ISB-451 Development of Islamic Sciences upto Abbasids

1. Tafsir: Definition, Significance and Early Development

The word tafsīr is derived from the three-letter Arabic verbal root of ر-س- ف F-S-R (fassara,

'interpret'). In its literal meaning, the word refers to interpreting, explaining, expounding, or

disclosing.[2] In Islamic contexts, it is defined as understanding and uncovering God's will

which has been conveyed by the Quranic text, by means of the Arabic language and one's

own knowledge.[3]

Tafsīr, (Arabic: “explanation,” “exegesis”) the science of explanation of the Qur ān,

the sacred scripture of Islam, or of Qur ānic commentary. So long as Muhammad, the

Prophet of Islam, was alive, no other authority for interpretations of the Qur ānic revelations

was recognized by Muslims. Upon his death, however, commentaries were needed because

the text, when it achieved written form, lacked historical sequence in the arrangement

of surahs, suffered from ambiguity of both text and meaning, showed a variety of differing

readings, was recorded in a defective script (lacking especially in vowels), and even

contained apparent contradictions. Many Muslims in the early period sought to explain the

Qur ān on the basis of pure personal speculation, known as tafsīr bil-ra y, and such

interpretation, though generally disapproved, has persisted down to the present time. Others

explained or embellished Qur ānic passages using stories drawn from Christian—and

especially from Jewish—sources (Isrā īliyyāt). To counter the arbitrariness of such

interpretation, in the fourth Islamic century (10th century CE) there emerged the religious

science called ilm al-tafsīr, a systematic exegesis of the Qur ānic text, which proceeds verse

by verse, and sometimes word by word. Over time this science developed several methods

and forms of its own.

The Hungarian scholar Ignáz Goldziher traced the development of tafsīr through several

stages. In the first, or primitive, stage, Muslims were concerned principally to establish the

proper text of the Qur ān. The second stage, known as traditional tafsīr, featured explanations

of Qur ānic passages based upon what the Prophet himself or his companions said these

passages to mean. It relied, therefore, upon the traditions (Hadith) or reports of the sayings of

Muhammad and his immediate associates. As Muslims sought to establish their identity as a

religious community and to define their doctrinal stance, there arose a dogmatic type of tafsīr.

The Qur ān was interpreted by various sectarian groups to establish their own peculiar

doctrinal positions; notable among them were the Mu tazilah, so-called rationalists, who

insisted that interpretation (ta wīl) of the Qur ān must conform with reason. Sufis (Muslim

mystics) and Shi is with esoteric inclinations also practiced ta wīl, departing sharply from a

purely external analysis. (See Bāṭiniyyah.) A British scholar, John Wansbrough,

classified tafsīr literature according to its form and function. He distinguished five types,

which he held to have appeared in roughly the following chronological order: attempts to

supply a narrative context for passages, efforts to explain the implications for conduct of

various passages, concern with details of the text, concern with matters of rhetoric, and

allegorical interpretation.

The monumental commentary compiled by the historian al-Ṭabarī (838/839–923) assembled

all the traditional scholarship that had been produced until his time. It remains the most basic

of all tafsīrs. Subsequent commentaries of note include those by al-Zamakhsharī (1075–

1143), al-Rāzī (1149–1209), al-Bayḍāwī (d. 1280), and al-Suyūṭī (1445–1505).

Commentaries continue to be compiled at the present time; Muslim modernists, for example,

have used them as a vehicle for their reformist ideas.

The first examples of tafsir can be traced back to Muhammad. According to Islamic belief, as

the Quran was revealed to him, he recited the verses to his companions, usually explaining

their meanings to teach them, as it was one of Muhammad's responsibilities.[4] Elements of

Muhammad's explanations including clarifying verses whose intents are not understood, the

indication of names, places, times etc. which have not been mentioned in the verse, restriction

of meanings which have been given as absolute and reconciliation of expressions which seem

contradictory.[citation needed] Although scholars including ibn Taymiyyah claim that Muhammad

has commented on the whole of the Quran, others including Ghazali cite the limited amount

of narratives (hadith), thus indicating that he has commented only on a portion of the

Quran.[1]

After the death of Muhammad, his companions (sahabah) undertook the task of

interpretation, thus starting a new age in tafsir. Most of the sahabah, including Abu Bakr,

refrained from commenting based on their personal views, and only narrated comments by

Muhammad. Others including ibn Abbas used their own knowledge from the Arabic

language to interpret the Quran. At this stage, tafsir was selective and concise regarding its

coverage, and only certain words, phrases and verses were explained.[1] The Quran was still

not fully interpreted, and commentaries were not separated from the hadith collection nor

written separately, mainly due to other occupations such as the collection of the Quran.[5]

By the time of the next generations ensuing the sahabah, scholars in the age of the successors

(tabi'in) started using a wide range of sources for tafsir. The whole of the Quran is

interpreted, and narrations are separated from tafsir into separate books and literature.

Grammatical explanations and historical data are preserved within these books; personal

opinions are recorded, whether accepted or rejected. During this time, a whole range of

schools of tafsir came into existence in different scholastic centers,

including Mecca, Medina and Iraq. Iraqi schools of tafsir came to be known for an approach

relied on personal judgment aside from the transmitted reports, and Jewish apocryphal

reports were also widely employed.[1] Notable compilers on this age including Sufyan al-

Thawri.[1]

Until this age, tafsir had been transmitted orally and had not been collected independently in

a book, rather, they had been gathered by muhaddithun (lit. scholars of hadith) in their hadith

books, under the topic of tafsir, along with other narrations of Muhammad.[6] This indicates

that tafsir, in its formative age, used to be a special domain within hadith. Widening of the

scope of tafsir and emergence of mufassirun in the age of the successors lead to the

development of an independent discipline of tafsir.[1]

Tafsir bi-al-ma'thur (tafsir bi-al-riwaya)[edit]

Tafsir bi-al-ma'thur, or commonly known as tafsir bi-al-riwaya, is the method of

commenting on the Quran using traditional sources. Tafsir bi-al-riwaya connotes tafsir using

another portion of the Quran, or sayings of Muhammad, or saying of his companions.[8] This

classical tafsir method is agreed upon by all scholars, and is the most used method throughout

history, partly because other methods have been criticized. Criticism of non-riwaya method is

mostly based on two grounds; for one, Muhammad has condemned those who interpret the

Quran from their own point of view,[9] and for two, most companions of Muhammad have

refrained from presenting their own ideas.[10] Some important examples of tafsir bi-al-

riwaya are Jāmi al-Bayān by al-Tabari and Tafseer al-Qur ān al- Aẓeem by ibn Kathir. The

sources used for tafsir bi-al-riwaya can be ordered by the rank of authority, as the Quran,

Hadith, the report by Sahaba and Tabi'iun, classical Arabic literature, and Isra'iliyat.

The most authoritative source of the interpretation is the Quran itself. Interpretation of the

Quran employing other Quranic reference is very common because of the close

interrelatedness of the verses of the Quran with one another. The Quranic verses explain and

interpret one another, which leads many to believe that it has the highest level of authenticity.

Many verses or words in the Quran are explained or further clarified in other verses of the

Quran. One example of the hadith which extensively employs this source of method is Al-

Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an by Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i. The authoritative source of

method second to the Quran is Hadith, by using narratives of Muhammad to interpret the

Quran. In this approach the most important external aids used are the collected oral traditions

upon which Muslim scholars based Islamic history and law. Authority of this method is

considered established by the statement made in the Quran that Muhammad is responsible for

explanation and guidance.[11] While some narratives are of revelation origin, others can be the

result of reasonings made by Muhammad.[12] One important aspect of these narratives is their

origin. Narratives used for tafsir, and in general, must be of authentic origin (sahih).

Narratives of such origin are considered requisite for tafsir.

Other source of the interpretation includes the accounts of Ṣaḥābah, companions of

Muhammad, or tabi‘un, the generation after sahabah, and Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in, the generation

after tabi'un. Their authority is based on an account in hadith Sahih Bukhari, which

accordingly, Muhammad said;

"The best people are those living in my generation, then those coming after them (Tābi‘un),

and then those coming after (the second generation)".[13]

If nothing is found in the Quran or the Hadīth, the commentator has recourse to what the

Ṣaḥābah reported about various verses. These are generally considered above personal

opinion, because these people grew up with everyday interaction with Muhammad, and had

often asked about the meanings of verses or circumstances of their revelation; and they were

very knowledgeable in both Arabic literature and Islamic thought. Another non-scripture

based source of the interpretation is classical Arabic literature. Classical Arabic poetry and

the text of the Quran are two resources which can be used as foundational reference in

ascertaining the meaning and signification of the remaining literal and figurative diction of

the Quran and its style of expression.[14] Using Arabic poetry for defining words is a long

used practice, in fact there are very few scholars who haven't used this source.[15] Less

authoritative source of the interpretation is Isra'iliyat, which is the body of narratives

originating from Judeo-Christian traditions, rather than from other well-accepted sources. The

Isra'iliyat are mostly non-biblical explanatory stories and traditions (Hebrew: midrashim)

giving extra information or interpretation about events or individuals recorded in the Hebrew

scriptures. Scholars starting with the Sahabah have studied narrative accounts of

other Abrahamic religions to further explain and clarify verses, especially parables, in the

Quran. While some may be accurate, these narratives are not subject to hadith authenticity

criteria, and are generally not favored for use.

Tafsir bi-al-ra'y (tafsir bi-al-diraya)[edit]

Tafsir bi-al-ra'y, or commonly known as tafsir bi-al-diraya, is the method of using one's

independent rational reasoning and mind (ijtihad) to form an opinion-oriented interpretation.

The most distinctive feature of tafsir bi-al-diraya is the inclusion of the opinions of the

commentator, thus forming the more objective view on Quranic verses. The relative paucity

of traditional sources is also a practical reason why the scope of the methodology is

augmented. This is considered sanctioned by the Quran itself,[1] as written in the

surah Sad verse 29:

(This is) a Scripture that We have revealed unto thee, full of blessing, that they may ponder

its revelations, and that men of understanding may reflect.

— Quran 38:29

This method is not interpretation by mere opinion however, but rather opinions must be based

on the main sources. Performing Quranic interpretation using solely one's own opinion is

believed to be prohibited by some Muslims. This is based on an authenticated hadith of

Muhammad which states "He who says (something) concerning the Qur'ân without

knowledge, he has taken his seat of fire".[16] However, this hadith can alternatively be

interpreted to refer to the importance of first properly studying and learning the Quran before

attempting to teach or preach it to others. Accordingly, the method of independent reasoning

(ijtihad) has several qualifications and conditions that need to be satisfied. Due to the nature

of orientation toward opinions, this method is rejected by certain scholars such as Ibn

Taymiyyah,[1] and prohibited by Wahhabi Islamic doctrine.[citation needed] Some important

examples of such tafsirs include Anwar al-Tanzil by al-Baydawi and Mafatih al-

Ghayb by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Some parameters used by these scholars including linguistic

resources, historical sources, methodological concepts such as maqasid or socio-cultural

environment taken into consideration.

In terms of linguistic resources, literary elements of the Arabic language,

including morphology, eloquence, syntax are an integral part of tafsir, as they constitute the

basis of understanding and interpretation. Arabic has a systematic way of shaping words so

one can know the meaning by knowing the root and the form the word was coined from. If

any word can be given a meaning that is compatible with the rules of grammar, Quranic text

can be interpreted that way. In terms of historical resources, scholars may choose to interpret

verses according to external factors, including their historical context and their place of

revelation. Historical context (Asbab al-nuzul) is particularly important to interpret verses

according to how the Quran was revealed, when and under which circumstances, and much

commentary was dedicated to history. The early tafsirs are considered to be some of the best

sources for Islamic history. Classification of the place of revelation, whether it was revealed

in Mecca or Medina, is important as well. This is because in general Meccan verses tend to

have an iman (loosely translated as faith) nature that includes believing in Allah, Muhammad,

and the day of judgment, whether it be theological foundations or basic faith principles. On

the other hand, Medinan verses constitute legislation, social obligations, and constitution of a

state.

On the more conceptual level, the idea of maqasid (goals or purpose) can be taken into

account. Verses may be interpreted to preserve the general goals of shariah, which may be

considered simply as bringing happiness to a person in this life and the hereafter. That way,

any interpretation that threatens to compromise the preservation of religion, life, lineage,

intellect or property may be discarded or ruled otherwise in order to secure these goals.

Further, the socio-cultural environment may also taken into consideration. This includes

understanding and interpreting the Quran while taking into account the cultural and social

environment to which it has been revealed; or according to the scholars' own time. Often than

not, the distinction can be made between the 'amm (general) verses that aimed at universal

conditions for Muslims, and khass (specific) verses that applied to specific conditions, time

or need.[1] This is considered an integral part of analyzing the universality of the Quran.

Scholars usually do not favor to confine verses to a single time interval, but rather interpret

according to the needs of their time.[17]

3. Hadith: Definition, Significance and Early Development

Hadith, Arabic Ḥadīth (“News” or “Story”), also spelled Hadīt, record of the traditions or

sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, revered and received as a major source of

religious law and moral guidance, second only to the authority of the Qur ān, the holy book

of Islam. It might be defined as the biography of Muhammad perpetuated by the long

memory of his community for their exemplification and obedience. The development of

Hadith is a vital element during the first three centuries of Islamic history, and its study

provides a broad index to the mind and ethos of Islam.

Nature and Origins

The term Hadith derives from the Arabic root ḥ-d-th meaning “to happen” and so

“to tell a happening,” “to report,” “to have, or give, as news,” or “to speak of.” It

means tradition seen as narrative and record. From Hadith comes

the Sunnah (literally, a “well-trodden path”—i.e., taken as precedent and

authority or directive), to which the faithful conform in submission to the

sanction that Hadith possesses and that legalists, on that ground, can enjoin.

Tradition in Islam is thus both content and constraint, Hadith as the biographical

ground of law and Sunnah as the system of obligation derived from it. In and

through Hadith, Muhammad may be said to have shaped and determined from

the grave the behaviour patterns of the household of Islam by the posthumous

leadership his personality exercised. There were, broadly, two factors operating

to this end. One was the unique status of Muhammad in the genesis of Islam, and

the other was the rapid geographical expansion of the new faith in the first two

centuries of its history into various areas of cultural confrontation. Hadith cannot

be rightly assessed unless the measure of these two elements and their

interaction is properly taken.

The experience of Muslims in the conquered territories of west and middle Asia and North

Africa was related to their earlier tradition. Islamic tradition was firmly grounded in the sense

of Muhammad’s personal destiny as the Prophet—the instrument of the Qur ān and the

apostle of God. The clue to tradition as an institution in Islam may be seen in the recital of

the shahādah, or “witness” (“There is no god but God; Muhammad is the prophet of God”),

with its twin items as inseparable convictions—God and the messenger. Islamic tradition

follows from the primary phenomenon of the Qur ān, received personally by Muhammad and

thus inextricably bound up with his person and the agency of his vocation. Acknowledgment

of the Qur ān as scripture by the Islamic community was inseparable from acknowledgment

of Muhammad as its appointed recipient. In that calling he had neither fellow nor partner, for

God, according to the Qur ān, spoke only to Muhammad. When Muhammad died, in 632 CE,

the gap thus created in the emotions and the mental universe of Muslims was shatteringly

wide. It was also permanent. Death had terminated the revelation embodied in the Qur ān. By

the same stroke, scriptural mediation had ended, as well as prophetic presence.

The Prophet’s death was said to have coincided with the perfection of revelation. But the

perfective closure of both the book and the Prophet’s life, though in that sense triumphant,

was also onerous, particularly in view of the new changing circumstances, of both space and

time, in the geographical expansion of Islam. In all the new pressures of historical

circumstance, where was direction to be sought? Where, if not from the same source as the

scriptural mouthpiece, who by virtue of that consummated status had become the revelatory

instrument of the divine word and could therefore be taken as an everlasting index to the

divine counsel? The instinct for and the growth of tradition are thus integral elements in the

very nature of Islam, Muhammad, and the Qur ān. Ongoing history and the extending

dispersion of Muslim believers provided the occasion and spur for the compilation of Hadith.

Historical Development

The appeal of the ordered recollection of Muhammad to the Islamic mind did not become

immediately formalized and sophisticated. On the contrary, there is evidence that the full

development of Hadith was slow and uneven. Time and distance had to play their role before

memory became stylized and official.

Literary tradition in pre-Islamic Arabia

The first generation had its own immediacy of Islamic experience, both within the life span of

the Prophet and in the first quarter century afterward. It had also the familiar patterns of tribal

chronicle in song and saga. Pre-Islamic poetry celebrated the glory of each tribe and their

warriors. Such poetry was recited in honour of each tribe’s ancestors. The vigour and élan of

original Islam took up these postures and baptized them into Muslim lore. The proud history

of which Muhammad was the crux was, naturally, the ardent theme, first of chronicle and

then of history writing. Both needed and stimulated the cherishing of tradition. The lawyers,

in turn, took their clues from the same source. While the Qur ān was being received, there

had been reluctance and misgiving about recording the words and acts of the Prophet, lest

they be confused with the uniquely constituted contents of the scripture. Knowledge of

Muhammad’s disapproval of the practice of recording his words is evidence enough that the

practice existed. With the Qur ān complete and canonized, those considerations no longer

obtained, and time and necessity turned the instinct for Hadith into a process of gathering

momentum.

Developments of the 1st and 2nd centuries AH

Within the first century of the Prophet’s death, tradition had come to be a central factor in the

development of law and the shape of society. Association by Hadith with Muhammad’s name

and example became increasingly the ground of authority. The 2nd century brought the

further elaboration of this relationship by increasing formalism in its processes. Traditions

had to be sustained by an expert “science” of attestation able to satisfy rigorous

formal criteria of their connection with the person of Muhammad through his “companions,”

by an unbroken sequence of “reportage.” This science became so meticulous that it is fair

(even if also paradoxical) to suspect that the more complete and formally satisfactory the

attestation claimed to be, the more likely it was that the tradition was of late and deliberate

origin. The developed requirements of acceptability that the tradition boasted simply did not

exist in the early, more haphazard and spontaneous days.

It is clear that many customs and usages native to non-Arab societies prior to their

Islamization found their way into Islam in the form of reputed or alleged traditions of

Muhammad, though always on the condition of their general compatibility with Islamic

tradition. Implicit in this sense in Muhammad’s personal example and genius, tradition

inferred an elasticity and an embrace large enough to comprehend and anticipate all that

Islam in its wide geographical experience was to become.

Qur ānic commentary, as it developed in the wake of these other factors of law and custom,

also leaned heavily on traditional material, for the incidents of the Qur ānic narrative and the

occasions of revelation could best be understood by what tradition had to say in its reporting

of them. Further, since the patterns of Qur ānic commentary were largely hortatory, Hadith

was a ready mine of word and story calculated to exemplify and reinforce what exhortation

commended. Except in rare and controversial cases (the so-called Ḥadīth Qudsī, or Holy

Tradition), these traditional factors in Qur ānic interpretation were only elucidatory, and the

substance of tradition could in no way dispute or displace the essential, primary authority of

the Qur ānic text; the obiter dicta (incidental observations) of Muhammad,

though sacrosanct, lacked the hallmark of revelation, which belonged solely to the Qur ān.

Among earliest developed examples of Hadith are the narratives of the biographer Ibn

Isḥāq (died AH 150 [767 CE]) and the compilation of laws by Mālik ibn Anas, known as al-

Muwaṭṭa (died AH 179 [795 CE]). But they preceded by less than half a century the success

of the theory that made tradition indispensable to the valid development of Islamic law.

3rd century AH and subsequent developments

The chief protagonist of the view correlating tradition and law was Muḥammad al-

Shāfi ī (died AH 204 [820 CE]), who claimed for tradition a divine imprint as an extension of

the revelation of the Qur ān. It was in line with this conviction that the phrase “the Qur ān

and the Sunnah” became current to describe the fount of authority in Sunni Islam (the major

traditionalist sect). By this mandate and out of the needs and inventiveness of lawyers, the

mass of tradition grew apace. When virtually no issues could be argued, still less settled,

except by connection with cited acts and opinions of Muhammad, the temptation to require or

to imagine or to allege such traditions became irresistible. Supply approximated to demand,

and the growth of both made more ingenious and pretentious the science of

supporting attribution. The increasing volume and complexity of the material contained in

Hadith necessitated larger compilations and more detailed classification. These factors

worked together to inspire a critical editorial activity that in the course of the 3rd century

generated what have come to be regarded as the six canonical collections of Hadith by

Sunnis. The first two of them have acquired a status of great sanctity. Before noting these, it

is convenient to describe the editorial task and the editorial procedures that constitute the

developed science of Hadith criticism.

The Science of Hadith

The study of tradition ( ilm al-ḥadīth) distinguishes between the substance, or content, known

as the “gist” (matn) of the matter, and the “leaning” (isnād), or chain of corroboration on

which it hangs.

Form of Hadith and criteria of authentication

That Muhammad observed “Seek knowledge, though it be in China” or “Beware of

suspicion, for it is the falsest of falsehoods” reveals the matn, or “the meat of the matter.” The

formula introducing such a Hadith would speak in the first person: “It was related to me by

A, on the authority of B, on the authority of C, on the authority of D, from E (here a

companion of Muhammad) that the Prophet said….” This chain of

names constituted the isnād on which the saying or event depended for its authenticity. The

major emphases in editing and arguing from tradition always fell on the isnād, rather than on

a critical attitude to the matn itself. The question was not “Is this the sort of thing Muhammad

might credibly be imagined to have said or done?” but “Is the report that he said or did it well

supported in respect of witnesses and transmitters?” The first question would have introduced

too great a danger of subjective judgment or independence of mind, though it may be

suspected that issues were in fact often decided by such critical appraisal in the form of

decisions ostensibly relating only to isnād. The second question certainly allowed a

theoretically objective and reasonably precise pattern of criteria.

If the adjacent names in the chain of transmission overlapped in life, there was certainty that

they could have listened to one another. Their travels were also investigated to see if their

paths could have really crossed. Biographies could be built up to show that they were honest

men and spoke truly. Comparative study could be made of their reputations for veracity as

acknowledged by their contemporaries or indicated by their traditions when compared. The

frequency of currency through several sources was yet another element in the testing of

traditions. Most important of all was the final link with the “companion,” who in the first

instance had the tradition from his or her contact with the Prophet.

Classifications

In all these ways, and others involving more minutiae, it was possible to establish categories

of Hadith quality. Traditions might be sound (ṣaḥīḥ), good (ḥasan), or weak (ḍā īf). Other

terms, such as healthy (ṣāliḥ) and infirm (saqīm), were also current. Each of the three

classifications was liable to subdivisions, depending on refinements of assessment and, later,

on their standing with the classic compilers. Distinctions were less rigorously seen if the

traditions were cited not for legal definitions but merely for moral purposes. A ḍā īf tradition,

for example, might well be salutary for exhortation, even if lawyers were required to exclude

or ignore it. Traditions also varied in strength according to whether one or more

“companions” could be adduced, whether the isnād had parallels, and whether they were

continuous back to Muhammad (muttaṣil) or intermitted (mawqūf). The subtleties in these

and other questions were part of the active competence that attended the whole science.

The repute and authority of the canonical collections did much to stabilize the situation, but

only because their emergence demonstrated that the zest for tradition had overreached itself.

