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Is there a relationship between leadership style and regime type?

The case of Venezuela

Natasha Lindfield University of New South Wales

natasha.lindfield@student.adfa.edu.au

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Abstract

Is there a relationship between leadership style and regime type? The case of Venezuela

This paper explores the relationship between leadership styles and regime type. Do certain regimes have particular leadership styles and, if so, what are these, and why? To investigate these questions, the full range leadership theory is utilised to examine the link between regime type and leadership. For the purposes of this paper, the theory has been adapted from its original use in organisations and applied with adaptations to a political case study. This paper employs a case study approach to explore the Venezuelan experience of three time periods that demonstrate three distinctive regimes. The first was Venezuela’s independence from the Spanish in 1811, which resulted in an authoritarian system that lasted until 1958. The second was the transition to democracy in 1958 with the creation of the pact of Punto Fijo. Finally, in 1998, the election of Hugo Chávez began the gradual transformation of the Venezuelan polity into a hybrid regime. Key leaders from each of these time periods will be analysed through the lens of full range leadership theory. The pervasive question throughout this examination is, do leadership styles transcend regime type and, if so, can the styles work just as effectively across each regime type?

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Introduction

Leadership is central to every facet of society, yet the theory’s development within

the realm of political science is lacking. Scholars such as Burns (1978), Bass (1985;

1990; 1997a; 1997b), Avolio and Bass (1995; 1998; 2002), and Bass and Riggio

(2006), have undertaken extensive work to advance the understanding of leadership,

however systematic analysis has tended to focus on leaders within the business world.

In contrast, discussion of political leaders has been relegated to biographies that tell

the story of the leader rather than provide a systematic analysis of these leaders using

prevailing theory. Consequently, our understanding of political leadership,

particularly across different regime types requires development. This paper seeks to

understand the relationship between leadership styles and regime type. Does a leader

of an authoritarian regime necessarily always engage in corresponding leadership

styles? What about a leader operating in a democracy? And, what of a leader within

the ‘grey area’ of political regimes - the hybrid model? Is there a useful approach to

better understand leaders and their effect on culture and development within a nation?

To answer these questions, this paper will firstly provide an overview of the

prevailing leadership theories: transactional leadership, transformational leadership,

and their amalgamation, full range leadership. For the purposes of this paper, full

range leadership theory has been adapted to incorporate political phenomena such as

clientelism, corruption and corporatism. This paper will then examine five leaders

from Venezuela across three different time periods and three distinct regime types:

the authoritarian regime, the democratic regime and the hybrid regime. What

leadership styles do the selected Venezuelan leaders exhibit to consolidate their power

and achieve their goals? Are these styles applicable across regime type? This paper

contends that leadership styles do transcend regime type, however the way in which

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these styles are used has real implications for the nature of governance within the

nation.

Leadership theory

Leadership theory has a rich and varied history across a number of disciplines,

including management, psychology and the social sciences. However, it is also the

reason why the study of leadership is fragmented. In the past, leadership has been

analysed as a trait or behaviour, while others have studied it through the context of

power and influence.

This paper acknowledges that over time a range of theories have been developed in an

attempt to understand leadership. Trait theory (Derue et al. 2011; Galton 1972;

Northouse 2001), behavioural theory (Avery 2004); attribute pattern approach

(Mumford et al. 2000); situational contingency theory (House 1971; Vroom & Yetton

1973; Fiedler 1981), and the integrated psychological theory (Scouller 2011) are just

some examples. However, it is the full range leadership model that enjoys a

considerable amount of support amongst scholars and is buoyed by empirical findings

(Hater & Bass 1988; Howell & Avolio 1989; Lowe et al. 1996; Yammarino et al.

1993; Antonakis & House 2013).

Transactional Leadership

The transactional theory of leadership examines the leader-follower relationship. It

seeks to understand the value placed upon reciprocity, and the interplay of

expectations between leaders and followers. Transactional leadership is characterized

by Burns (1978, 258) as ‘the leader and the follower exchanging gratifications in a

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political marketplace’. The promise of the delivery of a government policy in

exchange for votes, as measured by opinion polls and electoral victories, is an

example of this. Bass (1990), O’Shea et al. (2009, 239) and Lussier and Achua (2010,

253) identify transactional leadership as possessing the following characteristics:

(a) Contingent reward (engaging in reward or punishment for performance);

(b) Active management-by-exception (monitoring followers’ performance and

taking corrective action if deviations from standards occur);

(c) Passive management-by-exception (failing to act until problems become

serious).

