IS MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE? ALMOST

I am a libertarian. So I used to think that Middle

Knowledge (MK) is impossible. I thought this for what I

presume is one reason all skeptics think it:

counterfactuals require (occurrent) truth-makers, and

counterfactuals of freedom cannot have truth-makers.

Libertarian skeptics deny that there are such truth-makers

because they take their existence to be incompatible with

the existence of “real” freedom of the will. The issue is

not significantly distinct from the question whether there

can be divine foreknowledge, divine knowledge of what a

given agent will freely do. For, after all, for God to have

MK concerning a subject S’s future decision D at t is for

God to know what S would do at t under any possible

circumstances S might face; and if God knows what

circumstances S in fact will face at t – something God can

certainly know if the occasioning of those circumstances is

causally determined, and can also know if the circumstances

hinge on the actions of others about whom God has MK – God

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can know what S will do (or decide to do) at t. But if S is

genuinely free, as the libertarian understands freedom, then

God cannot know that sort of thing ahead of time, because

there’s nothing ahead of time that can make it the case that

S would, or will, do D at t.

As I said, I used to think this. Indeed, I still do

think it – given that Molinism has a patent on the term

“middle knowledge,” and given the Molinist’s conception of

free will.1 For that conception countenances the following

1 There is danger of terminological confusion here. If ‘middle knowledge’ is defined as knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom, then Ihold (given the view of freedom to be defended below) that God can have such knowledge. If, on the other hand, freedom is understood (as many think Molina does understand it) to be such that two agents identical inall respects of history, circumstance, and physical and psychological makeup at t can make opposing choices, then I claim that such counterfactuals lack truth conditions and God can’t know them. Christoph Jäger (unpublished ms.) has recently argued, however, that since Molina was committed to a Thomistic conception of God as atemporal, His knowledge of what an agent does or would do is grounded in God’s atemporal awareness of what the agent in fact does do (in the actual world or in any agent-containing possible world) at time t. Hence, counterfactuals of freedom have as their truth-makers the actionsand inactions themselves that occur at t in the relevant possible world.The fundamental problem for Molinists on this account is that it is inconceivable how God could know such a thing except by way of perceiving free acts when they occur, and this explanation comes acropper on at least three counts. First, Molina holds (with Thomas) that God is impassible; hence, He does not have perceptual relations with the world,for these involve world/God causal influence. Second, it seems clear that there can’t in any case be causal relations between a temporal world and an eternal God (see Stump & Kretzmann, Craig, Fales, Swinburne). And third, it’s hard to conceive of what it would be for God, whether eternal or temporal, to perceive what happens in some otherwise-specified non-actual possible world (what God would perceive is

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circumstance: Mr. Grue and Mr. Bleen are libertarian-free

dopplegangers who each face, at time t, a choice between two

options (pick the blue balloon, or pick the green one).

Although their mental and physical histories and

circumstances are up to time t identical, Grue chooses blue,

and Bleen chooses green. Moreover, God knows Grue and

Bleen’s choices ahead of time and, indeed, knows

counterfactually what Grue and Bleen would choose at t, if

faced with this choice, even if they are not faced with it.

Given a conception of libertarian freedom that has that

consequence, the critique of Molinism is exactly correct.

But it doesn’t follow that divine foreknowledge of

libertarian-free agents is impossible; nor that

counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-makers and cannot

be known by God. Indeed, it appears to me that the claim of

impossibility is not obviously true, and indeed is (sort of)

false. That is because the way I understand freedom – the

libertarian theory of freedom that I hold – entails that

such foreknowledge, and knowledge of counterfactuals of

irrelevant: we are concerned with what God does know).

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freedom (collectively FK) is indeed possible, in a sense.

It will not have escaped your notice that I am hedging my

bets: “sort of;” “in a sense.” How and why I’m hedging

will be made clear presently.

