Items-in-USA - Nixon, Richard M. - United Nations Archives

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Items-in-USA - Nixon, Richard M.

Date Created 08/11 /1968

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0882-0004: Correspondence Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: with Heads of State,Governments, Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit

Confidential

8 November 1968

To: The Secretary-General

From: L.N. KutakovUnder-Secretary-General, PSCA

I send you, herewith, a short note on

President-Elect Nixon's attitude toward theUnited Nations. As you can see, this Note isvery tentative for obvious reasons.

As soon as the Nixon's administration viewstoward the U.N. become clearer and whendecisions on the formation of his Cabinet aretaken in December, we will then prepare anadditional paper.

Confidential

PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON'S ATTITUDE TOWARD

THE UNITED NATIONS

Any attempt to assess the probable attitude towards the United

Nations of the new American Administration to be headed by Richard M.

Nixon, and particularly of Mr. Nixon himself, must of necessity be

highly speculative since, in marked contrast to his main opponent,

the new President-elect has in his public utterances both during the

campaign and in the period preceding his nomination had very little

to say about the United Nations. Similarly, the Republican Party

platform adopted in Miami, on which Mr. Nixon of course ran, makes

only two passing references to the United Nations, in contrast to

the platform of the Democratic Party, which devoted an entire section

to it.

It is in fact this failure to make any but the briefest and

most perfunctory references to the United Nations which is probably

the most significant indication of the basic mood of Mr. Nixon, and

of the dominant wiqg of the Republican Party, with regard to the

United Nations. By temperament and conviction, the leaders of the

new Administration seem inclined to turn away from the United

Nations not only in its aspect as an expression of transnational

idealism but as a practical instrument of American policy.

The extent to which this underlying mood will be modified by

the choices Mr. Nixon must make with regard to the men who will be

his chief policy advisers remains to be seen. In any event, however,

it seems clear that the extent to which this temperamental indifference

to the United Nations can be translated into practice will be sharply

-2-

limited "by the realities of the political situation, "both at home

and abroad, -which the new Administration will have to confront.

The narrowness of the margin "by which Mr. Nixon won the presidency,

the continuing control of both houses of Congress by the Democratic

party, and the obvious and recognized need for a policy of concilia-

tion aimed at restoring some measure of internal tranquillity would

all seem to preclude any sharp break with America's traditional

policy of active participation in and verbal support of the United

Nations.

Beyond this rough circumscription of the main factors determin-

ing and limiting the new Administration's probable attitude toward

the United Nations, it seems possible, on the basis of the public

statements available, to hazard only a few conjectures regarding

details. Of the references to the United Nations made in the

Republican party platform, the first occurs in connexion with the

question of the recognition of China ("Under existing conditions, we

cannot favor recognition of Communist China or its admission to

the United Nations"), while the second is a pledge to "seek an end

to the arms race through international agreement and the stationing

of peacekeeping forces of the United Nations in areas of severe

tention". These statements would seem to foreshadow the continuation,

more or less unchanged, of America's present position on peacekeeping

in the United Nations, and the hardening, if anything, of its

present position on the representation of China.

An indication of Mr. Nixon's personal point of view, on

Asian affairs at least, can also be gleaned from an article entitled

"Asia After Viet-Nam" published under his name in the issue of

Foreign Affairs for October 1967. The main theme of the article is

-3-

that the United States should "now assign to the strengthening of

non-communist Asia a priority comparable to that which we gave to

the strengthening of Western Europe after World War II," and that

an effort should be made to transform the4\sian and Pacific Council

•whose members include the Republic of Korea and the Republic of

China, into "an alliance actively dedicated to concerting whatever

efforts might be necessary to maintain the security of the region,"

i.e., "a military grouping designed to forestall the Chinese threat.1

The implications of this proposal for America's position with

regard to both the question of Chinese representation and the

Korean question are obvious.

Finally, the clearest public indication so far available of

Mr. Nixon's personal point of view regarding the general role skid

usefulness of the United Nations has come in the reply he has

given on various occasions, including television appearances, to

questions concerning the United Nations. The gist of this reply

has been that, while he regards the United Nations as a useful

instrument for the settlement of conflicts between minor Powers,

disputes involving great Powers, and particularly the Superpowers,

must be handled by direct negotiation.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

RICHARD M. NIXON

WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 2, 1968

Mr, 0, Thant3600 Palisades AveKiverdale, New York 10471

Dear Mr- Thant:

As you may know, I have pledged to bring into thisAdministration men and women who by their qualities ofyouthfulness, judgment, intelligence and creativity,can make significant contributions to our country. Iseek the best minds in America to meet the challengesof this rapidly changing world. To find them, I ask foryour active participation and assistance.

You, as a leader, are in a position to know andrecommend exceptional individuals. The persons you se-lect should complete the enclosed form and return it toyou. I ask that you then attach your comments. My staffwill carefully review all recommendations for inclusionin our reservoir of talent from which appointments willbe made*

I will appreciate greatly, Mr. Thant, your takingtime from your busy schedule to participate in thisall-important program.

Sincerely,

lichard M, Nixoa

RMN/jwwEnclosures

CONFIDENTIAL RESUME' FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

BUSINESS ADDRESS (Street, City, State and zip code)

HOME ADDRESS (Street, City, State and zip code)

AGE BIRTH DATE BIRTH PLACE

HEALTH MARITAL STATUS

SEX

WIFE

CH

ILD

RE

NF

AT

HE

RE

DU

CA

TIO

N

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. HEIGHT

MAIDEN NAME BIRTH DATE

BUSINESS PHONE

HOME PHONE

CITIZENSHIP

MARRIAGES (Number)

WEIGHT

BIRTH PLACE

NAME AGE NAME

NAME

ADDRESS

MO

TH

ER

AGE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

S N A P S H O T

(Not required, butcan be attachedhere if you desire)

NAME AGE

MAIDEN NAME

ADDRESS

NAME DATES

ELEMENTARY

HIGH SCHOOL

ANDGRADUATE

LANGUAGE COMPETENCE

COLLEGE MAJOR COLLEGE MINOR

HONORS. SCHOLARSHIPS. FELLOWSHIPS. AWARDS, SPECIAL RECOGNITION

LOCATION DEGREES

-

FIELDS OF GRADUATE STUDY

CAREER HISTORY (Please account for all time since High School; Include beginning and ending salaries for each position, indicating basicresponsibility and immediate supervisor)

MILITARY RECORD

Use extra sheets as necessary

LIST THREE PERSONS WHOM YOU BELIEVE WOULD RECOMMEND YOU FOR FEDERAL OFFICE

NAME

POSITION

COMPANY

ADDRESS(Street,City, State,•and zipcode)

PHONE

RELATIONTO YOU

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS A CIVILIAN? | | YES j | NO

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF A FELONY OR SERIOUS MISDEMEANOR?(Explain fully, if Yes. Omit traffic violations.)

DO YOU HAVE ANY RESERVATION ABOUT MAKING A FULL DISCLOSURE OF YOUR FINANCIAL AFFAIRS IN CASE OF APPOINTMENT? | | YES | p

SPECIFIC POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND/OR OFFICES HELD AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

HAVE YOU EVER OBTAINED A FEDERAL SECURITY CLEARANCE? YES DIF SO, WHAT

HOBBIES, SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AND AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

STATE YOUR PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIPS AND POSITIONS HELD IN PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC. BUSINESS, OR CULTURAL SOCIETIES AND CONFERENCES

LIST PUBLICATIONS YOU HAVE AUTHORED

LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN CLUBS AND OTHER SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT POSITIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT YOU BELIEVE YOURSELF-TO BE BEST SUITED FOR

STATE BRIEFLY ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS YOU HAVE FOR EACH SUCH POSITION

PLEASE STATE IN A BRIEF PARAGRAPH WHAT YOU CONSIDER TO BE YOUR MOST OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT

FOREIGN TRAVEL (Do not include residence abroad)

A R E A

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

EUROPE

ORIENT

AFRICA

TIME SPENT A R E A

MIDDLE EAST

FAR EAST

RUSSIA

CHINA

AGGREGATE TIME SPENT (All trips)

TIME SPENT

R E S I D E N C E ABROAD (Area, time spent and purpose, i.e. business, military service, government service, other)

SIGNATURE DATE

1 1 - 2 9 - 6 8(Use extra sheets as necessary

JRB/brcc. Dr. Bunche

Mr. HarasimhanMr. Lemieux

30 July 1969

Dear Kr. President*I em noat grateful to you for your letter of 22 July 1969

and for sharing with 00 your personal concern regarding the plightof the civilian victims of the civil war in Higeria.

On this saste natter X have had exchanges of ecBcwnicationsKith the Governments of Canada, the Ketherlands and Sew Zealand, andwith Hie Holiness Pope Paul VI. I have also written to BrapsrorHalle Selassie, and several other governments have conveyed to B»their preoccupation about the suspension of the mercy flightsconducted under the auspices of the International Committee ofthe Bed Cross, As you are no doubt assure, the United Rations hascontributed substantially to this humanitarian effort. Accordingto an estimate of a high official of the ICRC, UlJICEF's share aloneamounted to about forty per cent of tho total aid distributed in -'.'196d by the ICRC, In addition, the World Food Program* has cadejavailable important supplies*

In view of the fact that it has not yet been possible torenew the flow of aid and that there is a growing danger of all thevaluable past efforts to stem the tide of starvation, disease anddeath being wiped out, I have decided to issue a statement todayappealing to both sides in the civil war to grant the necessaryfacilities for the resuoptioa of the flow of aid. An advance copyhas been cade available for your inforaatioa through the United State*Mission to the United Rations.

The HonourableBichard H. HixonPresident of the OniUd State*of America

The White House

• 2-

X ««leon»» Kr« President, the opportunity of exchangingvieva with you on thi* natter a* well a* on wiy othor questionof mutual concern to your Govamawnt and the United Natioo0.

Sincerely,

If Thant

t <r ~ .v<, JEB/brec» Dr. Bunclie

; >: . , MP« HarasiinhanMr» LemieiHC

. 30

£«p ôur Isfctsr of 22sa@ ysas* j^srsssal «soae©s^ tfasfe of tfee «1»13L âr is MgeKfes*

I feaf© feM ejffi&sngss of eesrasaieatdmsscitli tb© 8©¥^n3si ^s of Cassia^ ttes Sdjlierlaads ^sii gm?

His Eo3Jis@ss F«pa P&ul fl.« I haTe aleo wittiss tog6V< iS!ie3its hsv® to sse

tSx«a saaisp isia^ of the m&g&Tf flightsh® Istsniatloml €as®dttee of

the £^ Cross, ,4s yaw &r€ so dcssfet seiajpa, the feitssd i tissus- be,®eost2lbui«4 a^JtaatMO^ fe> t-Ms hmsealtas'lSK effort, Aceordisgto ^s sstiss.t® of .a Mgfe offioial of the ICHC9 UHGEF'si

to abo>a% f &3?iy per c«at of tho total addth@ ICSKJ. Bi ^diilona %h@ Iterid Food

lu view ©f tfee fact that it Issg sot yefc ^©ss po^^fel^ tothe fLer^ of sM sad tfast tkss« is a gyaffiuiag of all t

gt efforts' to s&@a the tM® ofb^Lng' wiped' otits I haw decided to issn© a

to feotla siêfe iai fefe© ei1?!! lax* to gyaat tfe<afacilities for the 3peiase|*lcas of tlie Hew of @id. to

eade avaiMbl^ for ^lour issf Gma,ti<m through thsto the

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fehe ©pposHtelii' ©f

with jois m tM&»^t^r 'as ««3!"&s es sa^r sfehssata «tt^ Gefrsisaffint asid tls® United l

4 October 196?

Dear Hr. President,

It was gratifying to receive your letter of 22 September,

presented to m« by Kr. Joseph BI&tchfordt and to read of youroonaaitjsent to th« concept of international voluntary service.

I am particularly pleased that th« United States Govenaaent

welcomes the etudy of an International Volunteer Corpe now

b«in£ undertaken by th» United Kations, ftnd 1 vlsh to assure

you that, in preparing our report to tho Econcasic and Social

Council, we shall keep in Ediul the e perieneo of tha United

States Peace Corps.

.. Kay I thank you a,s&in» *<?• f resident , for the reiteration

of your full co-o ttrittian, and express th« hope that th«proposals evolved will eocjsond themselves to your favourabla

cooeidierfttion.

Tour* aincoaroly,

U Thant

His KxcellcncyKr. Richard h. KixoaPresident of tha United states ofTh,e VMt« House

D.C,

cctt Ambassador Olds (U.S. MissionMr. de SeynesMr. KarasimhanMr. Lemieux ,/

* i

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• ^ • ^ CCe Anbassador Olds (U.S. MissioJtb® Usaitea §ta%«^ of Ass^rie®

* *

THE WHITE HOUSE ""' _

WASHINGTON *~ ' ^

September 22, 1969

Dear Mr. Secretary General: ff/

Thank you for meeting with our Peace Corps representatives <-"'v'?

who are serving abroad. Your deep commitment to worldpeace and to economic, social and human development is anexample to these fine Americans, and to the thousands ofVolunteers they represent.

I am sure you will find that they share many of your goals,especially your thought that we must "channel the idealismof our young people" into an international effort againstinjustice and poverty.

As we approach the United Nations1 second developmentdecade, I find appropriate and encouraging the internationalinterest in volunteer service which is reflected in the recentsignificant resolutions of the General Assembly and theEconomic and Social Council. I am deeply pleased that theUnited Nations is now studying the possibilities of an Inter-national Volunteer Corps, for if Volunteers of the worldcan work together, the vision of development will becomeless distant and the promise of peace will move closer toreality.

In keeping with this Administration's dedication to inter-national cooperation and development, the Peace Corps,under the direction of Mr. Joseph Blatchford, is under-taking a number of new initiatives, including a commitmentto the concept of international voluntary service. Guidingits new directions is a conviction that the developingcountries themselves must take part in their own humandevelopment through the formation of their own volunteerorganizations. To help achieve these goals, the PeaceCorps will seek to send abroad more technically skilledVolunteers, along with the traditional generalists; it willpersist in efforfes to develop the concept of exchange volun-teer programs and will look to host country leadership inthe development of Peace Corps activities.

The vast number of people of all ages who wish to offertheir goodwill, skills and idealism as Volunteers must begiven the chance to do so, and the participation of the UnitedNations toward this goal merits the highest commendation.I wish you success and assure our full cooperation in thismost important effort.

Sincerely,

His Excellency U ThantSecretary General of the

United NationsUnited Nations, New York 10017

w

: ^

CVN/CC

cc: Permanent RepresentsMr. MarasimhanMr. Lemieux •

IX October 1969

Dear Mr. President, . ;

I was very happy to receive your letter of6 October. It was indeed thoughtful of you to write.I know I am speaking, not only for oyself, but forall the Member States as well as members of theSecretariat when I say that we highly valued yourkind gesture in visiting the "United nations andaddressing the General Assembly* W« all hope thatyou will come again soon.

With beat wishes wunwhile,

Yours sincerely*

The Honourable Richard M. KixonPresident of the Doited State* of Aoeric*3fce White Bouse wtfashingtoo* D.C.

cw/cc

cc: Permanent RepresentaMr. KarasimhanMr . Lemieux •

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of yoa tofor

o receive6 Octctosr, It was ixitimI 'loader I ®a sfeaMg®, not oaly £*?#al.1 the ife&ber Sta$^ sus well as E©Hfeer® of the

I ssjf ttet we M^Jlgr vstlwedgesture In visitiag tte UMt«d SJations and

addressing the Seaeral Asisetablir. We all tope that

V/ith test istishes

Yours sineersly*

fke Siciiaa?d. M.of t&e;i3B&t&d' States of:

on,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1969

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

The opportunity to meet with you and so manyother distinguished diplomats on the occasionof my recent brief stay in New York was anespecially welcome one. I was delighted tosee you again and grateful for the privilegeof addressing the General Assembly and I wantyou to know how much I appreciate yourthoughtfulness in giving me the unusuallyhandsome album of United Nations stamps.They will always remind me of this interestingand very rewarding visit to United NationsHeadquarters.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary General

of the United NationsNew York, New York 10017

CVN/nt

SB February 1970

Dear Mr. President,

X actenowlftdge with much appreciation your kindletter of IB February with which you sent n» th«text of your message to the Congress cm th* subjectof United States fordga policy* X bav* wad itwltfc tb» greatest interest.