Two factors define what constitutes a good transactional leader: first, an ability to

initiate and organize work and, second, an ability to satisfy the self-interest of

followers who act in a favourable manner (Bass 1997b). A drawback of transactional

leadership is that follower loyalty is often weak and provisional due to the fact that

they are only connected to the leader’s mission out of self-interest (Bass & Riggio

2006). Another conception of a good transactional leader relates to their morality or

authenticity. A moral or authentic transactional leader will ensure that ‘the truth is

told, promises are kept, negotiations are fair and choices are free’, and is immoral

when ‘information harmful to followers is deliberately concealed from them, when

bribes are proffered, when nepotism is practiced, and when authority is abused’ (Bass

& Steidlmeier 1999, 192).

From a political perspective, inauthentic transactional leadership may manifest in

clientelism or patronage with the government leader presiding over networks of

clients who receive favourable treatment for their loyalty to the patron (Khan 2005;

Blunt et al. 2012). Contingent reward diverges from its usual role in management

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theory of positive reinforcement to provide incentives, either monetary or political

favour, to a leader’s supporters. As such, this type of leadership mode in a political

setting serves to preserve the status quo and provide tangible rewards or punishments

to maintain follower loyalty.

Transformational Leadership

Burns introduced the concept of transforming leadership (later to be termed

‘transformational leadership’ by Bass) in Leadership (1978). Burns’ transforming

leadership ‘engages the full person of the follower’, and the leader possesses the

intuition to foresee, articulate and act upon followers’ wants and needs (1978, 4).

From this, a relationship develops between the transforming leader and the followers:

the transforming leader elevates the followers to a higher moral and philosophical

plane, priming them for a change in the status quo (Bass & Riggio 2006; Hunt 1999).

Transformational leaders also tend to be proactive, risk-takers, and they engage in

long-term, and often innovative, planning to achieve their goal (Howell & Higgens

1990; Church & Waclawski 1998; van Eeden et al. 2008). Typically, transforming

leaders possess the ability to combine both analytical and normative ideas, often

involving ‘socio-structural dissent’ that seeks to recreate the social order and alter the

status quo (Burns 1978, 142). As such, the followers’ connection to the

transformational leader is not just one of votes in exchange for a service, like the

transactional leader. The connection takes on an emotional character in which the

leader does not simply seek to satisfy the wants and needs of the followers.

As a result of this relationship, followers feel more elevated by their interactions with

the transformational leader and, by extension, become more engaged in their society,

inducing a flow-on effect of creating new leaders. Burns (1978, 142-3) posits that

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social or moral conflict is essential in bringing transformational leaders to the

forefront. Transformational leadership thus differs from transactional leadership in

that it elevates followers to a higher moral grounding, and is mostly forged in conflict.

Following Burns, other scholars have worked to establish the essential qualities of a

transformational leader. O’Shea et al. (2009, 238-9) examined follower responses to

726 leaders to identify the styles of a transformational leader. These emerged as:

(a) Idealized influence/charisma (displaying conviction, taking stands on difficult

issues, and emphasizing the importance of purpose, commitment, and the

ethical consequences of decisions);

(b) Inspirational motivation (articulating an appealing vision of the future and

challenging followers with high standards);

(c) Intellectual stimulation (questioning old assumptions and stimulating in others

new perspectives and ways of doing things);

(d) Individualized consideration (considering individuals’ unique needs, abilities,

and aspirations).

These styles, in addition to the aforementioned transactional styles, will be applied to

the case studies of selected leaders from Venezuela in order to examine whether

leaders across different regimes utilize similar leadership styles. However, to do this,

an understanding of authentic transformational leadership styles and pseudo-

transformational leadership styles must be attained.

Pseudo vs authentic transformational leaders

Concerns about definitions of transformational leadership encouraging a ‘superman’

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or ‘Messiah’ mentality have been raised (Gemmil & Oakley 1992; Tourish 2013).

However, numerous scholars have addressed the ‘morality’ of leadership (Conger &

Kanungo 1998; Bass & Steidlmeier 1999; Price 2003; Barling et al. 2008; Christie et

al. 2011). Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999) work is perhaps the most widely utilised

typology, although others (Cheng et al. 2000; Schuh et al. 2013) have also contributed

to the study of authentic leadership. Leaders who demonstrate qualities such as

narcissism, authoritarianism, a need for power, and flawed vision, are referred to as

pseudo-transformational leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999, 182; Bass & Riggio

2006). To differentiate from pseudo-transformational leaders that engage in the above

activities, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, 186) suggest the use of the term ‘authentic

transformational leadership’. Authentic transformational leadership involves the

concern and commitment on the part of the leader to improve the lives of family,

friends, and community above his or her own self-interest, and this type of leader will

‘actively refrain from using their power for personal gains … they do not use personal

relationships, dependencies, and back-door practices. Rather they forgo personal

privileges to benefit the group’ (Schuh et al. 2013, 632).

Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, 187) provide a detailed comparison of the behaviours of

pseudo-transformational leaders versus authentic transformational leaders in relation

to the four transformational leadership styles identified earlier in this paper. For

example, when implementing the idealized influence style, a pseudo-transformational

leader will engage in ‘we-them’ differences to create division. In contrast, an

authentic transformational leader will advocate for ‘universal brotherhood’. A

pseudo-transformational leader, when engaging in the inspirational motivation style,

will encourage discord. He or she will focus on ‘demonic plots, conspiracies, unreal

dangers, excuses, and insecurities’. An authentic transformational leader, on the other

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hand, will focus on ‘harmony, charity, and good works’, and is ‘inwardly and

outwardly concerned about the good that can be achieved’ for his or her organization

or society (1999, 188). In regard to the intellectual stimulation style, a pseudo-

transformational leader will ‘overweight authority and underweight reason’. He or she

will ‘substitute anecdotes for hard evidence’ and ‘feed on the ignorance of their

followers’. An authentic transformational leader will instead persuade followers on

the ‘merits of the issues’ and bring about changes in followers’ values and vision by

engaging in open debate and creative solution-making (1999, 188-189). Finally, when

engaging in the individualized consideration style, a pseudo-transformational leader

will seek to continue the dependence of followers on their leadership, whereas an

authentic transformational leader will aim to develop their followers into leaders

themselves.

Understanding the difference between pseudo and authentic transformational leaders,

as well as moral and immoral transactional leaders, provides a helpful analytical

distinction in regard to the ethics and morality of leadership, and will be particularly

relevant when utilizing full range leadership theory to understand political leaders

across different regime types.

Full Range Leadership

It is argued that the combination of both the transactional and transformational

theories of leadership allows for a full range leader to exercise dynamic transactional

and/or transformational behaviours as the situation calls for, and that the utilization of

transformational qualities serves to enhance the positive potential of transactional

qualities (O'Shea et al. 2009).

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Full range leadership makes the argument that when transformational leadership

attributes are combined with transactional leadership attributes in a ‘leadership

toolbox’, outcomes are more effective as the leader has more leadership styles to

choose from to better match the situation in which they find themselves. A hierarchy

of effective leadership styles was developed by Bass (1990), with a good full range

leader predominantly demonstrating authentic transformational leadership styles,

followed by contingent reward, then active-management-by-exception, and passive-

management-by-exception. Leaders should avoid the laissez-faire style (Antonakis &

House 2013). Leaders display these styles at ‘various frequencies depending on their

mental model of leadership, personality, and the situation’ (Burke & Cooper 2006,

35). The focus, therefore, is on adaptation.

Authoritarian rule in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Venezuela

Bolívar

Simón Bolívar was a Latin American hero who is considered a champion of the South

American Independence Wars of the early nineteenth century. From 1810 until 1821

he fought to consolidate Venezuela’s independence from the Spanish, and was

president of a united region named Gran Colombia from 1819 until 1831 (Lynch

2006).

Bolívar was an authoritarian leader. Given the wartime environment, power was

centralized in the role of the President of the nation and Commander-in-chief of the

military, of which Bolívar occupied both offices (Lynch 2006). His solution to the

conflict with the Spanish and the regional caudillos was ‘the stewardship of

paternalistic governments to cure the wounds and ravages of despotism and war’

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(Bolívar 1816, cited in Bushnell 2003, 24). As such, Bolívar believed that a small,

moral elite was required to rule the inhabitants of Gran Colombia, whom he

considered not yet capable of governing themselves (Masur 1969, 187).

These beliefs are evident in his most famous writings, the Cartagena Manifesto, the

Jamaica Letter and the Angostura Address. Although Bolívar advocated for an

authoritarian system of government, the aforementioned publications contain

evidence of transformational leadership qualities. The Cartagena Manifesto,

published in 1812, comprised Bolívar’s earliest conceptions of potential governance

structures for Venezuela, and called for support to fight for Venezuela’s

independence. In the Manifesto, Bolívar writes:

… let us march forth to break the chains of those victims groaning in dungeons, still awaiting salvation from us. Do not betray their trust; do not be deaf to the pleas of our brothers. Rush forth to avenge death, to give life to the dying, succor to the oppressed, and freedom to all (Bolívar 1812, cited in Bushnell 2003, 10-11).

In laying the foundations for his governance philosophy in the Manifesto, Bolívar

created the space to enable his followers to envision a different future that diverged

from the experiences of Europe and Northern America, and one that was distinct from

a colonial relationship with Spain. However, Bolívar’s governance philosophy centred

on the premise that the Venezuelan people were not ready to rule themselves due to

their subjugation under the Spanish (Bushnell 2003, 19). By this logic, Bolívar

justified his implementation of an authoritarian system of government. As the

inhabitants of Venezuela had little experience in self-governance they required a

strong, singular leader through which power was invested to ensure stability. Other

publications of Bolívar’s that further developed his governance philosophy include

the Jamaica Letter, written in 1816. Bolívar stated that Venezuela ‘[should] not adopt

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the best system of government, but the one that is most likely to succeed’ (Bolívar

1816, cited in Johnson 1968, 90). From his own analysis, Bolívar had determined that

the best system of government for Venezuela was one that provided stability instead

of one that, from the outset, ensured broad political participation.