First let me explain more precisely what lies behind

the intuition that free will (and henceforth, I shall mean

free will as a libertarian would conceive it, unless I state

otherwise) is incompatible with FK. A knowledge of what a

(possible or actual) agent S would do under conditions C

must involve some understanding of what conditions are

relevant to S’s acting in a certain way. To simplify

matters, let’s pretend that S’s deciding to perform action A

ensures that S does actually A (an idealization that ignores

various ways in which a decision or intention can be

hijacked before being carried out). Then, to know what S

will do involves knowing what conditions are relevant to S’s

deciding to A (or not). Whatever those conditions are – S’s

motivations or desires, S’s beliefs, S’s intelligence and

cognitive habits, S’s character, facts about S’s

environment, etc. – their relevance must consist in their

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somehow conspiring to determine whether S decides to A or

not.2 And, although I shall shortly be arguing to the

contrary, this seems incompatible with S’s freely choosing

whether to A. If, for example, God knows whether S will A

because God knows that conditions C will obtain, and knows

that if those conditions were to obtain S would A, God must

know that in virtue of God’s understanding that conditions C

ensure S’s doing (or deciding to do) A. So the truth-maker

for the counterfactual of freedom known by God is the set of

relevance-conditions in virtue of which C’s obtaining

results in S’s decision to A. But then, of course, what God

knows is something that entails that, in conditions C, S

does not choose freely.3

2 One could allow that the relevant factors jointly do not determine S’sdecision, but only determine a probability for a given choice. But thenone will have to allow that knowledge of what S will do can be predicated upon knowledge of those probabilities; and even a latitudinarian view of knowledge will not survive in cases in which the probabilities (say of S’s doing A versus not doing A) are not very significantly different. 3 Does the agent-causation theory of libertarian freedom escape this line of reasoning? I think not: to the precise extent that agent-causation is efficacious in producing an action, knowledge of what the agent will/would do eludes divine FK, for there is literally nothing about the agent or his/her circumstances that provide God with that kindof knowledge. The whole point of agent-causation, the point that distinguishes it from ordinary event-causation, is that it involves the efficacy of a substance independently of any of its properties or relations.

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Or so it seems. But this is too fast. We can begin to

see this by considering a familiar dilemma that appears to

catch the libertarian between its prongs. The libertarian

affirms that there are free actions, and denies that those

actions are causally determined by events or states of

affairs preceding them. But – as Hobart forcefully argued

75 years ago, a free action must be determined, for were it

just entirely random or spontaneous, the agent would be “out

of control;” such an act, so far from being genuinely free,

would be neither voluntary nor responsibility-generating.4

There are, as I see it, just three basic ways a

libertarian can respond to this dilemma. One way – a very

popular way nowadays – is to defend an agent-causation

theory of free action. Such theories have, as I also see

it, two Achilles’ heels. The left Achilles’ heel is that

those theories more or less abandon the possibility of

explaining free actions. They may make provision for

explanatory moves: appeal to an agent’s motivations and the

like – but they will deny that such an appeal can provide

4 Hobart, R. E., 1934. “Free Will as Involving Indeterminism and Inconceivable Without It,” Mind, 43: 1–27.

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the full story. The full story must include, in addition to

the influence of motivations, the agent him or herself as an

“INUS” condition of the performance of the act. Agency

itself cannot be explained; nor can it be subsumed under

laws and the like. The metaphysical queerness of agent-

causation is mitigated, it is sometimes claimed, by the

causal relation itself being no different than that

obtaining in event-event causation. But this, if anything,

makes agent-causation rather more mysterious than less;

consider how odd it would be to have a cause that’s an

event, with an effect that’s a particular, not a state of

affairs or event (such as the particular’s beginning to

exist).

The right Achilles’ heel is that agent-causation views

require the laws of physics to be modified. In particular,

such views appear to violate local conservation of energy

and momentum. But we have no reason to think (though also

hardly decisive reasons to deny) that causal processes in

human bodies are insufficient (together with physical

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environment) to explain the bodily movements in which

actions are embodied.

A second libertarian view, defended by, e.g., Robert

Kane, grasps the first horn of Hobart’s dilemma, by claiming

that free decisions are made by way of causally

indeterministic brain processes that underwrite conflicting

lines of reasoning, supporting competing alternatives, one

of which indeterministically “wins out.” According to Kane,

such decisions are still willed by us and are still our

decisions, in a sense that implies moral responsibility (and

permits the ascription of reasons in explanation for choices

made). Although I find Kane’s solution to Hobart’s dilemma

unconvincing, I shall set it aside here, with the

observation that if, as Kane suggests, the relevant

indeterminacies in brain processes are really quantum-

mechanical, and if not even God can foreknow the outcomes of

such processes, then Kane’s view excludes the existence of

FK.5

5 See Robert Kane, “Libertarianism,” Ch. 1 of John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008): 5 – 43. At the core of Kane’sposition is the question of the relation between reasons and choice – a question that also besets agent-causation views. In Kane’s case, the

