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Szalay, Lorand g.; Strohl, Jean BrysonAmerican, Jordanian, and Other Middle EasternNational Perceptions.Institute of Comparative Social and ,C,ultural Studies,Inc., Washington, D.C.Defense Nuclear Agency (DOD), Washington, DC.Feb 81DNA001-79-C-0341-P0000125716%; Appendix I may not reproduce clearly due tosmall prinetype of various charts.Reports -/Research/Technical (143)

MF01/PC11 Plus Postage.Anxiety; Comparative Analysis; *Cross CulturalStudies; Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; GroupUnity; Higher Education; Individualism;*International Relations; Na,tionalism; Peace;*Psychological Patterns; Research Methodology; SocialScience Research; *Student AttitudesEgypt; Israel; *Jordan; United States

ABSTRACTInternational perceptions of Jordanian university

students are compared with those of American, Egyptian, apd Israelistudents. The sample consisted of 50 students from each country;results concentrate on Jordanian perceptions. Assessments were basedon the Associative Group Analysis (AGA) which reconstructsperceptions and attitudes.characteristic of national/cultural groupsfrom their free word associations. Jordanians tended td. ixconflict-ridden and laden with perceived threats and fears of'aggressive, expansionist.intentions. When compared to a 1977assessment, 4n increase in their longing for peace, less concern withmilitary threat, more concern with violence and security, and adeterioration in their image of the ited States was evident.Egyptian and I.sraeli perceptions were ilar to the Jordanianemphasis on group and family unity, while Americans valued,individualism and autonomy. The document also discusses the role of.psychological disposition in international relations and in shaping -

political events, needs and problems identified-by public policy4 offices, and strategies for social science research on foreign

populations. Appendices contain the U,S. and Jordanian response listsand a discussion of the AGA methodology. (KC)

***********************************************************************Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made

4 from the original document.***********************************************************************

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EOUCATIONNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

4EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION

dor CENTER (ERIC)

)(TM document has been reproduced asreceived from the person or organizationoriginating itMinor changes have been made to improve

reproduction quality

Points of view or opinions stated in this docu-

mint do not necessanlv represent offical NIEPosition or policy

AMERICAN, JORDANIAN, AND'OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN

'

V.

NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS4.

Lorand B. Sza lay, Ph.D.

Jea-n Bryson Sitrohl

February 1981

ICS

INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE,

SOCIAL & CULTURAL STUDIES INC,

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

.The authors wish -to express their appreciation to

Dr. William Parker and Dr'. Bela Maday for their useful help

and comments, in reviewing the manuscript; to Dr. Rita Kelly

and David Gwalthney for adaptation of the conputer programs;and to Margret Brena for her assistance in the final prepara-

tidn of the -report.

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"I.

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SUMMARY

OERVIEW

, HUMAN PREDISPOSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

, THE JORDANIAN CASE

Images of Important Countries

Dominant Political Perspectives

.The Military Threat

Soctal and Economic Premise

JORDANIANS COMPARED TO EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS

SYSTEMIC INFLUENCES ON PERCEPTIONS.

ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS-OF,THE REPRESENTATIONAL APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

PSY.CHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS, l'HEIR ROLt IN INTERNATIONAL

-KELATIONS AND IN SHAPING POLITICAL EVENTS

THE POLICY PROBLEM: HOW TO RECOGNIZE 'AND DEAL.WITH'THE CRITICAL

HUMAN/CULTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . 17

PopUlation Characteristics---Powerful But:Hidden Predispositions 17

Signs of Dedlining U.S. Capabilities in International Relations 181

The Blind Spot 26;

OWEOVE: TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES IN ASSESSING FOREIGNPSYCHOLOGICALCHARACTERISTICS*AND IN USING THE,RELEVANT INFORMATION . .

FOWTOLICY PLANNING 124

A)

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GENERAL APPROACH: A COORDINATED USE OF THREE SOURCES: POLICY

OFFICIALS, TECHNICAL,LITERATURE, AND RESEARCH ON NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS 25

;

PART I

NEED5 AND PROBLEMS IN.DICATED BY POLICY OFFICIALS 27

REVIEW OF POLICY 'OFFICIALS" VIEWS OF NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS 27

Policy Relevance of/Psychocultural'Population Characteristics 28

,Reasons for Low dse of Perceptual Information 30

FIVE CRITICAL CHOICES IN THE USE OF POLICY RELEVANCE SOCIAL ,

SCIENCE INFORMATION 32

\,What are the Variables Practically Most Useful? 32

Which Sodrce Offers the Information Most Needed? 34

Who Are the Authentic, Reliable Experts? 36

Whoge Views, Perceptions, Motivations. Should be Assessed? 37

How Does One Differentiate the Biased and Misleading Fromthe Valid and Useful Information? 38

PART I I

STRATEGIES- FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

ON FOREIGN POPULATIONS 40

STUDIES AIMING AT A BROAD REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING OF OPINIONS 40-

STUDIES FOCUSING ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 42

THE INFORMATION GAP RESULTING FROM BYPASSING LINES 'OF Ii,k)UIRY 44

THE NEED FOR PRIMARY DATA 46

PART' I I I

JORDANIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONSi

AN ILLUSTRATION OF POLICY 'RELEVANT INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH RINCIPLES

JORDANIAN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS 50

The Political Actors: Images of Super Powers, NationsFriendly 4nd Hostile 50

The Super PowersWho They Are, What They Do 51

The United Statesv-Our National Image 52

The Soviet Union..:7-Images of the Red Giant 54

Imperialism---Who is the Villian? 55

Israel--%-Image of the Arch Ener6, . .57

Palestine-7-The Centerpoint of Disagreement 58

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,EgyptImage of Another Arab NationNatiohNationalism as a Dynamic Source of Cohesion

and Confrontation

The Balance of the 'Competitors from the JordanianPerspective

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%. Dominant Political Concerns: Terrorism, Capitalism, Freedom 65

Politics---From a Nationalistic Perspective 66.1Capitalism---A Salient Issue of Emotional Ambivalence 67

CommunismAn Evil of Little Concern . 69

., SocialismThe Better Face of the Soviet Union 10

Human Rights---Protection Against the Misuse of Power---- 72

Oppression-7Jhe MisUie of Power 73

FreedomA High Priority Collective Aspiration 75J.

TerrorismFrom the Jordanian Viewpoint 76

Common Trends Acicoss Political Isms and Issues 78O.

Peace or War, Nuclear Proliferation or Disarmairent . 83

The EnerryWho Is It? 84...

War---Views Influenced by the Image of the Enemy 85

DisarmamentRealities and Hopes 87

The Arms Race--Foolish or Criminal? 89

Nuclear Weapons--7,Their Use an,c1 Threat 90

'SALT IIIts-Promise of Peace \ :91

DetenteFilled With Hopes and Expectations 93 s

ProliferationLittle Emphasis on Nuclear Arms 95

The Military Perspective 96 ,

- Economic Problems lcip"

Economy-r-The Developmental Perspective 100

Exploitation---A U,S./Israeli Domination 101

Underdevelopment---The Plague of the Arab World 103

Foreign AidAn Instrument of Political Domination '4 104

Economic Development, A Link etween Personal andGroup Interests 106,

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The Social Frame of \Reference

Social Proble-.--Di vorce , Low Morals -JUsticeMorality Over LegalityEquality---A High Ideal with Religious Connotatl'onsPeace---A State of Security and Freedom

Peace and the Jordanians' Social Frame of Reference

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Changes in Jordanian National Perceptions Since Camp David 117

United States---Changes i ri the Jordan i ans ' Image

PoliticsA Growing' Concern with U.S. Foreign Policy4%117

119

CapitalismMore American, Less Negative .120

'trhe EnemyLess Dominant, Less Negative Image,But More American- 122

WarLess Conventional Military Actions; MoreCivi i an Sufferings 123

Peace---Less an ipstract ideal, More an Irrinedia'te Need "- 125

Changes" Could Promote Rapproachrent 126

SOME SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF U.'S., JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN,AND ISRAELI FRgMES OF REFERENCE 128

International RelationsThe Dominance of Aiab-Israeli 0Con fl i ct 130

Politics and GovernMentProcedural vs. 'LeadershipPerspecti ves 131

War, Military---Peace or Oppression' 132,

Self and Society---Individualism vs. Primary GroupIdentifi cation 134

Money, Economy, Work---The U.S.-Arab Contrast 135

.mip-ant Aspirations--J-Justice, Freedom, Happiness 137

Education and Knowledge---The Influence of DevelopnentalPerspecti ves 138

Law, Customs, DutyInternalized Law or External Obligations 139.

Religion, God---Modest Differ_Lences in the Focus of Attention 140

Personality Char,acteristicsSelf. vs..0ther Orientation 141

Existence---Problems, Anxieties 142

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Miscellaneous Issues, Concerns

The Main Contrast

METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS-

APPENDIX I: THE U.S. AND JORDANIAN GROUP RESPONSE LISTS

APPENDIX II: Jiff ASSOCIATIVE GROUP ANALYSIS (AGA) METHOD:DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND MAIN CATEGORIES

OF INFERENCES

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OVERVIEW

SUMMARY

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Jordanian and American perceptions, psychological predispositions,and priorities were assessed through an indepth comparative analysis oftheir spontaneous reactions to a broad variety of, topics. Some of thespecific issues covered by the analysis are: 'the Jordanians. images ofthe super powers and otherinternational actors, their perception oftinely political anti military issues (e'.g., war, the arms race, detente),their views and attitudes on certain economic arid social issues. The

assessment shows the Jordanians to be conflict-ridden arid laden withperceived threats and fears of aggressive, expansionist intentions.Domestic and -international problemi, economic, social, and political .

conditions, and individual and national existence are cloSely inter-,related in the Jordanian,' 'view of-the world. .

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Data from a similar assessment in 1977 made it possible to trace'some changes in Jordanian perceptions and attitudes regarding the *wildpowers and timely. issues since the Camp David peace initiative of theU.S. Government. The past three years have shown an increase in theirlonging for a peaceful settlemen less concern with military thfeat,more concern with violence and p rsonal security, ant a marked deteriora-titn in their image of the Unite States.

To place, the findings on JOT'two Other samples 'of Americans an

, Samples of Egyptianst nd Israelis.the political dirension, several o

, frames of reference. The ,resultsfound between the Americans and Jopresent in the.other Middle Easternfound to have strong group affiliat*emphasis on family. The Israelis'as strong as theJordanians',. Howe

security.and their level of feirMany of the Jordanian views emergingfeel thre'atened by U.S. imperialiSmare clearly a product of'subjectivebeen predicted on the basis of facts

anian percepions in broader perspective,Jordanians were comparep with matcOngThe conparison encompassed, beyond

her dominant characteristics of theirhow that.most of.the main differencesanians reflect broaderlrends alsogroups as well. Egyptians were alsoons.and to place an even stronger -ational/political awareness was juster, the Jordanians' concern withanxiety clearly outrankep the.others'.here---like thd extent tp which theyr by Israel's nuclear capabilities---erceptions which could-not have

r so-called common sense.

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These assessments weiv based on an. unstrktured, inferegilal method

called A§sociative Group Analysis (AGA). AGA aims at reconstructing' the

perceptions and attitudes characteristic of nationalkultural 'grpupt., from

their free worfl associations. Each national group (N-50) used in thesestudies was tested in its native language at universities in the tapitalcitie§ of the tountries cOmpared. Major perceptual trends characteristtcof each group Were charted through a computer-assisted analysis of hundreds .

of thousands of spontaneous reactions.

In contrast to the traditional survu methods which ask for people's

opinions and rational judgaents, this methpd of in-ferential assessmen,t

charts perceptual trends and Motivational dispositions of which people ,

themselves are often unaware. From the angle of methodology the findihgst

bear direttly on the main problelis which have surfaced in our inquiry

with policy officials. The findings suggest that a combined use of the

optnion survey and an inferential-representational method offers a

flexible research capability with a Wide. potential application In the ,

field of internatiohal relations.

HUMAN PREDIS.POSITIoNS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE JORDANIAN. CASE

In today's fast expanding network of complex and'delicate interrfatiOnal2

relations the dangers of confrontation are growing and militaiv strength

offer's less'security than it once 'did. This situation presentS.a

particular challenge to' U.S. foreign policy. There is a pressing need

to learn more about the human dimensions, of internatiOnal affairs' in

order to'commimicate and cooperate effectively with foreign nations,

despite often vast differences in backgrounds, wor'18 views, and ways of

thinking.

:As indicated by the results of our brief inqujry, U.S. policy,officials

are aware that people in other countries are predisposed to think and

uci differently from Americans. They also recbgnize the need to lake

into consideratioh the perceptual and 'Motivational predispositions of .

bOth friends and adversaries. Yet the capability to take such differ-,

ences into consideration is limited. Timely, reliable information on

the psychójogical characteristics of foreign populations is scarce, and

itS use is hampered by methodological as well as conceptual problems.

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This, repoK presents extensive findings to illustrate sone critical, principles and research methods'designed to improve our understanding of-.

cUlturally shared piychological predispositions, those-powerful but,. , .

invisible-forces operating in international relations. Middle Eastern, .,

national;perceptiont provide an interesting' and reTievant context topursue this 'problem. A i

,Jordanians and knericans take basi cally different approaches to life....

4 .

At the findings show, the Jordanians tend to view problems of politics,military poweaeconoinics; soctal conditioris as well as'problemS of theirown personal, existence in closely interdependent.relationships. This

predisposition is a, clear contrast to the pragmatic "case particularism"of Americans, who tend to look at each issue individualli, preferr'ingfo isolate problems and sollie them one by one..

One major reason for the Jordanians' hgistic aPproach to life comesfrom the psychological effects of living in an acute crisis situation.

,Their perceptions 'of international issues 'as well as of most of theirdomestic problebs.are influenced by their_confrontation with Israela ppoccupation which is central and pervasive in ttieir thinking. Based

on the continuous reports of bombings,,terrorism, and retaliations, suchan intensive preoccupation is notSurprising. The psychological melchanisms

. .

operating in crisis situationssucti as selective attention, selectiveperceptions, exaggerated tears and hopes, suppressigns and overreactions---

are extensively discussed in the professional literature. While the

. working of such mechanisms.is well established, the actual effects ofconflict and stress tin people, their views, attitudes, and frame of -

v

reference, are frequently unpredictable. Did Camp David generate

exaggerated hopes? Did the Afghanistan invasion induce exaggerated /}fears?' Will they lead to overreactions or to suppressed feelings? Will

1minims about the* Israeli nuclear' capabi I ities produce r a paralyzing fea.ror will it be perceived as a danger to be encountered in a holy war?

r This study shows how the Jordanians' way of looking at things differsfroin our own, and it also demonstrates' the neefi for new researchistrategies which go beyond the traditional survey methods.

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Images of Important CountrieS

International relations, especially between the super powers, areviewed from a very different angle by Joridaniani. Their major intere'stis not the 'competition between the super powers but rather the rolesof these and other :countries in 'the poli tical/military confrontationJordanians.feel they are facing in defense of their existence. In

this respect the Jordanians see the role,s of the United'States andthe Soviet Union as similarly questionable, although their feelings

--abo,ut the United States are particularly ambivalent.A

What positively impresses the Jordanians about the United Statesare its economic and industrial development,' its technologiial advance-ment, and its political ideals of freedom, justice, and democracy.However, they are strongly concerned about U.S. misuse ofimilitary power,violence and killings; its collaboration with Israel, and its immorality,and betrayal. Their image of the United States 'is salient in their mindsand cone4,s, strong conflicting emotions. Sortie of the negative elements

are apparently prodUcts of recent changes since the United States wasfound to*have a predominantly positive image in 1977 in a similar testina.

The Jordanians' image of the Soviet Union is less talient but conveyssimilarly.ambivalent feelings. Their main objections again relate to themisuse of power, to oppresSive, colonialist policies implemented bya great power that is heavily armed and involved in war and killing.? Theyconsider communism to Jpe the dominant ch-aracteristic of the-SoViet Union,

and they describe it as being against Islam and religion. On the positive

side equality and other social-yalues as well as technolog,ical advancementand economic development receive recognition. 4

.174

Although the Jordanians have a rather unflattering.image of the-SovietUnion, the United States is still cOnsidered -to be the leading "imperialist"country,4probab1y because of its close affiliation with Israel 'in theirminds. The Jordanians recognize Israel as,their nurnt3er one enemy and

from their perspective Israel is only negative, characterized as an.aggressive, racist, Zionist oppressor and colonizer of Palestine.,

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, Despitte all the negative undertones, a comparison of Jordanian .-

reactions 'obtained in`1980 and 1977 inaicates that over the laSt few

, years their image of the eneny became less salient and less negative.

Ihx1977 they were extremely preoccupied with thoughts of the enemy,

1. n asso iated exclusively with Israel; in 1980 their preoccugation with

theenenv,had decreased. The role of Israel became less salient,

while the United States is now apparently being charged with an increasing

anount of the blame.

Dominant Ppolitical Perspectives

The analysis of dominant political issues reveals certain trends

which characterize the Jordanians' general political views.

With regard to, the very issue of politiCs the U.S. and Jordanian

approaches are'thoroughly different. Politics to Jordanians has little

to do with wilat Americans think of as, the practice of party politics--

campaigninfl; elections, voting. In the Jordanians' world view politics

involves the pursuit of national objectives by all available means---

pol iti cal , soci al , econon% educational . From this perspectiv>e pol i ti cal

leadership and decision making are geared toward effectively serving

and promoting the best interests of the'people as well as defending them

against,hostile forces. In other Words, it is much less a question of

identifying 'and representing the views of the people---that is, df

gauging and followihg maiority opinions---than it is in 'this country.

The Jordanians' predispOsition to evaluate international and domestis

political events as theY relate to Jordanian national idlterests indicates

a strong nationalistic,orientation. They seetheir fate-ts individuals

as dependent on the fate of the nation, a view 4lich generates strong

feelings of national identilcation. Thus, they take a strong personal

interest in issues considered to be-of national inportance and feel "that

personal success and welfare can be promoted through the achievement of

national objectives.

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By their repeated references to oppression, human rights, freedom,

and.terrorism the Jordanians seem strongly preoccupied with tile misuse

,of political and military power and,with domination by hostiles-eorces.

While- three years ago there was a considerably 5tronger eXpreision of

active anger, the present reactions convey more fear nd feelings of

being threatened. It may be pointed,out that the terrorist activities

the Jordanians attribute .to the enemy (torture, killings) are the

sane described as defensive, measures or retaliatory actions by the other

si de ..

From the angle of finding workable solutions to this conflict, it

is desirable to recognize the intensity of the Jordanians' anxieties. If

they had been asked_directly it is not likely that they would have

expressed their fears, but the J danians' reactions in the indirect

aqseisnent used in this study ey an exceptionally high level of -

anxiety.

The Jordanians' concern with political power and with the dangers

and consequences of its abuse may be a natural result of repeated

frustrations and losses,-suffered- by Jordanians in recent wars. Or it

may reflect negative experience with European colonization, big power

politics, or humiliations imposed by alien forces. Although the exact.

source of their concern may be debated, the findings consistently reflect, -

intense p*occupation with the misuse of power through'oppression,

domination, and colonization.

The Military Threat-

In a'world alarned by the spiraling-arms, race between the super

powers and the dangers of a. thermo-nuclear war, the Jordanians' concerns

are mit less intensive but of a different nature from the Americans'.

To the Jordanians the military issues examined here, from the irms

race to disarmament, bear primarily on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The

attention given to the super powers is largely in relation to how the

foreign policies and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union c?

will affect the future of Jordan or the situation in the Middle East.

6

Considering the intense confrontation andithe Jordanians' negative

image of Israel at the enemy, it would be natural to expect 'that the

) existence of nuclear weapons in Israel would generate a strong concern

with nuclear threat among the Jordanians. Our data show with contiderable

consistency that this is not the case. They did not show any specials.

concern with Israeli nuclear capabilities. This is even more remarkable.

since data in other areas have shown that Jordani s feel intensely

threatened: They see dangers of domination and oppression in the context

of practically all the political issues explored. 'Their lack of

attention to nuclear weapons amidst intense feeTinvs of political and

military threat does not appear particularly rational, following the

"comon sense" of Western strategical thinking. The intensity of,

Jordanian preoccupation with Israeli military power in the conventional

realm may have readied a point where additional nuclear threat

Aakes little difference. Actually, their lack of concern with Israel's

nuclear strength may i-ndicate that they are dismissing the use of force

as a solution.

The Jordanians show a clear and consistent pattern of choices.

They reject and conderm the military alternatives---war, arms race,

nuclear weap6ns', proliferation---and almost unaninnuily favor the peace

oriented initiatives like disarmament, SALT II, and detente. The con-

sistency of these preferences is particularly significant s,ince it

indicates a rejection of mi litary force in favor of peaceful settlenents.

Three years ag War was viewed as involving two main alternatives,

defeat or victory; in 80 the Jordanians made almost no references to

vi dory and their ovei1ding concern appears to be protection.against

power---safety, security. Theintensity with which the Jordanians

condemn the misuse of power and the passion with which peace is sought

suggest the same anxious peace orientation observed in the context of

tinely political issues.

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Social and Economic Premises

The social doma-in apparently serves as.the connecting link betweenthe Jorddnians personal and national goals and interests. The con-.

vergence of individual and group perspectives was a consistent findingin our earlier, more extensive study"of the Jordanian cultural frameof reference.* Their self image, for instartce, involves strong groupidentificatisms; the Jordanian tends to perceive himself as a member of

his family;of the Arab ,race, or of his nation. Jordanian moral ahd

religious beliefs underline the importance of such social values asequality, justice, brotherhood, love, and cooperation, vgliich applyto both interpersonal and international relations-.

,

Similarly, peace e.Merged as an important personal as well asnational Objective. -In view of the Jordanians' general desire °for 4peace, if theirseCurity needs could be met, their inclination towarda peaceful settlement could possibly be strengthened into a significantpolitical force. Such a possibility deserves consideration in thepresent §ituation where Sadat's attempts to cone to terms with Israelcould getan important boost if Jordan were' to follow his epmple.'

The Jordanians allo see a Close rel-AVship.betwie the individualand nation in regard to economic-interests. In their' view of economy, #the

welfare of the individual is dependent on economic development; whichis seen as a collective task for.the entire natiOn. The Jordanians

hive a very strong economic orientation. Backwardness, lack of resources,

and poverty are considered important national problems. In response

to the issue of "world problems, '! edonomy was the most frequentlymentioned one by the Jordanians. They see economic deftlopment as 'a .

massiv4 change from a state of backwardness and poverty to a state ofeconomic and social well being.

*,L.B. Szaldy, A. Hilal, J.P. Mason°, R. Goodison, and J.B. -Strohl,U.S.-Arabic Communication Lexicon of Cultural Meanfrigs: Inteversonaland Social Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of ComparativeSocial and Cultural Studies, Inc., 1978).

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That the Jordanians' .perceptions are closely interrelated is once

agai.n conveged by their view that peace is a prerequisite to eConomic

development, a view which 'in turn, is likely to reinforce their longing

for peace.

JORDANIANS COMPARED TO EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS)1,

The global comparison.of four countries---U.S., Jordan, Egypt, and

israel---helps to place the previous_findings in broader perspectives.

The results show that in some ways the Jordanians are unique and in many

others they are typically Arab and Middle Eastern.

4

In dealing with problems of international relations the Jordanians'

tendency to view actors and events from a highly subjective angle

in no way exceptional. Together with Egypt and Israel they turn mach

more of their attention to the United States than to the Soviet Union

and blame the U.S. for oppression, imperialism, inrnrality, and. barayal.

The Jordanian political frarre of reference may not be less confl ict-

ridden* than the Israeli but it is much more so than the Egyptian.

However, the fundamental alternatives in which Jordanians and Israelis

think are different. While the Israelis view peace or war as the main

options, the Jordanians are- intensely preoccupied with occupation,

domination, oppression, tyranny, viewed as an intermediary state that

is neither war nor peace.

The Jordanian frame of reference is highly politicized. This may

be attributed to some situational as, well as psychocultural factors.

While the military confrontation is a situational factor, the Jordanians

show strong national and ethnic identifications, which come close to

the Israells and certainly exceed the Egyptians. from the Jordanian

perspective, more than from-that of any of he other groups, the individual

is seen as a subordinate part of the Jrsocial, jethni c/ndti ona I

col lective..

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Similarly, the Jordanians views of economy and human conditions

are more oriented toward national development and influenced.bypolitical priorities -thn the Israe)i or Egyptiar views. From the

Jordanian perspective the fate of the individual, his economic welfareas.well as his personal happiness, is more intimately dependent onthe fate and future of the national/cultural-collective than it appearsin the eyes of the two other Middle Eastern groups.

Interestingly:, this,does not lead to a position of fatalism. Work

and cooperation, apparently as individual efforts, are also emphasizedby ihe Jordanians, whilethe Israelis and Egyptians, along with the .

Aner)cans, emphasize the financial and business dinensions of economic

life.tiihi le the Is4raefis tend to ribte the inherently positive and

. .

negative characteristics of issues and events, the Jordanians stress highideals such as justice, equality, and freedonl... Lawl and customs

6

seeni to regulate ,the behavior of the Israelis, whereas the Jordaniansappear to'be motivated by a sense of duty and.obligation and stresloYlty and fidelity'as personal values. The Egyptians express a

general contern.with problems and difficulties, while the Jordanians'expresyintense feelings of fear and anxiety.

SYSTEMIC.INFLUENCES ON PERCEPTIONS

The findings presented here offer many specifics about the similaritiesand differences between Jordanians and Americans 1n/their perceptionS. of .

timelgi World problems. *At the same timethey show some, of the important

attributes of national perceptions and the subjective representationalsystem they form, whicli go beyond the Jordanian case and beyond their

implications for the Middle Eas

Shared experiences set comon perspectives which predispose people.

to view the world in certain ways. The Jordanians' system of perceptualrepresentation is in many ways predetermined by their background, theirnationalistic traditions, their religious beliefs, and other shared

10

elerents of direct and vicarious experiences (fears, depri4ations,sufferings). It has .a high, degree of internal organization in whichissue's, actors, and events,are closely interrelated.

Some of the.critical characteristics in the Jordanians' system ofperceptual representation were nationalism, high level of politicization,strong fears and tensions resulting from a prolonged crisis situation,and strong personal interests in such national objectives as peace andeconomic development. These dimensions are evident in the salientcomponents of the Jordanians' perceptions comon to many issues, yet "they become most apparent through comparison with kerican perceptions.

Although these culturally conditioned predispositions consistentlyinfluence perception, people do riot realize that they are projecting theirown sense of reality into' situations based on their internal system ofperceptual representation. When responding in this study the Jordanianscould not have known how deeply their conflict-ridden rOationalitic Arabperspective would influence their political and military views as wellas\their perceptions of issues in other domains'(economic, social, moral,etc.). Their view of disarmanent, for example, clear4y tied in withtheir views of the super powers as eggressive and expansionistic. ItaTso tied in with their view of Israel as the enemy and major externalthreat. This threat is apparently unrelated*to Israel's nuclear

<

capabilities but is based on a,perceived intent to overtake others throughthe use of conventional forces:

Th'e system of perceptions which developsin a particular.nationp ()vides. their sense of reality and determines the wiy they relate

sues. People.are typically unaware of the extent to which their viewsreinforce each-other and influence what they observe (e.g., negative4cts Jordanians attrib4te to Israel), what they ignore (e.g., the Israelis'concerns with their own security), and how they organize these elenentsin an internally consistent way (attributing negative characteristics-to the U.S., for example, because ofits association with Israel).

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Dominant priorities redispose wtiat people are likely to do.

Knowing the subjective dominance of issues is also of considerable

practical importance. In theitinited States the issue of.nuclear weapons

commands a great deal of attention and can be the mainspring,for extreme

actions ranging from protest strikes to demands for uncbnditional

surrender. As we found, this issue receives minimal attention from.the

Jordanians and does not proVide a sufficient impetus for concerted

pOlitiCal actions.

A famfliarity with these priorities and relationships can offer

the key for understanding the way other peoples think and behave. The

influence that the-perceptual represenfational systemrexerts on political

behavior calls for More systematic reagnition and careful assessment. -

ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL NRROACH

A meaningful and eefective use of ihe perceptual information

presented in this repat requires a recognition of the characteristics.

which distinguish these data from those produced by traditional attitude,

and opinion-surVeys. It may help to see more clearly the advantages and

liMitations of this new approach and how the two strategies may be

effectively combined.

In contrast to traditional pubfic oOnion surveis, the associatiOn-4

based representational approach does not call for the respondents to make.

'rational decisions, or judgments. --Associations showNerely what js upPermost

in people's minas in.the context of selec d topics. Their spontaneous 1 '

reacttons are used to infer how ideas, iss s, and events are represente4

and orpaniled'in their minds.

Traditional survey research relies mdominantly on people'S jud4ments

and positions expressed by a ,choice between two Otmore alternatives

'offered. A sdrvey May ask, for instance: "What economic system has fhe

most.promise to.solve the Most pressing economic ProbTems?;* (a) free

enterprise system, (b) economy subStdized and regulated,by the state, or

(c) do not know, undecided." Stnce the-alternatives are clear,-iny

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4choice offers an apparently unanbiguous piece of i-nformation. Free

associations are usually less definite, more ambiguous.

Fur:thermore, survey questions can ask people about the past orfuture. They may-ask people's opinions about contingencies, probabilities,hypothetical situations, etc. Free associations convey only people'ssubjective representation of reality as it exists for them here and now.They are riot rationally chosen,:reditee statements of opinions.

The association-based metliod is not an appropriate instrument for-assessing the objectiveof a tax ctillson the econ

cts of miven sit'uation-, such as -the effectsThe aim of the representational approach

behind the AGA method is to assess how national/cultural background and

shared experiences lead People to see the world in their own way,setting their priorities and percepttons, independent of logiCal reason-ing, and setting their patterns of behavior.

10,While people's explicit statements of choices andopreferences' are

usually more definite and.unequivocal, the psychology of motivations leavesno doubt that-human behavior tends to follow subjective priorities, ambi.guousas they frequently are because of their charigin6 constellations.

How, these two main research strategies can complement eath other '

and bear on the practical problems facing the policy official is el.aboratedbrieffy in 'the methodological 'conclusions of this' repoct.

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INTRODUCTION

PSYCHOCULTURAL /DISPOSITIONS, THEIR ROLE' IN.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IN -NiAPING POLITICAL,EVENTS

Behind the extensive data presented on Jordanian nationallerceptionsthe fundamental question to be, addressed here trhowto-improve

our capability to understand how particular foreign populaiions interpretthe world os they experience it in contexts relevant to,U.S. foreignpolicy. 'How can we take into account such invisible psychologica]realities bs priorities, images, value orientations, and'wOys of thinking?More specifically, how can we apply the methods and concepts or the socialsciences to provide practical assistance in the complex and danigerous

-field of international relations?

. Our discussion focuses on the shared perceptions wily? areaccumulated co:ter time and which form an invisible borid.tamong.members of,a particular nation or culture. 1These shared perceptions constituteframes of reference which lead people of the same backgroupd to look atthe world in particular ways and to bring similar information to bear ,

on paricul ar issues or situations. This is why knowledge' of nationalpatterns-of perception is so-critical for unders%anding..,and anticiliotingbehavior relevant to foreign policy and international relations.

\,An extensive review of the tedhnicalliterature on perception0.

was performed previously) to identify key variables_affe,cting dominant'perceptual tendencies and their stgnificance in sha-pipg national.behavior. patterns. The findings were presented in the T ch fcal Report,entitled National Perceptions: Criecal Dionsions) Poli R'elevance,and Use (April 1980).

1111bA

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A subsequent inquiry condutted with ptlity officialt inaicated

that the majority recognize sYStemati c' daia on cul turally shared

psychological disposition's as potentially useful and valuable. The

inquiry considered such things as the potentiaci advantages of information

on dominant national perceptions, the availability of such information,

and the problems of using perceptual dnd'motivational information in

foreign policy planning.

The literature review and the &ubsequent inquiry 'with Policy

officials have similar implications. The general indication is that .

the United States has growingtdifficulty in coping with the inta gible

psychological dimensions of foreign_affairs de spite their infl tial

roie.

This .situation contrasts with some significant experiences of the

policy,making corimunity in,the 1940s and 1950s. 'In 'the second

world war cultural expertise vias applied to provide strategic guidance

and to. ameliorate the conditionS of conflict in both the Asian and

Europlan theatres. A particularly innovative and Useful set of studies

on Japan was carried out by the.Office of WarInformation. Later, during

the Cold War, cultural and, psychological analyses were apiiited in order

to assist U.S. pOlicy4akers in ,anticipating Soyiet reactions, as an,

aid in negotiatibns and in reducing the chances fdr unnecessary mis-,

perception vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

This report isolates the critical psychocultural variables operating

in international settings and iOntifies sone.false assumptions that

.ar,:e deeply rooted in our own experiences and cultural..predispositions.

The main body o.f the report presents policy relevant findings on

national perceptions in Jordan and the Middle East. It Pays special

attention to 'the subjective selectivity of perceptions, to the illusion

that perceptual representations reflect objective, universally shared

vfa4s of reelitt, and to the close connections between Perceptions,

decisionmaking and behavior. It addresses 'five critical choices for

obtaining foreign policy. relevant data on nationa41 pextceptions. The

focus Is here on new and insightful information which helps to overcome

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ss

,expectations based on our own natiorkal perceptions and which enables

U.S. foreign,policy officials ,to uaerstand and anticipate international

developments and eyents in their human dimensions.; The data pre:sentation

serves to introduce the, probTems at a practical working level .supported .

,by new methodological capabilities. ".. ,

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THE POL I CY PROBLEM

HOW TO RECOGNIZE AND-DEAL WITH THE CRITICAL

HUMAN/CULTURAL 'FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

POPULATION tHARACTERISTICS - POWERFUL ,BUT HIDDEN PREDISPOSITIONS

In recent years such international events as he sudden collapse

of the South Vietnamese military in 1975 and the 'Crumbling of the

Shah'-s goVetwent in Iran have taken U.S. foreign policy eXperts by

surprise. The South Vietnamese forces caved in' not just because the

North Vietnamese were stronger in terms of weaponry, equipment, or

trainedlmanpower but because they lost faith in the belief that they

had a fighting chance; they felt abandoned and so became disorganized.

The Shah lost his throne, and the U.S. one of its most powerful allies

in the Middle East, despite the fact that the Iranian military force was

one of the :largest and,best equipped in the world. ,Within less than

a ye.ar of President Oarter' s compl rant to the Shah ;that Iran was an

-"island ,for pr6gress and stability," opposition forces managed to

dethront the Shah and smash the monarchy. They did it by cashing in on

the alienation and hatred of many people who saw Western gonomic,

technical, and social modernization as threatening to their culture. ,

religion, and personal identities. President darter 'admitted that

he was caught by surprise and as' an explanation he complained that he

did not receive information in time about the Iranian peoples' viewsI.

and sentiments.

These are just two well known examples of recent political

developments whose outcones were vital to our nattonal interest and

which took lines dramatically different from our own expectations.

U.S. forefgn policy planning was based rather narrowly.on such material

factors as the GNP, sttndard of liVing indicators, and mi-Kry strength

17

25

as

-in manpower, weaponry,.equipment, etc. It virtually ignored the human

element, that is, the role of psychological factors.

These experiences and others have dramatically demonstrated the

need to make U.S foreign policy sensitive to such hiddetLbut power-.

ful psychological realities, as national perceptions. The reason is

not so mUch a matter of testing our perception of realAy against others''

or'of abandoning our own views in order to acdomodate or appease others.

The real value.of such knowledge is that it can reveal those built-in

trends and limitations that national/cultural dispositions ,set for

People's actiOns, including ourselves,, our allies, and our. potential

adVersaries:

In examining hcAst, these infdrmation needs are actually translated

into reality wt ;find an immense gap between what is stated as desirable

and What is actually being dorie."., Analysts of recent U.S. foreign policy'fai 1 ures concur that U.S. pol i cy makers have di ffi cul ty taking -into

consideration the psychological characteristics of people whose

background, culture, and'national identity differ from our own.

SIGNS OF DECLINING U.S. CAPABILMES I INTERfgATIONAL RELATIONS

In face .of increasing need for deeper international understanding,

as'accentuated by recent world.events, our.efforts to take foreign

psychocultural dispositions into accoTt deserve siSecial attention.

The trends appear rather alarming in historical ,pective. Such

leading sôcial scientists as Ruth Benedict, Margaret ittad, George

Taylor, and Alexander George helped shape our policies toward Japan

in the forties, and Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer provided an empirically-

based foundation for our knowledge of Soviet society in the fifties.

During the last twenty years the scope of opinion surveys has

expanded overseas, but social science 'input that could place the .

findings in the appropriate cultural context hp shown little increase.

This lag is hard to explain in the present hislorical period of broad. .

international involvenents, when power relations are shifting and

/- challenges and frustrations are at a peak.

(

In our open democratic society foreign policy isoshaped by theAmerican public as well as by the federal goiernnent, and millions ofAmeriCen businessmen and tourists now travel extenSively overseas.Thus, it is eiosential that both the people and government can improvetheir understanding of people overseas.

The dramatic consequences of not haiiing an kdequate unders

offoreign perceptions and behavior oftenceffect foreign p licy mostdtrectly. Blanes forofailures in the field of foreign policy areusually on the Department of State or on the various intelligence . .

agencies. Yet it would be a dangerous simplification to concludethat information on the perceptions and franes of reference of foreignpopulatibns is`a matter of concern only for the govekrent.

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THE BLIND- SPOT

In an article entitled "The Blind Spot of U.S. Foreign Intelligence,"*Anthony Marc Lewis supports with several concrete examples his central

the5is that lack.of sensitivity to Vietnamese culturaymedispositionswas a source of repeatedmiscalculationsinU.S. foritgri policy:

.40 "Vietnam case studies; based in part on newly declassified evidence,suggest that hidden cultural. assumptions crippled the, CIA's abilityto perform its adVisory function" (p. 44). Based on his long years

of service in the CIA, LeWis concludes that there is a rather universalproblem affecting .policy relevant reports on foreign countries. "The

writer's cultural- biases tend especially to distort their presentationsof the very kinds of 141psychological factors which decision-makers

and. executers' of policy need most urgently" (p. 45). Sumarizing hisexperiences regarding our iwolvement'in SouthVietnam frOm PresidentDiem's days up to the' North Vietnamese victory, Lewis documents ageneral trend whereby administrative pressures, "group think," andnarrow bureaucratic views interfered with and suppressed the insights

of authentic cultural experts.

Based on Lewis's inside account, it becones apparent that this

. substitution of domestic views for massive external realities is anunintentional but systematic process which proceeds without awareness

or malicious intent.

To illustrate this problem in the context of Iran re may turn toa summary assessment presented in a Staff Report of the PermanritSelect Comittee on Intelligence, U.S. House pf Representatives

1--(January 1979), entitled "Iran: Evaluation of U.S. IntelligencePerformance Prior to November 1978." The report was the result of .

an inquiry conducted following President Carter's dissatisfaction with

* A.M. Lewis, "The Blind Spot of U.S. Foreign Inteil-ice,"Journal of Comunication 1976 (Winter), 26:1.

20

the quality of information available to him and after press t4epdrts

began to refer to-intelligence failure, concluding that "the inadequacy

of intelligence had narrowed American policy choices." *The report

concl udes:

The intelligence and policy making comunities must eachcarry part of the blame for insensitivity to deep-rootedproblems in Iran. More importantly, intelligence andpolicy failings were intertWined. (p. 1).

In the words of the Committee, "intelligence field reporting from

Iran provided a narrow and cloudy window through which to observe'the

.7 sweeping social and\ political changes underway....What was missing--

and is still weak---was insight into the goals and expectations of

opposition elements, and popular attitudes toward them" _(p. 2-3).

The report further states that neithff-the CIA nor the Embassy

political section was very responsive to requests for information on

the "less tangible influences:"

One problem is that information on social groups and trendstends to be,considered overly academic by field personnel,since it is usually not fast-changing, and its relationshipto policy issues and users' requirements is not readily apparent.Another is that collection on these intangible subjects isdifficult and unrdWarding to any but an "Iranophile," and intoo many cases field personnel lack the back.ground, languagefluency, or inclination torpursue them 'effectively. (p. 3),.

This example suggest's that in effect the intelligence agencies have

root given adequate priority to information human psychocultural

repredispositions. The main asons give n are at this subject is lessc

tangible, that it is academic, and that t is not fast-changing. These

may appear to be sound bureaucratic reasons, but what is being rejected

here is information vital in shaping U.S. international relations at

both governmental and private levels.

il.The apparently erratic Iranian reactions are a case in point.

They have caused bewilderment and raised enntions in the American public

during the past two years. They have seriously affected U.S. foreign

policy. The Carter' administration 'has been repeatedly blarted for making

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commitments to a situation which., could amounii to a deadly trap. Without

knowing the basic framework of Iranian perceptions, U.S. foreign policy

makers have no map which could provide orientation on the strange

te rain of the Iranian psychocultural landscape. In searching for

ion we use our ,domestic mapsi.e., our own experiences, Our

and priorities, our own rationale. These domestic maps offer

uidance in application "to .a population ,as different and distant

e Iranians. Yet as an Iranian 'expert, William Beeman, has observed,

di

own vie

little

there is a rea/rkable reluctance to use authentic area expertise. Beeman,

a well known cultural enthropologist, expressed his views 13---eist=ent.

New York Times arti cle , "Devaluing. Experts on Irare*

Negotiations and dealing with Iran in the hostage crisis. have._ '

been delicate and complex Paradóxically, since the crisis

began, in Novembe6rThdividuals best equipped to deal with itsintricaciesAmerican experts on Iran---have not been usedeffectively by our Government....Consultation,with specialistson Iran was eeverely reduced, and their few invited memorandumswere largply ignored. This shift resulted in ongoing mis-interpretations, misreadings and mistakes in day-tqaday: deafingswith Irariian officials....Thus,/to look at the hostage crisis andthe degree to ,which our expert.9t-are being under-used is to be

saddened. We want to develop more experts to deal with crises,but we don't know how to use profitably the'ones we have.

In his 1980 election debate with Governor Ronald Reagan President

Carter referred to the dilemma he onstantly Zas facing. As he put it,

on some of the most critical question experts are usually split right

. in the middle, 50/50, in camps of con icting opinions. While this

problem is not new, it now aPpears t be exceptionally critical.

The United States no longer enjoys the massive advantages in

economid and military superiority which prevailed after arld War II.

The contemporary world situatfoli makes it increasingly desirable that

the United States promotes peace and international cooperatiethrough

policies backed by genuine tultural understanding. Under the conditions

*W. -Beeman, "Devaluing Experts on Iran," New York Times, Friday,October 11, 1980.

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of strategic balance and keen ecqnomic competition, world leadership

and the preservation of peace require an increased capability in the

la humanlpsychological dimension to 4nticipate and influence events.

These are the abilities Strobe talbott pleads for-with special

regard to the Middle 'East -in Time (October.20; 7980):

Even before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, the U.S.14 was widely perceived, both at hone and abroad, to be losing

its ability to anticipate and influence events that jeopardizeWestern intprests and world peace. For the U.S. to find itselfon the sidelines'of the current trouble is particularlyfrustrating. and ominous. This"marks the first time in the longapd variegated history of modern Middle Eastern warfare that theU.S. has neither diplomatic relations with, nor politicalleverage on, either Of the combatants. Comnented Saudi Arabia'sForeign Affairs Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal: "The almost .

total absence of any U.S. sway with the parIles directly involved .

in such,a dangerous situation is sobering to. say the least."

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OBJECT-14i', lit

TO IMPROVE OUR. CAPABILITIES IN ASSESSING FOREIGN

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS ANb IN USING THE RELEVANT 'INFORMATION

,FOR POLICY PLANNING

The central objective of this study is to assist policy planning

and decision-making in the field of international relations by

facilitating a wider and more systematic use of behavioral science

information, parti cularly data on national perceptions.. ,

In support of this long-range objective, we have pursued some more

speci fic 'interrelated aims:

First, as a point of departure we have undertaken a modest effort

to identify how policy officials view.the usefulness of perceptual/

motivational information in relation to their own information needs and

requi rements.

