Individual differences in attributional style but not in interoceptive sensitivity, predict...

Individual differences in attributional style but not in interoceptivesensitivity, predict subjective estimates of action intention.

Tegan Penton, Guillaume Thierry and Nick J. Davis

Journal Name: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

ISSN: 1662-5161

Article type: Original Research Article

Received on: 16 Apr 2014

Accepted on: 31 Jul 2014

Provisional PDF published on: 31 Jul 2014

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Citation: Penton T, Thierry G and Davis NJ(2014) Individual differences inattributional style but not in interoceptive sensitivity, predictsubjective estimates of action intention.. Front. Hum. Neurosci.8:638. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00638

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Frontiers in Journal Original Research 16/04/2014

Individual differences in attributional style but not in interoceptive 1

sensitivity, predict subjective estimates of action intention. 2

3

Tegan Penton1,2*

, Guillaume L. Thierry2, Nick J. Davis

3 4

1 Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, London, UK 5

2 School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, Wales, UK 6

3 Department of Psychology, Swansea University, Swansea, Wales, UK 7

* Correspondence: Tegan Penton, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, London, 8 SE14 6NW, UK. 9 [email protected] 10

Keywords: W-judgment, Libet, Interoception, Locus of Control, Agency. 11 12 Abstract 13

The debate on the existence of free will is on-going. Seminal findings by Libet et al. demonstrate that 14

subjective awareness of a voluntary urge to act (the W-judgement) occurs before action execution. 15 Libet’s paradigm requires participants to perform voluntary actions while watching a clock hand 16 rotate. On response trials, participants make a retrospective judgement related to awareness of their 17

urge to act. This research investigates the relationship between individual differences in performance 18 on the Libet task and self-awareness. We examined the relationship between W-judgement, 19

Attributional Style (AS; a measure of perceived control) and interoceptive sensitivity (IS; awareness 20 of stimuli originating from one’s body; e.g. heartbeats). Thirty participants completed the AS 21

questionnaire (ASQ), a heartbeat estimation task (IS), and the Libet paradigm. The ASQ score 22 significantly predicted performance on the Libet task, while IS did not - more negative ASQ scores 23

indicated larger latency between W-judgement and action execution. A significant correlation was 24 also observed between ASQ score and IS. This is the first research to report a relationship between 25 W-judgement and AS and should inform the future use of electroencephalography to investigate the 26

relationship between AS, W-judgement and RP onset. Our findings raise questions surrounding the 27 importance of one’s perceived control in determining the point of conscious intention to act. 28 Furthermore, we demonstrate possible negative implications associated with a longer period between 29

conscious awareness and action execution. 30

1. Introduction 31

The concept of free will has long been a controversial topic in both philosophical and scientific 32

domains (Nadel & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). Here free will, or volitional action, is defined as 33

conscious awareness of the intention to act. The traditional concept of free will (control of one’s 34

actions) has been challenged by the research of Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl (1983); whose 35

results show onset of neural activity associated with an action before an individual becomes aware of 36

their intention to act. In their seminal experiment, Libet et al. (1983) used electroencephalography 37

(EEG) to record the readiness potentials (RP) of six participants while they completed a computer 38

Penton et al. Individual Differences in Volition

2 This is a provisional file, not the final typeset article

task. During the task, participants were asked to watch a clock hand rotate around a clock and to 39

press a button only if they felt the urge to act (to emphasise voluntary action). If a response was made 40

during a given trial, the participant was asked to indicate the position of the clock hand when they 41

first became aware of the urge to move (known as the W-judgement). The RP (or 42

Bereitschaftspotential) is characterised by a slow negative shift in potential related to the motor and 43

pre-motor area (Luder Deecke & Kornhuber, 1969) and is often seen before voluntary movements 44

(for example, Waszak et al., 2005; for alternative explanations see Schurger, Sitt & Dehaene, 2012). 45

Libet et al. (1983) showed that, on average, an RP was seen 550ms before action initiation while W-46

judgements were seen 206ms before action initiation (-206ms). Therefore, Libet et al. suggested that 47

action intention is not entirely ‘free’ and that conscious awareness may occur as more of a 48

justification of a predetermined action. 49

Libet (1999) later argued that these findings do not necessarily negate the concept of volition, rather 50

the phenomenon may exist in the period between awareness of the urge to act and action execution. 51

