Industry differences in the neoliberal transformation of Australian industrial relations

Industry differences in the neoliberaltransformation of Australian industrialrelationsMark Bray and Elsa Underhill

ABSTRACT

This article argues that our theoretical understanding of neoliberalism and empiricalunderstanding of the transformation of industrial relations in Australia since the early1990s can be improved by disaggregating analysis from national to industry level,and by focusing on the dual neoliberal objectives of decollectivisation andindividualisation.

INTRODUCTION

The passing of the ‘Work Choices’ amendments to the Workplace Relations Act inNovember 2005 can be seen as the culmination of a trend towards neoliberalism inAustralia begun 20 years earlier (Bray and Walsh, 1998; Burgess, 2005; Cahill, 2007;Cooper and Ellem, 2008; Fairbrother et al., 1997). The term neoliberalism is used tocapture the market-oriented, anti-union policies that emerged under both Labor andCoalition governments from the 1980s. The defeat of the Howard Coalition govern-ment in November 2007 will not end neoliberalism in Australia. New legislativechanges will reorient state intervention and restore some collective aspects of indus-trial relations, and Prime Minister Rudd might condemn neoliberalism (Rudd, 2009),but his government, like its counterpart in Britain (Smith and Morton, 2006), is likelyto continue to be influenced by a philosophy that promotes market-oriented processesover collective rights.

Despite widespread use of the term ‘neoliberalism’ and the importance of thosereal-world trends it has been used to characterise, it has rarely been clearly defined,especially in the industrial relations literature. We begin by clarifying the concept ofneoliberalism, drawing upon both political economy and industrial relations litera-tures. Many studies of neoliberalism show that it assumes different forms in differ-ent countries to accommodate local institutional and political contexts (e.g. Cahill,2007; Peck and Tickell, 2007; Vogel, 1996). In the second section, we describe theparticular form that neoliberalism assumed in Australia by tracing changes to thenational system of industrial relations since the early 1990s.

❒ Mark Bray is Professor of Employment Studies, Newcastle Business School, University of Newcastle.Elsa Underhill is a Senior Lecturer, Deakin Business School, Deakin University. Correspondence Shouldbe addressed to Mark Bray, Newcastle Business School, University of Newcastle, Cnr King and AucklandStreets, Newcastle, NSW 2300, Australia; email [email protected].

Industrial Relations Journal 40:5, 372–392ISSN 0019-8692

© 2009 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St.,Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Most studies of neoliberalism take the nation state as the unit of analysis, tracingtrends in national state policy, labour legislation and industrial relations institutions.In the third section, we analyse differences in the form and effect of neoliberalism inthree Australian industries. This ‘intra-national’ comparison not only deepens theappreciation of Australia’s particular manifestations of neoliberalism, but also dem-onstrates the need to go beyond national studies to better reveal the variable impactof neoliberalism upon industrial relations.

Our methodology reflects both the conceptual and empirical nature of the analysis.We draw upon recent political economy theoretical analyses of neoliberalism andindustrial relations research focused upon changes to national systems. The empiricalanalysis of national and industry trends in Australian industrial relations is designedto uncover the breadth of both neoliberal policies and impacts, and draws uponsecondary sources, supplemented by primary data, including previously unpublishedAustralian Bureau of Statistics data, interviews and documentary data.

THEORISING NEOLIBERALISM

Definitions of neoliberalism are rare in both industrial relations and politicaleconomy literature. Where scholars explicitly discuss the meaning of this concept,the point of departure is usually that neoliberalism involves a belief or philosophythat free market outcomes are superior to those achieved through governmentintervention.

Chang (2002) sheds further light on the concept of neoliberalism. He describes it asan ‘unholy alliance’ between neoclassical economics (which provides analytical toolsthat privilege ‘free markets’ as mechanisms by which resources are best allocated andcondemns ‘state intervention’ as distorting the positive effects of free markets), andthe ‘Austrian-Libertarian tradition’ (which provides a political and moral philosophythat associates markets with the ‘freedom’ of individuals and the encouragement of an‘entrepreneurial spirit’ that is necessary for social and economic progress). We arguebelow that this account of neoliberalism, although abstract, is valuable in understand-ing trends in industrial relations.

Less abstract are issues associated with the implementation of neoliberal industrialrelations state policy. Empirical political economy studies claim that the realisation ofneoliberal philosophy in state policy is often ambiguous or at least incomplete. Someargue that ‘reregulation’ has occurred rather than ‘deregulation’, while others suggestthat the state can be seen to change the objective and form of its intervention ratherthan withdraw its intervention (Cahill, 2007; Vogel, 1996; see also Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002; Larner, 2000; Peck and Tickell, 2007).

Observations about the continuance of state intervention in neoliberal regimes canalso be found in the industrial relations literature. In Australia, Dabscheck (2006)described how ‘new right’ employers advocated deregulation of employment con-tracts while simultaneously and vigorously lobbying for greater state intervention toreduce union power and enhance employers’ capacity for unfettered decision-makingpower. More recently, Cooper and Ellem (2008) observed how the Howard govern-ment’s neoliberal agenda required extensive and highly detailed regulation, including‘extraordinary prescriptive detail’ (ibid.: 542).

Political economy scholars confirm a trend identified by industrial relations schol-ars where the state continues to play a major (possibly expanded) role when neoliberalphilosophies are implemented in practice. Chang’s (2002) analysis partly attributes

373Industry differences in Australia’s neoliberal transformation

© 2009 The Author(s)Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009

this contradiction to internal inconsistencies in neoliberal ideas that both reduce theirconceptual clarity and encourage diversity in the practice, as opposed to the philoso-phy, of neoliberalism. For example, the meanings of ‘free markets’ and ‘state inter-vention’ are obscure in neoliberal writing, while the level and form of ‘minimal’ stateintervention (or the restrictions on individual freedom) that are acceptable in a freemarket are debatable (ibid.: 542–544). Consequently, the neoliberal ideal leaves somefundamental issues unresolved.

It follows that to understand how neoliberalism is applied in practice, we mustbegin with a more systematic description. Both political economy and industrialrelations scholars provide some valuable pointers towards a descriptive framework.Chang’s (2002) approach, for example, reveals the imperative for a neoliberal state towithdraw state interventions that support non-neoliberal structures and establish newstructures consistent with their view of free market dominance (see also Peck andTickell, 2007). In industrial relations, this dual imperative takes peculiar formsbecause the impediments to the operation of a ‘free’ labour market come not onlyfrom the state, but also from collective organisations of workers and employers.Existing accounts therefore focus on changes to state policy designed to destroyprevious collective regimes of labour regulation (decollectivisation), and to introducenew individualised forms of regulation (individualisation).

