Internal Refugee Flows and Development-Induced Population Displacement

Journal of Refugee Studies VoL 3. No. 4 1990

Internal Refugee Flows andDevelopment-Induced PopulationDisplacement*

MICHAEL M. CERNEASenior sociology Adviser, The World Bank, Washington, DC

An unjustified dichotomy in the social science literature dealing with displacedpopulations separates the study of refugees from the study of populationsuprooted by development projects. The paper argues that this dichotomy must beovercome by exploring the similarities and differences between these categories ofdisplaced populations. Both bodies of literature, which currently do not 'speak toeach other', stand to gain conceptually from overcoming their relative isolation.New trends are signalled regarding the international aid and assistance channelledduring the 1980s to refugee and displaced populations. The paper discusses theworldwide growth of development-related population displacements, while inmany countries domestic policies and legal frameworks to guide forced disloca-tion and resettlement are lacking. The differences between relief and developmentoriented strategies for resettling displaced people are examined with emphasis onthe importance of allocating adequate resources for the sustainable socio-economic re-establishment of people displaced by development.

Introduction

Two categories of aid interventions are used by international agencies to res-pond to situations in which large groups of people are uprooted from theirhabitat, their socio-economic status is ravaged, and their human rights arejeopardized. These are first, emergency assistance projects for refugees andsecond, projects (or project components) aimed at resettling the people for-cibly displaced by planned change (for example, dam building, highways,canals, and ports). In both categories of projects the target groups are dis-placed populations, even though the causes of their displacement differprofoundly.

The currently growing interest in these types of projects stems largely fromthe fact that they bring to the forefront two sets of key issues: on the one hand,issues related to their potential as vehicles for shifting aid from relief assistanceto development goals; on the other, issues related to the increasing efforts tolink development aid to human rights protection.

© Oxford University Press 1990

by guest on June 27, 2014http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloaded from

http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/

Internal Population Displacement 321

In the present paper, I will deal explicitly with just the first group of issues,particularly with restoring the self-sufficiency and normal productiveactivities of uprooted populations, even though concern for their human andeconomic rights is an implicit constant theme of my argument.1 I will exploresome commonalities and differences between these two categories of aidintervention and between the segments of displaced populations they address.When discussing refugee groups, I will deliberately focus on inter-nally displaced people, rather than on international refugees; this willfacilitate comparison with people displaced by development projects who,typically, also tend to remain within national borders. First, the paper willconsider the causal agents of internal population displacement; second, it willprovide a brief overview of World Bank involvement during the last twodecades in emergency projects that assist internal refugees; and third, thepaper will discuss several key issues common to refugees and populationgroups dislocated by planned development interventions. In the context of thelast point, I will examine the magnitude of such induced dislocations and thepolicy framework that must guide projects causing displacement. For the pur-poses of this paper, I will generally use the term refugees to describe in-ternal refugee populations and the term oustees to describe populationsdisplaced by development projects.

Main Causes of Population Displacement

A Research DichotomyThere is a visible, yet in my opinion hardly justified, dichotomy within thesocial science literature on displaced populations: a literature on refugees co-exists side by side with a literature on development-caused involuntary resettle-ment. The two literatures do not usually speak to one another. With someexceptions, most of the writings on refugees, for instance, omit altogetheroustee groups from the typology of displaced populations. And in turn the an-thropological literature on oustees bypasses comparative analysis withrefugees. As a result, the chance for more in-depth treatment by examiningcommonalities and differences is being missed.

There are, of course, valid reasons for discriminating between thesecategories. But are these reasons sufficient to justify the absence of com-parative analysis? Or the lack of overarching concepts and theories encom-passing both (and perhaps other) categories?

I submit that the fact that research on refugees, journals on refugees, andconferences on refugees usually overlook development-related displacementresults in weakening both the theoretical conceptualizations and the practicalinfluence of such research on government policies and programmes. Con-versely, a strong case can be made, for both practical and theoretical purposes,to identify and compare the similarities and differences between the various


Dow

nloaded from


322 Michael M. Cernea

sub-categories of displaced populations. In addition, lessons with wideapplicability can be derived by comparing the different types of projects thataddress the needs of internally displaced populations, and by examining thebehavioural strategies which the latter have adopted to regain normalcy.

There have been a handful of valuable scholarly attempts to integrate thestudy of both refugee relocation and development relocation under a singleconceptual and analytical sociological framework. Scudder and Colson (1982)have delineated such a framework around the concept of stress and havedivided the process of dislocation-relocation in stages. In a less formal elabora-tion, Oliver-Smith and Hansen (1982) have suggested that such populationmovements may be seen in the context of a migration continuum stretchingfrom voluntary to involuntary. However promising these integrative approacheshave seemed, by and large they have not been systematically followed, ascould have been expected, through a subsequent body of comparative re-search. Such comparative investigation still remains to be done.

Internal and International RefugeesDespite the lack (or impossibility) of precise statistics, a consensus is graduallyemerging that the number of internally displaced people worldwide surpassesthe number of those usually encompassed by the concept of international (orexternal) refugees (Clark 1988; McColm 1989). The US Council for Refugeeshas estimated that by the end of 1987 the number of cross-border refugeesworldwide stood at about 15.4 million; the same upheavals produced at leastan additional 17 million people displaced internally (cf. Zolberg et al 1989).These figures do not include those displaced internally by planned develop-ment programmes. Despite the huge number of internal refugees, however, 'atpresent no international agency has responsibility for ensuring the adequacy ofprotection and assistance, including health care, for internally displaced per-sons' (The Georgetown Declaration 1988).

It is perhaps a telling sign of our distressed time that the simultaneousgrowth of both groups — internal and international refugees — is so rapidthat it raises doubt about which sad category outnumbers the other. Beyondthat doubt, however, the conceptual distinction between them is far frombeing strictly academic: it is consequential for resource allocation andassistance strategies. There are established international structures created toassist international refugees, while for internal refugees much less insti-tutionalized support is available. While external refugees are recognized by in-ternational agencies, those who do not cross borders, namely the internalrefugees, are often not recognized as such by the same agencies, even thoughboth the triggers and the consequences of their displacement may be identical.In turn, this difference in recognition results in great differences between thelevels of public and private assistance provided to these groups. It appearswarranted therefore to consider that in the area of refugee assistance 'thechallenge for the future is presented by internally displaced people, (where)roles and mandates are unclear' (Keely 1988).