The second aim was to identify soire of the main ,f4ctors responsible'

for the limited use of perceptual. informatioh, rangin§ from skepticism

and misconceptions to serious limitations andshortages of the

information available.

_

A third related ai\ni was to demonstrate that a partial tolution to

what we have identified as the "high need, low use paradox" may slitlpy

be to provide the policy official with Wore and better information on

national perceptions.

Timely perceptual data obtained on Jordanians and other Middle

Eastern samples are used to illustrate several characteristics Of

:perceptual information that are of particular relevance and practical

value to pol icy-rel ated appl i cations .

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GENERAL APPROACH

o .

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A COORDINATED USE OF THREE SOURCES: POLICY OFFICIALS,

TECHNICAL LITERATURE, AND RESEARCH ON NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS1

1

To identify user needs 'and requirements we first conducted an

inquiry with policy officials, including senior,members of the Department

of Defense and to a lesser extent the Department of State., in three,general areas. First, we asked about their views on the 'role of Kum

psychocultural factors in international 'relations and the: value of

perceptual information in understanding Kid predicting policy7relevant

national behavior. Second, we asked them about the information avail-

able on national perceptions and about its quality and utility. Third,

we asked 'for their opinions and recommendations on how foreign policy

planning could-be assisted through perceptual information. ,

We then examined the reactions obtained froin policy officials in

combination with the results of our previous survey of the literature.' .

The problems raised by policy officials and the blind spots, mis-

conceptions, and defitiencies identified in the literature review appeared

to be interrelated. We were particularly interested in how the problems,

raised by the policy officials could be resOlvid based on findings in

the scientific literature and on conclusions we drew from our selective

review of the, literature. In this conteXt the critical paraneters-of,,

N pe r ce pt ton s -identified in the previous technical report on 'national

perceptions were found to have considerable relevance and explanatory

val ue.

Finally, we use:4 enpirically ,based research findings to illustrate

how some of the most fundamental shortcomings of perceptual assessments

coitld be.overcome. The focus here is the key factors responsible for

the present state of disorientapon and skepticism and the ttrikingly

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low-Jae of perceptual data---all of which stand in sharp contrast to

a broadly recognized need for information on foreign perceptions. This

last step is based on -an analysis of Jordanian and American national -

perceptions. Also included are sone additional gata on Middle Eastern

countries which were accumulated in the context af otherrstudies under-

taken recently by scholars of American and Arab backeouhd. We used-

these data because of their tineliness and their potential to illustrate

some basic principles in the contpxt of one of the world's contemporary

trouble spots, characterized by highlpolitical tensions and widely

divergent perceptions

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'PAR1 I

NE-EDS AND. PROBLE,MS INDICATED BY POLICY OFFICIALS,

REVIEW OF POLICY OFFICIALS' VIEWS OF NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

As a point of departure it was desirable to estebYTV how policy

officials view the need to know the perceptual and motivational human,

factors underlying political events. In other words, is there a

nialitation that knowledge of widery shared national/cultural perceptions

could help U.S. policy officials avoid being taken by surprisel It

tbould'have helped, for instance, to develop less costly and less

dangelous foreign policy alternati)res in encountering _the Iranian

situation (e.g., if we had known ejrlier of the Iranian people's

rejection of the Shah's monarchy in favor of a republican form of

government).,

We were also interested in astessing.what type of information policy

offttials have available on the human dimensiOn, especially on

perceftual-MOtivaitOnal predisPosiiions, in the context Of their major'

areas of concern and.their practic'al work assignments.. This itind of

inquiry was taken to establish whether the'limited attention given'to

foreign predispositions is due mainly to a lack of interest or lack_

of information. What.are really the main reasons for the fow and

apparently declining use of information on the psychological

characteristics.of people in othe'?nations?

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Finally, we asked policy officials what are the major vbstacltsto the use of timely information on 1ts human dimension in poltcy

planning and decision making.

Although we had a clear set of questions in mind, our inquiry waskept unstructured' and informal. Our research reports on nationalperceptions and on Irv(lan and Arab percdptions,anda;frames of reference

offered a natural contex i. for eliciting cOninent.5.- It was desirable tohave a concrete framework so that policy officials did not feel that e

their opinions were being examined indivtdually but rather tirt theywere being called upon to evaluate some material and its. untlerlyingpropositions along their area of expertis'e and interegt. Policy officialsMight have been rêluc t to respond-if they had felt that they werethe target of the ass ssment and had to articulate ,their opinions inan entirely open-ended situation. As it was they had specificinformation to read, and.theirtask was mainly to review it critically.

While this framework did facilitate interattion, the documentswe have offered as "context" may have influenced in a certain sensethe responses elicited from the policy officials. Most of the policypeople we included had previously expressed interest in this 'subjectmatter. As,a result, the views of offidals with specialized focuson technical (technological, economic, financial, military) factorsmay be underrepresented here.

Policy Relevance of Psychocultural Population Characteristics

Praotically everyone agreed that we should pay attentton to deeply'ingrained psychological predispositions that are culturally shared

,among the people, of a particular country:

While the policy officials and experts.agreed ,bout the generalneed for taking certain foreign population characteristics intoconsideration, they showed considerable diversity of opinions with'regard to what these characteristics actually are, what cOnstitutes

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truly'useful information, and how such information may be.obtained. Itbecame clear, for instance, that policy officials are little preparedto, draw distinctions among such terms as attitudes ,'beliefs , perceptions,and opinions. Sone were more used to speaking Of attitudes, othersof perceptions and images, and many have used these concepts. inter-changeably. They were apparently bothered by the diversity of. labelsand definitions in the social and behavioral Science literature. They

prefer to leave the choice of terms to the professionals of the')particular field. What is really esserhial is that the informationon people in other nations provides a solid foundation for understandingand anticipating their policy'relevant behavior.

Almost all the policy officials/experts. with whom we dismissedthese questions haO read the original report on "National Perception"or at least the Executive Summary of it. No one questioned the

literature ov bur tOnclusions about the practical utility of percetitualdata to bear on policy. We found, for example, a rather wide acceptanceof the principle of subjective`selectivity operating in people'sperceptions. Policy officials generally agreed that shared experiences,backgrounds, and cultural assumptions predispose people to see thingsand events in the world in a particular way and that these sharedperceptions will inflience people's behavior.,,

The'consensus, loud and clear at a verbal level,stands in vivid-

contrast to actual praCtices, in governmental as well as private spheres,whi ch indi cate

ally ignored.mean thdat they

that in effect stich policy relevant factors are systematic-Their acceptance of our 'premises does not automaticallywould follow through in concrete life situations.%

This problem area.characteristicNy suffers from gaps which separate

the acceptance of principleS at a verbal/theoretical level from theactual practical implementation of these principles.

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Reasons for Low Use of Perceptual Infonnation

The main thrust of our further inquiry was 10 identify the causesand reasons for the rather consistent neglect of foreign people'spredispositions which actively interfere with their political choicesand behavior.

There was a general consensus that decision makers are usually

ill Orepared to take the human elenent into considera ion.. They would

not deny in the context of intellectual deliberations t at foreignnations view and approach problems of international rel tions different\y.Nor did anyone seriously question that these views infl nce their -

choices or that by knowing their perceptions we can bet en anticipate 1/

their behavior. 'Yet in actually dealing with foreign n mns, whetherIranians, Russians, or Chinese, after a formal reciiiiiition of someimportant differences, our foreign policy decisions are likely to bebased on the assumption that the foreign powers will follow our owncomon sense in a universal way. Evenathe highly experienced policyofficials who have seen at first hand how Soviet leaders for oversixtryears have subordinated economic interests to politi,cal objectivesare tempted agai and again to read into new policy statenents that theSoviets now recoge P1t politics has to be subbr-dinated to naturaleconomc priorities opulation needs, consumer demands.

The inclination to accept the idea of differences between various'nations at an.intellectual level and to ignore, them at the practicalworking level is strong and universai. Since the contradiction isnow frequently recognized, there is/I-chance for improvenent. Yet t e4ominant practice of ignoring the reality of foreign populationcharacteristics is...supported by several related factors.

?lost importantly, the dedision makers usually have extensiveinformation on the various material' factors 'which bear on a particularpolicy decision. The economic, financial, military, technologicaldata are, not only available, they are also usually solidly founded inobservable facts and sources of information the decision makers arefamiliar with as a .matter of their professional training as businessnen,scientists, etc:-

er, 30

'In contrast, intonation on the relevant psychological predispositions

is usually meager. It is rarely based on verifiable facts* and is

frequently qualitative rather than quantitative. Frequently it involves

expert opinions which are often conflicting. A resolution of the contra-

dictions would require that the decision maker.possess a familiarity -

and expertise superior to that of his man experts expressing the con-'

flicting views. In reality, this is ,naturally seldom the, case; it is

wore likely' that the decision maker becomes frustrated and reverts to

his good American common.sense. That this common sense is not*likely

to be followed by Russians, Arabs, Koreans- or others is Usually ignored

at this point.

With relatively solid data on tangible material factors and with

little, or questionable, information on the human psychocultural

factors, the decision maker is likely,to rely on what he feel§ to have

solidly in hand an0 give up ambitions to account for:the intangible

human dimensions which do not fit readily into the world his familiar

with. It is understandable that many people'dismiss or avoid foreign

'psychological predispositions which fall outside their expertise and

with which they have little familiarity.

A

:3

FIVE CRITICAL CHOICES IN THE USE OF PO[ICY RELEVANT SOCIAL SCIENCEINFORMATION

In the deCision-making process one solutiOn may appear attractive

based on the foreign policy official's domestic experiences and comonsense, while another may also seem appropriate but unconventional bx

dories ti c standards and would requi re more justifi cation. Since. the

policy,official cannot be exPecteckto be an expert in-all areas, hemust often seek the advice of professionals who are specialists intheir fields. Based g. our discussions with policy offiCials, wehave identified five .Wdamental deciions whiCh appear to be particu-larly.froublesOme in cdnsi deri ng informati on cin psychocul tuN: 'factors:

I. The_proper yariable: Which characteristics.,of the foreign°population should receive primary attention as being most informativefor understanding and predicting policy relevant behavior?

2. Proper informatioh source: Which disapline or profession isbest prepared to provide the information needed? Is it opinion research,psychology, anthropology, political science, area expertise, or sone

other 'field?

3. The proper expertise: How does one decide which expert is'

right when encountering contradictory, conflicting expert opinions?

4. 'The proper population to study: WhichAroup or groups

should serve as the primary basis for assessments "(elite, professionals,

general population)?

5'. Distinguishing biased from valid information: In a situationwhere outdated and timely, valid and.biased information about burselvesas well as other peoples coexist in excessive quantities, in vgrious

mixtures, how Oan one differentiate.the valid information from thatwhich is useless and misleading?

What ar4 the Variables Practically Most Useful?

Whit typeof infOrmatiOn helps us the most to,uhderstand other.

people? What do we have to knrabout others in Order to anticipateoi

32

40

with reasonable accuracy what they will do? In many ways menters of'several professions (psychologists, opinion re§earchers, marketresearchers, etc.) do agree that people's attitudes and opinions that mattermost. While in the context of our domestic exPerien,ces this seems tobe a well founded conclusion, there are some reasons to believe thatattitude and opinion data alone may not be sufficiently informativefor understanding foreign natibns and predicting thefr policy relevant

-behavior.

In our own environment we are generally familiar with people'sworld views and the attitudes wkich acconpany them. If we know that aperson is hr,the ratification of the SALT II agreement, for example, wecan make certain assumptions about his general way of thinking.since,in our own environment we are familiar with the most widely held viewson this subject. At the sa4'tiine, knowing a specific attitude wouldnot be sufficient information to draw conclusioin-about the accompanying

6

views of a person with a foreign cultural background.

In the U.S. cultural environment people are more used to makkgchoices and acting on separate matters indepe,ndently of each other,and'iheir behavior is likely to be consistent with their attioiludes onspecific issues. In traditional and especially in more controlledsocieties, people are Jnore limited in theiP ch'oices, and they makefewer independent choiCes in line with single isolated attitudes.

The shared backgroOnds 'and experiences of people brou_ght up in

the same national/cultural environment set certain patterns ofperception which determine how they view the world and react to it.They create sOme relattively stable predispositions which characterizeihé people of a pirticular nation. In contrast to those stablepredispositions,the main focus of our donestic interest.is more opchanging attitudes, Opinions, their variations depending on changingsituations, fluctuating moods, events, etc.

To understand people from different cultural backarounds we haveto know what in their minds ate the truly dominant concerns 'and issues.We then need to know what are,the salient 1ements in their perceptions

33

of those concerns. By knowing their Priorities and thejuerceptions

we can gain insights into the factors which are most likeV to influence

their behavior.

The main thrust of our domestic interest is in the barometric

changes of attitudes and opinions which bear closely on dtimestic

politics, cOnsumerism, social style, etc. When dealing with other 44,

nations, which-live under different conditions, 'in cultural enyironments

frequently vastly different from ours, it is essential to have at first

asbasic Understandingof the-mein pexceftual and Motivational trends

reflected by people's way of thinking. This provides the necessary

backdrop against which to evaluate more specific information on

particular attitudes and opinions. ---

Which Source Offers the Information Most Needed?

In domgstic contexts attitude and opinion surveys are useful and

informative. We are familiar with the main alternative views and

opinions, for example, on SALT II or foreign aid. We4know the general

opinions of those, for instance, who are for or against foreign-aidt

What the surveys can tell us is the actual proportions of those who

opt for one or the other alternative position or how these.proportions

change.

When used overseas, however, survey research encounters several

difficult problems. In discussing the methodological problems

associated with international survey research, Buchanan and Cantril*

in their seminal work place at the top of the list the biases resulting

from differences in meaning. These problems are discussed extensively

by leading international relations and communications experts who explore

various ways to overcome differences in meanings and.problems in translation.**

* W. B chanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, (Urbana:

University)f Illinois Press, 1953).

** L: Radvanyi, "Problems of International Opinion Surveys," Inter-national Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, 1947, 1, 43-51;

D. Wallace, et al., "Experience in the Tine International Survey," Public

Opinion Quarterly, 1949, 7, 708-721; D.-ggrOw, "Transfer of MeaninisNational Boundaries," in R. Merritt (ed.), Communication in International

Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press,1972);111.14; Brislin,

Back-Translation for Cross-cultural Research," Journal 'of Cross-Cultural

Psychology, 1970, 1, 185-216....,

. 34

42

VIP

k-

According to Cantril the major objective of internationalsurvey research would require "to get an overall*picture of the realityworlds in which people tive," which requiires that they have the free-doeto express themselves using their own terms.* As he observes:"Clearly, an accurate'app'raisal of an individual's reality world cannever be obtained if he is forcedAo make choices or seledtions betweencategories, alternatives, symbols or situations as these are posed inthe-usual type of questionnaire.'"

The applicability of survey rrethods in various societies representsanother problem. Direct approaches, such as used in attitude and opinionsurveys, have almost unl imited applicability in open , democrati c-societies where, people are used to social science research free ofgovernment control. However, the utility of these direct 'approachesis limited in societies where the political systems are controlled,where people with oppositional views are politically persecuted, orwhere people have little experiencoor desire to state freely their-owncandid opinions. *

While our domestic assessments of people's views and attitudes showa strong natural .reliance on opinion surveys, in international contextssuch surveys may be unavailable, unreliable, or both. Here the don-,

ventional methods have to be adapted and complemented by other sourtes

of information like those offered by the `fields of cultural anthropologYand social psychology.

Particularly relevant and useful in this context are the expe'riencesand methods accumulated and developed by anthropologists who are specially

trained to recognize` old. assess psychocultural dispositions as character-istic of people 'of-different-background and culture. The anthropological

apProach is Characterized by Bennet and Thaiss** as "intensive"as opposed to "extensive" approaches such as the highly structured

*W. Buchanan arid H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (.Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1953). .

** J. Bennet and-G. Thaiss, "Sociocultural Anthropology and SurveyResearch," in*Cos,Y. Glock (ed.), Survey Research in the Social Sciences(New York: Sage Foundation, 196n. \

35

1*.tv4

survey methods that focus on single 'specific issues. As anthropologists_argue, the structured, narrowly, focusedquestions typically used in"extensive" survey approaches take only a single element into consider-ation andtherefore cannot offer sufficient cultural insibhts and under-.

standing.

Who Are the Authentic, Reliable Experts?

In the field of :international relations or foreign policy,detision makers. have to consider a nunber of 'diverse factors---economic,military, social, psychological., Since no one person.has the necessary

knowledge of all these diverse elements, decision makers usually call onexperts in the various fields.

The identification and use of expertise in the i'pkychocultural"field require separate consideration. Expertise on human pred4positions,attitudes, perceptions, and Motivations of people of different culturalbackground presents some special problems:

Expert opinions are frequently contradictory, with few ways. of checking which position is tight.

Cultural expertise on a particular foreign group is usuallycontaminated with the expeks' .own underlying sultural perSpectivesand predispOsitIons.

11141

A consensus among experts from the same cultdral baCkground

(e.g., who make observations and'pass judgrnents on a particularforeign Itoup (e.g. ,. Iranians) is no proof of validity. Thei r consensus.

can well be the result of their similar perspectives rather than theproduct of genuine, independent observations.

Area experts who have eXtensi.ve first-hand experiences 'with .

Oople of a given country and Who have the flexibility to shift toforeign cultural perspectives.often findthemselves at odds with theviews.of the majdrity. To select truly 'competent experts is hardlypossible for policy officials o'r anyone else unless there are some

, ;independent data available on the perceptions and motivations of

q

- 36.4

.1.2%

,members of the particular population which can be uSed in validation,

documntation, and elaboration of authentic'expert opinions.

The various problems associated with the selestion and use of

authentic expert opinions have been elaborated in our previous report.,

on National Perceptions.*

se Vi ews , Perceptions , Moti vations Shoul d _be Assessed?

% A question frequently posed by policy officials is what particular

group or social strata should be given- primary attention. This question

acquires special importance because the approach we are inclinedto

take based on our national experience would lead naturally to the

representative polling of entire nations. The application of such a

broad approach is hampered in international contexts, .however, both

because of the liMited access to people.and because of the prohibitiye

costs involved. As is discusse8 later, it is widely argued that in

controlled societies the only group worthwhile to study ts the elite,

the national leadershili. In contrast to the U.S. experience where the

public opinion is an extremely powerful force, in many developing

countries-1nd in countries under authoritarian rule or totalitarian

control,- the opinions of the general population have negligible effects.

These two,lines of-reasoning have c7ated two distinct research

trends, one stressing public opinion research, the other stressing

leac,Rhip studies. _These are generally considered to be either-or

alternatives, and oCC4ional1y both options are ignored, as was the

case with Iran. The unexpected Iranian developments illustrate the

serioui consequences of allowing this fallacious dichotomy to paralyze

research efforts.

As elaborated in war previous report on national. perceptions,"

an assessment of broadly shared perceptual trends is

e, a

* L.B. Szalay and J.B. Strohi, National Perceptions-Critical

Dimensions, Policy Relevance and Use (Washington, D.C.: ICS, 1980).

** L.B. Szalay and J.B. Strohl, National Perceptions. (see above)

Appendix VI.4.

37

*

feasible without relying on large samples of national representation.'A contrasting scientific apprOath comes from cultural anthropology, whichdraws conclusions from studying relativelY small nurrbers of culturalrepretentatives in depth. Furthermore, there are indications that byusing strategically selected native representatives---e.g., students-.Hitis possible to chart the critical psyChocultural_predispositions whia are

generally characteri,Q of the peoplee.living in that country. Asillustrated by a recent comparative study of krerican and Iranian studentsamples,* in the process of issessing psychological predispositions thisstrategy simultaneously captures timely political attitudes as well. The

Jordanian political perceptions explored in the present`study are.

expected to shed 'additional light on this problem.

How-wet One Differentiate the Biaied and Misleading from the Validand Useful Information?

The information available to policy officials ona particular foreignPopulation' is usually eitens.ive but often of questionable value. There

are several reasons for this, but the nrsi crucial one is that theinescapable influence of one's native cultee interferes subconsciouslywith the capability to analyze other people's perceptions and motivationt.

Almost everyone who has spent at least a few days in a foreigncountry is inclined to draw some general conclusions about the peoplethere, and there the Well nown p)enomenon orthe "instantexpert"---the tendency to present one's Personal inpressions as statements offact, uninhibited by the potential, harm that could result from bi,asedmisleadinrconclusioris. In contrast to ,.such instant expertise.,professional, clinical, and personal experience tells us what ademanding and time-serving task it can be to try to understand just oneparticular individual.

roTo draw conclusions which can be generalized

with reasonable accuracy to thousands, even millions, of people ishardly possible without special training and-carefOly developed methods.

Because everione has Kis idedi and impressions ai)out how othersthink and feel, misconceptions abound. Much of the' info'rmation available.on the psychocultural characteristics of foreign peoples is based onsuperficial impi-esions, much of it-is unintentionally biased ind

*L.B. Szalayt E. Mir-Djalalt, H. Moftakhar, and J. Bryson Strohi,Iranian and American Perceptions and Cultural Frames of Reference(Washington, D.C.: 'Tnstitute of.Comparative & Cultural Studies, 1979).

38 .1

-411

distorted by the writer's-eultural viewpoint, and an unknoWn Portion

of the material is outdated, no longer of timely relevance.

r The extensive works produced by conpetent anthropologists and cultural

experts on foreign populations could fill-libraries. One major

problem with the) literature, however, is that we are In an age of rapid

.societal change where peoPle's perceptns., attitudes, and values change

as well. Frequently just how much of prior observations has contemporary

applicability remains unanswered. Or the answers produced by different

authorities contradict each other.

This ,field is plagued not only by frequent disagreement among

authorities but also by expert consensus resulting from limilar biases

and culturally based assumptions.,

While thern validity of information is readily.testable in the naturali

sciences, there are no fully standardized tests orprocedures for 4,

validating information on the psychological characteristics of people

in other nations of the world.

To rep.roduce other people's perceptions and motivations is not a

question of .intell.igence or professional conpel,knce; it is largely a

matter of combining rich and close personal experiences with ihe ability.,

Ncilto shift from one's own cultural perspective to the perspective

racteristic of the nation in question. For those of us living in

a luralistic society with its open cometition,, free enterprise'system,

, and deMocratic institutions, it .is very hard.t6 sort out in what ways

, nembers of other societies---Soviet,,Chtnese,'Iranian:-look at the

world differently from ourselves:\

While we cannot see the world through their eyes, if we can accumulate

data which allow to reconstruct how the world appears to them and compare

this with how it appears tO us, eventually an objective way can be

found to make the transition-from our subjecti vit world into theirs

and vice versa.

39.,

47

f7The.strategy used in overseas'research is-primarily determined by

:III:

..

e choice of population sample as well as by Ihe social and political

constraints to social science research in the country under consideration.

S

r

PART II

STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL' SCIENCE RESEARCH

ON FOREIGN POPULATIONS

r

u

tSTUDIES AIMING AT A BROAD REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING OF OPINIONS .

.

The most popular approach is the public opinion survey. ,It is.

deeply rooted in democratic valuet and procedures built around the

majority principle. This approach relies on sophisticated, scientific

sampling methods, takes advantage of modern computer technology, arid

effectively serves numerous domestic political and business interests.

Public opinion polls have become very much a part of the contemporary,

,kAmerican cultural scene, an integral ,art of our wey of thinking, our

world vieir. If we want to know how.th people are thinking, or.hoW.their

views have changed, we consult the polls. These domestic experiences

N create a strong and natural predisposition to follow the same procedures

to learn tout people's views abroad./

Since national/cultural groups often encomliass tens, even huRdreds,

of mdllions ofipeople with-some obvious differences within,them, it is

natural to ask how to select representative samples so that the assess-

ment will produce valid results generalizable for the entire popUlation.

This question is the:same encountered,in dorTZ,suhey research----.

4048

0 4,

f

for instance,.how to sample voters- so that the responses of a few). thousand people will faithfully represent the actual proportion of

_preferences held by many millions of voters. Even those who recognize

that there are some views which are particularly characteristic ofAmericans feel that a systematic,'statistical sampling of the Anericanpopulation is necessary in orderto draw any valid conclusions.

This rationale is solidly founded on Our experiences with thediversity of opinions existing in our open democ4tic society. It isfurther slipported bY the flourishing practice of pblic. opinion surveysar-51 polls. Since in the historyof polling,wrong predictions couldbe frequently traced bacvo a biased, nonrepresentative sampling _Ofthe populaton,,At ts underostandable that a representative sampling ofentitt naisionqappears to be a flindamental_prerequisite to policy'officials traiiied in the tradition of donestic public opinion surveys Aft,

and communication research.

Several problem are encountered in attempts to implement thisdomestic rationale in research overseas.

In most developing countries statistigs on demographic and otherPopulation characteristics as well as the organizational resourcesnecessary for repreSentative sampling and surveying of opinions are

.6

Foreign populations are generally not familiar with the practiceof public opkon surveys. They-have little 'exPerience with social'science research pursued indepenClently of government interests.

There is generally less freedom of thought, less tolerance fordiversity of opinions. The people are more afraid or reluctant toexpress opinions particularly when they disagree with or are criticalof the central authority, political leadership, government, etc. The

interference and control of a centralized government is naturally aprohibitive factor in the conduct of opinion surveys in countries underabsolutist monarchies and totalitarian governbents.

-.

. ^

64.

Additional problems hampering the use of public opinion surveys inmast countries overseas are discussed in ourprevious report.* TheseSampling and testing problems afp bound to produce biased opinion surveyreslilts in many foreign countries and prevent opinion-research alto-gether in some.

ks annoying or prohibitive as these problems may be, there is adangerous tendency to.assume that opinion-surveys constitute the only

t solid, scientific wky to obtain timely information needed for inter-.national understanding. Such a reasoninianchored in the rationale ofour domestic opinion surveys is leaning toward the view that large-scalerepresentative sampling is an indispeniable .prerequisite for -obtainingvalid, generalizable information. That reasoning excludes a very large-portion of the world which we badly need to know about and understand.It leads to a dangerous pessimism and inertia with regard to searlchingfor Mternative ways of arriving at psychocultural assessments andbehavioral predictions.

STUDIES FOCUSING ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The limitations of testing and sampling in the public opinionstrategy have contributed to the development of a contrasting strategywith interest focused specifically on the elites 'end political leaders.It is applied primahly in research on countries under tight ,politicalcontrol. Under these conditions there is a tendency to ignore the viewsof broad population strata and to focus attention on the nationarleader-ship. A narrow concern with the leaders is justified by the reasoningthat in controlled societies the broad population has ltttle or no influenceand is not easily acces&-ible; so the onlY.thing that matters is whatthe leaders think and want. This,narrow elitist pragmatism,. which tendsto be inSensitive to the needs and dispositions of the genera) population,has directed interest to such generally untestable factors as the leaders'

* L.B. Szalay and J.B. Strohl, National Perceptions - CriticalDimensions, Policy Relevance and Use (Washington, D.C.: Institute of.Comparative Social and CulturaT Studies, 'Inc., 1980).

142

50

f

personality traits and to psythoanalytic interpretations of their

character and notives. The fes.ult is a mixture of speculations,.

gossip, and confidential information aboLit the individual members and

ctynamics of decision making in the- tap leadership Circles. Most

of our attention to the Soviet Union, for instance, is absorbed in

second-guessing the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin, developing elaborate

attempls to reconstruct'power relationio domdnant patterns of decision

making in the. Kremlin, a field loosely labelled as "Kremlinology." While

the perceptions and motivations of the national leadership certainly

deserve close attention, this approach has several weaknesses:

The political leadership is usually a Small select group of

political actfvi its who are rarely accessible to objective systematic

assessment.

Although the policy stateMents of officials do reflect on

perceptions and motivations, it would be impossible to differentiate

between their genuine perception and statements produced for propaganda

and other maniOulative purposesA(e.g., Do Brezhnev's statements on

Afghanistan 'represent his own perceptions or are they products prepared

for public consumption?).

p'1

There is an even greater danger-in' attempting to infer national

perceptions (e.g., of the Soviet or Iranian people) from the statements

of the national leaders (Brezhnev, the Shah, Khomeini).

By ignOring the views of the population and dismissing the.

opposition this approach does not facilitate anticipation-of political

developments such as uprisings which may be critical to U.S. foreig6"

policy planning.

ibt

( Thus, energy and talents spent in the often speculative endeavor

of studying elites draws attention away from the shared psyChological

characteristics of the broad population which are likely to be much

more stable determinants of policy relevant outcomei than contemporary

leadership or existing patterns of Political affiliations.' People who

do not live in Modern democratic systems are by far the majority of the

43

'51

world's population.. They represent wing political forces in our time

and:yet are not reached effectively ty either of our most popular metho s:(

public opinion surveys and political leadership analysis.

A.

2

THE INFORMATION GAP RESULTING FROM BYPASSING LINES OF INQUIRY'

,

The relationship of the two main information sources deserves

attention since it explains a great deal about the critical shortage

of relevant data on foreign perceptions. Each approach is firmly

anchored in our cultural experiences and assumptions, leaving little

nce for recognifing the need for an approach that considers the actual

chara ristics and requirements of the international setting.

The empirically based, scientificalbioriented public opinion

research dffers reasonably reliable, information when it is performed

within democratic Western societies whose populations are used to, 1

polling practices. Even here the information shows Oimarily how the

population is divided in its attitudes on topics that are important t4

the pollster but not necessarily to those being polled. Polls_

frequently fail to concentrate on what is truly important to the people

or what salient perceptions in their subjective view of their.world i

,

are likely to motivate their behavior.

The public opinion philosophy is frequently used to reject "on -

scientific grounds" assessment strategies that do not follow the

sampling and procedural requirements derived from the distributional

characteristics.of attitudes and their free expression in a democratic

environment. ,

1

The-focus on national.leadership by experts of controlled politica

systens usually involves sortie vague assumptions about the people,but '

attention to their actual views and way of thinking is frequently minima .

This approach is based on a narrow political pragmatism which asserts th t

the,political decisions depend on the leaders and the party bosses rathei'1

than the people.

The leadership analysis strategy. is ,quite reconcilable with the I

......ell

public opinion approach. Public opinion researchers more or less

1

, 44

willingly limit their interest to acce'ssible, democratic societies,

and the leadership experts (So-viet, Chinese, etc.) have no interest in

general izing thei r con cl usions to anti re countries and nations.

Actually,- the two contrasting approaches are so far apart that they

do not even interfere with each other. The gap separating them is

broid'enough to encompasi the majority of the peoples of the world--

frOm Eastern .Europe toAsia, from Latin America to Africa---people

cannot be reached by our surveys and who fail outside the interest

of leadership studies. While little attention is usually given to

the perceptions and motivations of .these people, their influence on the

future Of the worid is hirdly questionable:

The" contemporary social and political conditions of the world

are given facts' which set clear limitations for the use of the opiniOn

survey method. In view of their successful and widespread use in this

country, tbese limitations for other settings are poorly recognized:

In- oveleas application generally mare is expected from public opinion

research than it can actually deliver. Furthermore, the principles

and procedures of doniestic public opinion research have come to be

taken as universal criteria and standards. These misplaced criteria E.

frequently hamper the use of other reseirch methods in social and cultural

settings which call for the adaptation of our,methods and procedures.

Thtis is probably a main reason,that anthropology; the discipline

most competent to provide an understanding of, our Own anil other cultures,

has such a small and declining "act on the thinking and training of

policy officials and experts dealing with international relations.

- Margaret_Wad identified international relations as a major

responsibility of cultural anthropology:

A primary iask of mid-rtwentieth century is the increastngof understanding, understanding of our own culture and'of thatof other countries. On our capacity to develop new forms of suchunderstandtng may well depend the survival of our civilization,which has placed its faith in science and reason b,ut has not yestsucceeded in developing a science of human behavior which givesmen a decent measure of control over their own fate.*

*Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1951), p. 1.

45

- 53

She was a leading advocate of "interdisc1plina6 research within an

anthropological franework as a principal exploratory method of

increasing our understanding of the World we live in, including the

extreme dangers to which we are exposed, so' that we may the better

learn to live in the world 'we have made."*

THE NEED FOR PRIMARY DATA

Previously we argued that in order to anticiWe pol;cy-relevant

developments, overseas and to plan on_a realistic solid foundation

what ao particular foreign population will or will not do in dealing

with contemporary issues such as peace, wart alliances, and other matters

involving international relations, it is necessary to know their national

perceptions and motivations. Furthermore, we have argued that acquiring

such knowledge is hampered by:.

an extensive amount of biased and misleading infoig.tion pat

is contaminated by ouo own priorities and cultural 'perspictives

- -44P' Ian, accumulation of information which has become oUtdated to

various extents

an adherence to tnformation-dategories which meet (Air domestic

research interests but offer limited opportunities for understanding

people with,backgrounds different from-ours

frequently Conflicting views of experts who appear to be

equally authentic by their formal credentials

o the lack of criteria for separating the valid from the biased

information and for distinguishing the competent experts from the less

authentic ones

All the ambiguities inherent in this situation call for systematic

reliance 'on,primary data. Only information obtained directly from the

*Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes' Toward Authority (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1951).

46 .

e

4.4

6

perceivers will enable us to reconstruct with thee necessary certainty

what they see and how they see it. If available even to a limited

extent-, it could make a big difference. Primary data could be used to

determine which expert is more insightful. They could ptovide the

criteria necessary.' for separating the validçimely information from the

,biased and outdated: .And the characteristic psychocultural dispositions

they reveal co'uld help knowledgeable cultural experts to interpret

,and explain specific events and likely actions. Most importantly, basic

psychocultural knowledge of other peoples could bolster U.S. capabilities

to influence internattonal relations towdrd the developnent of a more

stable .and secure world.

In the follOwing we present some findings on Jordanian and other

Middle Eastern perceptions. The data were obtained by using a research

strategy designed to minimize the influence of the- investigator and to

maximize each respondent's spontaneous expression of his viek in regard

to a number of specific issues.

.e

r

,

PART III

JORDANIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS.:

AN ILLUSTRATION' OF POLICY RELEVANT INSIGHTS AND

RESEARCH PRINCIPLES

The following empirical findings come primarily from a recentcomparative study of U.S. -and Jordanian student samples (N=50) tested

in Washington, D.C., and in Amman, Jordan in'the summer of 1§80. To

provide a broader perspective the presentation will be supplenentedwith- results from similar studies involving Egyptian and ,

Israeli student samples.

Broadening the presentation is desirable for several reasons.First of all, while the U.S.-Jordanian comparisoii was focused on

, 1,10flift,"contemporary world problems," the other studies were less politicallyoriented and involved an indepth -analysis of a broad nunber of domainsof life. Through this extension it was porible to examine.rhoW thetimely policy relevant specifics tie in with the overall Jordanianway ofIthinking.

Second, the broadened scope also allows,to explore how these variousMiddle Eastein groups compare in their global' fr"ams of re:ference witheach other and with -the-American.

Third, in light of the theoretical and practical queWons raised;earlier, it helps to examine how fattors like geogriphic region (MiddleEast), and alliances (U.S.--Israeli).influence the similarities ordifferences between these groups.

e 48

56

'The data collection was based on the Associative Group Analysis (AGk)method. A description-.df the AGA method is offered in Appendix II. Briefly,in contrast to the conventional survey techniques wych rely on interviewsand questionaires, AGA does not require the respondent to express his.opinions or judgments..- To allow the respondent rather than the researcherto define the limits of_the4tilyic, no specific questions or mUltiple-choiceanswers are provided. The respondents are presented with a topicand asked to write down in their native language whatever thoughts itbrings to mind. It is an entirely open-ended,'unstructured task in whichfree word associations dre eliated to selected tinely,issues from mertersof seleCied sample groups.

The sample iof themes to which the U.S. and Jordanian groups gave

reactions is shown, in Figure 1. From the distribution of their manyTeetronses,..the analois .(described in Appendix II) reconstructs the lainperceptual conponen/ ts by grouping related responses together. 'The scores

accuinulated by each response cluster indicates hr mdch attention theyreceived from each group. the perceptual components'on which the U.S.

and Jordanian groups different most are presented in the following bar,graphs as a percentage'of the total responie score. 'The ,reader interested.,.in the underlying data is encouraged to refer..to Appendix I for the actualresponses given by each gibup.

The findings on Jordanian and other' Middle Eastern national

perceptions simultineously.help to demOnstrae sow of the principlespreviously discussed.

*040,

world probleassuper powersUnited,statesSoviet Union

enemywardisarmamentarms race

free 'enterprise

economic planninginflationenergy shortage

poverty

unemploymenthungerdisease

imperialism nuclear weapons social problems overpopulation

.politics SALT II justice .abortion

capitalism detente equality; mandatory sterilization

communism proliferation peace birth control

socialismhuaan rights

economyexploitation

educationilliteracy .

environmentpollution.

oppression underdevelopment understanding crime

freedom foreign aid conflict violence

terrorism

Figure 1. Issilei; World Problems Used in the Test Administered in 1980.

;49

JORDANIAN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

The following analysis encompasses American and Jordanian views of

particular nations, including their own, and a comparison of how the

U.S. and Jordiniamiespondentspercelve a number-of tontemPorary

political, military, and economic issues.

THE POLITICAL ACTORS: IMAGES OF SUPERPOWERS,NATIONS FRIENDLY AND HOc1ILE

International relations have a strong human component. They de7

pend a great deal on how various nations, including leaders and the

peoPle, view each otherand how they feel about each other. Our study

was done to iearn about these views and feelings from the images and

perceptions held by Jordanians and Americans. While the official

positions and foreign policy of Jordan are a matter of historical

record,-how well.they reflect the perceptions and attitudes of the

Jordanian people at large is often left to an educated guess.

In a world characterized by stiff competition between two super

powers, it is of particular intereit how others---in this case, the

Jordaniansperceive the United-States and the Soviet Union. How dd

they view their competition? What characteristics and motives do they

attribute to,the United States and the Soviet Union? How do they view

these giants in relationship to their own national security and

interests?

Political realities and hi'storical alliances and hostilities in

the explosive atmosphere in the Middle East make it similarly relevant

50

'yr

to explore how the Jordanians view some of theiik important neighbors,

such as Israel and Egypt, and hOw they perceive the problem of

Palestine.

While these questions make good common sense based on one of our

previous studies involving Middle Eastern countries,. we can expect

additional'Auestions to emerge which are more closely related to

problems as they exist in the Jordanians" representative view of

international relationS.

The Super Powers---Who They Are, What They Do

Of the nations of the world the Jordanians focus on the two

giants: the United States and the Soviet Union. While their attention

is about equally split between these two nations, Americans have more

emphaticall2i their own country in mind. Furthermore, Americans per-

ceive China as a world power almost equal with the Soviet Union, while

the Jordanians give little attention to China. In the.eyes of the

Jordanians England and France coant more, while they are not mentioned

at all by Americans. In thinking of super powers the Jordanians als6

include the spiritual world (God, Islam), actually giving it more'

attention than the United States or the Soviet Union. Their interest

in supernatural forces does not seem to detract-from their practical

concern with certain very worldly characteristics attributed to super

powers. They are most concerned with the potential),

misuse of power

'resulting in exploitation and injustice, particularly through

domination and colonization. Yet.the Jordanians are also quite

articulate in relating super powers with positive objectives. In the

'more tangible material realm the super powers are viewed as sources of

development, industry, and technology. In the context of the less

tangible ideals, the Jordanian expectations are focused on justice and

law.

Americans ir their perception of super powers are more pre-

occupied with confrontation and war, particularly in regard to the arms1

51

59

T

race and nuclear Weapons. The Jordanians do not ignore\the military

and do mention weapons, but they do not show any explicit concern with

i-§1iaba4-confrontation or with unconventional weapons and nuclear war.

6

SUPER POWERS

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptigns

ilain Components of Perception

U.S., America

-Russia, U.S.S:R.

. God, Islam

Colonization, Domination

Rights, Justfce,-Equality

Development, Technology

u.s.0

Jordanian

peroentage of total response

"NOTE: For complete presintation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 2.

. Figure 2-

,There is naturally a major difference in perspectives here.

While Americans.are primarily concerned with how the super powers re-

late to each other in a competitive context of military power and

power balance, what really matters to the Jordanians is haw the super

powers may promote or frustrate the national interests of Jordan.

While the above perceptions reflect our respondents' view of the

super powers in general, their images of two specific super powers, the

United States and the U.S.S.R., will be%plored wext.

The United States---Our National Image

The United States represents one of the most dominant topics of

concern to the Jordanians. In fact the Jordanians have more to sax about

the United 5tates than the, Americans thinking/of their own country. .

'52

GO

A

UNITED STATES

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions"

Main Components of'Perception

Power, Control

Freedorn,--Just-tce

Technology, Progress

Colonization, Oppre ion

Immoral, Unjust

*Weapons, Killing

U.S. 1,3

Jordanian gfipercentage of total avsporwe

5 16 15 20 Zs

k".

'NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual caponents andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 3.

Figure 3

The Jordanians are strongly impressed by tRe political/military

and industrial/technological might of the United States. Beyond

gen!ral references to the strength, power, and influence of the U.S.,

the Jordanians' references to war, weapons and killing4are less

weighty but still significant. The Jordanians express some negative

feelings about U.S. influence and misuse of political power. They are

particUlarly concerned about possible U.S. oppression and colonization.

Their association of the.,U.S. with Israel and Zionism could account

for a sizable part of their negative feelings toward the United States.

Still, other reactions suggesting critical Attitudes toward the V.S. .

carry social and moral connotations. The dominant characterizations-

.of the U.S. include "bad morals.," "betrayal," "taking advantage,"

"racism," etc.

53

Freedom, justice, democracy, and several other world acclaimed

features of the United States get relatively little attention from the.

Jordanians. Capitalism is considered a salient characteristic, but,,

as will be shown later, this has both positive and negative

connotations for Jordanians.

In a later section we present some comparative data which will

show that'over the past three years the Jordanians have become more

negative and critical\olsthe United States. This may be at least

partially due to an active,role assumed by the U.S. to engineer a

Middle Eastern settlement, as introduced at Camp David. This U.S. role

has been repeatedly questioned and criticized by the Jordanian

government.

The Soviet Union---Imagerof the Red Giant

Both,Ahdricans and Jordantans describe the'Soviet Union as..being

Communist or "red," but'beyond tAis their 'images of the Sciviet Union

are quite different. American attention is captured by geographic

areas with strong historical undertones-(eg., Russia, Siberia, Moscow,

a Leningrad), details by and large ignored by the Jordanians.$

The Jordanians' image of the Soviet Union is more contemporary

and political. Interestingly, there is more Jordanian concern with

Soviet military power, weapons, and killing, whereas the AmeriCans

°stress the danger4Of war and specifically mention Afghanistan. The. '

Jqrdanians see the Soviet Union as a strong country and great power

interested in domination and also,express stbrig concerns with the

oppressive'colonialist nature of Soviet power. Yet they also speak of

equality and unity, which,indicatkome positive evaluatdons. Also on

the,positive side, Jordanians view the Soviet Union as a highly

advanced country and seem to be impressed by its scientific achieve-.%

ments,'organization, and self sufficiency;

Comparid to.the rather apolitical view of the Soviet Union held

.by the American students, the Jorda s view reflects more pre-

occupation with.the oppressive us military and organizational power.

54

SOVIET UNION

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

&tin Components of ftrception

Russia, Moscow

Leaders: Lenin, Stalin

Oppression, Colonization

Advancement, Technology

Powerful, Big

War, Weapons, Killing

U.S.

Jordani an

peroontage of total. responoe

lo 15 Zo

1-,;;;;.;;:j:

NOTE: for .complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian respon4es,*see Agperidix.4-0.

Ftgure 4

Since.the ompative perceptions of the United States and Soviet

Union represent a parttcularly interesting question, in the following

we explore a topic which may facilitate understanding and clarification.a

Imperialism---Who is the Villian?