With vuttMt pagnmul regards,

Yoora sincerely*

U Tbant

The Sonourable Hichard K.President of the Uoit«d Statesof America

!Chfc White HouadWashington, D.C* :

co * Mr* NaraeimhanMr. Lemieux _/

THE REPRESENTATIVEOF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICATO THE

UNITED NATIONS

April 24, 1970

Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit the following messagefrom the President of the United States:

"Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

"On behalf of the people of the UnitedStates, I wish to thank you for your kindmessage concerning the Apollo XIII mission.While we are naturally disappointed that theprincipal objectives of the flight were notachieved, it has long been recognized thatthe complexities of such an endeavor make itnecessary to be prepared for the possibilityof such difficulties.

"We are most gratified that the meninvolved in the flight have returned safelyto earth and we look forward to proceedingtoward the completion of the goals of theApollo mission.

"Sincerely,"Richard Nixon"

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highestconsideration.

His ExcellencyU Thant,

Secretary-Generalof the United Nations.

UN-355V675

THE REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE


UNITED NATIONS

April 24, 1970

Excellency:



"On behalf of the people of the UnitedStates, I wish to thank you for your kindmessage concerning the Apollo XIII mission.While we are naturally disappointed that theprincipal objectives of the flight were notachieved, it has long been recognized thatthe complexities of such an endeavor make itnecessary to be prepared for the possibilityof such difficulties.

"We are most gratified that the meninvolved in the flight have returned safelyto earth and we look forward to proceedingtoward the completion of the goals of theApollo mission.





UN-355V675

PAMROniA IN PFR<iPFPTI\/F\jMnuwB Qvs&sirl is* r t.11Or i-O 11VC,

VIEINAMIZAT10N ASSURED

An Interim Report

By

Richard Nixon

President of the United States

June 3,1970

CAMBODIA IN PERSPECTIVE

One month ago, I announced a decision orderingAmerican participation with South Vietnamese forces ina series of operations against Communist-occupied areasin Cambodia which have been used for 5 years as basesfor attacks on our forces in Vietnam.

This past weekend, in the western White House inCalifornia, I met with Secretary Laird, General Abramsand other senior advisors to receive a firsthand report onthe results of this operation.

Based on General Abrams' report, I can now state thatthis has been the most successful operation of this longand difficult war.

Before going into the details which form the basis forthis conclusion, I believe it would be helpful to reviewbriefly why I considered it necessary to make this deci-sion, what our objectives were; and the prospects forachieving those objectives.

On April 20, I announced the withdrawal of an addi-tional 150,000 American troops from Vietnam within ayear—which will bring the total number withdrawn, sinceI have taken office, to 260,000 men. I also reaffirmed ourproposals for a negotiated peace. At the time of this an-nouncement I warned that if the enemy tried to take ad-vantage of our withdrawal program by increased attacksin Cambodia, Laos, or South Vietnam in a way that en-dangered the lives of our remaining men in Vietnam I

would, in my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of ourArmed Forces, take strong action to deal with that threat.

Between April 20 and April 30, Communist forceslaunched a series of attacks against a number of key citiesin neutral Cambodia. Their objective was unmistakable—to link together bases they.,had maintained in neutralCambodia for 5 years in flagrant violation of Cambodianneutrality. The entire six-hundred-mile Cambodian-SouthVietnam border would then have become one continuoushostile territory from which to launch assaults uponAmerican and allied forces.

This posed an unacceptable threat to our remainingforces in South Vietnam. It would have meant higher cas-ualties. It would have jeopardized our program for troopwithdrawals. It would have meant a longer war. And—carried out in the face of an explicit warning from thisGovernment—failure to deal with this enemy actionwould have eroded the credibility of the United Statesbefore the entire world.

After intensive consultations with my top advisors, Idirected that American troops join the South Vietnamesein. destroying these major enemy bases along the Cam-

-bodian frontier. I said then: "Our purpose is not to occupythe areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanc-tuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, wewill withdraw." That pledge is being kept. I said further:"We take this action not for the purpose of expanding thewar into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the warin Vietnam." That purpose is being advanced.

As of today I can report that all our major military ob-jectives have been achieved. 43,000 South Vietnamesetook part in these operations, along with 31,000 Ameri-can troops. Our combined forces have moved with greaterspeed and success than we had planned; we have cap-tured and destroyed far more in war material than we

anticipated; and f-been far lower than

In the month ofa total amount of <and food nearly eqnam all last year.

Here is some filcaptured.

First, the ammuiWe have captui

ammunition—equzmonths.

Here also you wand machine gun:against American t

This reality was Iago. I was talking vson died in Vietnanhad we moved earlitured the enemy w

Now, you will silaunchers and recccamps and Vietnanof these, along wit!the enemy shot inway into South Vieand allied troops, Iincreased.

We have also c;of rice—some ofenough rice to feeiVietnam for over 'i.enemy troops now,

With the rainy ,«enemy months to

-Chief of ouri that threat,jnist forcesof key citieslistakable—d in neutral: Cambodianodian-Southj continuoussaults upon

ir remainingt higher cas-am for troopwar. And—ig from thislemy actionnited States

D advisors, IVietnamese

ng the Cam-lot to occupyf these sanc-estroyed, wesaid further:<pandingtheding the warJ.• military ob-Vietnamese

.,000 Ameri-with greater/e have cap-rial than we

anticipated; and American and allied casualties havebeen far lower than we expected.

In the month of May, in Cambodia alone, we captureda total amount of enemy arms, equipment, ammunitionand food nearly equal to what we captured in all of Viet-nam all last year.

Here is some film of the war material that has beencaptured.

First, the ammunition.We have captured more than 10 million rounds of

ammunition—equal to the enemy's expenditures for 9months.

Here also you will see a few of the over 15,000 riflesand machine guns captured. They will never be usedagainst American boys in Vietnam.

This reality was brought home directly to me a few daysago. I was talking with a union leader from New York. Hisson died in Vietnam this past February. He told me that—had we moved earlier into Cambodia—we might have cap-tured the enemy weapon that eventually killed his son.

Now, you will see some of the heavy mortars, rocketlaunchers and recoilless rifles that have shelled U.S. basecamps and Vietnamese towns. We have seized over 2,000of these, along with 90,000 rounds of ammunition—whatthe enemy shot in a year. Had this war material made itsway into South Vietnam and been used against Americanand allied troops, U.S. casualties would have been vastlyincreased.

We have also captured more than 11 million poundsof rice—some of it is shown here—this is more thanenough rice to feed all the enemy's combat battalions inVietnam for over 3 months. This rice will not be feedingenemy troops now, however—but rather war refugees.

With the rainy season now beginning, it will take theenemy months to rebuild his shattered installations and

to replace the equipment we have captured or destroyed.The success of these operations to date has guaran-

teed that the June 30 deadline I set for withdrawal of allAmerican troops from Cambodia will be met. GeneraJAbrams advises me that 17,000 of the 31,000 Americantroops who entered Cambodia have already returned toVietnam. The remainder will return by the end of themonth. This includes all American air support, logistics,and military advisory personnel.

The only remaining American activity in Cambodia afterJuly 1 will be air missions to interdict the movement ofenemy troops and material where I find this is necessaryto protect the lives and security of our forces in SouthVietnam.

Our discussions with the South Vietnamese Govern-ment indicate that their primary objective remains the se-curity of South Vietnam, and their activity in Cambodiain the future—after their withdrawal from the sanctu-aries—will be determined by the actions of the enemy.

When this operation was announced, critics chargedthat it would increase American casualties, widen thewar, lengthen our involvement, postpone troop withdraw-als. But the operation was taken for precisely the oppo-site reasons—and it has had precisely the opposite effect.

Let us examine the long-range impact of this operation.First, we have eliminated an immediate danger to the

security of the remaining Americans in Vietnam, therebyreducing future casualties. Seizing those weapons andammunition will save American lives. Because of this op-eration, American soldiers who might not otherwise beever coming home—will be coming home.

Second, we have won precious time for the SouthVietnamese to train and prepare themselves to carry theburden of their national defense so that our Americanforces can be withdrawn. ;

captured or destroyed,is to date has guaran-et for withdrawal of allwill be met. General

f the 31,000 Americanve already returned tojrn by the end of thei air support, logistics,

tivity in Cambodia afterrdict the movement ofI find this is necessaryof our forces in South

th Vietnamese Govern-bjective remains the se-iir activity in Cambodia•awal from the sanctu-j actions of the enemy.)unced, critics chargedi casualties, widen the>stpone troop withdraw-for precisely the oppo-

isely the opposite effect,mpact of this operation,nmediate danger to theans in Vietnam, therebying those weapons andves. Because of this op-might not otherwise beng home.>us time for the Souththemselves to carry the3 so that our American

From General Abrams' reports and from our advisorsin the field, one of the most dramatic and heartening de-velopments of the operation has been the splendid per-formance of the South Vietnamese Army in the field. Sixtypercent of all the troops involved in the Cambodian op-erations were South Vietnamese. The effectiveness, theskill and the valor with which they fought far exceededexpectations. Confidence and morale in ARVN has beengreatly bolstered. This operation has clearly demon-strated that our Vietnamization program is succeeding.

Third, we have insured the continuance and successof our withdrawal program. On April 20, I announced anadditional 150,000 American troops would be homewithin a year. As a result of the success of the Cambodianoperations Secretary Laird has resumed the withdrawalof American troops from Vietnam. Fifty thousand of the150,000 I announced on April 20 will now be out byOctober 15.

As long as the war goes on, we can expect setbacks andreversals. But, following the success of this effort, we cansay with confidence that we will keep our timetable fortroop withdrawals.

Secretary Rogers and I have been particularly encour-aged by the resolve of 11 Asian countries at the DjakartaConference to seek a solution to the problem of Cam-bodia. Cambodia offers an opportunity for the 11 nations,as well as other countries of the area, to cooperate insupporting the Cambodian Government's efforts to main-tain Cambodian neutrality, independence and territorialintegrity. We shall do what we can to make it possible forthese Asian initiatives to succeed.

To the North Vietnamese tonight I say again—the doorto a negotiated peace remains wide open. Every offer wehave made at the conference table, pjuplicly or privately,

1 (—1-1 -•nLrtimiiiLlii

I herewith reaffirm. We are ready to negotiate, wheneverthey are ready to negotiate.

However, if their answer to our troop withdrawal pro-gram, and to our offer to negotiate, is to increase theirattacks in a way that jeopardizes the safety of our remain-ing forces in Vietnam, I shall, as my action 5 weeks agodemonstrated, take strong and effective measures to dealwith that situation.

When I first announced the decision on Cambodia, itwas subjected to an unprecedented barrage of criticism.I want to express my deep appreciation tonight to the mil-lions of Americans who supported me then and who havesupported me since in our efforts to win a just peace.

But I also understand the deep divisions in this coun-try over the war. I realize many Americans are deeplytroubled. They want peace. They want to bring the boyshome. Let us understand once and for all that no grouphas a monopoly on these concerns. Every American sharesthose desires; I share them.

Our differences are over the best means to achieve ajust peace.

As President, I have a responsibility to listen to thosein this country who disagree with my policies. But I alsohave a solemn obligation to make the hard decisions whichI find are necessary to protect the lives of the 400,000young Americans remaining in Vietnam.

When I spoke to you a month ago, a clear threat wasemerging in Cambodia to the security of our men inVietnam.

If an American President had failed to meet this threatto 400,000 American men in Vietnam, would those na-tions and peoples who rely on America's power and treatycommitments for their security—in Latin America, Eur-ope, the Middle East or other parts of Asia—retain anyconfidence in the United States? That is why I deeply be-

lieve that ato be a lasti

With thhpledge I ma<withdraw fijust as thismade to th<nam and thi

Let us loiIn June

troops. TheI said I woumen. They >50,000 Annhave come

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threat wasDur men in

t this threatd those na-r and treatynerica, Eur--retain anyI deeply be-

lieve that a just peaqe in Vietnam is essential, if there isto be a lasting peace in other parts of the world.

With this announcement tonight, we have kept thepledge I made when I ordered the operation, that we wouldwithdraw from Cambodia on a scheduled timetable—just as this Administration has kept every pledge it hasmade to the American people regarding the war in Viet-nam and the return of American troops.

Let us look at the record.In June of 1969 I pledged a withdrawal of 25,000

troops. They came home. In September of the same year,I said I would bring home an additional 35,000 Americanmen. They came home. In December I said an additional50,000 Americans were coming out of Vietnam. They, too,have come home.

There is one basic commitment yet to be fulfilled. Ihave pledged to end this war. I shall keep that promise.But I am determined to end the war in a way that willpromote peace rather than conflict throughout the world.I am determined to end it in a way that will bring an eraof reconciliation to our people—and not a period offurious recrimination.

In seeking peace, let us remember that at this time onlythis Administration can end this war and bring peace. Wehave a program for peace—and the greater the supportthe Administration receives in its efforts, the greater theopportunity to win that just peace we all desire.

Peace is the goal that unites us. Peace is the goal to-ward which we are working. Peace is the goal this Gov-ernment will pursue until the day that we reach it.

r"

COMPLETE INVENTORY OF CAPTURED OR

DESTROYED EQUIPMENT

as of 4:00 p.m.

June 3, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons 15,251Crew-Served Weapons 2,114Bunkers/Structures Destroyed 8,296

Machine Gun Rounds 3,267,952Rifle Rounds 6,910,972

Total Small Arms Ammunition 10,178,924(Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)

Grenades 34,813Mines :. 3,961Miscellaneous Explosives (Ibs.) 76,600

(Includes 1,000 Satchel Charges)Anti-Aircraft Rounds 132,694Mortar Rounds 48,320Large Rocket Rounds 1,587Smaller Rocket Rounds 26,191Recoilless Rifle Rounds 22,202Rice (Ibs.) 11,080,000

Man Months 243,760Vehicles 359Boats 40Generators 36Radios 186Medical Supplies (Ibs.) 50,800Enemy KIA 9,145POWs (Includes Detainees) 1,916

8



UNITED NATIONS

June 13, 1970


I have the honor to enclose a letter

addressed to you by President Nixon with a

copy of his June 3rd address on Cambodia.

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU Thant,Secretary Generalof the United Nations.

June 1970

Dear Ambassador Tost,

The Secretary-General would very much appreciate it if

.«** you vould convey to President RLxon the enclosed letter to

~ hia from U Thant.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph J. BuncheUnder-Secretary-General

His ExcellencyMr. Charles W. YostAmbassador Ertraordinary and PlenipotentiaryPermanent Representative of the United Statesof America to the United Rations

799 United Nations PlaaaHev York, H.Y. 10017

J-ane 1978

Bear

^he Secretary-General vouldi very mtaft appreciate it if

you wcruld convey to PpesiSeiat Jfixon the enclosed letter to

Mm fepom ¥ Ebaut^

Sincerely yours,

. BuneheIfocter- Secretaxy-Gaaeral

Sis Ilceelleney?r lost

Hepresentative of the United Statesof ^Btierica to the 0nite<i Jfetious

799 Bnfted j^ations Plaza

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2$ Jun*

Pear Mr. President,

Ambassador Yost has been good enough to convey to me your

letter of 8 June enclosing a printed copy of your interim report

on the Cambodia operation. Xt 10 thoughtful of you to do thin

and X am happy to have it,

As you know, X continue to hope and pray for an early

resolution of the total conflict in Xndo-China and therefore

X take particular note that one aspect of it, the expedition

Into Cambodia, i» «oon to be ended*

With varm regards,

Sincerely,

0

The Honorable Richard M, NixonPresident of the Halted States of AmericaThe White BouseWashington, B.C.

23 June 1970

liear %v .

Anbaessdor to$i teas Ibefcn go^ saougk to eonvey to me your

letter of 8 tFune enclosing a printed copy of yoiar interim report

on the Carabo&ta operation. It is thoughtful of you to do this

anft t a® feappy to hav» it.

As you toiow, *$.' continue to hope and pray for an early

reeoltition of the total conflict itt tneUa-Ohiiaa and therefore

I take particular note that one aspect of it, the expedition

Sato:0ambodJs, i& soon to be

Hoiiora'ble Richard M.of ti»*'®aits4 Ststee of



UNITED NATIONS

June 30, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

President Nixon has asked me to for-

ward the enclosed letter to you and I do

so with pleasure.

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary-GeneralUnited Nations

l , VI • '



UNITED NATIONS

June 30, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

President Nixon has asked me to for-

ward the enclosed letter to you and I do

so with pleasure.

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSe eretary-Genera1United Nations

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1970


Ambassador Yost has conveyed to me and tothe Secretary of State your expression ofappreciation for the accession of the UnitedStates to the Convention on the Privileges andImmunities of the United Nations. Let mevoice my personal satisfaction that this itemof unfinished business has at last been takencare of. I hope it foreshadows the continuedexcellent relations between the United Statesand the United Nations in this 25th anniversaryyear.

