Japanese imperialism and Mongolian Buddhism, 1932-1945

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Japanese imperialism and Mongolian Buddhism,1932-1945Li Narangoa

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To cite this Article: Narangoa, Li (2003) 'Japanese imperialism and MongolianBuddhism, 1932-1945', Critical Asian Studies, 35:4, 491 — 514

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Li/Japanese Imperialism

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM ANDMONGOLIAN BUDDHISM,

1932-1945

Li Narangoa

ABSTRACT: Between 1932 and 1945 imperial Japan had strong political and strategicinterests in the Mongol lands. To win Mongol backing for the Japanese war effortand to strengthen the Mongol regions as a base for Japanese operations elsewhereon the Asian mainland, the Japanese military authorities developed a complex pol-icy to support and reform Mongolian Buddhism. In pursuit of their goals, they pro-moted changes in Buddhist religious practices and fostered the use of monasteriesas conduits for modern education and health care. Mongolian Buddhists them-selves took part in these reforms but they generally accepted only those changesthat were already a part of Mongol political and religious thinking.

Introduction

During the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland broughtJapanese in contact with Mongols who inhabited a vast, strategic tract of landbetween Russia and China. Some of the Mongol lands came under indirect Japa-nese rule in the client state of Manchukuo; other Mongol regions were simplysubject to heavy Japanese influence. To secure these regions, both against inva-sion and as a base for further expansion, Japanese authorities sought to win thepolitical support of the Mongols and to mobilize them for the war effort. As partof this effort, Japan made especial use of Mongolian Buddhism, providing mate-rial support to monasteries, for example. It also encouraged reforms withinMongolian Buddhism to make it more useful to Japanese purposes. For theirpart, Mongol leaders and Buddhists generally cooperated in such arrangementsbecause of the protection and status they conferred. They also tried to utilizeJapanese resources for their own nation-building efforts. Collaboration with

Critical Asian Studies35:4 (2003), 491-514

ISSN 1467-2715 print/1472-6033 online / 04 / 000491-24 ©2003 BCAS, Inc. DOI: 10.1080/1467271032000147005

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Mongolian Buddhism was of course unable to save Japan from military defeat in1945, but it did reinforce Japan’s political position in the contested region. Forthe Mongols themselves, collaboration with Japan did not deliver independ-ence, but for a period of time it did accelerate the modernization of MongolianBuddhism and indirectly strengthen the political position of the Mongols inpostwar China.

The historical lands of the Mongols stretch from close to the Bohai Gulf in theeast to well beyond Lake Baikal in the west, encompassing a vast territory ofsteppe, forest, desert, and mountain. Throughout the second half of the nine-teenth century and the first half of the twentieth, these lands were the object of along territorial contest between Russia and China. Early in the twentieth cen-tury, the contest was made more complicated by the intrusion of Japanese impe-rial interests into the region and by an incipient modern Mongol nationalism.The northern lands of the Mongols — Outer Mongolia — declared independ-ence from China in 1911 and came under Soviet domination as the MongolianPeople’s Republic (MPR) in 1924. The southern and eastern Mongol lands — In-ner Mongolia — became part of the Chinese Republic, but with a significant de-gree of practical autonomy.

During the 1930s and 1940s Inner Mongolia fell for practical political pur-poses into three zones. The eastern region, stretching from Rehe (Jehol) northto the Soviet border, was incorporated by the Japanese into the client state ofManchukuo (Manzhouguo). The western region comprising roughly the Chi-nese provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan was nominally under Chinese rule but inpractice was heavily dominated by the Japanese. Prince Demchugdongrob(Prince De) led a strong push for independence or autonomy in this region.Finally, the far west of Inner Mongolia — roughly the province of Ningxia andparts of Gansu — remained more or less under the authority of Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang (GMD) government. This GMD-governed region is notconsidered in this essay, which discusses only those parts of Mongolia in whichthe Japanese were directly engaged. For convenience, in this article I use theterm “Inner Mongolia” to signify those regions under Japanese influence.1

Although politically diverse internally, Inner Mongolia formed a distinct zonefor Japanese political initiatives on the Asian mainland. As we shall see, these ini-tiatives helped shape the development of Japanese policies as well as the devel-opment of Mongol Buddhism.

Japan was interested in the Mongols primarily because of the territory theyoccupied — an area that would be geopolitically important in the event of a con-flict with either China or the Soviet Union. The Mongol lands were both a poten-tial base for military operations northwards or southwards and a potentialbuffer against Chinese or Soviet counterattacks. The eastern part of Inner Mon-golia was strategically important because it lay closest to the Manchurian plain,where the Japanese had been developing powerful strategic and economic in-terests since early in the twentieth century. The region was politically importantas well. The Japanese believed that if they won the support of Mongols there,they would also win support and sympathy from Mongols living in the regionsdominated by the Soviet Union and China. Japan was also concerned that con-

492 Critical Asian Studies 35:4 (2003)

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trol of Inner Mongolia not be costly in personnel or administrative terms. Forthis reason, they wanted a regime in the region that would be broadly accept-able to the Mongols, that would be economically self-supporting, and thatwould even contribute to the war effort. These three goals were in some re-spects contradictory. Winning acceptance by the Mongols involved accommo-dating to existing Mongol institutions, whereas economic self-sufficiency inwartime implied important social, economic, institutional changes. Japanesepolicy never really managed to resolve this contradiction.

The two most important traditional Mongol institutions at the time were the“banners” — administrative units dominated by hereditary princes2 — and theBuddhist monasteries. To win the support of the princes, the Japanese made re-peated hints — which never became serious promises — that they would sponsorsome degree of Mongolian independence or at least a high level of autonomyunder Japanese auspices. Ever since Outer Mongolia declared its independencein 1911, the princes of Inner Mongolia had had cherished ambitions of achiev-ing the same for themselves. With the borders of Inner Mongolia not far fromBeijing, however, and with a large Chinese population already in the Mongollands, the princes felt that their ambitions were being blocked by China. Inthese circumstances, they saw Japan as a natural ally. But Japan’s hints that itmight support Mongol independence were constrained both by Japan’s generalimperial goals, which had nothing to do with granting real independence toanyone, and by Japan’s need to take account of their relationship to China. Japa-nese policy toward China was complex. In part it involved attempting to con-vince the local Chinese that Japan was a better custodian of their interests thanthe GMD or the communists. Japan was also wary of promising independencebecause it knew that most of China’s political elite, left and right, believed thatthe Mongol lands belonged to China.

Li/Japanese Imperialism 493

Eastern Asia, 1937

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Because the Japanese were constrained in what they could promise the Mon-golian princes, winning the support of Mongolian Buddhism was especially im-portant. Buddhism was the religion of virtually all Mongols and most familiesaspired to send at least one son into the monastic system. Buddhist monks hadenormous influence at every level of society and they played a multitude of im-portant social roles, especially in the provision of education and health care. Ja-pan’s policy toward Buddhism was largely one of support and patronage, withthe aim of making Mongolian Buddhists happy with the Japanese presence andavoiding the possibility that the monasteries might became a focus for resis-tance or hostility to Japan. The Japanese were strongly aware of the influence ofthe Buddhist monks over the princes and believed that serious resistance by theprinces could be avoided if the monks remained sympathetic to Japan. This pol-icy was reinforced by the general political strategy of the Japanese in the region,which emphasized ethnic harmony rather than ethnic self-determination. BothManchukuo and Inner Mongolia were multiethnic societies: Manchukuo’s pop-ulation was mainly Chinese but with a significant presence of Mongol, Japanese,Korean, and Manchu minorities. Inner Mongolia contained Chinese, Mongol,and Muslim communities, whose relative importance depended on where thepolitical boundaries were drawn. Japanese rhetoric in both Manchukuo and In-ner Mongolia therefore emphasized the harmony of the distinct ethnic groupsand claimed to guarantee their cultural autonomy. In the case of the Mongols inManchukuo, this autonomy was formalized in the Xing’an Office, a separate ad-ministration for the Mongol regions.

