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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

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Iran days in Egypt: Mosaddeq's Visit to Cairo in1951

Lior Sternfeld

To cite this article: Lior Sternfeld (2016) Iran days in Egypt: Mosaddeq's Visit to Cairo in 1951,British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 43:1, 1-20, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2015.1060151

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.1060151

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British Journal of Middle eastern studies, 2016Vol. 43, no. 1, 1–20http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.1060151

Iran days in Egypt: Mosaddeq's Visit to Cairo in 1951

Lior Sternfeld

department of history, Pennsylvania state university, Pa, usa

Introduction

In 1950, oil concessions around the globe headed towards a new profit-sharing paradigm. Venezuela successfully negotiated a 50:50 agreement with Shell. Shortly after Venezuela, the Iraq Petroleum Company (which was owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) signif-icantly improved the royalty payments to Iraq, just before the Saudi–American partnership in ARAMCO famously signed their own 50:50 agreement.1 Iran, which attempted to reopen the 1933 agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, faced staunch British refusal to re-negotiate any of the terms. In a long publicized debate, a coalition of Iranian politicians brought the demands for a better deal to the Iranian parliament (the Majlis). The Iranian National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli) and its leader, Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq, spearheaded this struggle. Mosaddeq chaired the Majlis oil committee and drafted an oil nationalization bill to counter the British refusal.

The oil concessions occurred at a moment of political instability. A few weeks earlier, Prime Minister Ali Razamra was assassinated. Hossein ‘Ala, Razamara’s successor, had resigned after six weeks in office amidst public unrest, protests, and political deadlock. On 27 April 1951, the Majlis had to elect a new prime minister. As the leader of the struggle for oil

1 Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup, 1st us edition (new York, nY: harper, 2012), pp. 149–50.

ABSTRACTDuring Mohammad Mosaddeq’s tenure as the Iranian Prime Minister, the struggles for de-colonization took shape vis-à-vis the old superpowers, Britain and France, in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Following the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Mohammad Mosaddeq became the first Middle Eastern Muslim leader that overcame Britain, albeit temporarily. Mosaddeq paid a price, overthrown in 1953 in an American and British-backed coup, but his struggle aroused interest around the world and received different interpretations, depending on the location. This article examines the way Mosaddeq was perceived in Egypt, where he visited in November 1951 for a highly significant four-day visit. The article examines the evolution of the anti-colonial struggle in Egypt and the emergence of a new vernacular framing of the struggles in the Middle East in one context.

© 2015 British society for Middle eastern studies

CONTACT lior sternfeld lbs18@psu.edu

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Figure 1. egypt’s Guest today: dr Mosaddeq.source: al-ahram, 20 november 1951, P.1.

Figure 2. Mosaddeq statue as Presented in the royal College of fine arts.source: al-ahram, 27 november 1951, P.2.

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nationalization, Mosaddeq enjoyed tremendous popularity in Iran, so the deputy speaker of the Majlis nominated him for the position. Mosaddeq agreed, on one condition: that the Majlis would vote simultaneously on his nomination and ratification of the nationalization bill. The Majlis overwhelmingly supported both.2

Following this victory and Mosaddeq’s appointment as Prime Minister, Britain launched a legal fight against the nationalization. First, the International Court of Justice rejected the

2 ibid., pp. 154–6.

Figure 3. (Cartoon) Mosaddeq, Churchill, and the stability in iran. Mosaddeq: You are Butchering it, not Me …source: akhbar al-Yaum, 22 august 1953, P.3.

Figure 4. (Cartoon) saint Churchill and his Miracles.source: akhbar al-Yaum, 29 august, 1953, P.3.

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British claims for trial, accepting Mosaddeq’s defence that the conflict existed between a country and a commercial company rather than between two countries. Britain then turned to the united Nations (uN) Security Council in the hopes that it would impose sanctions on Iran which would force it to reverse its actions.

On 8 October 1951, the Iranian Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq travelled to New York to present the Iranian arguments in favour of the oil nationalization before the uN Security Council.3 While visiting the united States, Mosaddeq successfully defended Iran’s right to benefit from its own natural resources, and articulated a new sort of diplomatic struggle for the postcolonial world.

In his two years in office, Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq pursued the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, cancellation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession, and expulsion of British forces from Iran. Mosaddeq resorted to these measures after the British rejected his request to review the terms of their oil concession and reach a fairer agreement. He was aiming at an agreement similar to ARAMCO’s, which focused on profit-sharing rather than the exploitation of resources.4

In the eyes of the struggling Middle East region, Mosaddeq managed to overcome, if only temporarily, the greatest and most dominant world-power in the Middle East. More specifically, he succeeded in claiming ownership of a crucial global economic asset regarded by the British as theirs. One of the countries that followed closely Mosaddeq’s visit to the uN was Egypt, which was invested in its own struggle against British imperialism at that time.

On his way back to Tehran from the uN, on 20 November 1951, Mosaddeq made a four-day stopover in Egypt—a country that was still looking for a way to deal with the long-time British presence and involvement in Egyptian national affairs. upon his arrival in Cairo, Mosaddeq

3 for a good account of Mosaddeq’s un visit, see: ervand abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.–Iranian Relations (new York, nY: the new Press, 2013), pp. 123–30.

4 at that time, the united states and saudi arabia signed their partnership treaty over the araMCo oil company, according to which profits would be equally shared by both sides. this treaty caused unrest in iran and a willingness to struggle towards a new agreement with the British. for more information about this agreement, see: daniel Yergin, The Prize : The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power, free Press trade paperback edition (new York: free Press, 2009); and robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (stanford, Ca: stanford university Press, 2007).

Figure 5. (Cartoon) the iran Play.source: akhbar al-Yaum, 22 august, 1953, P.4.

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was received as a victorious leader who fearlessly faced Britain and, to British dismay, had expelled them from Iran. In 1951, the British control of the Suez Canal was a heated topic in Egypt. Only a month earlier the Egyptian government, headed by Mustafa al-Nahhas, abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty due to increasing public resentment towards the British and their proponents in the country (especially the King and the Wafd party).5 In that context, Mosaddeq’s personality, charm, and success overshadowed many of Egypt’s leaders, who were not confrontational enough.

This article examines Mosaddeq’s tenure in the context of the anti-colonial struggle in Egypt. His ascendance to prominence allowed the articulation of a common struggle between Iran and Egypt, and the surrounding countries. This research allows scholars to examine Mosaddeq’s influence beyond the scope scholars have allowed thus far and to broaden the conversation on the political economy of the Middle East in the early 1950s.

Mosaddeq’s visit allowed Egyptian thinkers, dissidents, and political activists to connect their campaign in the Suez Canal to the more efficient Iranian campaign in Abadan. I pro-pose that Mosaddeq was perceived by several spheres of the Egyptian public, including intellectual, political, and journalistic discourses, first and foremost in a sense of anti-colonial solidarity. In his image and in the struggle he led, Mosaddeq represented aspirations for a different kind of reality, one of national and economic independence and a strong sovereign stance in face of the imperial powers.

The fascinating history of Iran and Egypt’s relationship attests to the Egyptian public’s strong awareness of Iranian issues, thus making Mosaddeq’s tenure worthy of examination in the Egyptian perspective. In 1939, the Iranian prince at the time, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi married the Egyptian princess Fawziyah in a much-celebrated wedding. The New York Times described this marriage as ‘[O]ne of the most important political alliances in the history of Islam’, hence suggesting that this marriage was supposed to strengthen the relationships between the two kingdoms and to allow them to gain greater political power in the region.6 This headline, of course, exaggerates. Iran and Egypt were both dealing with severe domestic and international challenges and had problematic relations with British imperialism. However, in Iran this wedding reduced cultural animosity to Arab countries. In Egypt, the popular media reported extensively and fondly on the young couple’s new life, and celebrated the revitalization of these two ancient cultures; photographs from the lavish wedding ceremony and the celebrations adorned many of the newspapers’ front pages. After less than a decade, in 1948, the then-Iranian queen, Fawziyah, divorced Mohammad Reza Shah and returned to Egypt. Notwithstanding, the Egyptian public’s curiosity about Iran remained significant.