These categories of decollectivisation and individualisation are valuable; theysuggest that to be called ‘neoliberal’, a state must work towards the destruction ofexisting arrangements that support unions and the collective determination ofemployment conditions and establish new arrangements that support individualisedindustrial relations. These categories can assist in analysing historical trends towardsneoliberalism within one country. Differences in the forms of decollectivisation andindividualisation also provide a basis for comparison of neoliberalism betweencountries. The pursuit of decollectivisation and individualisation illustrates the poten-tial contradictions in the implementation of neoliberalism: ‘free markets’ can actuallyallow collectivist institutions like unions and collective bargaining to survive andprosper, while destroying collective institutions often requires extensive state inter-vention to restrict union organisation and strike activity. As well, introducing andsustaining individualised arrangements for determining wages and working condi-tions can require considerable state support, such as laws to protect individualcontracting.

A final feature of the existing literature that informs the following account ofAustralia is its preoccupation with neoliberal trends at the level of the nation state. Asunderstandable as this national focus is, it neglects important differences withinnations in the form of neoliberalism. Again, the imperative towards destroying exist-ing arrangements and establishing new ones, and the categories of decollectivisationand individualisation, are valuable analytical tools at an industry level because dif-ferent industries have historically exhibited different levels of collectivisation (Brayand Waring, forthcoming). Industry-level analysis thus offers insights into how andwhy neoliberalism has taken different paths in different circumstances.

NEOLIBERALISM AND NATIONAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIANINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The rise of neoliberalism in Australia arguably had its origins under the Hawke Laborgovernment elected in 1983. While this government is best known for its corporatist

374 Mark Bray and Elsa Underhill


approach to industrial relations, symbolised by cooperation between unions and thestate through the Accord, its non-labour market policies were strongly influencedfrom the outset by neoliberal philosophies. Decisions to deregulate the currency andthe financial sector and successive tariff cuts give clear evidence of this. By the late1980s, neoliberal policy extended to promoting deregulation and competition inproduct markets and privatisation of public sector enterprises (Bell, 1997; Bryan andRafferty, 1999; Head, 1988; Kaptein, 1993; Stilwell, 2000).

However, the victory of neoliberalism over corporatism under Labor did not yetfully correspond with the ideals described by Chang (2002). While the governmentemphasised the role of markets, it continued to recognise the role of unions and stateregulation of the labour market, no doubt because of the continuing (if waning)influence of unions (Bray and Walsh, 1998).

The unambiguously neoliberal vision of the conservative Howard Coalition gov-ernment, elected in 1996, more closely approximated that described by Chang (2002).Its industrial relations policy condemned collectivism and emphasised individualismand the entrepreneurial spirit. However, the government was constrained in makinglegislative change in its first three terms by a hostile upper house of parliament.Neoliberalism was consequently introduced incrementally by reform of existing lawsand institutions, and through the executive arm of government. In this way, the riseof neoliberalism in Australia produced a peculiarly Australian type of regulatorycomplexity, with significant layering of rules governing the employment relationship(Bray and Waring, 2005). Only after the 2004 election, when the Howard governmentgained control of both houses of parliament, was caution (and political pragmatism)thrown to the wind. The Coalition’s Work Choices legislation of 2005 marked thehigh tide of neoliberalism by introducing significant state intervention to promotedecollectivisation and individualism in the labour market.

The following account of neoliberalism in Australian industrial relations atnational level emphasises continuities between the approaches of both Labor andCoalition federal governments during the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses uponfour aspects of neoliberalism. First are changes to state regulatory interventionthrough the three main legislative initiatives of the period: Labor’s Industrial Rela-tions Reform Act of 1993, and the Coalition’s Workplace Relations Act of 1996 andWorkplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act of 2005. These changes toindustrial law underpinned neoliberalism during the period. Second is the decline oftrade union representation. On the one hand, the membership and role of unionsdeclined dramatically as unions became a primary target of decollectivist policies; onthe other hand, new forms of non-union employee representation were promoted,although employees were often left to represent themselves as individuals. Third arechanges to bargaining structures in which collective regulation gave ground to thegrowth of individualism. Finally, the article examines the role of employers whoadvocated neoliberal philosophies, were significant beneficiaries of these policies andoften adopted aggressive strategies to implement decollectivisation and individual-isation in their workplaces.

Changing state intervention

Australian industrial relations throughout most of the 20th century were heavilyregulated by state systems of compulsory conciliation and arbitration. This form ofstate intervention was inherently collectivist because it relied exclusively on unions



and employer associations to represent employees and employers before arbitraltribunals. Indeed, both the empowering legislation and the awards determined bytribunals frequently contained provisions promoting membership of collectiveorganisations as an objective of state policy (Creighton and Stewart, 2005; Gardnerand Palmer, 1997).

This system of state regulation also directly regulated the terms and conditions ofemployment of individual employees. One instrument by which this was done wasawards, determined by the conciliation and arbitration tribunals, which set legallybinding minimum standards of employment. Also, legislation (especially laws passedby state parliaments) set minimum standards on issues like occupational health andsafety, annual holidays, long service leave, or provided machinery to regulate issueslike equal employment opportunity and discrimination at work (see Bray et al., 2009;Creighton and Stewart, 2005). The rhetoric of Australian neoliberalism in the 1980sand 1990s was deeply opposed to state intervention, preferring to allow parties(especially employers and individual employees) to determine the terms and condi-tions of employment without interference from third parties, such as unions andindustrial tribunals (e.g. Andrews, 2005; Reith, 1996).

Neoliberal legislative reforms were modest under Labor. Its 1993 legislation soughtto replace compulsory arbitration with decentralised collective bargaining. Thefederal tribunal’s role consequently contracted to annual adjustment of nationalminimum wages, setting ad hoc national employment standards and the vetting ofcollective agreements against award standards. Awards were relegated to the minorrole of ‘safety nets’. Labor maintained collectivism by continuing to support unions,notwithstanding the creation of a new option for non-union enterprise agreements(Gardner and Palmer, 1997; Isaac, 2005).

