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INTERESTS OF MAJ POWERS IN SUDAN

Saquib Mehmood

3 October, 2009

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Introduction

1. Sudan represents an instructive case study in conflict evolution. The Sudanese

conflict, spanning over six decades, contains all necessary elements which typically

lead to direct intervention by external forces. Local rivalries and ethno-religious tensions

aggravated by climatic devastation and inequitable resource distribution set the stage

for a long drawn out clash between the Arabized Islamic elite of the North and

indigenous African population of the South. This was followed first by the still unsettled,

low intensity conflict in Eastern Sudan and later by the violent conflict in Darfur Region

of Western Sudan. Regional dynamics have played an important role in exacerbating

the conflicts while the attention of major powers was drawn to the Region respectively

with the discovery of large oil deposits and alleged rise of “Radical Islam”.

2. The first Sudanese Civil War lasting 17 years from 1955 to 1972, concluded with

the signing of Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. It was largely a localized affair in which

the major powers’ interests remained peripheral with occasional support provided

through regional proxies, following a pattern typical of the Cold War era. However, after

a hiatus of ten years, the Second Civil War erupted in 1983, coinciding with discovery of

major oil deposits and imposition of Sharia Law by then President Gaffar Nimeiri. This

also attracted attention of international powers, mainly United States and China, adding

a new dimension to the conflict. The conflict officially culminated after signing of a

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the warring parties in 2005. Since

then, a new phase of jostling for position between the major powers has commenced,

mainly aimed at consolidation of respective interests prior to culmination of transition

period in 2011.

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3. Besides political myopia demonstrated by Sudanese politicians, major powers’

interference has been the main contributing factor towards prolongation of the conflict

leading ultimately to arbitration by external forces to reach some form of settlement. The

following study explores the role played by major powers pursuing their respective

interests, in evolution of the Sudanese conflict to its present state and the future

prospects for the Country.

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PART-I – FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUDAN’S

IMPORTANCE

4. Sudan is the largest African country with an area of 2.5 million square kilometres1

and population of approximately 40 million2. Several factors including its size, location,

religion and ethnicity, regional influence and newfound resource affluence combine to

make it an important country of the African continent. These factors are successively

discussed in this part of the study.

5. Geography and Geo-Strategic Importance3

a. Sudan’s large size affords it access to Eastern, Central and Northern

African Regions

besides proximity

to the Arabian

Peninsula across

the Red Sea.

Sudan draws its

Arab credentials

from its Northern

neighbours that

include Egypt and

Libya and to an

extent from its

trans-Red Sea

links to Arabia proper. The 700 kilometres long Red Sea Coast also

affords the Country an important position on arguably one of the world’s

most important strategic waterways. Sudan’s major port, Port Sudan, lies

approximately midway between the Red Sea entry point of Bab-al-Mandeb

1This is roughly three times the area of Pakistan (0.8 million square kilometres) or three fourths of the

area of India (3.3 million square kilometres). 2 39 million according to latest but disputed results of census conducted in 2008.

3 Map courtesy Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

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and its northern end culminating at Sinai Peninsula overlooking the Gulfs

of Suez and Aqaba. The Port provides the most viable sea access to

Persian Gulf and South and East Asia to Sudan’s western landlocked

neighbours including Chad and CAR.

b. Sudan’s links to strategically important and volatile Horn of Africa Region

are manifested through its land borders with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya

towards its east and southeast while its southern part is connected with

Equatorial Africa through borders with Uganda and Democratic Republic

of Congo (DRC). Sudan is also linked with Sub-Saharan Africa in the west

through landlocked CAR and Chad.

c. Sudan’s own stunning landscape is shaped by the curious union of two

iconic landmarks, namely the Sahara Desert and the Nile River. While the

Desert runs across the northern part of the Country making sustenance

difficult and population sparse, the River gives life to the scorched earth

flowing length wise through the eastern one third of the Sudanese land

mass where most of the major population centres and large cities of

Sudan are located astride the River. However, drainage from the River

creates large swamps and wetlands in the south, rendering the land unfit

for major agriculture activities and sustenance of large population centres.

The north-central and north-eastern parts of the country have traditionally

drawn strength and claimed dominance over other areas due to this

peculiar geography which makes them the major population and economic

hubs. This dominance has come under challenge in recent times with the

discovery of large oil deposits away from the traditional centres of power

along the Nile Valley.

d. The traditional North-South Boundary separating Darfur, Kardofan and

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Blue Nile Provinces in the North from Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile

Provinces in the South dates back to the Anglo-Egyptian period (1898-

1956) when Sudan was divided into two separate administrative units. At

the time of independence, Sudan comprised nine provinces with six

including Northern, Kasala (Eastern), Khartoum, Darfur (Western),

Kardofan and Blue Nile in the North and Bahar al Ghazal, Upper Nile and

Equatoria in the South. Over the years, various re-adjustments in

administrative structures led successively to creation of 18 and 26 states

respectively by 1994. These re-alignments were largely viewed by the

southerners as attempts to take control of the Oil Fields lying astride the

boundary line. More readjustments in 2005 and 2006 reduced the number

of states to present 25 with 15 in the North and 10 in the South. The 2005

Comprehensive Peace Agreement between GoS and SPLM/A accepts the

traditional boundary line between the North and South apart from three

pockets of dispute in bordering States of Western Kardofan (Abyei),

Southern Kardofan and Blue Nile. A North-South Boundary Commission

constituted under the CPA is yet to decide over the official alignment of

the boundary4. Referendum will be held in 2011 to determine the status of

Southern Sudan as an independent state or an entity within United Sudan

till which time it will be run as a semi-autonomous entity. Permanence of

North-South Boundary Line will render Southern Sudan landlocked and

dependent on the North for sea access.

e. Sudan’s neighbourhood is characterized by instability owing to various

ongoing insurgencies and inter-state rivalries. Ethiopia is fighting several

secessionist movements besides remaining in a state of permanent

hostilities with Eritrea which is seen as a supporter of several regional

insurgencies including those in Ethiopia and Eastern Sudan. In 2006

Ethiopia invaded Somalia, another fractured but strategically important

State beset by civil war since early 90s, to dislodge the Islamic Courts

4 In August 2009, Hague based International Permanent Court of Arbitration accepted GoS point of view

on delimitation of Abyei boundaries

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Union (ICU) regime which itself had seized power by driving out US

backed Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism

(ARPCT). Chad and DRC in Sudan’s West and Southwest are also

embroiled in ethnic conflicts with spill over effects in bordering regions of

Sudan. Libya in Sudan’s North West, which has only recently come out of

international isolation, has long been a major contributor of instability in

the Region due to its support for Arab Nationalism in neighbouring Chad

and Sudan.

6. Demography and Ethnicity5. Sudan with a population of approximately 40

million is rightly described as the microcosm of Africa being the home to over 600 ethnic

groups who speak over 400 different languages. However, most of the ethnic groups

are either too small to play a significant role in Sudanese society or have been culturally

assimilated by larger groups. Broadly, the Sudanese population can be categorized

among the Arab Muslims, the non Arab Muslims and the Nilotic population of the south.

a. Arab Muslims. Arab Muslims are the largest ethnic group comprising

40% of Sudanese population. Arabs are mainly concentrated in the North

and Central Regions of Sudan and are further identified as Juhayna who

are nomads (Bedouins), Baggara (including Humr/Messiria, Rizaygat,

Shuwia, Hawazma, Ta’isha, and Habbaniya) who are mostly cattle

herders (name derived from Arabic word for cow,i.e. Baqqara), Juhayna

who are believed to be of mixed Arab-Nubian ancestry and who form a

large part of the merchant class, Rashaida who are the latest Arab people

to settle in North Eastern Sudan and Eritrea, and Kababish, a people of

mixed Arab and African ancestry. Arabs dominate most of the important

positions in the government.

b. Non Arab Muslims. The largest non Arab Muslim group is the

Nubians who number several millions in Sudan. They are descended from

Egyptians who mixed with local people and settled in the Nubian Region

(North Eastern Sudan). Nubians are mostly farmers but some of them are

5 “Ethnic Groups Worldwide – A ready reference handbook”, David Levinson, 1947, reprinted Oryx Press

Arizona, 1998.