Some Japanese authorities also saw Buddhism as a potential tool for the so-cial and economic transformation of Mongol society. Conservative Buddhistpractices, they thought, were significant obstacles to the modernization of Mon-gol society, but they believed that Mongolian Buddhism was amenable to re-form and they were confident that Buddhist institutions, if brought into linewith “modern” and Japanese practice, could become both a conduit for themodernization of Mongol society and a means of mobilizing Mongols in sup-port of the war effort. Modernization, therefore, was another element in Japan’spolitical strategy in the region. As they did in China, the Japanese made use oftheir own success in rapid modernization at home to present themselves as theforce best able to deliver modernity to other Asian peoples. Dealing with Mon-golian Buddhism was an essential part of this strategy because of Buddhism’spotential both for blocking and for facilitating social and economic change. Inother words, the Japanese promoted reform within Mongolian Buddhism in or-der to make it a more useful tool for Japanese interests. In this respect, the Japa-nese experience with Buddhism in Inner Mongolia was comparable to its laterencounter with Islam in Indonesia and Malaya, as we will see below. In these re-gions, Islam was the religion of the vast majority of the indigenous population,as was Buddhism in Mongolia. In both cases, the Japanese saw religion as a spe-cial key to achieving their aims.

The effort to reform Mongolian Buddhism rested in part on Japanese claimsof an affinity between Mongolian and Japanese Buddhism,3 but their policieswere driven mainly by the calculation that reforms in Mongolian Buddhism


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would help to modernize Mongolian society and so contribute more effectivelyto the war effort.

State Support, Myth, and Manipulation

The Japanese were not the first to see Buddhism as a force for mobilizing theMongols. In the sixteenth century, the Mongol leader Altan Khan had promotedTibetan Buddhism in the Mongol lands as a way of unifying the Mongol tribesunder his rule. During the Qing dynasty, the emperors in Peking had also beenimportant sponsors of Mongolian Buddhism, providing imperial patronage inthe form of titles and subsidies to the Buddhist monasteries in Mongolia and Ti-bet.4 The monasteries supported by the Qing court were called imperial monas-teries and because they were large, powerful and well-off in political andfinancial terms, many smaller monasteries came under their influence. Qingcourt officials also assisted in the search for reincarnations and they bestowedtitles upon senior lamas. The purpose of this religious sponsorship, however,was not to unite the Mongols but rather to distract them from warfare and toprevent a revival of the Mongol military threat to the Qing empire. For the samereason, the Qing emperors worked hard to prevent the reemergence of politicalunity among the Mongols by supporting the numerous petty princes of the ban-ner system. As Buddhism became more firmly established, winning the supportof the Buddhist establishment became an important element in ensuring the ac-quiescence of Mongols in Qing rule.

Under the early Chinese Republic, Yuan Shikai maintained this system of sup-port for Mongolian Buddhism, seeing it as a prerequisite for winning backOuter Mongolia, which had declared independence in 1911, and for retain-ing control of Inner Mongolia. After Yuan’s death in 1916, political disorder,chaotic state finances, and Chinese suspicions of the political implications ofMongol identity all worked to reduce financial support for Buddhist institu-tions from the central government. Nonetheless, the authorities continuedto pay formal respect to Buddhism and to make gestures such as grantinghonorific titles to senior lamas. These policies continued under the GMD ad-ministration.5

When the Japanese Kwantung Army created Manchukuo in 1932, its strate-gists were well aware of the existence of a large Mongol community within thenew state’s borders and they had already begun to develop plans for extendingJapanese influence into the Mongol lands farther west. On the basis of earlier re-search on Mongolian Buddhism — conducted, often clandestinely, throughJapanese Buddhist missionary groups in Mongolia — the Japanese well under-stood the nature and strength of Buddhist influence in Mongol society, espe-cially in Inner Mongolia. Initially they saw Buddhism as a potential threat, a pos-sible source of resistance to Japanese rule. Accordingly they took steps toremove Buddhist influence from the political arena even as they continued toprovide generous financial support to the Buddhist monasteries. From the startthe Japanese authorities encouraged the Xing’an Office to provide financialsupport for the restoration and upkeep of monasteries as well as allowances forolder monks in much the same way that earlier Qing rulers had. Their aim was


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to give Mongolian Buddhists no reason to feel that Japanese domination hadbrought about any downgrading of Buddhism’s standing in their region.

At the same time, the Japanese were wary of the potential power of Buddhistauthorities to block or subvert their goals. On 24 December 1932, therefore, theXing’an Office issued a statement on the role of Buddhism in the Mongol re-gions. This document, entitled “Prohibition on the Political Involvement ofLamas,” stated that the purpose of religion was salvation and that links betweenreligion and politics threatened the political order. Even though the earlierMongolian khans (rulers) had used religion in support of political ends, thedocument explained, politics and religion were to be entirely separate in themodern state of Manchukuo. Manchukuo would deliver modernity to its peo-ple in a new way, without being dependent on old ways. The khutuktu (livingBuddhas, or important reincarnations), who were located in the monasteries,were therefore informed that they would have no further role in political deci-sion-making.6

The Japanese, however, had ambitions for Manchukuo and these requiredthem to engage with Mongolian Buddhism. Japanese authorities constructed aworldview in which Japan was to be the agent for the modernization of the restof Asia and they regarded Manchukuo as an opportunity to devise a blueprintfor this modernization process. The multifaceted development strategy of theJapanese involved both the construction of infrastructure in Manchukuo andthe mobilization of its people. For the Japanese, it was important that the ener-gies of the people be used productively, both directly in support of the war ef-fort and more generally for the sake of development. Japanese developmentideology emphasized both technical improvements — new varieties of cropsand livestock, new industrial production techniques and so on — and increasedeffort. Believing that their own achievements were the product of hard workand discipline, the Japanese regarded laziness, indiscipline, inefficiency, andlack of direction as being the most significant obstacles to economic progress inthe rest of Asia. Throughout the territories they dominated, therefore, not onlyin Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia but later also in Southeast Asia, the Japaneseinvariably emphasized that other Asian societies would achieve great thingsonly if they accepted the need for hard work and discipline on the Japanesemodel.

The emerging war in China increased the demand for raw materials for pro-duction and human resources for fighting and this gave the Japanese anotherreason to prod the Mongols (and other Asians as well) to work. In all the societ-ies they encountered, the Japanese looked for social forms and practices thatthey thought could generate a spirit of discipline and hard work. In Mongoliansociety, they were convinced of the power of Buddhism to provide disciplineand moral strength to the Mongols. For this reason, they not only supported tra-ditional Buddhist activities but also promoted the idea of using Buddhist monksas chaplains for armed units and other official and semiofficial organizations asthey employed Japanese monks as chaplains in the Japanese Army. 7

As a first part of this effort to mobilize the people of Manchukuo in support ofthe new state, Japan’s Kwantung Army launched a propaganda campaign, be-


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ginning in the second half of the 1930s, to present Manchukuo to the Mongolsin terms of Buddhist doctrine. They claimed that Pu Yi, the former Qing em-peror, whom the Japanese had installed as emperor of Manchukuo, was the re-incarnation of Manjusri Boddhisatva of Wutaishan (Mountain of the Five Ter-races)8 and that Manchukuo was a creation of Heaven.9

Buddhism was also important to the Japanese as a defense against commu-nism. The Japanese military authorities saw communist influence in Japan itself,in Korea, and in Manchukuo and the Mongol lands as a serious source of dangerbecause it transcended national and ethnic boundaries. There was a risk, intheir view, that Soviet domination of the MPR would provide a conduit for theinfiltration of communist influences into Inner Mongolia and on into Manchu-kuo. Especially after the Soviet-inspired purges of leading politicians andmonks in the MPR began in the late 1920s, the Japanese saw Mongolian Bud-dhism as a reliable bulwark against communist influence. There were evenhopes that by patronizing Buddhism in Inner Mongolia they might generategoodwill toward Japan in Outer Mongolia and that this might be useful in Ja-pan’s later imperial plans.

Finally, the Japanese authorities saw Buddhism as a means of creating a specialbond between Japan and Mongolia, based on religious brotherhood. Buddhismwas the dominant religion in Japan, and the Japanese hoped that a sense of sharedreligious belief would make the Mongols still more sympathetic to Japan.10

Reform of Mongolian Buddhism in Manchukuo

Japan’s plans to use Mongolian Buddhism in the above-mentioned ways re-quired changes in Buddhist institutions and practice. The reforms aimed to en-sure that Mongolian Buddhist institutions did not stand in the way of moderniza-tion and to make the most of those institutions’ strengths in the service ofdevelopment. These reforms included reducing the number of monks, devel-oping the monasteries as a conduit for modern education and health care, andweakening the links between Mongolian and Tibetan Buddhism.