The Coalition government’s 1996 legislation advanced decollectivisation bybanning compulsory unionism, eliminating legal mechanisms to protect the right ofunions to bargain collectively, expanding the availability of non-union agreementsand sanctions against unauthorised strikes (Lee and Peetz, 1998). Statutory individualcontracts were also introduced in the form of Australian Workplace Agreements(AWAs), offering a new tool for employers who sought decollectivisation (Peetz,2006). AWAs had the potential to undercut minimum award standards for employees,although this was limited by the ‘no disadvantage test’ imposed upon the Coalition bya hostile upper house of parliament (Mitchell and Fetter, 2003).

More far reaching was the Howard government’s Work Choices legislation of late2005, encompassing over 1,700 pages of complex legislation and regulations (Cooperand Ellem, 2008). Three initiatives illustrate the government’s neoliberal approach.First, the legislation directly targeted the membership, role and power of unions:unprecedented limits were placed on union access to workplaces, industrial actionrequired a secret ballot and pattern bargaining was outlawed (Cooney, 2006; Dab-scheck, 2005; Forsyth and Sutherland, 2006).

Second, most functions of the federal tribunal were eliminated or shifted to otherbodies that were more distant from unions. A new body (the Australian Fair PayCommission) was established to adjust the minimum wage and set award wages,parliament set five minimum employment standards, public servants vetted agree-ments to ensure prohibited content was excluded, civil penalty enforcementby courts replaced the pursuit of rights through tribunals, and the Minister forWorkplace Relations was given widespread unilateral regulatory powers (Cooney,2006).



Third, the regulatory instruments available under federal law changed. Awards nolonger supported unions and collective regulation as they once did (Ostenfeld andLewer, 2002). They also provided less protection for employees as their scope nar-rowed, the ‘no disadvantage test’ was repealed, thereby diminishing their safety-netrole (Evesson et al., 2007; Peetz and Preston, 2007), and AWAs were given primacyover them. Where unions were able to negotiate collective agreements, they wereprevented from including provisions (called ‘prohibited content’) that in any waypromoted the role of unions (Cooney, 2006; Forsyth and Sutherland, 2006). Finally,greenfield agreement provisions allowed employers who were establishing new work-places to determine wages and conditions without negotiating with either employeesor unions (Briggs and Cooper, 2007).

Employee representation

A dramatic decline in union membership is evident in the data presented in Table 1:in 1990, union density in ‘all industries’ stood at 40.5 per cent; by 2006 the proportionhad virtually halved to 20.3 per cent. The political power of unions, so high during theAccord period, plummeted after 1996 when the Howard Coalition governmentexcluded unions from consultation. Union influence within the Labor Party alsodeclined, although the Australian Council of Trade Union’s (ACTU) successful pub-licity campaign against the Work Choices legislation in 2007 demonstrated capacityto still influence the popular electorate (Spies-Butcher and Wilson, 2008).

Union industrial power also declined. The shift towards decentralised bargainingleft the ACTU with little role in bargaining (Briggs, 1999), while the restrictiveregulation of collective bargaining (especially after 2005) limited union capacity toutilise traditional industrial tactics and preserve entitlements (Cooney, 2006).

In contrast to the extreme regulation of unions, non-union methods of fixingemployment conditions were only loosely prescribed. Employers were required to dolittle more than consult with employees over non-union collective agreements, whichbecame legally binding once supported in a ballot by a majority of employees (Briggsand Cooper, 2007). Indeed, there is no evidence that employers regularly recognisedindependent non-union representatives of employees in negotiating collective agree-ments, while little ‘bargaining’ seems to have occurred over individual contracts.Instead, non-union collective agreements and AWAs were mostly fixed by manage-ment prerogative, with employers making offers that employees could only accept orreject (Bray et al., 2009).

Bargaining structures

National data showing different types of bargaining structures have only recentlybeen collected. Table 2 shows changes in methods of setting pay between 2002 and2006 as Work Choices took effect. The balance between awards only (around 20 percent), collective bargaining (around 40 per cent) and individual arrangements (around40 per cent) remained relatively stable.

However, decollectivisation did affect the character of Australian bargaining.Within the collective bargaining sector, the level of bargaining decentralised progres-sively to a system where, by the mid-1990s, almost all wages and working conditionswere determined within the individual enterprise (ACIRRT, 1999; Gardner, 1990).Work Choices then virtually banned industry bargaining by withdrawing legal



Tab

le1:

Num

ber

ofem

ploy

ees,

trad

eun

ion

mem

bers

hip

and

unio

nde

nsit

yin

sele

cted

indu

stri

es,1

990–

2006

1990

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

All

indu

stri

esT

otal

empl

oyee

s(0

00s)

2,65

9.6

2,28

3.4

2,25

1.8

2,19

4.3

2,11

0.3

2,03

7.5

1,87

8.2

1,90

1.8

1,90

2.7

1,83

3.7

1,86

6.7

1,84

2.1

1,91

1.9

1,78

6.0

Uni

onde

nsit

y(%

)40

.535

.032

.731

.130

.328

.125

.724

.724

.523

.123

.022

.722

.420

.3A

ccom

mod

atio

n,ca

fes

and

rest

aura

nts

Tra

deun

ion

mem

bers

(000

s)65

.761

.762

.352

.753

.446

.535

.041

.351

.147

.536

.535

.832

.335

.4

Tot

alem

ploy

ees

(000

s)27

7.6

320.

333

7.6

341.

534

5.4

359.

634

5.1

400.

940

2.8

402.

442

0.0

441.

544

6.8

439.

0U

nion

dens

ity

(%)

23.7

19.3

18.4

15.4

15.5

12.9

10.1

10.3

12.7

11.8

8.7

8.1

7.2

8.1

Air

and

spac

etr

ansp

ort

Tra

deun

ion

mem

bers

(000

s)24

.825

.428

.933

.130

.026

.327

.727

.936

.125

.728

.322

.023

.121

.3

Tot

alem

ploy

ees

(000

s)40

.235

.540

.850

.048

.345

.947

.356

.953

.246

.352

.742

.050

.346

.5U

nion

dens

ity

(%)

61.7

71.6

70.8

66.3

62.0

57.2

58.4

49.1

67.8

55.5

53.7

52.5

45.9

45.8

Con

stru

ctio

nT

rade

unio

nm

embe

rs(0

00s)

171.

511

3.4

105.

110

9.6

115.

010

0.6

110.

611

6.2

106.

811

7.2

129.

411

8.5

144.

612

7.3

Tot

alem

ploy

ees

(000

s)37

6.0

332.

234

3.1

369.

334

3.4

399.

042

9.8

440.

643

5.6

422.