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also involved in wage labour and small businesses. Other Muslim people

in Sudan are smaller ethnic groups including Beja along the Red Sea

Coast and the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Daju and Beti in the North West.

Most of these groups subsist through a combination of farming and cattle

herding.

c. Southern Nilotic Tribes. Southern Sudan is ethnically more diverse than

the North being home to several hundred ethnic groups, however, the

most visible and dominant among them are the Dinka who live in northern

part of Southern Sudan and number over 3 million, the Nuer who live in

the central region of Southern Sudan and have a population of about a

million, the Shilluk living further north of Nuer number around quarter

million, and the Azande who are dispersed astride the Sudanese-Congo

and Sudanese-CAR Borders. The major non-Nilotic people in the South

are the Nuba (distinct from Nubians) who live in the northern reaches of

Southern Sudan in the Nuba Mountains and are mostly farmers.

d. Ethnic tensions are mainly the result of Arab dominance over

administration and resources due to their advantageous location in the

fertile central belt and numerical preponderance. The marginalized

sections of the Sudanese population, i.e., the non Arab Muslims and

Nilotic people have, however, the control of the border regions and have

trans-border ethnic linkages, which is also the cause of many regional

conflicts having a spill over effect in Sudan and vice versa besides

providing opportunity for external interference to interested parties.

7. Religion and Politics

a. In Sudan, with a 70% Muslim Sunni population, religion and politics are

invariably interlinked. The “Islamization of Sudan” Project with Pan-Islamic

undertones, which started with the Islamists backed coup of 1989, led to

the Country’s isolation on the international stage besides creating deep

rifts within, threatening to disintegrate the Country on religious and

ethnical lines. Sudan has a long tradition of adherence with beliefs

associated with Sufism and certain Sufi Orders including the Khatmiyya,

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Qadriyya and Niassiyya have deep roots among the Sudanese people.

Another influence has been the Ansars, the followers of Mahdi, who

organized themselves on political lines after the overthrow of Mahdist

Regime by the British in 1899. The Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood

(Akhwan-ul-Muslimoon) also established its outpost in Sudan, however,

Salafi (Wahabi) influence from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Countries later

led the Sudanese Chapter of the Brotherhood to mould its views in

accordance with strict interpretations of Islam, typical of the Salafi creed.

b. The Ansars. Most of these religious orders and sects are represented in

Sudanese mainstream political diaspora. The Ansar Movement organized

itself as a mainstream political party in 1945, the resulting Umma Party

has played a prominent role in Sudanese politics since independence and

has remained in power during all interludes of civilian rule (1956-58, 1965-

1969 and 1986-1989) between the military coups. Sadiq al Mahdi’s (great

grandson of Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi and twice Prime Minister of

Sudan) Umma led Government was close to negotiate a settlement with

southern rebels in 1989 when it was toppled by Omar al-Bashir led and

National Islamic Front (NIF) supported military coup just a day before a bill

freezing Sharia Laws was to be presented in the Parliament. Umma Party

became a part of opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) following

al-Bashir’s Coup. Other major parties to join NDA included the Democratic

Unionist Party (DUP) and the Communist Party of Sudan (CPS). Later

SPLM also joined the alliance.

c. The Khatimiyaa. The Khatimiyaa Sufi Order also manifests its political

aspirations through its political arm, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

formerly the National Unionist Party (NUP), the oldest and one of Sudan’s

major political parties. Sudan’s first civilian government was formed by the

NUP and Sudan’s first President Ismail Al-Azhari was a member of the

Party. Khatimiyaa are traditional opponents of Ansars, having initially

opposed the Mahdist Movement in 1880s. However, political expediency

forced the party led by Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani to become part of

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Umma led political dispensation that ruled the Country between 1986 and

1989. DUP was in the forefront of peace talks with southern rebels and

reached a peace agreement with SPLM/A in 1988 calling for the abolition

of military pacts with Egypt and Libya, freezing of Islamic laws, an end to

the state of emergency, and a cease-fire. The Plan was not initially

approved by Prime Minister Al-Mahdi forcing DUP to abandon the

coalition. After al-Bashir’s coup, the DUP’s leader Al-Mirghani led the

National opposition alliance, the NDA of which Umma was also a part.

d. The Muslim Brotherhood

(1) The Brotherhood started casting its dark shadow on Sudanese

politics with the increased influence of its leader Hassan Abdallah

al-Tarabi with the Nimeiri Regime in late seventies and early

eighties. Tarabi, as Nimeiri’s Attorney General, was instrumental in

introduction of controversial Sharia Law across the Country, a

move that ultimately led to Nimeiri’s ouster in 1985 following

commencement of second Sudanese Civil War in 1983.

(2) The Brotherhood’s politics were manifested initially through the

National Islamic Front (NIF) and later through its successor the

National Congress Party (NCP). While Ummah and DUP realized

the dangers posed to Sudan’s unity by universal application of

Sharia Laws, Tarabi and his party pursued the goal of

implementation of Sharia and Pan-Islamism with a single minded

obsession leading to moves such as hosting Osama Bin Laden in

Sudan (1991-1996), besides other Jihadist groups. Bin Laden

married Tarabi’s niece and set up 23 training camps in Sudan to

carry out his activities before he was expelled from Sudan in the

wake of increasing international pressure.

(3) Tarabi also founded the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference

(PAIC) providing an annual platform to all major Jihadist

Organisations of the Region for coordinating their activities. In

1991, Tarabi created Sunni Islamist Revolutionary International as

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a counterweight to the mainstream Organization of the Islamic

Conference (OIC). Such overt gestures of defiance led Sudan to be

declared as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” by US, following World

Trade Centre Bombing in 1993 in which five suspects were

declared to be Sudanese. In 1995, an assassination attempt on

Egyptian President Hosni Mubbarak was blamed on Egyptian

Islamic Jehad which was a part of Turabi’s Arab and Islamic

Conference conglomerate and was suspected to have links with Bin

Laden.

(4) The Al-Bashir-Tarabi duo led the Country from one disaster to

another culminating in US cruise missile attack on Khartoum in

1998 following bombing of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Sudan had already been placed under comprehensive UN

diplomatic sanctions and US trade sanctions. Eventually, the falling

out between Al-Bashir and Tarabi led to Tarabi’s arrest in 1999.

Since then Tarabi has remained an opponent of Al-Bashir and the

NCP which still consists of Islamist hardliners keen to implement

the Islamization Project.

e. SPLA/M. Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Army/ Movement is the major

militant group (now a major political party) of Southern Sudan and was

formed in 1983 under Colonel John Garang, a southern Army Officer,

following imposition of Sharia by Nimeiri. The Party which was initially

represented by all southern ethnic groups, was later split into factions

following falling out between Dinkas and Nuer/ Shiluks. Violent conflict

broke out between the SPLA/M factions during early nineties as the

Government armed and provided support to the breakaway factions

consisting mostly of Nuer Tribesmen. In 1997, GoS negotiated a separate

peace agreement with the breakaway SPLM/A faction which had by then

assumed the name of Sudan Peoples Defence Forces (SPDF)6. The

agreement known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement provided the

6 In January 2002 SPDF and SPLA/M signed a Unity Agreement rejoining most of the split factions.

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breathing space to the Government and enabled it to achieve a measure

of stability attracting major foreign oil investments. SPLA/M was initially

supported and armed by Soviet backed Menjustu Regime of Ethiopia and

later by United States through Ethiopia (after fall of Marxist regime in

1991), Uganda and Eritrea. John Garang died in a helicopter crash in July

2005 only six months after signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA) with GoS in January 2005. Since then the Party is led by Silva Kir

Miyardit the current First Vice President of Sudan and the President of

semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).