Japanese perceptions of Mongolian Buddhism, which they called Mðkobukkyð, were complex, even contradictory. In the eyes of many Japanese offi-cials and researchers, Mongolian Buddhism had degenerated into primitive su-perstition that stood in the way of constructing a modern society in Manchu-kuo. In particular, they felt that the lamas were parasites on the rest of Mongolsociety and that the labor force of the monks represented a significant untappedhuman resource. The Mongolian clergy was (incorrectly) said to compriseabout half of the adult male population. Because the monks were exempt fromboth economic and military duties, the Japanese authorities considered them tobe useless for economic development and for the defense of Manchukuo. TheJapanese therefore sought to mobilize this “unproductive” labor force.11 In real-ity, the level of participation in the monasteries was probably much more mod-est. A survey in 1934 indicated that 4 percent of the population of the Xing’anprovinces lived in monasteries, rising as high as 13 percent in Northern Xing’an(Hulunbuir).12 Nonetheless, the Japanese were convinced that the monkhoodrepresented a serious drain on Inner Mongolia’s resources. The Japanese were


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aware, however, that releasing this “unproductive” labor would not be easy.They realized that they would antagonize the Mongols if they expressed theirunflattering opinions publicly or if they proceeded too quickly with attempts atreform.

Wary of confronting Mongolian Buddhism directly, the Japanese insteadsought to release the labor of lamas for productive purposes by promoting re-forms in practice within Mongolian Buddhism in ways that did not immediatelysuggest an ulterior motive. The main vehicle for reducing the number of lamaswas the introduction of examinations in Buddhist doctrine. This measure,which could be justified as a means of purifying religious practice, was expectedto result in the return of many monks to secular occupations.13 Banner officialsand higher-ranking lamas were thus instructed to conduct oral examinations ofall monks. They asked questions about the Buddhist sutras, raised points ofBuddhist doctrine, and checked familiarity with monastic rules. As a result, thenumber of monks in the monasteries dropped, although not as much as the Jap-anese had hoped.14 In some cases, senior monks protected as many of their sub-ordinates as they could, while at the same time appearing to meet the Japanesedemands.

The Japanese authorities also believed that the sexual practices of the monkswere a burden on the economy. Because celibacy was standard in the dGe-lugs-pa school (yellow hat sect), which dominated Mongolian Buddhism, a signifi-cant proportion of the male population was not available for reproduction. Inthe Japanese view, this arrangement was an undesirable curb on populationgrowth. In addition, the Japanese came to share the common (but seldom ex-pressed) Mongol belief that the monks were sexually promiscuous. Japanesetypically believed that celibacy was unnatural and that it gave rise to homosexu-ality and casual heterosexual liaisons that were responsible in turn for thespread of venereal diseases. For this reason, the Japanese authorities proposedthat monks should be allowed to marry, in the hope that they would be removedfrom one form of temptation and would play their part in increasing the popula-tion so as to provide more healthy subjects for the Japanese empire.15

Recognizing the key role that lamas played in providing health care and edu-cation, the Japanese sought to use Mongolian Buddhism as a more effectiveconduit for modern medicine and instruction. Lamas were the main medicalpractitioners in Mongolia, but their knowledge was based on Tibetan medicineand some elements drawn from older Mongolian folk medicine. The Japaneseauthorities regarded these practices as primitive and unscientific and theysought to replace them with modern Western medicine by introducing modernmedical education into Mongolian monasteries.16 In these monastic medicalschools, it was hoped, lamas could learn the basic elements of modern healthcare and hygiene and apply these to their healing.17 Much the same reorienta-tion was meant to apply in education. The bulk of conventional learning inmonasteries consisted of memorizing and reciting the holy scripture, but underJapanese influence new lama schools began offering curricula that includedmodern mathematics, physics, and physical education.18


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International ImplicationsReforming Mongolian Buddhism had international implications as well. Fromearly times, Mongolian Buddhism had been strongly oriented toward TibetanBuddhism. Mongolian Buddhists accepted the religious authority of the DalaiLama and Panchen Lama, both based in Tibet, and Tibetan religious practiceswere considered standard. The main language of religious observance in Mon-golian monasteries was Tibetan and most Mongolian lamas who intended tomake a career as monks dreamed of studying in Tibet. Many monks could readscripture in Tibetan, but not in Mongolian. Although Tibet for all practical pur-poses was largely independent in the 1930s, the Japanese were well aware ofthe long-standing interest of the British, the Russians, and the Chinese there,and they were unhappy that Mongolian Buddhists should defer to authoritiesoutside Japan’s sphere of influence. They also believed that Tibet was thesource of many of the undesirable features of Mongolian Buddhism. For boththese reasons, the Japanese were keen to reorient Mongolian Buddhism awayfrom its Tibetan roots. They therefore encouraged lamas to learn Mongol textsand to recite holy scriptures in Mongolian, rather than in Tibetan.19

Although the Japanese portrayed this reorientation as creating a true “Mon-golian Buddhism” that did not look up to Tibet or the Tibetan language as theholy fountain of knowledge and wisdom, a seldom-stated element in their planswas to bring Mongolian Buddhism closer to the Buddhism of Japan.20Althoughsome Japanese thought that Mongolian Buddhism should give way entirely toJapanese Buddhism, most Japanese planners saw Buddhist practice in Japan assimply a repertoire from which they drew a number of possibilities for reform.They wanted a Mongolian Buddhism they could deal with, but they were not inany way insistent on a serious program of Japanization that, they knew, wouldspark resistance and hostility on the part of the Mongols. Apart from imposingthe few significant reforms already mentioned (e.g., requiring examinations),the Japanese authorities preferred to promote reform in Mongolian Buddhismby encouraging and assisting reform-minded monks within Mongolian Bud-dhism itself. There was frequent discussion in Japanese circles about how theMongols themselves might reform their religious forms of expression.21

Central to this policy of indirect influence was winning the support of influ-ential lamas. For this purpose, the Japanese maintained support for the tradi-tion of reincarnation, even though this belief was not a significant part of Japa-nese Buddhist practices. The Japanese also invited lamaist dignitaries to Japan.From the 1920s to the end of World War II, several groups of lamas from easternand western Inner Mongolia visited Japan. The lamas were given tours of fa-mous Buddhist monasteries and temples, modern schools, factories, farms, andother places of interest that showed the modernity and progress of Japanese so-ciety. To promote the same appreciation of Japanese achievements in the youn-ger clergy, who would be the leaders of the future, similar visits to Japan wereorganized for young clerics.22

Young lamas also went to Japan to be educated. Already in 1933, the Xing’anOffice of Manchukuo had decided to send lama students to Japan supported by


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Manchukuo state funds.23 After 1937 young clergy from the western part of In-ner Mongolia began going to Japan. Altogether about two hundred lamas weresent to Japan to study between 1932 and 1945. Their overseas study wasfunded, in part, by Japanese Buddhist communities24 such as the Jðdo SchoolChion’in, which created a special hall (kachðkan) for Mongolian lamas in Kyotowhere more than fifty lamas were trained between 1938 and 1945. In 1942 theybuilt another hall, the Manchurian-Mongolian hall (Man-Mð kaikan) in Mukden(Fengtian, present Shenyang) in Manchukuo. This was a language training cen-ter for lamas and young Mongolians and Manchurians who later went to Japanfor advanced studies.25 Support also came from the Shingon School at Kðyasan,which established a special academy (Kða mikkyð gakuin) in 1939 to educateMongolian lamas,26 and the Tendai School received Mongolian lamas at theHieizan Middle School in Sakamoto near Kyoto and educated the lamas to-gether with Japanese pupils.27 Tendai-shþ also established a preparatory coursein Mukden for lamas who intended to go to Japan.28 At the same time, Buddhistclergy from Japan were encouraged to begin missionary work in Mongolia. Thebudget for the Mongolia-Manchuria mission, which included the expenses forthese young lamas’ education, grew from year to year. For example, Shin-gon-shþ’s budget for the Mongolia mission rose from ¥29,020 in 1942 to¥54,940 in 1944.29

