JOHANNES CLAUBERG(1622-1665)

AND CARTESIAN PTIILOSOPHY INTHE SEVENTEENTTI Csvruny

ed. Theo Verbcek :

Dordrecht-Boston-London 1999 i

1.. s l ' l lL, l l

5. JOIIANNTTS CLAUBERG ON PERCEP,TUALKNOWLEDCìE,

Johannes Clauberg became acquainted wit l r Cartesian plr i losophy dur ing his

stut l ies in the Nether lancls.rHe was a great aclmirer of l )escartes2 and shorvet i

an except ional interest in his v iews. Yet, l ike his master Johannes de Raeyr at

Leiclen, he stuck to Aristot le4 and to the Peripatet ic tradit ion.5 Indeed,

ClaUberg's ref lect ions on knowledge acquisit ion and related issues made an

attempt at l rarmonizing dual ism with a dependency of perceptual ideas upon

external th ings.ó f lowever, there are also dist inct t races of Plato and Augttst tne

in l r is work.? In part icular, the inf luence of Renaissance Neoplatonism can be

noticed, f i rst of al l through the countless references to the f i f teenth-century

Neoplatonist Marsi l io Fic ino.E Like many Renaissance phi losophers, c lauberg

conceivecl of man as a microcosme and also, with expl ici t reference to Ficino, as

a "miraculum divinum"..r0 Moreover, he defined the lruman nl ind as "divtnae

ment is aenrula".rrAlso in his theory of ideas he was clear ly inf luenced by

ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism.Clautrerg's ref lect ions on perception and knowledge of the sensitr le world are

int imately connected to his ideas about the metaphysical structure of the wor l r ì

and his v iew of the nr incl-body relat ion. In the f i rst sect ion, I anaìyze how

Clnubcrg's psyclrology c lepends on trat t i t ional and contentpor i r ry rnetaplrysics.

In the secontl section I cl iscuss the relat ion between mind and bocly, The third

scct ion is r jevotcd to Clauberg's v iews on percept ion. In the f inal secl ion I

analyze the nature ancl generation of percepttral icleas.

1. INrELLIGTBILIry AND TDEAS

The metaphysical assumptions underlying Clauberg's psychology are laid down

in a number of interrelated views which he derived from various phi losophical

schools, inclucl ing scholasticism, Neoplatonism, and Cartesianism. clauberg

en(lorsed the scholastic theory of transcendentals and thus accepted the idea

that truth has an ontological basis.r2 His theory of ideas was clearly inf luenced

by ancient ancl Renaissance Neoplatonism, since he postulated the presence of

ideas in God's mind as wel l as in the human mind. And, l ike Descartes, he

argued that al l phi losophical knowledge was to be based on the idea of God.

'75

' l - l t l1 ' r lu ' tk ( t r l I I , t l ronnet Clot t l , t rc (162)- l66. t l 75-( . t1

76 L. Spntit

Far jro,m simplygrafting these conceptions onto one anothcr, Cr.rrrrcrg tric<r r.work thcm into a ncw ana.coherent synthesis. For example, tt. f iomin"ntfunction of the idea of God in trre deveiopment of phirosophicar nnó ,. i"ntit i .knowledge' was connected by crauberg'to a thesis dcrivcd from Avcrrocs,namely, that the "scientia Dei" is the cauie of alr f inite things.r As we shail see,also Clauberg's theory of (perceptual) ideas was in effeciu n"* ,ynii.. i , ofPlatonic, Cartesian and peripatetlc views.clauberg believed that thought and knowredge are based on the intrinsícintell igibil iry of the world:

f raeJgrea, omne ens potest cogi tar i seuIntel l ig ib i le appel latur, ( . . . ) Ding res &or is in is.ra

intell igi, ideoque Cogirabile &denken cogitari ejusdem sunt

, Elsewhere, clauberg expricit ly endorsed the centrar thesis of the schorastictheory of transcendentarsr "exiitentia & veritas pari passu amburant,,.15 Theintell igibil i ty of the worrtr is intimatery connected with the role crauberg

î:rjg::o to-knowledg" oj

9o9 in phitósophy, and with his rheory oii,r"ur.,,no...o,. Ltauberg regarded the idea of God as the starting póint of attknowledge. Moreover, he believed that things are íntell igible in virtue of thcircorrespondence to divine ideas.tó In the follówing I take a closer look at thesevlews.

At the outset of his main phirosophicar work, Exercirariones Centunt deCognitione Dei & Nostri, crauúerg argued that without knowlcdgc of coa,scrence is impossible.rT l_,ike Descartes, Clauberg thought that the i-a.u-ot CoOntust be innate, since a finite substance cannot ienerate the idea of an infiniteobject' Knowledge of God is prior to ail other fnowredge, not temporaily, butIogically. '8 The idea of G_od has a specific function, it iJite . .unot"tigti ttrutguides our knowredge.'e Thus, Clauùerg suggesred, God as tr,. r ighi oi it; sourguarantees the (formar) correctness of our knowredge. This is"the pi;;;;Augustinian strand in his.psychorogy.2' The prominent prace of the idea of Godin science and phirosophy, is connectea with craubérg's ontoiogy-oiio.ur,which he conceived of as present both in the divine mind and in the humanmind.

The doctrine of ideas as present in the divine and in the human mind has itsorigins in the Hellenistic interpretation of pratonic phitosophy. rt "

pry.r,,logical rwist in the notion of idèa was deveropel o.*."n praro and protinus.The ancient Stoics interpreted pratonic ideas as mere representations of ourthough.t.2r Similarry, cicero saw ideas as human thoughts, but he also con_sidered them to be innate rures of conduct, shared by alr indíviduars.22 phiro andother representatives of middre-pratonism, possibry in a crit ical reaction to theStoic interpretation of ideas as human thoughts bur court,a characterized ideasas the thoughts of God.?a Thjs. doctrine, alsJpresent in Augustine,b .""f p."r.0in Macrobuis' In Macrobuis's comment"ry on c,"". o's somnium (probabrywritten berween the end of the. 4th and thé beginning of the 5th century), weread that God's mind contains the ,,rerum .p..iJr;,, *h:.h ;";;;;;; iJJ.r."

Johannes Clauberg on Perceptual Knowledgc lj

[ ) l r l i r rg thc Mid<l lc Agcs t l rc tcrrrr " i tJc l" was rrrairr ly usct l lor d iv inc i t jcns. I lycontrasl, some Renaissance authors such as Marsi l io Ficino anrl ci iort iano[3runo, started to use i t again for human ideas.

claubcrg endorsed the vicw t lrat ideas are present in the divine mincl as"archetypae" of created things. Man's ideas of God and of the things createcl byGod are defined as "ectypae":

Ex ideis al iae sunt ectypae, qual is est idea Dei & al iarum rerum ab hominenon factibilium, aliae archerypae, quae renrm faciendarum formulae &exemplaria sunt & à Philosophis ad causam eff icientem referuntur (. . .) .27

Mediated by the sensible world, human knowledge is related to the divineideas. Perceptual ideas depend essential ly upon the sensible world.a Norv, inthe fol lowing I want to argue that clauberg's theory of ideas must be uncler-stood in terms of Renaissance Neoplatonism.

Renaissance authors, such as Ficino, pico and Bruno, regarded the idea as aneternal model with a specif ic function in the relat ion between Gotj, world, anclI tuman soul. As "cognit ionis generationisque fundamentum", the idea is notonly a formal principle of real i ty, but also a possible object of knowleclge.2esignif icant is Ficino's definit ion of the ideas as "prirnum in al iquo generè",,uwhich was also echoed by Clauberg.sr clauberg's view of the ontological andpsychological function of ideas was most clearly anticipated by GjordanoBruno, howevcr, who devclopcd his cognit ive psychology in the framewclrk ofwhat is cal lcr l thc thcory of t l rc t l rrcc worlds: Gotl , thc. inf ini te universc ornaturc, and thc human soul. on Bruno's vicw, thc contcnts of thc hunran sout arerelatcd to the formal structure of natural real i ty and to the origin of t l re lattcr. 'The new cosmolory led Bruno to a part ial departure from the Neoplatonic viewof lr ierarchy: in an inf initc universc thcre can bc no quali tat ive hiatus bctwccrrthe sublunar and the celestial world. Bruno dist inguishcd between, on the onehand, thc world of cod and of divinc idcas ("rnundus suprcnrus"), on the ot lrcrhand the world of natural real i fy ("mundus ideatus"). God and the divine ideasform the basis of the natural world and guarantee i ts knowabil i ty.r On t lr isconstrual the human soul can represent the "corpus idearum" at a mental level.-!

Notice that clauberg, l ike Descartes, did not dist inguish between represen-tat ional principle ( idea in the mind) and known content (essence of sensiblebodies or image of a divine idea). Ideas are mental i tems with represenrationalcontent. This conflat ion of representation and content also had a paral lel in latesixteenth-century eclect ic authors such as Giordano Bruno and Siipio Agnello.Bruno assigned to "umbra" and species a representational ancl instrumentalfunction, but often he also regarded them as the object of knowledge.3s Agnelloassimilated species to idea, regarding both as the cognitive object.ró

It is obviously highly improbable that clauberg was acquainted with all thesources mentioned above. To be sure, he quoted at length from the works ofFicino. He was probably not acquainted with the writ ings of Bruno, howevsl,although he did have knowledge of ideas that are very simirar to Bruno's,namely, through the work of the relatively unknown German author Conrad

78 L. Spruit

I3crg.r7 I 'his may cxplain the unmistakable affinity bctwccn Claubcrg's vicwsand Bruno's. L ike his Renaissance 'precursors ' , Clauberg s i tuated theintell igible world in the divine mind,38 and held that rhis world of ideas ismirrored in natural reality. This construal guarantees the intell igibil i ty ofnatural reality, and, as in Bruno, enables the human mind to 'follow' the ideas,that is, to reproduce them at a mental level.