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The remaining libertarian option is the one I favor;

and, unlike agent-causation views, it makes FK possible –

with caveats. It also sports a strong left heel. According

to this view, free actions are indeed, as Hobart insisted,

determined. But they are not causally determined. A free

agent is, paradigmatically, a rational agent. Such an agent

determines how to act (in ponder-worthy cases) by

deliberating. To deliberate just is to choose; i.e., to

determine how to act – to move from a state of uncertainty

and indecisiveness to the formation of an intention.

Deliberate acts are acts freely chosen. Central to fleshing

out such a view are two tasks: 1) Showing how deliberation,

the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, rationality, and

moral responsibility are all conceptually interwoven; and –

more relevant to my present concern – 2) Showing that

best that can be said is that the competing lines of reasoning that leadto rational impasse and correspond to their (deterministic and physical)supervenience bases are such as to frame the issue for the agent in terms of setting which alternative courses of action are serious contenders. But the triumph of one such line of reasoning over its rivals in producing what Kane calls a Self-Forming Act is random. Pace Kane, I suggest that this leads to an etiolated conception of freedom; and not only because the story seems applicable only in cases in which something approaching a genuine rational stalemate between choices is reached.

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rational deliberation is a process in which earlier thoughts

determine later thoughts (in the sense that there is a non-

accidental connection between them), while also showing that

this determination is not causal determination.

The determination is familiar enough; we all deliberate

– we are all directly aware of the connections between

successive steps in a line of reasoning. It is a

contentious matter whether (as I believe) we are similarly

directly aware of causal necessitation. I maintain that the

paradigm of the latter relation is given to us in felt

pushes and pulls; it is nothing like the relation in virtue

of which good reasons lead to a conclusion. Well, not

nothing like: in both cases, one or more events non-

accidentally produce another; in both the relation is

defeasible. But reasoning is subject to normative

evaluation; causal processes of course are not. That’s

because a line of reasoning can only be understood as

reasoning by understanding the propositional contents of the

entertained thoughts, and recognizing the logical relations

that hold between them.

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A proper analysis of free will as thus conceived gets

us into ontological deep waters, on at least three counts.

First, it requires an understanding of original

intentionality, for it is fundamental to explanations by

reasons that a thought that serves as a reason connects the

reasoner to some propositional content. Second, it requires

an understanding of what it is for an agent to be “guided by

reasons” – that is, to so order his or her thinking as to

conform to rules of valid inference that are recognized to

be such, and to reason as he or she does because of that

(usually implicit) recognition. It is this that makes an

agent rational; and it is this that enables reasons to

inform action in the proper sort of way. (But what *is* it

to be “guided by” reasons?) Third, a proper analysis must

show how the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is

compatible with (indeed, essential to) this conception of

free actions as determined by reasons.

Before turning briefly to those matters, we should note

that this conception of freedom is compatible with robust

explanation of actions. In particular, it gives pride of

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place to the practical syllogism more or less as Aristotle

conceived it; more liberally, it is free to draw upon all

the relevant explanatory resources of Folk Psychology (FP),

though I shall not attempt to argue that in any detail here.

That is why I claim that this Explanation-by-Reasons (EBR)

version of libertarianism can boast a sturdy left heel. The

right heel is another matter; more on that later.

As to the ontological depths, I shall be all too brief.

First, I have no idea how to solve the problem of original

intentionality (which I judge to be the truly hard mind/body

problem). But even if I did, that would take me far too far

afield here. Second, because inferring lies at the heart of

the process by means of which decisions are arrived at, one

must ask what it is for S to infer p2 from p1. This is

difficult for several reasons. It requires, in the first

place, an account of what it is for S to understand the

propositional content of his/her thoughts, and it requires

an account of what it is to recognize validity. But more

than that, it raises the question whether inferring is itself

an action, properly speaking, and whether – if it is – it

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makes sense to characterize such an action as free or not

