Independent invention in anthropological context

Independent Invention in Anthropological Context

Stephen Chrisomalis

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Stephen Chrisomalis

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Cite as: Chrisomalis, Stephen. 1996. Independent invention in anthropological context.

Unpublished manuscript.

Abstract: The phenomenon of simultaneous, independent inventions has long been known in the

scientific, technical and sociological literature. However, analysis of this phenomenon has

largely been restricted to recent historical contexts within the framework of competing

professional scientists and inventors. I argue that the equally well-known phenomenon of

multiple inventions among prehistoric and early historic societies (usually not simultaneous) can

be fruitfully understood and analyzed as a precursor of the modern phenomenon. As such, I reject

the nonchalant use of the terms “culture” and “idea” as used to describe the social milieu resulting

in modern invention, as this usage obscures the fact that multiple invention occurs without, as

well as within, single cultural or societal entities. Using the three criteria of similarity,

simultaneity and independence, it becomes clear that there is no useful way to distinguish

between invention, multiple or not, in scientific and non-scientific circles. I use the single issue

of multiple inventions as a starting point for a critical analysis of views of invention and their

ramifications for modern debates on materialism versus idealism and “great man” versus “great

event” theories.


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It is generally well-known that a number of technological innovations and scientific

discoveries have been made independently and nearly simultaneously by several researchers.

Many of the most important discoveries of the industrial age are of multiple origin: biological

evolution (Darwin/Wallace), calculus (Newton/Leibniz), the telephone (Bell/Gray) and others.

The concept of independent invention has many ramifications for the debate between proponents

of what has been called the “Great Man” theory and a fuzzy set of scholars known as

“technological determinists”. If this principle holds true, then, despite human free will, our

actions and their consequences may be seriously constrained by historical precedent and our

social environment. Might we even be able to say that our actions are thereby determined, if in

fact their outcomes are predictable?

As a sociological concept, independent invention was studied extensively from the 1920s

through to the mid-1960s. Unfortunately, it has received little consideration during the past thirty

years. There is currently no general theoretical construct within which to place independent

invention. More notably, independent invention has been studied intensively in specific instances

by archaeologists and anthropologists over much longer time scales. However, there has been no

systematic comparison of the sociological and anthropological “forms” of independent invention

to determine if, in fact, they are one and the same.

By examining independent invention from outside the realm of the history of science, and,

more importantly, using a “longue durée” approach which is able to assess diachronic trends, I

will argue that there is no basis in fact for the current unstated theoretical distinction between


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independent invention in Western scientific contexts and historical (and pre-historical)

independent invention of the sort discussed in disciplines such as archaeology. While the latter

instances are usually not simultaneous, nor do they exhibit the close similarity of extremely

complex scientific discoveries, their independence is much easier to show. Furthermore, the

existence of similar ideas outside a single cultural sphere suggests that such multiples in fact have

their basis either in a) the inevitability of particular trajectories or sequences of inventions; b)

innate trends in human minds to solve problems in specific ways; or c) similar responses to

similar material and historical conditions.

The task at hand becomes extremely daunting when we consider that we are not always

clear what we mean by the term “invention”. Has a specific invention emerged when the first

inventor cries “Eureka”? If so, then da Vinci is the inventor of the helicopter in the fifteenth

century, but, for reasons of practicality, that honour is normally granted to Sikorsky. The practice

of attributing inventive priority to such unclear and often unworkable models, called by Merton

“adumbrationism”, would certainly increase the number of independent (though not

simultaneous) inventions significantly, if widely accepted (Merton 1973: 369). When the concept

is first disseminated, or a workable item first produced? What do we make, then, of Leibniz’s

calculus, five years later than Newton’s but seen by many as a superior version? To account for a

better invention, we might allow that an invention has truly taken place when its influence is

widely felt throughout society. However, we might then be giving points to the inventor for

success after the fact, and, although a better model may be more likely to succeed, success does

not automatically imply technical superiority. The question of multiples throughout history


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makes the issue of invention even more complex. Were pyramids not “invented” in Mesoamerica

simply because they had been previously invented thousands of kilometres away?