2. MtNp AND BoDY

Like Descartes, Clauberg thought that body and mind are two distinct sub-stances. He ruled out the idea ofa causal or physical interaction between bodyand mind. Yet, he believed that body and soul are intimately ("arctè"3e) relatedto one another: the motions of bodily organs may determine or change thestates of mind,4 and the mind in its turn is able to govern and to move thebody.ot Between mind and body there exists a "conjunctio" or "nexus"a2 that isguaranteed by divine providence. This conjunction may be seen as a special caseof the more global formal coherence between God and the world, groundect inthe ontology of ideas. Indeed, the mind's relation to the body was explicit lycompared to that between God and the world.as

Clauberg endorsed the Cartesian view of the soul as "res cogitans",e reject-ing the Aristotelian definitions of the soul as "actus corporis", "forma assistens"or "informans",t5 and also rejecting the metaphor of the sailor and the ship.{6With Descartes and De Raey he shared the view that the soul is present in thewhole body, but has the pineal gland as its privileged seat where mind and bodymay interact: '

In quanr cerebri partem cirm & corpus per suos spiritus, & anima per saumvoluntatem agere possit, contingit interdum ut inter se pugnent & confligant.aT

That mind and body are related to one another, is clear from the t"ct itrrtthere are perceptions in the mind which depend on bodily motions, and on thefact that the body is moved by the soul's wil l.a8 The bond behveen body and soulis not a substantial union but rather a "conjunctio vitalis,,, that is to say, bodyand soul are connected through their operations.ae Clauberg regarded the bodyas the instrument of the soul.so The non-causal relation between the two hecompared to that between lord and servant, or between rider and horse.slIndeed, mental operations do not depend on the body, and the acts of the soul-body complex are defined as "actus transeuntes".s2

Interesting from an epistemological point of view is Clauberg's thesis of the"objective" presence of the body to the soul:

Est quidem animo corpus nostrum etiam objectivè praesens, quoties de eocogitat (...) Objectiva i l la praesenta est inter signum & signatum, imaginem& examplar, inque sola intentionali & vicaria, inrò picta quadam entitateconsisti t.5l

Johannes Clauhe ry on Pcrccplual Knowlcdg,c 19

' l 'hc prcscrrcc ol t l rc Lrody to t lrc soul (whiclr i rr t l rc ubovc pitssagc is pltr t tsct l

in the same terms used by the schoolmen to indicate the presence of cognit ive

objects in the mind5a) is subsequently explained in Cartesian terms: bodi lvmovements can st ir the soul to an activi ty, in the sense that they can give the

occasion for the soul to develop thoughts.

Inferius in superius agere non potest enti tatem se nobil iorem ì.rè eff icienclo:attamen potest ei producendae certam atque val idam occasionem dare,potest incitamentum esse fort issimum.5s

No natural bond or necessity can explain the mutual interaction betwcen

mind and body; al l we can say here is that i t is grounded in God's wil l .56 This isthe upsot of Clauberg's occasional ism. Thus, Clauberg was not a 'classical 'occasional ist.s? Indeed, he neither endorsed the causal ineff icacy of the humanmind, not did he postulate or argue for a continuous divine intervention in thegeneration of perception and cognit ion.5s

3. PEnceploN

Clauberg did not lay down a definit ive theory of perception in any onepart icular work. The question of how the human mind may gain knowledge ofthe sensible world returned on many occasions, and was addressed by him fromdifferent angles in dif ferent works, depending on the context in which i î was

raised. Thus, he sometimes presented only concise notes and definit ions (as inTheoia Corporum Wventium), while at other times he dwelled more extensivelyon physiological aspects and on more str ict ly psychological and cognit ive issues

{as in Conjunclio and Exercitationes).lnhisTheoia Corporum Viventium, Clauberg stated that some "cogitationes"

are acîions ("vol i t iones"), while other are passions:

Passionem general i ter appello omne genus perceptionis, quae in nobisinvenitur, quia saepe accidit , ut animus noster eam talem ncln faciat, qual isest, & semper eam recipimus ex rebus, quae cognoscendo repraesentantur.so

Perception is a passive, or more precisely, an involuntary process, when i tregards an external object.m Indeed, perception depends on soul or body.órA1lperceptions depend on the nervous system, however, not just insofar as they areeffects of bodily causes, but as "compositum ex aliquo corporis nostri motu &mentis cogitat ione".62 Thus, al l perception involves the mind-body complex.

Clauberg endorsed Descartes' view of perception as a process involving three

stages. The first stage consists in the affection of the sense organ and thesubsequent transmission of sensory stimuli through the nerves to the brain.'fhesecond stage is the actual perception of an external object by the soul, insofaras the lattcr is present in the pineal gland. Descartes argued that for thisperception no intentional species were required, because the brain may affectthe mind without introducing anything into it. Clauberg, who was less polemical

S0 L. Spruit

towards scholastic psychology, stated that a repeated scnsit ive affcct ion lcavcsa ' \cst igium" in thc brian, wlr ich the "phi losophcn" cal l "spccics & plrantasma".ólI t is obviously the "conjunctio" of mind and body that makes i t possible forappropriate brain activi ty to give the mind occasion to have an iclca orintel lectual representation which corresponds to the condit ion of the brain'sbeing tr iggered by the sense organs. The last stage is the formation of aperceptual judgement.e A more extcnsive analysis of the three stages ispresented elsewhere.ós .

For a better understanding of Clauberg's posit ion, i t is helpful to compare i tto that of Descartes and to traditional psychology. Clauberg followed Descartes'concept of the ontolory of the sensory process.6ó Notice that the first stage ofperception, as described above, is not essential ly dif ferent fronr the Aristotel ianidea of the affect ion of sense organs as a necessary condit ion for sensation. Asfor Clauberg's and Descartes'second stage, however, there is a substantialdif ference with the Peripatet ic view of the relat ionship between perception andknowledge. The second stage seems to comprise both perception and themind's simple apprehension, as conceived by the Peripatetics. Indeed, Descarîesdist inguished between sensation (pertaining to the mind-body complex) andimagination or perception as such (a mental event), but he also tended toconflate sensuous and non-sensuous perception, as may be derived from thethought-experiment of the wax tablet in the Second Meditat ion.ó7 Also Clauberg,though dist inguishing between sense perception and mental perception,regarded perception as a mental function.d Moreover, truth and falsi ty do notapply to the f irst two stages.6e According to the Peripatet ics, this holds for theperception cjf sensibles pertaining to specif ic senses, and for the mind's simpleapprehension of an individual essence. In Aristot le, perceiving involved aphenomenon that was dif f icult to explain in terms of Aristotel ian physics, namely,the absorption of the form of the object by the senses. Clauberg and Descartesreplaced this process by a non-mechanical reading of pattems in the pineal glfrrd.

ln Conjunctio, Clauberg distinguished between the two sorts of perception,confused and pure. Confused perception he attr ibuted to the imagination andto the senses; i t has i ts ground in the complex of soul and body. pure perceptionhe also described as mental or intel lectual perception.T0 Sense perception takesplace by means of material signs, which merely indicate but do not represenlexternal objects.?r Through the senses we know tftat things exist, but we do notcome to know what they are.72 Intel lectual perception, by contrast, takes placeby means of formal signs, that is, by means of mental images:

Puri intel lectus perceptio f i t per signa/ormalia, quae res verè repraesentant,quatenus earum sunt inragines mente pictae.Tl

An important point that should be mentioned here is that Clauberg describetlmental representations as "formal signs", a definit ion that was often used forthe inîel l igible species.?1 what is more, Clauberg identi f ied mental repre-sentations as images depicted in the mind. Also Descartes sometimes suggestedthat ideas are images, but he eventual ly rejected that view.75

Jolnrurc,s Clouhery on Pcrccplual Krunvledgc lJl

Tlrc t l ist inct ion bctwccn sctìSc pcrccption and ntental pcrccptiott scclì ìs t()

suggest a return to something l ike the Aristotel ian dist inct ion between pcrcep-

t ion and cognit ion. This interpretat ion is confirmed by Claubcrg wllcrc lrc

clcscribcd t lrc acts of thc soul-body conrplcx as " i tctus transcttntcs", att t l cogtr i t iot l

as an "actus immanens".76 This is an Aristotel izing restateme nt of Descartes'

dist inct ion between sensation and imagination or perception as such'

By virtue of the vital conjunction between body and mind, the mind is able to

perieive sensible objects. The role of the body, although essential in perception,

is subordinate to that of the soul. In perception the body is the organ or instru-

ment of the soul, compared to the bl ind man's st ick.77 To certain bodi ly st imuli

correspond precise mental reactions,?8 but perceptual ideas are only apparently

brought about by the body. Indeed, the bodity motions only st ir the soul to

perceive. The body furnishes the necessary st imuli , but perception as such is a

mental function. Sense-perception does not capture the essences of things, hut

merely communicates their existence to the soul.re A clear and dist inct pe rcep-

t ion requires the attention of the mind.m Indeed, the imagination may bc

perfected by " interna meditat io".8r

4. PERcerrunL IDEAs

l lurrrarr i t lcas arc 11l t uetual iz l t iorrs of i rutatc disposi t iot ts, as i t t l )cscl t t tcs.