Additionally, the great political similarity between Iran and Egypt at the time suggests a common denominator. Both were victim to the imperialist European strategy to take over resources, and both were on a similar page with relation to decolonization and the anti- colonial struggle. The essential difference between the two states lies in the fact that while Iran was not subjected to imperialist rule in its classical sense, Egypt had been under indi-rect British rule since 1882. By the mid-twentieth century, the two states were ostensibly independent, but the British maintained political dominance through loyalist monarchies. The two states owned national-economic assets that were in fact under British control (oil in Iran and the Suez Canal in Egypt). In addition to its ownership of the Suez Canal, Britain

5 robert l. tignor, Egypt: A Short History (Princeton, nJ and oxford: Princeton university Press, 2010), pp. 250–5.6 headliners, New York Times, p. 131, 19 March 1939.

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maintained an extensive military presence in Egypt. Furthermore, just as the British–Iranian crisis was taking place in Iran, the Free Officers were carrying out their coup in Egypt (July 1952), after which the new regime assumed an anti-colonialist position par excellence. The way in which the entire Mosaddeq crisis was read in Egypt since 1951 also affected British decision-making throughout the colonial world, as they viewed the British experiences in Iran and feared that this affair would result in a similar course in Egypt.7

Mosaddeq’s visit to Egypt in November 1951 allows further examination of his impact on Egyptian political discourse. During this important visit, Mosaddeq was hailed as a national hero. Through mass demonstrations of support, the Egyptians demanded that their leaders take responsibility for the fate of their country and follow Mosaddeq in confronting the western powers, attaining Egyptian sovereignty and never again allowing such humiliation as the Abdin Palace affair.8

This research draws on two types of primary sources: documents from the British National Archives, and Egyptian periodicals and newspapers. The archival documents include political correspondence between the British embassy in Cairo and the Foreign Office in London, local media reviews by the embassy, and interviews British diplomats conducted with Egyptian public figures in order to gain a better sense of the goings-on. By using these sources I examine the significance of the Mosaddeq crisis in Egypt at the time it occurred. Through readings of editorials and op-eds I will show how the Egyptian media and public figures used Mosaddeq and his visit to promote domestic ideals and policies. Through the press coverage, this article argues that the Egyptian public perceived Mosaddeq as a regional leader and anti-imperialist hero.

Between Abadan and Suez: The Initial Connection between Iran and Egypt

‘If Mosaddeq could get away with nationalizing the oil industry in Iran, might not Nasser be inspired to nationalize the Suez Canal Company?‘9 Historian William Roger Louis’s question reflects the opinion held by British officials on the eve of their decision to carry out Operation Ajax, which resulted in the deposition of Mosaddeq as Prime Minister of Iran. Louis suggested that the similarities between Abadan and Suez were obvious for Britain, as it was for the Egyptians and the Iranians. In order to properly understand the role of Mosaddeq’s political influence in Egypt, a brief review of the Egyptian political system and its situation just before Mosaddeq’s emergence is called for. A general analysis of Egypt’s political map shows three principal mutually-challenging forces. First, there is the monarchy; the king relied consid-erably on Britain’s interest in keeping him on the throne. In the years prior to the events discussed here, Egyptians regarded their king as Britain’s lackey, and occasional deviations from imperial policy were duly punished with Britain’s well-known ‘gunboat diplomacy’.

The monarchy fell steeply in the public’s eyes as a result of a concerted effort by the Wafd party and also because it was perceived, justly, to maintain too slack a position vis-à-vis the

7 the lebanese government refused to let Mosaddeq enter its borders for fear of stirring similar sentiments. Al-Siyasa, p. 3, 21 January 1952.

8 on 4 february 1942, following the king’s refusal to the British demand to dismiss and replace the cabinet, British military forces broke into abdin Palace while armed military vehicles surrounded the palace. this event is burnt in the egyptian memory as a national disgrace. Charles d. smith, ‘4 february 1942: its Causes and its influence on egyptian Politics and on the future of anglo-egyptian relations, 1937–1945’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10(4) (1 november 1979), pp. 453–79.

9 William roger louis, End of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonialism: Collected Essays (london and new York: i.B. tauris, 2006), p. 731.

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British.10 In April 1951, just before the Majlis approved the reappropriation bill and the oil nationalization crisis began unfolding, King Farouk met the British ambassador to Egypt, Ralph Stevenson, at the royal palace and apologized for the intensifying protests around the Suez Canal following the Iranian influence. The king asked Stevenson whether the British government appreciated his efforts in maintaining the status quo, which Stevenson con-firmed. Further into their conversation, the king expressed his support of the British in the Iran conflict and hoped the matter would be settled as soon as possible.11

The second major Egyptian political force was the Wafd, the national party that had gained power and prestige following the events of 1919 and that stood in opposition to the mon-archy. At its onset, this party—headed by Sa’ad Zaghlul—symbolized the Egyptian struggle for independence and enjoyed great popularity. In the 1950 elections, the party gained great support from the public, the majority of which voted for the new changes promised by the leadership. However, at this moment the party was already regarded a part of the ‘old order’. Indeed, by mid-1951 the Wafd was considered a corrupt, dated party that had abandoned the principles upon which it was founded.12 Still, the leaders of the Wafd remembered that national independence was the goal set for them by the public and upon occasion attempted to take further steps in that direction. The Wafd also conducted a steady battle with the royal palace contesting the authority vested in the parliament and the king.13

The British are usually seen as the third factor in Egyptian politics, but here I would like to propose a fourth factor which I find necessary for examining public opinion in the country: the Egyptian people, or, more specifically, the new politicized urban publics of the post-World War II era.14 I would argue that the British influence had diminished by the early 1950s and that Egyptian public opinion had superseded it as a factor. On the one hand, the people witnessed a weak, submissive king whom Britain had placed and maintained on the throne. On the other, a national party was emerging from within the people itself, a party that had led national struggles but had lost its own direction. The public still aspired to achieve polit-ical and economic independence, shrug off British imperialism, and fulfil its own destiny.15 Instead of support for the enfeebled Wafd, slogans calling to fight the British were now being voiced by still controversial organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. This movement saw itself as the cutting edge in the struggle against British imperialism and aimed to abolish monarchy on the way to realizing its vision. Be that as it may, at this time members of the movement were finding their activity increasingly restricted by the Egyptian government.

As these movements began articulating a vision of an independent Egypt, Mosaddeq’s policy towards Britain amazed Egyptians: an eastern statesman had dared challenge one of the world’s mightiest powers. At the onset of this affair, Egyptian newspapers noted certain appreciation for his actions, albeit hesitantly, while simultaneously indicating the belief that

10 tignor, Egypt, pp. 254–5.11 fo 371/90131, ralph stevenson, Political department: General Correspondence, 3 april 1951.12 Joel Gordon, ‘the false hopes of 1950: the Wafd’s last hurrah and the demise of egypt’s old order’, International Journal

of Middle East Studies, 21(2) (1 May 1989), pp. 193–214.13 in work meetings, representatives of the Wafd presented the British with demands to reduce British presence in egypt.

the British, however, dismissed their demands. reports of such meetings abound; for example, fo 371/90130, from Cairo to foreign office, 29 March 1951.

