Environmental Peacebuilding in Sudan and South Sudan: Is Benefit Sharing Enough for Peace?

Sudan and South Sudan: Is Benefit Sharing Enough for Peace? Howell

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Environmental Peacemaking in Sudan and South Sudan:

Is Benefit Sharing Enough to Establish Lasting Peace in the Context of Oil Revenues?

Sarah Howell

May 2, 2013

Environmental Peacemaking

Prof. Abitbol

SIS-619-030


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Introduction

Sudan’s long history of internal conflict, repression and marginalization of its people, has

had significant negative impacts on the subsequent peacebuilding efforts. Despite the efforts of

the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 to end the brutal civil war between Sudan and South Sudan,

leadership, policies and politics have contributed to the erosion of peace again and again. Self-

serving economic, development, and agricultural policies have favored the minority elites that

primarily live in the urban centers such as Khartoum, and continue to by-pass the needs of the

rural majority living in distant states away from the capital. This consistent marginalization of its

people has helped to fuel civil conflicts, which have been linked to disputes over land and natural

resources.

Today, despite recent promises for dialogue, the cease-fires, and the negotiation tables at

work to establish peace between the two countries, the question of how each state should benefit

from oil resources still remains to be addressed. A history of mistrust and asymmetrical power

relations between the two states permeates the nature of recent events and discussions. For

progress to be made to establish peace in the region, the concept of benefit sharing – a practice

very common in natural resource management policy today – will have to be deconstructed and

critically analyzed as a framework for peacebuilding. This paper will take a look at the specific

context of peacebuilding in Sudan and till then deconstruct the theory of benefit sharing as a

method for ensuring equity and sustainable utilization of resources. By doing so, it will address

whether benefit sharing is an adequate approach for environmental peacebuilding in the context

of Sudan and South Sudan.

Environment and Conflict Connection

The terrain of discourse regarding the interconnected nature of conflict, natural resources,

and the environment is diverse and varied. From Homer-Dixon’s thesis of environmental change

and resource scarcity as a catalyst for violence1, the discourse has recently evolved to reflect a

more nuanced analyses of whether there exists a direct link between the environment and violent

1 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 76-119; or Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).


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conflict, as typified by Gleditsch.2 The relationship between natural resources, environmental

change, and violence is not as significant an indicator of conflict as previously thought. Better

indicators of violent conflict include economic and political characteristics, for instance,

development and forms of government.3 Natural resources play a role in determining the

intensity and the duration of a violent conflict, but are poor predictors of conflict erupting. In the

case of Sudan and South Sudan, oil resource extraction has turned out to be a thorn in the side of

the peace building process, extending the duration and intensity of Sudan’s second civil war and

serving as a focal point of the South’s resistance to Sudanese rule. Unless the historical, cultural,

and political root causes of insecurity in the region are addressed, benefit sharing and resource

management mechanisms governing the extraction of oil resources will not be enough to

establish a durable peace.

The Colonial Legacy

Great Britain’s colonial rule and patterns of development in Sudan between 1898 and

1956 reflected policies that benefited a few and marginalized many throughout the various

regions of the country. This set the roots of the economic, social, and political inequity and

distrust of the central governing body that has continued until modern times. Additionally, the

British policy of restricting cultural exchange, trade, education and development from the north

to the southern regions of Sudan drew a “line in the sand” across which north-south animosity

and conflict could be directed.4 This division ultimately led to the secession and recent creation

of the new state of South Sudan, but not without a tumultuous and violent path.

After Sudan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1956, Young describes the

country as a place “…characterized by the wealth of a few and the poverty of the majority, by

fierce competition for resources in conditions of scarcity, and a state which controlled the

production and distribution of material and social resources…”5 The tight-fisted nature of

Sudanese state control over resources created the target for social conflict that would develop

2 Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Environmental Conflict and the Democratic Peace,” in Gleditsch, ed., Conflict and the Environment (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). 3 Ken Conca, “The Case for Environmental Peacemaking,” in Conca and Dabelko, eds., Environmental Peacemaking (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002). 4 For more on the history of Sudan’s colonialist legacy, see John Young, The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process (New York: Zed Books, 2012); Justin D. Leach, War and Politics in Sudan: Cultural Identities and the Challenges of the Peace Process (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 5 Young, The Fate of Sudan, 3.