Rat l rer , l ike many Scholast ics and Rcnaissance Platonists, c lauberg in his

thcory of ideas cmphasized their ontological status. Idcas arc rcgardccl as

enti t ies,s2 exist ing both in the divine mind and in human minds'

ln Erercitat iones Clauberg again described the idea as "pictura rei in mertte".8'

Ideas are involved in acts of simple apprehension, and as such thcy are sinl i lar

to perception, thought, and concept.so Clauberg assigned a twofold ntrrde of

being to ideas:

Duplex in onrni idea, in omni imagine esse consideramus, quorum unum ah

al tero var i is nominibus dist inguimus, jam reale & intent ionale, jam mater ia lc

& formale, jam formale & objectin-rm, jam proprium & vicariurn opponendo.*5

As an immanent act or an operation of the rnind the idea is a 'real ' thing, t tr

bc classif icd in thc catcgory of act ion. I ts sccond nrodc of bcing is dcscribct l ls

"plus quìrm omnino non esse", that is, as a diminished kind of being. ln this

mode the idea represents things ìn the nrind:

Et hoc ipsum reprae.sentare sive exhibere, pcr modum imaginis, vociìrntrs

idearurn nostrarum esse vicar ium, seu object ivum, seu intent ionalc.b

By virtue of the representational force of ideas thc soul may "bccome al l

things", as Aristot le had put i t . To support his claim that ideas are sornclhirìq

'real ' , Clauberg invoked Augustine's conception of the soul as " imago",

Zabarel la's argument for the existence of intentions, and Piccolomini 's argtr-

ment for the exjstence of spir i tual beings. Of the latter two Clauberg remarkerl

82 L. S1trui t

that they sometimcs cxprcssctl thcmselves rat lrcr obscurcly, but that thcy st i l lhad valuable things to say on the ontology of ideas and mental images.87 Sti l l ,Clauberg was well aware of the dif ferences between tradit ional species andCartesian ideas.ff i Indeed, in the subsequent section he questioned the inter-pretat ion of Cartesian ideas given by Conrad Berg, mentioned above, who hadassimilated them to intel l igible species in the tradit ional sense.se

Perceptual ideas are generated by the mind on the occasion of bodi ly motions:

Quapropter corporis nostri motus tantummodo sunt causae procatarcticae,quae menti tanquam causae pincipal i occasionem dant, has i l lasve ideas,quas virtute quidem semper in se habet, hoc potiùs tempore quàm al io ex seel iciendi ac vim cogitandi in actum deducendi.m

Bodily events provide the occasion for the mental occurrence of ideas.Clauberg endorsed neither a str ict ly Cartesian innatism of idcas, nor did heclaim that ideas come from perception. In this sense his posit ion was similar tothat of many medieval authors who opposed the natural ist ic strand inAristotel ian phi losophy, and who were cri t ical of the species doctr ine inpart icular. Examples here are Peter Olivi and Godfrey of Fontaines.et A briefsurvey of their posit ions may help us understand the possible historicalbackground of Clauberg's posit ion.

Peter Olivie2 ruled out al l effect ive interaction between soul and extra-mentalreal i ty in cognit ive processes. Cognit ion originates from a mental principle witha total ly self-support ing activi ty, that is; stemming from its "nuda essentia".e3SomewhAt paradoxical ly, the human mind is supposed to open i tself up to anobject that has no eff icient causal role in the production of the mental actdirected at the object.ea The impact of sensory st imuli occasions mental act ivi ty,whereas the cognit ive assimilat ion of the object is a purely intra-mental process.Olivi did not rule out that the object may play a role in knowledge acquisit ion,but he emphasized that i t is the intel lect that tends towards the object, whereasthe object only serves to 'terminate' the cognitive act.es According to Olivi, cog-nit ion rests on a relat ionship, cal led "aspectus", between the cognit ive facultyand the object. This l ink is establ ished by a conversion caused either by the wil lor by a stirring of the senses.e6 The cognitive act directed at a sensible objectnatural ly fol lows the conversion of the íntel lect to the object. In the samecontext, OIivi developed an epistemological theory of the "col l igantia" betweenbody and soul, which reappeared in the work of Suarez and which may be seenas one of the historical roots of Clauberg's occasional ism.eT

Godfrey of Fontaines was implici t ly referred to by Clauberg where hepostulated the existence of a "contactus virtut is" between body and soul.esGodfrey of Fontainese identified the interaction between intellect and sensibleimages in the generation of mental contents with a "contactus spiritualis" or"virtualis", by which the substantial quiddities contained in sensory repre-sentations manifest themselves.rm The "virtual contact" suffices for the agentintellect to produce the mental act which may also be called intell igible species,provided one regards it as contained virlualiter in the intellect's own light.tol

Iohannes Clauhcrg on Pcrccptuul Knowlcdgc f'ìl

' l ' l rus, t l re nrerr la l act is a l rcady vi l tual ly containcd iu t l tc lgct t t i r t tc l lcct 's l ig l r t .

As far as i ts content is concerned, however, the act-species seems to depcnd onthe effects of the phantasm's puri f icat ion.

Clauberg's own solut ion for the generation of pe rceptual ideas involved the

existence of divine sparks in the soul,rm and the bel ief that perceptual ideas<Jepend for their content on material objects. ln Exercitat io XVII, Claubergproposed an account of the origin of ideas in terms of their twofold being. ' fhehuman mind is the spontaneous cause of i ts own operations, hence also that ofideas with respect to their formal being. This does not hold for ideas withrespect to their representational being, however, which requires a necessaryrather than a spontaneous cause. Clausberg observed that Descartes'words atthe beginning of the f i f th Meditat ion, on mind as the cause of i ts true ideas, arediff icult to grasp.r0r He also questioned Descartes' account of our idea of God.Clauberg pointed out that we should f irst deal with ideas of common objectsbefore turning to exceptional cases, and that mental representations normallydepend on external objects as their "exemplar". I t belongs to the nature of thesoul to think, but to have determinate thoughts depends upon precise "causaeexemplares". For their formal being, perceptual ideas depend on the minci, butfor their "esse obiectivum", that is, for their being representations, thcy dcpcndon external bodies.rB Or, as was pointed out in section l , above, perceptualideas are "ectypae" of sensible objects. lOs

Clauberg's view of the role of external bodies in the r ise of perceptual icleaswas most probably derived from Suarez. Suarez had ruled out that the ( inner)

senses and their representations can have any. direct inf luence on îhcprocluction of intel lectual knowledge. They merely provide the occasion for themind to generate menîal representations and cognit ive acts. Suarez's psycho-logy drew on ideas from declared opponents of Thomist psychology, such asPetcr Olivi , and probably also from Neoplatonic Perípatet ics. In his psychologr.the phantasm has no instrumental causal i ty: as "causa quasi examplaris"rtr i tmerely offers the occasion for a mental operation to take place. Suarez prob-ably bel ieved that the unity of the soul, as the ensemble perceptual and cogni{ ivefacult ies, is suff icient to explain the relat ionship between mind and phantasm.in such a way that no causal relat ion between intel lect and sensory repre-sentation is required for the generation of sense-dependence cognit ive contents.

The 'occasional ist ' explanation of the sense-dependence of intel lect ive cogrri-t ion is a clear token of aff ini ty between Suarez and Neoplatonic interpretat ionsof Aristotle's psychology found in Renaissance authors such as Marsilio Ficino,Marcantonio Genua,r07 and Teofi lo Zimara.tN An important point of dif fere ncewith these authors, and with Clauberg, too, should also be mentioned here,namely, the fact that Suarez did not endorse any type of nativism.r@ îre nrincl

produces immaterial representations whenever the inner senses enable it t0perform a'parallel 'operation. The intell igible species is an exclusive product ofthe mind, but it is not innate. It arises or emanates in the same instant when tlrephantasy generates a phantasm.rr0 Elsewhere, Suarez defined this non-essentialrelationship between the operations of the intellect and the inner sense as"concomitant ia".r I I

84 L. Spntit

Let me f inal ly compare Clauberg's cxplanat ion of the gencrat ion of 'perceptual ideas with the account given by Dcscartcs. According to Descartcs,cxtcrnal objccts causc motions in thc sensory organs, wherc thcy triggcr acomplex pattern of motions; once these motions reach the brain, they occasionthe soul to perceive the various qualit ies of the object.rr2 The mind producesperceptual ideas on the occasion of, and attending to, the patterns in the pinealgland. Now, while Descartes believed that nothing is known without ideas,Clauberg argued that no ideas exist without things.rrr Moreovcr, Claubcrg hcldon to a vicw that was explicit ly refutcd by Descartcs, namcly, that of thc formllsimil itude between ideas and things. ldeas for Clausberg are basically images,that is, imitations of the things they represent. In this sense, then, Clauberg'sposition owed as much to Peripatetic psychology as to the Cartesian theory ofideas. Mind autonomously generates its acts, but the acts depend on sensiblereality for the contents they express.rra

5. CONCLUSIoN

Clauberg's theory of perceptual knowledge was based on a systematic elabora-tion of views derived both from traditional philosophy and from Cartesianism.His outlook in psycholory shows a clear affinify with Descartes, but it is alsoremarkably cognate to some Scholastic crit ics of the naturalizing tendencies inAristotelian philosophy, as well as to Neoplatonic theories of ideas. Clauberg'saccount of the acquisit ion of perceptual knowledge was based on two keyconcepts, one concerning the metaphysical position of the soul, which in virtueof inborn divine "sparks" is connected to the divine ideas and to the latter'ssensible images, the other concerning the mind's sensitivity to cerebral motions,that is, its unacquired abil ity to interpret the world without being causallyaffected by it.

