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5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam University, 10-12 September 2009

Section: Reconceptualizing the transition in new EU member states

Panel: Problems of stabilization of party system in new democracies

Institutionalization of the modes of party competition: Emerging bipolar competition in the

CEE party systems?

Mizuho NAKADA-AMIYA（Nagoya University, Japan）

(m.nakada@law.nagoya-u.ac.jp)

<Abstruct>

This paper is an attempt to analyze the party competition structure, which is an important

dimension of party system, taking the 2006 election of Czech Republic and Slovakia as cases. With

bipolarization hypothesis in mind, which suggest the emergence of bipolar competition in CEE

countries, this study offer empirical research mainly based on the careful examination of parties’

election programs. For the precise analysis, the party’s linkage strategy is divided into three linkage

modes, 1)programmatic linkage mode, 2)charismatic leadership linkage mode and 3)linkage mode by

social group identification, corresponding to the types of linkages suggested by Kitschelt (2007). The

entire party competition structure would be appeared as a sum of the party competition structure in

each linkage mode.

This paper’s conclusion is threefold. First, when we put focus on party competition structure, the

same inclination for bipolar competition was observed in Czech and Slovak party systems, as in west

and north European party systems. Secondly, though bipolarization was observed in both countries

under research, its dynamics were very complex and different from the simple ideal bipolarism. Even

when bipolar competition existed in several linkage modes, other linkage modes with different

competition patterns also affected the party competition structure. Thirdly, focusing on party

competition structure, the relatively “stable” Czech party system was found to be changing, and in

the “unstable” Slovak party system, the long-lasting stable element was observed, thought it is

necessary to consider several further elements to predict the future trend of party competition

structure, because of the complex character of bipolarism in these two cases.

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0. Introduction

0-1. Party competition structure in Party system.

Party systems of new democracies have several common features; high electoral volatility,

emergence of new parties, sudden decline of once seemingly established parties, disintegration and

merger of parties, et cetra. With usual analytical focus on party numbers, voters' party identification

and cleavage structures, these features all seem to suggest instability of party systems. Among the

Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic and Hungary are classified to relatively stable cases, while

Poland and Slovakia to unstable cases.

However, party systems are composed of parties, which compete on both electoral and government

formation level (Wolinetz 2006, 51). It is necessary to focus more on “party competitions” besides

party numbers and party lineup to analyze the stabilization of the CEE party systems.

In this paper, we will take relatively “stable” party system of the Czech Republic and “unstable”

party system of Slovakia as cases, and analyze the party competition structures of these two party

systems, as seen in the latest parliamentary elections in 2006.

0-2.Bipolarism

When we examine party competition in CEE countries, it is also interesting whether we can

observe bipolarism there. It is pointed out that bipolarism is observed in both established

democracies in northern and Western Europe and new democracies in southern Europe (Mair 2006,

65) (1). In countries like Italy and Japan, for example, where no clear-cut bipolar competition was

seen for a long time in postwar period, electoral reform of 1990s has brought bipolarism to their party

systems. This is an important change, which could affect the quality of democracy.

In most CEE countries, proportional representation was adopted for the new free elections

during the transition. Constitutional engineers might adopt PR election intending to prepare the

ground for coalition politics under moderate plural party systems, which can reflect opinions of

minorities. This intention is in contrast to the constitutional engineering of 1990s Italy and Japan,

which introduced majoritarian election, hoping to produce bipolar competition and governmental

exchange. Is there inclination to bipolarism in CEE party systems, in spite of original intention of the

constitutional engineers? If so, does this change the quality of democracy in the CEE countries? As a

starting point for these questions, we will focus on bipolarization in the examination of party

competition structure of these new democracies.

Here, the concept of bipolarism or bipolar competition has to be made clear. Especially the

difference between bipolar competition and two-bloc competition must be clarified. Both types of

competitions can appear simultaneously. They are not used distinctively in literatures. In this paper,

we define bipolar competition as the salience of competition between two large parties in party

system. On the other hand, two-bloc competition can be defined as follows; several parties, for

example 5 or 6 parties, which consist of party system, form two blocs and these two blocs become

the main actor of competition, which competes with each other (2).

0-3. Methods

0-3-1. Modes of Linkage

To analyze party competition structure, party’s strategies are important (Mair, Müller and Plasser

2004). Political parties have their own strategies to make linkage with voters. It must be stressed here

that political party can use several linkage modes to gain support from voters. In the Czech Republic

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and Slovakia, three modes of linkage can be observed: 1) programmatic linkages, by which parties

show program accountability for voters, 2) charismatic linkage, by which parties gain voters’ support

by offering attractive and competent political leaders, 3) linkage by social group identification, which

represents those people who belong to ethnic minority or believers. (Kitschelt 2007, 525-529,

Nakada-Amiya 2005) (3).

0-3-2.Competition pattern

In this paper, we take each linkage in turn, and scrutinize what kind of strategy do parties adopt

and how they compete with each other in that proper linkage mode. There are several patterns of

party competition. It depends on how many parties are involved in that linkage mode, if competitions

take place between blocs or among individual parties, and the strength of competitions.

Each party chooses its strategy considering which linkage is most advantageous for the party. Party

competition structure is formed based on these party linkage strategies.

0-3-3.Competition for government coalition and voters’ preferences

The party competition structure is not determined only by party linkage strategies. Parties also

compete for government coalition formation. Moreover, voters’ preferences make conditions for the

success or failure of linkage strategies. These two points, therefore, are taken into consideration to

describe the whole picture of party competition structure in each country.

0-4.Cases

Our cases are Czech and Slovak parliamentary election in 2006. The reason of case selection is

twofold. First, as we have already mentioned, the party system of the Czech Republic is classified to

the stable case and that of Slovakia to the unstable case, when party system analysis focuses on party

numbers and lineups. Our intention is to certify if we can observe the same contrast in party

competition structures of these two countries.