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over the next few decades. Post-colonial access to political representation was not equally

distributed across Sudan, with the imbalance of power heavily skewed to serve the interests of

regions in proximity to the central government located in Khartoum. The Khartoum government,

located on the White Nile, was largely concerned with serving the interests of those closest and

their ethnic supporters. These roots in inequity, coupled with the political imposition of Arab-

Islamic identity across the country through indoctrination of sharia law, helped to further the

marginalize the periphery – largely the non-Arab-Islamic ethnic groups of southern Sudan.

While the non-Muslim Africans in South Sudan were not the first group to resist the north’s

brutal efforts to impose Islamic and Arabic ideologies, they certainly were the first to respond in

a violent nature.6

The various conflicts of Sudan’s recent history – the First and Second Civil Wars, the

Darfur conflict and genocide, and the disputed border territories – while often regarded by the

international community and media as separate conflicts, are all interrelated and stem from the

post-colonial legacy of power, control, and coercion. Past attempts to establish peace agreements

and peacebuilding often have ignored the multi-dimensional nature of the conflicts; the myopic

approach of diplomacy and peace negotiations has produced weak peace agreements, which do

not incorporate all the various stakeholders at the table. These agreements have ultimately

eroded. Though future policies regarding Sudanese conflict should not treat each conflict as

being divorced from the others, the scope of this paper and analysis of will be focused on north-

south relations between Sudan and South Sudan, particularly regarding oil resource

development. The particular policy towards incorporating oil resource wealth sharing into the

peace process needs to be evaluated in depth if action is going to lead to peace in the region.

Sudan’s Civil Wars, the Role of Oil, and Failure to Establish Lasting Peace

When the British colonialists turned over the political power to Khartoum elites, there

was discontent throughout Sudan, particularly so for the southern Sudanese Africans who saw

this as simply an exchange of power from one colonial rule to another.7 The first civil war in

Sudan between the Southerners and the Sudanese state, began with colonial independence and

6 Ibid., 17. 7 Young, 3.


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the pro-Arabic-Islamic agenda of “Sudanization” of society by the Khartoum government.8 True

to Khartoum’s tight-fisted control of political representation, the Southerners were not

represented by the central government and did not condone the coercive ideological policies that

the new regime was promoting for an Islamic identity for all of Sudan. In “Anyanya” the

southern resistance took to fighting the central government in a costly fight, which was later

brought to a close two decades later with the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972.9

The period between the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement until 1983 was promising

for peace. It is characterized as a time where the distrust between the Southerners and

Northerners seemed to relax as the agreement “responded to the Southerners’ sense of insecurity,

both in their capacity as individuals and as a part of a larger community.”10 The agreement –

which included the Sudanese Nimeiri regime as a signature party – acknowledged the existence

of ethnic, religious, cultural, and lingual diversity of Sudan, which sounded promising to the

ethnically diverse marginalized minorities. Additionally, the agreement’s framework provided

the space for government to address the various economic, social, and political needs of its

people. However, as time proceeded, the conditions of the Agreement were methodically eroded

by the subversive actions of the Nimeiri regime to undermine the economic development,

political balance of power, and respect for cultural differences of the South.

When Chevron discovered oil in South Sudan in 1978 along the border region with

Sudan, this discovery of future wealth and development only added to the suspicions the

Southerners had towards the central government. The financial wealth sharing conditions in the

Agreement allocated all revenues from the South to the regional treasury, effectively placing any

profits from oil development out of the clutches of the North. Instead of trying to renegotiate

these conditions of wealth sharing, the central Sudan government created a new map with

boundary lines that placed the oil resources in the North. This attempt to exercise control over

the oil and potential wealth was met with much resistance, and so the North decided to try to

control the export process of the oil and thus constructed a pipeline and refineries on the Red

8 Mey Eltayeb Ahmed, “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Does not Guarantee Peace,” in Sudan’s Wars and Peace Agreements, eds. Jay Spaulding, Stephanie Beswick, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard A. Lobban, Jr. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 118-119. 9 Ibid. 10 Taisier M. Ali, Robert O. Matthews, and Ian S. Spears, “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan and Angola,” in Durable Peace: Challenges for peacebuilding in Africa, eds. Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 283-285.