Expansion of power and influence through'colonialism and military

and economic meanstTepresents a set of attributes frequently identified

as imperialism. Since the Jordanian images of super powers and

specifically of the drifted Stites are strongly endowed with these

attributes, it is interesting to explore how Jordanians perceive

imperialism in relatioW to the two leading world powers:

The countries Americans identify as imperialistic are the same

they identified as super powers. 'The only exception is Japan, which

:4- 55

ranks ahe.ad of the Soviet Union. It would come as a surprise in manp

parts of the world that Americans would -Place the United States at tbe

top.of their list of supdrfpowers as well as of imperialists. It is

similarly'unexpected to sie that the Jordanians percepe the United

States as much.more imperialistic than theitoviet Union and that Israel

ranks above the Soviet Union on their list of imperialistic powers.

IMPERIALISM

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Min Components ofPerception

U,S.,'Japan, Russia

Oppression, Eiploitation

Colonization, Zioriism

.' Injustice, Inhumanity

War, Violence

Jordaniani:,*

pereentage'of total response

10 15 to z5

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and'all U.S. & Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 5.

4.

Figure 5

As can be seen in the detailed table of results in Appendix I (p. 5),

imperialism is most closely related to capitalism for both Americans

and Jordanians; communism takes a comfortable second.place in the eyes

of the Americans'but is not even mentioned by the Jordanians. In the

Jordanian rank list of imperialistic.isns Zionism takes the leack

followed closely by.colonialism.- t

, As we will see later, the Jordanians' negative evaluatiOn of therat

United States ap6ears to be a relatively recent development. It could

be a consequence of the U.S. support to Israel: Such an impression is

reinforced by the observation that the three main clusters of negative

attributes and activities had no direct relationship to the U.S. in

the 1977 testing: (1) war, violence, hostility (enmity), killing,

destruction; (2) oppression and takiIng advantage, along the idea of

exploitation; and (3) inhumanity, injustice, betrayaLtgreed, etc.

These Jordanian views also have little in common with the American.

hiperialism has generally a more limited meaning for Americans than for

Jordanians. Ignoring the timely ideblogical undertones, Americans

a,ssociate imperialism more with the rule of traditional monarchs, kings,

queens. %.

Israel---Image of the Arch-Enemy

Americans identify Israel as the country of Jews and show a strong

awareness of the conflict between the Jews and Arabs. For Americans

Israel is associated with other Middle Eastern countries, with

Palestine, and the Holy Land. Israel also has a strong.religious

connotation, involving elements of Christianity. Americans generally

view Israel as a Small but strong nation striving for independence.

In contrast to the benevolent friendly posture of the Americans,

the Jordanians display extremely negative,'hostile attitudes toward

Israel. They think. of Israel in termS of war and pggression, the

displacement of Palestinians from their homeland, and as the initiator

of four wars. They describe Israel as the enemy, an assailant, an

aggressor and racist characterized by .such negative qualities,and

practices as unfairness, discrimination, and deceit.

Whether we look at their image of Israel or their general

image of the enemy, we find that the Jordanians stress similar

characteristics: exploitation, imperialism, coionization, Zionism,

and occpatiOn of their land. For those familiar with the tone of

statements made by the Jordanian government and in the press, the -

negativeness of theif- image of Israel does not come as a surprise.

:* 57.0

NIP

4,

There is a ttrong feeling of threat. From the angle of searchihg,for

constructive solutions, these psychological predispositions deserve

more attention.

ISRAEL *

Main differences in U.S. & Jordanian. Perceptions

Main Components ofPerception

People: Jews, Arabs

Small, Foreign

War, Aggression

Racism, Zionism

Colonialism, Occupation

U.S.

Jordaniatipercentage of total response

10 15 ZO 25

. . . ye...

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual compobentsandall U.S. & Jordanian responses, see Appendix.I, 11-. 6.

Figure 6

PalestineThe Center Point of Disagreement

War, guerillas, te rorists, and fighting come most immediately to

mind for the Americans i thinking of Palestine. They associate Arabs

-and Jews Kith_Palestine b pie Jordanians think only of Arabs.

Ancient history and religio particularly,Christiani*, are *Portant

elements of the Americans' perception of Palestine. The contemporary

situation is of more immediate importance to the Jordanians. The

'Jordanians-emphasize that Palettine is a country, a nation, amd that it

is their country, sUggestin'g that mapytof the'yespondents were

Palestinians. Both the Jorplanians and Americans closely associate

Palestine with Israel,'but from different perspectives. For Americans

58

66

Palestine has predOminantly historical, religious significance; in

contemporary context they think rather of Israel.

Main Differences

Main Components of Perception

War, Guerillas

Colonization, Banishment

Country, Nation

Rights, Fredom.

. Love, Hope

-PALESTINE

U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

peroentage ottotca response

U.S.0

Jorcia°nianM

30

NOTE: For complete ftesentation of main perceptual componentsall U.s. 'and Jordanian responses, 'see Appendix I, p. 7.

and

Figure 7

To the Jordanians Palestine is an occupied land, deprived of its

national indepindence and transformed into a Jewish/Zionist state. In

their view military occupation resulted in forcible displacement of

thousands of people-into refugee camps. Jordanians see this as

cOlonization and condemn it 49-vnjust. They emphasize rights, libera-,---

tibn, and independence. Despite the fear and threat the Jordanians

experience'they seem to have hope for peace and detente.

Egypt---Image of Another Arab Nation

After considering the image of the super powers and such.important

neighbors as Israel or Palestine, which involve emotion-laden relation-

ships it is interesting to explore the image of another Arab country

with which relations are more neutral, less emotional. As an example

59

a

t,

we may consider Egypt,. based on data collected prior to the Cam.p.David

agreement. The introduction of this new reffrence point may helpto

shim, for instance, haw important ethnic, political, or economic

dimensions are for the Joridanians itys ng their relationships to

other Arab countries.

Main

'EGYPT

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions. u.s.0

JordanianE.of Perception poroentage of total ?Aponte

10. 15 0 Zs

Pyrami ds , Pharoahs

Desert, Hot

People, Arabs,,Egyptian

Nile, CairoA

Nation, Country Ramon

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U,S. and Jordanian responses, see ,Appendix I, p. 8.

Fi-gure 8

In the Americans' image of Egypt, the historical and cultural

details are particularly vivid and salient: the pharaohs, pyramids,

sphynx, mumniat. The cliniatic, geographical elementt of the scenery

also appeal to the American imagination:. hot, dry, desert, sand:*

Jordanians paynegligible attention tettiese ,detaile spects, but the

Nile, the Suez Canal , the Sinai, and other items of 'geopolitical

relevance are more salient in their image of Egypt..

Ttle most salient attribute Of Eght from the Jordanian vSewpoint

is that it is an Arab country.. They identify the people as brothers

and also show a strong interest in Egypt's past and-present national

60

68

C

r. .

leaders (Nasser, 5adat). While Jordanians ei EdYpt as a sister

country, a natiovith the same'brigin, Aki§riCans identify it as both

an African and Middle Eastern country. The main context of U.S.

interest in E09bt, is in relation to Israel. ,To Mrdanians the 'relation,.

ship .of. Egypt to Jordan and otHer Arab Countries ltke Syria ,-Lebanon,of

and' Saudi Arabia is the main Tontext o'f.theit interest.44

Compared theSe ethnically oriented political identifications, .

the more tangtte social , ecoróric, on'scientifie dimensions attract

relatively little interest. However, progrets indUstry, science as

well as the arts are recognized as Egyptian cOntr&tiOns bn tile -

, .

. positive side: On the, negative side econOMitandmoral ,problems----,.

poverty, crowding, corruption, theft--,are of someconcern. While the',

-preyalence of etfinic-national istic considerations is 6-c.pticitly clear,

there are'relatively few direct .references ,to Islam,and religion. How-

ever, since Arab, nationalism and)ISlamic religious identification are

intertned, it WOuld be a mistake tO conclude that religious

-tdentificationsdo not_pley an important -role here.i

The Jordanians' tommitment to Arab/Palestinian solidarity, 'founded

,on their own ethnic/racial or religious/ethical iNdentifications, calls

for-a closemlook at how their views are influenCed by their

national i stic perspective:

Nation---MationalismCas a Dynamic Source of Cohesion and Confrontation

Nation is a..particularly central and popular subject for -_

Jordanians. It is an 'emotion-laden.topic involving strong feelings of

personal identification. In, geteral , Americans prefer to tilink of0

'country rather than, the more emotive, romantic idea,o't nation.

Americans think' nob only of their own nation but also of a number' of

other xmintries, in vivid contrast for the Jordanians who think.7

exclusively of Arab n4iOns.-_-)

*

/4

61

-69

.400

t

'NATION

Main Diffeeences in U.S.,& Jordanian PeeceptiCns

u.s.121

JordanianE,

1421m ,Couponents of Iferception percentage of tota response

10

,

Countries: U.S., Egypt

Gavernment, Politics

War, Sacrifice

Love, Patriotism

People, Family

Freedom, Progress

NOTE: For complete presentatftvi of main perceptual°components andall U.S. & Jordanian rbsponses, see Appendix I, p. 9.

Figure 0

In contrast to.the American perspective in whidh the nation is

represented by government and involves political organization and

political power, Jordanians view nation primarily as people, and

secondarily as their land. To Jorglanians gallen is rait so much an

aggregate of independent individuals but a national collective of

people unified by coMmon ancestry and by do's-6 personal ties with

relatives, friends, famify. The image emerging herns that of a

large extended family---something like the'anthrapological notion of

tribe. This nation/rople/family fink partially explains the strong

emotional attachment to nation, which inspires patriotic feelings of

love, loyaltyl and duty.

In what ways does this notion impact on everyday life and in-

fluence the political Choices and behavior of )ordantans? An

indication that it does have an immediate impact may be found in their

A

62

_

4400'

references to sacrifices'and defense of their nation. While soNe of the

Jordanians spoke more spedifically of military defense; the fundamental

'thrust was security and protection of the nation. The Jordanians

also mentioned.freedom, liberation, and progress apparently-as dominant

national objectiVes. That nation is a central idea involVing personal/

commitment andtidentification for Jordanians will become even more

apparent in a later-section on the main_parameters of the Jordanian

political frameof reference.

The.Balance of the Competitors---From Jordanian,Perspectives

What emerges here are some highly subjective national images as

seen from the Jordanians' perspectives and world view. To bring these

images into # clearer..:reliet, we have contrasted.them with Ihe Americans'

images, which are natUrally also based on their experiences and per-

spectives.

'In general, the.Jordanians show little concern with the

competition of the super powers, including such matt3rs as nuElear

armament or the power balance. Still, a comparative analysis of the

Jordanian views of the two super powers, the United States and the

Soviet Union,.offer some rat4I-P conclusive insights.

The richness of their reactions (as reflected by the dominance

scoree)leaves no doubt that the Jordanians have ,a more,vivid picture

of the United States,than of the Soviet Union. Their image of the

United States is also more emotion-laden and ambivalent. Whatever

the,power balance may be,on'an objective basis, the Jordanians seem to

be more concerned with-the U.S.'s-power and its mi5use in political-,

milftary contexts;

(

While power could be a source of respect, the Jordanians are'

presently both impressed and frustrated by U.S. political power and its

impact on their immediate ituation. This creates a strong ambivalence

about the U.S. Which:appea the embddiment Of several of their

own frustrations and sufferings. This strong preoccupation with the

*See Appendix II, p. 9.

63

U.S. power'and influence in .the Middle East pushes, at least tempor-

arily, the sympathies and affinities theY felt a few years ago into the

background. The predominant contemporary modd is disaPpointment and

accusation for supporting politi6al oppression and domination... .

The United States is viewed more_ negatively or just as negatively

as the oviet Union in several important contexts, From the Jordanian

perspeCtive the United States appears to be the greater power and-to

pose a grekter threat in regard to colonization. That they view the

U.S. as more "imperial'stic" than-the Soviet Union just a few months. *.

after the Soviet inyasi n of Afghanistan is, to iay the least, puzzling.

In search for sone explanation we find that while the U.S. and the

'Soviet Union are both criticized in sonewhat similar terms for

colonization, oppression, aggression, and mtsuse of power,_ane distinct

category of reactions which distinguishes thee U.S. from the S'oviet

Union deals with Israel and Zionism. That the U.S.-Israeil alliance

may be a major sourceXf the deterioration of the U.S. ima§e is

suggested by an "eneinrsyndrome," which theiUnited States and Israel

share in the eyes of the Jordanians': This syndrone involves (a) the.'

reliance on and misuse of power; (b) domination and cOloniza, tion:

(c) racism, Zionism, and (d),immorality, deceptiveness'. While the

Soviet Union is perceived as having at least two of these character-

istics intrather excessive form, the U.S. is perceived as sharing

all four Of them. Yet, as we haVe een, this alignnent of the U.S.

with the enemy is not total but merely a part of an -intensive

ambivalence.; -Furthermore, as we will see, this represents a rather

recent developmene.

Rib- Jordanians' images of Egype and Palestine illustrates, on

the other hand, how they-view their frienfeemphasizing (a) Arab-

'national identity, (b) protection from oppression and exploitation, **.

and (c) the need fo'r.freedom and development. This suggeits a,.more or

. less tacit ideology of nktionalcsm. Central to this ideology is their.

concept of nat on. Their Mtional identification provides a fundamental

key to their jrception aod understanding of the world.

64

DOMIN'Ar5.POLITICACCONCERNS: TERRORISM, CAPITALISM, FREEDOM

The images of \political actors examined clearly indicate that oirJordanian respondents live in their own political world which theyorganize according to their own subjective priorities.

In their world nationalism occupies a particularly dominant, ,k

position; it heavily influences, their approach to international re-,lations, their relationship to the `super powers..as well as to: thefy

neighbors: Furthermore, political issues like "freedom, oPpression,and teiTorism were found to be particularly salient, to Jordanians!

. In light of these findings, it is in;t.eresting to explore how thei.foreign policy views tie in with their overall franelaf reference. In-

,

this:respect we may Consider their view of politicOrtiow -it bearson,their approach to international relations, and how it ;is. likely, to,'predicate their future political orientation. By -exinoring their

percept-ions of,the major political ideologies,Such as capitalismandOmmunism we expect to gain sow insights into their overall

,

orientations---e.g., how strong their doctrirtiNrientatibn is and howmuch it coincides with the ,Oactical foreign policy considerationswe have just examined in the context of

.the leading world powers.

A simultaneous analysis of these international and donestic

domains:of the Jordanians/1- frane of reference will be Usedto explore their position on War and peace and their likely postumtoward such timely Subjects as,ithe arms race or disarmdment.

.4

..7

I.

9

Politics---From a Nationalistic Perspective

The main overriding 'difference in the Anerican and Jdrdanian

perceptidns of politics is that while' Americans 'view politics*

predominantly 'as a domestic `concern, the Jordaniani see it primat;ly

as national. and international. A closer analysis reveals that with

respect to their actual-ipolitical concellis,the -two groups, have

relatively little in common.

4r

POLITICS,

Main Differences in U.S. & JordanfaZ Ptrceptions

Jorde;niannik-\

&in Components of'Peiveptioft

Electi ons , Campai gns

Cbrruption, Deceit

Countries, U.S., Israel

Goals, Development, Economy

Problems, Wa'r, Colonization

Political Sciente, Oiplomacy..

PO:ventage of total plporsse10 15

XeeX.X.X.

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual coMponents andall U.S. & Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 10.

Figure 10

The Jordanians' view of politics ties in with their inclination

,to loOk at world problems from an angle of nationalist:k priorities.

From them pOl itics principally involves the inter`relationship of

nptidns. Affinities and hostil i ties. are more'predetdrmined by p,ast

history and generations often on the basis of blood lies --a-nci racial

ide-ritifications---a social characteristic which follows fronvthis .ten-

denci to stress fami an-d "tri bal /cl sh" relationshi ps

contrast, Americans s ioNs as countries with ,poiltical

66

7 4

organizations which operate more on an ad hoc, situational basis little

influenced by traditional or racial based alliances. The Jordanians'

focys on intrnattonai actors contrasts markedly with the Americ

that political parties and polit cians are the main actors. In their

view of,politics Jordanians pay lmost no attention to :polifical parties

and politicians.orto government They emphasize national goals andl

issues of broad national interest such is order, development, advance-

ment, economy, planning. It is consistent with this perspective that

Jordanians alscrstress the importance -Of wisdomCand diplomacy. These

classic attributes of statesmgnship irecomplementary to the Jordanian

preoCcupation with external threat (war, colonization, oppression)-.

This at least partially explains their strong.nationalistic focus

underlining their preoccupation with large-scale national probleMs.

In this case the-feeling of threat is collectively shared yet affects

people individually. Collective threat, imagined or real, has been

repeatedly identified Is the most potent force promoti4 nationalism.*'

These considerations do not forM any identifiable part of the U.S.

apOroach te politics. International considerations receive as little

attention from Americans as details of the domestic and political %

process. do from Jordanians. The most salient difference here is the

Americans emphasis on the political Processelections, campaigning,

competitlo , candidates, parties--.:-which nstitute the.very substance

c%ofpolitics. to'them put ar'e almost_compleiel ignored by Jordanians.

In view of these clearly bypassing approaches to politics, it is

not particularly surprising that we frequently fail to anticipate

political events-in the Middle East. turprtse and confusion detract

-from our Capability to have an active and positive3influence on future

developments there.41k.

*P. Sigmund, Jr., (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations(New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967).

ofr

67

75

V,IAt,"Atnumi,Alfri,

Capitalism---A Salient Issue of Emotional Ambivalence

Just as the Jordanians' image of the United States included

capitalism as a salient element, in the Jordanians' yiew of capitaliim

'the United States is-by far the sihgle most iignificant representative,

. identified also as the leaderlof the "western camp." No other country

Asinentioned, except Europe in general.

ainfALIsm

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions.

Main Components (of Perception

Economy, Money, Profit

'Business, Industry

Government, Politics

Freedom; Rights

Society, Classes

U.S. 0

Jordanian Epertuntage f total response

0 5 5

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 11.

Figure 11

In the U.S. view capitalism refers primarily to economic and

--financial and business activities. The economjc, financial diMension

is less domAnant for Jordanians;in fact they give equal consideration

to the social and soctetal aspects of Capitalism. In Aort, capitali'sm

is an economic and ftnancial system tp Americans and a social system to

Jordanians.

7The Jordanians' positive as well as negatpeevaluations reflec t

feelings of 'intensive ambivalence toward capitalism. A partipylarly

68

76

4

salient positive attribute is freedom,0which along with rights and

principles, invoilves social and political considerations as well. On

the negative sfde.the Jordanians show codcern with the misuse of power

in a 'capitallstic_system---e.g., oppression, colonization, revolution,

hostility, lack of equality, etc,

While the positive and negative evaluations reflect strong con-.

flicting feelings, they ponVey a sense of strong interesyn capitalism

(the extent of their interest is also conveyed by a dominance score

that is Clearly above average---see Appendix I, p. 11).

These general findings indicate that the Jordaniansattach strong

importance to-the socioeconomic system of capitalism, which they

identify nearly exclusively with the United States and which elicits

mixed feelings of. admiration for its freedom and'suspicion of misuse Of

power.

Communism---An Evil of Little Concern la

The attention Jordanians give to communism is far below their *

interest shown in capitalisM. This parallels the previous Observation

that their attention to the United States was substantially stronger

.than.that.given to the Soviet Union---that is, to the main representa-.

tives of the two competing systems of capitalism and communism. The

Jordanians' perceptions of thes'e syst,Olas parallel- in many ways their

images of the countries.

Americans and Jordanians have similar:perceptions of communism.

In addition to Russia and China,Ahe two major represntative countries

mentioned, Americans think of a greater diversity of countries withA

Communlst systems, while to Jordanians the Soviet Union ii practicelly

the only actual representative.

(-

Americans stress ideology---Marxism, socialism---more than the

-7 Jordanians. The groups are similar in theihleDeral,criticism and

rejection of cothmunism. Americans are opposed maiiilyto the lack of

freedom and to the evil and unfair nature of the Communist system,

69

77

while.the Jordanians stress more the cortupt and immoral nature of the

system. Furthermore, the Jordanians are particularly articulate in

condemning communism on,religious grounds as an enemy of Islam and of-

Islamic countries. They also.blame communism for war And aggression,

not too intensively but more.so than the Americans.

-\71MUNISM

Main Off.ferences in ,S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Ae

hhin Components of Ftrception

MArxism, Socialism

tAtheism, Enemy f Islam

Corruption, Op ression

War, Destruction

JOrdanianra:

poroentags of total response10 15 20 ?5

NOTE: For-complete presentation of main perceptual components'andall U.S. & Jordanian respopses, see Appendix I, p. 12.

`Compared to the Jordanians

of communism is apparently more

may be that the Soviet Union is

tive systemic label (communism)

label (socialism).

Figure 12

' image of the Soviet Union, their,/ image

negative. One-reason for the difference

identified not only in terms of a nega-.,

but Also in terms of a more positive

Socialism---The Better Face of the Sovibt Union

While to many Americans socialism means totalftarian communism4

with the Soviet Union as the main representative, to others soc

stands for democratic systems with strong social and welfaere program

70

-r13

lhe Sweden or England. To Jordanians socialism means nearly ex-%

clusively the Soviet system, apparently a package more attractive than

communism.

SOCIALISM

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Jordanianni&tin Components of'Perception pimento's of total ruponse

10 1.5 tO Zs

Communism, Marxism

Countries, Russia,.Sweden

Work, Help, Share

Equality, Freedom

vs- :

;77:EUMW.X.X.:4*.

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and .

all U.S.'& Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p.13.

Figure 13

-

For both groups.socialism has a close.affinity with communism

. and Marxism, although this conn,,ction receives much more interest from

Americans than fromardanians. At the same time.both groups view

socialism as a system in which government plays an impetant role.

The Jordanians deviate clearly from the Americans in stressing

more positive attributes of socialism. To Jordanians socialism standsa

for such social values as equality, treedom and justice. Furthermore,

it implies more intensively mutual help, participation, that is,

attitudes and behavior:reflecting. social responsibility and commitment%

Finally, all these are consistent with the observation that to

Jordanians socialism implies emphasis on the people, social class,

that iS, on society in general. This emphasis represents a more

71

collective, group orientation whlich is consistent with the previously'

observed emphasis on nation, on the national-cbllective.as the main

basis of social identification.

Despite this natural affinity between socialism and the Jordanians'

collective-nationalistic group orientation, the subjective importance ,

of socialism is relatively low. This may be due.to its strong

association with communism and its relatively abstract nature.

Human Rights---Protection'Against the Misuse of Power-

The issue of hdman.rights tieing debated as one of today's most

timely subjects. As we, have observed throughout the analysis-so far,

the Jordanians show a?t intense preoccupation with the misuse of

political power---injustice, oppression, domination. -It somewhat

logically follows that their concerns with,unjust, inhuman treatment

tould be subsgmed under the label of "human righits." Such a conclusion

is generally valid but it requires some important qualifications.

HUMAN RIGHT

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

*tin Components of Perception. ,

People, Blacks, Women.

Equality

Freedom

Justice, Religion

Oppression, Restraint

U. S .

Jordani an

peroentage of total response1.0 1.5 tO ZS

NOTE: Tor complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 14. \

Figure 14

72

t,

,t

The dominance of human rights (as indicated by the lower dominance

score, Appendix I, p.14) falls in the Jordanian mfnd 'distinctly below

its place in the American way of thinking. This finding would indicate

that the human rights problem is not as dominant an issue for the

Jordanians as-we may have anticipated from other trends. A closer

analysis suggests, however, a different explanation. The most salient

humaftright for the Jordanians involves justice and religion,: This is!

in contrast with the U.S. view which stresses individual rights---

particularly of minorities, Blacks, women---and the rights of people in

general. The rights Americans consider primarily involve such specific

concerns as the right to life, abortion, pursuit of happiness, dignity;

and others protected by the constitution and its various amendments.

Focus is on the individual and protection of his/her rights against

adverse forces represented by the state or other individuals.

The Jordanians show little concern with the rights of the

individual, at least not directly. Human rights for them involve

primarily ethical considerations which have either religious fountation

in Islam or involve the status of Islam in the world in general.

Furthermore, they are intensively preoccupied, with wrongdoing, pres-

scon, colonialitm, racism, and persecution at a level which appe s to

be national/collective rather than individual. Such conclusions about

the Jordanians are-supported by the lack -of references to individual

concerns such as freedom and equality and by their attention

religion, nation and Palestine. The nationalistic/collectivistic

overtone of thi Jordanian responses as well as their explicit refer-

ences to oppression and persecution-suggest that beynd the protection

of the individual, they are more concerned-with large-scale problems

of national security.

OppressionThe Misuse of Power

As was also o6served in the context of human rights, Americans ere

concernA about the oppression of minorities, Blacks, Jews, as well as

73

of women and the poor. The Jordanians are not so sPecific, speaking of

people and the weak in general.

OPPRESSION

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

JordanianMain Comonents offtrceptioh peraintage of tot4t response

lo Zo

Held Back, Suppressed, Depre§Sed e

Colonization,,Domination

Rights, Justiee

War,- Killing, Cruelty

:::::::-::-:::;:;:::::::;::::

XdX4:X0:X.Xee.vee

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components anall U.S. & Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 15,

, Figure 15

Americans vivw th violationof the individual's intere as

economic (e.g., in depressions) as well as social and.polit'cal (e.g

slavery, prejudice, discrimination). In the Jordanian per pective

oppression has more political and religious connotations. The source

of it is power,"tyrannY/dictitorship, the governing powe s. It,is

large-scale and violent---involving war, revolutiOn, ki ling,t

tbrrorism,'cruelty---and is considered.criminal and.c rrupt. In its

large-scale practice it involves coloniálfsm, domina ion, Zionism. ;

Those primarilyMamed as being responsible for Opp ession ard Israel

and the United States, with Palestine as the maih ictim.

the of,oppression has an elem nt,of this political-

tyranny and.enslavement as well, but it is attri(buted primarily fo

,

74

8 2

4ItRussfa and,to a, lesser extent to China and Cuba.. The,political syitems

blamed for it are communism and tO a lesserexterit capitalism.

Despite thiS dual domestic and international impliqation, oppres-y

sion is not a particUlarly meaningful concept for Americans, especi-ally

compared to Jordanians. (The large difference in the dominance scores

reflects the strbnger Jordanian concern with Oppression---See Appendix

1, p. 15). The subject is brought upby Jordanians in the context of

a variety of political issued ranginn'from huMan rights to:capitalism..

!When Oppression emerged as.part of the Jordanianst,image of the

-A-United States it was not clear whether JordanianSmere,yeferring to

international or.to. internal problems such as the.treatmeht'of domestic, ',-

minorities in the U.S. Looking et the Jordanian view Ofoppression, it

is tlear that the JOrdanians had in mind tbe external, international? !

misuse of power,-somewhat synonymbus with colonizatiOn,and,internatibnal

A

, aggression.

Freedom---A High Priority.Cbllective ASpiTation

. .

Foeedom is probably the highe,st,most attractive individUal and

social value in the-United States. As he dominance scores indicate,

the Jordanians'do not feel less strongly abOut freedom as an issue; ,

but theirlational$ international foows' is'again greater than'tgeir

concern with the individual and his rights.

The Jordanians shoW a particularly stro<concern with rights in '

general and with justice and equality in 'Articular. While this is

conSistent with kevious observatibm, it comes somewhat as a neil and

surprising finding that they placesuch a strong enphasis on freedom of _.

opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of thpught. These are usually

considered to te uniquely charaqeristi of*estern democratic.

societies. Less enphatit but similar y unexpected is 91e importtnce

Jordanians give-to certain economic and business related dimgnsions of

Ireedom, involv,ing work, prodUction, and mutual help'.

at.

441,

8 3

44.

z

-$

Kai

,rREEDOM

Main,Differences in U.S. & Jordanian.Perceptions

onenta of Perception

U.S., Democracy

War, Revolution

People, Women, Individual

Press, "Speech, Opinion

Worlsoiroduction

u.s . DJordan i an

peroentage of total response10 t ZS 33

NOTE: For coinplete presentation of maip'perceptual components andalJ U.S. and Jordanian-responses, see Appendix I, p. 16.

gure 16

Although we found that freedo0-was a diginct el,ement of the

imale o'f. the United,States, in the present Clitext of freedom, o

'expLicit references are made to 'the United States; hoWever, freedom is.

closely linked to democracy, as prCticaTly the'only political system

identified in this context. Americans think of-freedom in close

connection.with iheir own national 'history, the American revol n,

constitution, bill of rights, slaVery,thile Jordanians Complain out

the lack of freedom---that it is novexistent. The Jordanians r fer to-. ,

women, men, people, and life.with the apparent implication that ill

should have freedom and benefit from it.

In general, the Jordanian'view of freedom shows a .remarkable

degree of similarjty with the Amvican, except that the JordAnian view ,

is less historical andsymbolLc ancr,shows- more'conte;porary emphasis 6.

4

cst:

76 .\

freedom as a broad national issue. In this respect Jordanians see the

freedom-of thAindivjdual as practiCally inSeparable from the freedom

of the nation.

Jerrorism-----From the Jordania wpoint

This again is one of,X1ose affèc.laden political issues which re-

ceives a great deal,mor direct attention from the Jordanians than from

the average Pr1cThThe image, in concordance with the theory of ,

mirror images, is recipro_cal,pr reversed.* Al,though in the eyes of the

Americans Iran is currently at the top of.the list of those who prac-

tice terrorism, the PLO, the Palestinians and Arabs occupy a solid':

second position. Israel is mentioned slightly, probably morle ai a

victim.

In the eyes of ;the Jordanians the list is headed by Israel, the

Jews and Zionists Although these perceptions may have been pre-.

diCtable on the basis of'a modest familiarity with the natUre of the

hostility.and the mutual incriminations between Jordan and

other elements of the Jordanians! ;image are more revealing. Boty

Americans and.Jordanians dssociate terrorish with war, fighting, and/W,

destruction, but Americans show mdiord concern With the use of guns and

bombs. Both speak of fears and anxieties but.the Jordanians more so.,

The most salient4thacacterization, of terrori-sm by Jordanians

and one which goes almost unrecognized by Americansis that it isja,, °

means of pursuing political-militarj objectives,of oppression and,

Colonization by means of force, impcisonment, and sTavery. The

Judanians also express strong.,concern With the'human costs of.ter-,

rorism (killing, death). ordanians view terrorism as a criminal act

attributed to the enem and there is lOsindication that they consider

(

* Urie.Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-Amerifan:Relations: A,SoCial Psychologist's Report," Journal of SoCial,Issues,1964 17, 45-56. Anatol Rapoport, "Perceiying the Cold War," in'Roger Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science4(New York: ,Basi.c Boo,ks, Inc., 1964).

.1

similar Arab o&PLO actions (e.g., bombings, hostage takjng) as acts

of terrorism or that they would view them as similarly objectionab)e

dr criminal. In other words, there- is litth apparent inclination to

see hostility in terms of mutuali.ty. . In the'present context Ois is

particularly interesting tecause of its psychological implications

the general impi.ession is that the Jordanians feel threatened.ánd are

4 filled with intense.fears.

TERRORISM

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

&tin compbnents of'Perveption

Iran, Israel, Peop.le

Hostages, Victims

i4ombing, Guns

PLO, Palestinians

Colonization,-.-00ression

Enemy, Crime

u.s.0

NOTE._; For &nip-10e preseritation of main perceptual components.andall'U.S. & Jordanian responses, see Appendlx-I, p 17. -

Figpre 17 -

Common Trends Acros'S Political Isms and-Issues

4111

'Our analesis was pursued at two different le els: We first.

analyzed some dominant political isms and then ex mined a few specific

issues. I

I

On political isms, such as capitalism and co unism,,we found

considerable ogreement betwen Americans and Jordan

compared to Oeir viewS on specific issues like cippressi

.11

8 6

at least

or terrorism.

Li

The results are consistent with findings on the super powers. The

Jordanian view of capitalism shows sone agreenent with their image_ of -

the United States, tilt their view of capitalism is generally more.positive.- The Jordanians are Intrigued by_and attracted to capitalisnkbut they are not free of some ambivalence; a distinctly more intens.felantivalence was expressed toward the United StateS. On, the other hand,

they are more critical of communism than they are of- the Soviet Union.They reject communism primarily on religious grounds and because ofits oppressive nature. They show a certain naturaraffinity toigardsocialism with re,ard to its social and collectivistic orientation.

The findings on political isns support our conclusions in thecontex of political aetors, particularly the 'super powers. Jordanians

are little interested in the ideological dimension of the super powerconfrontation. Their sympathies or antipathies Are little influenced

.

by po'litical or ideologl.cal alignnent. Their judgments are based

primarily 'on their Subjective perceptions of how the super powers '

and their dominant ideologies bear on Jordanian national interests,how they relate to their confrontation with ISrael and to theirstruggle for advancement of economic dewlopment, etc.

Along their interests in economic developnent, tfley see potentials'in capitalism, while in their social and religious principles they.

, stand closer to socialism and are appalled by communism. Their.worfdview is dominated bynationalism and their orientation i more prag-

matic, than ideologi cal

The salient concerns the.Jordanians express in the context ofpolitical sms and ideologies are closely similar to those noted inthe context of political actors. Their main conCern regarding botficapitalism and comunism is with the misuse oi political and militarypower (oppression, colonization, vio.lence). Theif nunerous references

to.oppression, violence, terrorism, and rights also reflect a strongpreoccupation with the misuse of power.

' 79

(lir).. Of

The second pajt of our a is fur f riled the importance

of these issues to the Jordanians. One s well as in conibinationthese issues revolve a ound the idea of liti al/military domination:,They all convey a poli ical orien on whose internal priorities andrationale differ in sev al tant ways from the,Arneritan approech

to pol itics.

The excesses of po

the light of their tripethe freedom and rights

misuse are viewed by Americans in

'on the individual. Freedom and rights imply

f the individual ,'whose interests have to betected from other more powerful individuals or from the power of

the, state or

On the

in vi duels

government.

misuse of power, the Jordarlians,' concerri goes beyond single

and includes their national collective and the Arab world.Ininking of oppresion, colonization, tetrrorism an.d the violationof rights and freedom, the Jordanians are not.insensitive to individualtrib.ulations.' and deprivations, but in their minds these are primarilycollective national isues.. Frem their perspective the nation ingeneral suffers from oppression, 'colonizatio'n,.add exploitation by .

another nation: in other words, col lecive, national considerationsare given top prfority.

This view is the produCt of both histohcal Ind contemporary1:7 3

experiences:, their tribal, national ideniifi cation and inheritle,nCeof religious-ethical beliefs, lead them to view the individual firstand, foremost, as a member of a family, tribe or nation. Thtl view has -

been clearly and consistently shown by our previous'results. Further-...,more, the atmosOhere of intensive political confrontation in which

they live probably reinforces the lines of division atority-qhnic/-national differences. It may be more consequential whether one isArab or Jew than whether one'is "Jim" or "Joe."

-

80

U

MINN

> The tension and group identification conveyed by the Jordantan

responses illusti-ate the psychol'ogical mechanisms of group cOnflict

elaborated by leading social psychologists* and traced in its historical

origins by experts in nationalism and national de-velopnent. When

people perdive a generalized collective threat, which they feel they cannot

esc.ape individually, group or nationa'l identification can gain great

inportance. The resulting nationalistic feelings can becone Particularly

powerful, explosive forces when people cone to beliefe that their-self

interest dan be served or protected only through the strength of'the

group to which they_ belong..

While Aniericans are concerned

inNdividual from abuse b'y other indi

his own governnent,. the Jordanians'

with the threat of external forces,

1 group, their own nation as the main

commonly with the protection of the"

viduals in tiis own society and by,r

reactions reflect intensiv& concern

against which they view their own

shield of protection.

,The dominant psychological dispositions and mechanisms have national

relevance to the tasks of crisis management and problem solving. The

findings here deserve s'pedal attention since the Jordanian perceptions.

and cultural experienceson'this. matter of the individual's relationship

to the group are so fundamentally different from thewAnerican.

It appears,./for instance, that 'finding ways to reassure the

Jordanians_ that their existence is not threatened could help to over-

cone'a major psychological barrier. Along this link Roger Fishk's

strategy -of "fractionated fension reductjon" may be applicable by

separately addressing issubs which are of mutual interest.***4

M. Sherif, The Psychology of Socikl Norms (New York: Harper,1936)'(

.** John H. Kautsky (ed.),Political Change in UnderdevelopedCountries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 196?); Paul E. Sigmund, Jr.(ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing.Nations.(hew York: FrederickA. Praeger, 1967). .

"* Roger-Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science(New York: Basic Books, 1964).'.

81

,

We.

The obvious penetration of Klitical considerations into the

Jordanians' individUal thinking, their extreme concern with the misuse

of power, and thei'r preoccupation with the enemy and with colonization

and oppression all suggest that Jordanians as a people feel highly

threatened. While their psychological state creates an existential

interest in finding reasonably reassuring political solutions, at the

same ..time it is likely to block 4ihers that are perceived as

heightening rather than relieving the threat.

82

PEACE OR WAR; NUCLEAR PROLVERATION OR DISARMAMENT

The Jordanian views of the leading world powers, considered in

conbination with their dominant political concerns., make. it interesting

to explore their position on critical international issues which involve

peace and survival.

Our holistic approach is L?asiI on the realization that.problems of

war, disarmament, and nuclear weapons are inseparable from the overall,

political frame of reference of the people, concerned. Their stand on

theie issues can be properly understood"only in 'su,Ch broader contexts

as their Views of the-eneiny and their experiences in past military

confrontations, their feelings-of threat and frustrations, etc.

Thbpreviouslyobserved concern oVhe Jordanians with the misuse of

power and with external threat makes it particularly interesting-to -

eNplore to what extent the intensity of this threat perception stems.

from cOncern with the nuclear weapon_capabitities which Israel is sus-

pected to have.

/ft

Since in' the United Sfaies the fear of \gar is seriously aggravated

by anxieti;es regarding the use of nuclear weapons, despite a pariti,

the nuclear weapon potential of Israel may be expected to be a source. .

of trauma to Jordanians.

War and peace are highly emotional issues and, as Kissinger has

observed, the "unwary ouisider" can get flooded by a "linguistic

exuberance" by asking the wrong question about such topics.* By

avoiding direct questions we seek to bypass this verbal exuberance and

get at people's actual perceptions, at their subjective representation

/' of what they perceive as rea1.4

Nit

* Henry Kissinger., White House Years (Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1979)., * 4u.

..

83

91

A

The EnemyWho is It?

.Based on the Jordanians heavy association of the United Stateswith imperialism, oppression. and hostility, the United- States could. ,

be their nunter one enemy. A close look at the Jordanians' image ofthe enemy, however, shows that this is not the caie. Despite alltheir negatiw feelingstoward pie U.S. and their view of the U.-.13-A asthe entodimen't of imperialism, the nunter one enemy in thetreyes,_ isundoubtedly Israel. The United.States is only arstistant second, and 4

the Soviet Onion, third but insignificant.

ENEMY

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian `Perceptions

*tin Components' of ,Perception,

Ratred, Fea, JealousyOppression , Col oni zati on .

Ki 1 ling , DestructionIsrael

Sickness , Ins tabil ity ,Di sl ocati on

u.s.

JordaniatM:::

peroeltags of total response

NOTE: For complete presentation of main' perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix 1, P- 18-

Figure 18

84

92

tfi

In thinki9 the enemy Americans speak first of the Soviet Union,

followed by Iran reflecting contemporary resen ments due to the current

hostage situation.

In general, the enemy conjures bothfor .Americaris and jordanians

images of*military confrontation, war and fighting. The negative Con-

sequences of confrontation with the enemy are distthCtly more'vivid in -

the Jordanian mind, due obviously to their more recent anddirect ex-

periences in several wars anearmed involients. With regard to

personality attributes', the Jordanians characterize the enemy in ,

terms of deceit, curtningness,,and betra01. The most dominant '

concerns are military threat: oppression, colonization, domination.

General references to hatred and fear by Jordanians are numerous al-. lk- ,

though less so than by Americans. Jordanians are apparently more pre-

occupied with contemporary problems contributed to by the enemy:

dislocation, the refugee problem.

The comparatively high dominance of this sbbject to Jordanians

suggests that the threat of the enemy is a mejor preoccupation for them.1

In comparison with results obtained in 1977, the Jordanians' iMage

of the enemy shows some interesting changes, ta be elaborated on in a

, later Section. The two testings three years apart show that the

Jordanians' concern with the.enemy has not decreased, although it has

become more diffuse, including, among,othersi a grea4er concern withe *

the role of the United States . Compared to an Egyptian group also

teited in 1977, the Jordanians expressed an exceptionally emotion-

laden and intense preoccupation with the enemy.

War-:-Views Influenced by the IMageof the Enemy

Both to Americans and to Jordanians war refers to large-scale

killing; bloodshed, death, and involves ftghting, aggression, and

violence. Yet due to the obvious effects of differing.past experiences

and present circumstances, the Jordanians' view of war differs:in many

important aspects fromthe American.

f85

411,

WAR

Main Differences in U.S.. & Jordanian Perceptions

*Lin Components of Perception

Peace, Freedom

Terror, Hunger, Displacement

Destruction, Ruin,

Domination, Oppression

u.s.EJ

Jordanian S.§

peronstage of totai 14spanse10 15 20 Zs

NOtE: For complete presentation of main-perceptual components anda U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p:19.

Figure 19

The Jordanians have more their present immediate situation" and.

thein recent past in mind, while.Americans war is a much more distant

experience---the civil war, world wars---or a concern with.a terrible

but mnbigUous future threat (nuclear war).

Americans think of war as a potential alternative to peace. The

_conviction that war could be avoided and peace preserved, granted*

that people are rasonable, is reflected in theAmericans' condemnation

-of war as both bad and stupid.

In Contrast', the Jordanian§ do not look at it as-a matter of free

'choice. 'This may be partially a matter,of their Jilore fatali'stic view

of life and of the future. But it involves several other components

as.well.

Probably due to repeated defeats, Jórdanians spem more concerne&

with the present circumstances created by past wars than with the

.86

94.

4

9

possible consequences of future wars. Their yagerg of destructian and

ruin is particularly vivid and ties in with their past and present

miseries: terror, hunger,.disease. For the Jo;-danian respondents,

many of.them Palestinians, one of the mostdestructive consequences of

war is diOlacement, being forced to leave one's homeland and become a

refugee, a displaced person.

(Not only do the Jordanians make sizable references to the enemy,

but, they also express strong concern with domination and oPirression, the

same:as they did in the context of their-perception of the enemy. This

indicafes that their intense preoccupation with the enemy influences

their image of war as well.

In general, the majar differences in the Johlanian and American

perceptionS of war areAhat Jordanians think more of the past and

present compared to the Americans concern with potential horrors of a

future nuclear War; and that the Jórdanians' concern with unconvention-

al:war, nuclear exchange, is negligible.

.Disarmament---Realities and Hopes

Americans take a practical, matter-of-fact approach to the problem

of' disarmamenf in a mtxed emotional atmosphere o'f high ho.pes and

skepticism. From this perspectiie disarmam.ent'is,loaked at-as a re-

duction af guns, weaponry, Pombt, particularly,miconventional weapons

with nuclear potential. What it involves is SoMething like a SALT

treaty which Would reduce the dangers of World War III. Such-an

arrangement is viewed as dependent mai'fily on the United States and the

Soviet Union but more mthe latter.

The Jodanian view is quite different. They'do'nat even mention.

weapons o'r nuclear bombs. They see disarmament as a mitter of 14-iter-_

national agreement but not just between the two suPer powers; they

consider the involvement of other countries as well, Jordanians make,,,

no spectfic reference.to SALT, which is further indication that the

I.

87

4, 0

0

Jordanians think of disarmament in a,diffgrent context, more applied to

their local concerns and priOrities rather than to the U.S.-Soviet

power balance.

DISARMAMENT

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceotions

Main Components of Perception

'Guns, Nuclear Weapons

Treaty, Politics, SALT

U.S., Russia

Peace,-Security

Love, Happiness, Comfort

Freedom, Justice, Equality

u.s.0

.JordanianVperoentage of total response ..

1.0 1.5 25

0.