Specifically, Libet suggested that 200ms latency between awareness and action execution could 52

allow for conscious inhibition of that action if required. This latency is known as the ‘veto’ period 53

and is used to provide a more observable notion of volition (Mele, 2008; Haggard & Libet, 2001). 54

While the Libet paradigm has been subject to criticism (see Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002), 55

research accounting for issues related to task constraints (Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008; RP’s 1.42s 56

prior to action onset) and subjective report (Fried, Mukamel & Kreiman, 2011; activity seen 700ms 57

prior to action onset in single-cell recordings) still replicate the basic findings of Libet’s work. 58

However, the precise timing of associated neural activation is disputed (for more replications see, 59

Soon, Brass, Heinze & Haynes, 2008; Lau, Rogers, Haggard & Passingham, 2004). 60

In spite of the wealth of research into the Libet paradigm, the influence of individual differences in 61

response patterns on the Libet task is relatively unknown. Libet et al. (1983) did take individual 62

differences in response patterns into account (by creating a discrepancy score between a participants 63

average W-judgment and the average time of perceived external touch, determined by another task) 64

in the hope of providing a more reliable estimate of awareness of intention to act, but did not 65

consider other inter-individual differences (e.g. personality). Haggard and Eimer (1999) also 66

addressed variance in W-judgments by investigating variance within a participant’s W-judgments and 67

the covariance of associated brain activity (namely, the RP and lateralised RP; a potential calculated 68

by investigating the relative shift in activity between the contralateral and ipsilateral hemisphere to 69

the hand performing the action). They suggest that LRP onset covaries with time of W-judgments in 70

that early W-judgments correlate with early LRP onset and late W-judgments correlate with late LRP 71

onset. In this way, it is clear that research into volition is aware of potential individual differences in 72

the W-judgement. The current research aims to investigate the relationship between aspects of self-73

awareness (Interoceptive Sensitivity, one’s awareness of one’s internal stimuli), perceived control 74

(Attributional Style; the style one uses to explain life events) and one’s awareness of one’s intention 75

to act. To our knowledge this is the first research investigating personality and perceptual correlates 76

of W-judgements on the Libet task. 77

Attributional Style (AS) refers to the style an individual uses to explain previous positive and 78


Tegan Penton 3

negative life events. Peterson et al. (1982) developed the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) to 79

measure perceived control across several modalities. In order to enable a more holistic understanding 80

of an individual’s perception of control to be established, the ASQ attempts to define the style that 81

individuals adopt to explain life events across three areas; 1) Internality (whether the individual feels 82

the cause of the event is due to themselves or an external factor), 2) Stability (whether the individual 83

feels this cause is stable over time), and 3) Globality (whether the individual feels the cause will be 84

present across multiple life domains). Those who view the cause of positive life events as internal, 85

stable and global, and the cause of negative life events as external, transient and specific are said to 86

have a positive or optimistic AS; while those who view the cause of positive life events as external, 87

transient and specific, and the cause of negative life events as internal, stable and global are thought 88

to have a negative or pessimistic AS. Many benefits of having an optimistic AS have been reported in 89

the literature, such as higher levels of well-being in comparison to those with a negative AS (see 90

Forgeard & Seligman, 2012 for a review). Research into negative AS is more extensive (Seligman, 91

2002) with many reporting a relationship between depression (e.g. Peterson et al., 1982; Stange et al., 92

2013) and anxiety (e.g. Luten, Ralph, Mineka, 1997; Mark & Smith, 2011) and negative AS scores. 93

Furthermore research has also shown negative feelings and emotions to correlate with other 94

measures. For example, Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman and Dolan (2004) show a positive 95

relationship between ‘negative emotional experience’ and interoceptive sensitivity. 96

Interoception refers to one’s awareness of one’s internal stimuli (e.g. an individual’s ability to 97

estimate their own heartbeats over a given time period, Craig, 2002). The Somatic-Marker hypothesis 98

proposed by Damasio, Everitt and Bishop (1996) suggests that emotional and physiological changes 99

elicited by exposure to certain situations or stimuli are bound together. Therefore, when encountering 100

a new stimulus that elicits the same physical arousal / emotion, the individual will evaluate the 101

potential reward or punishment based on prior experience. Werner et al. (2013) supports this theory 102

by showing that increased interoceptive awareness relates to increased processing of somatic markers 103

during a decision making task. Craig (2004) suggests this integration of interoceptive and emotion 104

information occurs within a neural network converging in the insular cortex. Furthermore, he later 105

suggests that integration of this information occurs at each moment in time to create a global, time-106

locked, sense of self-awareness (Craig, 2010). Relating this to the current research, work by 107