8. Oil Resources7. Oil exploration in Sudan commenced in 1959, however,

significant oil reserves were not found until 1979, when US based Chevron discovered

the first oil reserves in Muglad Basin of White Nile State, later discoveries included

Melut (1981) and Unity/ Heglig Fields (1982). In 1984, Chevron suspended operations

after its Unity Fields were attacked by SPLA/M. Exploration activity remained

suspended in later years due to the Civil War but was resumed in 1992 with the

Chevron explored area forming the basis for further discoveries and operations. In

1996, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC, 40%) and Malysian Petronas

Caligary (30%) acquired major shares in Unity/ Heglig Oil Fields (Blocks 1,2 and 4) and

formed the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) along with Sudapet

(5%) of Sudan. India’s State Run ONGC Videsh later acquired 25% shares in 2003 to

join the Consortium. Today, these three Companies account for Sudan’s 90% oil output.

CNPC (41%) and Petronas (40%) are also the major shareholders in Petrodar

Operating Company (PDOC), the Consortium responsible for former Chevron

operations in Melut Basin (Blocks 3 and 7). First official Sudanese oil export operations

started in 1997 but received substantial boost only after construction of Sudan’s first oil

pipeline by GNPOC connecting Unity/Heglig Fields to Port Sudan, in August 1999. A

brief discussion of Sudan’s oil resources, the major stakeholders and future potential is

covered below.

7 Info condensed from “Sudan Oil Dossier” by European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), April 2008

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a. Reserves. Sudan’s proven oil reserves currently stand at 6.4 billion

barrels (according to British Petrol’s estimates and 5 billion according to

Oil and Gas Journal) making it Africa’s 5th largest holder of reserves

behind Libya (42 billion), Nigeria (36 billion), Algeria (13 billion) and

Angola (8 billion). Both Sudan’s reserves and production stands at 0.5% of

world total. This also means that Sudan is a relatively minor player on

world oil stage. The Country has been divided into 23 prospective blocks

(refer map below), all of which except two i.e. 10 (Gadaref, Kasala along

Eritrean Border) and 12b (North and West Darfur) have been awarded.

The only producing blocks are one through seven (largely developed on

previous explorations by Chevron) and producing fields are mostly located

in Southern Sudan, rest of the blocks largely remain un-explored.

However, out of the un-explored blocks only blocks 5B and B in Southern

Sudan and the two off shore blocks (13 and 15) are considered promising.

b. Potential and Production. Current production is approximately 0.7

million bbl/d (barrels per day). Out of the currently producing blocks,

GNPOC operates blocks 1, 2 and 4 and the oil fields in this block are

connected to Port Sudan via a pipeline which became operational in 1999.

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Block 1 lies entirely in Southern Sudan, Block 2 lies entirely in Northern

Sudan while Block 4 lies astride the North-South Boundary Line. Blocks 3

and 7 are operated by Sino-Malaysian Consortium PDOC and all the

producing fields lie in Southern Sudan. Pipeline from this facility joins the

main GNPOC Pipeline at Khartoum. Block 6 which lies in Western

Kardofan and extends into Southern Darfur is almost exclusively operated

by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and lies entirely in

Northern Sudan, however production from Block-6 is yet to make

significant contribution to overall figures. Block 5A lies entirely in Southern

Sudan and is operated by Western Nile Operating Company-I (WNOC-I),

a consortium of Indian ONGC (24%) and Malaysian Petronas (67%).

Pipeline from this block joins the main GNPOC Pipeline for further

transportation till Port Sudan. Block 5B which has not started production

yet is also operated by WNOC while the other potentially promising block

i.e Block B is controlled by French Company Total (33%) and some local

companies.

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Production from existing finds seems to have peaked already and barring

another major find, Sudanese oil production is predicted to decline

substantially by 2016. Current and expected production figures are given

below (in thousands of barrels per day).

c. Infrastructure. While most of the production fields are located in the

landlocked South, the oil export and refining infrastructure is located in the

North giving it considerable leverage over the South. Sudan’s major

refinery at Khartoum has a capacity of 100,000 bbl/d while a smaller

refinery at Port Sudan has a capacity of 21,000 bbl/d. Plans for

constructing another refinery at Port Sudan have been deferred due to

rising costs of the project. Two major pipelines from Muglad (1999) and

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Melut (2006) Basins till Port Sudan have substantially increased Sudan’s

export potential.

d. Exports and Revenues. Sudan’s economy has registered significant

improvement since commencement of oil export operations in 1999-2000

with double digit GDP growth rate recorded since 2006. As of 2007,

Sudan’s total exports stood at approximately US$ 6 billion of which oil

accounted for US$ 5.2 billion (86%). Revenue sharing between North and

South is stipulated in CPA according to which 2% of the total revenue is

shared by oil producing states, revenue from Southern fields is to be

evenly shared between the GoSS and the Government of National Unity

(GONU) while GONU has exclusive rights over revenue from Northern

fields.

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PART-II – INTERESTS OF MAJOR POWERS

9. From preceding discussion, it would appear that two factors dominate the

relevance of Sudan in the international arena. These include its oil resources and the

rise of what is pejoratively termed as “radical Islam” and more reasonably as “political

Islam”. The two factors are interlinked as witnessed in various conflicts raging in Muslim

majority countries from Middle East to Central and East Asia. A third factor is Sudan’s

size and geography and by virtue of that its ability to influence events in the strategic

region on the Red Sea Rim, particularly the Horn of Africa.

10. A Scramble for African Oil

a. Individually, African countries do not offer potentially unlimited oil

resources as is the case with Middle Eastern and Gulf countries which

hold some of the world’s largest oil deposits. However, oil has been

discovered in many African countries, the cumulative effect of which is that

as a Region Africa offers an alternative source of oil to up and coming

economies of the world who find access to conventional sources of oil

increasingly difficult due to effective control by established economies (the

West, particularly the United States).

b. Africa had proven oil reserves of 117.481 billion barrels at the end of 2007

or 9.49 % of the world's reserves and in 2007 the region produced an

average of 10317.6 thousand barrels of crude oil per day, 12.5% of the

world total8. Small to moderate oil reserves of African countries offer an

incentive to developing economies like China, India and East Asia

(particularly Malaysia) to invest in the oil infrastructure in these countries

to meet their growing energy demands.

c. A typical case of competing interests is that of the United States and

China. While United States has been for long the world’s largest oil

consumer, China became the second largest in 2003 after decades of

rapid economic growth. US imports over 60% of its oil from such diverse

sources as the Middle East, the Gulf, South America and West Africa and

8 British Petroleum Survey, 2008.

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is suspected of vying for Central Asian Oil reserves for its future

requirements. For China, it is difficult to venture so far afield from its home

turf and has correctly identified the Indian Ocean as its main route for oil

transportation to economize on transportation costs. From this standpoint,

Eastern and Central African countries present a most attractive prospect

to the Chinese and explain their interest in African Oil. For United States,

on the other hand, the moderate reserves of East and Central Africa are

important but not very critical and blocking Chinese access to them would

serve its interests well.

d. Another factor that makes African Oil worth fighting for is the non-OPEC

status of all of its producers barring Nigeria. This can really be a crucial

factor in breaking OPEC monopoly over prices through production control.

From a geographical perspective, West African oil is more attractive for

United States and European Countries providing easy access for

transportation through the Atlantic, circumventing all troubled regions of

the world.

11. The Spread of Political Islam and its Regional Impact9

a. East Africa is an important strategic zone characterized by its domination

of the Red Sea and its entry point at Gulf of Aden off Somali Coast and

the choke point at Bab Al-Mandeb off Djibouti’s Coast. 3.3 million barrels

of oil transit daily through the Bab Al-Mandeb Straits10 making it one of the

most busy and commercially vital water ways of the world. Therefore,

stability in greater East African Region including Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia,

Djibouti and Sudan is of vital interest for all major stakeholders, especially

the United States and its allies (Europe and Israel).

b. Presently, the major factor perceived to be affecting the regional stability is

the challenge posed to US dominance in the Region by the spread of

political Islam. While other States in the Region have become relatively

stable, Sudan and Somalia remain in the throes of violent conflict posing

9 Statistics quoted from “Radical Islam in East Africa”, RAND Corporation, April 2009 unless otherwise

specified. 10

“Piracy off the Horn of Africa”, US Congressional Research Service, April 2009.