free. I shall say only this: We justify some inferences by

reducing them to a series of simpler inferences. But some

inferences are as simple as inference gets. These, we say,

are “self-evident.” They are such that failure to draw them

counts either as failure to grasp the related propositions,

or as a failure to reason altogether. Drawing such an

inference is, a fortiori, a case of deciding something in only

a peculiarly degenerate sense: it is not as if one is in a

state of indecision about whether p2 is true, given one’s

commitment to p1. It is not a state that needs resolution;

one finds commitment to p2 “inescapable.” We can think of

this as the limiting case of choosing: one finds that one

must affirm p2 rather than deny it. (Similarly God, Who

sees directly and immediately all entailments, has no need

to deliberate in any extended sense; yet, even though He is

bound by necessity always to do the very best, He is free in

this limiting and degenerate sense that necessarily He

always acts for good reasons.)

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Now this suggests what we should say about the relation

between EBR and PAP. In ordinary human decision-making, the

very point of deliberating is to determine which of two or

more courses of action is the best; and that exercise

requires us to envision actions that are, in some sense,

open to us. In what sense? Well, in the first place we

must judge that circumstances and physical abilities put an

action within range of our prowess;6 and in the second, we

must judge that, relative to what we initially know, that

action could be the one to be preferred over alternatives.

What deliberating achieves is, precisely, to eliminate

alternatives as sensible; and if we are rational, that

determines us not to pursue them. Thus, a field of

possibilities is, ideally, reduced to one “survivor” whose

performance is the (rationally determined) outcome of the

deliberation.

6 I mean this in the quite ordinary sense: I can, in this sense, do something when the action is something that’s within my reach to perform, should I set myself the task. Possibilities are always with respect to some determiner; in the case of actions the determiner from among physically possible actions is reason. So initially reason faces alternatives, and then it eliminates some. (But is there more than one physical possibility, in the circumstances? – on this, see my concludingremark.)

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What, then, of the argument that God’s foreknowledge

that I will do A at time t is incompatible with my having,

prior to t, alternative possibilities? The response to the

objection should just be this: First, we remember that a

will cannot be freely exercised unless something (involving

the agent) determines the choice. Second, we see that, if

reasons do that, and if God knows that I am rational and

will, in the circumstances, see that A is the right

(reasonable) thing to do, then God can see what I will do

without foreclosing on my choices or denying me alternative possibilities, in the

sense that, from my perspective, the question of what I ought to do is framed

prior to t by what are, for me, real and un-foreclosed possibilities, in the sense

just detailed, until I reason to exclusion of all of those possibilities except the very

one God foresaw.

Having said very little about these metaphysically deep

matters, I am nevertheless content to rest my case on the

observation that intentionality and the nature of rational

inference involve features of our awareness with which we

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are directly acquainted; to deny them seems to me

unintelligible.7

With this much baggage in tow, I must now turn, quite

crisply, to the possibility of FK. The first, and obvious,

observation is that we all know, in the loose and popular 7 Explanation by reasons offers the libertarian a natural response to the Frankfurt examples that have caused so much libertarian hand-wringing. What rational deliberation presupposes is that alternative actions be available to the subject in two senses: first, that she rationally takes a prospective action to lie within the range of her physical abilities and skills, under the circumstances, to execute; and second, that each prospective action be such that, for all she knows prior to deliberation, it may prove to be the best of the available options. That is, every alternative must be, as we might say, a rational possibility for her; the purpose of the deliberation is (ideally) to eliminate all of these initially rational possibilities butone. Choosing (accepting the conclusion of a practical syllogism) is done freely just when there are such alternative possibilities, and the deliberation is successfully and properly carried through; i.e., the reasons lead, rationally and non-deviantly, to the choice in question. A free choice is subject to contravention, in the sense that knowledge how she should act isn’t sufficient for the performance of the action: action may be thwarted or derailed by temptation. Moreover, the falsityof the beliefs that inform deliberation does not undermine free choice –though it may undermine freedom of action; e.g. if, pursuing a free choice, S is forestalled by the unforeseen. But the choosing itself will have been free.