Second reason is that, those two countries are hard cases for bipolar competition hypothesis among

the Visegrad countries. In Poland and Hungary, opposition coalition defeated government coalition in

almost all elections since 1990s, and resulted in governmental changes. So, bipolar competitions

were notified for these two countries early on. In contrast, center-right and center-left coalition

alternated in the Czech Republic with center parties at the pivotal status. Slovakia has another

experience. In Slovakia, the coalition with Meciar’s HZDS at its center competed with anti-HZDS

parties since 1990s, but this pattern resolved slowly after Meciar’s defeat at 1998 election. New

structure of competition seems under construction in Slovakia.

With proportional representation and moderate plural party system (5 parties in the Czech

Republic and 6 parties in Slovakia), bipolar competition seems difficult to observe, with rare

exception of Slovakia in 1990s, when antagonism between Meciarism and anti-Meciarism prevailed.

Even in these two countries, several researches have pointed out the inclination to bipolarism of their

party systems (Čaloud, Foltýn & Havlík 2006; Foltýn 2006; Gyárfašová & Krivý 2007). This

phenomenon must have considerable importance in the study of CEE party systems, exactly because

Czech and Slovak cases are hard ones. We are, however, still lacking in empirical studies with clear

theoretical focus on party competition structure. The differences between electoral and governmental

competition, or between bipolar and two-bloc competition were not fully took into consideration.

This paper is an attempt to fill this lacuna.

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This study takes these hard cases and examine if bipolar competition can be observed using

aforementioned analytical approaches. If we can observe bipolar competition patterns in these two

countries, we would analyze when this pattern took place and if this pattern will continue or not.

Party election programs are used to analyze parties’ electoral strategies (4). Opinion polls and

studies on electoral campaign will be consulted to find the further information.

1. Linkage strategies and party competition at the Czech parliamentary election in 2006

Five political parties acquired parliamentary seats after the 2006 election in the Czech Republic:

the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Green Party (SZ), the Christian and Democratic

Union-Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party (KDU-ČSL), the Czech Social Democratic Party（ČSSD）, The

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The government coalition until the 2006

election consisted of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, and the Free Union, but the Free Union could not pass the

5% criteria, which is necessary to be allocated parliamentary seats. Election results were as shown in

table 1. After the election, ODS, KDU-ČSL and newly elected the Green Party made coalition

government after seven months of long coalition bargaining. Let us examine strategies, which these

political parties adopted for this election.

1-1. Programmatic linkages and party competition

① Program and ideology

Czech political parties have ardently made effort to establish programmatic linkages with voters

since 1990s (Nakada-Amiya 2005). In the 2006 election, every Czech party published much more

detailed election program than before. Until the parliamentary election in 2002, election program of

the Civic Democrats and the Social Democrats contain mainly manifesto, which pledged various

concrete policy proposals and differentiated itself from party’s program, which contend its long-term

aim. However, election programs in 2006 include both of them. Showing the party’s precise attitude

toward broad areas, ranging from economy, social security, health care, culture, education to

diplomacy and security, election programs gave party’s concrete measure to realize these policies at

the same time. Therefore, the election programs became three (ODS) to six (ČSSD) times longer than

respective 2002 programs (see table 2). As a result, the election programs of ODS and ČSSD became

almost equal in length. The Greens’ was rather longer, People’s party’s was shorter, but these four

had same precise, all-embracing election programs.

As for contents, ODS’s program was the most original, proposing the introduction of flat tax, basic

income or education fee paid by graduates, not by students, in order to support higher education

institutions. In contrast to the 2002 election, when ODS unofficially cooperated with ČSSD’s

minority government from 1998 to 2002, they clearly opposed to center-right government by ČSSD,

KDH and US-DEU from 2002. It did not therefore need to justify policy compromise necessary for

governing party. ODS’s clear programmatic stance and new policy proposal stood out impressively.

In contrast, the election programs of ČSSD and KDU-ČSL were, though detailed, not clear-cut.

The Social Democrats claimed, in their program named “Security and prosperity”, economic growth

from 2002 to 2006 as their achievement, and promise farther economic growth and the rise of living

standard. ČSSD’s election program advocated past governmental policy and tried to go further along

this line. Therefore, its programs can be realized with high possibility, but did not give fresh

impression. On the one side, for example, ČSSD emphasized the importance of the “social state” and

the society based on human solidarity and justified social assistance to guaranty life with dignity for

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people in nose, but on the other side, it insisted, for example, that the level of unemployment benefit

should be set up to stimulate the unemployed to look for jobs. Like this, its arguments were eclectic.

KDU-ČSL tried to take programmatic stance different from both ODS and ČSSD, but the effort is

not so successful. Its economic and social programs were overlapping with those of ODS in some

parts, and with ČSSD in other. Therefore, it is difficult to recognize its stance properly. Even in

another programmatic dimension, cultural and political value dimension, KDU-ČSL could not attract

voters with its program, because civil partnership or abortion did not become salient issue in the

Czech Republic.

The Green Party had the longest and most detailed election program. Its originalities were seen in

its ordering of policies. First part was about environment, which included policies on economy,

countryside, agriculture and transportation. New policies like departure from carbon energies,

countermeasures on global warming, trash problems, welfare of animals were proposed here in this

first part. Second part was about civic liberty and right, including justice and public order. The greens

advocated many new policies here: suffrage from sixteen years old, new concept of family,

countermeasures on gender discrimination, integration of foreigners, integration of Roma

communities, and legalization of prostitution. It was very characteristic for the Czech green party,

that it took liberal stance in policies on social security and economics. For example, it recognized the

necessity to reduce the social expenditure and suggested localization and privatization of social

governance to realize this aim.

The Communist had, though all-involving as well, shorter election program than other parties. One

reason is that, it did not show communists’ opinion about governmental policy, because it was

difficult for the Communists both to criticize and to esteem actual status, which was the outcome of

center-left government, with which KSČM cooperate unofficially. Another reason was that its policy

proposals were abstract and did not show concrete measure to realize it. KSČM insisted that

government has to take main responsibility in deciding direction of society and economy. Its policy

stance was near to that of the Social Democrats, but while the Social Democrats made a point of

voluntary activities of society, the Communists stressed the role of state. As an outcome, the

Communists insisted on state ownership of main industries, restriction of foreign investment, and

differed from the Social Democrats on these policies. In cultural and political value dimension,

KSČM placed itself on the authoritarian side. For example, KSČM take the decline of birthrate

seriously, because it means decline of national power.

