Initia Philosophiae Universae: F.W.J Schelling’s Erlanger Lectures !Translated by Adam Arola !

On the Nature of Philosophy as Science ! [8] The thought or the ambition to find a system of human knowledge—or to express it in another, better way—to catch a glimpse of human knowledge in a system, i.e., the way it holds together, naturally assumes that in and of itself human knowledge is not in a system—that it is to say, human knowledge is originally asustaton, it does not hold together, but rather that it is in conflict with itself. In order to recognize this asystematic character, this nonconformity, this ununity, this quasi bellum intestinum, in human knowledge—(because this inner conflict must be revealed), the human spirit must have already searched in all possible directions. For example, in Greece, the simple physicists precede in their belief that all things could be ascribed to mere natural causes. The dualism of Anaxagoras, the teaching of the Eleatics, posited a [9] simple unity in order to sublate all conflict, while the opposite, or the non-unity, had similar right to be posited. The true system can only be that which is the unity of unity and its opposite, i.e. which shows how unity and its opposite and the opposite and unity stand in similitude, how one is necessary for the highest good of the other. All of this must take place before the true idea of a system could finally appear in Plato. Thus in time, the systems are prior to the system. The need for harmony first arises from disharmony. Finally, for the striving towards system to actually become present, the insight that each conflict of views is not itself something accidental, given subject imperfection, perfunctory thought or the perversity of individuals must come along. Nor is it grounded, as many shallow [10] minds represent it to themselves, in mere logical fabrications. One must assure oneself that this conflict has an objective ground, that it is the nature of the matter [Sache], in which the root of all existence is grounded. One must even abandon the hope that this conflict, this bellum omnium contra omnes, could cease if any one view became absolute master, a system which placed all others under its yoke. Granted, this can often seem to be the case, as, although all exclusive systems have this in common with one another, this is not the case with the system. Insofar as these exclusive systems are somehow partial or disordered, another system can exist which is indeed superior. Or—because this demands an accurate presentation—it more properly behaves as follows. Beyond all its inconsistencies with contradictory systems, the system is involved in an even greater conflict, an originary struggle [Urzwist]. It can be expressed in a situation where one maintains A=B, while another holds that it =C. Now, it can happen that both systems, the first which posits A=B and the second in which A=C is put forth, can be understood at a very menial level as competing. In the meantime, something is found which rises above this subordinate standpoint. But as higher, it is not something assembled whereby A=B and A=C are united. Instead, only A=B finds itself, but now at a higher level, in a higher potency. Yet univocity is very commonly cultivated in a crude manner. As once the degradation has begun, it treads off, lost to the end. As where only the individual decides, absolutely no other master is avowed. However, if A=B has raised itself up in actuality (without, incidentally, changing its essential character), while A=C has not raised itself up and instead remains as it was. Thus for the moment, A=B becomes master over A=C. But this does not last long as A=C finally becomes aware of its disadvantage and simultaneously rises above itself to the higher standpoint from which it can again, as before, stand in opposition to the lower.

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[11] The following is another contingent possibility. If A=B and A=C sustain perfect balance with each other, it is necessary that either the one or the other of these two asserts itself as the better fighter. This is a victory that alone decides nothing. Thus, for a time a system can become the master of another in, but only seemingly, neither in actuality nor for a long time. In actuality it is impossible. Each system has the same right to make its claim. This insight must precede the idea of the system in the wider sense—the system par excellence. So long as the materialist does not acknowledge that the intellecualist is entitled to his claim, or, so long as the materialist does not acknowledge the claim of the idealist, the system kat’ eksochen cannot be thought. I would also note that I am only speaking of systems which present actual moments of development; not systems which are only given this title by their authors. Such authors are given too much credit even when they are regarded as capable of error. Whoever is able to err must at least be on some path; whereas whoever never even once strikes out on a path, but rather completely remains sitting in their house cannot err. Whoever risks themselves at sea can certainly be thrown off track and deviate from their way, but whosoever never even sails out of the port, but rather whose whole endeavor consists in not sailing out and preventing the coming of philosophy by eternally philosophizing about philosophy, such a person clearly has no dangers to fear. Thus the idea of the system as such presupposes the necessary and irresolvable conflict of systems. Without this conflict the system as such would never emerge. [12] Philosophy has often enough been blamed for this asystasy, this inner conflict. In various passages in his writings, Kant represents metaphysics, in terms of its teaching and amelioration, as shameful compared to the example of mathematics, and to other examples as well. “See here,” they say, “how in geometry, for example, all from Euclid to Thales and the Egyptian priests have agreed. Whereas the situation in philosophy is quot capita, tot sensus: as many systems as there are heads, and each day a new system is born.” I have already stated my opinion concerning those systems which emerge over night. But if one, therefore, attaches little value to philosophy because it is in systems while geometry is not, I reply that there are clearly no systems in geometry because there is no system—and in philosophy there must be systems because there is a system. It is as if one preferred a stereometrically regulated crystal to the human form because the former has no potential for sickness, whereas the seeds for all possible illnesses lie in the human body. Sickness and health are roughly related to one another as particulars systems and the system kat’ eksochen. Doctors distinguish between particular systems in the human organism as well. Whoever suffers from one of these systems, i.e. if one of these is particularly obtrusive, that person is thereby bound to that system, inhibited in his freedom, and quite properly a slave to it. A healthy person feels none of these systems in particular. As used to be said, he does not know that he has a digestive system, and so on. He is free from all systems. Why? Not because his organism does not contain these systems—that would serve no purpose to him—instead because he lives only in the whole, total system, in which each particular system, as a manner of speaking, fall silent and become impossible (the word [13] “health” quite likely means the same as whole). It is the same in philosophy; whoever has penetrated to the end sees themselves in full freedom; he is free from system—above all system. At present, we have determined the following. 1) The external possibility of the system, that is, so to speak, the matter, the stuff from which it is made, is the inner and irresolvable conflict in human knowing. 2) This conflict must have become revealed. It must have shown and cultivated itself in all possible directions. 3) It must be seen that this conflict is not contingent, but rather that everything is grounded in first principles themselves. 4) The hope that this conflict could be brought to an end if one system were to become master over another must be given up. But if a one-sided subjugation of one by another is

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impossible, one must thus 5) –and this is a new determination—one must thus not imagine that they have the ability to find a unity in which all opposition is destroyed, as the concept of the system would collapse with it. Instead, the task is for these oppositions to coexist. In the first case (if all opposition was destroyed), one would see before oneself a bottomless abyss in place of the system; an abyss into which all things sink and in which nothing can be distinguished anymore. Systems should not be destroyed. Rather they should coexist, like the different systems in an organism. Through this coexistence, they would generate a view that lies beyond all particular systems; an view in which humanity finds comfort, as in the healthy human body all different organs and functions melt into one inseparable life, the feeling of which is well being. To want to annihilate, to destroy any actual system, would clearly be contrary to the purpose. As, from where does the onesidedness of the system emerge? Answer: as you must already clearly see, it does not emerge from what one claims, but rather from what one denies. Quite naively, Leibniz has already said somewhere, “I have found that, to a great extent, the sects are right in large part in what they claim, but not nearly so in what they deny.” Leibniz must have felt that exception is falsity, however, he yet again erected a manifestly onesided system when he claimed that [14] everything in the world comes back to the forces of representation. “The deeper one penetrates into the ground of things, the more truth is discovered in the teachings of most sects. One finally comes to a midpoint in which all is found united. If one positions oneself in this midpoint, one only sees regularity and correspondence. If one departs from it, and the further one departs from it, everything is more and more tangled, the lines misalign and one part covers another.” But, at this point, he adds: “the spirit of the sect has thus far been the mistake. One has restricted themselves insofar as what another has taught is thrown out.” Thus here too the mistake is set up as dismissal. Yet why does Leibniz himself make this same mistake? The answer: his system admittedly stands at a high level, and thus there was clearly in this system a certain, but still always partially perspectival, midpoint from which many teachings and claims which stand at a lower level could appear to accord with one another. [15] Up to this point, I have spoken about the external ground of the system, or the striving to be able to see human knowledge in a system, as coexistent. For human knowledge, this external ground is in itself an irresolvable conflict. I have not displayed or proven this; I have presupposed it and I must presuppose it. Had I wanted to include it, I would have needed to give the preparation—the propadeutic itself—in place of the system. The best propadeutic, to be specific, is one which is able to follow these necessary contradictions in which the awakening of consciousness and the awakening of reflection take place. It follows these contradictions from the first roots through its branching out, up until the despair induced by this branching, wherein humanity is, in a manner of speaking, forced to latch on to the idea of a higher whole, in which a higher consciousness is generated through the coexistence of conflicting systems. In this higher consciousness humans are free of all systems, above all systems. This is properly the business of the mere dialectic, which is in no way science itself, but arguably only the preparation for it. Thus the external ground of the system is the original asustasía of human knowledge. But now, what is the principle of its possibility? To be specific, we can presumably understand that a whole in which all such conflicts harmonize is desirable, but how is it possible? And what must be assumed for it to be thinkable? – The first assumption that makes it thinkable is indisputably 1) the general idea of progression, or movement in the system. As it is admittedly impossible that conflicting claims could both be true, as used to be said, in one and the same moment of development. But it is quite possible that the assertion A is B is true for one certain point of development, where as A is not B is true for