By the end of the 3rd century AH it was sorely necessary to solidify Hadith into a stable

corpus of material to which no new element could credibly be added and from which

extravagances had been purged. The Hadith tradition within the various traditions had by then

become a permanent and disciplined element in the authority structure of Islam—the second

great source of law and practice, complementary to the Qur ān and available for analogical

handling (qiyās) and for consensus (ijtihād) as further sources of legislation, arguing from the

Qur ān and the Sunnah as primary. Shī ite tradition stands apart from this structure of

authority.

Sectarian Variations

The tradition of the Shī ites, the most significant minority branch of Islam in terms of number

of adherents, distinguished from the tradition of the Sunni majority by belief in the special

role of the Prophet’s cousin Alī and his descendants, diverges sharply from a very early date,

though the emphasis on the personality of Muhammad was identical. The Shī ites broke away

from the Sunni stream of Islam for deep reasons of politics, emotion, and theology. There

was the dispute about caliphal succession and the role of Alī, the fourth caliph, cousin and

son-in-law of Muhammad, and bitter cleavage because of the tragic fate of his two sons and

especially of Ḥusayn in the massacre of Karbalā , from which there ultimately evolved the

theology of vicarious suffering epitomized in Shī ite devotion and ritual. All these factors

inevitably involved the business of tradition. The schism read the origins according to the

divided loyalties, and there was little that was not potentially contentious, apart from obvious

matters—e.g., Muhammad’s intentions for Alī and the caliphate. The issues were fought out

in rivalry for the mind of the Prophet, the authority of which was the sole agreement in the

very disputing of it. The Shī ites thus rejected the tradition of the Sunnis and developed their

own corpus of tradition (though there is evidence that al-Nasā ī, at least, among the classical

compilers, had sympathy with aspects of their cause). They also questioned the Sunni notions

of isnād and of the community as a locus of authority and evolved their own system of

submission to their imams. This altered the whole role that tradition might play. The major

Shī ite compilations date from the 4th and 5th centuries AH and allow only traditions

emanating from the house of Alī. The first of them is that of Abū Ja far Muḥammad al-

Qulīnī (died AH 328 [939 CE]), Kāfī fī ilm al-dīn, which might be translated: “Everything

You Need to Know About the Science of Religious Practice.”

Significance of Hadith

Canonical collections of Hadith are, for the non-Muslim, an introduction to a world of faith—

of behaviour, authority, and almost encyclopaedic inclusiveness. Provisions of law are the

primary element, enlarging Qur ānic legislation. They contain a whole array of moral, social,

commercial, and personal matters, as well as the themes of eschatology. All reaches of public

and private conduct may be found there, from the disposal of a date stone to the crisis of the

deathbed, from the manner of ablution to the duties of forgiveness, from the physical routines

of digestion to the description of the Day of Judgment. There is a Talmudic capacity for

detail and scrupulousness in legal and ethical prescriptions and precepts. There are stories

of integrity and right action—for example, that of the purchaser of a plot of ground who

subsequently unearthed in it a pot of gold, which he brought back to the former owner,

protesting that it was not within his bargain. The vendor, likewise, refused to claim it since he

had not known the gold was there when he sold his field. An arbitrator solved their dilemma

of honesty by proposing the marriage of the son of one with the daughter of the other so that,

after alms, the gold might be settled on the couple. Through and in tradition, Islam aligned

itself authoritatively with all it found compatible in local usages and brought hospitably and

masterfully within its purview the continuity of many cultures. There is wide evidence of the

impact of Jewish and Christian elements, notably in the realm of eschatology, in the

elaboration of the stark and urgent Qur ānic doctrine of the Last Judgment. But always the

imprint of Islam is clear. Tradition is at once a mine and a kind of currency, the source and

the circulation of the values it makes and preserves.

4. The Compilations

The most revered of all traditionalists was al-Bukhārī (AH 194–256 [810–870 CE]),

whose Al-Jāmi al-ṣaḥīḥ (“The Authentic Collection”) has a unique place in the awe and

esteem of Muslims as a work of great historical import and deep piety. While a boy, he made

the pilgrimage to Mecca and gathered traditions in wide travels. According to tradition, he

was inspired to his task by a vision of the Prophet Muhammad being pestered by flies while

asleep—flies that he (al-Bukhārī) fanned from the Prophet’s face. The flies represented the

cloud of spurious traditions darkening the true image, and the fan was its tireless rescuer.

Whatever the truth of this narrative, it captures the temper of al-Bukhārī’s vocation.

His Ṣaḥīḥ occupied 16 years of editorial pains and scrutiny. He included 7,397 traditions with

full isnād. Allowing for repetitions, the net total was 2,762, gathered, it is said, from more

than 600,000 memorized items. He arranged the whole into 97 books and 3,450 chapters or

topics, repeating the traditions that bore on several themes.

Of comparable stature was the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj (AH 202–261 [817–875 CE]),

to which the compiler prefaced a discussion of the criteria of Hadith. The material largely

confirms his contemporaries, and all such traditions common to these two authorities are

known as agreed (muttafaq). It became characteristic to give freer rein to prevailing or

communal assent in matters of isnād.

There are four other classical collections of tradition, all belonging within the 3rd

century AH and interdependent in part. Abū Dā ūd al-Sijistānī (AH 202–275 [817–889 CE])

produced his Kitāb al-sunan (“Book of Traditions”), containing 4,800 traditions relating to

matters of jurisprudence (as the term sunan indicates, in contradistinction to a jāmi , or

collection embracing all fields). Abū Isā Muḥammad al-Tirmidhī (died AH 279 [892 CE])

edited the Jāmi al-ṣaḥīḥ, adding notes on the distinctive interpretations of the schools of law

(madhāhib). Abū Abd al-Raḥmān al-Nasā ī (AH 216–303 [830–915 CE]) produced

another Kitāb al-sunan with special concern for the religious law relating to ritual acts. Abū

Abdallāh ibn Mājā (AH 210–273 [824–886 CE]), a pupil of Abū Dā ūd, compiled another

with the same title but tended to a readier tolerance of less than satisfactory traditions.

Preferences shifted between these four, and some were slower of recognition than others. Nor

did they oust the earlier collection of Mālik ibn Anas, which maintained, if intermittently, its

wide appeal. But they formed the increasing reliance of generations of Muslims, within the

unique eminence of the master “pair,” and formed the sources of later popular editions,

intended to conflate material for didactic purposes. One such was the work of Abū

Muḥammad al-Baghawī (died AH 516 [1122 CE]) called Maṣābīḥ al-Sunnah (“The Lamps of

the Sunnah”). Commentaries on all these classical musannafāt, or compilations, were many,

and they were important in education and piety.

The Kutub al-Sittah (Arabic: تة ('romanized: al-Kutub as-Sittah, lit. 'The six books , ٱلكتب ٱلس

are six (originally five) books containing collections of hadith (sayings or acts of the Islamic

prophet Muhammad) compiled by six Sunni Muslim scholars in the ninth century CE,

approximately two centuries after the death of Muhammad. They are sometimes referred to

as al-Sihah al-Sittah, which translates as "The Authentic Six". They were first formally

grouped and defined by Ibn al-Qaisarani in the 11th century, who add Sunan ibn Majah to the

list.[1][2][3] Since then, they have enjoyed near-universal acceptance as part of the official

canon of Sunni Islam.

Not all Sunni Muslim jurisprudence scholars agree on the addition of Ibn Majah. In

particular, the Malikis and Ibn al-Athir consider al-Mawatta' to be the sixth book.[4] The

reason for the addition of Ibn Majah's Sunan is that it contains many Hadiths which do not

figure in the other five, whereas all the Hadiths in the Muwatta' figure in the other Sahih

books.[4]

Sunni Muslims view the six major hadith collections as their most important, though the

order of authenticity varies between Madhhabs:[5]

1. Sahih Bukhari, collected by Imam Bukhari (d. 256 AH, 870 CE), includes 7,275

ahadith (2,230 without repetitions)[6]

2. Sahih Muslim, collected by Muslim b. al-Hajjaj (d. 261 AH, 875 CE), includes 9,200

ahadith (2,200 without repetitions)[7]

3. Sunan Abu Dawood, collected by Abu Dawood (d. 275 AH, 888 CE), includes 4,800

ahadith

4. Jami al-Tirmidhi, collected by al-Tirmidhi (d. 279 AH, 892 CE), includes 3,956

ahadith

5. Sunan al-Sughra, collected by al-Nasa'i (d. 303 AH, 915 CE), includes 5,270 ahadith

6. Either:

Sunan ibn Majah, collected by Ibn Majah (d. 273 AH, 887 CE), over 4,000 ahadith

Muwatta Malik, collected by Imam Malik (d. 179 AH, 795 CE), 1,720 ahadith [8]

The first two, commonly referred to as the Two Sahihs as an indication of their authenticity,

contain approximately seven thousand hadiths altogether if repetitions are not counted,

according to Ibn Hajar.[9]

Authors

According to the Cambridge History of Iran:[10] "After this period commences the age of the

authors of the six canonical collections of Sunni hadith, all of whom were Persian, except

Imam Malik. The authors of the six collections are as follows:

1. Muhammad b. Isma'il al-Bukhari, the author of the Sahih Bukhari, which he

composed over a period of sixteen years. Traditional sources quote Bukhari as saying

that he did not record any hadith before performing ablution and praying. Bukhari

died near Samarqand in 256/869–70

2. Muslim b. Hajjaj al-Naishapuri, who died in Nishapur in 261/874–5 and whose Sahih

Muslim is second in authenticity only to that of Bukhari. Some scholars rate the

authenticity of Sahih Muslim more than Sahih Bukhari

3. Abu Dawood Sulaiman b. Ash'ath al-Sijistani, a Persian but of Arab descent, who

died in 275/888–9.

4. Muhammad b. 'Isa al-Tirmidhi, the author of the well-known as Sunan al-Tirmidhi,

who was a student of Bukhari and died in 279/892–3.

5. Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-Nasa'i, who was from Khurasan and died in 303/915–16.

6. Ibn Majah al-Qazwini, who died in 273/886–7.

7. Malik was born the son of Anas ibn Malik (not the Sahabi) and Aaliyah bint Shurayk

al-Azdiyya in Medina circa 711. His family was originally from the al-Asbahi tribe

of Yemen, but his great grandfather Abu 'Amir relocated the family to Medina after

converting to Islam in the second year of the Hijri calendar, or 623 CE. According

to Al-Muwatta, he was tall, heavyset, imposing of stature, very fair, with white hair

and beard but bald, with a huge beard and blue eyes.[11] In chronological order his

work was compiled even earlier than Sahih Bukhari, therefore Al-Muwatta is highly

regarded in Islamic literature.

5. Fiqh: Definition and Sources

The word fiqh is an Arabic term meaning "deep understanding"[7]:470 or "full comprehension".

Technically it refers to the body of Islamic law extracted from detailed Islamic sources

(which are studied in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence) and the process of gaining

knowledge of Islam through jurisprudence. The historian Ibn Khaldun describes fiqh as

"knowledge of the rules of God which concern the actions of persons who own themselves

connected to obey the law respecting what is required (wajib), sinful (haraam), recommended

(mandūb), disapproved (makrūh) or neutral (mubah)".[8] This definition is consistent amongst

the jurists.

In Modern Standard Arabic, fiqh has also come to mean Islamic jurisprudence.[9] It is not thus

possible to speak of Chief Justice John Roberts as an expert in the common law fiqh of

the United States, or of Egyptian legal scholar Abd El-Razzak El-Sanhuri as an expert in the

civil law fiqh of Egypt.

Fiqh (/fiːk/;[1] Arabic: فقھ [f qh]) is Islamic jurisprudence.[2] Fiqh is often described as the

human understanding of the sharia,[3] that is human understanding of the divine Islamic law

as revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah (the teachings and practices of the Islamic

prophet Muhammad and His companions). Fiqh expands and develops Shariah through

interpretation (ijtihad) of the Quran and Sunnah by Islamic jurists (ulama)[3] and is

implemented by the rulings (fatwa) of jurists on questions presented to them. Thus,

whereas sharia is considered immutable and infallible by Muslims, fiqh is considered fallible

and changeable. Fiqh deals with the observance of rituals, morals and social legislation in

Islam as well as political system. In the modern era, there are four prominent schools

(madh'hab) of fiqh within Sunni practice, plus two (or three) within Shi'a practice. A person

trained in fiqh is known as a faqīh (plural fuqaha).[4]

Figuratively, fiqh means knowledge about Islamic legal rulings from their sources and

deriving religious rulings from their sources necessitates the mujtahid (an individual who

exercises ijtihad) to have a deep understanding in the different discussions of jurisprudence.

A faqīh must look deep down into a matter and not suffice himself with just the apparent

meaning, and a person who only knows the appearance of a matter is not qualified as

a faqīh.[2]

The studies of fiqh, are traditionally divided into Uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of Islamic

jurisprudence, lit. the roots of fiqh), the methods of legal interpretation and analysis;

and Furū al-fiqh (lit. the branches of fiqh), the elaboration of rulings on the basis of these

principles.[5][6] Furū al-fiqh is the product of the application of Uṣūl al-fiqh and the total

product of human efforts at understanding the divine will. A hukm (plural aḥkām) is a

particular ruling in a given case.

Primary sources

The Qur'an is the first and most important source of Islamic law. Believed to be the direct

word of God as revealed to Muhammad through angel Gabriel in Mecca and Medina, the

scripture specifies the moral, philosophical, social, political and economic basis on which a

society should be constructed. The verses revealed in Mecca deal

with philosophical and theological issues, whereas those revealed in Medina are concerned

with socio-economic laws. The Qur'an was written and preserved during the life of

Muhammad, and compiled soon after his death.[6]

The verses of the Qur'an are categorized into three fields: "science of speculative theology",

"ethical principles" and "rules of human conduct". The third category is directly concerned

with Islamic legal matters which contains about five hundred verses or one thirteenth of it.

The task of interpreting the Qur'an has led to various opinions and judgments. The

interpretations of the verses by Muhammad's companions for Sunnis and Imams for Shias are

considered the most authentic, since they knew why, where and on what occasion each verse

was revealed.[1][6]

Sunnah

The Sunnah is the next important source, and is commonly defined as "the traditions and

customs of Muhammad" or "the words, actions and silent assertions of him". It includes the

everyday sayings and utterances of Muhammad, his acts, his tacit consent, and

acknowledgments of statements and activities. According to Shi'ite jurists, the sunnah also

includes the words, deeds and acknowledgments of the twelve Imams and Fatimah,

Muhammad's daughter, who are believed to be infallible.[1][7]

Justification for using the Sunnah as a source of law can be found in the Qur'an. The Qur'an

commands Muslims to follow Muhammad.[8] During his lifetime, Muhammad made it clear

that his traditions (along with the Qur'an) should be followed after his death.[9] The

overwhelming majority of Muslims consider the sunnah to be essential supplements to and

clarifications of the Qur'an. In Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur'an contains many rules for the

behavior expected of Muslims but there are no specific Qur'anic rules on many religious and

practical matters. Muslims believe that they can look at the way of life, or sunnah, of

Muhammad and his companions to discover what to imitate and what to avoid.

Much of the sunnah is recorded in the Hadith. Initially, Muhammad had instructed his

followers not to write down his acts, so they may not confuse it with the Qur'an. However, he

did ask his followers to disseminate his sayings orally. As long as he was alive, any doubtful

record could be confirmed as true or false by simply asking him. His death, however, gave

rise to confusion over Muhammad's conduct. Thus the Hadith were established.[7] Due to

problems of authenticity, the science of Hadith (Arabic: `Ulum al-hadith) is established. It is

a method of textual criticism developed by early Muslim scholars in determining the veracity

of reports attributed to Muhammad. This is achieved by analyzing the text of the report, the

scale of the report's transmission, the routes through which the report was transmitted, and

the individual narrators involved in its transmission. On the basis of these criteria, various

Hadith classifications developed.[10]

To establish the authenticity of a particular Hadith or report, it had to be checked by

following the chain of transmission (isnad). Thus the reporters had to cite their reference, and

their reference's reference all the way back to Muhammad. All the references in the chain had

to have a reputation for honesty and possessing a good retentive memory.[7] Thus

biographical analysis (`ilm al-rijāl, lit. "science of people"), which contains details about the

transmitter are scrutinized. This includes analyzing their date and place of birth; familial

connections; teachers and students; religiosity; moral behaviour; literary output; their travels;

as well as their date of death. Based upon these criteria, the reliability (thiqāt) of the

transmitter is assessed. Also determined is whether the individual was actually able to

transmit the report, which is deduced from their contemporaneity and geographical proximity

with the other transmitters in the chain.[11] Examples of biographical dictionaries include Ibn

Hajar al-Asqalani's "Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb" or al-Dhahabi's "Tadhkirat al-huffāz."[12]

Using this criterion, Hadith are classified into three categories:[7]

1. Undubitable (mutawatir), which are very widely known, and backed up by numerous

references.

2. Widespread (mashhur), which are widely known, but backed up with few original

references.

3. Isolated or Single (wahid), which are backed up by too few and often discontinuous

references.

in a shariah court a qadi (judge ) hears a case, including witnesses and evidence . then the

qadi makes a ruling . sometimes the qadi consults a mufti or scholar of law, for an opinion.

Secondary sources

All medieval Muslim jurists rejected arbitrary opinion, and instead developed various

secondary sources, also known as juristic principles or doctrines[clarification needed], to follow in

case the primary sources (i.e. the Qur'an and Sunnah) are silent on the issue.[13]

Consensus

The ijma' , or consensus amongst Muslim jurists on a particular legal issue, constitutes the

third source of Islamic law. Muslim jurists provide many verses of the Qur'an that

legitimize ijma' as a source of legislation.[14][15] Muhammad himself said:

"My followers will never agree upon an error or what is wrong",

"God's hand is with the entire community".[14][16]

In history, it has been the most important factor in defining the meaning of the other sources

and thus in formulating the doctrine and practice of the Muslim community.[17] This is so

because ijma' represents the unanimous agreement of Muslims on a regulation or law at any

given time.[18]

There are various views on ijma' among Muslims. Sunni jurists consider ijma' as a source, in

matters of legislation, as important as the Qur'an and Sunnah. Shiite jurists, however,

consider ijma' as source of secondary importance, and a source that is, unlike the Qur'an and

Sunnah, not free from error.[19] Ijma' was always used to refer to agreement reached in the

past, either remote or near.[17] Amongst the Sunni jurists there is diversity on who is eligible

to participate in ijma' , as shown in the following table:

In modern Muslim usage it is no longer associated with traditional authority and appears as

democratic institution and an instrument of reform.[17]

Analogical reason

Qiyas or analogical reason is the fourth source of the sharia for the majority

of Sunni jurisprudence. It aims to draw analogies to a previously accepted

decision. Shiites do not accept analogy, but replace it with reason (aql); among Sunnis,

the Hanbalites have traditionally been reluctant to accept analogy while the Zahirites don't

accept it at all. Analogical reason in Islam is the process of legal deduction according to

which the jurist, confronted with an unprecedented case, bases his or her argument on the

logic used in the Qur'an and Sunnah. Legally sound analogy must not be based on arbitrary

judgment, but rather be firmly rooted in the primary sources.[20]

Supporters of the practice of qiyas will often point to passages in the Qur'an that describe an

application of a similar process by past Islamic communities. According to supporters of the

practice, Muhammad said: "Where there is no revealed injunction, I will judge amongst you

according to reason."[21] Further, supporters claim that he extended the right to reason to

others. Finally, supporters of the practice claim that it is sanctioned by the ijma, or consensus,

amongst Muhammad's companions.[20] Islamic studies scholar Bernard G. Weiss has pointed

out that while analogical reason was accepted as a fourth source of law by later generations,

its validity was not a foregone conclusion among earlier Muslim jurists.[22] Thus the issue of

analogical reason and its validity was a controversial one early on, though the practice

eventually gained acceptance of the majority of Sunni jurists.

The success and expansion of Islam brought it into contact with different cultures, societies

and traditions, such as those of Byzantines and Persians. With such contact, new problems

emerged for Islamic law to tackle. Moreover, there was a significant distance

between Medina, the Islamic capital, and the Muslims on the periphery on the Islamic state.

Thus far off jurists had to find novel Islamic solutions without the close supervision of the

hub of Islamic law (back in Medina). During the Umayyad dynasty, the concept of qiyas was

abused by the rulers. The Abbasids, who succeeded the Umayyads defined it more strictly, in

an attempt to apply it more consistently.[20]

The general principle behind the process of qiyas is based on the understanding that every

legal injunction guarantees a beneficial and welfare satisfying objective. Thus, if the cause of

an injunction can be deduced from the primary sources, then analogical deduction can be

applied to cases with similar causes. For example, wine is prohibited in Islam because of its

intoxicating property. Thus qiyas leads to the conclusion that all intoxicants are forbidden.[20]

The Hanafi school of thought very strongly supports qiyas. Imam Abu Hanifa, an important

practitioner of qiyas, elevated qiyas to a position of great significance in Islamic law. Abu

Hanifa extended the rigid principle of basing rulings on the Qur'an and Sunnah to incorporate

opinion and exercise of free thought by jurists. In order to respond suitably to emerging

problems, he based his judgments, like other jurists, on the explicit meanings of primary texts

(the Qur'an and sunnah). But, he also considered the "spirit" of Islamic teachings, as well as

whether the ruling would be in the interest of the objectives of Islam. Such rulings were

based on public interest and the welfare of the Muslim community.[20]

“ The knowledge of ours is an opinion, it is the best

we have been able to achieve. He who is able to

arrive at different conclusions is entitled to his

own opinion as we are entitled to our own. ”

— Abu Hanifa[20]

The Shafi'i school of thought accepts qiyas as a valid source. Imam Shafi'i, however,

considered it a weak source, and tried to limit the cases where jurists would need to resort

to qiyas. He criticized and rejected analogical deductions that were not firmly rooted in

the Qur'an and sunnah. According to Shafi'i, if analogical deductions were not strictly rooted

in primary sources, they would have adverse effects. One such consequence could be variety

of different rulings in the same subject. Such a situation, he argued, would undermine the

predictability and uniformity of a sound legal system. [23]

Imam Malik accepted qiyas as a valid source of legislation. For him, if a parallel could be

established between the effective cause of a law in the primary sources and a new case, then

analogical deduction could be viable tool. Malik, however, went beyond his adherence to

"strict analogy" and proposed pronouncements on the basis of what jurists considered was

"public good".[23]

Juristic preference

Abu Hanifa developed a new source known as juristic preference.[24] Juristic preference is

defined as:

A means to seek ease and convenience,

To adopt tolerance and moderation,

To over-rule analogical reason, if necessary.[25]

The source, inspired by the principle of conscience, is a last resort if none of the widely

accepted sources are applicable to a problem. It involves giving favor to rulings that dispel

hardship and bring ease to people.[23] The doctrine was justified directly by the Qur'anic verse

stating: "Allah desires you ease and good, not hardship".[25] Though its main adherents were

Abu Hanifa and his pupils (such as Abu Yusuf), Malik and his students made use of it to

some degree. The source was subject to extensive discussion and argumentation,[26] and its

opponents claimed that it often departs from the primary sources.[23]

This doctrine was useful in the Islamic world outside the Middle East where the Muslims

encountered environments and challenges they had been unfamiliar with in Arabia.[24] One

example of isthisan is cited as follows: If a well is contaminated it may not be used for ritual

purification. Istihsan suggests that withdrawing a certain number of buckets of water from the

well will remove the impurities. Analogical reason, however, dictates that despite removing

some of the water, a small concentration of contaminants will always remain in the well (or

the well walls) rendering the well impure. The application of analogy means the public may

not use the well, and therefore causes hardship. Thus the principle of justistic preference is

applied, and the public may use the well for ritual purification.[25]

Public interest

Malik developed a tertiary source called al-maslahah al-mursalah, which means that which is

in the best interests of the general public. According to this source of Islamic law, rulings can

be pronounced in accordance with the "underlying meaning of the revealed text in the light of

public interest". In this case, the jurist uses his wisdom to pursue public interest. This source

is rejected by the Shafi'ites, Hanbalites and Zahirites from Sunni jurisprudence.[23]

Inference

Shafi'i accepted cases in which he had to be more flexible with the application of Qisas.