Another important element in the reform of Mongolian Buddhism was thesetting up of new religious institutions. Unhappy with the decentralized struc-ture of the Mongolian Buddhist monastery system, the Japanese tried instead toplace smaller independent monasteries under the direct authority of largerones, as was customary in Japan and as they had done in Korea. In May 1939, theBuddhist General Assembly of Manchukuo (Manzhouguo fojiao zonghui) wasestablished. This General Assembly, which consisted of three sections (Manchu-rian, Japanese, and Mongolian), aimed to promote harmony among ethnicgroups in Manchukuo, reminding them that they possessed a “young state oftheir own” and encouraging them to serve the state by training missionaries, do-ing theological research, and fighting against communism.30

The dispersed nature of authority in Mongolian Buddhism meant that majorreforms could not be introduced quickly. Indeed, during the first decade ofManchukuo’s existence, the authorities convened meeting after meeting andconference after conference to discuss Mongolian Buddhism and its possiblereform. In August 1940, for example, the Xing’an Office organized a major con-ference on the reform of lamaism to which they invited Mongolian lamas, Japa-nese researchers, and monks such as Kobayashi Gidð, who was very active intraining Mongolian lamas at Chion’in in Kyoto.31 The 1940 conference pro-duced an ambitious reform agenda that included the introduction of exams, areduction in the number of lamas, the establishing of medical schools, the regu-lation of temple and monastic properties, and the founding of a Council ofLamaism for Manchukuo.32

On 5 December 1940, the Lamaism Council of the Imperial Manchukuo Gov-ernment (Manshþ teikoku rama-kyð shþdan) was established in Xinjing (Hsin-king), the capital of Manchukuo. The head of the council was a high-ranking


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Mongolian lama (Chagan Khutuktu); the Japanese vice director was Satð Tomie.Designed to be a central organ to control the scattered Mongolian monasteriesand temples, the council managed lama credentials, temples, monastic educa-tion, religious gatherings, finance, property, and monastic land. It was alsocharged with conducting a census of monasteries and gathering information onthe number of lamas and their living standards.33

In general, the response of the Mongol leaders in Manchukuo to Japanese re-form efforts was selective. They were happy with the introduction of modern fa-cilities such as health care and medical training and they were generally willingto accept the broadening of the education system and the promotion of Mongolculture. But especially on more strictly doctrinal issues, the Mongolian lamasand politicians saw little reason to change their established beliefs and practicesat the behest of the Japanese. Thus, the Japanese proposal to abolish the celi-bacy of Mongolian lamas and to allow lamas to marry as Japanese Buddhistpriests do was completely rejected by the Mongols. Only in a few cases were la-mas forced to engage in physical work such as coal mining.34 Nonetheless, theMongol leaders wished to avoid direct confrontation with the powerful Japa-nese authorities; moreover, many of the reforms proposed by the Japanese hadin fact been under discussion within Mongolian Buddhist circles since earlier inthe century.

Reform Attempts in Western Inner Mongolia

Very soon after the founding of Manchukuo in 1932, Japan’s Kwantung Armybegan to involve lamas in the western part of Inner Mongolia in plans to reformMongolian Buddhism and to send civilians affiliated with the army, mostly theTokumukikan (secret service), to monasteries in that region. The KwantungArmy issued a number of secret documents (at least one every year) regardingpolicies toward Inner Mongolia.35 One of these secret documents, “Tai Nai-Mðshisaku yðryð,” issued in 1935, states:

We should respect the Mongolian custom of esteeming Lamaism, and bydoing so win the heart of the Mongols. Therefore lama sites, when neces-sary, should be renovated and the livelihood of the influential lamas as-sured. Lamaism and lamas should be gradually reformed (improved)without scaring people. Then, the number of lamas should be decreasedlittle by little and the large number of [secularized] young men should un-dertake other occupations (industry, business) to the advantage of thewhole population.36

Later, in 1942 and 1943, the Japanese Army in western Inner Mongolia, theso-called Mongolia Garrison (Chþmðgun), invited study groups consisting oflamas of the highest rank in Inner Mongolia to Japan. Despite their efforts, theJapanese in western Inner Mongolia were unable to impose a central Buddhistassembly as the authorities in Manchukuo had done. Mongol leaders in the re-gion, presented with a proposal to form such an organization, did not wish toaccept it, but they knew they could not simply reject it. They opted instead to re-establish the Lama-yin tamaga (Lama Seal Office), a religious office that had ex-isted during the Qing dynasty. Through this organization, they sought to avoid


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direct Japanese influence in religious matters.37 This action was a compromisefrom both sides: the Japanese military achieved its goal of setting up a centraladministration and the Mongol leaders “avoided” the establishment of a new in-stitution that would have been entirely controlled by the Japanese. HashimotoKðhð, one of the best-known scholars of Mongolian Buddhism, who alsoworked as an intelligence officer in Mongolia and later in the Japanese foreignministry in Tokyo, observed these Mongolian maneuvers at the time. Accordingto Hashimoto, Prince De feared that a new religious organization might developpolitical aspirations and challenge the old administrative system or even at-tempt to take power. Hashimoto stated that Prince De was satisfied with the ex-isting form of lamaism and saw no need for reform. Furthermore, the prince didnot want the Japanese (“from a different religion”) to be the agents of reform inholy lamaism.38

The situation in Western Inner Mongolia presented the Japanese with a morecomplex set of strategic problems than had that in Manchukuo. After creatingManchukuo in 1932, the Kwantung Army began to develop ideas of creating asecond Manchukuo in the western part of Inner Mongolia. Unlike Manchukuo,this western region was a high plateau, not especially attractive for Japanese set-tlement. But it did have coal and iron reserves, as well as wool production capa-bilities, and these could be tapped to strengthen the Japanese empire. More im-portantly, western Inner Mongolia lay on the northern flank of China and thesouthern flank of the Soviet sphere. The Kwantung Army therefore saw geo-political possibilities in exploiting Mongolian nationalism against both Chinaand the Soviet Union.

The princes of western Inner Mongolia had been in conflict with the Chineseauthorities over issues of land and tax, with Prince De emerging as the most im-portant promoter of Mongolian interests and autonomy. The Japanese Armysent secret agents to contact the Mongolian princes and they proceeded to pen-etrate the region through informal means as well, setting up schools and clinics,improving communications, and so forth. This so-called cultural work (bunkakðsaku) was the responsibility of civil groups such as the Zenrin Kyðkai.39 TheJapanese military was clearly trying to detach western Inner Mongolia fromgreater China, just as it had done in Manchukuo.

The Chinese government, however, was well aware of the danger posed bysuch Japanese efforts. Chiang Kai-shek’s GMD, therefore, sought to show that it,too, was a defender of Mongol interests and autonomy. The GMD continuedstate sponsorship of senior Mongolian and Tibetan lamas during the Nanjingdecade (see endnote 5) and it used the authority of the lamas it had sponsoredin an effort to thwart Mongol plans for greater autonomy. In particular, the GMDused the authority of the Jangjia Khutuktu, who was one of most senior lamas inthe Mongolian hierarchy and who lived in GMD territory. In 1933 he tried tovisit Inner Mongolia at the request of the GMD government in order to stop theInner Mongolian independence movement initiated by Prince De. However, hewas blocked on his way by Mongolian students in Peiping (Peking/ Beijing), whosupported independence.40 Thus the Japanese Kwantung Army had to competewith the Chinese Nationalist government for influence in Inner Mongolia.