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another. At this point, movement holds the conflicting assertions apart from one another. 2) But a subject of movement and progression is needed by this movement; this is the subject whose moving and progressing is that which is understood. In light of this subject, two assumptions are made: a) it is only one subject which goes through all things; because if there were another subject in B, and again another in C, B and C would be fully divorced, and there would be no connection. As the subject is only one and itself that lives in the differentiated members of an organism, so there must be only one subject that goes through all moments of the system—yet the members through which this subject passes are not all one and the same.—But b) this one subject must pass through all things and not remain in any of them. As if it remained, [16] life and development would be inhibited. Passing through all things and not being any of them, that is, being no thing such that it could not be another—this is the requirement. What is this subject that is in all things and remains in no thing? What should it be called? – (In passing; this question is identical to the common question about what principle of philosophy is. To be specific, the principle of philosophy is not something which is principle only in the beginning and then ceases to be so. Rather, it is that which is principle always and above all in beginning, middle, and end all the same.—This principle furthermore has been understood as a supreme law. In that case, philosophy was seen as a chain of laws which followed from one another. It was imagined that there must have been a supreme link in this chain – a first law, from which a second and again a third follows, etc. Thus Cartesius has cogito ergo sum as supreme law. Fichte: I is I. In a living system alone, which is not the consequence of a law, but rather is the moments of progression and development, there can be no account of any such supreme principle.) Thus, what is the principle of the system, what is that one subject that passes through all and remains in nothing? What should we call it, what should be said of it? – We first want to see, what the question itself, “what is it?”, means. “Something whose existence is named.” Now this is easy. Shall I say A is B, perhaps? Freely! But it is also not B. I simply ask for an explicit determination, I ask that its concept be defined and circumscribed within fixed boundaries. If one requests a definition, [17] one wants to know what the subject is definitively and not merely what it is such that it could be something other or even the exact opposite of that other. This is the case here. I cannot determinately say that A is, nor can I determinately say that B is not. It is both B and not B, and it is neither B nor not B. It is not B in such a way, that it would not also be not B, and it is not not B in such a way, that it absolutely in no way could not be B. The case would be the same with every other determination; with C, with D, and so forth. Thus, what remains? Should I repeat the whole sequence, should I say that it is A, B, C, D and so on? But, my friends, that is exactly the whole science, that is already exactly the system itself. Thus what remains? Answer: I must make the indefinable the definition. I must define it as that in the subject itself which is not definable. What does it mean ‘to define’? According to the word, it means to enclose within determinate boundaries. This does not let itself be defined as that which is, by nature, enclosed in determinate boundaries. For this reason defining a geometric figure is something extremely simple, as its essence persists in limitation. In this case the definiendum is already a definitum—I do not actually define it, it is already defined, and if I say I gave a definition of an ellipse, for example, it only means as much as follows: I only become conscious of the definition of an ellipse—as this definition lies in the ellipse itself. Therefore geometry=definable science. Only with the subject of philosophy is it something wholly other. It is simply indefinable because 1) it is nothing—not something, and this itself is at least a negative definition; it alone is also not nothing, i.e., it is all things. Only it is nothing individual, in stasis, particular; it is B, C, D and so on, only insofar as each of these points belongs to the flux of inseparable movement.

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There is nothing that it would be and nothing that it would not be. It is in an unstoppable motion, enclosed in no form. It is the incoercible, the ungraspable, the truly infinite. Whoever wants to completely release the mighty, self-generating science, must raise themselves to this level. At this point all things finite, whatever is still a being, must be forsaken, the last devotion must atrophy. Here we have to leave all things—not merely, as used to be said, wife and child, but also that which simply is, God himself—[18] as from this standpoint even God is only a being. Here, where we first name this concept (God), we may account for it as the highest example of what was mentioned earlier. We say that there is nothing that the absolute subject would not be, and there is nothing that it would be. To be specific, the absolute subject is not not God, yet it is also not God, and it is also that which God is not. Thus, insofar as this is the case, it is above God, and as one of the most excellent mystics of earlier times dared to speak of a superdivinity (Übergottheit), this will also be granted to us. At this point it is therefore expressly noted that the absolute—that absolute subject—should not be confused with God, as this distinction is very important. Thus, whoever wants to stand at the beginning point of a true and free philosophy must leave God. This means that whoever wants to gain it will lose it, and whoever gives it up will find it. Only those who have arrived at the ground itself and have become aware of the great depths of life, who have at one time abandoned everything and been abandoned by everything in turn, for whom all has been sunk, and has looked into the infinite and had it look back: a [19] great step which Plato likened with death. What Dante has written on the door of the Inferno can also be written, in another sense, before the entrance to philosophy: “Abandon all hope, whoever enters here”. Whoever wants to truly philosophize must be without all hope, all desire, all yearning [Sehnsucht]. He must want nothing, must know nothing, must feel bare and poor, must give up all things in order to attain all things. This is a difficult step. It is difficult to depart from this proverbial final shore. We can see this as so few throughout all time stood here. How high Spinoza elevates himself when he teaches that we must cut ourselves off from all particular and finite things and raise ourselves to the infinite! Yet how deeply he himself sinks when he makes this infinite into substance, i.e. something dead and stagnant, and when he describes this substance as the unity of extended and thinking essence; which are as two weights through which he completely pulls substance down into the sphere of finitude! So to in our time, Fichte, who before me stood in this place, was the first to again [20] forcefully appeal for freedom. We properly owe the fact that we can freely and entirely begin to philosophize again from scratch. How far beneath him he saw all being, in which he saw only an inhibition of free activity! But in the moment in which all external and objective being is lost to him—a moment in which one excepts to see him raise himself above all beings—he again latches on to his own I. Whoever wants to be able to reach this free Aether must not only let go of the object, but also must let go of their self. Through a great decision in the middle of time, it is open to humans to be able to begin their moral life again from the beginning. Should this not also be able to occur in the spiritual? But here to one must simply be born afresh and anew. I said that what is indefinable in this absolute subject must itself be made its definition. Yet when we see clearly, it will assault us that we have thereby attained nothing more than a negative concept of this absolute subject, and even more it is a danger to get caught in negation, as the word infinite itself properly only expresses the negation of finitude. Likewise: indefinable, incoercible, ungraspable. Thus we still only know what this subject is not, but not what it is. But we do not cease because of this. Rather, we strive in all ways to obtain the affirmative concept itself. We want to see how we get in this danger of negation. What have we done? We said to ourselves determinatively and categorically that this absolute subject is the indefinable, the

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ungraspable, the infinite. But in doing so we acted against our own fundamental principle, namely that nothing can simply be expressed about this absolute subject, the opposite of which would not also be possible. The same must be applicable to the concept of the indefinable. Specifically, it is not so indefinable that it could not also become definable; it is not so infinite that it could not also become finite, not so ungraspable that it could not also be grasped. And if you hold to this correctly, you have the positive concept. Namely, in order to be able to enclose it in a form, it must freely be [21] outside of all form, but the positive in it is not that it is outside of all form or that its being is ungraspable. Rather, the positive in it is that it can enclose itself in a form, that it can make itself graspable, thus that it is free to enclose itself or to not enclose itself in a form. Likewise, at the beginning it was not maintained that it is simply shapeless and formless, but rather only that it would remain in no shape, it would not be fettered. We thus expressly assumed that it would receive a form; as it only shows itself as the ungraspable and infinite because it receives a form and steps out of each one victorious. But it would not be free to step outside of each form if it has not been free to take on or not take on each form from the beginning. I say from the beginning—because after it takes on form once, it may not be possible for it to immediately break through again in its eternal freedom. Rather, it must pass through all forms. But it is still originally free to either enclose itself or not enclose itself in a form. But I do not want to say that it is that which is free to take on form. As then, this freedom would appear as a property, which presumes a still distinct and independent subject—rather, freedom is the essence of the subject, or it is itself nothing other than eternal freedom. This freedom is not to be thought as mere independence from external determination, but rather the freedom to be able to enclose itself in forms. It is eternal freedom, but it is also not such that it could not also not be freedom, specifically through the passage into another form—and here we see from whence the proper duplicity of being and not-being, its natura anceps [dual nature], comes to it; specifically, that it is nothing but absolute [22] freedom itself. Because if it were only freedom in such a way that it could not also become not-Freedom, that it would have to remain freedom, freedom would become its own limit, its own necessity, it would not actually be absolute freedom. We now finally have the whole and complete concept, in such a way that we cannot lose it again. All that we could still add to it is merely unpacking and explanation and you should accept it as such. Specifically, instead of essential freedom we could also say that 1) it is eternal, pure possibility. It is not the possibility for something (whereby it is already limited), but rather the possibility for the sake of possibility, possibility without intention or object. This is the highest above all, and when we see it we believe we are able to see a ray of this original freedom. 2) It is will—not the will of a being [Wesens] that is distinct from it—nothing but the will itself. It is also not the will for something (as that would already limit it), but rather the will in itself. It is not the will that actually wants, and also not the will that does not want or rejects, rather it is the will insofar as it neither wants nor does not want, the will in its complete indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] (an indifference which again encompasses itself and non-indifference). And you may at least be aware that historically this same indifference was declared as the indifference [Indifferenz] as the form of the properly absolute. Now, how this eternal freedom is first enclosed in a form—in a being [Seyn]—and how it goes through all and remains in none to finally break through in eternal freedom again—as the eternally struggling, but never defeated, never overcome force, that always consuming itself in each form in which in encloses itself, emerging again from each as the Phoenix and glorifying itself through its flaming death—this is the content of the highest science.

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But how can we get inside [inne-werden] of this eternal freedom, how can we know this movement? This is now the next question. [23] It is an ancient teaching that like is only known by like. The knower must be as the known and the known as the knower. Thus it is the case that they eye is similar to light according to an ancient saying which Goethe has included in the foreword to his doctrine of colors: !

Were the eye not like the sun, How could we behold the light? If God’s own force lived not in us, How could divinity enrapture us? !

At this point a historical knowledge of this movement is not of particular concern, rather it is a matter of knowing-with [Mitwissenschaft], conscientia. From this it follows that there is something similar and like this eternal freedom in us ourselves—or still more determinately: this eternal freedom itself must be in us, this eternal freedom itself in us must be the knower of itself. How is this possible? I ask: is the concept of eternal freedom actually so distant from our knowing? What is eternal freedom? As we have already seen, it is a) = the eternal, pure possibility. But every possibility is a knowing, even if the reverse is not so. b) Possibility in action is a willing: before it passes over to [24] activity, it is the resting willing. The will, insofar as it does not want is disinterestedness, indifference [Gleichgültigkeit, Indifferenz]. But now, what is this willing? It is an attracting, a making something its object, i.e. a knowing, as knowing too is the act of making something its object, and as eternal freedom in its disinterestedness is the resting will, it is also resting knowing = not knowing knowing [nicht wissendes Wissen]. (My assertion, by the way, is not that willing and knowing are one and the same, but only that in each willing there is a knowing, as willing cannot be thought without knowing). c) The concepts of possibility and willing are united the word “to desire”. I do not desire = I do not want to. “May one blind man guide another on the way” = Can also, etc. Eternal freedom is eternal desire, not the desire for something, desire in [25] itself, or as we could also express this, eternal magic. I use this word because it expresses my concept; it is indeed a strange word, but when we use it for ourselves we are only taking back our property. If we say, eternal possibility, or if we say, eternal magic, it is one in the same. This word only suggests itself because it expresses the capacity to take to all forms and to remain in none simultaneously. Likewise, this also holds for knowing, as resting knowing is infinite in itself, and can give itself any form. This magic = resting knowing so long as it is inactive. When it is acting, enclosing itself in a form, it becomes knowing, it experiences knowing as it goes from form to form, steps from knowing to knowing, but only in order to be able to break through again in the bliss of not-knowing (which is then a knowing not-knowing). Thus this movement generates science (this account is naturally not of human science). Science only emerges originally when a principle steps out from the original state of not-knowing, becomes knowable, and accordingly passes through all forms and returns to the original not-knowing. What the absolute beginning is, cannot itself be known; passing into knowing it ceases to be the beginning and therefore must advance until it finds itself again as beginning. When this beginning knows itself as beginning, a restored beginning, it is the end of all knowing. [26] More than mere knowing lies in the original magic, namely, objective bringing forth. Therefore, in order to be able to distinguish this knowing, which is simultaneously an