Similar to Abu Hanifa and Malik, he developed a tertiary source of legislation. The Shafi'i

school adopted istidlal or inference, a process of seeking guidance from the source. Inference

allowed the jurists to avoid strict analogy in a case where no clear precedent could be found.

In this case, public interest was distinguished as a basis for legislation.[23]

Muslim scholars divided inference into three types. The first is the expression of the

connection existing between one proposition and another without any specific effective

cause. Next, inference could mean presumption that a state of things, which is not proved to

have ceased, still continues. The final type of inference is the authority as to the revealed laws

previous to Islam.[27]

Reason

Shi'ite jurists maintain that if a solution to a problem can not be found from the primary

sources, then aql or reason should be given free rein to deduce a proper response from the

primary sources. The process, whereby rational efforts are made by the jurist to arrive at an

appropriate ruling, when applied is called ijtihad (literally meaning "exerting oneself").

Shi'ite jurists maintain that qiyas is a specific type of ijtihad. The Sunni Shafi' school of

thought, however, holds that both qiyas and ijtihad are the same.[28]

Sunni jurists accepted ijtihad as a mechanism for deducing rulings. They, however,

announced an end to its practice during the thirteenth century. The reason for this was that

centers of Islamic learning (such as Baghdad, Nishapur, and Bukhara) had fallen into the

hands of the Mongols. Thus, the "doors to ijtihad", were closed.[28] In Sunni Islam, thus,

ijtihad was replaced by taqlid or the acceptance of doctrines developed previously.[29] Later in

Sunni history, however, there were notable instances of jurists using reason to re-derive law

from the first principles. One was Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), another was Ibn

Rushd (Averroes d. 595/1198).[29]

There are many justifications, found in the Qur'an and sunnah, for the use of ijtihad. For

example, during a conversation with Mu'ādh ibn Jabal, Muhammad asked the former how he

would give judgments. Mu'ādh replied that he would refer first to the Qur'an, then to the

Sunnah and finally commit to ijtihad to make his own judgment. Muhammad approved of

this.[30]

A lawyer who is qualified to use this source is called a mujtahid. The founders of the

Sunni madhabs (schools of law) were considered such lawyers. All mujtahid exercise at the

same time the powers of a mufti and can give fatwa. Some mujtahid have claimed to

be mujaddid, or "renewer of religion." Such persons are thought to appear in every century.

In Shi'ite Islam they are regarded as the spokespersons of the hidden Imam.[29]

Local custom

The term urf, meaning "to know", refers to the customs and practices of a given society.

Although this was not formally included in Islamic law,[31] the sharia recognizes customs that

prevailed at the time of Muhammad but were not abrogated by the Qur'an or the tradition

(called "Divine silence"). Practices later innovated are also justified, since Islamic tradition

says what the people, in general, consider good is also considered as such by God. According

to some sources, urf holds as much authority as ijma (consensus), and more than qiyas

(analogical deduction). Urf is the Islamic equivalent of "common law".[32]

Local custom was first recognized by Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), an early leader of the Ḥanafī

school. However, it was considered part of the Sunnah, and not as formal source. Later, al-

Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) opposed it, holding that custom cannot prevail over a written text.[31]

According to Sunni jurisprudence, in the application of local custom, custom that is accepted

into law should be commonly prevalent in the region, not merely in an isolated locality. If it

is in absolute opposition to Islamic texts, custom is disregarded. However, if it is in

opposition to analogical reason, custom is given preference. Jurists also tend to, with caution,

give precedence to custom over doctoral opinions of highly esteemed scholars.[32] Shi'ite

scholars do not consider custom as a source of jurisprudence, nor do the Hanbalite or Zahirite

schools of Sunni jurisprudence.

6. Hanafi School of Fiqh

INTRODUCTION

The Hanafi School is one of the four Madhhabs (schools of law) in jurisprudence (Fiqh)

within Sunni Islam. The Hanafi madhhab is named after scholar Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man ibn

Thābit ((767 - 699CE /80 - 148 AH), a Tabi‘i whose legal views were preserved primarily by

his two most important disciples, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani. They laid down

the systematic foundations for the work of later Hanafis. Though the Hanafi School finally

came to adopt the mainstream legal methodology and philosophy, it did maintain peculiar

characteristics such as its emphasis on the practical aspects of the law. Particularly in the first

three centuries of Islam, its followers, more than any other school, were the chief authors and

experts on formularies (shurut), notarial documents, and the profession and conduct of

judgeship (adab alqada). It is distinguished from the other schools through its placing less

reliance on mass oral traditions as a source of legal knowledge. It developed the exegesis of

the Qur'an through a method of analogical reasoning known as Qiyas. It also established the

principle that the universal concurrence of the Ummah (community) of Islam on a point of

law, as represented by legal and religious scholars, constituted evidence of the will of God.

This process is called ijma', which means the consensus of the scholars. Thus, the school

definitively established the Qur'an, the Traditions of the Prophet, ijma' and qiyas as the basis

of Islamic law. In addition to these, Hanafi accepted local customs as a secondary source of

the law.

FOUNDER OF THE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT – IMAM ABU HANIFA

Numān ibn Thābit ibn Zūṭā ibn Marzubān, better known as Imām Abū Ḥanīfah(R.A.), (699

—767 CE / 80 — 148 AH) was the founder of the Ḥanafī school of Islamic law—the largest

of the four primary Sunni schools of law. He was born in Kufa, but his ancestors were

originally fromIran. In the formation of Abu Hanifa played a decisive role to find him in

Kufa, which that period was, one of the cultural centers of the Caliphate. His forefathers were

engaged silk trade. So In his early time he involved in that trade. He was keen interested in

study. Primary, basic Islamic teachings were acquired from his home land.At the age of 22

years much spare time was spent in debating. In this period of time Imaam Sha’bee (R. A.)

advised Imaam Abu Hanifah ( R.A.) to associate himself with a scholar. Being unable to

answer a query regarding the correct Sunnah procedure of divorce, Imaam Abu Hanifah

began to join the gatherings of lmam Hammad (R. A), (student of Hadhrat Anas (RA.) ),

disposing of his works as a debator. For the next ten consecutive years he remained the

student of Imaam Hammad (R.A.). After two years, for a period of two months Imaam

Hammad took a sudden leave to Basra ( due to his relative’s death) leaving Imaam Abu

Hanifah (R. A.) to continue his works in Kufa. Imaam Abu Hanifah (R. A.) remained Imaam

Hammad’s student for a further 8 years. The Imam went to Medina in 102 A.H. in pursuit of

Knowledge and attended the lessons of seven top theologians. The celebrated Imam Musa

Kazim and his illustrious father Imam Jafar Sadiq the descendants of Muhammad, were the

greatest authorities in Islamic learning of their times and Imām Abū Ḥanīfah took full

advantage of their society in Medina. He was highly impressed with the erudition of Imam

Ja'far al-Sadiq whom he acknowledged as the most learned man in the world of Islam.

Abstinent, God fearing, generous, knowledgeable and virtuous are all attributes collectively

found of Imaam Abu Hanifah. A great many Muhadditheen and Hanafi, Shafi’ee, Maaliki

andHanbali Ulamaa are in unison with regards to this Imaam’s strengths and virtues.

Amongst the Imaams ‘Imaam-e-Aazam’ (Greatest of the Imaams ) was the address of Imaam

Abu Hanifah alone. Abū Ḥanīfah is regarded by some as one of the Tabi‘un, the generation

after the Sahaba, who were the companions of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. This is based

on reports that he saw the Sahabi Anas ibn Malik, with some even reporting that he

transmitted Hadith from him and other companions of Muhammad.Others take the view that

Abū Ḥanīfah only saw around half a dozen companions, possibly at a young age, and did not

directly narrate hadith from them. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that he learnt

hadith from tabi'een including Ibrahim al Nakha'i. In 148A.H (767A.D), Abū Ḥanīfah died in

prison. The reason of his death is not clear, as some say that Abū Ḥanīfah issued a legal

opinion for bearing arms against Al-mansoor, and the latter had him poisoned to death. It was

said that so many people attended his funeral that the funeral service was repeated six times

for more than 50,000 people who had amassed before he was actually buried.

A SMALL GLIMPSE OF IMAAM ABU HANIFA’S (R.A.) TEACHERS:

Imam Abu Hanifah benefited from nearly 4,000 Sheikhs. Among his 1st and the most

important tutors was Imam Hammad (Died 120 A.H.) whose educational lineage is linked

with Hadhrat Abdullah IbnMas’ood (R.A.). and also others were:Imam Jafar ibn Muhammad

al-SādiqAamir Ibn Shurahbeel, Sha’abi Kufi, Alqama Ibn Marthad, Ziyaad Ibn Ilaqa, Adi Ibn

Thabit, Qataada Basri, Muhammed Ibn Munkadir Madni, Simaak Ibn Harb, Qays Ibn Muslim

Kufi, Mansoor Ibn Umar etc.

A SMALL GLIMPSE OF IMAAM ABU HANIFA’S (R.A.) STUDENTS: Qazi Abu Yusuf,

Muhammad Ibn Hasan, Zufar Ibn Huzayl, Hammad Ibn Abu Hanifah, Abu Ismat Mugheera

Ibn Miqsam,Yunus Ibn Is‘haaq, Abu Bakr Ibn Ayyaash, Abdullah Ibn Mubarak, Ali Ibn

Aasim, Ja’ far Ibn Awn, Ubaydullah Ibn Musa etc. etc.

HIGHLIGHTS OF AL-MADH'HAB AL-HANAFI

Al-Madh'hab Al-Hanafi took off after Abu Hanifa died in 150H. Of his close followers some

stand out in spreading the Fiqh. The main ones are Abu Yusuf, Muhammad Sheybani, and

Al-Lu'lu'i.

Abu Yusuf, Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim al-Kufi (113-182) was the Chief Justice appointed during

the times of Khalifa Al-Mahdi, then Khalifa Al-Haadi, then Khalifa Al-Rasheed. The last was

grateful to Abu Yusuf for he was the main influence in favor of the Al-Rasheed for the

Khilaafah; therefore Abu Yusuf was elevated to be the Supreme Justice. Meanwhile Abu

Yusuf, with full support of the powers of the government, appointed to the Justice

Department only those who acknowledged the Hanafi Fiqh—all others had either to change

their Madh'hab or lose their job. Abu Yusuf had his own interpretation of the Hanafi Fiqh,

and he wrote some books about the Madh'hab. His close student was Al-Sheybani, who

had not reached his twenties when Abu Hanifa died.

¾ Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Shibani (132-189) was a good writer, and he wrote a good

many books about the teachings of Abu Hanifa, thus making the biggest contribution to the

Hanafi Madh'hab. Like Abu Yusuf, Al-Sheybani had his personal views and Fiqh points, and

he expressed them when he wrote the Hanafi Fiqh. Al-Sheybani also studied under Malik Ibn

Anas for 3 years and was affected by his methodology, thus he introduced Malik's method of

Hadith selection in the emerging Hanafi Madh'hab. His books are among the most

authoritative in Hanafi school of thought (Al-Zahir Rivayya).

Hasan ibn Ziyad al-Lulu (d. 204) Studied law at the Abu Hanifa, and then at the Abu Yusuf

and Muhammad al-Sheibani. There was also a transmitter of hadith. Described the

philosophy of his teacher Abu Hanifa. However, the degree of credibility in Hanafi school of

thought, his books inferior to the books of Muhammad al-Sheibani, who part of Zahir al-

rivayya.

FORMATION OF THE HANAFI SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Abu Hanif left no fundamental books. Several small booklets which he ascribed to express

only the general ideological principles and tenets of his teachings. Almost all of his legacy

was passed to them orally their students, who began work on the systematization and records

everything tremendous scientific heritage, which left a teacher. His disciples done everything

in their power to ensure that the legacy of this great man was not forgotten and their efforts

began to form the ideological and legal School (Madh'hab) Hanafi, who was destined to

become one ofthe most prevalent in orthodox Islam.

In preserving, organizing and disseminating the teachings of Abu Hanifa is particularly

distinguished two of his students - Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari (d. 182), the better known as

Abu Yusuf and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan Al-Shibani (132-189 gg.). They are called

"sahibeyn (two student). Abu Yusuf is the author of the following works:

• Kitab al-Asar. In this essay Yusuf, son of Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim, tells of his father, and that of

Abu Hanifa. In this work are the links and chains narrators (isnady) of all the events that

date back to the Prophet and his companions, referred to by the late teacher. In the same

essay shows the scientific methods of Abu Hanifa, and also collected fatwas of various

Iraqi jurists.

• Ihtilafu Abu Hanifa wa Ibn Abu Laila. In this polemic tells about the various aspects of

the debate on various issues between Abu Hanifa and jurist Ibn Abu Leila. It also clearly

expressed With world?? bit ibn Numan and his methods.

• Alaa al-radd al-Siyyer Avzai. In this work refers to the respect Muslims with non-Muslims

during the conduct of war and addresses various aspects of Islamic doctrine of war (jihad).

• Kitab al-Kharaj. In this work of Abu Yusuf addressed the economic problems state.

Distinctive feature of this work is its own representations on this issue, which sometimes do

not coincide with the representations of the Abu Hanifa, which the author gave in parallel

with his thoughts. What As for Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Sheibani, he was a disciple of

Abu Hanifa short time. His education he supplemented later by Abu Yusuf and considered

one of the leading specialists in the field of law in Iraq. He wrote many books in the field of

Islamic jurisprudence. All these books are among of the most basic to the Hanafi school of

thought. In Among the outstanding pupils of Abu Hanifa was also Zufar ibn Huzayl (110-

158) Abdullah ibn Mubarak al-Mavardi (118-181), Hasan ibn Ziyad (d. 204).

FEATURES OF AL-MADH'HAB AL-HANAFI

The Al-Hanafi School of Thought tends to put more emphasis on Qiyas ( القـیــاسAnalogy)

and Raa'y (personal opinion) than an emphasis on Hadith choices, and the deductions there

from. It does not acknowledge the Imamah of Ahlul Bayt. The Hanafi School of الــرأى

Thought began its popularity in the last quarter of the second century Hijrah.

USOOL (FOUNDATION) OF FIQH

The method of making legal provisions for Abu Hanifa was based on the following basic

sources:

1) Quran . This is the Word of God and the fundamental basis of Sharia.

2) Sunnah. Examples from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, his words and expressions

which are commentaries for the verses of the Quran.

3) Posts Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. This source also clarifies in various

aspects of the Sharia, as the companions were with the Prophet and know the essence or

the same background, different problems. Vyskazavaniya tabiinov (the next generation

behind them) are not statements of associates, as they not directly have contact with the

Prophet.

4) Qiyas. A proposition by analogy, which applies in cases where in Revelation there was no

literal to a given problem. The essence of this method is that the legal issue in these cases

can be resolved on the basis of analogy with what already exists in Revelation.

The legal problem is associated already in solution and on this basis of decision.

5) Istihsan (preference). Possibility of rejection of arguments qiyas if formally correct

opinion on the analogy in this situation is not quite appropriate. In this case, the requirement

imposed on the basis of another argument, which is opposed to explicit qiyas. Istihsan

applies when qiyas contradicts Ijma and orfom.

6) Ijma. Unanimity mudzhtahidov (theologians), both past and today, about any problem.

7) Orf. Use as an argument to any of the traditional distribution opinion in the Muslim

society, if there is no literal evidence Revelation. Orff is divided into Sahih and FASID.

Saheeh - is the RUF, which is not contradicts revelation. That allows him to apply as

evidence. FASID – this is the RUF, which contradicts revelation. This type of Orff not

accepted as evidence.

SOME METHODS OF THE HANAFI SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Those fatwas, which are based on the verdict of Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad

AlShibani (Zahiru'r-Rivayya) are final and binding execution. If the requirements of Abu

Hanifa and Sahibeyna different, the prescriptions founder of school of thought are more a

priority for execution. What As for the requirements Sahibeyna (Abu Yusuf and Muhammad

al- Sheibani), they not given in this case, preference, if not for that, no pressing necessary.

For example, the need may occur if data membership of a fatwa of Abu Hanifa are

questionable. By certain issues, such as evidence of inheritance or fatwas can be given with

reference to Abu Yusuf. On some issues fatwa can be given and with reference to

Muhammad al-Sheibani and Zufarov ibn Huzayla.

If for some issue no ready prescription Imam (Abu Hanifa), the fatwa (legal requirement)

may be issued on the basis of the views and evidence of Abu Yusuf, then Muhammad

AlSheibani, and then Zufarov Huzayla and ibn Hasan ibn Ziyad.

If any problem can be applied as qiyas and istihsana, then in most cases it is necessary to

issue an order pursuant istihsana.

If Zahiru'r-Rivayye there is nothing on any issue under consideration, then it solution is

allowed to seek other sources of school of thought.

If from the Imam (Abu Hanifa) on some issue there are many legends, then the

granting legalrequirements necessary to refer to the most convincing and indisputable.

When Masha (followers who have not seen Abu Hanifa) have different, sometimes

conflicting requirements on some issue, must give fatwa on the basis of majority opinion.

Cannot issue legal regulations on the basis of the weak and doubtful traditions (hadith).

However, if there is an urgent need, in exceptional If permissible to issue a fatwa on the

basis of these legends.

TERMS OF THE HANAFI SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

1) Zahiru'r-Rivayya - Messages from Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Sheibani;

2) Imam - Abu Hanifa;

3) Sheikhan - Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf;

4) Tarafeyn - Abu Hanifa and Muhammad Al-Shibani;

5) Sahibeyn - Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Sheibani;

6) Thani - Abu Yusuf;

7) Al Salis - Muhammad Al-Shibani Lech - The view of Abu Hanifa;

8) Lehuma or Mezhebuhuma - the view of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Sheibani;

9) Ashabuna - Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Sheibani;

10) Mashayih - Followers who lived during the life of Abu Hanifa.

LIST OF MAJOR HANAFI BOOKS

a) Bahar-e-Shariat by Mufti Amjad Ali Aazmi.

b) Fatawa Rashidiya by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi.

c) Fatawa Razawiyya by Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi.

d) Fatawa Mustafwiyah by Mustafa Raza Khan.

e) Hidayah by Burhan al-Din al-Marghinani.

f) Mukhtasar al-Quduri by Imam al-Quduri translated by Imam Tahir Mahmood al-Kiani.

g) Radd al-Muhtar ala al-Dur al-Mukhtar by Ibn Abidin.

CONCLUSION

The Hanafi School is the first of the four orthodox Sunni schools of law. It is distinguished

from the other schools through its placing less reliance on mass oral traditions as a source of

legal knowledge. How already stated above, the disciples of Abu Hanifa, in spite of some

differences with Teacher on specific issues, in general, sought to extend its legal school in the

Caliphate. At the same time, they were engaged in teaching activity and did everything in

their power to further refine theoretical basis of the Hanafi school of thought. Thanks to their

efforts Hanafi teaching has become a comprehensive school of Islamic jurisprudence, which

was able to solve almost all the existing problems in this area. These processes have led to the

fact that this Madh'hab became the most widespread in Abbasid caliphate. Hanafizm even

began to encourage the ruling dynasty, which was interested in the presence of the state of the

fundamental legal framework. When Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid, one of the most

prominent theorists Hanafi school of thought Abu Yusuf became the supreme judge (kadiem)

of Baghdad. All kadii provinces of the Caliphate appointed them. In selecting candidates,

Abu Yusuf gave Preferred representatives of the Hanafi school ofthought. For this reason

hanafizm spread in the country with even greater rapidity. Later HanafiMadh'hab acquired

official status in the Ottoman State Empire. Since Hanafi Madh'hab firmly established in

various regions Muslim world and to this day his followers is the majority of Muslims in the

world.

7. Maliki School of Fiqh

Introduction Malik did not record the fundamental principles on which he based his school

and on whose basis he derived his judgements and to which he limited himself in the

derivation of his rulings. In that respect he resembled his contemporary, Abu Hanifa, but not

his student, ash-Shafi'i, who did record the principles he used in derivation and defined them

precisely, specifying the motives which moved him to consider them and their position in

deduction. Nonetheless, Malik did indicate the principles he used in some of his fatwas,

questions and the hadiths which had muttasil (uninterrupted), munqati' (broken), or mursal

(link missing) isnads and balaghat (without isnad) hadith, even if he did not precisely explain

his method or defend it or explain the motives which moved him to adopt it and why he used

that method rather than another. For instance, the Muwatta' makes it clear to us that Malik

uses mursal, munqati' and balaghat hadiths but does not explain how he chose them because

it does not go into the problems concerning the isnads. The reason for this is that Malik only

transmitted from people in whose mursal and balaghat hadith he had absolute confidence.

That is why his great concern was with the choice of transmitter. When he had confidence in

the character, intelligence and knowledge of the transmitter he dispensed with the chain of

narration. Malik clearly stated that he took the practice of the people of Madina as a source

and explained the motives which led him to do so. The Muwatta' shows that he used it in

making analogy, as he when he made an analogy between the wife of a missing man when he

returns to her after she has married someone else and someone who divorces his wife with a

revocable divorce and then takes her back when she knows about the divorce but not the

taking back and consequently remarries. Thus in the Muwatta' you will see clear statements

or indications of Malik's principles of derivation even if he did not actually clarify or identify

them specifically. For instance, he did not clarify the rules and grades of the underlying legal

principles ('illa) in analogy and such things. The fuqaha' of the Maliki school have done with

Malik's fiqh what the fuqaha' of the Hanafi school have done with their school – studied the

secondary rulings and derived from them what can validly be employed as fundamental

principles on which to base deduction. They called the principles they derived in this way the

'fundamental principles (usul) of Malik'. For instance, they say that Malik employed certain

textual principles which they called'mafhum al-mukhalafa' (an interpretation which diverges

from the obvious meaning of a given text), 'fahwa al-khatab' (implied meanings of a given

text), and 'dhahir' (apparent meanings of a given text). They say that he also said certain

things about general unspecific texts. The truth is that although these principles are

transmitted as having been formulated by him, they are in fact derived from secondary

judgements reported from him; and the specific proofs of these principles are derived from

the actual context or were formulated by the fuqaha' who came after him. Deduction from

texts can only validly be undertaken when the necessary evidence exists.