Clauberg remained rather vague about the nature of the inborn sparks. Hedescribed them as simple perceptions that may serve as the basis for furtherknowledge. In this sense, Clauberg may be said to have anticipated Leibniz'sview of the "petites perceptions" developed in the Nouveaar Essars. However,Clauberg did not hold that these sparks determine the content of ourperceptual knowledge, emphasizing as he repeatedly did that sensible bodiesare the exemplars of our ideas. Thus, unlike Leibniz, he was not a nativist withregard to content. The sparks should most probably be seen as principles witha role in organizing the acquired ideas. In this sense they would seem to berelaîed to Thomas Aquinas'doctrine of f irst principles,r15 which was also echoedin Descartes' notion of inborn seeds.rró

Clauberg believed that the mind is the efficient cause of perceptual ideas,which are generated upon the impingement of external stimuli on the senseorgans. The extramental object has no causal effect on the soul, yet its role goesbeyond that of being a mere occasional condition for a mental state to instan-tiate the object's form or essence. Sensible objects reflect the "archetypae", andare thus able to determine the content of perceptual ideas. Clauberg arguedthat percepîual knowledge is principally mediated by the body, the sense

Johunnes Claubery on l'erccptuul Krcw'ledge 85

organs, antl t l tc idcas.'I 'hc lunction of t lrc botly artd of thc scnscs is to tralìslìì i tt lre stimuli from cxtcrnal trot.l ics, which dctcrnrine thc contcnt of our idcas. Antlthc idc;rs are the vchiclcs of all knowlcdge. They :ìrc not a "tcrl irtrn qtrit l".however: Clauberg did not subscribe to a representational vicw of cognition, inthe strict sense in which ideas are seen as cognitive objects. A representationaltheory of mind generally cntails of perceptual experience whose content cannotbe identif ied with anything in the external world. Clauberg's doctrine of ideas,by còntrast, postulatcs thc possibil i ty of grasping the essences of matcrialobjccts. In Clarrbcrg's vicw, thc iclens nre signs relating mind to worlcl.rrT Thcbasis for thcir representational power is the metaphysical claim that hunlanidcas' fo l low' the "ectypae", which in turn mirror the div ine ideas.

Noles

L For biographical information, and for sources of Clauberg's philosophy, see W. We ier,Die Stellung des Johannes Claubery in der Philosophre, Mainz 1960, l-6. All quotationsare from Opera omnia philosophica, Amstelodami 1691.

2. See Corporis el dnimac itt honinc conjunclio, p. 237, whcrc C--laubcrg callcd Dcscartcs"Phi losophus", which was the epi theton medieval Scholast ics used for Ar istot le.

3. For discussion of De Raey (1622-1707), see Verheek, Descartes ond the Dutch. FarlvReactions to Canesian Philosophy, 1ó37-Ió50, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1992, pp. 48

and 71-72; idem, De vijheid van de filosofie, Rellecties over een Caftesiaans thema,

Utrecht 1994.4. Cf., for example, Conjunclio corporis et animae, XXXY7, p' 239, where Clauberg

endorsed a central thesis ofAr istotel ian psychology regarding the relal ion between the

three souls in man- For a seneral d iscussion, see E. Viola, "Scolast ica e cartesianesimonel pensiero di J. Clautierg" in Rivista di filosofia neoscolastico Ó7( 1975). 247-2ó6: Weicr.

Dei Stellung des Johannes Claubcrg in der Philo.sophie, 172; cf . also Vcrbcck, De.\conesand the Dutch,8. Also other late Cartesians, such as E. Maignan and J. Du Ì lamcl, t r ie d

to fit Aristotelian notions within an overall Carîesian framework. See my Specle.sintelligibilis. From Perception to l(nowledge, vol. II: Renaissance Conîrover-sies, LaterScholast ic ism and the El iminat ion of the Intel l ig ib le Species in Modcrn Phi losophv,Leiden 1995, ch. XI l , $ 3.

5. Thcre are many rcfcrcnccs to l )urandus of Sainl-Pourqain, Scotus. lhc RcnnissanccAristotelians, Suarez etc.

6. See Exercitationes Centum de Cognirtone Dei & Nostri, LXX.{VII.3-4, p. 744. }:orClauberg's at tcmpts to harmonize Ar istotel ian at td Cartcsian phi losophy, sce i t lsrrDilferenria, LXXXI, p. 1234.

7. Scc Weicr, Die Stellun7 dcs Jolnnncs Claubery in dcr Philosophie, 162.8. Erercitationes,5l2, 599-ó00, and passim.9. Theoia Corporum l4ventium, 187. For the view of man as microcosm, sce, among others,

Giovanni Pico della Miran<lola, Heptaplus, in [)e Inrninis dignitate, Ileptnpltr, I)( etltt d

uno e scitti vari, ed. E. Garin, Fìrenze 1942, p. 192, and Cornelius Agrippa, De ocatltaphilosophia, ed. K.A. Nowotny, Graz 1967 (reprint of the 1533 edition), lll.36' p. 296.

10. Etercitatio LXXIX, p.731-32.

17. Erercitatio LlI.24, p.680.12. The"locusclassicus"of thedoctr ineoftranscendentals inThomasAquinasisDever i tate

f .l; for discussion, cf. L. Oeing-Hanhoff, Ens et utiltm converlunlur Stellung und Gehaltdes Grundsalz in der Philosophie des Hl. Thomas von Aquin, Mùnster 19-53.

13. Exercitalio II.1, p. 596. See Averroes, Commentaium ma9num in Arutotelis De aninnl ibros, ed, F. St . Cra* ' ford. Cambridge (Ma.) 19,s3, p.501:"( . . . ) neque causa ent ium estaliud nisi scientia eius"; idem, /n Aristotels Metaphysicontm librum XII, in Aristotcìcs,

86 L. Spruit

Opera cum Avenois commentar ik, 11 vols. , Venct i is 1562-1574, vol . VI l l , p. 337. AlstrThomas Aquinas endorsed this view, see: Slltr/rn thcologiae, I, q. 14, a. 8; Sttntma contrnGentìles, I, cap. 6l; In Xll Metaphysicorum Anstotelis, lectio 12.2631. Cf. also Ficino, /nParmenidem, c.32, in Opera omnia, 2 vols. , Basi lcae 1576 (repr int : Tor ino 1983),

. l 149,

and Giordano Bruno, ,Spaccio de Io bestía trionfante, o Dialoghi italiani, ed. G.Aquilecchia, Firenze 1985r, p. 6.f4.

14. Ontosophio. I1.8, p. 283.15. Ontosophia, IX.155, p. 308.16. Cf. Erercitatio XVI.l2, p. 620: "Veitas nihil aliud est quàm unio archetypi cum ectypo.

vel ideae repraesentantis cum repraesentato"; and XXXLl 2, p. 648-49, where Claubergreferred to the words of a French author'. "Veitas rerum naturalium fundamenlum est &radLr intelligibilítatis earunden\ &c. Ab eadem veitale seu conlormitote rerum cum ideis,quae in Deo aaemae sunt (...)"; cf. Ontosophia, IX.1-53, p. 308.

17 . ln Exercitatio I, pp. 592-595, Clauberg gave practical and theoretical arguments for theimporîance ofknowledge of God. The latter is useful for refuting theorelical an<1 prac-t ical atheists, as wel l as for refut ing the arguments of Socinians against natural theology;moreover, natural knowledge of God strengthens fai th and furnishes a theoret icalfoundat ion for those human discipl ines, "quarum f i rma et evidens not i t ia expet i tur" . InErercitatio 11,p.596-97, he argued îhat the knowledge of God is "Philosophiae princip-ium. medium f in is" .

18. Erzrcinno IX, p. 61 1-12.19. Exerci lanoXI.7,p.ó13:"Quaeclarèdist inctequepercipimusinrebusquibusl ibctcreat is,

sunt quasi candelae singulae: eadem clarè percepta dum Deo conjunct im tr ibuunîuromnia, sed cum addi tamento & augmento creatam omnem perfect ionem superantc,accendi tur quasi una ex omnibusjunct is atque al i is innumeris addi t is conf lata candela,quae non potest non esse lucidissima".

20. August ine bel ieved that the soul is capable of an immediate cogni t ive grasp of i ts ownessence and of the moral virtues, whereas divine illumination is needed for knowledgeof God and of the sensible realm. Insofa'r as the latter is concerned, however,August i r i ian i l luminat ion did not involve innate contents: i t merely ensured the formalcorrectness of our reporls of the sensible realm. Though accepting, as is well-known, themind's acquaintance with îhe "eternal reasons", August ine rejected innate cogni t ivecontents; cf. his criticisms of Plato's Meno in De Trinitate, ed. WJ. Mounta in, Opera, parsXvl .1-2, Turnhout 1968, Xl l , c. 15.

21. Cî. Die Fragmenîe n Dialekik der Sroiker Neue Sammlung der Tèxte mit deutÈhenÙbenetzung und Kommentaren, ed. K. Húlser, Band I , Stut lgart 1987, nos 315-321.

22. See, for example, Cicero, Orato4 7-10. For discussion, see PO. Krisîeller, Dic ldeen aLrGedanken der menschlichen und gòfllichen Vemunft, Heidelberg 1989, p. 9, who identifiesPanetius as the likely source of Cicero; and J. Pépin, "ldéalidea dans la Patristiquegfecque et latine. Un dossier", in ldea. W Colloquio Inlemazíonale del LessicoInrellentale Europeo, eds. M. Fattori and M.L. Bianchi, Roma 1990, 1342, p.34.

23. ln Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoikeri ed. cit., no 318 and no 319, this interpretationwas challenged by Plotinus, Enneades VL6.i2 and by Proclus, In Euclidk Elementa,89,11.15-20. On this discussion, see also G. Reale, Stoia della Filosofa Anrica, IV Le scuoledell'età imperiale, Milano 1987 (fint edition 1978), 336. Plato argued, already inParmenides, that the identilication of ideas with thoughts is absurd; cf. R.E. Allen,"ldeas and thoughts: Parmenides 132b{", inAncient Philosophy (1980),29-38.