Thus, in the Czech Republic, each political party placed itself on two dimensional policy space

relatively clearly. Political Parties appealed to the voters who had the similar programmatic position

to them. They have separate electoral market of their own (See Figure 1). If we see figure 1,

competitions occur in spaces between circles, where both side of parties could allure voters.

The Green Party locates itself where liberal parties like the Civil Democratic Union (ODA) or the

Free Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU) were in 1990s and the former half of 2000s. The Greens

could succeed in the 2006 election, because they replaced the US-DEU by offering new alternative in

this programmatic sphere with ecology issue.

The Social Democrats placed themselves just between KSČM and KDU-ČSL. The Social

Democrats stressed the importance of society and individual in order to differentiate themselves from

KSČM, which emphasized the role of state. However, this contestation of the Social Democrats was

almost the same as that of KDU-ČSL, which put stress on individual and social solidarity based on

Catholic belief. Therefore, the competition between Social Democrats and KDU-ČSL in this

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programmatic sphere might seem intense. In reality, however, KDU-ČSL made use of the social

group identification linkage mode more than the programmatic linkage as ČSSD, as we will see latter.

The ČSSD and the KDU-ČSL took different linkage strategy to obtain support from voters.

② Competition by relative position

In above mentioned competition mode, parties show their vision or world view which they would

like to realize. There is another competition strategy among spatial competition based on

programmatic accountability. This is the competition by relative positioning, competition using

programmatic difference with other party. This is the strategy, which assumes the existence of

ideological conflict and clarifies the party’s own relative position. The way of presenting conflict

situation by the party depends on parties’ assumption about voter preference distribution and parties’

coalition strategy to form government after election.

Some election programs say explicitly which party is its competitor, but others not. In Czech 2006

election, ODS, ČSSD, and KSČM pointed out its competitor explicitly in their forewords of election

programs, and define this election as crossroad of two alternatives.

At the head of its election program, ODS said that the 2006 election was the important choice

between two alternatives. One road headed toward the state-led society of the past, which was

initiated by ČSSD and KSČM, and the other led to the new future where state serves, not governs.

This was the future, which ODS would realize with citizen. ODS criticized the Social Democrats’

“social state” as illusion. It tried to defend the individual against statism and bureaucracy.

On the other hand, ČSSD appealed to deny ODS’s risky economic experiment like flat tax, and to

choose social state with security and prosperity, for which ČSSD had governed for years. KSČM

insisted that in this election, people would decide between neoliberal right politics, represented

mainly by ODS, and politics of left, which allied with effort of preservation and development of the

basic value of social state.

Negative campaign by the Social Democrats was a typical example of relative positional

competition. ČSSD could not respond to new policy offer by ODS with its own policy. Instead, they

used negative campaign as a vehicle to attack ODS’ policy. When ODS appealed the merits of flat

tax by poster, which read “ODS plus”, ČSSD made the quite similar posters, which read “ODS

minus”, and several “manifesto” of ODS like “Education fee must be paid” or “Reduce the tax rate

for the richest people” (Matušková 2006, 71). This was the typical competition by relative position,

which placed ČSSD at the opposite side of ODS in policies. ČSSD and KSČM criticized ODS for its

intention to introduce flat tax. ODS could not react for the critics, which became one of the weak

points for ODS.

ODS, however, countered ČSSD with another negative campaign named “Mask” (Matušková

2006, 75; Šaradín 2008, 52-53). ODS made posters, in which four social democratic leaders had

masks on their hands. The letters “KSČSSD” are written on the Poster, which suggested that the

social democrats were communists with mask. KSČ is the acronym of former Czechoslovak

Communist Party. The Communist party of the Czech Republic has different acronym (KSČM). This

poster hinted that the programmatic stance of ČSSD had something in common with KSČ. This was

not a so decent strategy to stigmatize ČSSD. A publicity company rejected these posters to put up on

their billboards, and ODS stopped this campaign in the mid course, but this relative positional

competition concerning anti-communism played an important role.

KSČM made posters, which read “We have different answer”, criticizing policy of ODS and

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appealing positional difference, at the same time provoking their own programmatic policy

(Matušková 2006, 80-81).

The Green Party did not care about neither ODS nor ČSSD. Instead, they concentrated on the

programmatic appeal of their own, attracting both left and right voters. As for environmental issue,

ODS and ČSSD had followed suit immediately and imported this issue into their election program or

policy proposal. Therefore, environmental issue itself did not become contentions.

KDU-ČSL insisted that they were the third pole independent of both ODS and ČSSD, and this

third pole is necessary for the Czech Parliament. Their slogan “Silent Power” showed this intention.

However, its election program did not have the original content to match their claim, and could not

appeal to voters effectively.

Thus, two loose blocs ODS on the right, and ČSSD and KSČM on the left, competed with each

other stressing relative difference of their programmatic position. But the bloc formation was not

solid, as each political party had a different bloc perception. ODS and KSČM had the same bloc

perception, that ČSSD and KSČM consist of one bloc confronting ODS. The Czech Social

Democratic Party, though agreeing left to the right confrontation, did not mention about the

relationship between ČSSD and KSČM. They just described the confrontation between the two big

parties, ČSSD vs. ODS.

Mass media had significant influence on party competition. They reported the 2006 election as the

duel between ODS versus ČSSD, and did not highlight the details of programmatic appeal of them,

or of other political parties.

1-2. Charismatic leadership and party competition

Competition based on politicians’ personality was fought exclusively between the former premier

Jiří Paroubek from ČSSD and the party head of ODS, Mirek Topolánek. In the Czech Republic, all

leaders from five main parties had been invited to TV discussion. But for the first time, at the last TV

discussion during the 2006 election campaign, only the two leaders from the two largest parties were

invited to the “TV duel” (Petrová 2006, 47; Foltýn 2006, 180）. ČSSD vigorously appealed

Paroubek’s popularity and his ability as a governmental leader in their electoral campaign. ODS did

not intend to advertise Topolánek, with his unappealing character, but could not help doing so,

responding to ČSSD’s strategy (Matušková 2006,70; Petrová 2006, 46-47; Šaradín 2008, 53-54). In

this linkage mode, the two largest parties confronted each other demonstrating their leaders’ ability as

a governmental leader. Mass media played an important part as well as parties’ own strategy here.