Dow

nloaded from



Causal Agents of DislocationBy seperating out types of causal agent, we can distinguish four sets of factorsleading to population displacement:

1. wars and political turmoil;2. persecution (or fear of) based on ethnicity, race, or religion;3. natural disasters: floods, earthquakes, droughts, etc.; and4. development projects that deliberately cause major changes in land and

water use.

The first three of these general causes are common to both flows ofrefugees: international and internal. Indeed, when wars, persecution and/ornatural calamities force people to flee their homelands, the push reasons aremuch the same for external refugees who cross an international border andseek shelter in a different country, and for internal refugees who cannot orchoose not to leave their countries. And the trauma of being a refugee in one'sown land is not necessarily less than being a refugee on foreign soil.

The last among the four causes listed above — planned change — typicallyresults in internal rather than cross-border displacement. Major infrastructureprogrammes commonly require non-voluntary population relocation, imposedthrough state power. For want of a more adequate concept, populationsforced to move are described under a variety of terms such as 'oustees' (a termwidely used in India), 'evictees', 'displacees', 'resettlers', 'relocatees', and'project affected persons'.

The oustees can be further divided into the following sub-categories:

(a) people who lose their houses;(b) people who lose both their houses and their farming land or other pro-

ductive assets (in full or in part); and(c) people who lose land only (in full or in significant part), but not their

houses.

People in the last subgroup, where housing is not affected, may remain inplace, only if land or employment can be found nearby; otherwise, they tooare compelled to resettle.

A brief comment is warranted about the last sub-category. Technical andplanning agencies tend to omit these people from oustee statistics, planning,and resource allocation, on grounds that their houses are not destroyed. Butthe loss of even one significant part of a household's farmland may be suffi-cient to make that farm economically non-viable; it may cause marginalization(Cernea 1990b), defined elsewhere as the sliding of a family from barely aboveto below the poverty threshold.

Denying this sub-category the label of displaced people (for example of'oustees") is not just an innocuous semantic matter. As was correctly arguedin the case of refugees (Zetter 1988; 1990), labelling (designation of status) is apowerful tool of practical policy used by governments for purposes of


Dow

nloaded from



allocating resources to, or withholding from, certain groups. The denial (bycertain government agencies) of displacement status to families falling insubgroup (c) above is a way of belittling the adverse effects of projects throughthe device of refusing to recognize the rights, losses, and legitimate entitle-ments of part of the population affected. Under the provisions of the WorldBank's policy regarding involuntary resettlement (see Cernea 1988a), all threesubgroups are defined as project-dislocated populations, and their socio-economic re-establishment must be carried out by the same project thatdisplaces them.

Similarities and DifferencesSome social scientists describe communities displaced by development pro-grammes as development refugees (Mahapatra 1983). This is not a well definedand rigorous concept. Its wholesale use to define all those displaced bydevelopment programmes would blur certain essential differences betweenoustees and refugees, and would be misleading.

When communities are displaced by a public development project, it is in-cumbent upon the government to ensure that the oustees are fully compen-sated and assisted to resettle adequately. It is when this does not happen,however, and when development-displaced people become destitute — theirassets lost, their habitat gone, and their basic human rights unrecognized andtrampled on — that their situation becomes, in essence, similar to refugees.Therefore, it is conceptually useful explicitly to point out, rather than blur,both similarities and differences between refugees (from war, ethnic persecu-tion, and drought) and oustees from planned programmes. This permits us tohighlight the circumstances in which bad planning or abdication of govern-ment responsibility converts oustees into refugees. The purpose of resettlementpolicies must be absolutely to prevent the sliding of development-displacedpeople (oustees) into a refugee-like condition.

In turn, the definitions commonly accepted for the term refugees tend to befairly restrictive. In other words, they are not open to encompass either volun-tary migrants or people dislocated by planned projects (see, for instance, thedefinitions discussed in Zolberg et al. (1989); or the definition used by theUnited Nations). This is probably how it should be, for both practical and con-ceptual reasons. Given the special entitlements granted by many countries andinternational organizations to refugees, every attempt formally to define theterm is underlined by the concern to avoid confusing, for instance, a migrantwith a genuine refugee.

Zolberg's (1989) analysis of contemporary refugee populations distinguishesthree sociological types of refugees: the activist; the target; and the victim. Thecharacteristics that unite these types under the category (and concept) ofrefugees describe both causes and consequences of their condition as in-dividuals uprooted from their habitat.

On the causal side, for instance, one common characteristic of their condi-tion is fear of violence. As was observed with insight, 'what all three (types)


Dow

nloaded from



have in common is fear of immediate violence — violence resulting from con-flict between state and civil society, between opposing armies, or conflictamong ethnic groups or class formations that the state is unable or unwilling tocontrol' (Zolberg 1989:269). On the consequences' side, in turn, there areother sociologically significant components that these three types share asrefugees: for instance, abrupt destitution, residence loss, loss of economic self-sufficiency, cultural separation, identity deprivation, and socio-psychologicalstress.

Carrying further the comparison between refugees and oustees, we find onthe causal side essential differences, while we note many similarities in the con-sequences of their displacement.

Displaced people of all categories resemble each other in that they lose theirhouses and households; they temporarily or permanently lose their lands,water wells, workshops, vending stalls, or other assets. Their productionsystems are dismantled, their ways of making a living are disrupted and theirvery livelihood critically jeopardized. The supporting social networks of whichthey are a part unravel. They relocate in previously unknown places, amonghost populations often suspicious of them or directly hostile.

On the other hand, there are sharp dissimilarities between refugees andoustees in legal status, entitlements to assistance, and often in ethnic com-position. Compared to other refugee-causing circumstances, development-related displacements inflict upon the uprooted population material losses thatare often greater, or definitive. For instance, refugees fleeing their homelandsbecause of civil war, persecution, or flooding may in some cases eventuallyreturn at least to their fanning land; those displaced by dam reservoirs,however, will never get the same lands back, and simply cannot return to theirearlier homes.