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severe challenges to regional stability. Sudan’s Islamists backed coup in

1989 was a watershed event in East African regional politics as it

threatened to export instability to neighbouring Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya

and as far afield as Somalia. All these countries are struggling with Islamic

secessionist movements linked with Salafi (Wahabi) school of thought. In

Eritrea, the Muslim population is opposed to the Country’s Israeli

connection and Sudan is often blamed for fuelling the anti-Israeli

sentiment. Sudan in turn blames Eritrea for providing base for Israeli

intelligence operations against Sudan. The main secessionist

organisation, the Eritrean Islamic Jehad Movement (EIJM) blamed for

much violence in Eritrea is thought to be based in Sudan. Sudan’s

harbouring of Osama Bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jehad (EIJ) during

the nineties brought it much international condemnation and was the

major cause of its ostracization following assassination attempt on

Egyptian President Hosni Mobarak in 1995 and bombings of US

embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998.

c. Another critical country in the Horn of Africa is Somalia which is in a state

of civil war since early 1990s. Presently state structure in Somalia has

completely collapsed due to war-lordism prevalent after collapse of Said

Bare regime in 1991. Ethiopia is the main US ally in the Region and has

acted on various occasions in concord with US interests. In 2006,

Ethiopian Forces invaded Somalia and installed the current Transitional

Federal Government (TFG) after driving out the Islamic Courts Union

(ICU) led Government which had itself occupied power after driving out

US backed conglomerate of warlords known as Alliance for Restoration of

Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT).

d. Western observers, particularly the US have lately taken to lump all these

Islamist movements under the broad umbrella of Al-Qaeda and declared

war against them in what is being termed as the Global War on Terrorism

(GWOT). Sudan has consistently been blamed for being an important

base of Al-Qaeda terrorists in East Africa. The recent cause for concern

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has been the so called maritime terrorism manifested as piracy off the

Somali Coast blamed on Somali dissident groups and sporadic attacks on

western commercial and military vessels for which Al-Qaeda is being held

responsible.

12. US Interests – Regional Overview

a. Historically US has had only peripheral interests in the African Continent.

However, this began to change with the turn of the century as US and the

competing world powers started focusing on Africa for their energy needs

and the rise of non state actors became a cause for concern. The Obama

Administration announced its new Africa Policy in February 2009 with

focus on four areas including security assistance for military capacity

building, support of democracy in African countries, promotion of broad

based economic growth and promotion of health and social

development.11In her testimony before the Senate’s Foreign Relations

Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined the policy objectives

as: “combating al-Qaida's efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the

Horn of Africa; helping African nations to conserve their natural resources

and reap fair benefits from them...”12.

b. Security Assistance. This process started with the creation in 2007

of the US Africa Command or the AFRICOM. This also involves security

capacity building of African States at the regional, sub-regional and

individual states level. Currently, the Planning and Management Division

of African Union (AU) Headquarters at Addis Ababa is run by US advisors

while US has also established peace keeping training centres in Senegal,

Ghana, South Africa and Kenya. US is also running an International

Military Education and Training Program (IMET) and another program by

the name of Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance

(ACOTA) to build capacity building of African militaries.

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Text of US Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Phillip Carter III’s speech before the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9 February 2009. 12

Text of US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s Testimony before the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009.

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c. Post Cold War US Military Involvement in Africa – Combined Joint

Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and AFRICOM

(1) Somalia – 1992-94. The first major post Cold War US deployment

in Africa was in Somalia as part of US led Unified Task Force

(UNITAF also known as Operation Restore Hope in which 25,000

US soldiers were deployed) in 1992, and later under UN Operations

in Somalia (UNOSOM-II). US Forces were withdrawn in March

1994 following the disastrous Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993

resulting in deaths of 18 US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis.

(2) In 1994, 3600 US troops were deployed in Central Africa for

humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees. Subsequent US

military interest in Africa remained limited owing to “little traditional

strategic interest in Africa.”13In 1998, US conducted retaliatory

cruise missile strikes on Khartoum following attack on its

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

(3) Liberia – 2003. In 2003, US intervened in the Liberian Civil

War by deploying a 5000 strong force known as Joint Task Force

Liberia operating under EUCOM.

(4) AFRICOM. US Africa Command or AFRICOM was created on 6

February 2007 “to promote US National Security Objectives in

Africa and its surrounding waters.”14Previously, the African

Continent was a shared responsibility of Central Command

(CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM) and Pacific

Command (PACOM). AFRICOM is presently headquartered in

Stuttgart, Germany till decision on a suitable location for its

headquarters in Africa is finalized. AFRICOM initially operated as a

sub-unified command of EUCOM but was declared a stand-alone

unified command in October 2008. AFRICOM’s role is more

13

DOD Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, August 1995. 14

Ploch, Lauren; “Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa”, Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2009

22

enhanced as compared to other US combatant commands as it

includes “a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building a stable

security environment and incorporates a larger civilian component

from other U.S. government agencies to address those

challenges”15besides the ability to conduct military operations.

AFRICOM is therefore, destined to play a greater developmental

role complementing the role of other US Agencies like USAID.

Through this strategy, US intends to adopt a proactive role in

conflict prevention in Africa which is interpreted by critics as a

pretext for greater political and military interference. At present, the

US State Department is opposed to creating Forward Operating

Sites (military bases) on the Continent maintaining that the

establishment of AFRICOM reflects an organizational re-adjustment

rather than an attempt to establish permanent military footprints on

the African Continent.16 Nevertheless, a permanent military

presence has been established in the form of CJTF-HOA at

Djibouti. U.S. military facilities in Rota (Spain), Sionella (Italy) and

Cairo(Egypt) serve as logistic support facilities for AFRICOM. The

U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air bases and

ports in Africa including locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon,

Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra

Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. “There has been

considerable apprehension over U.S. motivations for creating

AFRICOM, and some Africans worry that the move represents a

neo-colonial effort to dominate the region militarily. Reports of U.S.

air strikes in Somalia in recent years and U.S. support for Ethiopia’s

military intervention there have added to those concerns. Many

view U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa with skepticism, and

there appears to be a widespread belief that the new command’s

15

ibid 16

Map courtesy, Congressional Research Service (CRS).

23

primary goals will be to hunt terrorists and to secure U.S. access to

African oil. U.S. foreign policy analysts have focused increased

attention on China’s role in Africa in recent years, and such

attention has led some to question whether an Africa Command

might be part of a new contest for influence on the Continent.”17

(5) CJTF-HOA. CJTF-HOA was established under US CENTCOM in

2002 to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating

transnational terrorist groups operating in the region.”18The Force

was later deputed to AFRICOM upon its establishment with a

broader mission of “conflict prevention”. The force comprises

between 1500-2000 military and civilian personnel and its area of

operation covers the land and airspace in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,

Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen besides coastal waters of

Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. The Force is

presently headquartered at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. “CJTF

personnel train the region’s security forces in counter-terrorism and

other areas of military professionalization, collect intelligence, serve

as advisors to peace operations, and oversee and support

17

Ploch, Lauren; “Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa”, Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2009. 18

ibid

24

humanitarian assistance efforts.”19The responsibility for conducting

anti-piracy operations is maintained by US CENTCOM, however,

CJTF-HOA provides assistance to regional maritime security

forces. “CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military operations

throughout East Africa as part of an effort to “win hearts and minds

and enhance the “long-term stability of the region.”20

13. US Interests – Sudan Specific. US interests in Sudan may be viewed in terms

of stability of the East African Region besides desire for some form of control over oil

resources. Sudan’s Islamic credentials with a potential to influence regional events

undermines the former while Chinese de-facto control over Sudanese oil affects the

later. For United States, the space presented by the current Sudanese conflict is an

important means to correct the direction of Sudanese policy in its favour. Following

discourse takes stock of this phenomenon.

a. Profile of US-Sudan Relationship

(1) The Beginning. Gaffar Nimeiri’s communist backed coup in

1968 put Sudan firmly in the Soviet Camp during the Cold War era.

However, Nimeiri shifted his policies following rapprochement with

the South in 1972 and gradually aligned himself with the United

States. Following years saw Sudan emerging as the major US ally

in the Region especially after the Marxist led Coup in neighbouring

Ethiopia, which until that time had been United States’ main ally in

East Africa. The alliance was further cemented with the discovery

of oil resources in Sudan in late seventies. By the early 1980’s

Sudan was the sixth largest recipient of US military assistance in

the world.