The First Source: The Book of Allah

According to ash-Shatibi al-Maliki in al-Muwafaqat: "The Qur'an is the whole of the Shari'a,

the support of religion, the fount of wisdom, the sign of Prophethood and the light of the eyes

and the heart. There is no way to Allah except through it and there is no salvation by any

other means than it. You must not hold to anything that contradicts it. None of this needs

affirmation or deduction because it is known to the deen of the Community. Since that is the

case, whoever wants complete knowledge of the Shari'a and desires to perceive its aims and

be joined to its adherents must necessarily take the Qur'an as his constant companion and

make it his intimate, night and day, in both investigation and action... If he is able to do that,

he will soon have students and find himself among the Frontrunners and in the first rank. He

will not be able to do it without being helped in that by the Sunna which clarifies the Book

and, failing that, the works of earlier Imams and the Salaf, which will guide him in this noble

aim and lofty purpose." (p. 247, vol. 3) Malik viewed the Qur'an in the same way. So he was

only seen reciting the Qur'an or relating hadiths or deriving fatwas from them to answer

questions which were directed to him. He did not look at the Qur'an with the eye of a debater.

It is not reported that he ever said that the Qur'an consisted of both words and meaning or

meaning only; nor did he engage in any discussion of the mutakallimun about the Qur'an

being created since he did not consider such subjects to be debatable. He believed that

whenever a man argued with another, he cheapened that which Jibril had revealed to

Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him. Malik knew that the Qur'an contains all the

Shari'a and that the Sunna is simply its exposition. The Qur'an cannot be understood correctly

and completely unless the clarification which elucidates it, the Sunna of the Prophet, is taken

into account. He was thirsty for it, not merely because it was the second Islamic source, but

because it also clarifies and expounds the Qur'an and gives detail to what is general and limits

what is unrestricted. The Qur'an is in Arabic and was revealed in the Arabic language. The

people of eloquent Arabic saw that its style was inimitable and were overwhelmed by it as all

people are. However, it is in Arabic, and Malik did not think that it was proper for anyone to

try to explain it unless he had deep knowledge of the Arabic language, its different dialects,

and styles of speech. That is why it is reported that he said, "No one who explains the Book

of Allah who does not know the dialects of the Arabs is brought to me without my making an

example of him." The Sunna is the straight way to grasp the meanings of the Book. That is

why it is not correct to hold only to the Qur'an without seeking help in its explanation,

meaning the Sunna. Malik disliked including any Biblical or Jewish (Talmudic) material in

its explanation. He did not have confidence in the transmission of anyone who proceeded in

this way. He mentioned that there was excellence in a certain person but criticised him for

accepting tafsir from Qatada because he reckoned that Qatada included in his tafsir much that

was not sound. Malik considered the Qur'an to consist of both expressions and meanings,

which is the position and consensus of the majority of Muslims, but he did not get involved in

any wrangling or debate about this. That is why he did not consider that a translation of the

Qur'an could be used for recitation in the prayer, or to be that for whose recitation there is

prostration, or to be that whose copy may only touched by someone who is pure, or to be that

which may not be recited by a woman who is menstruating or bleeding after childbirth or

someone in a state of major impurity. A translation can never be more than an explanation of

the meaning or rather a partial explanation of what can be understood from the Arabic

original. Scholars of the Maliki school mentioned that he used all the various degrees of

textual interpretation referred to above, just as he took note of those matters in the Sunna. We

are obliged to clarify the method and opinion of Malik concerning these matters in brief and

his position in respect of other opinions without going into excessive detail.

The Second Source:

The Sunna There is no dispute that Malik was an Imam in hadith and fiqh: a transmitter of the

first rank in hadith and a faqih with insight into fatwa and the deduction of judgements. His

transmission of hadith is also considered one of the soundest of transmissions, particularly in

his choice of transmitters and knowledge of the accuracy of their transmission. He was a

faqih with insight into fatwa and derivation of judgements, analogy of similar things,

recognition of the welfare of people, and what fatwas are appropriate without being far from

the text nor shunning what is transmitted of cases and fatwas ascribed to the righteous Salaf.

Some people criticised the riwaya of ash-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifa. In spite of their prejudice,

they were not able say anything about Malik's transmission. Some scholars, including at-

Tabari, deny that Ahmad ibn Hanbal was a faqih and said that he was a only a muhaddith and

not a faqih. Malik alone is a muhaddith who is counted in the first rank by consensus and a

faqih with insight into the subjects of fatwas and its sources by consensus. This is a

confirmed and established matter on which there is agreement among the scholars of hadith

and fiqh. Imam al-Bukhari, whose book come to be considered the soundest of the books in

hadith and the strongest of them in attribution considers the isnad of Malik in some hadiths as

the soundest isnad. It is: Malik from Abu'z-Zinad from al-A'raj from Abu Hurayra. Abu

Dawud, the author of the Sunan, says, "The strongest isnad is: Malik from Nafi' from Ibn

'Umar, then Malik from az-Zuhri from Salim from his father; then Malik from Abu'z-Zinad

from al-A'raj from Abu Hurayra, and he did not mention anyone except Malik. This

testimony from the people of this science indicates that two things place him in the first rank

of hadith scholars: He himself is reliable. He is just and accurate and there is no way to attack

his transmission in respect of his person or his accuracy. People have spoken against others in

that respect. He was excellent in selecting those from whom he transmitted. He and his men

from whom he related are in the first rank since al-Bukhari considers him and some of his

men to have the soundest isnad, and Abu Dawud considers him and his men in the first three

ranks in the strength of isnad. He is reliable and excellent in the measure of men by the

testimony of the people of skill and precision who know this business. He was strict about the

preconditions of good character and accuracy in his transmitters.

The Third Source: Fatwas of the Companions

In his early studies Malik concentrated on learning the cases of the Companions, their

fatwas, and their judgements in respect of the questions which he concerned him. We have

already seen how eager he was to learn the fatwas of 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar from his client

Nafi'. He used to lie in wait for him when he went out so that he might ask him about the

statements of 'Abdullah. He also was eager to learn the cases of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, may

Allah be pleased with him. He learned the fiqh of the seven fuqaha' of Madina. They

transmitted the disagreements, perceptions, fatwas and decisions of the Companions as well

as the hadiths of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. The

knowledge which he was taught and which he mastered and on which he based himself and

on the basis of which he made deduction and according to which he proceeded with the

implementation of the hadiths of the Messenger of Allah was the decisions and fatwas of the

Companions. That is why the fatwas of the Companions occupied a major place in Malik's

deduction. He took them and did not infringe them. He accepted the position of the People of

Madina because the Companions had been there, as he mentioned in his letter to al-Layth.

"Know, may Allah have mercy on you, that I have been informed that you give people fatwas

which are contrary to what is done by our community and in our city. You are Imam and

have importance and position with the people of your city and they need you and rely on

what they get from you. Therefore you ought to fear for yourself and follow that whose

pursuit you hope will bring you salvation.

Fatwas of the Followers (Tabi'un)

The scholars accepted the statements of the Companions either by way of imitation or as an

authoritative source of the Shari'a since it was sunna derived from the guidance of the

Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Most scholars do not accord the

Followers this rank. Abu Hanifa explicitly stated that he used to strive as al-Hasan, Ibn Sirin,

ash-Sha'bi and Ibrahim an-Nakha'i strove. In his Risala, ash-Shafi'i did not mention that he

allowed imitating them. Perhaps in these cases he did not reach a confirmed and established

ijtihad which was definitive in the question. When he saw a statement by one of the

Followers in the question, he accepted it, but not on the basis that it was a juristic choice

based on evidence or on the basis that its imitation was permitted, like that of the Companion.

It was giving information about the position of those before him in something in which he did

not have an opinion. Some Hanbalis accepted the statements of the Followers when they did

not differ from the statements of the Companions or the Followers. Which of the two parties

did Malik fall into? It is clear that Malik did not consider the statements of the Followers to

occupy the same position in the Sunna as those of the Companions; but he did take account of

the positions of some of the Followers because of their knowledge of fiqh or their

truthfulness or their exalted qualities of character. These included such people as 'Umar ibn

'Abdu'l-'Aziz, Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab, Ibn Shihab az-Zuhri, Nafi' the client of Ibn 'Umar, and

others who were accurate in transmission of knowledge and had high proficiency in fiqh. He

accepted a fatwa from them when its basis was a known sunna, or was in accordance with the

Practice of the People of Madina, or with the position of the majority of scholars. Sometimes

he was satisfied with their ijtihad when he had confidence in it and did not find anything to

contradict it. We will mention some the transmissions which support what we said and attest

to it: 1. Part of that is forbidding man to sell what is not in his possession. In that Malik

accepted the opinion Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab. We read in the Muwatta': Malik reported from

Musa ibn Maysara that he heard a man say to Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab, "I am a man who sells

for a debt." Sa'id said, "Do not sell except for what you take directly to your camel."

(31.40.85) 2. Malik accepted the position of Zayd ibn Aslam on the reality of the usury of the

Jahiliyya: "Malik related from Zayd ibn Aslam that the usury in the Jahiliyya was that a man

would give a loan to a man for a set term. When the term was due, he would say, 'Will you

pay it off or increase me?" Based on this, a reduction of the debt in return for a reduction in

the term is part of usury. That is why he said, "The disapproved way of doing things about

which there is no dispute among us is that a man gives a loan to a man for a term, and then

the demander reduces it and the one from whom it is demanded pays it in advance. To us that

is like someone who delays repaying his debt after it is due to his creditor and his creditor

increases his debt. This is nothing else but usury." 3. Another instance is that he accepted the

statement of al-Qasim ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr about it being disliked to reduce the

price in exchange for early payment and to increase it in exchange for delay. In the Muwatta':

"Malik conveyed to him that al-Qasim ibn Muhammad was asked about a man who bought

goods for ten dinars cash or fifteen dinars on credit. He disapproved of that and forbade it."

The Fourth Source: Consensus (Ijma')

Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, was probably the one of the four Imams who most

frequently mentioned consensus and used it as evidence. If you open the Muwatta', you will

find in many places that the ruling in the case mentions that it is Òthe generally agreed-on

way of doing things,Ó and that was considered to be an evidence which was sufficiently

authoritative for him to give fatwa by it. We will give you some examples: 1. The Muwatta'

mentions the inheritance of paternal half-siblings: "Malik said, 'The generally agreed-on way

of doing things with us is that when there are no full-siblings with them, half-siblings by the

father take the position of full-siblings. Their males are like the males of the full-siblings, and

their females are like their females except in the case where the half-siblings by the mother

and full-siblings share, because they are not offspring of the mother who joins these.'" (27.6)

Then he proceeded to the secondary rulings based on this consensus. 2. Another example of

that is the inheritance of maternal half-siblings. Malik said about that: "The generally agreed-

on way of doing things with us is that maternal half-siblings do not inherit anything when

there are children or grandchildren through sons, male or female. They do not inherit

anything when there is a father or the father's father. They inherit in what is outside of that. If

there is only one male or female, they are given a sixth. If there are two, each of them has has

a sixth. If there are more than that, they share in a third which is divided among them. The

male does not have the portion of two females." (27.4) 3. Another instance is what the

Muwatta' says about the judgement of the sale with the precondition of being free of all

defects: "The generally agreed-on way of doing things with us regarding a person ...who sells

a slave, slavegirl or animal which is meant to be free of defects is that he is not responsible

for any defect in what he sold unless he knew about the fault and concealed it. If he knew that

there was a fault and concealed, his declaration that he was it was free of faults does not

absolve him, and what he sold is returned to him." (31.4) 4. It is reported that the sale of meat

for meat can entail a form of usury (riba al-fadl). Malik said, "It is the generally agreed-on

way of doing things with us that the meat of camels, cattle, sheep and similar wild animals is

not to be bartered one for one, except like for like, weight for weight, from hand to hand.

There is no harm in that. If it is not weighed, then it is estimated to be like for like from hand

to hand. There is no harm in bartering the meat of fish for the meat of camels, cattle and

sheep and so on, two or more for one, from hand to hand. If delayed terms enter into the

transaction, however, there is no good in it." (31/28.67) In all of this you see that Malik used

consensus as authoritative and said, "The generally agreed-on way of doing things with us".

We turn to what is quoted from him to discover his explanation of the term, 'agreed-on'. We

find that transmitted in what we quoted before in his words in the Muwatta'. Let us see what

Malik himself says in explanation of his use of the term 'agreed-on'. We find that he says in

the Muwatta': As for 'the agreed-upon practice', it is something that the people of fiqh and

knowledge agree upon without dispute. This is the agreement of the people of this

community who contract agreements (ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd) in any matter. By agreement we

mean agreement in word, action or belief. The definition of the mujtahidun who produce

consensus was investigated by Malik as we will make clear. That is the consensus which

Malik took as an authoritative evidence and which you see often used in the Muwatta' in

resolving questions about which there is no unequivocal text or when he believes that the text

needs to be amplified, or when the text is an ayat whose meaning is of the apparent sort

(dhahir) which admits of interpretation and specification. The discussion of scholars

regarding the principles in consensus is extensive and detailed. We do not want to quote them

here. Here we will mention what is connected to Malik's fiqh and the different varieties of

consensus he used to employ and how authoritative he viewed consensus and its ranks and its

basis. In general, we will speak about consensus where it has a a firm connection to our

subject: Malik's fiqh. Before we turn to Malik's view, we will define the case which the books

of some of the legists mention: when consensus is advanced before the Book and the Sunna.

This case is mentioned by some of the legists and before we clarify how it is invalid, we will

mention their explanation of it so that people will not err in understanding, even though we

are not happy with any explanation of it. What they mean is the consensus which is based on

the Book or the Sunna, and it acquires strength by that support so that it is given priority over

other texts. That is because consensus supports the text. It strengthens it to the degree that it

becomes definitive and whatever judgement it contains cannot be denied. Some of them

reckon that a person is an unbeliever if he denies a judgement which is established by

consensus which is derived from text. That is because consensus based on the evidence of the

text to the judgement raises it in the level of something which is understood from the Deen by

necessity. Even when the discussion is interpreted in that way, many scholars do not permit it

because consensus of this type is only in fundamental obligations, like the prayer being five,

the times of the prayer, fasting Ramadan, the obligation of zakat and so forth. They are

obligations established by text and there is consensus on them, and so the texts do not admit

of any probability in them. Ash-Shafi'i denied the claim of consensus except in the principles

of legal questions and Ahmad ibn Hanbal denied the existence of any consensus except the

consensus of the Companions. The generalised nature of the proposition has allowed some

people to oppose some unequivocal texts based on the claim of consensus in questions,

whether the consensus in them is a subject of dispute or is not agreed upon at all. The

generalisation contains an attack against the texts to support the partisanship for a school.

Indeed this generalisation makes some of those who do not understand Islamic fiqh, its

principles or the expressions of its writers suppose that it is within the ability of people to

agree on something which then it becomes a deen which is followed, even if it opposes the

texts and undermines established judgements. Ibn al-Qayyim refuted that in I'lam al-

Muwaqqi'in: "If someone does not acknowledge disagreement between imitators when there

is evidence for it in the Book and Sunna and says, 'This is contrary to the consensus,' this is

the one whom Imams of Islam repudiate and censure from every aspect. They refute the one

who claims that. Ibn Hanbal said, 'Whoever claims consensus is a liar. Perhaps people

disagreed. This was the claim of Bishr al-Marisi and al-Asamm, but he says, "We do not

know whether people disagreed or that has not reached us."' He said, 'How can it be permitted

for a man to say, "They agreed" when I heard them say they agreed and I suspected them? If

only he had said, "I do not know of any who opposes."' He said, 'This is a lie. I do not know

that the people agreed. It is better to say, "I do not know of any disagreement about it" than to

say, "The consensus of the people." Perhaps the people disagreed.'" (pt. 2, p. 179) In truth, we

do not permit in any case that it be said that consensus in any description is given priority

before the Book and the Sunna, even if some of the questions agreed upon reach the level of

necessary matters in the Deen. That is because of the position of the unequivocal text which

is attested to by consensus. It is based on its evidence, not by consensus alone, especially

when some of the Imams permit consensus to be ascribed to indication or analogy. When we

advance consensus derived from analogy, then we advance analogy over the unequivocal

text, and that is illogical except in the areas which we already have stipulated. Scholars have

agreed that the support (sanad) of consensus can be the Book, mutawatir Sunna, dhahir text

of the Book, or a single tradition. When something which is probabilistic in its evidence or its

certainty is supported by consensus and there is consensus that judgement is issued according

to it, then by that the judgement becomes definitive. The definitiveness comes from the

consensus on the judgement derived from the text, not from the text itself. So it is as if the

text provides the judgement and consensus provides definitiveness. He mentioned from Malik

that consensus can be supported by analogy. Support in it is not confined to a text of the

Book or the Sunna. In this case, the judgement derived from the analogy is elevated from the

rank of the probable to the rank of the definitive, and that was obtained from consensus, and

so it provides definitiveness when it is based on analogy, as it provides it when it is based on

single traditions. There is a case which requires investigation and study of Malik's opinion

about it. This is the definition of those whose agreement forms consensus. We will present

two points in the explanation of this problem: 1. Malik did not think that the common people

were included in the generality of those who constituted consensus. That was because the

proofs of consensus were specifically a duty of those who are not the common because the

unsupported statement of the common person is of no consequence. Consensus must have a

support on which it is based, and that is not conceivable from common people. Furthermore

the Companions agreed that the common people are not taken into account and they must

follow the men of knowledge.The common are not included in the consensus about them

because they do not have the ability to understand it or to form a respected opinion in it. Its

basis is investigation based on legal deduction. 2. Who are those of the mujtahidun whose

agreement amounts to consensus? Are they the scholars of a certain time in all Islamic

locations? Are the people of innovations among the mujtahidun included or not? Or is the

consensus taken into account that of the people of Madina about an opinion? In that we are

not concerned with the disagreement of the scholars of legal principles in that – that has its

proper place in that science. That which concerns us is the opinion of Malik, and scholars

disagree about whether his opinion was to consider that consensus was achieved by the

consensus of the scholars of Madina or only by the consensus of all. That is the matter which

concerns us in the study of consensus. Al-Ghazali said in al-Mustasfa: "Malik said: 'The

authoritative source is only the consensus of the people of Madina.' He said that the people

considered for consensus are the people of the Haramayn: Makka and Madina, and the two

cities: Kufa and Basra. Those who deduce mean by this that these locations comprised the

people of hall wa'l-'aqd in the time of the Companions. If Malik meant that the people of

Madina included all of them, then that is accepted if it is comprehensive. Thus actual place

has no effect. That would not be accepted. Madina did not contain all of the scholars, either

before or after the Hijra. They were constantly dispersed in journeys, expeditions and

garrisons. So there is no sense in the words of Malik unless he says that the action of the

people of Madina is authoritative because they are numerous and there is consideration of the

statement of the majority or a a statement which indicates their agreement in word or action

that they relied on something definitive which they heard. The abrogating revelation was

revealed among them, and so the fine points of the Shari'a do not elude them. This is accurate

since it is not impossible that someone else heard a hadith from the Messenger of Allah, may

Allah bless him and grant him peace, on a journey or in Madina, but he left it before he

transmitted it. So the authoritative source is in the consensus and not a consensus." (pt. 1, p.

187) Al-Ghazali stated that consensus in Malik's view is only that which is formulated by the

fuqaha' of Madina, and that he does not include anyone else with them. He vindicates that

statement by the fact that in the Muwatta' whenever Malik used the agreement of the scholars

about a matter as evidence, he says, "This is the generally agreed-on way of doing things with

us." If you examine the Muwatta', you will find the word "with" ('inda) follows "generally

agreedon." There is no doubt that "'inda" here refers to place, meaning the generally agreed-

on way of doing things in Madina. That is also supported by the fact that in his letters and in

his fiqh, Malik used to consider other than the people of Madina as being subservient to them

in fiqh. The logic of his position demands that what they agree on be considered consensus.

Thus consensus and the practice of the people of Madina are the same type of evidence, i.e.

that which the people of Madina have is consensus and that consensus is the consensus of

their fuqaha' rather than others. However, we find that in his Usul al-Qarafi lists the forms of

evidence, and counts consensus as one proof and that which the People of Madina have as a

different form of evidence. He says "Evidence is: the Book, the Sunna, the consensus of the

Community, the consensus of the people of Madina, analogy, the statement of the

Companions, masalih mursala and istishab." He speaks about consensus and mentions

Malik's views on it which indicate that he considered consensus as one of the sources of the

Shari'a other than the consensus of the people of Madina. At the beginning of the discussion

on Malik's usul, we mentioned what was said by the mujtahidun in Maliki fiqh. They

ennumerated the forms of evidence and counted consensus as an independent root separate

from the consensus of the people of Madina. We cannot say that all the Malikis follow the

method of al-Qarafi which I quoted from at the beginning of our discussion on his principles.

Indeed, we found that in his Fatwas, Shaykh 'Ullaysh stated that the Malikis say that the

agreement of the people of Madina is what Malik considers consensus. That is why he said:

"There were in Madina the Imams of the Followers who were not in other places – like the

seven fuqaha', az-Zuhri, Rabi'a, Nafi', and others. That is why the Imam referred to them and

considered their agreement to be consensus. Consulting consensus and using it as evidence is

not imitation. It is ijtihad itself. This is self-evident and Ibn al-Hajib stated that." He said

about comparing a single tradition with the action of the people of Madina: "You know that

the people of Madina are loftier, more numerous and have more knowledge than others. Thus

it is them who must be consulted to when there is disagreement. When a hadith is sound and

the practice of the people of Madina differs from it, one of the following must apply: they are

all judged to be ignorant, which is something an intelligent man is too shy to utter since those

are the most knowledgeable of the Imams and bad opinion is iniquity; or they are judged to

be deliberately in opposition to the Sunna and playing around, which is worse and more

foolish; or they are judged to possess knowledge and action, and thus when they abandoned a

hadith, they left it for something stronger. This is what we claim. It is known that consensus

is a proof which must have a support which may be known or not known. Their agreement

was from something reliable since there is no way to call them ignorant or misguided. So the

clear truth is evident to you if you accept. Those whose action the Imam used as evidence

were the Followers whom he met, and they did not leave the path of the Companions."

(Fatwas of Shaykh ÔUllaysh, pt. 1, p. 43.) This clearly indicates that Malik considered the

agreement of the people of Madina to be consensus and authoritative. When it is added to

what we quoted from al-Ghazali and his explicit expression in the Muwatta' when consensus

is used as evidence (the generally agreed-on way of doing things with us), that results in the

conclusion that the consensus which is used as evidence by Malik is the consensus of the

people of Madina. This is a logical result of his considering the agreement of Madina to be

binding evidence which must be followed and that it refutes single traditions because when

the consensus of the people of Madina is evidence on its own, there would be no need for the

agreement of others. If someone considers their agreement alone as binding, it is more fitting

that it be binding when they agree with other Muslim scholars. It is also clear that consensus

in the view of Malik is the consensus of the people of Madina, and this leads us on to the

practice of the people of Madina.

The Fifth Source: The Practice of the People of Madina

Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, considered the practice of the people of Madina to be

a legal source on which he relied in his fatwas. That is why he often said, after mentioning

the traditions and hadith, "the way of doing things generally agreed-on among us."

Sometimes, when no text or other authority existed, Malik used the practice of the people of

Madina as an evidence to be relied on absolutely. His previously mentioned letter to al-Layth

ibn Sa'd shows the great extent to which he relied on it and his objection to those who

followed anything other than the practice of the People of Madina. "I have been informed that

you give people fatwas which are contrary to what is done by our community and in our city.

