessation of attacks pending the outcome of the talks to resolve political differences. This process was spearheaded by the CODESA (Congress for

145


a Democratic South Africa) talks where the leaders and interest groups from various forces across the political spectrum converged at Kempton Park near Johannesburg to grapple with the country’s future. This signalled the possibility of a peaceful negotiated settlement in South Arica although one may add that the writing was already on the wall for the regime even though there were no clear winners of the then hostilities.

One good thing to emerge from the negotiation process was the fact that both sides of the political divide engaged in political pragmatism and therefore worked towards a sustainable solution — despite mutual suspicions and deeply ingrained hatred emanating from years of conflict. Among the many factors that clearly signalled the end of the apartheid era, the release of political prisoners from the numerous apartheid prisons was arguably the most convincing element that became the precursor of the country’s post-1994 political stability. For the first time, even the most cynical critics of the apartheid government who forever doubted its sincerity to release the political prisoners were for once convinced that the country looked set to resolve its then seemingly irreconcilable differences. As soon as the first political prisoners were released from South Africa’s notorious dungeons and penitentiaries such as Robben Island, the public image of the apartheid government improved slightly in the eyes of the largely sceptical local and international publics — although much still had to be done before political stability and the state’s legitimacy could be restored. But this was only possible after “…four years of protracted negotiations which had begun in 1990 with the unbanning of the liberation movements, including the ANC, and a commitment to negotiated settlement by the then ruling National Party (NP)” (Ajulu, 2010: 3). Another observer noted that “…the move to negotiations was a direct consequence of a strategic stalemate which had set in at the end of the 1980…[which arose] out of a long and violent impasse in which neither side was able to impose itself decisively on the other” (O’Meara, 1996: 5, emphasis in original). The release of the former political prisoners also heralded an imminent change to the country’s political culture. For the first time South Africans were able to interact with the formerly banned stalwarts of the liberation and anti-apartheid movements; which contributed immensely to debates on the development of a new democratic system in South Africa.

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS BASED ON FAIRNESS, IMPARTIALITY AND AN INDEPENDENT ELECTION AUTHORITYIt has been argued that “[s]ince the beginning of 1990, political developments

in South Africa have occurred at a speed unprecedented in the country’s history” (Maphai, 1994: 42). Foremost among the processes that the country witnessed during that period was the acceptance of a political settlement by the major parties to the conflict. This negotiated settlement paved way for the holding of the country’s

K.J. Maphunye



first ever free, fair, democratic and internationally accepted non-racial elections. Arguably, the extension of franchise rights to all the country’s citizens for the first time, who were previously denied this right, also promoted political stability at an early period in the run-up to the establishment of a new democratic government. As Matlosa notes, since then, “South Africa has been holding democratic elections on a regular basis…” (Matlosa, 2010:1).

These elections, probably the country’s euphoric moment after Nelson Mandela’s February 1990 release from prison, in turn paved the way for a truly democratic but mutually accepted political transition. For the first time in many decades, black people were able to cast their votes in a democratic election and freely choose a government of their choice. White people, although many still feared for their lives and what the future held, could also proudly declare their South African citizenship without risking any attack or international ridicule. Thus, the important role of elections in delivering a relatively stable political environment cannot be ignored. “Despite the fact that much still needs to be done to improve the running of elections in South Africa, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC)…has been congratulated by political parties ‘…for facilitating successful elections over the years’ (Maphunye, 2010:58, citing IEC, 2007:39).

Some argue that “…South Africa, a big country both population-wise and in territorial size, remains a multi-party system, which is a positive for democracy. This multi-party system is based upon proportional [representation system of] elections to parliament, which elects the president who is the head of state and head of government at the same time,” (Lane & Ersson, 2007: 225).3

Democratic elections ushered in a largely peaceful political transition and transfer of power from a minority to a majority government. They also signalled a formal incremental process that later became known as ‘transformation’, i.e. the fundamental reordering of state institutions and social relations along democratic non-racial lines. Hence, observers argue that:

Post-apartheid South Africa invested substantially in an institution-building process given the institutional vacuum which emerged with the major system-switch in the 1994 political transition. Examples include…a new progressive institution, the entrenchment of the separation of powers between various levels of government, and a bill of civil and economic rights. (Feddereke & Luiz, 2006: 1075).

These rights are enshrined in the country’s constitution and Bill of Rights and include: human dignity; freedom and security of the person; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; freedom of expression, freedom of association, and political rights such as the right to form a political party, vote and stand for public office (Constitution, 1996, ss 15-19).

3 South Africa’s proportional representation (PR) electoral system has enabled the inclusion of minority interests, women, youth, persons with disability etc. in its political system. However, its main weakness has been the fact that public representatives elected through PR have not always been accountable to the voters; they also tend to be loyal to the party which appointed them (FPD, 2014:41) .

147


South Africans now have rights and largely cherish them. But sometimes it would appear as if they prioritise rights over responsibilities — which may undermine their political stability and economic prosperity. A pertinent example is that they now have the right to protest and express their grievances in public marches or gatherings as enshrined in the constitution; but this does it mean that they equally have a right to destroy property such as clinics, libraries or schools if they do not have water, electricity, sanitation or some other service that they may have been promised by the government? This is seemingly one area of weakness displayed by many community members whenever they feel aggrieved and want to express their anger or frustration over perceived lack of services in their areas. Nevertheless, this tendency might be a remnant from decades of violent suppression of genuine grievances and systematic denial of certain fundamental human rights to marginalised sections of society; many ordinary members of the communities might now find it difficult to discontinue peaceful demonstrations as violence was the only means available to confront a violent political system.

Still, some have noted that South Africa’s previous elections (2009 in this case) revealed essentially three components: “…acceptance by all stakeholders of the ‘rules of the game’, effective elections management…[and] participants’ acceptance of the outcomes of the elections” (Booysen and Masterson, 2009: 387). These components have resulted largely in the promotion of political stability and peace after major elections were held; even if the losers rarely congratulated the winners as is usually the case in more mature democracies.

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) PROCESSThe South African experience would probably be incomplete without the brief

but equally emotive and nerve-wracking episode of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process. The process became imperative given the fact that hundreds of thousands of (mostly black) South Africans were tortured, maimed, killed, imprisoned and countless others disappeared during the segregation and apartheid periods. Hence, the main protagonists and leaders of South Africa’s political movements saw it fit to create a platform through which to tackle the uncertainties surrounding the whereabouts of those who disappeared during apartheid atrocities.

The work of the TRC borrowed immensely from the Africa’s Ubuntu philosophy (Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, i.e. literally, Zulu for “one becomes a person through other people”). Ubuntu, which encompasses the near universal humanist values, emphasises forgiveness, compassion, respect for fellow human beings, and settling of conflict through dialogue and negotiation, among other mechanisms. The TRC essentially involved three concepts: ‘reconciliation’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘redress’. The first two are interlinked and involve the need to forgive one’s oppressors or perpetrators of violence and other dastardly acts that were committed during the anti-apartheid and anti-colonial struggle against South Africa’s indigenous

K.J. Maphunye



inhabitants. The third concept of redress is more forward looking and seeks to provide socio-economic, psychological, political and other mechanisms that seek to ameliorate the hardships endured by the victims of apartheid.

Reconciliation, by its very nature, was also ingrained into Nelson Mandela’s post-apartheid strategy and became a key factor in defining the country’s new socio-economic and political future. Subsequently, some have described South Africa as a “consociational democracy” whose “…object…is to seek consensus between the different groups through a political process that brings all their leaders into the governmental process, whether through carefully tailored forms of proportional representation or federalism, or by specifically reserving offices of state for members of the different groups” (Pinkney, 1993: 12). Probably, one of the striking features of such consociationalism was the legislation of eleven official languages for South Africa, which was an attempt to accommodate all the country’s indigenous languages into the official sphere (Deegan, 1999: 31). “One of the interesting features of the transitional period was the emergence of a government of national unity (GNU) which was to last a period of five years” (Deegan, 1999: 18) after the first democratic elections on 27 April 1994. The GNU resulted in a power-sharing formula complete with the controversial “Sunset Clause” which required that no major changes or policies would be introduced in government during this period. Yet, it was expected to be fundamentally different from the previous regime which Huntington (1991) described as a “racial oligarchy” in his four-fold typology of authoritarian regimes: one-party, personal, military and racial oligarchic” (Huntington, 1991 cited in Pinkney, 1993: 119).

In terms of forgiveness, it appears that South Africans have not made much progress in this regard if a few post-1994 incidents could be used as illustrations. These include the recurring alleged refusal by many white people to accept blacks as equals; recurring use of derogatory names (e.g. the ‘K’ word) during disagreements or conflicts; use of black people in videos that undermine their dignity and dehumanises them; the assumption that black governments (especially at national level and in some provinces) are inherently corrupt and the widely held public view that black people continue to have a raw deal even under a democratic government despite having gone the extra mile to forgive their apartheid-era tormentors (many of these examples emanate from the author’s observations in the media as well as in daily experiences).

The third element of redress was also incorporated into the TRC process although some have said that it was under-emphasised unlike the other two. But redress itself cannot happen overnight as a once-off process and will probably take many decades. Redress was also understood by others as being closely linked to reparations, which some ardent critics of the apartheid regime advocated; one of these was the Khulumani Support Group which recently sought to mount litigation for reparation against some US companies that allegedly connived with

149


the apartheid regime.4 However, in general there were divided perspectives on this matter and hence the TRC process essentially drummed up more support for reconciliation and forgiveness, to the disappointment of some black citizens who argued that the Mandela post-apartheid process was disproportionately tilted towards the first two elements and underemphasised redress.

While some cynics have over the years dismissed the TRC process as a cry-show and a charade, for many victims and perpetrators who appeared before this Commission (Theissen, 2008), this was a cathartic moment. On the one hand, it helped the victims to at least meet with face-to-face with their torturers, vent out their bottled-up feelings at the loss, death, torture or disappearance of their loved ones, and somehow helped the victims to bring closure to the matter and move on with their lives. On the other hand, this process also enabled the perpetrators of apartheid torture chambers sufficient space to come to terms with their conduct and its consequences and, in very rare cases, to express remorse for their actions. Granted, the TRC process was nowhere near the German Nuremberg trials after which many perpetrators were jailed (or executed) (Graybill, 2002:1); which probably opened as many wounds as it sought to heal, without providing sustainable solutions. In the case of similar processes elsewhere, an observer argues that “Nuremberg, for instance, dispensed harsh retribution to the top echelon of Nazis but permitted ordinary Germans to live in a state of denial. In Chile and Argentina, the army and police made general confessions in exchange for blanket amnesties that allowed individual assassins and torturers to evade personal responsibility”, (Graybill, 2002:1).

But the process helped many South African victims of apartheid, including the rest of their supporters around the world, to accept the situation and move on no matter how difficult this might have been at the time. In many ways, this scenario perhaps has more to do with the country’s political culture which, some believe, “contains factors that compensate for a democracy deficit”, (Lane & Ersson, 2007: 227, citing Diamond, 1997 and Paxton, 2002).

A ‘RAINBOW’ NATION: UNITED IN ITS DIVERSITYBishop Desmond Tutu’s metaphor of a “rainbow people of God” (Tutu, 1996),

shortly after the TRC process began, probably neatly summarised the nature of the cultural, multi-racial and highly diverse society that could not be described in terms of uniformity but demographic diversity. At the time, South Africans across the political spectrum generally welcomed the metaphor as an apt description of the ‘new’ South Africa; save for extreme right-wing groups such as Eugene Terre’ Blanche’s AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) which was covered widely in the local and international media during the country’s transition to democracy (see NBC News, 2012). Like others of its kind, this group vehemently opposed the

4 In its website, Khulumani argues that “Reconciliation without reparations is incomplete justice” (http://www.khulumani.net/).

K.J. Maphunye



negotiated settlement and vehemently argued that “the colour black is not part of a rainbow”;5 thereby insinuating that black rule was unjustifiable and therefore illegitimate in their view.

ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S INSTITUTIONS PROMOTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (CHAPTER 9S)In what was expected to boost the development of the country’s fledgling

democracy, the South African Constitution (sections 181-194) deals with “state institutions for supporting democracy”, which are as follows:

• Public Protector • South African Human Rights Commission• Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural,

Religious and Linguistic Communities• Commission for Gender Equality• Auditor General• Electoral Commission of South Africa6 (IEC)The roles of these institutors have immensely boosted the country’s newfound

democracy in their respective areas such as elections, sensitising the society on gender inequalities and disparities, the need for sensitivity on cultural diversity issues as well as the need for accountability and good governance. For instance, the IEC for its part has played a significant role of promoting political tolerance and dialogue by working closely with all political parties and the country’s leaders through its PLCs (Party Liaison Committees). This has in many ways also helped to promote political stability as most political parties often accept the outcome of elections. The few that do not have had no justification to resort to violence as they also have recourse to the Electoral Court and other legal avenues.

The legal processes and emphasis on the need for due process in dealing with election-related disputes or conflicts have largely boosted political stability since some political parties have in some instances won court cases against the IEC; but the Commission has also had courts ruling in its favour thereby rejecting the parties’ court challenges. The EMB has over the years achieved a remarkable status of global integrity and respect even from its critics through its rigorous standards of impartiality in running South Africa’s elections. In many ways, the role of the Chapter 9 Institutions is not always acknowledged but they complement the work of the traditional government and civil society structures. Their roles, which also provide extra layers of checks and balances against abuse of power, and promote public accountability, have also enabled South Africa’s governance mechanisms to be decentralised, thereby reduce the power of an overly strong political centre 5 Such sentiments were commonly uttered by extreme right groups such as the AWB shortly before its leader was killed in 2012. 6 For branding purposes, this Commission has retained the use of the abbreviation “IEC” which was popularised during the short stint of the inaugural Independent Electoral Commission that conducted South Africa’s 1994 elections.

151


since the governing African National Congress (ANC) has for the past 2 decades enjoyed dominance over other political parties. This does not imply that one-party dominance per se is not good. On the contrary, probably one virtue of this situation is the fact that it might engender stability and channel the country’s energy, resources and focus in the direction of development and nation-building.

Most importantly, the losers of elections have almost always accepted the outcome as a fair reflection of the wishes of the voters, which is important towards promoting political stability and sustainable development. They have also accepted their losses with humility but this was also thanks to South Africa’s Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system which has over the years made it possible for even the smallest political parties or politically insignificant interests to be accommodated to have bigger opportunities of being represented in the country’s parliament.

Scholars argue that “Democracy in South Africa is entrenched through a system of institutions that are conducive to the stability of democracy”, (Lane & Ersson, 2007: 220-221, citing Lijphart, 1998; Friedman 1999; Pottie & Hassim, 2003; Lodge, 203; and Southall, 2003). Some of these institutions cited above are enshrined in South Africa’s constitution (1996) and called ‘Chapter 9 Institutions’ as they appear in that chapter of the constitution. They generally enjoy relative autonomy and therefore add an extra layer of accountability and legitimacy to South Africa’s governance processes.

In addition, these institutions would not have succeeded had they not been accepted by a forgiving, generally tolerant and diverse nation which viewed them as legitimate. Undoubtedly, there are as many arguments as there are counter-arguments on the relevance of the term ‘rainbow nation’, which was popularised by Archbishop Emeritus, Desmond Tutu in his book “The Rainbow People of God” (1996). Some analysts even suggest that “…the rainbow romance of the transition has faded…” (Beall, et al., 2005: 682). Yet, the concept of the rainbow nation at least underscores the symbolical recognition of the need to accept South Africa’s multi-cultural demographic profile, which in many ways promotes political stability and nation-building. Surprisingly, the recent death of Nelson Mandela was feared by some (mostly white) citizens and expected to be a period in which black people could turn the table and avenge themselves for past atrocities committed against them. But the expected disaster or catastrophe did not occur; nor did the 1994 ‘miracle’ disintegrate.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTAlthough very few South Africans might agree, the country is increasingly being

seen as a veritable success story of a country that was on the brink of catastrophe and possibly a prolonged civil war barely two decades ago. Therefore, it is often

K.J. Maphunye



recognised by other societies in conflict that if South Africa managed to resolve its apparently irreconcilable social differences, then they also could do so. Pertinent examples include former Northern Ireland situation, Tutsi-Hutu ethnic conflict in the Great Lakes region, and the Palestinian-Israeli dispute where South Africans were invited by the warring sides to assist with mediation, conflict resolution and peace-building. The South African model is also being relied upon in conflict situations globally. Nationally, it is still being utilised e.g. during elections, crime, Afro/xenophobia or political intolerance situations and labour-business conflict especially institutions such as NEDLAC (National, Economic, Development and Labour Council) and the recent Social Cohesion Summit which sought to identify factors that promote a South African national identity.

The most important contribution of the above process is to encourage peaceful resolution of disputes or the resolution of seemingly intractable disputes through dialogue and negotiation. No wonder that the country has since 1994 increasingly being called upon to participate in or lead peace missions as part of “roadmaps for resolving African conflicts” (Khadiagala, 2012: 7). Granted, South Africa has made tremendous progress since the 1994 elections. However, many were shocked when the country experienced apartheid-type killings of workers in Marikana (North West Province) in 2013; coupled with numerous violent public protests. Still, the successes made by the country probably far outweigh the problems it experiences; which has showcased the country as an example of peace-building and conflict resolution in Africa and globally.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND PROSPERITYSouth Africa was for many years viewed as a country at war with itself or,

better put, a country that had launched a low intensity war on its black citizens, while exploiting them to generate super profits for a few privileged whites and international monopoly capital. Economically, the country was renowned for its abundant natural resources and vast economic and business potential. Hence, many western countries very early in South Africa’s history sought to capture or safeguard these resources and therefore protect its former racist rulers from international condemnation and sanctions. Therefore, on the one hand, the country was seen as an engine of economic growth and prosperity at the southern tip of the continent. On the other hand, it was also seen as a country which systematically exploited its indigenous population in order to sustain the wide economic gaps between blacks and whites.

Therefore, the economy in South Africa was always vulnerable to sabotage, labour unrest and international sanctions aimed at destroying apartheid labour relations. Moreover, even taxation was usually very difficult to collect owing to the number of tax dodgers and international economic actors who consciously advocated the boycott of South African goods and economic relations.

153


After apartheid, however, a careful process of macroeconomic financial planning and economic prudence, coupled with the development of a reconstruction and development programme (RDP) and strengthening of the country’s banking and financial institutions significantly boosted the economy. One of the reasons for this was also the country’s internationally renowned infrastructure (e.g. efficient and effective railways, air, road, rail and information and communications technology) or what others term South Africa’s “structural power on account of its sheer economic size and level of development as compared to its neighbours” (Andreasson, 2011: 1175).

In the late 1990s, the new South African leaders probably realised that “…Africa is situated most precariously within the global economic system as a continent comparatively impoverished and marginalised, and with little ability to directly influence key decisions made in developed and emerging market states,” (Andreasson, 2011: 1166). Hence the need to belong to and play a significant role in major economic institutions and alliances such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), IBSA India-Brazil- South Africa trilateral forum, and later BRICSA with the addition of Russia and China to this group), and G-20 to name a few. South Africa’s has played a major role in such fora to showcase “Africa’s increasing attractiveness”, especially since the country’s “economy dwarfs others on the continent…” (Andreasson, 2011:1167; 1171).

Moreover, the country has skilfully used sports and other cultural events to tap into the global arena. Such events include the numerous “Mandela Jazz Music” festivals, the 1995 Rugby World Cup which drew tremendous global attention as the elder statesman attended this event and probably changed the negative stigma among black South Africans that rugby was a racist sport. Some argue that, “[w]ith victorious Springboks rugby captain Francois Pienaar and President Nelson Mandela standing side by side to present the Webb Ells Trophy to a rapturous South African crowd in Johannesburg on Saturday 24 June 1995, billions of television viewers worldwide could be forgiven for believing that South Africa had not only won the Rugby World Cup but had emerged triumphant in the struggle to transform itself from a besieged apartheid state into a prosperous non-racial democracy,” (Dollery & Worthington, 1996: 189). This was followed by numerous other sporting events especially the 2010 FIFA7 World Cup which was hailed as a success in boosting nation-building and improving race relations while promoting tourism and marketing South Africa’s economy globally. Generally, these events helped in marketing the coountry as a safe destination for commerce and international trade while seeking to work closely with other African countries to protect the continent from unfair trade and economic exploitation.

Thus, the country increasingly regained the international reputation as an African economic success story and its currency appreciated and gained global respect. Observers explain the recent developments thus:7 Federation of International Football Federations

K.J. Maphunye



UK-based banking giant HSBC has been trying to establish a significant African presence, attempting in 2010 to buy a controlling stake in ABSA and of China’s ICBC, which owns a 20 per cent stake in Standard Bank, South Africa’s largest and second largest banks, respectively, thereby establishing a presence in South Africa … renewed attention to Africa is also part of a gradual but steady shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy. (Andreasson, 2011:1168).

South Africa was thus able to reap the rewards globally as a reliable economic and business destination; this, despite the country’s often worrisome labour unrests and apparently volatile mining, agriculture and other industries which last year resulted in the country’s first ever post-apartheid massacre of disgruntled protesters in Marikana in the country’s North West province. Obviously, violence and such incidents undermine stability; they have “destroyed countries and has devastated populations” in other African countries (Hall, 2013:4). Notably, Hall also argues that Africa’s success hinges on the development of a middle-class whose economic activities can boost trade and economic growth; yet such middle-classes also require a peaceful environment capable of promoting stability. “Conflict undermines the stability on which middle class life is based. Warfare wipes out the middle-class lifestyle as surely as it takes actual lives” (Hall, ibid.). Yet, in the case of South Africa with its very diverse society, one cannot argue solely in favour of a single class or sector of society as all of them require stability to be able to realise their full potential.

A few significant challenges to South Africa’s economic and political stability and prosperity were widely reported in the local media focusing on the following:

• Violent crimes: rape, murder, xenophobia• Huge rich-poor gap (Gini Coefficient said to be the highest globally, Rawson

Property Group, 2012)• Police brutality: especially Marikana, Skielik, Andries Tatane, Mido Macia8

• Right-wing: Eugene Terre’ Blanche and the Boeremag, Orania and its implications for national unity and protection of minority rights; The spectre of ‘Prime evil’ (Eugene De Kock) and the convicted killers of Chris Hani (Janus Walus and Clive Derby-Lewis; and ‘Dr Death’ (Wouter Basson)

• The ANC and one-party dominance: Mbeki recall; “tenderpreneurship” and greed

• Corruption: in the public and private spheres• Unresolved land and wealth distribution questions• Zunami! (Southall & Daniel, 2009): in general, this is with reference to the

storm of major changes that Jacob Zuma, then South Africa’s president-elect, was expected to usher in with his new administration.

“EVERY CLOUD HAS A SILVER LINING”In South Africa, negative reporting recently forced some Cabinet ministers

to urge the media to report on good news for once. This later became known as “sunshine journalism” which was widely reported in the local media during 8 Sowetan, 2014.a, p.5 “Malamulele boycotts voter registration”.

155


debates on the ‘Secrecy Bill’).9 Needless to say, they were heavily criticised for their comments. However, one commentator followed such criticisms with an paper in an influential daily titled “Amidst the bad, good news too”. He outlined the following ten positive factors on which South Africans should reflect as the country prepared to celebrate its twentieth anniversary (Tabane, Pretoria News, 8/10/2013):

1. South Africans have rights based constitution2. All citizens regardless of colour or creed have a vote3. They have freedom of association and association 4. All enjoy freedom of movement5. Public facilities and amenities are for all and function optimally6. Women are no longer considered as inferior and therefore enjoy full

labour and other rights like their male counterparts7. The Ministry of Higher Education recently (2013) resolved to recognise

African languages at higher learning institutions and mooted compul-sory introduction of learning an African language at University

8. Recognition of the Khoi and San (Khoi-Nama languages) is now accepted and seen in a positive light, unlike during apartheid (although much more could be done).

9. The myriad education systems under apartheid have now all been suc-cessfully integrated post-1994

10. Petty apartheid has all but disappeared from churches and all places of worship.

For those who may not have experienced apartheid first-hand, the above changes may seem insignificant. Yet, if one looks at the extent to which apartheid had entrenched racial discrimination and segregation in virtually every facet of South African society, then the above changes are indeed significant. Similarly, as observers note, “…there is no longer any threat facing the constitutional order from die-hards, whether white or black, and the survival of the non-racial regime is no longer in question”, unlike just after 1994 when the new government was installed (Beall, et al., 2005: 682). In addition, the current government’s policy of racial, gender and disability “transformation” is in many ways aimed at the vestiges of decades of apartheid colonial policies and practices which severely undermined the development of the country’s indigenous peoples.

POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH AFRICA EXPERIENCE?It was stated at the beginning of this paper that South Africa’s experiences are

unique as there has been no other African country where a settler minority imposed a ruthless and racist socio-economic and political system that systematically destroyed the indigenous systems of large African populations and exploited them on a grand scale such as in South Africa. Of all the qualities that the country is usually associated with, this is probably what explains South Africa’s ‘exceptionalism’ as it

9 News24.com/2013

K.J. Maphunye



resulted in the country’s apparent triumph over so many hurdles it faced just before its 1994 historic all-race elections Only Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) probably came close to this situation; but its situation was nowhere near the massive atrocities and super exploitation on a scale witnessed in South Africa’s meticulously planned “separate development” (Adam & Giliomee, 1979: 221). So, the key question to ask is: what lessons and for whom?

The first question is probably much easier as South Africa’s experiences may be characterised as ‘lessons’ or at least good practices which may be analysed individually. A pertinent example is the integration of numerous formerly disparate sections of the society including the security forces (police, intelligence, army, and air force), community and traditional leaders and influential social actors into the country’s democratic governance system. These are clearly “lessons” or experiences from which future historians, social scientists and those fascinated by the South African story will continue to draw lessons and attempts to resolve conflict in many parts of the globe; let alone in the country should it experience another conflict many decades into the future.

Thus, the above “lessons” are better understood as a South African phenomenon aimed at resolving the country’s domestic conflicts or disputes. The second question: Lessons for whom?, is not easy to answer as it implies a paternalistic and prescriptive approach towards other Africans. Whether, any of the above good practices may be exported to other African or developing countries remains contentious owing to the uniqueness of South Africa’s historical experiences and evolution. Moreover, some practices of South Africa’s internationally renowned post-1994 transition to democracy might be difficult to identify as “lessons” to be prescribed to other countries. Those expecting this approach of developing a kind of package to other countries undergoing similar problems may be disappointed especially because South Africa was the last country to be liberated in terms of the African Union’s decolonisation processes. Thus, the argument could be made that the ‘new kid around the block’ should instead learn more from its predecessors. Besides, the country’s story is still unfolding and two decades is arguably too short a period for serious assessment of the country’s progress―despite the existence of significant milestones such as the removal of apartheid laws from the statute books. However, South Africa’s unique experiences may be regarded as learning points to Africa’s future generations who need to avoid the pitfalls of repeating the same mistakes as their forebears; especially the entrenchment of racism, intolerance, hatred, prejudice and dehumanisation of those they may perceive to be different from the mainstream.

CONCLUSIONThis paper discussed the complex issues surrounding South Africa’s post-1994

transition to democracy. It briefly examined the South African experience which is now associated with political and economic stability and economic prosperity

157


globally, despite the myriad challenges the country faces to-date. The TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) process was identified as one of the mechanisms that helped South Africa to promote stability and prosperity. As Amtaika (2013:44) explains, “[i]n order to heal the wounds of the past, the government set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to help build consensus and lay the foundation for reconciliation, even though this would take a long time to reach.” This also included an assessment of the concept of a ‘rainbow nation’ and the national conflict resolution and peace building efforts that South Africa experienced in the run-up to the its historic 1994 democratic elections.

The paper briefly examined the post-apartheid government’s attempts to establish a “people-centred” democratic state through democratic elections and institutions that support the democratic system including South Africa’s multi-party system as complemented by the country’s Electoral Commission. However, this would probably have never happened were it not for the new government’s Afro-centric political vision and pro-Africa stance in its foreign policy; which enabled it to showcase Africa’s attractiveness in global fora such as IBSA and BRICSA.10 The paper acknowledges the country’s problems or challenges but deliberately chose not to dwell on them as is usually the case in Afro-pessimist discourse especially the western inclined media. It has also assessed possible ‘lessons’ from the South African case example, while equally acknowledging that they may be irrelevant to other African countries owing to the country’s unique experiences.

The paper has attempted to answer the question posed in its title: “Is South Africa a unique democratic transition?” by looking at aspects of the country’s internationally acclaimed transition to democracy and the semblance of political and economic stability it enjoys. On the one hand, South Africa twenty-years into its democratic era in 2014 stands proudly among countries that are admired globally for having moved from a difficult and troubled authoritarian past to a remarkable position in Africa and globally. To this effect, the country’s transition to democracy is indeed remarkable and unique owing to the myriad pre-democratic era challenges it faced. It has presented numerous opportunities and prospects for the country to play a leading role in global development forums, peace missions, international diplomacy and trade; this has essentially given hope to many other developing countries which usually seek to emulate South Africa in terms of playing a more proactive or visible role globally.

On the other hand, however, the country has not completely resolved its domestic problems such as high rate of crime, youth unemployment, poverty, disease (especially HIV-Aids), Afro-phobia11 and destructive racial attitudes. Almost two decades ago just after the country’s 1994 elections, an observer noted that “…South Africa is quite literally haunted by the manifold unresolved 10 IBSA: India, Brazil, South Africa trilateral forum; BRICSA: the same forum with Russia and China added.11 During the 2012-2013 ‘Xenophobic’ attacks, most victims were Africans and hardly any Europeans or North Americans were targeted, suggesting that South Africans generally dislike other Africans.

K.J. Maphunye



issues of its tragic past” (O’Meara, 1996: 7). These “manifold unresolved issues” continue to undermine the significant gains made by the country in addressing its new challenges. Furthermore, the country clearly needs fresh ideas to address its current challenges especially those which result in public protests that destroy public property. Furthermore, a call can also be made to government, private sector, civil society bodies and most of all researchers to collaborate in joint research and development initiatives that may enhance South Africa’s quest to become a developmental state. Overall, however, such problems do not outweigh the progress made over the last twenty years.

Finally, it has to be acknowledged that “[t]he consolidation of democracy in South Africa is vitally important for the future of the entire African continent”, (Lane & Ersson, 2007: 235). But Beall et al.’s finding that in South Africa “…the post-transition path is not short, smooth or direct” (2005: 697) reminds us equally that much as other countries might be fascinated to learn from South Africa, they have to be reminded that the South African story has just begun and therefore care must be taken to avoid premature judgements or conclusions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTAn original version of this paper was first read at a conference organised by the

ISS (Institute of Security Studies) Briefing Seminar on 29 Nov. 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the theme: “Oases of Stability in Africa: Lessons for the Future on African Best Practices.” Based on the insightful comments that were made by the participants and the feedback received from anonymous reviewers of the earlier paper, a much improved version of the paper was developed.

LIST OF REFERENCESAdam, H. and Giliomee, H. 1979. The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, Cape Town:

David Phillip.Ajulu, R. 2010. A Historical Overview of the South African Democratic Transition since

1994, in EISA. 2010. Election Update South Africa: February-July 2009, Johannesburg: EISA, pp.3-7.

Amtaika, A. 2013. Local Government in South Africa since 1994, Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

Andreasson, S. 2011. Africa’s prospects and South Africa’s leadership potential in the emerging markets century, Third World Quarterly, Vol.32, No.6, pp.1165-1181.

Armah, S.E. 2010. Does political stability improve aid-growth relationship? A panel evidence on selected Sub-Saharan African countries, African review of Economics and Finance, Vol.2, No.1, December, pp. 54-76.

Beall, J., Gelb, S. and Hassim, S. 2005. Fragile stability: State and society in democratic South Africa, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.31, December, No.4, pp.681-700.

Beinart, W. and Dubow, S. 1995. (Eds.). Segregation and Apartheid in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge.

Booysen, S. and Masterson, G. 2009. South Africa, in Kadima and Booysen, 2009, Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989-2009, pp.387-458

Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Daniel, J, Southall, R., and Lutchman, J. 2006. (Eds). State of

159

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationthe Nation: South Africa 2005-2006, Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Deegan, H. 1999. South Africa Reborn, London: UCL Press.Dollery, B. and Worthington, A. 1996. Economic growth and political stability in South

Africa: Possible Australian Policy Initiatives, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.50, No.2, pp.189-197.

Dubow, S. 1989. Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

EISA. 2010. Election Update South Africa: February-July 2009, Johannesburg: EISA.Fedderke, J.W. and Luiz, J.M. 2008. The political economy of Institutions, stability

and investment: A simultaneous equation approach in an emerging economy. The case of South Africa, Journal of Development Studies, Vol.44, August, No.7, pp.1056-1079.

Giliomee, H. 1979. ‘Afrikaner Politics: How the system Works”, in Adam Adam & Giliomee, 1979, The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, Cape Town: David Phillip, pp.196-257.

Graybill, L.S. 2002. Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model? Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hall, J. 2013. Continental Overview: Africa’s middle-class: A factor favouring political stability, Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor, April Edition, pp.4-7.

Khadiagala, G.M. 2012. Roadmaps for resolving African conflicts, paper presented at the Institute for Global Dialogue Project on “The concept of ‘Roadmaps’ in conflict resolution in Africa”, October 2012.

Khulumani Support Group. 2013. “Reconciliation we want” Retrieved from: http://www.khulumani.net/reconciliation.html, Retrieved on 21/02/2014.

Lane, J-E and Ersson, S. 2007. South Africa: Explaining Democratic Stability, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.45, April, No.2, pp.219-240.

Maphai, V. 1994. South Africa-The Challenge of Change, Harare: SAPES BooksMaphunye, K.J. 2010. Evaluating election management in South Africa’s 2009

elections, Journal of African Elections, Vol. 9, No.2 October, pp.55-78.Matlosa, K. 2010. Ahistorical overview of the South African Democratic Transition

since 1994: Progress, Problems, and Prospects for the 2009 elections, in EISA. 2010. Election Update South Africa: February-July 2009, Johannesburg: EISA, pp.1-7.

NBC News. 2012. Africa’s Rainbow Nation troubled by racist time warp, Retrieved on: 23/5/2012, from: http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/23/11827987-africas-rainbow-nation-troubled-by-racist-time-warp?lite

News 24.com. “Controversial secrecy bill passed”, Retrieved from http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Parliament-passes-controversial-secrecy-bill-20130425. Retrieved on 25/04/2013.

O’Meara,D.O. Forty Lost Years: the Apartheid State and the Politics of the NP, 1948-1994, Randburg: Ravan Press.

Pinkney, R. 1993. Democracy in the Third World, Buckingham: Open University Press Posel, D. 1991. The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise,

Oxford: The Clarendon Press.Rawson Property Group. 2012. “South Africa’s Gini coefficient is the highest in the

world”, Retrieved on 28/2/2014, from: http://www.rawson.co.za/news/south-africas-gini-coefficient-is-the-highest-in-the-world-id-874

Simkins, C. 2011. Poverty, inequality and democracy: South African disparities, Journal of Democracy, Vol.22, No. 3 July, pp105-119.

K.J. Maphunye


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSouthall, R. 2006. “Black empowerment and present limits to a more democratic

capitalism in South Africa”, in Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Daniel, J, Southall, R., and Lutchman, J. 2006. (Eds). State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006, Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp175-201.

Southall, R. and Daniel, J. 2009 (Eds.). Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections, Sunnyside: Jacana Media.

Sowetan. 2013a. “The Voter is still king”, 10/02/2014, p.12.Tabane, J.J. 2013. “Amidst the bad, good news too”, Pretoria News, 8/10/2013.Theissen, G. 2008. “Public opinions towards the TRC”, in Chapman, A.R. and Van

der Merwe, H. (Eds.), Truth and Recdonciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Press.

Tutu, D.M. 1996. The Rainbow People of God: The Making of a Peaceful Revolution, New York: Doubleday.

161


DEMOCRACY WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY, OR ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT DEMOCRACY?

‘BORN-FREE’ PERSPECTIVES OF PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA

K.J. Maphunye, M.L. Ledwaba & M.K. KobjanaUniversity of South Africa

ABSTRACT

Are South African public representatives accountable to the voters? If so, how far accountable are they? Is accountability the weakest link in South Africa’s democratisation process? This paper assesses the accountability

(or lack thereof) of public representatives in South Africa in the background of the country’s attainment of two decades of democracy. It examines the accountability of local government councillors, government ministers and provincial MECs (Members of the Provincial Executive Councils) including other public representatives to the voters. The voters expect such representatives to be responsive to their needs according to the country’s five-yearly electoral mandates. Based on a questionnaire that was administered to a purposive group of ‘Born-Frees’ or young adults who were born on or after 1994 in Gauteng Province, the paper explains the dynamics facing South Africa’s attempts to implement its policies; such difficulties emanate partly from the country’s electoral system and partly from the calibre of officials holding public office. Relying on theories of democracy and democratic consolidation, the paper argues that much still needs to be done to ensure the complete consolidation of democracy in South Africa, given the challenges of accountability that the country has recently experienced. The paper concludes by acknowledging that despite minimal gains such as the attainment of franchise and human rights, public accountability remains the Achilles heel and a major stumbling block towards substantive democratisation in South Africa’s governance systems.

INTRODUCTIONTwenty years after its first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa has

now been accepted and fully integrated into the fold of countries which are usually categorised as democracies based on regular elections that they conduct, adherence to the basic principles of the rule of law, and constitutional rule to which many subscribe. Yet, observers note that “…South Africa has undergone rapid demographic change as growing proportions of young people enter the electorate with no working memory of apartheid” (Mattes, 2012: 133). Despite this, however,

K.J. Maphunye, M.L. Ledwaba & M.K. Kobjana



it cannot be assumed that such young people are immune from influence by their parents and their predecessors owing if one remembers the saying that “no-one is an island”.

RESEARCH PROBLEMGiven South Africa’s attainment of two decades of democracy since the historic

elections of April 1994, the accountability of public representatives to the voters continually comes under the spotlight. In particular, the youth are usually foremost in raising concerns about why they do not want to vote whenever elections are about to be held; partly because of their disaffection with services in their communities. A related issue is that since the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa has generally been prone to numerous public demonstrations or service delivery protests, which were usually organised and sustained by the youth. Thus, the study sought to assess the views of the ‘Born-Frees’ on these and related issues twenty years into the country’s democratic transition.

RESEARCH METHODSThe argument that underpins the findings of this paper is based on a questionnaire

that was administered to a purposive group of ‘Born-Frees’ or young adults who were born on or after 1994 in several parts of Gauteng Province namely, Tembisa, Kempton Park, Birch Acres (Ekurhuleni), Pretoria CBD, University of South Africa Muckleneuk Campus, Pretoria Sunnyside (Tshwane Metropolitan area), Alexandra, Midrand, Fourways, Sandton, and Dobsonville in Soweto (City of Johannesburg). These areas were chosen based purely on convenience of the data collectors who lived in an area adjacent to these places.

Altogether, a total 44 interviews were conducted among a group of ‘Born-Frees’ who were randomly approached by the researchers. The researchers committed not to reveal their names or identities for ethical purposes. These interviews were supplemented by a review of the relevant literature as well as theories of democracy and democratic consolidation.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDYAs part of the delimitation of the areas of our study, we sought to focus on a

few urban areas, especially the former black townships around Johannesburg and Pretoria, Gauteng Province. The idea was not to obtain any representative cross-sectional analysis of the youth in these areas but to focus on a small number of respondents who were willing to give a response to questionnaire. While being mindful that the views carried in this study may not necessarily represent the views of the youth or ‘Born-Frees’ in South Africa’s rural areas, the intention of the study was not to aim for balance in this regard nor in any other variable such as race, gender, or disability. Similarly, the authors were aware that many more variables

163


could have been included to cover the perspectives of the ‘Born-Frees’ focusing on numerous other variables such as “national identity, racism, governmental legitimacy, and participation”, which are normally covered by studies in this area (Mattes, 2012: 151). However, these were beyond the objectives of this study and were therefore not covered.

WHO ARE THE ‘BORN-FREES’?In our study, we sought to capture the views of young people who were born in

1994 and beyond as it is generally assumed that this is the generation that was born free from apartheid; hence, the term ‘Born-Frees’. While mindful of the controversy surrounding this term, we nevertheless preferred to use it in quotes to denote that it may be subject to challenge or dispute in some quarters. For instance, given the huge diversity of the South African society, it might be assumed that lumping a category of the youth under the category “Born-Frees’ might be inappropriate as it suggests that they are a homogeneous group. Yet, they differ according to race, disability, political affiliation, socio-economic status and class, geographical location, religion, and whether their parents were political activists or not, etc. which in many instances might affect their perspectives about the nature of South Africa’s democracy.

CHALLENGES FACING THE YOUTH AND ‘BORN-FREES’The ‘Born-Frees’ are a section of South African youth or young adults who were

born on or after 1994 when the apartheid system formally came to an end. They belong to a new generation of South Africans who never witnessed the brutality of the apartheid system as well as the coercion and repression to which their parents and grandparents were subjected (Adam & Giliomee, 1979: 9). According to Mattes (2012:135) “[a]lmost one third of South Africa’s present electorate is now too young to have any direct memory of race classification, passes, official segregations of churches, schools, residences and interpersonal relations, the drastic repression of dissidence and resistance, or of the armed resistance and popular struggle against apartheid.” (emphasis in original).

Reporting on the outcome of the 2014 Final Voter Registration Weekend, IEC Chairperson Pansy Tlakula stated the process period indicated a shift in the pattern of registration among young people, adding that “…a record number of voters – and record number of young voters – [had] registered and [were]ready to vote…in May [2014]” as follows:

“Evidence of this shift is the fact that 79.89 percent of all new registrations this weekend – or 1 006 260 – are voters under the age of 30. This included:

• 691 002 voters aged 20 – 29 • 255 398 voters aged 18 and 19 • And 59 860 voters aged 16 and 1712

12 IEC, 2014, pp.4, 6




These figures suggest an improvement from the previous situation whereby the youth were thought to be apathetic especially on matters pertaining to elections. In contemporary South Africa, young people are however confronted by a myriad of challenges which might adversely affect their participation in the country’s democratic institutions and system. In its recent Editorial of 10 February 2014, a local daily had the following statement in an attempt to assess the state of South Africa’s democracy:

Our democracy is teetering on the brink of peril. Some of the violent protests are as a result of government officials who deliberately put deaf ears to the ground after being elected into office (Sowetan, 10/02/2014).

The statement seemingly summarises one of the key challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa, namely instability arising from community dissatisfaction with their authorities. Since 1994, the country has continually been bedevilled by public demonstrations which are normally dubbed “service delivery protests” but which might be linked to party political squabbles or conflicts as well as numerous other dynamics. Research suggests that such dynamics are responsible for the wave of unrest and instability that the country continues to witness. For instance, observers state that:

Each outbreak of protest in the recent wave of discontent with local governance in South Africa has had its own dynamics. Local conditions and even performance of specific individuals have been among the triggers that have set off confrontations. However, it is clear that national issues have often driven unrest in places that are …out of the minds of metropolitan policy-makers (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007: 135).

This suggests a far more complicated scenario than the usual “service delivery protests” mantra that many South Africans are now familiar with. In addition, Bernstein and Johnston further argue that among the issues they refer to above are “…shortage of skills, an absence of leadership and accountability over a wide range of governance functions, and a yawning gap between the formulation of ambitious policies and the availability of the managerial resources and expertise needed to achieve them in practice” (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007: 135). In the case of this study, lack of accountability by public representatives was foremost among the problems identified by the ‘Born-Frees’ as impediments to the country’s democratisation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, TWO DECADES ON After the historic 1994 democratic transition and subsequent establishment

of a legitimate government in South Africa, the country experienced a three-fold process pertaining to the development of its political system.

First, numerous socio-economic, political and other changes were introduced in

165


the country ranging from the repeal of the apartheid era discriminatory legislation, establishment of democratic institutions to support democracy especially the judiciary, and Chapter 9 institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission, Public Protector, Commission for Gender Equality, Electoral Commission, and the South African Revenue Services, to name but a few.

Second, some changes were merely superficial either because there was an agreement among the CODESA13 parties during the pre-independence negotiations that such changes be delayed until a few years into democracy; or simply because the democratic government was overwhelmed and lacked capacity in those areas to effect substantial changes.

Third, some issues were not touched at all by the new government’s transformation and democratisation agenda. If any attempt was made to address them, this was very insignificant and therefore lacked impact. In this paper, we looked at the above scenario in relation to public accountability by public representatives from the perspective of data collected through interviews from a small group of ‘Born-Frees’. But who exactly are the ‘Born-Frees’? To start with, the term ‘Born-Free’ as used in South Africa refers to an individual who was born on or after 27 April 1994 and who is therefore perceived to have been born ‘free’ from the yoke or clutches of apartheid. Such a person would usually have little or no recollection about the system that was declared a crime against humanity by the international community. Furthermore, a ‘Born-Free’ is assumed to be an individual for whom the past might mean very little and who may therefore have radically different views and expectations about governance, accountability and responsible government unlike their parents or grandparents. The data in the figures below indicates the range of views that were given by the respondents to this study in answer to the question, starting with the question: “Are you aware of the term “Born Free” as used in South Africa? Please explain.”

More than 90 percent of born free asserted that they were aware of the concept as used in South Africa. Only a small fraction of them argued that they were not familiar with it. In our study, most of the youths explained “Born-Free” in different ways. Firstly, they commonly explained it as those youths who were born after the 1994 first democratic elections. It was also explained as a generation of those who were born in the advent of democracy and the end of apartheid. As a concept it is synonymous with the youth who were born after the release of Nelson Mandela and commonly referred to as “Mandela’s children”. This is probably with reference to the fact that it was following the release of Nelson Mandela that South Africa attained its freedom and democracy.

On the other hand, most of the “Born-Frees” were of the view that the ruling ANC would win in the upcoming national and provincial elections to be held on the 7 May 2014. The primary reason given for this was that the ANC has always won in the elections and that it was this party which “brought freedom” that they 13 Congress for Democratic South Africa




enjoyed today in South Africa. Furthermore, most of “Born-Frees” were of the view that elections would bring peace and stability that would facilitate change, more jobs and allocation of basic essential services such as water, electricity, housing education, infrastructure and health care. The irony here is that it is usually the youth in the same communities such as those in which the “Born-Frees” live who continually accuse the governing ANC for failing to deliver services.

However, critics argue that with the coming of elections things would get worse. Proponents of this view highlight that the 2014 elections will be marred by acts of violence and political intolerance, a view that was shared by some of our interviewees. For instance, the South African Institute for Race Relations recently expressed concern that acts of violence had already erupted in a period preceding the elections and that violent clashes occurred between two political arch-rivals (ANC and DA) when the DA decided to march to the ANC headquarters in Luthuli house in February 2014, Johannesburg, (The Star, 2014: 3 ).

More importantly, even if there was a point of divergence amongst the Born-Frees’ about the 2014 national and provincial elections, there was however, general consensus that elections would contribute to further consolidation of democracy in the country. In other words, proponents of this view argued that elections would lead to democratization, peace and stability. This might well turn out to be so in those “hot-spots” or areas that are not normally regarded as “no-go areas” by rival political parties owing to intense campaigning in such areas. As Wachuku argues, using the phrase “tell-tale of democracy”, it is impossible to have democracy without elections nor to to have elections without democracy. Wachuku (2011:153-4) argues that “where there are elections one should look for democracy. Where there are no elections, one should forget about democracy.” Of course, elections per se are not tantamount to democracy; nor is democracy defined solely by the presence or absence of elections.

KEY PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED BY THE ‘BORN-FREES’Most the ‘Born-Frees’ felt that even though they were born after the end of

apartheid in 1994, they still had to contend with many intractable challenges which continued to affect their lives These included the spiralling cost of living, social ills such as moral decadence, poverty, proliferation of drugs (especially the deadly Nyaope) which continually devastate the lives of many township youths, and the spread of the HIV-Aids pandemic. However, perhaps owing to resilience among many in the young generation, some still manage even in the midst adversity to see education as the way to get out of abject poverty.14

Another advantage for the ‘Born-Frees’ was that they have freedom and latitude to express their views freely without any fear of intimidation, unlike the previous generations which feared arrest, torture, imprisonment and even death for daring 14 This is despite the continual problems that they many youths, especially at tertiary institutions, who face financial difficulties after failing to qualify for NSFAS (National Student Financial Aid Scheme).

167


to express their quest for freedom. The ‘Born-Frees’ have the ability to question government policy decisions and are not afraid to make their own choices even if their parents disapprove of their views. This is unlike in the past when that generation was prohibited from making their own choices and questioning any decisions. In short, the ‘Born-Frees’ are more in control of their destiny such as choosing who to relate with, vote for or not to vote for. Thus, they were found to be more conscious of their rights and eager to exercise such rights.

VIEWS ON THE 2014 NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS As for the 2104 national and provincial elections, at the time of the study, there

had been much speculation in the local media that because the ‘Born-Frees’ were disgruntled, they were therefore not going to vote in 2014. Proponents of this view based their arguments on the fact that South Africa has the highest percentage of youth unemployment in the country. Official statistics indicate that youth unemployment is amongst the highest in South Africa and it is argued that “half of South Africa’s youth are unemployed” (IOL News, 2011). This creates serious challenges for the ‘Born-Frees’ especially African youth who usually bear the brunt of unemployment at 57 per cent, coloureds at 47 per cent, Indians 23 percent and Whites 21 percent.

Despite the grim statistics above, most ‘Born-Frees’ interviewed were of the view that they would vote in the 2014 elections. More than 50 per cent of those interviewed wanted to exercise their constitutional rights to vote. Only a small percent indicated that they would not vote. The last group of young people were those who were uncertain about their position (i.e. to vote or not). If they choose to go to the voting stations, they will most certainly join the ranks of the so-called ‘floating’ or swing voters who will be targeted by the political parties during election campaigns.

Four Top issues that Worry the ‘Born-Frees’ in South AfricaThe responses of the ‘Born-Frees’ who were interviewed in this study (see Figure

1 below) suggest that the following were among the most burning issues facing them in South Africa at the time of the study. Drug and alcohol abuse were by far the most worrisome in their communities. This trend may be related to how the advertising media usually portrays alcoholic beverages as refreshing and identified with celebrities as well as successful individuals. School drop-outs and crime also seemed to be the major problems facing the ‘Born-Frees’. The interviewees also made attempts to explain how these issues were interlinked in their views.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationFigure1:

Which elections do you (‘born-frees’) remember?As observers note, “[e]lections serve as instruments of democracy, but they do

so differently in various parts of the world” (Cho, 2012: 617). Since the attainment of democracy in 1994, South Africa held four consecutive national and provincial elections that were declared free and fair by our electoral commission (IEC). Throughout this elections, the youth of South Africa have been active in participating and the IEC and a number of NGO have been instrumental is ensuring that voter education was provided in communities though in most occasions the process was disrupted by lack of funding. As Kabemba (2005: 101) indicates, the 2004, 1999 and the 2000 local elections the efforts were limited and the IEC found it difficult to undertake a wide sustained vote education campaign. The study however suggests that the ‘Born-Frees’ recognize the 1994 elections. This could be the result of the fact that firstly, 1994 was the year they( Born-Frees’) were born, secondly, South Africa had the first black president and that it was the first time black people were granted their enfranchisement right(among other things). The study revealed that the ‘Born-Frees’ identify themselves with this elections base on the above mentioned reasons since these reasons were mentioned frequently.

The other elections that show popularity was the 2009 with a 25% segment as indicated on the figure below. The finding was informed by the current president taking office for the first time and most of the young people recognize the 2009 elections manly for this reason they also site that the elections were free, fair and peaceful. The 1999 and the 2000 elections were not so popular since the only

169


scored 5% and 2% subsequently. However, those who do not know anything scored 25% and it is a worrying factor in light of the status-qou in the country. The already emerged service delivery protest, police brutality lack of accountability, corruption through tender systems and other related issues could be identified as some of the reasons why young people lose interest in voting, which often results in lack of knowledge on electoral democracy matters.

Figure 2.

‘Born-free’ views on electronic votingThe figure below identifies how the ‘Born-Frees’ responded to the question, “If

electronic voting was introduced in South Africa, how would they react. It is not surprising that 24% respondents said it would “strongly encourage” them to take part in voting, scoring the highest, followed by a 10% indicating that it would only “encourage” them to vote. This could be attributed to the following:

• Globalization• The accessibility of the internet• The ever growing and changing consumer electronics gadgets• TechnologySouth Africa has become a participant in the global system after 1994 and

it became the giant economic hub of Africa. This implies that the South African society is slowly moving towards engaging in the above mentioned four points and that the youth is the most vulnerable in this regard. Hence the study showed a high percentage saying that electronic voting would strongly encourage them to vote. Arguably, despite its limitations, electronic voting might improve the voting processes as well as the management of the whole voting exercise in that




voting usually takes place at the comfort of one’s home or elsewhere, captured immediately and the results are also available within a short space of time. On the other hand, the study showed that only 2% were strongly discouraged and 3% just discouraged. These participants argued that this kind of practice had the potential to attract hackers and that the election results could easily be rigged. This is also supported by Sargent (2009: 99-100), who argues that the current electronic voting systems have been encountering errors and are vulnerable to manipulations and hackers. He emphasizes that whether these systems will prove to be more or less subject to manipulations than the older systems, was still to be determined. But in South Africa, the current reluctance to implement EVMs (electronic voting machines) and e-voting stems from many understandable factors such as the high illiteracy rates in some urban, peri-urban and rural areas, electricity and network coverage challenges, as well as scarcity of computers and Internet in many poorer parts of the country. Thus, the data suggests that electronic voting may have a negative and positive impact towards electoral democracy as it has the potential of building or destroying it.

Figure 3.

Source: Authors’ own data, 2014.

Would you vote if given a chance tomorrow?The above question asked during the interviews was phrased thus: “If an election

was held tomorrow, would you vote, abstain or not sure?” 32% of the participants

171


indicated that they would vote, scoring the highest in this category, followed by 12% saying they would abstain and only 2% not being sure (Figure 4 below). While this number might be insignificant given the fact that this was not a national sample, in a democratic state 32% the percentage might be significantly low for eligible voters who indicate that they will taking part in an election process. This is informed by the fact most ‘Born-Frees’ interviewed did not view South Africa as the “best democracy in the world”. The abstaining and not sure categories were mostly informed by the following:

• Lack of voter and basic political education• Party subjectivity• Information derived from friends and family• Ignorance• Accountability by public representatives• Corruption within government• HopelessnessThese points mentioned above are among other reasons why the youth of today

do not want to participate in the polls and these particular seven are the most burning issues as far as the question is concerned. Voter apathy pose danger to any democratic society and it need serious interventions by the civil society, private sector and government.

Figure 4.




Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationOverall Comments on the 2014 ElectionsA general question was posed to all respondents to assess their overall views on

the 2014 national and provincial elections and their responses yielded diverse mix of responses as follows:

Table1

Q.12 What can you comment about the 2014 elections? No. of respondents supporting this view

• The ANC will the 2014 elections because of conflict among opposition parties

√√

• Fear of conflict among political parties (during the campaign period) √√√√√√√√√√√√

• Best political party will win and deliver on its promises √

• Parties must reach consensus on the elections √√

• The ANC might not win due to opposition [inroads] into its traditional support base

√√√√√

• People must go and vote √

• Elections will change South Africans’ perspectives √

• We need balloting education and information on political activities √

• The elections will be peaceful √√

• More opposition is good (for the country) √√

• I hope for a new ruling party (after elections 2014) √√

NB These responses are part of grouped data from the current study. Source: Authors’ own data,

2014.

Surprisingly, the above data suggests that a significant number of the ‘Born-Frees’ were concerned about the possibility of violence or instability in the country in the run-up to the 2014 elections. These fears are understandable given the fact that a few days just after the date of the elections was announced by President Jacob Zuma, two individuals belonging to the National Freedom Party were killed allegedly as a result of political party rivalry between this party and the IFP.15 Subsequently, violence had also flared during the march by the DA’s march for jobs, which the party had organised to the ANC’s national headquarters (Luthuli House) (City Press, 23/2/2014). Another observation from the above data pertains to the respondents who felt that the governing party might not win owing to opposition parties’ inroads into the ANC’s support base. While this stands to be tested on Election Day (7 May 2014), it is possible that the views expressed here referred to parties such as the EFF which had been campaigning vigorously in some of the ANC’s strongholds. Yet, such responses should be treated cautiously given the fact that the EFF was barely a few months away from its formation when the election

15 Inkatha Freedom Party

173


date was announced; therefore, it remains to be seen as to how much support it will muster especially among the ‘Born-Frees’ and the rest of the voters in what will be a very short campaigning period.

Further, another question posed to the respondents sought to assess how informed they were, which would presumably enable them to participate meaningfully in the 2014 elections. The responses were as follows (Figure 5):

Figure 5. Source: Authors’ own data, 2014

Clearly, the responses suggest that most of the ‘Born-Frees’ agreed that they had sufficient information on election-related matters at the time they were interviewed, which would enable them to participate vigorously in South Africa’s democracy. Among others, such information is about basic electoral democracy issues such as why citizens need to vote; on what basis a voter should consider voting for a party; what to do when voters are dissatisfied with a public representative or authority; including the nature of the electoral system and its impact on voters’ choices at the ballot boxes. Ironically, the youth normally constitute a considerable number of those who engage in violent protest soon after an election; which often results in the destruction of public property such as libraries, clinics and community halls. It is therefore unclear as to whether having access to information about how to vote is alone sufficient to enable one to make contributions to South Africa’s democratic processes.

Another question that the respondents were asked was: “Do you agree / disagree with the statement that: “South Africa is the best democracy in the world?” This question was asked to assess the respondents’ identification with the country or patriotism. It was assumed that a patriotic respondent was more inclined to




vote in an election unlike one who was not or who seemed to be less patriotic or sympathetic to his/her country.

Figure 6: What the ‘Born-Frees’ think about South Africa’s democracy


The data in the above Table somewhat surprisingly suggests that the ‘Born-Frees’ might not be patriotic (or sympathetic) to their country. If this finding is credible, perhaps it might be assumed that they would not be very keen to vote in the 2014 elections. But other indicators (which were not covered in the present study) would be needed to verify this assumption.

This study sought to find out what the ‘Born-Frees’ thought about the accountability of public officials. They were therefore asked the following question: “In your view, do you think public representatives (e.g. Ministers, MECs,16 Councillors) in South Africa are accountable to the voters?” Their responses yielded an interesting finding whereby a significant 25 out of the total 44 respondents who answered this question disagreed that public representatives were accountable to the voters. Less than half (17) said that public representatives were accountable. This suggests that the ‘Born-Frees’ who offered an opinion on this question were sceptical about the accountability of public representatives. Many in this group also provided a response on the follow-up question: “In your view, is there anything that can be done to make public representatives more accountable to the citizens?”. Their verbal responses were captured as follows:

Table 2.

Respondent Code

Respondent’s Opinion

KA2 We must elect people who will be accountable

KA3 Arrest them [public representatives] for corruption; remove them from power (if they are found guilty)

16 Provincial Members of the Executive Council

175


KA4 Elect competent people

KA5 They [public representatives] should involve communities in decision-making

KA6 They must be removed

KA7 They must agree on the roles [tasks/duties] that they are given [by the public]

KA9 Replace them with more accountable people

KA11 Government must educate the voters about voting

KA14 They should put people’s needs before theirs

KA15 They must be replaced if they do not take their jobs seriously

KA16 Nothing can be done

KA17 Investigate public representative [if they are not accountable]

KA19 They need to do their jobs [properly]

KA22 We [the public] need to embark upon strikes [against lack of accountability]

KA24 They should integrate their interactions with [those of] the citizens

KA30 They must provide services [if they are to satisfy communities]

KA35 They must have knowledge about their people; they must be empathetic

Source: Authors’ own data (2014)

Two of the above responses (“nothing can be done” and “embark upon strikes”) might seem surprising. But they indicate diametrically opposed views and responses in many communities whereby some might ignore lack of accountability and lack of service delivery as they do not think anything positive can be done about this; whereas others tend to adopt a radical approach of strikes and violent protests to drive their message to the authorities. Furthermore, these responses suggest that the ‘Born-Frees’ who were interviewed seemingly identified external factors (e.g. Councillors/MECs/public representatives are to blame); rather than indicate what they as responsible citizens would do to address the perceived shortcomings. The respondents were also asked a follow-up qualitative question: “How far do you think such public representatives are accountable to the voters?” This question had the following options:

1. Completely accountableb. Somewhat accountablec. Completely not accountabled. Not accountablee. Don’t knowf. Other (please explain)

Here, the responses were almost balanced with most respondents who offered an opinion on this question choosing either “Completely accountable” or “Somewhat accountable”. This apparent ambivalence might be explained by the advent of a




spate of demonstrations and sometimes violent protests that erupted in areas such as Bekkersdal (Gauteng) and Mothutlung (North West) over provision of services such as water and sanitation, electricity, housing, and other basic services (Sowetan, 2014c). A constant complaint by frustrated community members was almost always the perceived “lack of action” to attend to poor services by the relevant public representatives, local councillors in this case (Sowetan, 2014c). Another question was asked to probe the extent to which the “Born-Frees’ understood party politics or their active involvement in this regard. In answer to this question: “Have you had any experience with any political party?”, the responses were as follows:

Yes: 11No: 19Here, the responses clearly indicate that few respondents had participated in

party political activities. This further suggests that they would therefore probably be struggling to find a political party for which to vote; unless they were subject to some persuasion or peer group influence. This could be contrasted to the views of some in the previous generation who tend to be defined by loyalty to political parties. For instance, during the recent violent protests in Bekkersdal near Johannesburg, one (elderly) resident was quoted as follows:

The ANC is the only party we know, love and respect. I am not happy to hear of people in government embroiled in corruption when we are dying of hunger. However, leaving the ANC is like spitting on Tata’s grave. (The Times. 2014a)17

An observer notes that “…if South Africa’s new democratic dispensation has created more spaces for legal political participation, the Born Free generation have not taken up these opportunities at higher rates than older citizens” (Mattes, 2012: 141). This suggests that the ‘Born-Frees’ are caught up in a kind of dilemma. On the one hand, many of them are clearly concerned about their situation and are affected by the many social problems such as drug addiction, teenage pregnancy, crime, unemployment and poverty; for which they would presumably be inclined to take action. One the other, however, they appear to be rather aloof from what is going on in their own communities and would rather focus on the latest fashion and other trends including the love of material items such as state-of-the-art cell-phones, computers and other modern gadgets. In fact, the ‘Born-Frees’ “…are less likely to be active members of community or religious groups, to join with others in raising local issues, attend community meetings, or contact their local councillor. In contrast to the common view of the wave of protest that has hit South Africa’s local municipalities over the past several years, the Born Frees are also less likely to have attended a protest” (Mattes, 2012: 141-142). How far this picture has changed given the fact that many in this group will be voting for the first time on 7 May 2014, is difficult to assess given that, like all ‘floating voters’ who are normally susceptible to party political campaign messages, they will also be targeted by

17 The term ‘Tata’ is South African’s nickname for Nelson Mandela who died in 2013.

177


political parties.

CONCLUSIONThe fundamental changes that South Africa witnessed shortly after its 1994

elections were expected to result in “…significant pro-democracy shifts in South Africa’s political culture, especially amongst the youngest generation, who are popularly known in South Africa as the ‘Born Frees’ (Mattes, 2012: 133).

Whether any significant “pro-democracy shifts” have occurred among the youth, especially the “Born-Frees” as argued and discussed in this paper is debatable. What is clear, though, is that a historical milestone will be achieved among a section of the youth who will be casting their votes for the first time in their lives. Thus, the question to ask is: to what extent, if any, this phenomenon will change the political voting and other patterns of the country? This question can only be answered once the complete results of the 2014 elections have been collated and youth participation in these elections assessed.

The findings of our study suggest that the younger generation are not satisfied with the changes that have occurred in the country for various reasons ranging from graduate and youth unemployment, HIV-Aids, crime, teenage pregnancy, most of which tend to affect the extent of their participation in South Africa’s fledgling democracy. Perceptions about these issues, have largely defined the perspectives of the ‘Born-Frees’ on what they view as lack of accountability by public representatives. But some of these perspectives have also been clouded by the systemic realities of South Africa’s democratic dispensation e.g. the fact that the country has adopted a proportional representation (PR) electoral system which tends to emphasise loyalty of public representatives to a party and not those who have voted for them (FPD. 2014: 41).

It is in this regard that we wondered whether South Africa has adopted a democratic system that lacks accountability given the concerns that communities often raise in the numerous public protests the country has continually witnessed. Some have argued that “[m]any elected representatives treat institutions of accountability (e.g. Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts – Scopa- and the Auditor General) with apparent indifference by reporting late or failing to attend sessions convened by these oversight institutions. These institutions exist to hold government at all levels answerable on questions of public spending, policy implementation, observance of regulations and responsiveness in general” (FPD, 2014: 41).

An attempt has been made to answer the questions posed at the beginning if this paper namely, “Are South African public representatives accountable to the voters? If so, how far accountable are they? Is accountability the weakest link in South Africa’s democratisation process?” In answer to the first question, and based on the data from the interviewees, South African public representatives are not accountable




to the voters in a sense that may interviewees complained about their lack of accountability and responsiveness to community grievances on public services. In response to the second question, our study suggests, though not conclusively, that lack of public accountability is a weak part of the governance chain in South Africa. Whether it is the weakest link in South Africa’s democratisation process is debatable given the myriad of other factors that have to be considered. These include leadership qualities, scourge of corruption in public and private sectors, transparency, professionalism (or lack of it) in public sector institutions including the very serious challenges that this structure normally faces in delivering services efficiently and effectively. However, the foregoing issues were not discussed and therefore were beyond the scope of this study although they may in many ways affect the ‘Born-Free’ Perspectives on accountability of public representatives in South Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTWe acknowledge the assistance of the interviewees who agreed to be

interviewed and who gave us valuable insights without which this paper would not have been possible.

LIST OF REFERENCESAdam, H. and Giliomee, H. 1979. The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, Cape Town:

David Phillip.Cho, W. 2012. Accountability or representation? How electoral systems promote

public trust in African legislatures, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, Vol.25 No.4, October, pp.617-637.

City Press, 2014. “The hard edge of hammer politics”, 23/02/2014, p.25Dalton J. 2001. Political parties and democratic linkage: how parties organise

democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. FPD. 2014. Electoral Systems and Accountability: Comparative Case Studies,

Johannesburg: Forum for Public Dialogue.IEC.2014. Statement on Outcome of Final Registration Weekend, Chairperson of the

Electoral Commission Advocate Pansy Tlakula, 11 February 2014. Pretoria, Retrieved 27/02/2014, from: http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Elections-timetables-Municipal-by-elections/

IOL News. 2011. “Half of SA’s youth are unemployed”, Retrieved on 1/2/2011, from: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/half-of-sa-s-youth-are-unemployed-1.1019783#.UxDIvvmSx8E/

Lindberg, S.I. 2006. Democracy and elections in Africa, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mattes, R. 2012. The ‘Born-Frees’: The Prospects for Generational Change in Post-apartheid South Africa, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol.47 No.1, March, pp.133-153.

Saine, A., N’diaye, B. Houngnikpo, M. 2011. (Eds). Elections and democratization in West Africa-1990-2009, Trenton: Africa World Press.

Sowetan, 2014.a “The voter is still king”, 10/02/2014, p.10.Sowetan, 2014.b “Malamulele boycotts registration”, 10/02/2014, p.5.

179

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSowetan, 2014.c “Residents frustrated by lack of action”, 20/02/2014, p.10.The Times. 2014a. “Petrol Bomb attack at voter registration”, 10/02/2014, p.4.The Times. 2014b. “Women NFP supporters ambushed”, 17/02/2014, p.4.The Star, 2014, p.3 Wachuku, A.N. 2011. “Nigeria: A tradition of elections without democracy”, in Saine,

A., N’diaye, B. Houngnikpo, M. (Eds.) Elections and democratization in West Africa-1990-2009, Trenton: Africa World Press, pp.153-154.




DEVELOPING AN ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SECTOR

D. Masiloane & S. DintweCollege of LawUniversity of South Africa

ABSTRACT

Despite the existence of numerous policy frameworks pertinent to fraud and corruption in the South Africa’s public sector, the statistics and reports of corrupt activities in the government of South Africa remain

epidemic. The enactment of pieces of legislation such as the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, the Public Finance Management Act and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, to mention but a few augured a positive turning point in corruption after the advent of democracy. However, amid those legislative ramifications, little positive results have been recorded almost twenty years into the democratic dispensation. Due to what appears to be legislative deficiency and inadequacy of investigation agencies such as the Special Investigation Unit, The Public Protector and other oversight bodies, corruption continues to emasculate public accountability leading to a continuous subversion of public interests for personal gains. This paper will hypothetically envisage that corruption is by its disposition and definition, a very extensive phenomenon. Consequently, legislation on financial management, supply chain management or preferential procurement may not be sufficient to cover all aspects of such a complex and abstract practice. At the same breath, legislations such as the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act and others are developed at a macro level and often do not address the step-by-step mechanisms of dealing with corrupt activities. Over and above legislation and at least implementation thereof, there remains a huge need for a specific, correctly pitched and relevant strategy or what other scholars call a programme dealing with corruption. The main aim of this paper is therefore to determine the development of an anti-corruption strategy which will be effective in addressing corruption and fraud in the public sphere. This will include the structural and discourse make-up of such a strategy and how this can become a panacea in a rejuvenated fight against the scourge of corruption in South Africa.

INTRODUCTIONThe statement by G. Edward Griffin to the effect that “to oppose corruption in

government is the highest obligation of patriotism” is probably the most pertinent when dealing with corruption in the public sphere. The epidemic levels of

181


corruption in South Africa need to be addressed through preventive and remedial measures to be employed after perpetration of such. Although this endeavor should generally be focused on the entire public service, the State Owned Enterprises and the private sector in general, this paper is premised on how corruption within the public sector in South Africa should be handled. Corruption is one of the most difficult societal ills that the government has to contend with. As a result of its complexity and its rampant impact on the general citizenry, corruption has taken a center stage in the body politic of not only South Africa but the world as a whole (Gildenhuys 2005:5)

Due to International Protocols that South Africa is signatory to, the manner in which corruption is handled has become a subject of analysis by different scholars. For instance, Gildenhuys (2004:36) submits that dealing with corruption calls for a complete change in the mindset of the population and once this is achieved, there is a likelihood that majority of people will obey all laws and regulations of government as well as the simplest unwritten social rules of society which are the rules of just being descent. Corruption and its manifestation, when understood in a simplistic way include acts of bribery, extortion, kickbacks, fraud, forgery, embezzlement or graft (Vil-Nkomo 2004:1). This description of how corruption manifests itself is supported by Martinez-Vazquez, Granado & Boex (2007: ix) who list tax administration, government expenditure programmes and other areas of fiscal policy and management as areas where corruption can manifest itself. Corruption also includes non-fiscal scenario in which government officials can sell their authority for personal benefits outside the realm of fiscal processes which according to Mafunisa (2000:11) amount to immoral, deprived or dishonest practices of persons. The transference of the means of production and part of the wealth onto the hands of those who were previously marginalised before 1994 and the institutional weakness (Eicher 2009:8) led to an increase in corruption (Randall 1996:666).

Although principles contained in the King Report II and III on corporate governance and a myriad of legislations that have been developed post democratisation indicate the government’s willingness to deal with the scourge of corruption and to reverse its adverse consequences, there seems to be a lack of guidelines on how to develop and implement the anti-corruption strategy in the public sector. Apart from numerous research projects on corruption, its manifestation and perceptions little has been revealed about development and implementation of the anti-corruption strategies. Pieces of legislation such as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), Public Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 1999) and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Act 12 of 2004) to mention but a few are examples of policy framework aimed at dealing with corruption. However, amid the existence of such stringent policy framework, the levels of corruption in South Africa remain high. This can be attributed to the contention that existing policy framework aimed at

D. Masiloane & S. Dintwe



addressing corruption remains inadequate and ineffective. This is in part caused by the complexities and sophistication of the framework which seems to intricate their implementation. On the other hand, this state of affairs is further exacerbated by the lack of competence amongst the managers in the public sector in ensuring that that the provisions of these frameworks are fully understood and observed by all stakeholders.

It is against this background that this paper seeks to utilise literature and content analysis thereof to develop an anti-corruption strategy for the South African public sector. This is preceded by a theoretical foundation, discussion on nascence, scale and frequency of corruption. Furthermore, a proposition on a specific, measurable and implementable anti-corruption strategy that the government of South Africa can adopt in order to enhance the fight against corruption while remaining within the ambits of the applicable laws is made.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKAlthough the field of criminal justice does not flaunt numerous theories, the study

of corruption as a phenomenon can be understood through various theories. The Rational Choice Theory (RCT), the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and the Economics of Crime Theory (ECT) are some of these theories which are used to interpret the manifestation of corruption (Scott 2000:23; Shar 2007:256). The common factor between all these theories is that there will be a corruptor and a corruptee in each case of corruption. The former refers to the person who unlawfully and intentionally offers a bribe so that certain procedures and rules can be broken or ignored while the latter refers to the recipient.

The Rational Choice Theory builds from the underpinnings that suggest that sociologists and political scientists alike, attempt to explain human behaviour from the idea that all actions are fundamentally ‘rational’ and that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding on their course of action (Scott 2000:23). This scholar has further persuasively contended that, the fact that people act rationally has been long recognised by many scientists, including the proponents of Criminology. If there are sufficient internal controls and sufficient number of perpetrators are apprehended for corruption and punished adequately, there is a likelihood that the prospective perpetrators will stop immediately. This will be due to the fact that, as argued by Scott (2000:23), the employees within a particular component of the public sphere will make choices on whether to commit corruption or not judging by the consequences of such cases.

The second theory which is known as the Principal-Agent theory advocates that the employers should reward those who are productive and punish those who are not toeing the line equally. It therefore emphasises in this context that those who perform their duties diligently and are not involved in corrupt activities need to be given incentives as submitted by Shar (2007:256). The main problem with

183


this theory is the list of punishments that are likely to be imposed on those who are corrupt which includes steps such as mere attendance of an improvement programme or a salary cut. In fact, in the public service where taxpayers’ monies are being used and where honesty is central to all activities of employees, this theory cannot be regarded as a prospective solution to corruption. It can only be employed in trivial cases of non-performance but not in cases of corruption.

The third theory which is called the Economics of Crime Theory focuses on the deterring value that severe punishments which are based on observable and verifiable behaviour can have on prospective corrupters and corruptees (Shar 2007:256). It is common cause in forensic investigations and criminology as well as other branches of law that punishment must be equivalent to the acts perpetrated otherwise the object of punishment will be defeated. The severity of punishment does not necessarily refer to barbaric punishment which is inconsistent with the Constitution particularly the Bill of Rights. However, it is submitted that when developing an Anti-Corruption strategy for the public service, this theory must be taken into consideration.