Bolívar also frequently utilized the contingent reward leadership style. For example,

the Manifesto declared ‘war to the death’ against any Spaniard not fighting for the

republican cause, however, any Venezuelan fighting on the side of the Spanish would

be spared. This latter policy may be an example of contingent reward, in that Bolívar

rewarded Spaniards with their lives for joining the republican cause. Further examples

of Bolívar’s use of contingent reward is the redistribution of land to officers fighting

in the republican army (Lynch 2006, 176), as well as the negotiations with New

Granada (now modern day Colombia) to secure its support in the independence

movement. Bolívar gave parcels of land to officers within his army to secure their

support and loyalty, and distributed booty from captured towns under royalist control

amongst the regular officers (Lynch 1983, 6). Bolívar also demonstrated a steadfast

commitment to Venezuelan, and by extension, Latin American independence. His rule

‘was less personal and more institutional; it dealt in policies as well as patronage’

(Lynch 1983, 9). Prior to the Independence Wars, Bolívar was one of the richest men

in Venezuela (Lynch 1983, 3). Bolívar used his own wealth to finance the patriots as

well as distribute a widows pension for the wives and families of fallen soldiers

(Lynch 2006, 281). In the Manifesto, Bolívar wrote that New Granada’s independence

from the Spanish was closely linked to Venezuela’s own success at independence. He

argued that if New Granada wanted to guarantee its freedom it needed to materially

support the Venezuelan independence movement with weapons and soldiers

(Bushnell 2003).

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The pinnacle example of idealized influence, inspirational motivation, and intellectual

stimulation in Bolívar’s writings is the Angostura Address. It was an attempt to finally

formalise the ideas iterated in the Cartagena Manifesto and the Jamaica Letter, and

have these ideas enshrined in a new constitution for Venezuela. Specifically, Bolívar

emphasised the importance of designing a government that was responsive to the

needs of Venezuela, and which would ensure the stability and longevity of its

independence.

Bolívar was highly visionary in both conceptualizing a governance structure for

Venezuela and securing its independence. Despite the authoritarian system of

government, reasons for arguing that Bolívar may have been an authentic

transformational leader within the full range leadership model are twofold. First,

Bolívar encouraged a sense of nationalism in Venezuela where it had previously not

existed. His writings and speeches connected followers to a future of an independent

nation, rather than one under the control of Spain. He dedicated much of his adult life

to persuading followers on the merits of independence. The potential of this future

made followers want to risk their lives to achieve this vision. In this sense, Bolívar’s

vision gradually became their vision. Second, Bolívar took no personal gains from the

Independence Wars. In fact, under the colonial system Bolívar had been one of the

richest men in Venezuela, yet by the end of his life he was virtually penniless and

reliant upon the help of wealthy friends (Lynch 2006). The absence of personal gain,

combined with a consistent dedication to persuading and inspiring followers to be part

of the leader’s vision, are key elements of an authentic leadership (Bass & Steidlmeier

1999; Christie et al. 2008).

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 Pérez Jiménez

Whereas Bolívar was Venezuela’s first authoritarian leader, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, a

military general, was the final ruler of Venezuela’s authoritarian period (1948 –

1958). Following a brief three-year period of democracy in Venezuela from 1945-48,

Pérez Jiménez and co-conspirators staged a coup d’état and re-established control of

Venezuela by the military (Derham 2002). Upon taking power, Pérez Jiménez

requested that the Venezuelan people ‘unite unquestioningly’ behind his regime, and

forego any ‘political activity, personalism, foreign ideology, freedom of expression,

and, especially, any elements of conflict within Venezuela’ (Erlich 1974, 29). In

return, Pérez Jiménez promised development and prosperity. However, Pérez Jiménez

was not a leader concerned with a grand philosophical or ideological vision for

Venezuela. Instead, he was concerned with demonstrating the wealth and modernity

of the nation (Coronil 1997, 176). It was only after foreign criticism that Pérez

Jiménez established something akin to ideology as the guiding governance strategy

for his government. This was called the ‘New National Ideal’ and argued, similar to

Bolívar and leaders such as Juan Vicente Gómez (military dictator of Venezuela from

1908-35) before him, that dictatorship was a necessary tool for progress and

efficiency (Coronil 1997; Levine 1973). Pérez Jiménez’s vision, then, was the

material advancement of Venezuela and the physical demonstration of its greatness.

In analysing this approach through the lens of full range leadership theory, it is clear

that Pérez Jiménez relied on the transactional style of contingent reward to distribute

oil wealth to supporters, and punish supporters and dissenters through the threat or

actual delivery of violence.