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objective bringing-forth and generation, from mere knowing, which is only an ideal repetition of original knowing, one must seek an appropriate expression in speech, namely wisdom. Wisdom is even more than knowing, it is active knowing, it is the knowing in deed and life, or knowledge insofar as it simultaneously practical. For this reason we can also call wisdom eternal freedom, wisdom par excellence in the highest sense, in which this word is used particularly in the Orient and specifically in the Old Testament. The Hebraic word, to which wisdom refers, in its origin properly indicates sovereignty, power, and strength because it is that which is in all but is thereby also above all. But strength is only in unity; in separation there is weakness. An ancient Oriental poem asks of this wisdom: “Where will wisdom be found, and where is the place of the understanding? No one knows where it lies, it is not found in the land of the living. The abyss says: it is not in me. The sea says: it is not in me.” The meaning is that wisdom is nothing particular, it does not tarry in the land of the living because it does remain anywhere at all. It moves through everything like the wind whose whistle can be heard, yet no one can say where its place is. This meaning is illuminated by the continuation of the account, where it says: “It is dissembled before all human eyes, [27] perdition and death speak: we have heard the report with our own ears”, i.e. it has passed before us, we have only heard of it in transitu, in passing. “God himself alone knows the way to it”, namely, according to its nature it is not static, and even with God it cannot stand still. “God alone knows the way to it, because he sees the end of the earth”, i.e. of all human life, and wisdom is not in the beginning alone, not in the middle alone, and not in the end alone—it is in the beginning, middle, and end together. Thus, here, wisdom = eternal freedom. But this wisdom is no longer in humanity, as in humanity there is not objective bringing forth, but rather mere ideal imitations. Humanity is not (no longer) the magical mover of all things; in humanity there is merely still knowing. But in this knowing humans seek eternal freedom or wisdom. But how could humanity seek it, if it has not sought itself in humanity? As the known must be as the knower. But how could eternal freedom seek itself in humanity’s subjective knowing, when it could still seek itself objectively? For eternal freedom’s whole movement through all things is a search for itself. Thus if it seeks itself in humanity, in subjective knowing, it only arrives there because it is inhibited in its objective search. This is exactly the case. We have described it as that which remains in nothing. Now we clearly see that it [28] remains in nothing, destroying each form, but what it sets in the place of what it has destroyed is again simply the form itself. Therein no advancement can be recognized, only inhibition. Each form is reluctantly driven to self-destruction (e.g. plants are driven to cultivate seeds), always hoping that something new emerges. Where this deadlock comes from cannot be explained, but this view of the world assures us of itself. The regular course of the stars, the recurrent circle of appearances in general points to it. The sun rises in order to set, and sets in order to rise again. Water flows into the sea in order to come out of it again. One generation comes, another goes, all work in order to annihilate and destroy themselves, and yet nothing new comes from it. The inhibition of advancement is thus objective. Only in knowing is there still an open point where wisdom can still search for and find itself. For this reason, it is a human concern to internalize wisdom. True, the active, the objective bringing forth from this knowing has vanished, the magic has thereby gone away. What was deed and life in this objective movement in humanity is still only knowing. However, this knowing is still itself in essence: it is eternal freedom, which is still in humanity as knowing; it the same magic that brings forth all things, that is the master of all arts. Yet in humanity it is limited by a knowing which is a merely ideal repetition of the process.

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[29] How can we know this absolute subject, eternal freedom? A more general question provides the ground for this one: How can this absolute subject, eternal freedom, be known at all? To be specific, 1) it is a contradiction that eternal freedom should be known. It is absolute subject = primal state; thus how can it become an object? It cannot possibly become so as absolute subject, because as such it does not relate to anything as if it were an object; it is the absolute which no thing can access insofar as it is properly transcendent. Instead of absolute subject it is also possible to call this pure knowing, and as such it also cannot be something known. This can be shown for all the concepts with which we have compared the absolute subject or eternal freedom. For example, we said, “it would be eternal, pure possibility.” But pure possibility abstracts itself from all things, it is not like an object, it is absolute inwardness. The situation is the same with pure willing and desire. [30] At this point, if eternal freedom as absolute subject is not like an object, it hinges on its becoming an object, something like an object. This may be possible. Since it is absolute freedom, i.e. freedom to also not be free (not be a subject), it can step outside itself as subject. Clearly, as object it can be known; we see it in all of its forms, but not as eternal freedom, not as subject, not as it is in itself. Thus it seems that it cannot be known anywhere or in any way. As absolute subject it is above all cognition and as object it is not in-itself. For all that, there is only one manner in which the absolute subject as such could be known, namely if the subject were reconstructed from out of the object. As then it is no longer simply subject, and yet not an object in such a way that it would lose the subject. Rather as it is object it is subject, and as it is subject it is object, without thereby being two. As the known it is the knower and as the knower it is the known; then eternal freedom would know itself as it was known. [31] As the possibility of the self-knowledge of eternal freedom lies only in the transmutation from object into subject, thus the absolute subject its not knowing itself a) in the beginning—as then it is simply pure knowledge (restful knowing = not knowing knowledge). Likewise, it is not knowing itself b) in the middle or the passage, as there knows itself, but as another, not as eternal freedom. c) Only in the end is it knowing itself as itself. 1

Clearly, it should know itself, and this is anticipated as what else would there be for it to know than itself, as there is nothing outside of it? Thus it should be subject and object of itself, but two poles of it are held apart from one another throughout the whole movement. In fact, it is precisely this which first creates the movement; both ends are not permitted to collapse together because as soon as they coincide the movement ceases. This can be made clear through the example of a magnetic needle: if both poles of the magnet could come together, its life would cease. Hence the whole movement is only a movement towards self-knowledge. The imperative, the impulse of the whole movement is, Gnôthi Seautón, know yourself. This exercise is generally seen as wisdom. Know what you are and be what you have known yourself to be; this is the highest rule of wisdom. [32] Thus eternal freedom in indifference is resting wisdom. In movement it is self-seeking, never resting wisdom, which is actualized in the end. As wisdom is self seeking throughout the whole movement, the whole movement is the striving after wisdom, it is—objectively—philosophy.

Trans—This passage is a bit awkward to translate, as Schelling is repeatedly using the gerund form of 1

erkennen, which he occasionally seems to oppose to merely conjugating the verb. I have maintained this by saying “is knowing”, to attempt to indicate the active character of the gerund rather than employing “knows” which seems to turn the known into too much of a static object.

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At this point it could be said: here (in the end), eternal freedom is recognizable as absolute subject. Yes, but only for it self. Eternal freedom can therefore only ever know itself; there is never any knowledge of it except when this self knows itself. Thus it appears that for humans there can be no knowledge of eternal freedom. Yet we demand such immediate knowledge, it is true. The only possibility of such knowledge would be if this self-knowledge of eternal freedom were our consciousness, and vice versa, if our consciousness were to be a self-knowledge of eternal freedom. To put it another way, if this self-knowledge rested upon the turning around of the objective into the subjective and if this turning around were to occur in us, i.e., if we ourselves were eternal freedom reconstructed as subject from object. [33] We must not allow ourselves to be terrified before this thought. As a) this abyssal freedom is again in humanity alone. In the midst of time humanity is not in time. Humanity is permitted to be another beginning; humanity is thus the reconstructed beginning. b) A dark recollection of having once been the beginning, the power, the absolute center of all things, openly stirs itself in humanity. Humanity would be this beginning in a twofold way, 1) insofar as humanity is the eternal freedom itself which was in the beginning, only now returned. Humanity would thus be the absolute center as this beginning, and would be it 2) as this re-achieved freedom. [35] But if humanity too is only freedom which has come to itself—as humanity actually is, because humanity in its inner sense is nothing other than egoity [Ichheit], consciousness, and all consciousness presupposes a having-come-to-itself—but if humanity is this re-achieved beginning, humanity does not know itself as such. For if humanity knew itself as such, humanity would know itself as freedom come to itself, and thus the question of how we recognize this eternal freedom would not be necessary. We would know it immediately, [36] we would, in fact, be this self-knowledge of eternal freedom. It is true that we are now this knowledge of eternal freedom, but we do not know it, thus we must first, again, be guided by science to the knowing of this knowledge. But science too has no other way to perform this task than to begin from eternal freedom; yet science cannot begin from eternal freedom without being able to know it. This is clearly circular. We must already have the results of science in order to be able to begin science. Here, we are at a point where the difficulty is apparent, where up until know it hovered before us in darkness. What else remains? Should we help ourselves with intimation? But intimation is incomplete knowing. Intimation only properly relates to the future. It is true and cannot be contradicted that with the first step into philosophy we also intimate the end; there is no science without divination. But it is not the same if I divine the [37] end in the beginning as if I intimate the beginning from itself, as the latter is a contradiction. The case is the same with belief. I regard belief with honor, but to thereby believe in the principle is laughable. – Or should we begin with a hypothesis which first becomes a certainty in the end? This gets a hearing, but is not enough. In this case I would always be the one who posited science and the principle. But what counts in philosophy is the ability to elevate oneself above all knowing that merely begins with the self. What can be done at this point? From where should we begin? – Here, then, what hinders most from even being able to come to philosophy must be expressed: it is the representation that philosophy has to do with a demonstrative science which first goes out from one thing known in order to arrive [38] at another thing known, and from this again another, and so forth. But philosophy is not a demonstrative science, philosophy is, in order to be able to express it with one word, a free act of spirit; its first step is not a knowing, but is better expressed as a not-knowing, a giving up of all human knowledge. So long as humanity still wants to know, the absolute subject becomes an object for it, and humanity, thereby, cannot recognize the absolute subject in itself. When humanity says, “I, as I, cannot know, I – do not want to know”, in doing that knowledge happens to humanity, humanity makes space for