14 By ‘people’ i mean the main part of egyptian society that represents a public agenda expressed by the popular press. it is not my intention here to generalize or ignore the existence of many elements that make up the people. When we talk about pub-lic perception of Mosaddeq, we see combination of massive taking to the streets in demonstrations (hence, street power), and simultaneously, intellectual and financial elites. the ranks of the effendiya were mobilized as well through other venues.

15 Gamal abdel nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: dar al-Ma’arif, 1959).

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such activity would not persist. However, an analogous view of the situation of Iran and Egypt soon followed. On 23 March 1951, when discussions in the Iranian Majlis were already suggesting the upcoming nationalization of oil, Egypt’s Al-Ahram flashed a front-page item about a column in the British New Statesman and Nation which was in favour of Iran’s right to nationalize its oil:

The leftist periodical New Statesman and Nation published an article in its latest issue this week, in defense of Iran’s right to nationalize the oil industry. The article also addresses Britain’s need to adopt an official policy in the Middle East different from the chain of improvised decisions that have been taken by the Foreign Office.16

The paper also cites an assumption that other national economic assets in other parts of the Middle East will be nationalized as well. The accumulating evidence indicates that the roots of ‘economic nationalism’ already existed in Egypt’s political discourse prior to Mosaddeq’s time, but Mosaddeq’s struggle focused and intensified this sentiment. Reading these sources, one cannot help feeling that any Egyptian report on the Iranian oil nationalization is invariably accompanied by instances from Egyptian internal discourse, perhaps even as a suggested direction of action to be undertaken by Egyptian leaders.

On 20 March 1951, the British Embassy in Cairo conducted its periodic review of the Egyptian press. This survey called attention to several articles in Al-Balagh, a periodical iden-tified with the Wafd party. The surveyed articles proposed that Egypt follow the Persian model, according to which ‘Britain will never learn how to behave with the peoples of the Middle East, and the wrath of the Persian people now falling upon its head is but the pun-ishment for her crimes’.17 In the same vein, an editorial in one of Egypt’s most widely read newspapers, Al-Misri, which was also affiliated with the Wafd party, declared that ‘[…] the British are our enemy now and in the future, and the enemy of the Arabs in general’.18 The trend here could mean that addressing the situation in Iran strengthened the discussion of the Suez Canal and British presence. These comparisons generated both solidarity with another victim of colonialism and even inspiration for intensifying the nationalist struggle. About a month and a half later, on 7 May 1951, a giant headline appeared in Al-Ahram: ‘99 out of 102 [Majlis deputies] support Mosaddeq as he presented his government’s plan to the Iranian Majlis’.19 Such a prominent headline is normally dedicated to highly important topics and usually Egyptian matters rather than foreign ones. Once again this prominence might indicate the importance ascribed in Egypt to Mosaddeq and his moves. In the same item, Britain is portrayed as helpless vis-à-vis the Iranian policies. ‘Britain will want to forget the 6th of May’ and ‘Iran taught Britain that no one will interfere in her internal affairs’ are just some instances of the pride two prominent Egyptian media outlets publicized regarding Mosaddeq’s actions. This coverage should be read not as a mere report of the goings-on in Iran. For Egyptians, a closer reading implies that Britain was not invincible.20 Such a message carried significant implications for a public staggering under the yoke of British imperialism. A new, tangible feeling began to emerge that this yoke might yet be broken—perhaps these headlines even served as encouragement to take an active stance against Britain.

16 Al-Ahram, 23 March 1951.17 fo 371/90130.18 al-Misri, 27 March 1951.19 ‘editorial’, Al-Ahram, 7 May 1951.20 ‘editorial’, Al-Ahram, 6 May 1951.

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On 26 September 1951, all of Egypt’s main newspapers ran huge headlines announcing the Iranian Majlis’ ruling to expel all British forces from the entire country within nine days.21 This event aroused great interest in Egypt, and on that very day most of the papers’ sections dealt with Tehran’s decision. On 4 October 1951, the Egypt press had its field day with pho-tographs of the British ousted from Abadan and headlines heralding Iranian triumph and British anger. Al-Ahram published a picture of the inert oil pumps of Abadan and a bird’s-eye view of the desolate refineries. Another image appearing in all the papers and preserved for posterity was that of Mosaddeq carried on the shoulders of the cheering crowd in Iran.22

In the following I focus largely on Al-Ahram, as one of the most widely-read dailies and the leading voice of independent journalism in Egypt.23 At times the paper voiced the goals of the anti-colonial movement. A good example of this support occurred on 14 November 1951, when the newspaper organized a mass demonstration protesting the British presence, marching from the Al-Ahram building to Khedive Ismail Square and on to the royal palace.24 On the next day’s front page, the headline boasted that ‘over one million people took part in the greatest demonstration in the history of Egypt’, and noted that this demonstration marked the beginning of a struggle against British imperialism. A rhymed poem written by the Egyptian intellectual and journalist Ahmad al-Sawi Muhammad appeared as an op-ed that day, praising the new path that Egypt had chosen:

How great a model, my dear nation/ In your simplicity, your loyalty, your royalty/ How great, my country, your power, your silence in every word, your stillness louder than any fanfare, from your falling into slavery until your sons have all been united/ This is my country, this is our country/ And the English people shall read in their press about our silent parade, and how we shall continue to fight for the love of our homelands and defy imperialism.25

The poet makes a point with the use of the word ‘homelands’ in the plural (awtan). I suggest here that the value of a shared struggle against imperialism is already incorporated; this language adopts a struggle that has already reached its peak in Iran and expresses hopes for its realization in Egypt. The growing interest in Mosaddeq and the different meanings his name bore in Egypt indicate his becoming a symbol. Mosaddeq gradually received more and more press space in news items, op-eds and editorials. At this point his name already car-ried weight for the Egyptians, associated with struggle against the British and with national pride. Mosaddeq’s policy was no longer perceived as an affair that affected only Iran, or as a bilateral Iranian–British crisis, but rather as an affair with general regional significance. In real time, Egyptians saw the goings-on in Iran as directly influencing them. In early October 1951, Al-Ahram published an article under the headline ‘The Revolution of the British Press Regarding Egypt’.26 Part of this article notes the connection between the Abadan events and the budding activity in Egypt. The British press, according to this article, attributed this connection to the national sentiment that was growing especially in these two states.27 Another example of the link found between Abadan and Suez may be seen in the article

21 Al-Misri, 26 september 1951; and Al-Ahram, 26 september 1951.22 Al-Ahram, 4 october 1951, image on p. 6.23 ami ayalon, The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History (new York: oxford university Press, 1995), pp. 145–51.24 Al-Ahram, 14 november 1951.25 Al-Ahram, 15 november 1951.26 Kemal al-shenawi, ‘thawrat al-suhuf al-baritaniyya ‘ala misr’ [the revolution of the British press regarding egypt], Al-Ahram,

10 october, 1951.27 Al-Ahram, 10 october 1951.