The New National Ideal asserted that it was the duty of the military to remove

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political discord from society, and channel the state’s energies toward the progress of

the nation and the public works that would embody it (Coronil 1997). State-owned

industries in steel and hydroelectric power, a national railroad and production in

atomic energy and aluminium were part of Pérez Jiménez’s development plan for

Venezuela (Ellner 1995). The benefits of this were particularly felt around the capital

Caracas and other highly populated areas. In the 1950s Growth Domestic Product

(GDP) per capita rose to the highest level in all of Latin America (Wilpert 2007, 11).

Little was achieved, however, in the realms of housing, health services, and education

(Erlich 1974).

In a display of contingent reward, Pérez Jiménez carried on Gómez’s legacy of severe

political repression and persecution (Morón 1964). The threat of punishment in the

form of exile and even death ensured that many potential dissenters toed the line.

Following the 1952 elections (where it has been claimed that Pérez Jiménez hijacked

the process) political parties were outlawed. Many opponents were jailed or exiled,

and the assassinations of two key Acción Democrática (AD - Democratic Action)

leaders have been attributed to the regime (Ellner 2008; Uzcategui 2010). Pérez

Jiménez punished those who fell from his favour by using the civilian police force

Seguridad Nacional (SN - National Security) to monitor, harass, torture or murder

(Erlich 1974; Alexander 1982). SN also established concentration camps in which to

keep the political opponents of Pérez Jiménez (Levine & Crisp 1999). Conversely,

Pérez Jiménez used contingent reward to secure and maintain support. Powerful

civilian families and military officers continued to reap the benefits of Venezuela’s oil

wealth, and corruption and nepotism reigned. To reward supporters, Pérez Jiménez

granted them key government positions. For example, of the 38 principal supporters

of Pérez Jiménez, in 1957 ‘20 held the 25 most important civil or military positions’

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(Taylor, cited by Alexander 1982, 391).

Pérez Jiménez utilized the pseudo-transformational style of individualised

consideration to establish clientelistic networks and encourage favouritism and

competition amongst his followers. A pseudo-transformational leader utilizing this

style will keep their distance from followers in order to ‘enhance their personal status’

while at the same time expecting complete obedience from the followers (Bass &

Steidlmeier 1999, 189). Pérez Jiménez’s focus on the use of the oil wealth to

modernize Venezuela, and thereby placate the population, is one that could succeed as

long as the benefits were being felt. His undoing, however, was the SN’s targeting of

military officers for arrest and torture, thereby leading his primary support base to

turn on him (Levine 1973).

Leadership and democratisation in the latter 20th century in Venezuela

 Betancourt

The collapse of the Pérez Jiménez regime from a coup d’état finally ushered in the era

of democracy for Venezuela. AD’s leaders returned from exile, and Rómulo

Betancourt was elected as the President of Venezuela (1959-64).

Betancourt’s governance philosophy centred on solidifying the pact of Punto Fijo, as

well as the removal of the personalist element from Venezuelan politics. As such,

Betancourt focused on strengthening institutions and bureaucracy. One of the first

tasks of the newly democratic government was to redesign the constitution in order to

decentralize power away from the office of the president. Additional restrictions on

term limits and re-election were also placed upon the presidency; however the ability

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of the president to temporarily suspend particular individual guarantees in emergency

situation was preserved (Alexander 1964).

Betancourt frequently used this power throughout his administration, and a key

feature of his rule was the marginalization of political parties or groups deemed

‘illegitimate’ (Velasco 2011, 165). A number of limitations on civil freedoms were

instituted at various points in time, and for various lengths of time, throughout

Betancourt’s administration (Alexander 1964, 127). For example, a worker’s strike

involving bank clerks and telephone workers in November 1960 was the first instance

in which Betancourt suspended civil liberties, and included restricting freedom of the

press, freedom of assembly, and freedom from seizure (Alexander 1964). These

suspensions were to last for a year and a half, and spurred the Movimiento de

Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR – Left Revolutionary Movement) to launch an armed

insurrection. MIR arose as a consequence of Betancourt’s move to the right on the

political spectrum, as well as his refusal to execute supporters of the Pérez Jiménez

regime (Alexander 1964, 120).

Betancourt also instituted repressive policies against the Partido Comunista de

Venezuela (PCV – Communist Party of Venezuela), whose philosophy he had

labelled as ‘not compatible with the development of Venezuela’ (Betancourt 1959,

cited in Tinker Salas 2015, 94). In retaliation to their exclusion from the political

sphere, groups such as the MIR and the PCV, as well as supporters of the Pérez

Jiménez regime trying to restore the status quo, launched insurgencies at the

Betancourt government (Tinker Salas 2015). These insurgencies were brought under

control by the mid-1960s, however not without significant effort and the occupation

of certain neighbourhoods on the part of the military (Velasco 2011). These particular

actions demonstrate that even leaders of democratic regimes may make decisions

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reminiscent to those previously utilized by authoritarian leaders. Consequently, the

repression of particular political groups within Venezuela indicates an inauthentic

form of transactionalism, as it involves an abuse of executive power and a failure to

deliver on promises for a pluralistic and democratic society. Moreover, it also shows a

pseudo-transformational style of idealized influence, as Betancourt failed to provide a

leadership committed to national unity.