24. Philo, De opifcio mundi. 16-25; Albinus, Epitome, ed. C.F. Herman, Plntonis Dùtlogisecundum Thrasylli teîralogtos disposíg vol. VI, Lipsiae 1880 (second edition), 152-189,p. 163; ps. Plutarchus [=Aetius], Placita, i.10.3, quoted in H. Diels, Doxographi graeci,Berlin-Leipzig 1,929,309,3. Cf. also Seneca, Epistola 65, 7: "haec exemplaria rerumomnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt, et modosmenle complexus est: plenus his figuris est, quas PIato ideas appellat, immortales,immutabi les, infat igabi les." For discussion, see: A.N.M. Rich, "The Platonic ideas as lhethoughts of God", in Mnemosyne 7(1954), 123-133; H.A. Wolfson, "Extradeical and

Johannes Clauhery on Perccplual Knowlcdge 87

irr t radcical intcrprctat ion of thc I ' latorr ic idcas", i r r Rcl ig ious l ' l t i losophl ' . A ( j rotrp ofEssays, Cambridge (Ma.) 1961,27*68, on pp.29f; I - .M. de Ri jk, "Quacst io dc i t lc ts.

Some notes on an important chapter of Platonism", in Keplnlaion. Studies in GreekPhi losophy and i ts Cont inuat ion, eds. J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Ri jk, Assen lQ7-5,20+213, on pp. 204f. See also C.J. de Vogel , "A la recherche dcs étapcs précises entrePlaton et la néoplatonisme", in Mnemosyne 7(1954), 111-127, on p. 120, and A.II.Armstrong, "The background of the doctr ine that the intel l ig ib les are not olr ls i ( le îheintelfect", in Les sources de Plotin, Genève 1960, 391425, on pp. 399-404. PO.Kristeller, Dle /deen als Gedanken der menschlichen und gòttlichen Vemunf4 argues on p.l3f that the doctr ine of ideas as div ine thoughts ar ises wi th Ant iochus of Ascalon.

2-5. Cf. L.M. de Ri jk, "Quaest io de ideis. Some notes on an imporîant chapter ofPlatonism",208. For other authors, see J. Pépin, " ldéal tdea dans la Patr ist ique grecqueet lat ine. Un dossier" . 28-36.

26. Macrobius,Commentai i inSomniumScipionis, ed. I .Wi l l is ,Leipzigl9T0(2nt l cd.) ,p.22' . "aut enim deus summus est aut mens ex eo nata in qua rerum species conl inenturaut mundi anima quae animarum omnium fons est , ( . . . ) " ; and 6: "( . . . ) vel ad mcntem,<1uem Graecinoún appellant, originales rerum species, quae r/lai dictae sunt, contìnentem,ex summo natam et profectam deo". This def in i t ion was frequent ly referred to in theMiddle Ages; cf . , among others, "Henry of Harclay 's Quest ions on the div ine ideas". cr l .A. Maurer, in Mediaevol Sntdies 23(1961),163-193, on pp. 174 and 181.

27. Lrercí tar io XV11,p.618;cf . ident,XVI.12,p.620:"Archetyprmeniminterdumest idea,ea videl icet quae existent iam rei antecedi t ( . . . ) " Cf. Ontosophia XXl l l .344--1-5, p. l lS.

?8. Ercrcitati<t XVl,22, p. 621: "Nempe sicut sunt ideae seu.specie.s in mente divina, quaeipsas rcs creatas & existentes realiter antecedunt: ila in nostris mentjbus sunt ideae scuspecies quaedam consequenles, quibus repraesentantur res, ut jam à Deo factae &crcatae sunt."

29. Cf. Marsilio Ficino, 1n Pamenidem, in Opera, p. 1140; cf' Pico, Cotnmentosopra ttnoconzone de amore contposla da Girolamo Beneúeni. in De homhis dignitatem, Ileptaplus'De ente et uno e scnîti vari, pp. 467-68; Giordano Bruno Srg//ru srgr llontnq in Opcro larineconscr ipta, eds. F. Firrrent ino et a l i i , 3 vols. , 8 parts, Neapol i -Florent iae I879-1891, vol .

u.2 p. 197.30. For discussion, see PO. Kristeller, II pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficirro, Firenze 14.53.

Parte Prima, cap. VII; cf. Thomas Aquinas, In librum De causis e9osirio, ed. C. Pera.Tòr ino 1955, lect io XVl l l .340: "Secundo, considerandum est quod in unoquoque genereest causa i l lud quod est pr imum in genere i l lo a quo omnia sunt i l l ius gencr is in i ì logenere const i tuuntur."

31. Antosophia, XXll.338, p. 338.32. Cf. De umbris ideanun, ed. R. Sturlese, Firenze 1991, intentio nx, 43-44: 'Analogirrn

enim quandam admit tunt methaphysica, physica, et logica seu ante natural ia, natural ia.& rat ional ia- Sicut verum, imago, & umbra. Caeterum idea in mente r l iv ina est in actutoto s imul et unico. ( . . . ) In natura per vest ig i i modum quasi per impressioncm. Inintent ione, et rat ione per umbrae modum."

33. Srgil/us sigillorum, 164-ó5: "ltaque a mundo supremoJ qui est fons idearum, in quodic i tur esse Deus vel qui d ic i tur esse in Deo, descensus est ad mundum ideatunr, qrr i pcri l lum et ab i l lo dic i tur esse factus, et ab isto ad ipsum, qui utr iusque praecedent is estcontemplat iws, quique ut est a pr imo per secundum, i ta cognoscet pr imum pcrsecundum." Cf. also De La causa, pincípio et uno, ed. G. Aquilecchia, Torino 197,1, pp.15 and 69. The background of th is doctr ine regarding the relat ion between Cod, theworld and man is in; Corpw Hermeticum, eds. A.D. Nock & A,-J. Festugière,4 vols,,Paris 1946-54, X.1-14, p. 113-120 Asclepizs, c. 10, in Corpus Hemeticium. vol. II. pp.308-9: man is the second image of God, created according to the image of the wor ld: cf .also Corpus Hermeticum, VIII.5, in vol. I, p. 89; Cusanus, De coniecturb, eds. J. Koch &W. Happ, Hamburg 1971, I . i , p.6.

34. I -ampas t ig inta stahtarum, inOpera, vol . l i I ,51: " lntel l igamus mentcm pr imam parcntcmluminis, intel lectum pr imum fontem idcarum et ideam ideanrm, intel l igent ias specula.

88 L. Spruit

r l recicr in t ratrrra idcarurrr vcrt ig ia, r : r l iotrc l i l l r r rutr t spccic l r l r i l nor. l ro i r r (c l lcc l r r

umbras ídearum"; De imaginum compositione, in Opera, vol. Ill, 94: "Quae sane spccicsante natural ia appel latur idea, in natural ibus forma sivc vcst ig ium idearunr, inpostnatural ibus rat io seu intent io, quae in pr imam atque secundam dist ingui tur , quamnos al iquando idearum umbram consuevimus appel lare"; idem,97:. "Sicut enim nostraeintent iones habent or ig inem a rebus natural ibus, quibus non existent ibus et ipsae nonessent, velut nul lo existente corpore nul la csset umbra; i ta rcs ipsac naturalcs, mundusnempc physicus ncquaquam csse posset, s i mctaphysicus i l lc , ncnrpc idca portansomnia, ex actu ment is et voluntat is div inae se ipsam communicant is non praecxistcret" ;Theses de magia, in Opera, vol. lll, 463: "(...) ut autem est species abslracta et separatamater iae secundum actum cogni t ionis sensi t ivae vel rat ional is. s ic pcrf ic i tur ter t iumideae genus quod est causatum a rebus natural ibus, quae dependet ab i l l is s icutsccundum genus a pr imo." For a s imi lar v icw, see Charlcs de Bovel les, L ibcr deintel lecru, inOpem, Par is 1510, l0rand 1lv.

35. Sígillw sigillorury 197.36. Scipio Agnello,Disceptationes de rder, Venice 16i5, pp. 108-109.37. This author was frequently quoted by Clauberg ín the Erercitatiortes; cf. pp. 599, 605,

612,67'l.lt is not easy to îrace this Conrad Berg. Chr.G. Jócher,,4 llgemeines Gelehnen-Ler icon,4 vols. , Leipzig 1750-51, ment ioned a certain Conrad Berg, who died in 1592,and his son Conrad Berg, who taught theology at Frankfurt and wrote an Artiftcrumaristotelico-lullio-rameutq and Themata theologíca. The latter died in 1642, which makesit improbable that he wrote a treatise on Descartes; cf. Exercitationes,619-22,

38. The Scholast ic v iew of the div ine mind as containing the exemplars of creat ion was st i l la current view among 17th-century theologians; cf. H. Heppe & E. Bizer, Die Dogmatikder *angelkch-reformierlen KircÀe, Neukirchen 1958, p. 153-54.

39. See,amongmanyotherpassages,Conjunct io,p.230,andExercirat ioLV. l ,p.682,fortheint imate connect ion between soul and body.

40. Conjunct io XII l .3, p.218: "Quando ig i tur prorsus cvidcns cst , corporeos organontmnostrorum motus, quot iescunque al iquid sent imus, mutare s latum ment is nostrac, novasei cogi tat lones inferendo ( . . ) . " ; cf . XI I I .4, an<l LI I I . , .