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In January 1936, the Kwantung Army issued another secret and even moredetailed document entitled “Tai Mð (seihoku) shisaku yðryð” (The outline ofthe policies toward Mongolia [North-West]). Article 9, covering cultural poli-cies, gave priority to religion: “We should pay enormous attention to matters ofreligion in order to oppose the Soviet’s anti-religious policy in Outer Mongoliaand to win the hearts of the Mongolians and Muslims.” The document con-cludes with the warning: “All these policies must be very carefully implemented.If possible they should not be made public, so that they do not make the world,especially China and the Soviet Union, nervous.”41

Japanese authorities were also aware of the interest of “their” Mongols inOuter Mongolia, which was, after all, formally independent. They were alsoaware of the long history of political and cultural links between Mongols and


Silinghool League Conference, 1942

In western Inner Mongolia, as in Manchukuo, years of reform discussionsculminated in a conference, held in March 1942, by the administration ofthe Silinghool League.1 Among the detailed regulations promulgated atthe conference, the reduction of the number of lamas must have seemedto many quite extreme: a family with one son was not allowed to let thischild become a lama; families with two sons could allow only one of themto enter a monastery; families with three to five sons could apply for per-mission to send a second child to the monastery. Families with larger num-bers of children could allow more of them to become lamas, but with anupper limit of four out of twelve children permitted to enter lamahood(clause 1). Lamas between sixteen and twenty-five years of age were to beexamined strictly; lamas who reached their eighteenth birthday were totake an examination in reciting sutras and would receive a diploma if theypassed. If lamas under the age of forty broke religious rules they were to besecularized (clauses 2, 3). Lamas under forty should study Mongolian writ-ing and reading for two years. Those who achieved a very good mark wereto be teachers and to educate lamas in monasteries (clause 15). The regu-lations also gave instruction on lamas’ education, lifestyle, behavior andthe like. In their free time, for instance, lamas should learn handicrafts(clause 21).2 The program seemed particularly severe in its aim of reduc-ing the number of lamas. Even some Japanese who favored gradual reformconsidered it far too harsh.3 The regulations, however, made no sugges-tion of doctrinal changes such as abolishing celibacy.

1. The Silinghool League, which was located close to the western border ofManchukuo, was led at the time by Prince De.

2. Ðbör Mongol-yin dangsa ebhemel, file no 02-1, entury Silinghool kôsho,“Jasag kaigi kettei jikð” (Decisions made at the Banner Conference) (1942).

3. Sechin Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchug-dongrob, 1902-1966 (Bellingham, Wash.: Center for East Asian Studies, West-ern Washington University, 1999), 270.

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China and realized that some of these links could be mobilized to create a Mon-gol-Chinese alliance against Japan. In the second half of the 1930s, the Japanesebecame concerned that progress toward autonomy in Inner Mongolia might en-courage secessionism among the Mongols of Manchukuo. In 1936, after thesplitting of the Mongolian Political Council, Prince De and other Mongolianleaders reached the conclusion that they needed to develop military strength ifthey were to achieve Mongol autonomy. Prince De and the other leaders there-fore established a Mongolian military government with Japanese assistance inwestern Inner Mongolia; in 1937 this administration developed into the Mon-golian Allied Leagues Autonomous Government.42

Japan’s policy of promoting reform within Mongolian Buddhism provedhard to reconcile with its expansionist ambitions. The Japanese military wasaware that radical actions would provoke discontent and distrust amongMongols because of their strong attachment to the Buddhist faith; this in turnwould have meant a setback for Japanese goals of attracting Buddhists in OuterMongolia and expanding their influence there. Thus, the military’s reform at-tempts were very circumspect.

Mongolian Responses

Mongols differed among themselves on religious questions. Many young radi-cal intellectuals pushed for religious reform; some, inspired by Marxist ideas,sought to abolish the lamaist institutions completely. The clergy and the conser-vative princes categorically opposed any efforts to abolish the lama institutions.At least one group of influential leaders shared the view that a reform of lamaismwas indispensable. But the differing parties were unanimous in rejecting theidea that Japan should shape and direct religious reform.43 Therefore theseleaders tried to obviate Japan’s plans by undertaking their own reforms.

The Japanese had assumed that the young Mongolian novices trained in Ja-pan would reform lamaism according to the Japanese model after returninghome. But they underestimated the power of the monastic hierarchy in Mongo-lia. The Mongolian saying, “Parents are for one life, teachers for three lives”(Nige törül-ün echige eke, gurban törül-ün bagsi) reflects the enormous au-thority of teachers. The saying means that although one owes reverence andobedience to one’s parents, one is far more obligated to one’s teachers. This be-lief — particularly in the case of the lamas, who were considered the educatedclass in Mongolian society — was so strong that students did not dare to contra-dict their teachers. Thus, it was unimaginable from the beginning that novicestrained in Japan would be able to win their teachers or masters over to modern-istic tendencies, let alone to reeducate or rebel against them. Young lamas whofound the new Japanese ideas compelling preferred to leave the monastery andresume secular life rather than confront their masters. These included thosewho became convinced that practical work would help the development ofMongolia more than prayers and reading sutras in the monasteries.

Lamas were, of course, the crux of the matter in the reform of lamaism. Theywere respected and needed by both princes and commoners, but they had nopolitical decision-making powers, whatever their influence. Neither conserva-


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tives nor progressives among the lamas actively pursued doctrinal changes intheir religion. The Japanese had hoped that by bringing high-ranking lamas toJapan, the spiritual leaders of Mongolia would be so awed by Japanese achieve-ments and the modern equipment of the Buddhist schools that their world ofideas would change from one oriented toward Tibetan Buddhism to one favor-ing the Japanese model. The lamas were indeed impressed by Japanese achieve-ments and modern institutions, but in no way did they renounce their funda-mental beliefs.44 Kanjurwa Khutuktu, one of the most influential lamadignitaries of that time, who was invited to Japan in 1942, commented in his au-tobiography:

The objective of the Japanese in requesting such visits was…to impressthe Mongol lamas that Japan was indeed a Buddhist nation and had great,ancient Buddhist centres. Such visits were significant partly because manylamas had serious reservations about whether the Japanese were trulyBuddhist. While they saw the Japanese armies and their impressive mili-tary equipment and political, cultural or economic activities, they did notsee much that convinced them that the Japanese really were Buddhist. An-other reason for the Japanese sponsoring excursions for Mongolian Bud-dhist leaders was to promote their Buddhist reform activities in Mongo-lia.…We were very impressed with our visit to Japan and welcomed closerrelations with the Japanese Buddhist leaders, but we did not welcomechange in our traditional culture, least of all our religious institutions.45

Nonetheless, these visits did offer food for thought and they induced somelamas to become interested in politics, looking beyond theology. After their re-turn, these lamas promoted a more effective education of younger lamas and, insome cases, urged the founding of small-scale industry in their monasteries.46

Although many monasteries sent young lamas to Japan to study, most of the la-mas remained faithful to their belief in the tenets of Mongolian Buddhism. Onlya few of the lamas who studied in Japanese Buddhist temples and schools wereattracted to the religious forms they were introduced to in Japan. Most of themreturned home with an increasing sense of Mongol national identity. Even thelamas who were sent by the Manchukuo government never referred to them-selves as citizens of the new state, but as Mongols, and their statements all con-cerned the future of the Mongols.

Even the implementation of the plan to reduce the number of lamas, whichmany Mongolians as well as Japanese agreed upon, encountered much diffi-culty. Elderly lamas were very often distressed with such changes, so they triedto keep their pupils in the monasteries, even negotiating with the secular au-thorities to make “special” exceptions.47 In July 1940, a survey of lama opinionson reform was carried out by the North Xing’an (Hulunbuir) provincial govern-ment. The answers given by the lamas quite openly indicated that lamas werenot willing to change much at all. The survey showed that most lamas acceptedthe value of learning to read Mongolian, but they still emphasized the Tibetanlanguage as the most significant language for understanding Buddhist texts anddoctrines.48 For example, survey respondents said: “It is difficult to accept thatlamas have to do heavy physical work”; “children should not go to public school


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before they become clerics”; and “the teaching methods in monasteries have tofollow the traditional way.” Interestingly, the survey also showed support for theview that “it is alright to use European medicine beside Tibetan medicine.”49

Nonetheless, Buddhist resistance to Japanese policies was weaker than it was inKorea, where during the second decade of the twentieth century a strong pro-test movement emerged in opposition to Japanese intervention in Korean Bud-dhism.50 Nor were there any active Buddhist attempts to protest against Japa-nese invasion and war. On the other hand, there was no case of the entiremembership of a monastery converting to Japanese Buddhism, as had hap-pened in Korea and in Taiwan.51 In fact, the only known case of conversion wasthat of two Mongolian youngsters who entered the Japanese Shin sect andworked in the temple of this sect in Hailar, eastern Inner Mongolia.52