It also gives me great pleasure that you haveaccepted my invitation to be my honored guestat dinner at the White House on July 1 0 in cele-bration of the Charter anniversary. I look for-ward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary General of the United NationsNew York, New York

July 1970

Dear Mr President,

receipt of your kind letter of 9 Judy, with vhlchyou sent tie the coraplotQ text of your report of JO June in regard tothe Cambodia operation.

While, of course, I bad already read the newspaper reports on the, I appreciate your thouehtfulneso In sealing the authentic

Vith kindest regards,

YQOTB sincerely,

The Honourable Bidhaard M, KlxonPresident of the United Statesof AmericaThe White IlouaoWashington, D.C.

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WASHINGTON

July 9, 1970


The report I gave to the American peopleon June 30 expresses the purposes andaccomplishments of the Cambodia operation,I think you may find the complete text ofthe report interesting and I am enclosinga copy with this note. It comes to youwith my best wishes.

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary General of the

United NationsUnited Nations, New York 10017

RJB/in

22 July 1970

Bear Mr. President,

May X *ay how very such I appreciate your warm letter of 18 July

concerning the visit to the United Nations on 20 July of Dr» Paine

and the Apollo XI astronauts to present the lunar fragment and the

United nations flag which had been taken by them to the moon,

j&obassador• Buffum read your letter to those attending the presentation

ceremony here and it vas heartily applauded.

W« are deeply grateful to you, Mr* President, for tale fine

gesture toward the United Stations*

Vith vannest regards,\ /\ /

Sincerely,

OTbant

The HonorableBichard M. NixonPresident of the United £tatea of AmericaThe White BouseWashington, D.C.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1970


On this first anniversary of man's landing on the moon, Iam particularly pleased to convey my best wishes to youand to your distinguished colleagues of the United NationsOuter Space Committee and the Security Council.

The lunar fragment which Dr. Paine will present to theUnited Nations this afternoon comes from all of the peopleof the United States of America. One year ago todayAstronauts Armstrong and Aldrin collected it on the sur-face of the moon and then, rejoining Astronaut Collins inthe command ship Columbia, returned to earth, bringingwith them the flag of the United Nations which you willfind mounted together with the lunar fragment.

The brave men of Apollo XI, who are with you in New Yorktoday, undertook their voyage in the name of all mankind.At that time, one of the world's great statesmen said: "Letus take inspiration from this moment and go forward togetherin peace here on earth. " Those inspiring words — whichwere your own —have set our task. Let us, then, rededicateourselves to the spirit of Apollo XI; let us as nations go for-ward together toward peace and unity, striving to express indeed the vision which has drawn us together in spirit.

"With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary General of the United NationsNew York, New York 10017

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1971

Dear Secretary General:

Along with this letter, Ambassador Bush, the newPermanent Representative of the United States tothe United Nations, will be presenting his formalcredentials. However, I would like to take thisoccasion to express to you more personally andinformally the special trust and high regard I havefor Ambassador Bush, and to reiterate to you thesupport of the United States Government and peoplefor the United Nations. Whether promoting a justand lasting peace in the Middle East, engaging inpeacekeeping operations in critical areas around theworld, or grappling with the problems of develop-ment, the environment, population and humanrights, there is no substitute for the importantwork being done by the United Nations.

As the nations become ever more interdependentand as common problems increasingly demandcommon solutions, I am certain the United Nationswill be even more important than it is today. Ihave instructed Ambassador Bush to reaffirm ourcommitment to help solve the problems confrontingthe United Nations, and to cooperate fully in effortsdesigned to make it even more effective in carryingout its heavy responsibilities under the Charter.

I will very shortly be sending you under separatecover a copy of my 1971 Message to the Congress

- 2 -

on Foreign Policy, which I delivered yesterday. Iwould be delighted to have your comments on it, andhope that you will feel free to convey them orallythrough Ambassador Bush if that is convenient foryou.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary General of the

United NationsNew York, New York 10017

c c

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1971


On February 25 of this year I sent aspecial message on American foreignpolicy to the Congress of the UnitedStates. Knowing how fully you sharemy interest in building and strength-ening a durable structure of inter-national relations, I am enclosing acopy of this report.

This message reflects my convictionthat an enlightened foreign policyfor the 1970's must look to strongerinternational institutions — and inparticular a more effective UnitedNations — to help nations share theresponsibilities and costs of meetingcommon global needs. A major task isto fashion the practical means thatwill enable the United Nations to movedecisively to keep the peace. Beyondthis, my report stresses this country'sinterest in encouraging internationalcooperation, within the United Nationsframework, to solve the increasingnumber of complex and pressing problemswhich are posed by the world's newtechnology and which are internationalin scope.

I recall with pleasure our meetingslast year in Washington and New York.The opportunity to exchange views withyou was especially welcome, and I wantto take this occasion to express myparticular appreciation for your im-portant role in supporting and facili-tating the talks under the auspices ofAmbassador Jarring for the purpose ofbringing about a just and lasting peacein the Middle East.


Sincerely,

His ExcellencyD ThantSecretary General of the United NationsNew York, New York

s

November 8, 1972

Dear Mr. President,

Although a non-American, let me .joinmillions of your friends and admirers in offer-ing" my sincere congratulations on your historicsuccess in yesterday's elections.. I still retainvery pleasant memories of our first meeting inBurma in 1953 when,' as adviser to the PrimeMinister, I had the privilege of/escorting youto several places on behalf of the Prime Minister.

''• Let me express the hope that the nextfour years will be characterised by peace, justiceand progress not only in this great country, butalso throughout the world.

., With my very best wishes,

• , Respectfully,

. '•/ ' " . ' " • ' . U Thant •UT-tks Former Secretary-General

- . . . . . 'of- theUnited Nations

'The Honorable Richard. M. NixonPresident of the United .States.The. White House ' •. :Washington, D.G.

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17

the

-spirit

NEW YORK TIMES, Saturday, 18 April 1970

or a FeW Minutes, PeoplejForget Their Differences

and Cheer Astronauts^- fsr\By MARTIN, ARNOLD

For a few minutes yesterday,all, over the world, people ofevery color and station, andpolitical belief seemed as onen their joy over the successfulsplashdown of Apollo 13.

In many American communi-ties, church bells pealed thesafe return of the three astro-nauts. Churches and synagoguesoffered prayers of thanksgiving.

Millions watched the splash-down on television here and|abroad, from Japan to Eng-land. The European Broadcast-ing Union said in Geneva that,it might well be the biggesttelevision audience of all time. I

In English pubs there were;cheers and drinks all aroundj

Thousands in Lima, Peru, gotI permission to take early lunch(breaks from their work towatch the final moments of the:itirama. ' ' '*

In "New York• \t & zz

atched Iffis recovery in thePacific on a giant televisionscreen above the old NewHaven, Railroad ticket windowsin the upper level of GrandCentral Terminal,

There were nervous whispersof "They've got this far atleast" and "It's amazing."Three, times there was long,loud clapping—once when thespace capsule, appeared on thescreen high in. the .sky, thenwhen it splashed into the Pacific and again when the astro-nauts limped out.

Along Madison Avenue,lunch-hour strollers peered intothe vast windows bf the Mag-navox showroom, and at theintersection of Vanderbilt Ave-nue and 47th Street a hotdogstand operator, Joe Lombardo,assured one and all -that "it'sall right." Everyone knewwhat he was talking about.

Long strands of multicoloredtickertape and bushels of con-fetti were poured from thewindows of many 'of the city'sskyscrapers.-.

Recess at City HallAt City Hall, a City Council

committee meeting recessed fora minute of silent prayer.

Mayor Lindsay said: "This isa joyful day. Now they aresafely back, and New Yorkersjoin with men everywhere insaying 'Welcome home.'"

At the United^ Nations, theSecretary General, U Thant,sent a message to PresidentNixon that said: ,

. "The entire world is thankful."iand all men will long marvel-.at the .unmatched combination

pf technological skill, courageand indomitable spirit which.alone, could safely bring themback to earth's embrace." '--"

In-the, Vatican,, Pope Paul VIwatched, ,the .splashdown on•television. Then, a- spokesmansaid, "His'Holiness stood upand prayed and thanked >Godfor. tee successful conclusionof Jffte,venture."

Minister.

pressed; "great^relief,":":and inEngland 'John Cardinal Heenan,Roman Catholic Archbishop ofWestminster, said "thankGod."

Throughout Europe, streetsemptied as people rushed hometo watch TV. The telephone oprerator at the, American Em-bassy in London was inundatedwith calls.

. "People were sobbing withobvious relief: and ,happiness;"the operator said. "I just don'tknow what to say to them."

. Church bells pealed in Gallup,N. H., and froni St. Patrick'sCathedral in New York; trafficcame to a standstill in Indianap-olis; for a short time no crimewas reported- in Los Angeles;the dice briefly stopped rollingin Las Vegas.

'Somebody Up There*Rose Pollet, a clerk in the

Detroit City Hall, .said, "Therewas somebody up there withthem." . '

"Thank God this thing isoveV; I think I got an ulcerworrying about it," said 49-year-old Thomas G. McCarthyJr. in Pittsburgh.

"I was scared to death thosechutes weren't going to open,"said Naomi Haley, a secretaryin the Tennessee State Capital.

In Des Moines, Iowa, a cook,Patsy Riedel, said: "I'll sell myticket to the-moon real cheap.It's a relief they're back."

Assistant Police Chief Ray-mond J. Stratton of Indianap-olis looked at the tangledtraffic and said, "I guess every-body was either looking at TVor parked listening to theirradio.". A department store managerin Richmond, standing behinda crowd of people' watchingtelevision in his 'store, summedup the splashdown moment thisway:. •• -.-'• ., . • . . . •-.•. • ,-,<-,•

'Everybody had a quietsmile, but it was curious theway they stood looking at allthat good news-*sil6ntly and

13 Jane 1970

Bear Mr* President,

It is with thanks end great appreciation that X receive yourkind invitation extended to EQ in your letter of June $• which washanded to me by Ambassador Yost, to be your honoured guest atdinner at the White House at 8*00 o'clock on Friday evening,July 10.i

Z em glad to accept your invitation and note with particularpleasure and gratitude that the occasion tfill be in celebration ofthe twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of tha Charter of theUnited Eatlone.

It will he good to meet with you again, l!r. President, and thiswill be for me a most welcoisa opportunity to exchange views with youon matters of common concern with regard to the United Rations, ltdpresent and future.

Sincerely youre,

U

Honourable Hi chord' M. Ulxonof the United States

1 of AmericaShe EMts EOUESWashington, D.C*

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T1IK V v ' I M T K H O U S E

V V A S I UNGTOTS.'

June 9, 1970


On behalf of the people of the United States,I would like to invite you to be my honoredguest at 8:00 o'clock on Friday evening,July 10, 1970, in celebration of the historicoccasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of thesigning of the Charter of the United Nations.

Your acceptance and attendance would be mostgratifying. I look forward to celebrating thisoccasion with you and welcome the opportunityto meet with you once again in order to furtherour shared objective of honoring and strengthen-ing the United Nations in its anniversary year.

Sincerely,

His ExcellencyU ThantSecretary General of the United NationsUnited Nations HeadquartersNew York, New York

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I am forwarding herewith a draftmessage of congratulation to PresidentNixon on the occasion of the missionof Apollo 14, in the event that youmay vish to send it.

Date:

5 February 1971

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:DE: -^ /

DBAFT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESIDENT NIXOHON THE 'OCCASION OF THE SPLASH DOWN OF APOLLO 14

Now that the Apollo Ik Astronauts Alan B. Shepard Jr., Edgar D.

Mitchell and Stuart A. Hoosa have returned safely to earth, I wish to

convey to you and the American people my warmest congratulations on this

remarkable feat. Once again the American Astronauts and their colleagues

on earth have shown extraordinary skill, courage, determination and coolness

in performing a fabulously complex and difficult mission. I know that all

the members of the United Nations share my admiration for Apollo l4's

achievement and are looking forward expectantly to the scientific results

of the expedition which will enhance man's knowledge of the nature of our universe.

May I also through you, Mr. President, express my warmest good wishes to

the wives and families of the Astronauts on this happy day.

}

04-

«-* -»2,

\\

5 February 1971

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESIDENT WIXONON THE OCCASION OF THE MISSION OF APOLLO 14

On this historic event of the landing on the moon by Apollo lU

Astronauts Alan B. Shephard Jr. and Edgar D. Mitchell, with the

assistance of their colleague Astronaut Stuart A. Roosa, may I,

Mr. President, congratulate you and the American people on this great

ctenanipllAlmii feat. This landing by American astronauts "was only

possible with the skill, courage, determination and coolness vith

which the astronauts have performed their complex mission. Through

you, Mr. President, may I also express my congratulations and best

wishes to the astronauts and their families and to pray for their safe

return to earth. We in the United Nations are looking forward to the

scientific results of the Apollo 14 mission which are expected to enhance

man's knowledge of space technology for the betterment of mankind.

WUTi SIR NEWYORK 69 10 12QQEST

THE HONOURABLE

RICHARD Mt NIXGfo (REPORT DELIVERY)

PRESIDENT. OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE WHITE HOUSE .

WASHI&3TQN DC =

EYE HAVE BEEN MOST DISTRESSED TO HEAR OF THE APPALLING CONSEQUENCES

OF THE LOS ANGELES EARTHQUAKE WHICH ADDS YET ANOTHER NATURAL/

CATASTROPHE TO THE UNPARALLELED RECORD OF THE PAST TWELVE 'MONTHS,

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED BATIOHS FAMILY OF ORGANIZATIONS EYE WISH,

MR. PRESIDENT, TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND THROUGH YOU =

TO THE QOVERSMEMT AND. PEOPLE OF THE USA— ESPECIALLY

THOSE DIRECTLY AFFLICTED BY THE EARTHQUAKE — MY MOST SINCERE-.,

SYMPATHY = •:"?. . i

'J THA£« SECRETARY-GENERAL U N I T E D N A T I O N S + v?

COL NIL +



UNITED NATIONS

February 19, 1971

His Excellency U ThantSecretary GeneralUnited Nations., New York


I have been asked to transmit to you the followingmessage from President Nixon:

"The men of Apollo 14 and all of our fellowcountry-men join me in expressing appreciationfor your kind words of congratulation. Allmankind has contributed to the knowledge thatmade this latest exploration possible3 and weare proud that the scientific informationreturned from the moon will benefit all thepeoples of this earth we share.


Richard Nixon"

Sincerely yours,

UN-355V729

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U M A T I O M S 8YK 126l'71

WUT001 BEWYORK 73 STR PD 22 131?EST'

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MIS EXCELLENCY

PRESIDENT R I C H A R D w. W I X O P

W A S H I N G T O N . DC ( U F A ) ?

EYE AP DEEPLY DI^TRE?;?FD TO L E A H M TF THE LOSP OF

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C O M I f G I N T H E WAKE O F T H E RECENT E A R T K P U A X E I N C A L I F O R N I A ,

'THIS FURTHER N A T U R A L P I S A f T E R C A M W O T F A I L TO ' A R O U S E THE

SYMPATHY OF THE ;

I N T E R N A T I O N A L C ^ ^ M U ' I T Y * OR BEHAL17 '" - TH r I"-! ITT n ' N A T I O N A HT

ITS F A M I L Y OF O R G A N I Z A T I O N EYE EXTE^n " i ' Y - " U MR. PRESI^~^T

A^D T H R O U G H YOU TO THE S T R I C K E N PEOPLE >Y M :"-°T S I ^ C F R E

SYMPATHY*

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COL NIL

DRAFT CABLEKKSD/arh22 February 1971

HIS EXCELLENCY

PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON

WASHINGTON, B.C.

U.S.A.

EYE AM DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO LEARN OF THE LOSS OF LIFE, SUFFERING AND

EXTENSIVE DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE TORNADOES WHICH HIT PARTS OF MISSISSIPPI,

LOUISIANA AND ADJOINING AREAS STOP COMING IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT EARTHQUAKE

IN CALIFORNIA, THIS FURTHER NATURAL DISASTER CANNOT FAIL TO AROUSE THE

SYMPATHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY STOP THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITSf\

FAMILY OF ORGANIZATIONS MOULD WILLINGLY EXTEND ANY ASSISTANCE WITHIN THEIR

RESOURCES WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED STOP ON THEIR BEHALF?EYE EXTEND TO YOU

. S J H . i t K . f M i —MR. PRESIDENT AND THROUGH YOU TO THE 66¥Sfflfflffi»=MM) PEOPLED THE UNITED

STATES, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE STRICKEN AREAslMY MOST SINCERE SYMPATHY

U THANT


UNITED STATES OF AM ERICATO THE

UNITED NATIONS

February 23, 1971

Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit to you the followingmessage from President Nixon:

"Your kind words of sympathy on the recentearthquake in southern California were deeplyappreciated. I am. sure that all who sufferedlosses will be heartened by your expression ofconcern as the long task of reconstruction goesforward.