1-3. Low competitive mode of social group and party identification linkage

KDU-ČSL has stable constituency in Moravia and south Bohemia, where many devout Catholic

exist. KSČM has party member organization in small towns and villages all over the country. The

two parties addressed their electoral campaign mainly toward this stable constituency. Both

KDU-ČSL and KSČM, however, are suffering from the shrinkage of this constituency, the former

because of secularization and the latter because of aging of party members with 70% of party

members being pensioner.

As for other political parties, they did not rely on social group or party identification as their main

linkage strategies. ČSSD spread the same campaign in all countries, without targeting particular

social strata or region.

ODS conducted opinion poll twice in July 2005 and February 2006, and surveyed liability of ODS

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support by social status, occupation, income level, gender and residence. Based on this survey, ODS

distinguished high support possibility segments from low support possibility segments, and aimed the

former segments of voters (Matušková 2006, 74). ODS also put stress on campaign in the capital city

Prague, because there were high percentage of potential voter of ODS. In this case, there was

relationship between social group and party support, but it could not be classify as social group

identification linkage. Rather it can be understood as a kind of programmatic linkage.

Thus, KDU-ČSL and KSČM used social group and party identification linkages as their main

linkage mode. For the other parties, this linkage mode had little importance.

2. Linkage strategies and party competition at Slovak parliamentary election in 2006

Six political parties acquired parliamentary seats after the 2006 election in Slovakia: the Slovak

Democratic and Christian Union and Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS), the Christian Democratic

Movement (KDH), the Party of the the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP), the Slovak National Party

(SNS), the People's Party－Movement for Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS), the Direction-Social

Democracy (SMER).

The government coalition until the 2006 election was made up of SDKÚ, SMK, KDH (left

coalition shortly before election), ANO (alliance for new citizens), but ANO could not pass the 5%

criteria in 2006 which is necessary to be allocated parliamentary seats. Election results were as

shown in table 3. After the election, Smer, SNS and HZDS formed coalition government regardless

of both national and international critics for Smer to involve nationalist SNS and former

quasi-authoritarian party of HZDS. Let us examine strategies, which these political parties adopted

for this election.

2-1.Programmatic linkages and party competition

① Program and ideology

Among Slovak political parties, SDKÚ, Smer, SNS have been making effort in programmatic

linkage strategy. On the other hand, this linkage had not been emphasized by HZDS and KDH

(Nakada-Amiya 2005), but even these parties tried to offer programmatic linkage to voters in the

2006 election. As in the Czech Republic, Slovak parties also published much more detailed election

program than before. Till the 2002 election, election program exhibited mainly concrete manifesto,

but in the 2006 election, election programs of the Slovak parties took each policy area one by one

and showed both parties’ basic policy stance and concrete measures to realize it. The election

programs of SDKÚ and Smer were twice as long as that of 2002 (table 2). But still their lengths are

about the half of that of Czech parties, and the manifestos prevail. HZDS and KDH also published

similar election programs, but theirs were still shorter than that of SDKÚ and Smer. SNS presented

the longest election program in 2002 and program of 2006 was also longer than that of SDKÚ and

Smer. The SMK published detailed election program.

The parties’ strategic intentions of programmatic linkage shown in the election programs are clear.

The election program of SDKÚ, named “Successful Slovakia is at stake,“ made the point that it was

important to develop ability of each Slovak citizens by education, and to realize the equality of

opportunity, and made the citizen centered society. It praised the political outcome of the center right

govenment of Dzurinda, the leader of SDKÚ, and lined up policies on education, economisc, state

administration, family and social security, following the achievement of Dzurinda government. The

word “justice“, with its derived form, was used 37 times in election program, but here the word

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“justice“ was used to emphasize the equality of oppotunity, and it was said that “the attempt to realize

the equality between active citizen and passive citiven“ could not be called justice.

In contrast, Smer, in its election program named “toward the people“, used the two key words:

“solitarity“ and “social state“. It advocated the society, where people from broad social strata can live

their life with dignity, offering policies to joint market mechanism and state mediation in tax, social

security and health care. The word “justice“ was used 47 times, in contrast to four times in the 2002

election program, to criticize the present situation. Here the word “justice” means equality of

outcomes, and stressed the role of state and social solidarity to recover “justice”. In the concrete,

revision of flat tax system, abolition of payment by beneficiary in health care, reintroduction of

tripartism were proposed, stopping reforms of Dzurinda government and rolling back some of them.

However, Smer set the limit in economic reform, so as not to hamper the joining of Slovakia to Euro.

Thus, the election programs of SDKÚ and Smer showed the clear programmatic position of both

parties about the state role in social security in different direction. However, the distance between

their policies was not so wide as that of programs.

On the other hand, KDH, in its election program named “Decent life in Slovakia”, did not succeed

in showing clear on social and economic programs. Its economic program is near to SDKÚ, with

which KDH formed coalition for years, and it insisted on the continuation of flat tax, reduction of

deficit spending and employer’s burden. About health care reform, which were strongly criticized by

the public and opposition parties, its stance swayed promising to reduce the payment by patients from

20 Slovak crowns to 5 Slovak crowns, approving the role of the state in health care. The originality

of KDH was apparent, when it refers to the importance of family. In the first part of its election

program, it proposed to reform the Constitution to protect the right of married, different-sex couples

from the international pressure to give the same right to other types of partnership. It also promised

several benefits for married couple, family and children. These stances correspond well with its

programmatic identification as conservative party, which protect the Christian tradition of Slovak

nation. However, KDH did not further develop its programmatic profile in the cultural dimension. It

is not reflected in its economic or social policy, either.

In the election program, SMK identified itself as the party, which aimed at the progress in minority

life of Slovakia. It appreciated the outcome of eight-year-long participation of the party to the

government. The participation realized the development of habitation area and protection of language

and cultural right of Hungarian minorities, stressed the progress. Party’s purpose for the next four

years was to continue this achievement. The election program commented on party’s stance on

economics, environment, social security, culture and regional autonomy, but basically affirmed the

policy of Dzurinda Government.