948

9.1

506.

955

0.0

592.

1U

nion

dens

ity

(%)

45.4

34.1

30.6

29.7

33.5

25.2

25.7

26.4

24.5

27.7

26.5

23.4

26.3

21.5

Sour

ce:

Em

ploy

eeE

arni

ngs,

Ben

efits

and

Tra

deU

nion

Mem

bers

hip,

Aus

tral

ia—

Tra

deU

nion

Mem

bers

hip

(631

00T

S000

1),R

eiss

ued

18A

pril

2007

.N

otes

:(i

)P

eopl

ew

hodi

dno

tkn

owth

eir

trad

eun

ion

mem

bers

hip

stat

usar

ein

clud

edin

tota

lsw

here

rele

vant

.(ii)

Indu

stry

not

furt

her

defin

edco

des

are

incl

uded

into

tals

whe

rere

leva

nt.

(iii)

Exc

ept

for

1990

,th

eta

ble

uses

1993

Aus

tral

ian

and

New

Zea

land

Stan

dard

Indu

stri

alC

lass

ifica

tion

(AN

ZSI

C)

clas

sific

atio

ns.

Dat

afo

r19

90ar

eno

tdi

rect

lyco

mpa

rabl

ew

ith

late

rda

ta.P

rior

to19

94,i

ndus

try

data

are

clas

sifie

dac

cord

ing

toth

eA

ustr

alia

nS

tand

ard

Indu

stri

alC

lass

ifica

tion

1983

.Fro

m19

94–2

006,

indu

stry

data

are

clas

sifie

dac

cord

ing

toth

eA

NZ

SIC

1993

.Fro

m20

06,i

ndus

try

data

are

also

clas

sifie

dac

cord

ing

toth

eA

NZ

SIC

2006

,whi

chre

plac

esA

NZ

SIC

1993

.Dat

aba

sed

onth

edi

ffer

ent

clas

sific

atio

nsar

eno

tdi

rect

lyco

mpa

rabl

e.(i

v)O

ther

tran

spor

t(s

ubdi

visi

on)

isin

clud

edin

tota

lsfo

rT

rans

port

and

stor

age

(div

isio

n).



Tab

le2:

Met

hods

ofpa

yse

ttin

g

Pro

port

ion

ofem

ploy

ees

(%)

Indu

stry

†A

war

don

lyC

olle

ctiv

eag

reem

ent

Indi

vidu

alar

rang

emen

t

All

met

hods

ofse

ttin

gpa

yR

egis

tere

dor

unre

gist

ered

Wor

king

prop

riet

orof

inco

rpor

ated

busi

ness

Tot

al

Con

stru

ctio

n20

0217

.123

.1na

na59

.810

0.0

2004

15.8

24.6

40.3

19.4

59.7

100.

020

0612

.027

.743

.516

.860

.310

0.0

Acc

omm

odat

ion,

cafe

san

dre

stau

rant

s20

0261

.26.

8*28

.33.

7*32

.010

0.0

2004

60.1

11.7

25.9

2.4

28.3

100.

020

0657

.28.

830

.63.

534

.010

0.0

Air

and

spac

etr

ansp

ort

2002

n.p.

84.6

14.0

*–

14.0

*10

0.0

2004

n.p.

87.0

7.0*

*n.

p.8.

4**

100.

020

062.

1**

75.3

21.3

n.p.

22.6

100.

0T

otal 2002

20.5

38.2

35.7

5.6

41.3

100.

020

0420

.040

.933

.75.

439

.110

0.0

2006

19.0

41.2

34.8

5.1

39.9

100.

0

Sour

ce:

Aus

tral

ian

Bur

eau

ofSt

atis

tics

(AB

S),E

mpl

oyee

Ear

ning

san

dH

ours

Surv

ey,M

ay20

06,A

BS

Cat

alog

uenu

mbe

r63

06.0

.C

avea

ts:

As

thes

eda

taar

eba

sed

onin

form

atio

nre

lati

ngto

asa

mpl

eof

empl

oyer

san

dem

ploy

ees

for

each

year

,rat

her

than

afu

llen

umer

atio

n,th

eyar

esu

bjec

tto

sam

ple

vari

abili

tyan

dm

ayva

ryfr

omth

ees

tim

ates

that

wou

ldha

vebe

enpr

oduc

edif

the

info

rmat

ion

had

been

obta

ined

from

alle

mpl

oyer

san

dal

lem

ploy

ees.

The

figur

espr

oduc

edat

this

fine

leve

lofd

isag

greg

atio

nsh

owvo

lati

lity

beca

use

ofth

esa

mpl

ede

sign

.Thi

ssu

rvey

was

notd

esig

ned

asa

tim

ese

ries

soca

utio

nsh

ould

beex

erci

sed

whe

nco

mpa

ring

data

betw

een

diff

eren

tye

ars.

*Est

imat

eha

sa

rela

tive

stan

dard

erro

rof

25to

50pe

rce

ntan

dsh

ould

beus

edw

ith

caut

ion;

**es

tim

ate

has

are

lati

vest

anda

rder

ror

grea

ter

than

50pe

rce

ntan

dis

cons

ider

edto

oun

relia

ble

for

gene

ralu

se.

†Ind

ustr

ycl

assi

fied

acco

rdin

gto

the

Aus

tral

ian

and

New

Zea

land

Stan

dard

Indu

stri

alC

lass

ifica

tion

,19

93.

Con

stru

ctio

nan

dac

com

mod

atio

n,ca

fes

and

rest

aura

nts

are

one-

digi

tcl

assi

ficat

ions

;air

and

spac

etr

ansp

ort

isa

two-

digi

tcl

assi

ficat

ion.

n.p.

,not

publ

ishe

d;na

,not

avai

labl

e;–,

nilo

rro

unde

dto

zero

(inc

ludi

ngnu

llce

lls).



protection for unions taking action in support of coordinated claims (Forsyth andSutherland, 2006). Also, non-union collective agreements grew after 1996 to coveraround 10 per cent of all employees covered by collective bargaining (Briggs andCooper, 2007).

The introduction and promotion of statutory individual contracts by the Coalitiongovernment succeeded in partially individualising the national system. Of the 40 percent of employees in Table 2 covered by ‘individual arrangements’, only 2–3 per centwere employed under AWAs, although these became more common under WorkChoices (Bray et al., 2009: 314–315). AWAs were more influential where employersused them in decollectivisation strategies (Peetz, 2006).