"With warm personal regards,

"Sincerely,Richard Nixon"




UN-3619/X

With the Compliments of the

United States Mission

to the

United Nations

Michael H. Newlin

799 United Nations PlazaNew York, N. Y. 10017

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S

Building for Peace

A REPORT BY

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

TO THE CONGRESS

FEBRUARY 25, 1971

- 96 -

THE MIDDLE JEAST

"The Middle East is a place .-today where localrivalries are intense, where the vital interests of theUnited States and the Soviet Union are both involved.Quite obviously, the primary responsibility forachieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle Eastrests on the nations there themselves. But in thisregion in particular, it is imperative that the twomajor powers conduct themselves so as to strengthenthe forces of peace rather than to strengthen the forcesof war. "

Address to the United NationsGeneral AssemblyOctober 23, 1970.

Vietnam is our most anguishing problem. It is not, however, the mostdangerous. That grim distinction must go to the situation in the Middle Eastwith its vastly greater potential for drawing Soviet policy and our own into acollision that could prove uncontrollable.

There are three distinct and serious aspects of the Middle Eastproblem, each by itself difficult enough to resolve. They cannot, however,be treated in isolation. They have become enmeshed, and each tends toexacerbate and make more intractable the others. The Middle East crisismust be recognized as the product of these three dimensions:

-- The Arab-Israeli conflict, which for more than twenty years hasfestered when it has not burned. It is the core problem of theMiddle East crisis, and its intensity today is undiminished.

-- Intra-Arab differences which focus primarily on whether a nego-tiated settlement of the Israeli conflict is acceptable or whetherforce is the only solution. There are also differences over howArab nations should be governed, which have led more than onceto civil conflict. And there are rivalries growing out of disagree-ment about the relation of Arab states to each other in the quest forunity in the Arab world.

%%$£**.

- 97 -

-- The conflict between the interests of the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates, each of which is now more deeply than ever engaged in theArab-Israeli conflict. Events surrounding the hostilities in Jordanin September showed how fragile are the barriers to direct greatpower confrontation in the Middle East.

America's interest in the Middle East -- and the world's interest -- isthat the global structure of peace not be allowed to break down there. Butthis objective has to be pursued in a situation in rapid flux:

-- The relationship between Middle East countries and outside powershas changed. The system of outside control that characterized thenineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is gone; thepeoples of the Near East have achieved national independence. Thereis a continuing search for a new balance between the strongnationalisms of the area and outside forces.

-- The character of the outside influences has changed. The nations ofthe Middle East must now come to terms on various levels with thetechnological, capital, political and military presence of the UnitedStates; with a new projection of Soviet power; and with a new Europeestablishing economic association through the Common Market witha number of nations in the area.

-- The relationship among the outside powers has changed. With linesbetween the U. S. and the Soviet Union firmly drawn in Europe, theircontest has spilled over to the south where no such lines exist andwhere local conflict and rapid change draw them into new competition.This takes place against a background of changes in their own globalstrategic relationship and changes in their respective nationalpostures toward global involvement.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

This protracted and bitter struggle lies at the heart of the Middle Eastcrisis. Its harmful potential is, to be sure, enhanced by great powerinvolvement. But the simple fact remains that the continuation of thisconflict grieviously damages the interests of all concerned:

- 98 -

-- It has drawn the Soviet Union and the United States into closemilitary association with the combatants, with all the danger thatposes to world peace.

-- It has caused the disruption of normal U.S. relations with a number ofArab countries. This, in turn, has increased the already ex-cessive Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore theirdangerous vulnerability to excessive Soviet influence.

--I t has provided an issue which has been exploited and manipulated byradical elements to undercut the internal stability of the Arabnations.

-- It has, for two decades, kept the 50 million people of Israel and theadjoining Arab nations in a permanent state of hostilities, and inconstant fear of attack.

-- It has forced both the Arab states and Israel to divert a tragicallydisproportionate share of their resources to the instruments andactivities of war.

-- It has condemned to squalor and to soul-searing hatred the lives ofthe Palestinian refugees, who include not only those who originallyfled their homes upon the establishment of Israel, but a wholegeneration born and reared in the hopelessness and frustration ofthe refugee camps. They are the material from which history createsthe tragedies of the future.

That is the outline of the situation which prevails. It is, and was whenmy Administration began, of deep concern to the American people.

We faced a choice. We could have elected to stand aloof from theproblem, on the theory that our diplomatic intervention would serve onlyto complicate further an already excessively complex problem.

We rejected that course. We did so for three reasons. First, thestakes involved are too high for us to accept a passive role. Second, wecould see nothing resulting from our restraint but the steady deteriorationof the situation into open war. Third, it would have been intolerable to

- 99 -

subordinate our own hopes for global peace and a more stable relationshipwith the Soviet Union to the local - - i f severe -- animosities of the MiddleEast.

Therefore -- with no illusions about the difficulty or the risks -- thisAdministration embarked upon a major and prolonged effort to achieve apeaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. In that effort, we have en-countered in full measure the difficulties we expected. We have had dis-appointments as well as a limited degree of success. Because thisproblem is so important, and because our role is central to the chancesfor settlement, I wish to discuss in detail our assessment of the problem,and our efforts to resolve it.

The interests of all concerned require a settlement. The purpose ofthe United States has been to help the parties work out among themselves apeace agreement that each would have a stake in maintaining. We haveproceeded with a sense of compassion for their concerns.

The Israelis seek recognition as a nation by their neighbors in securecircumstances. In any settlement they will seek more than simple declara-tions of peace and of Israel's legitimacy.. They also seek physical security.For Israel, peace must be something more than a paper peace.

The Arab governments seek the recovery of territories lost during theJune war, justice for those who have lost lands and homes through more thantwenty years of conflict, and a sense of dignity and security that will permitthem to feel no longer vulnerable to attack. Peace for them must also bereal.

If these concerns are to be reconciled, three conditions must be met:

-- Judgment on each side that the other is willing to make and live upto commitments that could produce a just and lasting peace.

-- Judgment on each side that the other will be able to keep itscommitments.

-- Judgment on each side that the world community can providerealistic supplementary guarantees of whatever agreements maybe reached.

- 100 -

The United States Initiative. Throughout 1969, the United States soughta framework for an agreed settlement through bilateral talks with the SovietUnion and in the multilateral channel of the Four Power talks, as well asthrough continuing consultation with Israel, Jordan and the UAR. We soughtto work out common guidelines which Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the UNSecretary General's Special Representative, could use as a catalyst fortalks between the parties.

By May of 1970 these efforts were stalled. And while they had proceeded,the intensity of the conflict had again reached the critical level. Fightingwas taking place daily along the Suez Canal. In retaliation, Israeli air powerhad reached deep into Egypt. Fedayeen attacks had provoked serious in-cidents on the ceasefire lines between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.The Soviet Union had taken steps to alter the military balance in the UAR'sfavor. Forces opposed to any kind of settlement were increasinglyassertive in many Arab countries.

Obviously, the situation was once again about to go out of control. Anew approach in the search for a settlement was urgently required.

Our experience over the past year had convinced us that no seriousmovement toward peace was possible unless the parties to the conflictthemselves came to grips with the issues between them.

On June 19, therefore, the United States launched an initiative to getboth sides to:

-- Re-establish the ceasefire.

-- Observe a military standstill in an agreed zone on both sides ofthe Israel-UAR ceasefire line.

-- Agree on a set of principles as the basic starting point for Arab-Israeli talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

The essence of this proposal was described by Secretary Rogers publiclyon June 25 as a major political initiative "to encourage the parties to stopshooting and start talking." The UAR, Jordan and Israel accepted theproposal, as did the Soviet Union. Our initiative produced significantresults:

- 101 -

- - I t halted the bloodshed along the ceasefire line, and therebyhelped reduce national passions to a level more conducive tosober consideration of a political settlement.

- - I t obtained, for the first time, agreement by Israel, Jordan, andthe UAR to seek "a just and lasting peace between them based on(1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordanand Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity andpolitical independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territoriesoccupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with" the UNSecurity Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

However, the ultimate goal of our initiative, a serious peace nego-tiation, did not follow immediately. For the Soviet and Egyptian buildupof military forces along the Suez Canal continued after the ceasefire wentinto effect on August 7, in violation of the agreement for a military stand-still. The fragile opening toward peace was further endangered in earlySeptember by the actions of Palestinian groups which attempted to forcethe Government of Jordan to withdraw from the effort to reach a settlement.

The situation in Jordan deteriorated into open conflict, and the sub-sequent intervention of armored forces from Syria created the gravestthreat to world peace since this Administration came into office.

More was at stake than Jordanian policy. As always with dangersavoided, it is not easy in retrospect to demonstrate how close to greaterdangers the world really came. But the prospect which threatened canbe described: If Jordan had succumbed to either internal subversion orexternal aggression, the danger of another full-scale Middle East warwould have been at hand. With the Soviet Union so deeply involved in themilitary operations of the UAR, and with firm U.S. support for the sur-vival of Israel, the risk of great-power confrontation would have beenreal, indeed.

The United States had no responsible choice but to prevent eventsfrom running away with the ability to control them. We took a firm standagainst the Syrian intervention. We acted to stabilize but not to threaten,to discourage irresponsibility without accelerating the momentum of crisis.

The Syrians withdrew, the Government of Jordan re-establishedorder, and a fragile agreement was reached on the future role of theorganized Palestinians.

: ' "

- 102 -

This sobering experience should demonstrate to all the partiesinvolved the extreme volatility of the present state of affairs. The entireworld has seen how precarious is the balance and how great the danger inthe Middle East.

The Shape of Peace in the Middle East. It is not for the United Statesto attempt to set the precise terms of a Middle East peace settlement. Thatcan be done only by the parties directly in conflict, and only by a processof negotiation •with each other.

However, some of the principles and elements that must be includedif a settlement is to be reached are clear and evident:

-- The Arab Governments will not accept a settlement which does notprovide for recovery of territories lost in the 1967 War. Withoutsuch acceptance, no settlement can have the essential quality ofassured permanence.

-- Israel will not agree to withdraw from occupied Arab territories,-which she sees as enhancing her physical security, unless she hasconfidence in the permanence of the peace settlement. She alsobelieves that the final borders to which she will withdraw must benegotiated and agreed in a binding peace settlement. She must,therefore, have confidence that no attack is forthcoming, andconfidence in her acceptance by her neighbors and in otherassurances.

-- The lack of mutual confidence between Israel and the Arab countriesis so deep that supplementary major power guarantees could add anelement of assurance. Such guarantees, coupled in time with areduction of the armed strength of both sides, can give the agree-ment permanence.

-- No lasting settlement can be achieved in the Middle East withoutaddressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.For over two decades they have been the victims of conditionsthat command sympathy. Peace requires fruitful lives for themand their children, and a just settlement of their claims.

- 103 -

The immediate task is to help the belligerents construct an agreementthat will achieve a workable balance between the security and recognitionthat Israel seeks and a just resolution, which the Arab states seek, of theterritorial and Palestinian issues. Only in such a balance can peace befound.

Great Power Contest

For over a century the Middle East has been an area of great concern tothe major powers. To NATO and Europe its independence is vital,militarily and economically. Similarly the Soviet Union has importantinterests which we recognize.

Despite the depth of these interests -- perhaps to some extent becauseof them -- the major powers have not established a pattern of relationshipswith the Middle East which accommodates the interests of all. The concerncaused by that fact is magnified by the instability and volatility of the region.

Any effort by any major power to secure a dominant position couldexacerbate local disputes, affect Europe's security, and increase the dangerto world peace. We seek no such position; we cannot allow others toestablish one.

We believe that the stability of the Middle East requires establishing abalance in the activities of the various outside powers involved there. Eachmust be free to pursue its own legitimate interests, but within the limitsimposed by respect for the legitimate interests of others and the sovereigntyof the nations of the area.

On this basis, the United States sought in 1969 and 1970 to enter intodiscussions with the Soviet Union on the Middle East question which wouldhave global significance for us and them, and would also contribute tomaking constructive peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israelispossible.

We repeatedly made clear to the Soviet leaders our desire to limitthe arms race in the Middle East on a reciprocal basis:

-- On February 4, 1970, I proposed to Chairman Kosygin that theUnited States and the Soviet Union discuss the question of limitingthe arms which our two countries provide to the Middle East. TheSoviets rejected this proposal as they had done similar proposalsin the past.

- 104 -

-- On March 23, Secretary Rogers announced that we would hold inabeyance a decision on Israel's request for additional aircraft,pointing out that: "Restraint will be required on the part of othermajor suppliers to the Middle East. No nation can pursue apolicy of seeking unilateral advantage in the area if peace is tobe achieved. "

The Soviet Union responded by stepping up the shipment of air-defensemissiles and aircraft, manned by Soviet combat crews to Egypt -- the firsttime that Soviet combat crews have been moved to a nation outside theCommunist orbit.

While indicating that the U.S. preferred restraint in the shipment ofarms, I have also repeatedly stated that the military balance between theArab states and Israel must be 'maintained.

- - In my February 4 letter to Chairman Kosygin, I made clear thatthe United States would not hesitate to provide arms to Israel ifthey were required in order to maintain that balance.

-- On July 31, I said publicly: "It is an integral part of our cease-fire proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire period toimprove its military position in the area of the cease-fire lines.All would have to refrain from . . . undertaking a military buildupof any kind in such an area. "

The Soviet Union's disregard for this essential foundation for peacetalks raised serious doubts about its readiness to cooperate in the effortto achieve peace. Against this background, the United States had nochoice but to take further steps to help maintain the military balance.

Throughout most of 1969 we had attempted to engage the Soviet Unionin developing a basis for Arab-Israeli negotiations. Our talks with theSoviets focussed particularly on three points:

-- The need for an Arab commitment to accept specific obligationsin a peace agreement with Israel.

-- The need for an Israeli commitment to withdraw from occupiedterritories as part of a binding peace which establishes recog-nized and secure boundaries.

- 105 -

-- The need for both sides to enter a genuine negotiating process towork out the detailed terms of a peace settlement between them.

The Soviets have persistently called for an Israeli commitment tototal withdrawal from all occupied territories. The Soviets have alsocalled for a refugee settlement which inadequately reflects the practicalhuman and security problems involved on both sides. The United Stateshas recognized that any changes in prewar borders should be insub-stantial, but we insist that any agreement to fix final borders must bedirectly linked in a peace agreement to mutually agreed practical arrange-ments that would make these secure. These are matters for negotiationbetween the parties. The Soviets have insisted, however, that the majorpowers make these judgments and, in effect, impose them on the parties.

In June 1970, the USSR offered further formulations on some of theobligations that all parties would undertake for preventing hostile acts fromtheir soil and on the precise time when peace would come into effect inrelation to the withdrawal of troops to final borders. But these formulations,which were modifications of earlier Soviet proposals,, came belatedly andstill failed to take into account the need for a negotiating process engagingthe parties themselves.

The U.S. continues to welcome Soviet suggestions for a settlement.But to be serious, they must meet the legitimate concerns of not one butboth sides.

Nationalism in the Area

Apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a strong Arab nationalism hasgrown in reaction to an era of outside political control which has nowended. It is nurtured by a persistent yearning for unity among Arab nations.But traditional and ideological rivalries make it difficult for Arabsto agree on the form their unity should take. The attempts to fashionunity, therefore, sharpen tensions.

At the heart of these disputes is a fundamental ideological disagreementon how Arab society should respond to pressures for rapid modernization.As a. consequence, some of the more militant forces exploit issues of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, even where these are not the realissues. For their own nationalist or ideological reasons, they seek toreduce the U.S. position. The ironic result of their action - - i f theysucceeded -- would be to make the area once again more vulnerable tooutside domination.

- 106 -

Thus some political currents in the area make it more difficult forthe U.S. to maintain, as we would wish to do, productive relations withnations on both sides of inter-Arab disputes. We will continue to main-tain friendly relations with all the countries of the area which welcomeour friendship. We can make a significant contribution, as we have inthe past, to the development of the Arab world in the fields of educationand technical training, business management, and investment. The valueof the contribution we can make, and wish to make, creates a commoninterest in the maintenance of decent relationships which mayioffsetpressures to disrupt them.