Take, then, the standard Frankfort case, where S deliberates whether to leave the room or stay, and Mad Scientist, remote control andbrain monitor in hand, stands at the ready: should S arrive at the point of deciding to leave, Mad Scientist will intervene at the eleventhhour and thwart formation of that intention. (Such intervention must appear odd to rational S: she was on the verge of concluding that leaving is the preferred option; suddenly, she finds herself intending to stay – presumably for no satisfactory reason.) Now if S decides on her own accord, and for good reasons, to stay, then her false belief about her options does not infringe upon her freedom. False beliefs can, of course, lead to choosing the impossible, but they need not constrain the ability freely to choose as such. Imagine the extreme case: someone who has every reason to think he is physically normal though his body has, in fact, become totally paralyzed. Such an

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sense, what others will do in all manner of circumstances.

That is, we can assign high probabilities – probabilities

high enough that, for example, we judge it normally not

irrational to get in a car and drive down the highway, where

poor judgment about the behavior of others can easily be

fatal. So even we have a kind of “FK” – where knowledge is

understood in the loose and popular sense – of what others

(even others we never have met) will do under, say, the

circumstances of the road. God can certainly manage that

kind of knowledge. But can He do better? How much better?

What I have said about rational deliberation suggests

where one should look for truth-makers for counterfactuals

of freedom: to know what a rational (hence, free) agent S

would do under circumstances C (which saliently include S’s

desires, beliefs, character, abilities, and commitments) is

(very crudely) to know what it would be rational to do, given

C. And the facts about that are just the facts about what

makes for a cogent practical syllogism.

unfortunate can rationally choose to perform any number of actions that he cannot in fact perform. He is in a sense the opposite of God, who allegedly can accomplish whatever He sets His heart upon; but, as Descartes observed, his will is as free as God’s.

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But life is more complicated than that, for any number

of reasons. Here I shall consider just a very few. Several

have to do with the paradoxes that plague practical

reasoning itself. These are various; but I shall just

indicate what might be said about a few of them: the

problem of justifying altruistic actions, the Prisoner’s

Dilemma, Newcomb’s Paradox, and Balaam’s ass.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the justification of

altruism are related, inasmuch as the repeated PD game can

be used to show that, under a range of conditions, a policy

of limited altruism (tit-for-tat) is the prudentially most

advantageous game strategy. But what about a single,

unrepeated game? That raises a more general question about

the relation of altruism to prudential rationality. Here my

own view, which I shall not defend, aligns quite closely

with the Plato of the Meno and the Republic: virtue is its

own reward. Our natures involve a teleological organization

that is best fulfilled by the exercise of virtue. So mum’s

the word.

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Balaam’s ass and Newcomb’s Paradox are also related, in

my view. The rational ass will, of course, turn either to

the left or to the right rather than remain immobile. But

will she turn left, or will she turn right? Imputing

rationality to the ass does not answer that question. Could

God answer it? Suppose the ass flips a “mental coin” (asses

are inept at flipping real shekels). We have really no idea

what such a process involves. I can think of two

possibilities. Either the outcome is determined by some

physical process in the donkey’s brain that, like an actual

coin flip, is deterministic and predictable by God (though

not by us). Or, the outcome is determined by some quantum

process that is not predictable by us and – so I am strongly

inclined to think – also unpredictable by God. (That is

because I take there to be good reason to believe that

counterfactuals of quantum outcomes do not have truth-

conditions. Of course that, if true, leaves God with plenty

of ignorance about the future of the material world; faced

with that, perhaps a theist will think that FK isn’t really

worth the candle.)

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I bring in Newcomb’s Paradox on the assumption that it

is a genuine paradox: that is, that there is no rationally

decisive way of defeating either the one-boxer or the two-

boxer strategy in favor of the other. Assume so; then a

rational agent will, qua rational, be in a situation similar

to the ass; she should just flip a real or mental coin. Not

even God will be able to predict, simply by considering what

S should rationally do, what she would do or will in fact

do. At best, God might be able to predict the outcome of

the coin toss. Otherwise, a new layer of complexity is

added to the Paradox: if S rightly understands that not

even God can predict, on rationality considerations or

otherwise, how she will choose, then S will know that either

the story about a successful predictor is false, or else

that other subjects haven’t framed their choices in terms of

rational considerations. But if that is so, then clearly

the two-boxer strategy wins. But if God can know that S

will reason in that way, then God will be able to predict S’s

choice – in which case S ought to one-box, and the paradox

re-emerges. In such cases, then, neither folk psychology

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nor decision theory can be of any help; and the supposition

that God can have FK with respect to the ass or S amounts to

little better than a pious hope.

