Is what I’m feeling genuine?Fiction vs. Reality

Florian Cova, Amanda Garcia & Vanessa Sennwald

Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences,University of Geneva

Those who did the work

The paradox of fiction

Let’s begin with the famous paradox of fiction:

1. We are genuinely moved by works of fiction. Emotions in response to fictional objects can be genuine.

2. We do not believe that fictional objects exist. We believe that what is portrayed in works of fiction is non-actual.

3. Genuine emotions in response to fictional objects require that one believe that these entities actually exist. We are genuinely moved only by what we believe is actual.

What it is a paradox ?

A paradox is certainly more that a set of incompatible propositions: (i) the moon is a huge watermelon, (ii) the moon is white, (iii) watermelons are green.

The incompatible propositions at stake must in addition be cognitively attractive.

So, the question is: what makes (3) cognitively attractive ? (3) Genuine emotions in response to fictional objects

require that one believe that these entities actually exist. We are genuinely moved only by what we believe is actual.

Dissolving the paradox of fiction

It may be tempting to dissolve the paradox of fiction by claiming that there is nothing that makes (3) cognitively attractive.

First, it is not clear that (3) is immediately cognitively attractive (i.e. intuitive).

I tested 100 participants (in United States) on Amazon Mechanical Turk.

They received a presentation of the philosophical debate, a formulation of premise (3), and add to answer the two following questions: 1. According to you, is this statement TRUE or FALSE?

Explain why. 2. How intuitive do you find the idea expressed in

this statement? (0=‘Not intuitive at all’, 6=‘Very intuitive’)

Is (3) intuitive ?

There is a disagreement among philosophers about whether we can feel genuine emotions for persons who do not exist. Some philosophers think that we can feel genuine emotions (such as compassion or fear) for persons who do not exist, even if we know and are fully aware that they do not exist. Others think that it is impossible to feel genuine emotions for persons we know not to exist, though we might eventually experience something that resembles genuine emotions when learning about their fate.

Thus, these philosophers disagree about the truth of the following statement:

(A) "For one person to feel genuine emotions for another person, the first person must believe that the second person really exists.“

(B) "One cannot be moved by the fate of another person, if one does not believe that this person really exists."

Is (3) intuitive?

Formulation A: 46% of participants gave the answer TRUE. Mean intuitiveness ratings were 4.12 (SD=1.30).

Formulation B: 20% of participants gave the answer TRUE. Mean intuitiveness ratings were 3.62 (SD=1.68).

There is a significant difference between the two formulation (p<05) for the TRUE/FALSE question.

But, overall, participants do not endorse (3), and the most cited reasons is the case of fictional characters.

Have we reasons to endorse (3)?

Moreover, some have argued that we have no reason to endorse (3).

For example, Tullmann and Buckwalter (2014) have recently investigated “the diverse existential commitments of several leading theories of emotion” and argued that “none of the theories we consider are committed to notions of ‘exist’ employed by the paradox.”

They thus conclude that “it is unclear whether or not there remains a paradox of fiction to be solved—rather than to be argued for—once this ambiguity is addressed.”

Radford’s justification for (3)

However, if we go back to the roots of the paradox (i.e. Radford, 1975), we find a reason for (3). It seems to be the best explanation for certain emotional patterns:

suppose that you have a drink with a man who proceeds to tell you a harrowing story about his sister and you are harrowed. After enjoying your reaction he then tells you that he doesn't have a sister, that he has invented the story. In his case, unlike the previous one, we might say that the 'heroine' of the account is fictitious. Nonetheless, and again, once you have been told this you can no longer feel harrowed. Indeed it is possible that you may be embarrassed by your reaction precisely because it so clearly indicates that you were taken in – and you may also feel embarrassed for the storyteller that he could behave in such a way. But the possibility of your being harrowed again seems to require that you believe that someone suffered. (Radford, 1975, p. 68)

The paradox of fiction, redux

So, even if something like (3) does not feature in current theories of emotions, it seems that we have reasons to adopt it : it is the best explanation for a certain pattern of emotional reactions.

However, we also have reasons not to adopt it : it seems to conflict with another pattern of emotional reactions – namely our emotional reactions to fictions.

Thus, we can rephrase the paradox of fiction as a psychological puzzle: how can it be that the reality of their object seems to matter for emotions in certain contexts, but not in others.

Are our emotional reactions incoherent?

Two possible answers

First solution: accept the idea that emotions do not always require a belief in the reality of their object. There seems to have other cases (Rozin et al., 1986):

disgust seems to be sensitive to beliefs in certain cases (cockroaches), but not in others (turd-shaped chocolate.)

However, emotions about fiction seems belief-sensitive.

Second solution: deny that affective reactions to fictions are genuine emotions. They are rather quasi-emotions (Walton, 1990). Quasi-emotions are phenomenologically indistinct from

genuine emotions. They only differ based on the kind of beliefs that

constitute their cognitive basis, as well as their action tendencies.