These theories will be used in determining how anti-corruption strategy should be structured in line with the tested and researched theories. Theories which have been tested and proved to be successful in dealing with corruption should form the cornerstone of any anti-corruption strategy. However, the propositions of these theories still need to be aligned with the Constitution, the human rights and the Rule of Law. It is worth noting that an anti-corruption strategy should be seen as an implementation tool of the existing legislation and need to be simple and understood by all concerned. It should therefore be seen to simplify pieces of legislation which may have been developed at a macro-level thus making the implementation of such laws possible and easy to realise. Put differently, it is envisaged that the framework to be suggested in this research will act as a manual for implementation and observation of the Prevention and Combating of the Corrupt Activities Act (Act 12 of 2004) and any other policy pertinent to the fight against corruption in the criminal justice system.

THE RATIONALE There are numerous reasons that justified this research and these reasons

are in a form of problems identified in the current state of affairs. History and previous research have shown that legislation alone cannot be adequate as a means of preventing and combating corruption. Since corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon, it calls for a complex approach when dealing with it. This means that over and above legislation, there is a need for theoretical frameworks and anti-corruption strategies aimed at complementing the anti-corruption legislation. However, despite the urgent need for theoretical frameworks and fundamental anti-corruption strategies, these are still scarce while most traditional anti-corruption strategies focus on dealing with symptoms rather than causes and emphasise




stern punishment, salary increments or establishing anti-corruption commissions (Habtemichael 2009:252). Compounding this problem is the submission by Bansal (2004:180) to the effect that corruption is far from arbitrary or static; it is rooted in customary, social and legal entities, which are complex adaptive subsystems of the society.

A search for literature and particularly, the anti-corruption strategy in the South African public sector reveals less and only a strategy as old as 2002. This strategy, which is titled ‘Public service Anti-Corruption Strategy’ (January 2002) is developed by the Department of Public Service and Administration and endeavors to touch on critical aspects of corruption and how it should be handled. Although a strategy can be simply understood as a plan, a ploy or a pattern, Mintzberg (1978:934) classically broadened its definition as ‘interplay between a dynamic environment and bureaucratic momentum, with leadership mediating between the two forces’. This means that a strategy is commonly ex post facto and its formation over time appears to follow some important patterns in organisations, notably life cycles and distinct change-continuity cycles with these; and that the study of interplay between intended and realized strategies may lead to understanding a strategy as a complex organisational process (Mintzberg 1978:934). It is therefore problematic that in South Africa the 2002 Anti-Corruption Strategy of the public sector preceded the enactment of the Prevention and Combating of the Corrupt Activities Act without any follow up to establish or ease the implementation of this legislation. This strategy is therefore conceived as a mere plan and borders outside the arrangement that strategic management is a continuous process which may both precede and follow the enactment of a specific legislation. Therefore, the absence of an implementation strategy post the enactment of the current legislation on corruption forms the crux of this problem statement and confirms that although various approaches and anti-corruption strategies have been useful, they tended to encourage a mechanical view of combating corruption as argued by Habtemichael (2009:253)

THE EMERGENCE OF CORRUPTIONAlthough it is difficult to single out a specific act which amounts to corruption,

Professor Vil-Nkomo in Gildenhuys (2004:1) contends that corruption and its manifestation, when understood in a simplistic way includes acts of bribery, extortion, kickbacks, fraud, forgery, embezzlement or graft. In addition to that, tax administration, government expenditure programmes and other areas of fiscal policy or non-fiscal policy and management are areas where corruption can manifest itself (Martinez-Vazquez, Granado & Boex 2007: ix). In the public sector, reference is often made to some non-fiscal acts such as officials selling their authority for personal benefits outside the realm of fiscal processes which amount to immoral, deprived or dishonest practices of persons (Mafunisa 2000:11).

An example of another type of emergence of corruption is provided by Eicher

185


(2009:8) who refers to the demolition of the former Soviet Union as an example of weakened institution which can lead to proliferation of corrupt activities as well. Historically, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, laws, Codes of Conduct and the government agencies had to be destroyed and re-established and as a result, the new economic graft and rent-seeking opportunities were created during this period (Eicher 2009:8). In the context of South Africa, the period immediately after the first democratic elections can be equated to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although this period cannot be equated to the weakened institution in this country, the population landscape and the political leadership changed tremendously. Those who were previously marginalised were given opportunity to lead and to become part of the economic machinery of this country. In addition, a myriad of changes came to the fore as the apartheid laws had to be disbanded in favour of new and democratic laws. During this transition, many government officials, private sector employees and politicians took an advantage and directed a myriad of resources into their own personal coffers thereby undermining and ridiculing democracy and government, fuelling crime, poverty and associated evils as argued by Basdeo (2010:385). According to Southall (2004:314), democracy had set in motion a rapid mobility whereby propertied and professional sections of the black community gained from advancement and that their relative advantage could easily render such elements anti-ethical to the interests of the poor. Literature, decided court cases and newspaper reports suggests that this trend of corruption still exists twenty years into democracy. For instance, the former National Commissioner of the Police which is just but one example of the public sector, was convicted of corruption in 2010 (Basdeo 2010:385) and this was followed by the removal of his successor, Bheki Cele from the office due to implication in an office rental worth billions of Rands. These reports which implicate the government’s officials and politicians are endless and include the conviction of Tony Yengeni, the sacking of the late Minister of Corporative Governance, Sicelo Shiceka; former Minister of Communications, Dina Pule and many others.

THE RATE OF RECURRENCE OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTORDue to the nature of corruption, it is difficult to measure its occurrence

quantitatively or otherwise. In an act of corruption both the corruptor and the corruptee can be guilty of an offence. This is the reason why people who have been involved actively or passively may not approach the police and report such cases. As a result of this, the most common measurement of corruption is based on the perception other that real numbers of reported cases. However, these reports on perceptions of corruption can be useful as a barometer and in guiding any policy relevant to the prevention and combating of corrupt activities. There is no counter argument to date to the argument that corruption is rife in the various sectors of government including the criminal justice system (Basdeo 2010:385). Corruption




Watch (2013:1) has also painted a daunting picture about the levels of corruption in South Africa generally.

Although this research did not intend to analyse the statistics of corruption, the crux of the matter is that there are few examples of measurements that were conducted and all showed that the South African government is experiencing high levels of corruption. When reflecting on history of South Africa, the former Auditor General, Wronsley (1994:14) revealed that the loss of cash through corruption by the South African government increased from a tiny fraction of 1% in 1990 to more than 15% in 1998. A survey conducted by IDASA in 1996 showed that 46% of those surveyed felt that most officials were involved in corruption and only 6% believed that there was clean government (Lodge 1998:157). In another survey conducted by World Value Survey (1996:41) 15% of the respondents were certain that all public servants were guilty of bribery and corruption whilst another 30% thought most officials were venal. In 2000, South Africa was rated number 34 out of 90 countries as a corrupt country and awarded number 5 on a scale of 10 with 0 being the ‘clean’ and 10 being ‘very corrupt’ (Transparency International 2000). It was further revealed in a survey conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2003 that the South African Police Services was the second most corrupt institution in South Africa after the traffic department (Burton, Du Plessis, Louw, Mistry & Van Vuuren 2003:115). Further than that, the Global Corruption Barometer showed that the general public believed that the police and the judicial system were the most corrupt institutions in the society. In 2010, South Africa was rated as the 54th most corrupt nation out of 178 countries surveyed (Transparency International 2008, 2010). There is no further literature currently which suggests that there has been a down-turn in incidences of corruption between 2010 and 2013.

The statistics on prevalence of corruption in South Africa, amid the passing of anti-corruption legislation provides a justification for this research. Amid all pieces of legislation that ought to prevent or deal with corruption, there is still an upsurge in numbers or at least in perceptions about corruption. It is assumed by this researcher that the implementation of these legislations such as the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and other prescripts of good and clean government may be too complex to comprehend and to implement. There is therefore a need to develop a strategy that can act as guidelines on how to effectively implement these policies or at least compliment the manner in which corruption is being handled in the public sector. These statistics further show that corruption is constituted by transactions or exchanges of public resources and benefits between actors some or all of whom are officials or public representatives (Lodge 1998:158). The following section utilises literature and the theoretical foundation laid earlier to suggest a framework that can be used as a turn-around strategy in dealing with corruption in the criminal justice system.

187


DISCUSSION: A PROPOSED ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK FOR THE PUBLIC SECTORIn this section, an anti-corruption framework or strategy is developed and

proposed for the public sector. This is done in full cognisance of the fact that corruption is in fact more complex and takes on many different forms and guises ranging from abuse of power to outright criminality as alluded to by Basdeo (2010:387). This framework is developed based on the integration of literature and the researcher’s experience as a former practitioner and academic in the criminal justice system. However, the following authorities formed the crux of this exercise of developing and suggesting an anti-corruption strategy for the South African public service:

• The universal model of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong. This model is based on three broad categories of anti-corruption elements, namely, prevention; education and investigation. This model proved to work in Hong Kong as alluded to Heilbrunn (2004:3-4) and Galtung (1998:112),

• Part of the model used by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) of Singapore which proved to be successful despite its covert nature and inaccessibility to public oversight (Meagher 2005:73), and

• The formula of ‘corruption= (monopoly + discretion) minus (accountability +integrity+ transparency) popularised and conceptualised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Klitgaard 1997)

In addition to above authorities, a finer look at literature revealed that there are generally six elements which need to be built into an anti-corruption strategy or framework. These elements are the measurement of public perceptions about corruption (Burton et al 2003; lodge 1998; Transparency International 2008); creation of public awareness about corruption (Treitsman 2000; Lodge 2001; Basdeo 2010); eliminating incentives from corruption (Rubin 2011; Lodge 2001); impose adequate sanctions (Kranacher, Riley & Wells 2011; Basdeo 2010); decrease public bureaucracy (Martini 2013; Lonescu, Lazaroiu & Losif 2012) as well as showing political will to deal with corruption (Lodge 2001; Salihu 2012). The proposed framework is in reaction to the realisation that complex interventions aimed at addressing corruption have proved futile. Due to this complexity of legislation and policies aimed at dealing with corruption, there is also an indication that the implementation of laws and policies aimed at dealing with corruption in the public sector take long to be effective and in certain instances does not take off at all. It was therefore envisaged that this framework will act as an instrument for those charged with the responsibility of preventing and investigating the cases of corruption in the public sector. The following diagrammatic representation summarises the proposed framework for an anti-corruption strategy in the public sector.




Figure 1.1: A proposed framework for an anti-corruption strategy

Source: (Own observation)

Figure 1.1 above reflects an anti-corruption framework and an illustration of six elements of an anti-corruption strategy which emerged through a synthesis of literature on corruption as well as the analysis of the research gap identified earlier. The strategy which is proposed as a set of guidelines for those responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption legislation consists of both the proactive and reactive mechanisms aimed at dealing with corruption. For instance, the elements such as creating awareness, measuring the public perception about corruption and reducing government bureaucracy are preventative in nature as they can be implemented before an act of corruption is perpetrated. This means that in this context, these elements which are proactive in nature can be aimed at changing the culture and the mindset within the criminal public sector as far as corruption is concerned. The second category of elements which includes disincentivising corruption or making it not lucrative, the imposition of sanctions and showing political will to deal with corruption are reactive in that they become more effective as a remedial measure or after an act of corruption has been perpetrated. The expectation of this researcher was that these elements could be able to create erudition on whether the observation of such will be able to satisfy the basic needs relevant to addressing corruption. The categories of reactive and proactive elements emanated directly from the theories that were discussed earlier. It can therefore be argued that dealing with corruption cannot be dealt with adequately

189


only through investigation and apprehension of perpetrators. This is the reason why this proposed framework also encapsulates three main categories of prevention, education and investigation. Corruption needs a change in the cultural make up of any society and a creation of an environment where corruption is seen as a serious societal illness. The mindset of the entire society need to be changed and through disincentivising corruption, the society can be lured to realise that corruption is not lucrative and does not pay. In the next section, the elements of corruption are discussed individually.

Element one: public perceptionsThe first perspective of an anti-corruption strategy is centered on measuring the

public perception about corruption. It is normally the first and the crucial step since it is diagnostic in nature. In order to develop an effective anti-corruption strategy, there is a need to acknowledge that there is a problem as far corruption is concerned. An example of such acknowledgement is contained in Pillay (2004:586) who argues corruption is likely to appear on every observer’s list of factors that threaten to obstruct South Africa’s path towards sustainable development and that rather than diminishing, corruption has proliferated in all segments of the South African national public service. It should be borne in mind that the measurement of public perceptions on corruption may not necessarily provide an accurate measurement thereof but may act as an estimation of how citizens in a particular society feel about the perpetration of corruption. It is imperative that any component of the public sector should seek to establish the level of corruption through the analysis of the perception of the public especially those who are served. However, the understanding of the level of corruption through the public perceptions will become fruitless as a step in addressing corruption if the officials within government deny its prevalence. The spin-doctoring of corruption incidents and the frequent statement that a particular incident is excluded and is perpetrated by few bad officials should not be used to deny the reality as far as the levels of corruption are concerned. Even if the incidents of corruption may seem to be sporadic and excluded, the officials within the public sector must acknowledge that something is wrong and need to be dealt with positively.

There is no evidence that can support any suggestions that the public sector in South Africa have done enough in trying to gauge the public perceptions on corruption. In cases where the independent research bodies provided the research results regarding these perceptions, the government did not readily accept these results and instead such results were normally met with great denial by the government. Apart from low level researches and disintegrated investigations about perceptions of corruption, there are no other clear avenues that the government used to gauge the level of corruption in South Africa and in instances where these measurements were made, such interventions still remained sporadic. Some of the agencies such as Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to mention




but a few, kept on publishing research results indicating public perception about the prevalence of corruption but there is no indication to date that these results were ever appreciated by the government. This is worrisome because according to Basdeo (2010:388) the society has tasked the government officials to be the guardians of the law and not to orchestrate the very evils such as corruption which society expects the government to combat. The second element of an anti-corruption strategy proposed in this research is discussed next.

Element two: public awareness The creation of public awareness about corruption is closely related to the

first element of measuring public perceptions on corruption. In this instance, however, the main focus is to show the public that corruption will not thrive if they do not become passive role-players when corruption is being perpetrated (Basdeo 2010:388). The fight against corruption needs the creation of an ethical environment within the government but also within the communities that are being served. This argument is echoed by Treitsman (2000:401) who submits that the ‘legal culture’ had an impact on the reduction of corruption and that this was more distinct in some of the former British colonies. The creation of awareness is not a persuasive requirement when dealing with corruption in the public service. It is a mandatory constitutional matter because Section 16 of the Constitution provides that every person shall have a right to freedom of expression which includes, inter alia, the freedom to receive or impart information (Cassim 2013:6). Awareness can potentially create an ethical environment as pointed out by Treitsman (2000:401). It is therefore argued that the creation of an ethical environment call for a continuous education and mobilisation which should create awareness on ethical values, the damages caused by unethical behaviour such as corruption and the benefits of ethics in government and in the society at large.

The usage of platforms such as non-governmental monitoring, anti-corruption hotlines and a general civic participation are useful tools in an attempt to implement this element of public awareness in the anti-corruption strategy. Corruption Watch launched by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is an example of such civic and non-governmental intervention. The creation of awareness about corruption seems to be a known factor by the government but the implementation of such has been mired in troubles and the chameleon pace at which this element is unfolding. The slow pace at which this element is unfolding can be illustrated by an incident during the Mbeki administration. At that point, the Mbeki administration intended and resolved to roll out a massive educational campaign against corruption in South Africa. The basic tenants of this campaign which included ‘zero tolerance’, ‘total war’, and ‘morale submits’ were a step towards a right direction in making the public aware of the losses and disadvantages of corruption on the society in general. However, this campaign did not succeed due to resource challenges and it was followed by Public Service Commission public campaigns aimed at reinforcing the ‘fear of detection punishment’. However,

191


some of the failures of these campaigns including the 1999 resolution of the Anti-Corruption Summit and the creation of Anti-Corruption Forum are revealed by Lodge (2001:58) who blames the modest resources allocated to these campaigns. The third element of an anti-corruption strategy is making corruption unprofitable and is discussed next.

Element three: disincentivisationAccording to Lodge (2001:60), with the government’s retreat from the ‘dirigiste’

models of public administration favoured under apartheid, the proliferation of privatisation and the contracting out of what were exclusively government’s functions, the government’s regulatory functions have expanded rapidly, well beyond its administrative capacity. This loophole in the regulation of private work performed for government requires an anti-corruption strategy which will make corruption unprofitable. It is a tedious and lengthy engagement to investigate corruption, apprehend perpetrators and recover the losses suffered by the government and this makes corruption to be lucrative to the perpetrators. The anti-corruption strategy should contain remedial measures which are structured in such a way that the punishment meted out to those found guilty of corruption becomes deterrence to the prospective fraudsters. It is therefore submitted that disincentivising corruption is a hallmark and an important facet of any anti-corruption strategy. This statement does not suggest that the rights of the citizens should be ignored when these acts of corruption are punished. This will be inconsistent with the Constitution. The Constitution imposes a duty on the state and all its organs not to perform any act that infringes the entrenched rights such as the right to life, human dignity and the freedom and the security of a person (Cassim 2013:6). This right was also confirmed in the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (10) BLCR 995 (cc) 44.

There are different ways in which corruption can be made unprofitable in South Africa. The first approach is to eradicate the tendering system and replace that with a system where the different government departments become responsible for provision of certain services such as the building of road infrastructure, provision of water and cleaning as well as maintenance of public buildings. Lodge (2001:60) submits that in certain countries, the political office bearers are paid more money so that they are not easily lured into corruption. Experience has shown that a lot of corruption takes place during procurement of services from the private companies. Statistics have shown that most of the money lost to corruption happens during tendering and the procurement of services. For instance, the Special Investigating Unit claimed that the R10 Billion worth of fraud that it was investigating in 1998 only represented 5% of the total cost of corruption. The very same trend of procurement fraud was also experienced in the delivery of low-cost housing to an extent that this have drawn comments and concern of the former Minister of Human Settlement, Tokyo Sexwale (Rubin 2011:483). Similar mechanisms can be used in the South African government with the intention of curbing the recurrence




of corruption. The sacking of the former National Commissioner of the Police, Bheki Cele related to procurement and the conduct that was found to be improper by the public protector.

Element four: SanctionsVisible sanctions are based on the premise that deterrence is accomplished

through a variety of efforts associated with internal controls and ethic programs that create a workplace of integrity and encourage employees to report potential wrongdoing (Kranacher, Riley & Wells 2011:13). In the case of an anti-corruption strategy in the government, sanctions which are equivalent to the infringement can provide deterrence for the prospective corrupt officials. However, the imposition of sanctions cannot become effective if not coupled with public awareness and awareness to the officials within the public service. This means that the media can play a role in disseminating information about those who have been convicted and sentenced for corruption. If the reports are only made available during the early phase of the cases without proper follow-ups, the society and the other officials will not be able to appreciate the consequences of corruption. Due to the legislation and Constitution in South Africa, it is worth noting that the definition of what constitutes a sanctionable practice may change over the years as alluded to by Dubois and Nowlan (2010:17). There are cases where literature indicates that certain sanctions meted out after the perpetration of corruption are not proportional to the losses suffered. In certain instances, the punishment is often very light and not justified given the amount involved in a particular case of corruption. Since the theories of dealing with corruption suggests two alternatives in punishing those guilty of corruption, visible sanctions means criminalising some of the activities which are dealt with through internal departmental disciplinary procedures. Different means of punishment such as criminal sanctions, dismissals and recovery of losses from the individual’s assets must be meted out. The anti-corruption strategy cannot be regarded as effective if it is not visible, or the wheels of justice are grinding at the lowest pace and most of those accused of corruption escape unscathed due to prolonged criminal justice processes. The next element of an anti-corruption strategy is the reduction of red tape and reduction of government bureaucracy.

Element five: Bureaucracy Reducing bureaucracy has a tendency of improving administrative regulations

and most importantly, reduction in bureaucracy improves transparency and accountability (Martini 2013:11). The argument advanced in this research is that a lot of red tape and a bureaucratic institution breed corruption. This is exacerbated by the possibility that it may become difficult to identify the exact point where corruption took place if there is a long list of officials in the government who were involved in a particular process. An example is when the officials want to procure a particular service and such an application is given to numerous officials who have to approve. It is within such long lists of officials that some may take advantage of

193


the system and get involved in corruption. An ideal situation is that there must be a clear line between the political leadership and the managers within the public sector.

Apart from the benefits derived generally from an effective anti-corruption strategy, there are benefits of openness and transparency in tackling corruption in the public sector and this relates to bureacratisation and the failure of bureaucratic systems (Lonescu, Lazaroiu & Losif 2012:665). It is common cause that in an bureaucratic institution, there will be a delay in implementation of decisions including the completion of internal disciplinary actions which are possible after employees or officials within an institution have committed an act of corruption. It is also common cause that such delay cannot reflect a healthy state of affairs since corruption is an act of dishonesty which requires an immediate removal of those who have been caught. It is therefore factual that an institution with a heavy hierarchical structure may not be able to expedite the investigation and completion of cases of corruption. Finally, the political leadership in the criminal justice system must be seen to be dealing with corruption and this forms part of the elements of an anti-corruption strategy.

Element six: Political willThe leaders within the management echelons government must set an example

when it comes to dealing with corruption. This is more important when it comes to political leadership who should speak against corruption and be seen to be acting against the perpetration of corruption. The political leadership in government and other enterprises of government cannot keep on claiming that they believe in the clean government and working towards such if there is no clear indication of political will to turn the tide against corruption in South Africa. The establishment of different agencies and development of policies and strategies aimed at dealing with corruption cannot suffice if senior government officials continue to criticise the decisions of the courts and other tribunals when their colleagues are involved in corruption. In certain instances the judges are being labeled counter-revolutionary if their decisions seem to contradict the aspirations of those who are politically connected and in the upper echelons of government. This effort of an Anti-Corruption programme is therefore creating mixed feelings in South Africa because the government reiterates the willingness to deal with corruption while at the same time the comments of senior government officials undermine the same political will. Unfortunately, all negative moves by the political leadership in criticising the outcomes of independent bodies overshadow all efforts by the government to succeed in establishing a profound anti-corruption strategy.

In trying to demonstrate acts which undermine the political will to deal with corruption, Lodge (2001:62-63) summarises the actions of the government leaders which contradicts the political will to deal with corruption:

• In 1999, the Minister of Energy, Penuel Maduna lashed out at the Auditor




General and concluded that Auditor General had grossly misrepresented the accounts of the Strategic Fuel Fund. Although these allegations by the Minister were proved to be untrue later, no withdrawal was ever forthcoming from the then Minister,

• In the same year, the South African courts were lambasted by the African National Congress through its spokesperson, Smuts Ngonyama who questioned the integrity and the level of transformation of these courts. This was after Allan Boesak, the then ANC leader was found guilty of embezzling the monies of the charity organisation he was heading. Ngonyama alluded that Boesak’s main sin was his ‘lack of accounting skills’. As if that was not enough an attack by the senior politicians on the corruption busting mechanisms, Ngonyama went further and accused the Appeals Court as being totally biased after Boesak’s conviction was confirmed,

• In 1999, the Mpumalanga News (1989) ran an interesting story of the reappointment of the disgraced members of the Executive Council (MEC’s). These MEC’s were previously implicated in earlier corruption scandals. Although the then premier of Mpumalanga, Ndaweni Mahlangu said the people he had chosen were ‘the best team’, this was a setback in the fight against corruption,

• In addition to these acts which contradict the political will to deal with corruption, the issue of political appointments, secrecy about electioneering funding and the retention as well as open praises about some of the Director Generals despite revelations about their involvement in corruption amount to a shadow which obscures political will of the South African government in dealing with corruption. The Director General of Home Affairs, Albert Mokoena was praised by the Minister, Mangusuthu Buthelezi as the ‘competent and capable person’ amid the findings that he unlawfully sponsored his private basketball team using state funds. The same happened with the Director-General of Correctional Services, Khulekani Sithole who was defended by his Minister, Ben Skosana.

Although the few examples given thus far may be contradicted by other good moves by the government, the crux of the matter is that the political will in dealing with corruption must be clear and consistent. It must be seen and followed both in letter and spirit. It is against this background that it is concluded that the political will in dealing with corruption by the government is tainted, skewed, inconsistent, minimal and less visible.

CONCLUSIONSPope Francis of the Catholic Church once said “corruption is worse than

other sins, because when it becomes a habit it hardens the heart”. The afore-said statement raises the fact of the multi-dimensional and complex nature that corruption tends to assume. In addition, it reveals that legislation alone cannot be

195


effective in addressing the scourge of corruption in the South African public service and elsewhere. Therefore, during synthesis, literature and above discussions reveal that there is a need for a uniform and comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy which should be developed by the Public Service Commission. While such a Public Service Anti- Corruption Strategy (January 2002) developed by the Department of Public Service and Administration exists, it does not encapsulate some of the elements of an effective strategy such as the political will, reduction of bureaucracy and disincentivisation of corruption. Compounding this loophole is the realization that this strategy did not come as a result of the latest legislation on corruption, to wit, The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act which only came into effect in 2004. Although it may remain debatable, a strategy should be deduced from a piece of legislation and deal with the nitty-gritty’s of how such legislation will be implemented. In the case of South Africa, this was not the case and a strategy became a plan which later influenced the enactment of the legislation dealing with corruption. It is founded that although there are positive aspects such as the establishment of several corruption busting bodies, enactment of anti-corruption legislations such as The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, Act 12 of 2004 and the recently launched non-governmental Corruption Watch of COSATU, the level of corruption in the country continue to reach epidemic levels.

The results of the analysis in this conceptual research therefore suggest that an anti-corruption strategy should encompass all elements referred to in Figure 1.1 which are able to reinforce each other. These elements which can be broadly categorised into prevention, investigation and education as is the case with the Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) provide the following lessons:

• That an Anti-Corruption Strategy in practice is messier and not linear as depicted in the Figure 1.1.,

• That the fight against corruption cannot be seen as a one strike but a dynamic phenomenon as corrupt people and organisations keep on employing new tactics over a period of time, and

• That once a fight against corruption is won, it does not stay there forever but it may deteriorate as a result of complacency. This is the reason why an effective anti-corruption strategy looks like a cycle which does not reach a destination.

It is recommended that the fight against corruption should include both the traditional and modern methods and should attempt to change the mindsets of those who are employed in public service and those who are having relationships with different public entities and departments. This is the reason why the proposed model also proposes the engagement of the public and everyone else who is somehow a stakeholder in the government sphere. It is envisaged that once the public is aware of the vicious impact of corruption on service delivery and the economy of South Africa in general, there will be a turning point in their




involvement in corrupt activities. The reality is that it will be difficult for public officials and political leadership to commit corruption in the absence of external stakeholders. This will also curb the incentives associated with corruption and the political will to deal with corruption will become more visible and certainly part of the anti-corruption strategy.

In conclusion, there is sufficient legislation and policy framework to deal with corruption. The biggest problem is therefore relating to lack of implementation of such legislation and the lack of all encompassing strategy aimed at addressing corruption at the national level. Secondary to this conclusion, the Anti-Corruption Strategy adopted by the government fell short of being effective as some of the important facets and elements were compromised, ignored and not implemented. An anti-corruption strategy is a set of action which must all be observed equally if any democracy is truly committed to addressing corruption and its repercussions on service delivery, political stability and the well being of the entire country. It is clear from the preceding discussion that some of the elements were observed whilst others remained to chance. The events which have been reported in the myriad of media are justifications of this conclusion. The desire of the government to deal with corruption is characterized by opacity, confusion and capriciousness which exacerbate the picture regarding the government’s will to thwart corruption and reverse its adverse impact on the ordinary citizens. As pointed out by Lodge (1998:161), although about fifteen years ago, it is the submission of this author that twenty years into our democracy, the South African government is still haunted by bureaucratic secrecy, the absence of mutual surveillance procedures by government agencies, protracted rule by one political party or an ageing one Party dominant system, administrative inefficiency, complicated hierarchical decision-making procedures which create lengthy delays and extensive patterns of political appointment in the civil service. All these enemies are adverse to any anti-corruption strategy and leave marginal opportunity for all corruption fighting mechanisms to succeed.

LIST OF REFERENCESBansal, S.C. 2004. Invisible wound. New Delhi: Panchsheel Park.Basdeo, V. 2010. The curse of corruption in the South African Police: A rot from within.

South African Journal of Criminal Justice 17(3): 385-400.Burton, P; Du Plessis, A; Louw, A; Mistry, D & Van Vuuren, H. 2003. National victims

of crime survey: South Africa 2003, ISS monograph series 101: Pretoria: institute for security Studies.

Cassim, F. 2013. Formulating adequate legislation to address cyber-bullying: Has the law kept pace with advancing technology? South African Journal of Criminal Justice 22(1): 1-20.

CorruptionWatch. 2013. Local government the weakest link. From http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/%E280%98local [accessed 13 May 2013].

Cronin, J. 1996. Thinking about the concept ‘National Democratic Revolution”, Umrabulo, 4.

197

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationDubois, P.H. & Nowlan A.E. 2010. Global administrative law and the legitimacy of

sanction regimes in International law. The Yale Journal of International Law Online. Vol 36: 15-25.

Eicher, S. 2009. Corruption in International business: The challenge of cultural and legal diversity. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Eide, E; Rubin, P.H & Shepherd, J.M. 2006. Economics of crime. Hanover: now Publishers

Galtung, F. 1998. Criteria for sustainable corruption control. European Journal of Development Research, 10 (1): 105-128.

Gildenhuys, S.H. Ethics and professionalism. Stellenbosch: Sunpress.Habtemichael, F.S. 2009. Anti-corruption strategies in the South African public

sector-perspectives on the contribution of complexity thinking and ICT’s. PhD Thesis, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.

Heilbrunn, J.R. 2004. Anti-corruption commissions panacea or real medicine to fight corruption? Available on http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources (accessed 14 February 2014)

Jordan, P. 1997. The national question in post 1994 South Africa: A discussion paper in preparation for the ANC’s 50th National conference. Available on www.anc.org/ancdocs/discussion/natquestion.html. Accessed 14 January 2012

Klitgaard, R. 1997. Cleaning up and invigorating the public service. Public Administration and Development, 17 (5): 487-509

Kranacher, M., Riley, R. & Wells, J.T. 2011. Forensic accounting and fraud examination. New York: ACFE

Lodge, T. 1998. Political corruption in South Africa. Journal of African Affairs, 97(3). Lodge, T. 2001. Countering public corruption in South Africa. Available at http://

archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20journals/pdfs. Accessed 15 January 2012. Lonescu, L., Lazaroiu, G. & Losif, G. 2012. Corruption and bureaucracy in public

services. The AMFITEATRU Economic Journal 14 (6): 665-679.Mafunisa, M.J. 2000. Public service ethics. Kenwyn: Juta & Co.Martinez-Vazquez, J., Granado, J.A & Boex, J. 2007. Fighting corruption in the public

sector. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Martini, M. 2013. Reducing bureaucracy and corruption affecting small and medium

enterprises. Available on http://www.u4.no/publications/reducing-bureacracy-and-corruption (accessed 14 February 2014).

Meagher, P. 2005. Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric versus reality. The Journal of Policy Reform, 8 (1): 69-103.

Mintzberg, H. 1978. Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science 24(9): 934-948.

Petherick, W.A.; Turvey, B.E. & Ferguson, C.E. 2010. Forensic Criminology. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Pillay, S. 2004. Corruption-the challenge to good governance: A South African perspective. The International Journal of Public Sector Management, 17 (7): 586-605.

Public Service Commission. 2002. A review of South Africa’s National Anti-Corruption Report, Annexure 3. Pretoria: PSC.

Randall, D.J. 1996. Prospects for the development of a black business class in South Africa. The journal of modern African studies, 34(4).

Salihu, G. Fighting corruption: Effective examples from surprising places. Available from: http://politicsinspires.org (accessed 14 February 2014).

Scott, J. 2000. Rational choice theory. From http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationsocscot7.htm (accessed 17 June 2013).

Shar, A. 2007. Public Sector Governance: Performance accountability and combating corruption. Washington: The World Bank.

Siebert, H. 2008. Economics of the environment: Theory and policy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Southall, R. 2004. The ANC and black capitalism in South Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 31(2).

Transparency International. 2008. Corruption perception index. Available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008. Accessed 15 January 2012.

Treisman, D. 2000. The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76.

Wronsley, R.P. 1994. Controlling corruption. SAIPA Journal of Public Administration, 29(1).

199


LEADERSHIP, ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

M.D.J. MatshabaphalaGraduate School of Public and Development Management

University of the Witwatersrand

ABSTRACT

Developments on the public and national discourse landscape are suggestive of the imperative of a much more professional public service. This paper however does acknowledge that there are pockets of excellence

in the public service, more especially where professionalism is concerned. This paper is an attempt to further provide the guidelines that will inform the content of the profesionalisation initiative. One of the dimensions is that of the need for the public servants to provide leadership at all levels of the public service. This paper further seeks to add to the leadership imperative in the professionalisation of the public service, appropriate models of ethics that are relevant to the social order of the age confirmed. This paper concludes by way of suggesting areas of improvement in leadership development for professionalisation.

INTRODUCTIONThe emerging and growing narrative in the public service discourse is on the

imperative of the professionalisation of the public service. This discourse resonates with what is seen as the escalation of deficits in the professionalism infrastructure in some areas of the public service. This paper however, would like to commence with an appreciative reflection, as an entry point into this discourse.

An appreciative take on behaviours in the public service does in some instances present high levels of professionalism and pockets of excellence. This is particularly moreso, that there are public servants who are providing leadership and high ethical standards at different levels of their work stations. This is with reference to those who do rightly provide leadership in the senior echelons of their departments. There are also those who are providing leadership even though they are in the lower rungs of their departments. This paper in the subsequent discussions illustrates the relationship between leadership and professionalism.

Closely related to the afore-mentioned is the ethical imperative in the professionalisation initiative. Still on the impulses of the appreciative reflection, it emerges that, there are those public servants who, in keeping with the professionalism imperative, demonstrate ethical conduct, in the course of the delivery of services.

M.D.J. Matshabaphala



The concept of ethics or ethical conduct, dovetails tightly, in more ways than one with professionalism and the need for professionalisation, more especially in the identified potential areas of improvement on the professionalism infrastructure in the public service, as it puts more premiums on human behaviour. One of the most pronounced positions in the professionalisation of the public service discourse is that of the imperative of ethically committed public service cadres (Sisulu, 2013:6).The discourse on the profesionalisation of the public service is seen as a call for the lifting of ethical standards in the public service.

ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISATIONThe general concerns raised on the behaviours in the public service, in more

ways than one, point to, as stated earlier, an escalation of deficits on the ethical and professionalism infrastructure. The concept ethics, is traceable to the six main branches of philosophy, which are all related to this discussion. The said branches are; metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics and axiology. Briefly, metaphysics, with its attendant sub-divisions of ontology and cosmology, is in part, concerned with human nature. At a certain point this paper reflects on human behavior and human nature in the public service. This paper, is concerned with a certain type of cadre, with a certain type of behavioural ethos and personal philosophy of leadership. Various contributions are being made on the types of characteristics and competencies that are required in the public servant and the public service of the future, by both the practitioner and the academic community. This is with a view to suggesting the basic principles of ethics that will guide the professionalisation initiative. The basic principles that are emerging in the professionalisation discourse are also found to be the basic principles and characteristics of what passes as leadership.

The concept epistemology has to do with the philosophical study of knowledge. For the purpose of this paper, it is a matter of the kind of knowledge that is required to herald professionalism in the public service. This is also with reference to the kind of knowledge and content that will need to be built into the curriculum of the programmes of the National School of Government. The concept of axiology on the other hand is concerned with the philosophical study of values. In the context of this paper, it is the values that serve as a source of authority for the public service and the values that lead to the enhancement of the professionalisation project. The source of authority can come in the form of a public servant’s attitude to fellow colleagues and the members of the public. The family, also, is viewed as a person’s source of authority. The same applies to culture, religion and politics, as they do in several ways influence a person’s behaviour in a multiplicity of spaces.

The notion ethics, as a philosophical study of human behaviour, draws heavily from the related branches of philosophy such as metaphysics, aesthetics and axiology in the formulation of ethical theory. The relevance of ethical theory and discourse forms the basis of the professionalisation project in the public service.

201


The discourse on professionalisation reveals a concern with the current behaviours of some people in the public service. The discourse on professionalisation in the public service is further found to be normative in the sense that beyond description, there is a prescription of diverse ethical theories and models for consideration (Adair:2013;10).

Some of the most pronounced orientations in the behaviours in the public service such as egoism, altruism and the categorical imperative, find their way in the discussions in this paper. The concept of egoism in this discussion is found to be closely related to some of the problematic behaviours in the public service. One of the major attributes of this orientation is that of self- interest, as in behaviours of those officials who believe that they are more important, as individuals, than the service itself. Such conduct is often times found to be deficient when it comes to the discharge of responsibilities in the public service. Altruism, as one of the orientations in ethics, is found to be in resonance with what is desirable in the professionalisation of the public service. Altruism has to do with the public servants’ commitment to producing the greatest good to the largest number of people, even with limited resources (Andrew, 2013:16). There are a lot of men and women in the public service who have stepped up to the plate and gave their all at the altars of service delivery in the public service, and they continue to be the personification of the ethical orientation of altruism in the public service.

At the base of the various theories of ethics and leadership are the basic principles of ethics, which can be of relevance in the professionalisation initiative. The said principles are those of; the principle of the value of life (Community of life). This principle has to do with the public servants’ commitment to the enhancement of the quality of a people’s lives and all other species that they share this planet with. The other principle is that of the promotion of goodness over badness, and also those of justice and fairness and truth-telling and honesty. It is with the contextualisation and refinement of the ethical principles in the public service that we will have an enhancement of professionalism in the public service. Being professional in more ways than one means being ethical. Simple etiquette, in a public servant’s discharge of his or her responsibilities resonates with the basic principle of the promotion of goodness over badness.

LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONALISATIONInterest in the concept of leadership has led to a myriad of definitions of

this notion. There is a growing body of knowledge and also contributions to the knowledge of the concept of leadership. The definitions that inform discussions in this paper are those of leadership as having to do with making the world a better place for others. Great men and women the world over, have left a legacy or are continuing to live a legacy, through their commitment to making the world a better place for others and even for those people that they have never met. We had in our recent past, iconic symbols of leadership like Nelson Mandela and Mother




Theresa. Research reveals that there are those professional public servants who are committed to making the world a better place for others (Jarvalt, 2013:5).This observation is read and understood in the context of the impulses of the ethical doctrine and orientation of altruism. The majority of public servant in the new order, comes from the liberation struggle traditions, where they were socialised into the virtues of altruism. There are those who still stick to the principles and traditions they were socialised into. But then again, as stated earlier on, there are those who have become a liability to the project of delivering services to the people of this country. This paper further asserts that leadership is defined as empowerment, given that it has to do with getting the best out of others. This is where, once again, the School of Government comes in handy, as it has to empower and resource the public servants onto the higher pedestals of professionalism in the public service. This paper further adds that leadership is about the behaviors that other people notice, and also how in these behaviours, members of the public service handle relationships with the clientele community. Professional conduct, therefore, and in the context of this paper, has to do with the public servants behaving in an ethical manner and also giving leadership in the discharge of responsibilities in the public service.

As stated earlier on in this paper, we do have those men and women in the public service who through their behaviours, truly are the ambassadors of the public service. This observation is attributable to the high levels of professionalism in the way that they conduct themselves and the way they deliver public goods to the members of the public (Armstrong, 2013:20).

THEORIES OF LEADERSHIPThe history of the theories of leadership inevitably shares the origins of the

concept of the philosophy of leadership. Out of the numerous philosophical inquiries, it emerges that most of the theories of leadership are in many ways related to the findings and postulates in psychology. The interests of philosophy and psychology in leadership are in both the domains of human nature and human behavior. On the frontier of human nature, there is interest in why certain people behave in certain ways. This is with reference to both those who present desirable behaviours in their discharge of their responsibilities and those whose behaviours are undesirable to both the employer and the clientele community.

One such theory is that of Theory X and Theory Y of Douglas McGregor. In so far as theory X is concerned, it is established that some people in the workplace just don’t like doing their work and they will do everything they can, to avoid it. These are the types of people who do not want to take responsibility. Research further reveals that we do have public servants who present such attributes. In the theory Y domain, we come across people to whom professionalism and taking of responsibility comes naturally. Once again, research reveals that we do have such people in the public service. These are the public servants that can serve as role

203


models in the professionalisation initiative (Groenewald, 2013:2).We also have the Facilitative Theory of Leadership. In this theory, it is maintained

that the business of leadership is to continually facilitate movement towards high performance, taking of responsibility and professionalism. It is however, acknowledged in this theory that some people are already there, in the space and universe of giving leadership and showing high levels of professionalism. The South African public service universe does have this kind of people.

Studies in psychology, more especially in the public service present us with scenarios of both the desirable and undesirable behaviours. Questions as to why some people behave in certain ways, find some of the answers in the studies in psychology, in which studies, confirmation is made, that some people are good by nature and others a vexation to the social order. The public service milieu also presents a similar scenario, where we come across good and well-behaved men and women in the public service and those who are a liability.

Closely related to the professionalisation project in the public service is the Theory of the Anatomy of Leadership. Bell (2006) argues in this theory that professionalisation is possible through presenting a balance in both character and competence. The call for the enhancement of professionalism comes across as a call for men and women of character and competence in the public service. Some of the most pronounced desirable qualities for character in the public service are found to be qualities such as; patriotism, humility, caring, positive attitude, respect, temperance, amiability, and considerateness. These are found to be the qualities that can be built into the content of the professionalisation interventions in the public service. This further suggests that professionalism does find expression in a balance between both character and competence. On the competence front it is further postulated that public servants need to develop the competence for self-regulation and management. In today’s leadership parlance it is referred to as emotional intelligence. Still on competence, it is suggested that public servants need to improve on their skills to work with their fellow colleagues and handling of relationships with the members of the public. For professionalisation of the public service, the public servants need to develop a well-defined philosophy of leadership with a very clear moral compass (Bell, 2006:10).

LEADERSHIP, ETHICS AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTUREWith the development of leadership and public service ethos, it is possible

that the organisational culture in the public service can significantly be enhanced. Professionalisation is meant for the enhancement of a professional organisational culture in the delivery of services. There is a need for leadership that demonstrates a balance in character and competence in the public service. It is possible that once people start to provide leadership in their work stations, the barriers and handicaps on professionalism in the public service can be removed. Professionalisation entails




the tackling of personal leadership handicaps and the refinement of the skills and capacity to work with other human beings. This is with reference to colleagues in the workplace and also with the interactions with the clientele community. There is a need for high levels of professionalism in the course of the delivery of service, and in the organisational culture (Groenewald, 2013:4).

PROFESSIONALISATION AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENTThe Grand National Narrative of the new and evolving social order in more

ways than one, informs the National Development Plan. Some of the issues highlighted in the National Development Plan are issues such as the imperative of the enhancement of institutional capacity for improvements in the delivery of services. This will entail the development of new programmes, more especially in the National School Government initiatives for capacity building. The envisaged new programmes will need to be predicated on the impulses and imperatives of building a competent and professional public service. Leadership development programmes in the human resource development programmes; need to accentuate the importance of ethical conduct in the course of the delivery of services. Successes in this kind of intervention will find expression in leadership and professionalism in service delivery. These interventions will be a recognition of people as strategic resource in the public service.

CONCLUSIONIn conclusion, this paper is of the view that professionalisation in the public

service is possible through leadership development and the development of the public service ethos. Leadership development is seen as a journey, both inward and outward. The inward leg of the journey refers to the need for people in the public service to focus on character development, specifically focusing on leadership qualities alluded to in this paper such as; patriotism, humility, care, respect for others, temperance and considerateness, among others. Still on the inward leg, it is important for the professionalisation initiative for the public servants to improve on their leadership competencies; ranging from the personal leadership competencies and of course public leadership competencies. On the ethics front, this paper is of the view that the professionalisation initiative in the public service requires a public service cadre immersed in altruism, and the attendant utilitarianism. As it were, there is a need for creation of an enabling environment for people in the public service to provide leadership through modeling the way and setting an example for professionalism. There are men and women in the public service who are ready to be of assistance to the professionalisation initiative.

LIST OF REFERENCES Achor, S.2010. The Happiness Advantage. London: Virgin Books.

205

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationAdair, J. 2013. Confucius on Leadership. London: MacMillan Publishers Limited.Andrew, J.H.C. 2013. Ethics, A Simple Matter. The Star. 6 June 2013.Armstrong, G.2013. Great Leaders Serve Followers, www.leadershipplatform.com

(accessed 20 June 2013).Armstrong, G.2013. Hallmarks of a Credible Leader. www.leadershipplatform.com

(accessed 20 June 2013).Bell, A. 2006. Great Leadership. London: Davies-Black Publishing.Farrel, B.2013. The Ten Best Decisions a Leader Can Make. Eugene, Oregon: Harvest

House Publishers.Groenewald, L. 2013. Attitude Determines Attitude. www.leadershipplatform.com

(accessed 20 June 2013).Jarvalt, J. 2013. What does Professionalisation of Public Service mean to Estonia Top

Officials. Estonia. University of Tartu. Kotter, J.P.2006. Our Iceberg is Melting. London: MacMillan Publishers Limited.Mckeown, M, 2012. The Strategy Book. London: Pearson.Sisulu, L. 2013. Striving for a Professional Public Administration. The Star. 6 June 2013.Ziglar, Z. 2012. Life Promises for Leaders. Carol Streams, Illinois: Tyndal House

Publishing.




ENGAGEMENT OF THE LEPHALALE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY AND ITS COMMUNITY ON WATER SERVICES: A

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

V. Mbeki & K. PhagoTurfloop Graduate School of LeadershipUniversity of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

The apartheid government of prior 1994 prioritised community needs and service provision on a racial basis. The subsequent post-1994 regime has made attempts to introduce new policies and laws which geared towards

correcting the legacy of apartheid system. In particular, sections 26 and 27 of the South African Constitution, 1996 introduced changes and improvements which emphasises on “the rights of citizens to basic services such as health care, food, social security, housing, education, water, sanitation and information in an equitable manner”. Accordingly, municipalities are required to work closely with the local communities, in order to identify the community needs and the current state of resources and infrastructure. In complying with this legislative mandate, Lephalale Local Municipality as a Water Service Authority has developed a Water Services Development Plan (WSDP) which was adopted by the Council in 2009. The purpose for the development of this WSDP is to guide all the planning and implementation of water services within the municipal area. This means that issues, objectives and projects developed during the IDP process formed part of the WSDP. According to Integrated Development Plan (IDP), 2013 – 2016, Lephalale Local Municipality has a duty to provide water to its population estimated at 115 746 living within urban, peri-urban and rural areas of jurisdiction and also as Water Service Authority has a duty to all customers and potential customers within its area of jurisdiction to progressively ensure efficient, affordable, economic and sustainable access to water in terms of section 11 of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997. The IDP process also provides a platform for the citizens to engage regarding services rendered to them including water services. The question that this paper raises is whether those IDP processes for community engagement are effective and that participation of the citizens is achieved. In order to address this question, the paper maintains a conceptual analysis of the Lephalale Local Municipality engagement processes. Further, several of the municipal official documents are analysed to understand the conception and practice of how engagement is viewed. This methodological approach is undertaken as an attempt to understand the methods of engagement between Lephalale Local Municipality and its local community. The paper finally argues that since municipalities have a responsibility to promote social and economic development for its people, evidence of effective and continuous engagement activities with its local communities should be accounted for.

207


INTRODUCTIONThe history of South Africa prior 1994, gives one a clear understanding that

during that during the apartheid regime, the then government ensured that development was considered only for the areas of a particular colour rather than for all South African citizens, however after 1994 transitional arrangements took place towards the democratising public service system. During this transitional period new policies, laws, strategies and frameworks were drafted in order to affirm and complement the new transforming South Africa, which focuses mainly on the development of the previously disadvantaged communities. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005), provides for an institutional framework for the three spheres of government to facilitate coherent government, effective provision of service, monitoring implementation of policy and legislation, and realisation of developmental goals of government as a whole. The Section 40 (1) of the Republic of South African Constitution of 1996 states that government is constituted as three spheres the national, provincial and local spheres which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.

These three spheres have different mandatory but complementary roles with regard to economic development of the country and also to render services to the citizens. This paper focuses on the role of local government in engaging the local communities in its own jurisdiction. The government spheres were meant to enhance the positive relationship between the citizens and the government because of the daily interaction especially at a local government. In essence, the role of local government ensures that services are rendered to the citizens, and resources are accessible to citizens, and they also perform local regulation on behalf of the other spheres of government. Since local government sphere functions closer to citizens it should easily identify local needs, the current state of resources and infrastructure as well as the available capacity within the community. This paper discusses the integrated development planning process undertaken within the Lephalale Local Municipality as a Water Service Authority. This is in line with the legal mandate for local municipalities to engage local communities in executing the water services provision. In addressing this issue, this paper discusses a brief climate situation in relation to its water conditions and its constitutional mandate. Further, the role of Department of Water Affairs (DWA) on water services and community engagement and the Lephalale Local Municipality are outlined. In the final analysis, recommendations and conclusion are drawn.

CLIMATE CONDITION OF LEPHALALE LOCAL MUNICIPAL AREALephalale Local Municipality is situated within the Mokolo River Catchment

and this is critical to the economic development because of the availability of water. An adequate supply of available water could make a significant contribution

V. Mbeki & K. Phago



to economic and social development in Lephalale Local Municipality. This municipality also has the largest direct dry-cooling power station in the world, Matimba and Medupi power station. According to its Integrated Development Plan (IDP), 2013 – 2016, Lephalale Municipality is named after the local river, a tributary of the Limpopo River, which has been the source of life to the people of this area since ages ago. This Municipality is situated in the NorthWestern part of Limpopo Province where it borders other local municipalities of Thabazimbi, Modimolle, Mogalakwena and Blouberg Municipalities. It is a gateway to Botswana and it borders (Botswana) to the west with four international border posts: Stockpoort, Groblersbrug, Zanzibar and Platjan. Lephalale Local Municipality has a population of about 115 746, which make up 29 880 households. In essence, it is a predominantly rural municipality with 38 villages, two townships (Marapong and Onverwacht) and one growing town called Lephalale. According to the Lephalale Local Municipality Integrated Development Plan (IDP), 2012 – 2013 “The Lephalale area falls in the summer rainfall region with an average annual rainfall of 350 to 400 mm. During summer time average sunshine duration is 65%, and the temperature varies around 32 degrees centigrade.

The summer evening temperatures are moderate. The sunshine duration throughout the winter months is as high as 80% while the temperature varies around 21 degrees centigrade” which means that this is a very hot area therefore effective water services provision is critical as the demands would be generally higher. Therefore Lephalale Local Municipality has a mandate to provide water services to the population stated above. However the government whether nationally, provincially or locally currently is faced with challenges of service provision which satisfy all the needs of the local communities. South African Constitution that was enacted in 1996 as the supreme law of the country emphasises on the rights of citizens to basic services such as health care, food, social security, housing, education, water, sanitation and information in an equitable manner as clearly articulated in Sections 26 & 27. Community has a very important role to play in water services because it affect their livelihood, economic, environmental and also their social status, therefore local government (municipalities) is expected to educate the public about their role and the policies that governs them and that will ultimately assist local government not to find policy implementation, regulation and enforcement of those policies strenuous but that would assist to mainitain common understanding on the policy intentions (White Paper on Local Government, 1998:27). In this regard, the question of democratric and accountable government remains necessary for local government sphere to ensure a proper provision of services in line with Section 152 of the South African Constitution of 1996. There has been anecdotal evidence that there is limited engagement between local government and the communities hence, if any, hence this paper seeks to explore that relationship between these key actors, namely, local government and its communities. In order to further understand the discussion regarding the municipal

209


mandate to provide water services, the following terminology is necessary:• Basic Water Supply - a basic minimum standard for water supply is defined

in regulations promulgated under Section 9(1) of the Water Services Act, (Act 108 of 1997) as six kilolitres per household per month or 25 litres per person per day within 200 metres of the household, at a flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute.

• Water Services - according to Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997) it means that as per South African Constitution of 1996, municipalities that are categorised as Water Services Authorities (WSA) like Lephalale Local Municipality have a mandate to ensure communities under its jurisdiction have efficient, affordable, economical and sustainable access to water services.

• Water Services Authority (WSA) - is defined in the Regulations under Section 10 of the Water Services Act, (Act 108 of 1997), as any municipality that has executive authority for water services within its area of jurisdiction in terms of the Municipal Structures Act or the ministerial authorisation made in terms of the Municipal Structures Act.

Water Services Provider (WSP) - is defined in the Regulations under Section 10 of the Water Services Act, (Act 108 of 1997), as any institution whether it is public, private, mixed entities, municipal or government that render water services and perform duties as required in the contract which is derived from the Constitution and Water Services Authority (WSA) by-laws on behalf of the local government.

The essence of this climate condition of the Lephalale Local Municipality is to provide details regarding the water needs of the communities. Further, the position of a municipality to meet such needs is outlined in order to highlight what may be obvious daily challenges of local residents which require municipal interventions. In further considerating this position, the role of the national Departnment of Water Affairs is considered in a discussion below.

THE ROLE OF DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS (DWA) ON WATER SERVICES AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENTThe objective of the National Water Act, 1998 (Act No. 36 of 1998) regarding

water services delivery is to ensure that South Africa’s water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons. The Act provides that the National Government, as the public trustee of the nation’s water resources and acting through the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, has the power to regulate the use, flow and control of all water in the Republic. DWA have to play a role of ensuring that there are sufficient resources for the provision of water and sanitation. And also to further monitor that those resources are managed in a sustainable and equitable manner. In support of the above, Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997) states that the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) has a role

V. Mbeki & K. Phago



to regulate, support and strengthen the capacity of the municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their functions with regard to water services provision. The support given by DWA could be in different forms - financial support, resources/infrastructure and capacity building in terms of conducting training and so forth. It is in that regard that the DWA in 2008 have developed a regulation programmes named Blue Drop (BD) and Green Drop (GD) Certification which addresses both drinking water and wastes water/sanitation services. The aim of these programmes is to encourage local municipalities to improve both their drinking water quality management and sanitation services.

The Blue Drop which is for water quality, and Green Drop for sanitation services, are regulation programmes which certify that water service providers and wastewater systems are managed, conveyed and treated to the highest possible standards in order to minimise risk to public health and the environment. Therefore if a municipality gains Blue Drop certification that is an indication that the municipality has complied with a stringent set of procedural, chemical, biological and other similar requirements. The Green Drop certification award on the other hand demonstrates that the municipality is achieving high standards in the management and delivery of an efficient waste water service. During the Department of Water Affairs, 2012 Blue Drop Assessment the Lephalale Local Municipality scored 92.84% for their drinking water and in 2011 Green Drop Assessment it scored 19.1% for their waste water management. One of the BD and GD criterion is that the municipality is expected to publish or inform the community of their performance in water services provision whether good or bad. This means that municipalities have the responsibility to inform community members about incidents that occur with regard to water services within their community as the end users of water services. This is done in order to encourage engagement between the municipality and the community and also to ensure accountability from the municipality side. In a case where the municipality is not communicating their performance with its community, penalties applicable during the BD or GD assessments are made. This is one of the ways to encourage continuous engagement between local municipality and local communities regarding water services.

THE ROLE OF LEPHALALE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY As earlier indicated, the government in South Africa is divided into three

spheres (National, Provincial and Local government). These different spheres have different mandatory roles with regard to economic development of the country and the rendering of services to the citizens. Usually, the national departments ensure that policies are developed while provincial government ensures that there is mobilisation of resources that will enable service delivery. In the Local Government Sphere, deployment of these mobilised resources and implementation of policies take place closely and directly with citizens. In this regard, the processes allow identification of local needs, the current state of resources and infrastructure,

211


and also the capacity they have within that community. In the context of this discussion therefore, Local Government ensures that there is a sustainable, efficient and effective provision of water services to all their areas of its jurisdiction, resource are accessible to citizens, and they also perform local regulation on behalf of the national government. With the function of local regulation for water services, the municipality has to develop regulation tools such as by-laws and contracts. The local municipality also ensures that there is an effective system for asset management so that there is a sustainable management and operation of water service infrastructure. Local Government with regard to their constitutional mandate, have to ensure that the drinking water treatment plants in their area of jurisdiction produces the quality of drinking water within acceptable standards and wastewater treatment plants produces the required quality in compliance with the South African National Standards (SANS 241 – 1:2011).

Lephalale Municipality is also involved in the budget process which seeks to ensure compliance with the provision of the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003). It is of cardinal importance that the IDP review processes facilitate community participation, provide for ward level information, encourage discussion on priorities and provide an opportunity for feedback. “The integrated development planning process is meant to arrive at decisions on issues such as municipal budgets, land management, social and economic development and Institutional transformation in a consultative, systematic and strategic manner” (Lephalale Local Municipality IDP Document, 2013 – 2016). In so doing therefore, municipality has to implement the integrated development planning, which is referred to as a process through which a municipality establishes a developmental plan for the short, medium, and long term goals. IDP process allows a municipality to evaluate the current status of their local communities within their area of jurisdiction in the municipal area, including economic, social and environmental trends, available resources, skills and capacities (du Plessis, 1999:77). Therefore through the IDP process municipalities are mandated to engage the local communities in identifying their needs then discuss their priorities and have a consensus in terms of water services provision. It is cardinal that municipalities work together with their communities in order to gain trust and support in carrying out their constitutional mandate. One of the key issues that municipalities have to do is to consult the community in decision-making. According to Benkink (2006:13), the enhancement of governmental accountability and strengthening of public participation in municipal processes and decisions are therefore constitutionally protected principles and must be provided for within a framework of certain minimum standards.

V. Mbeki & K. Phago



THE CHALLENGES FACING LEPHALALE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY: LACK OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ON WATER SERVICESIn view of the above assertions regarding the constitutional mandate of

municipalities including the Lephalale Local Municipality, it remains clear that challenges of community engagement with municipalities exist. This paper observes that integrated development planning processes need to be followed with regard to consultation of the community and other stakeholders in order to get their views, identify shortcomings and suggest possible solutions (Lephalale Local Municipality IDP 2012-2013). Some of the internal challenges that municipalities are faced with results in non-performance with regard to service delivery. In many cases the communities are not aware of such challenges until the services delivered are delay or unsatisfactory to them. According to the Local Development Planning 2008, Lephalale Local Municipality is also one among many municipalities faced with the severe challenge of under-resourcing of all the units reporting to the Infrastructure Services Department results in critical underperformance.

It is clear that there have been a serious lack of skilled staff in water services and sanitation (such as plumbers, engineering technicians, planning technicians, plant managers, artisans, water treatment specialists, engineers and assistant managers). The municipality in its previous report further argues that the current lack of capacity contributes a negative impact on the water services and ultimately on the community as end users. Unfortunately, this situation within the Lephalale local Municipality also contravenes the best interests of local economic development plan. Usually, these kind of challenges are most known by the municipality not the community hence the engagement between the two is of vital importance in order to make awareness of their current status and to gain support from the community it is serving. According to the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998), district municipalities are obliged to assist local municipalities in areas including in integrated development planning, access roads, bulk water provision, bulk sewage purification, solid waste disposal, emergency services and bulk electricity supply. In the current situation of the Lephalale Local Municipality, it is clear that assistance is required especially from its Distric Municipality. In this case Waterberg District Municipality has a responsibility to assist Lephalale Local Municipality to manage and improve performance in service delivery pertaining to its struggling water and sanitation services. According to the Waterberg District Municipality (WDM) IDP 2013/14, one of the challenges of Lephalale Local Municipality amongst many, is the issue of the rapid expansion of the local population from the 24,000 in 2008 to a projected 54,000 last year in 2013 which will necessitate considerable investment and support from the Limpopo Provincial government. WDM in it IDP 2013/14 also indicates that community engagement takes priority therefore it should be enhanced because it is one of the important elements which contributed

213


in the district receiving a clean audit in the previous financial year (2012/2013). The Waterberg District Municipality IDP (2013/14) reports acknowledges

that the IDP processes are followed by the municipality and further states that the development of an IDP cannot be credible if it excludes public participation. Local communities and other related stakeholders were consulted and provided with an opportunity to raise their opinions, identify challenges and also make recommendations on how to deal with those challenges. It is highlighted that meetings were held with the IDP Representative Forum between July and March 2012. The other future plans at that time was that after the 2012/13 IDP has been tabled then the municipality will continue to consult broadly with the local municipalities and communities through IDP roadshows in order to get new ideas regarding service delivery. If those inputs during the road shows are compelling, then the municipality has to revise some parts of the strategies and deployment of resources in the interest community to reflected their views and aspirations.

From the above discussions, it is very clear that for the Lephalale Local Municipality to improve its water services quality to its community, internal processes need to be put in place. This is necessary because municipal performance is also determined by its own challenges it is facing which may impede effective delivery of water services. What remains critical is to further consider challenges facing communities in engaging the municipality.

THE CHALLENGES FACING LOCAL COMMUNITY: LACK OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT FROM LEPHALALE LOCAL MUNICIPALITYFor the effective engagement on service delivery local government also has an

element of the community which also needs to be taken into consideration. Usually, this is the role played on behalf of the community members by Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)’s which have a very important role on water services provision. According to Haigh, Fox, and Davies-Coleman (2008), government have to ensure that not only the ordinary citizens are engaged or involved in water services delivery, also the CBOs and NGOs are given a chance or a platform rather to fully participate in the provisioning of water services on behalf of citizens. That will enhance an effective engagement which later will play an important role in developing and communicating all policies related to water services. The CBOs and NGOs will ensure that they:

• Advocate on behalf of nature and environmental protection. • Develop and test new models and tools in water management. • Increase awareness of the need for sustainable water management.• Mobilise local communities to get involved. In support of the above role played by the CBos and NGos, Haigh et al. (2008),

argue that engaging role players and participants from institutions outside the water

V. Mbeki & K. Phago



sector is a further crucial element to successfully move from sector based planning and management to collaborative holistic management.

In reviewing the Lephalale Local Municipality, it became clear that community is not sufficiently consulted in decision-making which has often led to conflicts between these two critical actors. There are so many causes of the conflicts, they may differ from community to community depending on the type of development and the resources in that community. One of them is the issue of minimal or no consultation of community members, regarding any water services activities which may include building of a new dam, putting communal stand taps, building houses, roads, mining or any development that is taking place in their community and likely to use water. In support to that Sebugwawo Musa (Undated: Online) in his paper argues that, “There is little evidence that local government is serious about responding to people’s challenges and there is a risk of creating a local government system that is not responding to citizen’s concerns. One of the key problems is the poor communication between the municipality and community”. If local government ignores or delays to meet the needs of the people for no apparent reason or without any substantive report, therefore it should be regarded as a contravention of its constitutional obligations, as it has been highlighted earlier in this paper. This has been at the centre of service delivery protests which have indicated that citizens feel excluded in most government processes including that of water delivery.

Accordingly, the United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action (2012) in their study found that, “where communities and stakeholders are poorly engaged, marginalised or excluded from the dialogue in the development processes, they are almost certain to begin to oppose the development. As the conflict escalates, the use of strategies of violence as a coercive measure against the institution, and as a means for addressing old grievances and mounting opposition against the government, are likely”. The other potential cause of conflict is the issue of the illegal settlement because of the challenges of housing in South Africa, therefore people move in a community, built shacks without any consultation with the municipality and then later demand water services and so forth. If a municipality does not have capacity to deliver any services then that often leads the community to violence and high level of vandalism, theft and criminal activities, breaking or stealing of water taps which interferes with effective operations and sustainability of community resources. Smit and Cronje (1997:335) argue that an effective communication can produce a competitive edge. The organisations, in which communication systems are effective, are likely to be more successful than those in which they are not.

CONCLUSION REMARKSThis paper concludes that South Africa has very good legal framework

that support service delivery within local government. However, the question

215


of community engagement remains a challenge in the implementation and enforcement of those policies. The discussion in this paper acknowledges the efforts that the Lephalale Local Municipality is currently undertaking including developing integrated development processes. However, it would be essential that they move a step further and ensure that due processes are followed structly in order to reach satisfactory levels of community engagement. It is also recommended that the institutional (municipality) structure should be adapted to strategic development needs that key positions should be filled and that stakeholder engagement should be significantly improved.

Notably, there are so many factors that could be attributed to the causing of conflicts between the local government and its community. In general, conflicts could be proactively avoided through regular engagement between the two parties and any other relavant stakeholders in a particular service for instance in this case focus is on water services. The socio-economy of South Africa is also ever changing therefore our local government should adapt strategies that will ensure community engagement and participation in all the services provision.

LIST OF REFERENCESBekink, B. 2006. Principles of South African Local Government: Law. Butterworth:

LexisNexis.Chester, B. 2013. Acceptance Theory of Authority. Online. Accessed on the 20 January

2014.du Plessis, N. 1999. Africanus. Journal of Development Administration. University of

South Africa. Vol.29. No 2. South Africa (p. 13, 47, 61, 77).Gelmon S.B., Seifer S.D., Kauper-Brown J. and Mikkelsen M. 2005. Building Capacity

for Community Engagement: Institutional Self-Assessment. Seattle, WA: Community-Campus Partnerships for Health. www.ccph.info.(accessed 20 June 2013).

Haigh, E.H., Fox, H.E. and Davies-Coleman, H.D. 2008.Framework for Local Government to implement Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) linked to water service delivery. Institute of Water Research: Rhodes University.

Lephalale Local Municipality, 2011-2012. Integrated Development Planning. Lephalale. South Africa. Lephalale Local Municipality.

Lephalale Local Municipality. 2008. Local Economic Development (LED) Strategy Section B: Strategy Formulation, 2008. Limpopo LED Capacity Building Programme.

Lephalale Local Municipality. 2012-2013. Integrated Development Planning. Lephalale. South Africa. Lephalale Local Municipality.

Lephalale Local Municipality. 2013-2016. Integrated Development Planning. Lephalale: South Africa. Lephalale Local Municipality.

Mello, D.M. 2007. Intergovernmental Relations in the Management of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park. Doctor of Administration (Public Administration) Thesis. University of Pretoria: Pretoria.

Republic of South Africa. 1995. White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service, 1995. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 1997. Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997). Pretoria:

V. Mbeki & K. Phago


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationGovernment Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 1998. National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998). Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1998. White Paper on Local Government, March 1998. Department of Provincial and Local Government. Pretoria. South Africa.

Republic of South Africa. 2000. Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000). Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2003. Municipal Finance Management Act, Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2005. Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005). Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2008. Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2008.15 Year Review Report on the State of Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa (2008). Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2010. Department of Human Settlements, 2010. Report on the evaluation of the impact of rural housing programme 2010/11. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2011. South African National Standards (SANS) 241 - 1: 2011.SABS Standards Division.

Republic of South Africa. 2012. Department of Water Affairs. Blue Drop Certification Report, 2012. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa. 2013. Department of Water Affairs. Green Drop Certification Report, 2013. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Sebugwawo Musa. (Undated. Online). Service Delivery Protests in South Africa: Lessons for Municipalities. Accessed on Wednesday, March 05, 2013.

Smit, P.J. and de Cronje, C.J. 1997. Management Principles: a contemporary edition forAfrica 2nd Edition. Cape Town : Creda Communications. United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action. 2012. Toolkit and

guidance for preventing and managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict: Extractive Industries and Conflict. European Union.

Waterberg District Municipality, 2008. Integrated Development Planning, 2013/14. Limpopo: South Africa. Waterberg District Municipality.

217


MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT – A CASE STUDY OF THE GREATER TUBATSE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

G. MohlalaDepartment of Public Administration and Management

University of South Africa

K.G. Phago & Z. MpehleTurfloop Graduate School of Leadership


ABSTRACT

The pre-1994 education and training was premised on the policy of separate development which prevented the majority of the African people from accessing relevant human resources training and development

opportunities. The post-1994 training and development landscape, which aims at accelerating and empowering the previously disadvantaged in South Africa, have assumed priority since the adoption of a constitutional democracy. This is also relevant at the Local Government Sphere which constitutes the coalface of service delivery which requires a realisation of the development agenda by individuals and households. Data collection, analysis and interpretation in this paper are undertaken through analysis of official documents, semi-structured interviews as well as structured questionnaires administered to the management cadre within the Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. The purpose of this paper is to describe opportunities created to motivate employees to use the workplace as an active learning environment to acquire new skills; and to understand the financial support and investment in training and development. Findings of the paper indicate, inter alia, that the majority of respondents disagree that opportunities are created to motivate employees to use the workplace as an active learning environment to acquire new skills, and that the majority of respondents within the municipality are not aware of the financial support and investment in training and development of municipal officials.

INTRODUCTIONTransforming municipal management training and development is an important

aspect in government, as municipal management is legally bound to ensure improvement of basic service delivery at the Local Government Sphere. Since the dawn of the new democratic dispensation, espoused in section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Constitution), public administration is also required to be based on good

G. Mohlala, K.G. Phago & Z. Mpehle



human resources management and career-development practices to maximise human potential. Good human resources management is crucial, especially at Local Government Sphere which constitutes the coalface of service delivery.

This paper undertakes to explain the need for effective management training and development within the public sector. This discussion is done through a description of the opportunities created to motivate employees in using the workplace as an active learning environment to acquire new skills as well as whether financial support and investment is placed in the training and development of municipal officials and management within the Greater Tubatse Local Municipality.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE TO THE PROBLEMThe Greater Tubatse Local Municipality (GTLM) serves a mainly rural community

located in the eastern Limpopo Province which borders the Mpumalanga Province. Together with four other local municipalities, the GTLM forms part of the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality (GSDM). The GTLM was declared by President Thabo Mbeki’s administration to be a development priority area, owing to the high level of impoverishment, illiteracy and unemployment (DPLG: Project Consolidate, 2007). The policy of separate development divided the people of South Africa into the privileged with developmental infrastructure such as exclusive schools and institutions of higher learning and the less privileged who were surrounded by underdeveloped physical and human resources.

Communities were dumped far from cities, with access routes difficult to manoeuvre, thus limiting the free movement of the people of the GTLM to places such as Praktiseer or Jane Furse (towns within GTLM), the only places in the vicinity with secondary schools and educational institutions such as vocational colleges for further education and training. The pre-1994 regime ensured that communities were abandoned in squalid conditions without proper basic services, due to dysfunctional and undemocratic regime. Chapter 7 of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for the establishment of democratic local government to provide services. According to the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, a municipality must develop its human resource capacity to a level that enables it to perform its functions and exercise its powers in an economical, effective, efficient and accountable manner. A relevant management training and development for officials is necessary to effect societal transformation and improvement of living conditions. In this regard, several complaints have been registered by popular activists within the GTLM. These complaints are a result of allegations regarding officials who lack requisite skills, do not demonstrate good leadership and financial skills or subject matter knowledge in critical management positions (Vena, 2010:2). Despite the concerns over lack of proper management and leadership skills, the GTLM Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) 2007/8 indicates that a total sum of over a million rands was committed to training and developing only five directors from a total of eleven. This would be regarded as unsustainable since

219


it lacks a succession planning component which would require that the majority of managers be trained.

Further, the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 makes provision for the establishment of a Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA). In this respect, the Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority has been established, with some of its functions being the following:

• To develop a sector skills plan within the framework of the national skills development strategy.

• To implement its sector skills plan by establishing learnerships, approving workplace skills plans, allocating grants to employers and training providers, and monitoring education and training in the sector.

The Local Government Sector education and Training Authority (LGSETA) is expected to play a crucial role in the GTLM due to the existence of widespread mismanagement as many development projects, such as road paving, remain unfinished, or those projects that are completed demonstrate a lack of adequate planning, skills and professionalism (Vena, 2010:2). As Du Toit, Van der Waldt, Bayat and Cheminais (1999:196) point out, improving municipal service can only be achieved through the skills of municipal managers and the resources that they have at their disposal. Management constitutes a leading part in managing change and conflict, and should be afforded opportunities to use the workplace as an active learning environment to acquire new skills.

Nengwekhulu’s (2009:351) reminds us that the shortage of quality skills has a direct bearing on the managerial capacity and could negatively impact on government service delivery. In this regard, the GTLM has a responsibility to ensure that the right skills are nurtured within the municipality so that service delivery improvements are facilitated. Vena (2010:2) reports that the Tubatse Action Forum’s (TAF) argument centres on the fact that that the majority of villages and towns in the GTLM are often without running water could be attributable to inefficiencies caused by lack of proper managerial planning skills within some sectors of the Municipality. In order to address issues of strategic importance, managers in the GTLM require various skills such as decision making, negotiation and communication (Van der Waldt & Knipe, 2007:193).

It is in this context that due to the challenges in capacity to deliver quality municipal services, this paper intends to describe the transformation of municipal management training and development policy in the GTLM. The GTLM stands to benefit from understanding the effects of transforming managerial training and development within the context of national guidelines as contained in the 1996 Constitution.




LITERATURE REVIEW: MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT As Babbie (1998:112) explains, a comprehensive literature review addresses

what other scholars have already considered about the problem, what theories address the problem and whether there have been consistent findings on the problem. This paper undertakes to consider the literature on two key issues, namely, the opportunities created to motivate employees in using the workplace as an active learning environment to acquire new skills as well as whether financial support and investment is considered in the training and development of municipal officials. This approach is necessary for the understanding whether scholars in training and development address pertinent institutional matters which have a direct bearing on service delivery and improvement of the lives of the poor.

In considering the training and development issues, Nel and Werner (2004:522) argue that proper human resources management plays a major role in the identification of challenges faced by the institutional need for human resources performance and productivity. In this regard, these authors further mention that human resources training and development management should be aligned to the institution’s strategic developmental objectives, in order to ensure proper institutional skills audit and assessment. Swart, Mann, Brown and Price (2005:2) assert that institutions consist of people and as a result people matter because in the highly competitive environment in which government institutions such as municipalities operate, human capital has become a special strategic commodity in gaining competitive advantage on service delivery projects.

In his study to determine the effects of management training and development on the performance and job satisfaction for a non-profit organisation (the Haven Night Shelter Welfare Organisation (HNSWO)), Kamfer (2005:12) underscores some interesting findings regarding the perennial management turnover in this institution. This author mentions the nature of the problem as being the lack of a comprehensive institutional management outcomes-based training programme to support and guide newly appointed and promoted managers. This assertion is complemented by the GTLM Training and Development Policy Document (2007) which states that to cope with the rapid changes and to deal proactively with a transforming local government, special attention should be given to training and development programmes in the context of a regulatory framework such as compliance with the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. Mothae (2008:820) consents that continuous training and development is necessary to encourage and foster continuous learning for managers for a successful transformation in the local sphere of government. This view is based on the premise that various and critical socio-political changes that lead to systemic transformation to address the needs of communities are occurring in South Africa. Mothae (2008) asserts that at the heart of this transformation process are the municipal managers who play a pivotal role

221


in the quest for service provision of their local communities. Van Dijk (2003:1) conducted a study to assess the status of training in the

Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) with a view to improve future human resource skills training and development initiatives. This study concludes that there is a need for the DPSA to increase its strength in terms of determining departmental training priorities, ensuring the financial feasibility of training courses, and anticipating the obstacles to implementing successful training courses. The study recommends that the DPSA should ensure that individuals understand the importance of their positions within the hierarchical structure as well as understand the significance of individual capacity in order to ensure departmental effectiveness and efficiency. This is a relevant study because the question of training alignment to institutional priorities means that management cadre is positioned to fathom its responsibility in guiding the strategic plans of the public institutions including municipalities. In this case, training needs for managers could be identified to ensure that management cohort possess the critical skills to steer the direction of their institution.