(2) Islamist Coup. Nimeiri utilized the opportunity presented by

US support to assert control over the oil rich South, initially through

modifications in the North-South boundary Line and later through

imposition of Sharia Law with the backing of Hassan Al-Tarabi’s

19

ibid 20

ibid

25

Islamists. This conflagrated the dormant North-South discord and

Sudan plunged into another violent conflict. Nimeiri was overthrown

in 1985 and was replaced by the Ummah led Government of Sadiq

Al-Mahdi. US-Sudanese relationship started to cool down following

Nimeiri’s departure and hit rock bottom with Omar Al-Bashir’s

Islamist backed overthrow of Mahdi’s Government in 1989.

(3) Deterioration of Relations. During the 90s, Al-Bashir and

Tarabi adopted radical policies that led to further tensions between

Sudan and United States. Sudan’s support for Iraq during the first

Gulf War and harbouring of Osama Bin Laden also aggravated the

relationship. United States adopted aggressive policies to isolate

the Sudanese Government and in 1993 put Sudan on the list of

States sponsoring terrorism. Assassination attempt on Hosni

Mobarak linked to EIJ led to US backed diplomatic sanctions by the

UNSC in 1996 while in 1997 US imposed comprehensive trade

sanctions on Sudan. US-Sudanese relations came to their lowest

ebb in August 1998 when Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory in

Khartoum was targeted by US cruise missiles following the

bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

(4) US Involvement in Sudanese Civil War. During later years,

US has allegedly remained involved in supporting the SPLA rebels

fighting the Sudanese Government forces. During the initial phase

of the Civil War SPLA was supported by Soviet Union through the

Marxist regime of Ethiopia and Gaddafi’s Libya. After the collapse

of Ethiopian Marxist regime in 1991 coinciding with the end of Cold

War, Ethiopia continued to support SPLA at the behest of US who

pumped in military hardware worth millions of dollars to Eritrea,

Ethiopia and Uganda to sustain the rebel movement in Sudan.

(5) Involvement in the Peace Process. Having experienced the

negative fallout of his radical policies, Al-Bashir started to distance

himself from the extremist agenda laid out by Al-Tarabi towards the

26

beginning of the new century. US-Sudan relationship also improved

as a consequence of this and also due to the fact that the United

States had started a comprehensive African Policy review following

Chinese ingress in Africa and in particular Sudan. Sudan sent

positive signals to the US following the nine eleven attacks and

offered intelligence cooperation. United States fully backed the

initiative of Inter Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD), a

body comprising seven regional countries, to resolve the Sudanese

conflict on the basis of the IGAD Declaration of Principles which

envisioned the right of self determination for the South. This also

formed the basis of later protocols and agreements leading to the

final Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Prior to that, in

October 2002, the US President passed the Sudan Peace Act

which threatened Sudanese Government with severe punitive

measures if it failed to comply with the IGAD Declaration of

Principles, besides pledging US$ 100 million of assistance for

Southern Sudan.

(6) Darfur Crisis. Darfur crisis erupted in 2003 while the

negotiations between the Sudanese Government and Southern

rebels were ongoing. The crisis was used to further build up

pressure on the Sudanese Government to arrive at a satisfactory

settlement with SPLA rebels. Another factor that evoked US

interest in Darfur was the construction of Chad-Cameroon Oil

27

Pipeline that came online in 2003 and carries Chadian Oil to the

Gulf of Guinea in Atlantic. Under pressure from the international

community, the Sudanese Government signed the Darfur Peace

Agreement (DPA) with Darfur rebels in 2006. Referendum to

determine the status of Darfur as a Region will be held in 2010.

b. US Geo-Strategic Interests – Stability in East Africa and Security of

the Red Sea Routes. Approximately 15-20% of the global maritime

trade, most of it between US/Europe and Asia/Africa, is carried out

through the Red Sea and Suez Canal route21, therefore, the security of the

sea lanes in the Region is of paramount importance for protection of

Western commercial interests. US involvement in Somalia in the nineties

reflects its sensitivity to instability in the Horn of Africa where US forces

are still operating under the ambit of CJTF-HOA. Sudan being the largest

country of the Region, and indeed the Continent, has the ability to

influence events in the neighbouring countries due to its ethno-religious

linkages. Several Islamist secessionist movements have cropped up in

Sudan’s neighbourhood since Al-Bashir’s Coup in 1989 and Sudan is

viewed as the main conduit for export of radical Islam in the Region. US

concerns with Sudan deepened after Sudan’s decision to host Osama Bin

Laden during early nineties and later with the bombing of its Kenyan and

Tanzanian embassies linked to Egyptian Islamic Jehad (EIJ) also hosted

by Sudan under the tutelage of Popular Arab and Islamic Conference

(PAIC). Al-Bashir has gradually renounced his associations with these

shady organizations ever since his falling out with Al-Tarabi and has

generally cooperated with US in the post nine eleven milieu but his

political dependence on the NCP (hence the Brotherhood) renders him

vulnerable to exploitation by Islamic ideologues currently occupying

positions of prominence in his regime. Sudan’s alleged nurturing of

Eritrean secessionists is also viewed with deep suspicion by not only US

but also Israel which has vital stakes in keeping the Red Sea routes open

21

Rodrigue, Jean Paul, “The Strategic Space of International Transportation”

28

and for which purpose it has allegedly established naval bases on Eritrean

islands of Dahlak and Fatma. Sudan is viewed by US and Israel as the

only overtly hostile African country on the Red Sea rim and hence must be

kept in check through diplomatic and even military posturing from

disturbing the present regional equation.

c. US Oil Interests

(1) Consumption. United States is the world’s largest consumer

of oil with an average daily consumption of over 20 million barrels

per day. Domestic production accounts for only about 35% of

consumption while over 65% requirement is met through imports,

which also makes US the world’s largest oil importer with import

requirements of over 13 million barrels per day or approximately 5

billion barrels per year (equivalent of Sudan’s total oil reserves).

(2) Reserves22. The most recent estimates indicate that out of world

total proven oil

reserves of

approximately 1300

billion barrels, 210

billion barrels are

held in the North

American Region

(including over 170

billion barrels of

Canadian reserves

and 21 billion

barrels of United

States), 122 billion

barrels in the Central & South American Region (with Venezuela

leading at approximately 100 billion barrels), 13 billion barrels in

Europe, approximately 100 billion barrels in Eurasia (including 60

22

Statistics courtesy US Energy Information Administration quoted from Oil and Gas Journal, 2009

29

billion barrels of Russia), 745 billion barrels in the Middle East &

Gulf, 34 billion barrels in Asia & Oceana (including 16 billion of

China, 5 billion of India, 4 billion of Indonesia and for interests sake

0.34 billion of Pakistan) and 117 billion barrels in Africa (including

43 billion of Libya, 36 billion of Nigeria, 12 billion of Algeria, 9 billion

of Angola, 6 billion of Sudan, 4 billion of Egypt, 2 billion of Gabon,

1.6 billion of Congo Brazaville, 1.5 billion of Chad and 1.1 billion of

Equatorial Guinea). African Oil, therefore, accounts for

approximately 9% of world’s total but is heavily concentrated in

North Africa and Niger Delta.

(3) US Oil Imports23. Approximately 35% of US oil demand is met

through domestic production while the remaining 65% is met

through imports. The profile of US oil imports indicates that US is

primarily dependent on North / South America and Middle East/

Gulf for its oil imports. However, in recent years US has sought to

diversify its oil imports with Africa emerging as one of the major

exporters. Presently, Africa makes up for about 20-25% of US oil

23

Statistics quoted from US Energy Information Administration

30

imports with Nigeria (10%), Angola (5%) and Algeria (5%) being the

main contributors while smaller producers including Chad, Gabon

and Equatorial Guinea also contribute in accordance with their

capacity. It may be noted that major oil exporting countries to US

are located on Africa’s Atlantic Coast while there are no significant

oil producers in the East African Region apart from Sudan which

mainly exports to China. US interest in Sudanese oil may therefore

be largely termed as “negative” with its denial to China and use as

a “tool of political coercion” being of more value than its export

potential to the US. The only prospects for Sudanese oil being

channelled to US would be heavily contingent upon resolution of

Darfur and South Sudan problems in accordance with US

perceptions thus allowing the oil to be exported through the Chad-

Cameroon pipeline via Darfur Region. This brings into prominence

the imp of Abyei area being the hub of pipeline infrastructure which

can be used as a launch pad for such an undertaking. Oil was

discovered in Sudan in the 80s but the Sudanese Civil War coupled

with lack of development of oil fields and associated facilities made

it impossible for the Sudanese Government to utilize the oil

resources. US pulled out all investment from Sudan during 80s and

90s and also led a sanctions regime to punish the Sudanese

Government for its opposition to US policies. Sudan was only able

to emerge as an oil exporter in late nineties after China exploited

the space left open by the US and invested heavily in developing oil

infrastructure in the country.