SNS published long election program named “We are Slovak, Slovakian Government in the hands

of the Slovaks”. As for economic and social policy, SNS criticized neo-liberal policies conducted by

the Dzurinda government and stressed the necessity of social state, but it lacked concrete policy

proposals. In contrast to this, as for national issue, its proposals were concrete and passionate, for

exemplified by the reform of constitution in order to define Slovakia as the nation state of Slovak

nation or the introduction of obligation to learn Slovak language by the state language law.

The short election program of HZDS did not have title, showing the lack of policy focuses which

the party stressed on the 2006 election. As for social and economic policy, it supported social market

economy combining both individual responsibility and consideration for the weak. HZDS stood in

the median point on all social and economic issues. HZDS identified itself as the party which

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advocated the Christian and national tradition of Slovakia and realized the social solidarity. In the

election program, however, HZDS did not appeal particular policies on any line, as if hiding its own

characteristics.

Thus, most parties tried to strengthen their programmatic linkage, except HZDS with its vague

election program. As in the Czech Republic, each political party located itself on the two dimensional

space (See Figure 2). On the economic dimension, Smer placed on the left side and SDKÚ on the

right side but the distance between the two is not so wide. All the other parties located at the same

place in the middle of this dimension. This situation could have caused hard competition, but it did

not so much actually, because their location on the cultural dimension differed. HZDS did not use

this programmatic linkage seriously, and it was difficult to say how it competed with other parties in

this linkage mode. Among center parties, SMK and KDH have their own stable constituency, as we

will see later closely, and the linkage mode of social group identification is more important for them

than the programmatic linkage mode.

② Competition by relative position

As the next step, let us examine how political parties use competition by relative position. Smer

emphasize its relative position most. Smer criticized the reforms by coalition government by SDKÚ,

KDH, and SMK and called this government as “the right government”. Smer aimed to offer clear

alternative proposing “societal and ecological market economy.” Even though its policy itself did not

change so much, its relative programmatic position changed quite leftward from the previous center

position in 2002 (Účer 2004; Rybář 2007, 158).

SDKÚ also insisted in the election program that the 2006 election was the crossroad of two

alternatives. One was the road to “the successful, educated, fair, civil and stable Slovakia”, and the

other was the road to “the false illusion of social state”. But in other places, SDKÚ aimed to appeal

its own programmatic stance directly, and did not emphasize relative positional difference with other

parties.

Both Smer and SDKÚ did not use negative campaign as their strategy（Šaradín 2008, 55; Školkay

2009, 100). There is no bloc formation according to this competition. Mass media did not stress the

relative positional competition, as was seen in the Czech Republic. Thus, we can say that the relative

positional competition in Slovakia was weaker than that in the Czech Republic.

2-2. Charismatic leadership and party competition

Slovak parties tend to identify itself with its founding leaders. Leaders’ popularity has played as an

important linkage with voters. For example, HZDS is identified with Meciar, Smer with Fico, SNS

with Slota, SMK with Bugar and SDKÚ with Dzurinda. In the 2006 election, each party used their

leader as the important campaign vehicle.

In contrast to the Czech case, each party “sold” their leader not as future prime minister but as the

leader of party. TV discussion was held with the participation of all the main party leaders.

Thus, competition concerning leadership linkage was fought by all parties and has little to do with

government choice.

2-3. Low competitive mode of social group and party identification linkage

KDH and SMK have their own stable constituency. KDH is supported by the devout Catholic, and

its organization has connection with the church organization. KDH adopted a traditional election

11

campaign with face-to-face talk with politicians and voters in the parks of villages or towns, and did

not conduct modern large meetings. KDH is the only main party, which did not use TV spot. This

fact can probably be explained as that, for KDH, the social group identification linkage mode is the

main linkage mode to attract voters（Školkay 2007, 104;107). SMK also used this linkage mode

intensively, to gain support from Hungarian minorities.

As for other parties, they did not use this linkage frequently. SDKÚ was supported by

high-income strata, with high education, living in big towns. Those who have lower education, with

low income, living in small villages, supported HZDS and SNS. Thus, social status has some relation

with party support, but it cannot be interpreted as partisanship based on social group identification.

3. Czech and Slovak party competition structure in the 2006 parliamentary election

We have so far examined parties’ linkage strategies in the 2006 election. Based on these linkage

strategies, party competition will be structured with two more elements, namely 1) coalition

strategies and 2) voter preference. The voter preferences are estimated from voters’ self-placement

on left-right axis, voters’ party location on left-right axis and trust in political leaders. These two

elements in mind, we can describe the party competition structure of each country as below.

3-1. Czech party competition structure

3-1-1.Coalition strategy

Coalition strategy is influenced by the relative positional competition and the competition on

leadership linkage, but has its own dynamics.

In this arena, smaller parties played an important part. KDU-ČSL participated in center-right

coalition with ČSSD and US-DEU from 2002 to 2006, but some members were not satisfied with the

economic policy of coalition government. After change of the party leader to conservative Miroslav

Kalousek, the relationship between KDU-ČSL and ČSSD became tensioned, and KDU-ČSL joined

ODS’s initiative for the vote of no confidence for Gross Government when the social democrat

Premier was accused by scandal（Čaloud, Foltýn & Havlík 2006, 21）. Though remaining in

government coalition till 2006 election, KDU-ČSL made public, in the election campaign, their

willingness to participate in center-right coalition government with ODS.

There was no possibility to become governmental party for KSČM, because none of other parties

would form coalition with them. But, the last Social Democrat premier, Paroubek, cooperated with

KSČM in order to pass the bills, with which they could not win coalition partners’ assent（Čaloud,

Foltýn & Havlík 2006, 21）. This opened another possibility for coalition building, though the Social

Democrats did not make clear if they dared to form coalition with KSČM.

The Green Party kept possibility to make coalition both with ODS and ČSSD till the beginning of

election year（Čaloud, Foltýn & Havlík 2006, 25）. However, the coalition with KSČM was not

acceptable. Therefore, as the possibility of coalition between ČSSD and KSČM increased, the Green

Party distanced itself from ČSSD and approached to ODS.