Japan’s Encounters with Islam in Indonesia and Malaya

The Japanese experience with Buddhism in Mongolia foreshadowed itslater encounter with Islam in Indonesia and Malaya. In these regions, Is-lam was the religion of the vast majority of the indigenous population, aswas Buddhism in Mongolia, and the Islamic teachers and scholars (kiaiand ulama) exercised a similarly powerful influence over the rural popu-lation in many areas, even though they were not organized in monaster-ies.1 As in Mongolia, it was a basic tenet of Japanese policy in SoutheastAsia that local religious institutions should have state support. The “Out-line on the Conduct of Military Administration in the Occupied Areas” of14 March 1942 stated: “The existing customs, relics, and such which arebased on religion or creed should be respected in order to reassure andwin the hearts of the local inhabitants. The people shall at the same timebe educated to cooperate with our policies.”2

The document went on to state: “Premature action with regard to reli-gious innovation shall be avoided. Adequate research shall be undertakenand, as occasion demands, our religious policies shall be gradually plannedand implemented in accord with local conditions.”3 The Japanese authori-ties often, though not always, responded sympathetically to complaints bylocal religious leaders about the behavior of Japanese troops disrespectfulof Islamic practices.4

In order to wean Indonesian Islam away from sources of authority thatwere beyond Japan’s control, the Japanese tried to force Islamic schools toabandon the teaching of Arabic in favor of Indonesian to give the Indone-sians a sense of Indonesian national identity,5 just as they had tried to per-suade the Mongols to abandon Tibetan for Mongolian. They also set up acentral Islamic council, the Masjumi, with a controlling and coordinatingrole similar to that of the Council for Lamaism in Manchukuo. The Japa-nese authorities convened numerous conferences and seminars for kiaiand ulama to persuade them to support the Japanese empire and to �

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Of course, the Mongolian leadership was also conscious of the importance ofthe lamas for Mongolian state building. Prince De stated in his autobiographythat Merse (Guo Daofu), a leader of the independence movement in eastern In-ner Mongolia before the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, had persuadedhim to call on the ninth Panchen Lama to mobilize the Mongols for independ-ence. In Merse’s view, Outer Mongolia had been able to achieve independencebecause the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu had mobilized the Mongols thereand because those Mongols were spiritually united. In Inner Mongolia, by con-trast, several movements against large-scale immigration of Chinese had all butfailed, in Merse’s view, because there was no spiritual foundation on which tomobilize people. Prince De shared Merse’s views and in 1933 he built two tem-ples for the Panchen Lama and asked him to persuade princes from other parts


deliver pro-Japanese propaganda to their followers6 and they introducedsecular elements into the curriculum in Islamic schools, just as they haddone in the lama schools of Mongolia. These attempts to use Muslim hos-tility to the Christian West to win Indonesians and Malays as allies in theEast Asian war were similar to their efforts to use Buddhism to rally theMongols against Soviet communism. Like the Mongolian Buddhists, how-ever, Muslims strongly defended their religious doctrines and resisted allattempts to align religious practices with Japanese models. Ultimately, theJapanese were unable to create more than an alliance of convenience withreligion in maritime Southeast Asia.

1. Japanese policies in occupied Burma might be expected to offer a usefulcomparison because of the dominant position of Buddhism there. Japan’smilitary presence in Burma, however, began only in 1942 and the territorywas always on an active military front line of the Japanese empire. The Japa-nese tried unsuccessfully to create a central council of Buddhist monks in Oc-tober 1942. See John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1958), 449.

2. Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura, and Koichi Kishi, Japanese Military Admin-istration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1965), 32.

3. This text closely resembles the document entitled “Tai Mð (seihoku) shisakuyðryð” [The outline of the policies toward Mongolia (North-West)], issued in1936 by the Kwantung Army.

4. Abu Talib Ahmad, “The Impact of the Japanese Occupation on the Malay-Mus-lim Population,” in Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation,ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1995), Journalof Southeast Asian Studies, Special Publication series 3, 24-35.

5. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under theJapanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 127.

6. Aiko Kurasawa, Nihon senryðka no Jawa nðson no henbo [The changes ofthe villages in Java under the Japanese occupation] (Tokyo: Sðshisha, 1992),368-97.

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of Mongolia to join his plan for a campaign to achieve Inner Mongolia’s self-de-termination.53

Whatever their conservative inclinations, many Mongolian leaders wereaware that Mongolian Buddhism could not be maintained in its traditional formif Mongols wanted to build a modern nation and find their place in the emerg-ing world order. For instance Prince De did not support the idea of identifyingthe reincarnation of the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu and he opposed the en-throning of a new Noyan Khutuktu, whose reincarnation had been found by theJapanese near the border with Outer Mongolia. He and other progressive Mon-golian intellectuals, aware of past political manipulation of reincarnations bythe Manchu emperors, did not want to be manipulated again by the Japanese.54

Furthermore, if the Japanese plan for bringing the ninth Jebtsundamba Khutuk-tu to Inner Mongolia had succeeded, it would have been possible for the Japa-nese to bypass the existing Mongolian leaders and use him as a tool to securetheir own influence over Mongol society. This would have put an immediateend to the hopes of building a Mongol state in Inner Mongolia. Prince De andthe other Mongolian leaders wanted to unite the Mongols through their reli-gion, but they did not want the religious authorities to be stronger than the sec-ular polity, particularly if the religion was to be controlled by “other people.”

Comparisons and Conclusion

Japan’s confidence that it could shape Mongolian Buddhism arose partly out ofa widespread Japanese perception that the Japanese and Mongolian peoplesshared common roots and worldviews. These perceptions derived from bothanthropological and linguistic research and romantic historical writings in Ja-pan of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This confidence wasreinforced by the extensive research on Mongolian Buddhism that Japanese ac-ademics, government organizations, and private firms undertook during thesame period. The research divisions of the Japanese-owned South ManchurianRailway and the Zenrin Kyðkai were particularly active, publishing a flow of re-search monographs and reports during the first half of the twentieth century. Ja-pan’s sense of the manageability of Mongolian Buddhism was further enhancedby the strong presence in the Mongol lands of missionaries from Japanese Bud-dhist schools. These schools not only provided a model that the MongolianBuddhists were expected to learn from, they also developed their own, more orless independent, ties with Mongolian monasteries and individual monks. Theywere an important source of information for the Japanese authorities as well.

This impressive understanding of Mongolian culture, however, did not al-ways translate into effective policies. For one thing, from 1937 on Japan was en-gaged in an increasingly demanding war in China and later also in SoutheastAsia and the Pacific. Resources, energy, and time to develop viable policies wereall lacking. As is often the case in colonial systems, moreover, those Japanesewho had the best understanding of the subject peoples were not always wellplaced to influence decision-making. Some of those who knew the Mongolsmost intimately were suspected of being too close to the Mongols in their per-sonal loyalties to be trusted to give advice in the Japanese interest.


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Perhaps most important of all, there was a fundamental difference of pur-pose between the Japanese and the Mongols. Mongols in Manchukuo as well asin western Inner Mongolia intended religious reform to be part of a broader na-tional awakening that would lead eventually to the establishment of an inde-pendent state for the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, if not a unified Mongolia in-cluding all the regions inhabited by Mongols. The intention of the Japanese,however, was to create a defense zone on the western and northern frontier ofManchukuo and to establish a base for further expansion on the Asian conti-nent. Japan’s religious policy toward Mongols in both Manchukuo and westernInner Mongolia arose out of these expansionist and defensive interests. The dif-ferences were only in time and political frame: since the Mongols in Manchukuowere incorporated into the new state system soon after the founding ofManchukuo in 1932, Japanese influence over them lasted a few years longerthan it did over their compatriots in western Inner Mongolia, where significantJapanese intervention began in the mid 1930s. The state structure of Manchu-kuo, moreover, provided an official framework for the implementation of Japa-nese religious policies there, whereas in western Inner Mongolia the govern-mental form and structure were unstable, dependant on the mood of Japanesepolicy makers toward China.

To summarize: Between 1932 and 1945, Japan sought to recruit MongolianBuddhism as part of its imperial strategy in Northeast Asia. Japan’s main aimswere to win Mongol support in the region by appearing to be a patron of Bud-dhism and to use Buddhism as a vehicle for modernizing Mongol society in thebroader interests of the war effort. In many ways, these two aims were contra-dictory, because patronizing Buddhism implied preserving old practices whilemodernization implied introducing reforms. This contradiction was neverworked out in Japanese policy. More importantly, however, Japanese plans wereconstrained and supported by the aspirations of the Mongols themselves. Asthey struggled to develop policies toward Mongolian Buddhism, the Japaneseauthorities discovered that they had entered a complex world of Mongol poli-tics, in which conservative and progressive groups competed to shape their na-tion’s future. Japan’s reluctance to side with any group meant that its policiesbecame a vehicle for Mongol aspirations rather than for its own. The changesthat Japanese intervention brought about in Mongolian Buddhism were in theend more an outcome of internal Mongolian politics than of Japanese inten-tions.