14. Chinese Interests

31

a. Economic Growth and Energy Requirements. China has

experienced monumental economic growth for over three decades but has

traditionally endeavoured to meet the corresponding increase in energy

32

consumption from domestic resources. However, the growing energy

demand led to China becoming a net oil importer in 1993 and is now the

second largest consumer (7.8 million barrels per day)24 after US and third

largest importer (3.9 million barrels per day)25 behind only the US and

Japan26. China’s oil consumption has been increasing by about 8% since

2002 while domestic oil production has increased by only 1.5% over the

last decade leading to a substantial gap between consumption and

production. China’s current oil consumption stands at over 7.8 million

barrels per day (compared to over 20 million of US) out of which nearly

half is met through imports27. The gap between production and

consumption is likely to increase further in the future which will increase

the net import requirements. Middle East remains the main supplier of oil

to

China making up nearly 50% of Chinese demand while African oil

accounts for over 30% of Chinese imports.

24

US Energy Information Administration 25

ibid 26

“China’s Thirst for Oil: Asia Report no 153”, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2008 27

“World Energy Outlook”, 2007

33

b. Need for Energy Security. China has remained concerned over the

security of energy supplies which are controlled by powerful oil

conglomerates and influenced by western importing nations, particularly

the United States. This sense of insecurity is rooted in the belief that the

powerful players on the global oil market may one day deny China the

access to energy that it requires28. This has led China to develop the

alternate strategy of physically acquiring and developing the untapped oil

resources of various countries by pressing its National Oil Companies

(NOCs) into service. This phenomenon refered to as “Equity Investment”

ensures guaranteed oil supplies from the particular fields in which

investment has been made by the Chinese oil companies. Over the years,

Chinese companies have made equity investments in oil fields in Thailand,

Canada, Peru, Indonesia, Venezuela, Sudan and Kazakhastan. Most

recent Chinese investments have been in Africa including in Chad and

Nigeria.

28

“China’s Thirst for Oil: Asia Report no 153”, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2008

34

c. Chinese Oil Interests in Sudan. China entered Sudanese oil

market in 1996 after US pressure led to pull out of all major western oil

companies from Sudan. China has today an investment of over US$ 8

billion in various oil projects in Sudan. China National Petroleum

Corporation (CNPC) acquired 40% shares in the consortium Greater Nile

Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) which operates Blocks 1,2 and

4 (refer oil map). CNPC also has 41% equity stake in the consortium

Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC) responsible for operations in Blocks

3 and 7 and 95% stakes in Block 6. CNPC also has 40% and 35% stakes

respectively in the two off shore Blocks 13 and 1529. The two major

pipelines carrying oil from Muglad and Melut Basins to Port Sudan have

been constructed by CNPC as is the third pipeline connecting Fula Fields

in Western Kardofan to Khartoum Refinery. CNPC also has 50% stakes in

Sudan’s major oil refinery at Khartoum. Sudanese oil accounts for 5-6% of

China’s total oil imports while Sudan’s exports to China account for 55% of

its total oil exports making China the largest oil importer from Sudan

followed by Japan (26%).

29

European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, “Sudan’s Oil Industry: Facts and Analysis”, April 2008

35

d. China’s Role in Sudan’s Civil War and Peace Agreements

(1) China has traditionally maintained close ties with Sudan apart from

a brief cooling off period following the 1989 Coup. However,

China’s quest for oil from non-traditional sources led it to become

the major player in the Sudanese oil market. China’s economic

expansion into Sudan was facilitated by US led international

isolation of Khartoum and Sudan’s need for economic and military

assistance to support the ongoing war with Southern rebels.

(2) SPLM/A has largely had an adversarial relationship with China due

to latter’s economic and alleged military support of the NCP led

Government. China has provided invaluable political support to the

Sudanese Government at various international forums, especially

at the United Nations where attempts to impose extensive

sanctions against Sudan were twice blocked by China (in 1996 and

2004). However, Chinese investments and commercial interests in

Sudan are limited in its overall economic calculus and are certainly

not worth protecting at the cost of antagonizing the US and the

West which are China’a major trading partners. This factor

eventually led China to support the US sponsored CPA in 2005,

leaving Sudan with not much options but to agree to its provisions.

(3) China has lately been attempting to foster good relations with

Southern Sudan and its current military deployment in Southern

Sudan as part of the United Nations’ Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

may be viewed as part of its efforts to mend fences with SPLM/A in

the event that the South chooses to seccede from the North in the

2011 referendum.

(4) China also encouraged the Sudanese Government to reach peace

agreement in Darfur and pledged to provide troops for the ensuing

United Nations deployment. It may be argued that China is trying to

encourage stability in Sudan in order to protect its interests and as

36

is typical of its policy of non-confrontation, has chosen to work with

the West instead of overtly opposing it. China is also making efforts

to hedge against the possible secession by the South by trying to

establish working relations with the Government of Southern

Sudan.

15. Indian Interests

a. Economic Growth and Energy Requirements. India has shown

robust economic growth

over the past decade

which has also led to

increase in its energy

requirements. Indian

domestic energy

production is far below its

requirement thus

necessitating import of

energy sources. Presently India is facing electricity shortages besides the

burden of a large oil import bill to meet its demands. Coal accounts for

over 50% of India’s total energy consumption followed by oil (31%)30.

Nuclear power currently makes up only about 1% of total energy

consumption but with the recent nuclear agreements with the United

States, the share of nuclear power in total energy consumption is

expected to improve significantly.

b. Oil Production and Consumption. India has proven oil reserves of

5.6 billion barrels and domestic oil production accounts for approximately

880,000 barrels per day31. This leaves a vast gap in demand and

production necessitating oil imports of over 2 million barrels per day (68%

of consumption) making it the fifth largest consumer and net importer of oil

behind only United States, Japan, China and Germany (In comparison

30

Source: US Energy Information Department 31

Source: Oil and Gas Journal.

37

Pakistan has proven oil reserves of only 0.3 billion barrels, production of

only 68,000 barrels, consumption of only 383,000 barrels and imports of

321,000 barrels making it world’s 34th largest consumer and 22nd largest

importer)32.

c. Indian Investments and Bilateral Trade with Sudan

(1) India has made deep inroads into Sudanese economy and is

currently the second largest exporter to Sudan behind only China.

The profile of Indo-Sudanese bilateral trade has risen sharply over

the past few years with the volume currently standing at

approximately US$ 1 billion33.

(2) Indian Government has identified what it calls five plus one priority

sectors for future investments including infrastructure, agriculture,

HRD, information and communication technologies and small and

medium industries while Plus one refers to development of energy

and manufacturing infrastructure. Indian investment projects

prudently cover both the North and South of the Country and India

was the first Asian country to establish a Consulate General at

Juba, the capital of South Sudan in 2007.

32

Source: US Energy Information Department 33

Source: Embassy of India in Sudan aval online,http://www.indembsdn.com/eng/india_sdn_partners.htm

38

(3) In January 2006, India extended a line of credit of US$ 350 million

to Sudan for setting up a 500 MW power project by state run Bharat

Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) and also extended a loan of US$

42 million for Singa-Gedarif Transmission Line. Indian investments

(mainly in oil and power sectors) and loans to Sudan currently

stand at over US$ 3 billion34.