The new assertiveness of employers

Once seen as weak victims of strong unions and an interventionist state, Australianemployers and their associations changed dramatically in the early 1990s (Plowman,1988; but see also Barry, 1995; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 1999). Several key nationalemployer associations campaigned for decentralised bargaining and greater restric-tions upon unions. By the mid-1990s, the ‘new right’ demands for decollectivisation,once perceived as reflecting a radical minority, had reshaped mainstream employeropinion. The election of the Howard government in 1996 created an opportunity fororganisations such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Busi-ness Council of Australia and the Australian Mines and Minerals Association toadvocate neoliberalism and related legislative change (see, for example, Hearn-Mackinnon, 2006; Lyons, 2007; Plowman, 2004; Thornthwaite and Sheldon, 1999;2000; 2001).

At the enterprise level, employers contributed to the growth of neoliberalism byexploiting opportunities created by new forms of state intervention, campaigningaggressively to decollectivise bargaining and reviving the use of lockouts (a bargainingtactic rarely seen since the 1930s depression). The federal government championedanti-union employers and chastised those who retained union collective bargaining(Briggs, 2004; Peetz, 2006; Thornthwaite and Sheldon, 2001).

The Work Choices regime was a significant neoliberal achievement, but the discus-sion above of changes to state intervention, employee representation, bargainingstructures and employer assertiveness shows that it fell short of the neoliberal ideal,establishing only modest individualisation and partial decollectivisation.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THREE INDUSTRIES

The following sections describe trends in industrial relations in three industries sincethe early 1990s. Their aim is to highlight variations in the impact of neoliberalism,analysed under the four subheadings discussed above.

Domestic airlines

The domestic airline industry (the major subset in the ‘air and space’ statisticalcategory) is an important industry, although small in terms of employment, with only46,500 in 2006 (see Table 1). Domestic airlines in Australia once had highly regulatedproduct markets and industrial relations. A ‘two-airline’ policy—with one privately-owned enterprise (Ansett) and one government-owned business (Australian Airlines,



later Qantas)—ensured that competition was limited. These conditions changed afterOctober 1990 with the deregulation of product markets, followed by the merger ofAustralian Airlines with its international counterpart, Qantas, and their subsequentprivatisation. Also, new entrants (Compass I and II, Impulse, Virgin Blue, Jetstar andTiger Air) introduced a ‘low-cost’ business model, creating robust price-basedcompetition. Several of the new entrants failed, as did the apparently well-establishedAnsett in 2001. The remaining ‘full-service’ carrier, Qantas, continued profitably, butencountered competitive pressure to cut costs (Blain, 1984; Bray, 1997; Small, 2002;Spiess and Bray, 2006).

In this context, traditional collectivist patterns of industrial relations were alsochallenged. Domestic airline flight crew were previously regulated by a strongindustry-specific industrial tribunal. This arose from both the strategic position of theindustry (strikes immediately and significantly disrupt the travelling public) and theimportance of public air safety. This tribunal was abolished in the late 1980s (Blain,1984; Bray, 1997), leaving all employees in the industry subject to general federalindustrial relations law which, after 1996, opened the door for new regulatoryoptions, restricted unions and imposed new sanctions on collective industrial action.

Union membership was adversely affected by neoliberal policies upon the productmarket and industrial relations. Before 1990, employees in domestic airlines werehighly unionised. Table 1 shows union density between 60 and 70 per cent in the early1990s, depending on the industry classification used. These data include many smalland poorly unionised regional passenger carriers and airlines in general aviation. Incontrast, unionisation was virtually 100 per cent in the two large domestic airlines(Bray, 1997). Subsequent years saw union density in the whole industry fall to around46 per cent in 2006, a decrease of 36 per cent since 1994. While density was still higherthan the national average, it fell well below past levels. Union structures and strategiesalso changed. Throughout the Accord years, the many different occupational unionsin aviation united under strong ACTU leadership. After 1996, industry-wide coord-ination broke down, and the ACTU’s leadership role in the industry disappeared,allowing individual unions to come into conflict with each other more frequently.These unions also adopted more cautious strategies and called strikes less often(Spiess and Bray, 2006).

The new low-cost employers also introduced strategies that underminedcollectivism. Airlines like Impulse, Virgin Blue and Jetstar were virtually ‘greenfieldsites’, developing different employment profiles, more flexible work organisation, andlower wages and conditions. While they bargained with unions, they also exploitednew opportunities available under federal labour laws by recognising fewer unionsand negotiating non-union collective agreements for some occupational groups.Qantas management also changed strategies, especially after 1996 under CEO GeoffDixon. The past pluralist approach to union negotiations was replaced by a moreconfrontational approach in which Qantas asserted managerial prerogative. Qantasconsidered its cost structures to be significantly higher than its new competitors andsought aggressively to reduce employment and increase part-time and casual work toboost productivity (ibid.).

Before the 1990s, collective regulation was deeply entrenched in the two majorairlines supporting high industry-wide standards in wages and working conditions.After 1992, collective bargaining with individual airlines became prevalent, withincreasingly different outcomes after 1996. Table 2 shows that over 75 per cent ofemployees had wages determined by collective agreements in the 2000s. Although



some of these employees were under non-union collective agreements and a handfulof individual contracts existed, neoliberal policies were largely unsuccessful in elim-inating collectivism. However, the union bargaining sector was more closely attunedto employer strategic priorities.

Building and construction industry

The building and construction industry is Australia’s fifth largest employer, withalmost 600,000 employees in 2006 (see Table 1). It accounts for an average of 5–6 percent of GDP, and its activities have strong flow-on effects impacting upon productiveefficiency in other industries (Royal Commission, 2002: 16).

The industry comprises two distinct sectors. First is commercial and civil construc-tion (mostly large construction projects). This sector has a tradition of strong andmilitant unionism, and was singled out by the Howard government for extremeanti-union intervention. Second is the housing sector, long dominated by non-unionised self-employed workers and requiring no further government action topromote individualism (Underhill et al., 1997). The account here deals just withcommercial and civil construction (referred to as ‘the building industry’), and beginswith an overview of earlier industrial relations practices.

Central to industrial relations in building is the role of major building contractors.In response to extreme competition and volatile product markets, building companiesevolved to become project managers (hereafter principal contractors) who subcon-tracted, by tender, the majority of construction work to smaller subcontractors. Mostemployees are therefore employed by many small subcontractors. Nevertheless, prin-cipal contractors influence industrial relations on building projects as they exercisecontrol through tendering processes, imposing employment obligations uponsubcontractors.