Referring to all these groups comprehensively as internally displaced people,but at the same time recognizing both similarities and differences betweenrefugees and oustees, is instrumental for the comparative analyses betweenthem, and between the operational approaches required to re-establish them tonormalcy.

Emergency Projects for Refugee Assistance

Two relatively new trends emerged during the 1980s, particularly during thesecond half of the decade, in the assistance given to displaced populations.These trends were insufficiently grasped and analyzed by the research com-munity. They consist of, on the one hand, a very considerable increase in thenumber and diversity of emergency international aid projects targeted torefugees and disaster victims, and, on the other hand, a significant increase inspecial project components to assist development oustees.

Relevant data documenting these trends, for example within World Bankactivities, are given below. One should note, however, that the Bank's projectsare only part of a larger movement. Not only have the resources been increased


Dow

nloaded from



multifold; the approaches to the uprooted populations, the forms of technicalassistance, the institutional arrangements, and so on, have been multiplied anddiversified through such projects. These trends open up new possibilities: onthe one hand, the practice of refugee relief aid can be informed with the ex-perience stemming from approaches that are pursuing redevelopment, as usedunder oustee-resettlement projects; on the other hand, assistance given to thelatter category can be informed by the experience of refugees' innovativecultural mechanisms to survive and cope (Christensen 1982), to regain self-sufficiency and to self-resettle.

World Bank Resources for Refugee AssistanceAmong the international agencies involved in aid to both internal and inter-national refugees, the World Bank contributes by financing many specialassistance projects and monitoring their implementation. The most familiarcategory among such projects are the emergency lending operations. It shouldbe noted, however, that a considerable number of regular Bank-financed pro-jects also provide direct assistance to populations that consist of, or include,internal and/or international refugees.

After its establishment following World War II, the World Bank's earliestloans were post-war reconstruction projects. Between 1947-1953 such loanswere extended exclusively to European countries. Those were emergencyoperations, addressed to a broad spectrum of populations and needs, not justto refugees. After 1953, however, the World Bank ceased this type of opera-tions. It replaced them with investment lending.

It took almost two decades, and a serious aggravation of the worldwide prob-lem of refugees, for emergency assistance operations to be resumed in 1970by the World Bank. Such lending is provided in order to respond to majornatural or man-caused disasters with immediate financial and technical sup-port. These operations have benefited large numbers of refugees from naturalor socio-political catastrophes, as well as other people from the same or adja-cent areas (Kreimer 1989). In virtually all cases, such projects have made amassive contribution to creating the socio-economic circumstances necessaryeither for the return of many refugees or for their permanent re-establishmentelsewhere.

Between 1970-1988, and especially in the 1980s, the frequency of suchemergency loans and the amount of resources channelled through them haverisen sharply (see Table 1).

Emergency World Bank assistance projects have addressed five types ofsituations:

1. civil wars and other internal disturbances: e.g., emergency projects inNigeria, Bangladesh, Sudan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Uganda, Zimbabwe,Ghana;

2. droughts: e.g., drought assistance projects in Burkina Faso, Mali,Mauritania, Senegal, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, India, among others;


Dow

nloaded from



3. cyclones: e.g., emergency projects in Bangladesh, Fiji, DominicanRepublic, Haiti, Madagascar, Swaziland;

4. flood: e.g., projects in Pakistan, Brazil, Bangladesh, Nepal;5. earthquakes and other disasters, such as volcanic eruptions, forest fires

(e.g. Peru, Yugoslavia, Romania, Mexico, Ecuador, China).

Altogether, 57 emergency projects were approved between 1974-1988, outof which 18 (31.6 per cent) were approved between 1984-88. The World Bankresources channelled into such projects in the last five years were 3.5 timeslarger than in the prior five years.

Table 1

Number and1969-1988*

Civil War/DisturbancesCyclone/HurricaneDroughtFloodEarthquakeForest FireVolcanicEruption

Total

Amount of World Bank Emergency Loans by Category Between Financial

FY69-73

No.

4

1——2—

—

7

$m

165.6

25.0——50.0—

—

240.6

FY74-78

No.

2

—8 "32—

1

16

$m

60.7

—35.0

135.086.5—

7.0

324.2

FY79-S3

No.

7

5—

13

—

16

$m

257.5

76.2—7.0

85.0

—

425.7

Year(FY)

FY84-88

No. $m

2

33541

—

18

123.0

25.6400.0345.5580.056.9

—

1531

NOTES: *No emergency loans are on record from FY54 to FY69. Also, this table does not includeall the Bank loans and projects which had assisted refugee populations, but only those labelled'emergency operations'. For instance, such important refugee assistance operations as the twoprojects targeted to Afghan refugees in Pakistan are not included in the table. The operationsreflected in this table have also benefited, of course, victims of those disasters who did not becomerefugees.•'Includes six loans to the Sahelian countries in FY74 for a series of inter-related drought relieffund projects.

Unfortunately, no in-depth evaluation studies have been carried out on theBank assisted projects comparable to, for instance, the kind of study under-taken in Uganda by Barbara Harrell-Bond and reported in her seminal bookon aid to refugees (Harrell-Bond 1986). But a number of project audit reportsand other assessments do exist, which help derive some important lessonsabout strategies, approaches and results.

Alternatives in Refugee AssistanceWithin the type of assistance provided by World Bank emergency projects, akey strategy issue is always the trade-offs between relief measures needed


Dow

nloaded from



immediately, on the one hand, and reconstruction investments for redevelop-ment in the long term, on the other.

By design, the World Bank puts the main emphasis on the latter type of pro-gramme. Considerable resources are provided for the reconstruction ofphysical infrastructure that has been destroyed or damaged, thus creatingemployment and laying the ground for the resumption of regular productiveactivities. In post-war or civil war situations, when production activities andtrade lines have been disrupted, causing famine, unemployment and disloca-tion, Bank projects primarily aim at restoring production and productivityrequired for recovery and rebuild transportation systems.

Of course, weighing and deciding on trade-offs is a highly judgmental exer-cise and is vulnerable to imperfect initial information. Built in flexibility formidstream adjustments is needed. World Bank assistance needs to be com-plemented by short term relief programmes by other agencies and non-governmental organizations.