In his paper on the analysis of the challenges facing the post-1994 public service delivery, Nengwekhulu (2009:344) points out that public service is an administrative vehicle to deliver various bulk services, such as provision of electricity, to the people. This author further concedes that although the public service is faced with a plethora of challenges such as nepotism and corruption, skills shortages do occupy a central role in the poor delivery or lack thereof of public services. Penceliah (1996:118) observes that human resources skills training and development in the South African context constitute a crucial element in the process of transformation of the public sector in order to empower those people who were previously disadvantaged by the policy of separate development.

In understanding the foregoing regarding management training and development it is imperative to observe the literature as considering the importance of human resources strategic planning. This is an endeavour which seeks to anticipate future pitfalls in the process of transforming the South African public sector management training including within municipalities. Management training transformation should serve as a necessary conduit to ensure that municipal performance is enhanced and thereby improving service delivery. Achieving service delivery improvements would require management training to possess relevant skills such as consultation skills so as to be able to consolidate inputs from the various stakeholders within the municipality management of other departments and the labour unions.

Since the literature review sets the tone to further contextualise the study especially in moving from a prescientific problem to a researchable problem, this logic has been considered in this paper. That is, the essence of undertaking a literature review in this paper undertook to investigate the management training




and development within the public sector to respond to its usefulness on whether public sector institutions could then be transformed to learning organisations that are able to reskill and engender a spirit of improved performance for managers and other officials. Subsequently, it is befitting that a consideration of methodology and approach used in the paper be explained to acquire a scientific legitimacy of undertaking this study within reasonable parameters.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLINGData collection tools used in this study include a structured questionnaire,

interviews and an analysis of official documents. In this regard, the data collection instruments used are found to be both in the qualitative and quantitative domains of research. Content validity in this questionnaire was also undertaken through consultations with a quantitative research methods specialist. His role was to advise on the relevance of the structured questionnaire as an instrument for data collection to the purpose of this research. Salkind (2009:118) supports this kind of an approach when he argues that this kind of verifying provides some credibility to the research.

The total staff establishment is 237, with the number of approved posts for Directors and Corporate Managers being 38 (GTLM Final Annual Report, 2009/10). However, at the time of the study, only 27 management posts were filled. Using a purposive sampling of 27 respondents, 17 structured questionnaires were completed and returned, which constituted a 63% response rate. The researchers have made use of unstructured and unscheduled telephone interviews with two respondents in the municipality to further probe and corroborate information obtained through the questionnaires (Denscombe, 2010:189).

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS WITHIN GREATER TUBATSE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY The Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality’s Integrated Development Plan

(2010/11:56) reports that the percentage of the population older than twenty years of age without schooling in the GSDM is relatively high, calculated at 42.64%, as compared with to other districts in the Limpopo and Mpumalanga Provinces, such as the Waterberg and Nkangala Districts with 25.76% and 26.42% respectively. The figure is also more than twice that of South Africa which is almost 20%.

Accordingly the vision of the municipality has set out ‘to develop the GTLM as a platinum city, in an integrated manner, to improve the quality of life for all’. The GTLM’s mission is ‘to promote local accountable democracy through needs-satisfying services rendered in a sustainable manner, municipal transformation and institutional development’. Some of the core values espoused by the GTLM include ‘transparency, accountability, high performance, professionalism, innovation, teamwork and consultation’ (GTLM Annual Report, 2008/9:15).

223


In order to achieve the above-mentioned vision, this paper argues that management training and development becomes crucial as managers should possess the necessary competencies including financial management to implement the stated objectives to improve the general welfare of the community. The Mayor of the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality during the State of the District Address of 2008 also made observations on the question of effective management training and development within the public sector. He argued that ‘human development is paramount to the success of achieving a national democratic society ready to prosecute its contemporary situation to advance development. As such enough money should be spent on HRD strategy” (Magabe, 2008). This observation provides a global municipal analysis of the role management training and development interventions are necessary for the municipalities within the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality which include GTLM.

According to the regulations under the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998, municipalities are required to appoint and register skills development facilitators whose key functions are facilitation of the training and development process within a municipality. This is therefore a legislative requirement that agencies such as municipalities need to comply. In this regard, the GTLM makes provision in its human resources section organisational structure for a senior human resources officer – under the human resources manager – responsible for training, recruitment and organisational development. Further, a hierarchical ladder is made for the appointment of both a human resources officer and assistant for training and development. The First Senior Manager (interview: 2011) confirms that the GTLM has not appointed a dedicated skills development facilitator. Therefore, together with recruitment and organisational development responsibilities, the senior human resources officer’s job description encompasses the duties of the skills development facilitator. Thus, since the issues of training are dealt with at a level that is not on the senior management structure within the municipality, it stands to reason that the prioritisation of training and development needs for managers within a municipality as structural matter which requires reconsideration. That is, identifying training needs and providing creative training interventions for management cadres is restricted since the issues are coordinated at a level that is not at a senior management. This limitation means that despite the GSDM Mayor’s observations regarding the need for proper training and development interventions, it would be difficult to address the skills gaps for senior managers within GTLM without changing the post level for training and development practitioner which points to a structural reconfiguration.

The GTLM Training and Development Policy Document (2007) further points to the GTLM’s responsibility to educate, train and develop its employees. This is justified by a need to establish and maintain a municipal learning environment that respects and accommodates the values and cultures of its employees and the community. This policy further mentions that all employees have the basic




right to continual and applicable education, training and development within the framework of their appointment and must be trained and developed according to their potential aptitude, interests and abilities. Obviously, this assertion considers training and development interventions to be implemented within the GTLM which are also tailored to meet the needs of both the municipality and the employees, such as filling crucial positions and receiving education and training in critical and scarce courses such as financial and general management in order to enhance the performance and quality of service delivery to the community. In section 5.3.3 of this GTLM Training and Development Policy Document (2007) it is also stipulated that training and development officers are to create an environment conducive to training and development through nomination of training candidates and act as facilitators and change agents by providing goal-oriented and cost-effective training in accordance with approved procedures and principles, such as ensuring the availability of the training budget. What could also be included in this policy is to make provision for management training as this is not mainly about the scarcity of skills within the municipality, but also the vision in which management is anticipated to steer the plans and activities towards.

However, while undertaking formal training and development needs analysis for the GTLM the municipality considered scientific techniques without detailed elaboration of these techniques to identify needs not reflected in the performance appraisal or interviews. The usual experience is that the Human Resources Division conducts the training and development needs assessment in collaboration with other relevant internal stakeholders such as labour unions and external stakeholders’ community organisations to enhance planning and budgetary processes. It is in this regard that once needs assessments have been undertaken and identified, performance gaps or sets of developmental needs such as communication skills for managers become clear. Subsequently, the municipality could be able to design a broad training and development strategy (which also encapsulates management training and development) that is responsive to the needs of the municipality.

The Human Resources Division is expected to oversee and investigate training and development options and recommending the most suitable to address the identified needs. In this regard, external training and development is considered after all relevant internal (training and development) interventions have been exhausted. Communication with municipal officials becomes crucial in order to gain prior knowledge of what to expect in terms of the training programme.

As earlier indicated on the municipal responsibility regarding training and development interventions the GTLM undertakes to provide the required funds from its pools of available resources. It is the responsibility of the different municipal departments to submit their respective budget allocations to the Human Resources Division for final approval by the municipal council (GTLM Training and Development Policy Document, 2007). According to the GTLM’s ATR (2007-2008) a total amount of R347 500 was spent on the formal and external training and

225


development of thirteen management human resources to complete management and finance certificates local universities (the University of Pretoria and the Wits Business School). The GTLM also provides limited funding through bursaries and educational assistance programmes to assist in securing adequately qualified personnel to enhance their level of competence.

While the foregoing discussion considers the question of training and development within the GTLM, it is noteworthy to highlight that municipal responsibility has not been clearly outlined in respect to management training and development. This is because the existing training and development policy exists without a proper senior level structural support which could be necessary for its proper implementation. This observation is further considered on the data analysis and interpretation below.

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION Although section 5.3.3 of the GTLM Training and Development Policy

Document (2007:9), provides for training and development officers to create an environment conducive to training and development through nomination of training candidates the final data analysis shows that an overall majority of 56% on average disagree that opportunities are created to motivate employees for training and development. The incapacity to create sufficient opportunities for training and development is incompatible with the provision of the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 which makes a prescription for management to be afforded opportunities to acquire new skills and use the workplace as an active learning environment. As Du Toit et al. (1999:196) advise, improving public service and product delivery to the public can only be achieved through the skills of public managers. Training and development are important in that public managers are continually faced with problems of innovation in their quest to transform the public sector from a centralised bureaucratic mechanism to a transparent and democratic mechanism.

On the second objective, nine respondents, constituting 60%, disagreed that they were aware of increments in the yearly training and development budget against six respondents, at 40%, who agreed with the statement. This finding proved interesting and surprising as the respondents are in management positions and should therefore be aware of the budgeting processes. However, documentary analysis of the GTLM ATR 2008/9 and 2009/10 indicates that totals of R1 076 722 and R1 350 000 respectively were budgeted for training and development, thus showing an increment in the budget for training and development. It can be deduced that this inconsistency between documentary analysis and the responses from the questionnaire could be attributed to a lack of transparent communication and consultation. This inconsistency on the level of funding for training and development requires further study, because of various inherent disadvantages contained in research tools, such as the respondents’ willingness to be open and tell the truth.




The final synthesis of the foregoing objectives reveals that although attempts are made in the GTLM to use the workplace as an active learning environment to acquire new skills, such as provision of courses relevant for the workplace, evidence shows a general dissatisfaction in the extent of opportunities offered. Financial investment allocated to training and development also needs to be reviewed in accordance with the vision and mandate of the GTLM. Although the GTLM Training and Development Policy Document (2007) advocates training and development in accordance with the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998, implementation to the management cadre remains unsatisfactory.

CONCLUSIONIt can be argued that although attempts are made in the GTLM to use the

workplace as an active learning environment through provision of courses relevant for the workplace, evidence shows a general dissatisfaction in management training and development. Financial investment in human resources training and development, at management level that constitutes the driving force behind transformation, is imperative for institutions to gain both strategic and operational advantage.

Municipal services require strategic and systematic capacity building to improve the skills and knowledge levels of management to be in line with the changing nature of the environment in South Africa. Municipal management training and development could contribute towards enhancing South Africa’s development potential by turning the working environments into learning institutions, and eventually to nurture talent. Learning institutions are places offering a stimulating atmosphere wherein potential could be discovered and developed through learning interventions such as in-house training. It is therefore recommended that efforts should be brought to bear in order to review the GTLM training and development policy to close the gap between theory and empirical issues. As the coalface in service delivery, the GTLM needs to align its strategic orientation to be able to anticipate future training and development requirements in a developmental context. It is in this respect that management needs to function in a learning environment as they constitute the driving force towards improvement in service delivery for a better life for all.

LIST OF REFERENCESBabbie, E. 1998. The practice of social research. 8th edition. Belmont: Wadsworth

Publishing Company.Babbie, E. 2005. The basics of social research. 3rd edition. Belmont: Wadsworth

Publishing Company.Denscombe, M. 2010. The good research guide for small-scale social research projects.

4th edition. England: Open University Press.DPLG Project Consolidate. 2007. Available at http://www.info.gov.za/

speeches/2007/07031512151001.htm. Accessed on 27 September 2010.

227

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationDu Toit, D.F.P., Van der Waldt, G., Bayat, M.S. & Cheminais, J. 1999. Public

administration and management for effective governance. Kenwyn: Juta & Co Ltd.First Senior Manager. 2011. Telephone Interview. 07 March.Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality. 2008. State of the District Address.

Groblersdal: Municipal Manager’s office.Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality. 2010/2011. Integrated Development Plan.

Groblersdal: District Manager’s office.Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2007. Training and Development Policy Document.

Burgersfort: Municipal Manager’s office.Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2007/2008. Service Delivery Budget

Implementation Plan. Burgersfort: Municipal Manager’s office.Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2008/2009. Annual Report. Burgersfort: Municipal

Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2007/2008. Annual Training Report. Burgersfort: Municipal Manager’s office.

Manager’s office.Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2008/2009. Annual Training Report. Burgersfort:

Municipal Manager’s office.Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2009/2010. Annual Training Report. Burgersfort:

Municipal Manager’s office.Greater Tubatse Local Municipality. 2009/2010. Final Annual Report. Burgersfort:

Municipal Manager’s office.Kamfer, A.R. 2005. Guidelines for a training programme for managers at the Haven

Night Shelter Welfare Organisations. Unpublished M Diaconiology thesis. Pretoria: Unisa Press.

Mothae, L. 2008. Training as an essential tool for successful local government transformation: developing the culture of learning in municipalities. Journal of Public Administration, 43 (4): 820-830.

Nel, P.S. & Werner, A. 2004. Interdependency between organisational strategy and strategic human resources management. In Nel, P.S. (coordinating author) Human Resources Management. Southern Africa: Oxford University Press: 521-539.

Nengwekhulu, R.H. 2009. Public service delivery challenges facing the South African Public Service. Journal of Public Administration 44 (2):341-363.

Penceliah, Y. 1996. Readings in Local Government Management and Development – a Southern African perspective. Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd.

Penceliah, Y. 2010. Towards learning organisations in the public sector: the democratisation of organisations through learning. Administratio Publica, 18(2):185-201.

Republic of South Africa, 1913. Natives Land Act 27. Pretoria: Government Printer.Republic of South Africa, 1993. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria:

Government Printer.Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria:

Government Printer.Republic of South Africa, 1966. Group Areas Act 36. Pretoria: Government Printer.Republic of South Africa, 1998. Skills Development Act 97. Pretoria: Government

Printer.Republic of South Africa, 1999. Skills Development Levies Act 9. Pretoria: Government

Printer.Republic of South Africa, 2000. Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32.

Pretoria: Government Printer.Republic of South Africa. 2001. Skills Development Funding Regulations in terms of the



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSkills Development Act 97. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa: Department of Labour. 2004. Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority Report. Pretoria: Department of Labour.

Salkind, N.J. 2009. Exploring research. 7th edition. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.Swart, J., Mann, C., Brown, S. & Price, A. 2005. Human Resource Development –

strategy and tactics. Elsevier: Butterworth-Heinemann.Van der Waldt, G. & Knipe, A. 2007. Project management for strategic change and

upliftment. Southern Africa: Oxford University Press. Van Dijk, H.G. 2003. Critical issues impacting on skills development in the Department

of Public Service and Administration: Trends and Options. Unpublished D Phil thesis. Pretoria: University of Pretoria Press.

Vena, V. 2010. Activists plan march against mismanagement in Tubatse. Mail & Guardian, 03 March p2.

229


CHAPTER 12 OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2030: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

M. MonteshCollege of Law

University of South Africa

ABSTRACT

The National Development Plan consists of fifteen chapters and Chapter 12 deals with “Building Safer Communities”. One of the key components of this chapter is the establishment of a National Policing Board equipped

with multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary expertise. According to the NDP, the Board should set standards for recruiting, selecting, appointing and promoting police officials and police officers. Furthermore, the NDP states that “the National Commissioner of Police and Deputies should be appointed by the President on a competitive basis”. The author believes that this approach is still vulnerable to cadre deployment and will not solve current leadership crisis in the SAPS. Ever since the appointment of Mr Jackie Selebi and Mr Bheki Cele as South African Police Commissioners, questions have been raised as to whether their lack of policing experience could help the police to move forward. These questions seem to have proven somehow correct in the sense that the two senior managers bowed-out of the office disgracefully without completing their contractual periods. Therefore this papers seeks to discuss the powers of the President to appoint and dismiss the National Police Commissioner as outlined in section 207 of the Constitution as well as section 7 and 8 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. The paper provides a comparative analysis with the Kenyan National Police Service Commission. In terms of section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act of 2011, the Inspector General and the Deputy Inspector General of the Kenyan Police are interviewed and recommended to Parliament by the Commissions. Once interviews are finalized, three names are submitted to Parliament and the successful candidate must obtain 75% of the votes in Parliament. The author believes that this is the model the South Africa should follow to appoint a National Commissioner of the South African Police Service. This is a qualitative study and will critically discuss policies and legislation that is used to appoint a National Commissioner of the South African Police Service as well as making recommendations. Finally, the paper discusses challenges with the current approach and why South Africa must abandon it.

INTRODUCTIONEver since the appointment of Mr Jackie Selebi and Mr Bheki Cele as South

African Police Commissioners, questions have been raised as to whether their lack

M. Montesh



of policing experience could help the police to move forward. These questions seem to have proved somehow right in the sense that the two gentlemen bowed out of office disgracefully without completing their terms. Therefore this papers seeks discuss the powers of the president to appoint and dismiss the National Police Commissioner as outlined in section 207 of the Constitution as well as section 7 and 8 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. The reason for this scrutiny is that presidents throughout the world dominate their police by virtue of the nature of their regimes and the force of their personalities. In theory and in practice presidents have complete authority over their police. Legislative provisions usually mean they can direct police operations, for example.

They also control the appointment and tenure of their commissioners. This has proved disastrous to South Africa. This article seeks to try and address these problems and propose a new Model for South Africa.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA The role of the president in policing matters differs from country to country

but in South Africa, section 207(1) of the Constitution states that “the President as head of the national executive must appoint a woman or a man as the National Commissioner of the police service, to control and manage the police service. Furthermore, section 207(2) states that the National Commissioner must exercise control over and manage the police service in accordance with the national policing policy and the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for policing. Subsection 3 further states that the National Commissioner, with the concurrence of the provincial executive, must appoint a woman or a man as the provincial commissioner for that province, but if the National Commissioner and the provincial executive are unable to agree on the appointment, the Cabinet member responsible for policing must mediate between the parties. The provincial commissioners are responsible for policing in their respective provinces as prescribed by national legislation and subject to the power of the National Commissioner to exercise control over and manage the police service in terms of subsection (2). These roles are carried out in conjunction with section 6 and 7 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. If the National Commissioner has lost the confidence of the Cabinet, the President may establish a board of inquiry consisting of a judge of the Supreme Court as chairperson, and two other suitable persons, to inquire into the circumstances that led to the loss of confidence, compile a report and make recommendations. This is done in terms of section 8(1) of the South African Police Service Act. According to the National Development Plan (NDP) (2030:395), “the National Commissioner of Police and Deputies should be appointed by the President on a competitive basis. A selection panel, established by the President, should select and interview candidates for these posts against objective criteria. The President should appoint the National Commissioner and Deputies from recommendations and reports received from this selection panel”. There is nothing

231


new that is being suggested by the NDP. Instead, it just confirms the current status quo which proved to be problematic.

THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT MODELThe appointment of George FivazJohn George Fivaz joined the former South African Police in 1964 and underwent

his basic police training at the Pretoria Police College. During his career he served in many positions doing normal police duties in various fields such as patrolling, charge office duties, attending to complaints, crime detection, management, work study and police administration. He also commanded various units such as the detective and Efficiency Services at Head Office, Pretoria. He holds a BAdmin degree and he is also fully qualified as a work study officer and police administrator. Fivaz also visited and studied police management styles and structures in Canada, USA, Europe and Southern America (South African Police Service, 2013).

He was appointed National Commissioner of the South African Police Service on 29 January 1995 by President Nelson Mandela. After his appointment he faced the challenge of amalgamating the eleven police agencies of the past into one South African Police Service. At the same time he had to manage the adoption of a new style of policing for South Africa namely community policing. He was also responsible for transforming the police service into an effective and acceptable policing agency for South Africa (South African Police Service, 2013). George Fivaz retired during January 2000 and was succeeded by Commissioner Jackie Selebi. Commissioner Fivaz will be remembered for his work in amalgamating the eleven policing agencies of the past into one united South African Police Service and for laying the foundation for a new democratic policing service for South Africa. He has also played a constructive role in the formation of SARPCCO (Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation) in order to enhance co-operation between policing agencies in the southern region of Africa (South African Police Service, 2013).

The rise and fall of Jackie SelebiJacob (Jackie) Sello Selebi (born 7 March 1950 in Johannesburg) is the former

President of the African National Congress Youth League 1987-1991, and a former president of Interpol. Selebi was a representative of the Soviet Union’s World Federation of Democratic Youth in Budapest, Hungary, from 1983 to 1987. In 1987 he was elected head of the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League while in exile in Zambia. In the same year, he was appointed to the National Executive Committee of the ANC. In 1991 he was made responsible for the repatriation of ANC exiles back into South Africa, and was appointed head of the Department of Welfare of the ANC in 1993. In 1994 he was elected as a Member of Parliament for the ANC. From 1995 to 1998, Selebi served as the South African ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations. In 1998, he was appointed

M. Montesh



Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, a post he held until 1999. In 1998, Selebi received a Human Rights Award from the International Service

for Human Rights. In 2000, he was made national commissioner of the South African Police Service, a post he held until 2009. During that time, Selebi was elected vice-president of Interpol (African region) in 2002, as post he held until 2004. In 2004, Selebi was elected as president of Interpol, a post he held until 2008. During his time with Interpol, Selebi also served as Chair of the Anti-Landmine Conference, Oslo, Norway; Chair of Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster; and Chair - Human Rights Commission, United Nations, 54th Session. He resigned both as National Police Commissioner and President of Interpol in 2008 when corruption charges were laid against him.

The corruption chargesThe accused was charged with two charged in the alternative to the counts

with two sub counts. He was also charged in the alternative to the first count (as separate count) with two sub counts. The reference to the counts that follows is set out in the indictment as originally formulated by the state. The first count was that the accused was guilty of the crime of corruption in contravention of section 4 (1) (a) of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, of 2004 (PCCA). The first alternative count was that the accused was guilty of the crime of corruption in contravention of s 1 (1) (b) read with section 3 of the Corruption Act, 94 of 1992 (CA). This count was in respect of the period 1 January 2000 to 26 April 2004. The second alternative count was that the accused was guilty of the crime of corruption in terms of section 3 (a) and or 4 (1) (a) of the PCCA. This count is in respect of the period 27 April 2004 to 16 November 2005.

The reason for the two alternative counts was to be found in the repeal of the CA by the PCCA. The PCCA came into effect on 27 April 2004. The second count was that the accused was guilty of the crime of defeating or obstructing the administration of justice. The factual basis as set out in the indictment for all the counts can be summarized in broad outline as follows: The accused was a public officer in terms of the PCCA. A relationship developed between a Mr Glen Norbert Agliotti and the accused. This relationship became a generally corrupt relationship. The accused received sums of money and clothing for himself and on one occasion for the accused’s sons from Agliotti. The accused received the aforementioned gratification in order to act in a manner proscribed in s 4 (1) (a) (i) to (iv) of the PCCA and the accused did so act. The accused so acted by sharing with Agliotti secret information about an investigation against Agliotti conducted by United Kingdom law enforcement authorities; protecting Agliotti from criminal investigation, sharing with Agliotti information about SAPS investigations, sharing secret and or confidential information with Agliotti, agreeing to and or attempting to influence the investigative and or prosecutorial process against one Rautenbach, sharing with one Sanders and or one Nassif and others tender information relating

233


to impending contractual work to be performed in Sudan, assisting Agliotti and or Agliotti’s associates to receive preferential or special SAPS services.

The guilty verdict and convictionOn the 5th July 2010, judge J Joffe found the accused guilty of corruption in

contravening s 4(1) (a) of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004 and acquitted on count 2 and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. In Selebi v State (240/2011) [2011] ZASCA 249 (2 December 2011) Mr Selebi appealed the judgment of the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg (Joffe J). Unfortunately, both judges Mthiyane DP (Bosielo and Theron JJA) upheld the conviction handed down by the South Gauteng High Court. On appeal the appellant was found to have received payments and provided quid pro quo for such payment in contravention of section 4(1)(a) of Act 12 of 2004.

The appointment of Bheki CeleBheki Hamilton Cele was born on 22-04-1952 and is a founding Member for

National Education Union of South Africa. He served as a member of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature. He served as the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service until he was suspended from the position, pending investigation, in October 2011. In June 2012 he was officially fired from the position. Cele also formerly served as MEC for Transport, Community Safety and Liaison in KwaZulu-Natal (South African Police Service, 2013). He was a Member of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress.

The controversial lease agreements (Pretoria and Durban)In this case, the Public Protector received complaints on 2 August 2010

in connection with the alleged improper procurement of the lease of office accommodation for the SAPS in the Sanlam Middestad building in the Pretoria Central Business District. These complaints originated from a newspaper article published on 1 August 2010 alleging improper conduct and maladministration by the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Department of Public Works (DPW). Primarily the complaints related to the alleged non-compliance with the requirements of section 217 of the Constitution by the SAPS and the DPW, and the alleged improper involvement the National Commissioner of the SAPS in the procurement of two buildings in Pretoria and Durban for office accommodation for the SAPS.

The need for a second building to accommodate the SAPS Head Office in Pretoria was also questioned. Questions were also raised regarding the SAPS’s relationship with the preferred service provider and the cost effectiveness of the transaction.

FindingsThe lease agreements were signed between RPF and the DPW and not by

the National Commissioner of the SAPS, as was alleged. However, the National

M. Montesh



Commissioner signed a memorandum, dated 10 May 2010, authorising funding for the Sanlam Middestad building lease. He also signed the final SAPS needs analysis, dated 19 July 2010 for 25 301.54m2. Although the SAPS did not sign the lease agreement, its involvement in the procurement process was improper, as it proceeded beyond the demand management phase and it further failed to implement proper controls, as required by the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) and relevant procurement prescripts. The SAPS failed to comply with section 217 of the Constitution, the relevant provisions of the PFMA, Treasury Regulations and supply chain management rules and policies.

This failure amounted to improper conduct and maladministration. The conduct of the accounting officer of the SAPS was in breach of those duties and obligations incumbent upon him in terms of section 217 of the Constitution, section 38 of the PFMA and the relevant Treasury Regulations. These provisions require an accounting officer to ensure that goods and services are procured in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective. This conduct was improper, unlawful and amounted to maladministration. After the first report was issued by office of the Public Protector, a new Minister of the Department of Public Works was appointed. However, allegations of maladministration against the police kept coming. As a result, a follow up investigation was undertaken by the Public Protector and was completed on 14 July 2011. The report revealed that the fact that the procurement was not cost effective it resulted in a significant potential monetary loss to the state and prejudice to the South African tax payers.

RecommendationsThe Public Protector then recommended that the Minister of Police should,

with the assistance of the National Treasury, take urgent steps to ensure that the appropriate action is instituted against the appropriate SAPS officials that acted in contravention of the law, policy and other prescripts in respect of the procurement processes referred to in this report. Furthermore, the Public Protector also recommended that the SAPS must ensure that appropriate measures are implemented to prevent a recurrence of contraventions of the relevant procurement legislation and prescripts.

The Moloi Commission of InquiryOn 4 November 2011, the President of South, Mr Jacob Zuma, appointed a

Board of Inquiry in terms of section 9(1) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 as per President Minute 314 of October 2011. The Board was chaired by Judge Jake Moloi. The mandate of the Board was to inquire into alleged misconduct by the National Commissioner of Police Mr Bheki Cele and to pronounce on his fitness for office or his capacity execute his official duties, efficiently. The inquiry was based on the adverse finding by the South African Public Protector, relating to the conduct of the National Commissioner and/or the South African Police Service with regard to the procurement of office accommodation at the Sanlam Middestad

235


building in Pretoria and the Transnet building in Durban. The Public Protector had found that the conduct of the National Commissioner with regards to procurement was unlawful and constituted maladministration.

The proceedings of the inquiry were quasi-judicial in nature. The parties submitted sworn statements of witnesses and were subjected to cross-examination. The evidence overwhelmingly proved that the National Commissioner in his capacity as the Accounting Officer of the SAPS, failed to observe and uphold the provisions of the Constitution, the Public Finance Mnagement Act, the Treasury Instructions and all the other relevant procurement prescripts, in acquiring the two leases. The evidence also proved that the conduct of the National Commissioner had the consequence of favouring one supplier namely, Mr Roux Shabangu, above all others, in contravention of section 217 of the Constitution and section 38 of the Public Finance Management Act, in that he did not allow a transparent, competitive, cost effective and open tender system, to take place.

The Board of Inquiry consequently made the following recommendations:• That the President order the removal of the National Commissioner, Mr

Bheki Cele as the National Commissioner of the SAPS in terms of section 8(6)(b)(v) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995.

• That the relationship between the National Commissioner and Mr Roux Shabangu on the one hand, and the relationship between Mr Roux Shabangu and some officials within the Department of Public Works, on the other hand, be referred to competent authorities for investigation.

Technically, the commission made two findings, namely, one as a misconduct and the other one being corruption. Pity the commission did not have the power to pronounce corruption per se, but the referral of the allegations to competent authorities is sufficient to make a deduction that corruption did in fact take place. In view of these findings, it is clear that that both Jackie Selebi and Bheki Cele have been found guilty of corruption.

The appointment of Riah PhiyegaIn June 2012, President Jacob Zuma appointed Riah Phiyega as the new

National Commissioner of the SAPS. General Riah Phiyega was born in Polokwane and received her primary and secondary education in various schools in Limpopo. She holds a BA (Social Work) degree from the University of the North, a BA Hons (Social Science) from Unisa, an MA (Social Science) degree from the University of Johannesburg and a Post Graduate Diploma in Business Administration from Wales- University- Cardiff (South African Police Service, 2013).

Just after her appointment, Phiyega reportedly also came under fire after it emerged that she had links with a company supplying the SAPS with IT equipment. Apparently, the CV that was submitted to the Parliament Standing Committee on Police did not indicate any declaration of a conflict of interest as required by law. Evidence showed that she was a director and shareholder in Kapela Capital, which

M. Montesh



owns a 40% stake in XON, which has IT contracts with the SAPS. Over and above these allegations, almost three months after she was appointed as the National Commissioner, the Marikana massacre took place where 47 striking miners were shot dead by the police.The shooting incident is the single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 1960 (News24.com). Although at the time of writing of this article the Marikana Commission of Inquiry had not completed it work, questions have raised about General Phiyega’s ability to lead the police, especially her lack of experience in policing.

IS THIS SITUATION UNIQUE TO SOUTH AFRICA?According to Hills (2007:3) the tendency of presidents appointing National

Police Commissioners without police experience is a worldwide practice. Hill further states that in Ghana for example, section 202 (1) of the Ghanaian Constitution of 1992 states that “the Inspector-General of Police shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State”. Although both the Ghanaian Constitution and the Ghanaian Police Act do not prescribe the level of experience of the Inspector General of Police, it is clear that that the president has unlimited powers to appoint anyone he/she so wishes to appoint as the national Police Commissioner. Countries such as Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Namibia and Uganda are some of the countries in Africa that the president has the power to appoint and dismiss the National Police Commissioner (Herbst, 2000:39). The danger of using this approach is that Presidents do not want an effective or efficient police answerable to parliamentary committees or judicial enquiries but they value the police as a tool for enforcing political decisions, maintaining order, regulating activities, and regime representation (Hills, 2007:4). National Police Commissioners are a president’s point of access to the police institution. Commissioners are presidential agents of political domination. In South Africa for example, Jackie Selebi was a close ally to former president Thabo Mbeki, hence it was difficult for him to suspend him after allegations of corruption could no longer be ignored. In his book titled “Finish and Kraar”, Adran Basson (2012:1-2) quotes a conversation between Mr Jackie Selebi and former president Thabo Mbeki as follows [“the problem is George Fivaz going. We do not have a commissioner of police. So I asked people to give me a list; they gave me a list of a hundred names to choose from. From these hundred names one person can be a commissioner of police. I looked at this list, and the only name that I found that I can think of is you”]. This is a clear indication that the two individuals were very close comrades.

According to Daloz (2003:48), the reason why various presidents use this model to appoint and fire a National Police Commissioner is to keep them in check. Appointing someone close to the president ensure s that the president’s interests are protected. In Kenya for example, before 2007 disastrous elections, former president Kibaki had a separate secretive police agency, the Administration Police, which was accountable to him by way of presidentially appointed district commissioners.

237


Under the previous Kenyan Constitution, the president had unlimited authority to appoint and remove commissioners. Furthermore, the Kenyan law did not even provide criteria for presidents to follow, and also the parliament had no legal role in a National Police Commissioner’s appointment or removal (Hills, 2008:67). Constitutionally, Kenya’s police was accountable to the president, whose intent was channeled through his commissioner. Fortunately this is no longer the case in Kenya. From the above analysis, it is clear that problems associated with the appointment and removal of a National Police Commissioner is not unique to South Africa only but a global challenge. Time has come for governments to move to more democratic methods of appointing National Police Commissioners.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONNorthern Ireland (Northern Ireland Policing Board)The Policing Board is an independent public body whose job it is to oversee

policing in Northern Ireland and to secure for all the people of Northern Ireland an effective, efficient and impartial police service which will secure the confidence of the whole community. There are 19 Members of the Policing Board. During the negotiations that resulted in the Belfast Agreement of 1998, participants recognised that policing was an important and central issue for any society. The Agreement led to the creation of the Independent Commission on Policing, also known as the Patten Commission after its chairman, Chris Patten. The Independent Commission was tasked with making recommendations on future policing arrangements which included encouraging widespread community support. The Commission’s proposal for a new structure of accountability was designed to ensure effective and democratically based oversight of policing and the creation of a close partnership between police and local communities. In November 2000 Parliament passed the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, which was based on the Independent Commission’s recommendations (the Government’s second revised implementation plan, amending legislation – the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003 which was passed in April of 2003. Central to the creation of a new structure of accountability and democratically based oversight was the establishment of the Northern Ireland Policing Board, which would have a clear statutory primary function to hold the Chief Constable and police service publicly to account. The Policing Board came into being on 4 November 2001, the same day as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The Policing Board was reconstituted on April 1 2006. Political representatives were nominated by their parties and seats were allocated according to the results of the November 2003 Assembly Election. This resulted in eight seats being allocated to Political Members and 11 to Independents. As the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended, all Policing Board Members were appointed by the Secretary of State, Peter Hain MP. This is a change from the previous Board which was made up of 10 Political Members apponted by the Assembly and 9 Independent Members appointed by the Secretary of State. The Board elects its

M. Montesh



own Chairman and Vice-Chairman.It is the Policing Board’s job to ensure that there is an effective and efficient

police service for Northern Ireland and to make sure that the Chief Constable and PSNI are accountable in carrying out their responsibilities and serving the community (Northern Ireland Policing Board, Undated:2). The Policing Board sets the strategic direction for policing in Northern Ireland and holds the Chief Constable to account for all his actions and those of his staff for the policing service delivered. This means that the Chief Constable is accountable to the Board on any aspect of policing in Northern Ireland. However, the Board cannot, and does not, direct or control the Chief Constable. The delivery of local policing services is the job of the Chief Constable and the police service. He still has the right to take independent decisions based only on the need to uphold law and order. The Board carries its mandate in terms of section 3 of the Act of 2000, which outlines the following statutory duties and responsibilities:

• to secure an effective and efficient local police service • to appoint (and dismiss, if necessary) the Chief Constable and senior police

officers (Assistant Chief Constable and above) • to consult widely with local people about the policing of their area • to set local policing priorities and targets for police performance • to monitor everything the police do and how well they perform against the

targets set by the Policing Board • to publish a three year and annual policing plan which tells local people what

they can expect from their police service and report on police performance every year

• to make sure local people get best value from their local police • to oversee complaints against senior officers• to discipline senior officers

Canada (Ottawa Police Service Board)In Canada, policing is decentralised to the Provincial Government. In the

province of Ontario, the Ottawa Police Board has been used as a case study. The legislated mandate and responsibilities of police services boards in the Province of Ontario are established by the Province and set out in the Ontario Police Services Act; the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Police Services Regulation (O.Reg.3/1999); and the corresponding Ministry Policing Standards (City of Ottawa Police Services Board Policy Manual, 2011:66). The Ottawa Police Services Board is legally responsible for the provision of adequate and effective police services in the City of Ottawa. The Board represents the public interest in determining appropriate organisational performance of the Ottawa Police Service, and in providing civilian oversight and governance of the activities of the Police Service. Responsibilities of boards In terms of section 31(1) of the Ontario Police Service Act, a board is responsible for the provision of adequate and effective police services in the municipality and shall:

239


• appoint the members of the municipal police force; • recruit and appoint the chief of police and any deputy chief of police, and

annually determine their remuneration and working conditions taking their submissions into account;

• direct the chief of police and monitor his or her performance.• generally determine, after consultation with the chief of police, objectives

and priorities with respect to police services in the municipality; • establish policies for the effective management of the police force; • recruit and appoint the chief of police and any deputy chief of police, and

annually determine their remuneration and working conditions, taking their submissions into account;

• direct the chief of police and monitor his or her performance; • establish policies respecting the disclosure by chiefs of police of personal

information about individuals; • receive regular reports from the chief of police on disclosures and decisions

made for secondary activities;• establish guidelines with respect to the indemnification of members of the

police force for legal costs under the law; • establish guidelines for dealing with complaints made the members of the

public against the police; • review the chief of police’s administration of the complaints system and

receive regular reports from the chief of police on his or her administration of the complaints system.

Uganda Section 8, Chapter 303 of the Ugandan Police Act of 1994 makes provision for

the establishment, composition and meetings of the Police Authority. The Police Authority consists of the following members:

• the Minister responsible for internal affairs as its chairperson;• the following members• the Attorney General;• the Inspector General of Police;• the Deputy Inspector General of Police;• a senior officer in charge of administration at the headquarters of the force;• three other persons appointed by the President.The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry responsible for internal affairs is the

secretary to the police authority. The quorum of the police authority is five and the police authority may regulate its own procedure. In terms of section 9 (1) and subject to the Constitution, the functions of the police authority are:

• to advise the Government on policy matters relating to the management, development and administration of the force;

• to advise the President on the appointment of the Inspector General of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police;

M. Montesh



• to recommend to the President appointments and promotions of police officers above the rank of assistant superintendent of police;

• to determine the terms and conditions of service in the force;• to hear and determine appeals from decisions of the police council;• to determine, by statutory order, the ranks, precedence, command and

seniority of the force and to empower the force to perform the services of a military force.

The Police Authority may appoint a committee from among its members to assist it in the performance of any of its functions and may assign to it such functions, subject to such conditions and restrictions, as the authority may think fit.

Kenya The Constitution of Kenya, made law in 2010, established a new National

Police Service and a National Police Service Commission. New laws were required to reflect the changes to the police system made under the new Constitution. The changes made to the police system were prompted by many factors, including the Police Reform Taskforce Report (also called the Ransley Report) that reviewed the police structures and systems after the 2007/8 post-election violence and recommended wide-ranging reforms to the police service. The goal of the police reforms was to transform the Police to a professional, efficient and accountable police service that is trusted by the public. The Ransley Report recommended the restructuring of the police services to include new organisations, including the Police Service Commission and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority. In terms of section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act of 2011, the following guidelines must be followed when appointing an Inspector General or Deputy Inspector General of the Kenyan Police:

• The NPS Commission advertises the position in the Gazette and two other national newspapers.

• The Commission considers the applicants, conducts interviews and short-lists at least 3 people, whose names are published in the Gazette. Only people who fit the selection criteria will be shortlisted.

• The Commission will also appoint a panel made up of representatives from the Officer of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Judicial Service Commission, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and the Kenya National Gender and Equality Commission. This panel will interview the candidates shortlisted by the NPS Commission and then give the President a list of candidates in order of preference.

• Within 7 days of receiving the list, the President must nominate one person from the list to the Parliament.

• Within 14 days of receiving the nomination, the Parliament must approve or reject the person nominated.

• Once the Parliament approves a person, a notice will be published in the

241


Gazette. If the Parliament does not agree with the person nominated by the President, then the President must submit a different nominee to the Parliament from the people put forward in the list given to the President.

• If the Parliament does not agree on any of the names put forward then the process will need to start again – and the position will be re-advertised.

In terms of the Kenyan Constitution read with the Kenyan National Police Service Act and National Police Service Commission Act, a person can only be the IGP for one term of 4 years. Once the four year term has been completed a new Inspector-General must be appointed. The previous Inspector-General cannot be reappointed. Furthermore, the law stipulates that the Kenyan Inspector-General can be removed from office, but only in accordance with the following process:

A petition is given to the NPS Commission which says that the Inspector-General should not continue to be the Inspector-General for one of the following reasons:

• a serious violation of the Constitution (including Chapter 6) or any other law;

• gross misconduct;• unable to perform the job due to physical or mental problems;• incompetence;• bankruptcy; or• any other just cause. Evidence to support the petition must be included.If two-thirds of the Commission believes that the petition shows that the

IGP should not continue to be the IGP for one of the above reasons, then the Commission will recommend that the Parliament remove the Inspector-General. The Parliament will then consider the petition, and if satisfied that it shows a valid reason to dismiss the IGP, the Parliament will inform the President of this. The President must then appoint a Tribunal to investigate the matter and make a binding recommendation to the President. The President can decide whether to suspend the IGP whilst the investigation by the Tribunal is being carried out. The Tribunal must investigate and provide a recommendation as quickly as possible. Once the Tribunal makes a recommendation, the President has to implement it within 7 days. In order to qualify to apply for the position of an Inspector General, the National Police Service Commission Act of 2011, the candidate must:

• be a citizen of Kenya, and must not hold citizenship of another country.• have a degree from a university recognized in Kenya.• have had a distinguished police career. • must have been employed in a senior management position for at least 15

years.• must have previous experience in either: criminal justice, policy

development and implementation, finance and public administration, strategic management, security, law, sociology or Government.

• must not be a Member of Parliament or of a county assembly, or be a Governor or Deputy Governor or hold an office in a political party.

M. Montesh



• must not have, in the last 5 years, served as a Member of Parliament, county assembly or trade union, or held an office in a political party.

• must not have been convicted of a criminal offence.• must not have violated the Constitution, and must meet the requirements of

Chapter 6 of the Constitution.• must not be employed elsewhere.• must not be an un-discharged bankrupt.• must be a serving police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above, and

have worked as a police officer for at least 15 years.In terms of Part II of the National Police Service Commission Act of 2011, the

National Police Service Commission is made up of nine (9) members consisting of a chairperson, who is a senior lawyer qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge, the Inspector-General of Police, two Deputy Inspectors-General, each being the head of regular police and administration police, two retired police officers, who held the rank of senior superintendent or above. One of these officers must be a woman. One must be retired from the Kenya Police Service, one from the Administration Police Service. Three other people of integrity who have served the public with distinction, and have at least 10 years’ experience in either:

• Finance and administration• Economics • Human resources development and management • Public administration • Labour laws • Law • Human rights

CONCLUSIONS Policing is a specialized field. However the last three National Police

Commissioners did not have policing experience. There are two schools of thought about whether a National Police Commissioner should be a civilian or a career police official. Bowman (2013:1) is of the opinion that policing is a specialized profession and not just a job – thus must be led by career police officials. The label of profession is often applied to a set of specialized skills that are transferable through training and experience. Profession also implies the development of objective work standards articulated through policies and procedures that define tasks and desired outcomes. While applying skills and standards are critical in defining a traditional model of professionalism, more essential is an emphasis on autonomous expertise, independent judgment, and the service ideal. On the other hand, the second school of thought is of the view that there is no need for policing experience in order to manage a police agency. According to Schulte (1996:3), in view of the increasing complexity and the broader range of police operational situations, a high standard of interpersonal and communication skills are being

243


expected from him/her, combined with the capability of utilizing problem-solving techniques that are in line with the constitution. The police manager is facing more demanding expectations on both quality and rapidness of his/her performance as a manager and is exposed to constantly more intricate and comprehensive policing situations (Schulte, 1996:3). This includes information technology, such as data recording and evaluation, and research work on the basic legal fundaments before the decision-making process is started. In view of the deeper European and international cooperation there is a particular need to have legal and political/institutional know-how and interpersonal skills.

The primary factor of each leadership/management activity is a sound professional leadership/management competence. The police manager must have obtained the professional know-how which is appropriate to his/her career level and must be able to professionally solve problems typically arising on that particular level (Schulte, 1996:3). He needs no in-depth or special skills such as the workforce at intermediate organisational level normally have. Instead, the police manager should be able to activate the know-how of the members of his organisation. One further element of leadership skills is to be familiar with various techniques, such as problem solving and leadership techniques. Therefore the handling of methodology is included in the leadership/management function. Police managers should have a managerial qualification to organize the force or the district they are responsible for (Schulte, 1996:3). Somebody being partly in charge of a police organisation must be able to manage himself/herself as well. Efficient time management, e.g., is an essential key element. Representative skills require the capability of acting convincingly both in the internal organisation and externally. Besides these more general requirements one further key element of the successful leadership/management function is pro-active visionary planning. Our society is indeed faced with an explosion of knowledge. At modern times, the half-life period of knowledge is not more than between 4 and 6 years. Schulte (1996:3) believes that it is important that the police take these circumstances into consideration and be prepared to the possible outcomes.

THE WAY FORWARDFrom the above discussion, it is clear that South Africa is not the only country

where the power to appoint a National Police Commissioner is vested with the president. On the other hand, it has been proved that South Africa needs to move away from this position. The conviction of former Police Commissioner Mr Jackie Selebi of corruption and the subsequent dismissal of Mr Bheki Cele by the president as a result maladministration and breach of policies is a clear indication that it is time to a system which allows a process a career police official to lead the South African Police Service. The author proposes a model almost similar to the used by the Kenyan government with minor adjustments. Therefore these recommendations entail the following:

M. Montesh



Section 207(1) of the Constitution and section 6 and 7 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 need to be amended to pave the way for the establishment of a Police Service Commission or Board. Such a Commission or Board shall have the powers to advertise a post of National Police Commissioners and Deputy National Commissioners.

After the positions have been advertised, the Commission shall interview the candidates for the position of a National Commissioner and those for Deputy National Commissioners. The Commission will also appoint a panel made up of representatives from the Officer of the President, the Office of the Minister of Police, the Judicial Service Commission, the Public Service Commission, the South African Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Auditor General, the Department of Public Service and Administration and Lawyers For Human Rights. This panel will interview the candidates shortlisted by the NPS Commission and then submit it to the parliament a list of candidates in order of preference.

Within 7 days of receiving the list, the parliament must vote for the successful candidate from list provided. In order to be appointed as the National Commissioner, the candidate shall be required to obtain 75% of the votes. Once the Parliament approves the successful candidate, a notice will be published in the Gazette. If the Parliament does not agree on any of the names put forward then the process will need to start again – and the position will be re-advertised. The same process shall be followed when Deputy National Commissioners are appointed except that the list of preferred candidates shall be eight. In order to qualify to apply for the position of a National Police Commissioner or Deputy National Police Commissioner, the candidate must:

• be a citizen of South Africa, and must not hold citizenship of another country.• have a degree from a university recognized in South Africa.• have had a distinguished police career. • must have been employed in a senior management position for at least 15

years.• must have previous experience in either: criminal justice, policy

development and implementation, finance and public administration, strategic management, security, law, sociology or Government.

• must not be a Member of Parliament or of a county assembly, or be a Premier/Mayor or Deputy Mayor or hold an office in a political party.

• must not have, in the last 5 years, served as a Member of Parliament, county assembly or trade union, or held an office in a political party.

• must not have been convicted of a criminal offence.• must not have violated the Constitution, and must meet the requirements of

the Constitution.• must not be employed elsewhere.

245


• must not be an un-discharged bankrupt.• must be a serving police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above, and

have worked as a police officer for at least 15 years.In cases of misconduct, the National Police Commissioner can be removed

from office, but only in accordance with the following process: A petition shall be given to the NPS Commission outlining that the National Commissioner should not continue to be the National Commissioner for one of the following reasons:

• a serious violation of the Constitution or any other law;• gross misconduct;• unable to perform the job due to physical or mental problems;• incompetence;• bankruptcy; or• any other just cause. Evidence to support the petition must be included.If two-thirds of the Commission believes that the petition shows that the

National Commissioner not continues to be the National Commissioner for one of the above reasons, then the Commission shall recommend that the Parliament remove the National Commissioner. The Parliament will then consider the petition, and if satisfied that it shows a valid reason to dismiss the National Commissioner, the Parliament will inform the President of this. The President must then appoint a Tribunal to investigate the matter and make a recommendation to the President. The President will then submit the findings to parliament to vote for the dismissal of the National Commissioner. Once the Tribunal makes a recommendation, the President has to inform the parliament within 7 days. All these requirements shall be applicable to both the National Police Commissioner and Deputy National Police Commissioners. These recommendations are more in line with the Kenyan model.

LIST OF REFERENCESBowman, T.L. 201. Is Policing a Job or a Profession? The Case for a Four-year

Degree. Texas, USA: CALEA Update Magazine. Issue 108. City of Ottawa Police Services Board. 2011. Policy Manual. Ottawa, Canada.Daloz, J-P. 2003. ‘“Big Men” in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate

Positions and Resources’. Comparative Sociology 2, 1: 271-285.Gomes, C. 2007. Police Accountability in the Caribbean: Where are the People? A

paper presented at the workshop on Police Accountability at the Civicus World Assembly: May 23-27, 2007. Glasgow, Scotland.

Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton.

Hills, A. 2000. Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization. London: Routledge.

Hills, A. 2007. Police commissioners, presidents and the governance of security. Journal of Modern African Studies. London: Routledge.

Hills, A. 2008. Kenya: Service to all or selective service? London: Routledge.

M. Montesh


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationKenya (Republic). 2011. Constitution. Nairobi.Kenya (Republic). 2011. National Police Service Act of 2011. Nairobi.Kenya (Republic). 2011. National Police Service Commission Act of 2011. Nairobi.Northern Ireland Policing Board. Undated. 10 Things about your Policing Board.

Available at www.nipolicingboard.org.uk. Accessed on 19-04-2013.Northern Ireland. 2000. Police Northern Ireland Act, Chapter 32 of 2000. Crown

copyright, UK: The Stationery Office Limited.Ontario. 1999. Adequacy and Effectiveness of Police Services. Regulation 3/1999.

Ontario, Canada.Ontario. 1999. Police Services Act of 1990. Ontario, Canada.Public Protector. 2010/2011. Against the rules. Report No. 33 of 2010/11. Report of

the Public Protector in terms of section 182(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and section 8(1) of the Public Protector Act, 1994 on an investigation into complaints and allegations of maladministration, improper and unlawful conduct by the department of public works and the South African Police Service relating to the leasing of office accommodation in Pretoria. Pretoria: Office of the Public Protector.

Public Protector. 2011. Against the rules too. Report of the Public Protector in terms of section 182(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and section 8(1) of the Public Protector Act, 1994 on an investigation into complaints and allegations of maladministration, improper and unlawful conduct by the department of public works and the South African Police Service relating to the leasing of office accommodation in Pretoria. Pretoria: Office of the Public Protector.

Schulte, R. 1996. Which challenges will police managers have to meet in the future? College of Police and Security Studies, Slovenia

South Africa (Republic). 1992. Corruption Act 94 of 1992. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1995. South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 2004. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 2012. Report of the Board of Inquiry in terms of Section 9(1) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. Pretoria: The Presidency.

South Africa. 2030. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future-make it work. Pretoria: The Presidency.

South African Police Service. 2013. Available at www.saps.gov.za. Accessed on 19-04-2013.

Uganda (Republic). 1994. Police Act of 1994. Chapter 303, Statute 13/1994. Kampala, Uganda.

Reported CasesS v Selebi (25/2009) [2010] ZAGPJHC 58Selebi v State (240/2011) [2011] ZASCA 249

247


THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON REFUGEE MOVEMENTS AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Z. MpehleTurfloop Graduate School of Leadership


ABSTRACT

The world is facing a daunting challenge of receiving refugees who flee their countries because of, inter alia, persecution meted against them by being associated with social groups that are perceived to be against the ruling

governments. As the number of refugees grows worldwide each year, South Africa has become one of the countries that receive refugees from neighbouring countries, Africa and around the world in large numbers. In an attempt to control the movement of refugees into South Africa the government has put in place laws such as the Refugees Act 103 of 1998 that would facilitate the registration of refugees and provide for a stricter immigration policy. The point of argument in this paper is that despite such attempts made by the South African government, the government seems unable to cope with the number of refugees coming into the country due to a lack of capacity in the registration of asylum seekers, which has created a backlog in asylum applications. The paper further states that because there are no refugee camps and proper refugee integration strategy by government, refugees find themselves looking for places to stay, with some ending up in townships and informal settlements where unemployment is rife, causing xenophobic attacks as they all scramble for same basic services. The local sphere of government cannot deal with the influx of refugees when it comes to service delivery because of its limited resources. The paper concludes by providing possible solutions to address the refugee challenges South Africa is currently facing.

INTRODUCTION The influx of refugees has become the 21st century challenge in South Africa

as the demise of the apartheid regime brought about new hope, not only for South Africans but for other African countries that perceive South Africa as the solution for their social and economic woes. Since the inception of democracy in 1994 South Africa saw itself as the recipient of asylum seekers, mainly from countries in the African region, that were fleeing from their countries because of, among other things, civil wars and fear of prosecution because of the their involvement in fighting for justice and aligning themselves with groups perceived as an ‘enemy’ of the ruling party.

Z. Mpehle



As further articulated by Landau & Wa Kwabe-Segatti (2009:7), identifies three ‘Ps’ that motivate African asylum seekers to flee their countries in favour of South Africa. The first motivating factor is ‘Profit’: the migrants who fall into this category are in the majority, they come to look for better jobs and other economic opportunities that could give them a better life. A typical example is the recent economic failure and political instability in Zimbabwe exacerbated the situation as thousands of Zimbabwean fled their country in search of employment and a better life. The second group come for ‘Protection’: their coming into South Africa is driven by political or domestic persecution, natural disasters, or violence that plagues their countries. For an example, the civil war that erupted in Mozambique in the 80’s caused about 350 000 of its citizens to flee the country and entered South Africa illegally. South Africa’s relatively good economy in the region and its peacefulness are the main contributing factors in the voluminous migration as migrants perceive the country to be the “greener pastures”. The third and last group are those that use South Africa as a ‘Passage’: for these South Africa is a springboard for better opportunities somewhere in the developed countries like the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Australia, etc.

The movement of foreign nationals into the country necessitated the government to introduce laws that would manage and control such movement in an effective manner. To ensure that management of refugees’ migration into South Africa is effective, according to the Department of Home Affairs 2008/2009 Annual Report (2010:55), the enactment of the laws became necessary so that compliance with the basic standards operating procedures in the immigration points is adhered to, accurate statistical analysis of information is done, and reports given to concerned managers on a monthly basis. However, the flow of asylum seekers and refugees has increased since 2001 as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Cumulative Numbers of Refugees and Asylum seekers from 2001 - 2007

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Refugees 18,605 23,344 26,558 27,683 29,714 35,086 36,736

Asylum Seekers

4,860 52,451 84,085 115,2241 40,095 131,107 170,865

Total 23,465 75,795 110,643 142,907 169,809 167,193 207,601

Source: Landau & Wa Kwabe-Segatti (2009: 8)

Due to the rising number of refugees and asylum seekers in the country it became necessary for the researcher to look at the present condition of refugees within the country and whether the country is able to cope with the refugees’ demands of services. Again it is imperative to identify challenges that come with this rising number of asylum seekers and refugees, and provide a possible solution in improving service delivery to the refugees. This paper therefore begins with the

249


background where issues of migration and causes are captured, and proceed to explore the push-pull theory that explains factors that contribute to the movements from one country to another because of different reasons such as the bad economic and political conditions. The paper further discusses the South African legislations that impact on movements of asylum seekers and refugees, and defines the refugee concept and deliberates on the state of refugees in South Africa and challenges faced by the South African government in the provision of services to the asylum seekers and refugees. The paper then draws conclusion from the discourse and provides recommendations as far as improving service delivery and curbing the high influx of asylum seekers and refugees. The paper is theoretical in nature, and therefore will utilise available literature from different sources such as, among others, books, journals, internet, reports, legislations and dissertations

REGULATORY FRAMEWORKIn trying to ensure that refugees receive a fair treatment, their human rights not

violated, and to control and curb the abnormal influx of refugees in South Africa, the government enacted legislations that directly and indirectly deal with refugees’ affairs. This section explores there pieces of legislation namely the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as the supreme law of the country, the Refugees Act 1998 (No 130 of 1998), and the Immigration Act 2002 (Act 13 of 2002).

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996Although this piece of legislation does not deal directly with refugees issues, it

does capture the rights of every human being who has been offered the legal status of being in South Africa. Section 9 in Chapter Two of this legislation termed as the Bill of Rights states clearly that “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”, and that “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.” Sections 10, 22 and 23 further state that everyone has the right to human dignity, freedom of trade and employment, and should be treated fairly as far as labour practices is concerned. Additionally, sections 24-27 and 29 state that every person has the right to a clean environment, property, housing, healthcare and education. The legislation implies that once a person has received the legal status of being in South Africa, in this instance the refugee status, that person has the right to enjoy all the privileges mentioned above.

The Refugees Act, 1998 (No 130 of 1998)The Act came into effect on 01 April 2000 and outlines principles and standards

that need to be followed in the reception, protection and recognition of asylum seekers and refugees. Sections 2 (a) and (b), and 4 (d) prevents the host country from deporting an asylum seeker without giving such an opportunity to present his case, and if such deportation is going to put the life of the asylum seeker in danger because of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political affiliation or opinion, and belonging to a social group. Furthermore, the host country should

Z. Mpehle



not extradite a person whose “physical safety and freedom would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the whole of that country.” The Act also states that no person will be given a refugee status when, at the time of applying, that person has similar status in another country. Section 8 gives authority to the Director-General, working closely with the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs, to establish Refugee Reception Offices to accelerate the applications for asylum. Of more importance, Chapter 5 stipulates the rights of refugees which are in line the bill of Rights that are contained in Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The rights include access and entitlement to basic health services and education, the South African passport and identity book, full legal protection, and the right to seek employment. Finally, section 24 provides for promotion of administrative justice by DHA officials to inform the applicants of the whole asylum application process.

The Immigration Act, 2002 (Act 13 of 2002) Section 23 of the Immigration Act 2000 (Act 13 of 2002) clearly states that

an asylum seeking person, at the port of entry, may be granted an asylum transit visa that lasts for five days. Within the five days the asylum seeker should present himself at the Refugee Reception Office to apply for asylum. If that does not happen, the asylum seeker will be treated as an illegal foreigner, and may face extradition.

THE PUSH-PULL THEORY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO REFUGEE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICAThe push-pull theory was developed by Lee in the 1960s and became very popular

migration literature and became popular among scholars and researchers in universities worldwide. The theory implies that people migrate from one place to another because of “demographic, environmental and economic factors.” Two main forces, namely the unsatisfactory condition in the home country of a migrant and perceived or imaginary satisfactory condition in the country of destination, are the sources of the pushes and the pulls (de Haas, 2008:9). Dorigo and Tobler (1983:1) also mention that the push-pull theory looks at two factors that cause people to leave the country of origin; the push factor and push factor. They identify push factors as situations in life that serve as a reason for dissatisfaction with the country of origin, and the pull factors as those external influences that make the country of destination appealing for various reasons. Parkins (2010:60) denotes that push factors that contribute to migration are, inter alia, a volatile economy, violence, lack of employment and economic opportunities which in turn deprive individual’s socio-economic advancement.

In the context of this paper the push-factor could refer to the undesirable conditions experienced by the prospective migrant that drive him/her out of the home country that was once a comfort zone to a perceived desirable territory because of better living conditions.

251

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationThe better living conditions may refer to economic, religious and political stability. However, the movement creates some uncertainties in the mind of the prospective migrant on whether the host country have the capacity to offer migrants, in this case a refugee, appropriate basic services such as health, education, housing and other necessary services.

As espoused by Muniz, Li and Schleicher (2011:5), a migrant when moving from an unfavourable to favourable region should expect impediments will make the journey arduous. The barriers may not necessarily be physical like borders and the terrace to be traversed but may be emotional, financial, legal (laws of the receiving country including its politics) and psychological too. The psychological barriers may include, inter alia, fear of being discriminated against, unemployment, and lack of self-worth when called by derogatory names, whilst emotional barriers may include starting a new life in a strange place without family and friends, and having to wait for the outcome of a lengthy application process to be recognised. Table 2 below summarises the push-pull theory. The plus signs in both the home country and host country indicate advantages of staying and leaving respectively, and the minus indicating disadvantages of staying and leaving respectively.

Table 2: Summary of Lee’s Push-Pull Theory

Source: Adapted from Muniz, Li and Schleicher, 2011

Given the present situation of escalating numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa, the application of the push-pull theory becomes relevant. Asylum seekers and refugees are pushed to leave their countries of origin by adverse conditions in those countries that make their stay unbearable, unsafe and without future guarantees. South Africa as a destination of choice is perceived to be a better refuge or haven that provides protection as far as human rights are concerned. As further explained by Wang (2013:4) the application of push-pull theory is prevalent in countries where internal pressures act as the driving force behind people’s choice to leave in search of better conditions in a country that seems to accommodative of their needs.

Z. Mpehle



WHO IS A REFUGEE?The 1951 Geneva Convention defines a refugee as an individual who has left the home

country as an asylum seeker because of unfavourable social and economic conditions such as persecution and lack of protection from such by that country’s government. In other words a refugee is someone that flees from his/her home country due to possibility of his/her life being in danger, and therefore pursues protection from a host country. Whereas danger refers to prosecution, torture, death or any cruel treatment meted out against that individual, protection refers to obtaining a refugee status. However, the refugee status in the host country is not automatically permanent, it ceases when conditions in the home country change in favour of the refugee, and the refugee decides to repatriate voluntarily (The 1951 United Nations Convention and its 1967 Protocol 2011:3). As further explained by sections 3(a) and 24 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, a refugee is an individual who has fled his country of origin because of civil war, fear of persecution, or if the country violates his/her human rights, and given asylum status and protection in the host country. There are six grounds on which an individual is given asylum or refugee status in South Africa, and they are:

• Political beliefs which may differ with the government of the time, and those beliefs or views are made known;

• A person is segregated because of colour, race, descent or ethnic origin;• An individual experiencing differential treatment because of gender,

language or sexual orientation;• An individual being segregated upon because of religion;• Receiving differential treatment because of nationality; and• Being treated unfairly because of belonging to a different tribe.

REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICASouth Africa is part of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969

Organisation of African Unity Convention, and therefore has to comply with agreements reached in these conventions. The 1951 Refugee Convention only protected European refugees that were displaced as a result of the World War II, and therefore that status had to be amended by the 1967 Protocol as displacement was not only limited to the Europeans. These instruments obligate the 148 countries which are party to them to protect refugees by ensuring that their human rights are not violated. The rights as per papers 17-23 contained in 1951 Geneva Convention, which are no different from those mentioned in the Bill of Rights, include the right to work, housing, education, and public relief and assistance. The two instruments have become the core documents in the protection of refugees. As a result of abiding by these instruments, South Africa has is the country that has the highest number of immigrants in the Southern African Development Community (UNHCR 2011:1, 4).

One of the objectives mentioned in the Department of Home Affairs Strategic Plan 2008/2009 – 2010/2011 (2008:34) is to assess and decide on the status of the asylum seekers, ensure that those who qualify to be refugees are given the necessary status, and that

253

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationthe whole process of refugee recognition as per the above-mentioned international treaties, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and the Bill of Rights is properly managed..

The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) working together with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there were 65,000 refugees in South Africa in 2012, and 230 500 asylum-seekers, as shown on table 3, who were mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Somali and Ethiopia (UNHCR Global Report, 2012:1).

Table 3: Number of refuges and asylum-seekers per African country in 2012

TYPE OF POPULATION ORIGIN TOTAL

Refugees Somalia 17,900

Dem. Rep. of the Congo 13,400

Angola 5,800

Ethiopia 5,500

Burundi 2,400

Congo 2,300

Rwanda 1,400

Zimbabwe 1,100

Eritrea 700

Various 14,800

A Total number of refugees 65 300

Asylum-Seekers Zimbabwe 37,000

Dem. Rep. of the Congo 8,100

Somalia 5,000

Malawi 3,400

Bangladesh 3,300

Ethiopia 3,100

Others/unknown 170,600

B Total number of asylum seekers 230 500

Total A + B 295 800

Source: UNHCR Global Report, 2012

According to Amit (2012:15), the DHA has been lauded by the public, the media and government for its remarkable service delivery in the processing of refugees documents. However the South African Government is not coping with the huge number of asylum seekers’ applications due financial and capacity constraints as it is also faced with deporting

Z. Mpehle


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationmany illegal immigrants. As stated by the Mail and Guardian, 17 May 2013, the DHA spends approximately R90m annually to deport illegal immigrants to their respective countries, and most of these illegal immigrants are from Zimbabwe. Between January and April of 2013 there were about 11 133 Zimbabweans deported. Despite the deportation most Zimbabweans find their way back to South Africa in a matter of few days due to porousness of the borders. At the same since 2009 the South African Police Service in Gauteng spends over R362.5-million a year to detect, detain and transfer illegal migrants to Lindelani, a repatriation centre in Johannesburg prior de deportation. Keeping illegal immigrant at the centre costs R99 a day, and a cost of deporting one Zimbabwean is R558.

An asylum seeker has to apply for an Asylum Seeker Permit, which is also referred to as Section 22 Permit, which will allow the asylum seeker to be officially in South Africa whilst waiting for approval or disapproval to be recognised as a refugee. The permit lasts for a maximum of three months. In the meantime the asylum seeker has to attend two interviews before a decision can be made whether a refugee status will be given. If approved then Section 24 Permit (Refugee Permit) will be issued, and can last up to five years (Amit, 2012:16).

According Gail Eddy the Parliamentary Liason Officer of the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, the 2011 budget speech that was delivered by the Minister of Finance, Mr Pravin Gordhan, the Department of Defence was given an amount of R2 billion in the 2012/2013 financial year, which was R1.3 billion more as compared to 2011/2012 budget. This amount was taken from the reserves of R33 billion for the safe guarding and improving of borders’ infrastructure as the country borders were porous (http://www.ngopulse.org/paper/consortium-refugees-and-migrants-south-africa-comments-201112-budget). A porous border where control is not effective poses a threat to the security of the country

CHALLENGES

South Africa has a dual responsibility, and that is to make sure that asylum seekers at their arrival and those who obtained refugee status receive a fair treatment as per the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol which provide a framework on how refugees and asylum seekers need to be treated and protected on their arrival, and that the neighbouring countries where there is conflict are pressurised to put to an end to the conflict (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/south-africa /0908 31/zimbabwean-migrants-face-crime-harassment-south-africaZimbabwean refugees face crime, harassment in South Africa). However there are challenges still faced by South Africa in the provisioning of services to refugees such as backlogs in the processing of asylum seekers’ applications, ingintegration of refugees into local communities, competition of resources by both locals and refugees, and backlogs

The DHA Service BacklogsIn order to cope with such a number of asylum seekers and refugees and the backlog in

the processing of applications of asylum seekers the DHA opened a number of reception offices around the country from from September 2007 to the year 2009 and were established

255

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationin Pretoria (Marabastad), Johannesburg (Crown Mines), Durban (Greyville), Cape Town (Nyanga) and Port Elizabeth (North End), Musina and Pretoria. The offices were envisaged to expedite the process of giving asylum seekers the status of a refugee, avoiding walking long distances and waiting in long queues in limited number of DHA offices. The lack of capacity and unavailability of adequate resources to facilitate the process of registration of asylum seekers led the high volume of asylum seeker’s applications that ran over 100 000 in 2010 not to be attended to, and therefore negatively affected the quality and efficiency of the refugee status determination process. By the end of 2011 the backlog was reduced from over 46 000 applications to 16 669. The lack of administrative capacity also led to the closure of some reception offices, which meant those asylum seekers’ applications to be classified as refugees could not be processed within the stipulated time, and therefore resulted in their illegal arrest, detention and deportation (McKnight 2008:33; Immigration News, 19 June 2012). According to Palmary (2002:8) the delay in the processing of applications make asylum seekers vulnerable as they are unable to look for employment and cannot access basic services like education, health and housing.

Integration of Refugees into Local CommunitiesAs per Chapter 7 (section 152) of the Constitution, most services to local

communities need to be provided by a local municipality in an equitable and sustainable manner. However, according to Palmary (2002:1) the local government’s role in the provision of services to refugees has not been explicitly mentioned in government legislations, including the Refugee Act. Again there are no possible barriers articulated concerning the accessibility of municipal services by refugees. The lack of clarity by legislations on such a matter creates a dilemma for municipalities who are supposed to offer services and safety to refugees, and serves as a source of conflict in communities where refugees find themselves. While some municipalities accept asylum seekers and refugees as part of the community, the communities themselves and some municipal’s do not take the presence of foreigners kindly, and therefor make the refugees’ stay amongst them very uncomfortable by pretending they do not exist, excluding them from the local development plans, and seen as a threat as far as job opportunities are concerned. Refugees are not only discriminated against by communities but also by police who harass them time and again.

Although Paper 27(g) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 affords migrants an opportunity to have access to basic services like any other South African, particularly in accessing health and education services, asylum seekers and refugees continue to be marginalised by government officials whenever they seek assistance as far as services are concerned. As stated by Landau & Wa Kwabe-Segatti (2009:40,42,43), generally it appears that accessing educational institutions seems not to be a challenge for refugees, state hospitals often seem reluctant to service refugees, which is discriminatory in nature. The country also does not provide low-cost houses to foreigners.

Z. Mpehle


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationCompetition for ResourcesOne of the challenges facing South Africa is that there are no refugee camps,

and therefore the refugees end up staying with local citizens, particularly in informal settlements where there is poverty and lack of services. Refugees end up scrambling for jobs and basic services such as shelter with locals, causing conflict that usually ends up in undesirable xenophobic attacks as recently witnessed in various South African townships where poverty is and unemployment is rife (http://www.southafrica.info/travel/documents/refugees_asylum.htm).

Despite being a middle-income country, South Africa is faced with high rate of unemployment that is currently at 24, 1%, according to the disputed official figures. The, lack of service delivery, poverty and economic inequality put refugees and asylum-seekers in competition with locals. What compounds the problem is an accelerated number of illegal immigrants that was estimated to be 1.2 million in 1990 and rose to 2 million in 1991. In the subsequent two years it rose to 2.5 million and 3 million. In 2011 there were about 5 million illegal immigrants in a country that had about 47 million as recorded by Statistics South Africa (http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=paper&id=1298:unemployment-and-immigration-in-south-africa-&catid=87:african-finance-a-economy&Itemid =294). According to Roos (2011:1) the unofficial unemployment rate in 2011 was at 36, 5% and 36, 7% in the first quarter of 2013, which was the highest since 2008.

Zimbabwe’s economic and political situation in particular has contributed to the massive flow which has had a huge impact on South Africa’s social landscape, including demand for jobs, healthcare, social grants and other services. The challenge with the inflow is the periodic outbreaks of tension that often resulted in open violence. Although some refugees and asylum seekers are able to find jobs and establish businesses, the xenophobic attitudes towards African refugees that result in attacks, which are embedded on intolerance and the colonial past which keeps on haunting the thinking of South Africans do not make life any easier (Naicker and Nair, 2000:3).

Although South Africa has legislations that are fairly liberal and favourable to asylum-seekers and refugees by supporting international endeavours to offer protection and providing access to health facilities, education and social services, refugees do not fully enjoy the privileges and rights afforded by such legislations due to their permits not recognised by some public institutions (UNHCR Country Operations Profile, 2014). In some instances, as mentioned by de la Hunt and Klaaren (2008:35, 36) some refugees and asylum seekers are made to pay extra money as compared to South Africans in order for them to access public institutions like hospitals and clinics.

To ‘deny’ refugees access to health facilities could prove to be detrimental not only to refugees but to the local communities in that the spread of diseases that

257


would have been prevented would be faster. This can be costly to the government as it will have to spend more money curing that which could have been prevented. If the same ‘denial’ happens in education then the number of illiterates will grow and thus accelerating high rate of unemployment which may subsequently lead to more crime.

Conflict between Refugees and Local PopulationsThe recent spate of violence against foreigners in predominantly poor societies

in townships has raised questions if South Africa is ready to accommodate refugees. The xenophobic attacks have created some kind of alienation of foreigners by locals, a serious concern that needs to be addressed by the government and all parties that are affected. The source of conflict emanates from accessing services. Many refugees who are in the country to look for a better living conditions are also faced with a challenge of not having access to basic services, without homes and proper shelter, and unemployment. This has led them to be vulnerable and “...often become the targets of the hostility of locals who don’t fancy waves of newcomers in a country plagued by chronic unemployment.” (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/south-africa/090831/zimbabwean-migrants-face-crime-harassment-south-africaZimbabwean refugees face crime, harassment in South Africa).

The Current Policy ShiftA concern has been raised on policy shifts proposed by government in trying to

curb the high inflow of refugees. According to Paton (2013:1) the shift of government from policies, without directly changing the policies, in the treatment of refugees suggests that refugees and asylum seekers will not receive the protection that was given in the early 1990s. It became evident when reception centres in Cape Town Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg were shut down with an intention of relocating them to the borders. This was seen as a strategy to refuse entry to asylum seekers right at the border even before they enter South Africa. The refusal to grant transit permits to asylum seekers at the port of entry is grounded on the fact that the asylum seekers should have tried applying directly to the countries they intend going to first. Although the DHA denies any proposed change in policy, the Human Right Lawyers foresee the establishment of refugee camps next to the borders, an attempt to remove refugees and asylum seekers from urban areas. This, if implemented, would have cost implications for both government and refugees who have to drive to the borders to renew their permits.

CONCLUSIONSouth Africa has the highest numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in the

Southern African Development Community. The inflow of asylum seekers from neighbouring countries and other African countries is mainly caused by civil wars, unemployment, political and economic instability, and life-threatening situations also known as push factors. Whilst asylum seekers and refugees see South Africa

Z. Mpehle



as a refuge, the country cannot cope with the high influx of refugees due to lack of financial resources, administrative capacity and laws that are vague as far the integration of refuges into local communities. The lack of integration strategies, poverty, unemployment and lack of delivery of basic services by municipalities contribute to conflicts that often arise between refugees and local which end up in xenophobic attacks. Even though xenophobia cannot be justified, the history of apartheid and its adverse consequences on the majority of the South African populace on service delivery issues cannot be ignored. The deficient provisioning of basic services such as housing and proper sanitation, for an example, creates a hostile environment where both locals and refugees have to compete for limited resources. Due to the above challenges, the following recommendations have been provided:

Whereas the government has laws that regulate the inflow of refugees and are accommodative of the treaties with the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention, there should be local government by-laws that specifically talk to accessing of basic services by refugees.

The closure of reception offices and reopening them at the borders is not a cost effective exercise. The administrative capacity that is already strained will still be a challenge; the deployment of officials to borders could be a mountain to climb as people usually are uncomfortable to leave their comfort zones to an unknown place. It would be better for government to avail budget to the DHA in order to employ more officials in the already established reception offices, and further reopen those that have already been closed.