Issues for the Future

The search for peace -- especially an Arab-Israeli settlement --and the quest for a stable U.S. -Soviet relationship that will help preservethe independence and integrity of each nation in this area will remain ourtop priorities. Our aim is to see an epoch begin in which strongindependent nations in this area - - i n association with each other as theychoose -- relate freely and constructively with the world outside. TheU.S. is prepared to consider new and fresh ways to assist in the develop-ment of the region to the benefit of both Arabs and Israelis once a realpeace agreement is achieved.

In pursuing those goals, the United States will face these principalissues in the months ahead:

First, if the United States is to play a major role - - a s we havepromised to do -- in helping to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlementand provide supplementary guarantees, what should be the nature andextent of our diplomatic involvement? As I pointed out at the UnitedNations last October, the primary responsibility for peace rests on thenations of the Middle East. What is the proper relation between theefforts of the international community to encourage a settlement and theresponsibility of the negotiating parties themselves?

Second, our bilateral relations with Arab nations are in flux. Withsome, formal diplomatic relations have been suspended. In others,attitudes toward the U.S. and the West are undergoing reassessment.The changing relationships in the Persian Gulf necessarily raise newissues for American policy. How do we best encourage and assist theconstructive forces in the area to build a regional system of stablerelationships?

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- 107 -

Finally, there is a range of broader worldwide issues that form thebackground to Middle East politics. Limiting the external supply of armsto the area is one such issue. The U.S. -Soviet military relationship inthe Mediterranean area is another. Beyond this, what is our policy towardthe broadening commercial association which the European Common Marketis establishing with nations in the area? How can we help assure theaccess of Western Europe and Japan to the supply of oil, and also helpassure that the producing states receive fair revenues for their oil?

rOn some of these issues, our work is already well advanced. With

others we are coming to grips for the first time. Our purpose is to resolvethem in a way that helps us and every nation involved in the Middle East,including above all the states of the area, to build and strengthen therelationships - - a t every level -- that will hold together the structure ofpeace.

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THE SOVIET UNION

"The great central issue of our time -- the question ofwhether the world as a whole is to live at peace -- has notbeen resolved.

"This central issue turns in large part on the relationsamong the great nuclear powers. Their strength imposes onthem special responsibilities of restraint and wisdom. Theissue of war and peace cannot be solved unless we in theUnited States and the Soviet Union demonstrate both the willand the capacity to put our relationship on a basis consistentwith the aspirations of mankind. "

Address to the United NationsGeneral AssemblyOctober 23, 1970

In my Inaugural Address, and again at the United Nations last October,I urged the Soviet leaders to join with us in building a new and constructiverelationship.

I emphasized four factors that provide a basis for such a development:

-- Neither of us wants a nuclear exchange.

-- We both should welcome the opportunity to reduce the burden ofarmaments.

-- We are both major industrial powers, and yet have very little tradeor commercial contact with one another. Both would clearly benefitif our relationship permitted an increase in trade.

-- Both are deeply involved, at home and abroad, with the need forcreative economic and social change. Both our interests -- and thebroader world interest -- would be served if our competition couldbe channeled more into our performances in that field.

Thus, our two nations have substantial mutual incentives to find ways ofworking together. We are realistic enough to recognize, however, that wealso have very real differences that can continue to divide us:

- 123 -

We view the world and approach international affairs differently. Ide-ology continues to shape many aspects of Soviet policy. It dictates an attitudeof constant pressure toward the external world. The Soviet Government toofrequently claims that the rationale for its internal and external policies isbased on universalist doctrines. In certain fundamental aspects the Sovietoutlook on world affairs is incompatible with a stable international system.

The internal order of the USSR, as such, is not an object of our policy,although we do not hide our rejection of many of its features. Our relationswith the USSR, as with other countries, are determined by its internationalbehavior. Consequently, the fruitfulness of the relationship depends signifi-cantly upon the degree to which its international behavior does not reflectmilitant doctrinal considerations.

As the two most powerful nations in the world, we conduct global policiesthat bring our interests into contention across a broad range of issues. His-torically, international adversaries have demonstrated a compulsion to seekevery gain, however marginal, at the expense of their competitors. In thisclassical conception, the accumulation of gains over a period of time couldalter the balance of power. This may have been realistic in the past; atleast it was the essence of international affairs.

But it is folly for the great nuclear powers to conduct their policies inthis manner. For if they succeed, it can only result in confrontation andpotential catastrophe.

The nature of nuclear power requires that both the Soviet Union and webe willing to practice self-restraint in the pursuit of national interests. Wehave acted on this principle in our conduct of the SALT negotiations, in ourdiplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, and in our proposals to improve thesituation in Berlin. We are prepared to apply it to all legitimate Soviet in-terests.

Such a policy of restraint, however, requires reciprocity -- concretelyexpressed in actions.

By virtue of its size and geography, the USSR has traditionally had im-portant security interests in Europe and East Asia. Her undoubted status asa global power obviously creates interests in other areas where Russia hasnot traditionally been a factor. But.the natural expansion of Soviet influencein the world must not distort itself into ambitions for exclusive or predominantpositions. For such a course ignores the interests of others, including our-selves. It must and will be resisted. It can, therefore, lead only to con-frontation.

- 124 -

We often approach negotiations with differing premises. We do notsuggest that the starting point -- or, indeed, the culmination - - o f our nego-tiations with the USSR be the acceptance of our views and positions. Nor dowe expect to resolve issues by cajoling the Soviet leaders into solutions dam-aging to their national interests. We cannot be expected, however, to acceptthe Soviet definition of every issue, to agree automatically to the Soviet orderof priorities, or to accept every aggrandizement of Soviet positions abroadas a "new reality" no longer open to challenge. The principle of mutual accom-modation, if it is to have any meaning, must be that both of us seek compro-mises, mutual concessions, and new solutions to old problems.

The relationship between the two great nuclear powers in this decademust rise above tactical considerations. We must be prepared to face issuesseriously, concretely, and in a spirit of mutual respect. Durable solutionswill be those which both sides have an interest in maintaining.

We are engaged in a strategic and military competition. We both possessthe capability to develop our military power and project it massively intodistant areas. The last two decades witnessed the transformation of theSoviet Union from a Eurasian power to an intercontinental one. The USSRnow possesses military capabilities far beyond those at the command of pre-vious Soviet leaders.

In earlier periods our strategic superiority gave us a margin of safety.Now, however, the enormous increase in Soviet capabilities has added a newand critical dimension to our relationship. The growth of Soviet power inthe last several years could tempt Soviet leaders into bolder challenges. Itcould lead them to underestimate the risks of certain policies. We, of course,continue to weigh carefully Soviet statements of intentions. But the existingmilitary balance does not permit us to judge the significance of Soviet actionsonly by what they say -- or even what we believe -- are their intentions.We must measure their actions, at least in part, against their capabilities.

It is of the utmost importance that the new strategic balance of the1970's and our interest in strategic stability not be misunderstood. Con-frontation may arise from a mistaken perception of the posture of an adver-sary. Such a mistake can lead to a failure to appreciate the risks and con-sequences of probing for advantages or testing the limits of toleration. Webelieve that this -was involved to some degree in the events which led up tothe Middle East crisis last year.

It may also have been a factor in Soviet Naval actions in the Caribbeanin the fall of 1970. There the Soviet Union took new steps which could haveafforded it the ability to again operate offensive weapons systems from this

- 125 -

Hemisphere. That would have been contrary to the understanding between us.Only after a period of discussion did we reaffirm our understanding and amplifyit to make clear that the agreement included activities related to sea-basedsystems.

In our relations with the USSR there should be no misconceptions of therole we will play in international affairs. This country is not withdrawinginto isolation. With the Soviet Union, we want a relationship in which theinterests of both are respected. When interests conflict, we prefer negotia-tion and restraint as the methods to adjust differences. But, when challenged,the United States will defend its interests and those of its allies. And, to-gether with our allies, we will maintain the power to do so effectively.

A New American-Soviet Relationship

Mutual restraint, accommodation of interests, and the changed strategicsituation open broad opportunities to the Soviet Union and the United States.It is our hope that the Soviet Union will recognize, as we do, that our futuresare best served by serious negotiation of the issues which divide us. Wehave taken the initiative in establishing an agenda on which agreement couldprofoundly alter the substance of our relationship:

-- SALT. Given the available resources, neither of us will concedea significant strategic advantage to the other. Yet the temptationto attempt to achieve such advantage is ever present, and moderntechnology makes such an attempt feasible. With our currentstrategic capabilities, we have a unique opportunity to design astable and mutually acceptable strategic relationship.

We did not expect agreements to emerge quickly, for the most vitalof interests are engaged. A resolution will not be achieved by agree-ment on generalities. We have put forward precise and serious pro-posals that would create no unilateral advantages and would cope withthe major concerns of both sides.

We do not yet know what conclusions the Soviet Union will draw fromthe facts of the situation. If its leaders share our assessment, wecan unquestionably bring competition in strategic weapons undercontrol.

-- Europe. With our allies, we have entered into negotiations with theUSSR to improve the Berlin situation. Arrangements which, in fact,bring an end to the twenty-four years of tension over Berlin, wouldenable us to move beyond the vestiges of the postwar period that have

rv

- 126 -

dominated our relationship for so long. A broader era of negotiationsin Europe then becomes possible.

i|*|TP Progress toward this goal also could be obtained through a successfulagreement on mutual reduction of military forces, especially inCentral Europe where confrontation could be most dangerous.

-- The Middle East is heavy with the danger that local and regionalconflict may engulf the Great Powers in confrontation.

We recognize that the USSR has acquired important interests and. influence in the area, and that a lasting settlement cannot be achieved' unless the Soviet Union sees it to be in its interest.

IMv/" --'%;';* We continue to believe that it is in the Soviet interest to support a

reasonable settlement. The USSR is not, however, contributing tothat end by providing increasingly large and dangerous numbers ofweapons to the Arab states, or by building military positions for itsown purposes. We are prepared to seek agreement with the USSRand the other major powers to limit arms shipments to the Middle East.

We have not tried to lay down a rigid order of priorities within this agenda.It is a fact of international politics, however, that major issues are related.The successful resolution of one such issue cannot help but improve theprospects for solving other problems. Similarly, aggressive action in onearea is bound to exert a disturbing influence in other areas.

An assessment of U. S. -Soviet relations at this point in my Administrationhas to be mixed. There have been some encouraging developments and wewelcome them. We are engaged in a serious dialogue in SALT. We haveboth signed the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds. We haveboth ratified the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We haveentered negotiations on the issue of Berlin. We have taken the f i rs t steptoward practical cooperation in outer space.

On the other hand, certain Soviet actions in the Middle East, Berlin, andCuba are not encouraging. Taken against a background of intensive and un-

(TV••-••' ' restrained anti-American propaganda, these actions inevitably suggest that'&<$:'#-i intransigence remains a cardinal feature of the Soviet system.

Yet these events may have provided a basis for future progress in ourrelations. Properly understood, they illustrate the altogether incommen-surate risks inherent in a policy of confrontation, and the marginal benefitsachievable by it.

Against this background it is an appropriate moment to take stock of ourrelations, and to weigh the decisions necessary for further progress.

- 127 -

The Soviet leaders will be reviewing their own policies and programsin connection •with the 24th Congress of their Party. This report sets forthmy own assessment of our relations with the USSR, and the principles bywhich we propose to govern our relations in the future. I have outlined thefactors that make for common interests and suggested an agenda of out-standing opportunities:

--a more stable military relationship for the next decade,

--a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

-- an agreed framework for security in Europe.

We are under no illusion that these are easy tasks. But, as I said inmy address to the United Nations:

"In the world today we are at a crossroads. We canfollow the old way, playing the traditional game of inter-national relations, but at ever-increasing risk. Everyonewill lose. No one will gain. Or we can take a new road.

"I invite the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us intaking that new road . . . . "

- 155 -

THE UNITED NATIONS

"As the United Nations begins its next quarter century,it does so richer in the experience and sobered in its under-standing of what it can do and what it cannot; what should beexpected and what should not.

"In the spirit of this 25th Anniversary, the United Stateswill go the extra mile in doing our part toward making the UNsucceed. We look forward to working together with all nationsrepresented here in going beyond the mere containment ofcrises to building a structure of peace that promotes justiceas well as assuring stability, and that will last because allhave a stake in its lasting. "

Address to the United NationsGeneral AssemblyOctober 23, 1970.

International cooperation has always been both a human dream and ahuman necessity. This is more true in our time than it has ever beenbefore.

The dream is important. Mankind aspires to lasting peace, and sinceits founding twenty-five years ago, the United Nations has symbolized thisprofound wish. But while the realization of the dream remains elusive,the necessity of international cooperation for other purposes has becomeimperative. For the march of technology has pressed upon the world anincreasing number of exigent problems which can only be solved by collabora-tion among governments. As a result, the United Nations' role in facilitat-ing international cooperation has taken on a new importance.

The Preservation of Peace

The major task for the world community is, of course, the preservationof peace. The need for an instrument which could further this purpose wasthe prime motivation behind the founding of the United Nations. The UN'sability to fill this role, however, is dependent to a considerable extent oncooperation among the major powers; and a somber fact of recent historyis the failure of the victorious allies of World War II to maintain their cooper-ation. This being true, a crucial development would be joint recognition bythe United States and the Soviet Union of a common interest in strengthening

- 156 -

the UN's peacekeeping capacities. On October 23, before many of theworld's Chiefs of State and Heads of Government assembled at the UN, Icalled on the USSR to put our relations "on a basis consistent with theaspirations of mankind" and to join with us in developing "practical meansthat will enable the United Nations to move decisively to keep the peace. "

Even if UN peacekeeping efforts cannot be perfected in the world asit is, they can certainly be improved. Peacekeeping in the past hasdepended essentially on improvisation. There were, and are, no generalunderstandings on how these operations are to be directed or financed.One result has been that the UN has developed a large financial deficit assome countries have refused to pay their share.

We believe that a major effort should be made to reach an agreementon reliable ground rules for peacekeeping operations. Discussions aregoing forward directly with the Soviet Union and in a special UN Committeeon this subject. One major issue is the degree of latitude which theSecretary General would have in conducting day-to-day operations, oncethe Security Council has authorized an undertaking. We believe he needsadequate authority to manage peacekeeping operations under the broadpolitical supervision of the Council. While these problems have beendifficult, discussions are continuing.

The Need for Restraint

Because the stresses of the Cold War have limited the ability of theSecurity Council to play an energetic role in alleviating political crisesand preserving the peace, much of the political agenda at the UN has flowedtoward the General Assembly. But the operations of the Assembly haveshortcomings related to the strains of a rapid growth in membership anddemands for actions beyond the capacities of the United Nations.

States have traditionally addressed their foreign policies to problemsaffecting their own concept of their national interests. National policieswere sustained, and to some extent defined and limited, by the resourceswhich states were willing and able to commit. With all its faults, thisprocess imposed a degree of discipline and realism upon foreign policygoals.

At the UN this pattern has been modified. Many states find themselvesinvolved in political problems in which their own interests are very oftennot importantly engaged and their ability to obtain information is limited.Without self-discipline, this can easily lead the organization to adopt posi-tions which cannot command the resources or the support required forattainment.

- 157 -

There are, of course, advantages in detachment, in having problemsconsidered by a community as a whole rather than by the parties directlyinvolved. But for this advantage to be maximized, more self-restraintis needed on the part of member states. UN members contribute best tothe maintenance of peace when they examine issues on their merits insteadof voting as blocs along geographical or ideological lines. And it should beremembered that problems cannot always be solved by the simple formulaof choosing the middle ground between conflicting claims. To assumethat justice is necessarily a middle point is to encourage adversaries tomove toward extremes.

The UN does in fact mirror much of the world's social turmoil, nationalconflicts, and ideological differences. It has to its credit substantial accom-plishments in peacekeeping, in social and economic betterment, and indrafting principles of international law. It will be strengthened to theextent that its members foreswear unrealistic rhetoric and concentrate onusing the UN constructively to settle rather than publicize disputes. TheUN must not become the forum where differences are exacerbated byintemperate advocacy.

Human Betterment

Another major function of the United Nations is to promote economicand social development. Its basic instrument for this purpose -- the UNDevelopment Program -- has achieved a good record in providing technicalexperts and technical training to the underdeveloped countries, and inhelping them survey the investment potential of their natural resources.

However, the Program has encountered two basic problems. First,its resources fall short of the job to be done. Second, even at its presentlevel of operations, its capacity to operate efficiently is strained to theutmost. It needs to adopt improved managerial practices.