You are Imam and have importance and position with the people of your city and they need

you and rely on what they get from you. Therefore you ought to fear for yourself and follow

that whose pursuit you hope will bring you salvation. Allah Almighty says in His Mighty

Book, 'The outstrippers, the first of the Muhajirun and the Ansar.' (9:100) Allah Almighty

further says, 'So give good news to My slaves, those who listen well to what is said and then

follow the best of it.' (39:18) It is essential to follow the People of Madina in which the

Qur'an was revealed..." In this he clearly stated that the Practice of the People of Madina

cannot validly be opposed and that people should follow it. Then after that he clarifies the

evidence which moved him to follow this course: "The basis of this proof is that the Qur'an

contains laws and the fiqh of Islam was revealed there and its people were the first who were

made responsible for it, encharged with the command and prohibition and who answered the

caller of Allah in what he commanded and established the buttress of the Deen. Then after the

Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, among them lived the people of his

community who most followed him: Abu Bakr, 'Umar and then 'Uthman. They implemented

his Sunna after investigating it and studying it while it was still fresh. Then the Followers

after them followed those paths and they followed those sunan. Madina had inherited the

knowledge of the Sunna and the fiqh of Islam in the time of the Followers of the Followers.

That is the time in which Malik saw it. The business there was clear and acted on it and no

one is permitted to oppose it because of that inheritance in their hands which none is allowed

to plagarise or lay claim to." This is Malik's evidence regarding his use of the Practice of the

People of Madina as proof and that in some cases he advanced the Practice of the People of

Madina over single traditions for the reason which he mentioned. It is that the famous opinion

which is acted upon in Madina in the famous transmitted sunna and the famous sunna is

advanced over single traditions. It is clear that Malik was not the first person to use the

practice of the people of Madina as an authoritative evidence. Malik's shaykh, Rabi'a,

mentioned the method and said, "A thousand from a thousand is better than one from one."

Malik said, "The learned men among the Followers quoted hadiths which had been conveyed

to them from others and they said, 'We are not ignorant of this, but the common practice is

different.'" He also said, "I saw Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr ibn 'Amr ibn Hazm who was a

qadi. His brother 'Abdullah knew many hadiths and was a truthful man. When Muhammad

gave a judgement and there was a hadith contrary to it, I heard 'Abdullah criticise him,

saying, 'Isn't there a hadith which says such and such? 'Yes,' he replied. 'Then what is the

matter with you? Why don't you give judgement by it?' asked his brother. 'Where are the

people in respect to it?' replied Muhammad, meaning 'what is the consensus of action on it in

Madina?' He meant that the practice outweighs the hadith in that instance." (Madarik, p. 38)

So it can be seen that Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, did not originate that method.

Rather he travelled a path which others among the Followers and the people of knowledge

before him had followed. He became renowned for it, however, because of the great number

of fatwas he was asked for and because some of his fatwas were contrary to hadiths which he

also related. He became the most famous of those who accepted the practice of the people of

Madina as an authoritative source and so the method was ascribed to him; but the truth is that

in that respect he was a follower, not an originator. We see that in the statements which were

transmitted from him or the letters which Malik wrote, he stated that what the community of

the people of knowledge had in Madina amounted to evidence which had to be accepted for

the reasons which we mentioned, and that if a single tradition was contrary to the practice of

Madina, he rejected the tradition and accepted their knowledge since it was transmitted from

the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in a more reliable transmission and

truer account. The examples transmitted from Malik in general contain the practices of the

people of Madina which cannot be known except by reliance, like the adhan, the mudd of the

Prophet and other things. Included within the practice of the people of Madina is that which

can derive from ijtihad and deduction whose method is like some decisions and the

judgements of behaviour between people.

The Sixth Source: Analogy (Qiyas)

Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, issued fatwas for more than fifty years. People came

to him from the East and West to ask for fatwa. Since questions are endless and events occur

every day, it is necessary for understanding of the texts to go beyond their immediate

significance to recognition of their immediate and further aims and to perception of their

indications and suggestions, so that the extent of their comprehensiveness may be correctly

ascertained. Only then is it possible to understand what lies behind the judgements made by

the Companions in cases where there was no well-known sunna and which could not be

included within the meaning of the literal text, even though the text might indirectly indicate

to it. That is why analogy is necessary for someone like Malik. Since fiqh, in its finest

meaning, is the penetration of the insight of the faqih to ascertain what is meant by the

expressions which indicate judgements and thus recognise its causes and recognise its ends,

the faqih must therefore use analogy since he must ascertain the cause behind the judgement

in order to recognise the full extent of what is meant by the Shari'a. When he knows the

cause, then the judgement is established in all that it applies to because the similarity between

matters demands similarity in judgement, and sameness between things with the same

qualities demands sameness in the judgements to which they are subject. Analogy in Islamic

fiqh denotes the connection of something without a text to its judgment by another textual

matter with a judgement by virtue of a shared cause between the two. It is part of submitting

to the principle of similarity between matters which obliges similarity in its judgements

because sameness in the cause obliges similarity in judgement. Thus analogy is natural and

logical because of the logical connection based on similarity. When the similarity is

complete, then it must be connected to the same judgement. We find that the Noble Qur'an

uses the law of sameness in judgments by the resemblance of qualities and actions in all its

similes and instructions, and Allah says, "Have they not travelled in the earth and seen what

was the end result of those before them? Allah destroyed them utterly. And those who reject

will get the same as that." (47:10) He clarifies the difference of judgement when there is no

sameness when He says, "Or do those who perpetrate evil actions reckon that We will make

them like those who believe and do right actions, their living and their dying being the same?

How evil is the judgement that they make!" (45:21) The Almighty also says, "Would We

make those who believe and do right actions the same as the corrupters of the earth? Would

We make the godfearing the same as the dissolute?" (38:28) You see that the Qur'an applies

the rule of logical equality in the most perfect manner and it confirms the judgment when

similarity exists and negates it when there is disparity. There are numerous reports from the

Prophet about adopting this wise dictum and guiding the Companions to it. It is related that

'Umar ibn al-Khattab said to the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace,

"Messenger of Allah, I did something terrible. I kissed while I was fasting." The Messenger

of Allah said, "Do you think that you can rinse your mouth with water while you are fasting?"

He replied, "There is no harm in it." The Messenger of Allah said, "So fast." Do you not see

that the Messenger of Allah made a connection between rinsing the mouth with water while

fasting and kissing while fasting? He pointed out the similarity between them since both of

them could lead to something which would break the fast or not. It does not in itself break the

fast. Breaking the fast is possible if it leads to that. Because of the similarity between them

they are equal in judgement. As rinsing does not break the fast - and that was known to 'Umar

- and so the kiss does not break it. The traditions from the Messenger of Allah are numerous

about the application of this just principle in the deduction of judgments for which there is no

clear text. Some texts are applied to them by the sameness in the judgement between similar

things. Al-Muzani, the companion of ash-Shafi'i, summarises the idea of analogy and the

action of the Companions in it excellently: "The fuqaha' from the time of the Messenger of

Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, until today have used analogies in all

judgements in their deen and they agreed that the like of what is true is true and the like of

what is false is the false, and no one is permitted to deny analogy because it is the

resemblance and similarity of things." Malik used that method and used the similarity

between things to arrive at a judgement. When they were similar, the legal cause existed. He

employed analogy in certain questions in which he knew the decisions of the Companions. So

he made an analogy about the condition of the wife of a missing man when he is deemed to

be dead and she does an 'idda as a widow and then marries someone else and then the first

man appears alive. He compared this with the case of someone who had divorced his wife

and informed her of divorce and then took her back but did not inform her of being taken

back and then she married after the end of the 'idda. That was because 'Umar gave a fatwa

that this woman belonged to her second husband, whether or not the marriage had been

consummated. Malik used this as an analogy for the wife of the missing man and said that she

belongs to the second husband, whether or not it has been consummated. There is no doubt

that the basis of this analogy is the similarity between the two cases, even if he mentions it

with the agreement of the People of Madina. By this it is clear that the basis of the agreement

is this analogy, and the basis of the similarity is that both of them married with a good

intention on the basis of legal knowledge established by legal means, but the error became

clear after that. She had no way to ascertain the error before he appeared. Thus the wife of the

missing man married on the basis of the legal judgement and the divorced woman married on

the basis of divorce and end of the 'idda, and the wife of the missing man had no way to

ascertain whether he is alive and the divorced woman had no way to know she had been

taken back. So the two cases are similar and the judgement must be the same and the same

judgment is a result of this similarity.

s

The Seventh Source: The Principle of Istihsan (Discretion)

There are many sources which state that Malik used to employ istihsan. Al-Qarafi mentioned

that sometimes he used to give fatwa on the basis of istihsan and he said about it, "Malik says

it in a number of questions about artisans who work on objects giving an guarantee of their

work and those who transport food and condiments giving a guarantee as opposed to others."

(Tanqih, p. 23) We read in the gloss of al-Banani that Ibn al-Qasim related from Malik that

he said that istihsan was nine-tenths of knowledge. Malik used analogy but made it subject to

general and partial benefit, so he only applied it when he was sure that there was no harm in

its application; otherwise he left it. For Malik it was a basic rule that analogy is subject to

benefit. That is why the underlying principle of Maliki fiqh is benefit, as we will explain.

Judgements based on istihsan or which make it the deciding factor when weighing up

different proofs are numerous in the Maliki school, as ash-Shatibi says in al-Muwafaqat. One

example of this is loans. A loan might be considered to be usury because a dirham is

exchanged for a dirham for a period of time but it is permissible under the principle of

istihsan because of the way people are helped by it. If loans had remained forbidden they

might have suffered great hardship. Another example is looking at the private parts of people

in medical treatment. The general rule is that it is unlawful to look at private parts, but it is

recommended to avert harm. Another is sharecropping. The general principle obliges that it is

forbidden since the recompense is unknown, but it is completely recommended. Another is

ignoring usury in smalls amount since it is insignificant and so it is permitted to have a small

disparity in a long delay. Another is what we mentioned before of the lack of making good

character a precondition for witnessing when the qadi is in a place in which witnesses of good

character are rare. The same applies to granting trusteeship to someone without good

character in order to avert hardship as was made clear under analogy. These secondary

rulings and those like them make it clear that Malik used to employ istihsan. What is the

reality of istihsan? What are the places in which it is permitted to use it and rely on it in the

construction of judgements?

The Eighth Source: Customs ('Adat) and Customary Usage ('Urf)

Custom is a matter on which a community of people agree in the course of their daily life,

and common usage is an action which is repeatedly performed by individuals and

communities. When a community makes a habit of doing something, it becomes its common

usage. So the custom and common usage of a community share the same underlying idea

even if what is understood by them differs slightly. Maliki fiqh, like Hanafi fiqh, makes use

of custom and considers it a legal principle in respect of matters about which there is no

definitive text. In fact it has an even deeper respect for custom than the Hanafi school since,

as we have seen, public interest and general benefit are the foundation of Maliki fiqh in

coming to decisions and there is no doubt that respect for a custom which contains no harm is

one of the types of benefit. It is not valid for any faqih to leave it: indeed, it is obligatory to

adopt it. We find that the Malikis abandon analogy when custom opposes it. Custom makes

the general specific and qualifies the unqualified, as far as the Malikis are concerned. It

appears that the Shafi'ites also takes custom into consideration when there is no text. If text

dominates in its judgement because people are subject to and do it by way of familiarity and

habit. Nothing can prevent them from adopting it except a prohibiting text. Where there is no

prohibiting text, then it must be adopted. We find that Ibn Hajar stated that custom is acted on

it when there is nothing in the custom contrary to a text. Al-Qurtubi observed that making use

of custom in this way is taken from an instance when the Prophet, may Allah bless him and

grant him peace, said to the wife of Abu Sufyan, "Take from the property of Abu Sufyan

what is adequate for you and your child in a normal manner." In this hadith custom is clearly

made the basis of a legal decision. This is not the case with the Shafi'ites. Ibn Hajar replies to

this by saying that the Shafi'ites forbid acting by custom when it is opposed to a legal text, or

is not suggested by it. This indicates that the Shafi'ites occasionally adopt custom, but with

the precondition that a legal text suggests it or does not contradict it. Therefore we can divide

custom in respect to the usage of the fuqaha' into three categories: 1. Custom which is

adopted by all the fuqaha'. It is the custom which is indicated by a text. In this case, it is

adopted by agreement. 2. Custom which is prohibited by an unequivocal text of the Lawgiver

or it is obligatory that it be overlooked as confirmed by a text. This type of custom is not

respected nor adopted by consensus. It is general corruption which must be brought to an end.

Silence on it is silence about commanding the correct and forbidding the incorrect and being

content with sin and transgression. 3. Custom in which there is no established prohibition nor

is it suggested or indicated by a text. The Malikis and Hanafis consider it an independent

principle. According to the Hanafis, general custom makes the general specific, qualifies the

unqualified, and custom is put ahead of analogy. The Malikis say that custom specifies the

general and qualifies the unqualified since they consider custom to be one of the categories of

benefit. Custom or customary usage plays a great role in Maliki fiqh. It explains expressions

since expressions are explained according to linguistic custom or usage rather than customs

in actions. Ash-Shatibi says about this: "Customs include those whose expression varies in

meaning, and so the expression may change its meaning in relation to the same people, like

the difference of terminology according to the usage of artisans in their crafts which differs

from the usage of the majority, or in respect of the predominant usage in some ideas so that

that expression which previously had a certain meaning which might have been understood as

meaning something else. The judgement is assigned to what is customary in respect to its

normal usage rather than an abnormal usage. This is the sense which is current often in oaths,

contracts and divorce by indirect words." (AlMuwafaqat, pt. 2, p. 198) As expressions are

explained according to customs, so customs have an effect on contracts. When the custom in

marriage is to pay the bride-price before consummation, it is considered as long as there is no

text contrary to it. If there is a custom that a type of sale is by cash and not credit or the

reverse, or for a known term rather than without it, that commercial custom is considered as

long as there is no text contrary to it. This resembles that on which judicial decision occurs by

respecting the custom of commerce in cases between them and its consideration as a

confirmed legal basis in their dealings. In al-Furuq, al-Qarafi devotes a section to clarifying

of the custom in contracts which affect it. Thus if there is an non-specific contract, it is

considered to involve equal shares. A contract for land includes the trees and buildings, a

contract for a building includes the earth, a contract on a house which includes its doors,

stairs, and shelves. A murabaha contract includes within the basis for the price the wage for

sewing, embroidery and all ornament. The contract on the tree includes the earth and fruit

which is pollinated, and so forth, as he said in mentioning these questions and others.

Conclusion

These are the fundamental principles of Imam Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, which

the scholars of his school have derived from the corpus of the secondary rulings transmitted

from him. It is by means of them that his rulings were derived and upon them that they are

based. The first thing to be noticed about these principles is their flexibility. He did not make

the unqualified text of the Book or the Sunna unequivocal. He opened the door to making its

general texts specific and to qualifying what is unqualified. Just as he opened the door of

specification, he showed there to be flexibility in the texts which facilitated the means of

deriving judgements from them. A faqih should not be inflexible where the text is concerned,

nor should he be excessively flexible. The principles are all interconnected, one amplifying

another, and so any unfamiliar meanings are winnowed out in favour of a meaning derived

from an immediate principle. From that there emerges a mature fiqh that is strong,

straightforward, familiar and known – one which people readily accept. The second thing to

be noticed after the flexibility of these principles is their orientation towards achieving the

greatest benefit in the most direct manner. Analogy is made a way of achieving this. Istihsan

is employed to achieve it by preferring a ruling derived by it if analogy is less apt to achieve

the desired benefit. Consideration of public interest is made into a principle in order to

achieve it by the easiest way. Malik also employed the method of facilitating or blocking the

means which is also considered to be one of the fundamental principles used in deriving

rulings. Then, finally, he considered custom, which is another means of removing distress,

averting hardship, achieving benefit, and fulfilling people's needs. Malik saw that the basic

aim of the Divine Lawgiver in His Shari'a was to realise the greatest benefit for the maximum

number of people and so he made all his fiqh which was not based on an unequivocal text

centre on this principle. He supports it by facilitating and blocking the means and other ways

which lead to it, in order to achieve it by the quickest and easiest manner. Thirdly, the

principles which Malik used in deriving judgements are interconnected with and

complementary to one another. All are derived from the same source and follow the same

guidance: namely, the definitive text, its spirit and meaning and the ways in which the

Prophet and the Companions applied it. Hence his fiqh is aimed at the same goal: the welfare

of people in this world and the Next and following path of the Prophet and Companions

without any innovation. We find that Malik relies on the cases and fatwas of the Companions

in recognising the objective of the Shari'a and then recognises the judgements of those of the

following generation with deep knowledge of the texts and goals of the Shari'a and of its

immediate and long-term consequences. In so doing, Malik opened the same methodology for

his students who came after him and their students. They understood fiqh as he did and

followed his way. So Maliki fiqh spread far and wide.

8. Shafi School of Fiqh

The Shâfi′i Madh-hab is the third school of Islamic jurisprudence, which was created by

Imam ash-Shâfi′i by combining the Fiqh of Hijaz (Mâliki thought) with that of Iraq (Hanafi

thought) and Egypt (al-Laythi thought). Let us first briefly discuss the biography of the

founder of this Madh-hab, then the phase-wise formation of the Madhhab al-Qadeem and al-

Jadeed within the Shâfi′I Madh-hab and its division into Tareeqa

al-Khurasaniyeen and Tareeqa al-Baghdadiyeen and, finally, list the various parts of the

Islamic world that follow it. Imam ash-Shâfi′i is one of the four great Imams of the Islamic

law, whose full name is Muhammad ibn Idrees ash-Shâfi′i. He belonged to the Qurayshi clan

Banu-Muttalib, which was the brother clan of the Banu-Hashim the clan of the Prophet

Muhammad . He was born in a village in Ghazzah in the year 769 CE, from where his mother

took him at the age of two to Makkah. In Makkah, he memorized the Quran at an early age.

He also memorized Imam Mâlik’s Muwatta’ word by word before travelling to Madeenah in

pursuit of knowledge. His two prominent teachers were Imam Mâlik ibn Anas and Imam

Muhammad ibn al-Hassan al-Shaybaanee, from whom he studied Fiqh of Madeenah and

hadith and Fiqh of Iraq when he travelled to Madeenah and Baghdad, respectively. He also

studied the Madh-hab of al-Layth from al-Layth’s students when he settled in Egypt. He

remained in Egypt until his death in the year 820 CE (Wahid, Yunus & Abdullah, 2016;

"ShafiiFiqh | A Brief Outline of the Shafi’i School’s Transmission", 2015; Philips, 2006, p.

108). According to Imam ash-Shâfi′i, there are five sources of Islamic law: the Quran and al-

Sunnah, al-Ijma (consensus), the views of the companions, alQiyas (analogical reasoning),

and Istis-hâb (linking) (Philips, 2006, pp. 109-110). The process of development of Shâfi′i

school of thought occurred through knowledge transfer by the tarjih (a specific verdict of

preference) and takhrij (extraction) activities among his students and contemporary scholars,

the mujtahidin, ulema and the spread/ transfer of knowledge within the Madh-hab (Hassan et

al., 2015). Let us first focus on the development of the al-Madh-hab al-Qadeem. This period

is based on two phases: the first phase of the Fiqh learning of Imam ash-Shâfi′I under Imam

Mâlik until his death in 801 CE, in which he got expertise in Fiqh of Hijaz, the Mâliki

thought, and hadith, and the second phase, which began in the year 805 CE with learning the

Fiqh of Iraq, the Hanafi thought, under Muhammad ibn al-Hassan al-Shaybaanee, the student

of Imam Abu Haneefah. Thereafter, during his stay in Iraq, Imam ash-Shâfi′i combined both

Fiqh, the Fiqh of Hijaz and the Fiqh of Iraq in the year 810 CE in the form of a book named

Kitabal-Hujjah (The Evidence), and created a new Madh-hab. This book was produced as a

result of his dictations to his students, and is a collection of his rulings (Hassan et al., 2015).

The al-Hujjah and that whole period of Imam ash-Shâfi′i scholarship is commonly known as

al-Madh-hab al-Qadeem or Qawl Qadeem (the old school of thought) (Philips, 2006, pp.

108-109). The three transmitters of al-Madh-habal-Qadeem, Za’farani, Ahmad ibn Hanbal,

and Karabisi, spread its rulings in Baghdad (Hassan et al., 2015). These disciples of Imam

ash-Shâfi′i played an active role in spreading the Qawl

Qadeem and the transfer of knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence during years 820-855 CE

("ShafiiFiqh | A Brief Outline of the Shafi’i School’s Transmission", 2015). The validity of

the rulings of al-Hujjah is considered when it is in accordance to the new doctrine, alUmm,

because Imam ash-Shâfi′i himself reversed many of his rulings after studying the

Fiqh of al-Layth, except approximately twenty-two questions in which scholars and muftis

have retained the opinions of the old thought. Hence, al-Umm is an authoritative guide of

Imam ash-Shâfi′i’s legal material (Sharif & Ijaz, 2014; Salam, 1998, p. 20). The formation of

the Madh-hab al-Jadeed, the second phase of Imam ash-Shâfi′i scholarship, started when he

settled in Egypt and learned the Madh-hab of al-Layth from his students in the year 815 CE.

There, he got expertise in the Fiqh of al-Layth and created a new Madh-hab, al-Madh-hab al-

Jadeed or Qawl Jadeed (the new school of thought) in the form of his book, al-Umm (The

Essence) (Philips, 2006, pp. 108-109). The

al-Umm is a treasure of legal material which includes the opinions of al-Awzâi, Mâlik ibn

Anas, and Muhammad al-Shaybaanee and many debates between Imam ash-Shâfi′i and

various other scholars. It was also enriched by the comments of ar-Râbee’ ibn Sulaymân al-

Marâdi, who is the student of Imam ash-Shâfi′i and the compiler of al-Umm (Shamsy, 2012).

The primary transmitters of the al-Madh-hab al-Jadeed are Yoosuf ibn Yahya alBuwayti,

Ismaeel ibn Yahya al-Muzani, and Ar-Rabee’ al-Marâdi who conveyed the new thought

during years 820-855 CE (Hassan et al., 2015; "ShafiiFiqh | A Brief Outline of the Shafi’i

School’s Transmission", 2015). Al-Muzani gathered the Fiqh of Imam ash-Shâfi′i and

condensed it in the form of a book, Mukhtasar al-Muzani, whereas al-Marâdi was the main

narrator of Imam ash-Shâfi′i’s book al-Umm. His third student, Yoosuf, was the mainteacher

of his Madh-hab and particularly known for his stance on “the creation of the Quran”, which

was against the Mu’tazilite philosophy (Philips, 2006, p. 111). The transmission of the Shâfi′i

Madh-hab from his students until two tareeqas,

Tareeqa al-Khurasaniyeen and Tareeqa al-Baghdadiyeen, occurred between the years 884-

952 CE through the four Muhammads, Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Muhammad ibn

Khuzaymah, Muhammad ibn al-Mundir, and Muhammad ibn Marwazi. They were known to

reach the stage where an individual can make its own ijtihad (personal reasoning) without

taqlid (imitation) of others. In progression of the division into two

tareeqas, the students of Abu Ishaq al-Marwazi branched off into two directions of

transmission, the Iraqi (952-1190 CE) and the Khurasani division (952-1165), but eventually

the two tareeqas began to merge during the years of 1190-1204 CE, which are in a unified

form today ("ShafiiFiqh | A Brief Outline of the Shafi’i School’s Transmission", 2015).