An example of a Bank assisted recovery programme after war and civildisturbance is the Reconstruction Credit to Uganda (FY80) which followed theoverthrow of the military government in 1979. The domestic economy wasdevastated. Facing large scale physical destruction, the reconstruction processwas complicated also by social disruption, administrative disarray and con-tinued political strife. In response to the urgent situation, the Bank proposed aquick disbursing project to Uganda to rapidly supply inputs for the productivesectors and to meet short term foreign exchange needs. Some slippage from theoriginal schedule reduced the overall impact, yet the quick disbursing ap-proach did provide resources faster than was possible using regular project lend-ing. Other comparable cases include projects in Mozambique (FY85), Ghana(FY83) and Zimbabwe (FY81), where the Bank has financed recovery pro-grammes and imports critical to begin a long term process of rehabilitationand reform.

When Mozambique joined the World Bank in 1984, the country was con-fronting a huge refugee problem. Its economy was suffering from the effectsof civil war, security problems, inappropriate policies, natural calamities andstructural imbalances of long standing. Against this backdrop, the governmentdeveloped a two year Economic Action Programme designed to institute morepragmatic policies to stem the economic decline. The Bank supported thegovernment's emergency rehabilitation efforts by providing quickly disbursedhard currency to meet priority needs as the government began the process ofrehabilitation. The initial project made possible imports of equipment, spareparts and raw materials for the key sectors of industry, agriculture andtransport, and directly helped the reintegration of war displaced populationinto productive activities. This approach has been replicated and validated inother, smaller scale projects assisted in Mozambique by bilateral donors, likethe Italian-sponsored project near Gondola (Manica province) and theSwedish-sponsored seed production unit in Chimoio. Results from these twoprojects (Morna 1990) confirm that production-oriented aid (inputs, seeds)


Dow

nloaded from



enables former war-refugees to shake off their dependency upon relief-aid,re-establish themselves on a productive basis, and gradually become againself-sustaining.

The implementation quality of emergency refugee assistance programmes,however, has seldom been satisfactory. It is often suggested that the fault liesnot with the programme, but with the refugees themselves. However, anthro-pological field research has documented that this assumption is mistaken(Harrell-Bond 1986). Analytical evaluations carried out by the World Banktends to confirm such findings. In fact, the most neglected dimensions in suchprojects are usually the cultural and psychological ones, particularly the socialengineering work necessary to re-establish the refugee population in new,viable settlements, with access to productive activities, some employment, andservices. Indeed, as Harrell-Bond (1986:2) observed, 'establishing a rural settle-ment involves social engineering'. My reading of the literature produced byagencies responsible for such policy suggests that full implications of thisreality has escaped attention.

One recurrent difference in the performance of emergency operations com-pared with conventional projects is the extent of implementation delays. Ac-cording to a recent analysis, such delays occur in ninety per cent of these loansand tend to be substantial if compared to the original, usually accelerated, im-plementation timetable. One reason for delays in Bank assisted projects wasthe choice of an inadequate project model, such as the model of single-sectorloans attempting to compress most of the elements of a regular project into theaccelerated time frame of an emergency project. The consequence was aslowdown of the project's implementation and disbursement. Such delays areespecially troubling in view of the required urgency of intervention. Delayingassistance has high human costs.

The recently re-issued, and strengthened, World Bank Operational Direc-tives for emergency recovery assistance projects put a stronger emphasis ondesign adequate to speedy implementation (World Bank 1989). The newdirectives aim at improving the quality of both immediate and long termassistance, by focussing on restoring the self-sufficiency and autonomy of theaffected population through redressing its productive capacity.

A characteristic of the Bank's approach in emergency interventions is theuse of quick disbursement procedures. These are much faster compared tonormal projects. Yet the use of quick disbursement should not precludedesigning such interventions not just for the crisis at hand but also as measuresfor preventing or mitigating similar occurrences in the future. In this connec-tion, it is worth mentioning the experience of Kenya. During a drought, nonew emergency loan was made, but the Bank reallocated funds from an existingKenya project to support a drought recovery programme it cofinanced withother donors. The reallocation was designed, appraised, negotiated andapproved by the Bank's board within three months. Other donors financedcomplementary activities and necessary inputs. The Bank's approach en-couraged subsequent planning based on 'lessons of the drought' and in so doing


Dow

nloaded from


330 MichaelM. Cernea

stimulated the government to prepare for the next possible drought.Agricultural recovery was rapid. Under the project the government startedpreparation of a Food Security Strategy, which includes early warning systemsand contingency plans for possible future droughts.

Development-Related Displacements

Certain types of development-programmes, particularly those which entail im-portant changes in land and water use, frequently cause forced populationdislocations.

These are not benign occurrences. Such dislocations often affect largegroups directly and immediately, and in addition reverberate subsequently invarious indirect ways over much larger populations. For instance, theconstruction of irrigation and hydropower dams causes the permanent sub-mergence of tens or hundreds of thousands of acres of land and forests, in-cluding houses, enterprises, temples, schools, shops, terraces, orchards androads. Similarly, highway projects, strip-mining projects, the establishment ofindustrial estates, often necessitate the displacement of people from theirhabitat and work sites. Displacement required for urban improvement isalready extensive and will also increase considerably, particularly in Africaand Asia (Cernea 1989).

Contradictions in DevelopmentA profound contradiction is embedded in the very fabric of such developmentprocesses. This contradiction results from the fact that certain project-fundedinfrastructure is essential for national or regional development, satisfiescritical needs of many direct and indirect beneficiaries, and generate im-mediate or long term gains unobtainable in any other way. Yet at the sametime, such constructions cause forced displacement that is immediatelydetrimental for those affected. The fulfilment of the needs of the manyclashes with the entitlements of the few. The gains do not accrue to those whobear the pains. Indeed, both the literature on refugees and that on oustees havedocumented in vivid detail the adverse consequences of dislocation (Scudder1981; Appel 1985; Fahim 1988; Salem-Murdock 1989; Christensen 1982; deWet 1991; Agreeparompil 1989; Keller 1975). Synthesizing the empirical datafrom many such field studies, it is clear that displacement has led in most casesto severe and all-round impoverishment, and that the typical processes of im-poverishment occur along seven key dimensions: landlessness; homelessness;joblessness; marginalization; food insecurity; increased mortality and mor-bidity; and social disarticulation (Cernea 1990b).