NOTE: For complete presentation Of.main perceptual components andwall'U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendik I, p. 20.

4 Figure 20

.

Even more fundamentally, ttle agrdanians give much less Consider-.

ation to what it requires to-bring about a 'lable international agree- _

ment about disarmament Their primary attention is focuged On all the. r

highly desiiratile consequdnces which disarmament could bring about?

They express the conviction tWat disarmament would end wdrs, prevent

them, and stop the fighting and deftruction. It woUld lead to peace.---:

thebir moit,centrAl belief---and'freedom, justice,,and equality would

, prevail.

Q

88r 9 6

The Arms Race---Foolish or Criminal?

While the Jordanians view disarmament as a concern to all, the arms

race is viewed as the foolish business of the super pOWers, slightly

n mdl.e.of the United States than of the Soviet Onion. On that 16atter

there appear to bd a considerable agreement betWeen the Americans and

Jordanians, except that the Americans are more inclined to blar the

Russians than the U.S. Both studerit groups view the arms race naturally

as'involving weapons; only the emphasis on weapons and the-types con-

sidei-ed are different. Americans think more in terms of nuclear weapons

and nuclear war; the Jordanians have more(conventional types of weapons

and fighting in mind. The Jordanians consider the arms race emphatic-

ally as competition-which could lead to extremely negative consequences

---death, destruction, killing., terror. In their mind the arms race

mainly series objectives of domination, oppression, and colonization

and is generally associated with all the evils of war and imberialism.

While Americans consider the arms ra, as ridiculoqs, foolish, and

teful Jbrdanians view it as inhuman, crimfnal, backward, against

Islam, and as serving Zionism.

As a way to halt the arms race Americans think of SALT with

relatively low salience but mention treaties and negotiations in

general. The Jordani striqly condemn the arms race but do not

suggest any specific ways which cOuld be used to slow,it down or

stop it.. In the Jordanians view ft is related to technologiOal

development.

While Americans view the arms race as a dangerous but more or

less natural product of powercompetition, which should and could be

stopped based on mutual interest's, the Jordanians see it more as a

design for domination and oppression.

89

9 7

ARMS RACE

Main Differences in.U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Ndin Components of Perception

SALT,.Negotiations

NucIear,,Atomic Weapons

Domination, Oppression

Development, Technology

u. s.

Jordani an

wordage of total response

NOTE: For complete presentation of main percept101 components and

all U.S..and Jordanian responses, see Appedix I, p. 21.

Figure 21

Nuclear WeapOns---Their Use and Threat

On the nature of nuclear weapons and theireuse 'there is more

agreement between the Americans and Jordanians than on most of the

other issues previously explored. There is agreement about their

role in war and fighting and about their main.forms of use. The

Americans do place more emphasis on bombs and missiles, their immense

destructive power, their unique potential to kill, etc. In some

details there ls a difference in emphasis, however. The Americans gre

more concerned with Soviet weapons, while the Jordaniahs pay mdre

attention to American capabilities. Americans show more awareness of

the danberous radiation effects and pay more attention to SALT and

disarmament as offering potential solutions.

There are two additional Jordanian views here which go beyond:the.

Ameritan conSiderations'and reflect apparently their characteristic

V

frame of reference. The Jordanians emphasize that nuclear weapons are

the products of technology, science, and civilization. The underton&

of these reactions conveys a certain skepiicism abo4t the benefits 'of

Western civilization.

NUCLEAR WEAPONi

Main Differences in,U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Main Components of-Pefiception -

Bombs, Missiles

SALT, Disarmament

I Terror, Instability

Development, Human Inventions

11.S.E3

JordanianMpercentage of total response

?5

NOTE: 'For complete presentation of pain perceptual components and

all U.S. and JordaNan responses, see Appendix I, p. 22.

Figut:e 22

The ,)ordanians, make in this context surprisingly little reference

.tofppression and domination than is usually the case.

Since such references are usually tied to Israel and Zionism, in

the present cokext th'eir relative lack, is rather remarkable. They

suggeSt that'r,umors.about the Israeli nuclear., capabilities do not

elicit the intensive anxieties as frequently assumed in'.the West.

SALT II---Its Promise of Peace

As in the case of disarmament, the American view is,narrowly

. focused on the U.S.-Soviet nexus. Special attention is given to the

Soviet 'role, probably because i is frequently viewed as a stumbling

9.1 99

C.,

blvck to an agreement. Along this practical angle may lie the reason

.that AmeHcans see the role of the leaders---Carter, Brezhnev,

as particularly important. Following this pragmatic approach, success

is qonsidered to be a matter of talks and negotiations leading

eventually to a treaty that would effectively limit prodUction of arm§,

missiles, weapons. Here the,AmeriCans show stronger preoccupation with

nuclear weapons, while the Jordaniins view SALT II in less specific

terms as involving weapons in general and their reduction.

SALT II

Main.Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Win Components of Perception

..*

Talks, Treaty

LeadergcbCarter, .)Srezhne.v

Peace, Safety

Dellelopment, Produttion

U.S.0

.JordanianE

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and

all'U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, 0. 23.

Figure 23

As was also observed in the context of disarmament, the Jordanians

are generally less specific, less articulate about the.details in-

volved in.SALT II---that is, about whaeis actually being done; their

primary interest is in the qoals and,objec.tives which may be served---

peace, securttp:--and in otir high ideals like freedom and-equality.

This distribution of intel.est c'ontrasts here again with the pragmatic

American focus on what could or is being ddne in terms of practical 4

actions and solutions. This may be partially a consequence of4S

92 10 u

situation in which SALT II depends in its details entirely on the two

super powers but its effects and consequences could bear on the future

of all people of the world, including Jordan. In this context it is

parficularly consequential that the Jordanians view SALT II as an in-

strument for promoting peace and safety. They are strongly in favor of

SALT II and apparently believe that in their own context strategic arms

limitation, if successfully achieved, would.bring peace and securqy.

The intensity of this belief is considerable ahd, combined with

other findings, indicates positive expectations which, rustrated,

could seriously-harm our national image abroad. C1idring certain

negative elements in the,Jordanians' image of the United States,

part)cularly their (dew of the U.S. as a super power with imperialistic

leanings, there may.be a distinct inclfnation on,the part of Jordanians

to blame the United States, should the negbtiations fail.

Detente---Filled with Hopes and Expectations

The views of Jordanians on detente show.a great deal of similarity-

with their views on disarmament and SALT II. They reflect the same

general perspectives or frame of reference. The main difference is

that SALT II was viewed in close connection,to the Super powers, the

outcome of peace.and safety being dependent on their attitudes and

agreement. Detente, on the other hang,_is viewed much more as a

broad attempt to improve'international relations.

While'to AmeriCans detente, like dicrmament and SALT II, is very

much a matter of the United States coming to terms with the Soviet

Union, the Jordanians also think of detente in the Middle East; i.e.,

between the Arab worl.d and fsrael.

Jordanians,view detente .as the opposite of the arms race, disputes,,

hostility. They see it as led.i.ng to peace andsecurity as much desired

commodities. ,Their emphasis on peace and freedom is noteworthihere

since it suggests that the Jordanians go not consider a detente between

the Arabs and Is'rael as inconceivable or dangerous to their national

interests.

93

DETENTE

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

u.s.

Jordani an

-

Main Components of Perception

I

peroentage of total responseic ZP 25

-U.S., Russia, ::: ".

Leaders

Coope ra ti on ,t Unple rs tan di ng tiMiaLicW.,

Peace, Sdcurity

Openness, Freedom.

EconOmy, Development

NN,

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andail U.S. ahd Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p.24.

Figure 24-/ ,

Even more encoura§ing is-that, against this background, the most .

salient features attributed to detente are cooperation, understanding,

love. These reactions indica,te that the Jordanians not only do not

dismiss detente in the Middle 'tast as'a hopeless dream but view ft as

a viable possibility for improving relations and leading to active

cooperation.

That these positive responses are not merely wishful thinking on

the paet of the Jordanians is suggested by their villingness to pursue

the matter further into the economic and pOlitical consequences of

detente. They characterize'detente as a practical way to promote

economic and:industrial development. In regard to political implica-

tions they have openness; justice, and freedom as,ppparent consequences

in mind.

94 1 02

1

In general, the Jordanians project a substantially richer and more

positive content/into detente than do the .S. respondents, who appear

to be more skeptical (see Appendix I, p. 24).

JO

Proliferation---Little Emphasis on Nuclear Arms

In our nuclear age everybody has a certain knowleqge of the avaitl-

ability of nuclear weapons and their destructive potential and couldibe

expected to want to prevent their spread, thatis, nuclear proliferation.

PROLIFERATION

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

144in Comonents offtroeption

Weapons, Nuclear

War, Domination

Science, Knowledge

Politics, International Re-lations

Society, Country

Freedom, Security, Peace

U.S.

Jordanianpercentage of total response

lo 15 ZO 2 5

amfmaNiM

NOTE: For Complete presentatiOn of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordan$an responses, see Appendix I, p. 25.

Figure 25 .

We intentiorially avoided) using this explicit term because it

would easily have elicited similar negative reactions from everyone

and would not t'ell us1Whether nuclear proliferation is an issue which

isgenuinely salient in people's minds. The neutral term-"prolifer-

ation" was cons'idered more appropriate to txplore how intensive "

people's Concerns are with the dangers.of proliferation. Although it

reflects less about technical aspects, it reveals more about the degree

of preoccupation with this problem. The ca'se of the 6.S.-Jordanian

comparison is wite illustrative in this respect.

* Proliferation is a rather meaningless issue to Americans, much

More so than.6 Jordanians (see dominance scores). To both groups, the

core element of proliferation is growth and spreading. To Americans

the most serious concern is with nuclear proliferation. This nuclear

aspect occupies only a small fraction of the Jordanian attentiork. Re-

ferences to radiation, weapons and the Geneva Conference make it clear

that the Jordanians are not unaware of the nuclear proliferation

problem; they simply pay it little attention. They are apparently more

interested in growth and spread in other areas such as political

domination, scientific knowledge, sickness, freedom, Islam, etc.

The relatively minimal attention given by Jordanians to the pro-

liferation of nuclear weapons is consistent, however, with observations

we have made in a variety of other contexts as well, ranging from war

to the arms race. In all these contexts Jordanians have shown a strong

'concern with military-power, weaponry, and the misuse of power in

particular. Theyilaie showtAveral signs that they feel threatened by

Israel, and the spread qf nuclear arms does not seem to constitute a

subject of any great concern to Jordanians.

The Military Perspective ft

Oppression and domination were found to.be the most dominant and

most consistent concerns of Jordanians with regard to both political

actors and p itical issues.(, A similar trend emerged here in the

144context of mi 'tary issues. 'The Jordanians showed little interest

in the relationship of the super powers to each other. Rather than .

looking at issues from the perspective of a concerned world citizen,

they tend to look at world problems from a more narrow, specifically ,

Jordanian viewpoint. This viewpoint beComeS clear from their reactions :

but it is based too much on the Jordanians'own personal and national

experiences to have been anticipated based only on American logic and

experiences.

I.

The mil-itary/political issues of broad international importance .are

interpreled here again from a characteristically Jordanian perspkti ve .

Arms race, detente, SALT II and other similar subjects are'likely to

impress us as typical issues involving the relations of the super

powers. Jordanians relate these problems specifically to their. own'

situation. For instance, in regard to disarmament or SALT -the Jordanians,

show little interest' in the Americans man conbern wish the statuS andirelative strengths of U.S.-Soviet military forcds' and their negotiated

.

reduction. What the Jordanians are primarily concerned with is how

the arms race could be stopped and disarniament achieved in the context

of the Middle East. The Jordanians appear to favor solutions that would

bring a reduction in tensions and eventually peace ih ttie Middle East.

The results indicate that the:Jordanians strongly favor di armament,

arrs liltations, as well as other measures prmarilybecafIse they expect

an improvement in their own situation in working toward p aceful

solutions. Their consistent support of\peace oriented solutions goes

along with other observations which'suggest therr interest in-a

negotiated settlemeni Similarly it offers additional, stipptrt to

observations that the Jordanians are little concerned with U.S:-Soviet

power relations, compared at least to their.intensive preoccupation

with their own situation. It also provides, a sense for the degree of

mistakes we are likely to commit in international surveys when we assume

that words like detente or disarmairt convey the same meanings we

attach to them, which we are inClined to assume are universal.

The Jordagians' view of nuclear threat is particularly inteireiting

sinCe it shows how it could be misleading to anticipate`Jordanian

views based on our Dwn rationale. Based on the American view of' nuclear

weapons arid of the dangers-pOsed 'by a stronger enemy armed with nuclear

weapons, it is rather natural to expect the Jordanians to show grea.t

concern with Israel's nuclear capabilities. Our previous data showing

that Jordanians feel intensely threatened by Israel and display strong

preoccupatfon with domination and oppression', and mise of power make

97

105

4.

/-

such expectations only stronger and logically mole cowelling. Yet our

findings-indicate that this is not the case. The Jordaniins' image of

the enew reflects a great dealsof concern With milsitary threat but all

the available indicators suggest that the weapons,they,have In mind are

conventional..

Simjlarly, war brings tso mind predominantly images of past and

present violence and sufferings, with almost no inditationl.hat there

is ail ictive Jordanian concerti-with nuclear war. ^This isàlso trueabout the Jordanian views..of disarmament and thb af-ms 'race, They show

a clear awareness of nuclear weapons when asked specifically but in

-that specifid context their majn ccncern,was with \the super powersiand

no' mention was 'made of Israel. z

While the results show this laceof cOnce'rn 'rather conclusively,

reasons that would explain this apparent inconsistency remain Midden.

Experts familiar with Jordan suggest two complementary explanations., . .

They point out that there are .few explicit references in OfficialJpi.danjan Statenients or in the mass media to the development of Israeli

nuclear weapons. Some`see this siNnce as a delibehte strategy forniaintaining morale in ficv of Israel's acquisitlon ounconventiona1military capabilities that wo4ld fUrther underscore its militarysuperiority. Such an eXplanaiion seems to overlook that Jordan is

open to Western cononuni'ca ons and' tkst the respondents here were. ,

students. If there were a de iberate strategy to ignore or suppressinformation, it woUTirnost likely lead to.a flood of .rumors among theintellectuals, which .would be clearly reflected in'our data.

A second explanation of why Israel's nuclear Capabilities receive

little attention is that these capab-ilities are considered to be rather

inconsequential. They may'believe that Israel could not seriously\affect the power balance and that Israel would probably use nuclear

.weapons only as a last resort if its total existence were at sdke:

.If the Arabs do not plan such a threat,,the Israeli counterneasuresof atomic weap-ons fall outside the realm of reality. Again here

policy, plans are clearly beyond the reach of assessment, but the

98

s,

s

JoiTianians' tendenoy to pay little attention to Israeli nuclear cape-

bilities eierges he're rather conclusively, even if the reasons for

this apparent paradox remain uncertain. .

AAOther interesting impfication of the findings bears on peace .

and disArmament related communication policies. The results,suggest

that the formal positjont adopted by.the United States.and the Soviet

Union on issues such as disarmament Or detente a're likely to influence

thedJordanians'' images. The Jordanians show a strong predisposition

prlie totallg postive on some'-issues like Iiisarkement and detente and

.totally negative on others. Their limited familiarity_ with the complex

substantiveissues (e.g., control) in combination with their strong

emotional suppbrt of such issues as disarmaant leads the Jordanians

to see any disarmament proposal, regardles's of its content, as a positive4

move. Similarly,rejecting suchia proposal would appear,to be a pegatfve

move in their eyes. Such disposittons lend themselves more readily to

exploitation by propaganda campaigng which operate on the*basis of

ovemimplification and strong emotional appeal.

r

a

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

As the fin1ing5 on political issues have already,Cohveyed, the

Jordanians, parallel to their intensive political int&ests, give high.

priority to economic oblectives, particularly to problems of national

advancement and economic 'development. The findingsshed some light on

the question of how economic objectives And personal interests in

advancement and improvement of living standards tie in with Jordanian

political views and beliefs. Their views of development and under-.

development, their perception of.the advantages and disadvantages aftri-.

buted to foreign aid, and their views on such major concerns-as

exploitation appear to be particularly relevanrand consequential.

Econompl,The Developmental Perspective

The AmericAn and Jordanian vieWs of economy differ in several

important ways. For both groupg economy involves monetary resdurces

and financial status, but Americans stress the role of money and its

instrumentality in economic life, while the Jordanians focus.on the

extreme positions of wealth and poverty.

Americans are very concerned with the state of the econOmy, its

instability and fluctuations, and show a strong preoccupation.with're-

cession and depression; Jordanians pay almost no attentibn to these

problems. In this same vein Americans-feel beSet with problems

involving economic failures, poor performance, and frustrations, while

again Jordanians.show minimal concern with these negative consequences.

Apparently failures and malfunctioning's of,the economy are concerns for

those who live in a highlY developed economic system.

The-most salient Jordanian concern is with developing the economy

arid with the role Of liuman and material resources in this national deVelop-

ment. Jordanians Show the most interest'in agriculture, followed by ,

industry and business. These fields-of economic activity, which seem to

be taken for granted by Americans,'are particularly valued by Jordanians

because they cdhtribute to national developMent. Americans think in

loo108

r.

terms of supply and demand and GNP; the 'Jordanians, of tonsumption and

trade. Foreign trade, import and export, is the focus of Jordanian

interest, while probably due to their greater Self suffiCiency, ther

Americans' focus-is almost exclusively domestic. Firially, Jordanians

relate economY to such social values and goals as freedom and justice.

While national development is the/overriding pncern for the Jordanians,

for AMericans it is economic troubles, present-arid future.

1.terI

ECONOMY

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Mhin Components of Perception ,

Recession, Depression

Money, Wealth

Bad, Poor, Failing

DeveloRment, AdvanceMent

Agriculture, Resource

Export, Import

u.s.13

Jo rdan i an

percentage of total response10 '15 Zo ZS

. .r,

NOTE: For complete presentation ofmainperceptual components and 1,

all U.S.'andJordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 26.

Figure 26

/

Exp1oitatiOn-4A44P,Israeli Domination

Exp1aitartipl-i-s-dist4nctly armae-dom4narit-issuein-the=m4nds-of=

',Jordanians than of hmericans. To Americans the major victims of ex-r,

ploitation are women, Blacks, minorities, and children. To Jordanians!,

Arabs and Muslimt are the victims, and ti:le main exploiters are the,,

United States and Israel:

101 109

EXPLOITATION

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

hhin Compamants of Perception

People, Blacks, Women ,

U. S. El

Jo rdani an

peroentags of total responsetO ZS

Wrong, Unfair, DestructiVe'

Sex

Oppression, Domihation FF0:7:771::

Resources, Wealth

Advancement, Work, Production

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and-Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 27.

Figure 27

To Americans exploitation means taking advantage of people

primarily in econpmic and social contexts,'-while Jordanians view it

mainly as a misuse of political power. Vhis is only a part of the

whole picture but the most dominant part. :The Jordanians also Oeak of

exploitation in terms of the use and misuse of available resources---

material, human, etc. The exploitation of natural resources.like

minerals, oil and water is oY greater concern to Jordanians than to

.Americans. The resulting profits and wealth are also salient Jordanian

considerations. But these material, economic dimensions are

--Opt-fetitly-part of-a more dominant issue which is-politicaL.

Unlike Americans, the Jordanians View exploitation as a goal

oriented activity practiced in the economic field by monopolies and in

the political field by governments that use their strength for domina-

tion and oppression. For Jordanians exploitation'is less one person

taking advantage of another or of an individual being exploited---

102 ilU

whether a Black, a woman, or anyone else in a.weaker position; for then

it is more a national/collective problem, as in thouse of force by one

counfry against another.

Americans tend to view exploitation, economic or sexual; as a

personal act and condemn it on moral ounds as wrong, bad, or unfair.

They place some blame on systems T' e communism or capitalism as being

exploitive, but these trends do not led to a primarily political

approach as in the case of tbe Jordanians.

Underdevelopment---The Plague of the Arab World

There is a broad consensus'between Americans and Jordanians that

underdevelopment is a source of many hunan miseries: poverty, hunger,

disease, ignorance. The Jordanians use the notion's of backwardness 1.

and slow-deVelopment quite broadly to char'acerize the situation of the

Arabs. There is also a general agreement that underdevelopment is

characteristic of the Third World, Africa, Asia, India, etc.

Aside from these shared,views, there are several additional con-, r,

siderations which deserve special attention. Beyond agreeing that

underdevelopment is the misery of the Third World in generAl, the

Jordanians identifY.the Arab countries and their own country of 'Jordan

as being the ones particularly plagued. The problem of,national

development has emerged in a variety of different contexts as a salient

Jordanian preoccupation. They have a quite realistic, unflattering view

of what 4t means to be ynderdeveloped, including cultural backwardness

and 'low thinking. However, the.main deficiency, in their view, is in

lack of'industry, te4snolOgy, planning, etc. Beyond these economic,

material reasons there is a certain tendency to relate underdevelopment

to the pOlitiCal conditions created by colonization, oppression,

exploitatiOn.

While the American perception includes physiological underdevelop-

ment---smallness, weakness of body, body parts, breasts, brain, etc.---'

froM the Jordanians' perspective underdevelopment is primarily

lb

41P

industrial, technological, and economic backwardness, a state which

cannot be iscolated from po1itic617tonditions, and which, though hiahly

undesirable, is characteristic of their.own cOuntry and oiher Arab

countries as well.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Main Differwes in U.S. & jordanian Perceptions

Main Components of Perception

PovertY

.Body, 'Inreture, Small

Arab Countries, Middle Eatt

Technology,'EcohOry

Colonization, Oppressilon

Low Thinking, NO Principles

NOTE:

JordanianEperoentage of total response

10 15 ZO ZS'

4For coMplete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 28.

figure 28

Foreign Aid-*-An Instrument of Political Domination

Jordanians a,nd AmOtans agree that fgreign aid invoIvet financial

suppbrt as well at-food and industrial and military products, but again

the perspectives.are rather different.

Americans view foreign aid primarily as help giyen to needy

countries, ranging from,Cambodia to Iran. Tlie Jorddnians pay more

attention to who the donors are---United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia

---and to a much lesser extent to the recipients---Israel andTalestine.

Although Jordanians recognize poverty, hunger, and other needs

which aid programs seek to alleviate,'nonetheless, their feelings are

104

11

mixed, contaminated by suspicions about the self-serving interests of

the donors, particularly the United States. They tend to view foreign

aid as a political weapon, an instrument of colonization and oppression.

Both Americans and Jordanians show awareness of the military dimenstons

. dT foreign aid.

FOREIGN AID.

Main DifferenCes in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Main, CompNente of Perception

Help, Assist

Domination, Coloniation

Needy,'Poor

Development, Interests

psroentage of total rosponse10 15 ZO / 25

U.S. 0

JordanianA

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual cemponents and' all U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 29,,

.4

p. Figure 29

While Americans are divided between two opposing views, that

foreign aid is good and needed or" that it i§la waste, Jordania"ns con-.,

sider.it tdilave the potential to promote national development as well

as foreign interests. The Jorda.nian'view of foreign aid as an in-

strument of political domination is consistent with their perception

of the, main donor, 4e United States, as a power seeking political

domination.

105

113

Economic Development, A qink Between Personal and Group Interests1

The findings on economic issues reveal several comon trends whichdominate the Jordanians' views in this domain. Most of these followfrom the Jordanians' view of econogwhich presents a clear contrastto the U.S. view.

From our U.S. perspective economy is a complex system built around

the idea of business. Central attention is given to.the role of moneyat the life blood of the system. The complexity of the system probablyexplains why Americans are particillarly preoccupied with how well itfunctions and especially with the dangers of failure---recession,inflation.

The Jordanians look individually at agriculture, industry, andtechnology as the essenflal elements of a well functioning econThey are .particularly concerned,with the general stage of developmentof the economic system and with speci fie elements which ay be presenting ,

barriers to progress and human welfare.

National developnvnt,and advancement represent the single most

central issue at the core of the Jordanian frame of reference. In

their view what-the economy needs most is development. Instability,..recessions, and inffation are the pains of the developed economic.,systems. An underdeveloped economy, as the Jordanians identify their

own, has little chance of "achieving prosperiV and affluence unless

it can reach higher stages of development. This is naturally. a commo'n,

goal of the national collect4e, which must be achieved in Order forthe people to benefit from it individually. This dependence of the

individual'1 economic welfare on the fate of 'the national economy, asperceived by Jordanians as well as by many peoples of the Third World.,is a strong and deep condition which explains a great desil of theirway of thinking.

First of all, it creates a strong interest in collective, nationalissues as a part of.indivigual salf interest. On the negative side 4.it produces a feeling of deOendence, which can lead in its extreme to

106

114

disabling feelings of helplessness, according tp Frederic Frey and

other experts of national and economic development.* On the positiveside it creates a tendency toward united efforts, a tendency forjoining and undertaking collective actions along shared .nationalinterests. Such plans and actions are inherently political in natureeven if they also serve economic objectives The result can be a close,practically inseParable fusion of economic and political issues, as isevident from the results of this stucty. In all the economic issuesexamined, considerations given to political power, its use and misuse,are pervasive. The evidence indicates-a sort of intensive politici-.zation of economic issues, frOm econony to underdevefopment.

These factors help explain the strong emotional arrbiValence which

we observe in all these contexts. Economic developnent is good and

foreign aid and the super powers are considered as potentially useful,but their appeal is somewhat counterabted by suspicions and fears ofexploitation and colonization. The.. Jordanians' perception,of under-

, ro.development in itself reveals a great deal of self criticism and arecognition of.their backward status, not only-economically buteducationally as well. They see a close interrelationship betweenbackwardness and the possibility of colonization and oppression.The intensive infusion of political perSPectives intolthe ecbtiomic

sphere is best illustrated here by the fact that all the ebononricissues examined reveal a cbncernVith the misuse of power throiigh

oppression and domination.

In the economiecontext the United States appears to be botR the,

most attractive country as well as the one viewed with greatestanxieties and suspicions.

* Frederic W. Frey, 'Statement before 'the Subcbmmittee on Inter-national Organizations and Movements.. Modern Communications and ForeignPolicy, February 9, 1967, p. 135; John H. Kautsky, Political Chan_ge inUnderdeveloped Countries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., T962);Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," in Jason L.Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and SocialChange (New York: ,John J. Wiley and Sons, 1966).

107

115

THE SOCL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Previous studies have shOwn a strong influence of social and

moral values on the interpersonal relations in the Arab world.*

Social and moral considerations were found tp be extensive in

Jordanian thinking as well, and they help to understand politically

relevant choices and behavior.

. The dominant values developed in interpersonal relations within

small social units such'as the family are receiving greater

recogrrition for their role in shaping peoples' relations to largeS

social units, even to the,extent of setting the Main patterns for how

one partic-ular country or nation will relate 'to another. Egalitarian

and democratic values, for example, produce certain patterns for

interacting with other nations while authoritarian values produce others.

Nationalistic ideologies differentiate between friends and foes more on ,

historical grounds, while mercantile philoSophies stress the role of4

economic intersts.

In a previous study, we have explored more extensively the

relationship between the Jordanians' (as 'well as Egyptians) social

values and political orientation.** Here we examine a few issues

which were found to be closelfrelited td the Jordanians' view of

peace and which are likely -to irifluence their political views, present

andfuture.

Social Problems--,4ivorce, Low Morals 0

The dominant social probl ms as perceived by the Jordanian; show

only partial overlap with' the ricans'. -Jordanians appear to be

particularly concerned with a series of problems related to family and

marriage, such as divorce, adultery., instability, etc. To Americans,

.these .are either less important or ma considered to be personal_

rather than social.

* J. Berque, The Arab's, TheirHistory and .Future (New York: Holt,Rinehart and Winston, 1958); S. Hamady,, Temperament and Character of theArabs (New-York: Twayne Publishers, 1960); R. Patai, The Arab Mind( R TrYork: Charles Scribner'-s Sons, 1973).

" L.B. Szalay etMeanings (Washington,

1978).

al. j U.S.-Arabic Connunication Lexicon of CulturalD.* Institute of CoMparative Social & Cultural Studies,

%

,

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

Main Components of Perception

Health, Disease, Hunger

Society, Class, Race

. Marriage, Divorce

0, .Crime, Theft

Low Morals, Bad Customs

4$0-perotntage of total ruponse

10 ls to Zs

4

U.S.0

Jordernianx.x..

; %. I

r.nMOM.

Miiiii:iiiii;:;:ii;i:iiiiigi;:.;:;:;:::/il

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and/

all U.S. and Jordanian responses,. see Appendix I, p. 30.

Figure 30

ow.

A second major social. problem in the Jordanian§' view is low .

morals, bad habits, lying, envy, hatred. Another is poverty, un-

employment, welfare, and a variety of other problem related to.. .

.

deprivation and lack of material resources. Jordaniansare klso. , :.

concerned about deviant behavior, crime, theft, killing, etc. While

Americans and Jordanians recognize hunger as an important social.

problem, Americans show distinctly more 'concern with other health

problems. The Jordanians pay a sur ising*amount of attention to.

-cigarette smoking as a social proble , much more so than to alcohol

4

or drugs. .,

*

The differing attention given to these various social probiems....

by.Amricans and Jordanians reflects priorities influenced by

contemporary domestic concerns and local conditions.t

Americans enphasize'social, racial, and other intergroup relation's

involving inequalities, tensions, and problems in American urban society.. ,

4

r \_. 109

,

,

/

,

Finally, as a rather consistent trend, Jordanians showparticularly strong concern with problems resultirtg from the inisuse ofpdwer: war, violence, invaion, oppression, `sla-fery, etc.

While the attention given to specific problems may vary becauseof differences in the objective situations, 'another source of variationis in the differing franes of reference in which some problems loomlarge and others go unnoticed.

1'

Justice--Morality Over Legality

From the American perspective justice fs a hi* value involvinglegal and moral considerationstto about the sane extent.' In a verypractical context justice, is the proper implementation of the lay,through the courts, judges, and the police. As a moral principle itinvolves fairness, equality,.and rights.

Jordanians are preoccupied with moral principles and 'pay littleattention to the legal aspects of justice. Their most salientconsiderations are equality and rights, which in their view aremoral values closely t`ied in with affect-laden 'ideals and Islamicreligious beliefs. While Anericans think of law, Jordanians think oflove, brotherhood, and mutual help. Islam,' God;' and religion areimportant elements in the Jordanians ideeof justice..

Furthermore, as in the case of equality,,Jordanians view justicein relation to political institutions, the nation, government, anddemocracy as well as to society in general.. The Jordanians are

particularly articulate in stressing' the re.lationship between govern-nent and people, conveying the view that justice and the political'system are related. Along-the previously outlined diffeiences; whilecrime represents the antithesis of justice to Anericans, the Jordaniansthink of sla4ry and Palestinian camps-.,

.4e#

110

.14

°JUSTICE

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

hbin Components ofPerception

Courts, Judge', Lawyers

Law

Rights : Equal i ty, Fairness..

Love, Brotherhood

Peace , Securi ty

God, Islam

peroentage of total roe10 15

4

U.S.E]

Jordan i an

t

NOTE: For complete presentation of main percelitual components and,all U.S. and Jordanian responses, see,Appendix I, p. 31. .4

'figure 31

es

Ualit --A H h Ideal with Reli ious Connotations

Equality is a particularly important social value to the Jordanians

(as shown by the high dominance score, Appendix I, p. 32). Unlike the

Americans, they stre.ss general humanistic, religious principles and

the relationship of man and woman. The Americans expressed concern 4.

with the equality of people---particularly minorities, Blacks, women--

that is, with those who fail to receive their equal share in life.

for Americans equality ties in primarily with a sense of fairness,

while for Jordanians justice, rights, and Islam are the main value

considerations. Americans consider equality as a value often competing .0- .

with freedom, but to the Jordanians equality is mo re synonymous with

freedOM. From the Jordanian perspective both equality and freedpm .

are dependent on justi,ce and rights. Their Views have their robts in

tpe Islamic ethical rellgio`us traditions. Consistent with this

perspective they stress love, brotherhood, mutuality, and sharing.

111

Americans view equality as a matter of fairness, equal rights, ever' ,

chances , sameness , that. is , from an i ndi vi dual-centered perspecti ve 'buil t

on the moral .prindiple of equity, but frequently violatetl by dis-

crimination and prejudice.

, To Jordanians equality is a part of their idea of ideal linter-

personal relations as characteristic of religious communities built-

on the loye of one's neighbor. Those who violate these ideal precepts

are the racfsts and the odressors who perpetrate economic and

political.inequalities.on others. The uhequal distribution of jobs

and money is apparently a more salient concern to Jordanianrthan

to Americans, artd, differential levels of development, industrialization,

and production atio receive more reco§nitibn as we)].

EQUALITY

Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions

hUin Calpownts oflOception

People, Men & Women, Blacks

Rights, Justice, Freedom

Live, Security

Rel i gi on , Islam

Prejudi ce , Di scrimi nati on

Dmocracy, Socialism

5

Jordan i an

peroentage of Mica response15 Z5 30

C

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 32.

Figure 32

112

120

It is rather consistent with these perspectives that the

Jordanians pay also more attention to political systems like democracy

and socialism as.presenting human conditions which favor or hamper

equality.

Peace---A State of Security and Freedom

To Americans peace is a state of love and happiness, the opposite

of war. These are arpart of the Jordanian vieW of peace as well, but

their main thrust is somewhat different. The most important difference

is that Jordanians view peace a a function of international relations,

which depends on a nunber of important actors---nations, statesmen.NNnatiordl leaders, etc. The Jordanians have particularly in mind

Israel and Begin, Egypt and Sadat, the United States', Palestine, and

the Arabs'in general. While the Jordanians refer to Israel in

numerous other contexts as the enemy, the attention they give to

Egypt and Sadat here seems to indicate that the Jordanians see Sadat's

diplomatic efforts in close reTationship to peace.

PEACE

Main Differencds in U.S. &Jordanian Perceptions

&tin Components of Perception4

Love, Happiness

World, Nations

Rights, Freedom

Safety, Stability

Development, Advancement

Ferarntao of total resionse

0 5 5

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perwtual components and

'all U.S. and Jordanian responses,-serAppendix I, p. 33.

Figure 33

113

121

cr

The most desired conditions associated with peace in the J'ordaniao

mind are freedom, justice, and equalitY on the one hand, and security

and stability' on the other. As we have previously observed, these social

and political values stand high f0 n the Jordanian list of aspirations

and priorities. These desiderata receive very little attention from

. Americans, who think of peace more as a happy state, threatened by

the possiblity of war.

The Jordanians are more concerned how peace could be achieved.

Wle.Americantt speak of peace treaties in general, the Jordanians

'show .a,-distirict awareness of the Camp David agreenent and Peace talks.

is also interesting and encouraging to observe that the Jordanians

see'a' distilibt connection between peace and, development, economic

advancement and production. In general, Americans view peace as a

state they are eager'to maintain, and Jordanians see it more as a state

associated with freedom and justice which they wOulsi like to achieve.

Peace and the Jordanians' Social Frame of Reference

The social domain constitutes an important link between several

.domains of the, Jordanian fre of Teference.

, In contrast with the Anerican approach in which the individual is

the major point of reference, social copsiderations of broad perSonal

as well as collective/national nature are more primary and central to

Jordanians. The Jordanians seem to be p*articularlY concerned with

problems of social- and political Consequence: divorces; crimes, social

deviance, bad morals, war, vfolenie.: Americans show more concern with

how adverse social conditions, such as hunger, poverty; drsease, 'and

addiction,.affect the individual. While Americans focd on material

'dimensions (e.g etoinomic

and physical well being), to the Jordanians

social issues have stronger moral, religious impligations. They

perceive a close, intrinsic relationship between social conditions and

peace as a part of their moral philosophy.

.114

1

-e.

.11

It is not accidental that el the social issues examined here had

stiong rejigiOus and moralistic undertones fo? the Jordanians. They

express a strong, explicit concern with morality in general as well as

with religion and Islam. Religious and moral considerations in the'

Jordanian and Arabic context reflect'an intensi reoccupation with

proper interpersonal relations between people.

From the Jordanian viewpoint of morality and conscience human actions

are evaluated primarily on the basis of their social implications. This

explains why for Jordanians justice, equality, and peace involve strong

emotional tiei such as love and brotherhood. Furthervore, the

Jordanians' concern with just and equal human relations transcends the

interpersonal to the international realm.

The 4ocial issues examinedhere are nearly exclusively domestic

considerations to Americans. They involve fewer international-con-

sideratiOns like war and violence, racism and oppression, than they do

from the Jordaniavviewpoint. In the American contexl morality and religion

are considered to be a matter of individual choice, and each jerson acts

in acCordance with his own principles and conscience.

Peace naturally has international'implications to Americans as well,

but the JOrdanians' emphasis on peace as an international issue is partid-

ularly strong. They see some of their most.dominant national objectives,

such as developmeni2safety, and freedom,as dependent on peace. The

Jordanians' emphasis on safety and-stability; on work.and development,

together with their overall emphasis on peace, disarmament and-detente,

also indicates that peace is a dominant imely issue. Ws suggests that

Camp David did create some hopes and expectations in Jordan.'

One may ask how these general dispositions translate into actions

and developments actually promoting peace. Since the Jordanians were

repeatedly defeated in past military conflicts, they are.presently

limited in their potential for.Thlking peace initiatives. Perhaps

more attention could be directed to the possibility of the Jordanians

joining the Egyptians in their peace efforts. ng the countries

115

,123

mentioned in the context of:peace, Egypt held a leading position in the

_eyes of the Jordanfans. Similarly, Anwar Sadat---the chief engineer

ofGamp David---was one of/pKe Statesmen most frequently mentioned.

While the Jordanians made few direct references to Camp.David, probably

because of the Jordanian government's forual opposition, connections

perceived by Jordanians between peace and,those representing this peace

'initiative are close. This seems to indicate that as private citizens

Jordanians do. attach distinct hope to this option.

116

,

124

CHANGES IN JORDANIAN NATICINAL PERCEPTIONS SINCE CAMP DAVID

In 1977 a data collection similar to the one used in the present

study was performed at the University of Jordan in Amman on a comparable

student population. The availability of these comparable data acquired

three years before the Camp David accords makes it possible to explore

possible changes whieh may have taken place in this important period.

Jordan is not a participant but ha's frequently,been a critic of

these peace initiatives. This makes the comparison particularly in-

*teresting for two reasons. First, 'Jordan could-be congidered more or

less representative of the numerous other Arab states that did not join

in the peace initiative but:whose participation may be possible despite

frequent official criticisms----Furthermore, our earlier assessment

indicated that the Jordanians were haunted by the threat of an enemy.

Their strongly emotion-laden image of the enemy had obviously.

,influenced their entire frame-of reference. Had their imape of the

enemy changed or lost its intensity? There are some indications in.the

present5t6dy that Camp David and the role of Sadat are connected in .

the Jordanian minds with peace.

Since the two studies were not designed to be interrelated and

thus pverlap only on a few relevant issues, we cannot draw inferences

across all potentially relevant topics but must work within a mole

limited area of findings which offer less opportunity for testing internal

consistency. Keeping these limitations in mind, we will explore a. -

few more or less specific topics like the Jordanians' image of the

United States,.theirimage of the enemy, orwar, oppression, etc. We,

will try to trace to what 'extent Jordanian perceptions and priorities

have changed during these few critical years which separate our two_

comparative a'ssessments.

United States---Changes in the Jordanians' Image

A comparison of the Jordanian per.ceptions of the United States in

1977 and in 1980 indicates that a few characteristics have attracted

117

5

growing attention. The.Jordanians became much more conscious of and '

concerned about the super power status of the United States, stressing

the characteristin of power and strength. This represented the most

sizable increase. One source of their increased toncern appears to be

with the U.S.'s technological and economic potential. A more important_

source of their concern however, appears to be poliitical. Coloniza-

tion and oppression became much more strongTy attributed to the United

States. While references to war decreased, there were other references,

'to violence, killing, weapons, destruction of Islam, indicating negative

feelin s toward-the U.S-.. They also expressed,greater moral jtondemnation

in aceus ng the.U.S. Of having bad morals, taking advantage of the

world, and betraying other'nations.

UNITED STATES

Main Differences in,Jordanian Perceptionsti

Main Components of Perception

Power, Control

Technology, Proress

Colonization,,Oppress on

WeapOns, Killi g

Immoral, Un st

Freedom, Justice

1977 to.1980

peroentags. of tote responseO 15 20 Z5

19770.xx

1980 M:

OTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, IS. 34,

,

Figure 34

Parallel tO this growing concern with the trength and misuse of

power by the U.S., some of the more human, social elementi of the U.S.

image have faded. In_the human dimension the U.S. as a country, a

118126

people, a culture, attracted less interest. The political, organization- ..

al dimensions also appear to be less important now to Jordanians,

inciuding the role of specific national leeders, like Presidents

Carter and Nixon and Henry Kissinger, and the importance of the United

Nations:

While three years before the United States was seen in closer .

relationship to a variety of othdr nations, the Jordanians now mention

tied only with Israel,and although direct references to Israel also

decreased; Zionism received mare attention.

Another noticeable change is the lack of references to America,

which is due,to the fact that the Jordanians responded to "U.S.".

earlier,then to "America" in the present study. This semantic faetor

,would' partially account for the decrease in the dominance score (see

Appendix I, p. 34 ),which:would usually indicate a drop in interest in

the U.S. by the Jordanians.

Polttics---A Growing Concern with U.S. Foreign Policy

The U.S.-Jordanian comparison, has shown some fundamental dif-

ferences in theii- approaches totpolitics and some of these differences

have become accentuated in the last few years.

The single most outstanding contrast is that politics is:nearly

exclusively a. domestic issue for Americans, while it has a particularly

strong international and foreign policy dimension to Jordanians. The

importance of this international dimension-showed the strongest increase

over the last few years, with the U.S. assuming a particularly central

and dominant position: Similarly, Israel and the U.S.S.R. are seen as

playing a growing role as well.

second dimension involve's a growing emphasis on\socioeconomic\

development. From the Jordanian perspectives, these goals appear in

political contexts, while in our U.S. frame of reference, these are

typically economic in nature.

119

127

The most sizeable decreaseoccurred in the polAical science,

diplomacy, planning aspects of politics which three years earlier

indicated,a rather sophisticated concern with politics as a fiel'd of

scientific inquiry, or profession. These more theOPetical and-technical .

considerations have given, way to more immediate consjderations in

addressing pressing timely needs in the second assessment.- Considering

the above immediate priOrities, there was also somewhat less attention

given to political leadership and influence, to government and law.-

POLITICS

Main Differences in Jordanian Perceptions---197.7 to 1980

Main Cavonents cfPerception

Countries, U.S., Israel.

Goals, Development, Economy

Political Science, Diplomacy..

Leadership, Poiret.

Laws, Constitution

Government, Democracy

19 77

19 80peroentage of total response

10 15 ZO Z5

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix It p: 35.

Figure 35

Capitalism---More American, Less Negative

While capitalism was found in 1977 to be,strongly associated with

the United States and to be'rather negative in, connotation, the results

of.the new assessment are surprising.in two ways.

Capitalism, is now more strongly identified with freedom and

human rights and with the economic process of free enterprise. Another

positive change is that althOugh(Jordanians earlier viewed capitalism .

120

128

,

1.

as very closely connected with'oppression, exploitation, and

colonialism, some of these connections have weakened. Capitalism has

lost much of its previously negative connotation.

CAPITALISM

Main Differences in Jordanian Perceptions---1977 to 1980

hhin Carponents ofPerception

U.S.; Western Camp

-Freedom, Rights

Free Enterprise, Ownership -

Imperialism, Oppression

Economy,- Money, Profit

peroentage of total response10 15 to ?5

1977 E]

1980 W

.: -;:;;;;;;;;::i

NOTE: For complete presentation of'main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 36.

Figure 36

These changes suggest a positive deVelopment in-view of the strong

identification of capitalism with the American way of life. This

finding may appear to be inconsi'stent, however, with,our observation

that during:the last fewyears the United States has lost some of its

popularity.with the Jordanians and its image has become Wire negative.