The government should also play a pivotal role in conducting public information sessions where locals are informed on the state of refugees and demystifying negative beliefs about refugees to prevent the xenophobic attacks from happening, and ensure that these sessions are ongoing for continuous social integration.

LIST OF REFERENCESAmit, R. 2012. NO WAY IN: Barriers to Access, Service and Administrative Justice at

South Africa’s Refugee Reception Offices. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration & Society.

Brulliard, N. 2009. “Situation improves slightly in Zimbabwe, but immigrants in Johannesburg stay put”. Global Post. Available from: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/south-africa /0908 31/zimbabwean-migrants-face-crime-harassment-south-africaZimbabwean refugees face crime, harassment in South Africa [04 January 2014].

Crush, J. & Williams, V. 2005. “International Migration and Development: Dynamics and Challenges in South and Southern Africa”. In United Nations Expert Group meeting on international Migration and Development. New York, 6-8 July 2005. New York: United Nations Population Division. pp. 4, 5.

de Haas, H. 2008. Migration and development: A Theoretical Perspective. Oxford: International Migration Institute.

de la Hunt, L. and Klaaren, J. 2008. Regional Integration, Protection and Migration

259

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationPolicy Challenges. In Advancing Refugee Protection In South Africa, Jeff Handmaker, Ed. New York: Berghahn Books.

Dorigo, G. and Tobler, W. 1983. Push Pull Migration Laws. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73(1): pp.1-22

Eddy, G. 2011. Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa Comments on the 2011/12 Budget. Availabble from: http://www.ngopulse.org/paper/consortium-refugees-and-migrants-south-africa-comments-201112-budget [13 February 2014].

IMCOSA Immigration & Consulting South Africa. 2012. Update on Immigration Matters. Immigration News, 19 June 2012.

Landau, L. B., & Wa Kabwe Segatti, A. 2009. “Human Development Impacts of Migration: South Africa Case Study”. Human Development Research Paper2009/05. Johannesburg: United Nation Development Programme – University of Witwatersrand.

Mabiala, S. S. 2013. Unemployment and Immigration in South Africa. Lynnwoodridge: Consultancy Africa Inteliigence. Available from: http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php? option=com_content&view=paper&id=1298:unemployment-and-immigration-in-south-africa-&catid=87:african-finance-a-economy&Itemid=294 [12 February 2014].

Mataboge, M. 2013. Zimbabwe wants SA to keep its citizens. Mail and Guardian, 17 May 2013.

McKnight, J. 2008. Through the Fear: A Study of Xenophobia in South Africa’s Refugee System. Journal of Identity and Migration Studies, 2(2): pp. 18-42.

Muniz, O., Li, W. and Schleicher, Y. 2011. Migration Conceptual Framework: Why do people move to work in another place or country? Push and Pull Factors. Washington: AAG Center for Global Geography Education.

Naicker, P. and Nair, R. 2000. To be a Refugee in South Africa: Ordinary People Living with Extraordinary Pressures. Track Two, 9 (3): Available from: http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampre sources/migrationdocuments/documents/2000/3.htm. [12 February 2014].

Palmary, I. 2002. Refugees, Safety and Xenophobia in South African Cities: The role of local government. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of violence and Reconciliations.

Parkins, N. C. 2010. Push and Pull Factors of Migration. American Review of Political Economy, 8(2): pp. 6-24. North Carolina: Winston-Salem State University.

Paton, C. 2013. Policy shift ‘could lead to refugee camps’. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration & Society, BD Live (University of Witwatersrand.

Refugees and asylum-seekers. 2004. South Africa.info. Available from: http://www. southafrica.info/travel/documents/refugees_asylum.htm [04 January 2013].

Roos, P. 2011. S A Unemployment rate among highest. Fin24, 04 May 2011. Available from:

http://www.fin24.com/Economy/SA-unemployment-rate-among-worlds-highest-20110504 [19 February 2014].

South Africa. Department of Home Affairs. 2008. Department of Home Affairs Strategic Plan 2008/2009 – 2010/2011. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. Department of Home Affairs. 2010. Department of Home Affairs 2008/2009 Annual Report. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 2002. The Immigration Act, 2002 (Act 13 of 2002). Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 1998. The Refugees Act, 1998 (No 130 of 1998). Pretoria: Government Printer.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2011. The 1951 United Convention

Z. Mpehle


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationand its 1967 Protocol 2011: Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: UNHCR.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2012. UNHCR Global Report 2012 – South Africa. Geneva: UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2014. UNHCR country operations profile - South Africa. Geneva: UNHCR

Wang, T. 2013. A Case Study of Customer Motivation in Boutique Hotels in Xiamen, China Using Push-Pull Theory. Iowa: Iowa State University (Masters Dissertation).

261


THE UNDERLYING FACTORS BEHIND VIOLENT MUNICIPAL SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

F.G. NetsweraGraduate School of Leadership University of Limpopo Turfloop

S. KgalaneMpumalanga Department of Basic Education

ABSTRACT

Violence associated with service delivery protests has over the past few years skyrocketed resulting in the loss of lives and damage to property. Political violence is a historical phenomenon in apartheid South Africa.

However, under the democratic dispensation violence service delivery protests persists and is estimated to have escalated from 41.66% in 2007 to 54.08% in 2010. While service delivery protests are not solely South African phenomena the level of violence that goes with it is peculiar and reminisce of violence associated with protests against the apartheid state in the mid to late 1980s. Accounted deaths associated with service delivery protests have escalated from 3 in 2004 to 11 in 2011. This paper analyses the escalation of service delivery protests and ascertains some of the underlying reasons for the mutual exchange of violent behaviour between protesting citizens and the state.

INTRODUCTIONViolent local government service delivery related protests are not a new

phenomenon in South Africa (Shubane, 1991; Netswera, 2005; Netswera and Phago, 2009; Pfaffe, 2010 and Gwane, 2011). The local government system prior to 1994 was premised on a policy of separate development (Baldwin, 1975 and Legassick and Innes, 1977). The separate development laws and the existent local government system then were a rallying point for anti-government establishment by the black citizenry. During such days protests which usually resulted in the damage of municipal properties and loss of lives by those closely associated or working for “the establishment” became a norm (PLANACT, 1989; Kane-Berman, 1993 and Shubane, 1991). Municipal councillors and other members of the apartheid local government system were labelled “impimpi” which directly translate into traitors to denote that they worked against the democratisation process in South Africa and therefore against the community that they supposedly represented.

It is now well documented that the violent nature of the protests during apartheid days was motivated by under and lack of proper representation and non-existence of democratic systems. It was a case of “them” (government) versus us (society).

F.G. Netswera & S. Kgalane



There is however growing evidence currently that violent local government service delivery protests have over the past few years escalated perhaps at even higher proportions with more violent undertones in comparison to protests during apartheid days.

Literature assumed to understand the primary causes of the apartheid related local government service protests and the resultant nature of the protest (Hoosen, 1999 and Mashabela, 1988). Contemporary literature cannot assume sufficiently to provide all the answers about the nature of the evolution of the reasons for protests and the associated violence in post-apartheid South Africa. The big question regarding the difference between pre- and post-apartheid motivation for protests and its manifest into violence is what this paper undertakes to analyse.

A HISTORICAL NECESSITYIn order to understand the nature of local government service delivery protests,

it becomes important to trace the genesis of the local government system in South Africa when it relates to black part of the society. It is equally important to trace the popular discontent, by the black part of the society, with local government structures and systems over the years. Such a background does not necessarily justify violence but provides a useful understanding and argument that over the years local government service delivery protests have become entrenched. It also provides an understanding that the ushering of a new democratic dispensation may by itself not have been sufficient in overcoming the entrenched societal culture of venting anger and frustrations against local governments.

During the period of 1922 and 1994, black society was “migrants” in urban centres throughout South Africa. The apartheid state required cheap black labour to sustain its industries and thus setup urban zones closer to the industrial hubs for purposes of labour extraction. The question of black urban authorities henceforth became a reality in these black townships. The earliest form of services and rent boycott can be traced to 1897 during the colonial era under the jurisdiction of the Sanitary Board which is the predecessor of the Johannesburg City Council in Mayfair Johannesburg. Such a violation was punishable by imprisonment without fine (Leyds, 1964).

The above literature suggests therefore that services and rates boycott is a very old phenomenon and was historically championed by the White populace in the case of Mayfair in Johannesburg. The policy to house black populace in major cities like Johannesburg only came in the early 1900; between 1902 and 1905 through the Native Affairs Commission (Musiker and Musiker, 1999).

The proper introduction of the urban black local authorities legislation came to the fore immediately after Hertzog become the president of the Republic. The Black Urban Areas Act (Act 21 of 1923) was introduced to establish Black Advisory Boards which were meant to advise White local authorities about black affairs.

263


A plethora of similar legislation followed with similar or related intent including among them the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act (Act 25 of 1945); the Urban Black Councils Act (Act 79 of 1961); Community Councils Act (Act 125 of 1977); Black Affairs Administration Act (Act 45 of 1971); Black Communities Development Act (Act 4 of 1984).

Continuous revision of these legislations could not contain nor address the problems associated with unrests in the black urban areas; challenges characterised by squalor, poor infrastructure funding and poor service delivery. Partly because these legislations did not affirm fully participation and the voice (voting) by the urban black populate that they were meant to address, no twigging of the legislation could yield any positive response. The local council “stooges” of the apartheid government who served in the black affairs administration boards were so vilified that some of them could not even live in the same townships they served (Netswera and Phago, 2013; Du Pre, 1990 and Shubane, 1991).

It is important to note that Soweto residents were in the 1980s worried enough to set up their independent commission in 1989 to determine the reasons and effects of local government service protests and boycotts. The report recommended upgrade of water and sewerage supplies but equally noted that the absence of a single tax base to be one of the major cause of the problems in the township (PLANACT, 1989).

THE PSYCHE OF RECENT PROTESTSWhile the apartheid government was perceived illegitimate and unrepresentative

of blacks; all protests that accompanied its existence could be rationalised on moral, human rights and democratic grounds. The new local government cannot however be accused along the same fault lines. The Constitution (1996) the Structures and Systems (Act 117 of 1998 and Act 32 of 2000) of local government today has changed; enabling society to vote in and out their preferred local government representatives (councillors). Communities can participate as well in the development of integrated development plans (IDP) and participate in a system of service prioritisation and delivery although the effectiveness of these processes may be in question (Netswera, 2005 and Netswera and Phago, 2009).

Taking the above reasoning into consideration, the current unhappiness with local government is therefore generally informed of different factors to those before the inclusive local government system. The set of local government challenges should equally be different. Literature suggests that local government protests can therefore be a manifestation of frustrations and unhappiness with, among others, local government service delivery efficiencies and effectiveness (Netswera and Phago, 2009 and Alexandra, 2010). Instead communities are more impatient now than they ordinarily would under the apartheid system which they knew was not their government and did not represent their aspirations.




Below is an illustration of the factors that are considered to shape the psyche of the violent protests which some authors have come to label as rebellion (Alexandra, 2010; Pfaffe, 2011 and Netswera and Phago, 2013). Such factors include but are not limited to the long history of violent protest culture, low trust level of politicians and the political system, class consciousness, the racial divide and corruption and display of opulence by societal representatives in government.

The culture of violenceThe culture of service delivery protest has been extensively researched (Netswera,

2005, Pfaffe, 2010; Netswera and Phago, 2009; Gwane, 2011 and Netswera and Phago, 2013). Some of the major factors influencing the general local government service delivery protests currently form part of the growing literature. Literature suggests that to a large extent the underground African National Congress (ANC) not only introduced but encouraged the service delivery boycotts, rent defaulting and protestations (Hoosen, 1999 and McDonald, 2002). The ANC later introduced the Masakhane campaign to counter the culture of boycotts and local government services protest. Expecting that the new Masakhane campaigns would immediately sweep over the country and overcome an entrenched culture of boycotts seemed unreal (Netswera, 2005).

The violence associated with local government service delivery protests has its own history and a track record but not as thoroughly researched as the popular service delivery protests. Protest politics in South Africa has been “utilised” differentially in different era and moments. Protests formed an important vehicle through which black society expressed their frustration and anger against the apartheid government since they had no legitimised representation in such a government.

At times violent protests were pursued because of its immediate ignition of attention and attention it generates from local authorities and because it attracted the attention of local and international media. Service delivery protests are however not a mechanism for pure political attention seeking but rather raise genuine anger emanating from community dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery or its lack thereof. Often it is a manifestation of poor or lack of communication in debriefing communities about progress and challenges faced by local municipalities (Nleya, et al., 2011). As a result; over the past few years local government protests have drastically increased as depicted. While protests have existed throughout the past three decades; Alexandra (2012) acknowledges that after 2004 South Africa has experienced unprecedented escalation in number of these protests.

265


Figure 1: Service delivery protests of the past decade (Alexander, Runciman, and Ngwane, 2013)

Low trust level of politics and politiciansNetswera (2005) found existence of huge distrust of local government institutions

by local communities. Such distrust was informed by, among others, by lack of understanding of the role of local government, negative reports and publicity of local government inefficiencies including corruption allegations by its officials. These reports enforced perceptions that local politicians and the local government system as an institution is uncaring. Through its annual South African Social Attitudinal Surveys (SASAS) the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has consistently found a below 40% trust level by the general society of the institution of local government (Pillay, Roberts and Rule, 2006).

Among the factors informing low level of trust include cumulative unrealised expectations and growing impatience that arose from local government election manifestos since 1995. To illustrate this point; the ANC manifesto between 2000 and 2011 promised among others, fighting corruption in tendering, hiring and other government functions, recalling corrupt councillors, eradicate bucket toilet system and taped water for all households. Today however there is a huge body of evidence that suggests that corruption and tender system in the local government sphere is rampant with only exceptions were dismiss and recalling of corrupt officials and councils is enforced (_; 2012; Atkinson, 2007 and Mattes, 2002). At the same time there is equally a growing body of literature that suggests that conditions of the poor have deteriorated evidence through the declining Gini coefficient from 2.7% to 2.3% of total income, among others according to the Presidency (2009 in Alexandra, 2010).

Amidst the growing frustrations with poor local government service delivery




and rampant corruption the local government electoral outcomes over time never the less reinstates the same political parties and representatives. To illustrate the dissonance between electoral outcome and low local government trust levels Sinwell, et al. (2009) provided a narrative of the Thandakukhanya in Piet Retief. The Thandakukhanya community established a Concerned Group and set up a Committee of 13. The Committee responded to the lack of accountability by the mayoral committee and represented a deepening of community mobilisation as well as a broadening of community participation. Interestingly the memorandum of protest drafted by the Concerned Group stated; “…we also want the ANC to win the local elections convincingly”. (b) To further strengthen this point of confusing loyalty Alexandra (2010) quoted verbatim the ANC Secretary General’s utterances addressing the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU); “…You find that in the majority of cases a march is led by members of the ANC”.

Instead of shifting political power, community frustration and anger has retained the status quo in political leadership at municipal levels. Instead dissatisfaction and loss of trust manifests in violent streets protest that often result in the loss of lives and damage to properties.

Racial and class divide as an anger triggerThe history of spatial development in South Africa firstly through the Natives

Land Act of 1913 and subsequent apartheid legislation entrenched racial disenfranchisement of blacks (Durrheim and Dixon, 2005). The Bantu education system and the apartheid policies equally skewed social class divisions along racial lines. Race as does social class equally influenced spatial developments in South African towns and are important factors in local government service delivery. It can be argued therefore that service delivery protests are phenomena among the black poor than black middle class or even white citizens because discontentment with service delivery is a class phenomenon. Netswera (in Van Donk, Swilling, Pieterse and Parnell, 2008) on service delivery in the City of Johannesburg found that the municipality is not responsive to community needs. The concerns of households in poor townships (worse-off) regard absence of municipal services and pricing of available services, while the middle class (well-off) households are concerned with the quality of services. The well-to-do, majority of which are white citizens in proportional terms do not take part in the affairs of the municipalities including street protests.

Equally because of the historic spatial and separate development trends, it can be argued that poverty is a perceptual condition informed through a comparative racial assessment. While the social class divide between black and whites was clearly pronounced during the apartheid days; class formations were not clearly and easily visible among blacks who lived in the same localities (Gurr, 1970). Today historically white suburban are the new middle class suburban and are perceived to continue receiving better municipal services visible through municipal

267


infrastructure like roads, parks and schools among other things. In these middle class suburban local government services delivery protests are currently absent confirming therefore that service delivery protests are a class phenomenon.

In his analysis of why man rebel Gurr (1970) observed interesting contradictions between social classes. He observed that frustration with basic delivery leads to aggression and argued that in the actualization of political victory violence is preceded by politicization of discontent stemming from emergence of discontent. The resource model believes that protests are a resource in itself that is employed by groups in the competition for power. This model implies that protests would be higher in better educated areas where organizers know very well what is to be done and how. Interestingly Gurr’s observation of the resource model runs counter the observation of service delivery protests in South Africa which are prevalent among poorly educated communities measured by class divisions unless his “educated” society has tacit implications to political education.

Veenhoven, (2002) provided another interesting analysis about contentment. He believes that a key economic variable that has a significant impact on societal happiness is the level of income at both country and at individual level. He asks, “…do people in richer countries report higher levels of happiness than those in poorer countries?” As one’s income increases over time, is there a corresponding increase in happiness? “…do richer individuals report higher levels of happiness than poorer individuals?” These questions from Veenhoven seem to have resonance with the South African experiences than Gurr’s model because service delivery protests are experienced in the section of society that is perceived poorer with low income levels.

Display of greed, opulence and corruptionThe challenge of service delivery protest is not only a government concern. In

the 1980s a commission of inquiry was instituted by the people of Soweto into the reasons and effect of service payment boycott. The findings of this commission carried out in 1989 revealed Soweto to be faced with a debt of R701 million, which included arrears totalling R200 million cumulated during the services boycotts. The report revealed between 1979 and 1989 approximately R400 million was spent on roads, electricity, storm water drainage and sewerage systems. Although no comparative figures for the same period were availed by the Johannesburg City Council; it was assumed that more funds were spent for the same duration in the white suburb. The report noted that in Soweto service quality was perceived extremely poorer and most residents were also too poor to afford service payments (PLANACT, 1989).

The current service delivery protests continue to raise the same challenges as did those in the 1980s. Absence and poor delivery of the basic services which forms part of the competence of the local municipalities continue to be the biggest reasons for the service delivery protests according to Alexandra, Runciman and Ngwane (2013).




Figure 2: Service delivery priorities (Alexander, Runciman, and Ngwane, 2013)

In the midst of absent and poor basic service delivery there looms equally troubling perceptions that there is within the realm of local government huge scale corruption (Atkinson, 2007). Poor basic service delivery to a large degree is in the perceptions of community members correlated with prevalence of large scale corruption. Such corruption manifests itself, among others, in awarding of service tenders and visible in opulent life styles of local politicians. The writing of and Lodge (1998) suggests that there is rampant corruption in issuing of tenders, nepotism in terms of offering jobs to family members and friends and shoddy work done by incompetent contractors who are connected to politicians result in people revolting against government. Patronage is also perceived rampant when political parties and leadership subsume powers in municipal administrative processes (Abdalla et al., 1998).

To augment with example community concerns regarding local government corruption; on 24 January 2014 residents of Madibeng local municipality in Brits brought the town to a standstill as they marched to the local municipal offices. Water supply had been interrupted for a while and among others protesting community members cited; “…the municipality is full of corruption. Enough is enough with Madibeng and the ANC [African National Congress] (ioL News, 2014).” The municipality has been hit by service delivery protests over water shortages and four people were killed in the local township of Mothutlung, allegedly at the hands of police. What emerged thereafter is that local municipal officials had decided to outsource water delivery on trucks than fix the main water supply lines with intentions of making money from the water delivery system.

269


WHY THE BRUTAL STATE REACTION AND RETALIATIONSThere is well documented evidence that South Africa has one of the highest

police violence against its citizenry in comparison with international norms (Bruce, 2002). When compared with other institutions, Netswera (2005) found that although slightly more trusted than political institutions and its representatives, the police establishment was deemed less trustworthy compared to civil society organisations, the church and news media. These findings were confirmed by the SASAS reports which ranked South Africans to have one of the lowest social trust in comparison to European countries. The survey also found the lowest mean trust level to exist among Black Africans and highest among those who have no schooling, who have low income levels and among those living in urban informal settlements (Mmotlane, Struwig and Roberts, Undated).

The reported and recoded figures show that violent protests have escalated to 32 per day between November 2013 and January 2014, with the total number 2 947 service-delivery protests having happened in Gauteng, Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape topping the list (Du Plessis, et al 2014). Despite being in a democracy for 20 years, South Africans have not given up their public protest and violent ways defined during apartheid days as “the people’s war”. That strategy of un-governability, launched in 1985 by the ANC underground and its affiliates was hugely successful in bringing instability to the apartheid government (Lodge, 1989); but the relevance in post-apartheid South Africa is currently questionable with acknowledgment that the strategy does raise government attention.

There are contradictory observations regarding the power of service delivery protests and its implications to the stability of the state. In 2007 Ramathlakane argued that the public violence associated with service delivery does not represent a fundamental threat to the stability of South Africa. The author concluded that this violence could be contained, although this would require adjustments to current policy and policy implementation. Former President Thabo Mbeki however in 2005 indicated in Parliament that poor service delivery could in the long run negatively affect the stability of South Africa (Nagar, 2012). This reaffirms that the trend in brining instability to state door is still perceived the most useful strategy by aggrieved members of the society and has potential of escalating beyond control.

Recently, a library, a house and community hall were set alight by protesters on the morning of 5 February 2014 when service demonstration turned violent at Rethabiseng. A week earlier, protesters burnt down the satellite police station in Zithobeni, as well as part of the municipal offices, two municipal trucks and a tractor near Bronkhorstspruit (Abrieu, 2014). This was after residents said they were unhappy that they have been without electricity for weeks. It is alleged that they were not permitted to load their prepaid meters because of unpaid water bills.

Incidents similar to those reflected above have become a norm as part of service delivery protests in South Africa. At the same time community members brandish




dangerous weapons when they constitute a march against local municipalities. There is an assumed correlation between carrying dangerous weapons by community members and ensuing violence in service delivery protests suffice for government to enact laws meant for curbing this behaviour. The enactment of new laws came as Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa declared that his forces were under siege although some members of public believed that the police where themselves part of the growing public order problem (Pereira, 2014).

Figure 3: Police killings associated with service delivery protests (Alexander; Runciman and

Ngwane, 2013)

The Dangerous Weapons Act (Act No 15 of 2013) came into effect on 2 January 2014 forbidding as a criminal offence possession of dangerous weapons punishable by fine or imprisonment for a period of up to three years. The act is intended at outlaw protesters from carrying weapons, traditional or otherwise. Although not a local government service delivery protest; 44 people killed in August 2012 at the miners’ strike at Lonmin in Marikana had carried these “weapons” which have come to characterise almost all local government service delivery protests in South Africa (Alexander, Lekgowa, Mmope, Sinwell, and Xezwi, 2012).

CONCLUDING REMARKSThe paper equally shows that there is a close link between historical service

delivery protest ideology, tendencies and attitude in the post-apartheid era. The Masakhane campaign which government had initiated with a view to influence participation in local government activities and payment of services was short-lived, however highly relevant even today.

While the paper pronounced the important factors determining violence service

271


delivery protest; it is never the less arguable that there are possible numerous other factors beyond this scope that empirical research can unravelled in their peculiar setups. It is important therefore to consider empirical findings in rural versus urban informal settlement protest as well as non-physical but equally violent protests that can harm the economic purse.

Importantly, the paper also suggests that addressing local government service delivery protests will require not only political and electoral training to the general population but training among the members of the police force on crowd control. Discussions of this paper surely suggest that the local government sphere is not the dumping site for incompetent officials. Being in the forefront of service delivery when communities revolt, the immediate target is the local officials and politicians. Local government therefore require services of highly competent officials to rid itself the image of incompetence in service delivery and rampant corruption.

LIST OF REFERENCESAbdalla, H.F., Maghrabi, A.S., Raggad, B.G. 1998. Assessing the perceptions of human

resource managers toward nepotism. Int. J. Manpower, 19(8), 554-570.Abreu, V. 2014. Don’t dare burn down police station. iOL News. 1 February 2014.

http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/don-t-dare-burn-down-police-station-1.1640420 (19 February 2014).

Alexandra, P. 2010. Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis, Review of African Political Economy, 37(123); 25-40.

Alexandra, P. 2012. Protests and police statistics: Some commentary. Weekly Mail and Guardian, April 13.

Alexander, P., Lekgowa, T., Mmope, B., Sinwell, L., and Xezwi, B. 2012. Marikana: A view from the mountain and a case to answer. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.

Alexander, P., Runciman, C. and Ngwane, T. 2013. Media Briefing – Community Protests 2004-2013: Some research findings. University of Johannesburg: Social change Research Unite

Atkinson, D. 2007. Taking to the Streets: Has developmental local government failed in South Africa? In Buhlungu, S, Daniel, J, Southall, R and Lutchman, L. 2007 State of the nation. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press

Baldwin, A. 1975. Mass removals and separate Development. Journal of Southern African Studies. 1(2), 215-227

Bruce, D. 2002. Police brutality in South Africa. Centre for the study of violence and reconciliation: Johannesburg.

Corruption Watch. 2012. Government tender fraud: Who takes the rap? Corruption watch

http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/government-tender-fraud-who-takes-rap (Accessed 06-03-2014).

Du Plesis, C, Ndlangisa, D and Saba, A. 2014. Zuma sidesteps flames. City Press, 3 Feb 2014.

Du Pre, R.H. 1990. The making of racial conflict in South Africa, Braamfontein: Scotaville Publishers.

Durrheim, K and Dixon, J. 2005. Racial encounters: the social psychology of contact and desegregation. Hove, England: Routledge.

Gurr, T.R. 1970. Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationGwane, T. 2011. Ideology and agency in protest politics: Service delivery struggles in

post-apartheid South Africa, (MA) dissertation. University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa.Hoosen, R.A. 1999. A developmental approach to the culture of non-payment for

municipal services in the former township of KwaZulu-Natal. Unpublished dissertation: University of Stellenbosch.

IoL News, 2014. Madibeng leadership must step down. iOL News. 24 January 2014. http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/madibeng-leadership-must-step-down-1.1636500 (19 March 2014).

Kane-Berman, J.S. 1993. Political violence in South Africa. South African Institute of Race Relations.

Legassick, M. and Innes, D. 1977. Capital restructuring and apartheid: A critique of constructive engagement. African Affairs 76(305), 437-482.

Leyds, G.A. 1964. A history of Johannesburg: The early years. Johannesburg: Nasionale Boekhandel.

Lodge, T. 1998. Political corruption in South Africa. African Affairs, 97(387), 157-187.Mashabela, H. 1988. Townships of the PWV. Johannesburg: South African Institute of

Race Relations.Mattes, R. 2002. South Africa: Democracy without the people? Journal of democracy,

13(1), 22-36.McDonald, D. 2002. It’s time to debunk the urban myth of the South African’s culture

of non-payment. Cape Times, 14 March 2002.Mmotlane, M., Struwig, J. and Roberts, B. Undated.The glue that binds or divides:

Social trust in South Africa. South African Attitudinal Survey. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

Musiker, N. and Musiker, R. 1999. A concise historical dictionary of Greater. Johannesburg. Cape Town: Francolin.

Nagar, D. 2012. Poor government service delivery continues to negatively impact SA business. Grant Thornton – International business report. 15 May 2012.

Netswera, F.G. 2005. Local Government Service Provision and Non-payment within Underdeveloped Communities of the Johannesburg Unicity: Service Protests 2004-2013: Some Research Findings. Social Change Research Unit: University of Johannesburg: Providers’ and Consumers’ Perspective, Doctoral thesis; University of Stellenbosch.

Netswera, F. 2008. A case study of community participation in governance and service delivery in the city of Johannesburg, 2008 in Ed van Donk, Swilling, M; Pieterse; E; Parnell, S; Consolidating Developmental Local Government: Lessons from the South African Experience UCT Press.

Netswera, F.G and Phago, K. 2009. How affordability to pay for municipal services determine participation in municipal activities: A case study of the City of Johannesburg. Journal of Public Administration, 44(1.1), 133-144.

Netswera, F. and Phago, K. 2013. How popular protests influence public discourse and public accountability – revisiting the theory of public spheres in South Africa. Politeia, 32 (1), 26-41.

Nleya, N., Thompson, L., Tapscott., C., Piper, L. and Esau, M. 2011. Considering the origins of protest in South Africa: Some lessons from Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg. Africanus, 50(1), 14-29.

Pereira, P. 2014. Protests: Police are under siege. The citizen. 6 February 2014.Pfaffe, P. 2010. From protest hotspot to cabinet hotspot. South African Labour Bulletin,

34(3), 41-43.Pfaffe, P. 2011. A protest event analysis of South African’s rebellion of the poor. Masters

dissertation of arts in labour policies and globalization: Global Labour University.

273

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationPillay, U., Roberts, B. and Rule, S. 2006. South African Social Attitudinal Survey -

Changing times, diverse voices, HSRC Press: Cape Town.PLANACT, 1989. The SOWETO rent boycott. Johannesburg: The Soweto Delegation.Shubane, K. 1991. Black local authorities: A contraption of control. In Apartheid city

in transition, ed. Swilling, M., Humphries, R. & Shubane, K. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Sinwell, L., Kirshner, J., Khumalo, K., Manda, O., Pfaffe, P., Phokela, C., Runciman, C. 2009. Service Delivery Protests: Findings from Quick Response Research on Four ‘Hot-Spots’ – Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, Diepsloot. Centre for Sociological Research: University of Johannesburg.

South Africa. 1971. Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act, Act 21 of 1971. Pretoria: Government Printer 186.

South Africa. 1993. Local Government Transition Act (LGTA), Act 209 of 1993. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 1998. Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa. 2000. Local Government: Municipal System Act, Act 32 of 2000. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Veenhoven, R. 2002. “Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators,” Social Indicators Research, Springer, 58(1), 33-46.




THE GOVERNANCE OF RETIREMENT FUNDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS

L. Nevondwe & K. RamatjiSchool of Law University of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

Governance is on the agenda of many of the world’s leading pension and investment institutions. Prompted by the challenges posed by global financial markets and closer scrutiny of performance by sponsors and

stakeholders, investment goals and objectives have demanded innovation in how funds are governed. In South Africa, there is a need for a proper governance of retirement funds in the public sector. There are discussion papers which were issued by National Treasury which promotes good governance of retirement funds. These papers have been issued since 2004 and so far an act of parliament which advocate for governance of retirement funds has not been passed which raises concerns considering the fact that retirement funds contributes substantially to the economy. Good corporate governance of retirement funds is about the application of principles in order to make these funds worth of trust and is essential to the effective achievement of their goals. This paper discusses the legislative framework and scrutinise how retirement funds in the public sector are managed and ways in which retirement funds can be best managed. This paper further discusses the members’ rights and trustees duties and draw some lessons from United States of America, United Kingdom and Malawi.

INTRODUCTIONIn recent years much attention has been paid to the significance of good

governance of retirement funds in South Africa. This is so because the South African pension fund retirement landscape has been ranked as one of the largest pension fund industries in the world, with 9 million members and assets in excess of R2 trillion (The Institute of Retirement Funds (IRF) 2013 Conference). In determining good governance of retirement funds, the rights of members and duties of the trustees conferred by the Pension Funds Act, 1956 cannot be overlooked.

According to Marumoagae (2012:554) “section 7C(2) of the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956 outlines the general duties of the boards of retirement funds. Over the years there has been much debate in the retirement fund industry as to whom the board, as the managing body of the retirement fund, is accountable. However, South African courts and tribunals adjudicating pension fund-related disputes and

275


the retirement industry at large seem to share the view that the board of trustees is accountable to both the fund and its members, meaning that the board is required to act in the best interest of the fund and its members”.

According to Nevondwe (2010:298) members of the pension funds contribute to pension, provident or retirement annuity funds and some people save enough in this way to be able to live adequately in retirement. When the members have contributed in this way, the Act provides them with particular rights towards their specific fund, for example, members of the fund have the right to elect at least 50% of the members of the board of trustees. Whilst the rights of members exist, the boards of trustees, on the other hand, are entrusted with a duty to properly administer the pension funds on behalf of members. Trustees are expected to act in good faith and protect the interest of the members.

The trustees are confronted with many difficult decisions on a regular basis and required to have knowledge and understanding of the legal framework in which they operate under as well as the rights of the members under that particular legal framework. At the core of the Act, lie the rights of the members and trustee duties, which are two fundamental aspects and play a significant role for the proper administration of the fund and protection of member’s interest. Often these two aspects are in conflict with each other and thus become necessary, for the development of the pension law jurisprudence, to determine whether the trustees’ duties supersede the member’s rights or whether member’s rights supersede trustee’s duties. It is evident that this two aspects complement each other, but the cardinal question that remains is that where should the emphasis be when these aspects are in conflict with each other?

GOVERNANCE OF RETIREMENT FUNDSGovernance is on the agenda of many of the world’s leading pension and

investment institutions. Prompted by the challenges posed by global financial markets and closer scrutiny of performance by sponsors and stakeholders, investment by goals and objectives has demanded innovation in how funds are governed (Clark and Urwin 2008:18). Good corporate governance of retirement funds is about the application of principles in order to make these funds worth of trust and is essential to the effective achievement of their goals (Hunter 2002:2). In the pension fund context good corporate governance assists in managing the competing interests of members, the sponsoring employer, unions, employees of the fund and the members of the fund’s board of management. According to Hunter (2002:2) it can be demonstrated that pension funds with good governance policies and procedures have better, more cost-effective administration and achieve better returns on the investment of pension fund assets than those that do not. According to Hunter (2002:2) what is clear is that, cost effective administration and better investment returns aside, good governance benefits everyone except the corrupt. It benefits members by protecting fund assets and it benefits employers by removing

L. Nevondwe & K. Ramatji



the potential for distrust by staff and provides an incentive for staff to remain loyal to the employer. Finally it reduces the likelihood of litigation against the fund.

According to the National Treasury’s Presevation, Portability and governance for retirement funds (2012:25) the policymakers around the world have robustly debated the efficacy of a retirement fund governance model which relies heavily on the expertise of pension fund trustees. In a financial world of increasing complexity that demands high levels of expertise, it is widely believed that many trustees may lack the competence to make investment decisions consistent with the best interest of beneficiaries (members). Another problem is conflicts of interest in the way that trustees discharge their duties to the beneficiaries of the fund.

The National Treasury’s Retirement Fund Reform (2004:7-8) pension fund failures do not occur often, but when they do, the consequences can be disastrous, especially for members who have spent their entire lives contributing, only to find their benefit compromised. A severe loss in fund asset value may arise from many causes for example poor investment performance, defective fund management, or even fraud. In almost all cases, however, there is an underlying failure to exercise appropriate and sufficiently rigorous standards of fund governance.

According to Sigwadi (2008:342) good corporate governance of pension funds is essential for pension fund trustees to comply with their fiduciary duties and other obligations. It minimises risks and maximises efficiency. Good governance of pension funds coupled with compliance with fiduciary duties will ensure that the standard of managing pension funds by pension fund trustees improves in the future; this will greatly benefit all concerned in the retirement industry and at the same time limit the exposure of pension fund trustees to personal liability.

According to the PF 130 Circular in order to protect the rights of the members the board should communicate aspects of the fund, including the performance of the fund’s investments, which are of relevance to members and which will assist the membership of the fund to assess the credibility and trustworthiness of the administration of the delivery of benefits. The fund should establish a communication policy reflecting the board’s commitment to this and other aspects of disclosure decided by the board, which should be made available to the membership of the fund.

The PF 130 Circular requires that all communication with members, beneficiaries and the stakeholders should be responded to promptly by or on behalf of the board and with thoroughness and respect. In particular complaints by members or any other person, which are directed to the fund, should be treated seriously at least and noted by the board.

Where a fund offers member investment choice, the details of the investments in respect of which members may make an election should be described setting out the severity of any associated risk and the performance benchmarks, as well as the underlying type of investments. Members should be able to make an informed

277


decision from the information. Members should also be reminded periodically of the need to review the investment choices made by them. In a defined contribution arrangement with individual investment choice, it should be made clear that the member bears the investment risk. In certain cases the fund may require that basic training be provided by the fund to ensure that the members understand the operations of the fund and investments. The fund’s investment performance, the average costs per member and also, in respect of any fund which has independent board members, the fees and disbursements paid to or in respect of them, must be communicated to members at least once a year. Members should also be aware of who the service providers of the fund are.

The National Treasury’s Presevation, Portability and governance for retirement funds (2012:26) provides that for pension fund governance to be effective, suitability standards are essential to ensure integrity and professionalism in managing pension funds. Given the pivotal fiduciary role that trustees play, it is critical that they have appropriate professional qualifications and experience to deal with the complexities surrounding pension funds. The Government reissued Regulation 28 in 2011, which sets out the prudential framework under which retirement funds must invest their assets. The regulation establishes principles by which trustees are required to determine their investment policies, and sets maximum permissible limits for investment by asset class and by issuer to ensure that funds are adequately diversified. Trustees are required to invest assets in the best interests of the members of the fund. In addition, they are now required to consider the environmental and social factors underlying investments. This gives trustees the opportunity, where they deem it in the best interests of their members, to align their investment policies more consistently with national goals, such as contributing to infrastructure development.

According to Oosthuizen (2008:1) there has been an explosion in financial products market, hundreds of policies, dozens of insurance products, each with its own terms, benefits and risk profiles. Some offer gradual, steady and relatively small growth. Others are far less conservative, higher growth potential, but also higher risk and higher volatility. In this situation, what are the trustees’ duties as regards the range of products to be made available? Are they obliged to exclude certain policies entirely, take them out of the shopping basket available to their members because of the risk profile attached thereto? Do they take on the role of investment advisor? Or can the trustees argue, for example, that their duties are minimal, restricted to warning fund members of the risks and benefits attaching to each available product, and leaving it to fund members to decide for themselves? Oosthuizen(2008:4-5) observes that underpinning the various section 7C duties are two realities:

Not all of their members have the acumen and savvy to appreciate and apply the investment information given to them.




Members join a particular fund inter alia because of its investment history, and because it has a particular reputation for soundness, stability, growth or whatever else. Ensuring that it lives up to that reputation is part of the network of duties created by section 7C.

In terms of Regulation 30(W)(v)) trustees must, reasonably satisfy themselves that the fund member policies are suitable for the membership profile of that fund, within a year after promulgation of the sub regulation, review the existing range of fund member policies available for selection and thereafter conduct such review annually and approve all new fund member policies. Oosthuizen (2008:4-5) argues that Regulation 30W(v) makes it quite clear that trustees have a duty to actively review the range of policies available to ensure that they are “suitable for the membership profile of the fund”.

An interesting question is whether a member who is dissatisfied with the manner in which his chosen investment has performed has any recourse against the trustees. In this instance, it would seem that the trustees must prove that they adhered to the guidelines contained in PF Circular 130, failing which the member may institute legal proceedings against the trustees. If the trustees have not complied with PF 130, the chances of such member succeeding are increased unless trustees can advance sound explanation for such failure. It is evident that one of the ways to protect the interest of the members is to secure reasonable returns on their savings. This has often been a challenge. Wallis (2004) suggests that fund administrators must be required to provide guarantees that particular levels of performance will be achieved.

RIGHTS OF THE MEMBERSMember rights have been explicitly outlined in the Act in various sections.

In most instances the custodians of these rights are not aware of their existence. Section 7D(c) of the Act however places a duty on the trustees to inform members of their rights, benefits and duties in terms of the rules of the fund. However in some determinations it has been found that the trustees have not acted in the best interest of the members as they are required by the Act. This is often perpetuated by the fact whilst the trustees are aware of their duties as conferred by the Act they are also enlightened that members are not aware of their rights under the Act, hence they find it easy to disregard members’ rights and therefore act for their own personal gain or other ulterior motive.

The knowledge and understanding of members’ rights is crucial. In terms of the Act the members are entitled to have access to the rules of the fund, to elect 50% of the board of trustees, to use of actuarial surplus in terms of section 15A of the Act, to be informed quarterly or annually of the interest borne on their investments and to have the pension benefits paid to them timeously. If a member is aware of his or her rights it becomes much easier for the latter to lodge a complaint against board

279


of trustees if they have not acted in his or her best interest.In the matter of Ngoepe v Metal Industries Provident Fund and Another BPLR

5316 (PFA), the complainant lodged a complaint with the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator (the OPFA) after he had requested the fund information regarding its rules, as well as a detailed breakdown of the computation of his withdrawal benefit, a request which has not been acceded to by the fund .The Adjudicator held that the fund has the required information in its possession, or at least within its disposal, and the duty on it is to ensure that adequate and appropriate information is communicated to the complainant and other members, informing them of their rights, benefits and duties in terms of the rules of the fund. The core of the members’ rights lies with the governance of the fund. It is when the board of trustees administers the fund properly that the rights and the interests of the members are protected. According to Marumoagae (2012:559) the board of trustees demonstrates only good faith towards the members of the fund by keeping them informed of the interests they have in the fund and also by ensuring that members are not prejudiced when the board is performing its functions. It is imperative for the members to note that trustees are personally liable for any loss caused by the actions of the board, being jointly and severely liable with the other trustees even where they were not individually involved in the ‘wrongful act’ causing the loss. The Act provides a procedure which the member must comply in order to lodge a complaint with OPFA. This procedure is regulated by section 30A of the Act. Accordingly, the complainant has to lodge a written complaint to the fund. The board of the fund has to consider the complaint and, the board of the fund or the employer must respond in writing to the complainant within 30 days from date of receipt of the complaint.

If the fund or the employer who participates in the fund does not respond within the 30 days period or the complainant is not satisfied with the response, the complainant may lodge a complaint, in writing, with the OPFA. This includes electronic mail and fax. The complainant may submit his or her complaint in any language and the OPFA will, if necessary, obtain a translation of such communication. The office’s documentation on how to submit a complaint has also been translated into various languages commonly used in South Africa. Personal and telephonic contact is usually conducted in the complainant’s preferred language. The OPFA has also placed the procedures on how to lodge the complaint in the website. According to Marumoagae (2012:562) the trustees are entrusted with the duty of protecting the interest of the beneficiaries, it is therefore imperative that the trustee refrain from engaging in conduct where their interests are in conflict with their duties towards their members.

So what is the position when a member requests information and has been furnished with incorrect information? In Connery v Old Mutual Life Assurance CO. (SA) LTD and Another [2002] 6 BPLR 3544 (PFA), the adjudicator held that the failure by the fund to perform its section 7D(c) duty precisely and completely




constitutes maladministration of the fund. The adjudicator reiterated the duty to act with care and diligence requires the fund and the administrators not to act carelessly and without diligence. The Adjudicator stated that the issuing of a disclaimer of a liability does not show the level of prudence expected on the part of the administrators, but amounts to an abdication of responsibility on their part which arguably, in itself, could amount to maladministration of the fund.

DUTIES OF THE TRUSTEESThe role of trustees is an important aspect of pension fund governance. In

general, trustees are required to take management decisions consistent with the best interest of members. According to Nevondwe (2013:6) the board of trustees is the managing and controlling body of the fund and should operate independently of the employer, members and other stakeholders of the fund. The board of trustees retrieve their duties under the Act and the rules of the fund. Both the Act and the rules of the fund are all binding on the fund and its members.

Section 7C of the Act provides the objects of the board. Accordingly, the objects of a board shall be to direct, control and oversee the operations of a fund in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the fund. In pursuing its object the board shall:

• take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of members in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of this Act are protected at all times, especially in the event of an amalgamation or transfer of any business contemplated in section 14, splitting of a fund, termination or reduction of contributions to a fund by an employer, increase of contributions of members and withdrawal of an employer who participates in a fund;

• act with due care, diligence and good faith;• avoid conflicts of interest;• act with impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries.In PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood

& Allied Workers Union (2007) 28 ILJ 2701 (W), the Court remarked at paragraph 21 that section 7C of the Act created statutory duties that overlap with the pre-existing common law fiduciary duties of the board. Section 7D of the Act on the other hand contains the duties of the board. Accordingly, the duties of a board shall be to:

• ensure that proper registers, books and records of the operations of the fund are kept, inclusive of proper minutes of all resolutions passed by the board;

• ensure that proper control systems are employed by or on behalf of the board;

• ensure that adequate and appropriate information is communicated to the members of the fund informing them of their rights, benefits and duties in terms of the rules of the fund;

• take all reasonable steps to ensure that contributions are paid timeously to

281


the fund in accordance with this Act;• obtain expert advice on matters where board members may lack sufficient

expertise• ensure that the rules and the operation and administration of the fund

comply with this Act, the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28, 2001 and all other applicable laws.

According to Marumoagae (2012:564) members of pension funds are amongst the major stakeholders in their respective funds and that they have interests vested therein. However, it has been argued that the board of trustees is not obliged to advance interests of the members but only take all reasonable steps to protect such interest as reflected in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of the Act.

According to Mdluli (2011:251) the board has been held to owe a fiduciary duty to the fund and to its members and other beneficiaries. In other words, as a fiduciary, under the common law the board may not exceed its powers; exercise its powers for an improper or collateral purpose; and fetter its discretion. In addition, board members may not place themselves in positions in which their personal interests may possibly conflict with those of the fund. However, Marumoagae (2012:555) argues that the board of trustees owes fiduciary duties only to the fund it serves and not to members of the fund this is because a fiduciary duty arises in the context of a fiduciary relationship, which relationship is based on the principle of loyalty. In Kriedemann v Lubritene Provident Fund [2002] 2 BPLR 3082, the adjudicator reiterated that the board of the management of any pension has a duty, inter alia, to ensure that material information is communicated to members of the fund informing them of their rights, benefits and duties in terms of the rules of the fund. The adjudicator held that failure of a fund to provide this material information amounts to maladministration of the fund by the fund.

According to Marumoagae (2012:563) “having been entrusted with the duty of protecting the interest of the beneficiaries, the trustee is not supposed to make a secret profit at the beneficiaries’ expense or to place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty to the beneficiaries”. In Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813A-B, the court held that a trustee undoubtedly occupies a fiduciary office which imposes upon a trustee the duty of utmost good faith towards all beneficiaries, whether actual or potential. As far as trusts are concerned, the trustees owe fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust. However, the position is different with regard to retirement funds, which possess independent legal personality under South African law.

The trustees’ duties need to be linked with the duties of the directors under the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 and King III report and its code of conduct. The King III preaches the principles of good corporate governance and these principles needs to be accepted by the Board of Trustees of retirement funds and these will go a long way to addresses the challenges faced by trustees to act in the best interests




of their members and act in good faith.Nevondwe and Mhlaba (2012:55) suggests that “the discussion paper issued by

National Treasury titled Social Security and Retirement Reform which was issued in 2007 also recommends the strengthening of the governance of retirement funds. It is proposed that the trustees need to protect its member’s retirement savings from erosion by risk premium costs by setting minimum allocations of contributions to retirement savings, compulsory preservation and portability, regulated minimum early withdrawal benefits and restricted deductions”.

LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM OTHER COUNTRIESThe position in the United States The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 (ERISA) defines a fiduciary

as anyone who exercises discretionary control or authority over plan management or plan assets, anyone with discretionary authority or responsibility for the administration of a plan, or anyone who provides investment advice to a plan for compensation or has any authority or responsibility to do so.

The primary responsibility of fiduciaries is to run the plan solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and paying plan expenses. Fiduciaries must act prudently and must diversify the plan’s investments in order to minimize the risk of large losses. In addition, they must follow the terms of plan documents to the extent that the plan terms are consistent with ERISA. They also must avoid conflicts on behalf of the plan that benefit parties related to the plan, such as other fiduciaries, service providers, or the plan sponsor. ERISA provides for penalties to fiduciaries that do not follow the principles of conduct accordingly such fiduciaries may be personally liable to restore any losses to the plan, or to restore any profits made through improper use of plan assets.

The disclosure of information to members of the fund regarding investment choices is significant in the United States and this forms part of good governance of pension funds. According to Mdluli (2011:260) where a fiduciary provides incorrect information or without good cause fails to provide relevant information, this would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The plan sponsors must allow members the opportunity to make investment decisions and to prevent them from being misled or misinformed. This however does not require a plan sponsor to guarantee that all material facts are conveyed to members. Rather, ERISA prohibits the plan sponsor from concealing facts, and requires it to speak truthfully when it chooses to do so.

The Position in the United KingdomIn the UK the composition of pension boards is regulated by the UK Pension

Act 2004. Pension fund trustees in the UK manage billion pound investment funds and continue to owe fiduciary duties towards the members and this encompasses the duty to act in their best in the best interest. These fiduciary duties are said to

283


override all other aspects of trusteeship. The UK provides penalties for trustees who breach their fiduciary duties. Accordingly, all appointed, elected or independent trustees are personally and collectively liable for losses from any breach of duty or misuse of scheme assets. Trustees must be able to demonstrate that they are able to act impartially without their decisions being tainted by actual or perceived conflicts.

According to Berry (2011:5-6) the challenge in the UK is that Pension fund members who enquire about an ethical issue often encounter the seeming paradox of being told that their views must be ignored because of the trustees’ fiduciary duty to act in their best interests. But are trustees legally restricted to interpreting this duty only in terms of financial best interests? Any discussion of what is in beneficiaries’ ‘best interests’ inevitably raises the question of who decides what those best interests are. Historically, the fiduciary relationship has been assumed to be a more or less paternalistic one, where trustees are left to decide what will serve beneficiaries’ interests with minimal regard for the views of beneficiaries themselves. But is this still appropriate?

It has been submitted that it is difficult to maintain the argument that members and beneficiaries should have no say at all in how their money is managed, moreover, with the shift towards DC arrangements; they increasingly bear the investment risk. In the premise, it has been suggested that there is a need to clarify the extent to which members’ views may be taken into account by trustees if it has not been possible to ascertain the views of all members, and to guarantee members an adequate level of disclosure and consultation.

The position in MalawiAccording to the International Organisations of Pension Supervisors (2011:3)

prior to the Pension Act, 2011 pension in Malawi was offered voluntarily through privately managed occupational schemes. The pension schemes were registered with the Commissioner of Taxes of the Malawi Revenue Authority. However, no regulatory framework existed before. According to Mhango and Thejane (2012:760-762) the Third Schedule of the Taxation Act of 1998 did not make it mandatory for pension funds to furnish members with fund information to ensure that members are informed about their rights and benefits and responsibilities. Pension members and their beneficiaries enjoyed no express right of access to information, such as benefit statements, audited financial statements, fund rules, and so on, concerning their pension rights and benefits. This was a problem when one considers that access to such information is important to ensure that members are able to make informed decisions and to protect their rights. The ability to have access to information assist members to exercise their rights adequate and make informed decisions. This definitely was prejudicial to members because even if their benefits are misused they wouldn’t know. They would just accept what is given to them. The enactment of the Pension Act was an important development in




the financial services sector reforms which began a few years ago in Malawi.According to this Act, members of the fund have a right to be provided with

fund information as soon as they become members. Fund information includes • The fund’s investment strategy;• The fund’s investment performance and financial position;• Fees and charges payable by, or borne by, members or beneficiaries in

relation to the fund;• The rights and entitlements of members or beneficiaries under the fund rules

and otherwise in relation to the fund;• The obligation of members to pay contributions under the fund rules; and• The obligations of members to pay contributions under the fund rules and to

provide life insurance under the requirements of the Act or as specified by Registrar’s Directive.

CONCLUSIONThe question arises whether pension fund trustees in South Africa are sufficiently

competent to safeguard all the moneys belonging to members. According to Sigwadi (2008:331) this question is particularly compelling as there are cases in which trustees have been found not to be acting in the best interests of the members, but for their own personal gain and other ulterior motives. It is therefore evident that trustees must be persons who are trustworthy and have the best interest of the members at heart. It is recommended that the trustees must familiarize themselves with the provisions of the Act and rules of the fund in order to take informed decisions that protect the interest of the members. To become a trustee, it is not required by the Act that there should be qualifications or a particular experience. This is rather troubling as trustees are being asked to take crucial investment decisions, yet many lack resources and expertise. Schutz JA in Durr v ABSA [1997] 3 All SA 1 (A). stated on page 6 that:

It is negligent to engage in any potentially dangerous activity unless one has the skill and knowledge usually associated with the proper discharge of the duties connected with such an activity.

In light of the above, this paper suggests that among the group of trustees should be individuals with investment expertise and experience. Investment decisions should be made in the best interests of the members. Furthermore the processes of investment should be transparent, and disclosures should be made to help interested parties monitor trustees and investment performance. The use of Trustee Toolkit is welcomed and should be encouraged as it helps trustees to be well acquainted with governance of retirement funds, which in turn protects the interests of the members. Acting in the best interest of the fund and its members is the foremost responsibility of the trustees, and often they have to make some very challenging decisions. It is therefore vital for the trustees to have access to online

285


mechanisms which provides a certain level of knowledge and understanding of the Act, Regulation and rules of the fund as well as circulars issued on governance of the fund.

It is evident that the disclosure of information to members is of paramount importance. The trustees must be in good possession to know which information must be disclosed to members and may be in breach of the fiduciary duty if without good cause refuses to disclose relevant information to members. We therefore opine that trustee duties do not supersede the rights of the members, After all if there were no members there wouldn’t be any duties bestowed on a trustee. Trustees must therefore aim to protect the interest of the members by complying with the Act, circulars and relevant regulations when exercising their duties.

LIST OF REFERENCESClark, G. and Urwin, R. 2008. Best-practice pension fund governance, Journal of Asset

Management Vol. 9, 1, 2–21. Berry, C. 2011. “Protecting our best interest: Rediscovering fiduciary obligation”,

March at p5. Online, www.fairpensions.org.uk, accessed 18 February 2013.Hayton, D. Online. The extent of pension trustees’ obligations in South Africa, p3,

online, http://www.pensionlawyers.co.za/downloads/files/DAVID%20HAYTON%20TRUSTEES%20S%20aFRICA.pdf, accessed 20 January 2013.

Hunter, R. 2002. The Governance Of Pension Funds, A Paper presented at the annual convention of the Financial Planning Institute Durban, April.

International Organisations of Pension Supervisors. 2011. Country Profile: Malawi. October.

Yermo, J. and Marossy, A. 2001. Insurance and private pensions compendium for emerging economies. Pension Fund Governance.

Marumoagae, M.C. 2012. “Do boards of trustees of South African retirement funds owe fiduciary duties to both the funds and fund members? The debate continues”, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2012, 15(2).

Mhango, M. and Thejane, P. 2012. “The Malawi Pension Act: a general commentary on some of its core mandatory provisions with specific reference to sections 9, 10 and 15”, The South African Law Journal 2012, 129 Pp761.

Sigwadi, M. 2008. “The Personal Liability of Pension Fund Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties”, The South African Mercantile Law Journal 2008, Vol 20.

National Treasury. 2012. Presevation, Portability and governance for retirement funds, 21 September. Pretoria: National Treasury.

National Treasury. 2012. Strengthening savings, an overview of the proposals announced in 2012 budget, 14 May. Pretoria: National Treasury.

Oosthuizen, A. 2008. “Trustees duties in relation to member choice investments presentation”. Paper delivered at the Pension Lawyers Association Conference on the 9 September 2008.

Nevondwe, L. 2010. “South African Social security and retirement reform a long journey towards the redrafting of the New Pension Funds Act”, Pensions, an International Journal, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, November 2010 UK, Vol 15, issue 4.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Guidelines for the protection of rights of members and beneficiaries in occupational pension plans.

Mdluli, S.M. 2011. “The Role of the Board of a South African Defined Contribution


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationPension Fund that Offers Investment Choice”. The South African Mercantile Law Journal 2011 Vol 23.

Sayce, S. and Ozbilgin, M. 2013. “Pension trusteeship and diversity in the UK: A new boardroom recipe for change or continuity?” at p5, online, http://eid.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/17/0143831X12462489.full.pdf, accessed, 18 February 2013.

United States Department of Labour. 2013. What protections do the fiduciary rules of ERISA provide? Online http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html, accessed on 02 February 2013.

Wallis, M. 2004. “Protecting members’ rights”, a paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the Pension Lawyers’ Association held in Cape Town on Tuesday, the 17th February, 2004.

287


COMPLICATING COMPLEXITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: STUCK IN THE WORLD OF MODERNITY

N. Nkuna & M.P. SebolaDepartment of Public Administration


ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to put forward a conceptual debate that in as much as South Africa has transcended beyond the democratic dispensation during the 1994 transition, its state of public administration practice is still

stuck in the dominant modern conception that sought to complicate the complex phenomena that came about through the philosophy of dominant rational science. It is argued that in as much as there is a need for theory for the development of Public Administration in a maturing democracy like that of South Africa, very little has been done since the dawn of democracy to engage on a theoretical discourse that would have suitably respond to the complexities that manifested themselves in practice. Such has eventually open space for the purported new democratic public administration practice to remain within the rational logic of modern discourse that sought a simplistic approach to complex problems. Consequently that opened up the practice to be invaded by practitioners from other disciplines that regard the phenomena as a common sense compatible arena. Instead complexities that accompanied the practice of public administration necessitate a need to have analysis and draw inferences beyond complicated explanations that remain dominant within modern scientific discourse. Therefore the practice of public administration is not an open for all career advancement like it is appearing to be in a democratic South Africa. The conclusion therefore is that the practice of public administration in a fragile democratic state like that of South Africa, need to be preceded by necessary acquiring of the relevant discipline of Public Administration as the arena of practice out there is complex especially if it is evolving towards a capable developmental state.

INTRODUCTIONThe hypothesis is that since inception of the new democratic dispensation

in South Africa with the ruling party having transcended beyond a century of existence and transformed from being a liberation movement, the practice of public administration is caught up within the quandary of shifting paradigms of simplistic rational thinking that fails to deal with a phenomenal shift from the

N. Nkuna & M.P. Sebola



mythology of reducing it to a positivist science that is beyond the normative basis of the practice. Reaffirmation of a need and justification of theory in dealing with a phenomenon like that of public administration practice within a context beyond common sense is exposed. In alluding to that there exists unanswered questions on the state of debate of Public Administration theory in South Africa that arguably provided a fertile ground for invasion within the praxis by other professionals that view the field as a comfort space for realising career enrichment irrespective whether one has acquired a discipline or not; yet that does not happen in other practices like medical sciences or highly reliable technical fields like mechanical engineering. A person trained as an educator cannot be appointed as a pilot, but interestingly, he/she can be appointed as a municipal manager in South Africa yet the expectations of having an effective, efficient administration remain ideal. The dearth of debate within Public Administration since inception of the new dispensation is raised as a possible factor that contributes to stagnation on rigorous engagement. Those within the discourse are caught up in seeking to continue engagement within the confines of complicated thinking whereas the phenomenon out there is complex and exacerbated by the executive that is giving minimal space for independent thinking that can enhance knowledge generation. Contemporary issues that matters for sustaining the democratic dispensation in South Africa are beyond complicated scrutiny. Hence the grand policy positions adopted right from the popular Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and recently the Growth Path are proving not to find full expression or prospective execution in practice. The folly of complicating complexity created a fad (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000) in ensuring that South Africa becomes the best capable administrative state as articulated in its founding with democratic developmental aspirations that require a strong bureaucratic machinery to propel it.

SYNOPSIS OF THE PROBLEMModern literature shows that Public Administration as a discipline to be in

quandary for over a century yet it is frameworks derived from such disciplines that inform practice at the time. Such derivation is what Stacy (1996) refers to as schema while Anderson (1999) refers to as schemata. South Africa as an administrative state is not immune of being caught up within that quandary despite having achieved its democracy on the 21st century; more especially if such discipline has to be practiced within the auspices of policy manifestos that rely on simplistic notion of attempting to complicate complexities within the practice of public administration that attempts to reduce it to positivist rational ontology of science. The argument is that it will remain a fad that implies the state of a democratic state trapped in its own making if not traversing to its past in disguise. Complexities that emanate from public administration practice make it impossible to delineate it or reducing it to finite rationality that fits well to modern thinking. Yet questions

289


like what would make an efficient and effective public administration practice in a democratic developmental state like that which South Africa aspires to be will always be posed (Maphunye, 2001). Should it be by having practitioners that have undergone rigorous training through the discipline of Public Administration or is having “politically relevant cadres” deployed in government administration to ensure that manifestos of the ruling party are carried forward irrespective of relevant meritocratic status of such assignments? The prototypes are the appointment of Director Generals, Police Commissioners and predominantly Municipal Managers and Managers accountable to municipal managers in South Africa. These questions are hobbling within the corridors of government institutions in South Africa with those assigned to the country’s executive having caught up in a paradox of putting in place administrative machinery that can be able to take South Africa towards the aspired capable democratic developmental state. The same also applies to young scholars that are visioning to develop careers by acquiring the discipline of Public Administration.

THE NEED FOR THEORY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONContemporary issues that matters for sustaining the maturing democratic dispensation

in South Africa are beyond complicated engagement or the use of common sense as in the process they create what Max-Neef (2005) referred to it as problematiques, while Nkuna and Sebola (2012) referred to as complexities within the field of public administration practice. There are in some cases exceptions, but few, of interdisciplinary attempts, especially in areas such as planning and philosophy, which are integrative disciplines to begin with (Max-Neef, 2005), the situation is not solved, as frequently attempted, creating supposed teams conformed of specialists in different areas, around a given problem. The South African Auditor General in terms of the 2011-2012 audit outcomes on the hand has identified the use of private consultants within government functionaries as matter of concern. Hence the grand policy positions adopted right from the popular Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and recently the Growth Path and National Development Plan (NDP) are proving not to find full expression or prospective execution in practice. The folly of complicating complexity create a fad (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000) in ensuring that South Africa becomes the best capable developmental state as articulated in its founding with democratic developmental aspirations that require a strong bureaucratic machine to propel it forward. That eventually needs knowledgeable practitioners that have grasped the basics of the level of rigor required through theoretical dispositions of the science in use.

Scientific research has two general goals: to increase knowledge and to increase an understanding of the world in which we live in (Hanekom & Thornhill, 1994; Reeves, Albert, Kuper, & Hodges; 2008). The increase of knowledge is usually achieved through the discovery of facts and general laws while understanding is increased by constructing explanations of the knowledge discovered and by arranging the knowledge and explanations into systematic generalisations, or into theories. However Max-Neef (2007) contend that knowledge without understanding is dangerous as having none. Theories remain tools that



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationprovide complex and comprehensive conceptual understandings of things that cannot be pinned down (Reeves et al, 2008). Such theories can be used to predict and bring reforms on how societies work, how organisations operate and why people interact in certain ways. Yet there is still no a unique, simple criterion or litmus test to decide if a theory is scientific or not (Daneke, 1990; Chu, Strand & Jelland, 2003; Revees et al, 2008). Scientific activity across the range from botany to particle physics and epidemiology is too diverse. Rather than looking for a universal criterion for being scientific, it is often better to ground criteria in the aim of the theory. The evolution that took place since South Africa transcended to democracy, ideological clashes among the major players within the policy landscape have played itself to an extent that even issues that critical managerial application of relevant knowledge are legislated. It is that process that qualifies the view of simplistic notion as it attempts to reduce public administration practice to a kitchen like recipe. Such ranges from the development of guidelines for developing an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) to the recent publication of regulations that gives effect to the implementation of Local Government Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2011.

It need to be understood that there are three aims central to a theory right from its development (Daneke, 1990; Hanekom & Thornhill, 1994), namely, predictive component, explanatory component, and control component. Predictive component attempts to predict future behaviour of a system given a set of observational data about it. Explanatory component deals with theoretical understanding of a system. Control component provide guidelines and control mechanisms for the intervention and manipulation of systems. The theoretical framework provides the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that informs discourse or research in a given field like that of public administration practice (Daneke, 1990; Alasuutari, 1998; Maxwell, 2005). Revees et al (2008) simplify it that theories give researchers different “lenses” through which to look at complicated problems and social issues, focusing their attention on different aspects of the data and providing a framework within which to conduct their analysis. This is also applicable to public administration practice as the phenomena need to be dealt with through a thorough theoretical grounding that is devoid to common-sense. Let alone if such phenomena find its expression within a diverse society like that of South Africa that have uniquely transcended to democracy through negotiated settlement with the constitutional bill of rights as well as the basic normative guidelines which in practice is characterised by paradox. It is in those situations that social science loses an important resource for theory development if the incompatible or inconsistent theses which inevitably arise in the study of organisations are ignored or are eliminated (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). This is because organisational theories attempt to capture a multifaceted reality like that of the practice of public administration with a finite, internally consistent statement that is essentially incomplete.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEBATES IN SOUTH AFRICAThe democratic South African public administration practice has its principled base from

section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, which subscribes to the normative foundations and societal values. Although the matter of the South African

291

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationsociety remains debatable since it is not well articulated in the Constitution of 1996, the tools and approaches of public administration practice must be guided by those principles together with the theoretical or mental framework in use. Such theoretical framework is acquired through a rigorous acquisition of knowledge and forms the basis of approaches or mental framework to be adopted in practice. It however need to be noted that during the transition in the early 1990s, very little work was done by the ruling party, on the nature of neither post-apartheid public service nor public administration practice (Cameron, 2009) accept the discussion documents on ready to govern and preparations for negotiated settlement. It is understandable that the focus was more on political issues that preparations of the administrative machinery that can propel such political ideologies at the execution level were not prioritised. Assumedly those responsible were within a paradigmatic ambit on taking it for granted that approaches that worked in business environment that formed the basis of New Public Management (NPM) will work as such capacity was obviously in abundance despite the competing ideologies that played itself through the macro-policy landscape. Such political power of course resonated to a consolidated majority that is characterised by diversity and complexity.

In public administration practice various legislative prescriptions and theoretical frameworks in use provide a schema or what Anderson (1999) refers to as schemata that need a premise base of specific discipline that can manoeuvre with a trans-disciplinary interplay (Max-Neef, 2005). A schema or schemata consists of a set of rules that reflects regularities in experience and enables a system to determine the nature of further experience and make sense of it (Stacey, 1996; Anderson, 1999). It cannot be acquired through common-sense as it also contains rules indicating how the system should respond to its experience, which may include extending, modifying, or changing the rules comprising the schema. The schema or schemata develop what in this paper is referred to as isomorphism and shape up persona in the form of competencies required in practice. The main stream theoretical discourse in Public Administration provides such schema or schemata through reductionist rational approaches that are dominating the modern world. Of course it need to be impressed on that South African Public Administration debates have been dominated by Cloete’s generic processes perspective until the introduction of the Initiative Public Administration of 1999 that brought about the systems thinking approach through the Mount Grace debates (McLennan & Fitzgerald, 1991). The question that remains unanswered is whether the dispensation has taken advantage of drawing in the potential of such schemata to practice or is it a matter of being politically correct. However, the trial and error mode that various regimes that assumed office since the inception of democracy showed that very little was done with the collapsing of professional bodies that were considered to be of apartheid making.

THE DEMISE OF THE MOUNT GRACE DEBATESIt is subtly put forward by Schwella (2000) that South Africa at the time of Mount Grace

debates was characterised by rapidly changing and highly dynamic contexts as a result of marked changes since the 1990’s. Cloete (2008) as cited in Cameron and Milne (2009), muses



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationhow Public Administration and Management transformation principles accepted in Mount Grace 1 are actually contained in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, with a caution of lack on uncertainty whether there is any causal relationship. While the government never lost sight of its constitutional and development role during the transition to new dispensation after 1994, it is generally accepted that NPM reforms were influential in South Africa (Cameron, 2009) with what Adelzadeh (1996) refer to as tendencies of moving towards neoliberalism. This is what this paper proclaims as a temptation of simplicity as the NPM ideas are attempting to complicate what is complex through the simplistic business like ideas within the practice of public administration. Unlike the Minnowbrook in the United States of America, participants of the Mount Grace in South Africa also interacted and engaged with the state and have an opportunity to contribute in the shaping of public administration practice (Cameron & Milne, 2009). Extensive policy and interactive consultancy work for government served on commissions, allowing academics to contribute to the solving of real life problems.

The deliberation at the academic fora is easily translated to shape the approaches in practice. For example most experts served in the 1998 Presidential Review Commission (PRC) where academics were drawn from various universities; as well as the contributors to the well-known macro-economic development strategy GEAR (Department of Finance, 1996). Although Mount Grace 1 did not specifically call for the introduction of NPM, some of the presented papers argued strongly for a Public Management approach in the discipline of Public Administration (Cameron & Milne, 2009). These have led to further deliberations from other quotas. For example Tshikwatamba (2007) argues that Public Management carried out the equivalent of coup over Public Administration. NPM is a general approach to regulation in stark contrast to the traditional managerial model; strongly market-oriented, promotes self-regulation, and trusts that the regulated and the government can become partners (Haynes, 2003; LeMay, 2006). The rational-choice underpinnings of the NPM are problematic to the continued legitimacy of democratic institutions in heterogeneous societies attempting to maintain an inclusive polity (Kaboolian, 1998). Therefore there is no doubt that NPM approach has also dominated public administration practice in South Africa through the introduction of neoliberal approach.

Given the complexity of the environment of South African public administration practice, the ordinary causal effect approach, that is advocated by the NPM conception on its own becomes absolute once the system reaches a certain proportion like the evolution of democracy as it is. Although Schwella (2000) in the Mount Grace II debates have cautioned these as modern fallacies, it need to mentioned that he was advocating for systems thinking within the same rational paradigmatic position that is within the modern world of science. Scholars such as Senge (1990) and Stacey (1996) have noted that rational paradigms start to breakdown when faced with unpredictable and unstable conditions (Combe & Botscheme, 2004) as they tend to be rigid recipes within the unpredictable phenomena like that of public administration practice. That has proved to be phenomenal in South Africa in terms of the shift from one macro-policy to the other since the inception of democracy. South Africa comprises of a diverse society and such diversity is protected in terms of the Bill of

293

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationRights provided for in chapter two of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. Application of the constitutional basic principles governing public administration practice in South Africa trigger diverse reaction to various agents or systems within the greater society as well as administrators within the field and eventually create complexities or what Max-Neef (2005) referred to as problematiques. A decade had passed by since the Mount Grace II and very little is being done within the discourse fora to bring the situation to track and that put the practice in a vulnerable state that can resonate to a need for reform after reform as the political power stakes appear to be gradually sloping to the right unless the ruling party strengthen its renewal beyond rhetoric.

COMPLICATING COMPLEXITYAlthough organisms and social systems belong to the same category of systems in general,

simple analogies are misplaced since all systems, just like public administration practice, unlike machines and organisms use communication to process meaning (Luhamann, 1988); it is no mean feat to either precisely delineates what constitutes complexity or even define the very term “complexity” (Chu, Strand & Jelland, 2003; Nowotny, 2005; Goldstein, 2008) especially in public administration practice. Like many other scientific theories, complexity theory is not a unified and homogeneous perspective (Teisman & Klijn, 2008; Zimmerman et al, 2009). Complexity is notoriously hard to define and measure as it emanates from a variety of perspectives and can surface in various forms of interactions and has its roots in well-developed disciplines including physics, mathematics, biology, chemistry, engineering, meteorology and astronomy (Nowotny, 2005; Zimmerman et al, 2009; Habtemichael & Cloete, 2010). It is because of this diversity of sources that it has not been easy to formulate an integrated theory of the concept. The term “complexity” however, does not only explain one kind of system behaviour; but a set of characteristics that can be identified in most natural systems, including organisations and their processes (Dolan, Garcia & Auerbach, 2003). Boisot (1999) in Mason (2007) refers to complexity to be known as a collection of theories that makes up its body of knowledge with a variety of concepts being used to describe it. The conceptual difficulties result from at least three crucial factors involved in the study of complex systems (Goldstein, 2008). The first has to do with exponential explosions of new findings across huge number of fields and from a great many countries including South Africa. Complexity theory is essentially trans-disciplinary in nature, representing the confluence of research from around the world in such ideationally and methodologically varied fields. In this paper however, the concept of complex reflexive system has been preferred due to the structure base, form and function of public administration practice that also interact in a social human nature with the internal structure with feedback loops. The existence of an internal structure within the system or agent makes it to be reflexive and have purpose that cannot be predicted as various agents bring with them emotions and personality traits in the practice of public administration.

The science of complexity studies the fundamental properties of nonlinear-feedback networks and particularly of complex adaptive networks (Stacey, 1996; Dooley, 1997). Stacey (1996) further refers to complex adaptive systems as systems that consist of a number



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationof components, or agents, that interact with each other according to sets of rules that require them to examine and respond to each other’s behaviour in order to improve their behaviour and thus the behaviour of the system they comprise. A complex system is not constituted by the sum of its components, but also by the intricate relationships between these components (Nowotny, 2005; Heylighen, 2007; Zimmerman et al, 2009). With reference to public administration practice, that connotes that systems can be understood through intricate interactions among its constituent components. Cilliers (1998) further espouse that complexity is not located at a specific identifiable site of the system because it results from interaction between components of a system and it is manifested at the level of the system itself. The range of public administration practice, with due consideration of its locus and focus, is not located within a specific identifiable site due to its normative nature and having to deal with the societal welfare which do not fit well within an objective rational analysis.

It has become a tendency for complexity writers to clarify it in distinct from complicated (Cilliers, 1998; Perona & Miragliotta, 2003). “Complicated” originally means “of things knotted, entwined with each other”, while “complex” means “of things which interact among each other.” Zimmerman et al (2009) however refer to “Complex” as implying diversity or a great number of connections between wide varieties of elements like that of public administration practice. To understand a complicated system, one needs to divide it into sub-elements and study each part separately and independently. This has become a trend in the practice of public administration and the policy landscape in South Africa although the integrated approach in planning with outcome based approach is signalling possibilities of differentiated prospects. No matter how big the complicated system might be, all one need is a complicated procedure to study that system and modern or traditional science based on Newtonian logic can be of assistance in dealing with such a system to a certain level (Zimmerman et al, 2009). If the practice of public administration is complicated, all what is needed is a complicated procedure to roll it and that can be easily done by promulgating legislation after legislation and regulations after regulation to an extent which even matters that are managerial in nature are afforded a status of legislative portfolio like they are in South Africa after 2009 dispensation. A prototype example is the establishment of portfolios on Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation in the presidency. Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation are within the elementary scope of management (Smit & Cronje, 2004) and within ideal public administration practice it is categorised as such. It is on that contention that complex systems like that of public administration practice are made up by single elements which have intimate connections, counterintuitive and non-linear links. Understanding the functioning of each single part does not imply to understand the whole system (Perona & Miragliotta, 2003; Zimmerman et al, 2009) in that such system is defined by relationships and networks rather than their constituent elements. A notion on appointment of national police commissioners, director generals and municipal managers has resembled such simplistic notion that if one has been identified to be good on the other part of the system, that do not reduce such to understanding the system as a whole.