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headed ‘Britain Plays the Devil’ published on 17 October 1951. Here, the writer cites a speech made by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herbert Morrison, warning the Iranians not to take forbidden measures in the Abadan struggle. ‘And the honorable minister emphasized’, said the article, ‘that theirs is a war fleet that covers the seven seas and the Persian Gulf as well—but overhead hangs a cloud more terrible than all their airplanes’.28 A likely guess as to the identity of this cloud is Mosaddeq. The writer warns the Iranian government not to help Britain out of the trap it has dug for itself, not to reach any understandings or agree-ments with her, and not to submit to the opposition in Iran. In the advice that he offers the Iranian government, the writer reflects on Egypt: the presence of an elite linked to Britain by its benefits, a public discourse supportive of the struggle, and the challenges the entire region should address. In this article, the writer moves freely between the two arenas—Iran and Egypt—and actually places them in a single context.29

Ayam Iran—‘Iran Days’

In October 1951, Mosaddeq travelled to the united States to address the uN Security Council. The debate in the Security Council followed Britain’s earlier appeal to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Mosaddeq refused to recognize that court’s legitimacy to discuss this case, as it was between an independent state and a private company. British frustration took the debate to the uN Security Council but miscalculated significantly. Britain under-estimated Mosaddeq’s ability to present the Iranian case in front of the council (and the support he had among some of the council’s members, such as India and Turkey), and the favouring approach of President Truman towards Mosaddeq.30 While Britain demanded that the uN impose sanctions, Mosaddeq defended Iran’s right to reap the economic benefits of its oil industry. He won wide international support for his country. En route back to Tehran, Mosaddeq chose to stop in Cairo. The highly effective visit transcended the normal cooper-ation of states and helped amplify the voice of the anti-colonial trend in Egypt.

Throughout his political career, Mosaddeq had received favourable but not particularly enthusiastic editorial support from the Egyptian press. Egyptian journalists seemed to have assumed that the Mosaddeq affair would be finished quickly, without any earth-shaking results. But after Mosaddeq showed his determination as he defended Iran’s position in front of the whole world at the uN, the struggle became a fait accompli. As soon as news arrived of Mosaddeq’s wish to visit Cairo on his way back to Iran, preparations began for what would be later called ‘Iran days’ (ayam Iran).31 The day of Mosaddeq’s arrival dawned with the Egyptian press’s warm welcome to the Iranian statesman. Mosaddeq’s portrait adorned the front page of every newspaper in the country. Prominent intellectuals such as Salamah Musa and Kamal al-Shanawi praised his moves and the strong stance he adopted against western imperial-ism. His arrival in Cairo was greeted by mass demonstrations all the way from the airport to

28 Kemal al-shnawi, ‘Baritaniya yula’ib al-shaytan’ [Britain plays the devil], Al-Ahram, 17 october 1951.29 it should be noted that not all the voices in egypt that linked the iranian struggle to its egyptian counterpart spoke of the

need to resemble or unite forces. there were those who found this to be functional, like the use of the numerous fronts in which the British were engaged. for example, on 1 november 1951 an Al-Ahram columnist wrote that the path to liberation in egypt runs through the British fronts in india, abadan and ireland. Al-Ahram, 1 november 1951.

30 for excellent accounts of Mosaddeq’s trip to the un security Council, see: de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia, 175–85; and abrahamian, The Coup, 123–38.

31 the term ‘iran days’ is borrowed from an Al-Ahram article at the end of Mosaddeq’s visit, and refers to the fact that this visit was a celebration of iran–egypt relations. in those days, iran was hailed as leading the east in its struggle against British imperialism.

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his hotel. Demonstrators carried signs supporting Mosaddeq and his struggle, and hailed him ‘Mosaddeq—the foe of imperialism’ (Mosaddeq—‘adu alisti’amar).32 Various references to these demonstrations indicate that they reflected the opinion of large segments of the Egyptian public. In his report to the Foreign Office, the British ambassador to Egypt wrote:

I have the honor to report that the prime minister of Iran arrived in Cairo […] He was met at the airport by the acting minister of Foreign Affairs and a large enthusiastic crowd […] The prime minister visited Dr. Mossadeq at his hotel and a considerable crowd was organized, and paid to cheer both of them […] They received the maximum publicity in the press consistent with the reservation of the main headlines for the atrocities committed by British troops.33

The cynical tone of the report covers a great concern.34 Apparently, the issue of paying the crowds was a figment of the ambassador’s imagination or merely wishful thinking. There is no evidence to support the ambassador’s claims, but the facts do demonstrate is that when Mosaddeq arrived in Egypt, the public saw him as a Middle East leader who was engaged in a noble struggle against British imperialism. He ousted the British from his country and revived discussion of a state’s right to control its own resources.35 It should be noted here that although Prime Minister Mustafa Nahas Pasha, of the Wafd party, did not receive Mosaddeq and his entourage at the airport, he did send his deputy and set up a meeting with Mosaddeq at the Iranian leader’s hotel. This move was harshly condemned by the Egyptian press the following day. The opposition’s newspaper Akher Lahza attacked the Prime Minister Nahas Pasha, and the independent newspaper Al-Ahram, which became a venue of criticism in the nationalist issues, also voiced criticism. But alongside this attack appeared a clarification on behalf of the government that official rules of ceremony did not require the prime minis-ter to receive his guest at the airport.36 I suggest that Nahas’ absence from the welcoming ceremony stemmed from a fear of the actual visit. Nahas, then at the low point of his term in office after losing much of the people’s support, was not interested in being eclipsed by the idealized Mosaddeq in such a public setting.

The front page of Al-Ahram issued on the second day of the visit extensively described the previous day and hailed Mosaddeq as ‘hero of Iran and the leader of its war’. It is well worth noting the appellations Mosaddeq received in the article itself: ‘The great leader’, ‘The great Iranian guest’, or ‘The Iranian hero’. Such terms, like the content of the article itself, contain both overt and covert criticism of the Egyptian government, especially for not having learned from Mosaddeq’s success. After a delightful description of the welcome that Mosaddeq enjoyed wherever he went and gushing superlatives, we read: ‘Yesterday was “Iran in Egypt day” and not “Iran and Egypt day” […] for the hosts are not yet equal to the guest and should learn from the Iranian warriors’ leader how to get their way, how to fight imperialism’.37 The writer here has placed Mosaddeq on a pedestal as a model and presented Iran as a pioneer leading the camp to which Egypt should belong.

If the mass demonstrations held in Cairo attest to the welcome Mosaddeq enjoyed and his significance in the eyes of the public at large, the following example illustrates the Egyptian

32 the demonstrations were riotous to the extent that even foreign press printed the demonstrators’ messages. ‘thousands of egyptians demonstrate for Mosaddeq—the foe of imperialism’, Ha’aretz, 21 november 1951; and ‘Mosaddeq Meets nahas Pasha’, Jerusalem Post, 21 november 1951.

33 fo 317/91474, Political departments: General Correspondence, 3 december 1951.34 Al-Ahram also wrote about the procession that accompanied Mosaddeq from the airport to his hotel. ‘istiqbal ra’ee li’ldoktor

Mosaddeq, batil iran wa’za’im harb’ha’, Al-Ahram, 21 november 1951.35 editorial, ‘Man of the Year—Challenge of the east’, Time, 7 January 1952.36 fo 371/91474.37 ‘ayam iran’, Al-Ahram, 21 november 1951.