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that which is knowledge, namely, the absolute subject, which has been shown to be precisely knowledge itself. In this act, in which humanity cuts itself off so as not to know, the absolute subject is appointed as knowledge. In this act of appointment, I now clearly become aware of it as something exuberant. This becoming aware could probably be called a knowing, but at the same time it must be set down that it is a knowing that from my perspective is more so a not-knowing. This absolute subject is only there insofar as I do not make it into an object, i.e., when I do not know, I cut myself off from knowing; but as soon as this not-knowing wants to straighten itself onto into knowing, the absolute subject vanishes again as it cannot be an object. [39] People have sought to express this wholly peculiar relation through the name intellectual intuition. It was called intuition, because it was accepted that in intuiting or (as this word has become common) in seeing the subject loses itself, it placed outside of itself. It was called intellectual intuition in order to express that the subject is not lost in a sensible intuition, in an actual object, but rather is lost in, or gives itself up in, something that cannot be an object. Simply because this expression is need of an explanation, it is better to wholly set it aside. Rather, the name ecstasy could be used for this relation. Namely, our I is placed outside of itself, i.e. out of its place. Its place is to be subject. But when confronted with the absolute subject it cannot be subject, because the absolute subject cannot comport itself as object. Thus it must abandon the place, it must be set outside itself, as something that is no longer existing. Only in this self-abandonment can the absolute subject burst open to the subject in its self-abandonment, and we thus behold it in wonder. This approximates the peaceful expression which the gentle Plato himself uses when he says: “Before all others, the primary affect of the philosopher is – wonder, to thaumazein,” and he adds, “because there is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder” (Theaetetus, 155d). This is a glorious expression, which you [40] should write deep in your souls, particularly since there are so many dimwits who are always shouting at beginners in philosophy to go into themselves – into their deepest depths, as they say; but this only means so much as always going deeper and deeper into one’s own limitations. The human need is not to be placed in oneself, but outside oneself. It was precisely through this going-in that humanity first lost what it should be. Specifically, humanity was the eternal freedom that had lost itself and which hard sought itself again throughout the whole of nature—humanity was the freedom brought back to itself, and should have remained as such; but insofar as humanity again only wanted to contemplate itself in it, to get to the ground of it, dress itself up in it, and thus wanted to make itself into the subject, humanity clearly remained subject, but eternal freedom now remains a mere object to it. How else can humanity begin again, in order to again become what it once was—wisdom, namely the self-knowledge of eternal freedom—other than by displacing itself from this place, setting itself outside of itself? [41] With regards to this I would like to note that Ekstasis is a vox anceps, which can be taken in a better or worse sense. Namely, every removal or displacement from a place is ecstasy. What matters is if something is removed from a place that is due to it, proper to it; or if it is removed from a place that is not proper to it. In the latter situation, it is a healthy ecstasy that leads to mindfulness [Besinnung], whereas the other leads to senselessness. But how can humanity be brought to this ecstasy—which means the same as asking how humanity is brought to mindfulness [Besinnung]? At this point, I want to show this in general (not in its whole genesis). [42] Insofar as humanity makes this original freedom into an object, wanting to bring it to knowledge, the following contradiction arises: humanity wants to know and feel this eternal freedom as freedom, but insofar as its is made into an object, it secretly turns into non-freedom, and yet humanity still seeks and desires it as freedom. Humanity wants to

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become conscious of it as freedom, but makes it into nothing by raising it up. A cyclical drive [Umtrieb] thereby emerges in the inner life of humanity; a rotary motion in which humanity constantly seeks freedom and freedom flees from it. This inner drive is the state of the most disruptive doubt, of eternal unrest. Not only does freedom cease, whoever wants to know it is placed in a state of the highest unfreedom—in constant tension with that very freedom which is eternally sought, and which constantly flees. The occurrence of this tension, which also takes place in humanity, finally reaches its highest point, an akmé, [43] a consequence of which must be a discharge through which whoever wanted to make eternal freedom known in itself, is thrown out—placed on the periphery—and is turned to absolute not knowing. At this point humanity is first well again. But this crisis is only a beginning, a condition of the process that ought to be described at this point. Through this decision two sides are posited: one on the side of our consciousness in the situation of absolute not-knowing, the other on the side of the absolute subject, which rises up to consciousness and announces itself as that which the other cannot know. It is true that both are now outside one another, but they do not remain in this separation. They only lost a false unity in which they were inhibited from being able to achieve the true, right, and free unity; but precisely because they are released from one and the same unity, they perpetually comport themselves as if they were sympathetic organs, in which no change can occur in one without being reflected in the other. But a change is necessary, as the absolute subject cannot remain in this constriction (of absolute inwardness), thus it promptly takes to movement again. This movement, like all [44] movement, has three primary moments. 1) The first moment, to be specific, is that wherein the absolute subject finds itself in absolute inwardness = A. This corresponds to the knowing of the moment of absolute externality, i.e. not knowing, which is = B. Yet the absolute subject cannot persist in this in-itself, it necessarily transforms into externality; or A becomes object = B. Thus 2) in the second moment, A becomes B. Nothing remains for knowledge in the first moment than to be absolute not knowing. In the second moment, where it becomes A = B, simple not knowing transforms itself into knowledge = A. As absolute not knowing, as B, as knowledge placed externally, it again elevates itself to inwardness—knowing-- = A. The passage from subject into object reflects itself in the passing from object into subject. For this reason the expression ‘reflection’ is needed. As an object is mirrored in water, the absolute subject clearly stands in an inverted relationship to consciousness. The absolute subject simply leaves not knowing behind. But if A becomes B, in the same relationship, B becomes A, i.e. knowledge. [45] Yet, the absolute subject does not remain static in the moment of its externality, c) in a third moment it again becomes A from B, it is again erected as subject; only now it is A reconstructed from B. The knowledge standing in rapport with it changes its relationship along with it; insofar as the absolute subject is reconstructed, knowledge must die off into not-knowing; B that had become A becomes B again, i.e., not-knowing. But as brought back from knowledge, it is no longer simply not-knowing, rather it is knowing not-knowing; it is not-knowing, but not externally as in the beginning, rather internally. It has internalized, made internal, eternal freedom, from which it was ejected in this crisis. Or: it has again recollected [erinnert] eternal freedom to itself—it now knows this eternal freedom, truly knows it immediately, namely as the interior of not-knowing. Thus the ancient teaching that all philosophy exists only as recollection. (In order to come to itself as the original interior of eternal freedom—as it emerged in this freedom—it must first be placed outside itself). [46] The relationship of knowledge to the absolute subject can be made clear through two lines. Imagine two lines: !

B

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A------------ --B = A A

B---------------A = B On the first line, the absolute subject (A) is the beginning, on the other line knowledge in not-knowing = B. Both are correlates. The absolute subject now passes through a point in its movement where it transforms into an object (B); at the same moment the B of the upper line reflects itself as A in the lower line, or, not-knowing passes over into knowledge (A). But now in the third moment, the absolute subject of the top line that passed over into object (B) in the second moment is brought back to itself again in the subject. Or in other words: B becomes A again, and in the same moment reflects the B = A of the upper line again in the lower line, and it appears there as the A = B, or knowledge unites with not-knowing. So much for general comments. This is the outline for a proper theory of philosophy. Now on to particular explanations and corollaries. [47] The process rests upon the holding apart of the absolute subject and our knowledge while still maintaining a constant rapport between the two such that the condition of our knowledge changes along with movements of the absolute subject. According to this view, the question can no longer be how I assure myself of the reality of this knowledge, because a) in this self-abandonment, in this ecstasy, the I, as I, is aware of itself as fully not-knowing, the absolute subject immediately becomes the highest reality to me. I posit the absolute subject through my not knowing (in this ecstasy). To me, it is not an object that I knowingly know; rather it is the absolute subject that I unknowingly know and that I thereby posit through my not-knowing. This rapport between my knowledge and the absolute subject, by the force of which there is as much reality in the absolute subject as there is non-reality in my knowledge, is only possible because both are originally one. It is only possible because eternal freedom is originally in our consciousness or is our consciousness. Yes, this eternal freedom has no place in which it is able to come to itself other than in our consciousness. b) Whatever obtains for the absolute subject from this first positing, namely that the absolute subject as such posits me as not-knowing and I , in turn, posit the absolute subject as not-knowing, also holds for each particular knowledge in this advancement. Namely i) knowledge is in constant transformation, it is in the place of another and is still itself, but ii) my knowledge does not shape itself, rather it is shaped; every single pattern is only the reflex (or [48] reversed, hence reflection!) of that shape in eternal freedom, and iii) I apperceive each pattern immediately through this reflex in myself, i.e. through the changes in my knowledge. iv) Thus all knowledge only rises up internally. We are not merely idle observers, rather we ourselves are in constant transformation until the form of perfect knowledge; this process which carves the path of this movement in our own inwardness is not superficial, rather it goes to the depths. Nothing can be brought to humanity in a merely external manner. The light of science must rise up in us through an internal cision and liberation. [50] In philosophy, nothing less than the pure, finished principle is sacrificed; the complete concept only generates itself gradually. I once again return to the process that has already been described and tie it together with the growing crisis mentioned above, the consequence of which is the separation of the absolute subject and consciousness. To be specific, human consciousness is originally the internal, ground providing, support, or subject, of eternal freedom coming to itself; but it is this subject in silence, i.e., the [51] not-knowing, not-acting, not-stepping-forth interior. The coming-to-itself of eternal freedom again rests upon the fact that it is again transformed from object into subject, from the B to

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the A. B is thus the underlying ground, that, as it were, underlies the A. The B, now, is a particular form or pattern—that of humanity. Thus humanity or human consciousness is the silent interior of eternal freedom come to itself, and a particular human consciousness is only the groundwork of the absolute or general consciousness. But it does not remain in such a standing, as otherwise eternal freedom would actually know itself, even though humanity would not know it. Therefore, without fail, humanity attracts this eternal freedom, which humanity is (humanity is the subject of it), to itself. Humanity must want it for itself. The particular principle, the individual human consciousness, is only the groundwork of the absolute or general consciousness, and a man would like the universal consciousness as his individual consciousness. But in doing so he cancels (aufheben) general consciousness, as this rested upon the fact that this B in A was the silent, concealed, indiscernible interior of A. Thus insofar as he wants to attract this pure consciousness, he destroys it. Hence the contradiction: whatever humans want is made to nothing through their wanting. Out of this contradiction rises the inner driving movement in which the seeking, so to speak, drives what is sought into constant flight away from itself. Hence this final crisis in which this unity that we expressed through the transformation of B into A – the consciousness of eternal freedom (= the ur-consciousness) – is torn apart. Through this crisis [52] we are again placed at the beginning. A is again the pure, absolute subject, so much the subject that it does not know itself even once; all that is new is that which remained standing as if it were a ruin from the processes which came before: the B that is set outside of itself and brought to not-knowing. This becomes frees through the setting-outside-of-itself, it is the first moment of mindfulness [der ersten Augenblick seiner Besinnung], and for the first time savors the freedom and blessedness of not-knowing. It is now – in order to give a positive expression – that which we could call free thinking. To think is to abandon knowledge; knowledge is bound, thinking is in complete freedom, and the word itself already implies that all free thinking is the result of a separation, a conflict, or a crisis that has been overcome [aufgehobenen]. To be specific, the word either comes from i) ‘to expand’, or ii) from the Hebrew word | ‘ \ or iii) from dinos, that which has escaped from a vertiginous movement. It always refers to an origin in a conflict. The same result unfolds if we return to an ancient use for the word ‘to think’, as it still found, for example, in the saying “noble people think for a long time”, i.e. their recollection lasts a long time. Here too thinking is characterized as that which is set outside itself, prior to knowing. [53] These separations are actually only primal consciousness separated within itself. Primal consciousness was when they were one and together, in their going apart from one another primal consciousness still is, but as something torn apart that seeks to restore itself as it would lie restored as potential in a seed. This primal consciousness in its potentiality, in its simple reconstructedness, is reason. Or, to be more determinate, primal consciousness that strives to be able to restore itself in this conflict, and which we only sense as an incitement, a notification, a pull within ourselves, is reason. This illuminates the potential, the barren, suffering nature of reason, but thereby also shows that reason cannot be the active principle of science. Primal consciousness is not merely parsed out into free, not knowing thinking; rather the absolute subject which stands opposed to this thinking is only an excretion of primal consciousness, and only as such, as a correlate of my not-knowing, objectless knowledge, can it ever be posited. Insofar as this not-knowing knowledge is free thinking, I can say that it is posited through my free thinking, it is my thought, but not in the sense that a chimera is my thought, rather because it was originally one and together with what is now thinking. For this reason, in thinking it is cut out from the primal consciousness that was also my consciousness. I can say that it is my concept—but this does not mean that a) it the object of