The cost of industrial disputes on construction sites delivers substantial bargainingpower to building unions. Principal contractors, who bear the costs of project delaysarising from industrial disputes, have reacted by developing risk-sharing practiceswhereby they pass the costs of disputes to subcontractors, potentially bankruptingthem and ensuring their compliance with collective agreements. In this way, principalcontractors stabilise collective employment regulation among the multitude of sub-contractors and unions.

Unions negotiated separate agreements with principal contractors and subcontrac-tors, and the former provided that only subcontractors with union agreements couldoperate on building sites (Productivity Commission, 1999; Underhill, 2003). This‘locking-in’ process proved a potent source of collective regulation throughout the1990s and early 2000s, causing the 1996 neoliberal national reforms to have littleeffect. Unions and principal contractors both resisted changes that might underminerelatively stable collective arrangements.

In the late 1990s, however, frustrated with the industry’s disregard for its reforms,the Howard Coalition government began to use its role as purchaser of constructionoutput. The government developed a Code of Practice for federally funded construc-tion projects that required compliance with the Workplace Relations Act. Neverthe-less, most industrial relations practices remained unchanged because the industry isdominated by private sector construction, and the Code applied only to the publicsector (Royal Commission, 2002). In 2001, the federal government established aRoyal Commission into industrial relations in the building industry. The 2003 report



set a blueprint for revisions to the Code of Practice and actions to outlaw commonbuilding industry union practices (Dabscheck, 2005; Forsyth et al., 2007; Howe, 2007;Ross, 2005).

Following these recommendations, the government passed the Building and Con-struction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (BCII). A new authority was established(Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner, ABCC) to enforcethe Code and the new legislative constraints tailored to the industry (Forsyth et al.,2007). In recommending the Bill to Parliament, the Minister reasserted the importanceof direct employer–employee relationships with minimal third-party intervention,while simultaneously creating a new third party with extraordinary powers to inter-vene. The government would no longer ‘sit idly by and permit long overdue reform ofthis industry to be impeded by unlawful union demands’ (Andrews, 2005: 6). From itsperspective, building employers had been unwilling to challenge practices that resultedfrom strong unionism. Extensive reregulation was considered necessary to achieve theneoliberal objective of destroying collective institutional arrangements.

The revised Code of Practice and its enforcement processes allow employers (espe-cially subcontractors) to choose their preferred mode of bargaining arrangements.First, the Code bans a raft of established industrial relations practices that earlierreforms had failed to curb (most of which concerned union activities). Second, theCode applies to all principal contractors’ projects once they have tendered for afederal project, thereby extending direct government intervention into industrial rela-tions practices in the 70 per cent of construction projects that are privately funded(ABCC, 2007a: 32). Third, the Code is enforced through processes that are bothunique and draconian. For example, the ABCC can prosecute individuals and organ-isations for not reporting breaches of the Code and not cooperating with investiga-tions into possible breaches. It can also compel individuals to be interviewed (with apenalty of six months’ imprisonment for refusal), require that the content of inter-views not be disclosed and disallow legal representation during examinations.Breaches of the Code can result in heavy fines and the exclusion of organisations fromfuture government projects (ABCC, 2007b).

The ABCC embraced its role with zeal, and immediately shifted the balance ofpower in the industry in favour of employers by vigorously launching prosecutionsagainst union officials and members for involvement in banned union activities.Indicative of the ABCC’s approach is the criticism of one Federal Court judge, whoaccused it of anti-union bias when it sought to prosecute a union while ignoring taxevasion by the employer (Lovewell v. O’Carroll, PGEU Qld Branch & CEPU [2007]FCA, No. QUD 427, Transcript, 8 October 2008).

Union density in building has traditionally been high. By the late 1980s, all collec-tive agreements required compulsory unionism and full-time shop stewards on mostlarge building projects. Table 1 shows union density in the early–mid-1990s at the lowlevel of 30–34 per cent, although this figure also includes the non-unionised housingsector. Whilst compulsory unionism was prohibited in 1996 by the Workplace Rela-tions Act, building employers were unwilling to overturn past practice, and it contin-ued mostly unabated. Union membership declined in the late 1990s, consistent withdeclines throughout the Australian workforce, but remained stubbornly in the mid-20s in the larger general construction industry and much higher in commercial andcivil construction.

Not until 2006 did union membership fall significantly to an all-time low of 21.5 percent, probably because of the activities of the ABCC, which doggedly enforced



voluntary unionism. Compulsory unionism was removed from collective agreements,full-time shop stewards were banned and union organisers’ access to building sites wasseverely hindered. In the 2006/07 financial year, 31 per cent of the ABCC’s investiga-tions concerned union access to building sites and compulsory unionism (ABCC,2007a: 24). A climate of fear existed in which principal contractors discouraged unionactivity to avoid prosecution, and unions abided by the new rules to prevent publicityammunition to the Howard government. A national survey of 42 subcontractorsconducted on behalf of the Australian Contractors Association in late 2007 observedthat union officials had become much less commonplace and managerial prerogativeincreased, with workforce decisions increasingly made without union intervention orconsultation (Jackson Wells Morris Pty. Ltd., 2007).

Established site-level practices to strengthen union collectivism were also quashed.Stop-work meetings instigated by shop stewards to enforce agreements were targetedby the ABCC and all but ceased. Large fines were imposed on individual workers (inone case, over 90 workers were fined almost A$10,000 each), sending a clear messageto unions, shop stewards and individual workers that industrial action placed theirpersonal financial security at risk (Hadgkiss v. Aldin [2007] FCA 2068 and Hadgkiss v.Aldin (No. 2) [2007] FCA 2069, 20 December 2007).

Despite these interventions, union collective bargaining remained dominant.Table 2 shows that collective agreement coverage in construction was stable in the2000s, at around one-third of all employees, most of these employed in commercialand civil construction. The 2005 reforms, however, caused changes in collectivebargaining: industry and project agreements were replaced by enterprise agree-ments, and some provisions in earlier collective agreements were outlawed (includ-ing compulsory unionism and obligations imposed by principal contractors onsubcontractors).