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intellectuals’ regard for him. Sayyid Qutb, the well-known teacher and literary critic, joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1951 and became the movement’s ideologue and one of its harshest critics of the British presence in Egypt.38 On the day of Mosaddeq’s visit, Qutb published a poem in Al-Ahram, entitled ‘Saluting Mosaddeq’:

This is the East, let it be known by one and all!/ It has been united like the leap of the lion/ Which it sent forth like thunder/ Rolling in the cry of blood/ Boiling in infernal anger/ Shooting black flames/ At any criminal, any tyrant/ For any injustice in his dank cave/ This is the East created in its pains/ And thus unafraid of that which hurt it/ Its wounds, like tongues incessant/Cry to him: Forward!/ We shall either live on the highest peaks/ Or be thrown into the abyss/ For life tends not towards lowliness/ But always towards honor and glory/ Mosaddeq, son of life, nobleman/ Hero of the Muslim East/ Trustworthy and alerted guard/ Withstanding the criminal thief’s power/ You are the torch of triumph that you have lit/ With the oil and your own inspired heart/ You lived and brought to their pirates/ the fire of the East of our burning oil.39

Beside its overt criticism of the Arab states and the Middle East, and its praise of Mosaddeq, the poem’s importance also lies in the fact that it was written by a popular thinker and pub-lished alongside that issue’s editorial. The editorial in Al-Ahram that day, too, was charged with symbolically significant expressions and written in a similar vein. Its headline reads ‘Our Sister Iran’ (‘Shaqiqatna Iran’). The meaning of the word Shaqiqa is ‘sister’, as used by Arab states for depicting friendly neighbour-states. The lack of differentiation between Arab and non-Arab states by this cultural reference charges this headline ideologically. The editorial itself said:

Yesterday was Iran day in Cairo, the arrival of its great leader Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq. With him arrived the opportunity for both young and old in this country, equally, to be blessed with the admiration and enchantment at what this man contains, a man who symbolizes the spirit of Jihad in our sister-state Iran. The man who gave solace to his country when it was desolate, its soul caught in a nightmare that lasted over one hundred and fifty years.40

The description of Iran’s misery under imperial rule reflected the emotional state of the Egyptian people, subjected at that very moment to the same conditions which ruled Iran prior to the Mosaddeq era.

Among other meetings and interviews, Mosaddeq met the renowned Egyptian feminist and influential activist Doria Shafik. For Shafik, too, Mosaddeq ‘symbolized the very spirit of nationalism’.41 In her recollection of the interview with Mosaddeq, Doria Shafik wrote that she was:

mesmerized by his unbelievable way of reasoning, his great faith in duty and deep confidence in his nation, which he has raised above all nations. He is someone who is a true man of revolt. He is a symbol of his country’s struggle against foreign exploitation and an example that should be followed all over the world.42

During this successful visit, an idea arose that caused much concern among several officials of the British government while awakening hopes in the emerging Egypt–Iran axis. In a con-versation with several Egyptian politicians, Mosaddeq proposed to establish a bloc of Middle Eastern states led by Iran and Egypt, consolidating a policy that would give precedence to

38 for better understanding of sayyid Qutb’s political ideology, read: John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam (oxford and new York: oxford university Press, 2009); James toth, Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual (oxford and new York: oxford university Press, 2013).

39 sayyid Qutb, ‘tahiya ila Mosaddeq’ [saluting Mosaddeq], Al-Ahram, 21 november 1951.40 editorial, ‘shaqiqatna iran’ [our sister iran], Al-Ahram, 21 november 1951.41 Cynthia nelson, Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist: A Woman Apart (Cairo: american university in Cairo Press, 1996), p. 177.42 ibid.

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their peoples and interests.43 This idea thrilled the imagination of several journalists, who proceeded to publicize it in the press. On one of the days of his Cairene visit, Dr Mosaddeq granted an interview to Al-Ahram and said that Egypt has proven its friendship with Iran, that the two were sister-states, and that Iran would assist Egypt in attaining her national demands.44 Although the idea was not in fact realized, even the mere attempt is significant.

The day Mosaddeq returned to Iran, Al-Ahram printed his open letter to the Egyptian people: ‘Tomorrow morning, I shall leave your precious land […] my soul tormented with love (Lawa’a) […] and my heart filled with admiration and gratitude’.45 Later on in the same letter, Mosaddeq thanked his official hosts and the Egyptian people for the warm welcome extended to him wherever he went. This letter deeply moved Egyptian writers, and Taha Hussein, an influential cultural and literary figure in Egypt, even called Mosaddeq ‘Glory of the East’ (‘Muffakharat al-shark’).46 The editorial that day, entitled ‘Revival of the East’ (‘Wathbat al-shark’), called upon the Egyptians—and particularly their government—to learn a lesson from Mosaddeq’s visit:

Early this morning, Dr. Mosaddeq will board the plane that will take him back to his homeland with God’s blessing. He will cast a last glance at the green fields lying below, and see the country that has welcomed him most warmly and celebrated his presence most lavishly. From his plane he will gaze at the thousands of farmers tilling their land, and knowing that it is his plane that flies overhead. That very moment they will drop everything in order to cast a last look at the man who had become like their own countryman, and promised them a life of peace in absolute independence, never more to know war and dispossession […] Such is the Prime Minister of Iran, one of the greatest statesmen. Party leaders came to meet him, leaders of youth and the workers. They came to see with their own eyes the man who had defeated Britain! The fate of Egypt has been tied to that of Iran […] The East has lent its ear to the call that surprised the West, from Indonesia to Iran, to Egypt and Sudan. The thieving and sneaking, violence and intimida-tion will no longer serve the goals of imperialism […] and like the oil of Abadan is Iran’s own by right, so shall the Suez Canal be the rightful claim of Egypt. It is the heart of their hope, in spite of the dispossession, the robbery and aggression […] It is this hope, this soothing of the pain, that now ties Egypt and Iran until the end of time, thus spoke Dr. Mosaddeq.47

The visit left its marks on Mosaddeq as well. After his return to Iran, Mosaddeq spoke to the Majlis and expressed his gratitude to the Egyptian government and people:

I may submit that during our three day stay in that historic country, not a moment passed without the people and government of Egypt extending their special kindness and applause to us. It was as if the people had prepared themselves for our reception from a long time in advance. H.I.M Malek Faruk, his Royal Highness, the Crown Prince, his Excellency Nahas Pasha, the popular Prime Minister of Egypt, the Honorable Members of the Government, the well known clergy, the religious and party leaders, hands of the Communities, writers, editors, university Professors and students, merchants, professional men and workers, in short the government and the people of Egypt did everything in their power for our reception and expressed their keen interest in the people of Iran. I do hope that God will help the Iranian people to express their deep mutual feelings to the brace and struggling Nation of Egypt and will help the people of Iran and Egypt in their manly struggles so that these ancient nations may renew their grandeur of their olden days.48

43 fo 371/91474.44 ‘Mosaddeq yaqul: misr ‘abarat ‘an sadaqatiha li’iran’, Al-Ahram, 22 november 1951.45 Mohammad Mosaddeq, ‘Min mosaddeq ila al-uma al-misriyya’, Al-Ahram, 23 november 1951.46 taha hussein, ‘Mufakharat al-sharq’ [Glory of the east], Al-Ahram, 23 november 1951.47 ‘editorial’, Al-Ahram, 23 november 1951.48 fo 371/98609, text of the report submitted by the Prime Minister, dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, on nov. 23 1951, upon his

return from the united states of america and egypt, 25 november 1951.

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Representations of Mosaddeq in Egyptian discourse remained central until the Free Officers’ coup in July 1952, and he was revered like royalty. Although not every article published on the British presence in the Suez tied the Egyptian situation with the Iranian one, following Mosaddeq’s visit the connection became more prominent in internal Egyptian discourse. This approach departed from articles published prior to March 1951 when the Egyptian press rarely, if ever, connected the Suez issue with the Iranian oil industry, Mosaddeq entered the political–public discourse in Egypt, and his politics resonated there. He was appreciated for his work and became a role model. Shortly after the Iranian premier’s visit, an article was published on 27 November 1951 about a statue prepared in his honour at the Royal Faculty of Fine Arts. The article showed a portrait of the sculpture and its maker at the finishing phase.49

The political success of Mosaddeq’s visit in Cairo was unexpected in view of its unpromis-ing beginnings. Prime Minister Nahas was absent from the welcoming ceremony, evoking the anger of Egyptians and the Iranian entourage.50 Perhaps a re-reading of public opinion led Nahas to change his attitude towards this visit, and consequently to consolidate with Mosaddeq a comprehensive collaboration agreement between the two states.51 The visit peaked in the ceremonial signing of a treaty of cooperation, attended by Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq and Mustafa Nahas Pasha in the name of the ‘brother peoples’, Egyptians and Iranians. This agreement committed the two statesmen to creating treaties on economic and cultural issues and increasing their mutual trade ties, especially in the amounts of oil. The principles of the treaty included the expansion of cultural and economic cooperation; in the economic annex to the document, Egypt became the main customer of Iranian oil production.52 Furthermore, the agreement states that the two countries should insist on their central status in the region by objecting to the British dominance that had burdened them both.