Berlucchi and Aglioti (2010) demonstrate that similar cortical regions, primarily the Insula, are 108

associated with both interoception and agency (a sense of control over one’s actions). In this context, 109

one may expect a relationship between performance on the Libet task, AS and IS in the current study. 110

There is evidence to suggest that perceived control and belief in free will are related, with Baumeister 111

and Brewer (2012) demonstrating a positive correlation between internal Locus of Control 112

(attribution of the cause of life events to the self; LOC; Rotter, 1966) and belief in free will. 113

Furthermore, Stroessner and Green (2010) demonstrate a positive correlation between beliefs in 114

determinism and external LOC (attribution of the cause of life events to external factors). Supporting 115

this, Paulhus and Carey (2011) demonstrate a positive correlation between belief in free will and 116

attributional style (one’s style of explaining life events; a measure of perceived control). As well as 117

this, Orellana-Damacela, Tindale and Suarez-Balcazar (2000) suggest that, when more self-aware, 118

one is more likely to consult one’s own standards and beliefs during decision-making. It is proposed 119



that this act can be beneficial or detrimental to the individual in question based on their ability to 120

meet their own expectations. This suggests that individual differences in levels of self-awareness can 121

have varying effects on cognition based on top-down factors such as perceived control and decision 122

making. However, little is known about the relationship between one’s conscious awareness of 123

intention to act and one’s perceived control over life events. Rigoni, Kuhn, Sartori and Brass (2011) 124

attempt to address this issue by investigating the neural correlates associated with manipulating belief 125

in free will. Participants who read a passage of text negating the concept of free will showed 126

decreased RP amplitude, but not W-judgement latency, during the Libet task in comparison to those 127

who read a neutral passage of text. Rigoni et al.’s work demonstrates the relationship between neural 128

activity associated with action execution and higher level beliefs while demonstrating the 129

malleability of both. However, it is still unclear to what extent pre-existing perceptions of control and 130

awareness of conscious intention to act are related. Therefore, the current research aims to investigate 131

how individual differences in perceived control and self-awareness correlate with one another and 132

with awareness of intention to act. 133

Materials and methods 134

Ethical Approval. 135

Prior to data collection, ethical approval was granted by Bangor University’s Ethics Board. All 136

participants were recruited via the universities recruitment site and were offered printer credits or 137

course credits as compensation for taking part. Written consent was obtained from all participants 138

before beginning the experiment. 139

Trials and Procedure. 140

A repeated measures design was used to allow for correlational data analysis and to reduce inter-141

subject variance. Analysis consisted of a multiple regression to assess whether AS and IS predicted 142 performance on the Libet task. A separate correlation was run using Interoceptive Sensitivity scores 143

and Attributional Style scores. All tasks (clock, questionnaire, heart-rate) were counterbalanced 144 across participants. 145 146 Clock task. The stimuli used were similar to that of Libet et al. (1983), consisting of a black clock 147 hand rotating around a clock-like object on a white background (stimuli remained on screen during 148

inter-trial intervals). The clock hand disappeared during the judgement part of the task (see 149 procedure). During each trial the clock hand rotated around the clock 3 times (2 seconds per rotation, 150 6 seconds in total). The hand completed 3 full rotations for every trial (including response trials) to 151 prevent the stop position of the hand from influencing the W-judgement. Participants were instructed 152 to allow one full rotation of the clock hand around the clock and to click the mouse at any point 153 during the final two rotations if they felt the urge to do so. On response trials, following 3 rotations of 154 the clock hand, the clock hand disappeared and a question mark appeared in the middle of the screen. 155

The participant was instructed to use the mouse to make a retrospective judgment of when they first 156 became aware of the urge to act. “Using the mouse, please mark the point on the clock that the clock 157 hand was at when you first became aware of the urge to act”. The next trial began once a mouse click 158 was detected. Trials where no response occurred were excluded from the final analysis. There were 159 60 trials during the task but, due to the voluntary nature, there was variation in the number of trials 160