But the supposition that agents are ideally rational is

itself in many circumstances far from realistic; and indeed,

both folk psychology and experimental psychology have

various resources for predicting and explaining behavior

under conditions of informational complexity or uncertainty;

and also irrational behavior. But those resources are,

obviously, very far from giving us predictive knowledge of

what any particular agent would do under any circumstance we

might envision. Can God do better?

Consider first irrationality. Although an irrational

action lies in some way outside the ambit of rational

explanation, the practical syllogism nevertheless affords us

with a conceptual framework in terms of which to

characterize different species of irrationality. These are

several; here, let me just consider weakness of the will

(akrasia), and inferential blunders. Akrasia involves a

slip betwixt understanding and undertaking: one has

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correctly executed the syllogism, knows what one ought to

do, and then fails to do it. There is much discussion about

how this is possible; but it may not involve a failure of

reasoning. Perhaps the process that connects seeing what to

do and acting is causal; and the normal causal process has,

in akrasic cases, been hijacked by a desire acting directly

as a cause. If so, and God knows all about the effects of

causes, then akrasia will provide no barrier to God’s

knowing what weak-willed S will do.

Blunders in reasoning present a potentially more

difficult case, for we do often judge such blunders

normatively and hold agents responsible for them. What if

they, too, are explained by causes that interfere with

deliberation? If such causes interfere too regularly, we no

longer count the agent rational at all; but what of milder

forms of stupidity? Again, if the explanation is purely

causal, that’s something God would be able to get a handle

on; it will not bar FK (but then why are such blunders often

blameworthy?). I am quite uncertain whether that is how

such cases should be explained.

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Similar uncertainties plague analyses of the structure

of reasoning performed under conditions of uncertainty,

incomplete information, or inferential complexity. Under

such circumstances, we resort to various rules of thumb,

heuristics, short-cuts, satisficing, muddling through, and

the like. It seems rather doubtful that either decision

theory or psychology will achieve an adequate theory, either

normative or descriptive, of our thinking in such

situations; in any case, we are far from such a theory now.

But perhaps, God, who knows the secrets in every heart, can

know such things, at least if they can be partitioned into

rational inferences and causal processes. Conversely, to

the extent that we can distinguish the better from the

worse, we can, without having to concern ourselves with

problems of irrationality, ignorance, and the rest, have

middle knowledge of what God would do.

Summarizing hastily, I should say that, insofar as the

springs of human behavior can be partitioned into rational

processes that determine courses of action and deterministic

causal ones, there are truth-makers for counterfactuals of

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freedom, and God has the resources to know them. For then

reasons determine what we do insofar as those things are

governed by rationality; and causes determine them insofar

as we fall short of rationality or are limited in our

ability to govern our actions rationally. But it may be

that there are no truth-makers for some such

counterfactuals; e.g. in the case of the ass. In those

cases, then, God lacks FK; perhaps He even lacks

probabilities. That is why FK is “sort of” possible: it is

likely to be incomplete.8

All of this depends upon the correctness of EBR

libertarianism. But what about that dangling right heel?

If our practical reasoning is not causally determined, how

is it that our bodily movements coordinate with what we’ve

8 In “Molinism” (Chapter 2 of Jonathan Kvanvig, ed., Oxford Studies in the Philosophyo of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), John Martin Fischer has elegantly argued that Molina’s theory of middle knowledge does not answer, but rather presupposes an answer to, the problem of howdivine foreknowledge can be compatible with human freedom. If the problem directly to be mentioned below cannot be solved, then I think Fischer is correct also about divine foreknowledge as I have explained it. But if it can, then EBR libertarianism provides an explanation of the compatibility, by showing how the truth-makers for counterfactuals of freedom are on the one hand knowable (many of them) by God, and on the other compatible with a properly understood PAP. Obviously, in offering this solution, I do not mean to be attributing it to Molina; nor is the present paper an attempt at Molina exegesis.

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rationally decided to do? For surely our bodily movements

are causally determined? Is the EBR libertarian committed

to Cartesian dualism (and violation of fundamental

conservation laws)? I hope not; but I have no space here to

discuss that important question.

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