The many natural rules coupled with normative values within public administration practice that influence systems behaviour, and multiple intricacies for dealing with turbulent

295

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationenvironment, remains a factor to be dealt with (Dooley, 1997; Cilliers, 1998; Dolan et al, 2003). Public administration practice is characterised by interactions within environment dimensions both in terms of feed-backs and feed-forwards, so its boundaries connect the system with its environment rather than separate it. The interaction among constituents of the system and the interaction between the system and its environment are of such a nature that the system as a whole cannot be understood by analysing its components (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006; Zimmerman et al, 2009). The relationships are not fixed, they shift and change often in a self-organised manner with human systems that are naturally having an internal structure (Stacey, 1996), but machine type systems, however intricate are complicated (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006). The Norwegian philosopher, Am (1996) as cited in Haynes (2003) has defined a complex reflexive system as having four attributes, namely; consists of many independent components; these components interact locally; the overall behaviour is independent of the internal structure of the components; and the overall behaviour of the system is well defined. Interactions among the components define the whole system, just like public administration practice as it is in South Africa hence a need to deal with it beyond common sense.

STUCK IN THE MODERN WORLDTo understand the modern world one had to first by outlining what is meant by modern.

Modern is explained as referring to our presently ingrained cultural values, the dominant theory in use in both society and academy: “causality, determinism, egalitarianism, humanism, liberal democracy, necessity, objectivity, rationality, responsibility, and truth” (Cunningham & Weschler, 2002). The notion of public administration practice within a modern world embraces a situation where boundaries and hierarchies can be rationally determined within various arms of government and other state functionaries (Cilliers, 2000). Contemporary science with its strong positivism tends to trivialise the nature of boundaries and hierarchies (Richardson, 2001) especially within the practice of public administration whereby some aspects are dealt with do not assume objective values. Boundaries are supposedly real and the ability to recognise them as such is regarded as a straightforward exercise yet is not the case within the practice of public administration. Complexity thinking forces us to review our conceptions of what natural boundaries are (Richardson & Lissack, 2001) among systems as they interact with each other in the practice of public administration. Questions to contend with are: Are they real in some absolute sense? Or are they no more than, and no less than, social constructs? Are some boundaries more real than others? Or are all boundaries equal? If one were to view the spatiotemporal evolution of a complex system, it would be observed that different structures wax and wane. In complex systems different domains can emerge that might even display qualitatively different behaviours from their neighbouring domains. A domain herein is simply defined as an apparently autonomous structure that differentiates itself from the whole (Richardson & Lissack, 2001). The apparent autonomy is illusory, however all domains are emergent structures that persist for undecidedly different durations like in public administration practice. A particular domain, or structure, or subsystem, may seem to appear spontaneously, persist for a long period, and then fade away just like the



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationway macro-policies are abandoned after each other. Particular organisations or industries can be seen as emergent domains that are apparently self-sustaining and separate from other organisations or industries. Therefore engaging on complicating complexity will remain a myth as boundaries and hierarchies within complex systems like that public administration practice. There is a need for shift beyond modern scientific analysis within the field and practice of public administration, more so if such is characterised by interactions that are manifesting themselves locally in a rich fashion and emergent nature.

CONCLUSIONThis paper has in briefly chronicling the evolution of the practice of public administration

in South Africa since the inception of democracy, exposed the need for a theoretical discourse that can be well positioned to deal with challenges in practice. That has been done by eluding the state of discourse in South Africa through relating it to Mount Grace I and II with a view of justifying the extent to which attempts are made to complicate complexity within the practice of public administration. Due to the dearth of debates after the inception of democracy, it has been argued that the country as an administrative state is trapped within a modern ontology of positivist thinking in Public Administration. By relating the hoping from one macro policy to another the paper expounds that the reality of the mythology of there can be a single uniform theory that can serve as an analytical base of a phenomenon like that of public administration practice; specially where the state is ambitious to be a capable developmental state with the kind of grey area of interface that remain complex for each arm within administration to can be able to accurately pick the tab along the policy process relay. Due to such complex interface the stagnation to the paradigmatic notion of modernity will be like taking a quantum leap backwards to the 1800s in order to deal with issues of the 21st century whereas there has been a shift towards a postmodern society. Therefore for South Africa to realise its macro policy intentions towards a capable developmental state, there is a need to move from the simplistic notion of complicating issues towards a creative world of complexity. This will in turn require commitment by the ruling party’s cadre deployment tendencies of placing wrong incumbents in wrong positions of authority that create conundrum of role assumption within relevant government arms. The intentions might be for a right course, but the level of knowledge and understanding of the practice of public administration is not as complicated as administering an experiment within a controlled laboratory setup. It takes practitioners that have undergone through rigorous theoretical discipline that can maneuverer their way critically within the field and practice of public administration. Therefore both practitioners and scholars of Public Administration in South Africa has to seriously consider to have debates like that of Mount Grace engagements replica as the country approaches a second decade of democracy before the problems within public administration practice are more severe like they appear to be at the moment.

LIST OF REFERENCESAdelzadeh, A. 1996. From The RDP To GEAR: The Gradual Embracing of Neo-

Liberalism in Economic Policy. Transformation, 31: 66-95.

297

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationAlasuutari, P. 1998. An invitation to social research. California: Sage Publications Inc.Anderson, P. 1999. Complexity Theory and Organisation Science. Organisation

Science. 10(3): 216-232.Cameron, R. & Milne, C. 2009. Minnowbrook, Mount Grace and the State of the

Discipline. Journal of Public Administration. 44(2): 380-395.Cameron, R. 2009. New Public Management Reforms in the South Africa: 1999-2009.

Journal of Public Administration. 44(4.1): 910 – 942.Chu, D., Strand, R & Fjelland, R. 2003. Theories of complexity. Complexity. 8(3):

19-30.Cilliers, P. 1998. Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems.

London: Routledge.Combe, I.A. & Botschen, G. 2004. Strategy paradigms for the management of quality:

Dealing with complexity. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6): 500-523.Cunningham, R. & Weschler L. 2002. Theory and the Public Administration Student/

Practitioner. Public Administration Review, 62(1).Daneke, G.A. 1990. A science of Public Administration. Public Administration Review,

50(3): 383-392.Dolan, S.L., S Garcia, S and Auerbach, A. 2003. Understanding and managing chaos in

organisations. International Journal of Management. 20(1): 23-35.Dooley, K.J. 1997. A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organisation Change.

Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences. 1(1): 69-97.Goldstein, J. 2008. Emergence, creativity, and the logic of following and negating. The

Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 10(3): article 31.Habtemichael, F. & Cloete, F. 2010. Complexity Thinking in the Fight against

Corruption: Some Perspectives from South Africa. Politikon, 37(1): 85-105.Hanekom, S.X. & Thornhill C. 1994.Public Administration in Contemporary Society: A

South African Perspective. Revised Edition. Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers.Haynes, P. 2003. Managing Complexity in the public services. London: Open

University Press.Haynes, P. 2007. Chaos, Complexity and Transformations in Social Care Policy in

England. Public Money & Management, 27(3): 199-206.Henry, N. 1975. Paradigms of Public Administration. Public Administration Review,

35(4): 378-386.Heylighen, F. 2007. Five Questions on Complexity. In C. Gershenson, C. (Ed.):

Complexity: 5 questions. Berlin: Automatic Press.

Heylighen, F., Cilliers, P & Gershenson, C. 2001. Complexity and Philosophy. Evolution, Complexity and Cognition, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Philosophy Department, University of Stellenbosch.

Heylighen, F., Cilliers, P. & Gershenson, C. 2007.Philosophy and Complexity. In Bogg, J. and Geyer, R. (Eds).Complexity, Science and Society. New York: Radcliffe Publishing.

Kaboolian, L. 1998. ‘The New Public Management: Challenging the Boundaries of the Management vs Administration Debate.’ Public Administration Review 58(3): 189–193.

Kiel, L.D. 1994. Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A new paradigm for managing Change, Innovation, and Organisational Renewal. San Fransisco: Jossey – Bass Publishers.

LeMay, M.C. 2006. Public Administration: Clashing Values in the Administration of Public Policy. Second Edition. New York: Thomson Wadsworth.

Lessard, C. 2007. Complexity and reflexivity: Two important issues for economic



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationevaluation in health care. Social Science and Medicine. 64:1754-1765. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed.

Luhamann, N. 1988. Tautology and Paradox in the Self-description of the Modern Society. Sociological Theory, 6(1): 21-37.

Maphunye, K.J. 2001. The South African senior public service: roles and the structure in post-1994 departments. Journal of Public Administration. 34(4): 312-323.

Mason, J. 1996. Qualitative Researching. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.Max-Neef, M.A. 2005. Foundations of transdisciplinarity. Ecological Economics, 53:

5-16.Max-Neef, M.A. 2007. From Knowledge to Understanding: Navigations and Returns.

Universidad Austral de Chile. Valdivia, Chile.McKelvey, B. 2004. Toward a Complexity Theory of Entrepreneurship. Journal of

Business Venturing. 19: 313-341.McLennan, A & Fitzgerald, P. (Eds). 1991. The Mount Grace Papers: The New Public

Administration Initiative and the Mount Grace Consultation. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.

Mitleton-Kelly, E. 2003.Ten principles of complexity and enabling infrastructures. In Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives of Organisations: The application of complexity theory to organisations. Oxford: Pergamon, Elsevier Science.

Moynihan, D.P., Daniel P. Carpenter, D.P & Krause, G.A. 2012. Reputation and Public Administration. Public Administration Review • January | February 2012.

Neumann, Jr F.X. 1996. What Makes Public Administration a Science? Or, Are Its “Big Questions” Really Big? Public Administration Review, 56(5): 409-415.

Nkuna, N & Sebola, M.P. 2012. The state of Public Administration theoretical discourse in South African developmental local government: A need to go beyond Modern thinking. Journal of Public Administration. 47(1): 68-87.

Nowotny, H. 2005. The increase of Complexity and its Reduction: Emergent Interfaces between the Natural Sciences, Humanities and Social Sciences. Theory, Culture and Society, 22(5): 15-31

Perona, M. & Miragliotta, G. 2003. Complexity management and supply chain performance assessment: A field study and a conceptual framework. International Journal of Production Economics 90 (2004): 103-115.

Reeves, S., Albert, M., Kuper, A. & Hodges, B.D. 2008. Qualitative Research Why use theories in qualitative research? Practice.

Richardson, K.A & Lissack, M.L. 2001. On the Status of Boundaries, both Natural and Organisational: A Complex Systems Perspective, Emergence, 3(4), 32–49.

Richardson, K.A. 2001. On the Status of Natural Boundaries: A Complex Systems Perspective. Systems in Management 7th Annual ANZSYS Conference 2001.

Richardson, K.A., Mathieson, G., & Cilliers, P. 2000. The Theory and Practice of Complexity Science: Epistemological Considerations for Military Operational Analysis. SysteMexico. 1: 25-66.

Schwella, E. 2000. The state of Public and Development Management in South Africa. The Mount Crace II Papers. School of Public Management and Planning. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.

Senge, P.M. 1990. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organisation. New York: Doubleday.

Smit, P.J. & de Cronje, G.J. 2004.Management Principles: A contemporary Edition for Africa (3rd Edition). Cape Town. Juta and Company Ltd.

South Africa (Republic). 1994. The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development. Notice Number 1954 of 1994. Cape Town: Government Printers.

299

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSouth Africa (Republic). 1996: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of

1996. Pretoria: Government Printers.Stacey, R.D. 1996. Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics. Second

Edition. London: Pitman Publishing.Stacey, R.D., Griffin, D., & Shaw, P. 2000. Complexity and Management: Fad or radical

challenge to systems thinking? London: Routledge.Teisman, G.R. & Klijn, E.H. 2008. Complexity Theory and Public Management: An

Introduction. Public Administration Review, 10(3): 287-297.Thom, R & Fowler, D.H. 1989. Structural Stability and Morphogenesis: An Outline of

General Theory Models. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.Thornhill, C. 2007. Research in Public Administration: Some South African

developments. Administratio Publica. 15(2): 1-18.Tshikwatamba, N.E. 2007. A critical and inter-disciplinary analysis of the selected

criticisms leveled against Public Administration. Journal of Public Administration. 42(8): 33-43.

Zimmerman, B., Lindberg, C & Plsek, P. 2009. A Complexity Science Primer: What is Complexity Science and why should I learn about it? NAPCRG Resources.




THE COMMUNITY POLICING PHILOSOPHY AND THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC PROTEST IN SOUTH AFRICA: ARE THERE

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AFTER TWO DECADES OF DEMOCRACY?

M.P. SebolaDepartment of Public Administration University of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to put forward an argument that despite the adoption of a new approach into policing dubbed Community Policing in South Africa, challenges of controlling public especially during protests

are replica to those of apartheid era and triggering similar output and criticism among some parts of the society. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, unlike the pre-1994 constitutions, provides for the South African population with the right to protest and express their dissatisfaction against government on socio-economic issues. These rights which are enshrined in the 1996 Constitution are supposed to be limited within the parameters of the law. However, a reaction from the South African Police Services (SAPS) in handling public protests contradict the provisions of the Constitution in the sense that elements of brutality still prevail. This paper is conceptual in the sense that it evaluates and analyse the philosophical system of policing in South Africa from 1994 to 2014 in trying to establish whether there are positive developments or not in line with the spirit of the new democratically dispensation. The paper therefore conclude that the Community Policing philosophy is not positively working as an applicable model suitable for policing in a democratic South Africa and its current application retains the status quo of the apartheid-era police practice and therefore the country need to review its approach in policing and public order control.

INTRODUCTIONCommunity Policing in South Africa is known of a history of being brutal

and confrontational in approach to communities than using a problem solving approach in legal transgressions and providing community safety. The handling of the Sharpeville public protests which turned into a blood on 21 March 1960, white police in the town of Sharpeville and the students’ riots and uprising of 1976 characterised the South African Police Force as a brutal law enforcement agent

301


(Turok, 2008). The normal acceptable situation in the country therefore was that the police and the public are nothing other than formal enemies. When the African National Congress (ANC) took over the government in 1994 they committed themselves to the principle that South Africans are entitled to live safely, free from crime and violence (Hyasom, 2014:1) although the period preceding such was turbulence partly stirred by other grassroots formations intended to delay the democratic dispensation (Turok, 2008). It was agreed that this will be achieved through adoption of a system that should transform the policing approach used at the time by the South African Central government, homelands and self-governing territories. The philosophy adopted was therefore the Community Policing Philosophy aimed at fixing and strengthening the relationship and cooperation between police and citizens (Sadd & Grinc, 1996; Pelser, 1999:1-3), a move which up to so far does not prove to find expression in reality by failing to retain the image of police with the integrity that differs from those of the apartheid era in managing public order. Such phenomenally mirror to notion of a dictum “the more things change, the more they stay the same”. A major question for this paper is that: While Community Policing philosophy retains a similar status of perception of police by the communities, is there any alternative model for improvement beyond the status quo? The paper will keep the relevance of its discussion to the brief history of policing in South Africa, the concept Community Policing, the role of the South African policy in peace keeping, protection and safety provision and the handling of public protest in the new democratic South Africa.

THE ORIGIN OF POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICAThe South African Police Service as we know it today owes its origin to the

1902 Anglo-Boer War (South African History On-Line, 2014:1); however the official recorded date of establishment of the South African Police Force is 1 April 1913 (Brewer, 1994; Watson, 1999:16) after all forces of the Union of South Africa were united into one police force. Other sources traces the origin of the South African Police Services from the Dutch Watch, a paramilitary organisation formed by the settlers at the Cape Colony around 1655 as an attempt to protect themselves against attacks by the natives as well as maintaining law and order (Marais & Rauch, 1992; The Library of Congress of Country Studies, 2014:1). Before the war each of the colonies in South Africa had its own law enforcement agency. A united police force was formed in 1910 after the draft of the Union Bill and regulations drawn for the Union of South Africa. Theodorus Truter was appointed the first Police Commissioner of South African Union Police Force at the time (Watson, 1999: 21) who was later succeeded by IP de Villiers in 1928 as a renowned strict disciplinarian of the force.

By the end of 1911 the police force was restructured into two forces, namely; The South African Police (SAP) delegated to do normal police duties under the Police Act passed at the time, but would be conscripted under the Defence Force

M.P. Sebola



Act during time of war and the South African Mounted Rifle Men (SAMR) as an ordinary military force but will do normal policing duties in black areas during times of peace. It is very clear that from its origin the police force in South Africa was designed to fight lack of legal compliance in the country. Its activities are well known to have crushed the 1914 rebellion and the 1922 Rand Rebellion strike as well as active participation in World War 1 and 2. It is argued that from its formal establishment in 1913 and above those years the South African Police Force by world’s standard has far exceeded its functions by performing both civil and military functions at the same time (South African History Online, 2014:2). With the National Party winning the elections in 1948, the role of the police force was strengthened to go beyond the functions of law and order, investigation and prevention of crime to, to quell unrest and conduct counterinsurgency activities (Brewer, 1994; The library of Congress of Country Studies, 2014:2) through the enacting of the Police Act (No.7) of 1958. The Police Amendment Act (Act. No 70) of 1965 empowered the police to search without a warrant any person, receptacle, vehicle, aircraft, or premise within two kilometres of any border, and to seize anything found during such search. The search and seize zone was increased to ten kilometres in 1979, and to the entire country in 1983. The enactment of these two pieces of legislation which empowered and extended the police force functions was mainly meant to counteract the liberal opponents that were growing in a fast manner from both the sides of Black South Africans and Indians. From that perspective the South African Police Force existed for counteracting political opponents than overseeing and investigating crime. The South African Police Force because of its proximity to the communities through police stations had a favourable opportunity to locate and deal with opponents than the military battalions which operate only in borders of the country and outside the setting of the local people. Until today in post-apartheid South Africa and worldwide military operations remains far away from the people and the police stations are built closer to the local communities meant to protect and serve communities. Therefore a police force that serves as a watchdog of the country’s political eye is likely to perform both civil and military functions and therefore the country become a police state. That is basically how policing was characterised in South Africa post 1994. A need to change and adopt the new approach of serving the people than being confrontational with them was first articulated by former President de Klerk when he said” We want to take the police out of the political arena. We don’t want to use you again as instruments to reach certain political goals. We as politicians must take full responsibility for politics…This is the direction we are taking and I want you to make peace with this new line…”. From this perspective it could be argued that de Klerk being a realist politician of the time knew that the era of the minority rule is over and therefore was indeed preparing the South African Police Force members for integration into the community before the ANC take over. And in this context de Klerk’s message was indeed not directed to the black members of the force as such but preparing

303


his own people for a positive integration and accommodation into the new South Africa. It was known however that post-apartheid South Africa political leadership would need a police system that is community based, trusted and friendly towards the citizens. Marias and Rauch (1992) argued that it was indeed the rebuilding of the image of the police and the de-politicisation of the police force that became a major concern of the new South Africa. A major question of significance here is whether the adopted new philosophy of policing in South Africa could achieve those objectives of post-apartheid South Africa.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNITY POLICINGIn its transformation agenda of building a public image for the police in

South Africa, the government adopted the Community Policing Philosophy. This philosophy according to Anderson (n.d:1-2) and Rohe (n.d 1-2) refer to a typical policing approach/philosophy in which the police and the local communities are working together to deal and solve criminal activities of their areas (see also Sadd & Grinc, 1996; Maroga, 2003). It is however acknowledged by Skogan and Hartnett (1997) that the universally accepted definition of the concept community policing does not exists. This philosophy is similar to other approaches used by modern governments for development planning and management. It is a typical public participation model in which the community as affected citizens by crime can serve as a source of information and assistance to the police in investigating and solving crime. The conceptual confusion of this terminology is often associated with many other policing programmes undertaken as to whether they fit the definition as claimed. The Community Policing concept in South Africa according to Rakgoadi (1995:2) replaces “an illegitimate, highly millitarised police force by a more humane and people orientated police service”. From this purpose it becomes clear that the South African police will become a public service orientated agency that will operate on equal partnerships with the targeted citizens.

The Community policing should however not be viewed as an initiative of the South African government when adopted in the country in post-apartheid South Africa. South Africa responded like any other countries of the world in striving for police methods that will meet the modern community needs (Sadd & Grinc, 1996; Schwartz, Shurink & Stanz, 2007).The philosophy is indeed a philosophy that has been pioneered in the 1970’s and 80’s in other countries such as Australia, Unites States and the United Kingdom and France. Marx (1999) refers to “Community policing as a prominent philosophy of recent decades” therefore implying that it is an ideology of policing which is of recent origin which is attempting to transform policing activity with other government activities. In South Africa Community Policing have been accepted as an adopted operational philosophy of the South African Police Services and integrated into the Police Services Act (South Africa, n.d:2) for compliance by the South African policing authority and was therefore based on the following principles to be achieved through consultation:

M.P. Sebola



• Improvement of the delivery of policing- services to the community• Strengthening the relationship between the community and their police• Promote joint problem identification and problem-solving;• Ensure police accountability and transparency; and• Ensure consultation and proper communication between the police and

their clients.All of the above mandated principles of policing in the country come into one

conclusion; that is: the police must work with the community and they are given a mandate to convene the community and engage them in police activities. That may mean that the responsibility of public image building of the police rests in the police themselves. They have a responsibility to establish and co-ordinate in partnership with the community Policing forums. The initiatives as practiced are indeed seen as a solution to the long lasting enmity between the public and the police. To a larger extent in South Africa Community policing is seen as both a philosophy and an operational strategy.

THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE IN PEACE KEEPING, PROTECTION AND SAFETY PROVISION IN POST APARTHEIDThe South African Police force was already significantly transformed to a

police service before 1994 elections (The Library of Congress Country Studies, 2014:5). There were notable changes such as it characterised by representativity (non-racial), dedication to protection of rights of citizens and training programmes focusing on racial tolerance and human rights. The South African Police Services (SAPS) is mandated in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, Section 205(3), from now on to be referred to as the Constitution of 1996, to:

• Prevent and combat crime• Maintain law and order• Protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and• Uphold and enforce the lawFrom the above mandated constitutional mandates it becomes clear that the

functions of the police services are mostly community or civil orientated and distinguishes themselves from the previous para-military functions of the apartheid era. According to Sebola (2006:36) it is indeed the enactment of the two laws, the South African Police Act, 1995 and the SAPS Regulations and National orders that completely changed the role of the South African Police from para-military activities. The new role of the police in South Africa was heavily based on humanitarian approach which aimed at healing the historical rift between the police and the community. As mandated by the 1996 Constitution of the country, the South African police know that their role is most to protect the citizens’ rights with dignity against crime than humiliating them. As Marx (1999) indicated, in South Africa “public confidence in the police is dependent on public support for

305


the government which controls them, a condition which can only be achieved through political transformation”. The role of a police man in South Africa is not without challenges, especially those that have served both government orders (past and present). Even those that are serving the new order as the new recruits find the career of policing to be very challenging because even if they did not serve a previous force but they were privy to its activities that a policeman is a law enforcer who carries on his shoulder an authority that supersede the rights of citizens. It is therefore acknowledged that in performing their safety and security functions the police faces some challenges which some of them reflect the old motto of the police force being that of “We shall serve, protect and die for our beautiful South Africa”. In this case is a reference to be killed by the citizens they are trying to protect like in spreading cases where police men become victims. And ironically the response of the government of the day for a police man killed by criminals is said to be more sympathetic to criminals than when a criminal is killed by the police.

The SAPS is expected to adopt an apolitical approach in dealing with criminal activities and providing safety and protection of the citizens. Rakgoadi (1995) indicated that this is a juxtaposition of the successive regime in which the South African Police only served the purpose of imposing the ruler’s political ideology on the citizens. This has however been a disputed fact in post-apartheid South Africa that the police service is impartial. There are still sayings that the South African Police are a tool of political mandates and functions in post-apartheid South Africa. Marais and Rauch (1992:16-18) anticipated the following values for the SAPS:

• Upholding the law and democratic constitution;• Upholding the Bill of rights and protecting the rights granted to citizens;• Treating every citizen, in every encounter, with equal respect;• Caring about the communities quality of life;• Being accountable and accessible to the public;• Behaving in a professional manner with integrity and honesty; and• Prioritising human life and minimising the use of lethal force.From the above values if successfully implemented the policeman of the era is

supposed to know that his career means nothing other a sacrificial lamb of his own citizens. It is argued that one of the major challenges of modern policing is balancing both the rights of the police and the rights of the citizens of which phenomenally the rights of policeman are undermined due to the obligatory duty to protect. When members of the public are protesting legitimately that is constitutionally allowed (Martin, 2011:1), but when members of the same public become unruly and threatens the lives of the police on duty there emerge conflicts of rights individual members of the public and the police. The South African Police like all other police worldwide have taken a protective approach against the unruly citizens other than protecting them. When such happens the public and the government will take a stand to equate the modern South African Police Services to the same old saying of “murderers in uniform” (Nortjie, 2006), subjecting the current police service to the

M.P. Sebola



same old criteria of the old apartheid era. The challenges of policing in South Africa currently are many and not limited to corruption, unionism, political interferences and interventions. Benit-Gbaffou (2008) also noted that the Community policing philosophy has granted the community too much power and relations with the community to the extent that the police are able to get informers in the community with fewer efforts. That helps them to keep the crime level low.

PUBLIC PROTESTS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAPublic protest in South Africa is a Constitutional right and crushing the protesters

in a military form or use of maximum force is unconstitutional, especially if the crowd is not provocative. Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides South Africans with the right to peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions. However Section 36 of the Constitution imposes limit to those rights in terms of reasonable and justifiable circumstances of open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and considering relevant factors. It is acknowledged that during public protests there are many unintended consequences such as intimidations, assault against those with descending views about the protests and damage to properties. Prior to 1994 according to Marks and Fleming (2008) public order problems or controls were handled by the brutal responses of the Riot Units and the Internal Stability Units of the police force. The replacement of these units by the Public Order Policing (POP) was a correction of the use of brutal force to the use of a specialised force in policing that will maintain law and order while ensuring respect for human rights and dignity. The achievement of democracy in South Africa was never a guarantee that public protests are over- hence the need for protection and rights of public protesters.

The African National Congress (ANC) have always wished for a police service that will opt for the use of minimum force and value the life of the complaining citizens( Haysom, 2014:6). Unlike in the past where public protesters were militarily crushed by both the South African Police Force and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the new democracy provide a platform for protest at any time as long as it is non-violent and peaceful and is within the permissible legal limit. This platform on the other hand provides an opportunity for enemies of democracy to incite unnecessary protests characterised by violence and disorder. The most public disorder and protests recorded in our recent history are service delivery protests and xenophobic attacks launched against foreign nationals at street level (Tait & Marks, 2011) of the country. That in extent also exacerbated by complexities that emanate from such protests (Nkuna & Sebola, 2012) in that other elements takes advantage of service delivery to achieve ulterior motives. While the xenophobic attacks may be linked to competition for scarce resources of the country by locals and individuals of foreign descendants in South Africa (Sebola, 2008), there is no consensus as to legitimacy of service delivery protests that took place in

307


South Africa as other forces due hijack such protests to achieve other community related pathologies. Others link it to political opportunism although Tsheola (2008) dispute such assertions and argues that many authors and parliamentarians have affirmed the protests as legitimate. But even though the general are concerns may have legitimised public protest by the citizens the political executives such as the ANC General Secretary Gwede Mantashe have argued that most of the uprisings were coming from informal settlements where services were adequately provided as juxtaposed to communities that are found on the informal rural outskirts of the country with no basic services at all.

Public protests in South Africa are diverse and have many causes. They may have to do with political issues like service delivery problems, criminal issues like child and woman abuse, and cultural taboos like muti murders and serial killings and labour matters like salary pay hikes and improvement of working conditions and justice related causes like pleading for the system to be harsh on criminals especially during bail applications which is by itself a constitutional right. However these may not be the only sources of public disorder problems in the country, but they are the most common one in which there are recorded conflict with the policing system when the situation comes out of control. The police are expected from time to time in terms of the Constitution of 1996 to provide security and safety to the citizens and maintain law and order other than creating unsafe environment and disorder in the country. The unsafe conditions in public gatherings of South Africa like in any other country of the globe is not excluded from the manner of mischief of publicity stunt and circularisation of media reports( Veno & Veno, n.d:158-159). And often because of political influences the presence of police in public gatherings may fuel the behaviour of the protesters into becoming violent and confrontational. It may also be argued that despite the rebranded image of the South African police service in public gatherings, the community continues to view them as an armed force aimed at limiting their constitutional rights to demonstrate their interests and concerns to either the government or the employers. While it was never a guaranteed fact that the changed approach in South African policing system would allow free reign of criminal activities or to allow the society in public gatherings to limit other citizens’ rights, the image of the modern SAPS remain questionable as a democratic policing system. Its differentiation from the former apartheid police system of the country is difficult to make. That raises an important question for this paper: Did the community policing philosophy bring about positive developments in the South African policing environment?

ARE THERE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE COMMUNITY POLICING PHILOSOPHY?Either positive or negative developments of the Community Policing philosophy

of the South African police service will be considered from a relative perspective of argument. There are various positive developments which most of them are not

M.P. Sebola



materially important to the South African ordinary community members such as the changing of ranks and employment transformation which changed the service from being white dominated to the black majority domination after 1994. Some of these changes were however reversed such as community ranks given to the South African police officials to military rank type again. The positive transformation of this sector could have been achieved in many instances such as the fact that the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) has handled cases and popularises actions taken against police brutality in post-apartheid, while the successive government promoted that brutality. There could also be recorded negative development such as the fact that the soft-approach to crime through community policing philosophy could have increased the level of crime, and therefore causing political insecurity for the ruling party. With all these aforementioned examples it becomes difficult to argue that the Community Policing philosophy is working in South Africa and that military and confrontational approaches are not necessary in the SAPS. This paper argues that all what is seen in the SAPS is a back and forth movement that takes the post-apartheid South African image into the picture whenever there is police intervention in public protest and gatherings. The SAPS is indeed operating in military fashion of its predecessors. The following are good examples of failing philosophy of Community Policing; The Steve Tshwete Police militarisation approach, the Andries Tatane killing and the Marikana miners’ strike.

The Steve Tshwete Police militarisation approach?The appointment of Steve Tshwete in 1999 by the President Thabo Mbeki’s

government shifted a bit from the nature of a known Community Policing philosophy of crime in South Africa. According to South African Crime Stats (2014:7-8) he took an office when crime statistics in South Africa was very high. In his approach to whatever form of crime and the need to instil discipline and order in the country he is known to have said in threatening criminals in a Police public address:” I will be in your midst all time, in the rain, at night and where you are. I will not sit in my office like a doll. We are going to deal with criminals in the same way that a bull dog deals with a bull…when we are done, he or she will have been dealt with…we are going to give them hell because they are giving our people hell.” Tshwete’s approach to policing in the new South Africa which was already accused of being too friendly to disorder and lawlessness in the country was not different from speeches made by apartheid leaders in the force before. This may mean that there is a clear realisation by the post-apartheid South Africa that communising police is not a testable option. Van der Spuy & Rontsch (2008: 56-57) are of the opinion that South Africa is a high level rate crime country with limited resources in which the society should take responsibility of crime prevention. It is indeed that distance or lack of cooperation between the police and the community that conflict may emerge in which the police may take the offensive. It should also be understood that Tshwete’s tough stand on crime which may have been the cause of police remilitarisation approach in post-apartheid South Africa was

309


also influenced by the society’s complaint about the SAPS attitudes towards the rising level of criminal activities. A coercive and tough approach against dissidents as De Lint (2004:8) argues is dependent on the measured level of threat to the government of the day as well as the power of influence wielded by the dissident group. The Statement released by the Democratic Party in 2014 on the SAPS in the country is that it is the ANC’s 2009 political manifesto and the militarisation of the Police Officers rank in 2010 which brought about the police brutality in handling criminal issues of the country (Mfundisi, 2014:1). The ICD handled between 5 903 (2003/2004) and 5790(2004/2005) cases of police brutality under its mandate (Roux, 2005:115-116). It is clear that the community policing philosophy does not yield the expected results of the policing environment in South Africa leaving the police with little option except opting for the normal police duties of using maximum force in implementing the law.

The Andries Tatane killing (Military or Community Policing?)South Africa is arguably the most violent country in the globe with political

violence overshadowed by high level of other forms of criminal violence (Malaquias, 2011:3-4). From a South African perspective there is a correlation between other forms of criminal violence and political violence in the sense that most political violence originate from the police failure to handle to other forms of crime. For example the service delivery protests cannot be viewed outside the South African Police Service’s failure to handle the crime of corruption which leads to state organs failing to deliver service to the intended citizens. The police services failure to solve muti murder cases will lead to political violence at the end when communities take the law into their own hands. Pelser & Rauch( 2001:31 ) concludes that the Police System of the country after realising that their Policing strategy has failed by the perception of the public have decided to take a though stand on crime. And this tough stand as it is argued has given the current SAPS the branding of the old South African Police Force. The Andries Tatane story is one of the few recorded incident of police brutality in the post-apartheid era. According to Tait and Marks (2011) this is not the only case of police brutality in post-apartheid South Africa, but the story obtained a major media coverage it revealed a symbol of injustice, poor policing and lack of governments’ response to critical issues. It is argued that in a community policing environment in which well-trained police officials were handling that public order protest, community police officers would not have killed him. It was indeed understandable that Tatane had the right of public protest together with members of his community and his exchange of blows of fists with the police does not give the police a good image as law enforcers, especially if they allowed themselves to be a punching back of the civilians. But also the other argument is that he was provoked and hence was punching back. No matter the level of the integrity of the police service, where they not supposed to handle him in terms of the training they received on community policing principles of rights and dignity of human beings? If that is acceptable and only condemnable

M.P. Sebola



in public political briefings then what makes the community policing agents of the current government different from the South African Police force agents that killed Steve Biko in South Africa and the one that killed Anna Kakurukaze Mungunda (a Namibian women who sets a police van alight after police killed his only child and son in a public protests)? What becomes clear in all this argument is that whether a camouflage by Community Policing or not the philosophy believed to be in use is not workable for a South African environment where violent crimes are ranking high in the globe and closely linked to political violence.

The Marikana miners’ strike (Community Policing or Military?)The Marikana miners’ strike is one of the events of police brutality in South

Africa which has received international publicity. It is indeed one of the worse political trials of President Jacob Zuma and the first woman Police National Commissioner of the SAPS, Ria Phiyega, which happens coincidentally after Zuma’s lieutenant Julius Malema now his worst enemy was expelled from the ANC. Malema took advantage of the volatile situation and in his inciting public speeches to the striking miners of Marikana he advised them to make the mining industry ungovernable until nationalisation is achieved (Smith, 2012:3-5). Malema was later frog marched and barred from addressing the striking miners by the police. His rights to canvass politically in terms of the Constitution of 1996 were viewed as being infringed in terms of Section 19 (1 b-c). However, those rights are limited in terms of Section 16(1 b-c) on prohibiting incitement of violence and hatred. Even though the strike was claiming its source from wage demands and not being sanctioned by a recognised union, the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), the strike was indeed viewed from the perspective of the state as having the potential to threaten the political stability and there was dealt from a political perspective than economic. However the media reported little on police officials killed by the miners prior to the incident. Mail Online (2013:1) reported that police ordered in advance four mortuary vans and 4000 round ammunition, which can only tell that the massacre was premeditated, planned and expected.

Unlike the previous Riot units and Internal Stability Divisions of the former South African Police Force, the Public Order Policing unit of the current police service is said to be a skilled unit trained to deal with law and order in consideration of human rights. It is a skilful unit trained to control public gatherings in the interest of safety and security of the South Africans in which the approach is respect for human dignity and life preservation. As it emerges from this experience those that are supposed to protect life under the pretext of an adopted Community Policing Philosophy reacted with military action against the striking miners. Rauch (2004:2) noted that the apartheid police force existed to enforce unpopular laws and militarily crushed popular public protests. However most literature on the subject of policing in South Africa discredit the former apartheid police force practices, it remains difficult for an ordinary South African today to say that the SAPS is different when it comes to handling popular public protest. On the Marikana issue

311


President Zuma appointed the Farlam Commission to investigate the exact cause and determination of verdict. That is a standard political procedure done by all good and brutal political leaders of the country before him. All Presidents of South Africa did the same on Sharpeville massacre, the 1976 uprising and the old location uprising in Windhoek (Namibia). In all the circumstances the government clears the police of any blood on their hands. It remains difficult for one to claim that the philosophy of community policing in South Africa even though integrated into the Police Act of the country is applied to fit the policing needs of the society. Shaw (2000:27) noted that most of the policing strategies of the Republic of South Africa are borrowed from Europe and Northern America and applied without considering the differing conditions of history and governance of these countries. More often than not the policing strategy of the country however put emphasis on democratic principles but the realities of the practice that the citizen can see is that there is a little shift if any from the apartheid Police Force to the democratic Police Service of post-apartheid South Africa.

CONCLUSION This paper investigated the development of the post-apartheid community

policing strategy. As a conceptual paper one could argue that even though most post-apartheid literature on the subject of policing in South Africa condemned the apartheid SAPS and its practices especially on crushing popular public protest the practices of both the old and the new police force/service replicate each other. There is little evidence that suggests that the current police service is viewed positively by the citizens than their predecessors. What is clear is that the adoption of the Community Policing Philosophy is not quite compliant with the South African policing environment. The country should be clear of whether it takes the military route (heavily armed police force) or the Community Policing route (human centred and use of batons in controlling in public order).

LIST OF REFERENCESAnderson, J. n.d. Community Policing- Working Together to Prevent Crime. Australian

Institute of Criminology, Canberra, ACT, Australia. 2005. Accessed on <http://www.engagingcommunities2005.org/abstracts/Anderson-Jessica-final.pdf at 10/02/2014.

Benit-Gbaffou, C. 2008. Community Policing and Disputed Norms for Local Social Control in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg. Journal of Southern African Studies. 34(1). 93-109.

Brewer, J.D. 1994. Black and blue: policing in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

de Lint, W. 2004. Public Order Policing in Canada: An Analysis of Operations at Recent High Stakes Events. Ipperwash Inquiry.

Hyasom, F. 2014. Policing the Transition: Transforming the police. Accessed at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=252 on 12/02/2014.

M.P. Sebola


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationMail Online. 2013. South African Police ordered enough Mortuary Vans to Carry 32

Bodies Hours before Shooting Dead 34 Striking Miners, Inquiry Hears. Accessed at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/paper-2513189/Marikana-miners-strike-South-African-police-ordered-vans-carry-32-bodies-shooting-34.html on 15/02/2014.

Malaquias, A. 2011. Stress-Testing South Africa: The Tenuous Foundations of One of Africa’s Stable States. Africa Center for Strategic Studies Research Paper No. 3. Washington, D.C.

Marais, E. & Rauch, J. 1992. Policing South Africa: Reform and Prospects. Paper presented at IDASA conference at Van der Bijl Park. October 1992.

Martin, G. 2011. Minister of Police Affirms Importance of Public Order Policing Policy. Accessed at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=paper&id=19682:minister-of-police-affirms-importance-of-public-order-policing-policy&catid=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113 on 14/02/2014.

Maroga, M. 2003. Two Sides of the Same Coin? Sector policing and community policing forums. SA Crime Quarterly, 6: 13-16

Marx, G.T. 1999. Police and Democracy. Policing, Security and Democracy: Theory and Practice. 2. 1-11.

Marks, M. & Fleming, J. 2008. As Unremarkable as the Air they Breath? Reforming Police Management in South Africa. Sage: London.

Mfundisi, S. 2014. Statement on the South African Police Service. Accessed at http://www.ucdp.org.za/default?action=news&Id=285. On 15/02/2014

Nkuna N & Sebola M. 2012. Public administration theoretical discourse in South Africa and the developmental local government: A need to go beyond modern thinking. Journal of Public Administration, 47 (2)

Nortjie, S. M. 2006. The Metamorphosis of South Africa’s Public Order Police. PINS. 34. 57-59.

Pelser, E. 1999. The Challenges of Community Policing in South Africa. Accessed at www.communitypolice.co.za/challenges_of_community_policing.htm― on 15/02/2014.

Pelser, E. & Rauch, J. 2001. South Africa’s Criminal Justice System: Policy and Priorities. Paper presented at the South African Sociological Association (SASA) Annual Congress from 1-4 July 2001.

Rakgoadi, P.S. 1995. Community Policing and Governance. Research report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. July.

Rauch, J. 2004. Police Transformation and the South African TRC. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation: Johannesburg.

Rohe, W.R. n.d. Community Policing and Planning. Chapel Hill, N.C: The Center for Urban and Regional Studies.

Roux, T. 2005. South Africa: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law. Open Society Foundation for South Africa: Cape Town.

313

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationSadd, S & Grinc, R.M. 1996. Implementation Challenges in Community Policing

Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in Eight Cities. US Justice Department. Research in Brief.

Schwartz, G. J. Shurink, W.J & Stanz, K.J. 2007. Frontline Police Employees’ Social Construction of Client Service. SA Journal of Human Resource Management. 5(3). 38-47.

Sebola, M.S. 2006. The Nature and extent of collaboration between the police and the community police forums in the Polokwane policing area. Unpublished Master dissertation University of Limpopo.

Sebola, M.P 2008. Managing the provision of low cost housing in South Africa: Evaluating the access to habitable housing and the migration impact on housing delivery. Paper published in the Peer reviewed SAAPAM-G conference proceedings: 101-114, 31 May 2008.

Shaw, M. 2000. Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies. University of the Witwatersrand: Johannesburg.

Skogan, W.G & Hartnett, S. M. 1997. Community Policing: Chicago Style. Oxford University Press.

Smith, D. 2012. Marikana Mine Shooting Revive Bitter Days of Soweto and Sharpville. The Guardian. 07 September 2012.

South Africa, n.d. Manual on Community Policing (Policy, Framework and Guidelines). Government Printers: Pretoria.

South African Crime Stats. 2014. A timeline of Crime Statistics. Daily Maverick.

South African History On-Line, 2014. Accessed on http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/south-african-police-sap. On 136/02/2014.

Tait, S. & Marks, M. 2011. You Strike a Gathering, You Strike a Rock. S.A. Crime Quarterly. 38. 15-22.

The Library of Congress of Country Studies, 2014.

Tsheola, J.P. 2008. Theorising a Democratic Developmental State: Issues of Public Service Delivery Planning and Violent Protests in South Africa. Journal of Public Administration. 47(1). 161-179.

Turok, B. 2008. From the Freedom Charter to Polokwane: The Evolution of the ANC Economic Policy. Capetown. Picasso Headline Pty (Ltd)

Van der Spuy, E. & Rontsch, R. 2008. Police and crime prevention in Africa: a brief appraisal of structures, policies and practices. Thematic Analysis Report: Centre of Criminology.

Veno, A. and E. Veno (1993). “Situational Prevention of Public Disorder at the Australian Motorcycle Grand Prix.” In: R.V. Clarke (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, Vol I. Monsey, New York, NY: Criminal Justice. Press.

Watson, K. I. 1999. A History of the South African Police in Port Elizabeth: 1913-1956. Unpublished Doctoral thesis. Rhodes University.

M.P. Sebola



CRIME RATE IN AFRICA: TIME FOR AFRICAN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY

A.A. Olutola Faculty of HumanitiesTshwane University of Technology, South Africa

ABSTRACT

Criminological theory connotes the preposition of a theory for the scientific study of crime and possible solution to the menace of crime. The reality however, is that most criminological theories originates from scholars

outside Africa continent and those scholars naturally assumed that a general criminological theory will work for all. The purport of this paper is to deviate from the populist criminological theory and advocates for Afrocentric criminological theory. The paper adopts literature review with document analyses and concludes that there is no basis for a legitimate expectation that “Eurocentric or American-centric criminological theory(ies)” will produce the desire results in a distant Africa continent (in the global struggle against the menace of crime and or its prevention).

INTRODUCTIONThe central issue raised and discussed in this paper is the placement of

“Afrocentric(sm)” in the criminological theory of causation and solution to the menace of crime. The researcher contends herein that the universality in the applicability of criminological theory has not been proven by scholars beyond reasonable doubt. The ingenuity in this contention is in agreement with the statement of Wassertheil-Smoller (2004:1), in which it was asserted (and rightly too) that the medicine to produce health has to examine disease; and music to create harmony must investigate discord.

Although it can be deduced from Leon-Carrion and Ramos (2003:207) that criminality is part of human nature and that criminal behaviour is as omnipresent in developed countries as it is in the developing countries. This statement can be confirmed from the global crime statistics. Leon-Carrion and Ramos (supra) refer to the information from the Central Service of the Study of Crime of the French Ministry of the Interior, and note that France, Sweden and Belgium have the highest rates of reported sexual assault in Northern Europe. This same source of information reveals that Sweden has the highest homicide rate at 10.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, while Finland occupies the lowest ranking with 0.7 per 100,000 inhabitants.

315


CRIME IN SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES: NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICAThe type and nature of criminality or criminal behaviour tends to follow the

pattern of socio-economic development of a particular society. Aggressiveness, brutality, and high levels of criminality with deviant attitudes have been identified as common denominators of countries in transition (Kempa & Shearing, 2003:25). This probably further explains one of the reasons why societies (such as Nigeria and South Africa) with low level of political and economic developments experience an upsurge in the rate of violent crimes and politically motivated killings.

Kempa and Shearing (2003:25) note that high crime rates in some countries could be due to the difficult and uncontrollable nature of change in the formative stage of a new system of government, as well as to the dismantling of an anarchical security system put in place by a previous authoritarian government and the struggle to introduce equal socio-economic opportunities brought about by a new administration. Nigeria and South Africa are typical illustrations of the above scenarios. Nigeria was under the military junta for almost three decades (1966-1979 and 1983-1999) and whereas the Republic of South Africa was under the siege of apartheid system of government from 1948 to 1994. Apartheid was a system of government (laws and policies) of total racial segregation that began in 1948 when the National Party came to power and ended in 1994, when Nelson Mandela was elected President in the first democratic elections (Olagunju, 2008) and (SA: Online).

The statistics in paragraph two of this introductory paragraph suggests that those countries have lower crime rates than Nigeria and South Africa. However, every society needs strong and effective crime prevention and social control measures to maintain law and order, promote peace and harmony and secure the lives and properties of the inhabitants (Olutola, 2011). A society which cannot protect the lives and properties of its people is not worthy of their allegiance, and such will soon become a failed state and the consequences will be heinous.

In the Tables 1 below, the experience or the familiarity of crime in Nigeria has been demonstrated. The table shows that one out every three Nigerians has experience of one crime or another. Nigeria as a country has a population of approximately One Hundred and Sixty million people (courtesy of 2007 National population census). The country has Thirty Six States excluding the Federal capital Territory of Abuja. Each of the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory are equally represented in the Table 1 (below).

A.A. Olutola



Table 1: Experience of Crime in Nigeria in the year 2012 Source of information: Cleen foundation’s website: Available at: http://www.

cleen.org/pdf [Accessed: 3rd January, 2013]Nearly one out of every three Nigerians has experience of crime. Most affected

States are Kebbi, Ebonyi, Enugu and totality of Nigeria (in red). Table 2 below indicates the degree of the fear of crime in Nigeria. Specifically, it demonstrates fear of crime in each State of the Federation of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Fear of crime can be as a result of the perception that the services being rendered by the law enforcement agents especially the Police are inadequate and inequitable; the downplay of the maintenance of order by the police, whilst much emphasis is on crime statistics, when the citizens question the legitimacy of the Police service and when corruption manifests in the Police Service or when the Police service has a low status in the community (Peak and Glensor, 1996:14-15).

From Table 2 (below) one could not but agree that whatever criminological theory or criminal justice approach being used in that country is woefully failing.

317


Table 2: Fear of Crime in Nigeria (same period as in the Table 1 above)Source of information: Cleen foundation’s website: Available at: http://www.

cleen.org/pdf. [Accessed on: 3rd January, 2013]With a national average of 75%, fear of crime or becoming a victim of crime.

Fear of crime hs become pervasive in Nigeria with severe impact on quality of life.

Table 3: SOUTH AFRICA: SERIOUS CRIME RATIO PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION

PROVINCE 2003/4

Baseline

2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12

Eastern Cape 3780.0 3595.1 3300.7 3002.3 2929.8 2889.1 2806.2

Free State 4525.4 4399.4 4164.6 4108.8 4343.9

Gauteng 6645.5 5676.0 5633.8 4980.0 4576.1

Kwazulu Natal 3136.4 2882.8 2838.4 2731.3 2669.9

Limpopo 1955.8 1740.6 1750.3 1618.9 1873.3

Mpumalanga 3787.0 3501.9 3411.0 3180.9 3073.7

North West 3346.9 3106.6 3014.7 3105.5 3061.1

Northern Cape 4993.1 4188.4 4021.1 3819.4 3793.5

Western Cape 7297.7 6278.0 6334.1 6431.2 6601.9

RSA 4329.6 3922.7 3871.7 3679.9 3608.7

Source: South African Police Service’s website: www.saps.gov.za: Accessed 3rd January, 2013

Table 3 above indicates the occurrence of serious crime per 100,000 of the population per province and in the whole of the Republic of South Africa. This

A.A. Olutola



figure portrays an alarming situation of the frequent occurrence of serious crime over a period of nine years in South Africa. Serious crime categories according to the information available from the South African Police website include:

• Contact Crime: Murder, Attempted Murder, Sexual Offences, Assault GBH, Common Assault, Robbery Aggravating & Common Robbery

• Trio Crime: Carjacking, Robbery Residential &Business• Contact Related Crime: Arson, Malicious Damage to Property• Property Related Crime: Burglary Residential and Non-Residential, Theft of

Motor Vehicle/Cycle, Theft out of Motor Vehicle & Stock Theft• Crime Detected: Police Action– Illegal Possession of Firearm/ Ammunition,

Driving Under Influence & Drug Related• Other Serious Crime: Other Theft, Commercial Crime & ShopliftingThe above data correlates a recent South African newspaper report quoting the

country’s Minister of Correctional Services saying “South African has the highest prison population in Africa, ranked ninth in the world, with approximately 160,000 inmates…. The problem of over-crowding is a priority” (Mail & Guardian: February, 2013). Several reasons can be adduced for the disparities in crime statistics in different countries. Some of which are: (i) crime reporting, (ii) crime recording (iii) efficiency in the administration of the criminal justice systems (Waller & Sansfacon, 2000). Efforts by the criminal justice structures can play a role in crime control but not in the holistic crime prevention (Burger, 2005:310), See also Olutola (2011:271). Braithwaite (1989:133) notes that:

A criminal justice system cannot prescribe policies that will work to reduce crime; we (criminal justice) cannot in all honesty say that the societies spending more on criminological research get better criminal justice policies than those that spend little or nothing on criminology.

In the same token, the criminal justice funnel as enunciated by Ratcliffe (2008: 52-62) “shows that the criminal justice system is not well placed to respond to crime problem…for every 1,000 crimes, less than 8 per cent are detected, and less than 1 per cent of these crimes result in sentence”.

The question then is whether we can justifiably copy criminological theory from one society and paste in another society and expects it (the theory) to work? The simple answer is NO. Whilst in some countries, the citizenry have relative confidence in the law enforcement agents; the same cannot be said of Nigeria and South Africa (as shown in the Table 1, 2 and 3 above).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND GENERIC CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIESThere are colossal theoretical frameworks on why people commit crime.

Scholars will never agree as to why people commit crime. It all depends on the angle at which one is looking at the argument. Although this article is particularly

319


about advocating for the necessity of Afrocentric criminological theory, it needs to be reiterated that the menace of crime and corruption are antithetical to religion, gender and race. George Soros and Raghavan Srinivasan (2000) note that although most commentators on crime, corruption and “good governance” dwell on developing countries not industrialised ones, most call attention to the petty corruption of low-paid civil servants, not to the grand corruption of wealthy multinationals. Most focus on symptoms such as missing resources, not causes such as deregulation of state enterprises. Most talk about bribe-takers, not bribe-givers (George Soros and Raghavan Srinivasan, 2000).

Sutherland’s theory of differential association argues that human behaviour is learnt through interaction and involvement with people around us in our various societies and communities. Sutherland’s theory of differential association is based on the assumption that mal-behaviour or faulty thing is learnt rather than inherent or inborn (Bezuidenhout, 2011:144). Lipsey, Landenberger and Wilson (2007), note that inaccurate thought is an outstanding feature common in offenders. Holmqvist, Hill and Lang (2009), observe that aggression replacement training (ART) is a treatment is designed to reduce anger and violence and reduce setback in violent behaviour in individuals who are prone to criminal behaviour. The aggression replacement training has three components. Firstly, social skills training. This training is based on assumption that aggressive and violent people have skills deficits which is related to offending behaviour. Secondly, anger control training which is based on training to reduce impulses to behave with anger by increasing self-control. Thirdly, moral reasoning training, a program designed to raise offenders level of fairness, justice and concern with the needs to differentiate between what is right and what is wrong.

Another important criminological theory is ‘Biological foundation’. Cesare Lombroso, an Italian physician, is the father of biological explanation of causes of crime (Conley and Bennet, 2000:458-67). Lombroso opined that crime is caused not as a human choice, but by inherited and uncontrollable biological and psychological traits. Conley and Bennet (2000:458-67) asked: “Is Biology Destiny?” This argument was supported by Siegel and Sienna (2008:95) as they found that low-birth babies have been found to suffer poor educational achievement and academic deficiency and have also been linked to delinquency and drug abuse.

The above issue of the relationship between crime and biology was also confirmed in a study by Schauss (1980), who demonstrated the strong relationship between criminality, diet, crime and delinquency. Schauss shows that diet, toxic metals, food additives, insufficient nutrients, food allergy and lack of exercise can contribute to criminal behaviour. As a result of the above factors and to guide against continuous youth involvements in crime, Canada in the 1980s introduced and promoted an extensive good nutrition project among the Canadian youth, mostly through programs directed at the youth population and specifically at pregnant women (Schauss, 1980). Further, the bio-criminologists draw a relationship

A.A. Olutola



between brain activity and behaviour. In one of her works, Psychologist Diana Fishbein (2000:139-59) notes that persistent abnormality in the way the brain metabolises glucose could be linked to abuse – namely, the commission of a crime. In her bio-criminological study on the causes of crime, Fishbein (supra) focused on hypoglycaemia, a condition that occurs when blood glucose (sugar) falls below normal and impairs efficient brain functioning. Siegel and Sienna (2008:96) note that symptoms of hypoglycaemia include irritability, anxiety, depression, crying spells, headache, confusion and likely criminalities.

Another school of thought concerning the causes of crime in the society is offered by the Social Disorganisation Foundation. Hooley (1962:5) notes that the mass movement of people from rural to urban areas is destructive in nature as it causes frustrating experiences as a result of the social dislocation and disorganisation of individuals, resulting in criminal behaviour. A review of the migration and mobility in sub-Sahara Africa by the Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations in 2008 revealed that poverty forces people to migrate from rural to urban cities in Africa. The aforementioned study has shown that migration is seen predominantly in negative terms as it places pressure on urban areas, promotes the spread of crime and HIV/AIDS, stimulates land degradation and reinforces both urban and rural poverty (UNO, 2008). This rural-urban drift places a huge burden on the social and criminal justice institutions as they battle to cope with absolving the mass movement of citizens.

Literature review has revealed that the Sociological school is another generic school of thought on the causes of crime. Hope, a proponent of the Sociological School, opines that the weakening of family and of ethnic and community traditions is the root cause of crime (Hope, 1995:21). Van der Walt, Cronje and Smit (1994) refer to this as the ‘natural dimension’, which they further divide into ‘somatic’ and ‘subsistent’ dimensions. It is also the argument of eminent Criminologists of the Harvard School of law, that although war on poverty is desirable, parental love is not purchasable and cannot be replaced with an increase in wages. “You cannot make good parents out of bad ones simply by raising their incomes or moving them into new house” (Lewin, 1968:34). However, Critical Criminologists emphasise that money, power and political factors have direct links to criminal behaviour in the society. Siegel and Sienna (2008:112-113) note that the theft of an item worth five dollars by a poor person can be punished much more severely than the misappropriation of millions by a large corporation. It is further contended by Siegel and Sienna (supra) that the history of criminal sanctions worldwide has shown that those sanctions have responded to the needs of the wealthy and that the police, the court and the correctional agencies have almost always served as the tools of the powerful members of society, simply because people in government have control and direct the legal system. Unfortunately, this encourages criminality.

321


THE THEORY OF CAUSALITY AS IT RELATES TO THE CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY Causality theory presupposes the cause of events (or simply put what made

events occur). Two important theories of causality in Africa relevant to the criminological theory become apparent and require brief attention. This is because Hamminga (2005:28) notes that in the traditional African setting knowledge is not attained through labour but given by the ancestors. In other words, knowledge is not universal but local and tribal. This confirms further the argument in this paper that generic criminological theory cannot work for all? Hamminga (2005:28) posits that knowledge is passed from one generation to the next. In the conventional African setting no knowledge of reality exists if the individual is not connected to the mainstream (Nasseem, 2002:264). This is rekindled by the principles of Ubuntu (infra). African epistemology postulates that knowledge is the integration and cooperation of all human experiences, feelings, reasoning and integration. Nasseem (2002:264) warns that care must be taken not to present the African view as if it were a Western view, as the two are worlds apart.

Prior to the scramble for and the partitioning of the Africa continent by the colonialist in the first part of the nineteen century, the Nigeria nations had their respective traditional legal systems and the machinery for the administration of criminal justice. Chukkol (1988) notes:

Long before the white man set foot on Nigerian soil our various communities had a system of meting out punishments for wrong doings and many acts that we today call crimes were treated more or less the same by the early inhabitants of what is now the Nigerian nation. What our forefathers regarded as heinous conducts and deserving punishment remain more or less similarly regarded by us today.

Ibidapo-Obe (2005:39) observes that in the monarchical African traditional societies such as Igbo of Nigeria, the Nuer of Sudan and the Talensi of Ghana, a proposed idea or legislation (criminal justice legislation inclusive) will be passed into law after it has been meticulously discussed at the village square (Oha) on the principle of equal participation by the members of the community. However in today’s world, the criminal justice legislations in Nigeria and South Africa do not take cognisance of the traditional methods which explain how and why events occur. Although, the 1999 and the 1996 Constitutions of Nigeria and South Africa respectively recognise traditional institutions, but not to the extent of involving locals in the prosecution, adjudication and rehabilitation of offenders in the way and manner it was done in the traditional African society (before the scramble for and partitioning of Africa by the colonialists). The question that needs to be asked is; could it not be possible that criminality is thriving in Nigeria and South Africa because of the neglect of the African causality theory?

Additionally, Sogolo (2002:192) opines that in the traditional African thought,

A.A. Olutola



there are two basic theories of cause of events, namely mechanistic and non-mechanistic theories. According to Sogolo (2002:198), when a person is attacked by malaria as a result of a mosquito bite, a Westerner would attribute the malaria to the mosquito bite and sees a nexus between the bite and the malaria; in other words it would be seen as the mechanistic cause of event. Conversely, in the African non-mechanistic way of life, a person inflicted by malaria will dwell on thoughts such as: ‘Why should such a malaria attack be on me or my family, why not on another person or family?’ (Sogolo, 2002:198).

THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY IN AFRICADalgleish (2005) opines that, although in contemporary time, scholars have

done more than in any other period to advance African criminological writings, nevertheless, there is still much to be done. Thus it is important for African scholars to advance Africanisation of criminology and to shift from European and American theories of crime and its prevention. More so, relying on Eurocentric (European culture) and American-centric criminological theories in Africa will be tantamount to assessing and evaluating other cultures in a manner with which the latter would not necessarily agree. Commenting on the need for Africa (Nigeria and South Africa inclusive) to have indigenous criminal justice principles and concepts Ibidapo-Obe (2005:50) posits that Nigeria have tried the Westminster justice model, but it did not work; she tried the Washington model and it is failing. Although Nigeria is rich in models, it appears that nobody seems to study them. Ibidapo-Obe (2005:50) emphasises that African countries’ tendency to embrace foreign political culture and social control systems has been total, while their traditional institutions languish in the peripheries. It is pertinent to reiterate that Africa as a continent has unique way of doing things before the arrival of the British colonialist in 1816 in the Lagos protectorate of Nigeria or in 1806 in the Cape colony of South Africa. Suffice it to say that the idea being propagated today by the United Nations against the usage of death penalty is after all, not novel to the indigenous African society.

The imperial power truly brought into Africa (Nigeria and South Africa inclusive) among many other things; the new religion of Christianity and the common law principle of capital punishment. Most of the laws in the Nigeria statute book today including death penalty were inherited from the British. Hitherto to the arrival of the British in Nigeria in 1816, the Yoruba’s’ in the Western part of Nigeria practiced African Traditional Religion and consults the Odu-Ifa through Ifa priest; (a herbalist) in the same manner the Christian (the imperial religion) consults the priest or the pastor using Holy Bible. Maulana Karenga (1999: iii) notes:

the Odu Ifa is a corpus of sacred texts designed essentially to answer questions of human life through the process of divination. But as Awise Wande Abimbola has pointed out in his seminar works on Odu, they contain a wealth of knowledge and teachings in the realm of various

323


fields including, art, literature, medicine, history, religion and ethics.Bewaji, (2006:51) notes that the Yoruba’s in their indigenous culture believes

that all other rights a human being may have, emanates from right to life. The significant of the right to life much emphasised by the ‘human rights fighters’ today can be noticed from the Yoruba (West of Nigeria) adage as : “Emi loju” (‘life is sacred); Ba o ku ise ko tan (If we are not dead, we still have roles to play).

In the same sense, the Bantu people of Southern Africa prior to the arrival of the colonialist expressed their disgust against death penalty through the Ubuntu philosophy. Ubuntu is an African way of life that teaches us that there is a common bond between us as humans. That life is sacred and should not be taken away on the pretext of punishment. The Zulus in South Africa put it succinctly and say:

Umuntu Ng’muntu Ngabantu, which means that a person is a person through other persons.

The concept of Ubuntu cuts across Africa; though it is with different names but same philosophy. In Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), it is known as Unhu in the Shona language. Samkange (1980) noted that there are three maxims of Ubuntunism or Unhuism. First, it connotes that to be human is to recognise the humanity of others. Second, when one is faced with conflicting decisions of choosing between wealth and preservation of life, one must choose preservation of life and thirdly the leaders or the Kings owed their status to the will of the people under him. Notwithstanding the dominance of Americanisation and the Eurocentric bias of criminological theory, there is no doubt that the search for the causes of crime and the answer to criminality is a worldwide quest. Gibbons (1979: xiii) states:

The contemporary criminological enterprise is worldwide in scope. Relatively large numbers of persons are doing criminology in England, Germany, and a number of other European countries. Criminology is also flourishing in Australia...Canada, Japan... as well as in pockets in China, Pakistan, and various other countries of the world...

The appropriateness of the above quote becomes more real in view of the contemporary situation in Africa. In Africa, despite the introduction of the imperial criminal justice systems and generic criminological theories to the indigenous people of Nigeria and South Africa and the other African countries, the value of the traditional social control of these countries is subsisting. Okafo (2007:5) identifies a few reasons for this. One reason is the inefficiency of the English law and its judicial system in the African context. Secondly, the imposed English based common law and social control in Africa lack the foundation they enjoy in their native England and or Europe. Thirdly, African people take great pride in their culture.

Another reason is that indigenous African people desire swift, inexpensive justice. Contrary to this, the adversarial justice systems in Nigeria and South Africa that were imposed by the colonialist are based on the English common law system, which is expensive, time consuming and insensitive to the indigenous African

A.A. Olutola



culture. Criminal justice in Nigeria and South Africa is administered through their respective established imperial laws. A prominent source of law in Nigeria and South Africa is the common law which was inherited from the English law. This form of law requires legal representation in a court of law. It is directly opposite to the African people’s concept of a social control mechanism of swift, less expensive and culturally relevant social justice (Okafo, 2007:6).

The researcher concedes that, although it is not impossible, it will be an onerous task to develop a single criminological theory for Africa (Africa continent has an average fifty countries; consisting of not only Anglo-Franco both American and Portuguese colonies). Van der Merwe (1996:1-15) elaborates that plurality of cultures may deceive researchers to resort to absolutism or relativism in their assessment of other cultures. Absolutism might, on the one hand, rob a researcher of bias of criticism or being tagged as absolutist, whereas relativism on the other hand might preclude self-understanding of other cultures or their way of life (Van der Merwe, 1996:1-15).

In the traditional African society and before the arrival of the imperialists, the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of social vices such as crime were in the domain of the traditional leaders. Unfortunately, European scholars have not been fair to the African jurisprudence. For instance, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1946:21) note that Africans do not analyse their social system, but live it. Ayoade and Agbaje (1989:55), Ibidapo-Obe (2005:70) appraised the opinion expressed by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, arguing that they offer the extreme suggestion that Africans are thoughtless. Ayoade and Agbaje (1989:55), Ibidapo-Obe (2005:70) elaborate, claiming that the fact that Africans had developed institutions prior to the arrival of the colonialists’ means that anti-African scholars could not be right, as institutions cannot exist in vacuum. Agozino (2005: 119) reflects on the development of indigenous Africa’s criminological theories and emphasises that the colonialist intrusions and contaminations of the sophisticated, effective social control and criminal justice systems that existed in West Africa before the arrival of the imperialists, were nothing but a set-back to the development of the effective traditional criminal justice systems which existed prior to the arrival of the colonialists.

Okafo (2007:4) notes that the lifestyle of Nigerians and other Africans (including the majority of South Africans) seems to be fundamentally different from that of the English or other Europeans. Regrettably, the Nigerian and most other African governments in post-colonial Africa are pursuing social control - including control of criminal justice systems - that are consistent with the systems and techniques bestowed on them by the colonialists.

In reality, the English justice system is best suited to regulate and control the prevalent situation in England and its environments, and not in a faraway African nation with its different ideologies. The imperial system reflects imperial norms, and

325


not African norms. An average African who in any event is illiterate in the English language (Nigerians and South Africans inclusive), suffers from a confused (norm-less) condition in which the rules of conduct of the criminal justice official differ from those of his indigenous practices (Okafo, 2007:4). It is the humble opinion of the researcher (although contestable), that if Nigeria and other African countries have continued to apply their erstwhile indigenous criminal justice systems that are swift, inexpensive and require no legal representation, the administration of criminal justice in these two countries could possibly be more efficient than it is at present.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMOlutola (2011:17-18) notes that an excellent way to understand what is meant

by the term criminal justice is to give an holistic view of the term. In summary, it is better to view the term criminal justice as both a system and a process. As a system, criminal justice contains various components, whereas as a process, criminal justice involves stages. In other words, the combination of the efforts of the criminal justice institutions (components and structures) and the processes (procedures/decision making stages) through which an offender, the victim of an offence and the society will pass in a coordinated manner (when a suspect is suspected of having committed a crime or an offender has committed a crime) to ensure justice in the society, is known as the criminal justice system.

ADVERSARIAL AND INQUISITORIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMSSchmalleger (2002:739) notes that, there are two types of criminal justice

systems: The adversarial and the inquisitorial systems. Adversarial Criminal Justice systemAdversarial system can best be viewed as two opponents (The State vs. The

Accused) facing each other in a legal contest refereed by the judge. Justice is done under the adversarial criminal justice system when the most effective adversary is able to convince the judge or the jury that his or her perspective on the case is the correct version. Fairchild and Dammer (2001:140) compares adversarial criminal justice system to a game or contest in which both sides (The State and The Accused) are trying to win and a neutral umpire decides who wins. Ideally, the judges are supposed to act as umpire for both sides of the contest. This is unlike African traditional method of administration of justice but typical criminal justice system inherited under the common law by the colonies in Africa.

Recheil (2005:151) lists some of the advantages of adopting the adversarial criminal justice system; such as (i) the suspect has the rights to remain silent and presumed to be innocent of the offence charged (see sections 35(2) of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution and section 35(1) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic

A.A. Olutola



of South Africa (ii)the right to be free from unwarranted searches and arrest; (iii)the right to compel witnesses to appear for the defence; (iv) the right to confront ones accuser; (v)the right to appeal. The abovementioned advantages and other rules of criminal process in the adversarial criminal justice system help to keep the prosecutor from automatically wining a case. Nigeria, South Africa, America, Britain and most of the former British colonies in Africa practices the adversarial criminal justice system.

Reichel (2005: 151) identifies two safeguards of adversarial system: First, it uses cross examination to confront witness evidence (each side has a chance to question the truthfulness of the witnesses. Second, instead of granting power to a single actor in the administration of justice (all the participants: the prosecution, the defence, the judge and or the jury share the power). The prosecutor represents the State in trying to prove the guilt of the suspect. The Attorney to the suspect; attempts to argue the innocence of the suspect and ensures that the suspect has all the legal protection possible.

Inquisitorial criminal justice systemReichel (2002:130, 2005:168) opines that one of the first things necessary to

understand Inquisitorial criminal justice process is to separate it from the term Inquisition. The learned author stressed further that the Spanish Inquisition of the late fifteen century (1400-1499) was notorious for its use of torture to compel cooperation in its investigations. The only thing it had in common with today’s Inquisition process was the prominent role given to the judges. Abadinsky (1988) cited by Reichel (2002:130) notes that rather than competition between the opposing sides, a trial under inquisitorial system is more like a continuing investigation; (i) the parties in the case must provide all relevant evidence to the court (ii) the judges, not the attorneys for the parties call and actively examine the witnesses. (iii) In this way the Inquisitorial system assumes that the truth can be, in fact must be discovered in an investigation procedure. Erika and Dammer (2001:146) note that in the modern civil law systems, the Inquisitorial system refers not to any legacy of the Inquisition but to the extensive pretrial investigation and interrogations that are designed to ensure that no innocent person is brought to trial. Examples of the countries practicing Inquisitorial criminal system of justice include, France, Germany, China and Japan. Italy, as a civil law country changed its pretrial process in 1988, and its systems now follow or resemble common law procedures in many ways. However, the Italian calls its system “Process Perry Mason”.

Reichel (2005:150) summaries the differences between the inquisitorial and adversarial criminal justice process by asking four distinct questions :( i) who plays the role of the accuser? (ii) How is the truth determined? (iii) Where does power lie? (iv) What level of cooperation is expected of the defendant (accused)?

327


CONCLUSIONThe researcher will like to reiterate that most criminological theories focus

on what makes people ‘criminal’. The outcomes of literatures searched have alluded to distant reasons for criminalities, such as genetic make-up, child rearing practices, and psychological or social processes. These theories are difficult either to test or are of varying and sometimes questionable scientific validity; and yield ambiguous policy implications that are mostly beyond the power of the police and the criminal justice structures (Clarke and Eck, 2005). However, it is certain that whenever researchers (especially crime theorists in Africa) write, talk or analyse crime and solutions to crime, it is necessary to understand why criminals commit crime and what the benefits they seek to obtain. It is equally important in our quest to find solutions to the problem of criminalities in Africa, to take hints from Africa causality theory which elucidates the cause of events (or simply put what makes events occur). The causality theories (especially as applicable to Africa jurisprudence) as earlier enunciated in this paper must be well-thought-out. This is because knowledge is not always universal but could as well be fundamentally local and tribal.

LIST OF REFERENCESAgozino, B. (ed.). 2005. Crime criminology: post-colonial theory. African Journal of

Criminology and Justice Studies, 1(2).ISSN:1554-3897.Ayoade, J. & Agbaje, A. (eds.). 1989. In African traditional political thought and

institutions. Lagos: Centre for Black Arts and Civilisation.Bezuidenhout, C. 2011. A South African Perspective on Fundamental Criminology.

Cape Town PearsonBeraho, K. E. 2007. Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal Vol. 14 No.

3, pp. 254-266 .Available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1352-7606.htm. Accessed: 2nd August, 2013

Bewaji, T. 2006. In: Human Rights- A Philosophical Analysis of Indigenous Yoruba, Contemporary Nigerian and Universal Ideas. Retrieved on November 26th, 2007 from http://www.africaresource.com/conferences

Braithwaite, J. 1989. The state of criminology: theoretical decay or renaissance? Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology. 22:129-35.

Burger, F.J. 2005. A strategic perspective on the role of the police in combating crime. Unpublished Doctoral thesis. Pretoria: Tshwane University of Technology.

Chukkol, K.S. 1988. Law of Crimes, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press Ltd.Clarke, R. & Eck, J. 2005. Crime analysis for problem solvers in 60 small steps.

Washington DC: United States Department of Justice. [Online]. Available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1597 Accessed on 13th June 2010.

Cleen. 2012. Summary report of the crime and safety survey. In: Cleen Publications, Lagos, Nigeria. [Online]. Available at http://www.cleen.org Accessed on 3rd January, 2013

Conley, D. & Bennett, N. 2000. Is Biology destiny? Birth weight and life chances. American Sociological Review, 65(3):458-467.

Dalgleish, D. 2005. Pre-colonial criminal justice. West Africa: Eurocentric thought versus Afrocentric evidence. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 1(1).

A.A. Olutola


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationErika, F. & Dammer, H.R. 2000. Comparative criminal justice systems. 2nd ed.

California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.Fishbein, D. 2000. Neuropsychological function, drug abuse and violence: a

conceptual framework. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 27(2):139-159.Fortes, M. & Evans-Pritchard, E. (eds.). 1946. African political systems. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.George Soros and Raghavan Srinivasan. 2000. Briefing 19: Corruption, Privatisation

and Multinationals: The Corner House [Online] See: http://www.icaap.org./Cornerhouse Accessed 5th October, 2012.

George Soros and Raghavan Srinivasan. 2000. the Globalisation of Corruption. http://www.oecd.org//daf/nocorruption/faq.htm Accessed 5th October, 2012

Gibbons, D.C. 1979. The criminological enterprise. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pentice Hall.

Hamminga, B. (ed.). 2005. Epistemology from the African point of view. Poznan studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities, knowledge cultures - comparative Western and African epistemology. Amsterdam/New York. NY.

Hooley, C. 1962. Social organisation. New York: Shoken Books.Holmqvist, R., Hill, T., & Lang, A. (2009). Effects of Aggression Replacement Training

in Yong Offender Institutions. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. Vol 53 (1), page 74-92

Hope, T. 1995. Community crime prevention. In: M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington (eds.). Building a safer society: strategic approaches to crime prevention. Crime and Justice, 19. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ibidapo-Obe, A. 2005. A synthesis of African law. Lagos: Concept Publications.Karenga, M. (1999).Odu Ifa: The Ethical Teachings. Los Angeles, California. University

of Sakore Press.Kempa, M. & Shearing, C. 2003. Microscopic and macroscopic responses to

inequalities in the governance of security: respective experiments in South Africa and Northern Ireland. [Online]. Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/journal/tm/summary/v049/49.1Kemp.html:[Accessed on: 30 June 2010].

Leon-Carrion, J. & Javier Chacartegui Ramos, F. 2003. Blow to the head during development can predispose to violent criminal behaviour: rehabilitation of consequences of head injury is a measure for crime prevention. Brain injury, 17(3):207-216.

Lewin, S. 1968. Crime and its prevention, 40. New York: H.W.Wilson.Lipsey, M.W., Landenberger, N.A., and Wilson, S.J., (2007) Effects of Cognitive-

Behavioural Programs for Criminal Offenders. Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review. Retrieved from: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/docpdflipsey_cbt_finalreview.pdf. Accessed, 1st December, 2013.

Mail & Guardian. 2013. “Ndebele: SA has highest prison population in Africa.” February 11 page 1 [Online]. Available at http://mg.co.za Accessed on 12th February, 2013.