(4) India entered Sudanese oil market in 2003 when the state owned

Oil and Gas Corporation (ONGC) acquired 40% stakes in the

Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) consortium

operating Blocks 1,2 and 4 in Muglad Basin. Recent Indian

investments include approximately 24% stakes in Blocks 5 A and

5B (Unity and Warab States) operated by the White Nile Petroleum

Operating Company (WNPOC) consortium. India currently imports

around 75,000 barrels per day from Sudan accounting for

approximately 4% of Indian oil imports.

(5) Despite heavy Indian investment in oil infrastructure, it is worth

noting that India is attempting to arrange its economic relations with

Sudan beyond oil by making strategic inroads into various sectors

of the Sudanese economy and is currently Sudan’s most important

economic partner besides China.

34

Source: Embassy of India in Sudan, http://www.indembsdn.com/eng/india_sdn_partners.htm

39

PART-III – FUTURE PROSPECTS

16. The future of Sudan seems uncertain at present as a number of issues remain

unresolved and various scenarios can be visualised to anticipate future developments.

The key scenarios revolve around the holding and outcome of National Elections and

Referendum on Southern secession. Both these issues are in turn dependent on

implementation of main CPA provisions and the extent of engagement of international

community. Ensuing discussion takes stock of present environment and prospects for

the future.

17. Issues Affecting Implementation of the CPA. The declared objective of

the CPA is to “make unity attractive” by addressing the divisive issues in a fair and

equitable manner. It provides principles and mechanisms for resolving issues related to

power and wealth sharing and security arrangements besides acceptance of the right of

“self determination” for people of the South which will be manifested through a

referendum at the end of six year interim period (July 2011). The agreement also lays

down mechanism for resolving the dispute over three contested areas including Abyei in

Western Kardofan, Nuba Mountains/ Southern Kardofan and Southern Blue Nile.

Certain key issues related to CPA are yet to be resolved leading to speculations about

its future. Moreover, certain developments in local and international politics are also

likely to affect CPA implementation. Major issues which may affect the implementation

of CPA include:-

a. Darfur Crisis and ICC’s Arrest Warrant. UNSG’s report to the

Security Council dated 7 Apr 2009 notes that the ICC’s arrest warrants

against President Al-Bashir for alleged human rights violations in Darfur,

issued in March 2009, remained the main topic of political discourse in the

Country. Oil prospects in Darfur are small but the Sudanese Government

perceives that US and its Western allies are using the Darfur issue as a

stick with which to beat the Al-Bashir Regime into submission over the

Southern issue. The arrest warrants are seen to be aimed at creating

political pressure on President Bashir and large rallies were taken out in

Khartoum and major Northern cities against the move. China, Arab

40

League and African Union called for a deferral of ICC’s process while

United States called for quick implementation of the warrant. Some

Western political observers hoped that ICC’s move would lead to internal

dissension within the NCP’s ranks which may lead to a possible coup

against Al-Bashir, “senior members of the NCP reportedly are considering

a number of options. According to senior Sudanese government officials,

the NCP leadership is reportedly pushing for President Bashir to go into

exile. They are also considering ousting Bashir from power through a

military coup, according to Sudanese sources…” Presently, the

Government has chosen to maintain silence on the issue of arrest warrant

but the problem may re-surface at some inconvenient time for President

Bashir which may lead him to consider some drastic action like

abandoning the CPA.

b. Border Demarcation

(1) A North-South Boundary Commission was established under the

CPA but has yet to come out with its final award. Abyei is one of the

important areas of dispute due to the location of some of the most

productive oil fields within its confines. CPA provides for

referendum in Abyei area in 2011 for deciding its preference for

South or remaining as a special administrative area within Northern

Sudan. However, delimitation of Abyei’s boundaries has remained

a bone of contention between North and South.

(2) Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) came out with its award in July

41

2004 assigning a much larger area (over 25,000 Sq km) to Abyei

than was acceptable to Sudanese Government35 which claimed

that the Commission had not taken into account the transfer of 9

Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms to Southern Kardofan in 1905 and had

exceeded its mandate in interpretation and implementation of its

mandate. The case was referred to Hague based International

Court of Justice’s Permanent Court of Arbitration.

(3) The Tribunal appointed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration came

out with its findings in July 2009 accepting the GoS contention that

the ABC had indeed exceeded its mandate and delimited a new

boundary containing a much lesser area (10,460 Sq Kms) than was

awarded by ABC. Most of the Abyei producing fields lie outside the

boundary delimited by the Tribunal.

(4) However, the importance of Abyei in overall production has

significantly reduced over the years not only due to increase in

Sudanese overall production but also due to reduction in Abyei’s

output. Abyei accounted for nearly 25% of total oil production in

2003 which reduced to only 7% in 200736 and approximately 6% in

2008. Production figures are likely to reduce further and by the time

of referendum in 2011 it is expected that Abyei question will have

become largely irrelevant in terms of oil production, however,

Abyei’s importance due to pipeline infrastructure will remain intact.

c. Security

(1) Security situation especially in Southern Sudan has considerably

deteriorated over the past few months with several incidents of

violence reported since February 2009. Tribal infighting in Southern

Sudan, clashes between SAF and SPLA elements of Joint

Integrated Units (JIUs) and forays into South Sudanese territory by

35

In spite of the CPA provisions declaring the determinations of the ABC to be final and binding. 36

European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, “Sudan’s Oil Dossier”, April 2008.

42

Uganda based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) accounted for scores

of killings during the current year.

(2) On 24 February, clashes between SAF and SPLA elements of JIU

in Malakal caused 62 deaths and injuries to 94 persons. Tribal

rivalries among Dinka, Nuer, Murle and Shilluk are likely to escalate

further as the Dinka dominated SPLM/A is perceived to be in

cahoots with the North to deny independence to the Southerners.

(3) More than 1200 people have been killed this year in ethnic fighting

in Southern Sudan. 453 people were killed in a Lou Nuer Tribe (a

sub-tribe of Nuer) raid on a Murle (one of the smallest tribes in

South Sudan) village in Jonglei State between March 5-13, 177

people were killed in retaliatory attack by Murle fighters on Lou

Nuer villages on April 18/19, 185 people were killed in a Murle

attack on a Lou Nuer fishing settlement in Jonglei State on 2

August, 38 people were killed in a Lou Nuer attack on a Dinka

Village in Jonglei on 28 August and in the latest round of violence

more than 100 people were killed in a Lou Nuer attack on a Dinka

settlement in Jonglei on 21 September.

(4) Southern politicians perceive that Khartoum is arming southern

militias and civilian groups to spread unrest ahead of elections and

referendum. Khartoum is also accused of supporting the LRA

across the Ugandan border and LRA’s latest activities in Southern

Sudan including raiding and burning of several villages in Equatoria

Region in which over 200 people have died since late 2008, have

reinforced this perception. However, Khartoum in turn accuses

United States and Uganda of arming the tribes and provoking

violence to create unrest and “hatred of North” among Southerners.

(5) Security situation in the South has the potential of escalating

violence in Sudan which will be detrimental not only for the

implementation of CPA but may also lead to renewed fighting

between the North and South.

43

d. Political Environment

(1) National Census. Sudanese census was held from 22 April to 6

May 2008. Preliminary results were released in July 2009 but were

immediately contested by the South declaring the statistics to have

been manipulated by the NCP Government in favour of the North.

According to official figures the total population of Sudan has been

estimated to be 39 million out of which over 30 million are residents

of the North while South Sudan’s population was estimated to be

approximately 8 million. Only 0.5 million southerners were

determined to be living in the North. SPLM expecting much higher

population figures for the South than what were declared expressed

grave dissatisfaction with the results stating that the South

Sudanese population was at least one third of Sudan’s total

population. Dispute over census may result in many South

Sudanese political forces giving a call for boycott of forthcoming

National Elections.

(2) National Elections and Referendum. Elections in Sudan were to

be held by July 2009 in accordance with the CPA, however, after

many deferrals and postponements the National Election

Commission has now announced that elections would be held in

April 2010. Opposition parties have accused the Government of

violating the provisions and spirit of the the Election Law passed

last year by the Sudanese Parliament. The Commission itself is not

seen as impartial and there is a general perception that the

elections are likely to be rigged by the NCP. Referendum on

South’s secession is to be held in 2011, however, the Southern

parties find themselves at loggerheads with the ruling NCP over the

Referendum Law currently under discussion in the Parliament. NCP

is insisting on at least 75% majority to make secession possible

while SPLM thinks that 50% votes would be sufficient to enable the

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South to secede. Uncertainty over the important issues of Elections

and Referendum is likely to increase political tensions in the future.