41. Tlteoia Corporunr Wventiun4 195.42. Ercrcitatio LXXIX.1, p. 731.47. Exerci tot io XCI.14,p.753: "Cumqueimago&simi l i tudoDci inHominevar i is inrebus

posi ta esse judicetur, atque, et iam in dominio in res terrenas quae circa nos: cur nonet iam in eo col locatur, quòd sicut i Deus se habet ad majorem mundum, i ta se aqimanostra quodammodo habeat ad minorem mundum, hoc est , ad corpusculum nostrum(. . ) " Cf.Conjunct io, XLvl l l . l1, p.253.

44. Notice, that in Exercilalio Iv, p. 6f.X), this definition is defended with quotes from FrancisBacon, Marsi l io Fic ino and Plato. Moreover, in contrast wi th Descartes, Claubergattributed a (non-rational) soul also to the animals; cf .Theoria l4ventium Corporum, 184.

45. Cf . Theoria Corporum l/iventium, pp. 188-89; Exercitatio lY p. 599-600; Conjunctio, 252.M. Conjuncrio,230; Erercitatio XCI.7. p. 153; cf . Defensio, p. 1097. Also Dcscartes rejcctcd

this defirition; cf . Meditationes, in Oeuvres, eds. Ch. Adam and P. Tànnery, 12 vols., Paris1982-47, VII, 80-81, 86. See also Drscoun de Ia Mérhode in AT VI, 59. Thomas ascribedthis view to Plato; cf, Summa contm Gentiles, ll, c. 57 ,1327; cf . also Aristotle, De anima,4l3a&9: " l t is a lso uncertain whether the soul as an actual i ty bears the same relat ion tothe body as the sailor to the ship." The metaphor was also used by Plotinus, Enneades,IV3.21; Ficino, In Enneodes, VL7.5.6, in Opera,1788; and by Giordano Bruno, De iacauso" principio et uno, 77; Spaccio della butia trionfonte, in Dinloghi ilaliani, erJ. G.Aquilecchia, Firenze 1985r, 555-557; De gli ercici furori, in Dialoghi italioni, 1092; Orariovaledictoritt, in Opera, vol. I.1, l4; Lampas îiginîa statuarum, in Opera, vol. lIl, 246 andz) 3-

47. Conjunctio, 273, and Exercitatrb XCII, p. 754. See also Theoria Corporum Viventiut4 195,and Conjuntio, ?53-54.

48. Theoria Coeonun l/iventium, 195.

Joltunrres Claubery ttn I'e rceplutl Krtov;lcdgc ll9

,1 '1. l l t t rn iu ( ' t t lx t rurrr I ivrr t l i t t t t r , ) l l . ' , , ( r t t tJt t r t , l r t ' , - l l r r | / , t l ' ' l l : l ror lv t r r t t l r0tr l r r rc

conncctcd through act ions and passlons.

5O. Conjunctio,230ff.51. Coijunctio,216, and 221_77. For a more complere list of rhe mctaplìors uscrl by

Clauberg, see weier. , ,Der okkasional ismus des Johannes clauberg und sein vcrhàl tn is

zu Desc;rtes, Geulincz, Malebranche", inSrudia carTesiana 2(1981)' 43-62' p 48'

52. Conjunct io, xI ,4, p.211: "haquc l ranseunres tantummod0 sul ì l aclus, qulbus ct , rpus

alquC arr i r r rus in l lor i l i r rc c() l l igantur, drrrr l a l iqtr id [ i t nb l rn i r r r i r t l i rot l lcrr t t i t tn lur ; r t l

corpus, al iquid i tcm f i t a corporc, quod ad animam terminalur, ' 'Scc also the ncxl

- .".iion on perccpîion. See Theoria Corporum l4ventium, 182 for the physiological

aspects of tire bràin moving the body. For Clauberg's view of mental causation, see

Cànjunct io, XVI.5, p. 221: "Mens autem humana motuum in lJomine corporeorum

cauia ejusmodi Pftysica non est , sed Mort l i r tantùm (" )" ; cf ' a lso Pp 2l7,Zl8 ' 225' arr i l

272-73.57. Conjunctio,2l8.54. For a br ief out l ine of fhe Scholast ic doctr ine of objcct ive being, see notc 8f i '

55. Conjunctío, XtlL7, p. 219', cf . idcm, LXVII.4.56. Cf. Conjuncrio, XlV.ó, p. 219, antl XV.9, p. 220; cf. 245-46 Scc also l:;tnttatr"

XCL&-10, 16, p.7-s3.57. I agrcc wi th thc cr i lcr ium formulatcd by R. Spcclr t , Crtnrnrcrcír i l t r t t tcnt i \ . t torTxtr is. Ol ' t r

Kn-usalvorstellungen im Carlesianismu, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1966, p' 4: an author

cnclorscs Occasional ism when he argues for the thesis t l rat Scctrnt lary cîuscs merclY

predispose, but do not cause both moi ions and thoughts.

58. For fur fher discussion of Clauberg's occasional ism and his relat ion to Cculrncx and

Malebranche, among others, see A'C.A. Balz, "Claubcrg and thc t lcvcloptt tcr t t of

occasionalism", in piitosophicat Review 42(1933), 553-72 and 43(1934), 48-ó4; Vlola,

"scolastica c cartcsiancsinro ncl lrnsicro tli J. Clarrbcrg", 2fr4-ó'51 R. SJrclrt' Grrtrrrrcn itirtt

ntent is d corpor i - r , 108- l l7; w. wcicr , "Dcr okkasion:ì l ismus dcs Jol tanncs Claubcrg "c i t .

59. I I rc,na Cttrpontnt Vi lent ìutr t , xxvl l .Ó5{}-ó52, p. l90. l l tc brckgtot t t t t l o l t l tcrc r l i r t t t lc '

tions is in l)cscartcs, Lc.s pu.rions dc l'onrc, book I. AI XL

60. Scc Cnnynnctio,225 afXJ22.8, anrJ Notoc in Concsii Pincipia. p 497: 'At rrobis ìibcntttt

non csl qt tascunque formare idcas, at s ic cas formarc dcbcmus ut i à natura ( l { )c l l

s t rmus." Cf . Lre rc i tat io LXXXVII I .4 ' p. 747.(>1. ' l hcona corporum vivenl ìunr, xxvl l .66l-ó5, p. 190: " l 'crccpt i t r t lcs nt tstrr tc t 'c l a l t i t r l r t t t

pro causa habent: velut i cùm pcrcipis te vel le, imaginar i vcl a l iud quot lcunquc cogi t r rc,

vcl prc, causi t l rabcnt cr l rprrs, t rnt lc t l ix i r t rus, tprot l r r r t i r t t t sr( ì l ìc l l l lcs c i Ìs l ì ( ì i ì f i r ( i r l .

qualcs sunt (Causam intc l l ige, quae cxci tat vel occasioncm { lat ' ) "(t2. Thcorio Corpontm l4ventíun\ XXV|I.677, p. 191.

63. T-lrcoia Corporum Vivenrium, 202.

M. Theoria Corporum Wventium, xxxlll, p. 196. Cf. I)escarles, Ìledirationes, in Al YlI,

pp. 43tr37.65. iee Exercirationes LXXXIV-LXXXVIII. See also Theoria Coryontm l',' iventrurn,

XXL478-481,pp.182-83,forananalysisof themoÎ ionoftheobjeclscommunicale( l l ( rthe nervous systcm.

66. For a minute analysis of Descartes'physiological program, see G. Hatf ie ld, "Dcscar lcs '

physiology and its relation to his psychology", in Tlrc Canúidge Con+tottt(ttt tu)'Discarrei,

ed. J. Cotringham, Cambridge 1992, 335-370, on pp. 340-46. l'latficld thinks

that, considered from ihe standpoint of geometrical optics, DescarÎes' theor)' may bc

scen as a t ranslat ion of previous opt ical doctr ines in a mechanist id iom; cf . op. c i t . , pp.

351-52. Th.C. Meyering, Hístoical Roots of Cognitive science. The Rise of a coptírivr

Theory of Perception from Antiquiry to the Nineteenth century, Dordrecht 1989, ch. V

convincingly argùes that the mathematizat ion of physics and the mechanizat ion of the

worldview had gradual ly been prepared by the development of medieval opt ics rathcr

than by that of terrestr ia l or celest ia l mechanics.

90 L. Spruit

( t l . Mcdttat ione.\ ,29-34. Scc, f<l r cxantplc, t l tc t lc f i r t i l jon of l )crccl) t i ( ) l i rs "sol i r rs r lerr t isinspect io" (p.31); cf . a lso Pincipia, in AT VI l l . i , 17, where percepr ion is characrcr izcdas "operatio intelf ectus". For general discussion, sce M. Gueroult, Descarles selon I'onlredes raisons, 2 vols., Paris 1953, vol. l, 127-131, and i49; D.W. Hamlyn, Sensation ondPerception. A History of the Phílosophy of Perception, London 1961, p. 6ó. Valuablespecific studies are: J.-M. Beyssade, "l-analyse du morceau de cire. Contriburion àl 'étude des "degrés du sens" dans la Seconde Méditat ion de Descartes", in Sinnl ichkei tund Verctand in d.er deutschen und franzòsischen Philosophie von Descarles bis llegel, erl,H. Wagner, Bonn 1976, 9-25; J. Pacho, "Uber e. in ige erkenntnistheoret ischeSchwier igkei ten des Klassischen Rat ional ismus. Uber legungen anhand einescartesianischen Beispiels", in Zeirschift ftr philosophische FoncÀung 38( I 984), 561-581.See aiso: M. Cook, "Descarîes alleged representationalism", 188-89, in Hktory ofPhilosophy Quanerly 4(1987), 179-195; D.M. Clarke, Descarles' Philosophy of Science,Manchester \982,32. In the context of the thought-exper imenl of the wax tablet ,Descartes seems also to col lapse simple apprehension and judgment; cf . in part icular,Meditariones,32. The view of judgement as not distinct from simple apprehension wasalready formulated in the l3th century by Bonaventura, and dur ing the Renaissance byCusanus, Zabarella and Piccolomini.