Such arguments soon become ludicrous. There is no one definition of invention that will

satisfy all conditions for all inventions through time. In fact, I imagine that in popular usage,

different criteria are applied for different inventions, and, when we factor in issues of national

pride and prior scientific reputation, the situation seems grim indeed. The definition of invention

is clearly not a simple one. It may be that inventions must be classified polythetically, rather than

monothetically, which will make the task of identifying independent inventions more difficult but

no less important. The only clear concept which emerges from all inventions seems to be

“newness”, in the sense that something comes into existence, in thought or reality, which had not

previously existed. To go further into this issue would exceed the scope of this discussion.

The concept of independent invention is likewise far more vague than it might first

appear. As I will use the term, it encompasses three distinct conditions. Firstly, the similarity of

the inventions in question must be established; if not identical, there must be a sufficient number

of points of identity to warrant such a claim. Kuhn notes that while the concept of the

conservation of energy was discovered independently by twelve scholars, “few of their papers

have more than fragmentary resemblances retrievable in isolated sentences and paragraphs”

(Kuhn 1957: 322). It is not necessary to insist on absolute correspondence between two or more

ideas in order to fulfil this condition. It is, however, important that caution be exercised when

evaluating inventions in this manner. Similarity of function may not be an adequate solution, as

an invention such as the wheel could be used as the cornerstone of Western transportation


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systems while being relegated to use for children’s toys in the New World. We do not, therefore,

say that the wheel was invented in the Old World and something else in the New. Nor is it

sufficient for two inventions to be similar at some sort of culturally cognized level without further

similarities in technology and process. This question is obviously a complex one, and it may not

have a universal answer.

The second condition is that there must be relative simultaneity of invention. It would be

hopelessly futile to insist that inventors happen upon an idea at exactly the same instant in order

to fulfil this requirement. Some clear instances of near-simultaneity, such as the filing of patent

claims for the telephone by Bell and Gray in 1876, only a few hours apart, inspire wonder - and,

justifiably, fear - in the hearts of would-be inventors, and have generally become part of the

folklore of science. However, what is the dividing line, if any, to use in determining

simultaneity? No one contends that a one-day, one-year, or even one hundred-year lapse in the

case of the invention of agriculture destroys the usefulness of the term “independent invention”.

The key word for proper application of this criterion is “relative”, and we ought to be prepared to

allow differing degrees of latitude when inventions of great age are being considered.

The final condition, independence, is in many ways the most important one. It is nearly

impossible to prove lack of knowledge of another researcher’s work. The existence of rival

claimants to a specific concept, principle or technology has plagued many scientists, as it is part

of the culture of science to reward originators and to castigate those suspected of fraud. In such

situations, where all scholars have access to the same basic body of data, and where informal

discussion often precedes formal publication, independence becomes a much thornier issue.


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Furthermore, in the case of inventions in prehistoric and early historic time, it is the only criterion

which can be established readily. The fundamental issue regarding independence is the source of

the ideas which comprise the invention in question. Between the two extremes of outright

plagiarism and a total lack of contact, there are many shades of grey. My analysis rests in large

part on the dissection of these intermediates to explore the nature of independent invention.

The phenomenon which I will call “independent invention” has been given many names

by many different scholars: simultaneous invention, multiple invention, and so on. My choice of

terminology admittedly gives priority to the criterion of independence, which is central to any

argument using archaeological and early historical data which obscure the act of invention. By

doing so, I do not intend to reject the importance of simultaneity or similarity. I will also use the

term “multiple” as a noun to indicate specific instances of the general phenomenon of

independent invention, following Merton (1973). In general, independent invention occurs

whenever two or more very similar ideas, principles, technologies or items are developed

independently at approximately the same time. From these rather vague definitions, I hope to

outline a theory of independent invention which accounts for the available archaeological and

historical data.

As a basis for discussion, I will begin with a brief historical summary of perspectives on

independent invention as a generalized phenomenon. I will then seek to establish that the

mechanisms which lead to the fulfilment of the conditions for independent invention (similarity,

simultaneity and independence) are not restricted to the scientific paradigm or the modern time

period. Although simultaneity appears to have increased within the framework of science, I will


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argue that this is largely a statistical consequence of the accumulation of knowledge over time,

and that instances of independent invention from earlier times are equally valid. Independence,

while difficult to prove, is not difficult to explain; I argue that the coincidence of supply and

demand factors will often lead to a number of workers operating independently reaching the same

conclusions. Finally, while the similarities between different “multiple” inventions are

sometimes great, I will show that there may be a limited number of solutions to any given

problem, thus providing us a model to explain how complex ideas may originate independently in

the minds of many workers in various fields.