Finally, a few words on spreading of the Shâfi′i Madh-hab. In its early years, Baghdad and

Cairo were the main centers of it, then it was spread into various parts of the Muslim

countries. But then, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was replaced by Hanafi

Madh-hab due to the presence of Hanafi scholars in judiciary in Constantinople (“Shafi’i

School”, n.d.). Despite this influence, the Shâfi′i Madh-hab remains predominant today in

various parts of the Islamic world including Egypt; Southern Arabia, i.e., Yemen and

Hadramout; Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka; East Africa, i.e., Kenya, Tanzania; and Surinam

in South America (Philips, 2006, p. 112). In short, Imam ash-Shâfi′i, who played a central

role in the development of Islamic jurisprudence, created the Shâfi′i Madh-hab by unification

of the Fiqh of Hijaz with that ofIraq and Egypt. The developmental stages of the Shâfi′i

Madh-hab were based on the two main phases while he was alive, which resulted in the two

main books, al-Hujjah (the old doctrine) and al-Umm (the new doctrine), whereas after him

several phases of the transmission or transference of Shâfi′i Fiqh occurred through his

students and Shâfi′i scholars and muftis, and the divisional phases of his Madh-hab into Iraqi

and Khurasani channels. Today, the unified version of Shâfi′i Madh-hab is followed by

several parts of the Islamic world such as Egypt, Southern Arabia, East Africa, Surinam in

South America, etc.

9. Hanbali School of Fiqh

Ḥanbalī school, in Islam, one of the four Sunni schools of religious law, known especially

for its role in the codification of early theological doctrine. Based on the teachings of Aḥmad

ibn Ḥanbal (780–855), the Ḥanbalī legal school (madhhab) emphasized the authority of

the Hadith (traditions concerning the Prophet Muhammad’s life and utterances) and of the

precedent set by the early generations of Muslims. It was deeply suspicious of speculative

legal reasoning (ra y) and analogy (qiyās) and rejected their use to overrule hadiths or to

contravene early precedent. Between the 11th and 13th centuries, Iraqi Ḥanbalīs experienced

a period of intellectual efflorescence and social prominence, counting philosophers and

caliphal viziers among their number. By contrast, the Levantine Ḥanbalīs, whose quietist

Damascene school rose to prominence after the Mongol invasion in the 13th century,

maintained staunchly traditionalist theological norms. The Syrian Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn

Taymiyyah (1263–1328) synthesized the two approaches, inspiring the 18th-

century Wahhābī movement of central Arabia as well as the modernist Salafiyyah movement

of 19th- and 20th-century Syria and Egypt. Beginning in the 20th century the Ḥanbalī school

was broadly disseminated via Saudi Arabia, where it constitutes the official school of law.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of Hanbali school, was a disciple of Al-Shafi‘i. Like Shafi'i

and al-Zahiri, he was deeply concerned with the extreme elasticity being deployed by many

jurists of his time, who used their discretion to reinterpret the doctrines of Quran and Hadiths

to suit the demands of Caliphs and wealthy.[12] Ibn Hanbal advocated return to literal

interpretation of Quran and Hadiths. Influenced by the debates of his time, he was known for

rejecting religious rulings (Ijtihad) from the consensus of jurists of his time, which he

considered to be speculative theology (Kalam). He associated them with the Mu'tazilis,

whom he despised. Ibn Hanbal was also hostile to the discretionary principles of rulings in

jurisprudence (Usul al-fiqh) mainly championed by the people of opinion, which was

established by Abu Hanifa, although he did adopt al-Shafi'i's method in usul al-fiqh. He

linked these discretionary principles with kalam. His guiding principle was that the Quran

and Sunnah are the only proper sources of Islamic jurisprudence, and are of equal authority

and should be interpreted literally in line with the Athari creed. He also believed that there

can be no true consensus (Ijma) among jurists (mujtahids) of his time,[12] and preferred the

consensus of Muhammad's companions (Sahaba) and weaker hadiths. Imam Hanbal himself

compiled Al-Musnad, a text with over 30,000 saying, actions and customs of Muhammad.[1]

Ibn Hanbal never composed an actual systematic legal theory on his own, though his

followers established a systemic method after his death.[13][self-published source] Much of the work

of preserving the school based on Ibn Hanbal's method was laid by his student Abu Bakr al-

Khallal; his documentation on the founder's views eventually reached twenty

volumes.[14] The original copy of the work, which was contained in the House of Wisdom,

was burned along with many other works of literature during the Mongol siege of Baghdad.

The book was only preserved in a summarized form by the Hanbali jurist al-Khiraqi, who had

access to written copies of al-Khallal's book before the siege.[14]

Relations with the Abbasid Caliphate were rocky for the Hanbalites. Led by the Hanbalite

scholar Al-Hasan ibn 'Ali al-Barbahari, the school often formed mobs of followers in 10th-

century Baghdad who would engage in violence against fellow Sunnis suspected of

committing sins and all Shi'ites.[15] During al-Barbahari's leadership of the school in

Baghdad, shops were looted,[16] female entertainers were attacked in the streets,[16] popular

grievances among the lower classes were agitated as a source of mobilization,[17] and public

chaos in general ensued.[18] Their efforts would be their own undoing in 935, when a series

of home invasions and mob violence on the part of al-Barbahari's followers in addition to

perceived deviant views led to the Caliph Ar-Radi publicly condemning the school in its

entirety and ending its official patronage by state religious bodies.[18]

Like all other schools of Sunni Islam, the Hanbali school holds that the two primary sources

of Islamic law are the Qur'an and the Sunnah found in Hadiths (compilation of sayings,

actions and customs of Muhammad). Where these texts did not provide guidance, Imam

Hanbal recommended guidance from established consensus of Muhammad's companions

(Sahabah), then individual opinion of Muhammad's companions, followed in order of

preference by weaker hadiths, and in rare cases qiyas (analogy).[1] The Hanbali school, unlike

Hanafi and Maliki schools, rejected that a source of Islamic law can be a jurist's personal

discretionary opinion or consensus of later generation Muslims on matters that serve the

interest of Islam and community. Hanbalis hold that this is impossible and leads to abuse.[12]

Ibn Hanbal rejected the possibility of religiously binding consensus (Ijma), as it was

impossible to verify once later generations of Muslims spread throughout the world,[12] going

as far as declaring anyone who claimed as such to be a liar. Ibn Hanbal did, however, accept

the possibility and validity of the consensus of the Sahaba. the first generation of

Muslims.[19][20] Later followers of the school, however, expanded on the types of consensus

accepted as valid, and the prominent Hanbalite Ibn Taymiyyah expanded legal consensus to

later generations while at the same time restricting it only to the religiously

learned.[20] Analogical reasoning (Qiyas), was likewise rejected as a valid source of law by

Ibn Hanbal himself,[12][21][22] with a near-unanimous majority of later Hanbalite jurists not

only accepting analogical reasoning as valid but also borrowing from the works

of Shafi'ite jurists on the subject.

Ibn Hanbal's strict standards of acceptance regarding the sources of Islamic law were

probably due to his suspicion regarding the field of Usul al-Fiqh, which he equated with

speculative theology (kalam).[23] In the modern era, Hanbalites have branched out and even

delved into matters regarding the upholding (Istislah) of public interest (Maslaha) and even

juristic preference (Istihsan), anathema to the earlier Hanbalites as valid methods of

determining religious law.

Ibn Hanbal taught that the Qur'an is uncreated due to Muslim belief that it is the word of God,

and the word of God is not created. The Mu'tazilites taught that the Qur'an, which is readable

and touchable, is created like other creatures and created objects. Ibn Hanbal viewed this as

heresy, replying that there are things which are not touchable but are created, such as the

Throne of God.[24] Unlike the other three schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki,

and Shafi), the Hanbali madhab remained largely traditionalist or Athari in theology[25] and it

was primarily Hanbali scholars who codified the Athari school of thought.

10. Kalam: Definition, Scope and Origin

The word 'Kalam' means 'speech' and therefore the Quran is

called 'Kalam al-Alldh' denoting the fact that the Quran is the speech of

Allah. But, as a term, kalam has several implications. As Wolfson

indicates, "The terni Kalam, which literally means 'speech' or 'word' is

used in Arabic translations of the works of Greek philosophers as

rendering the tenn logos in its various senses of 'word', 'reason', and

'argument'. The term kalam is also used in those Arabic translations from

the Greek in the sense of any special branch of learning, thus the Greek

expression "discussions" about nature is translated by 'the physical

kalam'. Greek term for 'theologians' is translated by 'masters of the devine Kalam.

Explaining the kalam, De Boer says, "An assertion, expressed in

logical or dialectical fashion, whether verbal or written, was called by the

Arabs generally, but more particularly in religious teaching, a kalam and

those who advanced such assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name

was transferred from the individual assertion to the entire system and it

covered also the introductory, elementary observations on method, and so

on".

Though, kalam literally means 'speech' or 'word' but it has

several, and special by nature, implications which render kalam as a tool

of theological polemics. This is why some persons have translated it as

'ILm at-Kaiam simply 'theology' or 'speculative theology'. In the Encyclopaedia of

Islam it is pleaded about kalam that it is "one of the religious sciences of

Islam. The tenn is usually translated as an approximate rendering of

'theology"^. Mohsin Mehdi, on the other hand, translates Ihn al-Kalan as

"the science of speculative theology" Since Kalam is dialectical in its nature, therefore, it was

also translated as "dialectics" and the Mutakallimin (practitioners of the

Kalam) as "dialecticians". De Boer says, "Our best designation for the

science of the Kalam is "theological dialectics" or simply 'Dialectics',

and in what follows we may translate 'Mulakallimun' by

"Dialecticians"^ \ If the Kalam is dialectical in its nature, it is polemic in

its method. A Mutakallim always presupposes an opponent and tries his

best to defeat him by his argumentation. In other words, the methodology

adopted by the Mulakallimin to estabhsh their view-point was polemical,

therefore, some persons had translated it as 'polemic theology'. Mc

Carthy, for example, says, "In the present work, it might well be

translated by 'polemic theology'. Most Muslim theology is polemic, and

kalam seems to mean the kind of plemic which makes considerable use of

rational argument.” "In his 'Ihsa-al-Ulum', al-Farabi regards ilm al-kalam as a science

which enables a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and actions laid

down by the legislator of the religion, and to refute opinions

contracticting them. The doctors of Kalam {Mutakallimun) themselves

were to take a very similar view. This is one of many well-known

definitions. Kalam is the science which is concerned with firmly

estabhshing religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing

doubts. Ibn Khaldun and Mohammad Abduh are also of the same opinion.

"Ilm al-kalam is the discipline which brings to the service of

rehgious beliefs (aqa'id) discursive arguments, which thus provides a

place for reflexion and meditation and hence for reason, in the elucidation

and defense of the content of the faith. It takes its stand firstly against

"doubters and deniers" and its function as defensive ''apologia" cannot be

over-stressed.

"Another interpretation sometimes suggested explains ilm al-kalam

as "science of the Word of God". The attribute of the Word and the nature

of the Quran were indeed among the first themes treated, the discussions

on this subject continued throughout the centuries. But this was by no

means the first question undertaken, nor that later treated at most length.

It seems much more likely that kalam referred at first to discursive

arguments, and the mutakallimiin were reasoners". This was the case as

early as the rime of M'abad al-Djuhani (d. 80/699-700). Kalam became a

regular discipline when these arguments and discussions dealt with the

content of the faith. It is this character of discursive and reasoned

apologia which was to attract the attacks both of the traditionalists and of

falasifa.'"

One thing should be clarified here, viz, why kalam was called

Islamic scholasricism. For this purpose we should refer to its origin.

Scholasticism was derived from Latin word scholasticus meaning the

master of a school. St. Augustine^^'^-' (354-430) was the first Clirisrian

philosopher who, on individual level tried his best to defend Christianity

and the dogmas of its faith with the help of logical proofs and rational

arguments. And in the medieval period in Europe, this footstep was

'ILm. al-Kalam

followed by some other philosphers like Abelard^^^ and Thomas

Aquinas^'™-'. They attempted to harmonize between reason and revelation

and defended the dogmas of Christianity on the basis of reason. Thus

scholasticism was introduced in philosophy and theology as a defense

method. C. G. Nonn defines Scholasticism as, "A set of scholarly and

structural techniques developed in western European schools of the late

medieval period, including the use of commentry and disputed question,

scholasticism is derived firom Latin scholasticus, which in the twelfth

century meant the master of a school. The scholastic method is usually

presented as beginning in the law school and as being then transported

into theology and philosophy by a series of masters including Abelard

and Peter Lombard^''^'^"^^

Since the Kalam aims to establish Islamic behefs and dogmas with

the help of reason and to harmonize between reason and revelation,

therefore it was also called 'scholasticism'. But in order to distinguish the

kalam from that of Christianity it was named Tslamic scholasticism'.

Islamic scholasticism is used for Kalam that generally covers the kalam

of the Qadarites, the Jabarites, the Mushabbiha, the Mujassima, the

Sifatis, the Khawarij and the Shi'ites but more particularly, it covers the

kalam of the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites. Whereas the Mu'tazilites

and the Ash'arites chiefly differ on the point of priority of reason and

revelation. The former emphasize the importance of reason and the latter

believe in the authority of revelation. Nadvi, for example, says, "It is

clear that, though the Arabic word 'Kalam' meaning science of reason

includes both Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism, the word 'scholasticism' which

is generally used as an English equivalent for kalam, is not wide enough

to cover the two. To avoid the confusion, therefore, I shall refer to

'Ilm al-KalamMu'tazilism as a rationalistic school and Ash'arism as a scholastic

school". Accordingly, we can say that the Mu'tazilites were not the

Mylakallimin in the real sense, rather they were the philosophers of this

Ummah. Because Mutakallimun are those who take the truth of Islam as

their starting point and they do never deny any of its dogmas at any cost.

On the other hand, "a philosopher does not take them as his starting point

but follows a method of research independent of dogma, without,

however, rejecting the dogma or ignoring it in its sources" .

We can infer that the Mu'tazilites could not strictly follow this

methodology, that is, they could not take the truth of Islam as their

starting point and if they did so they could not justify the dogmas of the

Faith. For example, they denied the very existence of Attributes thinking

that this was contrary to the unity of God, or this did entail the plurality of

the Deity and so on along with the fact that they stressed more on reason

than revelation. Consequently, they were called rationalists rather than

Mutakallimun. Abu Zuhra^'^"-', on the contrary, regards the Mu'tazilites

to be the real Mutakallimun . But in our opinion, the Ash'antes are the

Mutakallimun in the real sense Nevertheless, the Mu'tazilites can also be

regarded Mutakallimun at least in some respects, because they tried their

best to defend the dogmas of faith and their efforts remained confined to

the Islamic framework. Further, it were the Mu'tazilites who had

introduced the terni 'Kalam', as a special branch of learning in Islam.

Their aim was to propound a science of their own, as a counterpart of

Mantiq (logic) of Greek philosophers. Shahrastani says, "The Mu'tazilite

leaders studied the works of the philosophers as they became available

during the reign of Mamun. They then introduced the methods of the

'Ilm al-Kalam philosophers into theology, which they made into a branch of science.

They gave it the name of kalam: either because the chief question on

which they spoke and disputed was that of kalam (Gods Word), by which

the whole discipline was called; or in imitation of the philosophers, who

so called one of their branches of learning logic, for logic and Kalam are

synonymous. Briefly, Kalam includes in its connotation different methods of the

study of theology including discourse, dialogue, defense,

philosophication, etc., resulting into theosophical efforts to justify faith

and beliefs of the religion either with the help of reason or revelation.

Kalam passed through three stages: in its primary and first stage it

was directed only to refute the arguments of new converts against Islam

and to prove Islamic tenets by quoting Quranic verses and traditions of

the Prophet. In the second stage it became rationalistic in the hands of the

Mu'tazilites, but in its final stage it was reduced to mere scholasticism

aiming at reconciliation between reason and revelation on the basis of

reasoning that is the work of the Ash'rities.

12. Ashari School: Origin and Development

Asharism is the name of a philosophico-religious school of thought in Islam that developed

during the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries. This movement was “an attempt not

only to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into it but also to

harmonize the religious consciousness with the religious thought of Islam.”

It laid the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or orthodox Kalam, as opposed to the

rationalist Kalam of the Mu'tazilites; and in opposition to the extreme orthodox class, it made

use of the dialectical method for the defence of the authority of divine revelation as applied to

theological subjects.

The position at the end of the third/ninth century was such that the development of such a

movement as orthodox Kalamwas inevitable. The rationalization of faith, which developed, at

the beginning of the second century of the Hijrah as a systematic movement of thought, in the

name of rationalism in Islam or Mu'tazilite movement, was, in its original stage, simply an

attempt to put Islam and its basic principles on a rational foundation, by giving a consistent

rational interpretation to the different dogmas and doctrines of Islam.

But when the Mu'tazilite rationalists began to study the Arabic translations of the works of

Greek physicists and philosophers made available to them by the early 'Abbasid Caliphs,

particularly by al-Mansur and al-Mamun, they began to apply the Greek philosophical

methods and ideas to the interpretation of the basic principles of Islam as well.

Some of the early 'Abbasid Caliphs, particularly al-Mamun, began to patronize the

rationalism of the Mu'tazilites in public. The Mu'tazilite speculation, in the hands of the later

Mu'tazilites, those of the second and third generations, under the influence of Greek

philosophy and with the active support and patronage of the Caliphs, tended to be purely

speculative and “absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of

thought.”1

They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality and thus identified the sphere of

philosophy with that of religion. They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure thought. They

ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very nature, incapable of

logical demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of Islam deal with supersensible

realities and, as such, they must first be accepted on the authority of revelation.

The Mu'tazilites, in their zeal to judge everything by reason alone, destroyed the personality

of God and reduced Him to a bare indefinable universality or to an abstract unity. This idea of

an abstract, impersonal, absolute God could not appeal to the ordinary Muslims. The

orthodox section of the people reacted strongly against the Mu'tazilite rationalism and began

to consider the Mu'tazilites to be heretics.

The extreme rationalistic attitude of the later Mu'tazilites was followed by powerful reaction

from the orthodox section of the people. This reaction was greatly aggravated by the

unfortunate attempt of the Caliph al-Mamun to force Mu'tazilism (rationalist Kalam) on his

subjects by introducing mihnah (a compulsory test of faith) in the Mu'tazilite doctrines,

particularly in their doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an. The whole of the third/ninth

century was a time of reaction.

The orthodox Muslims (and among them were the Traditionists [the Muhaddithin]), the

Zahirites (the followers of Dawud ibn `Ali), and the Muslim jurists (fuqaha') adhered strictly

to Tradition and literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah,2 and refused to admit any

“innovation” (bid'ah) in the Shari'ah (the Islamic Code). Any theological discussion was

considered an “innovation” and was as such a cause of displeasure to them.3 The reactionary

influence of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal and his Zahirite followers was very strong at that

period and the orthodox Muslims kept themselves safely aloof from the Mu'tazilites and the

philosophers.

The reaction against the rationalist Kalam went to such an extreme that even the

anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'an were interpreted by them in a purely literal sense.

Malik bin Anas said: “God's settling Himself firmly upon His Throne is known, the how of it

is unknown; belief in it is obligatory; and questioning about it is an innovation.”4 Any

speculation about sacred things was considered an innovation. Every dogma was to be

believed in without raising the question how or why (bila kaifa).

But such an attitude of blind faith could not be maintained for any length of time. Islam, as a

universal religion and as a living force, had to adapt itself to new thoughts and to new

surroundings. So, as time went on, there arose gradually a party, from amongst the orthodox

section of the Muslims, who realized the necessity of putting Islam on a solid ground by

advancing “reasons” for the traditional beliefs, of defending these beliefs against all sorts of

attacks internal and external, and thus purging their faith of all the non-Islamic elements that

had crept into it.

They founded the orthodox theology of Islam by using Kalam or the philosophical method in

order to meet the dialectical reasoning of the Mu'tazilites. These theologians who

employed Kalam for the defence of their faith were, therefore, known as the Mutakallimun

(orthodox theologians).5

But, although these thinkers used philosophical method in their discussions, they obtained the

primary materials from revelation. They developed a rival science of reasoning to meet the

Mu'tazilites on their own ground. In the beginning this new orthodox theological movement

developed privately and secretly. It was at first a gradual unconscious drift. It could not come

to the open for fear of public criticism.

Al-Junaid, for instance, had to discuss the unity of God behind closed doors. Al-Shafi'i held

that some trained people might defend and purify the faith but that should not be done in

public. Al-Muhasibi and other contemporaries of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal incurred his

displeasure for defending the faith with arguments or reason. But gradually the movement

gathered strength and began to be openly preached almost at the same time in different places

of the Muslim world-in Mesopotamia by Abu al-Hasan `Ali bin Isma`il al-Ashari (d. 330 or

334/941 or 945), in Egypt by al-Tahawi (d. 331/942), and in Samarqand by Abu Mansnr

al-Maturidi (d. 333/ 944).

But of these three, al-Ash'ari became the most popular hero, before whom the Mu'tazilite

system (the rationalist Kalam) went down, and he came to be known as the founder of the

orthodox philosophical theology, and the school founded by him was named after him as

Ash`arism.

Al-Ash'ari was born at Basrah. Regarding his date of birth there is difference of opinion. Ibn

Khallikan, in his discussion of the life of al-Ash'ari, mentions that he was born in 260 or

270/873 or 883 and died at Baghdad in 330/941 or some time after that.6

According to Shibli Nu'mani and Ibn `Asakir (the author of Tabyin Kidhb al-Muftari, on the

life and teachings of al-Ash'ari), he was born in 270/873 and died in 330/941.7 He was buried

between Karkh and Bab al-Basrah (the gate of Basrah). He was a descendant of Abu Musa

al-Ash'ari, one, of the famous Companions of the Prophet.

Al-Ash'ari, in his early youth, came under the care of the great Mu'tazilite scholar of the

Basrite school, Abu 'Ali Muhammad bin `Abd al-Wahhab al-Jubba'i, and, as a disciple of his,

became an adherent of the Mu'tazilite school and continued to support its doctrines up to the

age of forty. After that there happened a sudden change in his mind and one day he went to

the Mosque of Basrah and declared: “He who knows me, knows who I am, and he who does

not know me, let him know that I am Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari, that I used to maintain

that the Qur'an is created, that eyes of men shall not see God, and that the creatures create

their actions. Lo! I repent that I have been a Mu'tazilite. I renounce these opinions and I take

the engagement to refute the Mu'tazilites and expose their infamy and turpitude.”

What brought about this sudden change in al-Aah'ari is not definitely known to us. Shibli in

his `Ilm al-Kalam says that “the change came to him due to some directions which he had

obtained in a dream...”.8 Ibn Khallikan mentions in this connection the story of a public

discussion in which al-Ashari met his old Mu'tazilite teacher, al-Jubba'i, on the problem

of salah wa’l aslah, i. e., the problem whether God's actions are to be based on rational

consideration and whether He is bound to do what is best for His creatures.

Al-Ash'ari came to al-Jubba'i and presented the case of three brothers, one being God-fearing,

another godless, and a third having died as a child, and asked him as to what would be their

positions in the next world. Al-Jubba'i could not give a satisfactory and consistent reply to

that question and, on his having failed to justify rationally the Mu'tazilite doctrine of salah

wa’l aslah, al-Ash'ari abandoned the Mu'tazilite camp.9

But whatever might have been the cause of this change, when he changed he was terribly in

earnest. After the change he wrote a number of books and Ibn Furak says that the number

amounted to three hundred. Ibn `Asakir Dimashqi has given the titles of ninety-three of them,

but only a few have been preserved and are enumerated by Brockelmann.