Despite the repeated suspension of civil liberties, the Kennedy administration in 1961

declared Venezuela to be a model for ‘Latin American progressive democracy’

(Alexander 1982, 554). Betancourt’s visions for Venezuela involved using its oil

wealth to develop its ‘dormant resources’ in order to diversify the economy and

ensure that it was strong after the oil resources had been exhausted. In this sense,

Betancourt presented a sustainable and achievable vision for Venezuela, which

signals an authentic transformational intellectual stimulation style.

In contrast to Bolívar and Pérez Jiménez, Betancourt possessed more faith in the

capacity of the Venezuelan people to govern themselves and select their own leaders,

however he utilized oppressive tactics to consolidate and maintain his rule. This

demonstrates that Betancourt, despite being a democrat and operating within a

democratic regime, used similar tactics to leaders of authoritarian regimes, such as

Pérez Jiménez, to consolidate his authority. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) argue that in

the defining moments for transformational leaders, the styles they exhibit will be

transformational. In this sense, the means to achieve the ends must be

transformational in itself. Betancourt’s persecution of groups such as the MIR and

PCV demonstrates an immoral transactional approach, and shows that inauthentic

leadership styles are not just utilized by leaders of authoritarian or hybrid regimes.

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 Pérez

Carlos Andrés Pérez was President of Venezuela from both 1974-79 and 1989-93. His

first administration coincided with a huge boom in the global oil price. The Yom

Kippur War and resulting Arab oil embargo drove up oil prices and Pérez used this to

his advantage to transform the Venezuelan economy and initiate grand-scale social

programs (Martz 1977; Wilpert 2007; Ellner 2008). New economic ventures such as

the nationalization of the iron and oil industries, mega projects such as the

construction of dams and highways, and increased benefits for the poor through the

introduction of price controls and higher incomes, signified a development policy

known as La Gran Venezuela (The Great Venezuela) (Tinker Salas 2009, 228; Martz

1977). In order to achieve his vision, the legislature approved Pérez’s request to enact

the leyes habiliantes (enabling laws) to grant him power to rule by decree in areas of

the economy and social policy so as to fast track La Gran Venezuela (McCarthy-Jones

2013). Under Pérez, the leyes habilitantes had the broadest scope in comparison to its

usage under other administrations. It allowed him to reform the national finance

system, nationalize the iron ore industry, pay off debt of government institutions,

establish a new minimum wage, and reform the pension and worker rights (Garcia-

Serra 2001, 278).

Despite the economic boom experienced by Venezuela for most of the 1970s, revenue

from the oil was squandered through corruption, and many of the social programs and

mass industrialisation initiated by the Pérez government had been funded by

international credit (Raby 2006). By the end of his first administration, Pérez and his

administration were plagued by allegations of corruption, favouritism, and

inefficiency (Tinker Salas 2009). An example of this is the purchase of an old storage

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ship. The Pérez government acted as the intermediary in the sale, and the ship’s price

was driven up by $7 million above its actual value due to government officials

charging exorbitant commissions for their role in the sale (Tinker Salas 2015, 110).

By the early 1980s Venezuela had fallen into inordinate debt, and this was partially

attributed to the waste and corruption of the Pérez government. A number of phantom

companies under Pérez had won government contracts for equally phantom projects,

indicating that Pérez had been siphoning off government funds (Tinker Salas 2015).

The second administration of Pérez from 1989-93 was one affected by further

accusations of corruption, as well as human rights abuses. Pérez, campaigning on a

platform of anti-austerity measures and the legacy of the economic boom of the

1970s, was elected to the presidency for the second time. However, early into his

administration the Caracazo event of 1989 signalled the beginning of the end for the

Punto Fijo system. The Caracazo occurred due to the implementation of neoliberal

austerity measures promoted by the IMF, in a policy package titled El Gran Viraje

(the Great Turn Around), to combat a Venezuelan economy crippled by debt.

Venezuelans in the capital of Caracas took to the streets to riot and loot, and in

response Pérez declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, and

deployed the military to crack down on the protestors. This decision caused an

estimated 200 to 2,000 deaths, mostly from within the barrios1, and government-

authorized acts of retribution were carried out by the military for several days after

the protests ceased (Wilpert 2007, 16; Ellner 2008, 95).