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my concept, rather it is the concept itself. b) It is not, as is [54] commonly said, mere concept, rather it is eternal freedom itself that is only called my concept because it is originally conceived in the primal consciousness that was also my consciousness. Every concept is only something cut out from my consciousness, and is for that reason called concept, because it was conceived in primal consciousness. Also, it should not be represented as if thought preceded and posited the absolute subject, rather both step forward in one and the same act – in the same decision; both are born and emerge with one another at the same time from out of the primal unity. Free thinking that itself resists all knowledge now sees itself as opposed to the absolute subject. It is a great moment, the proper hour of philosophy’s birth. But this primal unity constantly seeks to establish itself, as this cision is also a forced state – and it is the case that in the relationship of these opposing terms, that the absolute subject, as A, that which is posited, seeks to establish itself in B=A, i.e., in that which is knowing itself. It cannot remain in this abstraction, for it has to lose its interiority, its fulfillment; it is pure knowledge itself, but does not know it, it is the vacuous essence of consciousness that seeks fulfillment; but its fulfillment actually lies in B. A, too, wants to recollect its knowledge to itself, i.e. it wants to internalize B again, which was its subject, its knowledge. But now A , the absolute subject, is only held in is abstraction through B, through the power of the not-knowing itself of all knowledge that is occurring. According to its nature it does not stand still for a moment, because it is freedom natura anceps; it is freedom and it is also not freedom, thus it must decide immediately. Thus, I can say, that it is my concept, but it is a concept that is stronger than I am, a living, driving concept; [55] by nature it is the most movable, it is actually mobility itself. Contrary to this, the not-knowing knowledge now comports itself towards it as the arresting, retarding force of this movement. It is only through the power of not-knowing knowledge that it is held in this abstraction, and thereby cannot move itself, as is often said, without the knowledge and the will to know that does not want to give up the freedom of not-knowing; and on this path, my knowledge is a freer and restful observer that accompanies and witnesses the movement step by step. Thus it is clear that I must no longer ask how I know this movement. As the movement itself and my knowledge of this movement are one in every moment [Augenblick], i.e. every moment of the movement and my knowledge of these moments [Moments] are one in every moment [Augenblick], and this arresting, retarding, reflecting knowledge is properly the knowledge of the philosopher, this is what we can properly call ours in the process. Since the movement itself is wholly independent of us, and – even more importantly – we do not move ourselves in knowledge and thereby generate knowledge (knowledge generated in this manner is subjective, a mere concept of knowledge without reality), rather, it is to contrary, our knowledge is immobile in itself. It is not merely not knowing, rather it posits itself against knowing, striving against the movement, arresting it, it necessitates that the movement halts in each moment, lingers and jumps over none of them. The proper force of the philosopher shows itself in these retarding moments; the master of this art is whoever stays calm [besonnen], whoever is able to arrest the movement, whoever is able to necessitate that it linger and does not, as it were, allow the movement to take any other steps than those which are necessary, and only allows it to take only those steps which are necessary, no more and no less. Therein lies the philosophical art; just as the true artist as such is more easily recognized in their arresting and retarding force than in their producing, driving, and accelerating force. It can be said that the philosopher or this knowledge is found to be constantly negotiating with the driving that is a proverbial unstoppable craving for knowledge; [56] the philosopher must make every step difficult for it, he must struggle with it for each step. This

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inner communication, this constant conversation takes place between two principles. One is knowledge itself, knowledge as essence, but does not know. The other is knowing, but not the essence, not knowledge itself – only not-knowing knowledge. One wants to recollect itself, while the other helps it reach this recollection. Mere dialectic is the external version and a copy of this art of inner interlocution. Wherever this dialectic becomes mere form, there is empty semblance and shadow. As it were, this relation has been exhibited in a person, a truly divine man, and this is not a hyperbole as is usually said. If one were able to conceive of his greatness and glory, the path to true philosophy would already be shown, -- Socrates, without any question a point of light, the brightest appearance of the whole of antiquity, in whom providence wanted to show what the original excellence of nature is capable of, Socrates, who, when he said that he only knew that he knew nothing, wanted, thereby, to indicate his relation to that which properly generates knowledge, which he sought to arouse anywhere and everywhere he could. He himself said that he could not give birth anymore—just as not-knowing knowledge cannot give birth, as a knowledge that is as if it were dead, as the birthing force only lies in eternal freedom. He was not longer to give birth, but may be able to help others give birth, and induce this birth, likening himself to his mother, the midwife. Just as a wise midwife does not hasten the birth, but instead advises the person giving birth to endure and persevere the difficulties of birth until the right hour to give birth has arrived, he does not heal by hastening, but rather heals as a guide for the movement or birth by slowing down this process through constant contradiction. [57] Now to describe the movement in a few words: when the primal unity B = A is restored, insofar as B is standing in rapport with it, B can no longer carry itself a) as simply not knowing (as it is not longer mere subject). b) It can no longer comport itself as knowledge, as it no longer has an object. Thus there is no longer space for B as such, but even here it still cannot be annihilated, thus nothing else remains for it than to be absorbed in the B = A, i.e. to become aware of itself as the B transformed into A, and thus to become internal to, or recollected in, A again. It is thus now a) again what it was at first, the silent interior of eternal freedom (as it no longer needs to attract eternal freedom). Yet at the same time it is the knowing of eternal freedom, precisely because it brings back a wholly complete knowledge from out of the movement – as it has seen eternal freedom in all of its moments, and it is b) eternal freedom knowing itself, as it has come to know itself in all of its depths. But this was precisely what should be reached, that it knows itself as the interior of eternal freedom. Prior to this, it was the interior of eternal freedom, but unknowingly. – [58] The goal is thus immediate knowing of eternal freedom. But in order to reach this goal, as in the original movement, the poles must be held apart from one another. [60] The display of necessity also belongs to the grounding of philosophy as science. This has basically already been displayed by what has preceded. The necessity of philosophy immediately emerges from out of this inevitable inner conflict, of which we have already spoken. I say inevitable. As human consciousness cannot remain standing as the silent interior, the mere support of eternal movement, the movement of eternal freedom itself. Though not exactly coerced, it is still necessary and inevitable that humanity itself, as it is, attracts eternal freedom. Humanity wants eternal freedom for itself in order to be able to arbitrarily put it to work for itself, as it is not thinkable that this would simply happen in the beginning of things. Each particular human consciousness is again a coming-to-itself of eternal freedom. But in each human consciousness this same attraction happens again. [61] Could it thus be said that each human being by nature itself would reside in this inner driving movement? – But is it then not also the case, and must we not admit, that a large part of humanity wanders about in a mindless [besinnungslosen] state? If the tension to which this inner activity belongs does not appear as such, what it results in still belongs to

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mindlessness [Besinnungslosigkeit]; and if this tension is no longer perceived in most humans, this is only because they have not yet achieved this point of inner activity, but have been displaced, abstracted from their inwardness into a premature, absent-minded, and agreeable stupefaction. Thus it happens that an inner struggle in most humans is not brought to expression, or at least the degree of tension is not reached that would make a decision necessary. That the ground and occasion for this inner conflict lies in human nature is illuminated by the fact that ignorant and unlearned people rise up in nearly every age in whom precisely this inner struggle emerges freely from itself, and who, withstanding the contradictions of scholars, philosophize in their own name and persist in a more or less lucky crisis. But wherever this inner conflict is originally actuated, without being able to dissolve itself through a crisis and cision in mindful knowledge, there it necessarily generates what we call errors. All errors are only generated in this wild, internal struggle of spiritual forces doing battle with one another. Error does not belong to indifference, nor is it mere lack; rather it is a perversion of knowledge (it belongs in the categories of evil and sickness). If all errors were simply false, [62] divested of all truth, they would not be dangerous. Many assertions are clearly of such harmless kind, but it proves too honorable to explain them as errors. There is something venerable about errors; something of the truth lies in them. But precisely this distortion, this perversion of truth, these traits of the original truth that are still recognizable or at least dimly felt in these terrifying errors are what makes errors so horrifying. When inhibited, even the most gentle force – which is active in the cultivation of organic beings – generates the monstrous. This is not terrifying to us because of its dissimilarity, but precisely because of it similarity with the true image, as the human form is still always recognizable. Even the inner rotation emerges through an inhibition, an attraction, but the force of movement does not cease, for it surges out of an eternal spring. It could be said that error emerges through merely wanting to know. One is safe from error only when one does not only want to know. Admittedly, this is the household remedy which most people use. Wanting to know does not only depend on humans. We want to know before we know that we want to know. For it is the case that each individual consciousness already emerges in humanity from out of this attraction, [63] by making what we are into our own object. Humans reside, already, by nature in knowledge – precisely in this knowledge in which we displace ourselves against the eternal freedom that we should be by making ourselves into a knowing subject. Since this knowledge emerges through our making eternal freedom into an object, by, so to speak, stepping into its shoes, its only consequence is naturally the distortion of knowledge, and a mixture of truth and falsity must arise in our cognition. We live, by nature, in this mixed and impure knowing – the same also holds for “natural” knowledge. People who approach philosophy without first being cleansed, and who remain covered over by the impurity of their knowing, must necessarily fall into still greater disorientation than that in which they resided without approaching philosophy. Naturally, all of their verses and costumes only serve to maintain this perverted knowing, and to fend for this perversion as they would fend for their lives – with every right, as their life is only in this knowledge. Therefore, whatever they find in this knowledge they establish as general, valid, eternal truths. For example: “The natural is outside of the supernatural”. This is clearly the case now, and we feel this separation painfully; and it is precisely from this pain that we demand to be liberated by higher knowledge. But because of this bias for the present, for what stands still, people do not see that there was a point where the natural was in the supernatural (this eternal freedom, from which everything comes, is above all nature), and that there is a point, where it is in the supernatural again, as it should be in the supernatural in humanity. This wonderful entanglement of freedom and necessity