His work al-Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah was printed at Hyderabad, Deccan (India), in

1321/1903 and a small treatise Risalah fi Istihsan al-Khaud fi al-Kalam was printed in

1323/1905 and reprinted at Hyderabad in 1344/1925. Al-Ash'ari's other famous works

are al-Maqalat al IsIamiyyin (published in Istanbul in 1348/1929), Kitab al-Sharh

wal-Tafsil, al-Luma`, Mu'jaz, I’adah al-Burhan, and Tab'in.

Of these books the Maqalat al Islamiyyin wa Ikhtilaf al Musalliyyin is the most authentic

book on the views of different schools about religious dogmas and doctrines. Al-Maqalat was

written much earlier than the other books on the same subject, such as Shahrastani's Kitab

al-Milal wal-Nihal, or Ibn Hazm's al-Fasl fi al-Milal wal-Ahwa' wal Nihal.

Ibn Taimiyyah said in his Minhaj al-Sunnah that the most comprehensive of the books he

went through on the views of different people on the basic principles of Islam was

al-Ash'ari's al-Maqalat al-Islamiyyin and that he (al-Ash'ari) discussed many of such views in

details as were not even mentioned by others. Ibn al-Qayyim also spoke very highly of this

work. In his Hadi al-Arwah and Ijtima` al-Juyush al-Islamiyyah, he said, “Shahrastani, `Abd

al-Qahir Baghdadi, and other later writers on the subject simply copied from al-Ash'ari's book

and did not discuss the views in details.”

Al-Ash'ari's other famous book al- Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah seems to have been written

by him just after his abandoning the Mu'tazilite views. In this book we find he is almost a

Zahirite. The reaction against the Mu'tazilite speculation might have been very strong in his

mind at that period. Al-Maqalat seems to be a later work. The Risalah fi Istihsan

al-Khaud deals with the objections raised by the extremely orthodox against the use

of Kalam, and the replies given by al-Ash'ari, justifying its use in matters of faith.

Al-Ash'ari's theology has been discussed mainly in these books. He had a good number of

pupils who passed as famous theologians and who spread and developed his doctrines and

dogmas. Some of those older Ash'arites were abu Sahl Saluqi, Abu Quffal, Abu Zaid Maruzi,

Zahir bin Ahmad, Hafiz Abu Bakr Jurjani, Shaikh Abu Muhammad Tabari, and Abu

al-Hasan Bahili. Some of the pupils of these older Ash'arites became still more famous and

the best known among them are Qadi Abu Bakr Baqillani, Abu Bakr bin Furak, Abu

al-Qasim al-Qushairi and abu Ishaq Isfra'ini and his pupil Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwaini, known as

Imam al-Haramain.10

Ash’arite Theology

Al-Ash'ari maintains an intermediary position between the two diametrically opposed schools

of thought prevailing at the time. He had to fight against both the opposing parties. At the one

extreme were the Mu'tazilites who made reason in preference to revelation the sole criterion

of truth and reality and, thus, passed slowly into comparatively innocuous heretics. At the

other extreme were the orthodox groups, particularly the Zahirites, the Mujassimites

(anthropomorphists), the Muhaddithin (Traditionists), and the Jurists, all of which were

wholly opposed to the use of reason or Kalam in defending or explaining religious dogmas

and condemned any discussion about them as innovation. Al-Ash'ari wrote his Istihsan

al-Khaud mainly to meet the objections raised by the orthodox school against the use of

reason in matters of faith.

In that treatise he says: “A section of the people (i.e., the Zahirites and other orthodox people)

made capital out of their own ignorance; discussions and rational thinking about matters of

faith became a heavy burden for them, and, therefore, they became inclined to blind faith and

blind following (taqlid). They condemned those who tried to rationalize the principles of

religion as `innovators.'

They considered discussion about motion, rest, body, accident, colour, space, atom, the

leaping of atoms, and attributes of God, to be an innovation and a sin. They said that had such

discussions been the right thing, the Prophet and his Companions would have definitely done

so; they further pointed out that the Prophet, before his death, discussed and fully explained

all those matters which were necessary from the religious point of view, leaving none of them

to be discussed by his followers; and since he did not discuss the problems mentioned above,

it was evident that to discuss them must be regarded as an innovation.”

They further contended that these so-called theological problems were either known to the

Prophet and his Companions and yet they kept silent and did not discuss them or they were

not known to them. If they knew them and yet did not discuss them, we are also to follow

them in keeping silent, and if they could remain unaware of them we can also do so. In both

cases discussion about them would be an “innovation.” These were, in brief, their objections

against the use of Kalam in matters of faith.

Al-Ash'ari, then, proceeds to justify theological discussions about matters of faith. He tries to

meet these objections in three ways. First, by turning the objections of the orthodox against

themselves by pointing out to them that the Prophet had not said that those who would

discuss these problems were to be condemned and charged as innovators. Hence, their

charging or condemning others as innovators was itself an innovation, for it amounted to

discussion about matters which the Prophet did not discuss, and condemn the action of those

whom the Prophet did not condemn.

Secondly, “the Prophet was not unaware of all these problems of body, accident, motion, rest,

atoms, etc., though he did not discuss each of them separately. The general principles (usul)

underlying these problems are present in general, not in details, in the Qur'an and the

Sunnah.” Al-Ash'ari then proceeds to prove his contention by citing verses from the Qur'an

and the sayings of the Prophet, and thereby showing that the principles underlying the

problems of harakah, sukun, tawhid, etc., are, as a matter of fact, present in the Qur'an and

the Sunnah.11

Thirdly, “the Prophet was not unaware of these matters and knew them in detail, but as

problems about them did not arise during his life-time, there was no question of his

discussing or not discussing them.” The Companions of the Prophet discussed and argued

about many religious matters which appeared during their life-time, although there was no

direct and explicit “saying” of the Prophet about them, and because of the absence of any

explicit injunction from the Prophet they differed in their judgments about them.

Had the question, for instance, of the creation of the Qur'an, or of atoms or substance, been

raised in so many words in the life of the Prophet, he would have definitely discussed and

explained it as he did in the case of all those problems which were then raised. “There is no

direct verdict (nass) from the Prophet, for instance, as to whether the Qur'an is created or

uncreated. If to call the Qur'an created is an `innovation,' then, on the same ground, to call it

uncreated must also be an `innovation.”' Al-Ash'ari then concludes that Islam is not opposed

to the use of reason; on the other hand, rationalization of faith is a necessity in Islam.

Al-Ash'ari discussed the main theological problems in his Maqalat al-Islamiy-

yin and al-Ibanah `an Usul al-Diyanah.In these books al-Ash’ari selects a few principles

which distinguish the Ash'arites from the Mu'tazilite school of thought. Later on al-Ghazali

put them in a consolidated form in his Ihya 12 as the “Principles of Faith” or Qawa'id

al-`Aqa'id, and Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi explained them more elaborately. The main

problems about which the Ash'arites differed from the Mu'tazilites are:

(1) The conception of God and the nature of His attributes.

(2) Freedom of the human will.

(3) The criterion of truth and the standard of good and evil.

(4) The vision (ru’yah) of God.

(5) Createdness of the Qur'an.

(6) Possibility of burdening the creatures with impossible tasks.

(7) Promise of reward and threat of punishment.

(8) The rational or non-rational basis of God's actions.

(9) Whether God is bound to do what is best for His creatures.13

The problems discussed by the Ash'arites in their system may be broadly classified into two

categories: (i) theological, and (ii) metaphysical.

Fundamental Principles Of The Ash'arite Theology

1. Conception of God and the Nature of His Attributes

According to the Ash'arites, God is one, unique, eternal, existent Being; He is not a

substance, not a body, not an accident, not limited to any direction, and not in any space. He

possesses attributes such as knowledge, power, life, will; He is hearing and seeing and has

speech.

About the nature of divine attributes two extreme views were held before the Ash'arites. On

the one hand, there were the extreme Attributists (Sifatis), the Anthropomorphists

(Mujassimin), and the Comparers (Mushabbihin), who maintained that God possesses all the

attributes mentioned in the Qur'an and that all such attributes as God's having hands, legs,

ears, eyes, and His sitting firmly (istiwa) on His Throne must be taken in their literal sense.

Such a view of the attributes of God is pure anthropomorphism, implying God's bodily

existence. On the other hand, there were the Mu'tazilites who held that God is one, eternal,

unique, absolute Being, having no touch of dualism in Him. His essence is self-contained. He

does not possess any attributes apart from His essence. His essence is, for instance, knowing,

powerful, seeing, willing, etc. They denied the attributes of God as anything other than and

addition to His essence.

The Ash'arites maintained a view which was, so to say, a reconciliation between the two

extreme views. In agreement with the Sifatis and in opposition to the Mu'tazilites and the

“philosophers” (those who were under Greek influence), the Ash'arites held that God

possesses attributes in general. They classified the attributes of God into two main groups:

(i) sifat-i salbiyyah, or negative attributes, and (ii) sifat-i wujudiyyah or existential or positive

attributes. According to them, the sifat-i wujudiyyah, which they also called sifat-i

`aqliyyah or rational attributes, were seven: knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, seeing, and

speech.

The extreme Sifatis asserted that even those attributes of God which imply His bodily

existence are also to be taken in their true literal sense. As against them, the Ash'arites

maintained that God possesses the apparently anthropomorphic attributes no doubt, but these

should be understood not in their literal sense. They are to be believed in bila kaifa, without

asking “how,” and bila tashbih, without drawing any comparison.14

The Ash'arites here introduced a principle that the attributes of God are unique and

fundamentally different from those of the created beings and as such should not be compared

to them. This is known as the doctrine of mukhalafah, or absolute difference. This doctrine

signifies that if any quality or term is applied to God, it must be understood in a unique sense

and never taken in the sense in which it is normally used when applied to created beings.

Because of the doctrine of mukhalafah, the Ash'arites held that we are not allowed to ascribe

any attribute to God unless it is expressly so applied in the Qur'an. God's attributes differ

from those of the creatures, not in degree but in kind, i. e., in their whole nature.

The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites, held that “God has attributes which inhere

eternally in Him and are in addition to His essence.”15 These attributes are eternal, but they

are neither identical with His essence, nor are they quite different from or other than His

essence. God is knowing, for instance, means that God possesses knowledge as an attribute,

which is inherent in God, and although it is not exactly the same as His essence, yet it is not

something quite different from and other than His essence. The Ash'arites, here, maintained a

very difficult position. They were between the two horns of a dilemma. They could neither

assert the eternal attributes of God to be identical with nor wholly different from the essence

of God.

They could not agree to the Mu'tazilite view and assert the identity of the attributes with the

essence of God, because that would be a virtual denial of the attributes. They could not also

assert that these eternal attributes are something absolutely different, or other than and

separate, from God, as that would lead to multiplicity of eternals, and go against divine unity.

They, therefore, maintained that these attributes are, in one sense, included in and, in another

sense, excluded from, the essence of God.16 It is common knowledge that the Asharites

contended that essence (mahiyyah), and attributes (sifat) are two different things and they

cannot be otherwise in the case of God, the Supreme Being.

The Ash'arites made a distinction between the meaning or connotation (mafhum) of a thing

and its reality (haqiqah). So far as their meaning is concerned, the attributes and the essence

of God are not the same and as such the attributes are in addition to the essence of God, i.e.,

they have different meanings. The meaning of dhat (essence) is different from the meanings

of different attributes.

God's essence, for instance, is not knowing or powerful or wise, but so far as their

ultimate haqiqah (reality or application) is concerned, the attributes are inherent in the divine

essence, and hence are not something quite different from or other than the essence of God.17

In support of the above view of theirs, the Ash'arites advanced the following arguments:

The analogical argument of the Ash'arites of the older generation: God's actions prove that

He is knowing, powerful, and willing; so they also prove that He possesses knowledge,

power, will, etc., because the ground of inference cannot differ in different things. What is

true in the case of a created being must also be true in the case of the Divine Being.18 In the

case of a human being, by “knowing” we mean one who possesses knowledge and even

common sense and draws a line of demarcation between an essence and its attributes.

On the same analogy, distinction must be drawn between the essence of God and His

attributes. The essence and the attributes should not be supposed to be blended in the Divine

Being. Hence the attributes of God cannot be identical with His essence, as the Mu'tazilites

held. But this analogical reasoning is very weak, for what is true of a finite being need not

necessarily be true of an infinite being. But, according to the doctrine of mukhalafah, God's

knowledge or power or will and, as a matter of fact, all His rational attributes signify quite

different meanings when applied to created beings.

Secondly, they argued that if all the attributes of God are identical with His essence, the

divine essence must be a homogeneous combination of contradictory qualities. For instance,

God is merciful (rahim) and also revengeful (qahhar); both the contradictory attributes would

constitute the essence of God, which is one, unique, and indivisible (ahad), and that is absurd.

Further, if the attributes are identical with God's essence, and if, for instance, His being

knowing, powerful, and living is His essence itself, no useful purpose will be served by

ascribing them to Him, for that would ultimately be the virtual application of His essence to

itself, which is useless. Hence the divine attributes cannot be identical with the divine

essence.

Thirdly, if the attributes of God are not distinct from His essence, the meanings of the

different attributes will be exactly the same, for God's essence is a simple and indivisible

unity. The meanings of knowing, willing, and living, for instance, will be exactly the same,

and thus knowledge will mean power, or power will mean life, and so on.19

This also is an absurdity. These different attributes imply different meanings and hence they

cannot be identical with God's essence. His essence is one and He possesses many attributes

which eternally inhere in Him and, though not identical with His essence, yet they are not

absolutely different from His essence.

2. Free will

On the question of free-will or on the ability of man to choose and produce actions, the

Ash'arites took up again an intermediary position between the libertarian and fatalistic views,

held by the Mu'tazilites and the Jabrites respectively. The orthodox people and the Jabrites

maintained a pure fatalistic view. They held that human actions are predetermined and

predestined by God.

Man has no power to produce any action. “Everything,” they contended, “is from God.” God

has absolute power over everything including human will and human actions. The

Mu'tazilites and the Qadarites, on the other hand, held that man has full power to produce an

action and has complete freedom in his choice, though the power was created in him by God.

The Ash'arites struck a middle path. They made a distinction between creation (khalq) and

acquisition (kasb) of an action. God, according to the Ash'arites, is the creator (khaliq) of

human actions and man is the acquisitor (muktasib). “Actions of human beings are created

(makhluq) by God, the creatures are not capable of creating any action.”20 “There is no

creator except God and the actions of man are, therefore, His creation.”21 Power (qudrah),

according to them, is either (i) original (qadamah) or (ii) derived (hadithah). The original

power alone is effective. Derived power can create nothing. The power possessed by man is

given by God and as such it is derived.22

Al Ash’ari said, “The true meaning of acquisition is the occurrence of a thing or event due to

derived power, and it is an acquisition for the person by whose derived power it takes

place.”23 God is, thus, the creator of human actions and man is the acquisitor. Man cannot

create anything; he cannot initiate work. God alone can create, because absolute creation is

His prerogative. God creates in man the power and the ability to perform an act. He also

creates in him the power to make a free choice (ikhtiyar) between two alternatives - between

right and wrong.

This free choice of man is not effective in producing the action. It is the habit or nature of

God to create the action corresponding to the choice and power created by Himself in man.

Thus, the action of man is created by God, both as to initiative and as to production or

completion. Man is free only in making the choice between alternatives and also in intending

to do the particular action freely chosen: Man, in making this choice and intending to do the

act, acquires (iktisab) either the merit of appreciation and reward from God if he makes the

right choice, or the demerit of condemnation and punishment if he makes the wrong choice.

The Ash`arites, thus, in order to avoid the fatalistic position, introduced the doctrine of

acquisition by which, they thought, they could account for man's free-will and lay

responsibility upon him. Man has no free-will in the Mu'tazilite sense; he has no real and

effective power, but has some derived power by which he acquires a share in the production

of the act: In the case of voluntary actions of human beings, there are, so to say, two causes.

The action is the combined effect of the real cause, God, and the choice and intention of man,

the acquisitor, the possessor of ineffective power because of its being derived power. God

creates in two ways: either with a locus (mahall) or without a locus. Human actions are His

creation with a locus.24

“God creates, in man, the power, ability, choice, and will to perform an act, and man,

endowed with this derived power, chooses freely one of the alternatives and intends or wills

to do the action and, corresponding to this intention, God creates and completes the

action.”25

It is this intention on the part of man which makes him responsible for his deeds. Man cannot

take the initiative in any matter, nor can he originate any action. But the completion of the act

is partially due to his intention: He, thus, acquires the merit or demerit of the action because

of his intending to do a good or bad action. Man's free choice is, so to say, an occasion for

God's causing the action corresponding to that choice.

In this the Ash`arites come very close to the occasionalism of Malebranche which was

expounded in Europe eight centuries and a half later. This correspondence and harmony

between the choice of man and God's creation, according to the Ash'arites, is not due to a

harmony established by God previously, but because of His habit or nature to create the

harmony whenever human action is done.

This, in short, is the solution of the problem of free-will offered by the Ash'arites. The

Ashh'arite view on this problem is not free from logical and ethical difficulties. It was really

very difficult for them to reconcile the absolute determination of all events by God with

man's accountability and responsibility for his deeds. Some, of the later Ash'arites,

particularly Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, discarded the veil of acquisition in order to escape

the charge of fatalism, and advocated naked determinism.26

3. The Problem of Reason and Revelation and the Criterion of Good and Evil

The Ash`arites differ from the Mu'tazilites on the question whether reason or revelation

should be the basis or source of truth and reality: Both the schools admit the necessity of

reason for the rational understanding of faith, but they differ with regard to the question

whether revelation or reason is more fundamental and, in case of a conflict, whether reason or

revelation is to get preference.

The Mu'tazilites held that reason is more fundamental than revelation and is to be preferred to

revelation. Revelation merely confirms what is accepted by reason and, if there be a conflict

between the two, reason is to be preferred and revelation must be so interpreted as to be in

conformity with the dictates of reason.

The Ash`arites, on the other hand, held that revelation is more fundamental as the source of

ultimate truth and reality, and reason should merely confirm what is given by revelation. The

Ash`arites prefer revelation to reason in case of a conflict between the two. As a matter of

fact, this is one of the fundamental principles in which the rational Kalam of the Mu'tazilites

differs from the orthodox Kalam of the Ash'arites.

If pure reason is made the sole basis or source of truth and reality, including the truth and

reality of the most fundamental principles or concepts on which Islam is based, it would be a

pure speculative philosophy or at best a rational theology in general and not a doctrinal

theology of a particular historic religion, i. e., that of Islam in particular. Islam is based on

certain fundamental principles or concepts which, being suprasensible in nature, are

incapable of rational proof. These principles, first, must be believed in on the basis of

revelation.

Revelation, thus, is the real basis of the truth and reality of these basic doctrines of Islam.

This faith, based on revelation, must be rationalized. Islam as a religion, no doubt, admits the

necessity of rationalizing its faith. But to admit the necessity of rationalizing faith is not to

admit pure reason or analytic thought to be the sole source or basis of Islam as a religion.

Reason, no doubt, has the right to judge Islam and its basic principles, but what is to be

judged is of such a nature that it cannot submit to the judgment of reason except on its own

terms.

Reason must, therefore, be subordinated to revelation. Its function is to rationalize faith in the

basic principles of Islam and not to question the validity or truth of the principles established

on the basis of revelation as embodied in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The problem of the

criterion of good and evil follows as a corollary to the problem of reason and revelation. The

problem of good and evil is one of the most controversial problems of Islamic theology.

The Mu'tazilites held that reason, and not revelation, is the criterion or standard of moral

judgment, i.e., of the goodness and badness of an action. The truth and moral value of things

and human actions must be determined by reason. They contended that moral qualities of

good and evil are objective; they are inherent in the very nature of things or actions and as

such can be known by reason and decided to be good or bad.

The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites, held that revelation and not reason is the real

authority or criterion to determine what is good and what is bad. Goodness and badness of

actions (husn wa qubh) are not qualities inhering in them; these are mere accidents (a'rad).

Actions-in-themselves are neither good nor bad. Divine Law makes them good or bad.

In order to make the ground of controversy between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites

clearer, we may explain here the three different senses in which these two terms, good and

evil, are used.27

(i) Good and evil are sometimes used in the sense of perfection and defect respectively. When

we say that a certain thing or action is good or bad (for instance, knowledge is good and

ignorance is bad), we mean that it is a quality which makes its possessor perfect or implies a

defect in him.

(ii) These terms are also used in a utilitarian sense meaning gain and loss in worldly affairs.

Whatever is useful or has utility in our experience is good, and the opposite of it is bad. So

whatever is neither useful nor harmful is neither good nor bad.

Both the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites agree that in the two senses, mentioned above, reason

is the criterion or standard of good and evil. There is no difference of opinion in the above

two senses. But good and bad in the second sense may vary from time to time, from

individual to individual, and from place to place.

In this sense there will be nothing permanently or universally good or bad; what is good to

one may be bad to others and vice versa. This implies that good and evil are subjective and

not objective and real. Hence actions are neither good nor bad, but experience or workability

would make them so and, therefore, they can be known by reason without the help of

revelation.

(iii) Good and evil are also used in a third sense of commendable and praiseworthy or

condemnable in this world and rewardable or punishable, as the case may be, in the other

world.

The Ash'arites maintained that good and evil in their third sense must be known through

revelation, not by reason as the Mu'tazilites had held. According to the Ash'arites, revelation

alone decides whether an action is good or bad. What is commanded by Shar' is good, and

what is prohibited is bad. Shar` can convert previously declared good into bad and vice versa.

As actions by themselves are neither good nor bad, there is nothing in them which would

make them rewardable (good) or punishable (bad). They are made rewardable or punishable

by revelation or Shar'. As there is no quality of good or evil seated in the very nature of an

act, there can be no question of knowing it by reason.

4. The Problem of the Eternity of the Qur'an

There was a great controversy over the question whether the Qur'an is created or uncreated

and eternal. This question is bound up with another question whether speech is one of God's

attributes or not. The orthodox section of the Muslims, including the Ash'arites, held that God

has it as one of His seven rational attributes, and as His attributes are eternal, divine speech,

i.e., the Qur'an, is also eternal.

As regards the eternity of the Qur'an, the Ash'arites adopted again an intermediary position

between the extreme views of the Zahirites and the Mu'tazilites. The Hanbalites and other

Zahirites (extreme orthodox schools) held that the speech of God, i. e., the Qur'an, is

composed of letters, words, and sounds which inhere in the essence of God and is, therefore,

eternal. Some of the Hanbalites went to the extreme and asserted that even the cover and the

binding of the Qur'an are eternal.28

The Mu'tazilites and a section of the Rafidites went to the other extreme and maintained that

the Qur'an was created. They denied all attributes of God, including the attribute of speech,

on the ground that if it be an eternal attribute of God, there would be multiplicity of eternals,

to believe which is polytheism and contrary to the basic principles of Islam. They further

argued that “the Qur'an is composed of parts, successively arranged parts, and whatever is

composed of such parts must be temporal.”29

Hence the Qur'an must be created. The Ash'arites maintained that the Qur'an is composed of

words and sounds, but these do not inhere in the essence of God. They made a distinction

between the outward and concrete expression of the Qur'an in language, and the real,

self-subsistent meaning of it, and held that the Qur'an, as expressed in words and sounds, is,

no doubt, temporal (hadath); but against the Mu'tazilites they asserted that the Qur'an in its

meanings is uncreated and eternal.