Nasseem, S.B. (Ed.). 2002. African heritage and contemporary life: philosophy from Africa. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nigeria. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abuja: Government Printer.

Okafo, N. 2007. Law enforcement in postcolonial Africa: interfacing indigenous and English policing in Nigeria. [Online]. No 7 from IPES. Available at: http://www.ipes.info[Accessed on: 13th October 2009].

Olagunju T. 2008. Nigeria in Africa: Foreign Policy and Areas of Cooperation. Volume 1, NO 1. In Journal of Africa Institute of South Africa (HE Olagunju Tunji is the former Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa).

329

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationOlutola, A.A. 2011. Crime prevention and the criminal justice systems of Nigeria and

South Africa: A comparative perspective. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis. Tshwane University of Technology. Pretoria. South Africa.

Peak, KJ. and Glensor.RW.1996. Community Policing and Problem Solving Strategies and Practices. Prentice Hall: New Jersey.

Ratcliffe, J. 2008. Intelligence-Led Policing. Willan Publishing. Devon.Reichel, P.L. 2002. Comparative criminal justice. 3rd ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice.Reichel, P.L. 2005. Comparative criminal justice. 4th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice.Samkange, S. & Samkange, T.M (1980) Hunhuism or Ubuntunism: A Zimbabwe

indigenous political philosophy. Salisbury [Harare]: Graham PublishingSchauss, A. 1980. Diet, crime and delinquency. USA: Parker-House.Schmalleger, F. 2005. Criminal justice today: an introductory text for the 21st Century.

8th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.Siegel, L.J. & Sienna, J.J. 2008. Introduction to criminal justice. 11th ed. USA:

Thomson Wadsworth.Sogolo, G. 2002. The concept of cause in African thought. Philosophy from Africa.

2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.South Africa. Online (nd.): http://overcomingapartheid.msu.ed [Accessed on 11th

February, 2013]South African Police Service. 2012 Annual Statistics. [Online]. Available at: http://

www.saps.gov.za. [Accessed on: 6th January 2013].South Africa. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria:

Government Printer.United Nations Organisation. 2008. Links between rural and urban development in

Africa and Asia. In: C. Tacoli (ed.). United Nations expert group meeting on population distribution, urbanisation, internal migration and development (UN/POP/EGM-URB/2008/9 ed.). New York: United Nations Secretariat.

Van der Merwe, W.L. 1996. African philosophy and the contextualisation of philosophy in a multi-cultural society. Ethical perspectives, 3(2):1-15.

Van der Walt, P.J., Cronje, G. & Smit, B.F. 1994. Criminology: an introduction. 3rd ed. Pretoria: HAUM.

Wassertheil-Smoller, S. 2004. Biostatistics and epidemiology: a primer for health and biomedical professionals. 3rd ed. New York: Springer.

A.A. Olutola



TURNOVER OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS: A FOCUS ON THE LIMPOPO PROVINCE

M.L. ShipalanaLimpopo Department of HealthK.G. PhagoTurfloop Graduate School of LeadershipUniversity of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

Turnover of health care professionals is a major global challenge where developing countries have largely bore the brunt of it. In particular, South Africa has also experienced this problem of the turnover within its hospitals

with dire consequences such as high vacancy rates as it has become increasingly difficult to fill these posts sustainably. This paper undertakes to consider key challenges such as a lack of clear understanding of the factors contributing to high turnover rate of health care professionals as well as the formulation of effective recruitment and retention interventions. In this regard then, the purpose of this paper is to analyse factors that contribute to turnover of health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital in Limpopo Province. In the process of analysing these factors, relevant quantitative methods and approaches were used to facilitate the undertaking of an empirical data. It is found that there are key factors which should be considered in effectively addressing these health care turnover problems in order to ensure that conditions for health care professionals are conducive for their retention within the South African health system.

INTRODUCTIONStaff turnover in the public health care institutions is a major concern due to the

fact that it affects the provision of the quality health care services, stability of services and the morale of the remaining employees. According to Wyss (2004:7), nearly half of all patients (46%) in State hospitals are HIV positive, and that nearly 29% of all deaths of health workers are attributable to AIDS. This situation is contributing to the workload of the health care professionals who are already overburdened and experiencing burnouts. In an attempt to bring an understanding and interpretation of the concept staff turnover, several explanations are taken into consideration. According to Wyss (2004:3), staff turnover takes place when employees terminate their service based on some of the following reasons: migrating to other countries, transfer from one institution to another, death, retirement, resignations or dismissals.

331


Ongori (2007:6) advises that employee turnover should be approached into three categories namely: sources of employee turnover or factors that contribute to staff turnover, effects of turnover in the public institution and the strategies that can be applied to minimise turnover. In this paper, factors underlying staff turnover, effects and strategies that may be applied to minimise staff turnover in the context of Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital are analysed. In further describing the understanding of turnover concept, a literature review is undertaken within this relevant context.

TURNOVER OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS: A LITERATURE REVIEWThere is a need to develop a clear understanding on the staff turnover

including factors that are contributing to turnover, effects and strategies that can be applied to reduce high turnover of health care professionals. Turnover among various public sectors may be as a result of factors including economic growth, multiple job opportunities, high demand of commodities and globalisation; and high competition in the local and global market (Ahmad and Riaz, 2011:58). It is necessary to note that health care professionals are regarded as the most important valuable assets in the public health care institutions due to the fact that quality health care services cannot be rendered without them. It is therefore, required that effective strategies be developed to reduce turnover of health care professionals.

In bringing the understanding and classification of the term “employee turnover” Nobilis (2011:2) defines “employee turnover” as the number of permanent employees leaving the public institution within the reported period versus the number of actual active permanent employees on the last day of the previous reported period (physical headcount). The number of leavers, that are included in the employee turnover, only includes natural turnover such as resignations, terminations, retirement, death, dismissals and transfers to other sectors. The number of leavers should be understood to be excluding any redundancies.

Baumann, Fisher, Blythe and Oreschina (2003) further distinguish turnover rate and vacancy rate by indicating that vacancy rate is a numerical value of vacant positions derived from the difference between budgeted and worked hours converted to full-time equivalent (FTE) vacancies. Meltz and Marzetti (2003) view “vacancy rate” as a proportion of all vacancies within an institution. In Ahmad and Riaz (2011:57), turnover is defined as the rotation of workers around the labour market; amongst public institutions, jobs and occupations; and between the states of employment and unemployment. Nel, Werner, Haasbroek, Poisat, Sono and Schultz (2008:583) agree with Abassi and Hollman (2002:49) and define turnover as the movement of employees in and outside the institutional boundaries. These scholars further distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable turnover. The former is concerned with having the ability to prevent the recurrence from within a public sector institution, while the latter is usually considered as being beyond

M.L. Shipalana & K.G. Phago



the public institution’s control. In a closer consideration of these two typologies of turnovers, both the internal environmental factors (such as) maybe attributable to the controlled turnover while external environmental factors (such as) are contributing to uncontrollable turnover.

According to Alam (2009:11), the health care profession is regarded as one of the noblest professions in the world. It is only natural that professional bodies as well as the general public expect health care professionals to demonstrate the highest standards of professionalism. Alam and Haque, (2010:4) agree and indicates that health care professionals are expected to adhere to the highest standards even in the face of such adversity as unfavourable job environment, poor conditions and low earnings that are also viewed as contributing factors to staff turnover. However, Khurram and Nemati (2010:6) argue that the major changes in demographics pattern, composition of the employment sector, consumerism coupled with declining moral standards are increasingly exerting pressure on health care professionals.

The study conducted by Ongori (2007) entitled “A review of the literature on employee turnover” Department of Management, University of Botswana examined the sources of employee turnover, effects and strategies to minimise employee turnover within public institutions. Ongori (2007:51) in his findings asserts that turnover rate in the public institutions is attributed by poor selection procedures and wage rates which produce earnings that are not competitive with other sectors. Ongori’s (2007:52) conclusion indicates that managers must continue to examine the sources of employee turnover and recommend the best options to fill the gaps in order to be in a position of retaining employees in the public institutions. While Ongori’s study provides the broader understanding of the sources of the employee turnover in the public institutions, it does not address the specific issues that affect health care professionals as indicated in this article.

A similar study was conducted by Mdindela (2009) entitled “Staff turnover at selected Government hospitals in Bhisho, Eastern Cape Province” in fulfilment the requirements for Master of Human Resource Management. The study examined factors that contribute to employee turnover and provided strategies that can be applied to minimise turnover rate. Mdindela (2009:134) in her findings indicates that health professionals are leaving the hospitals because of poor management, lack of career development, poor working conditions, workload and poor incentives. In highlighting strategies that can be used to minimise turnover, Mdindela (2009:36) argues that management must develop succession planning, implement flexible benefits to all health professionals, create climate of decision making and develop training programmes for health professionals. Considering efforts made by Mdindela in the building of knowledge, the study focused at selected hospitals and findings were based on the specific environment which may be similar with the situation within the Limpopo Province.

333


Another similar study was conducted by Vosloo (2009) entitled “Brain drain or brain gain of health care professionals in Limpopo” in fulfilment the requirements for Master of Business Administration. The study determined if migration of health care professionals is contributing to an imbalance and unequal distribution of health care service in rural and urban areas. Vosloo (2009:49) concludes that the retention and recruitment strategy does not have an effect in retaining the health care professionals. The study further outlines that health care professionals are leaving to other provinces or countries, because of high workload, inadequate remuneration and poor working conditions. While Vosloo provided major challenges faced by health professionals, the study focused at a single category of health care professionals which may not represent the views of other categories of health care professionals as it is the case in this article.

Khurram and Nemati (2010:71-83) in their study further argue that it is generally believed that health care professionals such as doctors are increasingly showing dissatisfaction with their jobs. Though medical doctors, unlike nurses, have achieved noticeable success in terms of career and finances, both (medical doctors and nurses) often remain overworked and stressed. As a result the frustration, anger and restlessness are taking a lead; and eventually they lose vision of their profession as well as personal ambitions. Murray, Montgomery, Chang, Rogers and Safran (2001) in their observe that a combination of workload, unsuitable working hours and a lack of incentives are the major contributing factors to the dissatisfaction of health care professionals and that eventually leads to high turnover rate. This assertion points to a correlation between burnout due to workload, job satisfaction and turnover. According to Zhang and Feng (2010) burnout is a comprehensive concept, first proposed in the clinical psychology. It is stemming from continuous work pressures that are not effectively handled and comprises the following three dimensions: emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation and reduced personal accomplishment. The study observes that the correlation between job satisfaction and burnout has been confirmed in health care institutions and further note that few dimensions of job satisfaction can significantly contribute to occupational burnout among health care professionals.

Stodel and Steward-Smith (2011:2) state that there has been a significant exodus of health professionals in South Africa. Their study shows that health care professionals tend to be young (under 42 years), male and not yet specialised. This exodus vastly increases the workload of the health professionals who remain in the public institutions. Stodel and Steward-Smith (2011) further indicate that unless sufficient emphasis is placed on the effects of burnout and other causes of medical migration, and attempts are made to mitigate them, South Africa will continue to lose doctors to the global labour market, ultimately resulting in detrimental standards of medical care. Hayes et al. (2006:43) add that high turnover affects the morale of nurses and doctors as well as productivity of those who remained to provide health care services in public hospitals.




It is clear from the literature that there is still a wider scope for scientific investigation of turnover of health care professionals to be undertaken since divergent views still exist in the understanding and interpreting what contribute to turnover of health care professionals. The underlying factors that contribute to turnover of health care professionals in public institutions are varied and pose major challenges. While these factors are influenced by the rapid change in the external and internal environment in the public institutions, there is a need to ensure that each health institution should undertake its situational analysis to consider relevant factors under its context.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND DATA COLLECTION In this article, quantitative research design is employed to obtain data for analysing

and measuring these factors that contribute to turnover of health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital. This methodological choice is also informed by the several researchers such as Vosloo (2009) and Mdindela (2009). Vosloo (2009) successfully used quantitative methods to investigate the question of brain drain and brain gain of Allied health care professionals in Limpopo Province. The study of Mdindela (2009) aptly considered quantitative research methods in analysing factors that cause staff turnover at selected government hospitals in the Eastern Cape. These two studies among many others provide some base for methodological choices and considerations of the relevance of quantitative methods in investigating a similar research problem of the factors contruibuting to the turnover of health care professionals.

In this regard, the self-administered questionnaires with closed-ended question were used to collect data from the respondents. The Four-Point and Five-Point Likert scale respectively, that allowed the respondents to indicate their responses on a weighted scale were applied. The questionnaire took approximately 30 minutes to be completed to ensure that the respondents were not strained. In this regard, collected data has been analysed by means of the selected technique or tool namely, Microsoft Excel programme.

SampleAccording to Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006:100) a sample is defined as

a subset of the whole population which is actually investigated by a researcher and whose characteristics may be generalised to the entire population depending on the type of sampling. In this article, a broader input was obtained from Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital in using a purposive sampling approach. The following table describes this sampling approach accordingly:

335

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationTable1: Purposive sampling approach

Occupational categories Total population % of the total population Sample size

Doctors 204 30.0 45

Professional Nurse 220 30.0 45

Allied Health Professionals 105 30.0 45

Pharmacist 30 10.0 15

Total 559 100.0 150

Source: (De Vos, 2005:196)

De Vos (2005:196) argues that 10% of the total sample population can be regarded as a representative sample. The total sample size of 150 in Table 1 above, which represents 26.8% of the total study population, could therefore be regarded as having some legitimacy in the generalisation of the findings to the entire target population.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS Presentation of the findings in the context of Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary

Hospital is done by means of Pie Charts in respect of the demographics and tables in respect of identified factors.

The demographics profile

Figure 1: Gender composition

Figure 1 indicates that the majority of respondents who took part in the study are females with 59.3% and males are at 40.7%. However, there is a balance with regard to gender participation and this played an important role in obtaining opinions from both males and females on the analysis of factors that are contributing to the turnover of health professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary




Hospital. Although, the findings are showing a balance of responses with regard to gender, the gap between females and males in the health institutions is attributed mainly to the nursing profession which is dominated by females who constitutes 70% of the total workforce.

Figure 2: Post title distribution

Figure 2 has involved various categories of health care professionals as respondents with 30.7% professional nurses and 30% of medical doctors. Pharmacists were at 29.3% and Allied Health Professionals at 10%. As earlier indicated, the statistics in the Department of Health shows that Professional Nurses are in the majority within the entire health care system in South Africa including Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital. However, the results reflected fair and inclusive representative of health care professionals in the sample characteristics of the population. This assisted researchers to obtain opinions of various health care professionals on the analysis of factors that are contributing to turnover of health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital.

Figure 4: Age group

337


Figure 4 has involved the respondents of various age groups. At least individuals ranging between 36 and 45 years are in the majority with 48% and followed by individuals ranging between 18 and 35 years that are classified in South Africa as youth with 30%. Individuals that are regarded as highly experienced are between the age of 46 and 55 years with 20.7% as respondents in the study. In this regard, the results determined as to whether the institution is able to attract and retain young health care professionals. However, the results show that Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital is unable to attract and retain young health care professionals. The results are consistent with opinion of Stodel and Stewart-Smith (2011) when indicating that public institutions are unable to attract and retain young health care professionals due to their high mobility tendencies.

Figure 6: Marital status

Figure 6 has involved respondents on various categories of marital status. The majority of respondents (68.7%) who participated in the study are married and followed by the respondents who are single with 28.7%. This assisted the researcher to obtain opinions from both married and unmarried respondents. The marital status also assists in determining the assumption of whether family responsibility could be one of the factors that contribute to turnover of health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationFigure 7: Years of service in the profession

Figure 7 has involved the respondent’s years of service in their profession. The largest group of these respondents were between 6 and 10 years of service in the profession with 39.33%; and followed by individuals ranging between 11 and 20 years with 30.7%. The years of service in this article also determine the stability of health care professionals in the health sector. According to data collected for this study, it is observed that there is a sufficient balance between the new entrance and the experienced health professionals.

Figure 8: Years of service at the current institutionFigure 8 has involved the individual’s years of service in their current institution.

The largest group of respondents, who took part in the study are ranging between 1 and 5 years with 49.3%; followed by those ranging between 6 and 10 years with 39.3%. This data indicates that the institution has difficulties in retaining health care professionals until they reach their retirement age. These observations in

339


this regard include the fact that since there are sufficient experienced health care professionals as indicated in figure 7, Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital successfully attracted such people with experiences. However, it is necessary to note that when these two figures (figure 7 and 8) are considered in the context of Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital, it shows significant mobility of these health care professionals as they tend not to stay in one institution for an extended period of time or until retirement. The results show that an average period that health care professionals have stayed at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital is 10 years.

Figure 9: Salary notch group

Figure 9 has involved the individual’s salary notch groups. The majority of the respondents who participated in the study, their salary notches are ranging between R300 000 and R499 000 with 56.7%; and followed by individuals ranging between R100 000 and R299 000 with 25.3%. The salary notches in the article help to determine whether the issue of salaries may be one of the key contributing factors for health care professionals to terminate their services. The results are consistent with the opinion of Vroom (1968:1) when indicates that employee’s motivation is usually an outcome of how much an individual wants a reward (Valence), the assessment of the likelihood that the effort will lead to expected performance (Expectancy) and the belief that the performance will lead to reward (Instrumentality).

FACTORS RELATED TO RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION Table 1 to Table 11 presents results indicating the frequency and percentage on

the importance of factors in recruiting and retaining health care professionals as presented hereunder:

Table 1: Residential accommodation for health care professionals




Scale Frequency Percentage

Totally unimportant 8 5.3

Unimportant 5 3.3

Important 43 28.7

Very important 94 62.7

Total 150 100.0

Table 1 indicates that majority (62.7%) of respondents are of the opinion that residential accommodation for health care professionals is regarded as a very important factor to attract and retain health care professionals at the institution and followed by those who indicated the residential accommodation for health care professionals as important factor with 28.7%. Although it is not an obligation for the public institutions to provide residential accommodation for public servants, however, this obligation is not applicable with regard to scarce skills such as health care professionals and also taking into consideration that Limpopo Province is rural and therefore provision of residential accommodation would serve as recruitment and retention incentives.

The results are consistent with the view of Ahmad and Riaz (2011:58) in their study when they indicate that provision of accommodation to health care professionals should be given priority in the public institutions. According to majority respondents in this article, it is evident that residential accommodation for health care professionals is a very important factor to attract and retain health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital.

Table 2: Salaries



Unimportant 1 0.7

Important 21 14.0


Total 150 100.0

Table 2 indicates that majority of respondents are of the opinion that salary is a very important factor to recruit and retain health care professionals in the institution with 81.3% and followed by the individuals who indicated salary as important factor with 14%. Mdindela (2009:134) in her findings indicates poor salaries as one of the factors that contribute to turnover of health care professionals. Although,

341


the introduction of occupational specific dispensation was aimed at improving the salaries of health care professional, it did not create competitive edge with other sectors. The results in this article reflect that health care professionals are regarding financial consideration as a very important factor in attracting and retaining health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary hospital.

Table 3: Career development



Unimportant 1 0.7

Important 29 19.3


Total 150 100.0

Table 3 indicates that the majority of respondents are of the opinion that career development is a very important factor to attract and retain health care professionals with 76.7% and followed by individuals who indicated career development as important factor with 19.3%. The results are consistent with the view of Mdindela (2009) who indicates that career development serves as a motivational factor to health care professionals and as a result, it plays a critical role in recruiting and retaining health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital.

Table 4: Leadership and management style



Unimportant 2 1.3

Important 25 16.7


Total 150 100.0

Table 4 indicates that the majority of respondents (79.3%) are of the opinion that leadership or management style in the institution play a very important role in recruiting and retaining health care professionals and followed by 16.7% individuals who are of the opinion that leadership or management style is an important factor in recruiting and retaining health care professionals. As Ongori (2007:49) states, public institutions that are experiencing instability due to poor management style and operations are having high degree of staff turnover (Ongori, 2007:49). The type of leadership or management style determines whether employees may be comfortable or uncomfortable at the Polokwane and Mankweng Hospital.

Table 5: Effective communication






Important 38 25.3

Unimportant 0 0


Total 150 100.0

Table 5 indicates the majority of respondents (71.4%) are of the opinion that effective commu-nication is one of the factors that plays a very important role in recruiting and retaining health care professionals in the institution. This opinion also confirmed by 25.3% of respondents who indicated effective communication as an important factor in recruiting and retaining health care professionals.

Table 6: Physical resources and equipment


Totally unim-portant 4 2.7

Unimportant 1 0.7

Important 23 15.3

Very import-ant 122 81.3

Total 150 100.0

Table 6 indicates the majority of respondents (81.4%) are of the opinion that allocation of physical resources or equipment plays a very important role in recruiting and retaining health care professionals. 15.3% of respondents from the data in this article supported by indicating physical resources or equipment as an important factor in recruiting and retaining health care professionals in the institution. Medical equipment at hospitals is an enabling tool for health care professionals to work effectively in saving the lives of their patients.

343


Table 7: Conducive working conditions

scale Frequency Percentage


Unimportant 3 2.0

Important 34 22.7


Total 150 100.0

Table 7 shows that the majority of respondents (74%) indicated that conducive working conditions is one of the factors that serves a very important role in recruiting and retaining health care professionals. 22.7% supported the opinion of conducive working conditions as recruitment and retention strategy for health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital. Safety and healthy environment are required to be taken into consideration in the health facilities to create conducive working environment due to the fact that patients are kept in the health facilities.

Table 8: Filling of posts to reduce workloads



Unimportant 2 1.3

Important 17 11.3


Total 150 100.0

Table 8 shows that the majority (84.7) of the respondents indicated that the

filling of vacant posts can play a very important role in reducing workload for health care professionals. 11.3% of the respondents viewed the filling of posts as an important factor in reducing the workload to health care professionals. The results are consistent with the study conducted by Vosloo (2009) when indicating that health care professionals are leaving to other provinces or countries, because of high workload, inadequate remuneration and poor working conditions. Department of Health Report (2011) and the MEC Budget Speech suggested that posts for health care professionals be filled to reduce the workload of health care professionals in the health institutions.




Table 9: Office space



Unimportant 4 2.7

Important 56 37.3


Total 150 100.0

Table 9 shows that the majority (58%) of the respondents indicated that the provision of the office space or consulting rooms serve a very important role to attract and retain health care professionals in the institution. 37% of the respondents indicated the provision of office space as an important factor. The importance of the office space or consulting rooms was also observed by the management of the institution when they introduced the revitalisation of the buildings in the institution which would also cover the improvement of office or consulting rooms.

Table 10: Entertainment facilities



Unimportant 15 10.0

Important 70 46.7


Total 150 100.0

Table 10 indicates that (46.7) of the respondents are of the opinion that provision of the entertainment areas in the institution plays an important role in attracting and retaining health care professionals. 40% of health care professionals pointed out that provision of entertainment areas in the institution are one of the most important factors that serve as a recruitment and retention strategy. The results were consistent with the revitalisation programme that the Department of Health in Limpopo Province has introduced in an attempt to improve health care facilities, including the entertainment facilities.

Table 11: Effective management of work outside the public service


345



Unimportant 8 5.3

Important 65 43.3


Total 150 100.0

The result show that the largest group (48.1) of the respondents were of the opinion that effective management of remuneration outside the public service is regarded as a very important factor to recruit and retain health professionals in the institution. 43.3% of the respondents regarded it as an important factor. The importance of effective management of remuneration outside the public service was also recognised by the Department of Health in Limpopo Province when introducing a policy in that regard.

GENERAL OVERALL OBSERVATIONS The overall observations in this article show that the identified factors that

contribute to turnover of health care professionals at Polokwane and Mankweng Tertiary Hospital are indeed the causes of staff turnover rate in the institution. The findings are consistent with literature as indicated by Mdindela (2009) that health care professionals are leaving the public institutions because of factors such as poor management, lack of career development, poor working conditions, workload and poor incentives. These observations are also in line with the study conducted by Murray, Montgomery, Chang, Rogers and Safran (2001) who state that the workload, unsuitably working conditions and lack of incentives are the major contributing factors to the dissatisfaction of health care professionals and that eventually leads to turnover of health care professionals.

CONCLUSIONIn this article, the respondents generally confirmed most of the factors as the

contributing factor of their dissatisfaction, with the exceptional of the remuneration of work outside the public service. The fact that any health care professional who is found to be engaged in the performance of work outside the public service for the purpose of remuneration without approval may face disciplinary actions, respondents may have been dishonest in their response. A further enquiry on this matter would require different instrument to ensure a valid and reliable data on this issue.

LIST OF REFERENCESAbassi, S.M. and Hollman, K.W. 2000. Turnover: The Real Bottom Line, Journal of

Public Personnel Management 29 (3): 333-342.Alam, G.M. 2009. The Role of Science and Technology Education at Network Age

Population for Sustainable Development of Bangladesh through Human Resource



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationAdvancement. Journal of Sci. Res. Essays 4(11): 1260-1270.

Alam, G.M. and Hoque, K.E. 2010. Who Gains from “Brain and Body Drain” Business. Developing/developed World or Individuals: A comparative Study between Skilled and Semi/unskilled Emigrants. African Journal of Business Management 4(4): 534-548.

Ahmad, T. and Riaz, A. 2011. Factors Affecting Turnover Intentions of Doctors in Public Medical Colleges and Hospitals, Interdisciplinary Journal of Research Business 3 (1): 167-192.

Baumann, A., Fisher, A., Blythe, J. and Oreschina, E. 2003. Vacancy Rate. A Proxy for Staffing Shortage. Nursing Effectiveness Utilization and Outcome Research Unit 5 (3): 35-66.

Baumann, A., Yan, J, Degelder, J. and Malikov, K. 2006. Retention Strategies for Nursing: A profile of four Countries. Journal of Health Human Resources Series 5 Nursing Health service Research Unit 10 (2): 101-133.

Baumann, A. 2010. The Impact of Turnover and the Benefits of Stability in theursing Workforce. Journal of International Council of Nurses. 11(3): 32-102.

Bhorat, H., Meyer, J. B. and Mlatsheni, C. 2002. Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries. Journal of International Labour Organisation. 33 (2): 52-56.

Bluedorn, A.C. 1982. A Unified Model of Turnover from Organisations. Journal of Human Relations. JAL Press, 35 (2): 135-153.

Bless, C., Higson-Smith, C. and Kagee, A. 2006. Fundamentals of Social Research: An African Perspective. Cape Town: Juta.

Charted Institute of Personnel and Developmen. 2010. Employee Turnover and Retention. Geneva, Switzerland.

Diallo, K. 2004. Data on the Migration of Health-care Workers: Bulletin of World Health Organisation: Geneva: Switzerland.

Dovlo, D. 2005. Wastage in the Health Workforce. Some Perspective from African Countries. Human Resources for Health: Geneva, Switzerland.

Droar, D (2006). Expectancy Theory of Motivation. Retrieved 17 February, 2012 from http//www.arrod.co.uk/archieve/concept-Vroon php.

Firth, L., Mellor, D.J., Moore K.A. and Loquet, C. 2007. How can Managers reduce Employee intention to quit? Journal of Management Psychology 19 (1): 27-38.

Forcier, M. B., Simoens, S., and Giuffrida, A. 2004. Impact, Regulation and Health Policy Implications of Physician Migration to OECD Countries. CITY: Human Resources for Health, Biomed Central Publishers.

Griffeth, R.W., Horn, P.W. and Gaetner, S. 2000. Meta-Analysis of Antecedents and Correlates of Employee Turnover: Update Moderator Tests and Research Implications. Journal of Management 26(3): 463-488.

Grobler, P.A, Warnick, S., Carrel, M.R., Elbert, N.F. and Hartfield, R.D. 2006. Human Resource Management in South Africa, 2nd edition. Uk, London: Cornwall Institute of Management.

Hayes, L.T, O’Brian, L.O., Duffield, C., Shamian, J., Nort, N. and Stone, P.W. (2006). Nurse turnover. A Literature Review, International Journal of Nursing Studies. 43 (2): 37-63.

Hesselhorn, H.M., Miller, B.H. and Tackerberg, P. 2005. Next Scientific Report July University of Wuppertal: Germany.

Holford, A.D., and Lovelace-Elmore, B. 2001. Applying the Principles of Human Motivation of Pharmaceutical Education. Journal of Pharm Teach. 54(2): 77-89.

Johnson, J., Griffeth, R.W. and Griffith, M. 2000. Factors Discrimination Functional Sales Force Turnover. Journal of Business. Ind. Marketing 15 (6): 399-415.

Jones, C.B. 2000. Staff Nurse Turnover Cost, Part 1, Conceptual Model. Journal of

347

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationNursing Administration 33 (3): 7-8.

Kalliath, T.J. and Beck, A. 2001. Is the path to burnout and turnover paved by a lack of supervisory support? A structural equations test, Journal of Psychology 30 (2) 432-438.

Kevin, M.M., Joan, L.C. and Andrian, J.W. 2004. “Organisational Change and Employee Turnover”. Journal of Personal Rev. 33(2) 71-83.

Khurram, K. and Nemati, A.R. 2010. Impact of Job Involvement on Employee Satisfaction: A Study based on Medical Doctors. African Journal of Business Management, 5 (6): 71-83.

Kumar, R. 2005. Research Methodology: A step-by-step guide for biginners. 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications.

Meaghan, S. and Nick, B. 2002. Voluntary turnover: Knowledge Management-Friend or Foe? Journal of Intellect. Cap. Inter-Asian Banality and Education 3(3): 303-322.

Meltz, N. and Marzetti, J. 1998. The Shortage of Nurses: An Analysis in Labour Market Context. Journal of Registered Nurses Association of Ontorio 46(5): 33-58.

Mdindela, S.V. 2009. Staff Turnover of Selected Government Hospitals. A case tudy: Business and Economics Sciences: Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

Murray, A., Montgomery, J.E., Rogers, W.H. and Safran, D.G. 2001. Doctors Discontent: Changes in Physicians Satisfaction. Journal of General Internal Medicine 34 (6): 451-459.

Nobilis, L. 2011. Employee turnover, Journal of Biz Development: Manage your Business Development. Amsterdam, 33 (2) 38-45

Ongori, H. 2007. A review of the literature on employee turnover: African Journal of Business Management. University of Botswana.

Pathman,D.E. and Konrad, T.R. 2002. Physician job satisfaction, job dissatisfaction and turnover. Journal of Family Practice 51(7): 593-598.

Price, J.L. 1977. The study of turnover, First Edition. Lower State University press.Reid, J. and McCormack, B. 2004. Practical Development. Journal of Clinical Nursing

13 (1): 30-36. Saks, A.M. 1996. The relationship between the amount of helpfulness of entry training

and work outcomes. Journal of Human Relations. 49 (4): 429-451.Stilwell, B., Diallo, K., Zurn, P., Vujicic, M., Adams, O. and Dal Poz, M. 2004.

Migration of Health-care workers from developing countries: strategic approaches to its management. Bulletin of the World Health Organisation: USA: Biomed Central Publishers.

Stodel, M.J. and Stewart-Smith, A. 2011. The influence of burnout on skills retention of junior doctors at Red Cross War Memorial Children Hospital: A case study. South African Medical Journal 101 (9): 604-620.

Vosloo, E. 2009. Brain Drain or Brain Gain of Allied Health Professionals in Limpopo. Management and Law. TGSL: University of Limpopo.

Vroom, V.H. 1968. Toward a Stochastic Model of Management Careers, Journal of Administrative Science Quarterly, School of Management. 13 (1): 26-46.

Weldman, J.D., Kelly, F., Aurora, S. and Smith, H.L. 2004. The Shocking cost of Turnover in Health Care. Health Care Management Review, Geneva, 29 (1): 2-7.

Wyss, K. 2004. An approach to Classifying Human Resources Constraints to Attaining Health-Related Millennium Development Goals. Basel, Switzerland.

Wiley, E. 2010. Diagnosis: Turnover. Independent Record Percent doctors turnover. Editorial matters. St. Peter’s Hospital. Journal of Human Relations 31 (9): 60-78.

Zhang, Y. and Feng, X. 2010. The relationship between job satisfactions, burnout



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationand turnover intention among physicians from urban state-owned medical institutions in Hubei, China: a cross-sectional study. Journal of BMC Health Services Research 70 (5): 77-79.

Zuber, A. 2001. A Career in Food Service Cons: High Turnover. Journal of Nation Restaurant News 35 (21): 147-148.

349


MANAGING THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

K.I. TheletsaneFaculty of Military Science

Stellenbosch University, South Africa

ABSTRACT

The history of policing in many countries, including South Africa, seems to be littered with cases of “things going wrong”, also referred to as “system failure”. While the apartheid state gained notoriety for its repressive use of

security forces, including the police, it seems that post-apartheid South Africa is not out of the woods yet. From Police Commissioners’ Jackie Selebi to Bheki Cele and from Bheki Cele to Riah Phiyega, experts on police have ceaselessly worried over one key problem during their term: how to control and manage the police who maintain that order. This is indeed a conundrum. Despite a glorified picture of crime statistics, the management of the South African Police Services remains a challenge. The police, unlike almost everyone else in South African society, are commissioned to use force, even deadly force. However, unlike other forces licensed to use force, such as prison warders and soldiers, police are not sequestered in prisons or on bases. Police do not operate in a group under close command and control, but are dispersed throughout society and over wide geographical spaces, both urban and rural. And as they patrol unsupervised, singly or in pairs, their power exposes them to mighty temptations. Police brutality is on the rise in South Africa. In the light of the current spate of this brutality, the management and leadership of the South African Police Service remain a challenge.

INTRODUCTIONThe role of the law in a society cannot be overemphasised. According to

Carpenter (1987:5), a state would not exist unless the community of people that lives in a specific geographically defined territory is subject to a legal order. Furthermore, an organised system of government that is able to uphold that legal order needs to be in place.

The management of the South African Police Services (SAPS) remains a challenge. Research shows that public trust in the SAPS is declining rapidly. This is because of the high level of crime, many cases of police brutality, corruption and a number of other things going wrong in the police force. The SAPS is under immense pressure from citizens and politicians, who constantly urge the police to

K.I. Theletsane



do something about drugs, crime and violence. Hampered by constricting criminal procedures, and at times by lack of resources, officers feel pressure to do what has to be done – that is to abuse their authority by settling matters with their own version of street justice.

In South Africa, the high level of crime and the role of the police continue to be the focus of debate and controversy. The continuing accusations of police inefficiency and ineffectiveness can only lead to desperation, despair and poor morale among police officials. Unlike the Defence Force and Correctional Services, who are also licensed to use force, they are not sequestered in bases or prisons. They do not operate in groups under command and control, but are dispersed throughout the country and are exposed to temptations. Managing a police department is a responsible and politically sensitive task which requires prudent leadership. Why do so many idealistic young men and women who enter policing turn against their organisation and citizens and tolerate corruption and brutality?

The history of policing in South Africa and elsewhere is littered with cases of “things going wrong”, sometimes known as “system failure”. These problems are among others police corruption, misconduct, death of prisoners in police custody and incompetence. System failure in any organisation acts as an important formative influence (Punch, 2003: 172-173). If one looks at the history of police reform in South Africa, and many other countries, it is evident that in many areas of institutional change and transformation, system failure played a critical part in those changes. Although system failure, by definition, carries with it negative inferences – of malpractice, under-performance, negligence, non-transparency, weak command and control and lack of an ethical ethos to mention but a few – it can also be a creative and productive force. System failure encourages, even demands, a period of reflection, review and investigation from policy makers, and from this can flow alternative ways of undertaking the business of policing. In short, when things go wrong, change and reform become necessary.

METHODOLOGYThis study is qualitative in nature and reflects elements of description.

Regarding the research methods, a literature review of appropriate primary and secondary sources containing authoritative publications, books, journals, the internet and official documents, such as departmental policies, was conducted to gather information. As a point of departure, a working definition for police and policing will be deployed and discussed against the backdrop of system failure in this particular field with South Africa as the unit of analysis.

DEFINING POLICE AND POLICINGFor the purpose of this study a definition of the concepts police and policing is

351


necessary. Internationally, it is recognised that there are clear differences between police and policing. The police are mainly a body of people patrolling public places in uniform, with a broad mandate to control crime, maintain law and order and to perform some negotiable social service functions (Morgan, Reiner, & Maguire, 1996:716). They are supplemented by non-uniformed colleagues, who are primarily concerned with the investigation of criminal offences and administrative tasks (Morgan, et al., 1996:716). Whereas policing refers to a set of processes with specific social functions and is a universal requirement of any social order, and may be carried out by a number of different processes and institutional arrangements.

McLaughlin, (2007:7) defines police as ... “generally; the arrangements made in all civilised countries to ensure that the inhabitants keep the peace and obey the law”. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000:892) defines police and policing as follows:

• police (noun): the organised civil force of a state, concerned with maintenance of law and order;

• police (verb): to regulate, control, or keep in order by means of a police or similar force; and

• policing (noun): the policies, techniques, and practice of a police force in keeping order, preventing crime.

Police and policing have been conflated over time, with historians and sociologists assuming that the two terms are synonymous (Johnston, 2002:4). However, the two are different as described by Francis, Davies, and Jupp (1997:5) that police refers to a particular kind of social institution, while policing implies a set of processes with specific social functions. Police are not found in every society, and police organisations and personnel can have a variety of shifting forms (Reiner, 2000:2-3). Policing, however, is arguably a necessity in any social order, which may be carried out by a number of different processes and institutional arrangements (Reiner, 2000:2-3) such as the metro police in the case of South Africa.

According to Francis, et al. (1997:5), the term police is also relatively new, whereas policing has a much longer historical pedigree. Francis et al., (1997:6), further describe police as “... a specialised body of people who are responsible for the use of legitimate force to safeguard security”.

Drawing upon the work of Francis et al. (1997:5-6) suggests a formulation inclusive of both police and policing which they believe will contribute to a better understanding of the two concepts: policing involves both “the creation of systems of surveillance” and “the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance” ... and may be carried out through a number of processes, of which the modern system of public police is but one example. It is increasingly evident that there is general agreement that the concept police, used as a noun, refers to the public police or “the organised civil force of a state concerned with maintenance of law and

K.I. Theletsane



order” (Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2000: 892). It is, however, the concept of policing that is becoming a contentious issue. Johnston (2002:4-6, 183-203), after discussing the history of policing, draws the conclusion that it entails more than what the public police do. According to Johnston “policing consists of a complex of connections between formal and substantive powers, and between private and public activities ...”.

The arguments in favour of a broader meaning of the concept policing are not convincing. It is, for example, debatable why the function of safety and security, when provided by private security companies, needs to be referred to as policing. It only adds to existing confusion regarding the concepts of police and policing. The researcher is in support of a more conservative or traditional interpretation of policing, to mean those functions performed by the police. In this sense, and for the purpose of this paper, it is proposed that policing be defined as “all those lawful activities, whether proactive or reactive, performed by the police in the process of providing their prescribed services such as reassuring the public; creating a visible deterrence; and executing their law enforcement, crime investigation and public order maintenance functions” (Burger, 2007:28).

DEFINING MANAGEMENTThe topic of this paper referred to “managing a police department” and this

necessitates that the researcher briefly define management. What does management mean? What do managers such Maria Ramos, Raymond Ackerman and Thuli Madonsela have in common? They get things done through their organisations. Managers create the conditions and environment that enable organisations to survive and thrive beyond the tenure of any specific or manager (Daft & Marcic, 2007:7). A key aspect of managing is recognising the role and importance of others.

Management theorists, Stoner and Freedman (1989:11), define management as the art of getting things done through other people. The word art means going beyond the classroom (theory) and practising management. Nelly, Gibson and Ivancevich, (1995:5) stated that the job of a manager is to give direction to the organisation, provide leadership, and decide how to use organisational resources to accomplish the organisation’s goal. Getting things done through people and other resources and providing leadership and direction, especially when things go wrong, are what the leadership of the police is expected to do. The leadership and management of the police must remain vigilant, especially in an organisation such as theirs, which is vulnerable to “things going wrong”.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKThe SAPS is mainly regulated by the following legislation and government

policies:

353

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationThe Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution)

is the supreme law of South Africa. Section 205 of the Constitution states that the objectives of the police service are to “prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law”. According to Section 207 of the Constitution, the National Commissioner must exercise control over and manage the police service in accordance with the national policing policy and the directions of the cabinet member responsible for policing. The Constitution implies that the Commissioner of Police is ultimately responsible for police actions while discharging their duties.

The Police Service Act (No. 68 of 1995)The South African Police Service Act provides for “the establishment,

organisation, regulation and control of the SAPS, and provides for matters in connection therewith”.

The preamble of the Police Service Act describes the functions of the SAPS as being to:

(a) ensure the safety and security of all persons and property in the national territory;

(b) uphold and safeguard the fundamental rights of every person as guaranteed by Chapter 3 of the Constitution;

(c) ensure cooperation between the Service and the communities it serves in the combating of crime; and

(d) reflect respect for victims of crime and an understanding of their needs.Undoubtedly, the focus of the police should be community oriented and be

based on the needs of communities. The Act, therefore, makes provision in Chapter 7 for direct input from communities through the introduction of community police forums and boards. Chapter 12 of the Act provides for the establishment of municipal and metropolitan police services.

White Paper on Safety and SecurityThe White Paper on Safety and Security was developed in 1997 and released

in 1998. It views the concept of safety and security in terms of two broad and interlocking components: policing or law enforcement, and crime prevention – particularly social crime prevention. The latter is aimed at undercutting the causes of crime. This twin approach to fighting crime is critical, the underlying principle being that law enforcement and crime prevention are not mutually exclusive but should reinforce each other.

SYSTEM FAILURE AND THE PUBLIC SECTORIn the past few years, the number of police officers killed on the streets of South

K.I. Theletsane



Africa has increased. The manner in which police leadership has responded, both to criticism of police policy and to the death of its own officers on the beat, has been aggressive. Thus far, it has only served to embed the image of SAPS brutality. The militaristic rankings of the police and the outspoken former Police Commissioner General Cele, who instructed his men to use maximum force (shoot to kill) and not to die with guns in their hands, have sparked concerns that the police are taking on a paramilitary role. Controversially, the police are allowed to use deadly force on a fleeing suspect. Public trust is diminishing and a police force that presents itself as a threat is not a true reflection of a progressive and democratic state.

Debate has raged around the “shoot to kill” legislation enacted in an amendment to Section 49 of the Constitution. A study by the University of North West declared that it “has brought South Africa into line with other law enforcement agencies and that it would survive any constitutional scrutiny” (Keebine-Sibanda & Sibanda, 2011). Others believe it has greater significance. The removal of the need for “immediate” threat in order to kill, has concerned de Vos, (2013). “David Bruce from the CSVR [Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation] believes that ‘reasonable grounds’ for suspicion are no basis upon which to make a life or death decision” (Farrel, 2011).

Following the death of many South Africans at the hands of the police during apartheid, such strong-arm tactics were condemned. Perhaps previous attempts to keep inquiries into police brutality in the present police force as internal affairs were prompted by the fear that such apartheid comparisons would be drawn. The SAPS is known for system failure or things going wrong and this is not unique to the police, but is the perception of the public sector as a whole.

It is not only in policing where system failure is experienced, and subsequently acts as a force for change and reform. Tragic events such as the fire at King’s Cross underground station in 1987 (Fennel, 1988:23) and the Paddington rail crash in 1999 (Crompton & Juppe, 2002:78) both stimulated fundamental reforms of the British public transport sector. Similarly, the crisis in the British food and agricultural industries in the 1990s associated with mad cow disease, had profound effects on subsequent policy making in those sectors and other sectors related to them (Forbes 2004:7). Public sector strikes, crises in education, corruption, service delivery protests, issuing of illegal passports and identity documents by Home Affairs officials and poor public financial management are some of the examples of system failure in the South African public sector. The field of public administration research is dedicated to the study of what Dunleavy (1995:15) calls “policy disasters” and Boin and t’Hart (2000:90) label “crises fiasco”. What these authors are advocating is that “policy disasters” can be an important stimulus for change and reform, or institutional renewal, in public sector institutions. System failure can offer a “window of opportunity” for reform (Keeler, 1993:44), creating conditions where change and reform become more possible and more likely than would otherwise have been the case (Cortell & Peterson, 1999:23).

355


Boin and t’Hart (2000:22) proposed a staged process by which crises within the public sector can lead to “institutional renewal”. First a stable and established policy sector is faced with problems, generated externally or internally, which seriously undermine the status quo in that sector. Secondly, as a result, the existing or traditional routines and procedures within that sector come under increasing scrutiny and criticism. Thirdly, the authority and legitimacy of policy makers within the sector are subsequently challenged and institutional crises ensue. In turn, this provides a “window of reform” where institutional change becomes possible, although not certain.

SYSTEM FAILURE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICESIn 1976 Sam Nzima’s photo of Hector Pieterson, a 12-year-old killed by police

bullets in the Soweto uprising, became an iconic image of apartheid brutality. On Wednesday, April 18, 2011, South Africa witnessed a comparable moment – the death of teacher and community activist Andries Tatane at the hands of six policemen during a service delivery protest, filmed and broadcast on television news and YouTube, caused a national outcry.

Around a week later a woman was allegedly shot dead by a police sergeant outside a police station. The circumstances around Jeannette Odendaal’s death remain unclear, but it seems that she was calling for help shortly before her death. In August 2012, 34 South African miners were killed in Marikana, which reminded South Africans of apartheid-type police action. On Thursday, February 28, 2013 the horrific video of a Daveyton taxi driver (Macea) being dragged behind a police van was the focus of international and local media; again a reminder of another incident in the early 1990s when a policeman brutalised an illegal immigrant by setting dogs on him. These are just a few incidents indicating system failure and police brutality in South Africa.

Clearly something has gone wrong here, but what follows this set of incidents depends on how the various actors respond to the problem, which may include actors on the national, and most importantly the political scene. This particular case of things going wrong might also be the beginning of something bigger. Public disorders in South Africa have a way of escalating to other parts of the country; they may also be part of what is starting to look like a pattern. When one starts to make connections between these incidents and others of their kind, one begins to construct a case showing that there is something systematically wrong with the police organisation and its relationship with the community (Baker, 2002:11). When things go wrong within the police, politicians demand some form of official enquiry into these incidents. A commission of enquiry may be ordered, chaired by an eminent judge and calling on evidence from those involved.

Once the commission releases the relevant report, policy makers might feel

K.I. Theletsane



obliged to act on its recommendations. This may be what is referred to as policy agenda setting, that is (Howlett & Ramesh, 201213) the process by which problems come to the attention of government. This illustrates the role of system failure in furthering change and reform in policing. System failure at the very least can serve to introduce or lend support to new agendas for change in policing (Savage, 2007:15). Therefore system failure can also be positive, as it may lead to positive policy change.

The police use force to make a number of arrests for possession of illegal substances and those arrested are placed in police vehicles in view of the community, who start shouting at the police, complaining that people in the area are being picked on by the police. More people come to the scene and missiles are thrown at the police officers and police vehicles. What seemed at one stage to be a relatively minor and specific police operation, has now escalated into a disaster such as the case of Marikana.

Although members of the police service are empowered by statute to use force in certain limited circumstances, this should only be resorted to where there is no other reasonable alternative of achieving the same objective without the use of force. In terms of section 13(3)(b) of the Police Service Act, a police official may use only the minimum force that is reasonable in the circumstances. Minimum force will, in most instances, mean no force at all. If there is a reasonable alternative way of achieving the objective without using force, this must be used. This principle is known as subsidiarity (Nel & Bezuidenhout 1997:194). Section 13(3)(b) of the Police Service Act provides that a member may only use force:

• while performing an official duty; • if authorised by law to use force; and• only the minimum force that is reasonable in the circumstances is used.• The use of a particular degree of force will be regarded as reasonable in the

circumstances only if the member has reasonable grounds to believe that:• the use of that degree of force is necessary in the circumstances to achieve

the objective; and• the effects the use of that degree of force could reasonably be expected to

have are proportional to the objective to be achieved.• A member will only be seen as having had reasonable grounds to form such

a belief if:• the member based his or her belief on facts that existed at the time;• the member honestly believed, in light of those facts, that the use of the

degree of force was necessary in the circumstances to achieve the objective; and that the

• effects the use of that degree of force were likely to have were proportional to the objective to be achieved.

357


VULNERABILITY TO POLICING TO SYSTEM FAILUREWhat are the systems failures which are mostly associated with policing? Failures

which are, in turn, most frequently associated with drivers for police reform? Each policy sector has its own particular configurations of stress points which, for the sector, provide most opportunities and vulnerabilities for “things going wrong”. For the health sector that might include the outbreak of infection in hospitals (Martin & Evans, 1984:3), like the outbreak of drug-resistant TB in South Africa; for the social welfare service this might include child abuse cases (Laming, 2003:11); for the education sector it might include violence at schools (Cullen, 1996:7); for the transport sector as one has seen, a major stress point lies with the crises associated with collisions and disasters. More closely associated with the police sector, it is evident that the prison sector, for example, is particularly vulnerable to failures surrounding prison disturbances (Carrabine, 2005:77) and escapes from prisons (Barker, 1998:89).

The police sector can be identified as particularly prone to “things going wrong” in the sense that policing carries with it inherent vulnerabilities to this phenomenon. Police work sometimes positions the police in highly sensitive and potentially volatile situations where, either as a result of their own activities or as a result of wider social problems and divisions, police intervention may provoke an outbreak of social disorder – a form of system failure in the policing context. The potential for public order problems is never that far from certain types of police work (Baker, 2002:86); when social disorder occurs, the police may be blamed for some or all of the problems. To add to this vulnerability, some police decisions, such as the use of force, have to be taken at short notice and with little opportunity for careful consideration and yet they may result in deaths and serious injuries to others or the police themselves. Therefore, such decisions may become the focus of intense scrutiny, with the potential of exposing a range of system failures in areas such as police training, supervision, management and communication, to mention but a few (Savage, 2007:15).

The involvement of police in such critical incidents, as consequences of their role, creates a unique propensity for the police sector to be vulnerable to “things going wrong”. Furthermore, policing is often undertaken in situations where public safety is at stake, and once public safety is compromised, police actions and decisions may be identified as causal factors (Savage, 2007:15). Perhaps the most notable example is the Marikana incident in 2012 when 34 miners were killed as result of police shooting and after which the police were to take much of the blame for the way in which crowd control was handled. Some of the excuses used were very much like those of the apartheid police: “They threw stones”, “there were armed protesters”. Afterwards some claims were made that some arms were put in the hands of, or near those, who were shot. If true, it seems that the current police have learnt lessons from the apartheid police.

K.I. Theletsane



In relation to the vulnerability to system failure associated with the police sector, it is in the area of corruption and police brutality where most of the attention has been concentrated; where most of the analysis of the linkage between system failure and police reform has been directed (Sherman, 1978:2; Dixon, 1999:10; Prenzler & Ransley, (2002:12; Newburn, 1999:98 & Punch, 2000:45).

Figure 1: Number of deaths in police custody and number of cases of mis-conduct by police members

Source: Republic of South Africa. Independent Complain Directorate. 2003/2004-2011/2012.

Pretoria: Governent Printer.

Figure 1 depicts the trend in respect of deaths in police custody and deaths as a result of police action from the 2003/2004 financial year to the 2011/12 financial year. The highest number of recorded deaths in police custody and as a result of police action was in 2010/2011, that is 1 276. The year with the lowest reported deaths was 2006/2007 with 621 cases. There is a slight decrease in 2011/2012 to 932 cases.

The number of cases of police misconduct remains relatively high. Although there is a decline between certain periods the differences are minimal. The financial year 2005/2006 saw the highest number of police misconduct cases (3 865). The decline in 2006/7 compared to 2005/6 was not significant, and there was no change in the number of misconduct cases in 2007/8 compared to 2006/7. Figure 1 is an indication of things going wrong in the police sector in South Africa.

359


CONCLUSIONMany things go wrong within the police service and as a result, public trust

can be damaged and the ability of the police to deliver fair and legitimate service can be destroyed. Things going wrong are not unique to the police, but also apply to many other government departments, but the police department is much more vulnerable than any other department. The police are not operating in close command and control like the defence force, and this makes it difficult to control them.

There is a clear linkage between system failure and reforms and thus system failure brings with it opportunities. The problems faced by the SAPS require political will and good leadership. The continuous accusations of inefficiency and ineffectiveness against the police can only lead to desperation, despair and low morale among police officials and can lead to public trust deteriorating further.

There is a problem in the public perception of the role of the police. For as long as the myth of the police being able to prevent crime is kept alive by the authorities and the media, the public will hold the police responsible for every failure to prevent crime. Everybody grew up with the belief that the police are there to prevent crime and, therefore, blaming the police is almost a natural or conditioned reaction. Since the dictum – that crime prevention is the primary function of the police – was laid down almost two centuries ago, it has become ingrained in statutes, in textbooks, in the mind of every police official, and in the minds of the public. Now, because of this conditioning, few people are prepared to look elsewhere for a solution or for alternative approaches, let alone for somebody else to take responsibility for crime prevention. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the debate and set in motion a process of rethinking and redefining the police’s role and, eventually, lead to fundamental changes to the outdated dictum about the responsibilities of the police vis-a-vis crime prevention.

From the above, one could conclude that there is a serious leadership challenge in the SAPS. Given the fact that problems in the SAPS remain the same year after year, one could also conclude that there is a lack of political will to deal with these challenges. In view of the above, it is proposed that the SAPS training philosophy focus more on educating members on ethics, and how to behave ethically in the public arena. The development of an ethics course for the SAPS could be a further topic for research.

LIST OF REFERENCESBaker, K. 2002. Public order policing, in Prenzler, T. & Ransley, J. (eds.) Police reform:

Building integrity. Sydney: Hawkins Press.Boin, A. & t’Hart, P. 2000. Institutional crises and reforms in the policy sectors, in

Wagenaar, H. (ed.) Government institutions: Effects, change and normative foundations. Boston: Kluwer.

Burger, J. 2007. Strategic Perspective on Crime and Policing in South Africa. Pretoria:

K.I. Theletsane


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationVan Schaik.

Carpenter, G. 1987. Introduction to South African constitutional law. Butterworths: Durban.

Carrabine, E. 2005. Prison riots, social order and the problem of legitimacy. British Journal of Criminology, 4:5, 6:69-88.

Cortell, A. & Peterson, A. 1999. Altered states: Explaining domestic institutional change. British Journal of Political Science, 29, 1.

Crompron, G. & Jupe, R. 2002. Delivering better transport? An evaluation of the ten-year for the railway industry. Public Money and Management, 22, 3.

Cullen, W. 1996. The public enquiry into the shooting at Dunblane Primary School. London: HMSO.

Daft, R.L. & Marcic, D. 2007. Management: The new workplace. New York: South Western.

De Vos, P. 2013. Police brutality and the killing of police officers in South Africa. Pretoria News, 21 January, 12.

Dixon, D. 1999. Corruption and reform: An introduction, in Dixon, D. (ed.) A culture of corruption: Changing an Australian police service. Sidney: Hawkins Press.

Donnelly, J.H., Gibson, J.L. & Ivangevich, J.M. 1995. Fundamentals of management. London: Irwin.

Dunleavy, P. 1995. Policy disasters: Explaining the UK’s record. Public Policy and Administration, 10, 2.

Farrel, D. 2011. South Africa’s police shoot to kill. [Online] Available http://thinkafricapress.com/south-africa/south-africas-police-shoot-kill. [Accessed: 2014-02-02].

Farrell, D. 2011. South Africa’s Police Shoot to Kill [Online] http://thinkafricapress.com/south-africa/south-africas-police-shoot-kill [Accessed 2014-02-02].

Fennel, D. 1988. Investigation into the King’s Cross fire. London: HMSO.Forbes, I. 2004. Making crisis out of a drama: The political analysis of the BSE policy

making in the United Kingdom. Political Studies, 52, 2.Francis, P., Davies, P. & Jupp, V. (eds.). 1997. Policing futures: The police, law

enforcement and the twenty first century. London: Macmillan Press.Howlett, M. & Ramesh, M. 2012. Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy

subsystems. London: Oxford University Press.Jodnston, L. 1992. The rebirth of private policing. London: Routledge.Johnston, L. 2002. Policing Britain: Risk, security, and governance. Harlow: Pearson.Keebine-Sibanda, M.T. & Sibanda, O.S. 2011. Use of deadly force by the South African

Police Services revisited. [Online] Available http://www.crisa.org.za/section_49.pdf [Accessed 2014-02-02].

Keeler, J. 1993. Opening windows for reform: Mandates, crises and extraordinary policy making. Comparative Political Studies, 25, 4.

Laming, L. 2003. Enquiry into the death of Victoria Climbie. London: HMSO.Martins, J. & Evans, D. 1984. Hospitals in trouble. Oxford: Blackwell.McLaughlin, E. 2007. The new policing. London: Sage.Metropolitan Police Service. Brief definition and history of policing. [Online] Available

http://wwwmet.police.uk/history/definition.htm. [Accessed: 2014-02-02].Morgan, R., Reiner, R. & Maguire, M. 1996. The Oxford handbook of criminology.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.Nel, F. & Bezuidenhout, J. (eds.). 1997. Policing and human rights. 2nd Ed. Juta:

Kenwyn.

361

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationNewburn, T. 1999. Understanding and preventing police corruption: Lessons from the

literature. London: Home Office.Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Prenzler, T. & Ransley, J. (eds.). 2002. Police reform: Building integrity. Sydney:

Hawkins Press.Punch, M. 2000. Police corruption and its prevention. European Journal of Criminal

Policy and Research, 8.Punch, M. 2003. Rotten orchards: Pestilence, police misconduct and system failure.

Policing and Society, 1392.Reiner, R. 2000. The Politics of the Police. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Republic of South Africa. 1995. The Police Service Act, 1995 (No. 68 of 1995).

Pretoria: Government Printers.Republic of South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.

Pretoria: Government Printers.Republic of South Africa. 1998. White Paper on Safety and Security. Pretoria:

Government Printers.Savage, S.P. 2007. Police reform: Process for change. London: Oxford University Press.Sherman, L. 1978. Scandal and reform: Controlling police corruption. Berkeley:

University of California Press.Stoner, J.A.F. & Freedman, R.E. 1989. Management. 4th Ed. Englewood Cliff: Prentice

Hall.

K.I. Theletsane



ETHICS COURSE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CURRICULUM

K.I. TheletsaneFaculty of Military ScienceStellenbosch University

ABSTRACT

Within liberal democratic countries, demands that ethics of public office be formally codified are becoming louder. Ethics committees are a growth in many organisations. Ethics education policies are in the

public sector are developed on an ad hoc basis, rather than drawn from any systematically considered ethical theory or embedded within any pragmatic, workable education programme. Many militaries around the world are setting a good example by implementing ethics programmes directly based on the work of academic philosophers and social scientists therefore public administration must follow. Philosophical principles around ethics programmes are, however, often very different schools of public administration and management. If the South African Public Administration curriculum in universities is to maintain its professional focus, certain valuable intellectual investigation must be sacrificed. One can hope that graduates in public administration already acquired a rich background in the liberal arts. But, one cannot demand extensive philosophical investigations from public administration students after starting their professional studies. To take political philosophy as part of a course in ethics will not be fair to the students or to philosophy itself. Therefore, academics must look elsewhere for the foundation of the course in ethics. This article outlines a method of integrating the study of ethics in the South African public administration curriculum.

INTRODUCTIONThe South African government is responsible to promote the democratic values

and principles enshrined in section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution), which will promote effective and efficient service delivery and the promotion of good governance. This requires all employees in the public sector to behave in an ethical, professional and accountable manner and perform their duties diligently and professionally. Ethics plays an important role in any public sector organisation. Unethical standards lead to negative consequences for the public sector where the public lose confidence on the public service. There is a demand within liberal democratic countries, to introduce ethics programmes in the public sector. The current state of public administration in

363


South Africa demand ethical programmes in universities’ curriculum. The purpose of this article is to propose a method of integrating the study of ethics in a public administration curriculum in South Africa. There are many ethical questions in the South African public sector such as corruption, arms deal and travel-gate scandal to mention but the few. It might be unwise to put too much emphasis on corruption and many other public administration ills in discussing future curriculum development. An obvious reason for this caution is that firstly most offenders in the travel-gate scandal and arms deal were either elected or politically appointed rather than career bureaucrats. Secondly, an undue emphasis upon the travel-gate scandal and arms deal will neglect the solid academic foundation for ethical reflection in this paper. Thirdly, there is a prudent counsel of Paul Appleby whose classic study, Morality and Administration in Democratic Government appeared at the night of Trauma scandals. Appleby (1952:56) assert that “crude wrong-doing is not a major, general problem of government” but that “further moral advance turns upon more complicated and elevated concerns”. The author suggests that incidents such as arms deal and travel-gate scandal be de-emphasised instead take administrative direction as the starting point of the debate. In stressing administrative discretion, a course in ethics can build upon principles that have been well established by political scientists and students of public administration.

The aim of this paper is to propose the introduction of ethics in the public administration curriculum in South Africa. The paper will start by defining public administration and ethics. It will further analyse the legislative framework in the South African public service and the importance of ethics in the PA curriculum will be emphasised.

METHODOLOGYThis study is qualitative in nature and reflects elements of description. The

concept of ethics and its relationship to public administration and management practice is explored. Regarding the research methods, a literature study of appropriate primary and secondary sources containing authoritative publications, books, journals, the internet and official documents, such as departmental policies, was conducted to gather information. Towards the end of the study the researcher reflects on ethics within the South African public administration. As a point of departure, public administration will be defined in the following section.

DEFINING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONThere is no general agreement on the definition of public administration in

literature and it seems that the most common practice is to define it by using examples (Theletsane, 2013:177). (P)public (A)administration has two components: the first being an academic discipline and the second being an activity. As an academic discipline, Public Administration is of fairly recent origin when compared to practice of public administration. Public Administration as an academic discipline

K.I. Theletsane



originated in the United States of America with the publication of an article in 1887 by the then President Woodrow Wilson, entitled “The study of administration” (Woll:1966). Wilson’s article has been interpreted by many scholars. Some insisted that Wilson originated the “politics/administration dichotomy“. This distinction between political activities in public organisations will continue to plaque the field for many years to come (Henry, 1999:26).

It appears that Wilson was well aware that public administration is inherently political in nature, and this is clear in his article. In reality Wilson could not come up with the meaning of public administration. Wilson failed to amplify what the study of administration actually entails, what the proper relationship should be between the administrative and political realms, and whether or not administrative study could ever become an abstract science akin to the natural science (Stillman, 1973:587). Nevertheless, Wilson unquestionably posited one explicit debate in his article that has a lasting impact on the field (Henry, 1999:26).

Wilson wanted the study of Public Administration to focus not only on the problems of personnel management, as many others former reformers of the time had advocated, but also on organisation and management in general. The reform movement of the time had an agenda that did not go beyond the abolition of the spoils system and the installation of a merit system. Wilson (1887:197) regarded civil service reform “as but a prelude to a fuller administrative reform,” and sought to push the concerns of public administration into investigations of the “organisation and methods of our government office” with a view towards determining “first, what government can properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do this proper things with the outmost possible efficiency and at the least possible costs either of money or energy.”

Since its origin the field of public administration, has been beleaguered by questions on its identity (Gabrielian, Yang & Spice, 2008:5). What is it all about, is it a science or art, is it a discipline or not? It is not the intention of this study to enter this debate. Public administration is so immense that there is no way to cover it all in one definition. Public administration is twofold – a field of study and a practice – and in the context of this paper it will be referred to as a practice and activity. Public administration deals with the nature and practice of government and the public sector (Venter & Landsburg, 2011:84). This entails the management and administration of, and interaction between, public institutions and other role players and stakeholders, as well as the accompanying dynamic processes (Shafritz, Russel, & Borick, 2009:14). Further components of public administration include the structuring, staffing, financing and control of the public sector and the formulation, implementation and reviewing of policy. In view of the above, public administration is very important and, as the resources within government are massive, it requires professionals who understand the importance of serving in government and performing their duties ethically. In the following section the term ethics will be defined.

365


ETHICS DEFINEDGenerally, ethics are ‘a set of principles, often defined as a code or system that

acts as guide to conduct’ (Lawton, 1999:299). Ethics are universal concepts at the core of human existence, which entail the notions of good and evil that are inherent in all communities (Singer 2011). In the most elementary sense, ethics refers to a set of values and rules that define right and wrong behaviour (Hellriegel, Jackson, Scolum, Staude, Amos, klopper, Louw & Oosthuizen, 2008:108). These values and rules indicate when behaviour is acceptable and when it is not. In broader sense ethics includes (a) distinguishing between facts and believe; (b) defining issues in the moral terms; and (c) applying moral principles to a situation.

Moral principles prescribe general rule of acceptable behaviour. They are of great importance to society and cannot be established or changed by the decisions of powerful individuals alone (Posner & Schmidt, 1987:384). Moral principles and the values they present are fundamental to ethics. Some moral principles concerning managerial and employee behaviour are widely shared but others not (Sims, 1994:83). There are four basic perspectives in which ethical values and decision can be evaluated.

Organisational practice and culture - The first force that shapes ethical conduct is the organisation’s practices and culture. To provide guidance for employees, an organisation can define ethical and unethical behaviour (Naidoo, 2002:10). The most fundamental informal source of guidance is top management’s behaviour, which demonstrates the ethical principle that is important to the organisation. Even with the same organisation, however, different departments may have different ethical subcultures (Webber, 1995:511). In other words, the behaviour of middle and lower-level managers can also send signals about what is considered ethical conduct.

Individual Perspective - The second force that shapes ethical conduct is individual perspectives. Individuals have their own values and sense of what is right and wrong. Helrieggel (2008:112) suggests that people develop morally, mush as they do physically from childhood to adulthood.

Societal Norms and Culture - The third force that shapes ethical conduct is society’s norms and culture. A large part of any view of what is ethical comes from the society in which the behaviour occurs (Disoloane, 2010:436). There seems to be growing disenchantment with the lack of ethical behaviour in general and with business ethics in particular. The view of what is ethical and legal change over time and changing societal views of ethical behaviour eventually result in new legal requirements. However before laws and government regulations change, government officials may take voluntary actions that reflect their values and beliefs, and their assessment of the public’s changing ethical stance.

Laws and regulations - The fourth force that shape ethical conduct is the

K.I. Theletsane



country’s laws and regulations. What a society interpret as ethical or unethical frequently end up being expressed in laws, government regulations, and court decisions. Laws are simply society’s values and standards that are enforceable in courts (Manyah, 2010:18). The challnge with laws is that the legality of actions and decisions does not necessarily make them ethical. In South Africa as part of laws and regulations, there are legislative frameworks that shape ethical conduct in the public service.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK SHAPING ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR In building an accountable and ethical public service, the democratically

elected government in South Africa introduced comprehensive legislations. These legislations are the foundation of ethical conduct in the South African public service. The first one is the Constitution which is the supreme law of the country.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa The Constitution lays the foundation for ethical behaviour in the South African

public sector by outlining the democratic values and principles guiding public administration. Section 195(a) of the Constitution states that “public administration must be accountable and a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted”. Therefore all public service employees are required to ensure that their actions are in line with the values and principles in public administration. It is through the Constitution that other bodies such as the Auditor General, Public Protector, and Public Service Commission were introduced. These institutions play varied roles in as far as anti-corruption is concerned and ensuring ethical behaviour within the public service (Manyaka, & Sebola, 2013:78).

The Public Service Act, Act No 103 of 1994The Public Service Act (Act No 103 of 1994) as amended is most important

piece of legislation in the public service. The Public Service Act aim to ensure effective and efficient performance within the public service and to promote values and principles of public administration as set out in the Constitution, throughout the public service. This Act a direct bearing on the behaviour and conduct of public servants as it seeks to promote high standards of ethical behaviour and further stipulates procedures to be followed when dealing with ineffective and inefficient officials (Manyaka, & Sebola, 2013:78).

Public Service Regulations, 2001In order to give practical effect to the relevant Constitutional provisions relating

to the public service, all employees are expected to comply with the Code of Conduct provided for in these public service regulations (Republic of South Africa, 2001). Compliance with this Code of Conduct can be expected to enhance professionalism and help to ensure confidence in the public service since the act serves as a guideline to employees in the public sector in terms of what is expected of them from an ethical point of view, both in their individual conduct and in their

367


relationship with others.The Public Finance Management Act, Act No 1 of 1999The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), (as amended by Act No. 29 of

1999) creates a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public service and advocate value for money in the procurement of gods and services. Public institutions can be judged in their ability to deliver services and goods and their accountability. Furthermore, the PFMA aim to improve accountability by requiring that managers take responsibility for their actions and achievement. The purpose of PFMA is to promote good financial management. The above legislations indicate the seriousness of the South African government in building a more ethical public administration. Further, to ensure the seriousness of government, the Public Service Commission was established to maintain a high standard of professional ethics through the public service.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONThe Public Service Commission (hereafter the Commission) is an independent

and impartial body mandated in terms of the Constitution to enhance excellence in governance within the public service by promoting a professional and ethical environment and adding value to a public administration that is accountable, equitable, efficient, effective, corruption-free and responsive to the needs of the people of South Africa (PSC, 2013:1). The Commission is responsible for Parliament with regard to the exercising and performance of its powers and functions.

WHY PUBLIC SECTOR ETHICSThose who are the carriers of the duties and obligations to provide us with

our legal and moral rights, freedoms and welfare are usually understood as the state or the public sector. The state is not only in the ethical theory of positive and conventional rights the foremost provider of rights and welfare, but the state is also the main provider of rights as understood by most people and in most circumstances (Amundsen & Andrade, 2009:8). In other words, negative duties are an obligation for everybody, whereas positive obligations are the duty of some particular group or institution, usually the state.

The public sector or the state is the government with all its ministries, departments, services, national, provincial, and local government, parastatal businesses and other institutions. The public sector is composed of two core elements; at the political level there are the political institutions where policies are formulated and the (major) decisions are made, and at the administrative level there is the public sector administration, which is in charge of implementing these policies and decisions (Cloete, 2012:14). The distinction between politics and administration is not entirely clear, however, because the administration also have quite some discretionary powers.

K.I. Theletsane



Public sector activities range from delivering social security, administering urban planning and organising national defence to the provision of health, schools and roads. In principle, there is no limit to what the state can do. There is, however, much debate on how much the state should intervene, like in the economic sectors and in the private life of their citizens. This is a political question, and the debate about the role and the size of the state and the public sector (as opposed to the private sector) is probably the single most important dividing line in political philosophy, with the socialists preferring greater state involvement, libertarians favouring only minimal state involvement (security and property protection), whereas conservatives and liberals are favouring state involvement in some aspects of the society but not others (Shafritz, Russel, & Borick, 2009:84).

Ethics is rarely a matter of concern in the ideology debate on the role of the state, but ethics is a natural concern in the discussion on the actual role of the politicians and the state administration ((Manyah, 2010:25). No matter how big and what role the state is playing (and supposed to be playing), both politicians and public servants have discretionary powers; they make decisions that affects a lot of people. Therefore, these decisions ought to be based on some form of ethics. For instance, the public (a nation’s citizens) will normally expect the country’s politicians and public servants to serve in the public interest, and to serve in a rational and efficient way. They will not want them to pursue narrow private, personal, or group interests.

Professional, public sector ethics of public servants and politicians are somewhat different from the personal ethics of individuals. In addition to the personal ethical values and principles of individuals (like respect for others, honesty, equality, fairness, etc.), the professional public servant faces another context and an additional set of values and principles. Although the public sector is a labyrinth of agencies with different tasks, reporting lines, levels of responsibility and ethical cultures, we are looking for these “universal” or basic principles of public service ((Manyah, 2010:27).

There are also some differences between public sector ethics and private sector (business) ethics. The aim of the private corporation or business is, in general, to make profit, whereas the public sector is meant to perform functions for the society as a whole, according to general and political priorities. For instance, a private company can choose to donate some of its profits to charity, but a public agency may be prohibited from such largesse with public funds (without a specific mandate to do so). The context is different, and the principles of operation between the public and business sectors differ.

According to Kinchin (2007:112), the ethics of public service is (should be) based on five basic virtues; fairness, transparency, responsibility, efficiency and no conflict of interest. There are, however, other principles in operation, and public servants face several dilemmas, for instance when the bureaucrats’ private ethics

369


collide with his professional public work ethics or organisational cultures.

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICEIt is the unique nature of public service that gives rise to ethical dilemmas which

are of concern to public servants today. There are certain features that distinguishes public service from the private sector which according to (Fleming & McNamee, 2005:141): (1) Services performed by the state are more urgent than those performed by private institutions, (2) Services performed by the state are semi-monopolistic in character, (3) The conduct of public services take place against relatively precise legal requirements, (4) Market price does not govern the supply of service, and (5) Much of the state’s business is conducted in the public eye.

Other consideration vital to the nature of the public service were outlined by Frederick, (1971:1-2) as: (1) Governmental decisions and behaviour impact with a great deal of influence upon the nature and development of society; (2) Many of the decisions and actions taken by government are determined by administrative officials who are appointed not elected; (3) the decisions and actions these officials take depend on their capabilities, orientations and their values; and (4) Attitudes of public officials are heavily dependent on their backgrounds, training and education and current associations.

Lack of understanding or even consideration of these special requirements and conditions inherent in the public service may be a contributing factor to most ethical debacles in the South African public service. Speculations can be raised as to whether the ethical debacles are a reflection of some dangerous trends developing within government, or a deterioration of the South African society.

What is required in South Africa is to develop ethical principles in line with ubuntu. South Africa has gone through transitional and evolutionary changes at all levels, along with those changes, new values are emerging, which justify a consideration of the ubuntu culture and values as necessary to the successful management of an organisation. The legitimacy of existing traditional Western type organisation hierarchies is critical, but their bureaucratical burdens can be eased by participative, democratic, leadership (Theletsane, 2012:365). The ethics of ubuntu suggest that all cultures have principles that can serve as a basis for re-emphasising the collective human rights and reinforcing the idea that these rights are inclusive and truly universal. In view of the above, the following section proposes an ethics course in Public Administration curriculum in the South African universities.

PROPOSED ETHICS COURSE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Through extensive discretion that bureaucrats enjoy in a modern administrative

state, they can be said to share in the governing process. To the extent that the bureaucrats govern in a democratic polity, they should somehow reflect the values of the people in whose name they govern (Stivers, 1994:366). This is an ethical

K.I. Theletsane



question. The ethical question is not only raised by the abuse of administrative questions but its simple existence as well. People responsible for performing these functions should therefore somehow respond to the values of the people. It is therefore important to include a course of ethics that will encourage reflection upon the values of the South African Society. In stressing reflection on values, the author does not intend to disparage the usefulness of governmental codes of ethics such as the Code of Conduct for the Public Services. However, their propriety as part of educational curriculum is questioned. It seems safe to say that education should aim more at inviting reflections than giving answers (Roh, 1976:405).

At the risk of making a broad generalisation, the author suggests that the principle academic foundation for ethical reflection come from political philosophy and human psychology. While any public administration curriculum that neglects these principles will be disadvantaged, the author does not believe that they provide a satisfactory foundation for a course in ethics. As far as political philosophy is concerned, the reason for questioning its propriety as the foundation for the study of ethics is that it is too demanding to be included as part of a course in ethics, (Cooper, 2001:395).