Nevertheless, given the rigidity of geographical and physical parameters orthe lack of comparable economic alternatives, such contradictions of thedevelopment process often connot be avoided. But the acuity and con-sequences of such contradictions can be mitigated and modified through goodplanning and appropriate resource allocations.


Dow

nloaded from



Displacement Size and EstimateWhat is the magnitude of population displacement caused by developmentprojects? Is it negligible, or is it significant enough to justify broad concern?

There are no hard global statistics about development-induced displace-ment. This absence contributes to insufficient public awareness of this issue.Yet a rough assessment can be made based on available figures. Table 2 pro-vides an image of the magnitude of population displacement on a dam-by-dam

TabU 2

Number of People Affected by

Dam

Already Built

TarbelaSrisailamAkosomboKossouKainjiHigh AswanNangbetoSagulingDanjiangkouSobradinhoMangla

Currently under Construction

ShuikouNarmada- Sardar SarovarAlmattiNarayanpurItaparicaYacyretaKayraktepe

Under Design

XiaolangdiGandhi SagarKalabaghSoubreKamali (Chisapani)Three Gorges

Major Dam Projects

Country

PakistanIndiaGhanaIvory CoastNigeriaEgyptTogo/BeninIndonesiaChinaBrazilPakistan

ChinaIndiaIndiaIndiaBrazilArgentina/ParaguayTurkey

ChinaIndiaPakistanIvory CoastNepalChina

No. of People

86,000100,00084,00085,00050,000

100,00012,00055,000

383,00060,00090,000

68,00070,000

160,00080,00045,00045,00020,000

170,000100,00080,00040,00050,000

750,000 to 1.2 mil.

NOTE: This table is based on data from project documents and/or public sources. Some of theseprojects were co-financed by the World Bank, while others were financed entirely from othersources, local and international.


Dow

nloaded from



basis. Some of these major dams have already been completed; others areunder construction, and yet others are being planned for the future.

A study I carried out in 1986 found that all new dams to be constructedunder irrigation and hydropower projects approved by the Bank between1979-1985 would eventually displace approximately 750,000 people (seeCernea 1988b). By extrapolation, this study may also help assess roughly theworldwide magnitude of dam-caused displacement.

According to the World Inventory of Dams, the dams being constructedwith World Bank financial assistance are but a small fraction of all the damsbeing erected in the world at a certain point in time. Of the 35,000 large damsin existence worldwide, about 11,000 were completed during the 1951-1982period, at an overall average of 340 dams per year; for the period of1975-1982, the average was smaller; 250 dams annually. World Bank finan-cing for the latter period was provided to between 3 per cent to 10 per cent ofthe dams being completed worldwide (Mermel 1990).

Given the imprecision of the available statistics, a more conservatively ad-justed estimate could be that dams constructed with World Bank assistancerepresented between 5 per cent to 8 per cent of the worldwide total number ofdams under construction during 1979-1985. That means, again with far fromdefinitive statistics, that the aggregate number of people affected by reservoirsubmergence in dams started in that period could vary between 8-15 millionpeople. Thus, each year between 1.2 and 2.1 million people are to be displacedworldwide as a consequence of new dams only.

Despite the incompleteness of this preliminary assessment, the aggregatenumbers are staggering. On a country-by-country basis, particularly in coun-tries engaged in large hydropower programmes, the annual 'waves' of newlydisplaced people are continuously compounding the problem. Recent statisticsfrom China, for instance, show that over the last three decades, from late1950s to 1989, the number of people displaced by water conservancy projectsalone exceeded 10,000,000 (Chao 1990).

In addition to the massive displacements caused by water resource develop-ment programmes, considerable forced dislocation is entailed by other types ofconstructions, such as industry, transportation and mining. Quite often, seem-ingly innocuous projects, such as establishing an agricultural research and ex-perimentation centre, building a hospital complex in a city, or constructing adrinking water storage basin, also involve land expropriation, depriving manyfamilies of their productive units and habitat, and forcing them to relocate.The numbers of oustees are determined with more rigour in internationallyassisted projects than in the ones supported from domestic sources only.Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the real totals are muchhigher.

Another category of people massively displaced by planned governmentprogrammes, whose uprooting appears to closely resemble refugee floods,are the people forced to move by large state-sponsored resettlement pro-grammes that claim to be designed to benefit primarily the relocatees. Such


Dow

nloaded from



programmes, for instance, are the forced move of the Bulusu' of EastKalimantan (Indonesia), and of other interior Dayak groups, to governmentestablished resettlement centres, with the stated purpose of providing themwith services; or the involuntary relocation of populations away fromEthiopia's droughtprone areas. Many social scientists conducting empiricalstudies of such resettlement programmes have concluded that in fact they arepolitically motivated government operations disguised by developmentrhetoric, but have little to do with real development (Appell 1985; Clay 1986;Kesmanee 1988; de Wet 1991; Clay, Steingraber and Niggli 1988).

In summary, both by its worldwide magnitude and the problems itengenders, population displacement caused by development programmesjustifies the attention of social researchers and, in particular, justifies com-parative analysis with other displaced groups such as internal refugees.Genuine development programmes that entail displacement usually producelong term benefits for a large number of people. But this in itself does notmake the disruptions any less or the hardship any lighter for those who havethe misfortune to be uprooted and who only rarely share in the projectbenefits.

Key Issues in Assisting Oustees

There are, nevertheless, some effective ways to control and reduce the extentof forced displacement and its adverse consequences. The extent of the disrup-tions and their short and long term effects can be corrected through appro-priate policies and resource allocation. There are also ways and techniques toreduce the numbers of people affected and displaced.

Drawing on World Bank experience with such displacement, I will brieflyrefer to four important issues concerning means and solutions:

1. avoidability of displacement;2. the need for national policies and legal frameworks governing forced

displacement operations;3. relief-based approaches vis-a-vis development-oriented strategies for

resettling displaced people;4. resource allocation for reconstruction and the responsibility of

national governments.