Table 2 also implies the industry was highly individualised, with around 60 percent covered by individual arrangements. Around one-third of these were workingproprietors, mostly outside the commercial and civil construction sector. Explana-tions for the remaining individual contracts remain difficult to find. Most industryplayers and commentators insist that subcontractors in commercial building preferenterprise agreements over individual agreements (AWAs), which they believe willlead to industrial instability (Jackson Wells Morris Pty. Ltd., 2007: 24–25). Accord-ing to one subcontractor, ‘AWAs would be pointless because people would all wantto be on the same rates and conditions as everyone else’ (ibid.: 25). Only a minorityof subcontractors have adopted AWAs, and they are thought to operate in moreremote regions. Industry authorities claim the neoliberal objective of more individu-alised pay setting arrangements has yet to come to fruition.

Employers in this industry have been reluctant to take up the neoliberal optionsmade available to them by the state. The complexities of coordinating work onlarge construction projects and the potential problems of disruption by militantunions were amply demonstrated to them during periods of industrial turmoil in the1980s. When enterprise bargaining was encouraged in the mid-1990s, principal con-tractors opted for industry-level negotiations to avoid being ‘picked off ’ by pow-erful unions (Workforce, 1999a). Unlike other industries, employers resisted thefederal government’s encouragement to ‘go for it’ (Reith, cited in Workforce,1999b: 1). The apparent satisfaction of principal contractors with existing arrange-ments meant they preferred to ignore the government’s aims of decollectivisationand individualisation.



The 2005 BCII legislation, however, left principal contractors with little choice butto abide by the new standards while offering new freedoms for subcontractor employ-ers to pursue alternate strategies (King, 2007). Neither unions nor principal contrac-tors could continue to demand subcontractors abide by the traditional collectivistapproach. Nonetheless, while some employers enjoy new freedoms from union inter-ference over day-to-day issues, others are concerned about the coercive tactics of theABCC (Jackson Wells Morris Pty. Ltd., 2007), and few have demonstrated a willing-ness to embrace individualist approaches to wages and conditions.

Hospitality

The hospitality industry (defined here by the ABS industry classification of ‘accom-modation, cafes and restaurants’) is a high-growth sector of the Australian economy,with employment growing from 277,600 in 1994 to 439,000 in 2006 (see Table 1). Ithas several key features that affect industrial relations: there are a large number ofvery small employers, although a few larger employers are important in some industrysegments, its production process is highly labour intensive, product market competi-tion is intense, and demand for the industry’s perishable ‘product’ fluctuates consid-erably and sometimes unpredictably over relatively short time periods (vanBarneveld, 2006). Product markets were not significantly affected by neoliberal statepolicies, largely because they were not heavily regulated previously, although a minorexception was the liberalisation of liquor licensing and trading hours. Employmentin hospitality is generally insecure and highly flexible. Only one-third of workersare permanent, full-time employees, and nearly half are part-time casuals (ibid.:156).

Historically, state intervention in hospitality industrial relations aimed not tocontrol unions or resolve disputes, but to protect minimum standards of wages andconditions through awards. Table 2 shows that even in the 2000s, the majority ofemployees in the industry relied on awards to determine their wages. This proportiondeclined marginally between 2002 and 2006, from 61.2 to 57.2 per cent. More disag-gregated data show that award reliance within hospitality varies between ‘cafes andrestaurants’ (the largest sector), which had 38.6 per cent of employees reliant onawards, while ‘pubs, taverns and bars’ and ‘clubs’ had 78.4 and 79.3 per cent, respec-tively (ABS, unpublished). Collective bargaining was insignificant across the wholeindustry, determining the wages for only about 10 per cent of employees. Individualarrangements covered less than one-third of all employees, although in cafes andrestaurants (where mostly small employers dominate), this figure was as high as 50.4per cent in 2006. By contrast, it was only 18.4 per cent in clubs (which has largerestablishments) (ibid.).

Although award regulation has wide coverage over hospitality employees, theprotection it provides deteriorated after 1993. First, the shift towards decentralisedcollective bargaining in both the 1993 and 1996 legislation meant hospitality awardsbecame ‘safety nets’ only, and award wage rates increasingly fell behind those incollective agreements (ACIRRT, 1999). Second, non-wage award regulations wereweakened by the ‘award simplification’ provisions instituted under the 1996 legislation.Hospitality was at the forefront of this process. On the application of employers,provisions that were deleted from the main hospitality award included ‘limitations onpart-time work, the requirements that employers consult with the union before intro-ducing new technologies or redundancies, fixed ratios of juniors to adult staff, and a



ban on bar staff cleaning toilets’ (Barnes and Fieldes, 2000: 542). Third, after 1996individual contracting through AWAs provided new opportunities for employers togain flexibilities, although the ‘no disadvantage test’ appeared to protect net wages andconditions relative to awards. AWAs flourished in the industry. Van Barneveld (2006:164) estimated that by the end of September 2005, approximately 65,900 employeeswere covered by newly approved AWAs compared with only 6,600 covered by newlynegotiated non-union collective agreements, and a further 7,500 by union collectiveagreements. In November 2005, Work Choices made AWAs more accessible throughsimpler procedures and the abolition of the no disadvantage test.

A number of studies have documented the extent to which employment conditionsin hospitality declined under these new arrangements (Evesson et al., 2007; Peetz andPreston, 2007). Evesson et al.’s study of all hospitality collective agreements (unionand non-union) lodged between March and December 2006 concluded that earningsfell between 12 and 16 per cent, while non-union agreements ‘mirror the loweststandards under the law’ (Evesson et al., 2007: 20). Union agreements, in contrast,built upon earlier collective agreements to maintain limits on managerial prerogativeover issues such as rostering of hours, which are important because of extended andnon-standard trading hours (ibid.: 20).

The aim of neoliberalism in hospitality was to destroy state regulation rather thanto decollectivise industrial relations. This said, decollectivisation also occurred.Unionism was always weak in hospitality, except in some large businesses like hotelchains or clubs (van Barneveld, 2006). Table 1 shows that union membership fell inthe industry in both absolute terms and as a percentage of total employment, from65,700 members in 1990 (23.7 per cent of all employees) to 35,400 in 2006 (8.1 percent). Because of their weak and unevenly spread membership, union strategy reliedupon centralised state regulation through awards. Indeed, van Barneveld (2006: 160)shows that the industry’s main union used several arbitration test cases up to the early2000s to win new rights concerning the conversion of casual employees to perma-nency, improvements in severance pay, work and family issues, and pay equity.However, in 2005, Work Choices ended the use of test cases convened by the AIRC,blocking this union strategy, leaving unions to organise and bargain collectively withindividual employers where they could.