Japan’s policies sought to encourage a trend toward renewal within Mongo-lian Buddhism itself. The aims of this renewal movement, however, coincidedonly in part with those of the Japanese. Whatever the crisis in Mongol politicsand society, Mongolian Buddhist leaders and lamas exhibited no sense of reli-gious crisis and the doctrinal changes urged by the Japanese had almost no im-pact. Other changes, such as the reduction in the number of lamas, improve-ments in hygiene, the raising of the lamas’ educational level, and efforts topromote use of the Mongolian language (instead of Tibetan) in the lamaist lit-urgy had their own advocates within Mongolian Buddhism and for the mostpart their implementation did not contribute directly to Japanese aims.


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Mongolian students and novices who went to Japan returned home not asagents of the Japanese but with a stronger sense of national pride. Those sent bythe Manchukuo government to Japan, for example, never identified themselvesas Manchukuoans but only as Mongols and they often mingled with their com-patriots from western Inner Mongolia to share their worries and hopes as wellas plans for the future of Mongols. They had found in Japan a different world.Modern institutions of education, medicine, farming, and industry, grandiosetemples, a high level of education, and an intense working tempo — all of theseimpressed them. After the initial fascination subsided, however, they started tocompare the two worlds. They reflected not only on how they might modernizetheir own country but also on what could be accomplished if Mongols united.The Mongol students and novices were presented and socialized in Japan asleaders of the Mongolian future. Thus Japanese reform efforts strengthened,unwittingly, the struggle for national emancipation in Mongolia and to a lesserdegree the religious life of the Mongols. The Mongols who returned from Japanfelt that they were Mongol intellectuals and had the obligation to contribute tothe future of Mongols by using what they had learned in Japan. Many novices,for example, did not go back to their temples but took up other practical profes-sions. They were convinced that in the nation-building process practical profes-sions would be more helpful than praying or chanting in a temple. Returneeswho remained in their religious institutions concentrated on the education ofyoung novices in spiritual as well as political matters, e.g., how one could be auseful monk for the Mongolian future.

The Japanese Army eventually scaled back its support for religion because itfeared that stronger nationalist trends among the Mongols would confront Jap-anese hegemony in the form of a Pan-Mongolian movement, laying the founda-tions of an independent Mongolian state.

Although the experience of Mongolian Buddhism in Manchukuo and in In-ner Mongolia differed in important ways, the reform movement in MongolianBuddhism ended up strengthening broader Mongol political consciousness.The Japanese presence both encouraged the Mongols to debate the future oftheir own society and strengthened the feeling that Mongols should take chargeof their own future. This feeling did not lead to a successful independencemovement after Japan’s defeat, but it did contribute significantly to the Chinesecommunist recognition of Mongol self-confidence and this, in turn, led to thecreation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

NotesI wish to thank Peter Pantzer, Uradyn E. Bulag, Mark Selden, Tom Fenton, and twoanonymous readers for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am in-debted to Robert Cribb for his help at various stages of my writing.1. These descriptive terms — eastern, western, and far western — had no formal

administrative basis; rather they reflect the practical division of the Mongollands at the time and, to a certain extent, the Mongols’ own perceptions of re-gional differences. During the first half of the twentieth century the Japaneseoften used the term Higashi Mðko (Eastern Mongolia) for the part of innerMongolia that was later included in the territory of Manchukuo. The rest of In-


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ner Mongolia they simply referred to as Uchi Mðko (Inner Mongolia) or some-times just Mðko (Mongolia).

2. The forty-nine traditional banners in Inner Mongolia were grouped into sixleagues, each of which was headed by one of the banner princes. The leaguestended to represent regional identity, but for practical administrative affairs thebanners were more important.

3. The idea of affinity came from the proposition that Mongols and Japanese allbelieved in Buddhism, which originated from India; thus they had a commonheritage. Otherwise, there were no particular direct links between Japaneseand Mongolian Buddhism. It is generally known that Mongolian Buddhismcame from India via Tibet and that Japanese Buddhism came via China. Priestsof the Shingon school felt particularly close to Mongolian Buddhism, however,because both belonged to the broad school of esoteric Buddhism. EsotericBuddhism maintains that some of the key elements of Buddhist belief cannotbe taught or revealed at all; they can only be comprehended by those who arespiritually prepared.

4. For the contrasting situation of Theravada Buddhism in mainland SoutheastAsia, see Trevor Ling, Buddhism, Imperialism and War: Burma and Thailandin Modern History (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977).

5. Yu Benyuan, Qing wangchao de zongjiao zhengce (Beijing: Zhongguo ShehuiKexue Chubanshe, 1999). During the so-called Nanjing decade (1927-37), theGuomindang (GMD) built up the highest lama dignitary of Inner Mongolia, theSixth Jangjia Khutuktu, and the Ninth Panchen Lama of Tibet with financialsupport and titles. Jangjia Khutuktu received, for example, the title of Meng qixuanhua shi [Enlightener (or educator) in Mongol banners] in 1932, and thePanchen Lama was given the title of Huguo xuanhua guanghui dashi [Greatteacher and enlightener with great wisdom who protects the country] in 1931.The Jangjia Khutuktu was sent to the Inner Mongolian banners and leaguesseveral times to build support for the Chinese national government. In 1934the title Huguo dashi [Great teacher who protects the country] was bestowedon him as it had earlier been bestowed on the Panchen Lama. Delege, NeiMenggu lamajiao shi [History of Lamaism in Inner Mongolia] (Hohhot: NeiMenggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 193-98.

6. See fuller discussion of this text in Delege, Nei Menggu lamajiao shi, 203.7. Ibid.8. Manjusri, one of the most important bodhisattvas of Mahayana Buddhism, is

especially associated with the wisdom of enlightenment. Wutaishan in Shansihas been a Buddhist pilgrimage center from the fourth century and the focusfor the Manjusri cult in China. It is a holy mountain for Tibetans and Mongols.Tibetan and Mongolian monks practiced Buddhism there and it has been a des-tination for pilgrims since the Yuan times. See David M. Farquhar, “Emperor asBodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch’ing Empire,” Harvard Journal of Asi-atic Studies 38, no 1 (1978): 5-34. Wutaishan remains one of the most impor-tant pilgrimage sites for Mongols. Even today, Mongols from rural areas inInner Mongolia consider it an honor to visit Wutaishan and, after death, to haveone’s ashes buried there.

9. Dawaosur, “We de jingli jianwen”[My experiences], in Neimenggu wenshiziliao 31 [Historical documentaries of Inner Mongolia], ed. Wenshi ziliao yan-jiu weiwuan hui (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1988), 143-44.Farquhar reports that from the fourteenth century Mongols attributed bodhi-sattva status to their secular rulers. Before the seventeenth century, however,the only rulers given this status were long-deceased dynastic founders and afew others known for their great accomplishments in the spreading of the Law.Identifying living emperors as bodhisattvas began only during the Qing Dy-


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nasty, when the fifth Dalai Lama sent a letter to Emperor Taizong in 1640 ad-dressed to the “Great Manjusri-Emperor.” The Manchu rulers were, after thattime, all regarded by the lamas as reincarnations of the same Manjusri. By hon-oring the Manchu emperors as reincarnations of Manjusri, the fifth Dalai Lamasaw the possibility of spreading Tibetan Buddhism not only in Mongolia butalso in China. For the Manchu emperors this recognition was also a useful tool,although according to Farquhar they “never formally referred to it [Manjusri]”when they sought to influence the Mongolian princes to submit to Manchu im-perial authority and to make their military forces available to the Manchus.Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva,” 12-19, 33.

10. In promoting the idea that Japan and Mongolia shared a common Buddhistheritage, the Japanese authorities initially did not go so far as to encourage Jap-anese Buddhists to work in Mongolia. Although several Japanese sects were ac-tive in the Mongol lands, they generally worked without official support and insome cases faced official obstruction. Nonetheless, it suited the authorities toappeal to a general shared religious heritage.