Tegan Penton 5

included for each individual. 161

Interoceptive sensitivity task. Participants’ heart beat estimates were recorded as well as actual heart 162 beats using an Electrocardiogram (electrodes were attached to both wrists and one ankle of the 163 participant). The task consisted of 6 blocks of varying length (35s, 45s, 100s, repeated) in a 164 randomised order across participants to allow for reliable and varied estimates between participants. 165 Intervals between blocks also varied in length (75, 65s, 55s and immediate start) – these were also 166

randomised across participants. Participants were instructed to count their heart beats to the best of 167 their ability without taking their pulse. Participants were instructed to close their eyes throughout the 168 experiment and to count their heartbeats to the best of their ability without taking their pulse. Upon 169 hearing a single tone, they were to start counting, upon hearing two short tones; they were required to 170 verbally report the number of heartbeats they had counted. 171

172 ASQ. Participants were required to answer the 12 items on the ASQ. Each item consisted of a 173 scenario (for example, “You meet a friend who acts hostilely towards you”) followed by 4 questions 174

(1 qualitative – “Write down one major cause for this event”) – the questions were the same for all 175 items. The participant was required to give an example of one major cause for the scenario and to rate 176 this cause across three, 7-point, likert scales to assess Internality (“Is this cause due to something 177

about you or to something about other people or circumstances?”), Stability (“In the future, will this 178 cause again be present?”) and Globality, respectively (“Is the cause unique to this situation or does it 179

also influence other areas of your life?”). 180 181 Data Analysis. Clock task. Only data from response trials was included in the analysis. If number of 182

response trials were more than 2 standard deviations away from the mean, that participant’s data was 183 excluded from analysis. The angle of the clock-hand on the clock when the participant made a button 184

press was recorded as well as the angle the mouse was at during the judgement phase of the task. 185 Both angles were converted into time by dividing the angle score by pi. To obtain the difference 186

scores, the time of action was taken from the W-judgement time to produce a negative number. 187 Therefore, the closer the difference score was to 0, the smaller the distance between action execution 188 and W-judgement. 189

190 Interoceptive sensitivity task. The following formula was used to calculate an average accuracy score 191

(scores were summed for all 6 trials prior to entry into the formula): 192 193

] 194

195

This was then multiplied by 100 to give a percentage accuracy score. Participants who provided more 196 accurate estimates had a higher accuracy score thought to be indicative of better interoceptive 197 sensitivity (Schandry, 1981). 198

199 ASQ. It is worth noting that the questionnaire’s subscale reliability is low (internality, r = .54; 200 stability, r = .65, globality; r = .59; Peterson et al. 1982), however, when compounding the scales 201 together, the reliability is vastly improved (positive AS, r = .75, negative AS, r = .72). As we were 202

concerned with a holistic representation of perceived control, we analysed response on the 203 questionnaire by taking an average across all the scales for positive and negative questions, 204 respectively. To obtain an overall Attributional Style score for each participant, scores from all 3 205

subscales for each of the 6 questions with a positive valence were summed and divided by 18, the 206 same was done for the 6 questions with a negative valence. The negative composite score was then 207



taken from the positive composite score to obtain an overall composite score of Attributional Style. 208 Higher scores were indicative of a more positive attributional style (more likely to attribute positive 209

events to internal, stable, global attributes and negative events to external, transient, specific 210 attributes). 211

212

2. Results 213 Three participants were removed due to incomplete data on the heartbeat task (electrode recordings 214 were too noisy) and two participants were removed due to outlier data (1 for only completing 6 trials 215 on the Libet task, and 1 because of an average W-judgement further than 2 standard deviations from 216

the group mean). Due to the voluntary nature of the libet task, the number of trials completed varied 217 between participants (responses Mean =45.84, SD = 12.91). Data for 25 participants (13 female, 218 Mean age = 23.6, range = 20-39) was included in the analysis. Descriptive statistics from the Libet 219 task represent the latency between W-judgement and action execution in milliseconds (this is a 220 negative number as awareness occurred before action onset in all participants), while percentage 221

scores were used for data from the heartbeat task and composite scores were used to represent 222 performance on the Attributional Style Questionnaire (see table 1). 223

224 Table 1 225

226 Descriptive Statistics for W-judgement, AS score and Heartbeat accuracy. 227

228

W-Judgment (ms) ASQ (7-point

Likert)

Heartbeat Accuracy (%)

Mean (SD) -253ms (198ms) 0.29 (1.06) 65.93 (15.84)

Min / Max -640 / -30 -2.28 / 1.78 36.41/96.96 Note: Values in parentheses indicate standard deviation. 229 230