To reconcile this apparent contradiction we-heed to consider U.S.

foreign policy, in relation to Israel, which seems to be at the very

core of t,he Jordanians' negativism. The negative feeiings which were

deepene during the most recent few years,since Camp David,seem to be

ot> centered on this foreign policy context and apparently are not

generalized automatically to all aspects of the its way of life,

its economic and social system, its techialogical', scie tific

121 129

achievements: These other'aspects of American life are not ignored but

simply overshadowed in a'period when U.S. foreign policy affecting the Middle

East appears of Litnost importance to the Jordanians:

The Enemy---Less Dominant, Less Negative Image, But More American

The Jordanians' intensive preocCupation with the enemy, found to be

. a most salient characteristiCin-the Jordanian-frame of reference in

1977, has decreased somewhat (see dominance scores).

-

ENEMY

Main Differences in Jordanian Perceptions ---1977 to 1980'

m2in Components ofPirception

Sickness, Instability, DiefrlocatiOn

Killing, Destruction

Bad, Despicable, Deceitful -

Israel, Jews

dIga.

poroentoge of total response1.0 ts to 15

.297:7

1980 :M

1

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components andall U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 37.

Figure 37

While there is similar concern with large-scale military actions

(wars, battles), there is nowi.more concern with violence directed

against single individuals, particularly with killings and other aCts

of violence such as torture and terrorism. This suggests a great deal

of internal tension.as well as feelingslof external threat. Explicit

references to hatred and fear.of the enemy have,decreased somewhat and

attention has turned more toward describing tribulations---sickness,

., 122

130_

instability, dislocation---perpetrated by the enemy. lso, accusing

the enemy of colonization and oppression has decreased somewhat,-at

least compared:to the extremely strong reactions obtained in 1977.

The enemy in 1977 was identified almost exclusively as Israel and

the Jews, but this-rather unequivocal identification has detreased

someWhat. From the angle of U.S. involvement it is revealing that

esplicit references to the United States have increased, suggesting

that the U.S. is presently viewed mor'e as a party directly involved in

the situation as an active ally Of Israel. This perception may

partially explain the deterioration of the U.S. image in the eyeS

of the Jordanians.

War---Less Conventional Military Actions, More Civilian Sufferings.

As previously observed,the Jordaniaps feel that their situation

neither one of peace nor war, at least imthe traditional sense. This

same impression is reinforced by looking at the changes in their view.of war

during the three yeai- period'.

In contrast to Americans who view war as a,frightening alternative

to peace, Jordanians do not see two mutually exclusive alternati.ves,

in the sense that the existenceof one would preclude the other. This

is probably due to the fact that half of our respondents are of, :44,,

Palestinian origin. They left their homeland in the context of war and

consider their dislocation as continuing anexistence that.is too un-

stable and violent to be viewed as peace.

in.1977 the Jordanians,have viewed the Arabs and

Palestinians as active participants together withi'Israel and the-United.

$tates, by 1980 they came to see only the latter two as associated

with war.

In general, in'their image of

fighting, battles, weapons, bombs,

of their previous salience because

military confrontatior-are fading

war the military elements=,

soldiers, armies, eic.---lost some

their, memories of large-scale

away. Yet their concern W4th death_.

123

1 31

1

and killing has not dithi ed since causali ies Continue to be suffered

fnmnguerrilla and terrorist -actiifties. Some f these concerns may be

based on first hand personal experience and oth rs from the accounts of

lc

friends and relatives in Jordan or in Is ael. Finally, there is also

extensive piress coverage -Oven to-guerri la activities and retali-,

atory measAes which haver-elentlessly,centinued over, the years.

WAR

Main Differences in Jordanian Perceptions

Alain Components offtrception

Terror, Hunger

Domination, Oppression

Peace, Freeclom

Nations, People

Fighting, Battle

1977 to 1980

A 1900peroentage of total response

10 15 tO z5

.7 TM: 7: 7: TT

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and -

all U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 38. .

Figure 38

To Jordanians terror, hunger,-and other htfinan sufferings are

consequences of a war prgduced by polittcal intents of domination

and oppression. The attention given to these human consequences has

increased draMatically. While memories of large-scale Military-con-.. .

frontations have faded, the human sufferippl which,persist givethe

Jordanians a view of war as an extended experience which gains weight

's and intensity in its timeliness.-

^

: 124

1 3

Peace---Less an Abstract Ideal; More an Imilediate Need

Considered in conjunction with.changes in the Jordanians'Subjective

view of war, the same atervations appear to be applicable to peace and

explain.most changes as well. Although the changes are somewhat

smaller,they similarly,characterize eiperiences in a "no war, nosr

peice" situation.

PEACE

Hain Differences in Jordanian Perceptions---1977 to 1980.L....s. '

144in Components of'Perception

)11orld, Nations

Rights,Freedom

War, Disarnament

'Religion

Love, Happiness

19 770pcmpentage of total response 19 80

10 15 tO 15

NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and '

all U.S. and Jordanian responses, see_Appendix I, p. 39.

Figure 39

In 1977 religious and moral considerations played an important

part in shaping the Jordanians' expectations regarding peabe. Love

and brotherhoodwere also seen as positive moral'forces. During the

last three years those hopes and beliefs have apparently lost some of

their strength.

4 In contrast, there is a 'growing concern with freedom and particu-

larly wtth rights and equality. As the various other contexts have

( revealed, these issues are not simply abstraCt,ideals to Jordanja.4,,

in their mind they are practical needs and protection against domination

and oppression which are their most dominant concerns.

The international dimension of peace also became more prominent.

Their mentioning of Egypt and Sadat reflects interest.in a new practical

alternative associated with peace. There is some growing awareness of

the roles of Israel, Begin, and the U.S. All of these spontaneous"

reactions suggest that the peaCe initative associated with Camp David

bas attracted considerable attention from the Jordanians. :They do not

dismiss it as readily as the Jordanian government spokesmen or voices

in the medja may suggest. In view of the predominantly negative nature

.of the official criticism, it does come as some surprise that the

direction taken at Camp David is viewed by Jordanians as a practical .

move which could serve peace.

Changes"Could Promote Rapproachment

Within the limited scolee of this comparative analysisiof changes

since the Camp.David agreements, our interest was focused on the

Jordanians' perception of the'U.S. role and iti-implications for the

future. 'A rather consistent picture emerges here. There are several

welcome changes which suggest a certain decrease in the intensity of

confrontation. The memories of.war seem to be fading, their preoccupa-

tion with the enemy also has decreased, and there are fewer references to

hatred and deceptiveneis.. These changes suggest that Jordanians do not

feel as intensely threatened, at least not in a strict military sense,

and they may be psycholo ally inore willing to consider a- compromise.

Their, concern With human suffering---death, torture, terror,

hunger---has greatly increased and they place the blame for these

sufferings on political intentions of domination, oppression and

colonization. While Israel was viewed earlier as the number one enemy,

the sole'power responsible for thit violence and suffering, presently

the U.S. is seen as a major contributor. The U.S. image shows con-

siderable deterioration and a certain refocusing and reordering along,

these same lines. This could mean a considerable loss in the U.S.'s

;26

134

potential to exert a positive influence'from a neutral mediating

position on Jordanian behavior. Yet there are some positive fndiCation's

that the Jordanians'views offer some opportunities as well.

The findings that Jordanians view Egypt's role and the leadership

of Sadat in close relationship to peace, along with other findings

such as.their longing for peace and thefr readiness to work toward

regional detente and disarmament, suggest that there are strong popular

dispositions-to welcome a Camp David type of tompromise, granted

reasonable assurances that it could work.

Jordanians' deep despair over the violence and human suffering which

they attribute to oppression and colonization could mike them also more

receptive to a compromise solution, particularly if active U.S.'involve-

ment can be shown to produce a just and viable settlement.

F4(thermore, th

that the Jordani , motivated by strong individual as well as national

self inprest, recognize the importance of economic development and

view peace as the prerequisite for achieving such a development. If

Gimp David can be shown to work, there seem to be strong enough popmlar

sentiments to press for joining in a compromise solution with Israel,

even if extremist elements in positions of political influence do maintain

less conciliatory attTdes.

are numerous indications throughout this study'

. 127

t

135 ,

1/4.

f

.;.*Wzr:i

SOME SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S.,

JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN, AND ISRAELI FRAMES OF REFERENCE .

The following analysis expands upon the U.S.-Jordanianmparison

in. two ways. In addition tO American and .Jordanian samples it also

includes 60 other national/cultural samples: Egyptians and Israelis.All these, groups were rnade up of matching studeip.samples (N=50) from

diverse fields of study and included males and feniales who were

comparable in age. The American sample was made up of studenth in

the Washington, DA., area. The-Jordanian sample was teSted at the

University of Jordan iri Aninan, and the Egyptian sample, at theAmerican Univesity in Cairo,. Data from these three groups wereobtained *

in 1977. The Israeli sanple was tested in 1979 at the Hebrew Universityin Jerusalem as part of a study condueted by- Rutgers University:

As a second line of extension the analysis has a broader scope.The comparisons are based on results obtained in ten domains .of life,

each represented by eight relevant issues.

While the previous analysis used the perceptions of selectedspecific issues as a point of departure, the following analysis relieson general perceptual and motivational trends. These trends emerge

across several issues and domains and reflect broad general pre-dispositions affecting each national/cultural group's views and

attitudes in many specific contexts.

The conparison of Jordanians and Affericans with' regard to theirperceptions of specific issues revealed sont consistent trends.Americans tend to perceive several of the issues in the framewprk.ofthe super power confrontation, giving special attention to the dangerscreated ty nuclear weapons. *The Jordanians, on the -other hand, tend

to 'view the international issues in relation to their cOnfrontation

with_Israelsand thereby disregard or ignore the threat of nuclear

128

136 .

holocaust. Americans were also found to look at social issues from

viewpoint of the individual, while the Jordanians considered the

socdetal viewpoint or,the't of Arab natiOns.

To trace such general trends which reflect the perceptual pre-

dispositions characteristic of particular groups, a computerized analysis

"was performed on all reactions produced by.the four groups to 80 istues

representing ten major domains of life (seeAppendix'1, p. 40). The

procedure is briefly outlined in Appendix II (p. 8), and the results of

this analysis are presented.in tne following tables. The score values

rdflect how much weight a particular perceptual or motivational trend

accumulated from eaCh group in the context of the same l'arge sample of

issues. Since all four groups responded.to the same issues, score

differences m4y be interpreted as refleeting genuine differences in

their perceptual and motivational p-redispositions.

Within-group differences are somewhat less readily inter-

pretable since the topics and issuei included in the study do not

provide a complete, balanced representation of all domains of life. For. .

instance, there were no themes representing thelnteftainment domain,

so it would be wrong tb conclude from their lack of references to

entértainrient that this domain of life is 'unimportant to them. For

domains that were not represented at all in the saMpling of themes used

in the study,'the reactions are likely to underrepresent those areas ,

compared to domains well represented (e.g., international relations

and politics):

/ °

The focus of the analysis is clearly on broaA-brush character-

izations of the groups based on the culturally shared psychological

predispositions of their members. The groups are cnaraCterized by

such broad terms as individualism, nationalism, and economic.motivation,

yet as we have seen in the previous anab4is, some of these issues;\

like,the concept of economy, are seen from a drastically different

perspect4ve by Amtricans and Jordanians. Since it would be tedious

to repeat theie findings, we2W1A-make only occasional references to

mind the reader of these difference.

129

137

International Relations---The Dominance of the Arab-Israelt Conflict

The aadition of two other countries to the U.S.=jordanian

comparison helps place our findings imbroaderoperspectives.

Table,1dDOMAIN: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Response Clusters'

Total Group Score

Anerican Jordanian Egyptian Israeli

U.S., America 1295 336 450 880

Jordan 23 202 7 52

.Egypt 189 111 1008 376

Israel 497 247 359 2641

Ruisia, U.S.S.R. 153 83 54 376

Other Countries, Nations 270 62 33 166

Arabs, Palestinians 492 9.96 618 1282

Jews, H7brevis 539 186 316 1021

Country, Nation 913 1339 1251 1565

Race, Origin 421 276 350 425

International 411 191 159 245

Places, Regions 246 52 30 210

The Americans, rsraelis and Egyptians show a natural focusing of

interest on their own countries. This national'interest is particularly'

strong among the'Israelis along three points: (a) their country

(Israel), (b) their ethnic identity (Jews, Hebrews), and (c) their

general emphasis on country and nation as important concepts. Among

Americans national identification (U.Si, America, American) is

important but not i separate racial identification.

The Jordarlians rank first in identifying themselves as Arabs.

Although they stand in list place in speaking of their own country

.130

138

(Jordan); they show the strongest tendency to itress nation and

national identity. These trends suggest a Jordanian predisposition

to stress 'comon Arab, ethnic ties rather than territoriality in

defining their national identity., 0.

In regard to the level of international awareness and involve-,

nent, the Americans., as a leading world power, show a widely spread

interest in various countries, continents, international organizations,

etc. The Israelis' concern is mainly with their adversaries, Arabs

as well as Russians.

Our previous finding that the Jordanians show much greater interest

in the role of the U.S. than the U.S.S.R. is reinforced here andthe

same seems to be true about the two other Middle Eastern countries

as well.

Politics and Government---Procedural vs. Leadership Perspectives

There is a rather clear-cut split of interest here between

political process and political systems.. The politica] process--

political parties, elections, voting---has high salience to Americans,

while the various political systems--7democracy, socialism, communism--

are of more interest to the Jordanians as 'well as the Israelis. The

Jordanians are especially interested in capitalism, particularly

compared with comunism.

A second dimension in which Jordanians and Americans differ is

leadership. The American focus is on government and governmental

organization, while the Jordanians think primarily of national leader-

ship and high offices. It is quite consistent with their focus on

leadership and high office that our Arab samples show more intensive

interest in authority and 'other qualities of leaders and rulers..

The Jordanians-and Egyptians also appear'to be more concerned about

problems related to power and control. ;The Israelis and the

Anericans are strongly impressed by the role and. performance'of

specific leaders, famous historical figures, statesnen. It is

131

3:° f

interesting to note that the Israelis expnessed about equal interest

in Sadat and Begin, while Nasser captured more'Egyptian interest

than Sadat.

'Table 2

DOMAIN: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Response Cluiters

Total Group Score

AMerieeniJordanian Egyptian Israeli

Politics, Parties,Electionem. 624 361 476 -620 _

Political Systems, Isns 726 1392 594 1186

Government, Organization

leadership, Nigh Office

867

468

345

894.

535

. 414

464

311

Famols Presidents,Statesmen 1026 180 '655 1394

Authority, Rule 194' 306 680 216

Power, Control 1152 1471 1608 1062

Generally.speaking, Americans are primarily interested in the

sources and Organization of political power, whili the Arab groups

appear to be more impressed by leadership and leadership qualities.

"Mk

War, Military---Peace or Oppression

Mar and.peace.appear to be pervasive issues in the Israelis'

thinking. They.seet especially preoccupied with war and other

military considerations. The Jordanians also express a great deal

of concern with the.yar/peace alternatives. Compared to the other

groups, the.Jordanians show the most concern with the enemy and with

the possibility of defeat, losses, and failure, which is under-

standable in light.of the repeated defeats they have sdffered in past

military coOrontatjons. These past.experiences may also account for

the Jordanians' extreme preoccupation with other consequences of

132

140

military defeat:. namely, occupation and domination as well as

oppreSsion and tyranny. 'The Egyptians share these vfews to some extent,

although their concern with the enemy and their feelings of threat,

danger, and fear are more moderate. ,

Table 3

DOMAIN: WAR, MILITARY

Response Clusters

Total GrouP Score

American Jordanian Egyptian Isr6eli

Wars, Military 1303 1556 1237 3053

Enemy 35 236 218 101

Killing, Violence 799 676 830 769

Victory, Defeat 219 321 286 95

Occupation, Domination 14 10602 254 20

Oppression, Tyranny 132 925 636 114

Peace 521 1317 865 1913

These indicators suggest that the Egyptians take a generally more

relaxed posture in regard to Military confrontations than do,the

Jordanians.. The Egyptians' attitude seems tote consistent with the

position taken by Presilent Anwar Sadat in his foreign policy (i.e.,

his willingness to enter into peace negotiations with Israel, which

led to the Camp David agreements. The results suggest that, aside

frOm Sadat's statesmanship, the public sentiments facilitated such a

rapproachment.

Our assessment was infrtative in showing that sore of our most

pressing concerns are actually not important concerns of the Jordanians.

Such military issues as SALT II, proliferation, and nuclear weapons

were found to have low priority for the Jordanians. This conclusion

is reinforced here by the fact that the military isSues which bear

133

0..

/

primarily on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. super pOwer confrontation did not -

emerge to any noticeable extent in the present comparative analysis.

Self and _Society---Indiviclualism vs. Primary Grdup Identification

Thite...patterns of social orientation emerge here. . They each bear

on how people Interact with their social environment. The American

emphasis is clearly on the self. The individual receives less attEntiony.om the jsreelis and even less from-the two Arab groups. The American

sees himself in interaction with two major human components in- his

social environment: One is the general aggregate of individuals tobe dealt with on a one-to-one basis, and the other is the family,probably the only social unit truly recognized in Anerican society.Americans do recognize sotial classes but only as categories helpfulin making distinctions between people according to status, livingconditions,' incone, etc. Society receives the least attention fromAmericans because to them'it is such an abstract concept with little,practical value.

Table 4.

DOMAIN: SELF AND SOCIETY

Response Cl usters

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Egyptian [Israeli

'Society, Groups,- Neighbors 316 868 .431 420

Social Classes, SocialStatus 646 163 344 334

Self, Me, Individual 1645 347 627 960

People, Human Beings 1525' 1421 1713 1848

Man, Woman, Sex 432 346 691 -701

Masses, Crowd§ , 278 204 234 214

Family, Relatives 1246 1375 2083 1530

Love, Friendship 2143 1938 2673 2393

, .(

This pattern is almost reversed for the Arab groupS; Oarti6ularly

the Jordanians. ordanians pay little attention to the individual or

his class positi n. Family is very important to both Arab groups and

not only because f the role of the individual family members. Finally,

in t e eyes of the Jordanians, societx is a very.important,concept,

closely related to nation. The social interest of Jordanlans and

of Arabs in general is primarily oriented toward the group rather than

the individual; thertend to think of themselves as memebers of their

family, their community, andpeir nation. The Israelis seem to

represent a combination of iWiquerican individual orientation and the

Arab social group orientation.

All four groups stress the importance of affective ties such as

love, friendship, and brotherhood. The Egyptians speak more of love,

the Israelis of friendship, and the Jordanians, of brotherhood. The

extent to which the cultural meantngs of love varies---whether the

emphasis is on sexual rapport, individual needs, or social commitment--

becomes apparent from the results of a more inclusive study of American

and Arab groups.*

Money, Economy, Work---The U.S.-Arab Contrast

Qn economic and work related themes considerable similarities can

be seen in the U.S. and Israeli views, on the one hand, and the Egyptian

and Jordanian views,on the other. The split is between countries that

are more developed and less-developed economdcally. Money, business,

economy, and inflatiOrihave htgh dominance for the U.S.-, and'Israelj,

groups; they reflect the importatice given to financial COniideritions

as the driving forces of an advanced economy. The prioritigiven to

energy and oil is part of this same syndrome.

L.B. Szalay, A. Hilal, J.P. Mason, R. Goodison, and J.B. Strohl,U.S.-Arabic Communication Lexicon of Cultural Meanings: Interpersonal

and Social Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative

Social and Cultural Studies, Inc., 1978).

1351 43

a

4

z

Table-5

DOMAIN: MONEY, ECONOMY, WORK

Response Clusters

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Egyptjan Israeli

Money, Business 1535 726 , 1 350 1438

Economy, Inflatten #.542 210 192 554

Wealth, Prosperity 329 494 '712 382

Development, Progress,Change 552 1299 848. 552'

Achievement, Accomplishment 292 574 311 160,

Industry, Production, Trade 72 494 32 25

Work, Effort 960 1002 1569 875

Action, Doing -59 279 35 51

Energy, Oil 710, 174 211 654

Cooperation, Help 138 1089 416. 305

Poverty, Sickness, Hunger 444 563 918 474

The contrasting syndrome characterizing the two Arab groups is

formed,of.priorities given to issues essential to economic develop-

ment. The leading factors are development, progress, achievement, work,

industry, and production. These stress the mobilization of manpower

resources and production. 'Both Arab groups pay consistently more

attention to these factors than do the Americans or Israelis. Further-

more, the Jordanians pay mole attention to these factors than do the

Egyptians. The Jordanians' emphasis on development, work, and

cooperation conveys an exCeptionally strong motivation for Rational

development. The pattern is clear and in good agreement.with other

findings which show a strong Jordanian interest in advancement and

economic development.

The comparative datalhere alsq underscore the previous findings

which.show soue classic differences in the American and Jordanian

136.e -1 4 4

k

approaches to econonw: the Jordanian position which,epitomize-s- the -

developmental philosophy of an underdeveloped country and the American.. a

position which reflects the perspective of a highly developed country

concerned with dangers of recession, inflation, depression, etc.,

Dominant AspirationsJuitice, Freedom, Happiness

The emphasis placed on goals, needs, and wishes generally reflects

the intensity of people's motivation to meet their desires and interests.

While hopes and wishes are more vague, goals and aims imply more

specificity and planning. The four groups compared do not show, any ,

striking differences; their motivational levels appear to be.'similarly4

htgh.

.Table 6

DOMAIN: DOMINANT ASPIRATIONS

'Response Cl usters

Total Group Score ,

Ameri can Jordanian Egyptians Israel iGoals, Aims

Inportant, Needed

Hopes, Wishes

Justice, Equality

Freedom, Independence, Liberty

Togetherness, Unity

Happiness, Joy

124

655

243

964

962

899

441

214

751

419

1482

1107

277

858

33

999

408

1.110

1117

393

551

44

990 ,

400.. . . .

1111

., . 704. ,

-- 356- -

-- 680 :

Justice and equality are emphasized particufgrly by theiordanians.

Freedom and independence are also stressed by the Jordanians, while ,

liberty is enphasized more by Americans than by any of the other grcitips.

Happiness is an objective stressed somewhat more by the Jordanians

and Israelis than by the.other two groups.

137

145:

7'

Interestingly, togetherness appears here, as in pany other cross-cultural comparisons, to represent a salient Anerican need. It conveysthe need of the individiral- to aSsoci'ate with others on a fretvoluntary basis to avoid the feeling of loneliness.*

.0Education and Knowledge---The Influence of Developnental Perspectives

This domain was not included in our detailed discussion of U.S.-Jordanian findings, but.since the respondents were students, acomparison, of the four groups' interest in issues involving educationand knowledge is of some relevance here.

-Table 7

DOMAIN: EDUCATION, KNOWLEDGEf

Response Cl us ters

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Egypti an Israeli

Education, School 851 550 905 1106 4

Science, Knowledge -_ u 306' *656 472 .295

Thought, Ability,Intel 1 igence 32 874 911 316

Opinions , Comuni catkin',Decisions 400 594 434 142

Unknown, Nonexistent 198 122 245 160

Education as a prOcdss arid the role of the teacher are particularlysalient to-the Israelis, Americans emphasize the role of the schools,.and the Arab groups emphasize studying and learning. The Arab groups

also stress knowledge as the purpose of stuckying, Somewhat unexpectedlythey also stress science rather heavily. This may be a pait of theirconcern with national developnent, which stresses the need to workand to develop human resourceg.

* D. Riesman, The Lonely_Crowd (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1950).

138.

116

There is a cpnsistently higher Arab

IP

hasis on thought, abiiities,

and intelligence.. Since we found in theIpeciffc context of under-development that Jordanians made refere;ces to educational backwardness,

this.emphasis on mental abilities cOuldbe a part of their,general .

concern to catch up with the.developed nations,

.. The cluster of reactions involving opinions, communications, and'

//

mmr decisions refers predominantly to the political counication process - --

/// diplomacy, negotiations, the press. l'his again illustrates the more

. politically oriented Arab frame of reference, how timely political, (_.

nationalQconterns spill over into seemingly apolitical; intellectual

dpmains.

Law, Customs, Duty - --Internalized Law or External Obligations

These three response trends reflect internal mechanisms which

regulate how people.interact with others. Certain habits and custons

represent universal regulatory mechanisms; they prescribe what people

should or should not do. All four groups' show a strong awareness

of the role of customs and culture.

Table 8/

DOMAIN: LAW, CUSTOMS, DUTY

Response Clusters

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Egyptian Israeli

Law, Constitution 1172 800 675, 1015

Customs, Culture 1630 1352 1661 1148

Duty, Obligation 481 1444 1488 307

Laws and constitution represent more formal and more explicit

regulations passed down from legislative authorities. The U.S. and

the Israeli groups place greater emphasis on these than do the Arab

groups. 'A sense of duty and obligation regulates behavior toward

139'

147

'7

1

0 ,other individuals or groups to whom a person feels comitments(or

identifications. This is the mechanism dominant in "other-oriented"

groUps (rather than inner-oriented ones, acdording to Rotter)*and in

"shame" cultures (rather than guilt cultures, as defined by Benedict).**

Our'Arab respondents stress the inportance of these inner controls of

duty and obligation.

Religion, God---Modest Differences in the Focus of Attention

This domain also falls beYond the scope of our original inquiry.Religion as a subject receives the least attention from the Jordanians,

although both Arab groups stress the importance of faith and religious

belief, the role of Allah and the importance of religious identities:

Christian, Muslim, Jew.

Table 9 f

DOMAIN: RELIGION, GOD

Response Cl usters

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Egyptian Israeli

Rbligion 919 956 802

God, Allah 989 1030 13154 526

Faith, Beliefs 509 957 786 b24

Soul, Spirit 210 515 620 417

Christian, Muslim, Jew 392 819 846 608

Church, Temple, Mosque 733 732 716 472

Priests, 'Prophets 250 381 430 396

Biple, Koran 315 388 147 433

Holy Places, Pilgrimage 143 346 259 206

* J.B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal Vs. ExternalControl of Reinforcement," Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, 609.

** R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1946). ..

140 148

To Americans _the church, both as an organized religious affiliation

and as a building, has high salience, while the soul and spirit receive

the least attention, at least compared with the other groups. The

related key notion is truth.

Personality Characteristics--Self vs. Other Orientation

The personality attributes stressed by the four nationa

cultural broups reflect different views and priorities in inter-personal relations.

,

Table 10.

DOMAIN:SPERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Response Clusters/

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Ejyptian Israeli

Good, Kind 1155 1070 909 2218

Honest, Sincere 1188 803 802 673

Proud, Courageous 472 722 454 139

Loyalty, Fidelity 140 512 521 110

Bad, Evil 720 332 739 1123

Decepti ve , Corrupt ' 479 617 553 231

Misc. Characteristics 101,

329 421 152

The cltracteristics most valued by. Americans are honesty and

truthfulness. This is fundathentally in line with the inner-directed,

individualistic personality type dominant in Am6ican society.

Courage and pride are particularly valued by the Jordanians.

Loyalty and fidelity, which represent other:directed personality'

characteristics, are also important to both Arab groups. Of the

negative personality charactersitics, deception and corruption were,

considered the worst by the two Arab groups. They tend to strtss

attributes implying social commitment, which is in agreement with

141

149

their emphasis on the family and nation as major sources of

i den ti fi cati on .

The Israelis tend to evalUate peOple, issues, or situations as

good or bad. They shOw an even stronger tendency to use evaluative terms

than the Americans? who are usually the strongest on this predisposition.

Whether the 'Israelis' evaluations are nlade from the angle of thek

individual or the grchip cannot be determined on the basis of the above

results, but the findings n individuaVand group orientation (see data

on self and society) suggest that the Israelis try to combine both.

ExistenceProblems, Anxieties

Beyond general concerns with life and existence, each group's

interests are focused on different problems. Problems in general

receive more attention from the Arab groups.

Table 11

DOMAIN: EXISTENCE

Response Cluiters

Total Group Scbre.

Aneri can Jordanian .Egypti ani Israeli

Li fe Exi stence 1413 1203 1538 1127

Problems , Di ffi cul ti es 257 584 719 299

Age, Old and Young 958 294 292 622

Hatred, Discrimination 213 470 661 427

.Fear, Anxiety 233 508 198

Sadness, Sorrow 227 124 118 97

Of the specifit problems, Americans see aging as parti.cularly

Important. By contrasting young and old and by their may references to

the disadvantages of-aging, 'there appears to be a cultural sensitivity,

little shared by the Arab'groups. Other reactions show, indeed that Arabs

do not regardiage as a special disadvantage. The unquestionable physical

142

150

L.

handicap are compensated by respect, esteem; and other social regards.

The Arab groups express strong concern with negative feelings and exiiress

,fears and anxieties. The negative-feelings Ixpressed.are the strOngest

from the E tians: they involve hatred, tigotry, racism, and

discriminationthat is, complaints -with distinct racial and political .

undertones., Explicit reactions of fear and-anxiety are strongest from

the Jordanians. Although in their minds fear and cowardice are closely

related and courage and pride are highly valued virtiki, we still-find

explicit 'Jordanian references to fear, danger, anxieties, and w

These explicit references agree, with our`previous observations

Jordanians' concern with ,domination, oppression, and threat is

and suggests a high level of anxiety.

Miscellaneous Issues, Concerns

orries.

that the

intensive .

This last category of response trends has little relevance to

international relations but we include them here to provide a complete

presentation df all the salient elements that athined a score of 30.4or higher by one or more of the four groups compared.

-4:

Table 12

DOMAIN: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES, CONCERNS

4, Response Cl usters

Total Group Score

American Jordanian Egyptian Israeli

'Nature , Envi roriment

Appearance, X,00ks

Physical Attributes.

Fun, Sports, Travel

Things, Places

Time, Duration

Symbolic Reacti'ons

Miscellaneous

538

590

1851

694

765

1038

374

675

185

476

.214

447'

103

830

158

-403

444 175

747 566

371 914

526 333

597 448

723 1126

224 241

200 518'

0

143

Traditional public,opinion .surveys focus on issues the investigator

feels are inportant; they may or may not,cover issues that are actuallyr

important to the group studied. The approach presented here allows for

. a more inclusive reconstruction of the system of perceptual representation

characteristic of the group studied. The results errern across a broad

variety of key issues and important domains of life. The differential

priorities and concerns resulting from the comparison offer broad-based

inferences on what is important to one group or the other.

The Main Contrast

The comparative presentation of the main perceptual and motivational

trends is brief enough to.make a summary superfluo,us. Yet there is one

trend which dese)ies.sone additonal attention here because of its

broad importance and explanatory -value and its hidde9, nature. It

bears on the much discussed characteristics of individualism. Although

a great deal has been written about this topic in view of its relevance

to the Anerican psyche, itstill remains controversial.partially becaute

of divergent views but mainly because of the scarcity of clear-cut

empirical Eividence.,

In light of the results just reviewed, the reactions of the U.S.

group indicate a clear preference for the individuaTittic alternative

in all social cOntexts. In the context of social units the Anerican

score highest on "me" and "egos,,,', in the context of personality

characteristics they score highest on attributes discribing a i)erson with

indtvidual autonomy, honesty, integrity; and in the context of human

values' the Americans placed the strongest emphasis on freedom.

The Jordanians and the Egyptians show a contrasting tendency

toward group identification or group affillation. In the context of

social units they score the highest on primary groups, family. In Vie

context of personality attributes i'hey stress socially relevant ones -

such as loyalty and fidelity. They also emphasize social commitment:

duty and dbligation. The vailues and aspirations most frequently

rrentioned by the Jordanians convey social undertones to justice and

equality.

,

144

These broad contrating trends are inportant,both for their

political implications as well .as for ihe insights they convey about the

very nature of culturally ased psychological/behavioral dispositions.

The, political implications are clear when we consider how our individu-

alism ties in with our pragmatic, process-oriented approach to political

problems, Ovich tacitly assures that in the final analysis politics

is, or should be, an aggregate expression of individual self interest.

How the Jordanians'.group-oriented approach to life leads to nationalism -

and to political perspectives fundanentally different from.ou'rs

beconis apparel-it in the previous analysis.

These two main patterns.of interpersonal relations tell us a

great deal about the nature of nati.onally shared psychological

dispositions. The findings suggest that the realm of interpersonal

relations maybe the :one most critiCallY affected by cultural background.

How people relate to themselves and to each other vai.ies a great deal

-rim country to coUntry. ,The cultural background, social environnent

and experiences that people living in a particular country share

affect most significantly how they perceive and interact with others---

including themselves, their imnediate social environnent (family,

friends, coworkers) and social organizations, close and distant.

These naturally include- all the people and sociai institutions essential

to their political views and behavior.

Our recent comparative stucky of Anglo and Hispanic Americans,

systematically sanpled to represent different sex, age, and incone

groups, produced similar finding-S: namely, that divergent patterns of

interpersonal relations are at the core of cultural differences.

Although we have elaborated here wily on the JordaRians, the four

group conparison indicates across most of the domains 'stir-died that

'Egyptians and Jordanians showgefttally similar...trends. The Israelis'

occupy, a position sonewhere between the Arabs and the Anericans.

* 145 1534

METHODOLOG I CAL CONCLUS I ONS

As stated at the outset, the AGA method used in this study q not

a survey technique. As a method of indepth assessment it suggests a

useful techrique to comPlement opinion surveys, particularly in oyarseas

appli cations.

Although social science research methodology is not his major field,

.Henry Kissinger made the following observation about asking delicate

judgmental questions in the Middle East:*

Whether in the Israelis' Talmudic exegesis or the Arabs'tendency toward epic poetry, the line is easily crossedbeyond what the pragmati c West woul d consider empi ri cal

reality into the sphere of passionate rhetoric and therealm of human inspiration, Woe to the unwary outsiderwho takes this linguistic.exuberance literally and seeksto find .4., sol uti on by aski ng adversaries what _they -reallymeant. ,e'

Whether Kissitner had a specific case in mind is uncertain, but

Joan Peters' analysis in Comentary (Summer 1975) provides a relevant

example. In interviews with members of Egypt's political elite she.

asked questions using affect-laden issues like Zionism and in turn

received highly emotional reactions in the "passionate Aetoric",

Kissinger alludes to. She mistook theM for the Egyptians' actual views.

and concluded that the Egyptians are deeply hostile toward Israel with

little hope in sight- for normalization. Her article, "In Search of,

*Henry Kissi*ger, White House Years (Boson: Little, Brown, andCompany, 1979), pp: 342-343.

.146'

15 4

Egyptian Moderates," ended with a pessimistic conclusion to be refuted

by the Egyptian position at Canp David. at'

The difficulties of assessing people's perception's and opinions are

not limited naturally to the Middle East. An extensive review of the

literature on national- perceptions has shown the various types of concerns

scholars have with how to adapt opinion surveys to provide useful

information on foreign populations.* As Cantril has pointed out,

an accurate assessment of foreign perceptiOns is practically impossible

if we force .people to niake choices between 'our' categories, alternatives;

symbols or situations as this is done by the usual type of questionnaire. **

We have advocated a "representational" approach which aims to reconstruct

,people's perceptions and motivations in the context of their view of

the world.

The U.S. and Jordanian findings provided the subjective representa-

tions of selected topics and issues as they are generally perceived by

these two national groups. The findings demonstrate the need for

representational assessnents in at least two important ways.

First, the differences found in the American and Jordanian perceptions

of specific issues, from development to economy, made it abundantly

clear that unless these differences are known, the findings of Jordanian

survey results on similar issues are likely to be misunde.rstood. Jordanians

resOonding 'to a question involving econony will respond with their idea

of economy in mind, while Americans will interpret the Jordanian reactions

along their own view.of economy.-

Secondly, as is shown again and again in the findings, the Jordanian

perception of individual' issues like politicsi economy, or peace are

closely interrelated. They form a network of interdependent perceptions---

*L. B. Szalay and J. Bryson Strohl, National Perceptions: Critical I

Dimensions, Policy Relevance and Use (Waitangton, D.C.: Institute of

..

Comparative ,Social and Cultur 1 Studies, Inc., 1980). .

W. Buchanan and H. Can ril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: ,

University of Illinois Press 1953).

4,r4

147 155

what we have labelled their system of perceptual representation, or

what is simply their world view. The Jordanians' perceptions of single

issues are influenced by such factors as the acute political-military .

confrontation, their feelings of threat,and striving for national

development. These emerge as perspectives which are built into their view

of the world and which affect their-perceptions of manysspecific issues

. and events. I.

The Jordanians, like everyone else, are un-aware that their perceptions

are not shared univerially. _Nor do they realize the extent to which their

thinking is influenced by their system of perceptual representation.

This lack of awareness explains why questions aiming at judgments and

opinions, even if*they are Candidly answered, have only limited chance

to reproduce people's.perceptual and motivationit dispositions built'-

into their system of representation.

The representational approach, as illustrated here with the Jordanian

data, does reproduce perceptual and motivational conponentS in their

subjective intensity and reveal perceptual trends that are below awareness.

The need to complement opinion data with representational data

increases as a direct function of "cultural distance." In our own cultural

environment we have generally the iame ideas of what econonwor government

is although our judgments about what form they should take or what

actions are needed frequently vary (e.g., do the ills of our economy come

from too much or too little control?). Since in domestic contexts we

are clear about what the implications of each option are, opinion data

on how many people share one or the other position are very informative.

In dealing with countries where the backgrourids and experiences

of the people may be very different from the American, many of the

dominant issues will not represent the same thing that they do to

Americans; the greater ihe differences_, the greater the need to complement

opinion data with representational data.

This, conclusion naturally has invlications in regard to the five

v nethodological problems we identified in our inquiry.with policy officials.

148

156

With regard to the most_useful _policy relevant variables, the answer

is not simple but is inherent in our preceding conclusion. It suggests

that the choice depends on the characteristics .of the country under

consideration. If the populations are culturally close---e.g., the

democrati-c societies of Canada, Australia or Western Europe--.-traditional

public opinion surveys can offer informative, readily interpretable data.

When dealing with countries from Asia or Africa where the cultures are

vastly different from ours, opinion data need to be used in combination

with representational data. Representational data are indisPensable for

deciding what issues are truly dominant in the minds of the people in

question. Similarly, they are critical in showing.how their perceptions

and meanings of the relevant issue4 are different from ours. Such

insights are estential to gafn full benefit' from opinion results.

With regard to the most useful information source, the above research

.principle suggests that we should rely on opinion survey research

capabi 1 i ties wherever they are avai 1 able . Furthermore, representational

information as offered by cultural anthropology, ethno-science, social

psychology, and intercultural communiCation research should be sought

for countries that are culturally more distant and not readily open or

accessible to attitude and opinion surveys:

It is important to recognize that there is a great deal of variation

within contemporary opinion surveys with regard to their potential to

shift from purely judgmental toward more representational modes of inquiry:

Highly structured multiple-choice strategies, for instance, are generally

judgmental and constrained, while open-ended questions and indepth

interviews can provide broader and better representational insights.

With regard to the effective use of authentic experts, the above

principle has two main implications. First, indepth familiarity with

the foreign group is essential. This requires first-hahd expbrience

involving living among them, at is usually a part of anthropological

training. Second, area expertise in the hunan dimension should be

evaluated by some enpirically based indepen ent criterion data. .

149

157

A

With regard to the question of whose views should be assessed, a

representational focus siinplifies the dilemma.' Perceptual/representationaldifferences wit in the same nation/culture are much narrower thanjudgmental dif erences that could be expected to exist in 'varioussegnents of the society. This is because shared native background and

experienCe produces a certain homogeneity across the social classes and

strata. Some leading anthropologists like Margaret Mead suggest thata culturally representative sampling can be based on simpler serplingstrategies than those posed4by public opinion research which callsfor statistically representative sampling of broad national populations.Recent research findings show that representational differences withinthe same country are distinctly smaller than between different countries.*This irhplies that by testing groups of comparable educational and r

.so.cioeconomic tiackgrout-td,.(e.g.,students),it is possible to assess- ,., -

national/cultural perceptual trends which are generalizeble to thepeople at large and to a certain extent to -the elite as well.

With regard to the last and most practical question of how todi fférenti ate val i d from bi ased i nformati cin , primary data suggest

our only natural resource. .Since our cultural perceptions prevent usfrom seeing the world the way Jordanians do, and since they are unawareof how their own perceptions differ from ours, primary data derived fromarallel tests may be the only' way to identify differences objectively

along their natural dimensions and in their actual proportions. The

spontaneous-, free Jordanian reactions reveal, indeed, perceptions andmotivations which could h.ardly have been provided by an outsider, justas the U.S. reactions reflect characteri.Stic psychological and behavioraldispositions which could not have been predicted by someone unfamiliar

with the American culture.

The simplicity and directness of opinion survey dath and the depth

- and infe);ential nature of the perceptual-representatiOnl data offer a

*Lorand B. Szalay,, Won T. Moon, and Jean A. Bryson,- Comunication.Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences: Domains Family, Education, andInternational Relations (Kensington, Ad.: American Ihstitutes forResearch, 19731.

150

158

416.

powerful combination when used together. In the field of international

relations a confined and coordinated use of these two research strategies

promises a much desired flexibility. To obtain maximum benefit the

components of this two-pronged approach have to be planned together,

but the data should be collected separately to provide for two independent

data sets which can be compared and cross-validated. ,

Opinion assessments are required more frequently because of the

frequent changes in peoples' attiudes and judgnents. Within a single

presidential term, for instance, opinions regarding the president's

social, economic, and foreign policies go through considerable fluctua-

tion, as does his popularity. The perceptual-representational assessment

does not have to be performed as.often since people's basic patterns of

thinking do not chan-ge fast. The basic differences between how Amerticans

and Jordanians perceive e6onomy, for example, reflect much more stable

predispositions. These funaainehial di'ffereneet'in cUltOral Tequire

recognition in the interpretation of any new public opinion results which

involves U.S.-Jordanian comparisons.

The opinion survey can be focused very specifically on single issues

(e.g., "supply econorry" or tax cut). ,The perceptual-representational

strategy, on the other hand, has to be more holistic; it has to encompass

the dominant priorities of the foreign culture group to be trkily informa--

tive about their way of thinking. For instance, without covering the

issues of 'national development, the Jordanians' frame of itference

would probably not be clearly understood.

To offer: generalizable, useful infbrmation the opinion surveys have

to meet the requirements of statistical representativeness;- this requires

the use of large samples and elaliorate sampling procedures. To be valid

and informative a representational assessment can be performed on

matching samples of relatively small size (N = SO). For example, three

foreign iamples (students, workers, farmers) from a foreign country,

compared with U.S..samples matching in age, sex, and educational

composition, can provide timely information on basic cultural differences

in perceptions. They can also inform on the nature and scope of donestic

perceptual differences withim the countries compared.

151

The advantage of iueh a two-pronged approach is that the complementary

qualitiesdepth and width, permanence ,and timeliness---can combine

in a way which is both informative and economical. By using the

representational approach, finally we can extend the scope of inquiry

to populations who do not feel free to express a particular position

in response to direct fnquirtes.

What we have tried to illustrate throughout this report is how

our characteristically American preferentes result in choices and

solutionsthe choice of variables lattitudes and opinions), of

population (the statistically representative .sample of the entire

population), and of method (direct questioning, preferably with simple,

multiple-choice answers)---which well suit our domestic conditionsbut

have limited applicability overseas. As a result of these logically

consistent, interlocking choices, we unintentionally decrease our

cap"abi lity to recognize the shared views and priorities of foreion

national/cultural bollectives which influence their behavior.