11. See, for example, Robert James Miller, Monasteries and Culture Change inInner Mongolia (Asiatische Forschungen 2) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1959),87-118.

12. The Mongol population of the Xing’an provinces in 1934 was 484,658, ofwhom 20,705 were registered as monks. In Northern Xing’an, with a Mongolpopulation of 24,950, there were 3,297 monks. The Xing’an Office was also re-sponsible for administering some 444,876 Mongols in parts of Manzhouguooutside the Xing’an provinces. See Mðseibu chðsaka, Ramabyð oyobi Rama sþ(Shinking: Mðseibu chðsaka, 1936).

13. Ðbör Mongol-yin dangsa ebhemel [Documents of Inner Mongolia Archive],file no. 02-1, entry: “Mðkyð kensetsu no konpon hðshin ni kansuru yiken sho”[Suggestions concerning principles for the development of Mðkyð].

14. The precise number of monks expelled from the monasteries is unknown.15. Ðbör Mongol-yin dangsa ebhemel, file no. 02-1, entury Silinghool kðsho, “Ja-

sag kaigi kettei jikð” [Decisions made at the Banner Conference] (1942).16. Ibid.17. Japanese priests, especially from Shinshþ, were also active in spreading mod-

ern medicine in Mongolia. They went from temple to temple extolling the ben-efits of modern medicine, providing pills, and giving treatment to people whowere willing to accept it. See, for example, Shinshþ [Newsletter of the Shinsect], October 1937, 17.

18. Fujimoto Ryðtai, Jðdo-shþ dainenpyð [A chronological record of the Jðdoschool] (Tokyo: Daitð shuppansha, 1941), 204.

19. For example, according to statistics taken in 1940, there were 440 lamas alto-gether in Gegen monastery, one of the biggest monasteries in eastern InnerMongolia. Ninety-five of these lamas excelled in the Tibetan language, whileonly 4 excelled in Mongolian; 296 monks had an adequate knowledge in read-ing Tibetan texts, while only 16 were adequate in reading Mongolian texts; 49lamas could not recite Tibetan texts, while 420 were unable to read Mongoliantexts. Xike qianqi gongshu neiwu ke, 1940, cited from Nei Menggu jiaoyushizhi ziliao 2 (Hohhot: Nei Menggu daxue, 1995), 523. Most monks, ofcourse, could speak Mongolian, but many had not learned to read or write thelanguage.

20. In Japan itself, the government had been suspicious of Buddhism since Meijitimes, when the religion lost its special official status.

21. Hashimoto Kðhð, Mongoru fuyu no tabi [A winter Journey to Mongolia] (To-kyo: Nonburu sha,1999), 59.


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22. Nakano Kyotoku, Tennðsei kokka to shokuminchi dendð [Tenð-system stateand missions in the colonies] (Tokyo: Nichiren shuppan, 1993).

23. Chþgai nippð (Kyoto), 23 January 1941.24. I have been able to identify 156 of them (see Li Narangoa, Japanische Religions-

politik in der Mongolei 1932-1945: Reformbestrebungen und Dialog zwischenjapanischem und mongolischem Buddhismus (Studies in Oriental Religions,43) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 246-53.

25. Jðdo shþhð [Newsletter of Jðdo sect], no. 2417 (30 August 1939): 6.26. Kogi Shingon-shþ shþmujo, Kða mikkyð gakuin ichiran hyð [Survey of the

Kða esoteric academy] (Kðyasan: Kogi Shingon-shþ shþmujo, 1939), 12-15.27. Tendai shþhð [Newsletter of Tendai sect], December 1943, 4.28. Shþhð [Religious newsletter], November 1941, 40.29. Shingon shþhð [Newsletter of the Shingon sect], April 1944: 5-8.30. Shþhð, June 1939, 28.31. Delege, Nei Menggu lamajiao shi, 204-5.32. Fujimoto Ryðtai, Jðdo-shþ dainenpyð [A chronological record of the Jðdo

school] (Tokyo: Daitð shuppansha, 1941), 16.33. Ibid., 204.34. Namuhaijabu, “Wei-Man chengli de lama zongtuan” [Lama union established un-

der the False-Manzhouguo], Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao 34 [Cultural and Histori-cal Documents of Inner Mongolia] (Hohhot: Nei Menggu daxue, 1989), 137.

35. Bðeichð Senshi Shiryð Shitsu (BSS) [The archives of the Japanese DefenceAgency] (Tokyo), file no. Jþyð Kokusaku Bunsho 407: Katakura Shiryð 68.

36. Ibid., entury Kantðgun Sanbðbu 35-5 (25 July 1935), 38.37. Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince, 296-97; Sechin Jagchid, Wo suo zhidao de De

Wang he dangshi de Nei Menggu [Prince De and Inner Mongolia in my mem-ory], 2 (Tokyo: Tðkyð gaikokugo daigaku Ajia-Afurika gengo bunka kenkyþjo,1993), 95-111.

38. Hashimoto, Mongoru fuyu no tabi, 37, 52.39. The Zenrin Kyðkai (Good Neighbor Association), founded in 1933 in Tokyo as

the Japanese-Mongolian Association, was chosen by the Kwantung Army to im-plement its cultural policies, including in religious matters. However, the asso-ciation was involved with religious policy only indirectly. The Tokumukikanand the Japanese Buddhist schools were the main promoters of religious pol-icy. The association established schools and introduced knowledge of modernhygiene and medicine. It also conducted extensive research on Mongolia. SeeZenrinkai, ed., Zenrin kyðkaishi [A History of the Good-Neighbourhood-Asso-ciation] (Tokyo: Zenrinkai, 1981).

40. The Mongolian Allied Leagues Autonomous Government is known as Meng-jiang in Chinese, Mðkyð in Japanese, and Mongol Chighulgaad-yi qolbunjasaqu jasag-un ordon in Mongol. Sechin Jagchid, Wo suo zhidao de De Wanghe dangshi de Nei Menggu [Prince De and Inner Mongolia in my memory], vol.1 (Tokyo: Tðkyð gaikokugo daigaku Ajia-Afurika gengo bunka kenkyþjo, 1985).

41. Bðeichð Senshi Shiryð Shitsu, file no. Jþyð Kokusaku Bunsho 407: KatakuraShiryð 68, entury Kantðgun Sanbðbu, 9-15-6 (January 1936), 40,46.

42. In 1939 this government was united with the two Chinese regimes of southernChahar (Chanan) and Northern Shanxi (Jinbei), both created by the JapaneseKwantung Army in 1937, and established the Mongolia Allied AutonomousGovernment. Its name was changed to Mongolian Autonomous State in 1941(see Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince).

43. Paul Hyer and Sechin Jagchid, A Mongolian Living Buddha: Biography of theKanjurwa Khutukhtu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983),173-76.


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44. Ibid., 152.45. Ibid., 154.46. Ibid., 180.47. Hashimoto, Mongoru fuyu no tabi, 72, 172.48. Gaimusho gaikð shiryðkan (GGSK) [Documents from the archive of the Japa-

nese Foreign Office], file no. I 2.1.0.2: Kakkoku ni okeru shþkyð oyobi fukyðkankei zakken, no. 3 (Tokyo).

49. Ibid., vol. 3, entry Satð, Hailar, July 1940, 32-35.50. As a result, in 1915 the governor general released an order that much more

strictly and precisely prescribed how the religious institutions should conducttheir mission. A number of Buddhist journals publishing on Korean Buddhisttradition and culture were forced to close. After 1937, the reciting of Buddhisttexts in Korean was restricted and the texts had to be recited in Japanese (seeNakano, Tennðsei kokka, 191-213). In Korea the Japanese Buddhist Missionstarted much earlier than in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, just after theKanwado incident in 1876 (Kojima Masaru and Kiba Akeshi, Ajia no kaikyð tokyðiku [Mission in Asia and education] (Kyoto: Hðzðkan, 1992), 34.

51. On Buddhism in Taiwan under the Japanese occupation, see Charles BrewerJones, Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion and the State, 1660-1990 (Honolulu:University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 33-94.

52. Bunka jihð (Kyoto), 13 April 1940.53. Domuchokudonropu, Tokuð jiden [A biography of Prince De], Mori Hisao,

trans. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), 23-25.54. Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince, 272.

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Japanese imperialism and Mongolian Buddhism, 1932-1945

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