The Caracazo was a defining moment for Pérez and for Punto Fijo democracy. Two

and a half years later, Chávez and co-conspirators from the Revolutionary Bolivarian

                                                                                                                         1 Poor neighbourhoods/informal settlements built into the hills surrounding Caracas.

21    

Movement-200 (MBR-200) attempted a coup d’état to remove Pérez from power,

claiming that Punto Fijo no longer served the interests of the Venezuelan people.

Although the coup d’état failed, it triggered widespread support for the removal of

Pérez, and an investigation into corruption was launched against him (Ellner 2008).

By May 1993, Pérez was impeached for corruption and forced to resign from the

presidency. Although democratically elected for both of his administrations, Pérez’s

legacy is one of corruption and the heavy-handed response to the Caracazo. He had a

grand vision for Venezuela, at least during the first administration, however the

effects of corporatism and clientelism dulled its effectiveness. Pérez’s response to

both the economic crisis and the riots of his second administration demonstrate an

immoral transactional approach. First, he failed to keep his election promises to

refrain from adopting IMF policy to reform the economy, and second, the tacit

approval of the military to engage in retribution against the protestors signifies an

abuse of power. Moreover, throughout both his administrations, Pérez engaged in, and

allowed, acts of bribery, nepotism and clientelism to occur.

From democracy to hybrid regime: Venezuela’s modern leadership

 Chávez  

Hugo Chávez, a former colonel in the Venezuelan armed forces, was the President of

Venezuela from 1999 until his death in March 2013. During this time, he was

popularly re-elected four times. He rose to power in 1998 on a wave of anti-Punto

Fijo and anti-neoliberal sentiment. Chávez’s first administration set about redefining

the governance principles of Venezuela, and used his Bolívarian philosophy (based

upon the political writings of Bolívar, among others) to do so. First, Chávez, along

with elected delegates from across the country, re-wrote the Venezuelan constitution.

22    

Considered ‘one of the most advanced in the world in terms of entrenchment of

human rights and citizen participation’ (Raby 2005, 11), the 1999 Venezuelan

Constitution undertakes a special responsibility to provide its citizens with education

(Articles 102 – 109), healthcare (Articles 83 – 86), political (Articles 62 – 70) and

economic freedoms (Articles 112 – 118), as well as labour rights (Articles 87 – 97)

(Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1999). In re-working the

constitution to include specific rights for a previously marginalized section of the

population, Chávez provided an appealing vision of the future that was perceived to

deliver an alternative to the corruption, elitism and wastage of the Punto Fijo system.

Chávez’s discourse appealed to the poor masses, which at the time of his election

consisted of over 70% of the general population (Weyland 2001, 77). He spoke of

instituting a direct, participatory democracy, rather than the representative model

enshrined in the Punto Fijo system.

Under Chávez, however, governance structures were gradually changed to centralize

power within the role of the executive. The limit on presidential terms was removed,

and prior to his death he had announced that he planned to govern until 2030 (Carroll

2013). The Community Councils, designed to enable popular participation and

endogenous development, bypass municipal and state governments and apply for

funding for their projects directly from the central government (Irazabal & Foley

2010). The arrest of María Lourdes Afiuni, a Caracas judge, drew much criticism

from domestic and international human rights groups as it was observed that Chávez

was attempting to influence and intimidate members of the judiciary into granting

rulings that he favoured (BBC 2013). Chávez publicly called Afiuni a ‘bandit’ and

demanded that she be sentenced to thirty years in jail (Human Rights Foundation

2013: 5). The ability of opposition media to operate within the nation has also been

23    

reduced, with the Chávez government refusing to renew a number of operating

licenses (Corrales & Penfold 2007). This was progressively enacted in response to the

role that opposition media played in the April 2002 coup d’état, in which Chávez was

removed from power for 72 hours. Importantly, it is after the 2002 coup d’état that a

significant change in Chávez’s discourse began to emerge. Chávez’s speeches, from

this point onwards, took on a much more divisive tone, and he was more aggressive

about the need to fight ‘American imperialism’ (Malinarich 2006). Furthermore,

levels of corruption have not been reduced. It has been suggested that the Punto Fijo

oligarchy has now been replaced with what is termed the ‘boligarchy’ – chavistas

(supporters of Chávez) who have been able to take advantage of the new economic

and political system, and now engage in the same behaviour as the Punto Fijo elite of

the Fourth Republic (The Economist 2007; Romero 2010; Carroll 2013).

Chávez’s discourse evolved into an ‘us-them’ dichotomy, in which the term

‘Venezuelan’ evolved to encompass the previously marginalized masses, and

excluded the middle-class and the rich (Emerson 2011). This form of division invoked

a rhetorical discourse that initially reminded the masses of the failings of Punto Fijo

democracy, however following the 2002 failed coup d’état the rhetoric moved to

focus on the opposition’s involvement in the coup. Such discourse was created to

invalidate the opposition’s claims to legitimacy, and can be interpreted as an example

of the pseudo-transformational leader creating divisive, or ‘wedge’, politics to assert

and legitimise his or her power.