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in humanity says nothing to them. Both are infinitely far and infinitely near to one another; freedom alienated from itself is nature, just as [64] nature drawn back into itself is freedom. All that is needed is a reinversion [Wiederumwendung]. Humanity falls into error precisely when it cuts the natural off from the supernatural. Thus those who struggle for this dualism at base fight for the guilt of humanity, and they want to throw this merely human guilt on to nature, the object itself. Better yet than these attempts to want to bring this impure and mixed knowledge to science, is the admittedly grim teaching that, as such, we are never able to know. They see that with this knowledge nothing is able to be known, still do not want to give up, and still are not able to survive this crisis. Kant calls his philosophy critical, and had it actually come to this crisis, it might well have kept the name. Kant’s philosophy is only still a beginning for a proper crisis, since when Kant says, for example, that we are not able to cognize the supersensible, the divine, with the forms of our finite understanding, he is quite right and has said nothing more than what is properly understandable from itself. He thereby simply always assumes that something must be knowable through these forms if it is to be knowable at all. [65] Humanity ought to die off from this natural knowledge. In philosophy, humanity is not the knower; rather humanity is that which strives against that which properly generates knowledge [Wissenerzeugenden] through constant contradiction, arresting it, -- reflecting it. But humanity precisely thereby wins free thinking for itself. That which generates knowledge is capable of all things, for it is the spirit that passes through all things. It is eternal magic, the wisdom that is the master of all arts. In this, as it is expressed in a late occidental book, the spirit is understanding, unified, and still manifold at the same time (this is a very important determination), and it passes through all spirits, as understanding, sharp and pure as they may be – thus it even passes through the highest spirit; for divinity itself, though purity in itself, is not purer than this. It passes through all spirits for it is that which persists in all things; or as it is said in this fundamental Greek text: pases gar kineseos kinetikoteron sophia, diexei de xai xorei dia panton k. t. l., more mobile than all that can move, which accords with what I have already said: it is mobility itself and thereby more mobile than each particular movement. It is unified and can – is able to – make (not that the German word ‘to make’ [machen] comes from ‘to be able to’ [mögen]) – and though it makes all, it remains as it is and still renews all, i.e., it constantly creates new things, and brings forth new things from them. This constantly being one while still being another is the particularity of knowledge; knowledge is neither that which always remains in one, never going beyond itself, nor is that which simply falls outside itself as that which lacks unity and togetherness. Knowledge is coherence, one and still many, always another and yet always one. This wisdom is not far from humanity, for it is only the discharge of primal consciousness, which human consciousness originally was. Humanity should have been the silent interior of eternal freedom come to itself, which precisely through this coming-to-itself was actualized wisdom. When this coming-to-itself did not fail, humanity was brought to itself, and the freedom that knows itself was under its own power. Even that which is not under its own control – as we see in nature – would come to be [66] mindful, and eternal freedom knowing itself – and through this, humanity – was the mindful power or magic of all things. But humanity disrupted this coming-to-itself in that humanity wanted eternal freedom for itself. Yet humanity could only attract the freedom that humanity was, i.e., the freedom that had come itself in humanity, not the freedom that should be subordinated to this freedom and thereby become free as well. Thus, this freedom remains external, where it still brings forth its wonders. But it does so aimlessly insofar as annihilates and destroys that

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which is brought forth over and over, only in order to be able to bring forth the same again – in a proverbial idle busyness, which is not its will, and drives against its will. But humanity pushed aside the eternal freedom that it was; precisely when humanity wanted to attract it, and thus made itself into the subject which was opposed to freedom, it excluded freedom (this is the oft-mentioned contradiction). Thus in an ancient occidental book, wisdom is constantly represented as the excluded – “they wail in the lanes”, and whoever seeks it, easily finds it, he finds it “waiting for him before his door”. It constantly calls upon humanity to give up on this inner tension and to posit itself and wisdom too, as far as possible, in freedom. This is exactly what happens in this crisis that we characterized as the beginning of philosophy, i.e. the love of wisdom. [67] This freedom, too, that was external to humanity and remained freedom in nature accords with the freedom held captive in humanity, and it awaited its liberation. It shows itself to be in agreement with inner freedom in that the latter exacerbates humanity’s inner life as the freedom in nature aggravates its outer life. Freedom attracts the unexperienced to itself through its unintentional [unwillkürlichen] appeal – its appeal is unintentional as it might like to shroud itself, but it warns humanity against giving itself over to it, as it directly teaches humanity through painful experience, teaches humanity to step back from the abyss with a shudder. Freedom does not conceal itself from humanity, as it were, it keeps no secrets from humans, it tells them that it only deceives them. And as freedom brought to a stand still is quite properly the work of humanity, freedom shows humans in all ways that it is in no way thankful to them. Thus freedom calls humanity to give up its knowledge, it calls humans to this cision through which they may first see themselves in complete freedom, but may also see the prior freedom opposite them in its ur-original [uranfänglichen] purity. [68] I hereby close this investigation on the nature of philosophy as science. It is always already a lasting reward to know what true philosophy would be, and how it relates to humanity and to other human strivings. The concept of wisdom is not fruitless in itself for those who would want to forgo proper philosophy. The love of wisdom does not merely show itself in what the schools have called it. Wisdom is in all things; it arises in the confrontation with all things for those who seek it. It conceals itself in all possible objects, in all sciences, and this love, this search for wisdom ennobles every study. Whoever finds it possesses in it a proper treasure. It ennobles the most common and in turn makes the most noble and the highest common; it should thereby be handled like daily bread. But it only gives itself to pure souls, for only to the pure does the pure reveal itself. !

A Student’s Lecture Notes from On the Nature of Philosophy as Science !First Lecture, January 4th, 1821 ! Just as if an artist simply formed the head and the breast of a human figure and left it incomplete, thus would this Initia be, if it were of the human body. Just as if an artist were to sketch the entirety of a figure in which all the parts were recognizable in their relationship to one another without completing all the details, thus is this Initia, and we must take what it is presented here in this aforementioned sense.—The object of these lectures is thus no part, but rather the whole: beginning, middle, and end; i.e., a system of philosophy. The concept “system” is not difficult to define, one can say that any whole which is put together from out of its mutually determining and reciprocally requiring members is a system. Only such

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members which are opposed to one another as means and ends yet which are reciprocally dependent form a whole. It is thus very appropriate to describe “system of the planets”, “system of the world”, and so forth as systems, because in these systems members are dependent upon the whole and the whole is dependent on members. Thus if one wavers the whole falls along with it, because these members live and die with one another and are connected through an indissolvable bond. But this is to define system very generally; what, to be specific, is a system of philosophy? This question cannot be settled with a definition, but rather must be demonstrated intuitively.—Imagine that the proper subject of philosophy is called A. Something must be revealed about this. The thesis would be: A=B. Now, if it were to be found through further research that it is not merely the case that A=B, rather it is also the case that A=C.—The first does not thus become false, but it is also not unconditionally true, and it is even appropriate to say that B=C. In opposition to this, the new proposition A=C stands with equal force. Now it is clear that the proposition A=B has been accepted. In this proposition the other is repeated and excluded. In this moment, the first proposition is thus false and true, but the latter only in system (sustema, composition). It is true only when it is put together with C. Now it is imagined that A=B+C must be embraced. Yet soon it appears that A=D is also true. Whoever has found this and not proceeded past it is in error, if they stall here. He must proceed. He cannot pause anywhere. A standstill is only possible if one ascribes the A to it self as A=A, thus all other moments appear as transition points, mediums. Through these mediums, A=B+C+D, etc., will the unconscious total A become conscious. None of these proposition is true by itself. The act of coming-back-to-itself [Wiederzusichselbstkommen], not the act of separation, is proper consciousness. That is, when the A steps outside of itself and the separation begins, and then it returns to itself, it comes to unity and consciousness. This can, without risk, be called the most general intimation of the “philosophical system.” Whosoever wants to tread the path from consciouslessness of A to its consciousness must either wholly cover the distance or be wholly left behind—and wherever he pauses, error will overtake him. A is only the untrue at first, but this is said silently (?). Now it steps out of itself and across this displacement from itself it hears that it is the primal truth [Urwahrheit]. For this reason, that which steps outside of itself must not linger but rather hasten and walk the entire path in order to save itself from error through constant flight. All error in philosophy emerges from stoppage. Physiology explains miscarriages and monsters through an inhibition or stagnancy and the same explanation holds for systems, not, as was said, through the system’s development which passes through all midpoints. In general, a true system must grasp [begreifen] the seeds of falsity within itself, and thus is able to go about its task. Let us not mistake Cicero’s assertion “that nothing is inconsistent, which has not yet been pointed out by a philosopher.” This phenomenon accounts for itself through the fact that philosophy contains seeds which should not emerge. They should be in potentia (possibility), but not in actu (actuality).—This is analogous with death, as death is the consequence of the growth of an inhibition which has set in. Only that which can no longer grow, dies. Infusorian exhibit a similar phenomena in organic nature, as these have 2

never existed in actu, but only as seeds. Insects are an example of a breed whose mere existence is inhibited by a higher form of life. The philosopher is the same. Sects only arise, when an inhibition of the growth of the system emerges.

“Infusoria is a collective term for minute aquatic creatures like ciliates, euglena, paramecia, protozoa and 2

unicellular algae that exist in freshwater pond water” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infusoria).