68. Conjunctio, 242.69. Clauberg, Errrcitatio XlIl, p. 615. Descartes, Meditationes,438. According to Descartcs,

single ideas are either aurhenîic or not, rarher than eirher true or false: cf. AT y. ISZ.The truth of an idea can be establ ished only by comparing i t wi th other ideas; th is is theonly reasonable interpretation of the abstraction of the intellect; cf. AT lll, 474. F<ttdiscussion, see A. Danto, "The representational character of ideas and the problem ofthe exîernal world", ìn Descartes: Citical and Interpretive Essays, ed. M. Hookcr,Bal t imore 1978,287-97, on pp.289, and295- '1.

70. Conjuntio, 242 and 256.77. Conjunct io,243:"Sensussivesensual ispercept iof i tpersignamateial ia,quaeresquidem

indicant, ut hedera susDensa monet v inum esse vendibi le: sed eas non reoraesentantinstat imaginis. Nam ab i l la impressione, quam objectum in organo corporeo faci t ,sensus caloris, soni, odoris & reliqui proximè pendent." See also Notae breves in RenatiDes Canes Pincipia Philosophiae, p.510: "Quod tolerandum est, ubi perceptio sive ideanostra dist incta est , ut i a l iquo modo dico, me Petrum videre, ubi ipsius dist inctamimaginem intueor. At s i quis Petrum repraesentare vel let l igno quocunque al io, ut iv inum vendibi le per hederam suspensam repraesentatur, minus commoclè dicera, sevidere Petrum"; cf. p.515. The example of the "suspensa hedera" was also used by ThomasHobbes for arbitrary signs; cf. De corpore, 11.2, in Apera latina, ed. W. Molesworrh,London 1839-45, vol . I , 13: "Signorum autem al ia natural ia sunt quorum exemplum estquod modo dixeramus; al ia arbi t rar ia, n imirum quae nostra voluntate adhibentur;qual ia sunt, suspensa hedera, ad s igni f icandum vinum venale ( . . . ) . "

72. Theoria Corporum l4ventium, XXXIV.846, p. 197: "Tàmetsi verò sensus propriè dati nonsunt ad naturam rerum int imam ejusque rat ionis invest igandas, s ive ad rò òrór i ; juvanttamen plur imum ad rò brL inveniendum, suppedi tando phaenomena & exper imenta, dequibus philosophemur." See also Erercitatio LXXXI|l.19, p. 737.

73. Conjunctio, 243; cf . Ontosopftra, XXL336, p.337 "Formale signum appellatur imago Ìeiin mente vel omne signum, quod propriè repraesentat."

74. See, for example, Eustachius of Saint-Paul, Summa philosophiae quadipartita de rebusdialectiis, nroralibus, physicis et metaphysicis, Coloniae 1629 (firsl edition: Paris 1609),21&219: "( . . . ) s ignum al iquod formale rei sensibus objectae, s ive qual i tatem quamdamquae ab objecto immissa, & in sensu recepta vim habet ipsum objectum repraesentandi,l icet ipsa sensu minime si t percept ib i l is ." Not ice that Clauberg st i l l uses the t radi t ionalterm species for mental representations. cf. Notae in Cartesii Principio, p. 510: .,Rei

species, &, ut Sceptici loquebantur melius, apparentiae"; cf. Theoia CorporumVventiut4 202. For discussion, see my Spec ies intelligtbilís, From Perception to Ktowleclge,vol . I I . pp. 43ó--10.

.lohannc.t Cluuhcrg on Pcrccptual Kttowlcdge 9l

7-5. Sco ^f({1rt1tr ; r r . r ,

l8 l , nrr t l - } t l7- l1t{ , lor l l rc " l {cplrcs lo l l ìc L) t ) jcct i ( } l ls t ty l l t r l t l tcs

(179-80) anr l Gassenr j i (28+85,337). For t l iscussion, sce M. cook, "Descartes'al lcgcd

representationalism", in tl istory of Philosophy Quarlerly 4(1987)' 179-195; and lr4 I

Cosra, . ,WhatCarresianideasare not" , inJountol of t l rcI t is toryof Phi losol t l tv 2 l (1983).

537-550.76. See Conjunctio, 211.77. Theoia Corporuml4ventium, XXXlll.808, p. 196; cf. also p. 184: the animal's boclv is

like an "automaton". See also Conjunctio, 230 and L53, for the view of the body as inslru-

mcnt of the soul . For the metaphor of the bl ind man's st ick, see Descartes, Dir tpt ique,-

in AT VI, 84. For discussion of the conîext , see J.J. Macintosh, "Percept ion and imagi-

nation in Descartes, Boyle, and Hooke", in Canadian Joumal of PhilosopÀy i3(198-l)'

321-52, on 349. The stick metaphor had already been used by Plotinus, Enneades. |Y 5.4.

for the intermediate light used by the eyes to touch things; for discussion, -see E K.

Emilson, Plotinus on Sense-Perceptrbn, Cambridge 1988,42-43, and for the systemalic

background of th is v iew: Timaeus,45d-e. For v is ion as louch, see also August ine, / ) r

quanîitate animae, XXlll,43,44. According to Leibniz, DescarÎes borrowed his stick

metaphor from Simplicius: see Leibniz, Philosophische Schit'ten, ed. C I' Gerharrlt,I I i ldcsheim 1965 ( f i rst edi t ion: Ber l in 1857-90), Band lV, 305; see also Petrus Cìassencl i 'Opera,6 vols. , Lyon 1658, vol . I I ,3714-8.

78. Conjunctio, XXIV.I-4, p. 228.79. Theoia Coryorum Wventium, XXXIV.846, p. 197; for the restricted valuc of pure

sensation, cf. Defensio XXXII-IV anrl Exercitario LXXXIII.2-3.80. Cf . Excrcitatio LXXXVII, p. 744.81. Theoia Corporum lTventium, xxxlx.937, p. 202: "Etsi autem imaginatio initio non tam

vivida & expressa esse soleat, quàm ipsae sensuum exter iorum percept iones. repett t ls

tamen al iquot ies externis impressionibus, accedente quoque interna meditat ione,

multum in nobis perf ic i tur & conf i rmatur ' "82. Exercitationes, 619 and 623.83. Etercitatione,s, 609 and 615.84. Erercirotioneq 613, andpassim,.see also weier, Die stellung des Johannes Clauberg in der

Philosophie, 33.85. Erercilationes, 6i7; cf. 607-9 (no 3, 8,9, 15).8(t. Erercitatione.r, 6i7. For the objective being of the ideas, see also Exercitationes,6l)1,

617-623,626-28; Ontosophia, XX1.32U29, p. 336. In Scholastic cognitive psychology."esse diminutum" or "obiect i r , rm" was used to ìndicate the speci f ic mode of being of

cogni t ive objects in the intel lect . The expression's or ig in l ies in ear ly Arab-Lat inlranslations of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Since the beginning of the fourteenlh centun' itwas systemat ical ly used in a psychological context . The'subject ive-object ive'dist inct ionf igured large in Renaissance disputes on the presence of species and cogni t ive contents

in the intel lectual soul . Scholasl ics used "esse obiect iwm" to indicate an ontologicalaspect of the mental realm that sets i t apart f rom physical real i ty. I t indicated the'diminished' real i ty of psychological i tems to which the 'normal 'Ar istotel ian ìnherence

of subject and accident did not apply. For a more detailed discussion, see mv .Specirs

intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge, vol. I, Lciden 1994, ch. IV $ l.-5, and, for thc

not ion in Descartes. idem, vol . l l , ch. Xl . $ 1.2.2.

87. Exercitationes, 617-619.88. C1 .Theoia CorporumWventiut4 202: sensory affections leave traccs on the brain, which

the "phi losophers" cal led specics or phantasms.

89. Erercitationes, 619422.9{. Conjunctio, XVt.10, p. 221.'the term "causa procatarctica" has a Stoic and Galenic

background. l t p layed a central ro le in Van Helmont 's pathology: a "causa procatarcî ica'may occasion a sickness. Also Heereboord used the term for occasional causes; seeSpccht, Commercium mentír et corporis, pp.112-113, and 165-172. The term also occursin Cf auberg's Norae in Canesii Pincipin, p.573.

91. Fordiscussion,seemy.lpecresintelligibilis.FromPerceptiontoKnowledge,vol.l,ch. lll,$-1.4.

92 L. Spruit

92 I 'c t rus lohannis Ol iv i , l24fJ [ ìézicrs - 1298 Narbonnc; I ' rarrc iscarr 1:r l r i losoptrcr ant lthcologian, rvho rvrotc his commentary on the Scnfencej bcnvccn l28l and 1283. Forbio-bibl iographical informat ion, cf . C. Partee, "Peter John Ol iv i : h istor ical and docrr inalstu dy", in I'ia n c isca n S t u d ic s 20( 196u), 21 5 -260.

93. Quoestiones in secundum libntm Senîentiantm, ed. B. Jansen,3 vols, euaracchi 1926, vol.f ll, q. 74, 119; cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodliberum V. q. 14, in Quodlibeta, Venetirs 16i3,260va for the same view.