The choices are interlocking because they result ftom similar

experiences and relinforce the same_ rationale. Much of the problem, stems

from the natural but false assumption that the various nations of:the

world follow a sort of universal rationale, the same as oui own. -This

line Of thinking leads one to overlook important.iriews and priorities

that contribute to a different representation of the world and that

lead (in other predictable ways) to different choices and di,fferent

behavior. Our logically consistent, mutually reinforcing patterns Of

thinking and behavior provide a protective shield against experiences

and views which are inconsistent with ours. This shell could crack

under the continuOut pressure of adverse realities working from the

dutside'. A safer and more constructive alternative would be to open the

shell from-the inside by introducing elements of external realities to

promote the realization that the shell is more a trap than 'a protection

in dealing with our international ,environment. A nation that is so

deeply committed to freedom in every walk of life--political, sociaL

economic---would not knowingly accept the limitations of a shell.,

152

However, in order to work toward removing this invisible barrier, its

existence must firs"i be recognized. Presently, alternative views are

rather systematically screened out and eliminated due to a combiFaion of

processes and choices promoted by our own cultural dispositions. *

Empirical evidence is needed to demonstrate the existence of

diff6rent psychological predispositions as characteristic of other

nations. This seems to psromise the critical farce needed 'to remove

the shell which hinders our effectiveness in the field of international

relations.

15

BESITOPY AVAILABLE

APPENDIX I

THE U.S. AND JORDANIAN GROUP RESPONSE LISTS

Included here are the original response lists with all the actualreactions produced by the U.S. and Jordanian groups. These reactionsare the empirical foundation for the results presented in this volum.

While we have used nontechnical language in the main body of thiswork, several of our terms have technical definitions, which have assuredconsistent treatment of the data over many years of interculturalinvestigation. In the text, the "salience" of a particular idea orsubjdct is frequently mentioned. This term refers to the magnitude ofa particular response score. A "perceptual component" is the clusterof semantically related responses characterized by a score value, .whichis the sum of the individual response scores included in the cluster.We speak in the text of the "dominance" of a particular theme. Thisis defined as the total score--accumulated by all the responses froma group which are elicited by a .particular theme.

The following tables show all the responses elicited,by each theme.The responses in each list are arranged in semantically related clusters-identified through content analysis. The score f6r each response isbased on the frequency with which that response was made. The scgresare suimied within each cluster to reflect the salience of each perceptualconponent in the group's cultural ijnages. Each of the response listsis presented with a percentage table which sumnarizes the relativecontributions of each of the semantic clusters. At the bottom ofeach percentage table, the "total dominance score" of all responsesisepresented. This s,core is analogous to Clyde Noble's (1952) measureof "meaningfulness," and shows the subjective importance of a particularsubject to the culture groups studied based on solid empirical foundation.

The laet table on paR 40 provides a list of the eighty themes usedin the response trend analysis of the U.S., Jordanian, Egyptian, andIsraeli group comparisons., The procedure is described in Appendix II,page 8,

1

162 ,

Main ComponentsaRd Responses

US, AMERICA

US J

168 105

SUPER POWERS,

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

U.S., America

OTHER,COUNTRIES

168 105

119 109

countriesChina

Europenations

EnglandGermanygov'tFrance

Iran

JapanworldArabs

RUSSIAc USSR

8 2371 13

7

14 -

- 239

14

- 19

8

6

6

7

10S" 102 Main Perceptual Components

ok,

Percentage ofTotal Score

USRussia, USSR,Soviet Union

WAR, CONFLICT

105 102

72 55U.S., AmericaOther CountriesRussia, ,U.S.S.R.

War, ConflictPower, AuthorityWeapons, Nuclear PowerSuperman, BatmanGod, IslamColonization, DominationRights, Justice, EqualityDevelopment, TechnologyMiscellaneous

23

16

14

9

9

8

6 .

3

1

2

2

6

11

11

11

6

7

3

° 17

14

9

7

4

war

cold warmilitaryfighting

conflictdestructiondangerterror.ismdeathkilling,er

POWER, AUTHORITY

34 12

7

6

5 8

10

13

10

9

7

- -6

67 64

influence

strength '

strongpower,fulbig

the authorityruler

WEAPONS,'NUCLEAR POWER

8

15 28

12

2015

15

5 13

55 31

Total Dominance Score 740 934

arms racenuclear-power

-weaponsweaponsbomb,atomic-

SUPERMAN, BATMAN

10

33

6 31

6

48

SupermanBatmansuper heroes

37

5

6

163

-

Main Componentsand Responses

GOD, ISLAM

US

22

J

155God 22 96Islam 30creed '20

religion,stick to- 9

COLONIZATION,DOMINATION . 8 129

colonization 37

oppression 17dictatorship 6

overpowering 20taking possession 7

domination 42control 8 -

RIGHTS, JUSTICE. -

EQUALITY 13 85rights 6

justice - 14

laws/justke - 11

liberation".0 8unity . 9holding together - 9

equality, no- . - 12

peace. 6

love 8good 8detente 7

DEVELOPMENT.TECHNOLOGY 14 62

developmenttechnologyeconomy ; 8 -

rich 6 ,-

inventions 8industry . 9getting to ioon 4

MACELLANEOUS 41 37. greed . 7 -

ESP 12 -interests - 12game 5 -president 5 -

oil 5 -

politics 7 -

capitalism - 5communism - 5humanityoe don'tperceive it

-

-

7

8

164 .

Hain Componentsand Responses

AMERICA, STAINSArerica,nstates

50 states50USA

California

GOVERNMENT,POLITICS

governmentpoliticsjimmy CarterWashm,DCdemdeVacycapitalism,ticArmy

Navy

organizationveto rights

LOVE, PATRIO/ISMlove,dgoodpride,proud

grektest national

flag

beatifulhome

my country

xed/white/blueunited -

COUNTRY, PEOPLE.

countrynation,a1

people

FREEDOM, JUSTfCEfreedomfree

libertyjusticepeace,fulJuly 4

opportunity

ISRAEL, RUSSIA

trrael

Iran

Russim,n

'US

174

112

9

10

7

288

'129

435

10

7

408

10

6

1247

89 =5

6 ,

17

832

: 10

814

J.

72

10

17 J

33

84

117 24

72 24

18' -

6

21

MISCELLANEOUShelp,er,fullife

interesthistoryplaying around

924911

87

-56 =

6

9

9

m n- 245' -

9

-6 -

- 9

- 68 -

8

16D

UNITED STATES

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATJONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main Percebtual Components

America, StatesGoverntent, PoliticsLove, PatriotismCountry';'People

Freedom, JusticePower, ContrblTechnology, Progl'ess

. Colonization, Oppression,Immoral, Unjust.'Weapons, KillingIsrael', Russia

, Miscellaneous

total Dominance Score

Main Componentsand Responses

WEAPONS. KILLING

warviolenceweaponskilling

frightfulsupportingterrorism

US J

6 100

613

35

19

9

US

22

16 7

16

15 2

12 1

13 231 22

16

2 12'

1 10

2. 32 2

796 985

-

Mein Components' and Responset ' US J

POWER, CONTROLmilitary poyersuperpowerPower,fulgreat powersbig

large .

great

stron 9.Strengthrichwealth,ygreatest countrylargest countryOvercominginfluence,-tialrich

101 231

5

1022

- 47

16 85

1610 71

12 . -10

16

10

2041

13,

TECHNOLOGY.PROGRESS 8 215-.technology 8 32

factories 6advancement;development ,, /4

help 7

exports 3industries 20advance inScience 23space investigation- 4educated . - 6high level ofeducation 6

thought.edvancement- 11

ciiilized 5

buildings,tkycrapeee= '7

resources ''' 6

COLONIZATION,OPPRESSION

colonizationimperialismdestruction ofIslam

Zionismoppression

IMMORAL, UNJUSTtaking advantageof world

corruptioninfustice

biasracismcrimesbetrayalbad.moralstumbling downwastefulpovertyoverpopulation

163

61

7

12

12

71

W119'

- 17

- 20

1"-;

4N

Main CPoponentsand Responses

RUSSIA, M3SCOW

US

307

J

-

S.

3

SOVIET UNION,e

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN *STUDENT GROUPS

0.

USSRRussiaMoscowLeningradKremlin

)

bearOlympicsballetSputnikgovernment

COMMUNISM, RED

62

151

2061212

26666

158

-

-

--

-

:

-

-

-

154communism,t

, red

partypolitics

ASIA, EUROPE

12236

-

74

145

5

4

34

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main PerceptUal Components UScountryAfghanistanSiberia .

USAPalestine

LEADERS: -

LENIN, STALIN

18

2216

18

77

12

13

9

9

Russia, MoscowCommunism, RedAsia, Europe

- Leaders: Lenin, Stalin,Bad Morals,.Evil

Advancement, TechnologyOppression, \ColonizationPowerful, BigWar, Wgapons, KillingSocialism, MarxismPeace, Equality, UnityMiscellanebu5

3g19 17

9 4

9 1

4. 3

164 "?' 16

9 14

5 10

1 82 81 4

zarBreshnevKruschevLeninMarx

Stalin

BAD MORALS, EVIL.

6

186

22619

35

-

-

-

9

-

-

27enemyevil

hate

threat,ening.

wrongbad morals,degeneration

cancerenemy of Islam

MISCELLANEOUS

6

a,

5

8

8

-

-

-

11

-

-

-

-

124

11

41

Total Dominance Score , 840 907

beliefcapitalismdemocracypeoplediseaseinterest

renegatiOn

6

5

-

16

4, 6

'1612/

Main Componentsand Responses ,

ADVANCEMENT,'

US J

TtCHNOLOGY - 148surpassing - 6 '

advancement - 55

country to moon - 8resources 7

material 1/4 7organized - 12

industry . - 7

space flights - 18

science,tific - 17

self sufficiency - 14

OPPRESSION,COLONIZATION ' 32 145

- dictatorship- 8 -

oppression,ive 16 33

repression 8 -

overpowering - 10

domination - 28restraint offreedom

interference - 6no equality - 8colonization - 36

reStraint - 4

opportunist - 12

-

POWERFUL, 816superpowerbiglarge,-territ.

power,fulcoldsnowsreat countrystrength

WAR, WEAPONS,

KILLING 44 90

war , 28competition 10

aggressive 6

weapons -

revollitionary

terrorism 6

enemy.-like 8killing , - 21

military fortes 7

against US 10

SOCIALISM,MARXISM

socialism,tMarxism

76 118

6 -

16- -8 9

26 -

20 -.II

24

- 74

6

21

PEACE,

EQUALITY, UNITY

PeaceSALT,-II,-talksequalunitedclean ,

beauty,fuljustice

ow**

1

77 (

6314

15 71

7 I8 -

zr

I'

IMain Components .

and Responses US J

US, JAPAN, .

RUSSIA 269USA \ 50America 12

Russia, USSR 36China, Chinese 29Japan,ese 44Europe,an 8England 20Iritain,sh 25France 5

Third WorldAfrica,n 6countries 18nations 11

Western countries -

Isrnelintenational

KING QUEEN 111

king 48

(Neel 14

royal:ty 10

crown 9

emperor 6kingdom 6

empire 12

imperial 6

183

106-

14

10

5

26

22

CAPITALISM.. COMMUNISM . 56 10

compunism.t 18 -

dictatorship 8 -

capitalism,t 30 10

GOVERNMENT,POLITICS 44 45

\ government 24 -

politics,al 20 20\

rule,type of - .13

N slogans - 42 t .

NISCE LANEOUSrichmoney

' actingMargriopinionsfright

iriterests

term,wordindustrial.

ith)

18 48s

7 .

- 66

- 9- 12

6

IMpERIALISM

PERCEPTIONS AND pALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN`STUDENT GROUPS

Maiti Perceptual Components

'U.S., Japan ussia

King, QueenCapita4ism, CommunismGovernment, PoliticsOppression, txploitationColonization, ZionismPower, DominationIniustice, IhhumanityWar, Violence ,

Miscellaneous

Tbtal Dominance Score

Percentage ofTotal Score

US J

. 38 22

16

8 1

5

6 17

7 14

10 13

3 . 11

3 10

2 6

697 830

.

--1114q14eCaponentsand prises US J

OPPRESSION. .

EXPLOITATION 40 144

tale over 20overpowering - 33exploitation 8 -

slave.ry 5 -

oppression 6 34taking advantageof- 35subduing - 6

, possession . 6tyranny - 6.weakness - 12

depriving of rights- 12

COLONIZATION,ZIONISM

colonization;colonialism

Zionismcoloniesexpansion,ism

POWER. 00MIkATIONpower .

controldoodmMmmleo.supremestrengthinfluenceauthority

nomnit,INHUMANITY

greed,ysavageness--badwronginjusticeinhumanitycrimebetrayal - .

backwardnessnot equalizingracism

47 115-

25 55,60

14 -

-73 11121 .-8 .

12 -

18 -

8 -

6 46- 54- 11

20 886 If- 7

6 72064

11

9

WAR, VIOLENCE 18 85war . 10

aggression 9enmity -killing ._

destruction -violence -

terrorism , -

military _. -

30

156

reactionary forces -

1.7.0

,

Main Csoicenints

and Responses US J

PEOPLE,JEWS. ARABS

peopleJSw-'Webrews -

ArabsGolds MeierBeginDeyan .

blacks.roommate

SMALL, FOREIGN ,

underdog -

smell

strength, powermewaidsupportforeign

traditionkibbutsdesertFOttraveloil

embargo

MIDDLE EAST,AMERICA

EgyptJordanSyria .

Middle EastAmerica

29922191 .

65

7

6

7313

39

5

133

159 206

11

12

11

e -6

NATION, COUNTRYnationcountrylandstatehomeland

FREEDOM, PEACEindependencefreedomrights

, insistencepeaceloveproudrespectsafepromise

developmentmovementcapacity

171

11

1441.

9

25

6

78 37

31

13

628

37

61 4528 17

22

- 11

- 17

11

53

912

11

6

6

9

se

1813

6

886

9

"1

JSRAEL

PERCEPTIONS AND BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUD N GROUPS

Main Perdeptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

US

People: Jews, Arabs-

Small, ForeignMiAdle East, AmericaNation, CountryFreedom, PeaceWar, AggressionRacism, ZionismColonialism, Occupation

,Palestine, JeruselumReligionMiscellaneous

A

32 7

.17 2

8. 3

6 4

6 6

14 29

1 2019

7 7

7 1

1 2

Total Dominance Score 927 1122

Mein Componentsand Responses

WAR, AGGRESSIONwar ,

, ..fighting

aestructionkilling,erterroristsweaponstanksarmyattackingdefeatassailant'

US J

129 314

76 56

23

12

10

COLONIALISM,OCCUPATION -

colonialism,ation -

occupationbanishmentexploitersstealingprisons

DISCRIMINATION,DECEIT

hatreddiscriminationrace hatredZionistunfairnesscorruption,cheaterdeceitunfaithful

13'

19

3135

2222587272236

;5

8 141

PALESTINE.

JERUSELUMPalestine,Tel.AvivJeruselueBethlehemholyland

RELIGION. JUDAISMliblebeliefChristJesusreligionstmhoT)Pbook.JudaismMOSqUe

MISCiLLANEOUSfrightening .cowardabnormal

8

5632

616

10

12

7

65 79

18 ,-70

101910

66 907

61312

1115

6

172

- 804

9 27

14

- 13

Main'Componentsand Responses

WAR, GUERRILLASmrfi ht

stgqleconfVctbatt eguerrillas

4 tirrOristS.kill

weaponstankbombs

gunPLFtroublesproblemdefensePLOrevolutionrough

PEOPLE, ARABS.JEWS

peopleArab,ianJewsPalestinian

US

327 126

1/6 27

49. 11

- 618 4

9 -

50 -

20 -

9 -

- 2

8 -

6 -

16 -

16 -

'FOREIGN, BEAUTIFULbeautifulmountaindesertilipsand

oil

orangeshistoryancientunknownforeign

RELIGIONreligionBibleJesusMuslimchurchIslamMosque

MIDDLE EAST,AMERICA

EgyptJordanMiddle EastAmerica

GOVERNMENTgovermentking

news

PALESTINE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

4 10 0

-

- 27- la- 4 Main Perceptual Components

176 148

22 6

69 9671 37

14 9

93 42- 17

5

10 -

6

18. ;1.

- 20

173

10 :

17

24

71 41

11

3914

7

6

14

- 21

47 24

21 -

10 12

16 -

- 12

30 -

9 4 -

. 9 -

12 -

t.

Percentage of . 4-

Total Sc6s1

US

'War, Guerrillas -.

People: Arabs, JewsForeign, BeautifulReligionMiddle East, AmericaPolitics, GovernmentColonization, BanishmentCountry, NationIsrael

Rights,-FreedomLove, HopeMiscellaneous

33

18

10

7

3

1

A,11

7

'1-

12

14

4

A2

18

17

12

11

62

Total DomThance Score 977 109kL

Main Ccoponentsand,Responsii US J

cOLONIZATION,BANISHMENT

occupied-banishmentrefugees. -camps_

inmigiants

lost'

prisonsstealing

unfairweakness

COUNTRTI NATION 41

country 24

nationland

My countryregion

ISRAELIsrael

Jeruselumholy citYPalestine

.-

7 196- 97

457 -

- 12

- 6

- 6,12- 16- 2

RIGHTS, FREEDOMrightsliberationfreedom -independencecausefuturesucceedvictorysmvement

LOVE, HOPEgoodlovehopepromisecourageunity

Power

MISCELLANEOUS

mothercitation .

hiteopen

107

166

954017

34

106 13299 50

73'

7 .- 9

66 117

- 2243 37

13 9- 21IQ

;

- 11

2

?174

13

6

617

2711

33

'46

22

Nein CompoimntsAnd Responses

PYRAMIDS, MAIMSpharoihsTut \sphinx \tombpyramidsmow

DESERT. NOTdesert

sanddryhot

mmcamels

NICOLE EASTcOUNTRIES

Mid EastAfrica

Isreel

JordonLebenonKuwaitIraq ,

SyriaSaudi ArabiaRussiaSudan

OIL INDUSTRY

industryprogress

LOVE, FUNlovebeautifulfun

MISCELLANEOUSfar

socialismsla

US

231 -97

.1

EGYPT

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

33

35

2032

93

18

156

zf

11

0

13

44

51

32

7

14

67

13

96Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

US21

22

24

-

-

-

-

50

6

24

14

4

614

10

7

24

Pyramids, PharoahsDesert, HotMiddle East CountriesOil, IndustryPeople, Arabs,-EgyptiansNile, CairoNation, CountryPoverty, WarHistory, TraditionLove, FunMiscellaneous

26

17

.7

6

12

14

2

8

1

9

1

9

2

2818

18

7

3

2

- ,12

- 12

- 29

-

-

12

11

612

20Total Dominance Score 893 1061

a- -

6

- 5

university - 9

1 76

Main Componentsand Responses

PEOPLE, ARABS,EGYPTIANS

US

9,

J

296

PeopleArebtian,icEgyptian

.9

2013

27.

123

Muslim 9 -r.)--dark skin II -

Mohammed 10 ,

Nasser 10 4iSadat 20 58brother - 26.

Islam - 17

NILE, CAIRO 123 188

Cairo 25 7Alexandria - 23Nile 77 101

Suez, -canal 21 43Sinai ,

high dam6

NATION COUNTRY 23 143

nation-state - 72

country 23republic - 37

state - esister country - 26

:. .

POVERTY, MAR> 57' 89war/confrontation 31fight " 11

poverty -

26-

16

crowded,ing - 25

Bar Lev line -- 5

comption - 4pick pocket - 6

revolution - 7

eneMY 7 -

bad II -

.HISTORY. TRADITION 75 71

historytic 9 .

old 6 -

ancient 21 -

anttquities - 7

Cleopatra 18

slaves -

snakesjewelssheets

3

6

-

-

arts - 34

books - '4

movie 10

sciences 36

;.

"ta

,Main Components

and Responses US J

COUNTRIES:U.S., EGYPT

nationalstate

413

34

Spain 11

land 16

world 16

country,my- 112

Poland 7

Israel 11

Arab -

Jordan -

Palestine - -

America, U.S.A. 127

Mexico 6

England 34

Canada. 21

boundaries,border 6

China- 6

France 20

Germany 18

Italy 6

Russia,U.S.S.R. 22

UNITEO,TOGETHERNESS

unitedunity

one -

1.0 togetherness

GOVERNMENT,.POLITICS

governmentsovereigntyleaderkingpoliticsruleU.N.

335

1332

16

51

16

72

61

3

1368319 6

15

19

POWER, STRENGTHpower, forcebig

Strong

99

49

9

614

622712

23

42

16

18

3

3

CULTURE, HISTORY 47 -20. culture 15 -

customs 5 -

history 7 4

tradition 4 -

language 5 -

views 6 -

society 5 16

FLAG,_CAPITOLanthemflag

capitolWashington

41

6

14

13, 8

NATION

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU,S, AND pRDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main. Perceptual Components -

Percentage ofTotal.Score

US .J

Countries: U.S., Egypt

United, TogethernessGovernment, PoliticsPower, StrengthCulture, HistoryReg, CapitolWar, SacrificeLove,,PatriotismPeople, FamilyFreedom, ProgressOrigin, BelongingMiscellaneous.(

46 26

1310 3

6

4 2

4

,2 19

2 14

6, 12

2 11

2 6

'3 6

Total Dominance Score 1034 ,1167'

Main Componentsand Responses

MISCELLANEOUSbelieverprinciple

accomplishcitationmanyseparatedivisionknowledgelifeexistencedust

US J

29 72

94

7

13 -

6

10

10

9'12

16

Main Components

and Responses US J

WAR, SACRIFICEwarArmyweaponstolensacrifice

OccupiedransomstabilitysecurityProtectiondefending itstruggleenemy

4* 110LO4, PATRIOTISM

Aveaffectionduty

faiql,fulnessPatrfotimportance

nationalismrespectful ,

serviceattachmenthappinessdearcouragenoble

PEOPLE,_ FAMILY

Peoplefellowfriends

motherrelativesrelation

group

FREEDOM, PROGRESSfreedomindependentmliberationhopeprogressgoal

developmenteconomywork

cooperationhelpbenefitright

Peace

igt

ORIGIN, BELONGINGorigin, descent

oursreturnresidence,t

22 237

13 5

9 15

6

4

- 43

- 32

- 34

22

13

14

14

22

23

15

10

166918

9

22

8

-863

1 0

57

65 158

65 58

- 8

- 10

- 13

44

- 16

- 9

21 143

- 25

8 11,

- 16

- 6,

-. 13

6 -

- 16

7 -

- 19

- 11

5

- 4

17 -

- 13

- 37

178

lisiAllponentsMain Componentsand Responses US J

ELECTIONS,--CAMPAIGNS 203

elections 51campaion,ing 18candidate 10vote,ing 1re-election 6

convention 6m.

competition 8debates 6

Democrats 26RepubliCan 32

party 16promises 8

deals . 8

PRESIDENTS,POLITICIANS

Ipresident$oliticiansgovernorsenatbrsOmmy CarterKennedyNixon

'AndersonFeaganKing Hussein

CORRUPTION0DECEITcorruptibncheat.ingdishonest4lies,lyingdirtypay offsscandalWatergateAbscambull

crooked '

greed,y

deceivingfailure

16844

37

9

3910

8

5

16

152

46-2710

9

5

5

, 614

6

6

6

-

GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACYDEMOCRACY 150

government 86orderdemocracy,tic 20Congress,men 20Senate 6House 8politics

party,- system r

LEADERSHIP,POWER

leader,shippower,fulrule,ingresponsibilityduties

*greatIpowers,.strong

46

6

3010

28

17

5

6

28

POLITIC5

RERCEPTIONS AND EVACUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

"

Main Perceptiol ComPonents

Rercentage ofTotal Score

US

Elections, CampaignPresidents, Politicians -Corruption, Deceit

,* Government, OemocracyLeadership, Power .

.of4

-

23

Countries, U.S.,,IsraelGoals, Dgvelopment, EconomyProblems, War, ColoriintionPblitical Science, Diplomacy, PlansRights, Freedom, LawsMiscellaneous-

Total Dominance Score

82

29-31

'

10 Main Components

12 ind Responses US J

MISCELLANEOUS 39 23

35boring 7

fun 6 -

ideology 6 '-

money 20 - -

8 ground - 6

9 general - 13

8 weak - 4

10

24

20

18

18

4

43.

4

4

4

11

36

11

12

11

4

3

853 762

Main Components

and Responses

COUNTRIES, U.S.,ISRAEL

country,snation,a1Washington,world

U.S.

EgyptIran

Arab countriesU.S.S.R.Israel

international

social

peopleinternalexternalclasscultureindividual

GOALS; DEVELOPAENT,ECONOMY

goals

educationmutual' hlepdevelopmentusefuleconomy,i*advancement

37 217

- 34-

12 =

'9 -

10 21

- 55

- ' 8

- 9

- 18

- 23- 32

- 146 11

- 14

- 16. - 6

-. 5

6

PROBLEMS, WAR,COLON12AT0N -

war -

battle -

_prison -

,oppression -

colonization '. -Zionitm -

taking advantage '

POLITICAL SCIENCE,DIPLOMACY, PLANS 33' 81

relations -5diplomacy. kiart - 12gam! 33plan,ing 24goal deterMinesmeans

wise -

'experienceintelligence

LACIS, RIGHTS ni 33. rights. 5

freedom 9:Justice 5

laWslawyersissbes

interests

8319

5

-105

7

26

11

92196

916

24.11

7 ,

5

9 ,

9 6106

Main ents

and Rtitinses US

ECONOMY', MONEY;PROFIT , 160

J

125

Ci.

CAPITALISM'

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUAIIONSU.S.,AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUP'S

BY

Main Comonentsand Responses

U.S., WESTERN CAMP

US

122

J

202U.S., AmericaRussia,n

country,sEuropeinternational

Western, -camp

FREEDOM, RIGHTS

103

6

25

133

22

6

41

130

( economy, -system 32

eccn.advancementmoney 94

wealth 12

profit cm' 22

capitalsprofiting frompropertyma4erial life

BUSIN ,- TRY .138

6

42

22

6

14

16

9

37

free,domrightprinciplegood, -idea

beautiful .

SOCIETY, CLASSES

14

11

5

9613

16

5

123

Maih Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

business 7 45big business 21monopolies 5

corporate,ions 6

' oil coapanies 5

industry,a1 20stocks,-market 5

imliet,-econ. 14

production 0

work,ers, 18factories -

COMUNISM,SOCIALISM 100

-

-

19

-

_

-

-

-

-

9

9

66

individual,tysRcial

-Classes

BourgeousieiddividualismEulturehumanity

man -.-

social levelsocietylife'

6

IMPERIALISM,OPPRESSION

5

-

-

30

11

2010

t145

9

23

88

US

Economy, Money, ProfitBusiness, Industry,CoMmunism, SocialismGovernment, PoliticsCorruption, Lack_of EqualityU.S., Western CampFreedom, RightsSociety, ClassesImperialism OppressionFree Enterprise, OwnershipMiscellaneous.- '

21 14

18 4

14 ' 7

11

5 5

16 22

3 14

13

4 10

4 8

1 '2

; Contnyl sm 46

socialism 43' anti-communism -

democracy 20capitalism ;

GOVERNMENT; POLITICS 80

11

97

<27

12

17

imperialism,ticcolonizationdominationoppressionexploitationterrbrismkillingrevolutionoverpowering

FREE ENTERPRISE.OWNERSHIP

22

-

8

.

-

12

434

F

6

11

15

70

government 36

system 9

Oolitics,al 19

influence -

power,ful 16

governing ' -

state interference -

CORRUPTION, LACKOF EQUALITY 0 M

-

-

5

-

6

6

46

. /)

Total Dominance Score 752 925

.

free enterprisecompetitiono0Portunismownershipfree economyfree importation-interests

MISCELLANEOUS

286

-

-

-

II

6

9

20

14

6

15

1

enipy-likeseTtishness -

bad 7

corcOpt,ion -8+greedysuppress,ion 5

control' _ 5

lack of equality -

atheis4i

8

6

-

6

-

17

9

securityMilton FreidmanAdam Smithnature

science

5

6

6

9

6

/

Main Componentsand Responses ,f

RUSSIA, CHINA

US

267

J-

167

COMMUNISM

PE'RCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Comptibrits

and Responses US J

AZHEISM,ENEMY OF ISLAM 115Russia, USSR

China,eseRed China

tubaGermany,E. -

VietnamEasterninternational

Iraq

MARXISM,

SOCIALISM

187

46

8

12

6

8

148

134

6

-

-

-

-

I0.

10

59

atheism 61killing Islam 10keeping away fromreligion 9

enemy of Isla. 16

enewy of Moslem' countries 12

Zionism 7

76 95capitalismdemocracy

Mtrxsism ISociali ,t

theory, cal

GOVERNMENT,POtITICSs.POWER

,

18

10

O. 33

Z. '

103

-

-

2534

-

65

wreig' .

107 -evil-

fear 7- -hate,rtd . -

corruptionsmortl - 27no freedom 12

oppression --Js9 31unfair - 11 -threat 8 -.backwardness - 7

lack of equality - 7

prison 4going against la 11

WAR, DESTRUCTION 44 51

Main Perceptual Components

-Percentage of,

Total Score

USgovernmentstatekingship,rule,

pwlitics,a1. representativeauthority

Dowersfulcontrol,ing .

partydoes dot believein government

no Overnmen/

RED, PINKO

-188

24

25

15

13L,

-

73

-

8

-

7

14

28

6

Russia, -China

Marxism, SocialismGovernment, Politics, PowerRed, Pinko"Stalin, Lenin-People, CommunesAtheismN Enemy of IslamCorruption, OppressionrWar, DestructionEquality, FreedomEconomy %

Miscellaneous

32 25

18 9

12 9

6 3

4 1

17

9 14

5 8

4 5'

2 5

5

wars 16 --7..w revoltsion 8 -

killing - 10death - 8destruction,tve 20 18blood - 8,

EQUALgy, FREEDOM 31 ' 33

red,s

pinko

red peril

STALIN, LENIN

60

6

7

54 19'

equaT,Ity 18 22freedom,lin- 13 -

justice - 11

' ECONOMY 14 32StalinLenin

Mao

Hitler

PEOPLE, CCMMUNES

20

22

66

30

19

7

economysics 5 6works-class 9 8taking profit 4

'wealth 8lack of ownership - 6

- -

MISCELLANEOUS 3?

Total Dciminance Score 846 675classes

peoplecorrunes,alshare,ingway of Me

5

8

12

5

7

reactionaryephemerous g-

materialgeneral

183'

184

t

-

Main Componentand Responses liwwo",05

COMMUNISM,MARXISM 215 64

Er

SOCIALISM

PERCEPTIONS AND EVOATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIKN STUDENT GROUPS

,

communism,tMarx,ismfascism,timderialismcapitalismdemocracy,ticsocialism

campus,RUSSIA, SWEDEN

104.

38

, 8

6

36

23

160

27

9

19

9

67country,snationRussia. USSRCuba

BritainEnglandFrance

Germany, E -Italy

SwedenScandanavia

usRomania

GOVERNMENT,POCITICS

11

6

508

6

18,

6

107

26

6

6

79

59

8

62

.)N

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

'US

Communism, MarxismCountries, Russia, SwedenGovernment, Politics,Economics, MoneyEquality, FreedomWork, Help, ShareSoc4ety, PeopleProblems, BadMiscellaneous

32 13

24 13

12 12

6 7

-6. 1/

6 :14

7' 11

4 7

2 6

governmentstate

politics,a1parties

Powerstrengthreactionaryplanning

ECONOMICS. 'MONEY

50

6

18

-

5

-

41'

-

-

24

a-

6

16

8

35

Total Dtominance Score ,672 503economy, systemtaxes, high-welfare,-statemedicinebuilding,housing

.__distrttetingprofits

moneyproductiondevelopmentadvancement

1

6,

10

9

-

-

6

57

5

7 .

t5

.186

Main Componentsand Responses

EQUALIii FREEDOMequal,ityfreedomjusticegood,-systemidealism,tfc

'WORK, HELP, SHAREwork,ers,inq'participationsharingtogether,ness

.unity,ed

help.mutual-brothechood

US J

4313

6

16

43.8

12

7 -

s

844121

22

70

8 51

SOCIETY, PEOPLE 48

society,a1 10

people 19

classes ( 6

no closes -

friend's'.

7

interactions 6

international:" -

organization -

groups -

PRO:1417;AD 298

permissive, no equality . -

atheism -.

colonization -

against it -

creeping 6

bad 10

wrong .

-

5

MISCELelNEOUS. 14

6

8

le -1?riTZYtp

universal.

7

51

10125

12

612

36

93

12

66

28

15

13

Main Componentsand Responses

PEOPLE, 8CACKS,NOM

peopleBlackswomenmains' rightsAndrew YoungCartereveryonefor allpersonality

EQUALITYequal,ityequal rightsERA

FREEDOMfreedomlibertyliberationnot being tjed

LIFE, PURSUIT

us

131

2022.

12

6

6

4811

6

92

626

24

8972

17

OF HAPPINESS 69

decency 6

dignity 14

happiness,

Pursuit of 16

life 26respect 7

mutual helpmutualunderstanding -

food -

economic:Aevel -

US, RUSSIA,PALESTINE

USIran

Russiainternationa)

,Palestine

MISCELLANEOUSobservationwealthdon't know aboutit

fate

2786

13

-

-

-

-

-

5

HUMAN RIGHTS

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S, AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

me**

Main Componentsand Responses . US

JUSTICE RELIOION 110

J

148

-'

35

justice 16

peace 12

civil rights 13Civil 12

basi 16

fair,ness 18

abortion 12

%educationspeech 6

point of viewIslamKoramreligiousnationalismthe press

OPPRESSION,RESTRAINT . -

61'15

1721'9

997

110

35

12

66

51

Main Perceptual Cotonents

Percentage ofTotal Score oppression

pushing oppression -' restrained -

colonization444:used

rsecutedracism

LAWS, CONSTITUTION 48

2112

10

7

42.12

48

US LI

People, Blacks, WomenEqualityFreedomLife, Pursuit of HappinessU.S Russia, PalestineJusticet ReligionOppressibn, RestraintLaws, ConstitutionImportant, NecessaryPolitics, ActivismMiscellaneous

21 1

15 7

14 211 10

4 4 ..

17 2821

8 9

5 ' 7

5 6

6

12

6

6

12

15

,

20

laws 23

constitutionamendment 15

protectionmaintained -

' duty -

IMPORTANT,NECESSARY 34

21

-a

19

36

good 8important 6

needs 6

necessary 14

wanted -

POLITICS,ACTIVISM 30

J5-

10

11

29,

-

-

-

614

30

Total ADominance Score 630 '524

-.activismprotest 6

politics 6

powerdemocracyelectionofganization

13

8

7

6

89

A

Main Coeponentsand Responses

'PEOPLE. BLACKS.WOMEN, THE WEAK 160

' 0 Blacks 34

Jews 13

minorities 24

people 22

racial 6

racism 12

slaves 8women 16

poor, poverty 25

man -

humanity -

the others -

self -

social -

the weak

US

HELD BACK, SUPPRESSEDDEPRESSED 128

discrimination 8prejudice 6

against 10

r ,teld back 11r

!oppressed,ionput down

mpression 12

suppressJon 22

slavery 16,depression 27

against religion - /

prison -

enslaving -

restraint -

taking the prvceeds-

BAD, CRIME.CORRUPTION 43

bad 8

sad 6

unfair 10

spite -

anger 6

fear 7

unhappiness -

ignorance 6

crime -

corruption

CAPITALISM,COMMUNISM

capitalismcommunism.t

.)

136

-

-/OPPRESSION

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

33

6

27

16 '

7

9

14

24

62,

15

14

6

11

9

7

55

41*

Main Perceptual Components

: Percentage ofTotal Score

US

People, Blacks, Women, the Weak'Held Back, Suppressed, DepressedBad, Crime, CorruptionCapitalism, CommunismGovernment, Power, Dictatorship

Colinization, DominationRights, Justice'Russia, Palestine, IsraelWar, Killing, Cruelty

32 19

26 9

9 8

5

13 14

14

2 13

6 . 7

7 179

7

22

17

Total Dominance Sco're 495 720

.24 -

6 -

18 -

Main Componentsand Responses

GOVERNMENT, POWER,DICTATORSHIP' 66

government 12

governing -

governors -

rule 8reigning -

control 7

dictator,shio 17

force 6power 9

strong . -

strength -

politics,a1 7

COLONIZATION,DOMINATION -

colonization -

Zionism -

doeination -

overpowering-,vanquish,ing -

aggression/transgression

RIGHTS, JUSTICE 9

rights

freedom 9,no equalityjusticelack of justice

US J

103

12

6

27

26

15

,9

99

25

10

14

10

14

26

9551

10

21

13

RUSSIA, OAtEsTikE,'ISRAEL 31 48

Russia 20China 6 -

Cuba

US - 10

Palestine - 17

Israel - 21

WAR; KILLING,CRUELTY

warfight

. revolutionterrorismwrestlingkillingdeathtake by violencesavagerycrueltyhurtexcessivehunger

ltsd 1.9(i

34 122

10 12

6 -

13

9

6

21

14

10

9

21

9

Main Componentsand Responses,

US, DEMOCRACY

us

130

J

32

t

FREEDOM

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

irts

US, America

countrydemocracY

LIBERTY,LIBERATION

84

14

32

BO'

10

22

54

%independent,ce. free

libertyliberation

departing

SLAVERY JAIL

13

2047

-

53

'30

24

55

bondageoppressionslaveryprison

restrained.nonexistent

WAR, REVOLUTION

89

6

30'-

44

14

9

9

23

8

PercentageTotal

of

Score,

Main Perceptual Components' US

warrevolution

- rider

movementfaight,erdeath

BELL, FLAG

8 .6

16

29

8

U.S., DemocracyLiberty, LiberationSlavery., Jail

War, RevolutionBell, FlagRights, Justice, Equality, ReligionPeople, Women, IndividualPress, Speech, OpinionLove, Happiness, PeaceWork, ProductionMiscellaneous

21 4

13 8

8 8

7 1

; 5

20 24

6 18

9 15

7

2 6

3 7

ideal

bellflagwind

MISCELLANEOUS

95

205

17* 49

. dutypolitics

educationracism*

necessaryword .

_changesat lastforever

-

-

5

6

6

13

12

6

6

66 Tptal Domihance Score 628 710

191.,

Main Componentsand Responses US J

RIGHTS, JUSTICE, ..

EQUALITY, RELIGION 128 169

, constitdtion 12 -

, Bill of Rights 6 -

rights. 35 74

'justice ____ 14 38equality - 37

religion 30 9

Islam, Moslem - 11

humanrrights 8 -

choice 23 -

PEOPLE, WOMEN,INDIVIDUAL'

society

PeoplemanhumanitywomenindividualPersonal .for alllife .

living.

PRESS,

SPEECH, OPINIONpress, of-speech, of-opinionthought, of-

* expressionmind

. 35 126

- 9

- 15

- 19

-

- 20

8 106 -

10 ' -

11 37

- 8

58 10920 11

38 6

- 48- ' 21

- 14

- 9

LOVE,HAPPINESS, PEACE

brotherhoodlovehappy,nessprideenjoyingPeace

,securityresttranquility

WORK, PRODUCTION

_workproductionmutual helpfree enterprise

advancement.money

194

42 647

14 7 '

Q 14-

66

7

9

8

12 44

- 20.10

106 -

6 - -

22

Main Componentsand Responses

IRAN, ISRAEL,PEOPLE

US

150

J

86Iran,ians 74 -

IrelandIrish

8.

-

IRA

Italy 8Israel 12 16groups 10

gangs - 25Arab,s 12

Patty Hearst 6 -

caNnunists 6 -

inhabitants - 5

Jews - 14

people 8children - 14

students - 4

WAR, FIGHTING,DESTRUCTION 95 72

fight,ing 18 7

hitting - 14

attack 8 9guerrilla,s 11

militants 5

war 24 21

revolution 8destruction 13 21

destroy 8

HOSTAGES, VICTIMS 57

hostages 51

victims 6 -

BOMBING,'GUNS 55 9bombs,ing 30 -guns 9weapons

.19

6

PLO, PALESTINIANS 50PLO 43Palestinians 7

MISCELLANEOUS 20 49law 7

politics,arparties

12 5

Olympics,

freedom8 -

12

religionintelligence

9

1 3

TERRbRISM

PERCEPTIONS A.ND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

4''

US

Iran, Israel, PeopleWar, Fighting, DestructionHostages, VictimsBombing, Guns , I

PLO, Palestinians .

Colonization, OppressionViolence, Torture, KillingEnemy, CrimeFear, Hate, Lack of SecurityMiscellaneous

23

14

9

8

8

1

19,

4

10

3

10

7

1

262414

12

5

Tovtal Dominance Score 657 974 alo

Main Componentsand Responses

COLONIZATION,OPPRESSION

dominationcolonizationZionismoppressionsubductiontake by violencetaking freedomslaveryrestrainedprison,imprison

powerforceoverpowering

6 256- 9

- 29M

- 74

8

9- 5- 9

- 12

- 19 4

6 -

- 32

- 14

VIOLENCE, TOF$TURE,

KILLING 126 237torture,ing 6 14

pain 6 -

violence 33 81

blood 8 -

murder 16 -

kill,ing,ers 33 105

death 24 11

harsh - 26

ENEMY 0CRIME 30 138baa 18 -

evil

rouble 6 -

crime - 44

criminal - 10envny-toilruption

contradictinglaws - 9

stealing - 11

hold up - s

beastliness - 8inhumanity - 9

,UAR, HATELACK OF SECURITY 68 117

fear 22. St.

frightening,-away 8 11

horror 6 -

tecror 6 -

scared 12 -

anxiety 17

hate 12 -

lack of secttrity 15

lack of stability 12

weakness 8

1

Main Componentsand Responses US J

WAR, FIGHTING 187 154war 96 53fight - 44battle 11 -

vying with - 12

weapons - 25defend' 8

conflict,ing 6 16rival,ry - 13attack 6

shoot 6 -

dispute - 35Army 5

watch . 5

HATRED,

JEALOUSY, FEAR 166 110hate,d,ful 88 68 0

dislike 17

distrust 10 -

jealous,Y 10 -

fear,ful 18 -

terror - 15

fdespise'mistrust

6

5)

anger 4s,revenge

6

6

spite . 17

boyar& - 4

lack of pity - - 6

FRIEND, ALLYfriend

ally,ance

BAD, EVILbadwrongevil

against

corruptionhostile,

danger,ous

savage, beastlyunfriendly

82 970 9

12 -

88 38

20 - 237 -

12 -

16 -

- 9

8 -12

5

'NATIONS, ,//eUSSIA, IRAN 81

Russia, USSR 56

Iran,ians 25US Americansland , -

Palestine

FA, TRAITOR 63 60foe 30 -bad guys 8 -opponentoppositiontraitorbetray

6

75

13

33

236

or

ENEMY

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND al8DANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components

;Jar, Fighting.

Hatred, Fear, JealousyFriend, AllyBad,,Evil

Nations, Russia, IranFoe, TraitorOppression, ColonizationKilling, DestructionIsrael

Sickness, Instability,DislocationMiscellaneous

Main Componentsand Responses US J

ORPRESSION,COLONIZATION 13 177

subduing 6

dominating 17

power 5 -

strength 6

oppression 8 43"colonizer 14

colonization, 23imperialism 8holding freedom 5

violating freedom \- 4

overpowering ' 15

prisons 8stealing - 12

Zionism - 16

KILLING,

DESTRUCTIONkilling,erdeathdestroy,tion

rturingPercentage ofTotal Score

71 135

31 74

8 6

11 16

- 4

8 -

US

24

21

10

10

10

82

9

1

5

Total Domtnance Score

violenceruin,ingterrorismviolationharmful

15

11

sl

4

7

6

18

,13

10

8

ISRAEL - 99

Israel

)SICKNESS,INSTABILITY,DISLOCATION

-

7

99

76problemssicknesshungerpoverty

unemploymentlack of stability

41ack of securityignorance

backwardness0 homelessunrest

7

-

-

4

15

6

5

9

67

812

4

'788 1010zn,msunism,f Iti

22

-

-

MISCELLANEOUS 77

-10

animal

gliemIZIn

'myself

2°Iter''/ interests

.

peace .