(3) Positions of Political Parties

(a) NCP. NCP is firmly entrenched in the seat of power and

appears unwilling to yield on key issues. Most observers

consider NCP as the major obstacle in implementation of

CPA and for prospects of unity in Sudan. The Party which is

effectively the GoS, has procrastinated on implementation of

several key provisions of CPA including power and wealth

sharing and is deeply mistrusted by opposition in North and

Southern secessionists. NCP recently boycotted an All

Parties Conference at Juba called by SPLM to resolve major

differences on various issues confronting Sudan including

the results of census and the deadlock over Referendum Bill.

Analysts are of the view that NCP will use all means to delay

the elections and referendum.

(b) Northern Opposition Parties. Opposition parties in the

North have been endeavouring to forge a combined front

against the NCP alongside SPLM, considering it the only

viable option to retain unity of the Country. However, the

opposition is currently weak and faces too many internal

dissensions to play its part effectively. During the recent

Juba Conference, the opposition parties tried to find a

common ground to resolve their differences and present a

strong front to the NCP. Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s Umma Party and

SPLM declared formation of an alliance to adopt a common

position on forthcoming elections and Referendum.

(c) SPLM. Being NCP’s partner in the Government of

Unity (GONU), SPLM publicly supports reconciliation efforts

between North and the South. However, NCPs tough

bargaining tactics makes it appear weak in the eyes of other

45

Southern groups leading it to take occasional tough stances

on some issues. SPLM is aware that the popular sentiment

in the South is heavily pro-secession, however, it is also

cognizant of the difficulties that will result from adopting such

a course of action. Presently, SPLM wants to negotiate best

terms for the South as regards wealth sharing and security

arrangements. It is likely that SPLM would favour delayed

Elections and Referendum while paying a lip service to

timely implementation of CPA provisions.

(d) Southern Opposition Parties. Southern opposition

parties are as mistrustful of SPLM as they are of the

Government in Khartoum. SPLM is now largely seen as a

Dinka dominated cabal in cahoots with Khartoum attempting

to deny the Southerners their right of self determination.

Southern opposition parties mostly represent a particular

tribe or clan and they see Dinka as the new enemy out to

wrest control of Southern Sudan’s oil resources. In case of

secession from the North or even a delay in elections and

referendum, tribal infighting in the South is a very realistic

possibility.

e. Interests of External Powers. China and United States are the two

major players with contrasting interests in Sudan. Interestingly, though,

both would like limited implementation of CPA for entirely different

reasons. Chinese oil interests would be severely hampered in case of

secession by South as it would portend an uncertain future for its oil

investments which lie mainly in the South. It would also involve new

negotiations, new discussions and new deals both with the North and the

South to protect the Chinese investments besides ensuring un-interrupted

supplies from the Southern oil fields through the Northern pipelines and

Sea Port. An independent South with a history of mistrust of the Chinese

is more likely to be under the US influence and may not be sympathetic to

46

Chinese interests. China would therefore like to see the implementation of

CPA as long as it serves to “make unity attractive” through transparency in

wealth sharing and increase in developmental spending in the South.

However, the promised referendum in the South is likely to work against

the Chinese interests, therefore, agreed postponement of referendum for

a few more years would be the best case scenario for China. US, on the

other hand, is profoundly anxious to see the referendum clause invoked

and is likely to employ a “carrot and stick” policy to see it through.

Apparently, US is likely to pressurise Sudanese Government over the

Darfur issue, put personal pressure on President Al-Bashir over the ICC

arrest warrant and may hand out incentives by reviewing its sanctions

regime to eventually ensure holding of referendum at the stipulated time.

Secession of the South will give immense leverage to the US to put

stumbling blocks in the way of Chinese access to oil besides creation of a

friendly state in an important region of Africa, however, US interests would

be just as well served if Sudan sinks back to the Civil War.

18. Future Scenarios37. The upshot of ongoing peace process could either be

a United or bifurcated Sudan but that would depend upon political choices made by

Sudanese politicians and its people during the upcoming National Elections and

Southern Referendum. The road to elections and referendum is hazardous and may

lead Sudan in an entirely different direction. Based upon the present political realities,

following scenarios can be developed for Sudan’s immediate future:-

a. Return to Civil War. This is a very real possibility given the present

political standing of NCP in the North and quick deterioration of support for

SPLM in the South. NCP is unwilling to yield on several key issues

including the census, referendum and border demarcation while SPLM is

facing internal dissensions due to its perceived appeasement of the North

on the question of secession. Weakening of SPLM could increase

violence and chaos in the south which could then be used by the NCP to

resort to military means to establish law and order prior to elections and

37

Reference: Van der Lijn, Jain, “Sudan 2012, Scenarios for the Future”, IKV Pax Kristi

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referendum. This would be a signal for southern separatists to openly

challenge the writ of GoSS and come out openly in favour of secession.

NCP is likely to use the differences to further divide the southerners but

this may backfire as it would also put immense pressure on SPLM to leave

its ambiguous stand and openly support independence. Khartoum’s

alleged support of southern rebel groups could also lead SPLM to support

separatists in Darfur and East. This situation may then be used by hostile

external powers to create further destabilisation in Sudan.

b. Secession. Secession is a popular but extremely difficult choice for the

South. Presently, the South is not politically and economically prepared for

secession and such a course of action could increase the prevalent chaos.

Even if the secession is achieved peacefully, i.e. through the promised

referendum, there is a great likelihood of the South itself plunging into

tribal warfare over control of resources and due to inability of the Southern

Government to bring about economic development at a quick pace.

Moreover, South will have to offer attractive terms to the North for use of

oil refining and transportation infrastructure besides maintenance of

cordial relations. A civil war in the South could see flight of international

investments exacerbating the economic problems of the fledgling State

and create another war ravaged country in Africa. Forcible achievement of

secession could result in an all out war between the North and the South.

c. Unity. This is the most unlikely yet most attractive scenario for Sudan’s

future. Unity is not popular among southerners and they are unlikely to opt

for it in the referendum. The best way to preserve unity is for the

Sudanese opposition parties to forge a strong and credible alliance with

SPLM during the forthcoming elections to dislodge the NCP from the

Government. This would bridge the trust deficit that currently exists

between the North and the South. This could be followed by renegotiation

of the terms of peace agreement to allow more time for unity to be

attractive for the South. For this scenario to work, international community,

especially the powers with high stakes in Sudan, will have to play their

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part in convincing the Sudanese political parties of the mutual benefits

which may accrue from unity as opposed to chaos and destruction that

might follow from adopting confrontational courses.

Conclusion

19. Sudan finds itself at an important political and historical cross-roads facing

numerous challenges threatening its viability as the largest African Country. Clearly,

narrow vision espoused by the Northern political elite who identify themselves more

closely with their Arab Islamic roots rather than the cultural and religious diversity that a

large country like Sudan demands, has engendered sense of deprivation and dejection

among other sections of population. Even now, when the Country is at the verge of

division, Sudan’s Northern elite still finds it difficult to let go of its hold over the country’s

resources and accept the right of equality and freedom for the others. The South, on the

other hand, is unable to fully comprehend the pitfalls of secession and how such a

course of action can reduce its economic opportunities instead of enhancing them. The

Southerners have to overcome their own differences and avoid becoming proxies of

external powers in plunging the Country into a new phase of civil war.

20. The CPA which was meant to make unity attractive by allowing equitable

distribution of resources and more development in the South has so far not been very

successful in achieving that purpose largely due to procrastination by the North on

many of its key provisions causing further mistrust in the South. All stakeholders need to

work more vigorously to make CPA a success and make re-adjustments to allow more

time for reflection on reconsideration of hardened stances adopted by the main parties.

External powers will keep on pursuing their interests in Sudan as they do elsewhere in

the world. It is up to Sudanese to channelize these external influences and interests in

accordance with their own national priorities.