In late November al-Ahram reported that the Wafd government intended to annul the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian agreement signed with Britain regarding British presence at the Suez Canal. Egyptians assumed that annulling the agreement and taking a position similar to that of the Iranians would lead to a British submission in Egypt as in Iran. At any rate, as the British reported on 1 December 1951, following the Mosaddeq visit and its effects on internal politics in Egypt, King Farouk wanted the Wafd out and an alternative government appointed. The British for their part at this point also wished to see an alternative for the Wafd in power and acknowledged their shared interests with the king.53

Every move that Mosaddeq made in Iran received Egyptian headlines (especially, but not only in Al-Ahram), and particularly aggressive actions evoked more detailed interpreta-tions as well. For example, Mosaddeq’s declaration of British forces’ full withdrawal from Iran

49 it may also reveal particular groups that supported Mosaddeq, such as artists, intellectuals and middle-class effendiya. al-ahram, 27 november 1951.

50 in his report of Mosaddeq’s visit in Cairo, the British ambassador noted the reactions voiced by both the egyptians and the iranian mission to nahas’ absence from the welcoming ceremony. the king’s absence was hardly criticized. it is difficult to tell whether this sheds any light on the king’s status or any expectations of him. fo 371/91474.

51 fo 371/98609.52 as a result of Britain’s control of the egyptian state budget, this aspect of the agreement was not implemented: the British

vetoed it. fo 371/90148, Measures to Maintain our Position in egypt, 26 november 1951; and Al-Ahram, 23 november 1951.53 the British embassy officials met a few egyptian prominent political leaders such as ali Maher and naguib al-hilali in order

to find an alternative to the ‘growing radical’ Wafd government. in his meeting with Maher, for example, M.J. Creswell spoke of the helplessness of the British government, and the report shows that Maher agreed in a rather catering manner with the British representative. the ‘need’ for a stronger rule also comes up in this conversation from time to time. fo 371/90148, from Creswell, Political departments: General Correspondence, 23 november 1951.

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appeared extensively in Egyptian papers.54 Special attention should be paid to an interview held with Mosaddeq and printed on the front page of Al-Ahram. According to Mosaddeq, his government would not agree to settle the conflict at the expense of the Iranian people. An act of nationalization, supported by the entire Iranian people, was essential to full inde-pendence.55 When any Egyptian read this interview, his thoughts naturally wandered to his own land and its road to independence.

In early December 1951, a British commission convened to reassess conditions in Egypt—from a British perspective, of course. On this commission were senior officials of the British military–imperial complex such as the multiply decorated Sir William Slim and Lord Bruce Fraser of the admiralty, a decorated commander of Second World War days. In a top-secret report of the commission discussions, Sir Slim estimated:

As things now stood we had lost the initiative in Egypt and no one was doing anything to hurt the Egyptians; A most unpleasant similarity was developing between the present situation in Egypt and the fiasco which had occurred in Persia and for the same reason—our loss of initiative.

He added that:the similarity to the first stages at Abadan was only too obvious not only to ourselves but also to the Egyptians who were now no doubt drawing the conclusion that this was the normal first stage in a pattern of events leading to a complete withdrawal.56

The Free Officers Revolution: A Step Down the Path of Mosaddeqism?

The Free Officers’ coup, which took place in July 1952, ousted the government and exiled the king and his family. The strongly anti-colonialist nature of the discourse that developed around Mosaddeq and Iran might lead one to expect this message to be warmly embraced by the new regime. However, contrary to expectations, the ‘Iranian voice’ (or national, anti-British voice) was not more strongly heard in post-revolution Egyptian discourse. Egypt’s official policy towards Iran, moreover, did not change regarding implementing treaties and stra-tegic relations. The respect and admiration that Mosaddeq enjoyed in Egyptian discourse were mostly unchanged, but in lower volume than at the time of the visit. This was a time when the new regime was busy achieving its own legitimacy. But Mosaddeq returned to the forefront of the public conversation in Egypt in the few months following the coup. In 1953, changes of governments both in the united States and Britain affected the development of the crisis and Iran struck Egyptian headlines as often as national events.

In late May 1953, a longer article appeared in Akhbar al-Yaum commemorating the two years since Mosaddeq’s election. The article included an interview in which Mosaddeq spoke of the attempts made by foreign elements to subvert his rule and emphasized the relations his government maintained with Egypt. The article also spoke of the path shared by the two states and their mutual objectives.57

On 13 May 1953, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasem Kashani, one of Mosaddeq’s senior supporters in Iran, was interviewed by Akhbar al-Yaum. A high-ranking cleric and a seasoned politician,

54 Al-Ahram, 26 november 1951.55 ‘al-doktor Mosaddeq yaqul: arju li’misr wa’iran an tafarda istiqlalhuma ‘ala al-duwal’, Al-Ahram, 17 december 1951.56 fo 371/90148, Measures.57 ayatullah Kashani was the speaker of the Majlis and the leader of the religious faction of the naitonal front. he was an

ultra-nationalist that his views positioned him at odds with the iranian regime several times in the past. during the late 1940s he was exiled to lebanon because of his harsh criticism of the shah and the British presence in iran. ‘sanatein li’hokumat Mosaddeq fi iran’, Akhbar al-Yaum, 30 May 1953.

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Kashani convinced the clerical establishment in Iran to side with Mosaddeq. In the interview, Kashani called upon the Egyptian people to internalize the lessons learned from Mosaddeq’s struggle and to engage in a similar struggle against the British, claiming that struggle is the way to liberate the East and do away with colonialism.58 In light of all of the above, the Egyptians apparently ‘adopted’ Mosaddeq as leader of the anti-imperialist struggle, who in certain instances was in the forefront of the discourse on assessing the Egyptian national struggle.

How did Egyptians ‘Read’ Mosaddeq’s Deposition?

On 19 August 1953, Britain and its American allies executed the coup d’état that overthrew the Mosaddeq government in Tehran. Operation Ajax successfully deposed Mosaddeq and reinstalled Mohammad Reza Shah as the monarch of Iran. The shah then appointed Britain’s handpicked candidate, General Fazlollah Zahedi, as the new Prime Minister.59 Following Mosaddeq’s arrest by Iranian authorities, the Egyptian press responded with an outcry of public support for the deposed Iranian leader. Almost simultaneously, another event took place that deepened the feeling of crisis. The French forces in Morocco surprisingly arrested the sultan, Muhammad V. That colonial power sent Muhammad and his two sons into forced exile, first in Corsica and then in Madagascar, because of his attempts to lead the national movement.60 The news that arrived from both east and west forged a general feeling of being under attack.