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Sea, where the oil could be exported. This option allowed the North to control the refinement and

export tariffs, while the production of oil remained in the South. By the end of 1983, Addis

Ababa Agreement had all but eroded with the North tightening its clutch on the economic,

political and social autonomy of the South. In September 1983, in opposition to Nimeiri’s

attempt to impose Islamic religion over all people of Sudan, the Sudan Peoples Liberation

Movement and Army (SPLM-A) took up arms and reengaged the North in the Second Civil

War.11

From 1983 until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the

government of Sudan engaged the South and the SPLM-A in civil war. During this war –

classified as the world’s longest running civil war – around 2 million people have died from war-

related casualties, famine, and disease, and approximately 4 million have been internally

displaced as a result of the Sudanese civil war.12 Throughout the 22-year war and period of great

social, economic, and political instability in the South, the region experienced a push of

momentum to develop the oil resources that had been discovered in 1979 just prior to the war

erupting. Led initially by the development of United States’ Chevron, oil development in South

Sudan proceeded first with caution, and then with great fury, both by international and national

companies. The Sudanese companies, however, attempted to regain control of international oil

lease holdings following a in 1989 coup, forcing Chevron to transfer holdings to a Sudanese

intermediary; later on, due to a lack of capacity to develop the oil leases, Sudan eventually

sought international corporations to take over the concessions and proceed with oil

development.13

The influx of development by foreign investment and national intermediary companies

had great impact on the shape of the political economy of Sudan. Though the size of the reserves

in Sudan and South Sudan will never be enough to make either country a top oil producer, oil

plays an important part to shaping the economy, due to the support services and industry it

requires. The foreign direct investment by China, India, Malaysia, and others has grown with the

11 Ibid., 285-294. 12 U.S. Committee for Refugees, Sudan: Nearly 2 million dead as a result of the world’s longest running civil war, http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm 2001. Archived 10 December 2004 on the Internet Archive http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm. 13 Laura M. James, “The Oil Boom & its Limitations in Sudan,” in Sudan Looks East: China, India & the Politics of Asian Alternatives, eds. Daniel Large and Luke A. Patey (Suffolk, UK: James Currey, 2011), 55-56.


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oil sector, resulting in development of supportive infrastructure, like transportation and power,

and an expanded services sector, such as telecommunications and finance. The equitable

distribution of benefits from development in the region still remains to be seen, as development

of these economic sectors do not necessarily reach the rural agriculturalists or pastoralists. The

presence of oil wealth has the capacity to develop better social, educational, and economic

services for all Sudanese; however, as it stands now, “oil reserves [have given] added emphasis

to wealth sharing, geography, and even identity” in the region’s conflict, and has made the

resolution of the war and the peacemaking process much more difficult.14 The relationship

between oil, violence, identity and Southern independence must be acknowledged for peace to

move forward.

The violence and civil conflict was mainly rooted in ideological differences between the

Sudanese state and the communities of the South, as well an effort by the South to maintain

autonomous political, social, and economic control. This political and social tension was not

lessened by the rapid development of the oil sector, which saw the most growth in South Sudan.

Oil was the opportunity for South Sudan to establish an economy, build its export revenue, and

build the governance and social services to support its communities. Oil also undermined the

peace negotiations and process that ultimately lead to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA) in 2005, by becoming a source of distrust between the South and the North. After the

completion of the pipeline in 1999, oil flowed from South Sudan to Sudan for export. During the

peace process, fearing the North would use profits from the exportation of oil (which happened

during more peaceful times) to fuel the conflict, the SPLM-A would attack the oil production

sites or block the pipeline to limit the oil that could be exported. The vicious cycle of violence

and mistrust would continue between the two sides until eventually the CPA was signed. What

went wrong with the CPA? This next section argues that a lack of attention to political and social

root causes of the tension underlying oil resource benefit sharing undermined the peace process.

14 Leach, 136.


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Benefit Sharing: Is it Enough to Sustain Peace?