Another aspect of Chávez’s leadership, particularly in his second and third

administrations, was the cult of personality that emerged around him. ‘Chavismo’

evolved from Bolívarianism, and is characterized by a personal and intense loyalty to

Chávez himself, similar to Peronism in Argentina. Personalism has long been a trend

24    

in Latin America, and it is particularly evident in Venezuela’s historical experience of

caudillo leadership. Chavistas, therefore, are known to support Chávez, whereas the

term anti-Chavista indicates support for the opposition. Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999)

conception of pseudo-transformational leadership also identifies personalism as a

characteristic of a leader who seeks to maintain follower dependency on his or her

leadership, rather than encourage followers to become leaders themselves. However,

it must be taken into account that Chávez politically mobilized a significant sector of

the population and engaged them in a discourse of human rights and development

which had never before been experienced to such an extent with previous

governments. Chávez’s popularity, recorded at 64% at the end of 2012, just a few

months prior to his death, indicates that he enjoyed a substantial level of popular

support (Robertson 2012). Part of Chávez’s appeal was his charisma and the anti-

establishment discourse used to generate support. For example, Zuquete (2008, 91)

notes that Chávez:

… has been described triumphantly as ‘a particularly astute, charismatic and visionary leader’ (Collins 2005, 367), with ‘his charisma deeply penetrating the feelings of the people, who have no doubts about the leader’s convictions’ (Domínguez 1999, 131) and, conversely, has been viewed as a tragic ‘step backward to the violent, personalized rule of the charismatic leader on horseback’ (Maxwell 2000, 122).

Opinions of Chávez’s leadership thus tend to occupy a similar ‘grey area’ often

associated with hybrid regimes. On the one hand he provided an alternative political

vision for Venezuela that does enjoy popular support amongst the masses. On the

other hand the independence of various institutions essential to the maintenance of a

liberal democracy has been eroded or limited due to the centralization of power within

the executive and the polarizing discourse adopted by Chávez.

25    

Conclusion

The examination of a range of leaders from Venezuela’s history since independence

and across different regime type provides a preliminary indication that regime type

does not necessarily determine the leadership styles employed by the leader at the

time. Instead, the Venezuelan case demonstrates that leadership styles can transcend

regime type. It further shows that in some instances a cultural preference for a

specific leadership style will emerge that remains discrete from regime across time.

For example, the Bolívar regime showed that a leader could possess an inspiring and

far-reaching vision for the future, while establishing and maintaining a centralised

governance structure. The Pérez Jiménez regime demonstrated that authoritarian

leaders can draw heavily on the practices of clientelism and corporatism to maintain

their rule. Moreover, the leadership of Pérez Jiménez indicates a favouring of

transactional styles through the use of reward or punishment to capture followers.

The Betancourt and Pérez regimes showed that leaders within democratic regimes can

use similar tactics, tools or practices to that of leaders within authoritarian regimes to

consolidate and maintain their power. While Betancourt is considered the grandfather

of democracy in Venezuela, the repressive treatment of political groups deemed

illegitimate by AD indicate that Venezuela was far from the democracy that it aspired

to be. The corrupt and clientelistic practices, as well as the heavy-handed response to

the Caracazo, of the Pérez administrations are also reminiscent of Venezuela’s

authoritarian past. Similarly, Chávez demonstrated that a leader of a hybrid regime

utilizes the same pseudo-and-authentic transactional and transformational leadership

styles as leaders of authoritarian and democratic regimes.

26    

Moreover, a belief that the Venezuelan people did not have the capacity to govern

themselves has emerged as a common justification for a strong, authoritative

leadership on the part of the leaders examined. This justification is evident throughout

the centuries, beginning with Bolívar, and with similar ideas evident in the Pérez

Jiménez, and even Betancourt, regimes. Once the Pact of Punto Fijo came into force,

the opportunity for strong and centralized leadership remained. Numerous enabling

powers such as the leyes habilitantes and the suspension of the constitution in times

of emergency allowed for the authoritative leader to emerge and operate even within a

democratic framework. This may indicate a cultural preference for an authoritative

leadership style, with the historical memory of independence and caudillo rule

embedded within Venezuelan society. As such, legal loopholes remained in Punto

Fijo to allow for this cultural preference, and therefore Chávez’s radicalization and

the use of leyes habilitantes was not a reversion to an authoritarian practice many

observers perceived it to be, but rather a historically accepted practice that reaches

back across time.

The use of regime types as a context and a lens through which to analyse leadership

will not necessarily reflect the reality of the leader or the regime. It is problematic to

assume that the natures of these two elements are inextricably linked. Rather, a deeper

analysis of the leader’s leadership styles and the broader context in which they find

themselves is a more useful starting point from which to analyse political leadership.

27    

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