However, the difference seems to fade once emotions and quasi-emotions are compared in similar contexts.

The trouble with quasi-emotions

Postulating the existence of quasi-emotions can seem a very ad hoc move if emotions and quasi-emotions only differ based on their cognitive bases (beliefs).

Thus, the hypothesis that there is such things as quasi-emotions must be defended on independent reasons.

Question: are there (other) differences between emotions towards fictions and emotions towards real events? Do they differ in how they feel, how they can be regulated, how they motivate us ?

These are questions that can be empirically investigated. This means that empirical data can be brought to bear on the question of the existence of quasi-emotions.

We began with the ‘simplest’ question: are there phenomenological differences between emotional reaction to real and fictional stimuli ? Are emotional reactions to fiction less intense, for example?

Reappraisal and emotional regulation

The real/fictional distinction is already studied in the psychological literature on emotional regulation and reappraisal. Reappraising a stimuli as not real has been show to reduce the emotional reaction to this stimuli.

However, experimenters do not only tell participants to see the stimuli as fictional, but also instructed them to perceive their content differently.

Though there have been several studies investigating reappraisal of emotional images through the usage of fictional scenarios compared to real scenarios (Oliveira et al., 2009; Mocaiber et al., 2011), the authors of these studies manipulated the appraisal of the images by giving two sets of descriptions to their participants: in one case they were told that the images they were about to see were real (the events occurred in reality) and in the other, they were told the images were fictional, obtained from movies and created through various means such as make-up.

Goal of the Research

Our goal was then to see if emotional reactions differ depending on whether a stimuli is perceived as real or fictional, while the content of this stimuli is kept constant.

We focused on negative emotions felt for other persons: sadness, empathy.

We used both films and texts. For films, we took 5-minutes long excerpts from

documentaries. We then wrote 1-page long texts matching the content of these documentaries.

4 documentaries were designed to elicit sadness, while the 4 others were supposed to be emotionally neutral. Examples of sad videos : one about a woman who lost custody

of her children due to her drug addiction and gang affiliation; a woman whose sole purpose in life is now taking care of her dying elderly father.

Examples of neutral videos: two men talking about snow while driving around; a man looking for mushrooms in a forest.

Study 1 - Method

Participants were told at the start that some videos were documentary, and the others were docu-fictions, but not told which ones were “real”. Similarly, participants who received the texts were told that some of them described real events while others were excerpt from work of fictions. Participants in the video condition had to carefully watch

the films and press “1”, “2” or “3” on the keyboard whenever they felt sad during the films, depending on the intensity of their sadness (a little bit sad (key 1), moderately sad (key 2) and extremely sad (key 3)). If they didn't feel sad, they didn't have to push on anything.

After each film, they filled out the BMIS again as well as answered three dichotomous questions and one question on a 6-point Likert scale: (1) a true or false control question about the content of the film, (2) whether the film was emotional or neutral, (3) if they believed the film they saw was real or fictional, and (4) to which extent they thought the film was real or fictional.

Participants in the text condition had similar instructions, unless they had to highlight emotional moments in the texts.

Study 1 - Results

53 participants (all women) were recruited and assigned to either condition.

A significant negative correlation was revealed, r = -.337 p = .014, reflecting that the more the items were perceived as real the more participants were sad.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101

1.52

2.53

3.54

4.55

5.56

Specific Sadness Score

Degree of belief (reality

or fictionality)

Study 2 - Method

In Study 2, we directly manipulated participants’ beliefs in the reality of fictionality of the stimuli.

Also, we added physiological measures: Facial EMG activity (corrugator supercilii). Skin conductance responses. Heart rate.

We registered these measures during the passages that were highlighted as most emotional in Study 1.

Five questions were asked: (1) a control true or false question about the content of the film, (2) whether the film was emotional or neutral and (3) how much negative affect they felt during the film, (4) how sad and (5) how melancholic they felt during the film.

73 women between 18 and 35 years old (M = 23.5 SD = 4.35) were recruited from the University of Geneva.

Study 2 - Procedure

Context:Docufictions

+  True False

Emo Neutral

Q1.

Q2. 

Q3. Negative Affect

1 2 3 4 5

 

Q4. Sad1 2 3 4 5

Q5. Melancholic1 2 3 4 5

Time

1000 ms~ 5 mins

Study 2 - Results

Study 2 - Results

Conclusion

What our results suggest is that the perceived reality (vs. fictionality) of our stimuli makes a difference to emotional reactions: emotional reactions to fictional stimuli tend to be less intense.

Of course, this is clearly far from enough that emotional reactions to fiction should be taken to be fundamentally different. But the same stimuli and method can now be used to investigate further possible differences between emotional reactions to real and fictional stimuli : Are emotional reactions to fictional stimuli easier

to regulate ? Are emotional reactions to fictional stimuli more

likely to motivate related behavior ?

Investigating these questions is likely to help us determining if there are theoretical benefits to positing the existence of quasi-emotions.