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From the assertion that the true system comprehends all false systems within itself, it can be concluded that antithesis of the truest system can easily be demonstrated, but it does not follow that it exists. Even in that system which is true, all particular moments are false, and it follows that even such a system in which all particulars are false, the system is true.—Just as if the heart or lungs lived alone. If a system of philosophy can be given, then a shell cannot be understood, rather a framework which is so much as laid out is purposive. Because this layout is contingent it is neither the concern of a particular individuals nor of a particular time. The layout is contingent, but to the system is essential, as rhythm is to music or the outline is to a painting. That via which that which is most original becomes barely comprehensible is merely adventitious contingency. The main concern lies in the system. In philosophy, the particular has neither worth nor truth. Each proposition of the system that is separated from the whole is false and only has truth in the system.—The adversaries of systems connect a wholly other concept with it. But there is also a system in a more simple sense, because sustema, as is widely known, also names the curdling of milk, stagnation, rising out, and sticking out. This account is about the system alone, it is wholly other, it is that which is more sublime than all.—Others turn and say that one and all systems are false, that there is no true system. But if there is a false system, there must also be a true system, just as wherever things the bent exists, the straight must exists as well.—Others say that true systems are unrecognizable, however if this is true it can also be asserted that one has already recognized the system. Schelling places a specific weight on the system because, first, it is the essential in philosophy; and second, the system is the prize for which our age competes. Yet philosophy will never win this prize so long as the plan is not agreed upon, and when this happens this would be a different science, and thereby an excellent advancement will have been made. It is thus a great gain of Kant’s that he especially insisted that the plan must be agreed upon first.—This striving towards systematization also shows itself in the ways in which he goes astray, because there is also a system of scarlet fever. And finally third; the system is the goal of academic studies. It is not as an ordered row of particular things in a market to be exchanged, but rather a system that is only the truth insofar as it forms and shapes itself in life. The main features of the total philosophy are now the most essential, but also the most difficult. It is a struggle of life and death, and humanity is appointed to fight it. It is a struggle that occupies our whole character, and in which we should strengthen and learn to know our force, which is a match for infinity. !Second Lecture, January 5th, 1821 We now have the concept of our object, so we ask, what claim has this object been able to make upon us?

The essence of knowledge, and especially philosophy, persists in a forward movement which goes out from a determinate beginning, runs through a determinate midpoint, and arrives at a decisive end. It is also necessary that there is a spiritual force and a strength of soul connected to one another from the beginning until the end, from first to last, in order to be able to think through all the parts completely until the absolute end. A proposition does not merely set the consequences, but also presumes that which came before it. All things only become clear through the end. There is no partial completion in philosophy. It is precisely as is said of humanity, that before its end it cannot become blessed, that philosophy becomes true only through its end. So long as philosophy is not at

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its end it is still a hovering between knowing and unknowing, a doubt, as the last word speaks: Amen. It is thus a magic circle which is only a perfect circle if it is all together complete and only thereby has its first life. It is thus no easy harvest which is due. Philosophy does not persist in particular propositions which can be taken and communicated. It is not as easy as this. This method alone is good for nothing. It is truth and error connected, and this is the total decay of knowing, as it is misdirected. (This can only be made clear through an example. Take the assertion: “The spiritual and the material are one;” this sounds very decisive. Yet even so, alone, it is also decided that “the spiritual and the material are not one.” Both assertions are correct and both are incorrect, and whoever asserts the first has merely advanced that he maintains the exception, while the second maintains the rule. Both are—as all things—one in the first beginning and the end, where the spiritual and the material are one. But in the passage they are thereby not one. Whoever wants to maintain that the spiritual and the material are one must also maintain the opposite. And whoever maintains both must also show where they are one and where they are not, but cannot emphasize a particular). An unbreakable diligence of the most severe sense is necessary here, as is necessary for all science, but in particular to philosophy due to its particularity. Thus neither the one nor the other can be understood partially or univocally as in mathematics and dogmatics. Rather understanding requires and assumes both in reciprocity. Whoever understands a section at least understands something, but this understanding is merely of this section. But here, the necessity of the unity of both must occur as one either understands everything or nothing. As the first proposition becomes intelligible through its consequences and these consequences become intelligible in turn through their premises, and knowing first becomes complete when the whole implies itself. Here, all things accompany each other and develop in simultaneity with one another; not, however, as the case in physics where and section of electricity can be known correctly without understanding of the whole. Philosophy does not inhere in particular portions, but rather, it is an absolute whole. One could compare its movement with a stream that plunges into the sea. The stream can be observed from its beginning up until the mouth; its parts stand in constant transformation; it is the stream itself in each moment and yet always an other. Clearly, philosophy is a process of patterning which is constantly advancing [Fortgestaltung] and yet always the same matter. Therefore, whoever neglects a moment of observing the change in its elements and its forward movement has lost the whole and can no longer find themselves in it. Finally, a proper spiritual activity—which is a living self-activity, not passive acceptance—is necessary to the study of philosophy. Philosophy is something living, and living things can only be generated through something which is the cause of its own activity, which depends on us. The repetition of this movement in ourselves is a purely spiritual activity. The truths of philosophy are not as the fruits of trees, which we need only pick. No. We must generate them in ourselves, as severed from us they die off. The teacher can only be a leader. The teacher must have covered a distance of the path on their own, but he cannot teach it through description and communication. Each of us must go along with him and follow the path for ourselves. Thus we have need of the will, character, and endurance of the force of spirit and the strength of soul—and also the diligence of our own free, spiritual activity.—Philosophy presumes these just as freely as every other science, because all sciences are constituted through spiritual activity alone. This is only difficult for those sciences which are accustomed to mechanic and passive acceptance and suppress the spiritual self activity in themselves.

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But unfortunately the study will aggravate many insofar as philosophy is extolled above all human understanding and above all human concepts and would be dealt with as beyond the human. But philosophy lies wholly near to us just as the circumstances of life in general has the greatest similarity with the particulars; they are still human acts. Thus Hippocrates speaks truly when he says “all things divine are human and all human, divine.” Hamann, a great German author, says in a even more comforting manner: “The analogy of the divine is the great key of human knowing.” The human is the world inverted and writ small. The history of the universe is also our history (mutato nominee de te fibula narratur).—The object of philosophy is therefore the movement of life in general, in which it has the most momentous role. A universal conscientia of this movement must be conceded to philosophy, as it is the epicenter of this movement. Humanity enters into this process as an active member at a fixed point of repetition of scientific life. And if it repeats this movement and thought within itself, then he can proclaim amidst universal sorrow, “Infandum jubes renovare dolorem (to deep for words is the grief you bid me to renew—from somewhere in Virgil’s Aeneid)”, and yet universal joy is also humanity’s joy.—But philosophy thereby became disconnected from all humanity, as it has presented itself in opposition to common sense [gemeinen Menschenverstand]. This is a misunderstanding, in that in this assertion the word “common” has been understood incorrectly. It is not “plebeian understanding”. If it were this, then it would have to be said that “Odi profanum vulgus (I hate the vulgar rabble).” No, it is in the sense in which we say “something is done for the common good,” or, “common” = “universal”.—But in relation to the universal human understanding [allgemeinen Menschenverstand] it can be said that there can be no truth which is not reconciled with it. It is a given that universal human understanding sometimes merely historical, local understanding and thus is limited. Take Copernicus as an example. As he brought forward his new teaching,, many may well have said, “this is contrary to common sense.” But in the end common sense reconciled itself with the teaching of Copernicus. Nothing can outrage common sense like philosophical truth; yet this can occur, at the utmost, for a short time. The study of philosophy is hampered by Kant’s false distinction between reason and the understanding.—It is said that the understanding is of no use to philosophy. Yet this vilification of the understanding is the vilification of science. Understanding is manly activity while reason is womanly. Later, reason is confused with feeling. Yet feeling and understanding can never stand in opposition. Feeling is contingent, it comes and goes. We all still know a time when all feeling for the divine seemed to be dead. Yet, through the grace of heaven, it is returning. Where it is, it is like it has always been. In Abraham’s time, it was not as heartfelt [inniger] as it is today. And whoever has it, must hold it as holy.—It cannot be denied that an imperfect understanding does not belong to philosophy. But the true task of our time, which is perfectly clear to us, is to push down to the ground of truth. Philosophy certainly comes to be in a univocal system, which does violence to the human spirit. Mercifully this does not last long, as spirit can well be put in a yoke, but it will soon shake it off again. Philosophy is hampered by the teachers’ lectures which lack method. This cannot occur wherever the system is the primary concern, as the object is thus combined with its form. The method exists in the object and the system necessitating one another, and thereby the matter generates itself. There is no universally accepted proposition in philosophy, rather, only propositions which hold for a moment of development, the moment with regards to which they were asserted. There is proposition which stands still as in a dogmatic system. Here rather, matter generates itself simultaneously with form.

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Philosophy is complicated through the falsely sought after clarity of teachers if they fall away from the strength of the concept. In order to facilitate the study, the teacher has to be able to mark the distinct moments clearly: Qui bene distinguit, bene docet (Whatever is well distinguished is well taught). We now hear free lecture, we hear philosophizing; and the distinction between philosophy and philosophizing is like the distinction between having gold and making gold. Whoever philosophizes, also has philosophy. !Third Lecture, January 10th, 1821 ! [8] We now seek a system of human knowledge [Erkenntniß] (not yet philosophy; as they are distinguished, which will be seen later). And today we consider the following question: Why and under which conditions will we be compelled to seek a system? Since the system of human knowing [Wissens] is just human knowing in system, this seeking after the system presupposes: 1) that human knowing is originally no system, but rather an Asustatov. It does not hold together , it is confused, it is, moreover, in conflict with itself; 2) that this conflict has become apparent, and that for this reason spirit endeavors to bring itself to a systematic state. It must already previously have occurred to the physical school of Jonier, which would explain everything from nature by accepting something—one fire, the other water, a third air, and a fourth earth—as the originary basis of all. It must have occurred to Anaxagoras who embraces a higher intellect as the primal origin of all things. It must have occurred to the Eleatics, the creators of dualism in Greece, who made it the opposition between the nous of Anaxagoras and experience. It must have occurred to Socrates who brought the principle of freedom into philosophy and thereby inferred the ethical principle. Only thus was it made possible for Plato to prepare a system. – In order [9] to be able to seek this system, one must arrive at the insight 3) that the contrariety of systems does not have its ground in the mere haphazardness and imperfections of human nature, nor in a simple logomachy, also not in imperfection of human reason, but is rather grounded in the roots of existence; 4) that this bellum omnium contra omnes is not dissolved by subjugating the one system through another. The true system will not be found through the oppositional extermination of all systems. Each and every system has the commonality that it imperfectly exhibits the original system [Ursystem]. In contrast is the disparity amongst them that one stands higher, the other deeper. Thus it is that all contradictions return to an originary contradiction. An age often brings forward one system that becomes dominant, and the age has the characteristic [das Eigene] that it drives the inchoate to externality. The best way to make this clear is through a short history of modern philosophy since Descartes. Descartes posited the spiritual directly in opposition to the material such that the tangency of the two can only be effected through the intervention of the highest knowing itself. He is thus the creator of a jagged dualism. – We shall refer to the spiritual as A, the material as B. With Descartes, A and B stand in direct opposition to each other. Spinoza, who pushed against this opposition, sought to unite them, and accordingly presented the spiritual and the material as one (A=B), thus he became the initiator of pantheism. Leibniz, in order not to follow Spinoza’s wrong turn, did not take the material to be substantial; he simply embraced the spiritual (A). However, he did not absolutely deny the existence of the world of bodies (B=A), and was thus the creator of intellectualism. – Simultaneously, hylozoism was formed in Italy, [10] according to which the material has an original life (B). Still, the spiritual is not wholly denied, rather it is positioned under the material (A=B). Finally, things went even further, particularly in France, where matter without any spiritual life was affirmed (B); not simply by shallow minds such as Lamettrie and the famous Helvetius, rather also by [11]