At the 2002 election, ODS was ready for the grand coalition with ČSSD according to the then

leader Vaclav Klaus. After the defeat in that election, ODS changed their strategy to the clear

opposition. At the 2006 election, it aimed coalition with KDU-ČSL, possibly with the Greens

（Čaloud, Foltýn & Havlík 2006, 17）.

Thus, as far as coalition strategy is concerned, two blocs emerged and competed with each other.

The left bloc consisted of ČSSD and KSČM, and the right bloc ODS and KDU-ČSL. However, it is

12

worth mentioning, that the both two blocs are not consolidated well. ČSSD did not accept KSČM as

their coalition partner officially, and KDU-ČSL and the Green Party have possibility to leave the

right bloc, when internal party situations change.

3-1-2.Voter preferences in the Czech Republic

The correspondence between Czech voters self-placement on the left-right scale and the party

preference is considerably high, that means, left voters choose ČSSD and KSČM, and right voters

choose ODS with high possibility (Klingemann et al. 2006, 54-55; Mainwaring & Torcal 2005, 14; 17).

Furthermore, according to Dalton’s research based on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,

Czech voters tend to locate parties on either end of left-right scale, with KSČM at 0.77, ČSSD 2.6,

ODS 8.24 respectively (the one end of left side scores 0, the other end of right side scores 10)（Dalton

2008, 905-907）. Czech party system is most polarized among 34 observed countries.

Opinion poll about voters’ trust shows that 40% of the Social Democrat supporter present trust in

communist, but only 4% in ODS and 20% in KDU-ČSL and 16% in the Greens（Důvěra politickým

stranám, 3）（5）. The percentage of communist supporters who trusts the social democrat is as high as

70%, and only 1% in ODS, 9% in KDU-ČSL and 5% in the Greens. Thus, there exist mutual trust

among ČSSD and KSČM supporters, but their confidence in center and right parties is low.

On the other hand, ODS supporter show low confidence in left parties: 10% in ČSSD and only 3%

in KSČM. There is deep clave between ODS supporters and ČSSD/KSČM supporters. As for center

parties, 27% of ODS supporter show confidence in KDU-ČSL, and 40% in the Greens.

The figure for center parties is interesting. Only 18% of KDU-ČSL supporters have confidence in

ODS, but 45% in ČSSD, in contrast to KDU-ČSL leaders coalition preferences. As for Green

supporter, their percentages of trust for the three neighboring parties are same; 24% in ČSSD, 26% in

ODS and 25% in KDU-ČSL. This situation must have some effect on party strategy.

3-1-3.Czech party competition structure in the 2006 election

Now we can summarize the Czech party competition structure in the 2006 parliamentary election.

In programmatic linkage and social group/party identification linkage, five parties compete with

each other in the same way since 1990s. The competition was not intense because they have separate

markets.

In the 2006 election, relative positional competition and competition based on charismatic

leadership linkage appeared as new modes of competition. These competitions were fought by the

two big parties, ODS and ČSSD and the role of these competitions became salient in the competition

structure as a whole. In this sense, inclination to bipolar competition can be observed.

Furthermore, in relative positional competition, ČSSD and KSČM fought as a bloc even though

not in complete form. In addition, in coalition strategy, right and left blocs were formed during the

election campaign. Thus, both bipolar competition and two-bloc competition can be observed.

However, if we keep the voters’ preference in mind, this Czech bipolar competition has different

from textbook bipolar competition. In programmatic competition sphere, relative positional

competition works most effectively, when there is normal bell-shaped distribution of voter

preferences, with the most numerous part being center. In this case, both left and right parties could

attract the voters in the center and the successful party would gain landslide victory.

But in the Czech Republic, where voter preference polarized, the size of center voters, which are

able to be won by relative positional competition, is small. Left voters, who are not satisfied with

13

linkage appeal by ČSSD or KSČM, would probably prefer to abstain from voting than to accept

linkage appeal from ODS, and vise versa. In addition, center voters who have social group linkage

with KDU-ČSL are difficult to achieve by other linkage mode.

Party competition become harsher, when there is much possibility that voters react to the linkage

appeal from parties (Kitschelt 2007, 533-535). Czech party competition became hard with its

inclination to bipolar competition. However, the possible magnitude of voter swing was limited

because of polarization of voter preferences. Therefore, bipolar competition coexisted with weak

party competition, each big parties having their own separate market.

Furthermore, political parties can easily change their strategy in relative positional competition

mode or charismatic leadership linkage mode, in contrast to the difficulty that parties would face

when they try to change strategies in programmatic linkage or social group/party identification

linkages mode. So, it is hard to foresee whether this trend toward bipolarism will continue or not.

As for two-bloc competition, ODS, KDU-ČSL and the Greens formed a right bloc as coalition

strategy, but this bloc could not be seen in electoral strategy. On the contrary, ČSSD and KSČM

formed the left bloc as electoral strategy, but it is not solid one. As coalition strategy, there is a high

hurdle of government participation of KSČM.

3-2. Slovak party competition structure

3-2-1. Coalition strategy

In the 1998 Slovak parliamentary election, coalition alternatives were clearly two blocs competing

between Meciar and anti-Meciar. In 2002 election, however, the coalition pattern was not clear,

because Smer, which positioned at the center, did not make clear their coalition strategy, letting both

alternatives, coalition with SDKÚ and with HZDS, open.

In the 2006 election, both SDKÚ and Smer take vote-maximizing strategy to become the core of

future coalition government. Coalition strategy of smaller parties could be divided into two kinds.

SMK chose SDKÚ, SNS chose Smer as their future coalition partner. However, KDH, which had left

center-right coalition just before the election, did not declare coalition strategy. The local

organization and delegates preferred coalition with Smer, but some leaders was against (Rybář 2007,

165). HZDS kept both side open to be able to participate in government with SDKÚ or Smer. But the

HZDS had little chance in one side because SDKÚ could not persuade KDH for the coalition with

HZDS（Rybář 2007, 164）.

3-2-2. Voter preferences in Slovakia

Compared to Czech polarization, Slovak voters place themselves and their parties in the center.