Prediction of Mean W-judgement from AS and IS scores 231 A multiple regression was conducted to establish the relationship between performance on the Libet 232

task, heartbeat accuracy and attributional style scores. The ‘Mean W-judgement’ variable was used as 233 the outcome variable with the ‘Attributional Style’ and ‘Heartbeat Accuracy’ variables acting as 234

predictors. Predictor variables were entered using the forced entry method due to the exploratory 235 nature of the research. Diagnostic tests did not reveal any violations of the test statistics. Multi-236 collinearity between predictor variables was not observed during diagnostic tests in the multiple 237

regression (VIF = 1.22, Tolerance = .82) and normality was assumed. The regression model was 238 found to be significant (R

2 = .32, F(2,22) = 5.08, p = .015) suggesting that the two predictor variables 239

(‘Heartbeat Accuracy’ and ‘Attributional Style’) explained 31.6% of the variance. ASQ score was a 240

significant predictor of mean W-judgment but heartbeat accuracy score was not (see table 2). 241 242 Table 2 243

244 The Unstandardised (u) and Standardised (s) Beta Coefficients as Predictors of W-judgement 245 246

Variables B (u) β (s) p

ASQ (SE) .115 (.036) .617 .004

Heartbeat accuracy (SE) .002 (.002) .198 .321 Note: Values in parentheses represent the standard error. R

2 = .32 (p = .015). 247

248


Tegan Penton 7

Relationship Between AS and IS 249 A separate correlation was run to investigate the relationship between ‘Attributional Style’ and 250

‘Heartbeat Accuracy’. A medium negative correlation was observed at a 2-tailed significance level, r 251 (23) = -.43, p = .034 (see figure 2). 252

253

3. Discussion 254

The results indicate that, while performance on the ASQ can predict performance on the Libet task 255

(consistent with our predictions), IS was not a significant predictor of Libet performance, contrary to 256

our predictions. Specifically, more negative AS scores correlate with more negative W-judgments 257

(further away from action onset). A significant relationship was also observed between AS score and 258

IS. 259

Firstly, it is important to note that this research serves as a replication of Libet et al’s (1983) original 260

findings in that the mean W-judgement across the entire sample (Mean =-253ms) was similar to that 261

of Libet’s sample (Mean =-206ms). This is also consistent with other replications of the Libet 262

experiment for example, Lau et al. (2004) reported a Mean =-228ms while investigating fMRI 263

correlates of voluntary action and Rigoni et al. (2011) also approximately replicate Libet’s findings 264

while demonstrating that reducing belief in free will correlates with significant reduction in early RP 265

amplitude, but not with a change in W-judgement (Reduced belief group Mean =-242, Control group 266

Mean=-223). As our data is consistent with the literature, it is possible that individual differences in 267

AS may have had undetected effects on previous findings in the same way as the current research. 268

The large variance of W-judgement values in the literature may be indicative of these individual 269

differences (i.e. Libet et al., 1983). Furthermore, given the direction of the previous literature (for 270

example, Libet et al. 1983, Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008), it is safe to presume that an overall average 271

W-judgement of -253ms will follow onset of the RP by several hundred milliseconds. 272

More negative mean scores are indicative of a larger discrepancy between W-judgment and action 273

execution. This would suggest that those with a more negative AS may be aware of the intention to 274

act sooner than those with a positive AS. It may also be that W-judgement accuracy is affected by 275

these top-down personality factors. This suggests that, even if criticisms surrounding the paradigm 276

were addressed; such as those related to reliance on recall of the urge to act, (for example, Dennett & 277

Kinsbourne, 1992), personality variants may still affect awareness of the urge to act. 278

This research raises questions surrounding belief in free will - i.e. that a larger veto period may relate 279

to a pessimistic AS. It may be that individuals with a more negative AS may perceive themselves as 280

having less control (and, therefore, less free will) due to a disassociation between action awareness 281

and action execution. Marcel (2003) argues that ownership of action can be separated into ownership 282

of action execution and ownership of action intention. Therefore, a temporal dissociation between the 283

two may reduce the ownership one feels over action execution. In turn, this may lead to a perceived 284

lack of control as intention in the individual’s schema is not bound to execution. 285

It is possible that those with a more pessimistic AS may be more uncertain in the choices they make, 286

as is consistent with research into pessimistic AS (e.g. Boudreaux & Ozer, 2013; Bunce & Peterson, 287