.against !slamsatheism

-splitparty-spirited

6

5

6

6

-

-

5

9

-

5

. 5

4

96

6

19t-i

Main Componentsand Responses

DEATH, KILLING

US

186 177

WAR

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

death, deaddie

kill,ingpainblood,-sheddeath of humanityhurt

murder

WEAPONS,NUCLEAR BOMBS

85

64812

24

-

5

6

133

91

61

19

6

118weaponsguns

tbombsnucleartanks

nuclear weaponplanes

strength

Power,-playatomic weaponscannons

NATIONS, PEOPLE

2026

22

31

12

6

6

10

124

47

17

10

17

17

4

6

70

Main Perceptual Components'

Pertentage of,5otal Score

US

libleath, KillingWeapons, Nucledr BombsNations, PeoplePeace, FreedomHate, Enemy;World Wars, Civil War3oldiers, ArmyBad,'StupidTerror, Hunger, DisplacementFighting, BattleDestruction, RuinDomination, OppressionMiscellaneous

'

19 16

13 11

12 6

11 2

6 2

6

6 1

19

10 14

7 12

8,

2 8

VietnamUS, AmericaKoreanIsrael

Palestine'Russia, USSRworld

governmentmensoulsIran

Arabs

childrenCarterearthinternat'l world

PEACE, FREEDOM

32

610

-

18

1.1

7

11

66

665

-

113

8

30

84

8

12

22

Total Dominance Scorb 993 1100Peacefreeomliberation

HATE, ENEMY

113

59

12

10

28

Main Components

and Responses US J

BAD, STUPID 50

hate,red

enemy, enmity'

WORLD WAR,CIVIL WAR

47

12

62

28

2ww I

MW IIWW III

revolutionCivil warcold

SOLDIERS, ARMY

11

18

6

9

10

8

56 8bad 12

evil 9wrong 6

.12

eedless 6

senseless 5

soldiersArmydraftMASH

14

22

15

5

8

19/

Main Compenentsand Responses US J

TERROR, HUNGER,DISPLACEMENT 23 211

lack stability - 4defeat

sickness,es.loss

hungerfamine

fear

terrorsadnessinhumanitylack of securitysocial problemsignorancecrime

backwardnesshomelesspoverty

FIGHTING BATTLEfightinqbattleconflictterrorismrivalry

aggressionviolencegames

wrestlingdispute

persecution

DESTRUCTION RUINdestructionruinhell

end

DOMINATION,OPPRESSION

overpoweringvictory-dominationweakness

colonizationinterestsspreadingcontinuation

MIStELLANEOUSmoviesanimalshelp

Islampoliticsbeliefpride

economics

812

5 7

336 -

-

6

6 -

- 10

- 6

6- 16

6- 19

- 32

3

984988

24

9

6648

11

7

15337

5

17

9

6

2746

6 -

139

11029N

-

-

123- 9- 12

- 20

6- 20- 17

7

6

23 484.N 6

a- 11

12

12 3

86

5

Main Componentsand Responses

GUNS, NUCLEARWEAPONS

guns

weapons,rybombs

missilenuclear

powerarms race

TREATY, POLITICS,SALT

leaderSALT, I, 11; kllconferencetalks

treaty-agree,mentnegotiate,idn'politicsinterests

1WAR, MILITARYwar,world-danger,ousfightingattackArmy

militarydefensesurrendering,disOute

corruptionoppression,terrorcolonization

US, RUSSIAcountriesUSRussia

USSRworldgreat countriesArabs '

rOSSIBLE,T APPLIEDunreahisticimpossiblenOvevnot applied

G000. NEE0E0/ good' needed

necessary

US J

143433514

12

22

6

124\53- 1 8

44 -

5 -

19 -

24 9

14 '95 -

13 18

9

111

63--

8.

12

814

6

9033-

3'.

4

7

8

6,

6

6

12

5

80 37

6 -

24 7

33 -

II 12

6

9

9

34 6

9 -

17 -

8 -

33 2113 12

11 -

9 9

DISARMAMENT

, PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main PercOtual CoMponents.

Percehtage of-To.tal Score

US J

Guns, Nuclear WeaponsTreaty, Politics, SALTWar, Military ,

U.S., RussiaImpossible, Not ApplieflGood, NeededPeace, tecurityEnd War, Limit ArmsLove, Happiqess, ComfortFreedom, Justice, EqualityMiscellaneous

22

19 6

17 11

12 4

5 1

5 2

14 38

4 10

1 12

11

2 4

. Total Dominance Score 659 823

Main Componentsand Responses US J

PEACE SECURITYquietude .

tranquility.

Peacesafe,tysecurity

. stability

END WAR, .

LIMIT APItS '29

end war, no war .5no fightingno dispute -

take away 9remove,a1 15

limitation .of arms -non ownership ofweapons

90 31.2

1042

80 187

10 54

6

LOVE, HAPPINESS,COMFORT

reconciliationcooperationlove

trustmutual

understandingbetter lifeno terrorhappinesscomfort, easein 4ife

flourishing

FREEDOM, JUSPICE.EQUALITY

freedomjustice

equality-

MISCELLANEOUSnow

if this happens:*

social

, technologyindustrialrevival

. weakness

2uu

11.

13

85539

10

6- _

- 29

5 -

13

5

6

8

1013

8949

2317

10 2910

3

3

9

1

Main Componeats

and Responses US J

U.S. RUSSIA 197 133'US, AmericaRussia

65

82

57

43Soviet Union 5

USSR 20US/USSR 12

China 7

Iran 6

great powers 12

country 6

' Israel 6

people _ 9

WEAPONS, POWEi . 134 70weapons 38 31

bombs 20 11

missiles 12

guns 29

tanksmodern weaponsarmamentplanespower

6

6

23

strength . 14

SALT,NEGOTIATIONS 78 17

SALT 26 .-

negotiations 6

disarmament 6

Peace 7 8

politics 22 9

treaties 14

necessary5

NUCLEAR,ATOMIC WEAPONS 72 20

nuclIkr 36

nuclgPr weapons 12

nukes ° 10

nuclear war 6

atomic, -weapons - 10

atmn bombs 8 10

BAD, FOOLISH 51 63'

bad 6

waste.ful 6

unnecessary 7

silly 8 -

ridiculous 6 .-

foolish 10 -

inhumanity' 9

hate 4

problemscrimihal

against society

8 -

4

backwardness 12

against Islam 6

against agreement 3

corruption 7

anarchy 10

*201

4

ARMS RACE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUOOT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components

1

U.S., RussiaI Weapons, PowerSALT, NegOtiations.

Nuclear, Atomic WeaponsBad, FoolishWar, FightingDeath, DotructionDomination, OppressionDevelopment, TechnologyMiscellaneous

4

.4

Percentage ofTotal Score

:25 15

Main Componentsand Responses

WM% FIGHTING

US

136

J

236war, worl'd- 70 56warfarebattlecompetition

10

15 57fight,ing 26run,ing 6wrestling' 18

Army 9 7

military 12

defense 6dispute 36enemy,-tymilitary

advancement

28

8

DEATH, DESTRUCTION 89 171death 18 '28destruction 32 56 4'danger,ous 21 -

kill,ing 6 27

4 suicide,lc

6 -

blood 16anxiety 7

terror 21scary 6against seturity 6ruin,ing 10

17 8

10 2

9, 2

7

17 26

11 19

12

.6,

3 3

Total Dominance Score 778 900

-44D3MINATION,OPPRESSION 109

domination 224 colonization 12

opftessicm 22dictatorship 14

overpowering 9

Zionist 8wandering

, 16

emigration 6

DENELOPMENT,TECHNOLOGY 52

development,advancement 22

-technology 13advancementscientificadvancement

8

4

space 5

MISCELLANEOUS 21 29money 16 18freedom 5

win,ing 5poverty 6

20i

N'

Main Componentsand Responses US. J.

DESTRUCTION, ENDdestructiondestroyanihilationend;-of.worldholocaustdesti-uction of

'societiesdestruction of.wOrld

danger,ous'ruin

TERROR, %INSTABILITY ' 6 108

threatening ,- 8anxiety . - 6

terrar v - 40fear 6 -

no security - 14

no stabilityhomeless 2

hunger - 5

disfiguration -,, 11--

DEATH,'XILLING 72 110death 48 57

* kill,ing 10 25deadly 14 -

killing"humanity - 10ending humanity - 11

blood - 7

156

= 72

819

8

32

fs

205'46

7

13

37

DEVELOPMENT,...MOHAN INVENTIONS

developmentscientific devel.technologydiscoveryadvancementsatellites

MIS6LLANEprobl

accident3 mile IslandProliferationknowledge

0 thinking mind. colonization ,

203

91

17

22

- 10

- 11

- 25 -6

236

5

6

6

204

4

4

8

1

NUCLEAR, WbPONS

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. ,AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS .

Main Perceptual Components

Percent6ge ofTotal Score

US

Bombs, MissilesRussia, Japan

liar, Fighting

RadiationPoWer, Domination"?'

DisarmamentB d, Unnecessary

Destruction, EndTerror, InstabilityDeath, Killing__Development, Human Inverti9onsMiscellaneous

16 8

15 13

la 13

8 3

6 4

5 1

4 3

21

1 11.

9 11

9

3 2

,s

Total Dominance Score'

f

801 958

Maid Componeghand Responses US J

BOMBS,'MISSILES 132 76

l

68 22

alttsbic: 19 7

InTssliirecssi

7

32

r."

arms roce . 13gunsweapons,

destructive

6

23atomic weapons 11

US, RUSSIA:JAPAN 120 127

U.S. 22 48China 9Russia, Sov. U. 53USSR 10 36Japan , 10Hiroshima 16 4

Communistcountries 11

*oreat powers 10 fEurope 4humanity 14

WAR, FIGHTING 109 122war 78 . 65

NW III 10fighting 10 25military 5

attack 6terrorism 15

rivalry 9against peace 8

RADIATION 65 27

radiatidn 416 22atom,ic 12 27plutonium 7

fall out 12radioactive 6

explosion 6

POWER, DOMINATION 46 37

Erg;ful

4616

5

domination 16

SALT DISARMAMENT 39 7

SALT 1, 11 20detente 8

disarmament 11 . -

peace 7

BAD, UNNECESSARY 32 28bad 14

evil 7

ignorance 6 #:unnecessary 11

spite 6

enemy,enemity 10hate 6

Main Components \ ----------------and Responses US J--.7--

TALKS TREATY-------290 54114 "-

. tails 38negotiate,ions 8

SALT 1 16SALT III r 8

SALT 4,5,100... 18peace talks,

.' treaty. 12communication- 6

coopyration - 11agrment 28 12

poili ics

pa

34

5

teeaty 84' mutual -

understandin4 . - 8disarmament 12

limitations 21

limiting arms race - 12determination - 11 .

NATIONS: US.RUSSIA

US, Amerfca' Russia, USSR.

,Europe,Iran

countries .nations

Overnmentworldgreat countriesdevelopedcountries

developingcountries

ARMS, NUCLEARWEAPONS -

nuclear(nuclear arms,weapOnsarms

armamentsarms racearms limitationsbombs, nuclear-weapons,developed-gunsmissilesatom

power,fulenergy

LEADERS:

CARTER, BREZHNEV

CarterNixon

KissingerCongress

Breschnev

160 9144 2782 275

6

86107 -

- 12

7

103 51

10

206

14

14

5

13

8 ' -

5 6

8 16

6

14 -

- 206

9

79

43

8

106

12

^

SALT".II

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S: AND JORDANIAN STUDENT QROUPS

Main Componentsand Responses US

PEACE AFETY N

J

327f edom -

uality - 10justice - 12peace 8 114detente 16 -

love - 12stability - 15

tranquility - 28safety - - 61conservation oflife 15

happiness 6no fighting 10

stopOing worlddisputes

stop fighting 6lack...of_terror 19

DEVELOPMENT,. PRODUCTION 51

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

USdevelopmentfiourishment

MM.production

constructionindustry

WAR, DESTRUCTION 12

17

13

9

66

51

Talks, TreatyNatiOps: U.S., Russia-----"---Arms, Nuclear-WOnsLeaders: Carter, BrezhnevUseless, insuccessfulPeace, Safety

Development, ProductionWar, Destruction'

Miscellaneous

40 8

22 12

14 8

11

5 1

3 . 488

2 8

4 6

war,-fare 12

destructionenemy,tyterror .

MISCELLANEOUS 28

13

15

8

15

42thinking minddirtymorals -

necessaryinterests

I

help,ful

pepper-I-II 20

USELESS1UNSUCCESSFUL 37

5

11

5

Is6

6

Total Dominance Score 733 673

failurefarce 6useless 11

inequitable 6.

never,-ending 5

will not beapplied completely-

,

6

2o6

s

,

Main Componentsand Responses

US, RUSSIAUSUSSRRussia

Soviet, -UnionChina

US/USSREuropeIsrael

nations

countriesFrenchworld

civilization: culture

Arabs

govermnent

TALKS. .

NEGOTIATIONS .

talks '.

communicationnegotiations'SALT

NATO

politics,-altreatyexchangeinternat'l

relations

dealing,ease in-cutting relations

COLD WAR, WEAPONScold warWVV1115

militarynuclear,-war,

weaponsfearprovocation ,

disputelack of peace

i armament raceenemybad relations

EEADERSCarterNixonKissingerBreschnev

US J

180 3830 -

12 ,-

60 -

12 -

6 -

- 5 -

11 -

- 9

7 614

5 .

- 7

- 7

- 911

81 56

16 6

8 - t8

12

7 -

24 -

6

- 11

2012

7

74 74

--2Z17 11

6

711

6

, 5..

-

2 0 1

___

58

10

19

19

10

-

7

19

9

9

9

10

_

:

,

DETENTE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

/Main Perceptual Components

...---'

I

U.S., Rus. sia .

Talks, NegotiationsCold War, Weapons

....,

Leaders0 .

Cooperation, UnderstandingPeace, SecurityOpenness, FreedomEconomy, DevelopmentProblems, FailureMiscellaneous

Percentage ofTotal Score

,US J

2 5

14 813 1010 -

9 2513 18

12

12

3 '5

4 4

Total Dominance Score 558 722

->

l

Main Componentsand Responses US

COOPERATION 49

J

183cooperation 6good irelations -

61

20understanding,mvt.16 31agree,ment 18friend,ship 9

13

love -

lack ofselfishness -

help -

unity, world

22

end of dispute - 13

PEACE, SECURITY 72 134peace 72 88tranquility - 11order 7

security.

- 28

OPENNESS, FREEDOM - 90openness -

freedomequality !"

-

38105

justice - 17

good - 20

ECONOMY,DEYELOPMENT 87

economy 8interests 7. 30productionadvancement,

6

development 15industrial revival 5

exportation 9flourishing . 14

PROBLEMS, FAILURE 19 34,problemm

failure 9useless 5farce 5

0

..lying 11

_difference 14

MISCELLANEOUS 25 .26'1 rmeaning . 7 -

wmrd 6 -unknown 12 -

reaching reality - 2

result - 10goal 9domination 5

2 t) 0NA

cm

Main Componentsand Responses US J

GROWTH, SPREAD 103 153grow,th 17

multiply 14

increase 10

spread,ing 17 120many ' 10distribution 12

expand,sion 8proliferate 'dividing

combining

9

14

abundant 6infiltrate 6

too many 6

WEAPONS, NUCLEAR 90 18

lweapons,ry 12 18

nuclearoweapons 54

arms 24

SEX REPROOUCTIO 43sereproduce,tio 6

bfrth 5

birth control 6rabbits 14-

life 6

WHAT, UNKNOWN 36word 10what 14

dictionary 6'

unknown . 6

MISCELLANEOUS - Mbad morals - 11

arriving 8 t

bread / - 15

PROLIFERATION

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY,U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main Perceptual Components US

1

Growth, Spread 31 25Weapons, Nuclear 27 3

Sex, Reproduction 13What, Unknown 11

War, Domination 4 14

Science, Knowledge 5 14

Politics, International Relations 4 13

Society, Country 11 ,

Freedom, Security, Peace 2 10Sickness, Hunger 2 5

Miscellaneous 6

Total Dominance Score 331 613

Main COmponentsand Responses US J

WAR, DOMINATION 14 84war 6 11

destroy,ction 8 -

domination - 22colonization - 25military force - 6anarchy - 12betrayal - 8

SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE 16 84sciensp - 28

advanetment - 21education - 11

knowledge - 16beliefs - 8communism 10 -

ideas 6 -

POLITICS.

INTERNAT'L RELATIONS 15 82politics, -power - 17

talk,ing 8 -

treaty 7 18

propaganda - 8relations - 12interests - 9goals - 8settling,ment - 10

SOCIETY, COUNTRYsocfetycultureinhabitantsenvironment

country,advanced-

FREEDOM,SECURITY, PEACE

freedom

securitylove

peaceIslamgood

SICKNESS, HUNGERsickness

.

povertyoverpopulation

. 210

6827

12

13

5

11

6 61

.15

- 13

6- 19

86

8 /9- 25

- 4

-

Main ComPonentsand Responses US J

RECESSION,OEPRESSION

depressioninflationrecessionbalancetight

, high

sound

183 10-30

64 1062

7

8,

6

6

MONEY, WEALTH 155 116

capjtal 5

money 100 27

budget 18 4leprices 7

taxes 10 -

'thrift 5 -

gold 5 -

. save 5 -

wealth - 23. rich,ness 5 35

poverty - 26

BAD, POOR,FAILING

bad

downhill ;

problems '

unemploymentfailingfallingpoorcomplextumbling down'exploitation

92 16

237

12

10

6

5

24

5

- 10

6

COUNTRIES, GOV'T 82

country 5

civilizationdevelopingcountries -/EumPe\_ -

- advanced-countries -5

18

U.S.

Cartergovernmentpolicy

politics

system

TRADE, CONSUMPTIONeconomicssupplydemsndexchangetrade

buyingconsumptionstock marketWall StreetgraphsGNP

62

914

86

6

19 19

11

63

15

885

6

85

8

78

5

14

27

329

ECONOMY

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main Perceptual Components

Recession; DepressionMoney, WealthBad, Poor, FailingCountries, Government

'Trade, ConsumptionDevelopment, AdvancementAgriculture, ResourcesBusiness, IndustryExport, ImportSocial Goals, NecessitiesMiscellaneous

Total Dominance Score

US

28 1

23 1614 2

12 alo 10

2 22

1 13

6 11

2 9

5

3

663

IS

744

Main Componentsand,Responses

'DEVELOPMENT,AOVANCEMENT

US

10

J

161advancement 32development,ing 30buildinggrfwth 5

7

sp?eading 11sufficiency 22flourishing 21organizinghelp, mutual- 5

10

16counseling 12

AGRICULTURE,RESOURCES 8 99

agrkultum0 - 46eesources - 28oil 8 25

BUSINESS, INDUSTRY 84businessindustryproduction

231

-

-

24

32factories - 17jobs 12 -

work,ers - 11employment 5

EXPORT, IMPORT 13 64exports 7 15

exportation - 19imports 6 9

-importation - 21

SOCIXL GOALS,NECESSITIES 35

necessary7

justice 5freedom 7

security 5livihg - 10

MISCELLANEOUS 18 19future 8ours 6 -

Ear. 6 -

news 6 1

a rmS51/4

disease 6

Main Componentsand Responses

PEOPLE, BLACKS,WOMEN

Blackschildrenmen

peopR.-slaves,rywomen

humankindmindArabsMoslems

classes

WRONGe UNFAIR,OESTRUCTIVEwrongevil

badabusecheaS

stealingcrimedestroyharmhurtmisus4(unfair

advantagehateinhumanity

US J

110

16

9

6

11

12

6

50

67,

6

10

14

10

6

9

6

6

105 30

Ikit,

9 -

16 -

5 -

- 12

9 -

5 -

6 -

899

9

144

OP) ' SEX 37

sex,ual )/pornography 6

POOR, IGNORANr. 20 24poor .11lack of food 9ignorant,ce 9 5

weakness 10

GOVERNMENT,SYSTEMS 19 21capitalism 6communism 8imperialism 5government 14

_ politics 7

213

"N

EXPLOITATION

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

4

4

Main Componentsand Responses

OPPRESSION,DOMINATION

US J

37 150oppressionexploitationcolonizationrights stifled 'taking .

used,usingdomination'control

powerstrength

RESOURCES, WEALTH

6 49- 14

- ' 10

- 9

- 15

19 -

- 246 -

6 -

29

32 1135resourcesnatural resourcesoil

mineralsland

waterSahatigoldmoneyrichesprofits

currencyexpensiveness

AOVANCEMENT, WORK,PRODUCTION

8 465 -

7 8- 10

6

6

12

5

12 9

12 ,

6

4

.11

98

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

US

people, Blacks, WomenWrong, Unfair, DestructiveSex

Poor, IgnorantGovernment, Systerps

Oppression, DominationResources, WealthAdvancement, Work, ProductionCountries, U.S., IsraelJnterests, GoalMiscellaneous

26 9

25_ .4

9

5 3

4 3

9 218 19

14'

9 12

8

4 6

advancementlemopoly .

workersproduction'

technologysciencebuilding

COUNTRIES, U S,ISRAEL

17

21

2811

9

6

6

39 90country,sforeignU S

great powersIsrael

INTERESTS, GOAL°

5 305

29 29- 10

' - 21

- 55Total Dominance Score 417 717*

lar

interests

goal

egocentricity

MISCELLANEOUS

2018

17

18 47warshowtire

denTalmediaTVfreedomhelp

- 19

6 -

- 6

- , 8

5 -

7- -- 7

7

21,1A

+lain Components

and Responses

3RD WORLDCOUNTRIES 150

nations 12

countriesAfrica,-countries 17Asia,-countries 9

India 18

3rd world,

-countriesworld

backwardcountrieSpeoplelots ofinhabitants

0%

US. J

112

24

11

7

40 36

5

11

6

23

112 41

60 41

52

96

5

6'

5 .-

13

10

-8

8

5

9

27

45 34

11

9 7.

17 16

8 -

- 11

34 19tt

9 -

9 -

10 -",6 -

8

- 11

POVERTY. poverty

poor

BODY, MATURE,SMALL .

,body

baby

briinbreastsbustchildrenimnatureprematureskinnysmall

HUNGER, DISEASE

sicknessdiseasehunger

starvationsleeping

RESOURCES,LAND, OIL

resources

agriculture,1rural

land

oil

lack of

resources

. 216

tr

UNDZROEVELOPMENT

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYAND JORDANIAN STUDENT-GROUPS

Main Perceptual ComPonents

Percentage ofTotal Score

US

Iountries, 3rd Worldoverty .

ody, Immature, Small.

.

unger, DiseaseResources, Land, OilAf.ab Countries, Middle EastTechnology, EconomyBaGkwardness, Ignorance :Colonization, OppressionLow Thinking, No Principles

( .Miscellaneous ,

1

ANC

28 1521 6

18

8 4 ALIO

6 2

262 14

8 13

8

6

7 5

Total Dominance ScOre 530 740

Main Components' and Responses US J

p.

MISCELLANEOUS 38 35

overdevelopment 12

speech 6education 7

housing 6government 5

politics 8help 9 14'welfare 6

AL)Hain Componegfi

,and Responses , US J

ARABCOONTR1ES,MIDDLE EAST - 192

Arabs,-countries - 81Arab countries - 46Jordan' - 49Middle East - , 16

TECHNOLOGY.ECONOMN 12 108

technology 6 13

irstries - 18

ustrial

ckwardness - 15

worker - 5

technologybackwardness 8sCience - 8production - 6

plans,ing - .12

unemployment - 8not developedeconomically

. 9imported 6money 6

BACKWARDNESS,, IGNORANCE ' 43 98

lacking 7 -

waste 5 -

backwardness 36slow, backward 5 13

weak 7 21counting on others - 6

reactionary 6ignorance 6 16illiteracy, 13

COLOWATION,OPPRESSION 60

colonization r' 27colonizedcountriesoppressionexploitationoverpowering

LOW THINKING. .

NO PRINCIPLES - 41

culturalbackwardness - 11

low thinking - 5

undevelopedsocial level 9

laziness 6no principles 5corruption 5

12

87

6

. 2.16

,

Mein Componentsand Responses.

IONEY, FOOD

US J

156 138

FOREIGN Ap

PERCEPTONS AND EVALUATIONS BY A

U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

4, Mein Componentsand Responses

COUNTRIES, GREATANO DEVELOPING

US

67 126

'financial aidmoneybillionsexpensiveloan

rish

from richfood

'wheatclothesmedicinetools

, oil

carsexperts

HELP._ ASSIST

683 207

6

7

15

640 235 6

910

11

12

7

16

118 36

Africa

tambodia .

CubansIndia

Iran

Israel

Russia, USSR3rd worldcountriesgreat countriesdevelopingcountries

Saudi ArabiaPalestine

gulf countries

DOMINATION,COLONIZATION

7

13

6

5

5

10

67

8-

-

-

-

-

9

22

17

9

28

25

11

92

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

US Jhelp.ful.ingassist.ancecareallymutual help

U.S. GOV'T,POLITICS

96 19

11

5

617

i5 ref

Money, FoodHelp, AssistU.S. Government, PoliticsMilitary, WarNeeded, GoodTin Much, NoCountries, Great and DevelopingDominations ColonizationNeedy, PoorDevelopment Interests

28 22

22 6

16 12

8 4

. 5

4

12 20

15

5 12

8

dominationownershipcolonizationslaveryexploitationcolonizers'1st step

NEEDY, POOR

-

-

-

-

28

18

6

27

17

12

12

72

11-3.

CarterCongress'governwentpolicypolitics

taxes

MILITARY, WAR

37 6510 -

6 -

6 -

7 -

11 98 -

41 25

needs,-I

poorpovertystarvationhungeroverpopulationrefugees

DEVELOPMENT,INTERESTS

9

5

5;

11-

32

1 -

,,15

7

50

militaryanis

weaponswar

NEEDED, GOOD

13

7 15

10 -711 efo

28

Totail Dominance-Store 546 613., interest

development'

workers-,

-

29

15

6

needednecessarygood

TOO MUCH, NO

10

11

7

23

too muchunappreciatednowaste

7

5

4

217

Mein Componentsand Responses US J

POVERTY,UNENPLCATENT,WELFARE

povertypoor,nessmoneyricheconomy,icinflationrecessionnecessity

119 125

- 6214

235

1011

6

9jobs idunemployment 16 15

putting wrong manin wrong place - 6

begging 7-

gambling - 10transportation - 6

housing = 10social work 6 -

welfare 18

HEALTH, DISEASE,HUNGER

healthdiseaseVDhunger

c) malnutrition

DRUGS, ALCOHOL,CIGARETTES 78 90

alcoholism 24 14

drinking 9 -

drugs 31 8smoking

cigatettes - 68pollution 14 -

SOCIETY, CLASS.RACE 80 22

society 18 -

classes - 16

People-, 15 -

blacks 9 -

race,ism 30 -

women - 6

friends a -

SEX, OVERPOPULATION 57 36sex,ual 24 15

abortion 7rape 8 -

overpopulation 8 16running aftergirlsprostitution 10

2 E)

'SOCIAL PROBLEMS

PERCEPTION§ AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

I.

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal Score

US

Poverty, Unemploynent, WelfareHealth, Disease, HungerDrugs, Alcohol, CigarettesSocirety, Class, Race

16

12

11-

11

13

- 2

9

2

Sex, Oveypopulation 8 4,

City, Country, World r 7 -

Inequality, Oppression 6 4

Marriage, TIvorce 3 20

Low Morals, Bad Cui4toms '3 16

Crime, Theft / 7 10

War, Violence, Killing 5 7

Education, Schooling 4 6

Miscellaneous 7 7

Total Dominance Score 726 ^ 973

CITY, COUNTRY,WORLD

city,sslumsghettoworldeverywhere

INEQUALITt;\OPPRESSION

equalityunequal,tydiAcriminationfreedom.lack ofslaveryoppressioninfluenceprejudice

54

8 .

1012

16

41 378-6

13 -

- 9

6

12

10

14

MISCELLANEOUSintrospectioncommunication

.sociologyof individualsimmigrationgovernmentpoliticsovercomingcure,ablemanya lotconnectionsrule

50 64- 8

5 .716 -

- 16

4

6

6 9

8

5

8

5

,

-

Main Components-t and Responses US J

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE 19 197marriage

unstability offamily -

46

15.problems in family - 10adultery - 20divorce ,- 67dowry - 5family 6 -

children 5women going outof home

9

6love a 9kindness 10

'LOW MORALS.11A0 CUSTCMS 26 iso

morals,ty a -

low morals - 23had moralslack ofresponsibility

- 15

8

had customs - 26lying - 14hate,red 6 11enVy - 13against religioncountry fallingapart

-

-

11

33ills 6 -

tumbling down - .6

CRIME THEFTcrimedeviationoffensetheftill doing

WAR, VIOLENCE.KILLING

warviolenceriots

conflictattackinvasionkillingsuicidewrestlingenemy

EDUCANH,SCHOOLING

schools,ing,educationignorance

coeducation,miNinglack of awareness

backwardness,

2

39 6810 6

7 -

.8

- 11

- 26

- 10

7

6

27 56

14 913 7

12

16

6

6

Main ComponentsandeResponses

CCWRTS, JUOGE,itAWYERS

US

236

J

30judicial 8Court,s,-room 92Supreme Court 27judges 12.

chief 5

lawyers 32trials 14

defendant 5

criminal 12

police 10

of the peacetreatment,-ofchildrentreating withjustice

19

16

14

INJUSTICE CRIME 62 50injustice 12 14

4 crime'jail

prison

15

5

punishment 8 11

unreal 5none 6no justice 5slavery

imaginary,

nonexistent

6

14

LAW 134 36law,s ful 114 27constitution 6 -

legal'

in introducinglaws

M

9

BALANCE,-SCALES 29beance 6even,ness 6

_scales 5

12

221

JUSTICE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

in Components

and Responses US

RtGHTS: EQUALITY,FAIRNESS, FREEDOM 234.

J

323rights 18right 28equal,ity 55

' fair,ness...plaY 69justice-freedom 30liberty 17

good 7

truth 10

gives right towhoever has rightresponsitiilitynecessary

LOVE, BROTHERHOOD 5

7§

139

15

-56

9

11

7

101

brotherhood -

lovelike&honesty 5

firmness,

resolutionworking towardmutual help

PEACE, SECURITY 29

13

385

6

9

30

91

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main Perceptual Components US .1

Codrts, Judge, LawyersInjustice, CrimetawBalance, ScalesRights: Equality, Fairness,

30 3

8 6

17 4

4

30 371 12

4 10

4 9

1 7

1

4

2 ,

peace 24

tranquilityorder 5

securityquietude

NATION, GOVERNMENT 32

33

17

7

28

6

77Freedom

Love, Brotherhood.Peace, SecurityNatlon, GovernmentGod, IslamPeople, SocietyAdvancement

. Miscellaneous

nation

government 12

department 14

democracy 6

betwn. govern/government

UN

GOD, ISLAM 10

8

6

558

60God, -fear 10 6religion 9Islam - 45

PEOPLE, SOCIETY 11 60Total Dominance Score 782 878 all 6

people 5

humanitysocietyclasses

Palestinejans

ADVANCEMENT

9

296

7

9

34

advancement -

rising -

production -

MISCELLANEOUS -

21

7

6

16

distributed land p

strength -

6

222

Main Componentsand,ReSponses

-RIGHTS, JUSTICE.

FREEDOMfree,domfaieness*MicelawsERAright.s.human -

constitutionolprincipleduty,

LOVE. SECURIITY

friendshipshare,ingbrotherhoodlove

securitjrcontentmentmmypeace

tranquilitymutual helporder

MONEY, JOBSjobsworkopportunityworkerspayemploymentwealthwealthy and pooreconomicdevelopment,advancementindustrial state

Aroduction

RELIGION, ISLAM'religionGod ,

morals

of Islam

PREJUDICE,DISCRIMINATION

prejudicediscriminationoppressionracismcheatingnonexistent

DEMOCRACY,SOCIALISM

rule,govt-votemgdemocracy,ticovercom ngauthoritysocialiSM

?23

us

212

.1

29730

292815

50

47

65

106

17

79

13 EQUALITY5

25

16 115

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONSkBY5

11 U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS31

276

6

4

8 Percentage of13 Total Score12

44 80 ,Main Perceptual Components US20-

-

16

7

6

6

8 'People, Men and Women, BlacksEqual, Same

36 17

12 15

5 Good, Ideal 7 1

- 11 Rights, qustice Freedom 28 336

Love, Securfty, 2 13 d234

7

Money, JobsReligion, Islam

6 9

1 \ 8

9 76Prejudice,-DiscriminationDemocracy, Socialism

3 6

2 5'9 6

Miscellaneous6

83 8

56

Total Dominance Score 757 90921 53

6 -

15 -

- 17

- 24

6

- 6

15- 447

6

9,,,z,

115

- 6

- 16

Main Componentsand Responses

PEOPLE. MEN ANDWOMEN, BLACKS

peoplechildrenbrotherblackseveryonemenwomenmen and womenwhitesrace,falminorities

sex.ualclasses.individualscountry men

EQUAL. SAMEequal, -rights

even,-chancessame,ness

balance,dequality

GOOD. IDEALgoal

good 11

ideal,istic 15

necessaryneeded 13

bettering

MISCELLANEOUS 21

strength -

mathematics 8sports 7

word 6

life -

masternot asking for it -

knowledge.higher ed:treatmentsetting downmeans,connection

US J ,

274k 158

18 205 -5 .

45 -

6

2490 235 5612

30 -,12

22 -

- 10

- 41

8

93 9

34

17

32

10

52

5

9

8 -

696

11

6'

9

13

6

10

8

224

Maim Conponentsand Responses

LOVE, HAPPINESS

J

219 611

PEACE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYU.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

'lovecooperationhelp

understandingtogethermessunitedjoyhannonyhappinesshonor.ingsharing'

relationshipcontentment

WAR, DISARMAMENT

106 1312 16

6

10 4

.8

5'3

161638 3

9

5

98

154 96

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal:Score

lercold warfight.-forarmamentdisarmamentno war.sno attackno killingbetrayal

colonizationZionism

SYMBOLS, DOVE

120 284 --6

6

18 20

98

- 106

8

106

US

Love, Happinei.s

War, Disarmament ,

Symbols, Dove-Tranquil, QuietDesire, HopeReligionWorld, NationsRights, Freedom

'Safety, StabilityDevelopment, AdvancementPolitics, NegotiationsMiscellaneous

26 8

18 12

12

11 8

10

4 1

7 18

2 17

1', 16

8

4 .5

5 6

signsymbol

doveflowers

pipe

TRANQUIL, QUIET

6

6210

6

93 68tranqUil.tycalmMessserene.typeacefulquiet.uderelaxotionrest.fulconfort

DESIRE, HOPE

20 28810

7

30 27

99 6

7

88

Total Dominance Score .845 791:

..

necessaryneeded

desire.able. dream

hope.fulfaithideal

goodgoal

Possible

RELIGION

69

10

818

6

'7

13

6

5

22 9religion.s 6Chr4cfmas-

God

no peace withoutIslamKoran

6

Stliam,""°m-

'22,6

Main Oamponentsand Responses pr US J

WORLD, NATIONSEgyptIsrael

'Vietnamearthworld

USPalestineland

hippiesBeginArabs.-peopleSadat

63 142- 21

- 3612

829 -

- 16

- 13

9

14

6- 10

- 31

RIGHTS, FREEDOM 18 136rights - 21free.dcm 18 48loss of rights - 4equality - 23just.ice - 40

SAFETY, STABILITY 9 124safity - 85security 9stability - 39

DEVELOPMENT,ACNANCEMENT - 61

----drer-7i---=-TgeveoPrnadvancement - 31

4 flourishment - 9production - 6

POLITICS,

NEGOTIATIONS 30 43Camp David

' - 21political 6 -

treaty . 14 -UN 10 -

talk - 11agreement 11

. 6

MISCELLANEOUSproblemCorps

time.-for thingsirjfrsfAti es

life

external

.no hungerwork

strengthnonexistent

43

812

6

8

9

51

11

10

.6

.2t;

Main Componentsand Responses \

POWER. CONTROL

1977

114

1980

231great power.s - 47military power 5biggreat 37

8-

strong,strength - 71control 9riche

. 15 13dollar ' 4 -

greatest country - 16large,st country 10overpowering ; - 20influence - 41power 43self sufficient 6'

TECHNOLOGi,PROGRESS 191 215

technology - 32factories

advancement.development

-

63

6

74help - 7cooperation 9 -

exports ,

oil

-

7

3-

intiustries

advance inscience

space

investigation

24

-

20

23

9educated .high level ofeducationthoughtadvancement

6

6

11civilizedbuildings,

skyscrapers

5

7

moon 20 -resouries - 6science 35 -

progress 12inventionactivity

8

7

establishpent 6

COLONIZATION.OPRREWON 56 163

cObnization,colonialism

imperialismracial

discrimination,destruction of

50

6

61

Islam - 12

Zionism - 12oppression - 71

2.41

UNITED STATES

, PERCEPTIONS AND'EVALUATIONSiYHRDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 198111

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main Perceptual Components

Power, Control

Technology, ProgressColonization, OppressionImmoral, UnjustWeapons, KillingGovernment, PoliticsIsrael, RussiaAmerica, SfatesCountry, PeopleFreedom, JusticeMiscellaneous

1977 1 1980

23

22

17

12

10

7

3

2

1

2

1047 985

11

18

5

,5

6

19

14

10

4

4

3

Total Dominance Score

Piain Components

and'Oesponses

IMMORAL, UNJUST

1977

50

1982

119Main Componentsand Responses

WEAPONS, KILLING

1977

58

1980

100

Sr

1,. ,

,

taking advant.of world

corruptioninjusticebias

roismcrimes

betrayalbid ribrals

unfairtumbling down'

overpopulationdrugs V$'

-

28-

-

-

7

-

-

8-

7

17

68

99

-17N.-

-10

weaponskillingviolenceattac4erenem9Elikesupportingterrorism

war

24

7

-

27

35

2413

19

9

Main Componentsand Responses

GOVERNMENT,

POLITICSpoliticsJimmy Carterdemocracy'

capitilism,ticNixonWashingtonWatergateorganizationveto rightKissingerCIAUN

1977 1980

201 72

8 10

50

11 17

61 33

12

13

11

84

'10

5 -20

ISRAEL, RUSSIA 400119 29Israel 57 29Palestine 11

Russia,n 20France 9West 16 -Mexico 9Saudi Arabia 6Arab 4

British 17

AMERICA, STATESAmericaoStatesNew York

COUNTRY:PEOPLEcountryworld

civilizationBlackBlack

FREEDOM, PEACEfreedompeace

MISCELLANEOUSsupplyimitationfly

lifeinterestplaying aroundanatomy

102

66

25

11

46 24

20 244

2

9'1313

38 9

32 9'6 n_

42 23

6

9- 6

8

Main Components **

and Responses 1977 1983

COUNTRIES,US, ISRAEL 182 277

country,s 84 34

nation,a1 6 -

world - 21 f

US, America 25 55Egypt 8Iran. . 5

Middle East 7

Arab countries 5 9

Palestine 9/ -

USSR - 7 18

Israel 10 23'international - 32

social 6 14

people 15 11'internal - 14

external - 16

class 8 6

culture 5

individual 6

GOALS, DEVELOPMENT,

ECONOMY 47 83

goals 19

education 5

, mutual help 10

development 5

useful ' 7

economy,ic 11 26

advancement 11

egualiti 5

Peace 4

progress

change15

7

PPOBLEMS, WAR,

COLONIZATION 121 92

problemsconflict 1fighting .8

warbattle

27,

-

19

6

Army 7

prison 25 9

oppression - 16

colonization 9 24

Zionism - . - 11

taking advantage -

ruined 10

enemy 8

PRESIDENTS,POLITICIANS 29 28

Kings 11

__consul " 7

ambassador 11

governor 17

Jimmy Carter 5

King Husseiti 6

POLITICS

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BYJORDANIAN ...UUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage.ofTotal Score

1977 1980

Countries, U.S., Israel 15 36Goals, Development, Economy, 4' 11

Problems, War, Colonizotion, 10 12

Presidents, Politicians 2 4

Political Science, Diplomacy,Plans 28 11

Leadership, p6wer : 13 4

Government, iocracy 12 9

Laws, Constitution 6 4

Corruption, Deceit 5 4

Miscellaneous 4 3

Total DoMinance ScCre .1197- 762

'Main CompOnentsand Resoonses

MISLJELLANEOUS

1977 -I98r

52 23fear 9 -

parts g _

character 5 -

base 12 -

wish.surviying 3 -

life c -

ground - 6general - 13

- 4weak

*

Main Xomponents*and Resoonses 1R77 1980

POLITICAL SfIENCE,DIPLOMACY, PLANS 337 81

relktions,ships 18 -5diplomaty 32 11skill. 10 -.art - 12negotiation 28 0...

deal,ing 14 -behavior 7 -

participetion - 17 -

ambitious 2 -plan,ino - 24goal detenninesmeant i - 5flexibility 9wise 9",

experience 23 8thought 13 -intelligence 23 7publicity 9 -

- science of 26 -profession 34ways, means 52work 14effort 6

LEADERSHIP. POW R 152 35ea eros

power,fu 22rule,in 41respon ibility 1 8duties 9gi*at powers 8strong - 1 10influence 13 ,-

GOVERNMENT,DEMOCRACY 142

governnent 35democracy,tic "7systen, order 65politicsparty;-systent

26

,embassy 9

LAWS, '

CONSTITUTION 78laws 24constitution 22rights 6freedom II

justiCe 15interests -

CORRUPTION, DECEIT '57cheat,ing 14unfair 5slyness

deceiyingfailure

race hatred

18

10dangerous 10

2 3

82

29

31

10-

12

33

6

5

9

5

8

28

23

5 0.

Main Components.004 and Responses 1977 1980

US, WESTERN CAMPUS, Americacountry,sEuropeinternational

Western,-campnational

"landArab

FREEDOM, RIGHTS

free,domright

principlebeautiful

SOCIETY, CLASSESsocial

classesbourgeousieindividualismculturehumanitymansocial levelsocietylife

peoplegroup

FREE ENTERPRISE,

OWNERSHIPcompetition

opportunismownershipfree economyfree importationinterests

CORRUPTION, LACKOF EQUALITY

corruptviongreedysneakyselfishnessenemy-like,lack of equalityatheismrace hatred

164 20291 133

17 -

20 22

6

11 41

9 -

9 - t,7

14 130

9614 13

16

5

81 123

11

51 20- 10

13 14

5

- 13

- 10

8

9

- 23

12

5

13 70

13 6

9

20

14

6 415

30

7

11

6

6

46

6

6,

8

17

9

CAPITALISM

, PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS,BYJORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Percentage ofTotal Score

Main Rereeptual Components

U.S., Western CampFreedom, RightsSociety, ClassesFree Enterprise, OwnershipCorruption, Lack of EqualityEconomy, Money, ProfitImperialism, OppressionBusiness, IndustryCommunism, SocialismGovernment, PoliticsMiscellaneous

Total Dominance Score

1977 1980

16 21

1 14

8 13

1 7

3 5

23 13

22 9

8 4

8 7

4 2

4 4

1020 940

Main Componentsand Responses 1977 1980

ECONOMY,MONEY, PROFIT 232 125

econcay,-system 17 -

econ. advancement - 6

money 95 42rich 52 -

wealth - 22profit 5 -

capital 17 16

profiting frail - .14

property '15 16material life 15 9

development 11' -

progress - 5 -

IMPERIALISM,... OPPRESSION 227 88

colonization 6 12

domination 51 4

oppression "WI 34

exploitation -45 -

terrorism - 6

killing - 6

revolution - 11

overpowering_ - 15

stealing .7 -

torture 17

war 12

empire 24dictatorship 8

BUSINESSINDUSTRYfactories

monopolieswork,erscompanies

COMMUNISM,SOCIALISM

communismsocialismdemocracyanti -communimcapitalism

GOVERNMENT,POLITICS

systempblitics,alinfluence

governingstate interference

MISCEtLANEOUSword

capacitysecurityreligion'belief

.' courtcomfortnaturescience

84

19

2519

21

37

9

19

9

87 66M51 '9

6 27

- 7

- 12

44

33

11

17

5

6

6

44 36

7 -

_ 13 -

8 - -

6 -

15

6 -

- 9

4 6

23 .