Avoidability of DisplacementWhile development projects are and will be necessary, forced displacement ofpeople can sometimes be fully avoided and often can be reduced. Developmentis not in itself a blind legitimizer of any displacement, regardless of size andconsequence. On the contrary, induced development must be designed in waysthat take advantage of any opportunity to minimize disruption. For instance,World Bank experience has demonstrated that if planners carefully weigh thetradeoffs between dam height and the size of population dislocation, they mayreduce the latter. Small decreases in reservoir elevation may cut down


Dow

nloaded from



significantly the number of people affected by submergence. This wasdemonstrated by the designers of the Bank-financed project for the Sagulingdam in Indonesia, who selected a reservoir elevation of 645m instead of theinitially envisaged elevation of 650m and thus reduced population displace-ment to 55,000 people instead of almost 100,000 people (Soepartomo and Tjip-tohandojo 1988). In the same way, optimization studies for road trajectories inthe Bank assisted urban improvement project in Shanghai (China) haveresulted in alternatives which avoided the displacement of several thousandfamilies.

Altogether, correct preliminary assessments of the total losses that would becaused by displacement, and the inclusion of the full costs of resettling bothpeople and infrastructure in the estimated costs of the new project, may lead tothe conclusion that one or another project is economically and socially un-justified, and therefore should either be modified or not started. It is necessaryto avoid engineering biases in the design of such technical projects, to opposethe fatalistic treatment of displacement as an invariably unavoidable conse-quence of development, and to take into account the social dimensions in theplanning of every project.

Domestic Policies and Legal FrameworksSurprising as it may appear, most governmental agencies that are involved inprojects causing involuntary resettlement do not have clearly articulatedregulations or policies concerning such displacement. The absence of thesedomestic policy frameworks allows many abuses and infringements ofpeoples' socioeconomic rights to occur by default, and to remain uncorrected.

The government's responsibility vis-d-vis development-dislocated people ismuch higher, in all respects, than it is concerning refugees from naturalcalamities because the former displacement is initiated by the government andenforced through the state's power of eminent domain. It turns out that manycountries have legal norms about expropriating and displacing people, butpreserve a legal lacuna with respect to the state's role in re-establishing theliving standards and self-sufficiency of oustees. Moreover, eminent domainlaws and their compensatory provisions, crafted initially for small scalesporadic cases, are often unfit for situations of massive expropriations.

Even many international donor agencies, such as the regional developmentbanks for Africa, Asia and Latin America, and many bilateral donor agencies,do not have formal policies for projects that cause displacement. As a result,when these agencies fund projects entailing displacement, they fund the newphysical infrastructure and hardware but only seldom provide equal guidanceand financial support for resettling the oustees. Resettlement is being left tothe local/territorial agency alone, which definitely has less resources and lessoverall responsibility. As a consequence of the policy vacuum, relocation re-mains barely planned, largely underfunded, and poorly implemented.

The World Bank is, to date, the only international development agency thathas adopted and published an explicit policy for addressing the social,


Dow

nloaded from



economic, and cultural issues of involuntary resettlement, a policy rooted insocial science knowledge about resettlement (see Rajagopalan 1989; Cernea1988a, 1990a; Guggenheim 1989). Recent experiences document that thepolicy's existence and enforcement lead to higher standards in planning andfinancing involuntary resettlement. Implementation at high standards, how-ever, does not automatically result from just adopting a policy. Departuresfrom policy norms occur continuously, for various reasons. Consistency ofimplementation with the policy must be constantly monitored and enforced.The policy is disciplining not only the work of Bank staff, but it also becomescompelling for Bank borrowers when they sign a loan agreement for a projectcontaining resettlement. In a fairly broad spectrum of projects the two majorconsequences of the policy have been more systematic, and advance, planningfor relocation, and more adequate resource allocation (Rajagopalan 1989).The binding effects of an institutional policy are that it compels Bank staff andborrowing agencies to pursue resettlement standards of a higher quality thanwould have been achieved in the absence of such a policy.

The World Bank also encourages the improvement or formulation of coun-try policies and legal frameworks pertinent to the rights of those displaced(Shihata 1991). Policy and institutional changes are widely required in manydeveloping countries (see Paul 1988, 1991; Dhagamwar 1989). In several coun-tries and states, the Bank-borrower policy dialogue and the lessons derivedfrom Bank assisted projects have already led to the elaboration of improved ornew domestic legislation. The Bank holds that the projects it finances shouldnot engage in practices which violate universally recognized rights. To createlegal guarantees to that respect, it supports the development of domestic legaland policy frameworks in borrowing countries.

Independent legal scholars have noted, correctly, that it cannot be said to beimproper interference for the Bank or IDA to insist, as a condition of a projectloan, that project-consistent law be put into practice to secure recognizedrights for the people affected by the project; on the contrary, it should be in-consistent and 'unlawful to fail to insist on such protection' (Paul 1988:118).Therefore, it must be emphasized forcefully that the adoption of nationalresettlement policies by the governments of developing countries, togetherwith the adoption of policy guidelines by the donor agencies of developedcountries, would go a long way towards safeguarding people's human andeconomic rights, and speeding up the productive re-establishment of oustees.

Relief versus DevelopmentRelief assistance to internally displaced populations is necessary, but not suffi-cient by far. This is, of course, true not only for oustees but also for other in-ternal refugees. However, the resources needed to achieve such an objectivefor all internal refugees are scarce.

The key objective of the Bank's policy for correcting the effects of project-induced dislocation was formulated in 1986 in the following way: because in-voluntary displacement dismantles a previous production system and way of


Dow

nloaded from



life, all resettlement programmes must be development programmes as well.When resettlement is unavoidable, the Bank's policy is to help the borrowerensure that the oustees' productive base and income-earning ability are im-proved, or at least restored to the level they would have achieved withoutrelocation. More recently, in June 1990, the Bank reissued its policy opera-tional directives (World Bank 1990). The new directives formulated this objec-tives in even stronger terms:

All involuntary resettlement should be conceived and executed as developmentprogrammes, with resettlers provided sufficient investment resources and oppor-tunities to snare in project benefits. The displaced should be (i) compensated fortheir losses at full replacement cost prior to the actual move; (ii) assisted with themove and supported during the transition period in the resettlement site; and (iii)assisted in their efforts to improve their former living standards, income earningcapacity, and production levels, or at least to restore them. Particular attentionshould be paid to the needs of the poorest groups to be resettled.