Natural resources play an important part in the peacemaking process, and if not properly

addressed, can undermine peace, as was the case with Sudan and the SPLM-A and oil.15 In order

to overcome the mistrust and perceived risk of peace affecting the access certain actors have to a

resource, natural resources need to be directly addressed as part of the peacemaking and

peacekeeping process. As suggested by UNEP, the peace process must integrate discussions and

peace processes that establish wealth or benefit sharing procedures.16 Benefit sharing is an

important and common aspect for natural resource management, and is usually proposed as a

way to involve communities in sharing and sustainably managing resources in the best way

possible. Chapter 3 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is almost exclusively devoted to

wealth sharing related to oil revenues; the CPA appears to follow UNEP’s recommendations, so

why did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan fail to sustain

peace in the region? To answer this, one must deconstruct what benefit sharing means.

Environmental policies and natural resource management strategies often include

“benefit sharing” as an aspect of sustainable use. Benefit sharing, in practice, is the foundation

for community-based resource management where communities govern the use of a shared

resource in a way that is sustainable for future generations. The theory of benefit sharing has its

roots in the “public use commons system” as described by the essays of Susan Buck and Elinor

Ostrom.17 In literature on ecosystem services, the benefits that humans gain from ecosystem

services, whether provisioning, regulating, supporting, or cultural benefits, are shared among

those who are there to experience them, as well as future generations.18 Many environmental

initiatives such as community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) for conservation

and also combating deforestation and forest degradation through REDD+ rely on benefit sharing

as an important pillar of methodology and as an indicator of the relative success of the initiative.

15 United Nations Environment Programme, “From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment,” (Nairobi: UNEP, 2009), 11. 16 Ibid., 28. 17 See Susan J. Buck, “No Tragedy on the Commons,” in Green Planet Blues: Four Decades of Environmental Politics, eds. Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 46-54; Nives Dolšak and Elinor Ostrom, The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). 18 Bank of Natural Capital, Different Kinds of Ecosystem Services, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) Study, United Nations Environment Programme, http://bankofnaturalcapital.com/2010/10/12/the-different-kinds-of-ecosystem-services/


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When considering the theory of benefit sharing, there are two aspects that should be

considered: the benefit and beneficiaries; the mechanism for sharing the benefit.19 The implicit

characteristic associated with “sharing” is that there is a level of equality that each beneficiary

feels is adequate to justify modifying individual, selfish behavior for the benefit of all others.

Whether this behavior is governed by community customs, traditions, taboos, or legal statute, all

beneficiaries and actors are in agreement that the result of sharing a benefit is more valuable than

if pursued for selfish gain.

However, the process of establishing benefit sharing mechanisms in the setting of

environmental policy could be recreating existing power asymmetry if one beneficiary feels they

are not receiving the full benefit from the arrangement. This could occur if one party has to

compromise their demands in order to reach an agreement with others. When agreements are

drafted, this power asymmetry gets written into law, unless precautions are taken to avoid

perpetuating structural violence. When engaging with political and state actors, particularly in

peacemaking and peacebuilding activities involving natural resources, practitioners, leaders,

diplomats, and negotiators need to be vigilant that such asymmetry is not perpetuated by the

arrangement itself.

In the case of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with Sudan and South Sudan, power

asymmetry existed and was duplicated in three ways. First, the agreement was made between

only the dominant political leadership of Sudan (the National Congress Party, NCP) and the

SPLM-A; no other minority or marginalized political party or group was allowed to participate in

any negotiations. The process of political elites making decisions for the whole was replicated.

Second, state governance type was very different between the parties; Sudan’s government was

well established, and still treated South Sudan as a colonial body under its determination. The

Government of South Sudan, soon to be the world’s youngest state, was still developing its

political and social structures. The imbalance of power and effective governance capacity

between Sudan and South Sudan was drastic and this threatened the likelihood for sustaining

peace post-CPA.20 Third, South Sudan felt disempowered regarding the sharing of oil resource

19 See for example, Diji C. Behr, Eileen M. Cunningham, George Kajembe, Gimbage Mbeyale, Steve Nsita, Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, “Benefit Sharing in Practice: Insights for REDD+ Initiatives,” PROFOR (Washington, DC: World Bank, February 2012). 20 Peter Adwok Nyaba, “SPLM-NCP Asymmetrical Power Relations Jeopardise the Implementation of the CPA and the Future of the Sudan,” International Journal of African Renaissance Studies- Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity 5, no. 1 (2010): 138-147.