During the past year, two actions in the UN set the stage for remedyingthese inadequacies:

- - In October, the General Assembly adopted the strategy for theSecond Development Decade, •which began in January, 1971. Thestrategy set goals, the basic one being an average growth rate of6% in developing countries, and an action program covering thespectrum of economic and social development. An importantelement was the affirmation by developed countries, including theUnited States, of efforts to achieve an aid target of the transfer ofresources, government and private, equal to one percent of GrossNational Product.

Si'V•*;#>•,

-,.:.

- 158 -

-- In December, the General Assembly approved a series of steps toimprove the capacity of the UN development system to handlelarger resources effectively. These reforms should ensure muchtighter coordination within each recipient country of the activitiesof the various UN agencies.

These recommended reforms are most encouraging. We look forwardto their rapid and effective implementation, which we view as a concrete testof the ability of the UN family of organizations to mold itself into a moreeffective instrument. Precisely because we attach great importance to theUN's role in development, we intend to apply high standards in judging itsperformance. The work of the United Nations and its specialized agenciesis too vital to permit good intentions to substitute for accomplishment.

The Nature of Our Participation

We intend to view the UN realistically, to face clearly what it can andcannot do, and to encourage its fullest employment on those problems ofthe world to which it can effectively contribute. It would be unrealisticto ignore the fact that the United Nations is not functioning as effectivelyas it might. But it would be equally unrealistic to view that situation asacceptable. For the United States has a transcendent interest in a moreeffective United Nations.

Success breeds success. If international cooperation succeeds inproducing creative solutions to some of the world's pressing needs, thefabric of that cooperation will itself be greatly strengthened. This couldhave long-term effects beyond the solution of individual problems. Forit could bring closer that lasting and general peace which has so far eludedour grasp.

We recognize that the nature of our own participation in the UnitedNations and its family of organizations is a central element in their healthand effectiveness. In the past, particularly in the specialized agencies,our financial contributions have been too large a part of our total contribu-tion. We intend to participate more fully in the future. We will urge thatthe utility of international activities be judged by the good that comes outof them rather than the good intentions that go into them.

We look forward to the report of the President's Commission for theObservance of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the UN. This group ofdistinguished American citizens has, since last July, been studying meansto enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations, and to improve U. S.participation therein. The fruit of their deliberations will receive themost serious study by my Administration.

- 159 -

Global Ch?llenges

The United Nations was, and is, a child of the mid-Twentieth Century.It stemmed from the perception that modern problems required a newpattern of interchange to supplement the older processes of diplomacy.Human institutions evolve in response to felt needs, and some of our mostserious international needs have only recently become evident. For mankindnow shares a number of new and urgent problems, which stem from thecontrast bet-ween man's progress in the technological arts and his short-comings in achieving a stable organization for international cooperation.The world has grown small, and we live increasingly in what has beendescribed as a "global village".

The world now has community problems such as the population explosion,the uses of the oceans and seabeds, maintenance of a healthy natural envi-ronment, control of drug abuse, deterrence of airplane hijackings, andcooperation in the use of outer space.

In last year 's report, and in my two speeches to the General Assembly,I suggested these problems as appropriate for UN attention. The UN hasmade useful beginnings on most of them, and marked progress on some.These developments are discussed in the following section of this report,along with the measures taken outside the UN, These global problems arenot, of course, the exclusive property of the UN, but it is uniquely qualifiedto focus the energies and attention of the world on them.

I want to take particular note of one instance in which the UN didprecisely that in 1970, and on a matter of the deepest interest to the Amer-ican people. In October, I asked the General Assembly to express "theworld interest" in the human rights of prisoners of war. I urged theAssembly to press all adversaries in the Vietnam conflict, and all otherconflicts, to honor the Geneva Convention. In December, the GeneralAssembly passed a resolution that fully met that request. This did not, ofcourse, effect the release of our prisoners now in North Vietnam's hands,but it does bring to bear on North Vietnam the full weight of world opinionin favor of decent treatment of those prisoners. And the UN Resolutionspecifically called for the repatriation of seriously ill or wounded prisoners,and of all prisoners who have endured a long period of captivity. TheAmerican people, I am sure, share my gratitude to the eleven states whostood with us in sponsoring this resolution, and the fifty-five others whosesupport led to its passage.

The Future

In the 1970s, the United Nations faces both a challenge and an opportunity.For the member states there is a challenge to prove themselves capable of

m' '

- 160 -

using the UN framework to meet the common needs of the internationalcommunity. For the UN itself, there is an opportunity to mold itselfinto the efficient instrument for international cooperation which thetimes require.

The United States will try to meet the challenge, and to help the UNseize its opportunity.

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Mr. Lemieux>Registry

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March IS, 1971

Excellency:

H* MAR 2 3 371

n-No Ac don HoINITIALS


"Your kind message of sympathy towardvictims of the recent tornadoes in the southernUnited States was greatly appreciated. Thosewho suffered the consequences of this secondrecent disaster will, I am sure, be encouragedby your concern for their plight as they proceedwith their work of reconstruction.

"With warm personal regards,"Sincerely,

"Richard Bfixon"f


George Bush



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21 Kerch 1971

Bear l>fr. president,,

I was greatly honoured and pleased to receive year kind lettersof Sf f ruary &a& 3 Jlarefc 1971, as well as yo«r report to the UnitedStates Congress on the halted States Foreign !*ollcy for the 1970s,delivered to me by Ambassador George Bush,

*• I wish to thank you most sincerely for these communications, Ihave read th®a tf ith great interest and 1 fally share your thoughts onthe interd pendeBce of »ationa9 on the growing importance of the UnitedNations and on the need for enlightened foreign policies for the 1970s.

I derive great comfort from the fact that, despite persistingdivisions, the vast scientific and technological changes which aremodifying so profoundly conditions on our planet will also inexorablydaaaM worldwide co-operation &nd unity* Soiae day historians mysingle this out as the fuiidaiaental trerid which marked the progress ofhyaani% daring our century. $fae chapter on glcfoal challeages in yourreport to Congress therefore gives me great hope. In. a world markedfor the moment by t&e kind of dieeoarag aent asad perplexity vliich ofteaprevails in the period before new direction© are taken, yoxsr views openup aetr vistas for worldwide partnership and co-operation*

I hope that the history of a new aad tanitod world will be writtenresolutely. Oar present costly divisions must be trsasfortaed into muchneeded co-operative pursuits. The world is prepared for such anhistorical change, and people everywhere are praying for it. If global

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a»d eorsaon responsibilities can tie Hade the central issuesof the foreign policies eat imtiojas, and if a genuine tmiversalec pera&io** of all wrajaeats is achieved through the 0nited Nations,thest, I am sure, tte& gckLs of $ea§ev order a»d justice can be reached

this eent«ry is

I have : assured Mbassador Bush that I ¥ill always be at hisdisposal for any eoneultatioHS fee my wls x to seek, he United Stationsasod its specialized ageaeies are & unique repository of knowl dgs on tiiestate of the world and en ft&&y emerging ijfsiads and prdblaas regardingjsan and his future » jubassador Busii, like all other representatives atthe United Hatidns, is isos .mtems td 'tas? this souree at any time.

Majr I add this personal vie»t lhat is jrolsably most nesded atpresent is to initiate a rjraf orientation in world policy through theUnited -nations by setting the global goals to new historical heights

and thus to show all nations 4 Inciting the hesitant or reluctant ones,

a ses" path t0s?a#&3

I recall wit&t gsreat pl aeare our meetings last year aM am mostto yo for t&e «aan» p«3E oj l w Leesme and reception you gave

me in feshingtoru I look forward to seeing you again this year,perhaps in Hew York. Your kind words towards Mbassador Jarring and

are greatly appreciated. It is eerfcainly a source of encourage-and gratification id ae id to m jr of us ia the United ..Rations

that titoa Government of the Qaited States is solidly feshind tdtie laatirlnge for&s of Ambassador Jarring in his search for a just and lasting peacein the Middle Bast on the Taasis of the Security Council resolution ofScflteB&er 196f« Sfey I ©s rssis to you i»y own appreciation for the personalefforts you and Secretary of • State Bogers are ssaking to "bring about a

settlement in the Middle Bast,

had y ste3?dfiQf a good ia3it witli jtoibassador Bush about thesittssttion of the Organisation, I believe that it would be

helpful if all gciransme&ts eoncerned could rn ks em ©arly andeffort to solve the finaaeial prolslaa with which the

Is still faced as on aftermath of past events* MbassadorKtiB8fers8< *»£ Seaway, the $z®&$&$$& of ^® last Oesei l Assesfcly, Isaa

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oy waanaest per^oaal

THE MM YORK TIMES, Thursday, 5 August 1971

Transcript of the President's News Conference*

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. ^ .__ and Gentlemen, I wanted t tf1 '•< jbegin this with a brief re'sume' of the '

T conversation I have just had with the.^Secretary of State, because I know the•.^subject will probably come up in any

•"* This is in regard to the Pakistan refu-p.gee situation, to recap what we have•'!aone. Insofar as the refugees, who are'in India, are concerned, we have pro-J.yided $70-million to date for the refu-gees, and we are prepared to provide./.iptore. That, incidentally, is more thanTJjjfll the rest of the nations of the worldjpiit together, so it is a substantialI ainountii-; As far as those in East Pakistan them--ijSelves are concerned, whereas you know"•tliere are prospects of famine, in the*|yent that the crop reports are as bad,,!aS' they seem to be, at this time weffiaye 360,000 tons of grain ready forJsjiipment there. We have also alotted' million for the chartering of ships*|r;the purpose of getting the grain into .

I'gr; overcrowded ports. \ Vsa further step, the Secretary of"

! has worked out,' with my very. ...Tj.___jg approval, a plan to go to the :

&rg|6nited Nations next week to talk to the'J responsible and appropriate members ofthe United Nations, including the U.N.

• High Commissioner in that office, to see4what additional steps can be taken onboth fronts to help the refugees in Inida

"from East Pakistan, and also to help'cthpse who are in East Pakistan and are: jfteseritly confronting famine situations.f ;|With regard to a /problem; that :wasAddressed by the^ House yesterday, we

;vdp not favor the idea that the.-United:£&ates should cut off economic assistance

'.'to,, Pakistan. To .do,, so would simply.f^ggrayate the refugee problem because it

". mean that the ability of the Gov-E Pakistan to work with the

asrit presently has indicated it isfilling to do so in distributing the food''supplies—its ability to create some sta-bility would be seriously jeopardized.:.

v We feel that .the most constructive ,irole we-can play is to continue oureconomic assistance to West Pakistanand, thereby, to be able to influence thecourse of events in a way ttiat will dealwith the problem of hunger,, in i East'Pakistan, which would reduce^the refu-'gee flow into India and whiclr will,,-wetrust, in the future look toward a Viablepolitical settlement.; ' '. "^ .

, J"We are not going to.engage .m--piiblicp'ressure on the Government of jyest,

"^ "--I1.;,xhat>--"1J-*:^:a-j:"y<-;---~ii5£i3'!

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.find an agreement with the most popu-lous nation in the world, which poten-tially in the future. could become themost powerful nation in the world,

"As we. look at the peace in the worldfor the balance of this century, and for.that matter the next century, we must

^•recognize that there cannot be world!peH'ce on which 'all the peoples ini the•yrolld can rely, and in which they haveIsiich a great stake, unless there is com-.;

•' irijimcation between and some negotla-- tidift' between these two great super-':powers, the People's Republic and theUnited States.

I have put this in general terms be-cause that is the understanding of thePeople's Republic, Premier Chou-En-lai,and it is our understanding that ouragenda will be worked out at a laterpoint; before the trip it will be verycarefully worked out so that the dis-c€ssions will deal with the hard prob-lems as well as the easy ones. ^

• We expect to; make some; progress,7

but to, sReculate^|ibput what progress]will be/made 6n!';fny particular issue-to speculate, for example, as to whateffect this might have on Vietnam—wpuld not serve the interests of coir

1. Plans for China TripQ. Mr. President, can you tell us any

more about your forthcoming trip toChina, when it is likely to occur, andpan you give us your assessment ofifwhat effect you think this will'haye, on|hding the war in Vietnam?;'• A. As far as the timing is concerned,i cannot add to .what I .said in theQjiginal announcement. It will be beforeMay 1. The time will be worked out^bmetime within the next two to threeihonths, I would assume, and a co%,.;;ipderable amount of preparatory activityniust take place, setting up tne agenda] ;iletting up' the numbers in the official;!liarty. ^J, These are matters, of course, thafjmust be discussed and worked out be-* jfore the time of the visit is finally an-nounced.| Second, and I know a number of youare interested in who is going, that is

tmatter still to be decided. It wassed by Dr. Kissinger and by Premier

;;7<||bu En-lai in their conversations, and'rj*lll, be worked out by mutual agree-i$|nt.

^s far as our party is concerned, it ,l; be a small working party. The onlyes that presently are definitely goingif

ae, of course, the Secretary of State fy;';.and Dr. Kissinger and myself. Beyond p'that, whatever others will be added willbe determined by mutual agreement be-tfiteen. the parties concerned.IJNow, as..to the-effect the, visit ,willf

Have arid.the<conversations will havedri yietnamr.T.wiU'tnbtspecAaate-on thatsubject. I .wiil ...drily say that, • as the 'jbjiijt .announcement indicated, this will,b!4:(a wide-ranging discussion of issuesconcerning both governments. It is not

; a!'Discussion'that is going to lead to in-stant detente.[What it really is, Is moving, as we

haye .moved, I believe, in the ^situationwtfi regard to the Soviet Union, fromaji era of confrontation without com-

.niunication to an era of negotiations.,\|rith discussion. It does not mean that\^e go into these meetings on eithersjde with any illusions about the widedifferences that we have. Our interestsare very different,.and both sides rec-ognize this, in the talks that Dr. Kis-

1 singer had, very extended talks he hadwith Premier, Chou En-lai. .We-do notexec: .that these, talks«wiU" settle

!n*«*«»ftti:(*.?«(ft*,*, -vv-t1S*'rf

•^^v^,-?^^nyrf^^my:^^^^^

Q. Can? I ask. a'"related policy q'ues-tion on1 Vietnam? A. Sure.

Q. There have been some suggestions,including some indirect hints from China,that a negotiating'forum involving anAsian conference to be held in Asia,primarily lyith Asian participants, butthe United States as well, might'be abetter forum for ..negotiating a settle-

. ment in Vietnam. Can you speak tothat?

A. Mr. Bailey, the question of whetherthere should be an all-Asian conference,with the government of the People'sRepublic participating, as you know, hasrisen several times over the past fewinonths, and was raised before our an-

":nt>uncement was made.j:,As far as we are concerned, we willfccmsider any proposal that might con-;.tr|bute to. a more peaceful situation, in'the Pacific and in the world. However^.aiUthis point there is no understanding-between the United States and the Peb- >pie's Republic as to whether or notj

out of this meeting should come thatkind of proposal.

Let me say on that score, there were •no conditions asked for on either side,and none accepted. There were no dealsmade on either side, or accepted; noneoffered and jnone accepted. This is adiscussion which will take place withboth sides knowing in advance thatthere are problems, but with both sideswell prepared. This is the secret of anysuccessful summit meeting.

As you know, parenthetically, I havealways taken somewhat of a dim viewof summitry when it comes in an unpre-pared 'form. But both sides will .be wellprepared, well in advance, on all pointsof major difference, and wg will discuss

* ' *' (lifferenceLth^could a£-

Q. Mr. President, is there any diplo-matic reason you might not visit theSoviet Union before going to Peking?That was suggested.

A. In view of the announcement wehave made on our visit to Peking, thatwill be the first visit-that Twill make,•Obviously, it takes a great .deal, of,-toeto prepare- a 'visit and to' attempt nowto visit—and the Soviet Union, I amsure, feels exactly the same way—toattempt to rush around and have asummit meeting in Moscow before wego to Peking would not be in the in-terest of either country.

I would add this point, too: WhenForeign Minister Gromyko was here, we

' discussed the possibility of a possiblesummit meeting, and we had a verycandid discussion. He agreed and saidthat his government ; leaders agreed

•%vith my position, which was that afjêefifig at the highest level should take:i;'"place-and would be useful -only when

, theiSfwas something substantive to ,di|-;"V:cuss: that could not be handled in otfeei^'channels, ' •••

With regard to the Soviets; I shouldalso point out that we are making very ,significant progress on Berlin. We aremaking good progress on SALT [stra-tegic arms limitation talks]. Discussionsare still continuing on the Mideast, al-though there I will hot speculate aboutwhat the prospects for success, are inview of the fact that Mr. Sisco ^.pres-ently in the area exploring with thegovernments concerned what the pos-sibilities of some interim settlementlooking toward a final settlement maybe.