How can this basic objective be accomplished in the framework of agovernment-sponsored development project? The answer is largely dependenton the allocation of adequate resources for the re-establishment of people'sproductive capacity.

Reconstruction and Resource AllocationReconstruction strategies represent the most promising domain for experiencetransfers between refugee assistance projects and projects for resettlingdevelopment oustees. It has been observed that 'too often the kind of agenciesinvolved in the relief activity simply don't know much about longer term,developmental approaches' (Clarke 1989:10). The questions being asked referto 'how can assistance be provided in ways that are as developmental aspossible?'; or how can ways be found 'to build some kind of economic activityinto the lives of refugees?' (Clarke 1989:10-11).

The crux of reconstruction strategies in situations of government planneddisplacement, as opposed to displacement caused by civil war or naturaldisasters, is that the government has to assume in advance financial andeconomic responsibility for correcting the adverse consequences of displace-ment. Philanthropy from the private sector and the public at large, which is soimportant for refugee assistance, cannot be counted upon as a resource inprogramme-caused dislocation. It is both a legal and ethical principle thatthe Government bears the primary responsibility for relocation. Nationalgovernments are best placed to prevent or at least reduce, through farsightedplanning, some of the causes and at least some of the effects of planneddisplacement.

In the case of resettlement projects, the core of the resettlement plan is adevelopment package. It consists of provisions centred either around land-based strategies or around employment-based strategies. The most effective,and relatively less costly, are the land-based strategies. They often involve land


Dow

nloaded from



reclamation, small scale irrigation, tree-crops development, fisheries, socialforestry and similar kinds of income generating activities. Sometimes, landscarcity is a major limiting factor, given high population densities. Vocationaltraining for jobs outside agriculture is used in employment-based strategies,but this avenue also requires investments in job creation. Vocational trainingalone, without actual employment in the newly acquired skills, does notrestore the livelihood of those displaced.

In all such activities, it is essential to stimulate the initiative of those re-settled and, whenever possible, to assist their efforts for self-resettlement aswell. In fact, refugee research has, in turn, documented the effectiveness ofself-resettlement, under certain circumstances. Hansen's research amongAngolan refugees in Zambia found that self-resettled people achieved greaterautonomy and integration in the long term than refugees that have spent anequal period of time in government controlled refugee schemes (Hansen 1990).

The Bank's resettlement policy demands borrowing agencies to recognizeand allocate the financial, technical and institutional resources necessary forboth the full compensation of the displaced and for re-establishing them on aproductive basis. The conventional treatment of involuntary resettlement assalvage operations rather than as development opportunities has resulted inunderplanning and gross underfinancing in many countries. To correct this,Bank assistance facilitates the development-oriented approach to resettlementby enabling national agencies to obtain the necessary financial resources, staffand technical expertise. The Bank is also supporting the participation ofNGOs, alongside government agencies, in the planning and implementation ofrelocation, because NGOs are apt to express the needs and defend the rightsof those displaced. Similarly, bilateral donor agencies should never financeonly the construction of new physical structures without also assisting thereconstruction of sustainable livelihoods for those displaced.

Internal population displacements should not be regarded with fatalism.Their magnitude can be reduced, provided political commitment, normativepolicy frameworks and adequate resources are put in place. The operationalapproaches for re-establishing both refugees and oustees hold mutuallyenriching lessons. The two rather distinct social science literatures dealing withthese groups could fare better by speaking more to each other, by researchingand explaining both similarities and differences between 'their' populations,and by reinforcing each other in formulating policy recommendations andoperational strategies.

(1) It is important to emphasize that human rights issues are becoming matters of growing con-cern in the allocation of international development aid. Anthropologists, sociologists and legalscholars increasingly explore the ethical and juridic links between human rights and policies forinducing development (see Paul 1988; Downing and Kushner 1988; Shihata 1988). Withoutelaborating here, I would like to draw attention to the fact that in designing and implementingprojects, multilateral and bilateral development agencies face at least three distinct sets ofhuman rights issues: (a) issues regarding general economic and social rights, particularly equitymatters; (b) issues related to the human rights of people affected by civil war, violent ethnicpersecution or natural calamities, who need protection and immediate assistance; and (c) issues


Dow

nloaded from


338 MichaelM. Cernea

arising when development projects themselves adversely affect the economic and social rightsof certain population segments. The kind of projects discussed in the present article are relevantto issues in groups (b) and (c).

APPELL, G. N. (1985) 'The Bulusu' of East Kalimantan: The Consequences of Resettlement', inAppell, O. N., t&.. Modernization and the Emergency of a Landless Peasantry, Studies in ThirdWorld Societies, vol. 33, Williamsburg, College of William and Mary.

AREEPARAMPIL. M. (1989) 'Industries, Mines and Dispossession of Indigenous People:the Case of Chotariapur', in Feniandes, W., and Thukral, E. G., eds., Development, Displace-ment and Rehabilitation, New Delhi: Indian Social Institute.

CERNEA, M. M. (1988a) Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects. Policy Guidelinesin World Bank Financed Projects, World Bank Technical PapeT No. 80, Washington, DC,1988.

(1988b) 'Involuntary Resettlement and Development', Finance and Development, No. 9,September.

(1989) 'Metropolitan Development and Compulsory Population Relocation. Policy Issuesand Project Experience, Regional Development Dialogue', 10(4).

(1990a) 'From Unused Social Knowledge to Policy Creation: The Case of Involuntary Re-settlement', Development Discussion Paper No. 342, May, Harvard University, Harvard In-stitute for International Development, Cambridge.

(1990b) 'Population Displacement and Water Resources Development: CurrentPractice, Issues and Policy Responses', paper presented at the Third Expert Group Workshopon the River/Lake Basin Approaches to Environmentally Sound Management of WaterResources, Otsu, Japan, February.

CHAO, L. (1990) 'State Plans New Rules for Dam Resettlement', China Daily, No. 2632,January 4.

CHRISTENSEN, H. (1982) Survival Strategies for and by Camp Refugees: Report on anExploratory Sociological Field Study in Somalia, UNRISD Report No. 82:3, Geneva, UnitedNations.