94. In I I sent. , q.72, vol . I I I , p. 35: "Nam actus et aspectus cogni t i r rs f ig i tur in obiecto etintent ional i ter habet ipsum intra se imbibi tur ; propter quod actus cogni t iws vocaturapprehensìo et apprehensiva tent io obiect i . "

95. In l l Sent. , q. '72, vol . l l l , 10: "Secundo est pracnotandum quod t iccl otr icctum, proquanto solum terminat aspectum vir tut is cogni t ivae et suae actual is cogni t ionis, nonhabeat s impl ic i ter et propr ie rat ionem eff ic ient is, quia formal is tcrminat io pracdict iaspectus non est a l iqua essent ia real i ter d i f ferens ab ipsu aspectu et sal tem non estinflu-ra vel educta ab obiecto, in quantum est solum terminus ipsius aspeclus et actuscogni t iv i . " See.In - f l Senr. , q. 72, vol . I I I , 35-36, and q. 58, vol . I I , 415_16, where Ol iv iemployed a varíat ion of the l ight meîaphor to explain th is ' terminat ive' causal i ty.Su.nl ight takes rhe shape of t r iangular i ty or roundness wen shining in a t r iangular orsphericaÌ vase. The vase itself does not effectively produce the shape of rhe light, butonly 'terminatively', that is, without the "terminus" such a shape could not have beenproduced. For discussion, see: Z. Kuksewicz, "criticisms of Aristotelian pyschology andthe Augustinian-Aristotelian synthesis", in Cambridge History of Later Mcdiaet,alPhilosophy, Cambridge 1,982, 623-28, on p. 626 K. Tàchau, L/ision and Ceninde in rheAge of Ockham. Optics, Epistemologt and the Foundations of Semantics j2S0-1345,Leiden 1988, 4Of, and especial ly by W. Hoeres, "Der Begr i f f der Intent ional i ràr beiOlivi", in SchoLastik 36(1961), 23-48.

96. In II Senr., q. 50, in vol. I I, 52f; q. 73, vol. II I, 66.91. In II Senr., q. 12. 30-31, and q. 58, vol. ll, 416. The idea of a colligantia bctwcen body

and soul was ant ic ipated by Jean de la Rochel le, Summa de anim4 ed. T Domcnichel l i .Prato 1882, f9+; cf . J. Rohmer, "La théor ie de I 'abstract ion dans l 'école Franciscained'Alexandre à Jean Peckam",in,4rchivcs d'lrLstoírc doctinale ct lilérailc du Moycn lpc3(1928),105-184, on p. 125.

98. Cor juncno, IX.14, p. 216.99. Godefrodus de Fontibus, ca. 1250-130611309; master in the theological faculty from

1285 to 1298-99 and again ca. 1303*1304. For his docrr inal posir ion and his di iagrceiments wi th rhomists such as Thomas Sutton, see J. Hoffmans, "Le table des diversJnceset innovations doctrinales de Godfroid de Fontaines", in Re'ue nóoscolatiAue clephilosophie 36(1934), 412436.

100. Cf. Quodl iberum V, eds. M. de Wulf & J. Hoffmans, Louvain 1914, q. 10,38:, ,Hoc autcmfi t quodam contactu spir i tual i et v i rual i luminis intel lectus agent is, nam supponendumest quod haec est natura intellectus agentis quod sua applicatione ad objectum singularevel phantasme quodammodo cont ingat i l lud sua vir tute solum quaniurn ad i t l quodpert inet d icto modo ad eius quiddi tatem substanr ia lem". cf . J.F. ù ippel , "The roie ofthe phantasm in Godfrey of Fontaines' theory of intellection", in L'homme et son untversau Moyen Age, ed. Ch. Wenin, Lnuvain-la-Neuve 198ó, 57j-592, on pp. 57G7g.

l0l. Quodlibewn Y 40.102. Ererci tar io, XI I I .4, p. 615: 'A Dei boni tate al ienum, nul las omnino scint i l las luminis in

mente humana rel inquere, omnia tenebras facere. Atqui s impl ices ferum pcrcept lonesse habent ut pr imae scint i l lae, quibus omne cogi tat ionis nostrae lumen susci tatur,quibus omnia nostra judic ia, d iscursus, invest igat iones, argumenrar lones, memoraprimò & maximè nituntur." In the Middle Ages, Meister Eckharr and Heymeric decampo had speculated on the existence of a divine spark in the soul; this ipark wasidentified with a superior cognitive faculty, however.

103' Erercitatio Xvll.3, p. 623; cf. v1.9, p. 606: the mind is not the sufficient cause of irsconcepî Or ideas.

Johanna.s Clauberg on I'erceptual Knowledgc 93

104. I : . t t r<i tut i r t v l l .9-17, ( f l l . t ( ) ( ì ' r ; xvl ,xvl l , 622.-2.1: f l . ( )nt t ) \1t l ' l t ì ( t , NXl l l . . l4. l . 1t . .1. ì t r ,

rcgart l ing thc rc l ; r t ion l )ctwccn "cxcmplar & imago".105. Cf.Exerci tat ioXlX.-5,p.628:"( . . . ) luminenatural iperspícuuntesseideas(cctypassci l icct

sctf c() f tsc( l t fcf f lcs) in i l t t i l l t i l r )J l rd (s, t . tc lu l i t l t t r ts lot t t t r r t r tg i r t r ' . r , t l t t t tL I r t t . \st t t t l t l t t ì t l . r t l

facilè deficere à perfectione rentm à quibus sunt desumtae (...)."

106. See De anima, in Opera omnia, t. Ill, Paris 1856, l. IV c 2, no I 1, 719.107. Suarez's af f in i ty wi th the Simpl ic ian Avenoist Marcantonlo Genua (1491-1563) was

alreacly noticed by E. Kessler, "The intellective soul" , in Canúidge History of Renaissance

Philosophy, Cambridge 1988, 485*534, on p. 515.108. See my Species intelligibilis. Front Pereeption to Knou'ledge, vol. [], ch. Vl, $ 1-3, ch. VIll '

$ 1.2 and 1.6, and ch. X, $ 1.6.109. J. Ludwig, I)as akausole Zu.sammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermógen in der

ErkenntnLslehre des Suarez, Mùnchcn 1929,56-57, spcaks of a prcliminary prcscncc ofthe species in the mind, but the îext he refers to is about angels; cf . De aninn, lY ' c.8 'no 13, p. 745.

l l0. De anima. IV. c.8.745a.111. De anima, IY c. 7, 740a: "Hinc ergo or i tur in ler potent ias has tam natural is concomi-

tant ia quae essent ia l is non est , sed ex actual i operaî ione proveniens ( . . . ) . " Cf. the af f in i tywith the not ion of "col l igant ia" in Jean de la Rochel le and Ol iv i , ment ioned ear l ier .

112. Dioptique, in AT VI 114. For the historical background of Descartes' views ofoccasional causes, see R. Specht, Commercium menlis cl coryorLs.2242-

113. Sce' tVeier,DieStel lungdeslohannesClauberyinderPhi losophie,2landl30,onthcant i -psychologism of Clauberg.

114. For the v iew of the sensible bodies as "causae exemplares" of cogni t ion, see also

Exerci tat iones VI.10, p.606; VIì .2.8.9 p.607-8; VII . l3, p.609: "Sic nul la in mente nostra

repraesentat io Sive imago sive v icar iatus esse potest , n is i in lu i tu al icujus pr incipal is s ive

exemplar is s ive repraesentat i . " ; XVL6.21.28, p.62A-21; XVII . l , p. 623. For the depen-

dcnce of perceptual knowledge on the exlernal world in general, see Erercitatione,s, p.

736f1 see aìso Nolae in Cartesii Pincipin, 498.I 15. See Thomas Aquinas, Dè vei tate, q. I t , a. I ad rcsp.: "pracexistunt in nobis quacdant

scicnt iarum scmina". Thcsc sccds ( thc f i rst pr inciplcs) bccomc actual knowlcdgc invir tuc of : rbstractcd in lc l l ig ib lc spccics.

l l6. Sec,forexamplc,z l l l l l ,665,andDi.scoundclaMéthode,64,whcrcDcscartcsclaimcdlhat, respect ively, pr imit ive not ions and "semences de Ver i tez" are prescnt in the soul :cÍ . AT X,373, where he spoke about "scmina iacta" in nr ind.

117. In his exposi t ion of Descartcs 's phi losophy, Clauberg seemed to endorse a rcpresen-tational vicw of pcrccplion; cl. Notac brcves itr Principio I'hilosolltiaq 510: "Qtli nrrlcntsensu externo & visu praecipuè al iquid percipi t , considerat i l lam percept ionem tanquanìideam, id est , repraesentamen rei extra nos posi tae in cogi tat ione. Et quamvis sensuperccpt io proximè tantum terminetur ad i l lam ideam sive speciem, ut vtr lg i ) loquuntur,nihi lominus per metonymiam signi pro s ignato, d ic imrrs nos rem percipere." For the useof thc tcrm "repracsentamcn",cf . idenq pp.496-91, and 50t] , Sce aìsoEpislo/rr ad l i r r , rndocum (. . . ) ,1239, where Clauberg endorsed f)escarîes'v iew that al l we perceive areideas. J.W. Yolton interprets Ihe Cartesian idea as a sign or semantic response; cf."Perceptual cogni t ion wi th Descartes", in Studia Conesiana 2(1981), 63'62 and

Percepnal Acquaínlance from Descarîes to Reid, Ortord 1984, ch. l. lle emphasizes the

fact that the relat ion between mind and wcr ld is not causal , as in Scholast ic psychoiogy,but s igni f icatory; cf . " l 'crccptual cogni t ion wi th f )escar lcs", pp.72-73.

I

1I'I{

1:i l