Having mentioned these three areas inwhich we are negotiating with the Soviet

• Union, I will add that if the time comes,; as it may come, and both sides realizeI this, then the final breakthrough in any'of these- areas can take place, only at•the highest level, and then there, will be.,a meeting. But as; faras the timing ojthe meeting before the visit to Peking

..^-in—«.«.»_.,.'«.<> j.^ a'pprogriatg' *^—

1 „„" f- Tdl&s/ohrArrtutm,enfe 1Q. I was thinking of such: a thing asl

a settlement on the SALT talks. *A. Mr. Theis, when I said there was

good progress being" made on SALT itis still a very technical and sticky prob-lem for both sides because it involvesour vital interests: Let me emphasizethat in SALT, both sides are asked tomake an agreement which limits thatThis is not unilateral. We, on our part,will be having very severe limitations

, with regard to our defensive capability,the ABM. They, on their part, will havelimitation on their offensive capability,their build-up of offensive missiles.

Neither side can make those decisionslightly, without very, very basic dis-cussions, but the fact.that we have, atthe highest level, committed ourselvesto working toward an agreement simul-taneously this year on both those issues,and the fact that since the talks at Hel-sinki began that we have made prog-ress, gives hope that we are going to ;

^fhê an arrangement. |-."' But to speculate that maybe we are

going to get that done before we go to iPeking, I think, would be ill-advised., ',

5. Reply to Vietcong Proposal •Q. Mr. President, why have you.'riqVj

accepted the Vietcong proposals afterall these weeks of probing, or givensome formal reply?

A. I have noted some criticism in thepress about the fact that AmbassadorBruce had to leave Aug. 1.. Incidentally,I am most grateful that he stayed anextra month, because his doctor got holdof me and said he should have left July1. In any event, his having left Aug. 1,and Mr. Porter not being able to arriveuntil the latter part of August, therehas been some speculation—and I under-stand this—criticism hi the press andthe Senate and the House that the Ad-ministration is not interested in nego-tiating a settlement, that we are notconsidering the various proposals thathave been made by the VC and North

•; Vietnamese.• • Now, just so the members of the press15 will not get out on a limb with regard

: to predicting what we are or are notI doing, let me make one statement and ,

f then I will go.np^further. • ' - V * C Z r •:?[.;\;; :• We are^yeryîactiyeiy pursuing. negoM3; : i 5*r %<-J^-fe-eJ>ft '•'£>•• S:. '•:;$ v^ ^^SôS^ti'ations; bnWiethahi; i^

nels. The record, when it finally coriie^ Kout, will answer,all tfc critics as,far 6*as the activity at :,this' Government in

, pursuing^ negotiations in established, channels.. It would not be useful ia ne-gotiate in the newspapers if we:want-

. to-have; those negotiations,succeed;" ' . ." .• .;• I.*am riot predicting that thelnegotia--tipns will succeed.:ram saying; however,

that as far;as the United States is con-cerned, we hav«.gone and are going theextra mile on negotiations in established,

-channels., You. can interpret that anyway you want, but do not interpret itin a way that indicates that .the United

.^fetes isimissing this.opportunity or thatônrtrirtiTnWwV^^êryonîitbiin^gpiisI

being mentioned in the comments on thenegotiations is the elecftori in SouthVietnam this fall. Is that a factor thatdoes have some bearing on the paceof the negotiations'

A It has certainly in terms of theNorth Vietnamese. As you know, thestumbling block for them in negotiations ,••really is the political' settlement. As they,: look at-, the election- this fall, they feel.that Unless that; election comes out ina way••-.that;' a 'candidate they can" sup- •'

.pprt,'.or;at least;th&t "they are not asmuch againSt as they are President Thieu

,—but unless' it/cdrtiesoiit .that way, it.will be Very difficult for them to have"

..a negotiated SeMeiaent., •:':'- :..;; '";

With regard to the ejections, let meemphasize our position."Our position isone of complete neutrality in -theseelections. -Under. Ambassador Bunker'sskillful direction,: we have made it clearto ,all;

:parties concerned• that we:.• .are .:not";supporting arty- candidate; that we'.will-1 accept .the Verdict of the peopleof South Vietnam. - ' -

I have-noted; for' example',' that Presi-- dent • Thieu, has invited observers. 'tocome '.frpm.. other jiatipns to. witness theelection; I hope'observers: do go; I thinkthey-will find^I hope, they will find,as they ;did -when they : observed pre-~vious ejections in'Vietnam, that by moststandards they were fair;

As far as observers from this coun-try are concerned, we have, of course,several inembers of the Senate andothers that have indicated a desire togo., We, of course, have no objection tothat. We want a fair election and we,of course, have some observers on thescene in the "person"* of the Ambassadorand hisjstaff who win" watch that'elec-

U N I T E D N A T I O N S

Press SectionOffice of Public Information

United Hations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA. — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/15217 August 1971

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESIDENT

OF UNITED STATES ON APOLLO 15 FLIGHT

Following is the text of a message sent by the Secretary-General,

U Thantj on 7 August to the President of the United States, Richard M. Hixon,

on the successful completion of the flight of Apollo 15;

The successful completion of the flight of Apollo 15 represents another

brilliant chapter in man's peaceful exploration of outer space. The

extraordinary scientific data collected by the intrepid - astronauts on this

lunar mission holds the promise of immense gains in human knowledge which will

benefit all of mankind.

I wish to convey to you, Mr. President, and through you to Colonel Scott,

Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin, Major Worden and their families, my heartfelt

congratulations on their magnificent accomplishments in space and their safe

return to earth, and also to those scientists and technicians who have

contributed so much to the spectacular success of the mission.

# ### #

WU ALLRTS IJYK®

NYK

PLS RUSH THESE T H A N K S * « * * * «

WUT-35 NEW YORK 104/103 STR 7 212.1Z ;

HIS EXCELLENCY

MR, RICHARD . M. NIXON

PRESIDE^ST OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE WHITE HOUSE

D.C, '

SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE FLIGHT OF APOLLO 15 REPRESENTS

B R I L L I A N T CHAPTER IN M A M ' S PEACEFUL E X P L O R A T I O N OF •OUTER SPACE. THE E X T R A O R D I N A R Y SCIENTIFIC D A T A COLLECTED RY THE

' I N T R E P I D ASTRONAUTS OF THIS L U N A R MISSION HOLDS THE PROMISE OFIMMENSE G A I N S I N ' H U M A N KNOWLEDGE V J H I C H WILL BENEFIT ALL OF M A R KPARA I s

P2/54/53 I '

tylSH TO CONVEY TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT* -AND THROUGH YOU TO COLONEL

SCOTT, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL I R W ! N r . M A J O R WORDEN AND THEIR

FAMILIES, MY HEARTFELT C O N G R A T U L A T I O N S OH THEIR M A G N I F I C E N T

ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN SPACE AND THEIR SAFE RETURN TO E A R T H , AMD

ALSO TO THOSE SCIENTISTS ASTO TECHNICIANS WHO HAVE §

CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO THE SPECTACULAR SUCCESS OF THE MISS10M |^

U THMT 4;

SECRETARY-GENERAL. . ' =M

UNITED N A T I O N S ' . w>

COL APOLLO 15 " v

)

WO ALLRTS .{JYK9

U»AT10MS

7 August 1971 JBUitodnear 3802 5012

3SQSG . ' • ' • •

BIS

HR. BXCS&BSM, 3UJKOH

OF SHE O&E&gS STATES OF AMBHICA.

13H2SCS BQ1BSJ

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AKOJSSH BBI£I2AHT CHAPUR 2R I^MK'S IffiACEnA EKFUXBAXZOB OF OUS1B SPACE,

IHB SX2HAOB0IKMI SCJSU32FIC DAiTA CQLXBCXBD B3T THE IMSEPID ASTEOHAOTS

OH miS SUMS HISS10S HOLI3S 5SB FB«ISE OF GAIKS IS HUMffi

XBOillESGS KBICH WEHi SBKEVZl'A£L OF MAffiQQGDi PARA I WISH TO COOTS?

ao Toy, Bra.'^BEBiiWj ®s mmm YOU $D COLOMBL^ »JOB WOHIUH J^D ussia

AGHIFICEH3? ACCGHBEJSBHEBaB 1H SPACE JfflD THSIH

SA3® SE!H3ia? TO BASJS^ -AHD AX@0 TO SHOSS SCJBOTIS2S AND IHSCSffildMS

HAVE COl miBmSB SO MUCH K> IBS SIECfACBLAS SUCCESS OF OBE MISSIOH.

SAZZOBS

Secretary-General

DRAFT6 August 1971

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECHETftBY-CEMBRAL TO PRESIDENT MIXOH

OH SUCCESSFUL MISSION OF APOLLO 15

Hie successful completion of the flight of Apollo 15 represents

another brilliant chapter in man's peaceful exploration of outer

space. The extraordinary scientific data collected by the

intrepid astronauts on this lunar mission holds the promise of

immense gains in human knowledge which will benefit all of

mankind,

I wish to convey to you, Mr. President, and through you to

Colonel Scott, Lieut.Colonel Irwin, Major Worden and their families,

my heartfelt congratulations on their magnificent accomplishments

in space and their safe return to earth. Q*—«*-



UNITED NATIONS

August 18, 1971

Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit the followingmessage from the President of the United States:


"On behalf of the crew of Apollo XVand all Americans, I want to thank you foryour gracious words on their recent mission.We feel that our pride in this accomplish-ment should be shared by all nations, foronly the collective achievement of man hasmade these explorations possible, and it isfor the benefit of all men that the infor-mation gained will be used.



Gedtge Bush


Se cre tary-Gene ra1of the United Nations.

UN-3554/759

YUKK TiFUib, Saturday, 13 November 1971

1XOH inference on Foreign and Domestic-AffairsWASHINGTON, Nov. J2—Following,

as made available by the White House,is a transcript of President Nixon'sflews conference today:

OPENING STATEMENT :; Won't you be seated, ladies and gen-tlemen? .. . ,• Ladies and gentlemen, I have an an-nouncement of a substantially increasedtroop withdrawal from Vietnam. WhenJ. entered off ice-on Jan. 20, 1969, thereyere 540,000 Americans hi Vietnam andpur casualties were running as high as300 a week. • • • -; Over the past three years, we havemade progress on both fronts. Our cas-ualties, for example, for the past fiveweeks have been less than 10, insteadof 300, a'Week, and with regard towithdrawals, 80 per cent of those whowere there have come home-^365,000.

1 have now had an opportunity toappraise the situation as it is today. Ihave consulted with my senior advisersand I have an up-to-date report fromSecretary Laird.; Based on those consultations and

consultations with the Government ofSouth Vietnam, I am now able to makethis announcement: Over the next twomonths, we will withdraw 45,000 Amer-icans. I will make another announcementbefore the First of February. As far asthat second announcement is concerned,before the First of February) the'num-ber to be withdrawn—the rate that is—as well as the duration of the announce-ment, willbe determined by tfiree'factors. : '. ' ' •

First, by the level of enemy activityand particularly by the infiltrationroute and its rate, because if the levelof enemy activity and infiltration sub-stantially increases, it could be verydangerous to our sharply decreasedforces in South Vietnam.

Second, the progress of our'trainingprogram, our Vietnamization ^programsin,South Vietnam, and third, any. prog-~ " jj*that may have been made with re-

""a two major objectives we have,ng the release of all bur P.O.W.'s

8rH|rever they are in Southeast Asia and' fining a cease-fire for all of Sputh-

f Asia. - • - . - • '..--Jiose three criteria will determine the

ine$?:;announcement, both its duration^-v;"irate. ' ;". ". .' -" rf'-" ':

giowfj twill be glad to take questions"this; announcement or any other sub-

jgdomestic or foreign; >ypu would

STIONS AND" ANSWERS_. laps and Cambodia'Ir. President; :t*' be cie£? on the

" includes" t46s"ana vCam-

t is 'our goal, Mr; Lis'agon' Yes,.lyou know,. we:, .offered. that .in""sr-,of, •tejtUy.e'ai.'.ia,':Qct8ber,/We

m^nMifihg.^'vUfteftit;1 Vfe'* '"•'•"?,'"beiievi6 .ffiiat; jjf1-'-'-1-'

\A' * Km**: :-*&' :

a new troop ceiling at the end of thewithdrawal period?

A. It will be a new troop ceiling forthe end of the withdrawal period. Ithink we would have to /cover thatlater. The 45,000 .should be taken offthe present ceiling. We are reducingthe ceiling by 45,QOOJ

Now, incidentally, I should say, too,that in terms of the withdrawal, I thinkit would be proper to inform the presson this matter, We are going to with-draw 25,000 in December and 20,000 inJanuary. Obviously we would like toget a few more out before Christmasand we were able to do this after Sec-retary Laird made his report.

5. Role of U.S. TroopsQ. In this present situation, you are

announcing a two- or three-months—A. Two months.Q. Two-months withdrawal, whereas

the last time it .was seven or eightmonths, I believe. How does this situa-tion,' in terms of negotiating need thatyou spoke of, differ from the other oneand can you tell us if you now, as aresult of this two-month withdrawal,foresee an end to the United States com-b a t role i n Vietham? • • • • ' : • '

A. Well, first, the situation is very'different because, as ive :get'l-.dowh innumbers, each withdrawal"has a muchmore dramatic effect on the percentagethat we bad there; •45,000 as against,for examptej J84,000, which is the pres-ent troop ceiling, is a lot different from25,000 as against 539,000 or 540,000,which was oui1 first withdrawal program.

So, consequently, it is essential, aswe get closer to the end, if we aregoing to maintain any negotiating lever-age, that the withdrawal periods, in myopinion, be somewhat shorter.:.

' With regard to the pther questionsthat we have on this—does that coverthat point? . .'. ...

Q. Yes, sir. About the combat role,though.

A. Well, the combat role,' let us under-stand, based on the casualties, as farthe offensive situation -is concerned, isalready concluded. -American troops arenow in a defensive position. They, how-ever, will defend themselves,-and whatcasualties we haVe taken-^they/are verysmall—will be ta'ken in .that defensive

You; will find, as you analyze: the bat-tlefield reports, as I do frojh'iiiune to•time, that the offensive activity, searchand destroy;: and an the'bther activity ithat we used to undertake, are now be- 'ing -undertaken by .the South Viet-."•natriese.v? M,• Q.,Mr..5resid8nt,<;have ypu sent or are 'you sending order's >itq' the forces •; taSouth Vietfiani regarding '-the offensiveand defensive role? Could you.outline'that foHus?•'- :-vi^'f;:4**P^'

A. That.is Cmîwh'liSifip&a.,..r ;'Abrants\:iri"the-filki; arid

.•it is one.."" ' ''"""

- - Tte New York Hmes/Mlte Lien

ANNOUNCES NEW TROOP CUTS: President Nixon at the news conference

publicly or privately, on getting releaseof our prisoners?

A. I do not .want to-give any falseencouragement to those who are thenext of kin or who are close relativesof our prisoners. I can only say, how-ever, that we, on our part, have takeninitiatives on a number of fronts here.So the possibility of progress in thefuture is there. As far as the enemy'sposition is concerned, it is still intran-sigent.

9. Air Power in VietnamQ. Mr. President, from the conditions

that you know now in Vietnam andSoutheast Asia, can you foresee in thenear future a Substantial diminution ofAmerican air power use in support ofthe Vietnamese?

•A. Well, air power of course, as faras .our use -of it is concerned, .wilVjJjftn;-tinue to be.used longer than our •—'--"-'forces, due to the fact that/Vietnamese to handle the airdfi*

' the 'ipngest lead time, as" we.Kf' vie will continue to use it-'iifof Jthe Spilth Vietnamese, untila-negotiated settlement or,Ip'-

;ther down the road, untilVietnamese have developed,bility to handle the situation^;?AS faiCas our air power islet me ajso say this:'As' w^number' of our forces, i| is|"--—--••'— for us to' cbritr

+U^- •itvfn-rVa-Hnn 'i

course, have hurt them, too.Miss Thomas?

12. '68 Campaign Promise| Q. In connection with your answer on: negotiations, is what you are sayingthat perhaps you might not be able to'teep your 1968 promise to end the war,which I believe was your, campaignpledge, rather than just ending Amer-ica's role in the war?

A. I would suggest that I be judgedat the time of the campaign, rather thannow, on that. I would also suggest thatevery promise that I have made I havekept to this date and that-usually is apretty good example of what you mightdo with regard to future promises.

13. Residual U.S. ForcesQ. Mr. President, we read much specu-

lation that you plan to keep a residualforce, 40,000 or 50,000 men; in Vietnam'until the prisoner-of-war issue is settledcompletely and all prisoners are out Is

. thatstil) valid?A. Well, Mrs/Cornell? [Laughter.]