If a public administration curriculum is to maintain its professional focus; certain valuable intellectual investigations must be sacrificed. One can hope that graduates students in public administration programmes have already acquired a rich background in the liberal arts. It will be unfair to demand philosophical investigation from public administration students after they have started their professional studies. To settle for political philosophy as part of a course in ethics would not be fair to students and philosophy itself (Roh, 1976:405). As a result one needs to look elsewhere for a course in ethics.

As far as human psychology is concern, the main criticism is that it focuses upon the individual as a person rather than upon his/her chosen career. One cannot ask psychologists to take seriously the formal distinction between private and public (Cooper, 2001:396). When Maslow writes about a person who is “self-actualised,” it takes no difference if the person is a bureaucrat, a carpenter, a dentist, or an actor. The same is true for the six stages of moral development in Kohlberg. It is the individual person who is important in human psychology –not how he is employed, (Hellriegel, et al., 2008:208).

All morality is personal in the obvious sense that only persons are morally accountable, (Rohr, 1976:400). A person is morally accountable in different ways for different aspects of his life (Fleming & McNamee 2005:138). Family morality, business morality, sexual morality and political morality to mention but the few are all matters that concern individuals. The same man is a father, salesman, husband, and a citizen. That man might believe that cheating customers, beating his children, committing adultery and failing to pay tax are all morally reprehensible, but the reason for condemning all these forms of behaviour might be different. Human

371


psychology could be quite helpful in assisting an individual to integrate various roles he/she must play, but it is less helpful in raising specific questions pertaining to one of these roles (Kinchi, 2007:114).

As an alternative to political philosophy and human psychology, the author suggests that, since public administration students aspire for leadership positions within government, the values of that government are the most suitable starting point for their ethical reflection. This is true in a country like South Africa where bureaucrats are expected to take an oath to uphold the Constitution. An oath is an important moral event in the personal history of an individual and oath take an added significance pluralistic society like South Africa where there are myriad philosophical and religious starting points from which people derived their ethical norms. Since the Constitution is the preeminent symbol of the political values, an oath to uphold Constitution is a commitment to uphold the values of government (Preston, 1997:1320).

In arguing the normative character of values of government, the author avoids the more important question of the fundamental justice of the government itself. It is important that one distinguish between a government that is fundamentally just and one that is perfectly just. To achieve this one would require nothing less than a recapitulation of the history of political thought (Preston, 1997:1322). According to Gupta, (1995:380) the following questions might help to decide whether a particular government is fundamentally just: (1) what are the professed values of government? (2) are the professed values consistent with my personal values? (3) to what extent does the government achieve its professed values? and (4) to the extent that it falls short of its professed values and are there any corrective mechanisms that offer some hope of reform?

Before one asks how to reinforce the value of government one should first ask if the government is fundamentally just. That is, can a person be a good man/woman and a good citizen at the same time. This is an important question; however, it cannot be the focus of a course in ethics unless this course is simply to collapse in philosophy. To say the justice of government cannot be focused on the ethics course does not mean the question is ignored. One should not enter a career in government unless one is convinced that a government is fundamentally just (Preston, 1997:1322).

In view of the above, it can therefore be further proposed that a course in ethics should focus heavily on the principles of public administration in South Africa. The course should also focus on the African values such as Ubuntu. Recognition of ubuntu is a call to put our principles in action, to practice politics with principle; it is also a call to rebuild our societies upon the foundations of tolerance and equal access to resources for the improvement of our collective well-being. It is important to note that a course in ethics will not be a panacea for public sector problems but rather a mechanism to inform individuals intending to take up positions in the

K.I. Theletsane



public sector of ethical behaviour required of them. The challenge is that public administration curricula compose formal education

for only limited number of people. Other educative measures must be provided to accommodate those already in the public service. A course in ethics can also be expanded to other government institution such as Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA). Requiring that those in the public service attend courses on the ethics of public service; such courses would cover ethical conduct, accountability, the nature of checks and balances in government, and the relationship between career and non-career service, and separation between government and party. Those public administrators returning to universities for advanced degrees also offer some places where ethical education may take place. These educational effort maximise opportunities for conclusion that universities offer the best hope of making the professions safe for democracy (Singer, 2011:80).

CONCLUSIONThis paper proposed the integration of an ethics course in Public Administration

curriculum in South Africa. What is important is to create an environment where public servants accept the moral obligation to put themselves in touch with the values of government. An ethical public service requires public servants with qualities of mind and character arising from internalised value system. Inherent in those value systems is a clear concept of the public trust an appreciation of the unique obligation of the public service.

The public service in South Africa requires public servants with qualities of mind and character arising from internalised value systems. Inherent in those values systems are a clear concept of the public trust and an appreciation of the unique obligation of the public service. What process may be followed to instil such qualities of character within the public service? The answer lies in the education process of both people who choose to enter public service via professional preparation in public administration as well as those who enter prom professional specialisation outside government. Education for the public service is in a better position to teach ethics today than it has been previously.

This paper was not meant to criticise if any, but rather to propose the introduction of an ethics course in the South African public Administration curriculum. The introduction of ethics in the curriculum, either by schools of public administration and management or any accredited service provider such as PALAMA, remains of great importance. The course should incorporate the government public administration principles and values and the Ubuntu values.

Students of Public Administration must be provided with the tool to become effective public servants. If a foundation in ethics is neglected, a significant need has been overlooked. If an understanding of ethical considerations and a high commitment to moral behaviour is going to be a norm in the South African public

373


service, it is clear that various approaches must be taken. In order for individual values to be viable force for an ethical public service, rigorous efforts must be made to build and strengthen internal commitment to moral government. Only then can individual responsibility serve as the first line of defence against unethical behaviour.

LIST OF REFERENCESAppleby, P.H. 1952. Morality and Administration in Democratic Government. Baton

Rouge: LSU Press.Cloete, J.J.N. 2012. South African Public Administration. 10th ed. Revised and updated

by Thornhill. C. Pretoria: Van Schaik.Cooper, T.L. 2001, Big Questions in Administrative Ethics. Public Administration

Review, 64(4), 395-408.Disoloane, V.P.P. 2010. Enhancing ethical conduct in the South African public service.

Journal of Public Administration, 45 (3): 436-446.Fleming, S. & McNamee, M. 2005. The Ethics of Corporate Governance in Public

Sector Organisations. Public Management Review, 7(1):135-144.Gabrielian, V., Yang, K. & Spice, S. 2008. Qualitative research methods. In: Yang, K. &

Miller, G.J. (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in public administration. 2nd ed. New York: CRC Press.

Gupta, A. 1995. Blurred boundaries. The discourse of corruption, the culture of politics and the imagined state. American Ethnologist, 32(2):375-402.

Hellriegel, D., Jackson, S.E., Scolum, J., Staude, G., Amos, T., klopper, H.B., Louw, L. & Oosthuizen,T. 2008. Management third South African Edition. Goodwood: Oxford.

Henry, N. 1999. Public administration and public affairs. 7th ed. London: Prentice Hall.Kinchi, N. 2007. More than writing on a wall: Evaluating the Role that Code of Ethics

Play in Securing Accountability of Public Sector Decision-Makers. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(1):112-120.

Kinchin, N. 2007. More than writing on a wall: Evaluating the Role that Code of Ethics Play in Securing Accountability of Public Sector Decision-Makers. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(1):112-120.

Lawton, A. 1999. Ethics and Management in Rose, A. & Lawton, A. (Eds.), Public Services Management, Harlow, ET Prentice Hall.

Manyah, D. 2010. Ethics, ethical dilemmas and public service, Ottawa: Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management.

Manyaka, R.K. & Sebola, M.P.2013. Ethical training for effective anti-corruption systems in the South African public service. Journal of public administration, 48(1) 78-88.

Mosher, F.C. 1971. Democracy and the public service. New York: Oxford University Press.

Naidoo, R. 2002. Corporate Governance. Cape Town: Juta & co.Posner, B.Z. & Schmidt, W.H. 1987. Ethics in American companies: A managerial

perspective. Journal of business ethics, 6(383-391). Preston, N. 1997. Institutionalising Ethics in the Queensland Public Sector: Discussion

of Research into Ethics Education for Public Officials. International Journal of Public Administration, 20(7):1317-1340.

Republic of South Africa 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa 1999. The Public Finance Management Act, Act NO 1 of

K.I. Theletsane


Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administration1999. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa 1999. The public service Act, Act No 103 of 1994. Pretoria: Government Printers

Republic of South Africa 2001. The public service regulations. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Roh, J.A. 1976. The study of ethics. Public administration review, 4(398-406).Shafritz, J.M., Russel, E.W., & Borick, C.P. 2009. Introducing public administration.

New York: Pearson Longman.Sims,R.R. 1994. Ethics and organisational decision making. Wesport Conn: Quorum

Books.Singer, P. 2011. Practical Ethics (3rd ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.South Africa (Republic). 2013. Department of Public Service and Administration.

Public Service Commission Annual Report 2011\2012. Pretoria: Government PrinterStillman, R.J. 1973. A new look at an old essay. American Political Science Review.

67:587-566.Stivers, C. 1994. The listening bureaucrat: Responsiveness in public administration.

Public Administration Review, 54(4): 364•370.Theletsane, K.I. 2012. Ubuntu Management Approach and Service Delivery. Journal of

Public Administration, 47(1.1):265-278.Theletsane, K.I. 2013. The South African Public Administration as a Profession. Journal

of public administration, 48(1):175-187.Venter, A. & Landberg, C. 2011. Government and politics in South Africa. 4th ed.

Pretoria: Van Schaik. Webber, J. 1995. Influence upon organisational ethical sublimates. Organisation

Science, 509-523.Wilson, W. 1887. The study of administration: Political Science Quarterly, 2(2):197-

222.Woll, P. 1966. Public administration and policy. New York: Harper & Row Publisher.

375


SOUTH AFRICA’S TWENTY YEARS OF “CIVILIZING MISSIONS” FOR AFRICA: FADED CONTINENTAL POSTURE

AND AGENDAJ.P. Tsheola & T. Lukhele

Department of Development Planning & ManagementUniversity of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

This article uses the nuance imperial paradigm to examine South Africa’s twenty years of conduct of international relations to demonstrate that this country’s continental “civilizing missions” have faded over time as it

drifted towards extraterritorial non-state global actor, BRICS. There is a growing search for nuance paradigm for the conceptualisation of the emerging global settings wherein the conduct of the USA, China, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Russia resembles the “geopolitical self-imaginary” of contemporary empires. The resurgence of imperial paradigm seeks to make for inadequacies of the concepts of global or pivotal states, great powers and hegemons in explaining governance of contemporary international relations. For example, the Al-Qaeda polity became a global actor shaping governance of international relations virtually overnight, post-9/11. Concepts of states, great powers and hegemonies are criticised for not accounting for the roles played by “pride, glory, morality or religious zeal” in international relations. Conversely, empires are conspicuous by their “civilizing missions”, which account for analysis of moral and ideological aspects in international relations. Together with their “geopolitical self-imaginary”, “civilizing missions” are recognized for giving purpose and moral meanings to imperial policies in extremes of guises such as global security, fight against barbarism and terrorism, resistance, spreading enlightenment and reason, as well as protecting human rights and freedoms. Civilizing missions, atrocious or otherwise, can serve integration purpose, legitimization of democratic and autocratic policies, or even justification of the empire’s global objectives. A democratic South Africa’s conduct of international relations in Africa and globally has remained elusive for cognitive analysis through the dominant explanatory paradigms reliant on concepts of pivotal states, great powers and hegemons. The period 1994-2009 was dominated by puerile nationalistic sentiments of post-apartheid polity leading African Renaissance, continental recovery and renewal. Post-2009, South Africa appeared to overtly peddle the notion of Africa’s sole emerging market that would become the future engine of global growth, by using desperate measure to be accepted in BRICS. The article concedes that acceding membership of BRICS, South Africa proved that its engagement of international relations has increasingly become a rudimentary nominal attempt at governance of global geopolitics with “non-places”. The article concludes that South Africa’s Africa agenda faded over the past twenty years as the puerility of its “civilizing missions” was increasingly exposed and largely detested.

J.P. Tsheola & T. Lukhele



INTRODUCTIONPost-1994, a democratic South Africa became a global actor, serving two

terms (2007-2008, 2011-2012) as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, in circumstances described by some commentators as controversial (Mbeki, 2009; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Parsons, 2013). Its tenure at the United Nations Security Council involved support for Resolution 1973 on Libya, subsequent criticism of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) regime change, refusal to support condemnation and sanctions against the so-called “rogue powers” of Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe, among others (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Premhid, 2014). In 2012, South Africa also “completed its term as a member of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council”, and it chaired the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, following the hosting of the FIFA Soccer World Cup in 2010 and the global COP17/CMP7 in 2011 (Calland, 2013; Kotze, 2013). Other than hosting the BRICS Summit, South Africa’s Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma took up the chairpersonship of the AU Commission in 2013 (Kotze, 2013). Additionally, this country led the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), championed the formation of the AU, chaired the G-77 of non-aligned states, and took part in attempts to resolve the crises in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Egypt, Iran and Zimbabwe. Also, South Africa was involved in emerging markets groupings of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). This recent democracy has shaped governance of international relations, defying conventional global or pivotal states, regional or great powers and hegemons paradigms.

International relations studies have largely focused on inter-state cooperation, conflict, negotiations and diplomacy, to the exclusion of cultural, historical and ideological factors that define the underlying nationalist sentiments of pride, glory, morality and religious zeal among both state and non-state global actors (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Pitts, 2005; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). Thus, the conduct of international relations by global actors such as South Africa, that are not necessarily middle or pivotal states, regional or great powers or hegemons, have increasingly become complex to explain through these conventional paradigms. This article seeks to apply the nuance conception of empires and their “civilizing missions” to draw insight into a democratic South Africa’s conduct of international relations. It posits that this country’s continental posture and agenda have equally faded over the past twenty years. South Africa’s “civilizing missions” for spaces beyond its territorial borders as well as those on the continent, in the hope of shaping global governance, is indicative of imperial inclinations and hopes of securing liberal democracy for human rights across the world. The article argues that the drive on African Renaissance, leadership of

377


NEPAD and promotion of the South-South relations between 1994 and 2009, were part of South Africa’s African “civilizing missions”, which have evidently faded away with the erosion of the democratic hyperbole. Whereas South Africa would readily be in denial, the extraterritorial borders missions of securing a new global order and “state-building” during the past twenty years were embedded with “civilizing missions” about liberal democracy, human rights, good governance, civility, peace-building and market reforms, among other imperial objectives and policies. Such peace and state-building missions were intricately interwoven with South Africa’s history, culture and ideology, sense of pride, glory, morality and religious nationalist sentiments. In emphasizing African Renaissance, leading NEPAD and pursuing South-South relations, South Africa had effectively embarked on missions to “civilize” and “institutionalize” its domestic interests and objectives across the continent and the world wherein internal blurred with foreign policy.

GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GLOBAL STATES, GREAT POWERS, HEGEMONS AND EMPIRES?Social sciences are replete with conceptual ambiguities occasioned by creative

and imaginary scholarship that brings to bear nuance conceptions, where existing ones do not provide adequate explanation of the fast evolving global settings. Whereas the currency of notions of democracy, power, nation, state and hegemon has a long history (Levy & Thompson, 2005; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Gat, 2007), their meanings have become fuzzy. Contemporary wars and invasions, formal and informal integrations or defragmentations, cessations as well as the use of incentives and carrots to cajole and so on, in the international relations always involve global actors such as the USA, Russia, China, EU and NATO (Levy & Thompson, 2005; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Gat, 2007; MacDonald, 2009; Habib, 2013), which cannot be generalized through notions of global states, great powers or hegemons. Notwithstanding the frequent contradictions, contestations and competitions over the same geopolitical spaces and loyalty of peripheries, these global actors’ conduct of international relations does not necessarily always involve inter-state conflict, cooperation, war, negotiations or diplomacy. Additionally, other global actors do not possess any verifiable material power capabilities; and, the list could include Israel, Iran, South Africa, North Korea, Al-Qaeda and so on.

The source of power for global actors cannot be generalized into a singular hierarchical capability because it derives from diverse domains such as command of nuclear arsenal, economics, politics, demographics, diplomacy, hearts and souls, religion and so on. These global actors share a common denominator, which is their readiness to interfere in world affairs in pursuit of their respective internal interests and objectives, even if it entailed atrocities and sacrifice. In recent times when Ukraine had to make a determination whether to lean towards the West or the Russia Federation, politicians from the EU and USA found reason to address protesting crowds in Kiev. The situation has now deteriorated into an aggressive




Russian interference, and accession of Crimea to the Federation, inevitably creating reason for USA, EU and NATO heightened rhetoric, threats and sanctions. The imperial paradigm appears to offer conceptual insights of specific domestic interests and objectives that are encapsulated in extraterritorial borders “civilizing missions” and foreign policies of these global actors. The latter, inclusive of extremes of Al-Qaeda and the USA, see their interferences as civilizing, peaceful, developmental and world-order inducing (Freedman, 2004; Landsberg, 2005; Pomeranz, 2005; Christensen, 2006; Foot, 2009; Jiemian, 2009; Gregory, 2010; Kotze, 2013), notwithstanding the diversity of their governance systems. The EU, BRICS, NATO and Al-Qaeda, for example, consist of global actors polities that are not state actors, and they are devoid of nations. The imperial paradigm offers nuance analytical explanations because it is not synonymous with colonialism.

Uniformly, contemporary “civilizing missions” purport to be serving the cause of freedoms and democracy, promotion of good governance, advocating for human rights and dignity, securing global order, stability and security, establishing a harmonious world, spreading enlightenment and reason, combating barbarism and terrorism as well as resistance of domination (Pomeranz, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Christensen, 2006; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). The pursuit of internal interests beyond territorial borders of polities through foreign policies is now common practice (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Pitts, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013); and, all actors are, to varying degrees, involved in shaping international governance because imperialism does not necessarily entail the use of coercion, oppression or exploitation. Questioning the explanatory power of conventional paradigms for the contemporary globality, Zielonka (2012) asserts that the conduct of present-day actors such as USA, China, Russia and the EU in the modern international system resemble empires. The inclusion of the EU in this category of contemporary “empires” calls for nuance paradigms for explaining the emergent globality. Zielonka’s (2012: 503) contents that the imperial paradigm holds the potential of shedding better insight about “several important aspects of international relations such as governance”.

Notwithstanding their usefulness, the concepts of Westphalian states, great powers and hegemons do not explain the “geopolitical self-imaginary” of contemporary empires, which manifest in “civilizing missions” (Pomeranz, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). The justification of atrocious sacrifices for poorly specified objectives and their extraterritorial border expressions suggest that contemporary foreign policy consists of a concoction of issues of nationalist pride, glory, morality and religious zeal, which cannot be accounted for through conceptions of global states, great powers and hegemons (Freedman, 2004; Pomeranz, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). Whereas sport is one of the most prominent integrative activities in the world, it is apparent that even the World Olympics are peculiar by the manner in which athletes engage in celebrations

379


that opaquely display “puerile and boastful” nationalistic pride and glory. Wars and their absurdities are equally founded on “puerile and boastful” nationalistic pride and glory, albeit covert. Events involving USA and British service personnel performing immoral acts on Iraqi and Afghani nationals in captivity cannot be cast aside as isolated events by uncanny renegades; instead, these acts reveal deep-seated nationalistic sense of pride, glory, morality and religious zeal that hold together the armies in adversity of sacrifice.

Global actors on the international stage are not only legal, formal, political and economic polities, they equally include illegal and informal entities, whose primary defining features are distinct cultures, histories and ideologies that drive their sense of nationalistic and/or religious pride, glory and morality (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Pomeranz, 2005; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). A democratic South Africa has, for instance, been variously described as a “pivotal state”, regional power and/or hegemon in Africa (Habib, 2013), but these notions do not explain this country’s puerile continentally transcendent “geopolitical self-imaginary” and self-selection of emerging markets such as BRICSAM, IBSA, BRICS and the Next-11. These groupings are global non-state actors in international management geopolitics; hence, their “geopolitical self-imaginary” is intricately intertwined with pride, glory, morality and religion, which are all subservient to specific cultures, histories and ideologies. Equally for states and non-state, formal and informal, legal and illegal global actors, they all hold normative agendas that variously “attach different meanings” to notions of free market, democracy or multilateralism, and resistance or domination, which manifest in their perpetual contestations of spaces (Christensen, 2006; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Gat, 2007; Foot, 2009; Jiemian, 2009; Gregory, 2010; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). That is, global governance is contested in many complex ways (Christensen, 2006; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Gat, 2007; Foot, 2009; MacDonald, 2009; Gregory, 2010); however, its scope and structure are functions of the interactions of both colluding and competing respective “civilizing missions”.

Empires, which are erroneously associated with colonial powers, predates colonialism, and they have outlived the abolition of colonial administration. They are never about “oppression and exploitation”; instead, they harbour “civilizing missions” around value-laden peace and wealth, founded in specific cultures, histories and ideologies (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Pitts, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; MacDonald, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2013). The latter inform expressions of nationalistic sentiments of pride, glory, morality and religion. South Africa’s political leadership of NEPAD cannot be understood away from its “geopolitical self-imaginary” and nationalist sentiments of pride, glory, human rights, wealth, peace and security. Rather than sheer power capabilities, the imperial paradigm points to nationalistic “geopolitical self-imaginary” as the key to the conduct of international relations. When South Africa was mandated by SADC to mediate in Zimbabwe, it had become an empire by default because it sought




to preach to the latter on matters relating to how to bring about order, peace and modernization. Indeed, “Some empires have risen quietly – even surreptitiously – through uneven modernization and social differentiation” (Zielonka, 2012; 508). The imperial paradigm provides that whereas material capabilities are significant, they should be understood as relational (Zielonka, 2012). South Africa’s twenty years of engagement of international relations involved imperial “civilizing missions”, especially for Africa. This article accepts that:

“If great powers are not only about material power capabilities, but also about spatial and ideational aspects, they are better conceived as empires. … focusing on empires rather than states and great powers will help get rid of simplistic visions of international anarchy on the one hand, and hegemony, bipolarity, and multipolarity on the other” Zielonka (2012: 520).

Paradoxically, polities’ conduct of international relations through foreign policies “directed at containing the power of the United States and its Western allies” simultaneously seek to “at least attempt to redirect the West’s agenda in ways that make it more compatible with their own” (Habib, 2013: 175), adequately confirms the validity of the imperial paradigm in describing the present global settings.

South Africa has evidently, on the grounds of its universally celebrated democratic dispensation, attained the status of a global actor, but cannot be tenably described as “regional power” or “pivotal state”, great power or hegemon (Landsberg, 2005; Bond, 2002; Biko, 2013; Habib, 2013; Parsons, 2013). The suggestion that the aggregation of economic, diplomatic and military capabilities automatically define South Africa in the present as “a regional power or hegemon” (Habib, 2013: 169) should be rejected (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Lansberg, 2005; Mbeki, 2009; Biko, 2013). Imperial preoccupation has always involved attempts, as it were, to “civilize” or “institutionalize” other territories and people (Pomeranz, 2005; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012); and, a democratic South Africa has attempted the same through its foreign economic policy in Africa as evidenced through the African Renaissance, NEPAD and the South-South relations drives (Kotze, 2013). South Africa has indeed “become more active on the international state”, establishing “alliances with the potential to reform the regional and global order in ways that are more facilitative of their own agendas” (Habib, 2013: 175). Additionally, applications of the global states, great powers and hegemons paradigms on the conduct of global actors such as the USA, China, Russia, EU and NATO too have become increasingly limiting. Extraterritorial borders interferences vary depending upon the specific governance systems and the “civilizing missions” of the particular global actors, which are not necessarily always “a product of rational calculations, but of complex historical, cultural and ideological processes” (Zielonka, 2012: 519). The imperial paradigm explains the role of cultures, histories and ideologies in the construction of “civilizing missions” embedded with nationalistic sentiments of pride, glory, morality and religion in shaping the complex international relations,

381


inclusive of that for global actors like Al-Qaeda.

CONTEMPORARY EMPIRES AND THEIR “CIVILIZING MISSIONS”South Africa’s foreign policy has been variously described as “incoherent and

inconsistent” or as “progressive” and grounded in human rights or as “realistic calculations and sub-imperialist ambitions” (Habib, 2013: 168). Global geopolitics demonstrate that contemporary empires pursue “civilizing missions” in a variety of contradictory and paradoxical ways (Pomeranz, 2005; Christensen, 2006; Foot, 2009; Jiemian, 2009; Gregory, 2010). Rather than mere rhetorical exercises (Zielonka, 2012), “civilizing missions” are critical to the imperial conduct of both the state and non-state global actors. Other than assisting in the definition of the imperial vision and the role of the empire therein, “civilizing missions” also “perform an important motivational, integrating and legitimizing function” through their roles in the identification and explanation of the purpose of imperial policies” (Zielonka, 2012: 515). A complexity of polities, with different systems of governance and “civilizing missions”, shape international relations in pursued of internal interests and objectives, virtually undermining “basic principles of inter-state politics such as sovereignty and territoriality” (Zielonka, 2012: 519). Just like the USA’s numerous interferences, Russia’s interference in Ukraine remains explicable through the same old “civilizing missions” of, if we could borrow from Zielonka (2012: 516), “a stabilizing and pacifying power centre, taming the barbarian forces of chaos, nationalism and religious fundamentalism in its backyard, with positive implications for the whole of Europe and the world”. It is this same “civilizing mission”, as well as the promotion of freedom and democracy, that the USA, EU and NATO have used to justify their interferences in the world, including where they had orchestrated and effected regime changes. Peace-building adventures are “civilizing missions”, indicative of imperial objectives and policies. Whereas writing about resurgence of authoritarian great powers of China and Russia as well as the USA’s policy of “making the world safe for democracy”, Gat (2007) notes that the contestations over territories and people through competing “civilizing missions” will remain unabated. Equally, the numerous interventions through the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including those that South Africa supported, are defined by one denominator, which is: “civilizing” and “institutionalizing” the world on specific cultural, historical and ideological values.

Post-1994 South Africa must be viewed as contemporary empires with “civilizing missions” in Africa (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Biko, 2013; Kotze, 2013). The USA’s prime interest is to maintain global preponderance and it uses its ideological, economic and military power, under the guise of serving the cause of freedoms, democracy, human rights and dignity, in order to pursue its imperial objectives (Freedman, 2004; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Foot, 2009; Zielonka, 2012). Russia’s “civilizing mission” is to establish global order, stability and security; whereas China




hopes to promote a “harmonious” world; the EU and NATO stress securing “good” governance and peace; and, South Africa has been preoccupied with the pursuit of African Renaissance, promotion of South-South relations and establishment of a new world order of democracy, peace, human rights and liberalism (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Christensen, 2006; Foot, 2009; Jiemian, 2009; Zielonka, 2012; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). Other than being both informal and formal, imperial “civilizing missions” are also “highly mutable” and uncertain (Pomeranz, 2005; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). The pursuit of “civilizing missions” could involve goading, punishment, negotiations, manipulation, pretending to be the world police or fire brigade and such other machinations, besides overt use of force and coercion. Often, territorial borders are blurred as “foreign threats” are made to justify “domestic policies” (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Freedman, 2004; Kearns, 2009; Gregory, 2010; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). The imperial paradigm suggests that some global actors adopt a “global perspective on international affairs” (Zielonka, 2012: 513, 514) and it emphasises blurring of internal with foreign interests in order to serve “homeland” objectives (Chandler, 2006; Christensen, 2006). A democratic South Africa’s continental posture and agenda define its African “civilizing missions”, which are based on puerile “geopolitical self-imaginary”.

SOUTH AFRICA’S CONTINENTAL POSTURE AND AGENDA: 1994-2009 AND BEYONDOn taking state power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) “led to a

fundamental shift in foreign policy” (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005) with evident imperial intent on Africa, the puerility of which was exposed in human rights crusade and mobilization of opposition against Nigeria’s Sani Abacha in 1995 after the hanging Ken Saro-Wiwa (Habib, 2013: 170, 176). This naivety persisted, notwithstanding the failure to isolate Nigeria. In conceiving a democratic South Africa’s “geopolitical self-imaginary”, the ANC (1997b: 16) held that,

“Since the peaceful elections of a democratic government in 1994, the whole world has had a very positive attitude towards South Africa. … it is important for international politics that things work out in South Africa”.

From this “geopolitical self-imaginary”, South Africa hoped to “reform the global order” by “developing mechanisms and alliances that enhance the leverage of those post-colonial powers that share this agenda” (Habib, 2013: 173, 174). South Africa’s hope in continental civilization was imperialist, especially given the attendant globalist modernization logic. This country’s nationalistic impulse was preeminent in the prioritization of Africa as domestic interests and objectives came to effectively be blurred with foreign policy, especially between 1994 and 2009, in ways that served its continental “civilizing missions”. South Africa had hoped to stabilize Africa, build peace and facilitate negotiations, overreaching itself at times, whilst its efforts were not always appreciated (Habib, 2013: 176). Bond (2002: 2)

383


succinctly captures the blurring of domestic with foreign policy on Africa thus:“new South Africans … locate not only their own (national) ambitions but also

the continent’s potential transformation … in the further integration of Africa into a world economy .…”

By 1996, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) identified leadership role in Africa as one of the crucial elements of South Africa’s foreign policy, with palatable commitment to democracy and human rights (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). However, South Africa’s Africa agenda was founded on neoliberal globalist logic and interpretation (Vale & Maseko, 1998).

President Mbeki’s regime emphasized African Renaissance wherein South Africa would provide leadership for continental welfare and politico-economic recovery (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). This ambitious vision of leading Africa’s century became more eloquently expressed with former President Mbeki’s ascension to state power in 1999, where he coupled it with the hope of forging the South-South relations and changing the global capitalist order (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2000, 2005; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). Former Presidents Mandela’s and Mbeki’s regimes’ foreign policies in Africa were consistent with each other (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). In both cases, South Africa was “Africa’s economic saviour, peacemaker to the continent and disciplinarian of regional hooligans” (Nevin, 2002: 52), because government believed that “a more equitable world is necessary for the full realization of citizens’ rights in the South” (Habib, 2013: 182). Former Presidents Mandela and Mbeki self-selected South Africa as a voice of reason for voiceless Africa and, perhaps, the developing world (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Lansberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013). The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, suggested that South Africa’s key foreign policy objective prioritized Africa (Barber, 2005; Calland, 2013), but it was former President Mbeki who dramatized South Africa’s leadership of African Renaissance. The unsanctioned mediation of Africa’s international relations by South Africa was palatable during former President Mbeki’s tenure.

At the heart of South Africa’s foreign policy, during the first two former presidencies, was that this country would “play a double-bridge role” in the North-South and South-South relations in order to promote free global trade (ANC, 1997a; Vale & Maseko, 1998; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2000, 2005, The Presidency, 2001b, 2000c; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). There was a naïve hope that South Africa would “advance the welfare of the whole continent” (cited in Landsberg, 2000: 78). To this extent, South Africa set out to “civilize” and “institutionalize” Africa into “full global integration” by, among other things,




campaigning and lobbying African states to undertake reforms, promote peace and human rights, adopt democracy and adhere to good governance (Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). Between 1994 and 2009, therefore, South Africa’s Africa foreign policy was focused on establishing itself as a “… credible champion of human rights, democracy and good governance by promoting respect for humane values and practices” (Landsberg, 2000: 80). Former Minister Alfred Nzo and President Mbeki highlighted these principles as fundamental aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa (Barber, 2005; Calland, 2013). Inevitably, resolution of conflicts, termination of one-party dictatorships, stopping corruption and ending economic mismanagement became central pillars of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). These same pillars became the building blocks for NEPAD (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Bond, 2002; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Kotze, 2013).

Also, South Africa had hoped to lead the reconstruction of “Africa’s institutional architecture” (Habib, 2013: 177). The apparent commonality in the basic principles of the domestic Growth, Employment and Redistribution microeconomics (GEAR) and NEPAD are intricately linked to former President Mbeki’s self-selection of continental leadership. Indeed, the “economic policy prescriptions encapsulated” in GEAR “form the fundamental assumptions underpinning NEPAD” (Habib, 2013: 179-180). Understandably, Ramutsindela (2001: 58) posits that “The association of South Africa with the rest of the states on the continent raises critical questions about the abstraction of the post-apartheid state”. This questioning of the abstraction of a democratic South Africa should invoke imperialist conceptions. Former President Mbeki’s hope of “modernizing” and/or “civilizing” Africa, particularly through NEPAD and its peer-review mechanisms, is paramount in almost all his speeches about continental recovery, as he crisscrossed the world selling the continent’s initiative (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013).

As the AU recorded at the beginning of the twenty first century, South Africa lobbied Africa on principles of restoration and maintenance of peace, promotion and protection of democracy and human rights, adherence to clear standards of accountability, transparency and “good” participatory governance (AU, 2001; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). This country’s hope, as expressed by former President Mbeki, was to counter the legacy of Afro-pessimism and mobilise FDI (The Star 29 January 2001). Consequently, the same “civilizing missions” are codified in NEPAD, whose overriding objective was “to consolidate democracy and sound economic management on the continent” (AU, 2001: 57). The essence of South Africa’s “civilizing missions” was that African countries that “introduced democracy, good governance, an independent judiciary, fiscal discipline and economic reforms” would easily attract foreign resources and investments, especially from the developed world (AU, 2001: 17; The Star 7 June 2001: 12). South Africa’s 1994-2009 engagement of international relations,

385


which is often described as punching “above its weight” (Calland, 2013: 90), was imperialist. South Africa’s conduct of international relations was buoyed by the democratization hyperbole, rather than material power capabilities, rendering conceptual explanations of “pivotal states”, great powers and hegemons limiting.

The post-2009 South African foreign policy is also associated with the transition from former President Mbeki to President Zuma’s regime. As Calland (2013: 91) puts it, President Zuma’s ascendency to state power was accompanied by a rise in the stakes because “domestic conditions weakened”. But Habib (2013) finds significant continuities in foreign policy between the two administrations, except for the insubstantial differences in their management of South Africa’s engagement of international relations. The strategic perspective has remained the same (Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Lansberg, 2005; Habib, 2013) because the notion of “Diplomacy of Ubuntu” expressed in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s (DIRCO) 2009 White Paper on Foreign Policy was merely a spirited re-invention of the “human-rights-based” foreign policy (Calland, 2013: 101). Further, South Africa sought to use India and Brazil in IBSA, which emerged after the failure of the 2003 World Trade Organisation Conference in Cancun, Mexico, under former President Mbeki, in the hope of securing membership of BRICs. But President Zuma’s administration exploited its relations with China for the same purpose. The former Chief Director of Trade Policy in the Department of Trade and Industry, Qobo laments the post-2009 Dalai Lama visa application saga thus:

“… before Zuma ascended to power, it was unthinkable that South Africa’s … government would easily sell its soul in exchange for maintaining a commercial relationship … When South Africa lobbied to be allowed into the Bric … club, it was a sign that its foreign policy was undergoing a prolonged crisis of confidence” (cited in Calland, 2013: 103).

Comparing President Zuma’s administration with those of former Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, Premhid (2014: n.p.) laments that “the lack of definition, clarity and purpose is chilling”, with the result that the inability to appreciate engagement of international relations “in the light of domestic policy questions” render post-2009 foreign policy decisions “incoherent, ad hoc and defragmented”. South Africa acceded membership of BRICS in 2011, under President Zuma’s administration, showing that foreign policy placed emphasis on economic interests and the strengthening of “economic ties with major emerging markets” (Calland, 2013: 91). But Calland (2013), Habib (2013) and Kotze (2013) do not find substantial deviation in South Africa’s foreign policy with the transition from former President Mbeki’s to President Zuma’s regime. Overall, the emphasis on South-South relations and the African agenda have continued under President Zuma’s administration (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). Indeed, DIRCO’s Strategic Plan 2012-2017 emphasizes the significance of Africa to “South Africa’s prosperity and national interest” (Kotze, 2013: n.p.). Unsurprisingly, the South




African government reaffirmed its aim to revitalise NEPAD and to provide ongoing support for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Kotze, 2013: n.p.). As of 2012, DIRCO’s pronouncements on foreign policy solidified the African agenda through prioritization of South-South relations in foreign policy, as exemplified in the IBSA and BRICS. Notwithstanding DIRCO’s codification of South Africa’s foreign policy focus on Africa (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013), mixed rhetorical signals emerged with President Zuma appearing to suggest that Malawi was inferior to South Africa when he stated that:

“We can’t think like Africans, in Africa, generally …. We are in Johannesburg, this is Johannesburg. It’s not some national road in Malawi” (The Presidency, 2013).

With such commentaries by President Zuma, the ingenuity of the promotion of the South-South relations for the interests of the African agenda would scarcely convince. If the thrust of South Africa’s foreign policy post-2009 has remained the same in substance, then it can be retorted that this country’s faded “civilizing missions” over the past twenty years affirms the accuracy of the observation that it “cannot establish a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, but can instead merely front for a slightly modified residual version of global apartheid” (Bond, 2002: 2), which would be in the IBSA, BRICS, BRICSAM, G-20 and so on.

SOUTH AFRICA’S TWENTY YEARS OF “CIVILIZING MISSIONS” FOR AFRICA: A SEARCH FOR “NO-PLACES”It cannot be denied that South Africa popularized “Africa’s agendas within

the international community” (Habib, 2013: 178), and that its leadership was “enhanced by the role model which its successful transition offers to the continent” (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 276). When South Africa led the Non-Aligned Movement, immediately after transition to democracy, it was considered to be a middle power “because of its involvement in ‘international bridge-building’ and multilateralism” (Calland, 2013: 92). But Premhid (2014: n.p.) describes South Africa as a “pretender to the role of regional hegemon”, meaning that Bond’s (2002: 2) assertion that South Africa “run a different danger: treading a well-known, dusty path: a post-colonial, neoliberal cul-de-sac of predictable direction and duration”, remains pertinent. Hence, globalist modernization notion of African Renaissance has become an “empty policy vessel” (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 277), fading with time.

South Africa’s extension of its domestic interests into Africa through foreign policy is the clearest indication of its “civilizing missions” that encapsulated nationalistic sentiments of pride, glory and morality associated with puerility of its democratic transition and attendant “geopolitical self-imaginary”. The latter is evident in former President Mbeki’s comment to the International Marketing Council (IMC) in 2002 that “The rest of the world wants us to succeed because success in South Africa is an investment in success in their own countries” (cited in Van der Merwe, 2002: 22). According to Marais (2001: 251), “geopolitical self-

387


imaginary” claims such as these, whatever their merits and demerits,“harmonize with the South African self-image of distinctiveness and superiority

vis-à-vis the rest of the continent – thereby resonating with the pervasive sense of differentness and superiority frequently encountered and remarked upon by visiting foreigners”.

South Africa’s self-selection as leader of African Renaissance meant that “the pursuit of a common continental destiny … (was) made to pivot on notions of South African exceptionalism” (Marais, 2001: 251). Mamdami’s questioning becomes pertinent because the notion of African Renaissance pre-dates 1994, but it suddenly became “a turnkey South African export to the rest of Africa” (Mail and Guardian 2-8 October 1998: 36) post-democratization. A democratic South Africa’s subsequent dramatization of an old notion of African Renaissance (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Taylor & Williams, 2001; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013) should necessarily be interpreted as “civilizing missions” based on puerile “geopolitical self-imaginary”. Vale & Maseko (1998: 283) caution that:

“The central paradox of leadership – that it requires followership – explains why, however desirable it might appear for South Africa to lead an African Renaissance, it cannot: indeed, it dare not”.

South Africa’s globalist modernization spin on African Renaissance amounted to “‘an externally driven consumerist movement’ that will leave African continuing to be ‘valued’ only for an ability to ‘absorb and popularize foreign ideas, trinkets and junk’” (Mail & Guardian, 1997 cited in Vale & Maseko, 1998: 280). That is, South Africa’s leadership of the continent in the past twenty years has not been emancipatory.

Former President Mbeki also embarked on an ambitious “lobbying schedule of world leaders” (Bond, 2002; Barber, 2005; Landsberg, 2005; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013) or “international roadshow” (Sunday Times Politics 5 August 2001; The Presidency, 2001c; The Star 29 January 2001) in 2000/01 and 2002. Indeed, former President Mbeki single-handedly marketed NEPAD to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the G-8, the International Financial Institutions, the former US President, the former UK Prime Minister, and to the German Chancellor in 2000/01 and 2003. In this self-selected continental leadership, former President Mbeki “personally” canvassed “global support” (Sunday Times Politics 5 August 2001: 2) to the extent that he even commended NEPAD as an “African charter” and “Africa’s own answer to Africa’s own problems” (The Presidency, 2001b: 2) as well as Africans’ way of accepting that the buck stops with itself and it cannot pass it to others (The Presidency, 2001a, c; The Star 29 January 2001). Essentially, these descriptions demonstrate the depth of South Africa’s strife, under former President Mbeki’s regime, to “civilize” Africa into accepting responsibility and accountability. As Vale & Maseko (1998: 276) put it, “although rooted in structure and buoyed by modernization theory, South Africa’s idea of an African Renaissance is abstruse –




more promise than policy”. South Africa’s engagement of international relations during 1994-2009 has to be generalized as an era of civilizing missions for Africa.

Post-2009, this same conduct of international relations has continued, South Africa exploited its relations with China, and perhaps BRICS, to wring political, economic and diplomatic concessions from global actors such as the USA, EU and China itself (Habib, 2013; Kotze, 2013). Hence, Kotze (2013: n.p.) asks if,

the definition of South Africa’s national interest includes interests not directly in its own interest, but primarily in others’ interest, but for pragmatic or altruistic reasons supported by South Africa?

Whereas this Africa-agenda foreign policy orientation is explained through emphasis on economic interests and the South-South alliances, it continues to be difficult to comprehend the economic rationale of this country’s conduct of international relations and compatibility of its “civilizing missions” with those of nondemocratic but key global actors of Russia and China. Kotze (2013: n.p.) notes, from a philosophical standpoint, that it is “impossible for South African government to define a national interest which is entirely self-centred, or purely nationally determined.” The fact that not all international relations interests promote domestic interests and objectives, implies that taking up of membership of BRICS and continued emphasis on improving the North-South cooperation in post-2009 should be tested against the assertion that “Africa is the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy” (Kotze, 2013: n.p.). The African Renaissance agenda could have been “an effort to secure non-African … interests on the African continent” (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 286). If, indeed, South Africa’s denial of Dalai Lama’s visa application was about selling of soul to China for commercial interests and acquisition of BRICS membership, then it has to be accepted that this country’s conduct of international relations around the African agenda has faded over the past twenty years. In the absence of any alternative explanation, the evidently faded continental posture and agenda as well as the drift towards BRICS should be embedded with “civilizing missions” that encapsulate nationalistic pride, glory, morality and religion predisposed through culture, history and ideology of a democratic South Africa.

CONCLUSIONThis article argued that the “miraculous” democratic transition did not necessarily

accord material power capabilities for South Africa’s conduct of international relations to be explicable through notions of global states, great powers and hegemons. The article insinuates that South Africa’s continental posture and agenda faded away over the past twenty years, because they involved “civilizing missions” that blurred domestic interests and objectives with foreign policy in Africa. As Bond (2002: 5) puts it, a democratic South Africa “claimed a unique noblesse oblige” that it “could help bridge the gap between the world’s rich and poor”; and, this

389


article describe this “geopolitical self-imaginary” as boastful puerility. In the final analysis, South Africa’s conduct of international relations invoked a longstanding question of whether it was an African state or European outpost in Africa, set to modernize, if not civilize, the rest of the continent. Whereas the post-2009 foreign policy may portray indifference, there has been no material change in direction regarding South Africa’s “civilizing missions”. In this context, President Zuma’s remarks that roads in Johannesburg are unlike those in Malawi encapsulate puerile imperial “geopolitical self-imaginary”. It remains true that South Africa’s attempts to “civilize” Africa towards shedding “its Hobbesian image” (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 286) is deeply entrenched in this country’s imperial obsession with nationalistic sentiments of pride, glory, morality and religion that are embedded with its distinct culture, history and ideology.

LIST OF REFERENCESAfrican National Congress (ANC), 1997a. Developing a Strategic Perspective on South

African Foreign Policy. Johannesburg: Umanyono Publications. African National Congress (ANC), 1997b. Understanding Gear: Growth, Employment

and Redistribution. http://www.polity.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/gear.html [30/3/1998].African Union (AU), 2001. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/misc/nepad.pdf [26/2/2002].Barber, J. 2005. The new South Africa’s foreign policy: Principles and practice.

International Affairs, 81(5): 1079-1096.Biko, H. 2013. The Great African Society: A Plan for a Nation Gone Astray.

Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.Bond, P. 2000. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-liberalism in South Africa.

London: Pluto.Bond, P. 2002. Thabo Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development: breaking or

shining the chains of global apartheid? Foreign Policy In Focus, http://www.fpif.org/papers/nepad/index_body.html [14/5/2002]

Calland, R. 2013. The Zuma Years: South Africa’s Changing Face of Power. Cape Town: Zebra Press.

Carmody, P.R. & Owusu, F.Y. 2007. Competing hegemons? Chinese versus American geo-economic strategies in Africa. Political Geography, 26: 504-524.

Chandler, D. 2006. Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building. London: Pluto Press.

Chua, A. 2007. Days of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why they Fall. New York: Doubleday.

Christensen, T.J. 2006. Fostering stability or creating a monster? The rise of China and U.S. policy towards East Asia. International Security, 31: 81-126.

Foot, R. 2009. China and the United States: Between Cold and Warm Peace. Survival, 51: 123-146.

Freedman, L. 2004. War in Iraq: Selling the threat. Survival, 46: 7-50.Gat, A. 2007. The return of authoritarian great powers. Foreign Affairs, 86: 59-63.Gregory, D. 2010. War and peace. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,

35: 154-186.Habib, A. 2013. South Africa’s Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects.

Johannesburg: Wits University Press.



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationHardt, M. & Negri, A. 2000. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Jiemian, Y. 2009. 60 years of New China’s diplomacy: Characteristics of practice and

evolution in thinking. Global Review, 1: 9.Kearns, G. 2009. Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Kotze, D. 2013. South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations during 2012.

In Jansen, J.D., Nyamnjoh, F., Pillay, U. & Hagg, G. (eds.) State of the Nation: South Africa 2012-2013 – Addressing Inequality and Poverty. Pretoria: HSRC.

Landsberg, C. 2000. Mbeki’s external initiative on Africa and the global South. Africa Insight, 30(3): 75-81.

Landsberg, C. 2005. Towards a developmental foreign policy? Challenges for South Africa’s diplomacy in the Second Decade of Liberation. Social Research, 72(3): 723-756.

Levy, J.S. & Thompson, W.R. 2005. Hegemonic threats and great power balancing in Europe, 1495-1999. Security Studies, 14: 1-30.

MacDonald, P.K. 2009. Those who forget historiography are doomed to republish it: Empire, imperialism and contemporary debates about American power. Review of International Studies, 35: 47-54.

Marais, H. 2001. South Africa: Limits to Change, The Political Economy of Transition, 2nd edn. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Mbeki, M. 2009. Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing. Johannesburg: Picador Africa.

Neethling, T. 2012. Reflections on norm dynamics: South African Foreign Policy and the no-fly zone over Libya. South African Journal of International Affairs, 19(1): 25-42.

Nevin, T. 2002. The unbearable pressure of being President Mbeki. African Business, 281: 52-54.

Parker, N. 2010. Empire as a geopolitical figure. Geopolitics, 15(1): 113-114.Parsons, R. 2013. Zumanomics Revisited: The Road from Mangaung to 2030.

Sunnyside: Jacana.Pitts, J. 2005. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.Pomeranz, K. 2005. “Civilizing” Missions, past and present. Daedalus, 134: 34-45.Premhid, K. 2014. Zuma’s foreign policy drift. News24, http://voices.news24.com/

kameel-premhid/2014/03/zumas-foreign-policy-drift/ [10/03/2014].Ramutsindela, M.F. 2001. Down the post-colonial road: reconstructing the post-

apartheid state in South Africa. Political Geography, 20(1): 57-84. Taylor, I. & Williams, P. 2001. South African foreign policy and the Great Lakes crisis:

African Renaissance meets Vagabondage Politique? African Affairs, 100: 265-286. The Presidency, 2001a. Mbeki: Third African Renaissance Festival. 31 March 2001,

Durban. http://www.gov.za/president/index.html [18/7/2001]The Presidency, 2001b. Mbeki: Banquet at the Guildhall. 13 June 2001, London. http://

www.gov.za/president/index.html [18/7/2001]The Presidency, 2001c. Mbeki: Briefing on Millennium Africa Renaissance Program at

WEF meeting in Davos. http://www.gov.za/president/index.html [18/7/2001]The Presidency, 2013. Zuma’s remarks will not damage relations. Business day Live,

http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2013/10/25/zumas-remarks-will-not-damage-relations/ [13/03/2014].

Vale, P. & Maseko, S. 1998. South Africa and the African Renaissance. International Affairs, 74(2): 271-287.

Van der Merwe, P. 2002. South Africa’s brand challenge. Business in Africa, 10(8):

391

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administration20-28.

Zielonka, J. 2012. Empires and the modern international system. Geopolitics, 17(3): 502-525.




TWENTY YEARS OF FALTERING “DEMOCRACY”: SERVICE DELIVERY PLANNING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN

SOUTH AFRICA

J.P. Tsheola, N.P. Ramonyai & M. SegageDepartment of Development Planning and Management,University of Limpopo

ABSTRACT

One of the pertinent distinctions of the concept of democracy is that it serves as an ideal for the exercise of people’s power as a totality of political association. This paper holds that democracy, as a set of

principles rather than mere institutions, remains nebulous if it is not given pragmatic effect in ordinary citizenry’s specific contexts. In a “democratic” South Africa, such a context would unavoidably involve the application of democratic principles in the service delivery planning and implementation so that the latter activities conform to the decisions shaped through popular public participation for consensus building. This paper contests that decisions about priorities relating to services to be delivered, the mushrooming of popular social protests that are violent as well as the evident upward spiral in voter apathy are inescapable pointers to a faltering democracy. This paper uses conceptions of democracy, its pragmatic realisation in service delivery planning through public participation, as well as the declining trends in voter perceptions about South Africa going in the right and government performance, to demonstrate that the citizenry has experienced twenty years of faltering democracy.

INTRODUCTIONDemocracy, as “an ideal of political association”, invokes a deeper meaning of

its being about “the power of the people” (Villoro, 1998: 95). Its popular conception as merely “a system of government” (Villoro, 1998: 95) has however allowed for reductionist practices. As an ideal of the totality of the citizenry, democracy should entail that the exercise of state power relies on popular consultation and participation for its sustenance; and, to this extent, such a democratic state become a servant of the publics (Reddy & Sabelo, 1997; Beetham, 1998; Kubiak, 1998; Massuh, 1998; Ramaphosa, 1998; Villoro, 1998; Malherbe & Van Eck, 2009; Mafunisa, 2010; Tsheola, 2012; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013). Twenty years on, South Africa presents unambiguous illustrations of a faltering democracy from the perspective of it being “an ideal of political association” (Villoro, 1998: 95). This paper uses conceptions of democracy, its pragmatic realization in service delivery

393


planning through public participation, as well as the declining trends in voter perceptions about South Africa going in the right and government performance, to demonstrate that the citizenry has experienced twenty years of faltering democracy.

In South Africa, given the severity and depth of privation (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013), the ideals of democracy should be given pragmatic effect through, among other modalities, public participation in service delivery planning. Indeed, one of the most urgent spheres for such public services in developing countries such as South Africa resides in the provision of basic services such as water, electricity, shelter, health care, education, transport and sanitation. In a “democratic” South Africa, households who reside in over 2 700 informal settlements and townships across the nation are beset by challenges, in some cases atrocious, associated with substandard, inadequate quantity and poor quality of provision of these basic services (Tsheola & Sebola, 2012). South Africa’s 1996 Constitution provides that legislative structures be created to ensure delivery of basic needs for community development through public participation (RSA, 1996). This Constitution is recognized as “possibly the best … in the world” (Richman & Hendricks, 2013, 27). Perhaps, should it be asked if observations such as these could be premature, because the “test of goodness” should have been in the pragmatic effects and “quotidian lived experiences” of this democratic constitutionalism? Ramaphosa (1998: 73), who was central to crafting South Africa’s Constitution, notes,

“… it is through the application of democracy that it achieves its meaning. Unless applied to the lives of ordinary people in a specific situation, democracy remains a nebulous and untested concept.”

In this context, the enduring experiences of violent service delivery protests, increasing voter apathy, negative public perceptions of the direction the country has taken and the undesirable public judgments of government’s performance in basic services delivery amidst world-class legislative structures for public participation in planning should signal a totality of faltering democracy.

NEXUS OF DEMOCRACY, PLANNING, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE DELIVERYIt is befitting to enter this nexus with a discussion of the democratic principles

that relate to public participation in decision-making planning processes (Beetham, 1998; Massuh, 1998; Malherbe & Van Eck, 2009). Kubiak (1998: 57) cites Michnik (1997) who describes democracy as “the emporium of passions and interest, the blend of outrage with virtue, sacredness with villainy”. This paper holds that democracy, to be given pragmatic effect with success, it needs to be stressed as “an ideal of political association” that describes “power of the people” wherein there is totality and collectivism in control of decisions and their execution (Villoro, 1998: 95). That is, democracy has a specific focus on decision-making by the citizenry as a means of exercising “people power” (Beetham, 1998; Massuh, 1998;

J.P. Tsheola, N.P. Ramonyai & M. Segage



Villoro, 1998). Inherently, democracy entails active participation of the citizenry in decision-making. The basic principles of democracy, according to Beetham (1998: 21), are “popular control and political equality”, meaning:

that the people have a right to a controlling influence over public decisions and decision-makers, and that they should be treated with equal respect and as of equal worth in the context of such decisions.

Whereas politics could provide for the realization of the democratic ideal, the latter can never be achieved in its entirety because it is a delicate balance (Massuh, 1998; Villoro, 1998). The provisions of systems of government by themselves should not presuppose the realization of democracy because political institutions such as elections, parliament and the rule of law are designed for the realization of the principles (Beetham, 1998; Ramaphosa, 1998; Villoro, 1998; Malherbe & Van Eck, 2009). Having evolved through popular struggles, South Africa’s democracy entails that the polity and politics should make it accessible popular and inclusive participation. The latter should shape both planning decisions and implementation or execution thereof. That is, establishment of democratic institutions, as well as public participation structures, is the means to the end, which is the realization of the democratic principles. Public violence and state reliance on brutal force, as demonstrated in South Africa’s service delivery protests, amidst a globally celebrated democracy implies that the latter is faltering.

Constitutional and legislative provisions for public participation in service delivery planning should be interpreted as attempts to the pragmatic realization of democratic principles of people exercising power. However, participation is contextual and in a state of flux because it depends upon personalities, attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values and interests as well as conflated needs, wants and means, social structure ties and competence or incompetence (Kubiak, 1998; Mussah, 1998). Notwithstanding these confrontational constituents of participation, the latter is crucial for democracy because it involves “free and equal citizens in the polity, acceptance of the rules of the game and trust in the social contracts”, thereby nullifying the use of brute force by both the state and the publics (Kubiak, 1998: 57). For this reason, the fatal violence in service delivery protest by both the state and the publics in South Africa should be interpreted as a sign of the weakening of democracy. As Kubiak (1998: 58) puts it, “only democracy possess the ability to question itself and to correct its own mistakes without resort to naked force”. That is, the violence in a perfectly democratic principle of protest should suggest that South Africa’s democracy is faltering at public participation relating to the planning decisions on service delivery.

Informal settlements are an enduring feature of the present global landscape (Rubin, 2011; Lekonyane & Disoloane, 2013); and, their persistence in a democratic South Africa implies that development planning itself may have been “poorly planned, poorly maintained, failed in its totality, or … absent from the start”

395


(Theron, 2008b: 42). To be successful, theorization and practice of development planning, as a normative process, has to revolve around “people” so that “its contents in specific situations” would be interpreted and understood through people-related issues and challenges (Dale, 2004: 1, 2). In this context, public participation is critical to service delivery planning because it instils humanistic content to the evidently normative process. That is, public participation in planning and execution of service delivery should be interpreted as democracy at work, especially for the deprived sections of the population.

Conceptions of planning are variable and complex because they are heavily dependent on the underlying motive for the construction of typologies (Dale, 2004; Theron, 2008b; Tsheola, 2012). Dale (2004) and Theron (2008b) present numerous typologies of planning on the bases of motives such as goal, activity and operational level. The fickleness in the conceptions of planning derives from the fact that it involves anticipation of the future and systematic imagination of policy goals (Dale, 2004; Theron, 2008b). Whereas decision-making about the allocation of public resources is destined to always be contested, the uncertainties about the future amidst limited resources inherently render planning a potentially volatile process. Inevitably, as a normative process, planning anticipation of uncertainties allows for co-existence of a complex mesh of promise, including that which is overtly unrealistic. Perhaps, this complexity explains the misgivings that often engulf public participation in service delivery decision-making processes. Like democracy, planning is a complex process of decision-making and change management for the reduction of future uncertainties (Theron, 2008b; Tsheola, 2012); and, some of the norms and principles entailed could be inaccessible to lay persons, especially within poor informal settlements such as those in South Africa.

Dale (2004) and Theron (2008b) distinguish two categories of development planning, which are denoted technical planning and social learning process planning. Technical planning encompasses economic planning and physical development planning whereas social learning process planning embraces interpretative, communicative and collaborative planning (Dale, 2004; Theron, 2008b; Tsheola, 2012). The latter category of planning is the most appropriate in the context where public participation is required because it allows for back-and-forth communication, shared interpretation of the fears and anxieties about the future as well as collaborative imagination of action to reduce future uncertainties. The primary contention is that if the public are the direct beneficiaries, their participation and stake in the planning process are primate (Tsheola, 2012). To this extent, the knowledge of the lay persons in the community is expected to be respected and treasured in shaping the service delivery decisions and implementation because they are, as it were, “for the people”. Delivery of physical projects such as roads, clinics, schools and dams may as well cause discontent, notwithstanding the potential spin-offs of services therefrom, if beneficiaries were not afforded the opportunity to influence the content, structure and agency involved through




integrated participatory development planning. Therefore, planning activities are important conceptual tools for understanding the discrepancies between public participation in service delivery planning and implementation. Often, communities are surprised during implementation of activities that do not relate to the decisions that they had sought to influence through public participation in service delivery planning. The norm appears to be that the process of public participation in service delivery planning is just a formality of deliberations that would later be superseded by the technocratic balances for efficacy and cost-benefit interests. Public participation in service delivery planning is therefore rendered nominal if the inputs, aspirations, fears, considerations and uncertainties felt by the beneficiary communities do not ultimately shape activities that are implemented. In essence, public participation in serve delivery planning should manifest in implementation activities to signal “people power”, “popular control” and “political equality” as well as to demonstrate that “democracy is at work” (Beetham, 1998; Kubiak, 1998; Villoro, 1998).

Service delivery planning entails decision-making and management of change to reduce uncertainties about public goods such as water, electricity, roads and transport, education and schools, health care and clinics, and so on, all of which have a distinguished potential to affect human dignity. Hence, such planning of service delivery should, as the adage has it, “be about people”. The latter links service delivery planning directly to the necessity of people involvement, which is commonly described as public participation. The exercise of “people power” in its totality and inclusivity of community in public decision-making is the observance of two primary principles of democracy (“popular control and political equality”). Active citizenry is central to democracy, planning, public participation and service delivery, which are all intricately interwoven in a nexus of “people power” for popular control, equality, respect for human dignity and rights. Thus, it is befitting to conclude this section with Beetham’s (1998: 21) formulations that “Democracy is always a matter of the degree to which certain principles are realized, rather than some final state of perfection.” That is, the principle of public participation for civic ownership of service delivery planning decisions in most of South Africa’s informal settlements and townships remain unattained. South African’s Public Administration is overwhelmed by analyses that emphasize democracy as “a system of government”, thereby focusing on the political institutions as though their forms mattered more than their content. Theoretically, this paper accepts Beetham’s (1998) and Villoro’s (1998) conceptualization of democracy in terms of its basic principles because it allows for examination of its pragmatic operations beyond the political structures. Democracy begins and ends with the citizenry, who simultaneously consists of its focus because its sustainability draws from people’s “ability and willingness to play a part in common affairs” (Beetham, 1998: 22) and to acknowledge self-responsibility as well as respect for others’ rights, human dignity, political equality, differentness and expression of views.

397


SOUTH AFRICA’S STRUCTURES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SERVICE DELIVERY PLANNINGAccording to Ramaphosa (1998: 74), “One of the main elements of democracy

must surely be the provision of access for the people to the key centres of power”. Twenty years on, does the South African citizenry exercise “people power” in its totality and inclusivity for popular control and equality of basic service delivery? A democratic South Africa’s Supreme Law provides for development planning at the municipality scale (RSA, 1996). Expected to be democratic and accountable to local communities, municipalities are required to ensure public participation in the provision of services (RSA, 1996, Section 152(a-e)). Section 153 (a, b) of the Constitution further stresses the requirement for planning for participatory community socio-economic development and delivery of basic needs. All other structures of public participation, including that in service delivery planning, are crafted in consort with the provisions of the Supreme Law of the Nation. It is not by coincidence that the 1997 White Paper on Transforming Service Delivery clearly requires public participation in the decision-making processes about prioritization of services as well as insurance of the highest standards in the provision of specified quantity and quality (RSA, 1997, Section 1.3.3). Given the popularity of the adage that “development is about people” in a democratic South Africa, the definition of municipalities as developmental in the White Paper on Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (RSA, 1998) should entail a necessary extension that “service delivery is about people”.

Social development planning, consistent with the social learning process planning, is further provided for through the Local Government Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 (RSA, 2000). This Act purposefully establishes and outlines integrated developmentally-oriented planning process for municipalities (RSA, 2000, Section 23, a, b). There is unambiguous stipulation of the process that municipalities are required to adhere to for public consultation, political deliberations on prioritization of community development needs as well as drafting of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) (RSA, 2000, Section 29(1)). Through the structures of the IDP, municipalities as well as the 2004 Community Development Workers Programme (CDWP) have been expected to give the necessary agency to fast-track service delivery (Tshishonga & Mafema, 2010). There was hope that the CDWP would allow for inclusivity in service delivery planning (Tshishonga & Mafema, 2010; Tsheola, 2012). Inherently, constitutional and legislative provisions for public participation in service delivery planning decision-making are an acknowledgement that the processes involve making choices, which may tendencially become “ad hoc and misdirected”. The latter can be expected to become worse if government’s choice is not couched through popular voices, aspirations, fears and uncertainties of the publics. Theoretically, South Africa’s legislative structures adequately provides for inclusiveness, consultation,




partnership, integration, coordination, strategic prioritization, spatial sensitivities and sustainability of public participation in service delivery decisions-making processes and implementation activities. These structures should, therefore, equally allow for normative future-oriented municipal service delivery planning that is focused on public participation.

Through the complex process of public participation, the community is expected to be involved in the establishment of consensus on priorities, in accordance with commonly shared social goals, to mute conflict and educate society about collectivism of welfare (Mzimakwe, 2010; Tsheola, 2012). The social learning processes in service delivery planning public participation enable communicative knowledge and information exchange that should alert community that setting service delivery priorities does not entail fixed targets because challenges too are in a state of flux. A proper conception of democracy should focus on a citizenry that appreciates the preceding point. Unsurprisingly, South Africa’s IDPs processes are undergirded by the rationale that public participation begins with the decision-making on priorities rather than later, and that it is a continuous process that encompass implementation activities and the on-going management of change (Mzimakwe, 2010; Tsheola, 2012). The violent public protests about service delivery and attendant fatalistic state violence in a democratic South Africa suggest that municipalities have not as yet adequately democratized the planning processes as provided for by legislative structures. Apparently, the heavy reliance on outsourcing to the private sector, as insinuated in the 2013/2014 Madibeng Municipality water saga, could perhaps explain the discrepancies between political deliberations for consensus building in service delivery planning and the implementation activities. Has the service delivery planning decision-making process being undermined through implementation activities that are pre-emptively goaded by the private sector? Implementation of service delivery activities devoid of public participation consensus should suggest that planning has become a nominal decision-making process to serve the interest of formalities, devoid of democracy. South Africa’s Constitution does not entail direct democracy and full participation; instead, it provides for representation (RSA, 1996). But if implementation activities do not conform to the aspirations of the public as expressed through the municipal service delivery decision-making processes and codified in the IDPs, then the municipalities themselves lack the agency to conform with the priorities expressed in its own popular development plan. Do municipalities ignore the consensus on service delivery priorities established through political deliberations of “people power” and popular control in the interest of technocratic convenience? If active citizenry is the focus, beginning and end of democracy, in whose convenience do municipalities manage change through service delivery planning and implementation?

399


INTERFACE OF SERVICE DELIVERY PLANNING, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PRIVATIONMalherbe & Van Eck (2009, 209) concede that “After a positive, almost euphoric

start, the constitution has in recent years become threatened by the state’s endemic failure to fulfil its constitutional and legal duties”. Indeed, informal settlements in South Africa are evidence that providing services such as housing has remained a daunting task (Rubin, 2011; Lekonyane & Disoloane, 2013), and this phenomenon could realistically become a permanent feature of the national landscape. Its persistence would imply that a significant majority of South Africans would continue to be deprived of access to basic services such as housing, water, sanitation, electricity and transport, at the constitutionally-mandated standards, quantity and quality (Malherbe & Van Eck, 2009). Such a context could become socially, economically and political unstable (Rubin, 2011; Lekonyane & Disoloane, 2013). Twenty years after the dawn of democracy, would it be far-fetched to contemplate the thought that the democratic state has materially neglected its constitutional responsibility? A response in the affirmative would concede that South Africa’s globally celebrated democracy has not translated into “lived experiences” of democracy for the majority of the poor.

South Africa’s legislative structures of service delivery planning public participation are evidently complex; and, the question is whether municipalities constitute the necessary agency to deliver at the required standards, quantity and quality. Do municipalities have the agency to popularize the decision-making consensus in respect of services prioritization, standards, quantity and quality? This questioning is not complete because the framing cannot escape the matter of public’s civic maturation in respect of understanding that planning involves competing priorities, and that the implementation activities may not almost always carry their wishes and aspirations. Democracy too entails public and state tolerance. There is no intent here or anywhere in the paper to insinuate that technical planning attempts to balance the diverse and competing priorities. If truth be told, technical planning priorities do not involve political deliberations and consensus building arising from public participation. That the promise of democracy in service delivery planning has waned in the past twenty years is evident in that whereas 76% of South Africans were confident that the country was heading in the right direction in the 1994-1999 political term, this proportion has dropped to 42.8% in the 2009-2014 period (RSA, 2012). Statistics released by the Cabinet in March 2012 show that since 1994 every other government elected into power would have contributed to the dampening of the popularity of public perceptions of the country going in the right direction (figure 1). Essentially, South Africa appears to have experienced democracy as “a system of government” through, among other institutions, elections rather than as an “ideal of political association” for assertion of “people power”, popular control and equality.




Figure 1: Public perceptions of South Africa going in the right direction

Source: RSA (2012)

There is a systematic general trend of decline in public perceptions of South Africa going in the right direction. This trend is an indictment on the democracy because it could imply that the public does not shape the direction South Africa is taking, notwithstanding their voting. Whereas election year appears to bring hope, subsequent years evidently consist of disappointment about the direction of the country. On average, the proportion of South Africans whose perceptions were that the country is going into the right direction was 61% during the 1994-1999 political term, declining to 53% (1999-2004), then 66% (2004-2009) and 50% (2009-2014) (computed from RSA, 2012 data). This trend is correlated with the 2000 and 2003/2004 promise of democratization and fast-tracking of service delivery through the structures of public participation in the IDP and CDWP, respectively. This statistical measure of the strength of public perceptions about the right direction declined to a low of 45% in November 2011 (RSA, 2012). Evidently, democracy is not at work if the public disown the decision-making processes and overwhelmingly feel that the country has taken a wrong direction.

This grim reality is corroborated by the decline in the proportion of turnout of voting age population in the 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 national elections which were 86%, 71.2%, 57.8% and 65%, respectively (RSA, 2012). There is acceptance that the voter participation “is unlikely to reach the heights of 1999” (RSA, 2012: 55) which is the clearest indication of voter apathy that cannot be explained away from the frustration with the unrealistic promises of “a better life for all” and non-democratization of service delivery planning. Cabinet accepts that “There has been

401


a general decline in public opinion about government’s performance in delivering services since November 2006. … (which) coincided with the high prevalence of service delivery protests across many municipalities” (RSA, 2012: 85). In a period of nine years between 2002 and 2011, public perceptions about government “performing well” in delivering basic services dropped by almost 23 percentage points (figure 2).

In this context, the scapegoat presented by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA, 2009: 18) that municipalities have become terrain for “factional conflicts, political infighting and patronage” has to be questioned for its validity. Whereas these dynamics could be playing out within municipalities, service delivery failures cannot be dismissed as consequences of “political parties that undermine the integrity and functioning of municipal councils through intra- and inter-party conflicts and inappropriate interference in councils and administration” (CoGTA, 2009: 18). There are substantive reasons of service delivery planning and the discrepancies between the decision-making processes and the implementation activities. Given these statistically-established trends in public opinion, this paper strongly assert that the decline in positive public perceptions of government’s performance in basic service delivery corroborates those negative trends in voter participation and the country taking the right direction. Public perceptions of government “performing well” in the delivery of basic services has systematically dropped from 73% in 2002 to 50% in 2011 (RSA, 2012). Together, these trends in public perceptions confirm that the public does not experience democracy as “people power”, “popular control” and “political equality”, especially in service delivery planning. Hence, civic tolerance on the part of both the publics and the state has virtually collapsed.

Figure 2: National public perceptions of government “performing well” in basic services delivery, 2002-2011

Source: RSA (2012)

These statistical trends confirm Nzimakwe’s (2010) and Tsheola’s (2012)




observations that service delivery planning in South Africa, notwithstanding the legislative structures for public participation, has lacked agency. Essentially, the promise of democracy in service delivery has been usurped by perverse reliance on technocratic professionals who do not understand the significance of political deliberations and consensus building in sustainable resolution of societal problems. Public participation in development planning is one of the key tenets of the rules of democracy; and, if the democratic state flouts the principles of democracy, poor communities in informal settlements too should be expected to ignore the rules of the game. It is in this context that this paper asserts that the mushrooming of violent protests about service delivery is reflective of the state’s lack of compliance with the constitutional duties, which ultimately undermines sustainability of democracy itself (Malherbe & Van Eck, 2009). Perhaps, the question of “which and whose democracy” (Villoro, 1998: 95) has become relevant for South Africa, twenty years after 1994. South Africa’s informal settlements expose communities to atrocious conditions of living; and, this observation remains relevant to date (Mzimakwe, 2010; NPC, 2012; Tsheola & Sebola, 2012; Alloggio & Thomas, 2013). It is not farfetched to insinuate that poor people have not as yet accessed democracy in South Africa because their voices continue to be socially excluded from the political deliberations that shape the implementation activities for service delivery, thereby allowing for the fomentation of conflicts and violent protests.

The legislative structures provided for democratization, such as the IDP and CDWP, have not given pragmatic effect to the principles of democracy (popular control and political equality). Mainstream models of development planning and the practice thereof failed to prioritize citizenry and its public participation as the beginning, focus and end of democracy. It can be asserted that the mushrooming of violent service delivery protests imply that South Africa’s democracy has not led to the realization of the principles of “popular control and political equality” because by their nature they signal a failure to establish publicly active citizenry “which is capable of exercising tolerance” (Beetham, 1998: 22). Indeed, democracy is paradoxical because “it can become its own enemy and yield to the temptation of one extreme or the other: authoritarianism or indifference”. Twenty years on, South Africa appears to be caught in the latter.

PUBLICS AND STATE INTOLERANCE: FALTERING SERVICE DELIVERY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION DEMOCRACYJust like any other developing country, South Africa pleads poverty of resources

because of capital scarcity and non-existent culture of savings; consequently, decisions about service delivery priorities and infrastructure investments are exceedingly complex (NPC, 2011). Simultaneously, deprivation has remained deep (Mbeki, 2009; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013). There is a strong coincidence of lack of societal tolerance, violent service delivery protests and state agencies’ culture of fatalistic violence against the publics. The NPC (2011) acknowledges

403


that the South African society’s “social fabric” is deeply fragmented. Evidently, there exist “social exclusion, mistrust and a fragmentation of society” (Manuel, 2011: 35). Cabinet already accepts that there is coincidence in the decline of positive public perception of government’s performance in basic service delivery and violent protests (RSA, 2012).

Regulatory planning has not succeeded anywhere in the world where poverty, deprivation and inequality are deep (Mbeki, 2009; Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013). South Africa, with its deprived majority population living in squalid informal settlements, cannot become an exception to the norm. Advocacy planning, which sets out to serve public interests, holds the potential to ensure that political deliberations about prioritization of services and that consensus established regarding implementation could be pragmatically shaped through popular control and public participation. The determination of priorities about services is a political and, sometimes, ideological decision, implying that service delivery planning is equally a process of political and ideological decision-making. To this extent, public participation is central to the success of service delivery under the prevailing financial constraints because it is about “people power”, totality and inclusivity of democracy.

CONCLUSIONThis paper argued that in the past twenty years democracy has faltered because

there is evidence of the paucity of “people power”, “popular control” and political equality in service delivery planning and public participation. Persistent downward spiral of public perceptions of government performance in basic service delivery, enduring voter apathy and negative judgments of the direction the country is taking, which coincided with violent protests across South Africa, cannot be ignored. Notwithstanding the constitutional mandate, “the majority of South Africans are still besieged with complex developmental challenges, including unemployment, poverty, and inequalities” (Qwabe, 2013: 21). It is unsurprising that over the past twenty years the democratic state has incessantly attempted versions of service delivery, culminating into the present National Development Plan 2030 Vision (Alloggio & Thomas, 2013; Qwabe, 2013). In a special issue of Social Dynamics dedicated to the NDP, Alloggio & Thomas (2013: 109) observe:

The rhetoric of active citizenry adds insult to injury: those who suffered the worst forms of injustice under apartheid are now liberal subjects who are cast as responsible for their failure to transcend and transform the harshness of life post-apartheid.

This observation is compelling because it exposes the discrepancies of the national political rhetoric of “a better life for all” and the twenty years of quotidian experiences. It is for these same reasons that the democratic state has, accepting the limitations of resources, provided for legislative structures that would democratize




service delivery planning decision-making processes in order to ensure public participation, tolerance and civic content. But South Africa’s democracy has not been realized in practice as an ongoing process of learning, mutual education and tolerance for both the state and the citizenry. Giving pragmatic effect to democracy as an ideal of people power, totality and inclusivity of political association has eluded South Africa. Massuh (1998: 67) states that democracy is so complex that “It requires a high degree of rationality in a world dominated by irrational stimuli of passion, propaganda …” and so on. In South Africa violent service delivery protests are met with state’s fatalistic violence. This paper concedes that democratization of service delivery through legislative structures of public participation in planning has faltered over the past twenty years.