Maih Componentsand Responses 1977

KILLING,DESTRUCTION 78 135

kill ,ing.er 27 74death 6 6destroy,-tion 26 16torturing 5 4defeat 14

ruin,ing 6terrorism 10violation 19

SICKNESS.INSTABILITY,

DISLOCATION 6 76problems 4sickness 15disease 6hunger 6unomaoyment 5lacleUf stability 9

g lack of security '6ignorapce 7

backwardness 8haneless 12unrest 4

TRAITOR' 11 60'traitor - 24betrayal - 20violator - 16spies 4 -

- against 7 -

WAR, FIGHTING 168 154war 69 53'battle 40

vying with 12weapons 17 25competition 18

guns 7

airplane 7

conflict,ing,rival,ry

10 16

13dispute 35

MISCELLANEOUS 24 77news 22children 3 -

future 7 -

animal - 6liberation 5 -

unity 6 -rights - 5interests - 9Iprelie - 5

ce 3 5against Islam - 4atheism - 9split - 6

party-spirited 6

233

ENEMY

PERCEPTIONS AND' EVALUATIONS BYJORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual-Components

Killing, QestructionSickness,Ifistability,Dislocation

Trattoi.

War, FightingOppression, tolonization

(

Israel, JewsHatred, Fear, JealousyBad, Despicablie, Deceitful'Nations, Russia, U.S.Friend,.Brother.Miscellaneous

rcentage ofal Score

677 198(1'

Total Dominance Score

7 13

1 8

1 , 6

15 15

23 18

14 10

13 11

13 4

10 '7

2- 1

2 8

1141 1010

41

Main Componentsand Responses 1977

OPPRESSION,

COLONIZATION

1980

263 17/tyranny 23 -

elcminating - 17subduing 6power 19 -

strength =- 6oppression - 43colonizer - 14colonization 32 23imper alism - 8holdljg freedom - 5

viejating freedoa - 4overpowering - 15theft a

A staling - P 12prtions 8banishnent 56Zionism

bccupation ofland

52

41

16

usurption 24

ISRAEL, JEWS 161 99Israel 110 99Jews 51

HATRED, FEAR,

'JEALOUSY - 147 110hate,d,ful 98 68animosity 31

fear,ful 9terror 15spite - 17coward 4

lack of pity 6humiliation 9

BAD, DESPICABtE,DECEITFUL 144 38

bad 23corruption 9

'despicable 45deceit 99savage 6

NATIONS, RUSSIA,US 112 75

nations 51.land 14 23Arabs 9

border 7

Russia,USSR 6 13US, America 6 33Palestine 19 6

FRIEND, BROTHER 27 9friend 22 9brother 5 -

234

Main Componentsand Responses 1977

TERROR, HUNGER,DISPLACEMENT 118

1980

211

terror - 49fear 31 -

sorrow 5 -

lack oftlecurity - 6

lack ofttability - 4

hunger 7 33

sicknesses 12

defeat 31 8loss 5 7

inhumanity - 10

social problems 6ignorance - 16

crimebackwardnessbanishment

9

30

6

homeless - 32

poverty 3

DEATH, KILLING 173 177

death,dead 43 91

kill,ing 59 61

blood,-shed 34 19

death of humanity - 6

martyrdom 12

sacrifice 9

dangerous 16

DESTRUCTION RUIN 143 139destruction 131 110ruin 29

explosion 12

DOMINATION,OPPRESSION 44 123

domination 20

overpowering - 9

'victory - 12

oppression 21 26

weakness - 6

colonization 7 20

occupationinterestsspread,in9

16

7

continuation - 6

MISCELLANEOUS 23 48

toil 6disturbance 7

animals 8night 4

help 11

Islam 12

politics 3

belief 8pride 6

stealing 6

.235

BYIN 19)7 AND 1980

Main Componentsand Responses

FIGHTIBG, BATTLE

1977 1980

213 153fight,ingbattleconfrontationrevolutionterrorismrivalryaggressionviolehcewrestlingdispute

persecutiontrainingcaptivescamps *guerillasnoblecouragevictoryalliance

WEAPONS,

NUCLEAR BOMBS

- 37

8420

- 17

14 9

6

- 27

466

6_

7

66 -

53

40

'9

166 118

WAR-

Fs.p10EPTIONS AND EVALUATIONSJORDANIAN.STUDENT GROUPS TES.TE0

Main Perceptual Components

Percentage ofTotal

1977. 1980weapons

bombs .

nuclearatomic weapons

jetstankscannonsplanesstrength

54 47_12 17

9

4

26

20 10

24 617

21 17

Terror, Hunger, DisplacementDeath, KillingDestruction, RuinDomination, Oppression

. ,

_10 19

14 16

12 13

4 11

Fighting, BattleWeapons, Nuclear BombsNations, PeoplePeace, Freedom.Enemy

Soldiers, ArmyMiscellaneous

.18 14

14 11

13- 6

6 1.

5 2

3 1

2 .5

NATIONSt PEOPLE 151 70Israel

Jew,ishArabs

Palestinenationland

.US, AmericapeopleleaderchildhenRussia,USSRsoulsinternat'l woOldorigtnatibnorphan

PEACE, FREEDOM

34 3010 -

35

14

11

2

8 83

10

. 5- 4- -8- 12

12

7

66 22

,Total DoM4nande Score 1193 1102

peacefreedomliberation

independenceright

Justicesecurity

ENEMY

12

3 12,

15. 10

5

10

9

12

55 28enemy,enmityrevinarul

SOLOIERS, ARMY

45 28

10

41 8sbldters .

Army- 8

41, -

Main.CompOnentsand RirOWit'

WORLD, NATIONS

1977

123

1980

142Egypt - 21Israel 20 36

people 6

name 6Jewish 4

Palestine 14 13US 13 16land 9

Begin 6Arabs,-people 25 10

Saila 31

Middle East 15

nations 14

RISHIS EDON 103 136rig_ 21

freedom 33 48independence 12

equality 7 23justice 45 40truth 6loss of rights 4

WAR, OISARMAMENT 102 96war 66 28armament 7

weaponsdisarmamentno wars

7

20no attack 9no killing 8struggleloss

4

8defeat 6victory 11

colonization 6

Zionism 8

betrayal 10

AOVANC T 65 61de opment 12-- 15

advancement - 31

flourishment ,- 9production - 6progress 35 -

solution 18 -

I.

237

PEACE

PIRCEPTIONS AND Ei/ALUATLONS BYJORDANIAN.STUDENT GROUPS ESTEO IN 1977 AND 1980

I

i Main Componentsand Responses 1977 1980

SAFETY',

STABILITY 212 124. safety - 85

security 163 -

stability 49 39

LOVE 149 6166 IS

cooperation f 22, 16help I -

harmony 6happiness 1 18 3

honor,in9 9kindness

< 5sharing - 5

relationshio - 9broth rhood 10human sm 7

reco iliation 15

RELIGI 122

Main Perceptual Cdmponents

Percentage ofTotal Seore

1977 1980

World, NationiRights, FreedomWar, DisarmamentDevelopment* AdvancementSafety, Stability-Love, HappinevReligion ,

Tranquil, QuietDesiise, Hope ,

Politics, NegotiationsMiscellaneous

Ii 189(' -179 12

6 . 8

19, 16

13 8

11 , 1

10 9

. 3

5 5

3 6

re g on.s 1

God 15believer 25no peape withoutIslam 4 9

Prophet Mohimined 17mosque 14

prayer 12fasting 12

pilgrimage 8

TRANOUIL, gUIET 111 68tranquil.ty' - 28calmmess, &apeaceful 35

quiet:ness:, 10 27rest.61 6'

comfort 8

DESIRE, HOPE 35Total Dominance Score 1109 -791

,

necessarymeed 19hopeful 16

POLITICS,NEGOTIATIONS 59 43

Camp David = 21UN 17

talk 12 11agreement 11

Geneva , 15negotiations 15

MISCELLANEOUS 28, 51

problemlife 16 11

external - 10no hunger 6work 12 6strength 9

238

Word associations to the eighty theme's listed in the table

below were elicited from U.5., Jordanian, and Egyptian student groups

'in 1977 and from the-Israeli students in 1979. The themes were

presented in the native langutge of each group. Their responses

provided the basps for the compar iVe analysiS of major perceptual

trends. The technical procedure s,described in Appendix II, page 8.

THEMES USED IN PERCEPTUAL TREND ANALYSIS FOR COMOARISON OFAMERUAN, JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN, AND ISRAELI STUDENT GROUPS

LIFE

ltfe

death

strengthhappinessenergyexistencetroublesbeauty

SOCIETY

societypeoplerace

status

social classauthoritysocielism

, equality

ECONOMYeconomyprogressprofit

competitiondevelopment ,

capitalismstability :

unemployment

RELIGION

religionGod

church. faith

MuslimIslamJew

Christian

POLITICS

electionpresidentpoliticspeace

, war

revolutiongovernmentqation

FREEDOM- freedom

Oghtsindependencedemocracy

respontibilityjusticechoice

dictatorship

HUMAN VALUES'human values'

frankness ,

, honesty1. courage

respect 1

truth

sincerity,

COUNTRY Ncountry

United States.AmericanEgypt

EgyptianArabsIsrael'

Palestine

st

SELFselfme

importantgoalsweyouthothers

ambition

TRADITION

traditionpastoldpride

customshistory .

unitylaw

40

239

7

ARPENDIX II

THE ASSOCIATIVEGROUP ANALYSIS (AGA) METHOD

DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND MAIN CATEGORIES OF INFERENCES

NJ"

Data Collection, Test Administration

Data Organization: Scoring6 Regponses,Compiling.Group Response Lists

Main Categories .of Inferences, TheirReliability and Validity

- Group Perceptions, Images, Meanings- Subjective Priorities or Importince- Overall Similarity in Perceptions- Attitudes and Evaluations- Relatedness of Themes,*Concepts

Publications of Research Using the AGA Method

- 24u

ASSOCIATIVE GROUP ANALYSIS.,.

, Associative Group Analysis (AGA) is a research-method which measuresthe perceptions, attitudei,'meanings, apd.beliefs of selected social orcultural groups. Rather than using direct questiOns or'scales, AGAdraws inferences from the spontaneously emerging word associations ofthe'groups studied. This "continued association" technique, in whichthe subjects give-as many. responses as they can think of in one minuteper'stimulus, produces.response material with sufficiently broadfoundation withoUt haiing to use extremelY large samples--a require-ment that treqdently makes.socially relevant studies unfeasible:andimpractical. Generally, samples of 50 to 100 subjects are used torepresent each. Oarticular group. The samples inc,lude,preferablyequal numbers'of Oales and females. The requirements for representativesampling are fundamentally the same as in any other data collectionaiming at generalizable results.

.Through careful, systematic selection of stimulus themes,investigations can be focused on any desired problem areas or domains.Several:related-themes are selected in the representatton of eachdomain in order to observe consistent trends on a broader data baseand thus produce more generalizable.findings. A strategy has beendeveloped for selecting themes that are representative of-the domainsfor-each culture group (Szalay and Maday, 1974).

6

t.

DATA COLLECTION, TEST ADMINISTRATION

The standard A Aesting conditions of group tesitng, written formof administration, an working with little time pressure nelp promotemore spontaneous, mean ng-mediated responsei. Individual subjects

. remain anonymous (demo raphic data being'obtained by a brtef questionnairethat carries the same c de number as the subject's test slips);assurance of this helps o reduce the likelihood of bias in the formof acquiescence, conside ations of social desirability, etc.; it.alsoopens up a variety of emo ion-laden issues to objective inquiry.

The subjects are aske to write free verbal associations to eachof the stirmilus words prese ted on randombrsequenced cards. Theyreceive the following instr tions, as well iss the test material, intheir native language.

This experiment is part of a study.in verbal behavior, and thisparticular task involves wor. associations. These are group experiments,and your responses will not evaluated individually but collectivelyfor your group. Your response are completely 'anonymous, and you arefree to give your associations oncerning any.subject. There are no bador wrong answers, so do not sel t your responses but put them down

' spontaneously in the order that hey occur to you-

- The task is easy and simple. You will find a word printed on eachslip of paper. Reading this stimu s word will make you think of otherassociated words (objects, ideas, i sues. etc.). You are asked to writeas many separate responses as you ca think of in the tine allated. Tryto think of one-word responses and a4oid long phrases or sentences.

'4

It is important that in giving yo r responses you always take thegiven stimulus word into consideration. \ For example, if the stimutus word

. was table and your answer was uritine, in jiving the subsequent resiTonses youmust refer back to table.and avoid °chain" responses (aYriting, imm, *014blue., ocean, soit....).

'Please wort without hurrying, but do y urbest to give us as manyanswers as possible. One minute will be given for each word. At the

,

t end of each minute I will ask you to go on to the next word. Do notwork longer than one minute on any word and do not read ahead or return toothers later.

DATA ORGANIZATION: SCORING RESPONSES,COMPILING GROUP RESPONSE LISTS

A logical assumption is that earlier responses are more meaningful.than later ones, that the first response has.more salience to the subjectthan the last. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence. Thestability of responses obtained at different rank places was studied bycomparing the responses obtained from the same group in two separatesessions one month apart (Szalay and Brent, 1967). The responses obtainedat higher rank places in the first test showed higher stability in theAecond test than did the responses ifrst obtained at lower rank places.The...coefficients of stability obtained in this comparative study providethe weights for the various rank places. The response socres consistof frequency within 50-member groups weighted by the order of occurrence.The weights beginhing with the first response are: 6,5,4,3,3,3,3,2,2,1,1...

2242

;

ust copy AVAILAiLE

The cards are organized by siimulus wora,' and the.indtvidualresponses from all the subjects are.tallied into group response lists. °

Certain responses (e.g., school to.educated) will occur to many members ofthe group; other responses mat-be given by only one or two members. Inorder to focus on the shared meaning for a particular group, the responsesgiven by only one,person are excluded from analysis.

Th. rove mimosas*list; rt JWISSVIIP

irsuato 440.15

Watives. alsedrindflthar

UM for 4ftilysisLemearisins.

NIStdemi. sesta 31

111'

/only. '14 90MmMmftwole. 'omen I

SSOrefither "S

If we look at associations prooduced by members of our own culture -

group, they appear to be just plain common sense.. We to feel thateverybody would produce similar responses and that thenigponses do not..

tell us anything new. This impression is probably the major reason that -

the potential informatton value of associative response distributions hasnot been clearly recognized in the past. The systematic exploitation ofassociations as an important information source is the central objectiveof the AGA method. The feeling that everybody would produce similarresponses is a culture-bound impression. This becomes apparent if we com-pare associations obtained from groups with different cultural backgrounds.A comparison of U.S. and Korean responses to the sttmulus ancestors, forinstance, shows that the most frequent U.S. response relative occurs onlydown around the middle of the Korean response list. Of the five mostfrequent Korean responses, only two, grandfhther and forefather, occur

3 243

to the Americans Both lists contain'nuherous responsei which.havehigh scores or salience for one culture group and low,or na salience atall for the other group. A quick glance at the most frequent responses

. readily reveals_that they are not accidental, but deeply rooted in thecultural background, religious-moral philosophy, life conditions, andContemporary experrinces of the respective groups.

U.S. AND KOREAN GROUP RESPONSES TO ANCESTORS

U.S. GROUPKOREAN GROUP

Response Response Score Response

relatives,'blood 216grandfather 126

dead, death97past

91old

91family, life 90grandparent - 88people, person 85forefather 75history 69'before, -me, -us 56ancient 54descendant 52family tree 48grandmother 47predecessor 45father 34long ago 32heritageIndians.

Ireland, ishtraditioncavemangreatforebeareriGerman, ygreat grandfatherforeign, ergenerationNeanderthal.early, ierJava manAdamEuropeotherworshipAmericanyearunknowngeneologyrespectson

31

4262423-

181716

151514131311

\ 11\10

10,

10\a,7 \ t6.

- 665

grandfatherrite

forefather ,

t grave, visitvenerationeldersTau gun

burial groundgreat grandfatherfathergeneologygenerationday gone byprimitivecmanrespecthuman beingfounder

relatives, blood .

historyfamilY, lifetraditiontiesserveotherdeceasedhome

lineagehill

dead, deathhabitseniorvanity,

country sideposterityclanLee DynastyLee Sun -sinPark NgoAkoseKing Sejong

Response Score

1

420198125

106848281

7777

585855

49

3534

' 3331

31

302828252423191918

' 1714141211

11

1010,

9

9s .

87

Each group response list represents a rich information source,

reflectjng the group's characteristic understanding of the stiMulusword, including perceptual.and affective details which are frequentlunverbalizabli'and belowtheir level of awareness. Actually, asystematic, examination,of suct),response lists has shown that everyresponse,contains,p piece of valid information about the group'scharacteristic understanding and evaluation of the stimulus word.Responses with a sizatile scbre value (10-15) are rarely accidental.,Using conservative estimates, scoredifferences of 18 can beconsidered significant at the .05 level, score differences of 2iat the .01 level. The-wealth of information provided by the groupresponse list is impressive, since even small score differences.canhave significant implications for communication,and choice behavior(Szalay et al., 1972).

244

A

MAIN CATEGORIES OF INFERENCES, THEIR RELIABILITY AND VALIDIiY

For the identification of various psychocultural characteristics,several analytical procedures have been developed, relying on the groupresponse lists as the main data base.

GROUP PERCEPTIONS, IMAGES, MEANINGS

One procedure relies on content analysis and provides for the .

identification of the main meaging components and their characteristicsaliences. The meaning'components are obtained by asking judges withbackgrounds comparable to those of the groups from which the response---`,,were obtained to group the responses into clusters.

Each category is described by a score and by a label to indicate itscontent. The category score is the sum of the scores of each subsumedresponse and expresses the.importance of the category for a particulargroup. If a category yieldi a high score for a group,'it may.be said thatthe category constitutes an important meaning component of that theme forthat group.

UsinIfthis procedure to analyze the stimulus theme ancestor, forexample, we4find a sizable group of responses dealing with "ritetcveneration, and worship." The overwhelming.majority of these responiescome from the Koreans While only a few of the American responses fall inthis cathory. A modest familiarity with the cultural background of theKoreans makes it obvious that this component reflects the traditionalancestor worship and shows how salient this cultural element is in theminds of contemporary Korean citizens. Another group of responsesidentified by'the judges concerns the pastand other time references,indicating that ancestors belong vet)/ much to past, ancient times in thiminds of our American respondents. Thii is less the case with the Koreans,probably because active veneration and worship is still part 6f contemporaryreligious practices. Another cluster of related responses involvereferences to foreign, predbminantly,European countries. These responsescome practically exclusively from Americans and show their awareness oftheir foreign ancestry. Naturally this component of cultural meaning isessentially missing from the Korean image of angestors. 'Through thisprocesrof content analyslis, the judges assign alP responses to main -

respollse categories of U.S. and Korean cultural meanings.

CATEGORIZATION OF U.S. ANDiOREAN`RESPONSES.Te/ANCESARS

IITES, VENERATION,WORSHIP '' '

scoreUS K TIME: PAST,OLD

scoreUS K

.

PEOPLE% FOREIGNERSscore

USworship 10 -, past 97 - American , 8 -respect 6 '34 old 91 - Europe 10 /veneration - 84 before, -me, -us 56 - Germano.y 15 .

serve . ' - 24 ncient 54 . Ireland..ish 24 -great ' 17 long.ago 32 - Indians 26rite , - 198 early, -ier 11 - foreign, -er 14 -other 6 ,44 unknown .6 ..- human being - 33

days gone by - 49 manyear 7 - people,person 85 -

_Posterity - 10, 39 384 354 -FY 187 33.

245

In the case of the responses to anCestors the judges have useilten categories to identify the most salient components of the groups'\contemporitY meanings of Ancgtors. The scores the various componentsaccumulated in.this proCeis reflect the subjective salience of-eachcomponent for the cultural groups compared.. The main content categoriesobtained by this analysis describe the total subjective meaning of the .theme in terms Of the main components characteristic of each group!sunderstanding. Because there is usually a difference between the twogroups in their level of responding, the category scores are convertedto percentages of the respective total scores in order to make themdirectly comparable.

PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF ANCESTORS BY AMERICANS AND KOREANS

tieaning Components

U,S. Group Korean Group

Score 1 % I Score

Time: Past, Old

Relationship, Family Tree

People, Foeeigners

History, Tradition

Prehistoric Man, Ape

Forefathers, Grandparents,Relatives

Rites, Veneration, Worship

Grave, Dead

Legendary Fi§ures

Miscellaneous :

354

335 ,

187

152

73

546,

39

91

-

25

dr

20 59 3

19 196 9

10 33 2

8 84 4

4 35 2

30 824 39

2 384 18

5 233 11

0 52 7

1 108. 5

Total scores (Domdnance) 1,802 , 2,100

4

The reliability of the content analytic method was tested bycomparing the performance of five judges working independently fromeach other. The interjudge rel4ability measured by-prOdUtt=momentcorrelation across 76 categories was .7. ,The validity of sudhoinferenceson particular single meaning-components

cannot be'directly assessedbecause simple criterion measures are not available.' There are, however,

*findings-which show, for filstance, that the salience of these meaning,*components provides valid predicftions'on the meaningfylness of messagesin intercultura) commimicatjons. Communication material that capitalizedon salient components of Eulturalmeanings was judged by membeeS.of, thisculture as relatively more meaningful than 'comparable communicationmaterial produced by cultural experft (Szalay, Lysne, and Bryson, 197'2).

4

BESTCOPY AVAILABLE

Another way to present the results of content analysis is thesemanto-graph. It shows the main categories of group meaning by usingradiallS, arranged bars. The dotted bars represent the maiR componentsof Korean interpretation and the striped bars the main components ofU.S. interpretation. Where the bars are similar in length, substantialagreement.exists between U.S. and Korean responses. Thebars arearbitrarily arranged so that those on the left of the semantograph showmeaning components especially strong (salient) for the U.S. group and ,

tbose on the right .show meaning components especially strong for theKorean group. This presentation is designed to help the reader torecognize components on which his awn group and the other culture groupare in agreement or disagreement.

ANCESTOR' Main Meaning Components

for U.S. anil Korean Groups

'.,S. Gro

.51MEz PAST. OLD,

. RELATIONSHIP,FAMILYTREE

46.

4

cam* Ges4p

FOREFATHER, GRAND-PARENTS,.RELATIVES

-OYES' VENERATION,-

. :ittF WORSHIP'

4.

. ....av:it

PEOPLE; FOREIGNERS

.HISTORY, TRADITION

GRAVE, DEAD

....**%047. LEGENDARY FIGURES......MISCELLANEOUS

PREHISTORIC MAN, APE

U.S. ahd*orean Groups' Main Meaning CoMponenis in Combined Prese tation

7

24

IDENTIFICATION OF DIFFEREWTIAL RESPONSE TRENDS

The strategy of this method.goes beyond a comparative presentationof single words or pictures. Actually, we use clusters of word samplesin the representation of larger domains for which there may be severalhuhdred words in the vocabulary. The main trends of cultural conceptual-izatiom and priorities emerge then from consistent response trends whichare observable across several themes used in the representation of thedomains.

A computer-based matrix evaluation of responses produced to selectedstimuli provides a more global picture of the general response trendsdifferentiating two groups. In this 4nilysis we use a stimulus-responsematrix in which the individual stimuli represent the heads of thecolumns and the responses, the rows. The'response scores constitute thecell values and the row totals represent the total score a particularresponse afccumulated across all the stimuli included in the analysis.These row totals show the salience of a particular response in thecontext of all the stimuli used in the representa/ion of a given semanticdomain. A comparison of the row totals in the matrix of each groupoffers a simple method for the identification of different perceptualtrends. The analysis is limited to responses whose score goes beyonda certain magnitude (e.g., 30 or more). The matrices contain severalthousand responses and are tpo lengthy for presentation, but the examplebelow may help to visualize the data matrix.

. , RowResponses Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Totals

abacus 0 6 0 6,abandon 6 o 12 18advise 8 21 o 440

. .-

. i

zenith .6 10 6 25

..

Column Totals 892 1012 752 11,793'

To facilitate the review of response trends, we,again use thecontent analysis approach to group the related responses together. Thesematrices have been used to compare ethnic-racial groups, pictorial versusverbal stimuli, and before-after reactions. The responkes of differentracial,or cultural groups can be compared to identify response trendswhich differentiate the two groups. A comparison ofTeactions producedbefore and after a specific event (e.g., a film presentation) can beused to identify which perceptual and attitudinal trends were strengthenedand which lost salience.

8 248

SUBJECTIVE PRIORITIES OR IMPORTANCE

How important a certain subject, theme, idea, or issue is, to aparticular group can'be inferred from the number of'responses they giveto it as a'stimulus word. The dominance score, simply the sum of thescores of all'responses elicited by a particular theme or domain, isused to measure the subjective importance. This measure is analogousto Noble's m measure of meaningfulness. The priorities of differentsocial or ciDtural groups cab be compared by looking at their dominancescores on the same concepts. Dominance scores reveal group-speci4icpriorities not only on single issues but also for larger domains, asshown in the example below.

DOMINANCE SCORES OF BLACK AND WHITE GROUPS

Domainand Themes Whi",dglack

Domain'

and Themes White Black$ /

SOCIAL PROB.de cracy. 636 449 'society (U.S.). 316 342socialism 396 280 social class, 402 475

. capitalism . 362 298 social justice 376 378communism 733 502 social progress. 260 334mean 532 382 mean 338 382

NATION.

.

NEEDSnation 661 591 goal 514 581United States 877 765 'expectation 236 298patriotism 508 222 desire 621 70,1Americans 605 648 . valuable 832 876

mean 663 556 mean 551 614

The results in this table cope from a more inClusive study in whichsamples of"BlaCk and White blue-collar workers were.compared on therelative importance they assigned to 60 selected themes in 15 major doMainsThe table includes domains on which the groups showed the greatestdifferences. The Black group shows more concern with social problemsand needs, While the White group places more emphasis on political ismsand nationalisM.

The grou0-based dominance scores have been found to be highly culture-specific (Stalky'', Moon, L);sne, and Bryson, 19714nd have a reliability of.93 calculated from a test-retest comparison of 40 themes.

More information on the dominance scores tan be found inCommunicition exicoh on Three South Korean Audiences (L.B. Szalay,W.T. Moon, and J., .Bryson, American Institutes for Research, Kensington,Md., 1971).

249

OVERAII SIMILOITY IN PERCEPTIONS

To measure the-extent to which two groups, cultural or social,agree in their perception and understanding of a particular theme, idea,or issue like birth control or socialism, the coefficient of similarityis used. Similarity-in subjective meaning is inferred from the similarity

- of response distributions measured by Pearson's product-moment correlation.Close similarity (high coefficient) means that the high frequency responsesproduced by one group are also high frequency responses for the othergroup;- similarly, the low frefuency responses produced by one group will.generally be the same.as those produced by the other group.

INTERGROUP SIMILARITY BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE GROUPS'

ADomain,

and Themes r -

Domainand Themes

.

r

EDUCATION NEEDSschool .90 goal .38

.. knowledge \ .88 expectation -.47educated ` .92 desire .76to learn .79 valuable .90

mean .88 mean .53,

FAMILY SOCIAL PROBLEMSfather .80 society (U.S.) .38mother .92 social class .50family .84 social justice .15home .79 social progress -.04.

.

mean .84 mean ..,)

,

.25

In the example above, the problerp areas or domains are presented indescending order of agreement. *the reactions of the Black and Whitegroups were mOst similar in the areas of education and family. Theproblem areas showing least agreement, social problems and needs, arethe same areas in which the dominance scores reflected more concernamong the Black group.

.

The reliability of the coefficient e similarity measure was tested.by coMparing two, groups obtained by splitting a larger group randomlyinto two halves; the coefficients produced on a sample of themes wasthen averaged. In a comparison of two.split-half voups on 26 themes,a correlation of 173 was obtained recently. In an earlier comparisonan r of .82 was obtained claculated over 40 themes. A closer examinationreveali that-the coefficeint depends a great,deal on the particular themeunder consideration.' Themes thit are specifiC and concrete produce steepresponse distributions characterized by a few widely shared responses, ormeaning elements. The theme faMily, for example, is spkific and concrete

10-

2 I)

and for everybody to a certain.extent it involves father and mother. Thethemes concern and anxiety are Iess definite,and instead of everybodyagreeing on a few particularly salient responses, people produce a broaddiversity of responses. In this situation,

low torrelation does notnecessarily indicate low reliabiltiy of the measure but may be a con-sequence of the indeterminate nature of the theme. In such a situatton athe stability of the measure may be better estimated by considering howstable a coefficient is within particular themes rather than across allthemes. To assess this stability, the coefficients obtained on the samethemes for the two split-half groups were correlatedover the 26 themesand produced an r of .89.

The similarity measure is deschibed in more detail in Priorities,Meanings andPsychocultural Distance of Black; White., and SpanishAmerican Groups (L. B. Szalay, R.E. Williams, J. A. Bryson, and G. West,American Institutes for Research, Washington, D. C., 1976) and in"Psychological Meaning:

Comparative Analyses and*Theoretical Implications"Szalay and J.A. Bryson in JoOrnal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 1974, 30:6; 860-870).

Intragroup Homogeneity

A comparison of split-half groups shows how muchlagreement existswithin a pafticular group on a particularstimulus theme. As previouslymentioned this intragroup agreement depends to a certain degree on thedetermtnate or indeterminate nature of the stimulus.

A second factor influencing the value of the coefficient is the size ofthe ghoup. Base4 on 32 themes in the domains of fathily and health, meancoefficients were calculated using simple sizes of 13, 26, 52, 78,104, and 156. They showed a distinct increase with the size of the groupscompared. The rate of the increase,is fast if we increase the size ofsmall samples. For instance, an increase in sample size from 13 to 26produced an increase of 27 points in the coefficient, while an increasefrom 52 to 104 produced an increase of only 9 points. Thus, there isa distinct decline in the growth rate in the case of large samples: andthe toefficients come close to their plateau with a sample size of 200.Correlations do not generally increase just because the base of theircalculation is extended. An explanation is likely to bejound in thenature of mechanics of the calculation; the relatively large number of0 scores obtained with a small sample decreases the correlation value.. Another interesting and important characteristic of the homogeneitycoefficient'is that it varies with the characteristics of individualthemes. The. variations are apparently explicable by the fact that somethemes and domains are more concrete,

definite, tangible (e.g., car,money), while others are more indeterminate,unobservable, abstract(equality, expectation). These variations may be illustrated bycalculating coefficients of homogeneity on 16 themes in the familydomain (family, mother, father, home, etc.) using three different samplesizes: 13, 52, and 156. In contrast to the wide range of variation(..12 to .70 observed at the level of smallest sample, in the case ofthe largest sample the range. was narrower (.72 to .96). As a tentativeexplanation we-are inclined to suggest the phenomenon

of-"culturalsharing" (D'Andrade, 1959). .It follows from the rationale of thissharing phenomenon that larger groups, which provide&broader basis forobservations, can be.more completely described than smaller ones. Thesedata,underscore the importance bf working with a sample size of at least 50.

11 251

ATTITUDES AND EVALUATIONS

How people evaluate ideas and events---ERA, arms embargo, human rights,legalization of marijuana--- can be assessed without.asking thent directly.The evaluative content of specific-themes is-inferred from the relativedominance of pesitive or negative responses. Two judges workingindependently assign the responses to positive,.negati-ve, or,neutralc#egories. An index. of evaluative dominance (EDI) is then calculatedby the following formula:

beores ,of positive responses - E scores of necntive responsesEDI x 100E scores of all responses

EVALUATIVE DOMINANCE INDICES FOR U.S. AND KOREAN GROUPS

Theme U.S. Group Korean Group

family 25 22proud 12 28 Illik*

educated . 51 51, knowledge 50 44

offense -27 -53capitalism 10 -4communism -14 -32equality

_

19 , 20poor -58 -28,'beggar -63 -42

-

,

A higher index implies more intense group evaluation, in either apositive or negative direction. The above example shows that Koreans aremore negatiVe in,their evaluation of political systems, particularlycommunism. Theii* less negative evaluation of poverty and beggars mayindicate more familiarity with or toferance of these problems.

The EDI measce is described in A Study of American and KoreanAttitudes and Values Through Associative Group Analysis (L.B. Szalay,D. A. Lysne, and J. E. Brent, American Institutes for Research, Kensington,Md., 1970) and in "Attitude Measurement by Free Verbal Associations"(L. B. Szalay, C. Windle, and D.A. Lysne, Journal of Social Stychology,1970, 82, 43-55).

A direct method of assessing attitudes can also be used. Itinvolves asking the respondents to give a general evaluation of eachstimulus word after performing the verbal association task. To expresswhether the words mean something positive, negative, or neutral, theyuse the following scale:

3 - strongly positive, favorable connotation -1 - slightly negative connotation2 - quite positive, favorable connotation -2 quite negative connotatipn1 - slightly positive, favorable connotation -3 - strongly negative connotation0 - neutral or ambivalent feeling tones

A mean group attitude score is obtained forgarob_stXnUlus word. Distancein evaluations is then measured by Pearson's r aefficient comparing twogroups across stfmulus words.

12 252'

BEST COPY AVAILABLE'

RELATEDNESS OF THEMES, CONCEPTS

How people relate things---e.g., birth control to imperialism orpeace---is highly.characteristic of their way of thinking, of their world

view. The index of interword affinity (IIA) measures the relationship of-one theme (A) to another (B) for a particular gi.oup. It is based on therelative weight of responses in common for the two themes upder considera-tion. The formula for the affinity of theme A to B is as follows:

score for responses in score for directcommon to A and B + elicitation (AyB)

X 1,000A-4$ total score for theme A

AFFINITY RELATiONSHIP OF MOTIVATIONAL AND ECONOMIC THEMES. FOR BLACK (B) AND WHITE (W) GROUPS

STIMULUSWORD A

Creep

STIMULUS WORD II AND DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP

Goal Expects-Con

Doak. Valuable The por Unem-oloyrnent prp..

A-11 B-A B-A A-11 11-A A-i 117A A-11 A-11 11-A 11-A 11-A

Prosperity 163 216 112 III 134 214 167 314 234 6II 131 312 *6 162IVO 361 2.1 131 131 346 1.N .971 AU 321 1.67 363 131 263

Unernploy. 27. 21 0 13 10 AO 76 ItS I% 204mem 111 110 161 $S 82 94 117 124 IN Ito 22: .si.4

The poor 66 46 23 a 144 133 9/ 110 .107I - us 103 319 9/ 136 134 122 131 370 2S3

The rich 82 61 39 13 103 96 337 323134 101 193 80- 200 194 JOS 33

Valuable 136 84 76 22 111 137MS 111 138 34 231 303

Desire 220 182 3 03 111132 110 303 S/

Expectation IV 19 2319/ 224

C

The matrix shows the rerationship of eight themes from the motivational andeconomic domains. The generally higher indices for the Black group suggesta stronger relationship between motivational themes-and economic matters.On the relationship of single themes, the table shows that the Black groupsees a relationship between expectation and unemployment, which does notemerge from the White group.

The associative affinity index, a modified relatedness measure similarto those'reviewed by Marshall and Cofer (1963), was developed for usewith continued associations, The reliability .of this index in split-

half comparisons was in the range of .90 (Szalay and Windle, 1968). In

a recent comparative study (Szalay and Bryson, 1972), the validity ofthis measure was estimated based on the correlations of-this measurewith other independent measures: similarity judgment ,73; judgment ofrelationship .77; grouping task ,84. The calculations were based on r

66 index pairs,

More information on the affinity measure can be obtained in CommunicationLexicon on Three South Korean Audiences (L.B. Szalay, W.T. Moon, and J.A.Bnyson, American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Md.', 1971).and in."Psychological Meaning: Comparative Analyses and'Theoretical Implications"(L.B. Szalay and J.A. Bryson, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1974; 30:6, 860-870).

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PUBLICATIONS OF RESEARCH USING THEASSOCIATIVE GROUP ANALYSIS METHOD

Cultural Meanings and Values: A Method of Empirical Assessment. L. B. Szalay,,and J. Brent. Washington, D. C.: The American University, 1965.

Comparative Analysis of Frames-of-Reference Between Groups RepresentingSocietally Approved and Delinquent Value Systems. UnpublishedMaster's research paper. J. C. Carroll and R. A. Stark. Washington,D. C.: The American University,1965.

"The Analysis of Cultural Meanings Through Free Verbal Associations,"Journal of Social Psychology, L. B. Szalay and J. Brent, LXXII (1967),161-187.

"Use of Word Associations in Foreign Area Study," Proceedings, 75th AnnualConvention, L. B. Szalay. American Psychologigal Association, 1967,17.73747--

Variables AffectingCultural Meanings Assessed by Associative Group Analysis.L. B. Szalay, C. Windle, and J. E. Brent. Washington, D. C.: Centerfor Research in Social Systems (CRESS),.The American University, 1968.

"Relative Influence of Linguistic Versus Cultural Factoi.s on Free VerbalAssociations," Psychological Reports, L. B. Szalay and C. Windle,XII (1968), 43-51.

"The Use of Word Associations for Value Analysis," Proceedings, 75th AnnualConvention, L. B. Szalay, J. E. Brent, and D. A. Lysne. AmericaAPsychological Association, 1968, 643-644.

A Study of American and Korean Attitudes and Values Through AssociativeGroup Analysis. L. B. Szalay, 0: A. Lysne, and J. E. Brent.Kensington, Md.: .Center for.Research fh Social Systems, American

. Institutes for-Research, 1976.

"Attitude Measurement by Free Verbal Associations,",Journal of SocialPsychology, L. B. Szalay, C. Windle, and D. A. Lysne, LXXXII (1970),43-55.

"Attitude Research in Intercultural Communication," Journal of Communication,L. B. Szalay and D. A. Lysne, XX (1970), 180-200.

Changes.in Frames of Reference Among Staff Participants in Staff/InmateEncounter Groups in a Federal Reformatory. J. E. Brent. Washington;D. C.: Bureau of Prisons, January 1970.

"The Impact of a Fbreign Culture: South Koreans in America," R. M. Kellyand L. B. Szalay. In Communications in International Politics, editedby Richard L. Merritt. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press,1972.

254

A Lexicon.of Selectedll.S.-Korean Communication Themes. L. B. Szalay,W. T. Mbon, D. A. Lysne, and J. A. Bryson. Kensington, Md.: AmericanIhstitutes,for, Research, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1971a..

ammunication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences: Social, National,and Motivational Domains. L. B. Szalay, W, T. Mbon, and J.-A. Bryson..Kensington, Md.: Arerican Institute5 for Research; 1971b.

The PilotPolice Project: A Description and Assessment of a Police-Community .

Relations Experiment in Washinoton, D. C. R. M. Kelly with D. Dockett,M. Farber, G. West, and C. Gray. Kensington, Md.: American/Institutesfor Research, 1972, 258-263.

. .

, "Verbal Associations in the Analysis of Subjective Culture," CurrentAnthropology, L. B. Szalay and B. C. &day, XLV (Feb-Apig73)7 151-173.

"Ideology: Its Meanihg ind Measurement," Comparative Political Studies,L. B. Szalay, R. N. Kelly, and W. T. Moon', (July 1972), 151-173.

"Similarity Scaling and Content Analysis in the Interpretation of WordAssociatlions," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, L. B. Szalay andRoy D'Antrade (Spring 1972), 5048.

"Designing and Testing Cogent Communicationi," Journal of Cross4,Cu1turilPsychology,' L. B. Szálby, D. A. Lysne, and J. A. Bryson, III (1972)-,247-258. .

"Mleasurement of Psychocultural Distance: A'Comparison of American Blacksand Whites," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.IL. B. Szalayand J. A. Bryson, moo (Kw 1973), 166-177.

Measurement of Meaning Through Verbal As'sociations and Othe)r EmpiricalMethods. B. Szalay and J.A. Bry,son. Kensington, Md.: AmericanIhstitutes for Research, 1972,

"Mbdernization as a Goal Value in Korean Society," Korea Journal, Young-hoLee (April 1972), 15-25.

"Image of Korea," Chosun Ilbo, Young-ho Lee, March 2, 1972.

"Values'of Koreans: Fatherland," Chosun Ilbo, YounpTho Lee, Febtuary 24, 1972.

Communication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences: Domains Family,' .

Education, and Internationalitelations. L. B. Szalay, W. T. Moon,and J. A. Bryson. Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for,Research,1973.

"Psychological Meaning: Comparative Analyses ahd Theoretical Implications,"Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, L. B. Szalay andJ. A. Bryson, XXX (1974), 860-870.

15 5 5.

Ethnic-Racial Attftudes, Images, and BehaVjor by Verbal Associations.B. Szalay, J. A. Bryson, and G. West. Kensington, Md.: American'

Institutes for Research, 1973.

"Adapting Communication Research to the Needs of International andIntercultural Communications," International and Intercultural,Communication Annual, L. B. Szalay, I Dec. 1974), 1;16.

Ethnic-Racial Perceptions and Attitudes by Word and Picture StimulatedAssociations. L. B. Szalay, J. A. BrYson, and G. West. Washington,D. C.: American Institutes for Research, 1974.

\Surveying Public Images and Opinions by the Asociative Group Analysis.

L. B. Szalay. Monograph prepared for the National Bureau of Standards.Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1975.

SubjectVve Culture and Communication: A Puerto Rican-U.S. Comparison.L. B. Szalay and J. A. Bryson. Washington, D. C.: American Institutesfor Research, 1975. Also published in JSAS Catalog of Selected Documentsin Psychology, August 1976.

"Comparative Analysis of Words and Pictures Through Associations," PsychologicalReports, L. B. Szalay and J. A. Bryson, 38 (1976), 275-296.

"Psychologtcal Correlates of Family Socialization in the United States andKorea," Bela Maday and L. B. Szalay. In Psychological Anthropology,edited by T. Williams. Hague: Mouton, 1976. Also published inCross Cultural Study of Adolescence, Hague: Mouton, 1976.

Priorities, Meanings, and Psychocultural,Distance of Black, White, andSpanish-American Groups. C. B. Szalay, R. E. Williams, J. A. Bryson,and G. West. Washington, D. C.: American Institutes for Research,1976.

Filipinos in the Navy: Service, Interpersonal Relations, and 'CulturalAdaptation. Lorand B. Szalay and J. A. Bryson. Washington, D. C.:American Institutes for Research, 1977.

"Comparative Analyses of U.S. and Slovenian Sociopolitical Frames ofReference," L. B. Szalay and Vid Pecjak. In Ekoerience Forms,edited by George Haydu, Hague: Mouton, 1979. ..-

Subjective Meanino and Culture:. An Assessment Throu h Word Associations.Loranct B. Szalay and-Dames-Deese. lHllsdale, Ne-i Jersey: LawrenceErlbaum/Wiley & Sons, 1978.

The Hispanic American Cultural Frame of Reference: A Communication Guidefor Use in Mental Health, Education, and Training. Lorand D. Szalay,P. Ruiz, R. Lopez, L. Turbyville, and J. Bryson Strohl. Washington.D.C.: rnstitute of Comparative Social and.Cultural Studies, 1978.

25616

^.

U.S.-Arabic Communication Lexicon of Cultural Meanings: Interpersonal- and Social Relations. torand B. Szalay, A. Abu-Hilal, J. P. Mason,R. Goodison, and J. Bnyson Strohl. Washington, D.C.: Instituteof Comparative Social and Cultural Studies; 1978:

Iranian and American Perceptions and Cultural Frames of Reference -A Communication Lexicon for Cultural Understanding. Lorand B. Szalay,Elahe Mir-Djalali, Hossein Matakhar, Jean Bryson Strohl.Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social and CulturalStudies, 1979.

National Perceptions: Critical Dimensions, Policy Relevance and Use.Lorand B. Szalay and Jean Bryson Strohl. Washington, D. C.:Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies, 1980.

- "Iranian and American Perceptions and Cultural Frames of Reference,"Journal of Political Psychology, Lorand B. SzalayHosseinMoftakhar, and Elahe Mir-Djalali, in press.

"Intercultural Communication: A Process Model," International Journalof Intercultural Relations, Lorand B. Szalay, in press.

25';17