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Diderot. – On the path that Leibniz had struck, Kant went forth and came upon idealism, which came to full bloom in Fichte. He embraces the spiritual, the I, and views everything corporeal as ideal modifications of the I (=A). – Each of these systems is justified with regards to what it claimed, and it erred only in that excluded the others; the true system arises from the unification of all systems. Thus, the true system will not be found through the destruction of all systems; through such destruction one merely arrives at a bottomless, empty abyss. No, all systems must be united. Naturally, we speak here only of great systems, which are honored by calling them great errors; for even errors are honorable. Whoever errs, whoever is able to stray from the path, is still able to go. Whoever remains surrounded by the warmth of the hearth is not able to err. [12] Philosophy has been reproached for the conflict of its systems and this conflict has likewise been regarded as philosophy’s parties honteuses, which must be concealed. But the conflict of systems is directly the material [Stoff] from which the true system produces itself [aus dem das wahre System hervorgeht]. Mathematics—the sister of philosophy—has been established as the paradigm (Kant, in particular has done this), in which there has never been contradictory systems. But the basis for this is that mathematics in general is no system. !Fourth Lecture, January 11th, 1821 ! [15] We have seen that what we took to be material external to the system is the systems very internal aystasia. We have not proven this, otherwise it would have become a propaedeutic. Today we consider the internal possibility of a system. It is certainly a highly esteemable wish to dissolve this discordance of distinct and thus conflicting systems into tune. Thus, we ask: how is a system internally possible? 1) through the general idea of development and of not-staying-the-same. This presumes 2) a) it is only a subject, A, that passes through all moments of movement. Were it different subjects, so would the predicates B and C be wholly opposed [auseinander]. The identity of the subject is thus presupposed. One is not thereby free, however, to understand a unity of the parts [Glieder]. That would precisely be as if one wanted to say of a tree, the root is the blossom, the bud [16] is the fruit, so on and so forth. b) This one subject must pass through all and remain in none. Wherever it would remain, the continuity of development would be interrupted. The going-through-all and being-nothing is the essential [Das Durchallesgehen und Nichtsein ist das Wesentliche]. Now, what is this subject? To ask this question is as if one erstwhile asked: what is the principle of philosophy? Now α) this principle is not merely the principle of the beginning, rather it is throughout the beginning, in the middle, and at the end. β) This principle is not merely the supreme, fundamental principle [Grundsatz], as if highest link in a chain, from which the subsequent assertions [Sätze] are deduced, as with, for example, the “Cogito ergo sum” of Descartes and the “I am I” of Fichte. That worked for a time when philosophy still consisted in propositions [wo die Philosophie noch aus Sätzen bestund]. – Thus we ask: what is the subject of science? Amongst everything that is, nothing adequate is found. But whoever wants to rise to free science par excellence, will not stumble. He must raise himself above everything that has a name. He must step forth, and not remain amidst anything. [17] He must leave all finite things behind. But, for humanity, this is the greater step. Thus, as one calls an ethical conversion a new life, one is able to consider this act of ejecting everything from himself and casting himself into everything [Von-sich-werfen-von-Allem] in spiritual life a new life as well. We [18] must return to the condition of original not-knowing [Nichtwissens]. Christ’s dictum: “If you do not become as children, so will you not come to the kingdom of heaven,” applies also in philosophy. Here it is imperative to leave behind all entities, God himself, for being already underlies these concepts. In fact,

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considered in his internality, he is also a non-being, no angel, no spirit, no man, thus precisely as this absolute subject. But precisely as this super-entity [Überseiende], he is not the infinite, the unnameable as such. The scriptures affirm that he has given himself names. The name is the excluded [das Ausschließliche], and upon this we base the claim that he is not creature, not nature. – The absolute subject is [certainly] also able to name God; but this absolute subject is also that which God is not. It is thus beyond God. The distinction between the absolute subject and God is also necessary, for the absolute subject is indeed all, hen to pan. One would only be able to call this pantheism if one claimed that this hen were God. This system would thus not be pantheism. Thus whosoever wants to raise himself up to the free science par excellence, must also leave God behind. He must, as the oriental sages did, go into the desert. He must, as the Greek sages, eject everything from himself. – Plato presented this as a cision [Scheidung], as a kind of death. It is not merely a cision sensibility, rather also from spirituality. Only whosoever has recognized the whole depth [19] of this principle, whosoever is free from all, he alone could see himself with the infinite [sich allein sah mit dem Unendlichen]. Clearly it is difficult to part from the final shore. Thus we marvel at Spinoza, who raised himself to the thoughts that one must undergo in the infinite; but we regret that he could sink down so low to a stand still of the infinite and to state a being-one [Einssein] of thinking [Denkenden] with what was thought. Thus we marvel at Fichte, who elevated himself to the thought: all being is freestanding activity. But we regret that he again could sink so low that he still clung to his own I. Whoever begins to philosophize and commits himself to it must let go of all hope. Christ’s words apply here as well: “Whoever wants to hold on to his life will lose it, but whosoever gives it up because of me, shall win it back.” Now, since one can merely redefine or enclose within its borders something that is defined through itself, but this absolute subject has no borders, thus we could call it the indefinable. (The wind blows, and you well hear its wail, but you know not from whence it comes, nor where it goes.) It goes through all things. It is nothing and thus not something. But it is also not nothing, thus it is all. It is not something at a standstill, but all in a passing-through [aber alles im Durchgehen]. – However, we now have a merely negative concept, and we seek an affirmative one [???]. How are we now led into danger by coming to simple negation? We would act contrary to our assertion (that nothing is able to be predicated), if we name it the indefinable. As the all, it is not indefinable such that it could not also be definable. It passes through [20] all forms. In order, however, to be able to grasp it in one pattern [Gestalt], it would first have to be external to all patterns. But insofar as it is located amidst this passing-through in an pattern, to that extent it is definable. But that is the positive concept, able to step into all patterns. It is the absolute, eternal freedom itself, not something free [ein Freies] that merely takes part in freedom. But we ought not think this absolute freedom negatively as independent from external grounds of determination, nor ought we think that it would sublate itself [sie sich selbst aufheben würde]. It must, itself, be free from freedom, and were it forced to remain absolute freedom, it would be limited. And here we arrive at the Natura anceps of freedom, freedom must, moreover, be able to be opposed to itself. Thus, if this absolute subject of the highest knowing were positively determined as absolute freedom, it must be free to be freedom itself and free not to be freedom, able to be without form [gestaltlos] and able to enclose itself in a form. That is the highest: absolute freedom encloses itself in a pattern and again is free to step out of it. [22] This original freedom has withered away, and the oldest memory of humanity is the mourning over the loss of this freedom; that everything is bound to being and abandoned by original freedom. The masterpieces of the Greeks attest to, and bear all the stamps of, the mourning of the loss of this freedom gone astray, and a melancholy is poured over the whole of nature. In

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the sublime creations of the Greeks, freedom stepped into the forms [in die Gestalt getreten] and for that reason they are the highest creations. ![23] Fifth Lecture, January 12th, 1821 ! It is an ancient teaching that like can only be known be like. The ancient skeptic Sextus Empiricus already noted this when he said: “If a philosopher boasts of transcendental knowledge, we are only able to regard this ignorance as a conceit over other humans.” Thus one of Goethe’s old singers quite correctly says: “were not the eye like the sun, how could we behold the light”. – All of this applies to our investigations from yesterday, today we ask: How do we become internal to this freedom and how is it possible to know this movement [Bewegg]? We are able to do so insofar as this eternal freedom in us is the knowing and the known. The whole science must be a progressive self-presentation of this eternal freedom. We do not see it, rather it sees itself through us. “But how is this possible?” In contrast, I ask: is there so great a chasm between the two concepts, eternal freedom and the knowing of eternal freedom? Are not both analogous? Freedom is pure possibility [Können], not the possibility of [24] something, but rather possibility for the sake of itself, a possibility that presupposes nothing, a possibility without intention. And all in all, that is the highest. Whence otherwise this joy in mastery, e.g., in an artwork without consideration for the possible [etwaigen] uses? But now this possibility is also a knowing, since no art (derived from possibility) [Kunst (deriviert von Können)] is without science, no possibility without knowing (e.g., in Latin, to be able to = to be powerful = to know). Change this possibility over into effect, thus it becomes willing. Beforehand it was a resting, not willing will. We can thus simultaneously regard eternal freedom as resting will, as pure will, as will that wants no thing, as will in its indifference [Gleichgültigkeit]. Where this equanimity, this difference is, there is the will, and the will, in this case, is positive. But this will must be, primarily, indifferent [gleichgültig] in itself to indifference. Thus, in what does this willing persist? All willing is an act that makes things into objects, it is an attracting [Anziehen], an act of drawing something to feeling [ein sich etwas zu Gemüte ziehen]. But what is the knowing of the other? There is no willing that would not also be a knowing. Thus, one can also initially call this absolute subject resting knowing, the knowing for the sake of itself. Naturally, it should not thereby be said that the concepts of willing and knowing are one and the same. Willing is the greater concept that comprehends knowing in itself. – Both concepts are united in the concept “wanting” [Mögen], which in the ancient German language also comprehended our “possibility” (Thus in Luther’s bible, “can also guide a blind man to another path” [mag auch ein Blinder dem andern den Weg weisen]. We are thus also able to call this eternal freedom, eternal wanting, eternal magic. – (Magic, a strange word, that, nevertheless, still belongs to us. It comes from the Persian word “Mog,” a noun, whose verbal root remains in the German word “Mögen,” to want, to like, to relish.) This word is particularly expressed in the power [Vermögen] to go out into all patterns and to abide in none of them. Simultaneously, the concept of magic lies in the concept of knowing. Before this magic becomes active, it is a restful will and a restful knowing. It becomes active, and thus steps forth from knowing