LIST OF REFERENCESAlloggio, S. & Thomas, K. 2013. Resisting the lure of deferral: realising the South

African National Development Plan. Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 39(1): 108-110.

Beetham, D. 1998. Democracy: key principles, institutions and problems. In Inter-Parliamentary Union (ed.) Democracy: Its Principles and Achievements. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, pp. 21-29.

Calland, R. 2013. The Zuma Years: South Africa’s Changing Face of Power. Cape Town: Zebra Press.

Dale, R. 2004. Development Planning: Concepts and Tools for Planners, Managers and Facilitators. London: Zed Books.

Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). 2009. Local Government Turnaround Strategy. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Habib, A. 2013. South Africa’s Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Kubiak, H. 1998. Democracy and the individual will. In Inter-Parliamentary Union (ed.) Democracy: Its Principles and Achievements. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, pp. 57-65.

Lekonyane, B.C. & Disoloane, V.P.P. 2013. Determining strategies to manage informal settlements: the case of City of Tshwane Municipality. Administratio Publica, 21(2): 57-71.

Mafunisa, M.J. 2010. The myth of the dichotomy in the South African local government. Journal of Public Administration, 45(4): 544-560.

Malherbe, R. & Van Eck, M. 2009. The state’s failure to comply with its constitutional duties and its impact on democracy. TSAR, 2: 209-224.

Massuh, V. 1998. Democracy: a delicate balance and universality. In Inter-Parliamentary Union (ed.) Democracy: Its Principles and Achievements. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, pp. 67-71.

Mbeki, M. 2009. Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing. Johannesburg: Picador Africa.

National Planning Commission (NPC) 2011. Diagnostic Report. Pretoria: The Presidency.

National Planning Commission (NPC) 2012. National Development Plan 2013: Our Future – Make it Work. Pretoria: The Presidency.

Nzimakwe, T. 2010. Public participation and engagement in local governance: a South African perspective. Journal of Public Administration, 45(4): 501-519.

405

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationQwabe, B.R. 2013. Realising South Africa’s Vision 2030: a capacity-building

perspective. Administratio Publica, 21(2): 21-36.Ramaphosa, C. 1998. The main elements of democracy: a South African experience.

In Inter-Parliamentary Union (ed.) Democracy: Its Principles and Achievements. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, pp. 73-79.

Reddy, P.S. & Sabelo, T. 1997. Democratic decentralization and central/provincial/local relations in South Africa. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 10(7): 572-588.

Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2000. Local Government: Municipal Systems Act No 32 of 2000. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2002. Planning Profession Act No. 36 of 2002. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2007. Development indicators mid-term review. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2012. Development Indicators. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Richman, T. & Hendricks, S. 2013. Ja, Well, No, Fine: An Alternative Guide to South Africa. Kenilworth: Burnet Media.

Rubin, M. 2011. Perceptions of corruption in the South African Housing allocation and delivery programme: What it may mean for accessing the state. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 46(5): 479-490.

Theron, F. (ed). 2008a. The Development Change Agent: A Micro-level Approach to Development. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F. 2008b. The change agent-project beneficiary partnership in development planning: theoretical perspectives. In Theron, F. (ed). The Development Change Agent: A Micro-level Approach to Development. Pretoria: Van Schaik, pp. 41-75.

Tsheola, J. 2012. Theorising a democratic developmental state: issues of public service delivery planning and violent protests in South Africa. Journal of Public Administration 47(1): 161-179.

Tsheola, J.P. and Sebola, M.P. 2012. Post-apartheid public service delivery and the dilemmas of state capitalism in South Africa, 1996-2009. Public Administration and Development 47(1.1): 228-250.

Tshishonga, N. & Mafema, E.D. 2010. Policy development for service delivery through Community Development Workers Programme in South Africa: exploring the implications of placing a cart before the horse. Journal of Public Administration, 45(4): 561-583.

Villoro, L. 1998. Which democracy? In Inter-Parliamentary Union (ed.) Democracy: Its Principles and Achievements. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, pp. 95-103.




STUDENT EXPERIENCES OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN AN ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT AT A HIGHER EDUCATION

INSTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

E.J. van der WesthuizenDepartment of Public Administration and ManagementUniversity of South Africa

ABSTRACT

This research was undertaken to determine the actual level of student satisfaction with service delivery levels in an academic department at a higher education institution in South Africa. A quantitative research

approach was used employing survey research through a questionnaire. The target group consisted of 1 033 Public Administration students from which a sample of 194 students was randomly drawn. Data was subjected to descriptive statistics and all the constructs were tested for reliability and validity by conducting the Cronbach’s alpha. To check for significant differences between the demographics of population and age, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. A major result revealed that the respondents had overall high expectations for service delivery. They also perceived the experiences of service delivery as overwhelmingly positive. It was found that empathy and accessibility do not make considerable contributions to students’ experiences of quality services. These results support the principles of the SERVQUAL model, implying that the general experiences of the respondents can be classified as new knowledge in service delivery literature. The results may serve as guidelines to a follow-up study and may be extended to other academic modules in the same academic department. The results may also contribute to better comprehension of service delivery matters

INTRODUCTION The private monitoring agency “Municipal IQ” counted 111 service delivery

protests in 2010. Gauteng experienced the most protests (38%), followed by the Western Cape (16%) (Municipal IQ 2010: internet). These protests have a negative impact on the capacity of the state and ultimately on the economy of the country, reflecting a broader failure in the entire public service delivery system. Although the South African government’s service delivery principles, mandated mainly in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery of 1997 (Republic of South Africa 1997(b): internet), comply with international standards, and are well established, research reveals that there is a gap between public policy formulation and implementation of government programmes in terms of service delivery (Open

407


Society Foundation for South Africa 2007: internet). Information about poor service delivery in the education sector is widely

available. For example, in a study conducted by Ghadamosi and De Jager (2009, 890) it was revealed that students’ perceived experiences with services at two universities of technology were significantly lower than their expectations of services at their universities. Particular areas of concern were, among others, the following: problems with registration; poor support from administrative staff; use of temporary staff at peak registration periods and poor computer facilities.

A major internal quality management investigation (audit) was also conducted at the particular university (University 1) where this study has been done. The audit was done during 2008 under the auspices of the Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC) of the Council on Higher Education. The HEQC has the statutory responsibility to conduct institutional audits as indicated in the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 (Republic of South Africa 1997(a): internet) and the National Qualifications Framework Act 67 of 2008 (Republic of South Africa 2008: internet). Report number 24 of the HEQC identified service delivery as one of the main indicators of improvement in terms of quality management at University 1. Specifically, the report indicated that the university addresses student dissatisfaction with service delivery at the different stages of the student process and finds solutions for both bad service and system failure in such a manner that it realises the promises made in the institution’s service charter’(Republic of South Africa 2011: internet).

Against the background of the HEQC audit, several other service delivery surveys were conducted at University 1 (at university and college levels) with the aim of gaining insight into students’ experiences pertaining to the services provided. A 2009 research study commissioned by Employer 1 revealed that student satisfaction levels had declined from 2005 to 2009. Research variables showing the lowest satisfaction ratings among 2009 students include, among others, aspects such as registration, student support and the Student Representative Council (University 1 2009: internet). Given that service delivery is a high priority at Employer 1, College 1 has acknowledged annual surveys among students as one of the methods to measure student satisfaction levels. One of the most interesting findings of the 2007 research, for example, was that students were generally satisfied with the service delivery levels in College 1. An average satisfaction score (mean) of 5.33 was obtained for the constructs of the different business units on a 7-point Likert scale. Scores above 4 reflect that students are generally satisfied with the services. Although the satisfaction levels were relatively high, many satisfaction items were also scored low by the students who participated in the study. The lowest-scoring satisfaction items include, among others, the following: time between receiving study material and first assignment; communication support systems; availability of lecturers and tutors; individual attention and availability of discussion classes (University 1 2009: internet).

E.J. van der Westhuizen



Thus, given the history of poor service delivery in the higher education sector, and the fact that no specific service delivery research has been done among third-year students in Academic Department 1 at University 1, it was considered advisable to verify the expectations and actual level of service delivery that the academic department provides to these students. The researcher is of the opinion that clear benefits may potentially ensue from understanding the actual service requirements of these students. Tracing the expectations and levels of service delivery offered to these students could enable Academic Department 1 to act upon areas requiring improvement. Against this background, the following pertinent research question was raised to simultaneously serve as the research problem: What are the expectations and the perceived experiences with current service delivery levels) among a selected group of third-year students in Academic Department 1 at University 1?

The rest of the article is structured as follows: A review of service delivery literature is presented. The research design is outlined and justified next, and is followed by the research findings (results) and discussions. The implications for further research are then presented and, finally, conclusions with research limitations and practical and theoretical implications are highlighted.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SERVICE DELIVERY In this part of the article details are given of selected theoretical aspects of

service delivery and the different options available for measuring service delivery in the higher education sector are analysed.

Expectations theory In the services context the central point of measuring service delivery is the

disconfirmation of expectations theory. There has always been extensive deliberation about the best way to quantify education services. On the one hand, Cheng and Tam (1997, 23) point out that ‘service delivery in higher education is a rather vague and controversial concept’. On the other hand, it is well acknowledged that ‘universities are increasingly finding themselves in an environment that is conducive to understanding the role and importance of service delivery’ (Shank, Walker and Hayes (1995, cited in Brochado 2009, 176). As a result of the difficulty in defining measurement methodologies, different approaches have emerged, leading to the inclusion or not of expectations as a determinant of the service. This difference in meaning has led to two different paradigms: the disconfirmation paradigm (expectations) and the perception paradigm (perceived experiences) (Ekinci 2004, cited in Petruzzellis, D’Uggento and Romanazzi 2006, 351]. Obviously, these two paradigms provide for both positive and negative disconfirmations. This relationship is supported by the literature, both theoretically and empirically (Angell, Heffernan and Megicks 2008, 238-239).

Although the disconfirmation of expectations theory provides a respectable

409


framework to compare expectations and experiences of services, it is deficient in the quantitative details that can be applied universally (Ling, Chai and Piew 2010, 3-4). Despite the shortcomings of the disconfirmation paradigm, the existing literature does support the relationship between these two paradigms. In this article, therefore, the disconfirmation of expectations theory is adopted as a platform to measure the PHRM students’ expectations and perceived experiences of service delivery in Academic Department 1.

Service delivery The literature on service delivery highlights the importance for the higher

education sector to examine the services that are provided by their institutions in order to commit themselves to constant improvements in terms of service delivery. However, there is a widespread debate in the literature about the best way to define service delivery (Khoshafian 2007, 311-312). From their research Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985, 42) conclude that ‘service delivery, amongst others, includes a measure of how well the service level has been achieved, or matches customer expectations’. This definition is echoed by Zeithaml (1988, 3-5) who states that ‘perceived service delivery reflects the opinion of the customer regarding the superiority ... of a product or service’. In his research on service delivery Pupo (2010, 75-76) highlights the customer factor by claiming that ‘there is no better proxy for the long-term economic potential of a business ... than the strength of its customer-satisfaction ratings’. These three quotations clearly show that service delivery should be judged by the customers’ assessments. In the higher education context, according to research by Tait and De Jager (2009, 1027), that obviously involves the education experiences of the students who are regarded as one of the primary customers. Generally, the experiences of students as customers take place internally (internal customers) and are based on the assessment of all the critical components of the education system, including inputs as well as outputs. Some authors are of the opinion that the traditional methods of assessing service delivery levels in higher education, namely measuring input levels such as expenditure per student and number of library volumes, are deficient.

Nowadays, service delivery is also being driven by outcomes assessment, which requires measuring the desired results of a particular instructional or education effort that is more strongly directed to the learning process. Other service delivery outcomes include the assessment of quality in teaching and learning and measuring the quality of the total student experience. According to a study by Abouchedid and Nasser (2002, 199) all these approaches are based on subjective student expectations and perceptions which are indispensable for service delivery and institutional promotion. Sometimes these student satisfaction assessments may be used as an instrument for closing the gap between the conventional views on how to advance higher education, and more market-oriented approaches. Market-related strategies are not inappropriate for current higher education institutions where there is a well known understanding of the teaching methods and processes




as a long-term investment in students’ lives (Gallifa and Batallé 2010, 157). These perspectives call attention to a new way of understanding service delivery as an outcome. Thus, student expectations and perceptions are strategic variables to be studied in this context and are regarded as being important for the focus of this article. Research of this kind will not only widen the scope of service delivery at University 1, but it will also give a broader understanding of the main theme of the study.

Conceptual frameworkApproaches to measuring service delivery have been based mainly on the

disconfirmation of expectations theory. Despite the many proposed alternatives to this theory, the centre of contemporary academic debate on service delivery is, according to Gallifa and Batallé (2010, 157), on the merits of the SERVQUAL model, first proposed by Parasuraman et al. (1985, 44). This model puts together both the dimensions of ‘expectations’ and ‘perceptions’ (experiences), reducing student prejudice caused by academic related events that might be manipulating their rating decisions in terms of service delivery. The advantage of dealing with the expectations and experiences of students simultaneously provides an opportunity for expressions based on needs, concerns and experiences as a collective whole.

In practice, the SERVQUAL model makes use of selected dimensions of the disconfirmation of expectations theory, suggesting that the difference (gap) between ‘expected’ and ‘perceived’ (experiences) service delivery levels by and large uncovers the students’ service assessment. From a structural point of view, 22 items were initially included in the model overseeing ten service delivery factors. However, wide-ranging statistical analysis exposed noteworthy correlations between many of the variables. This justified the case for reducing the ten variables to the current five, namely tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance and empathy (Brochado 2009, 176; Pupo 2010, 72).

Although the SERVQUAL model has been used extensively in the past, it has been subjected to criticism as well. Basically, the criticisms boil down to dimensional issues. On the dimensional criticisms, there is still much disagreement on the framework and the quantity of the dimensions (Hoffman and Bateson 2006, cited in Ling et al. 2010, 5). Owing to the perceived shortcomings in the SERVQUAL model, the researcher conducted a comprehensive study of various other service models and official service delivery documents at University 1 to ensure that this study is industry-related. A background study was done of University 1’s 2015 Strategic Plan, University 1’s Service Charter, College 1’s Service Charter, School 1’s Service Charter and Academic Department 1’s Teaching and Learning Code (Khoshafian 2007, 72-75; University 1 2011(a): internet; University 1 2011(b): internet; University 1 2011(c): internet; University 1 2011(d): internet; University 1 2011(e): internet). The different variables were slightly refined so that the items were mainly similar to the dimensions of the SERVQUAL model. This was done to

411


ensure that validity checks would not create unexpected results due to the problems of construct validity. The researcher identified the following five dimensions of the service delivery concept:

• Accessibility. Access to services and approachability: access to departmental website, access to university’s website, academic staff in person, phone, e-mail and fax.

• Tangibles. Appearance of facilities, staff and study material: general helpfulness of staff, handling of enquiries, convenience of operating hours, user-friendliness of tutorial letters and study guides and visual appearance of the departmental website.

• Reliability. Capacity to carry out the promised service in accurate ways: academic competence of lecturing staff, politeness of administrative staff, delivery of study material to empower students, availability of staff during operating hours, and handling of enquiries in a satisfactory way.

• Responsiveness. Prompt attention and speedy response: general experience with efficiency, rapid response in dealing with enquiries, turnaround time with the marking of assignments, information in study material and departmental website.

• Empathy. Compassion and individual attention to student needs: staff members’ care for students, experience with individual attention, patience levels of staff, willingness to assist and follow-up actions.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGYThe sections below provide an overview of the research design and methodology. DesignThis study is an exploratory research project, because globally and locally

there are limited studies that investigate service delivery matters in academic departments. An exploratory research project is often undertaken to fill the void in the literature in areas of inquiry that are new or under-studied, and existing areas where the research problems have been insufficiently answered. There was no study found locally that investigated service delivery in Academic Department 1. More particularly, a one-group post test-only design was chosen, because the focus was on a single group of third year students that was studied only once (De Vos 2001, 125-126). Basically, it involves the measuring of expectations and experiences of one group of respondents (unit of analysis - PHRM students) that were subjected to different forms of service delivery during a particular academic year.

MethodologyAccording to the literature, most of the studies on service delivery are both

quantitative and qualitative in nature frequently using, for example, questionnaires, case study experiences, literature studies and interviews (Angell, Heffernan and Megicks 2008, 242). This study was exploratory (the first of its kind in Academic




Department 1) in nature using a quantitative research approach to understand what students consider to be good quality of tuition and related services. Within the quantitative paradigm, the empirical method of investigation (survey) was used, which means the researcher used a questionnaire to assemble the data. The questionnaire included closed-ended questions. In order to inform the literature review and support the structured questionnaire, the evidence sources used were academic textbooks, Internet sources, government legislation and official university documents. In addition, journal articles were consulted, which was believed to be the most appropriate form of investigation to convey service delivery documentation.

Population, sampling and sampling methodBased on the arguments of Gallifa and Batallé (2010, 161) it can be accepted

that students’ acquaintance levels with a higher education institution will extend over time. In fact, these authors are of the opinion that ‘in their final year, students have an accurate perception of the institution and of its elements which can be understood as perceptions of service delivery. Usually at this time students also have some critical viewpoints.’ The group of respondents was selected using simple probability sampling in which each element (student) in the population had a known (and not-zero probability) chance of being included in the sample. For this reason, a finite population group consisting of 1 033 third-year students (which means all the elements were counted) was chosen, because perceptions are usually more critical at this level of study. Data was collected using the ‘personal contact’ approach during group discussions for those students registered during a particular semester of an academic year at the Limpopo Hub, the Gauteng Hub, the Western Cape Hub and the KwaZulu-Natal Regional Office. The questionnaire (with a covering letter) was also distributed electronically and by mail to those students who were not able to attend the group discussions. These students were registered at the Eastern Cape Hub, the Mpumalanga Sub-region Hub and the Midlands Regional Office. The sample (194) was well balanced with regard to student origin (28% from Limpopo; 25% from Gauteng; 17% from KwaZulu-Natal; 13% from the Western Cape; 8% from the Eastern Cape; 6% from other provinces; 3% from Mpumalanga), gender (62% female and 38% male), population group (70% Africans, 13% coloureds, 9% whites and 8% Asians) and age group (34% in the age group 30-39 years; 30% in the age group 20-29 years; 25% in the age group 40-49 years; 11% in the age group above 50 years). Responses were obtained from 53 students, which imply that the response rate represented 27.3% of the sample.

Research instrumentThe research instrument used for the study was a questionnaire which was a

slight variation of the SERVQUAL model of Parasuraman et al. (1985) referred to above. Compilation of the questionnaire involved the following stages:

413


• Analysis of the literature obtaining service delivery concepts, related procedures and dimensions and items to be included in the questionnaire.

• Analysis of service delivery questionnaires already used in other institutions, such as the South African Public Service Commission.

• Selection of experts in service delivery of the Bureau for Market Research and the Quality Assurance Promotion Unit at University 1 to explore factors that would be relevant from the students’ viewpoints for evaluating the quality of services.

• Compilation of the structured questionnaire.• Completion of a pilot study involving five randomly chosen staff members

in Academic Department 1. Data was collected by means of a structured questionnaire encompassing

four sections. Section A was confined to four questions where students were required to respond on their biographical characteristics such as population and age (independent variables). Section B and C required students to evaluate the expectations and the perceived experiences with current service delivery levels of Academic Department 1 respectively (dependent variables). More particularly, Section B consisted of expectation dimensions and Section C of perceived experienced dimensions obtained from the original SERVQUAL model and adapted to University’s 1 context. A five-point Likert-scale, where the options were anchored from ‘very high’ on the one hand to ‘very low’ on the other, was used. The draft questionnaire was initially subjected to pilot testing with a total of five staff members chosen at random from Academic Department 1. These staff members were requested to remark on any perceived vagueness, lapses or errors pertaining to the draft questionnaire, mainly in order to determine whether the wording of the questions was appropriate. For example, one question was slightly rephrased to ensure simplicity. The improved questionnaire was then provided to five randomly chosen experts (established researchers and quality assurance representatives) in Academic Department 1 for their opinions before being administered for the full-scale survey. These experts observed, for example, that words such as ‘learners’ should be replaced by ‘students’ and they also suggested that all the Public Administration students should be included in the study, which in fact did not correspond with the preliminary feedback. Some of the points raised by the experts were relatively insignificant. However, it was decided to add minor changes in the final version of the questionnaire for the sake of clarity. The pilot study was done to enhance the reliability and validity of the questionnaire for this particular study. Further, reliability and validity were ensured through purposive selection of the sample, selection of information according to a comprehensive literature review and data reduction after verification with the target group.

Data analysis The 53 completed questionnaires were coded and captured by means of the

statistical software programme SAS-JMP version 8.01 for Windows. Summary




tables and charts (bar and pie) were compiled in order to demonstrate the main expectations and experiences of students regarding the services received from Academic Department 1. The actual level of student satisfaction with current service delivery levels were measured using descriptive statistics (frequency and mean percentage differences). Descriptive statistics were performed in order to portray the main characteristics of the sample. In addition, the Cronbach’s alpha was used to ensure reliability of the constructs in the questionnaire. In practice, this means that the same set of items would elicit the same responses if the same questions were recast and re-administered to the same respondents for the construct. The nearer Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is to 1.0 the better the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Horton and Kleinman 2011, 156). In general, the reliability and validity analyses of the dimensions (constructs) recorded relatively high Cronbach’s alpha values. All the subscales showed a high alpha, which is an indication that the dimensions are reliable. Mean scores were calculated for each of the dimensions; thereafter an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test for significant differences between population and age.

Ethical considerationsPermission to conduct this study and obtain data was granted by the Chair of

Academic Department 1. Ethics clearance was sought from College 1 at University 1. The Ethics Committee could not grant clearance because application was done after the research had already commenced. However, the researcher has applied for ethical compliance in terms of the University’s Ethics Policy. Hence, an ethical compliance certificate has been issued by the Ethics Committee of College 1 to do this research.

Storing and destroying of dataAll data and information will be stored in a high security safe in the Principal

Researcher’s office. The office is only accessible to the researcher. Data stored on the researcher’s computer is password protected. Data and information will be destroyed when it is no longer of functional value. This is projected to be five (5) years from the date of publication of this study. A record, stating what records were destroyed, when and how the researcher did so, will also be kept.

DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTSThe respondents’ expectations and experiences regarding service delivery at

Academic Department 1 and problems of service delivery are presented below. Expectations of service delivery The expectations of service delivery were measured by five items (accessibility,

tangibles, reliability, responsiveness and empathy) on a five-point Likert scale. More particularly, it was based on the following variations: 1=very high; 2=high; 3=average; 4=low and 5=very low. Overall, the scale performed well in terms of reliability and validity; the sample obtained a Cronbach’s alpha (internal

415


consistency) of 0.97 for the dimension expectations. Next, the five service items were subjected to frequency analysis and the percentages are reported below.

In general, the percentages clearly show that the respondents’ expectations (perceptions) of service delivery of Academic Department 1 mainly varied from ‘high’ to ‘very high.’ The percentage scores in the above two categories varied from 32% (lowest level in the ‘high’ category) to 49% (highest level in the ‘very high’ category). The highest percentage of respondents’ evaluations of expectations of service delivery were from responsiveness (‘very high’ = 49%), accessibility (‘very high’ = 43%) and reliability (‘very high’ = 42%). The lowest percentage of respondents’ evaluations of service expectations were from empathy (‘very high’ = 34%) and tangibles (‘very high’ = 26%).

In order to explore whether the population group and age group categories were related to respondents’ service expectations, the one-way ANOVA was performed. From this, the means were also calculated across these two biographical subgroups. The overall mean of the four population groups was 1.99 out of 5 and for the four age groups it was 1.32 out of 5. Although there were no statistically significant differences in this sample between the four population groups (Africans, coloureds, Asians and whites), there was a slight deviation between the mean scores of Africans (1.78; standard deviation=0.58) and coloureds (1.77; standard deviation=0.65) on the one hand, and Asians (2.30; standard deviation=1.04) and whites (2.12; standard deviation=1.40), on the other hand. These mean scores demonstrate that the Africans and coloureds had slightly higher service expectations of Academic Department 1 than the Asians and whites. Overall, there were also no statistically significant differences between the mean scores of three of the four age groups: 20-29 years (1.53; standard deviation=0.36); 30-39 years (1.89; standard deviation=0.74) and 40-49 years (1.88; standard deviation=0.69). However, minor differences were found in the 50+ years category (2.5; standard deviation=1.08). This implies that older respondents had slightly lower service expectations of Academic Department 1 than those in the other age groups.

The above results are consistent with earlier research that analysed the perceived service expectations of students in the scope of service activities in the academic environment. In fact, the education literature appears to offer considerable support for the interaction between the five variables listed above and the positive effect it has on respondents’ perceived service expectations (Abdullah 2006, 41; Brochado 2009:184-185; Gallifa and Batallé 2010:165-166; Ling, Chai and Piew 2010:12-14). Thus, these results support the existing literature. In addition, the results provide some important insights into the service delivery expectations of respondents at Academic Department 1 and three general conclusions can be drawn from this. The first of these conclusions deals with the differences in service expectations between the various five dimensions. Although not significant, it seems that the respondents regarded responsiveness, accessibility and reliability as the most important determinants of service delivery expectations. Academic Department 1




should, therefore, focus their service delivery attempts on the other two dimensions, namely tangibles and empathy. Failure to prioritise service delivery efforts may have a negative effect, resulting in inefficient allocation of resources. The second of these conclusions deals with the differences in service expectations between the population groups and age groups. The results indicated that Asians, whites and older students have slightly lower service expectations than the other groups. Even though these results are not significant, this study offers empirical evidence that Academic Department 1should preferably extend their service delivery efforts even further, giving attention to these particular groups.

Experiences of service deliveryOnce the frequency distribution of the service expectations had been

performed the analysis moved onto measuring the respondents’ experiences of service delivery at Academic Department 1. This procedure used the same five items (accessibility, tangibles, reliability, responsiveness and empathy) on a five-point Likert scale including the following variations: 1=poor; 2=below average; 3= average; 4=good and 5=excellent. In addition, the items were expanded to dimensions which included five items each. For example, in the accessibility dimension, items such as ‘access to departmental website’ and ‘access to the university’s website’ were included, implying that each dimension was structured in such a way that it was treated as a separate construct for analysis purposes. Descriptive and comparative statistics were used to analyse the data of these five constructs. This means that percentage scores were obtained for each of the items under the different dimensions. Analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was used to measure any statistically significant differences for the mean scores of the constructs between the population and age groups. The internal consistency of the five constructs was assessed by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for each scale. In general, all the constructs (five dimensions) achieved high scores ranging from 0.70 to 0.91. This implies that the reliability and validity were at an acceptable level for experiences of service delivery. The parts below indicate the distribution of all the responses.

The data shows that the highest percentage scores for experiences of service delivery in all five dimensions at Academic Department 1 were located between ‘average’, ‘good’ and ‘excellent’. In fact, the percentage scores in these three categories fluctuated from 11% (lowest level in the ‘average’ category) to 50% (in the ‘excellent’ category’). However, most of the highest ratings were clustered around ‘good’ and ‘excellent’. Based on the percentage scores of these two categories, the responsiveness dimension received a fairly high positive rating from the respondents (overall the most important = 69.2%). All the variables that were measured gave rise to the superiority of this dimension. With regard to responsiveness, the variables which gave rise to a positive rating were: information in study material is on track with current events (81%), updating of the departmental website (77%), turnaround time on assignments (68%), general experience with

417


efficiency (65%) and rapid responses in dealing with enquiries (55%). Based on these percentage scores, respondents gave the highest priority to the variable study material, which implies that it contributes significantly towards service delivery in Academic Department 1 from a responsive perspective. Further, as can be seen from the data, the lowest rating (55%) was scored for responses in dealing with enquiries. In addition, an examination of the one-way ANOVA statistics indicates that statistically minor differences were reported between the two biographical groups. The overall mean of the experiences of the four population groups for responsiveness was 3.49 out of 5 and for the four age groups it was 3.79 out of 5. Based on the mean analysis, three of the four groups (Africans = 4.02 [standard deviation=0.66]; coloureds = 3.40 [standard deviation=0.71]; Asians = 3.50 [standard deviation=0.70]) gave relatively high importance to responsiveness. Further examination showed that the mean score of whites (3.04 [standard deviation=0.46]) was reasonably lower. Although white students are by far the minority, it can, thus, be interpreted that Academic Department 1 is not going in the direction of responsiveness as far as white students are concerned. In this sample, there were basically no statistically differences between the mean scores of the four age groups (20-29 years = 3.75 [standard deviation=0.87]; 30-39 years = 3.78 [standard deviation=0.64]; 40-49 years = 3.98 [standard deviation=0.59]; 50+ years = 3.67 [standard deviation=0.94]) with regard to their experiences of responsiveness.

Tangibles were rated overall as the second most important dimension (68%) in terms of service delivery in the ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ categories. In this regard, a significant number of responses (84%) showed that the respondents appreciated the appearance of study material and were of the opinion that it is user-friendly. The other four variables, namely general helpfulness of academic staff (66%), attractiveness of departmental website (65%), politeness of administrative staff (64%) and convenience of operating hours (61%), were also rated fairly highly in terms of service delivery. It is interesting to note, that as in the case of responsiveness, respondents gave a noticeably high rating for study material under the tangibles dimension as well. This is clear confirmation that the services of Academic Department 1, in terms of the provision of quality study material, were experienced as being overwhelmingly positive by the vast majority of the respondents in the sample. As far as practical value is concerned, it is worth noting that all the variables in the tangible dimension are perfectly positioned in terms of service delivery. This does not, however, mean that Academic Department 1 should conduct no more service delivery improvement efforts in future to advance in this area; rather it should maintain and improve upon the firm foundation that has already been established. Based on the one-way ANOVA statistics, minor differences were found between the mean scores of the two biographical groups. Taken as a whole, the mean scores of the four population groups and the four age groups were 3.48 and 3.78 out of 5 respectively. More particularly, the mean




scores were as follows: Africans (3.99 [standard deviation=0.70]), coloureds (3.40 [standard deviation=0.64]), Asians (3.15 [standard deviation=0.60]) and whites (3.40 [standard deviation=0.58]); 20-29 years (3.71 [standard deviation=0.76]), 30-39 years (3.78 [standard deviation=0.80]), 40-49 years (4.00 [standard deviation=0.63]) and 50+ years (3.63 [standard deviation=0.70]). From these scores it is apparent that in this sample there were no statistically significant differences between the population groups and the age groups regarding their experiences of service delivery for the tangibles dimension.

Reliability was rated overall as the third most important dimension (64%) in the ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ categories concerning the delivering of services at Academic Department 1. Results obtained on the reliability variables revealed that a large number of the respondents (83%) were of the opinion that study material was of a high quality and that it empowered them as students, while a slightly lower level of consensus (61%) was measured amongst respondents pertaining to their service experiences in the handling of their academic enquiries. Further, the frequency scores disclosed that respondents rated academic competence of lecturing staff (56%) and availability of staff during official hours (56%) in the same position. The significant positive link with study material in the responsiveness, tangibles and reliability dimensions is an important signal of the interwoven nature of this variable. These results are of great interest in understanding the main trends in service experiences at Academic Department 1. It can be deduced that Academic Department 1 is showing improvement in delivering quality study material to its students. Although the ratings for academic competence and availability of staff are somewhat lower than the other variables in this dimension, it can be assumed that these variables are also strong indicators of how reliable staff in Academic Department 1 is with regard to the service experiences of the students. The one-way ANOVA statistics show that the inclusive mean scores of the experiences of the two biographical groups (population and age) were 3.58 and 3.83 out of 5 respectively. Closer analysis of the mean scores exposed the following: Africans = 4.02 (standard deviation=0.63); coloureds = 3.79 (standard deviation=0.60); Asians = 3.13 (standard deviation=0.43); whites = 3.40 (standard deviation=0.22); 20-29 years = 3.91 (standard deviation=0.60), 30-39 years = 3.86 (standard deviation=0.70), 40-49 years = 3.90 (standard deviation=0.62) and 50+ years = 3.67 (standard deviation=0.74). These scores show that there were statistically insignificant differences between the two biographical groups for reliability.

The fourth most important dimension (58%), rated by the respondents in the ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ categories, was empathy. On the first two variables, a fairly high percentage (68%) of the respondents indicated that staff members were always willing to assist, while a slightly lower percentage of respondents (63%) were of the view that staff members showed patience in the delivery of services. Results obtained on the other three variables of empathy revealed that 58% were of the view that staff members cared about students, 55% felt that individual attention

419


was given to them and 46% were of the opinion that staff members engaged in follow-up actions after contact was made. Closer inspection of the abovementioned results shows that Academic Department 1 is underachieving in follow-up actions and this should be a major cause for concern. The overall mean scores of the one-way ANOVA statistics, with regard to the experiences of the two biographical groups, revealed the following results: population groups obtained 3.33 and age groups obtained 3.63 out of 5 respectively. More particularly, the mean scores disclosed that there were no significant differences between the Africans = 3.81 (standard deviation=0.85); coloureds = 3.57 (standard deviation=0.55) and Asians = 3.06 (standard deviation=1.53). However, the whites = 2.90 (standard deviation=0.80) revealed a fairly lower score. The scores for the age groups were as follows: 20-29 years = 3.73 (standard deviation=0.92), 30-39 years = 3.43 (standard deviation=1.01), 40-49 years = 3.85 (standard deviation=0.73) and 50+ years = 3.54 (standard deviation=0.98). It is evident from these scores that there were statistically no significant differences between the two biographical groups for empathy.

Accessibility was rated as the fifth most important dimension (52%) in the ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ categories. To a certain extent, this result is understandable as University 1 is a distance-based education institution and students do not have regular contact with the lecturing staff, which may have a detrimental effect on the service experiences of students. However, the mere fact that the respondents regarded accessibility as the least important dimension points towards gaps in this area for which immediate solutions need to be found. Although the overall score for accessibility is noticeably lower than the scores of the other four dimensions, the results indicate that access to the university (73%) and the departmental websites (71%) have significant positive correlations with the overall service experiences of respondents. Despite the positive responses to two of the variables in the accessibility dimension, the quantitative results also revealed negative responses in the other four variables. Particular areas of concern for the respondents are in access to academic staff by e-mail (50%), by phone (43%), in person (40%) and by fax (37%).

Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis showed basically the same overall mean scores for the two biographical groups, namely 3.22 for the population groups and 3.48 for the age groups (out of 5) respectively. The mean scores for the population groups ranged from 3.60 (standard deviation=0.81) for Africans; 3.17 (standard deviation = 0.70) for coloureds; 3.13 (standard deviation = 0.69) for Asians; and 3 (standard de = 0.62) for whites. With regard to age groups, the one-way ANOVA analysis yielded the following mean scores: 20-29 years = 3.18 (standard deviation=0.72), 30-39 years = 3.52 (standard deviation=0.75), 40-49 years = 3.63 (standard deviation=0.96) and 50+ years = 3.61 (standard deviation=0.61). The abovementioned results show that there were statistically no significant differences between the two biographical groups with regard to accessibility.




In summary: the results of this sample revealed that responsiveness, tangibles and reliability are the most positive influencing dimensions in the respondents’ evaluation of their experiences of service delivery. On the contrary, empathy and accessibility are not ideally placed and do not make substantial contributions to the students’ experiences of service delivery. These results support the research of Brochado (2009:183) which found that all three these dimensions (not in a particular order) are important indicators of service delivery. The same study provided proof that the empathy and accessibility dimensions did not make considerable positive inputs to service delivery.

The results obtained in this study also allow for the identification of the relative influence of different variables for each service delivery dimension. When all five service dimensions are analysed, strategic data is reflected. The current findings suggest that study material has been identified as the most important service delivery indicator for respondents. Likewise, experiences with the university and departmental websites have also been determined as important service delivery variables. The research also exposed respondents’ dissatisfaction with certain service delivery variables. The main variables which gave rise to a negative judgement (50% and below is regarded as a negative response) are the following: access to academic staff by e-mail (50%), follow-up actions after contact has been made regarding studies (46%); access to academic staff by phone (43%), access to academic staff in person (40%); access to academic staff by fax. As can be seen from these results sufficient ratings are scored in the positive for the different variables, while a few (four out of 25) variables scored negative ratings. The results revealed that access to or contact with staff, and empathy or care, are the most influencing negative dimensions and variables of service delivery. These results support the research by Angell, Heffernan and Megicks (2008, 246) which suggested that contact staff and their actions are important pointers of service delivery. Academic Department 1 should, therefore, prioritise the access and empathy dimensions (contact) as these make a substantial negative contribution to the experiences of students in terms of good service delivery. It should also be noted that the white respondents regarded responsiveness and empathy as being less important and thus Academic Department 1 needs to involve strategies to remove service delivery shortfalls for this particular population group in these areas.

CONCLUSION There is agreement in the field that service delivery has currently become a

strategic issue in the South African higher education sector. Nowadays, higher education institutions are being called to account for the services they provide. The mechanisms for achieving high service delivery levels are clearly provided for in policy documents such as the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 and the National Qualifications Framework Act 67 of 2008. One theoretical framework that provides a respectable foundation, and is frequently used in higher education for

421


measuring service delivery levels, is the disconfirmation of expectations theory. In terms of measurement methodologies, a review of the literature revealed that there are numerous service delivery evaluation models based on the disconfirmation of expectations theory. However, the most widely used model seems to be the SERVQUAL model, first proposed by Parasuraman et al. (1985). This model was adapted slightly to make certain it fits University 1’s education environment. The different variables were also refined so that the items were mainly similar to the dimensions of the SERVQUAL model. This was done to ensure that validity checks would not create unexpected results due to the problems of construct validity. Within the abovementioned context, the research reported in this article was aimed at determining the actual level of service delivery among a sample of third-year Public Human Resource Management students in Academic Department 1 at University 1.

The research results have brought to the fore some implications for the various stakeholders. These implications can be divided into the following two categories: theoretical and managerial. It was shown in the study that the formation of determinants based on both the expectations and the experiences of respondents could be used concurrently to evaluate the overall perceived service delivery levels. Therefore, this article endorses the principles of the SERVQUAL model. This means that the overall positive and negative (although not overwhelming) experiences of the respondents can be classified as new knowledge in service delivery literature, enabling other researchers to establish the applicability of the identified service delivery levels from this particular research milieu.

In terms of management, the research results provide some practical implications for Academic Department 1 at University 1 in outlining strategies on how to address the gaps in current service delivery levels. First, given the results, there is a need to label those variables in the tangibles and empathy dimensions more closely, since they were valued as the least important in terms of service expectations. Although in the minority, there is a need to manage and monitor the service expectations of Asians, whites and older respondents more closely, because they were lower than the other groups. Second, the results of this study suggest that the empathy and accessibility dimensions are the least important service delivery indicators (experience). More particularly, respondents experienced the following variables as being less important than the others: access to academic staff by e-mail, follow-up actions after contact has been made regarding studies, access to academic staff by phone, access to academic staff in person and access to academic staff by fax. An important implication for Academic 1 is that they should prioritise the access and empathy dimensions (contact) as these make a substantial negative contribution to the experiences of students in terms of good service delivery. It should also be noted that the white respondents regarded responsiveness and empathy as being less important and thus Academic 1 needs to involve management strategies to remove service delivery shortfalls for this particular population group in these




areas.As this study was directed at 194 third-year students (sample), but only 53

students responded, a possible first limitation may have been presented had other modules been included. Consequently, limited data is available and it may not be adequate to generalise on conclusions of this nature. Furthermore, it is accepted that questionnaires and individual discussions may have exposed personal attitudes rather than deeper realities that existed during the service delivery process at University 1. Lastly, the restriction of the boundary to only one module at undergraduate level as a target group implies that the findings of this study cannot be generalised across all other modules and qualifications at University 1. The main conclusion of this study is that the results provide conclusive evidence that the expectations and experiences levels were helpful in determining whether Academic 1 at University 1 delivers quality services to its students. However, the limitations show that future research is needed and that it should cover a larger variety of third-year modules to see if a consistent selection of expectations and experiences becomes evident.

LIST OF REFERENCESAbdullah, F. 2006. Measuring service quality in higher education: HEdPERF versus

SERVPERF. Marketing Intelligence and Planning 24 (1): 31-47.Abouchedid, K. and R. Nasser. 2002. Assuring quality assurance in higher education:

Registration and advising attitudes in a private university in Lebanon. Quality Assurance in Education 10 (4): 198-206.

Angell, R.J. Heffernan, T.W. and P. Megicks. 2008. Service quality in postgraduate education. Quality Assurance in Education 16 (3): 236-254.

Brochado, A. 2009. Comparing alternative instruments to measure service quality in higher education. Quality Assurance in Education 17 (2): 174-190.

Cheng, Y.C. and M.M. Tam. 1997. Multi-models of quality in education. Quality Assurance in Education 5 (1): 22-31.

De Vos. 2001. Research at grass roots: A primer for the caring professions. Pretoria: Van Schailk.

Gallifa, J. and P. Batallé. 2010. Student perceptions of service quality in a multi-campus higher education system in Spain. Quality Assurance in Education 18 (2): 156-170.

Ghadamosi, G. and J. de Jager. 2009. ‘What you see is what you get’: Service quality, students’ perceptions and satisfaction at South African universities. South African Journal of Higher Education 23 (5): 877-893.

http://www.unisa.ac.za/cmsys/staff/contents/docs/enotice/audit_report.pdf. (accessed 16 November 2011).

Horton, N.J. and K. Kleinman. 2011. Using R for data management, statistical analysis, and graphics. London: CRC: Taylor and Francis Group.

Khoshafian, S. 2007. Service oriented enterprises. New York: Auerbach.Ling, K.C. Chai, L.T. and T.H. Piew. 2010. The ‘Inside-out’ and ‘Outside-in’ approaches

on students’ perceived service quality: An empirical evaluation. Management Science and Engineering 4 (2): 1-26.

Municipal IQ. 2010. Municipal Data and intelligence: Municipal IQ’s updated

423

Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public Administrationmunicipal hotspots results. http://www.municipaliq.co.za. (accessed 15 November 2011).

Open Society Foundation for South Africa. 2007. Effective service delivery in the education and health sectors: A discussion paper. http://www.osf.org.za. (accessed 20 November 2011).

Parasuraman, A. Zeithaml, V.A. and L.L Berry. 1985. A conceptual model of service quality and its implications for future research. Journal of Marketing 49 (Fall 1985): 41-50.

Petruzzellis, L. D’Uggento, A.M. and S. Romanazzi. 2006. Student satisfaction and quality of service in Italian universities. Managing Service Quality 16 (4): 349-364.

Pupo, R. 2010. America’s service meltdown: Restoring service excellence in the age of the customer. Oxford: Praeger.

Republic of South Africa. 1997(a). Higher Education Act 101 of 1997. http://www.info.gov.za. (accessed 11 November 2011).

Republic of South Africa, 1997(b). White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery. http://www.info.gov.za. (accessed 9 December 2011).

Republic of South Africa. 2008. National Qualifications Framework Act 67 of 2008. http://www.info.gov.za. (accessed 27 November 2011).

http://www.info.gov.za. (accessed 9 December 2011).Republic of South Africa. 2011. Higher Education Quality Committee. Audit Report on

University 1. http://www.info.gov.za. (accessed 2 November 2011).Tait, M. and J.W. de Jager. 2009. Image and academic expectations of different levels

of university students: A South African case. South African Journal of Higher Education 23 (5): 1026-1038.

University 1. 2009. Student satisfaction survey: 2009. Details withheld to ensure the anonymity of the institution.

University 1. 2011(a). Service Charter. Details withheld to ensure the anonymity of the institution.

University 1. 2011(b). Service Charter of College 1. Details withheld to ensure the anonymity of the institution.

University 1. 2011(c). Service Charter of School 1. Details withheld to ensure the anonymity of the institution.

University 1. 2011(d). 2015 Strategic Plan. Details withheld to ensure the anonymity of the institution.

University 1. 2011(e). Department of Public Administration and Management Teaching and Learning Code. Details withheld to ensure the anonymity of the institution.

Zeithaml, V.A. 1988. Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value: A means-end model and synthesis of evidence. Journal of Marketing 52 (July): 2-22.




RURAL LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: INSIGHTS FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL COMMUNITY

K.C. Zulu & B.C. MubangiziSchool of Management, IT and Governance University of KwaZulu-Natal

ABSTRACT

As an approach to economic development, local economic development (LED) relates to development activities in cities, districts and small towns. Globalisation and decentralisation as socioeconomic and political

processes have seen a number of municipalities adopting an entrepreneurial outlook. With the ever-diminishing coffers of (mainly) rural municipalities having to sustain a constantly increasing burden of responsibilities, municipalities have added incentive to find ways and means for increasing local revenue and, by implication, broadening their tax base. For rural municipalities therefore, local economic development is a survival necessity. It is a draw card for investors, a source of tax revenue for municipal functions and a nurturer of social harmony. But what are the odds for rural municipalities seeking to create vibrant local economies? In this paper we describe the existing policy and legislative framework for LED in South Africa. Against this backdrop we examine, through the lens of a rural municipality, the limits of local economic development and we suggest a re-focus of the conceptualisation, planning and management of LED interventions in rural areas.

INTRODUCTIONSouth Africa’s democratic government has sought to reduce racial and spatial

inequalities by giving priority to the development of the previously marginalised areas that are home to the majority of rural communities. Despite policy attempts to minimise rural–urban disparities, severe social deprivation persists in rural areas and the vast majority of the rural population remain poor. Unless supportive measures are put in place alongside administrative reforms, rural areas are likely to remain poor and underdeveloped. Historically, rural areas comprise former homelands that were already poor and underdeveloped, and their situation has been exacerbated by dense settlements of displaced people on homeland boundaries that swell the population in areas devoid of formal industrial or commercial activity. The SA Cities Network (SACN, 2006) describes them as “large non-agricultural areas characterised by a virtual absence of a modern economy and services” (SACN, 2006:25). Prior to 1994 no form of local government was present in such areas other than quasi-homeland administration and traditional leadership. With

425


the post-1994 introduction of wall-to-wall local government, all such areas do now have formal local government administrative structures – co-existing uneasily quite often with the traditional leadership. Emerging from such a history, these municipalities tend inevitably to lack both institutional management experience and, more crucially, a sufficient tax base for building and sustaining vibrant local government institutions capable of taking care of their citizenry at the level that is enjoined upon all municipalities by the Constitution. Nonetheless, under the general banner of local economic development (LED), there are a number of strategies that do attempt to boost local economies.

South Africa’s LED policy has its roots in New Institutionalism theory, which recognises the close link between economy and society. In this paradigm economic decision-making and action is shaped by the shared values, norms, beliefs, meanings and procedures of formal and informal institutions in societies and localities (DPLG, 2005:4). To this effect, the thrust is, and should, be on developing shared meaning and values and on strengthening networks of social interaction that, in combination, will contribute to LED. Municipalities are best positioned to lead this thrust, insofar as economic development takes place at the local level, and it their responsibility to influence the shape, form and trajectory of local economies through locally appropriate strategies.

But are all municipalities, and particularly rural municipalities, capable of initiating LED projects using locally-based natural and human resources? Taylor and Mackenzie (1992: 38) note that throughout Africa the various strategies for rural development that have been put in operation have largely failed to alleviate the deprivation experienced by rural communities, and that, as such, most rural people have been left to their own devices. High rural unemployment has been a particular hindrance for development processes. Nonetheless, it is useful at this stage to examine the policy environment within which LED can unfold.

LED POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAThe evolution of LED policy and legislation in post-apartheid South Africa is

associated with the country’s decentralisation ethos and the attendant developmental thrust in local government, both of which are implicit in the Constitution (1996) and in the White Paper on Local Government (1998). Both are further given effect by the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (2000) and by an array of related Guidelines and other instruments.

Two local government objectives specified in Section 151 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, are

• To promote social and economic development • To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations

in the matters of local government

K.C. Zulu & B.C. Mubangizi



• Local Government Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000, Section 73 states that a municipality must give effect to the provisions of the Constitution and

• Give priority to the basic needs of the local community, and • Promote the development of the local community and ensure that all

members of the local community have access to minimum levels of basic municipal services.

The White Paper on Local Government (1998) stresses the need for the present local government system to ensure that all communities have access to basic services, with participatory decision-making and planning processes, leading to increased job opportunities and wise use of local resources to improve the quality of life for everyone now and in the future. In the present local government system there is a strong emphasis on people-centred development through encouragement of rural communities to engage in meaningful social and economic development issues affecting their lives. The Department of Constitutional Development (1998b: 1) describes local government as “the hands and feet” of reconstruction and development in South Africa.

Local government is at the heart of the development process in South Africa, and the next section will show, there is clear policy and legislative support for municipalities to fulfill this role and to specifically promote local economic development. Crucial to the policy and legislative framework in which LED functions is the paradigm in which it is conceptualised by the various stakeholders. Analysis of the state of LED in municipalities thus requires us to examine this conceptualisation.

CONCEPTUALISING LED IN SOUTH AFRICAThe Policy Guidelines for Implementing Local Economic Development in South

Africa describe LED as being intended to create robust and inclusive local economies that exploit local opportunities, address local needs and contribute to national development objectives such as economic growth and poverty eradication (DPLG, 2005:10). Plain though this definition may seem and supported, municipalities remain nonetheless deeply uncertain as to what LED actually means, what they are supposed to do about it and how they are supposed to organise it (Rogerson, 2006:229, citing Meyer-Sterner, 2002). At the root of this uncertainty is the divided emphasis in the Guidelines on two related but different paradigms for LED: a business development paradigm and a pro-poor poverty eradication paradigm. These bear further consideration.

Business development paradigmAs outlined by Cox (1995), Loveridge (1996), and Bradshaw and Blakely (1999),

the business development paradigm focuses on achieving high economic growth rates and incorporates heavy infrastructure development in support of SMMEs – intended to ensure (see Rogerson, 2006:233) that localities are competitive spaces

427


for production, consumption and (high-end) knowledge-based activities. Common strategies in this paradigm include the establishment of Industrial Development Zones as export processing localities. Also envisaged are high-level tourism initiatives that promote hosting capacity for world-class conference and sports events. Supportive activities in the business development paradigm relate to institutional efficiency and municipal functionality that make it easy to do business, coupled with acceptable safety and security measures and inner-city regeneration programmes.

Pro-poor poverty eradication paradigmAs outlined by Nel and Rogerson (2005) and Helmsing (2005), the pro-poor

poverty eradication paradigm identifies the main available asset for the poor as being their labour. Thus, pro-poor LED strategies tend to focus on employment creation and skills development programmes. Rogers (2004) makes the point that programmes such as these mostly relate to establishment of infrastructure for emerging entrepreneurs through initiatives such as the development of small-business hives, business incubators, and business support and advice centres. In addition, there are a number of national and provincial government programmes with a poverty-alleviation focus that contribute to the LED initiatives of municipalities – most notably the expanded public works programmes and the integrated sustainable rural development strategies, together with various initiatives to boost agriculture and programmes in support of food security. Needless to say, there is higher cash injection by municipalities into LED projects that have a poverty eradication focus since these are the ones least likely to attract private sector support (as compared to the business development projects mentioned earlier).

Marriott (in Rogerson ,2006) warns that distinguishing between the two paradigms is of little consequence and cautions against getting bogged down in searching for a desirable balance between programmes for business growth, development and competiveness on the one hand and programmes for poverty reduction on the other. For Marriott, one cannot and indeed should not, seek both global competitiveness and poverty reduction independently of one another. We argue, however, that while the two are mutually reinforcing there are also compelling circumstances that require a clear distinction in terms of planning, implementation and evaluation. We hope to show the force of this argument in an account of projects undertaken in Mthonjaneni Municipality – a category B rural municipality situated within uThungulu District Municipality.

DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREAThe Mthonjaneni Municipality falls under the uThungulu District Municipality

which is located in the north-eastern region of KwaZulu-Natal province on the eastern seaboard of South Africa. The municipality extends its jurisdiction over the town of Melmoth, with the rest of the municipal area consisting of traditional, rural




settlements together with individually-owned and company-owned commercial farms. Melmoth town is the administrative centre for the entire municipality and the location of the municipal council headquarters and its administrative departments. In this municipality many households and individuals, especially in rural areas, are wholly dependent for survival on government social grants, informal trading and subsistence farming. Although Melmoth is the main administrative node of economic significance within the municipality it is a small town and offers few formal or informal employment opportunities. This has negative consequences for the surrounding rural areas, whose inhabitants are predominantly from a low-income group (Mthonjaneni IDP Review, 2010).

RESEARCH PROBLEMThe drive towards LED in South Africa unquestionably has strong legislative,

policy-making and political support, yet it is plainly apparent that, in small rural municipalities most particularly, LED is a continuous upward battle and likely to remain so. Our question then, in regard to Mthonjaneni Municipality, is whether rural LED as an economic development strategy in the municipality has answers to the plight of its desperate rural communities.

Research on LED in South Africa has focused on various aspects of policy development and implementation, but successful initiatives that have been noted tend to be located in the metropolitan cities and in smaller towns (Rogerson, 2006:242). Less apparent is the organisational and institutional capacity of small rural municipalities for driving LED. Questions also remain with regard to the dual nature of LED strategies, with little clarity on distinguishing between fundamentally business-led strategies and fundamentally pro-poor strategies. The central problem in this study was to establish whether rural communities of the Mthonjaneni Municipality have substantively been participants in rural business-oriented LED initiatives, or whether LED-funded projects have been substantively pro-poor and thereby successful in addressing unemployment and poverty.

In responding to this question, the researcher sought to establish understanding around the cardinal issues of rural LED: the institutional set-up, the strategies in place, the extent to which communities participate in the implementation of the LED strategies, and the outcomes thereof. We present here a breakdown of the findings.

STATUS QUO OF LED PROJECTS IN MTHONJANENI The study found that a range of rural LED strategies have been implemented

in this municipality, with several small- and micro-enterprise projects already in place as far back as 1994. These have been implemented against the backdrop of the Mthonjaneni Municipality’s LED strategy formally adopted by Council in 2009. The Mthonjaneni Municipality LED projects are mainly agricultural projects, which

429


draw on the huge agricultural potential of the area and are regarded as the most appropriate for creating jobs and reducing poverty. These projects include poultry farming, aloe and essential oils growing, vegetable growing, and processing projects. The projects have attained various levels of strength but are generally still in the inception phase and still heavily reliant on the municipality for support.

The procedure in establishing these projects has been for the municipality to provide project beneficiaries with seed money which is used to fence off the land and to purchase the requisite farming inputs. In addition, the municipality has offered capacity building to the project’s steering committee members in the form of training in basic bookkeeping and minute taking.

There appeared to be little profit accruing from most of these enterprises. Instead, municipal funding which was meant to establish the projects on a sustainable path was used to pay salaries of project beneficiaries. Such a situation is not surprising seeing that the majority of project beneficiaries are poor, unemployed, and lacking in many basic household supplies. It would be folly to expect that beneficiaries will wait for the project to pay dividends before they can draw some form of salary. A feasible response to this, in a people-centred approach to development, would be for the planners to incorporate coping mechanisms that project beneficiaries would rely upon while the LED projects are in their initiation stages.

The project beneficiaries themselves did not seem to have a concrete understanding of what these LED projects were meant to achieve and appeared to focus only on short-term gains from the projects. This was evident in their demand for excessive salaries and their inability to channel enterprise profits back into projects as further investment, coupled with failure to secure the enterprise infrastructure from the vandalisation which has happened in some instances.

These initiatives which have taken place in Mthonjaneni municipality are in line with a pro-poor welfare approach to LED and are typical of smaller, rural based municipalities. Indeed, Van der Heijden (2008:12) has noted that it tends to be the norm for the LED strategies of smaller local authorities to be project focused. It would however be wrong simply to regard this as a mark of inadequacy on the part of the municipalities. Given the divided emphasis in South Africa’s LED policy, and mindful of the socio-economic status of Mthonjaneni’s citizens, it is not surprising that this municipality’s LED focus would be inclined towards job-creating, survivalist projects rather than long-term creation of an enabling environment. What is crucial, though, is the need for common understanding of the given approach – which, as we shall show, does not seem to have been the case.

CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF RURAL LED In multi-stakeholder undertakings such as LED it is crucial that all participants

share a common understanding of the issues. Once this is in place, it is more likely




that the various stakeholders will then pull together to mobilise their resources for the common objective.

Sadly, the interviews conducted in this study showed a significant disparity between the municipality’s LED unit and the LED community participants in the way LED was conceptualised and thus executed. This emerged in interviews with project beneficiaries, who also indicated that while they had heard about LED, they did not fully understand its meaning or its relevance to unemployment and poverty alleviation. These findings are in contrast to the impressions gained from municipal officials, who appear to have a concrete understanding of LED initiatives in the municipality. This was revealed in an interview with the Speaker of Council who defined local economic development as “a process where the municipality provides funding for sustainable projects identified by the communities with the aim of creating job opportunities.” Similar understanding was displayed by the municipality’s mayor, who spoke of rural local economic development as “a process where local people take charge of their lives by deciding how limited municipal resources are going to be distributed and used with aim of reducing poverty and creating employment opportunities.” Concrete understanding of LED in the municipality was not confined to the politicians (the Mayor and the Speaker). The municipal manager also displayed sound understanding of the concept, seeing LED as a means to provide economic development opportunities relating specifically to job creation, together with sustainable economic opportunities in the agricultural sector.

Overall, the study findings showed that shared conceptual understanding of the LED strategy and outcomes was lacking. While municipal officials were clear on the matter, it did not appear that their understanding had been adequately communicated to the (community member) owners of the enterprise, with the consequence that municipal initiatives came across as yet another form of welfare to which communities are entitled without acceptance of ownership or responsibility on their part. A possible reason for this failure understanding may also found in the level of engagement between the municipality and the community, a matter to which our discussion now turns.

THE MUNICIPALITY’S ROLE IN LEDThe legislative mandate of local government involves a number of

implementation-related challenges affecting the direction of rural LED. The National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006–2011: 15) states that the key role for local governments in the LED process is that identified by the Council for Urban Economic Development (CUED), namely that local governments are the primary institutional drivers, though not exclusively so, for LED. Within this context, local government has three key roles:

• To provide leadership and direction in policy making.• To administer policy, programme and projects; and

431


• To be the main initiator of economic development programmes through public spending, regulatory powers and their promotion of industrial, small business development, social enterprise and cooperatives.

In the case of local government in Mthonjaneni, the municipality executes a multifaceted set of LED functions: as co-ordinator, as facilitator, and as developer.

As a co-ordinating body, an important tool for Mthonjaneni Municipality is its Integrated Development Plan (IDP), which draws together the developmental objectives, priorities, strategies and programmes of the municipality. The IDP is used to ensure that rural LED initiatives are co-ordinated with other programmes and appropriately linked to provincial, district and private-sector initiatives.

As facilitator, Mthonjaneni Municipality improves the investment environment in the area by, for instance, streamlining the development process and improving planning procedures. In its role as a stimulator, Mthonjaneni Municipality encourages the active participation of all stakeholders in the development of rural LED strategy and its implementation in the interest of job creation for rural women and youth.

Lastly, as developer, Mthonjaneni Municipality takes on the full operational responsibilities of a developer in its own right. In some cases, the municipality also enters into a joint-venture partnership with the private sector or with NGOs.

Mthonjaneni Municipality thus has a pivotal role in driving the rural LED programme in pursuit of job creation for a community burdened by chronic unemployment. Yet limited human capacity and scarce financial resources, to name just two of multiple hindrances, severely impede the municipality’s ability to fulfil the expectations and aspirations of the rural community and the policy imperatives of national government through a genuine expansion of sustainable job opportunities. But the obstacles to LED in this municipality are more than simply a question of resource availability; there are also deep-seated issues with the underlying institutional arrangements in the development and promotion of LED activities.

Institutional arrangements: the LED ForumPart of the problem has to do with the (inactive) municipal LED Forum. In the

institutional arrangements envisaged in the National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006–2011: 33), a municipal LED stakeholder forum is meant to serve a platform where affected parties (individuals, private organisations, government, NGOs, CBOs, traditional authorities) within a particular locality gather to share information and experiences, pool resources and solve problems. In this way the LED stakeholder forum is supposed to play a key role in integrating job creation activities, mobilising all stakeholders and energising innovation and excellence for rural local economic development. But establishing (or indeed maintaining) this forum is a challenge which the Mthonjaneni Municipality has been unable to cope with. This was confirmed by project beneficiaries interviewed, who asserted




that no active LED structures were in place, and that there was no effective platform for dialogue with other role players in LED initiatives of the municipality. Appropriate LED structures would enable interaction between a multiplicity of LED stakeholders such as the uThungulu District, pertinent government departments, the private sector organisations, NGOs, and representatives of communities involved in LED projects, and in so doing would institutionalise LED far more widely in the overall scope of municipal activities. This was further corroborated by the municipal officers interviewed, who indicated that the Mthonjaneni Municipality has neither an LED forum nor a portfolio committee to handle specific LED issues. With no coordinating structure for discussing pertinent issues and in which other stakeholders can participate meaningfully, the likelihood is that local economic development will continue to stumble.

Institutional arrangements: community structuresA defining feature of the South African local government model is the space

provided to ordinary people to become actively involved in governance (RSA, 1998). Uniquely, in fact, the legal definition in South Africa of a municipality is that it comprises not just the councillors and the administration, but the local community as well (RSA, 2000). Rural economic development is based on the concept of building self-reliance through human resource development and skills enhancement; its central objectives are to alleviate poverty by improving the capacities of disadvantaged communities to create sustainable livelihoods for themselves (Slabbert, 2004: 192). Local economic development focuses on combining training, human services and enterprise development to enhance access to and creation of jobs, careers and self-sufficiency for disadvantaged communities. It aims to equip people in disadvantaged communities so that they can both take advantage of existing job opportunities and also create new job opportunities by opening small businesses (DPLG, 2000a: 5).

The National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006–2011: 15) emphasises that local rural community members should be fully involved in the local rural development process. Our research established that community participation in rural LED initiatives within the Mthonjaneni municipality was weak and still in its formative stages. The sole channel that the municipality used to enhance community participation was through ward committees which are established to serve as a communication structure between communities and the local municipality. Ward committees are a statutory element of local governance, established in terms of Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1989 as the formal communication channel between the community and the municipal council. In addition, they serve as advisory committees and, when necessary, make recommendations on any matter affecting their ward. Since these structures are chaired by ward councillors, and their recommendations of rural development are forwarded to the municipal Council through those same ward councillors, their effectiveness and success largely depend on the commitment of the ward councillor

433


in question. Ward committees are made up of ten members representing different stakeholders and interests within a ward. In Mthonjaneni, rural LED was not an issue they normally considered, and there were no other LED-specific community participation sessions with the communities at ward level that addressed issues of unemployment and poverty.

The municipality relied on annual IDP meetings to determine the needs of different rural communities, which are usually not specific to rural LED. Community participation in Mthonjaneni Municipality is, however, of utmost importance as nothing happens without community buy-in to a project. The importance of community participation in LED cannot be overemphasised as it is crucial for ensuring that the views, concerns and issues of different stakeholders are be included in the planning process. Further, as noted also by Ngubane and Diab (2005), participation is a vital element in LED because it is networking, partnerships and information sharing that makes better and more practical strategies possible.

Mthonjaneni Municipality ostensibly wanted its rural LED processes to be community driven, but the project beneficiaries interviewed indicated that there was no community participation at all. It was established that no ward-level community meetings took place in regard to rural LED, which made it difficult for communities to access councillors. Project beneficiaries reported further that when any LED meetings did take place they seldom heard about them and the meeting venues were too far away for them to attend without transport being provided by the municipality.

One member of the community did report that he had attended some community meetings but indicated that there had been no element of participation because communities were simply told by councillors and municipal officials what LED activities and projects were to be promoted, and how and when, without being included in decision making. There were also members of the focus group for the study who said that they had never met with their ward councillor, and some did not even know who their councillor was.

The research findings showed nonetheless that political leaders in the municipality were aware of the importance of community participation in rural LED initiatives, and that these initiatives could not succeed in their poverty-reduction objectives without active engagement of all community stakeholders. This points to the urgent necessity of joint, shared vision to establish a bond between the municipality and the organised structures of community stakeholders in relation to rural LED projects and the setting of priorities for facilitation and management of developmental efforts.

Institutional arrangements: LED UnitThe National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006–2011: 15) provides

for the establishment of a dedicated LED unit within each municipality. These LED units should play a facilitator role in establishing harmony and collaboration




between state institutions, civil society and the business community. Positioning of LED units is however often problematic, largely due to funding issues. Rather than existing as an independent entity, the LED unit is often subsumed into other municipal structures.

In Mthonjaneni Municipality our study found that the LED Unit was located in the Directorate of Corporate and Community Services, which had very limited financial resources of its own. Furthermore, there was just a single LED officer in the unit, who battled to establish workable liaison on LED matters with other directorates such as Finance and Technical Services. Although LED activities are by necessity the responsibility of all directorates, an LED unit has a particular responsibility to ensure that LED principles and priorities are indeed infused into the work of all other directorates; that LED projects are implemented in a coordinated manner, and that economic support services provided by government and public entities to local stakeholders are accessible. For this, core competencies and skills are required of the LED unit in addition to supportive financial and physical resources. Mthonjaneni Municipality had not been able to establish a sufficiently independent, functional LED unit – at least not one with the appropriate skills or resources. Part of the problem in this regard was staff turnover, as qualified staff members frequently move on to bigger municipalities that offer higher salaries.

The institutional problems we have outlined plainly impede Mthonjaneni Municipality in its pursuit of rural LED initiatives within its area of jurisdiction. Without functional, dedicated LED structures, development strategy for this municipality is likely to languish in isolation from other stakeholders such as provincial government departments, district municipality, private sector and local communities, and with little hope of effectively tackling unemployment and poverty.

DEEPER SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGESHigh unemployment in the community and low skills levels among municipal

staff are major barriers to rural LED implementation. Mthonjaneni Municipality does make a significant contribution towards improving the social and economic circumstances of its communities but it also has a very grave concentration of poverty pockets. The municipal Speaker, the Mayor and the Municipal Manager all confirmed this, noting too that the financial and skills capacity of the municipality did not permit full and effective support of community-based economic development structures. The failure to establish a Local Economic Development Forum is attributable to limited skills capacity in the municipality, as is inadequate liaison with national and provincial government departments.

Socio-economic issues that affect Mthonjaneni Municipality are poverty, unemployment, inequality and crime. Unemployment persists as a major socio-economic challenge not only in the Mthonjaneni Municipality area but in South

435


Africa as a whole, and it exacerbates community impoverishment as well as problems of social wellbeing. In response, the municipality needs to make optimal use of its scarce available resources in order to maximise potential for rural LED within the municipal area. The focus group interviewed in our research contended that Mthonjaneni Municipality did not respond adequately to rural local economic development needs of its citizens because the majority of municipally funded projects failed to address LED needs for the rural communities. They criticised the municipality for inappropriate expenditure on infrastructure projects such as halls and crèches which did not provide a direct response to the socio-economic challenges faced by rural local communities.

The mayor concurred with this assessment of the situation, indicating limited skills and financial capacity on the part of the municipality as reasons why its rural LED strategy had done little to reduce unemployment and poverty in the community. This is borne out by the fact that in 2007, out of a total population of 53 908 in Mthonjaneni Municipality, only 7 297 were employed – a situation this remains largely unchanged.

CONCLUSIONLED endeavours by Mthonjaneni Municipality clearly face a multitude of

challenges. Persky (1993) notes that urban areas typically sustain a wider range of production than rural areas do, and that rural areas are likely to specialise in relatively few local economic development activities. This is indeed the case with Mthonjaneni, which has a very low potential for LED activities, due mainly to a low level of infrastructure development, limited financial resources available to the municipality’s LED programme, and a general inability to attract investment from the private sector. Prahalad (2006) maintains, on the other hand, that what is needed to help the poor is a different and better approach – one that involves partnering with the poor to innovate and achieve sustainable win-win scenarios in which they themselves are actively engaged.

Mthonjaneni Municipality is to be commended for those steps which it has taken in establishing LED projects: the activities already mentioned such as poultry farming, aloe and essential oils production and vegetable projects which draw on the region’s agriculture potential – even though these may still be in the inception phase and dependent on the municipality for support. That there are LED activities to speak about attests to the municipality’s ability, however limited, to provide project beneficiaries with seed money for fencing off the land and purchasing the requisite farming inputs. Equally, too, there is capacity-building assistance offered to project steering committee members, as previously alluded to.

But LED is a process in which partnerships need to link local government, community and civic groups and the private sector in joint management of existing resources to create jobs and stimulate the economy of a locality. Thus,




while Mthonjaneni Municipality is best positioned to lead the LED thrust, it is not the only player that should be involved. Success of LED in Mthonjaneni will be critically dependent on simultaneous “complementary investments” (see Helmsing, 2003) by other economic agents – mainly, though not exclusively, from the private sector. In Mthonjaneni, evident niches for complementary investment would be in packaging activities, agro-processing, advertising and transportation – all of which can be developed by banks, corporate bodies or agencies from other spheres of government.

In addition to complimentary industries, LED in Mthonjaneni, as in other areas, would benefit from the presence, effectiveness and efficiency of what Helmsing (2003) calls “related services”. These include agricultural extension services, reliable water and electricity supply, and provision for safety and security. As public goods, such services must necessarily be provided by one or another directorate of the municipality in conjunction with pertinent agencies from other levels of government. It is for this reason that LED should synchronise with planning in other municipal sectors such as water services development, disaster management, waste management, and other programmes for infrastructural service delivery.

How LED is institutionalised is crucial for its success and sustainability. Thus local action to build institutions and an organisational structure for LED activities is an important element in developing an LED strategy for the municipality. This research established that LED organisations in form of an LED forum and community management structures were effectively non-existent in Mthonjaneni. Insofar as the municipality had sought to establish them that they were regarded as serving the municipality rather serving those to whom LED activities were in fact directed. The lesson here would seem to be that sustainable organisations are not established by decree but grow over time out of necessity. A user-led approach to establishing LED structures is more likely to yield positive results in that the work which an organisation performs will be informed and driven by the needs and wishes of its constituent members. Ornetzeder and Rohracherb (2006) have shown how a higher level of user participation could be used as a strategy to improve the development and dissemination of sustainable energy technologies. This is because the involvement of groups of users or beneficiaries in the LED activities and in the direction of the organisation builds a sense of empowerment for those involved, heightening levels of participation in LED and in overall contribution to the wider municipality. Absence of functional community structures to assist the municipality in driving LED projects is not in itself a cause of low performance; rather, the problem arises when these structures are externally imposed rather than being an expression of user-led group involvement. Top-down establishment is also more exposed to the time-frame disadvantages associated with the five-year term for political councillors, which pressures municipalities to deliver on measurable targets that are set in municipal IDPs.

Equally, undue focus on the IDP and the five-year political term for councillors

437


can blur the lines and cause a divide between the coupled LED paradigms of business development and pro-poor poverty eradication. This is not to say that municipal officials lack an understanding of LED and are unable to see the boundary between welfare programmes and the support of enterprise development. However our research revealed discordance in the understanding of these twinned objectives between Mthonjaneni Municipality officials and the intended beneficiaries and stakeholders. While the municipality’s plans promote a business development paradigm, the beneficiaries have a different understanding which sees LED as a direct job-creation move providing immediate gains. This result can then be the kind of developmental cul-de-sac we observed in which “seed” money meant to initiate forward-looking sustainable projects comes to be regarded by beneficiaries as a simple salary to take care of immediate personal needs.

LIST OF REFERENCESBradshaw, T. and Blakely, E. 1999. What are “third-wave” economic development

strategies? From incentives to industrial policy. Economic Development Quarterly. 13, 229-244.

Cox, K.R. 1995. Globalisation, Competition and the Politics of Local Economic Development. Urban Studies. Vol. 32 (2). 1995 213-224

DPLG. 2000. A Policy paper on Integrated Development Planning. Pretoria: Department of Provincial and Local Government.

DPLG. 2006. Policy Guidelines for Implementing Local Eonomic development in South Africa 2005. Pretoria: Department of Provincial and Local Government.

Nel, E.L. and Rogerson, C.M. 2005 Pro-Poor Local Economic Development in South Africa’s Cities: Policy and Practice. Africa Insight. Vol. 35 (4). 69-87

Helmsing, A.H.J. 2003. Local economic development in Africa. Public Administration and Development. Vol 23. 67-76

Loveridge, S. 1996. On the Continuing Popularity of Industrial Recruitment. Economic Development Quarterly. 10. 151- 158

Mthonjaneni Local Municipality Integrated Development Plan Review: (2009/2010).Mthonjaneni Local Municipality Integrated Development Plan Review: (2009/2010).National Framework for LED in South Africa. (2006 – 2011). Department of Provincial

and Local Government. Pretoria.Ngubane, J.S. and Diab, R.D. 2005. Engaging the Local Community in Tourism

Development Planning: A Case Study in Maputaland. South African Geographical Journal. Vol 87(2). 115-122

Ornetzeder, M. and Rohracherb, H. 2006. User-led Innovations and Participation Processes: Lessons from Sustainable Energy Technologies. Energy Policy. Vol. 34. Pp.138–150

Rogerson, C.M. (eds.) 2004. Local Economic Development in the Developing World. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Rogerson, C.M. 2003. Towards Pro-Poor Local Economic Development: the Case for Sectoral Targeting in South Africa. Urban Forum, 14:53-79

Rogerson, C.M. 2006. Local Economic Development in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Ten-Year Research Review. In Padayachee, V. 2006. The Development Decade? Economic and Social Change in South Africa, 1994-2004. HSRC Press. Cape Town. Pp 227-253.

RSA, 1998. The White Paper on Local Government, Department of Constitutional



Journal of Public Administration Journal of Public AdministrationDevelopment. Pretoria: Government Printer.

RSA, 2000. Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000). Pretoria: Government Printer.

Slabbert, T.J.C. 2004. An Investigation into the State of Affairs and Sustainability of the Emfulweni Economy. Unpublished thesis. University of Pretoria

South African Cites Network, State of the Cities Report, 2006, Cape Town: SACN, 2004.

Taylor, D.R.F. and Mackenzie, F. 1992. Development from Within: Survival in Rural Africa. London: Routledge.

439


CONTRIBUTIONSContributions to the Journal of Public Administration are invited from

academics, experts and practitioners in the field of Public Administration and Management. Before publication, contributions will be subject to adjudication. Contributions must be accompanied by a certificate that language editing had

been done by a suitably qualified person.The Journal is intended to provide the widest possible coverage of the various

aspects of the comprehensive field of Public Administration and Management. Public officials of all grades and specialities, academics as well as others are

invited to submit articles for publication to the Chief Editor.A variety of contributions may be made to the Journal. These include

full articles, review articles, viewpoints and research results. It should be noted, however that these articles are weighed differently for the purposes of

publication.

MANUSCRIPTS MUST BE SUBMITTED TO:Professor M.H. Maserumule

Chief EditorTel: (012) 382 9769

E-mail Address: [email protected] Address: P.O. Box 14257

Hatfield0028

COMMENTSComments on the Journal are invited from readers who may address these to

the chief editor or to the office of SAAPAM at the same address.

Journal of Public Administration

Documents

Transcript of Journal of Public Administration