The “self-subsisting meaning” eternally inheres in the essence of God. These meanings are

expressed; their expression in language is temporal and created. It is so because the same

meaning, while remaining the same, might be expressed differently at different times, in

different places by different persons or nations. They further maintained that this meaning is

an attribute other than knowledge and will and, as such, inheres eternally in the essence of

God and is, therefore, eternal.30

In support of this contention the Ash`arites advanced the following arguments:31

(i) The Qur'an is “knowledge from God”; it is, therefore, inseparable from God's attribute of

knowledge which is eternal and uncreated. Hence it is also eternal and uncreated.

(ii) God created everything by His word kun (be) and this word, which is in the Qur'an, could

not have been a created one, otherwise a created word would be a creator, which is absurd.

Hence God's word is uncreated, i. e.. eternal.

(iii) The Qur'an makes a distinction between creation (khalq) and command (amr) when it

says, “Are not the creation and command His alone?” Hence God's Command, His word

or Kalam, which is definitely something other than created things (makhluq), must be

unereated and eternal.

(iv) Further, God says to Moses, “I have chosen thee over mankind with My apostolate and

My word.” This verse signifies that God has speech. Again, Moses is addressed by God with

the words: “Lo, I am thy Lord.” Now, if the word which addresses Moses is a created thing,

it would mean that a created thing asserts that it is Moses Lord (God), which is absurd. God's

word, therefore, must be eternal.

The Ash'arites further pointed out that all the different arguments advanced by the

Mu'tazilites (and in Sharh-i Mawaqif as many as eight such arguments have been

mentioned), in support of their view that the Qur'an is created, would apply only to the

expressed Qur'an and not to the real Qur'an, the latter being the “meanings of the Qur'an.”32

5. The Problem of the Beatific Vision

On the question of the beatific vision, the Ash`arites, true to their attitude of reconciliation,

again tried to adopt a course lying midway between the extreme anthropomorphic view of the

Zahirites and other orthodox Muslims on the one hand and the view of the Mu'tazilites and

the “philosophers” on the other.

The extreme orthodox Muslims and the Zahirites, in particular, held that it is possible to see

God and the righteous persons would actually have His vision as the chief reward for their

good actions. They further held that God is settled firmly on His Throne, He exists in

different directions, and is capable of being pointed out. The Mu'tazilites and the

“philosophers” denied the possibility of seeing God with eyes, as that would imply His bodily

existence, which is absurd.

The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites and the “philosophers,” and in agreement with the

orthodox class, held that it is possible to see God;33 but they could not agree to their view

that God is extended and can be shown by pointing out. They accepted the philosophical

principle that whatever is extended or spatial must be contingent and temporal, and God is

not an extended and temporal being.

This admission landed them into a difficulty, for if God is not extended and only extended

things can be seen, God cannot be seen;34 but this conclusion conflicts with their position

that beatific vision is possible. So, in order to get out of this difficulty, they asserted the

possibility of seeing an object even if it is not present before the perceiver.35 This was a very

peculiar and untenable position, for it repudiated all the principles of optics.

It is possible to see God even though our sense of vision does not receive the corresponding

“impression” of the object on it. Besides, it is possible for God to create in human beings the

capacity to see Him without the necessary conditions of vision, such as the presence, in

concrete form, of the object itself in space and time, normal condition of the appropriate

sense-organ, absence of hindrance or obstruction to perception, and so on; and though God is

unextended and does not exist in space and time, “yet He may make Himself visible to His

creature like the full moon.”

They further contended that the vision of God is possible without any impression on our

sense-organ for another reason. There is practically no difference between a “sensation” and

an “after image” except that the sensation possesses an additional quality over and above the

common qualities present in both, and this additional quality, i.e, impression on the

sense-organ produced by the external object, does not make any difference in the perception

of an object.

Hence, though this impression is missing in the case of seeing God, it may still be called

“seeing.” The weakness of this argument is apparent to any student of psychology, because

an after-image is possible only when it is preceded by an actual impression of the object on

the sense-organ. The actual impression of the object is, therefore, a precondition of an

after-image in the case of beatific vision too.

The Ash'arites were faced with another difficulty. The Mu'tazilites had pointed out that if

seeing of God is possible, it must be possible under all circumstances and at all times, for this

possibility is due either to His essence or to an inseparable attribute in Him. In either case, it

should be possible at all times. And if it is possible at all times, it must be possible now; and

if it is possible to see Him now, we must see Him now, for when all the conditions of

“vision” are present, the actual seeing must take place. The Ash`arites met this objection in a

very naive manner by saying, “We do not admit the necessity of actual seeing taking place,

even when all its eight conditions are present.”

The Ash'arites supported their views on the basis of revelation. According to the Qur'an,

Moses asked of God, “O, my Lord, show Thyself to me so that I can see Thee.” Had seeing

been impossible, Moses would not have said so, for, otherwise, it must be assumed that either

he knew its impossibility or did not, and both the alternatives are absurd, because an

intelligent person like him could not have been ignorant of this impossibility and could not

have asked for what he knew was impossible.

Again, according to the Qur'an, God said to Moses, “If the mountain remains fixed in its

place, you can see Me,” and if the antecedent is possible the consequent must be possible.

Here, evidently, the antecedent, fixity of the mountain, is in itself a possible thing. Therefore,

the consequent, the vision of God, must also be possible. Some other verses also support the

conclusion.36

There are a few more controversial problems of secondary importance, in which the

Ash`arites differed from the Mu'tazilites. These are, for example, promise of reward and

threat of punishment by God; whether God can make His creatures responsible for the actions

for which they have no ability; whether God's actions are bound to be based on rational

considerations and on purpose; whether He is bound to do what is best for His creatures; and

whether the knowledge of God or recognition of His existence is based on reason or

revelation.

These theological problems of secondary importance are more or less the corollaries of the

main principles in which the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites differed.

The Ash'arites held that God is the only real cause of everything; He alone possesses real and

effective power and this power is unlimited; His will is absolutely free - not determined by

anything. Whatever power human beings apparently possess is given by God. Man does not

possess any real and effective power. God, being absolutely free in His action, is not bound to

act on rational purpose. He does not act teleologically for, otherwise, His actions would be

determined by something external to and other than Himself and He would not remain

absolutely free. External purpose would put a limit to God's omnipotence.

Like Spinoza, al-Ash'ari held that there is no purpose in the mind of God which would

determine His activity. From thus anti-teleological view it follows that as God's action is not

teleological, He is not bound to do what is best for His creatures. He does whatever He wills.

But as He is an absolutely intelligent and just being, His actions, as a matter of fact, are all

full of wisdom.37

As against the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites held that God can make us responsible for the

actions which we have no power to do. The Mu'tazilites held that God cannot do so, because

that would be an irrational and unjust act on His part. It is admitted by all schools of thought

in Islam that power or ability of men to do a thing is given by God. But opinions differ on the

question whether this power or ability is really effective in producing any action. The

Mu`tazilites and the Qadarites held that man's power is fully effective and can produce an

action. But the Ash'arites maintained that, being derivative, it can have no effective force.

Similar are their respective positions with regard to the ability to act.

This ability is no doubt given by God as an accident, but the Mu'tazilites, particularly Abu

al-Hudhail `Allaf, held that this ability is given to man simultaneously with the performance

of the act. But the Ash'arites maintained that it is given before the actual performance of the

act;38 but being a mere accident in man, it has only a momentary existence and is of no

practical use to man in performing the act.

As a matter of fact, it ceases to exist when the actual action takes place. Man, therefore, does

the act, practically without having the power and the ability to do so. He is held responsible

for his actions because of his choosing freely one of the two alternative actions and intending

to do the action so chosen. But neither his choice nor his intention can produce the action. It

is God who creates the action and is thus its effective and real cause.39

There is an almost similar controversy over the question of God's promise of reward to the

virtuous and His threat of punishment to the wrong-doer. This was one of the five main

problems with which the Mu'tazilite movement started.40

The Mu'tazilites held that God is bound to fulfil His promises of reward and punishment.

Every action, good or bad, must take its own course and be followed by its logical and

normal consequence. A right action, therefore, must be followed by its reward and a wrong

one by punishment. God has made promises in the Qur'an and He, being a just being, cannot

do otherwise, i.e., He cannot punish the virtuous and forgive the wrong-doer.

On the other hand, the Ash'arites maintained that, being all-powerful and absolutely free in

His will, God can punish His creatures even if they have not committed any sins or reward

His creatures even though they have done no virtuous deeds. There is nothing binding on

God; His will is not subject to teleological considerations.

It is by the inner necessity of His own nature that He fulfils His promises of reward to the

virtuous and does not do otherwise. And it is in His infinite mercy that He may forgive any

wrongdoer or vicious person, in spite of the threats of punishment for his vicious acts. This

act of forgiveness will also be in accordance with His nature as the most generous and

gracious being.

Ash’arite Metaphysics

Al-Ash'ari's interest was purely theological and his discussions did not contain much

metaphysics.41 But the subsequent Ash'arites found it impossible to achieve their main object

of defending the faith and harmonizing reason with revelation without making reference to

the ultimate nature of reality.

Al-Ash'ari's theological system was, thus, considered to be incomplete without a support

from metaphysics. The system was fully developed by the later Ash'arites, particularly by

Qadi Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Tayyyib al-Baqillani who was one of the greatest among

them. He was a Basrite, but he made Baghdad his permanent residence and died there in

403/1013. He was a great original thinker and wrote many valuable books on theology and

various other subjects.

He made use of some purely metaphysical propositions in his theological investigations, such

as substance is an individual unity, accident has only a momentary existence and cannot exist

in quality, and perfect vacuum is possible, and thus gave the school a metaphysical

foundation.

About him a Western scholar has remarked: “It is his glory to have contributed most

important elements to, and put into fixed form what is, perhaps, the most daring metaphysical

scheme, and almost certainly the most thorough theological scheme, ever thought out. On the

one hand, the Lucretian atoms raining down through the empty void, the self-developing

monads and pre-established harmony of Leibniz; and all the Kantian “things-in-themselves”

are lame and impotent in their consistency beside the parallel Ash'arite doctrines; and, on the

other, not even the rigours of Calvin; as developed in Dutch confessions, can compete with

the unflinching exactitude of the Muslim conclusions”.42

The Ash'arites, being primarily interested in theological problems, kept their philosophical

discussions mainly confined only to those questions which they thought had a direct or

indirect bearing on these problems.43 Willingly or unwillingly, they had to philosophize “in

order to meet the contemporary philosophers on their own ground.” But when they began

philosophizing, they were very earnest and became great metaphysicians.

In dealing with the most important basic principles of Islam: (i) the existence of God, as the

creator of the universe, and His unity and oneness, and (ii) the belief in the prophethood of

Muhammad, they had to use certain proofs which necessitated some metaphysical and

epistemological discussions. Hence they had to develop a theory of knowledge and a theory

of reality, which were peculiarly their own. God, the ultimate principle, is, according to the

Ash'arites, a necessary existent; His existence is identical with His essence.

In proving God's existence the Ash'arites used three arguments. Their argument from the

contingent nature of motion is not of much importance to our discussion. The other two are:

(i) All bodies, they argued, are ultimately one in so far as their essence is concerned. But, in

spite of this basic unity, their characteristics are different. Hence there must be an ultimate

cause for these divergent characteristic, and that ultimate cause is God.

(ii) The world is contingent. Every contingent thing must have a cause; therefore, the world

must have a cause, and as no contingent thing can be the cause, that cause must be God. The

major premise (i.e., every event must have a cause) does not require a proof. The minor

premise - the world is contingent - they proved in the following manner: Everything that

exists in the world is either a substance or a quality. The contingent character of a quality is

evident, and the contingence of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist

apart from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence of substance;

otherwise, the eternity of substance would necessitate the eternity of quality.44

The Ash'arites believed in miracles which were considered to be the basis of the proof of

prophethood and, in order to defend this view, they had to deny the laws of nature. They also

denied causality in nature and made God the only cause of everything.

Now, in order to explain the full implication of the above arguments, it was necessary for

them to develop a theory of knowledge and a metaphysics.

The world consists of things. Now, the question arises: What is meant by a thing, what is its

nature, and how far do we know it?

Al-Baqillani defined knowledge as the cognition of a thing as it is in itself.45 A thing is

defined by the Ash'arites as “that which is existent.” Everything is an existent and every

existent is a thing.46 So, according to the Ash'arites, existence, whether necessary or

contingent, is the thing or the essence of the thing-in-itself and not a quality in addition to it,

as the Mu'tazilites held.

Al-Jahiz, al-Jubba'i, and some other Mu'tazilites of the Basrite school defined a “thing” as

that which is known,47 and held that existence is a quality of it, added to its essence. The

Ash'arites, as against these Mu'tazilites, contended that if existence is an additional quality,

the essence-in-itself would be a nonexistent and hence a non-entity and the

subsequent-addition of the quality of “existence” to it would involve a clear contradiction in

so far as it would make the non-existent existent.48

This is an absurdity. The thing-in-itself which is the object of knowledge according to the

Ash'arites, is, therefore, an existent thing or a body. Everything that exists in the world has a

contingent existence and is either substance or quality. In this sense God is not a thing.

The Aristotelian categories of thought were subjected by the Ash'arites to a searching

criticism. Only two of those categories, substance and quality, were retained by them. The

other categories, quality, place, time, etc., are nothing but relative characteristics (i'tibarat)

that exist subjectively in the mind of the knower, having no corresponding objective reality.

Like Berkeley, the Irish philosopher, they also did not make any distinction between the

primary and secondary qualities of objects. The world, therefore, consists of substance, on

which the mind reflects, and qualities, which are not in the thing-in-itself but only in the mind

of the knower. The qualities are mere accidents which are fleeting, transitory, and subjective

relations, having only a momentary existence. A quality or accident cannot exist in another

accident but only in a substance. No substance could ever exist apart from a quality. The

substance, being inseparable from its accidents, must also be transitory, having only a

moment's duration, just as the accidents are. Everything that exists, therefore, consists of

mere transitory units (subjective), having only a moment's duration.

The Ash'arites, thus, rejected the Aristotelian view of matter as “a permanent potentiality

(hayula) of suffering the impress of form (surah),” because a possibility is neither an entity

nor a non-entity but purely a subjectivity. With inert matter, the active form and all causes

must also go. They, too, are mere subjectivities. This led them straight to the atomists and, as

a matter of fact, they did become atomists after their own fashion.

In this connection we may observe that the object of the Ash'arites was, like that of Kant, to

fix the relation of knowledge to the thing-in-itself; and they showed here a great originality in

their thought. On this question they not only anticipated Kant but, in reaching the

thing-in-itself, they were much more thorough than Kant. “In his examination of human

knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a process, Kant stopped at the idea of ‘Ding

an sich’ [thing-in-itself], but the Ash'arite endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained,

against the contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so-called underlying essence existed

only so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing subject.”49

Ash'arite Atomism

The substances perceived by us are atoms which come into existence from vacuity and drop

out of existence again. The world is made up of such atoms. The Ash'arite atoms are

fundamentally different from those of Democritus and Lucretius. The Ash`arite atoms are not

material; they are not permanent; they have only a momentary existence; they are not eternal

but every moment brought into being, and then allowed to go out of existence by the

Supreme Being, God, the only cause of everything in the universe. These atoms are not only

of space but of time also. They are non-material or ideal in character. They resemble the

monads of Leibniz.

But the Ash'arite monads differ from those of Leibniz in having no possibility of

self-development along certain lines. Each monad has certain qualities but has extension

neither in space nor in time. They have simply position, not bulk, and are isolated from and

independent of one another. There is absolute void between any two monads. Space and time

are subjective. All changes in the world are produced by their entering into existence and

dropping out again, but not by any change in themselves.

The Ash'arite ontology necessitated the existence of God. Their monads must have a cause,

without which they could not have come into being, nor could there be any harmony or

connection between them. This cause must be a cause sui; otherwise there would be an

infinite regress of the causal nexus. The Ash'arites found this cause in the free-will of God. It

creates and annihilates the atoms and their qualities and, thus, brings to pass all motion and

change in the world.

The Ash'arites were, thus, thoroughgoing metaphysicians. Being was all important in their

ontology. The will of that Being or God must, therefore, be the ground of all things. Hence

they did not find any difficulty, as Leibniz did, in explaining the harmony and coherence

among the isolated, windowless, and independent monads, constituting the one orderly world.

Leibniz had to bring in, in his monadology, a Monad of monads or God, and fall back upon

the Theory of Pre-established Harmony to bring his monads into harmonious and orderly

relations with one another, and this he could do only at the cost of his monadology, and by

abandoning his pluralistic and individualistic metaphysics.

But the Ash'arites, consistently with their ontology, fell straight back upon God, and found in

His will the ground of orderliness and harmony in the universe. They were, thus, more

thorough and consistent than Leibniz in their theory of monads. The Ash'arite atomism

approaches that of Lotze's, who in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its

Complete reduction to ideality. But, like Lotze, they could not believe their atoms to be the

inner working of the infinite Primal Being.

The necessary consequence of their analysis is a thorough going idealism like that of

Berkeley. Their theory of knowledge reduced the universe to a mere show of ordered

subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the

will of God. Their interest, as we have already pointed out, was mainly theological. Interest

in pure monotheism was very strong with them. Their metaphysical and epistemological

discussions were actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of divine creations, to drive

men back to God and His revelation and compel them to see in Him the one grand fact of the

universe.

The Ash'arites are here more consistent than Berkeley. God, according to them, is the only

cause in the true sense of the term. No created thing, having created power, could be the

cause of anything.

The attitude of the Ash'arites towards the law of causation was sceptical. They denied

objective validity of causality in nature. No created thing or being can be the cause of

anything. Things or beings in nature do not possess any power or quality which could

produce any effect. The so-called power which men and objects of nature seem to possess is

not an effective power, for it is a derived power, not an original power which alone can

produce effect.50 Whatever power the creatures might possess must have been given by God,

who alone possesses all real power. Being (God) is the only Ultimate Reality.

The things of the world are composed of indivisible units monads which, every moment, are

created and annihilated; and it is God who creates and annihilates them and their qualities,

thereby bringing about all the motion and change in the world. There is, thus, no such thing

as a law of nature and the world is sustained by a constant, ever repeated activity of God.

There is no such thing as a secondary cause; when there is the appearance of such a cause, it

is only illusionary. God produces the appearance of the effect as well as the effect. Things of

the world do not possess any permanent nature. Fire, for instance, does not possess the nature

or quality of burning; it does not burn. God creates in a substance “a being burned” when fire

touches it.

The Ash'arites thus denied power in the cause as well as the necessary connection between

the so-called cause and effect. Shibli mentions that the Ash'arites rejected the idea of

causation with a view to defending the possibility of miracles on the manifestation of which,

according to them, prophethood depended. The orthodox school believed in miracles as well

as in the universal law of causation; but they also maintained that, at the time of manifesting a

miracle, God suspends the operation of this law and thus brings about an exception.

Asha`ari, however, maintained that a cause must have always the same effect (i.e., the effect

of one and the cause cause could not be different at different times). Having accepted this

principle as formulated by their leader, the Ash'arites could not agree to the orthodox view

and, therefore, to prove the possibility of miracles they rejected the law of causation

altogether, According to them, there is no power in the antecedent to produce the consequent.

“We know nothing but floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by

God.”51

Objection might be raised against the Ash'arite metaphysics that it establishes in effect a

relationship between God and the atoms, but relationships, according to the Ash'arites, are

subjective illusions. In reply to this objection it may be pointed out that all relationship

applies only to contingent beings or things perceived by the senses. It would not hold in the

case of the Necessary Being, God, who is suprasensible. And according to their principle

of mukhalafah, nothing which is applied to created things or beings can be applied to God in

the same sense. God is not a natural cause but a free cause.

This is the Ash'arite system as completed by Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani. It faced a strong

opposition from the orthodox, particularly from the followers of Abmad bin Hanbal.

Al-Ashari's opinions did not get much recognition outside the Shafi'ite group to which he

belonged. The Hanafites preferred the doctrines of his contemporary al-Maturidi who differed

from al-Ash'ari in certain minor controversial points. Shibli has mentioned nine such

points.52

In Spain, Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1063) opposed the Ash'arite doctrines. The Saljuq Sultan Tughril

Beg, who was an adherent of the Hanbalite school, treated the Ash'arites very badly, but his

successor Sultan Alp Arsalan and especially his famous vizier, Nizam al-Mulk supported the

Ash`arites and put an end to the persecution to which they had been exposed. Nizam al-Mulk

founded the Nizamite Academy at Baghdad in 459/1066 for the defence of Ash'arite

doctrines. It is under his patronage that Abu al-Ma'ali `Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini got the

chance of preaching the Ash'arite doctrine freely.53

The Ash'arite system could not obtain widespread acceptance until it was popularized by

a1-Juwaini and al-Ghazali in the East and by Ibn Tumart in the West. It was al-Juwaini who

could legitimately claim the credit of making the Ash'arites' doctrines popular. His vast

learning and erudite scholarship brought him the title of Dia' al-Din (the light of religion).

Al-Juwaini received his early education from his father, Shaikh Abu Muhammad `Abd Allah,

and after the death of his father, he got further education from his teacher, abu Ishaq

al-Isfara'ini, a great Ash'arite scholar. Al-Juwaini, in course of time, was recognized by the

scholars of the time to be Shaikh al-Islam (the chief leader of Islam) and Imam al Haramain

(the religious leader of Makkah and Madinah). For thirty years, he continued teaching and

preaching the Ash'arite doctrines.

Al-Juwaini was the teacher of al-Ghazali. He wrote many books on various subjects. Some of

these are: al-Shamil, on the principles of religion; al-Burhan, on the principles of

jurisprudence; al-`Aqidat al-Nizamiyyah; and Irshad, on theology. He was born in 419/1028

and died at Nishapur in 478/1085.53 Being the Shaikh al-Islam and the Imam of Makkah and

Madinah, al-Juwaini's Fatawa (judgments on religious matters) used to be respected by

people in general throughout the Muslim world; and for this reason, his writings got the

widest circulation and, through these writings, Ash'arite doctrines became known

everywhere.

One great theological result of the Ash'arite system was that it checked the growth of free

thought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the Islamic Shari'ah. The Ash`arite mode of

thought had its intellectual results also.

It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy and prepared the ground for

philosophies propounded by men like al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Al-Ghazali is

generally included among the Ash'arites and it is he who maybe said to have completed the

Ash'arite metaphysics. It was he who, by giving a systematic refutation of Greek philosophy

in his famous work, Tahafut al-Falasifah, completely annihilated the dread of intellectualism

which had characterized the minds of the orthodox. It was chiefly through his influence that

people began to study dogma and metaphysics together.54

Strictly speaking, al-Ghazali was not an Ash'arite, though he admitted that the Ash'arite mode

of thought was excellent for the masses. “He held that the secret of faith could not be

revealed to the masses; for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash`arite theology,

and took care in persuading his disciples not to publish the results of his private reflection.”55

Al-Ghazali made the Ash'arite theology so popular that it became practically the theology of

the Muslim community in general and has continued to remain so up to the present time.