:'' Q. Touche. {LaiignterJ . -A. First, if the situation is such that,

we have a negotiated settlement, natur-ally that means,a total withdrawal ofall American force's."It'also not only

..means a: total withdrawal of. American -<•forces, in South Vietnam; it-means' a' dis-v

:.ebntinuatioa of pur air strikes and;-also:iiw.itn.drflw.al -of forces, stationed 'in; .OlhefiJ

is highly improbable at this point.. I sayhighly improbable—not impossible. Itdepends on what happens.

Our goal is-rr^nd I discussed this atgreat length with Mr. Gromyko whenhe was -here—our goal is, of course,at the highest level to urge our negotia-tors to try to find a common basis foragreement. But it must be a joint agree-ment We cannot limit defensive weap-ons first and them limit offensive weap-on's. Both must go together. It. willhappen. - . .

I would say this: I believe we aregoing to reach an agreement. I believewe will make considerable progress to-ward reaching that agreement beforethe end of the year. I think reaching theagreement before the end of the year

one of the earlier questioners here, thelevel of enemy activity has not been asgreat as it was, due to the fact that theenemy doesn't have the punch it had.Cambodia took a great deal out of theenemy's punch. Laps took a -great dealout of its punch. And in addition to that,those torrential floods have made it dif-ficult for the enemy to be as effectivein its attacks as it was previously.. .

That does not mean, however, look-ping to the future, that we must not bejon guard. That is why I said we are go-,Jing to watch this infiltration route andyrate very, very carefully in the critical;!months of December and January- he«.

'fore making another withdrawal an-rinounceroent. ~

: - • ' M!

20. Aid for Cambodians jis probably not likely at this time, but,great progress will be made and I think J Q. Mr. President, in your most recentby the end of the year we will be able j foreign aid bill, you requested a totalto see then that our goal can 'be 1 of $341-millipn in military and economic..>.i^»j -"-Said for Cambodia.-The:head:of the Goy-.:

eminent of Cambodia has.. just re^npunced democracy as a viable form of'government,. which some people .thinkjihas analogy to earlier developments :-Vietnam. What assurance can youthe American people that .we., aresliding into another Vietnam in Cam-ii•'bodia? '-• " '•: . - ':' :a

A. We didn't slide into Vietnam. That*is the difference.' In.Vietnam,'-conscious"*'decisions were made to Ser*: *'"—:—

achieved.

16. "Wage-Price GuidelinesQ. Mr. • President, are ypu satisfied

with the guidelines laid down by thepay commission and the prige board andare you concerned about the effect of alikely bulge, of increases in wages and

.prices 'after the .freeze -and public con-fidence on Phase .two? . . , ,

..; A. Well, the possibility of some, bulge;•- of course, 'has always been there, as .you

know," io when I -announced the freeze,it was wiaay speculated that once thefreeze was oft-and once we then moved•to guidelines,-that there would be there-fore some increase in wage rates andsome increase also in "prices. The freeztcould not be kept on indefinitely.

However, I -think the decisions ofboth the pay board and the price board

' have been very sound. They.did not, insome instances', perhaps, reach the goals

'some would have liked. I think somebusinessmen thought the wage increasesshould have been in the neighborhoodof 3 to 4 per cent. That would havebeen a very good thing fronvtheir stand-point, perhaps. .It would have been total-ly unrealistic. It would have broke theboard wide open. .

••• I think 5.5 per cent'is ah achievablegoal./That would be,, a substantial .re-

.•there to become involyed'.'.in.' cpinb'af35

I am not criticizing the decision; f .ai,,reflecting what ;the situation was. . r|

It was not a question of slidingbut was a question of decisions be,made, first, to send American combat |troops in. Those were -first made by,gPresident Kennedy, the first troops thaMwent in; and then the decisions to bombsin the north. Those were made by Presi- "'.dent Johnson, and the increases irtijjforces. ' . '."

Let's look at Cambodia.. We have£made a conscious decision not to send,.American troops in. There 'are no Amerr-'j*

• ican combat troops in Cambodia. Therert!

,are no American combat advisers iiin'Cambodia. There will be no American '„-,combat troops or advisers .in Cambodia,;}

We will aid Cambodia: Cambodia iSo.the Nixon doctrine in its purest form.

duction insofar as thejwage-pnce push .. Vietnam was in violation of the Nixori': ,, \^ 3S •^P^d.to.igeo, 1969, : doctrine. Because in Cambodia what we-ana lBb8. . • • ' - , • ' : ' ; • : » : • : . . • , - . are doing is 'helping the Cambodian's: to*

..fJL,f?!,a^??C .5et|°J5

<rSed',: he: -, help themselves.t-.and we are. doing- that:

Jerlyjhayejtfmttejr^ . . . - , , . . . . t , . _ . . . . . . , . . , , . .3'mthreg*d^;|>.hasCT™."!Triat:is:meVi-^ Advice il';'•stable. It' is; ihevitthlpifl'îiy-ffee' ec'ph--''" ' o 'ji>-'•• '"'fJ'-'-s'W'•'>' M r f'''i(i7S

uijuuv ,.wc /ii^vs Do,,av. t(jaj •. -we- Daê • feachea

^J^M^^M^/Bbft^ki,:^^^

EEeena, of course, believe that attainingegoal would bring peace to- the

whole- area, which is what we want,I and,of course would greatly reduce any

need for %a very heavy Antencan aidprogram that presently! we have forparticularly Cambodia

* 3,. Prisoners of War< Q Mr President, do you have an;

reason, for encouragement on the releaseof prisoners of war frchn any source9

t A- No reason for encouragement thatI can talfcâbout publicly . I can say, how-ever, that we are- pursuing this subjectas 1 have, indicated on sqveral occasionsin a number of channels and we havenot given up1 We willi never give upwith regard to ourj prisoners of warThat is one of the reasons why an an-nouncement is being matte for. a shorterperiod rather than a longer period be-cause the- moment that we make an announcement that is too long, it meansthat whatever negotiating stroke wemight have is substantially reduced.

3. Infiltratiohr by EnemyQ. Mr. President, what Has been the

most recent trend' towards the infiltra-tion by 'the enemy and do you havefigures 'Jpi;!. that, and: also, .what ratewould hayft to be maintained for you to carry put your ;,6ptijnum plan? • • • " , ' .

A. We.'Wo'uldvhave to examine, thatsituation " $ W?:' f !*?• *'rl1* -infiltrat!"1!rate: has i;c6me:':'ujjij spine 'as it' alwaysdoes:.atîsltffi?:"gf'ye'ar:, Hbweyeiv itis iipi' sjs/'higH'npw; just as .the rcasiial-tiesâre "not as'higK jipw"and the levelof enemy activity; a's' it was last year.We-'want- tpi seeVhowever, wh'at, thesituatipiii'isV'm December and January,which,;-: as ' you. alt know, are.- the ' KeymbnthsXwhe'n". infiltration comes along,because that will determine what theactivity \vill;' be' 'to April: May,. June' and

'Q. Mr. PresidentA. Yes, ,Mr. Bailey. :: : "

4/. iêbruar/ Troop CeOing: (j.'To-jje cifear;'.\Yhat it your.hew Feb.

• 1 trpoj? ceTl|Bg; 'tit j are you ' dpinr.1t theway'ypu have'dpne it before.hy" setting

about No. orders need to be giveiTiorthat purpose And, incidentally that ispossible due tp the fact thatsthe SouthVietnamese have gained the~ca£abilityj'(to handle the situation themselves.->

Also, there is another reason As. weget to 184 000, and at the end of thispenpd; 45000 less than that.^'what of-fensive capabilities w^jiaye are very,very seriously limited <

i ^ &. Peace Negotiation*- *? *3 i f r

<J J*r jTesident;-you said there wasHo movement on the prisoners of warissue If there anything at all to reporton negotiations either through Pans orthrougtfsome other means? 1

A I would respond to that only "bysaying thai we have not given up, onthe negotiating front This announce-ment is somewhat of an indication thatwe have not grten up on the negotiatingfront I, however, would not like foleave the impression that we see thepossibility of some staking break-through in negotiations in the nearfuture

But we are pursuing negotiations inParis and tlirpugh whatever other chan-nels we think are apprpriate. -

7. Private ,P.O.W. talks ,Q. One might infer from what' you

said previously-, that there has,-beenprogress' oh th'e prisoner questiori pri-vately, .Would that be a correct infer-ence to.' draw? -. ..'.'; ... .

A'.'' No,' it would not be.; a : correctinference to'-draw;'I'wishV.it were, :,be-,,cause this;:issue 'should, -pf-'cpurse,- aswell all. I: think, be separated from theissue of the combat role of Americansand our. withdrawal program. It is'.-ahumanitarian issue- .We havenot, as.yet, ha'd' any progress ib .'puir talks withthe North Vietnamese in getting themto separate that issue from the rest '••

On. the other hand, we have not givenup'on the'negotiating track;and we" are.gbing'tp;'continue to press on that" trackbecause thpt. is the track -on" which weev.entually:are, going to have success ingetting p.ur .prisoner.? back.-: . ., . .

. .8. i.Prpgjjesk on. Prisoners;;'. Q^There has'been up progress, either ,

let m° also saynumber of o\ir forces, it i: împortant for" us to. continue'sojjrs'airstakes on the infiltration routes If wesee any substantial step up in infiltrationin the passes, for example; which Jeadfrom North Vietnam into Laos and" ofcourse, the Laotian; trail which Comesdown through Cambodia into SouthVietnam—if we see- that we will haveto step them ftp

'u^ forces, ingouth. Vietnamrit means- s Qis' continuation of our air. stakes and. alsowithdrawal of forces stationed in otherpjaces m Southeast Asia or in the A^ân.theater that are directly related to the'support of our forces in Vietnamt That Is, in other words what is in-volved if We can gef a negotiated settlement JJJ we do not get a negotiatedasettlement, then it is necessary to mauv-

JThat is-why-we have been quite cate- t*m a residual force for not only thegoneaj with regard to that situation,because* as the number of our forcesgoes down, their danger increases andwe are not going tp allotf the enemyto pounce on them by reason of ourfailure to use air power against in-creased: infiltrations if it occurs

10 Peking and Moscow TiipsQ Mr President, do you expect to

discuss methods; possibly to help alleviate the situation m Indochina m yourvisit to Peking and to .Moscow'

A I dp not think }t would be helpfulto indicate at this time, what we will dis-'ciiss With regard to Indochina when ourvisits to PeHhg and'Moscow take place.We are hopeful and continue to be hope-ful that we can make progress on han-dling this problem ourselves, and thatit may not have to be a problem thatwill have to be discussed in those areas.

Incidentally, I think it would not bewell to speculate as to what, if any1-thing,,either Peking or Moscow can orwill.'_dp'ori this-''matter. All that I cansay is that we. are charting .our.' ownCQiirse.'and Tê will find our own wayto. bring it to a halt. •' -

.We :willi of course, welcome any as-sistance; but we are not counting on itfrom, eitheivsourcef-:" •" 'O

11. North Vietnam's Strength-- Q< Is it not"true that at this particular.point the Nprth Vietnamese are .probablyat their wealcest "they h^yei'been s:incethe war, and is this because of floodsandlack ofresources? " . . ' • . . . , . i

\'f-_'A,.\ :TJte. niajpr reaspn ::they are theVeaiest' ''since- the war" is because of:eambpdia'an"d Liios, and the floods, of

reason—and this is, of course, a veryprimary reason—of b.avmg something tonegotiate With, W4th regard to our pris-oners but it is also essential to do som order to continue our role of leavingSouth Vietnam m a position where itwilt be able to defend itself from aCommunist take over

Both objectives can be fulfilled, webelieve through a negotiated settlementWe would prefer that If they are notfulfilled through a negotiated settlement,then we w.ilThave to'-'go.another routeand we are prepared to do1 so:

14. Amnesty for ExilesQ Mr. President, do you foresee

granting amnesty to any- of the youngmen who .have fled the United Statesto avoid -fighting in a war that theyconsider to be immoral? ;

Arms Limitation TalksQ. Mr. President, you met this after-

noon with : our" SALT negotiating team,which is'returning, to Vienna. .Earlierthis year you expressed the hope thatsome kind of agreement could be made.Dp you foresee some kind' of SALTagreement before the end of the year?

A. We have made significant progressin the arms limitation, talks. The prog-ress, for example, with regard.td.the hotline'; and 'the progress "with regard toaccidental war is".(juite.': significant. ,AJso,wehave made; signifleant,/progress in.the discussion on limitation pf _defensiveweapons and we arej .beginning-now tomove into -;.'dise'u;ssions.i;"oh1":ofênsiyeweapons."';-, "'.'"'''." .; ••' '•',''''"'".'••'•',• •:'

i Wliether''We:'are';abie,:tb Jf.each agree-ment, .by. the eh'd' of..the year/r.thin|£,.:

otner words, tne"nree~enieipiihE y txto—t (I believe, that this1 answer of the payboard and the price commission''is a

»t very realistic one I believe it will sud-ceed and one of the f major reasPns Ibelieve it will succeed is the enormouspublic support that we had not onlyduring the 99-day period, but that wecontinue to have for the period afterthe freeze That public support willmake this work

17. Clarification of CeilingQ Mr President, could I he. quite

clear on the withdrawal' Â You mean "perfectly clear," right?

[Laughter] 'Q Is the 45 000 to be taken from the

184 000 sir' Does it come from the Dec1 target figure?

A Yes that is right You take yourceiling of Dec 1 and take 45,000 fromthat and you get where we will be onFeb 1 Let me ppi4t out, incidentally,that^w.e are always slightly .below; bur-:ceiling,'as'you know, with regafd,.to-actual withdrawals. But we have set asthe ceiling for Feb.-l the 45,000'from184,000, but we will probably be belowthai at that time by a few. hundred ormaybe even a few thousand, ,

18. Date for Peking TripQ. Mr. President, have you set a date

to go to China yet?A. I have nothing to announce on

that at this time. '

19. Reaction of ThieuQ. Mr. President, if we can assume

that President Thieu was informed atleast of the withdrawals, can you tell uswhat his reaction was?

A. : Complete approval. PresidentThieu, along with General Abrairis, andGeneral, Binh aiid .the others who worktpgeffierrinii'ths. 'combined joint chiefs

..byeEjthefli'hav'e b6en,. just as SecretaryLkird"- has reported, . erionnpusly- im-.pressed .with" the' speed of. the.' training 'program.'and 'the ability 'of ''the Sp.uth;.Vietnamese .to" delend-them'selfyes; -;.':': s •.: 'It ihas,' gone ••fgstef. than";, we had",thpugbtj'and also, asi.Wis pointed.put:by-,

1 titular matter, ubeenj taken, you would have done rea-JjsouablKiwell then, as you know As Is

said in Detroit whether it is? investments*in stocks or .bonds, or, for that matter,-|m reaj. property, which is my onlyysource of .investment, af I may para-'lphrase what one of the television cpm-Emercials I have heard often enoughsI am^bullisb. on America * However, I«would strongly advise anybody who to-vvests to invest on the long term, notthe short term "" >

On the long term, 1972 is going to be2

a good year When we see, for example,inflation cut in ihalf; which is our goal,when we see employment beginning torise—it rose>~over a million during thepenod'of the freeze—and ijrhen^we seesomething else, when we see our ecop-omy now being built on the basis ofêace rather than war, this is A timewhen people looking to the future, plan- imng to hang on could it seems to me,;well invest in America with the hops'that their investments will prove well {

Ninteeh-sixtyreight for example, was:a very bad time to buy, and yet it ap-fpeared to be like the'best ..of times.i:Stocks were high. Unemployment was;low. Everybody thought we .had high;prosperity, but prosperity was based on;300 American casualties a week, 500,0001Americans in Vietnam-, 25 to 30.'billion!dollars being spent on a warin; Vietnam;and on a burgeoning rate..oCinflation^.. \

At that time,- therefore, I would no|have advised, and I trust many brokidid hot advise their clients," to buy, 'cause when prosperity is based onand inflation, you are eventually goito have a setback.

The new prosperity that "we afe.worling toward—and we: haveVJpiri^'^rocl'times; we have had s'ome'-'Ind we mifhave some more—but looking towajthe year 1972, as lappraiste: the'situiion, the new prosperity,"1 based pn join peacetime, on peace; production p

jraarily, and based on a checked rate:;inflatibn, will be a much spjiiider pn•perity. and, the'reforej a he'ttef timeinvest in-America.. .;•- ' .' '

Q. Thank you, Mr:- President

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