According to the opinion poll, conducted by Bútorová and her collaborators, 46% voters placed

themselves as center oriented, 21% left and 17% right (Bútorová et.al 2006, p.9). Furthermore, as

Bútorová had pointed out, center orientation increased from 41% in 2005 autumn, in spite of the

vigorous discussion about continuation or rolling back of neo-liberal reform by the Dzurinda

Government during that period. According to the opinion poll about how each party’s supporters

placed their political orientation, the most center oriented are SNS supporters, 64% of whom located

themselves as center oriented, followed by SMK 53%, Smer 47%, HZDS 43%. It is interesting to

note, that, in SMK, HZDS and SNS, there were both right and left orientation among their supporters.

In SDKÚ, right supporters (53%) surmount center ones (39%), but in Smer there were more center

supporters (47%) than left ones (39%).

14

In contrast to the polarized situation in the Czech Republic, where most voters place themselves

either on the left or the right and support parties of their side, about the half of voters of Slovakia

locate themselves in the center. In addition, each party includes both left and right supporters, as well

as center supporters. This means that in Slovakia there is normal bell-shape distribution of voter

preferences, which is idealistic for normative bipolar competition.

However, considering supporters confidence in other parties, two bloc of mutual confidence exist:

SDKÚ, SMK and KDH on the one hand, and Smer, SNS, HZDS and KSS on the other hand

(Bútorová et.al 2006, 11-12) (6). High rate of distrust was also observable between these two blocs.

In the 2006 election, high amount of intra-bloc vote flow, especially that from HZDS to SNS, was

observed, but inter-bloc move of vote were rare with the considerable exception of flow from the

SDKÚ led bloc to Smer（Gayárfasová & Krivý 2007, 91）.

Thus, Slovak voters were divided into two blocs in relation to confidence in parties, in spite of

their strong orientation to center. This division was mainly determined by libertarian-authoritarian

orientation, so that the first bloc could be called libertarian bloc and the second one authoritarian bloc.

The reason for this division was two fold. Firstly, the relation to HZDS influences. HZDS recently

support EU and offer policies, which can be acceptable for KDH or SDKÚ, but the supporters of

libertarian bloc parties do not accept HZDS, because of their opposition to HZDS politics in 1990s.

Secondly, the allowance of the Slovak nationalism advocated by SNS divides two bloc supporters.

However, it is necessary to mention that Smer or HZDS do not actively advocate Slovak nationalism

as their own programmatic appeal.

3-2-3. Slovak party competition structure in the 2006 election

The character of party competition structure in the Slovak 2006 parliamentary election can be

summarized as follows.

As for programmatic linkage along economic dimension, the bipolar competition between SDKÚ

and Smer was observed. In difference to the Czech Republic where voters were polarized, there were

many center-oriented voters in Slovakia, which enable normative bipolar competition, namely the

competition between SDKÚ and Smer about the support of center voters. However, other four parties

were all located in the center of the economic dimension, and did not join the relative positional

competition. The bipolar competition between SDKÚ and Smer did not develop into two-bloc

competition including other parties. Therefore, the influence of bipolar competition on the entire

party competition structure was limited.

Along libertarian-authoritarian dimension, on the other hand, voter preference is divided into two

blocs. As a result, programmatic linkage strategy along this dimension caused weak competition by

two party blocs with each bloc having stable electoral market.

Furthermore, inside the libertarian bloc, SMK and KDH are supported by social group/party

identification linkage, that their supporters are not likely to move to other parties. On the other hand,

inside the authoritarian bloc, parties rely on charismatic leadership linkages, causing sometimes high

intra-bloc volatility with the decline of charisma of party leader like Meciar’s HZDS.

This two-bloc competition was not so strong to influence the whole character of Slovak party

competition structure. First, the two main parties, Smer and SDKÚ did not play central part in this

competition. Secondly, two-bloc competition was not found in coalition strategy. This difference

between party coalition strategy and party preferences by voters is noteworthy.

Thus, both the bipolar strong competition along the economic dimension and the two-bloc weak

15

competition along the libertarian-authoritarian dimension were observed in the Slovak party

competition structure in this election.

4. Conclusion

Let us summarize our findings. First, when we put focus on party competition structure, the same

inclination for bipolar competition was observed in Czech and Slovak party systems, as in the west

and north European party systems. With usual analytical focus on party numbers, party line-up, these

features all seem to suggest instability of east-central European party systems. In party competition

structure, the same trend is found in those countries and in the established European democracies. In

other words, they are “normal”.

Secondly, though bipolarization was observed in both countries under research, its dynamics were

very complex and different from the simple and idealized bipolarism as Mair suggested. In the ideal

bipolar competition, two big parties compete against each other for the support of center voters. But

in the Czech Republic, because of the voter polarization and strong social group linkage by

KDU-ČSL, ČSSD and ODS tried to maximize voters’ support within the separate left and right

electoral market. The possibility of clear victory of either party is small in this type of bipolar

competition. In Slovakia, bipolar competition and two-bloc competition coexisted with different

dynamics and the latter weakened the vector of bipolar competition in some aspect. Thus, even when

bipolar competition exists in several linkage modes, other linkage modes with different competition

patterns also affect the party competition structure. For the further analysis of party competition

structure, quantitative analysis, based on the approach in this study, is necessary in order to find out

the relationship between factors.

Thirdly, focusing on party competition structure, the relatively “stable” Czech party system was

found to be changing, and in the “unstable” Slovak party system, the long-lasting stable element was

observed. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, bipolar competitions were observed as a new

element in party competition structure. For the Czech Republic, this is a new phenomenon, pointing

that new change occurred in the Czech party system, where relative stability had been assumed. On

the other hand, in Slovakia, with bipolar competition being the new phenomena, two-bloc

competition since 1990s still affect strongly on party competition structure, in spite of the frequent

party rise and fall. So here, both change and continuity can be found.