Given the propensity of hospitality employers to rely upon awards, employerassociations have played a big part in the industry, focusing, like unions, on central-ised state regulation (van Barneveld, 2006). These associations played a key role inseveral arbitration test cases, reaping benefits for their members in areas like awardsimplification and reduced penalty rates. Few employers in hospitality addressed suchissues through collective bargaining; rather, they relied upon the reduction of awardstandards to limit wage increases and expand managerial prerogative (van Barneveld,2006). Where bargaining did take place, a significant minority of non-union andindividual agreements to emerge post-Work Choices were remarkably uniform, sug-gesting a form of pattern bargaining guided by employer associations and consult-ants, rather than unions (Evesson et al., 2007).

COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSION

Changes to industrial relations in the three industries described above reinforce thegeneral account of the rise of neoliberalism in Australia. All three saw a decline intraditional forms of collective bargaining and state regulation; as unions lost mem-



bership and power, employers became more assertive; and bargaining structures weredecentralised to enterprise level. New individualistic forms of regulation emerged, andthe scope of managerial prerogative expanded to displace collective and stateregulation.

At the same time, the three industries also reveal quite different paths towardsneoliberalism, and different outcomes. The processes by which the state intervened todismantle previous collective and state forms of regulation and to create new indi-vidualised forms of regulation, and the success of that intervention, variedconsiderably. These may be differences of degree rather than kind, but they sheduseful light both on the unique form that neoliberalism has taken in Australia and onthe concept of neoliberalism itself.

In domestic airlines, the pursuit of neoliberal ideals came through both the productmarket and industrial relations legislative reform. Product market deregulationincreased commercial freedom to existing airlines and allowed the entry of new airlines,increasing competition and creating strong pressure for industrial relations change.Legislative reform through the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and its amendmentscreated the same opportunities as in other industries, which new airlines in particularused to develop enterprise-specific industrial relations arrangements. But they did notgenerally seek to exclude unions or adopt individual contracts, perhaps because unionmembership and militancy remained high in most airlines. As a result, union collectivebargaining continued as the main means for determining wages and working condi-tions, despite some marginal use of non-union collective bargaining and some dilutionof the content of union collective agreements to the advantage of employers.

In the commercial and civil sector of building and construction, the key develop-ments came not from product markets, which were always competitive, but throughheavy industry-specific state intervention in industrial relations. Government actionhad little impact before 2005—unions retained their membership and employers werecontent to support conventional collective forms of regulation. After 2005, the Co-alition government expressed its frustration at the continued strength and militanttactics of building unions and introduced the BCII and the ABCC, as well as thegeneral Work Choices amendments. In the short time these laws have been operating,they appear to have been powerful agents for change. Decollectivisation proceedsapace, but employers have been cautious in seeking to reject collective bargaining andto embrace individualisation.

In hospitality, neoliberal industrial relations reform was the agency for changerather than product market deregulation, but here the key development was thedestruction of previous forms of state regulation and the rise of individualism.Although never strong, union membership declined dramatically. Employees whorelied mainly on awards to guarantee minimum standards of employment found theirconditions undermined by the demolition of award standards and the introduction ofstatutory individual contracts. Even though only a minority of hospitality employersformally exploited the new opportunities, the labour-intensive nature of productionand strong product market competition meant this minority could slash generalstandards by leading a ‘race to the bottom’.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we explore the meaning of neoliberalism and examine the peculiar formthat neoliberalism has assumed at national level in Australia by drawing upon the



framework of decollectivism and individualisation. The progress of neoliberalism inAustralia reached its zenith in the Work Choices legislation of 2005, which introducedextensive, complex and often highly prescriptive state intervention. Decollectivisationfocused on attacking what were considered to be the structures that traditionallysupported union strength. As in many other countries, this involved direct attacks onunions through limitations on strike activity, restrictions on the capacity of unions torecruit and organise members, and a denial of the right to freely bargain collectively.More unusual compared with other countries was the attack on industrial tribunals,which were seen as a source of union power and a constraint upon managerialprerogative. Many of the traditional functions of these tribunals were transferred tonew statutory authorities that offered unions no support or privileged access, whileother functions (like dispute settlement) were simply abolished. The remarkable lim-itations imposed on bargaining processes and the content of collective agreementswere also clearly designed to undermine unions. Even more uniquely Australians werethe new supports for individualisation, including statutory individual contracts. Thedecisions to retain awards (at least in name, if not in function), abolish the nodisadvantage test for AWAs and introduce new statutory minimum employmentstandards were also key parts of the neoliberal agenda.

Delving below the national level, the analysis exposes the different forms thatneoliberal institutional arrangements take in different industries. The economic andtechnological features of the industries and their histories created different patternsof industrial relations, which meant that the neoliberal pursuit of decollectivisationand individualisation unfolded in very different ways. In industries like airlines andbuilding, unions retained some collective strength, and employers chose to exploitonly some of the neoliberal options made available by national reforms. In airlines,competitive pressures in the product market (themselves created by neoliberalreforms), and perhaps the difficulties of achieving deeper decollectivisation,appeared to deliver outcomes acceptable to the government. However, this was notthe case in building where the government embarked on further industry-specificintervention intended to emasculate unions. Yet in neither industry did new forms ofindividualism emerge strongly. In hospitality, where unionisation was never strong,decollectivisation was much easier and complete individualism was only limited bythe retention of legal minimum standards in awards, which were progressively weak-ened by award simplification and Work Choices. Freed in this way, hospitalityemployment conditions were ratcheted down by free market forces to the lowestcommon denominator.

Interestingly, extreme examples of worker exploitation in industries like hospitalitywere publicised by unions in the mass media and played an important part in thepolitical campaign that led to the defeat of the Howard government in the election ofNovember 2007 (Bray et al., 2009: 407–409). The extent to which subsequent legisla-tive change by the new Rudd Labor government reverses the trend in Australiatowards neoliberalism remains to be seen.

What can the transformation of Australian industrial relations contribute to ourtheoretical understanding of neoliberalism? First, there is the paradox of greatergovernment intervention to eliminate regulation and promote decollectivisation.Second, the analysis shows that a variety of neoliberal trajectories were necessary topursue the same ideal. Third, decollectivism and individualisation are neither fullyinterdependent nor different sides of the same coin. Decollectivism can be progressedwithout a corresponding increase in individualisation.



Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the journal’s anonymous referees for their feedback, andJohanna Macneil, Peter Waring, Malcolm Rimmer and Adrian Wilkinson for com-ments on an earlier draft.

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Industry differences in the neoliberal transformation of Australian industrial relations

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