1997), while those with a more positive AS are more likely to claim ownership over the action 288

resulting in a smaller latency between w-judgement and action onset. Therefore, the pattern in the W-289

judgements may simply reflect level of self-doubt and uncertainty in those with a negative AS. This 290

theory is consistent with research into negative AS and self-doubt (Bunce et al., 1997; Heppner, 291

Baumgardner, & Jackson, 1985). 292

It is most likely that the relationship observed between AS and W-judgement is heavily influenced by 293

aspects of internality (i.e. “is the cause of a life event due to the individual or to an external factor?”). 294

This was not assessed specifically because of the desire to investigate the relationship between a 295

more holistic representation of perceived control and awareness of intention to act. Furthermore, the 296

poor subscale reliability of the ASQ meant that this relationship was not explored in an additional 297

analysis. However, future research should also employ the locus of control (LOC) questionnaire to 298

assess whether individuals with larger latency between W-judgement and action execution have a 299

more external Locus of Control independent of valence. Furthermore, research should investigate 300

whether those with a positive AS will experience greater ownership over their actions than those with 301

a negative AS. To our knowledge, this research is the first to consider the possible negative 302

implications of having a longer ‘veto’ period. Traditional literature into volition implicates the veto 303

period in conscious control of action (Libet, 1999; Mele, 2008) however, until now, no research has 304

investigated individual differences in the veto period. If the above theory is true, it may be that a 305

larger veto period (indicative of greater control over one’s actions) correlates with reduced levels of 306

perceived control. 307

The regression analysis demonstrated that IS did not predict awareness of conscious intention to act. 308

However, the results indicate a medium, negative correlation between interoceptive sensitivity and 309

AS suggesting that the more negative (or pessimistic) an individual’s AS, the better they are at 310

estimating their own heartbeats. Both AS and IS have been shown to correlate with anxiety (Mark & 311

Smith, 2011; Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer & Gerlach, 2010). Therefore, the effect here may relate 312

to a hyper-awareness seen in those with anxiety disorders. It is also possible that, due to the 313

correlation with depressive symptoms (Seligman, 2002), those with a negative AS have a tendency to 314

self-evaluate and, therefore, are more self-aware. It is important to note that researches into the 315

correlates of IS are inconsistent, so more work is still needed in the area (see Van der Does, Antony, 316

Ehlers & Barksy, 2000). 317

Future research should focus on furthering understanding of individual differences in performance on 318

the Libet task (and other tasks related to awareness of conscious intention to act), and what these 319

differences relate to. More specifically, a causal relationship between AS and W-judgement should 320

be investigated by attempting to manipulate AS (for example, see Anderson, 1983) score and, in turn, 321

modulate performance on the Libet task. This could establish whether perceived control over positive 322

and negative life events may have a causal impact on awareness of conscious intention to act. 323

Manipulating AS score could also be used to investigate a causal relationship between AS and IS. 324

Further investigation is required to uncover latent variables which may modulate the relationships in 325

question. These findings would be strengthened by using EEG to investigate potential neural 326


Tegan Penton 9

correlates, specifically the LRP. 327

Implications of this research are potentially wide ranging; specifically this research informs literature 328

relating to agency, action ownership and attributional style. Additionally, this research takes a step 329

toward understanding individual differences in awareness of intention to act. More generally, this 330

research suggests that perceived control and volition are related. 331

In conclusion, it is clear that a relationship exists between performance on the Libet task and 332

performance on the ASQ. It is possible therefore, that some of the variance in the Libet task results 333

from individual differences in top-down traits such as personality variants. The current research 334

highlights potential confounds in the W-judgement related to fluctuations in AS. Furthermore, this 335

research demonstrates that, those with a more negative AS may have a larger latency between W-336

judgement and action onset. It is proposed that this relationship may result from a discrepancy 337

between conscious awareness of the intention to move, and the consequence of this (action onset) 338

suggesting, for the first time, potential negative implications of a longer veto period. 339

4. Figure Legends 340

341 Figure 1. Prediction of Mean W-judgement scores from Attributional Style scores (AS Score), with 342 linear regression (R

2=0.32, p = .015). 343

344 Figure 2. The relationship between Attributional Style score (AS Score) and Heartbeat Accuracy 345

score (%; HB Accuracy), r = -.43, p = .034. 346 347

5. Acknowledgement 348

We would like to thank Dr. Julie Davies for her contribution to the statistics used. 349

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