To predict future trend of party competition structure it is necessary to consider following elements

because of the complex character of bipolarism in these two cases. As for the Czech Republic, not

only the bipolarism, which emerged in 2006 election, but also the former pattern of multi-polar

competition is likely to emerge in the future election. Therefore, even the structural instability can be

predicted. As for Slovakia, the antipathy against HZDS may weaken as time goes by, causing change

in the two-bloc competition as a result. The closeness of real programmatic distance between two

poles, Smer and SDKÚ, will also affect the future character of the bipolarism.

Lastly, let us consider the theoretical implication of this study briefly. In this study, bipolarization

is observed in the relative positional competition in the programmatic linkage mode and the

charismatic leadership linkage mode. When these linkages modes become central of party linkage

strategy, the relation between parties and voters becomes considerably different from the one when

other linkage modes are the main ones. This change causes the important change in the quality of our

representative democracy. Further research is needed to clarify the relation between party

competition structure and quality of democracy, with plurality of linkage modes in mind.

16

Figure 2. Self-location of Slovak Parties in

programmatic space

Libertarian

Market oriented

市場

State intervention

Authoritarian

SDKÚ

Smer

SNS

HZDS

KDH

SMK

Figure 1. Self-location of Czech

Parties in programmatic space

位置取り

Libertarian

ン

Market oriented

市場

State intervention

iintervention

iintervention

Authoritarian

ODS

ČSSD

KSČM

KDU-ČSL

SZ

17

Table 1. Czech Parliamentary Election

Party 2002 2006

vote

numbers

vote

share

seat

numbers

vote

numbers

vote

share

Seat

numbers

ODS 1166975 24.47 58 1892475 35.38 81

US-DEU 8

SZ 336487 6.29 6

KDU-ČSL

21

386706 7.22

13

Koalice(KDU-ČSL

and US-DEU) 680671 14.27 （31）

ČSSD 1440279 30.2 70 1728827 32.32 74

KSČM 882653 18.51 41 685328 12.81 26

independent 2

total 200 200

turnout 58.00% 64.47%

*http://www.volby.cz/index_en.htm

Table 2. Length of Election Programs

The 2006

Election

The 2002

Election

The Czech

Republic

ODS 26000 7700

SZ 30000

KDU-ČSL 21000

ČSSD 26000 4000

KSČM 7000

Slovakia

SDKÚ-DS 18000 9700

KDH 8000 6400

HZDS 6300

SMER 10500 4500

SNS 24300 21400

SMK (Slovak version) 21300

(approximate number of words)

18

Table 3. Slovak Parliamentary Election

Party 2002 2006

Vote

numbers

vote

share

seat

numbers

vote

numbers

Vote

share

seat

numbers

ANO 230309 8.01 15 32775 1.42 0

SDKÚ-DS(*1) 433953 15.09 28 422815 18.35 31

SMK-MKP 321069 11.17 20 269111 11.68 20

KDH 237202 8.25 15 191443 8.31 14

SNS 95633 3.33 0 270230 11.73 20

P SNS 105084 3.65 0

ĽS-HZDS(*2) 560691 19.50 36 202540 8.79 15

SMER-SD（*3) 387100 13.46 25 671185 29.14 50

KSS 181872 6.33 11 89418 3.88 0

total 2875081 150 2303139 150

turnout 70.06% 54.67%

*http://www.statistics.sk

*1. Sole result of SDKÚ in 2002

*2. Sole result of HZDS in 2002

*3. Smer-tretia cesta in 2002

<Notes>

(1) As for Italy, Reed 2001; Bartolini et al 2004; Ito 2008; Carbone and Newell 2008. As for Austria,

Daikoku 2008. About the Peter Mair’s argument on Bipolarism, Sorai 2008.

(2) The definition of bipolar competition by Bartolini et al 2004 is classified as the combination of

bipolar competition and two-bloc competition using definition in this study.

(3) Other important linkage like clientelistic linkage was not analyzed here, since this linkage was not

used as a main electoral strategy in the Czech Republic or in Slovakia.

(4) Qualitative approach was taken in this paper. Thought simultaneous quantitative analysis would be

desirable, the result of Comparative Manifest Analysis (Klingemann et al. 2006) is not able to use,

because it does not cover the 2006 election.

(5) This opinion, which was conducted in September 2008, was used here, since this is the only poll

about party supporters’ confidence in other parties. The voter preference in 2006 may be estimated

from this opinion poll, though the influence of two years experience of center right government must

be count.

(6) Another remarkable exception was SF, which could not get seat in spite of high expectation in

early election stage. SF was supported by supporters of parties in both blocs.

19

<Abbreviation of political parties>

<The Czech Republic>

ODS : The Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana)

US-DEU: Union of Freedom - Democratic Union (Unie svobody - Demokratická unie)

SZ: Green Party (Strana zelených)

KDU-ČSL: The Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party

(Křesťanská a demokratická unie - Československá strana lidová)

ČSSD: The Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická)

KSČM: The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

(Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy)

<Slovakia>

SDKÚ-DS: The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party

(Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia - Demokratická strana)

SMK-MKP : The Party of the the Hungarian Coalition

(Strana maďarskej koalície / Magyar Koalíció Pártja)

KDH: The Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťansko - demokratické hnutie)

ĽS-HZDS: The People's Party - Movement for Democratic Slovakia

(Ľudová strana - Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko)

SNS: The Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana)

SMER: The Direction - Social Democracy (SMER - sociálna demokracia)

<Materials >

Party election programs

<The Czech Republic>

ODS: Společně pro lepší život: Volební program 2006

SZ: Volební program Kvalita života

KDU-ČSL : Volební program: Klidná síla

ČSSD: Jistoty a prosperita: Volební program ČSSD

KSČM: Volební program komunistické strany Čech a Moravy na období 2006 - 2010 (volby do

Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu ČR 2006）

<Slovakia>

SDKÚ-DS: Ide o úspešné Slovensko - Volebný program SDKÚ-DS pre parlamentné voľby 2006

SMK: Volebný program 2006 - 2010

KDH: Za slušný život na Slovensko - volebný program KDH

ĽS-HZDS: Progamový dokument pre parlamentné voľby 2006

SNS: Sme Slováci Slovákom Slovenskú vládu - Volebný program Slovenskej národnej strany

SMER: Smerom k Ľuďom - Volebný program SMER - sociálna demokracia

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