The editorials and op-eds during that time connected the two recent events and con-textualized them as two parts of the same anti-imperial struggle. Daily newspapers such as Al-Misri and Akhbar al-Youm wrote extensively about the crisis in the East. The famous intel-lectual Salamah Musa published an article titled ‘One Revolution Cannot Stop us’ in which he described the blurring borders of the struggle and tried to define more clearly the struggle’s goals. Musa noted that the battle that had just begun was not merely an economic war or one of political dominance. More than anything, it was a war on cultural influence. ‘The war has no clear and defined arena’, he wrote, suggesting that it may be all over the region.61

Al-Misri’s editorial tried to link the events even more. The editorial saw the two events as serving the same purpose—hurting Arab and Muslim countries. The article also cited the western support for the establishment of the State of Israel, in the heart of the Arab Middle East, as part of their imperial policy. The editorial called for Arab and Muslim coun-tries to act and defend themselves from the ‘Imperial Threat’.62 Two days later, Al-Misri’s editorial offered the Arab League a chance to justify its existence by properly reacting to the attacks. The article urged the Arab League to declare war on British, French, and even Italian Imperialism.63

One prime example of the Egyptians’ anger about the coup appeared in a special issue of Akhbar al-Yaum, which focused almost exclusively on the Iranian situation. The editorial

58 Akhbar al-Yaum, 13 May 1953; see also fo 371/108579, Governor’s General Commission Khratoum. eventually, ayatollah Kashani was one of the people responsible for Mosaddeq’s downfall after the British convinced him to support his deposition and reinstate the monarchy, 26 february 1954.

59 to read more about General fazlollah Zahedi and his role in the coup, read: de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia, 209–11.60 C.r. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History (new York: new York university Press, 2000).61 salamah Musa, ‘thawra wahida lam tawqafna’ [one revolution Cannot stop us], Akhbar al-Youm, 22 august 1953.62 ‘editorial’, Al-Misri, 23 august 1951.63 the arab league condemned the attacks, but avoided declaring on operative acts. ‘editorial’, Al-Misri, 25 august 1951.

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of Akhbar al-Yaum on 22 August presented the events in Iran and Morocco as two battles in the larger war of the West against the East:

[…] The last chapter in the story of the Shah and Mosaddeq has not yet been written. People in the know say that Russia, too, will not remain indifferent to the goings-on, and the Arab nations are waiting to see what the Arab governments intend to do, as they have done nothing yet beside their usual, empty protests.64

Besides critiquing the Arab governments here, the editorial calls for Egyptian reaction. In conclusion, the article indicates the direction in which the Iranian affair might lead:

The English are wrong in assuming they can now get a free ticket back to Abadan […] This attempt has already gone too far. The flame of oil ignited in Iran will now grow in other direc-tions. If the Churchill government continues to adhere to its colonialist policy in the Middle East—disaster is unavoidable.65

This issue—published on 22 August 1953, three days after the coup—was especially interest-ing due to the inclusion of several caustic political cartoons. One notable cartoon emphasizes the fact that the eastern attitude towards Mosaddeq is a perfect mirror-image of the western one. In this caricature, Churchill dons a butcher’s garb, smiles broadly, and wields a huge butcher’s knife. On the table lies a lamb symbolizing stability in Iran (al-istikrar fi iran), as the caption underneath reads: ‘The butcher mourns its victim’. Mosaddeq is telling Churchill: ‘You’re the one butchering it [stability] … Not me’.66 While the West assumes that Mosaddeq was responsible for the instability of the region, this cartoon suggests that the western reaction to Mosaddeq is actually responsible for any instability in Iran and the Middle East.

On another page of this issue, an essay by Mohammad Hasnin Haykal presents the coup’s background events while analysing four forces in the ‘Iranian show’: the Shah, the political system, the Iranian army, and the people. Haykal does not identify the British as one of the ‘players’, but they do navigate and exercise their influence through various manipulations. The theatrical metaphor here probably refers to puppet-theatre, where there are both pup-peteers and marionettes.67

A telling graphic image summarizing the events in the Middle East is found in another cartoon, also published in Akhbar al-Yaum about one week after the coup. In it, Churchill appears as an angel contentedly clapping his hands, the clouds around him picturing the events in which he was involved: Mosaddeq behind bars in Iran; a British soldier at the Suez Canal; gallows in Kenya (an allusion to the Mau Mau revolt); and the scorning of the elections in the Sudan. The caption read ‘Saint Churchill and his Miracles’.68 Obviously the public mind closely linked the events taking place in Iran, Morocco, Sudan, and Kenya; these developments are perceived as an inevitable consequence of the British imperial presence in the Middle East.

A caricature appearing further in the same issue, ‘Iran’s Story’ (riwayat iran), reiterates the theatre image. Mohammad Reza Shah is seen on the stage, hands crossed, straight back, his face triumphant as he steps on the back of humiliated, injured Mosaddeq against the background of the active oil wells and chimneys of Abadan. The audience is constituted of ‘the world’ and an Egyptian effendi [title indicating the emerging middle class in the early-mid

64 ‘ahdath fi kul makan’, Akhbar al-Yaum, 22 august 1953.65 ibid.66 akhbar al-Yaum, 22 august 1953.67 Muhammad hasanayn haykal, ‘al-asrar waraa thawrat iran’, Akhbar al-Yaum, 22 august 1953.68 Akhbar al-Yaum, 29 august 1953.

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20th century in Egypt]. ‘The world’ turns to the Egyptian and asks: ‘Is the story over?’ The effendi applauds and answers him: ‘No, this is not the last act! There might be a second, and third and fourth act!’ The caricature shows the ‘effendi’, a comic figure, hinting that the Shah will get his come-uppance in the end.

Op-eds also reflected increasing anti-colonialist sentiment, especially emphasizing the events in Egypt and Iran’s backing out of the struggle under the new regime. Some of the articles written at this time proposed Egypt as a leader of the struggle against the British following Iran’s failure. Here a change is noticeable. At the beginning of the struggle we see the people pulling its government into the struggle, whereas in 1953 the aims of the government and the people seem to be identical.

In Egyptian discourse, Mosaddeq never ceased to represent proud, eastern, anti-colonialist nationalism, even after his deposition. ‘Mosaddeqism’ kept coming up whenever Mosaddeq was mentioned, and on several significant occasions in particular. In 1956, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Salah Salem, minister in the revolutionary government and the one of Egypt’s most recognized figures,69 admitted in a press interview that Mosaddeq was the one who began the process that ended with nationalizing the Canal. He proved the struggle against world powers to be concretely achievable, not a mere dream and act of fancy.70 The timing of this interview around the nationalization of the Suez Canal, itself a move in the spirit of ‘Mosaddeqism’, might illustrate that the case of Mosaddeq and Abadan is seared in Egyptian public mind as a trail-blazing event.

The press review conducted by the British Embassy in Cairo for the week of the canal nationalization featured an item in the Egyptian Gazette warning Nasser and his regime about imperialist conspiracies as a reaction to this nationalization,71 in line with the measures taken to depose the Mosaddeq regime after its anti-imperial activities.

Following Nasser’s speech on this momentous occasion, all of the newspapers analysed the nationalization and its ramifications. The magazine Ruz al-Yusuf addressed the West, saying that Nasser represented the entire Egyptian nation: ‘in Iran you found Zahedi [the handpicked Iranian Prime Minister after the coup] and used him to break Mosaddeq; in Egypt there is no Zahedi—we are all Nasser’.72 In this regard, Mohammad Hasnin Haikal, Nasser’s close adviser at the time and his semi-official voice from very early on, stated that Mosaddeq’s narrative was constantly in the background while the administration made decisions.73 In his book on Egypt and the process of nationalizing the Suez Canal, Haikal wrote that dur-ing the discussions on nationalization, more than one cabinet minister reminded Nasser of the Mosaddeq case. However, Nasser rejected this comparison, claiming he would not let his opponents paralyse the canal in the way Mosaddeq’s opponents prevented him from marketing oil production.74 Apparently Nasser also internalized this affair and it remained

69 Joel Gordon, ‘river Blindness: Black and White identity in early nasserist Cinema’, in i. Gershoni and Meir hatina (eds), Narrating the Nile: Politics, Cultures, Identities (Boulder, Co: lynne rienner Publishers, 2008), pp. 152–3.