CLARKE, L. (1989) 'Internally Displaced Persons: Framing the Issues', Centre for PolicyAnalysis and Research on Refugee Issues, Washington, DC:

CLAY, J. W. (1986) 'Research Report: Refugees Flee Ethiopia's Collectivization', Cultural Sur-vival Quarterly, 10(2), 1986.

CLAY, J. W., STEINGRABER, S., and NIGGU, P. (1988) The Spoils of Famine. EthiopianPolicy and Peasant Agriculture, Cultural Survival, Cambridge, Mass.

CLARK, L. (1988) 'Internal Refugees — The Hidden Half, in World Refugee Survey — 1988 inReview.

DE WET, C. (1991) 'Involuntary Resettlement as Imposed Transformation', in Cernea, M. andGuggenheim, S., eds., Anthropological Approaches to Involuntary Resettlement: Policy, Prac-tice, and Theory, Boulder, Colorado Westview Press (forthcoming).

DHAGAMWAR, V. (1989) 'Rehabilitation: Policy and Institutional Changes Required', inFernandes, W., and Thukral, E. G., eds. Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation, NewDelhi: Indian Social Institute.

DOWNING, T. and KUSHNER, G., eds. (1988) Human Rights and Tribal People, Cambridge,Cultural Survival.

THE GEORGETOWN DECLARATION ON HEALTH CARE FOR DISPLACED PERSONSAND REFUGEES (1988) Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

FAHIM, H. (1988) Egyptian Nubians: Resettlement and Years of Coping, Salt Lake City, Univer-sity of Utah Press.

GUGGENHEIM, S. (1991) 'Development and the Dynamics of Displacement', paper presented atthe Workshop on Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons, Bangalore, India, December.

HANSEN, A. (1990) 'Long-Term Consequences of Two African Refugee Settlement Strategies',paper presented at the meetings of the Society for Applied Anthropology, York, UnitedKingdom, March.

HANSEN, A and OLIVER-SMITH, A., eds. (1982) Involuntary Migration and Resettlement,Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.

HARRELL-BOND, B. E. (1986) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees, New York,Oxford University Press, 1986.


Dow

nloaded from



KEELY, C. B. (1988) Foreword to The Georgetown Declaration on Health Care for DisplacedPersons and Refugees, Georgetown University, 1988.

KELLER, S. L. (1975) Uprooting and Social Change, New Delhi, Manohar Book Service.KESMANEE, C. (1988) 'Hill Tribe Relocation Policy in Thailand', Cultural Survival Quarterly,

12(4).KREIMER, A. (1989) 'Disasters, Sustainability, and Development: A Look to the 1990s', papa-

presented at the World Bank Colloquium on Disasters, June 1989.MAHAPATRA, L. K. (1983) 'Development for Whom?' Paper presented at the International

Congress for Anthropological and Ethnographic Sciences, Vancouver.McCOLM, R. B. (1989) 'The World's Unwanted", The Wall Street Journal, September 28.MERMEL, T. W. (1990) 'World Bank's Share of Worldwide Dam Construction', in Le Moigne,

O., Barghouti, S. and Plusquellec, H.t eds., Dam Safety and the Environment, World BankTechnical Paper No. 115, Washington, DC.

MORNA, C. L. (1990) 'Refugees Return to the Farm', African Farmer, 4, July.PAUL, i. C. N. (1988) 'International Development Agencies, Human Rights and Humane

Development Projects', in Denver Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 17, No. 1.(1991) Rural Development, Human Rights and Constitutional Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa

(forthcoming).RAJAGOPALAN, V. (1989) 'Policy and Planning in Involuntary Resettlement', The Bank's

World, No. 9, September.SALEM-MURDOCK, MUNEERA (1989) Arabs and Nubians in New Haifa, University of Utah

Press, Salt Lake City.SCUDDER, T. (1981) 'What it Means to be Dammed', Engineering and Science, Pasadena,

Vol.54, No. 4.SCUDDER, T, and COLSON, E. (1982) 'From Welfare to Development: A Conceptual

Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People', in Hansen, A., and Oliver-Smith, A., In-voluntary Migration and Resettlement, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.

SH1HATA, I. F. I. (1988) "The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issuesand the Record of Achievements', Denver Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 17,No. 1.

(1991) 'Some Legal Aspects of Involuntary Population Displacement', in Cernea, M. M.and Guggenheim, S. E., eds., Anthropological Approaches to Involuntary Resettlement:Policy, Practice and Theory, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (forthcoming).

SOEPARTOMO and TJIPTOHANDOJO, P. (1988) 'Comparison between Predicted andObserved Environmental Impacts in Saguling Reservoir', in CIGB-ICOLD, Sixteenth Interna-tional Congress on Large Dams, vol. 1, San Francisco, June.

WORLD BANK (1989) 'Operational Directive 8.50: Emergency Recovery Assistance', November.(1990) 'Operational Directives 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement', June.

ZETTER, R. W. (1988) 'Refugees and Refugee Studies: A Label and an Agenda', Journal ofRefugee Studies, vol. 1, No. 1.

(1990) 'Labeling Refugees: Forming and Transforming An Identity'. Paper prepared forthe Program in International Cooperation in Africa, North-Western University, Illinois,February.

ZOLBERG, A. R., SUHRKE, A., and AGUAYO, S. (1989) Escape from Violence. Conflict andthe Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, New York, Oxford University Press.

MS received February 1990; revised MS received October 1990.

* The present paper has been prepared during the author's work as Visiting Scholar at HarvardUniversity in 1989-1990, on leave from the World Bank. Grateful thanks are expressed to both in-stitutions for their support. The views and interpretations expressed in this study are those of theauthor and should not necessarily be attributed to the institutions with which he is associated. Inpreparing this paper, I have directly benefited from discussions with D. Maybury-Lewis, V.Rajagopalan, I. Shihata, J. W. Stanton, B. Harrell-Bond, N. Yalman, R. Cernea, Ch. Keely, S.Guggenheim, J. Clay, R. Zetter and from the comments of two anonymous reviewers. Gratefulthanks are expressed to all of them. An earlier and shorter version of this paper was presented atthe Georgetown University Symposium on Internally Displaced People (October 1989,Washington, DC).


Dow

nloaded from


Internal Refugee Flows and Development-Induced Population Displacement

Documents

Transcript of Internal Refugee Flows and Development-Induced Population Displacement