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wealth with Sudan. This was characterized by the inability of South Sudan to be able to confirm

the oil export numbers that are reported Sudan. With a lack of capacity for tracking and

monitoring this data, the South Sudan government is skeptical that the information made

available by the government in Khartoum is accurate. This scenario is described in detail in a

Global Witness report published in 2009.21 A series of characteristics in the data that was

reported by Khartoum was not within the guidelines of the CPA, according to the report. The

economic and political opacity of relations between Sudan and South Sudan following the CPA

regarding the export, sales, and transfer of benefits from oil wealth, continued to erode the

integrity of the CPA, particularly regarding resource management.

Following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the distrust and lack of process

transparency was exemplified when, despite over a year of negotiations for new oil wealth

sharing regulations, Sudan took oil from South Sudan for export, undermining any amount of

momentum for peace.22 In January 2012, South Sudan decided to punish Sudan’s actions and

shut down all export of oil to Sudan, which was an economically and socially risky move for a

new nation whose economy is more than 97% dependent on oil revenue.23 Recently there have

been promising developments and South Sudan has presented new legislation for sustainable

management of oil. In early April of 2013, despite the risk of lack of transparency and corruption

in the oil industry, South Sudan resumed oil production and transport to Sudan for export. In

order for trust to be built up again, systems of information sharing, transparency about oil

revenues, exports, prices, as well as contracts and land holdings need to be available.

Transparency and accountability are critical to consider alongside the impacts of actors, power

dynamics, and persistent structural violence between the North and South. Though all of these

aspects risk undermining the tentative peace that has so far been established in the region,

peaceful benefit sharing of oil may be possible.

21 Global Witness, “Fueling Mistrust: The Need for Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Industry,” report published September 2009. 22 Global Witness, South Sudan’s oil production restarts amid concerns about transparency, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/south-sudan%E2%80%99s-oil-production-restarts-amid-concerns-about-transparency 23 Ibid.


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Conclusion

As illustrated with the case of Sudan and South Sudan, simply including “benefit

sharing” as a part of a peace agreement will not result in lasting peace if there are other factors

which undermine the full realization of benefit sharing. These other factors include ingrained

structural violence, power asymmetry, and the context of conflict and history of the region.

Another factor which was not directly addressed but that can be an important factor in creating

positive peace is the role of various actors. Whether they are communities or international

NGO’s, various actors can play an important role in helping to guarantee or undermine the

peacemaking process. This is especially true when these actors are involved in the use, economy,

or governance of natural resources.

Peacemaking and peacebuilding agreements, if they are to include a wealth or benefit-

sharing scheme as part of establishing peace between two or more parties, need to fully

deconstruct the implicit meanings and implications for such a scheme to occur if the process is to

lead to positive peace. After a long and violent road, Sudan and South Sudan have laid down

some key stepping stones for peaceful and equitable use of oil resources as a source for

economic and social development. Their path to peace is still a work in progress, one which will

continue for generations; the full impact and outcome of this process and wealth sharing

negotiations will have to wait to be seen.


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Bibliography

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Sudan’s Wars and Peace Agreements, edited by Jay Spaulding, Stephanie Beswick, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard A. Lobban, Jr., 117-130. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010.

Ali, Taisier M., Robert O. Matthews, and Ian S. Spears. “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan and

Angola.” In Durable Peace: Challenges for peacebuilding in Africa, edited by Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, 282-311. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.

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James, Laura M. “The Oil Boom & its Limitations in Sudan.” In Sudan Looks East: China, India & the Politics of Asian Alternatives, edited by Daniel Large and Luke A. Patey, 52-69. Suffolk, UK: James Currey, 2011.

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Resources and the Environment.” Nairobi: UNEP, 2009. United States Committee for Refugees. Sudan: Nearly 2 million dead as a result of the world’s

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Environmental Peacebuilding in Sudan and South Sudan: Is Benefit Sharing Enough for Peace?

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