70 fo 371/108349, Political department: General Correspondence, 19 february 1954.71 fo 371/108579, Political department: General Correspondence, 26 february 1954.72 General fazlollah Zahedi was a minister in Mosaddeq’s cabinet, and a general in the iranian army before that. he was hand-

picked by the British and american officials to replace Mosaddeq after the coup. he was appointed as Prime Minister by a royal decree. fo 371/119080, Political department: General Correspondence, 30 July 1956.

73 Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution, Studies in Middle Eastern History (new York: oxford university Press, 1992), pp. 118–25.

74 haykal stated that this was the difference between abadan and suez: the fact that the asset was not paralysed following its nationalization and continued to function and fulfill its purpose.

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BRITISH JOuRNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STuDIES 19

strongly etched in his mind.75 The comparison between the two cases was inevitable. Thus, too, the French press compared the occasions and the statesmen in its foreign press coverage. It likened Nasser’s persistence and determination to those of Mosaddeq.76

In a 1996 interview in Al-Ahram celebrating the 40th anniversary of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Muhammad Hasnin Haikal said:

In a single blow, Suez—the triumph of the Egyptian people in Suez—freed the Third World of what we may call the Mosaddeq syndrome. Mosaddeq had challenged Western hegemony over Iran and was defeated, and his defeat had intensified the Third World’s sense of inadequacy in coming to grips with Western domination.77

Haikal’s comments show to some extent the significance Mosaddeq and his politics had upon the Arab World, and in particular Egyptian nationalists during the 1950s.

Conclusions

In Mohammad Fadel’s Nasser 56, which depicts the days preceding the Suez Canal nationaliza-tion, one scene describes Nasser’s aide telling him about the stunning resemblance between the American reaction to the Egyptian request for dam project funds and Eisenhower’s letter to Mosaddeq three years earlier. In the conversation between the two, they conclude that in the Iranian affair this reaction served as a pretext for the overthrow; the same may happen in the Egyptian case if they do not act cautiously. Given that the film was made in 1996, this conversation shows how profoundly rooted Mosaddeq’s influence continued to be.78

This article has narrated Mosaddeq’s story in a different way. The Anti-Imperial struggle in Egypt started well before the Iranian premier visited Cairo. After his visit, however, the movement took a different shape and was charged with different images. Mosaddeq envis-aged and projected an ideal new Middle Eastern order, one that dramatically changed the equation perpetuated during western colonial and imperial endeavours. The Egyptians—just like the Iranians and other peoples in the nascent Third World—wished to share that future. This episode also shows us the inherent tensions between the Middle Eastern regimes, the nationalist elites, and the Cold War superpowers, which allowed Mosaddeq to become the symbol of the struggle. In many ways, the ideas that he advanced in his two-year term became the cornerstone of the Non-Aligned Movement some years later.

The premature end of Mosaddeq’s struggle enabled the pre-revolutionary and post- revolutionary Egyptian governments to learn from the Iranian leader’s mistakes and implement necessary precautions. Throughout his term, Mosaddeq symbolized the rightful path for Iran and Egypt alike, and his overthrow came unexpectedly for Egyptians. Nonetheless, it strength-ened their will to further pursue the national project, thus showing the power of Mosaddeqism.

Mosaddeq’s influence on publics in and outside Iran stemmed to a great extent from his unique personality. He was different from any other leader in the Middle East. His western edu-cation and secular values hardly matched the popular imagination of an anti-western leader.

75 Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement.76 fo 371/119078, Political department: General Correspondence, 28 July 1956.77 hosny Guindy, “a moment of revelation: an interview with Mohamed hassanein heikal”, al-ahram Weekly, 1-7 november

2006 [originally published on 25-31 July 1996]; http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1000/sc91.htm78 as Gordon argues in his article, the movie was produced as an educational tool for the egyptian public, telling the stories

of long-gone days and figures. Because of the nature of this production it is possible that reminding of Mosaddeq’s fate was deliberate. Joel Gordon, ‘nasser 56/ Cairo 96: reimaging egypt’s lost Community’, in Walter armbrust (ed.), Mass Mediations: New Approaches to Popular Culture in the Middle East and Beyond (Berkeley: university of California Press, 2000) (egypt: Mohammad fadel, 1996), pp. 161–81.

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20 L. STERNFELD

On top of that, Mosaddeq refused to change his old habits in order to gain greater support from the west. Habits such as welcoming high-ranked guests in his nightwear and showing his bad health ridiculed him in the eyes of his counterparts in the West, but increased the love and support from his own people, who appreciated his determination to be no one but him-self (general, aristocrat, or westernized). Moreover, he did not try to turn Iran into ‘Europe in the heart of Asia’, as some of the country’s former and later leaders did. By pursuing this path, Mosaddeq became a radical alternative to the existing order. Mosaddeq’s significance exceeded Egypt and Iran and characterized the mood of a region. As Orit Bashkin remarks, historically the use of ‘Persian’ in Iraq was as a derogatory term, but when it came to Mosaddeq ‘[Iraqi nation-alists] viewed Mosaddeq as a model for social reform, nationalization of oil, and willingness to resist American and British interventions’.79 Other examples of his widespread influence include countries like Lebanon, which feared allowing Mosaddeq’s visit, and surprisingly, even the Israeli state, whose opposition to Mossadeq’s politics was hotly contested by the Right Wing.80

The opposition to western imperialism and colonialism in Egypt and Iran lasted for many years and was strong on harsh political rhetoric but weak on actions. The exceptions were the 1919 events in Egypt and the 1949 oil workers’ strike in Abadan. British officials easily dismissed routine protest and demands of seniors Wafdists to set a schedule for British departure, convincing themselves that the British public could not accept withdrawal from Egypt without good reason.81

Mosaddeq had a few representations in Egypt, employed by different powers in different times. For the Wafd, identifying with Mosaddeq enabled the party to regain some of the popular support it had lost in the preceding years; for the Wafd opponents, referencing Mosaddeq allowed them to criticize the party for abandoning the struggle for independence. Finally, the ‘Free Officers’ used Mosaddeq to articulate a wider struggle of East versus West.

This article has presented prominent Egyptian intellectuals and officials like Taha Hussein and Sayyid Qutb who openly expressed appreciation of Mosaddeq and whose support helped legitimize him in the Egyptian public sphere. Even after the Free Officers’ Revolution, Mosaddeq’s case surfaced every time the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company became an issue. Saleh Salem’s post-nationalization confession that Egypt owes a great ideological debt to Mosaddeq82 reaffirms yet again the long-lasting influence of Mosaddeq in greater Middle East history.

AcknowledgementI would like to thank Haggai Ram, Relli Shechter, Joel Gordon, Orit Bashkin, Laleh Khalili, and Yoav Di-Capua for their advice and helpful comments on this article and previous versions. This article is the dedicated to the memory of Hafez Farmayan, an inspiring scholar of Iranian History.

Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

79 orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (stanford, Ca: stanford university Press, 2009), pp. 164–5.

80 for example, see a news item on al-Siyasa (21 January 1952) about the lebanese government refusal to let Mosaddeq visit the country for their fear from backlash against french and Belgian infrastructural projects in lebanon. regarding the case of israeli opposition reactions to Mosaddeq, see: Yosef nedava, ‘Mosaddeq be-doro ke-ahashverosh be-doro’, Ha’Boker, 12 october 1951.

81 fo 371/90130, Political departments: General Correspondence, 29 March 1951; and fo 371/90148.82 fo 371/108349, Political departments: General Correspondence, 1954–1956.

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