History of the concept of independent invention

Recognition of the occurrence of specific instances of independent invention is well-

documented beginning, at the latest, with the invention of calculus almost simultaneously by

Newton and Leibniz. Acknowledgement as a general phenomenon, however, was postponed

until 1828, when Macaulay recognized the Newton-Leibniz controversy to be part of a larger set

of instances. Thereafter, in one of the strange ironies of the history of science, independent

invention became, in Merton’s words, the “self-exemplifying hypothesis of multiples” (Merton

1973: 352). During the next hundred years, independent invention as a general occurrence was

noted no fewer than eighteen times, often fully independently (Merton 1973: 353-4).

The seminal paper of Ogburn and Thomas in 1922 brought the issue of independent

invention into a social scientific framework and attempted both to outline the evidence for

independent invention and to place the phenomenon as evidence supporting the inevitability of


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inventions which are “in the air”. Perhaps its most valuable contribution to the literature is that,

for the first time, a list of 148 multiple inventions was collected. Thus, even if many instances

were to prove false, Ogburn and Thomas’ theoretical conclusions would not necessarily be

invalidated. Interestingly, of all works on the subject, this paper is the only one which explicitly

discusses independent invention prior to the scientific revolution, mentioning, among others, the

building of pyramids and bronze-making as probable independent multiples (Ogburn and

Thomas 1975 [1922]: 62). However, given the early date of this paper, they are forced to concede

that “a statistical compilation of probable instances of multiple origins of inventions among

primitive peoples would give little evidence of the relative frequency of inventions made

independently, because of the vast number of cases about which we are ignorant” (Ogburn and

Thomas 1975 [1922]: 62-63). While it is still today probably overly optimistic to hope for

statistically significant data, we are now in a position where such a claim may be fruitfully

evaluated.

The first (and only) anthropologist to inquire into the roots of multiple invention

extensively has been Alfred Kroeber. Writing in 1948, his analysis is odd in that he states that

simultaneous inventions had not been recognized until “about the time of World War I” -

presumably, he is referring to Ogburn and Thomas’ shopping list of multiples - a failure he claims

is due to “the reluctance of our minds to see anything superpersonal in matters that involve

persons (Kroeber 1948: 341). Kroeber sees independent invention as a phenomenon rooted in the

ideas and concepts contained within a culture. He argues that “once the prerequisites have been

supplied, if desirability of a contrivance continues to be felt, a whole series of individuals are

likely to work on the problem” (Kroeber 1948: 364). For Kroeber, then, simultaneous invention


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is a persuasive line of evidence leading to his notion of cultures as superorganic wholes, leading

to the rejection “great man” theories and individual agency in favour of holistic and cultural

approaches to problems. Kroeber’s interest in independent invention, coupled with his use of

broad cross-cultural comparison, would seem to be a fertile scholarly climate to expand on the

instances of cross-cultural independent invention adduced by Ogburn and Thomas in order to

produce a general theoretical model. Unfortunately, despite a great deal of research into the issue

of “stimulus diffusion”, or the spread of ideas over long distances which then indirectly inspire

other cultures’ inventions, Kroeber’s research does not spread to include this issue.

To this day, the central controversy regarding independent invention is the role of the

individual genius in producing inventions, as opposed to larger societal factors. A number of

authors whose work is central to understanding invention still mistakenly hold that independent

inventions a) do not exist, b) are no more frequent than would be predicted by chance or c) do not

fulfil the three criteria above sufficiently to warrant special sociological consideration.

Schmookler, for instance, denies the similarity of multiples, arguing, “Whatever the term ‘the’

electric telegraph may mean, the telegraphs of Henry, Morse, Cooke and Wheatstone, and

Steinheil were not the same telegraphs” and similarly denying multiple status for the steamboat,

airplane and other inventions (Schmookler 1966: 191). Cyril Stanley Smith adopts a different

perspective, denying independence in his assertion that “human communication in some form is

behind nearly all cases of seemingly independent simultaneous invention” - instead, preferring to

see invention as the product of structural beauty in the mind of the genius (Smith 1981: 384).

Finally, Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman attack the criterion of simultaneity in asking, “What is

meant by simultaneous? In at least some of the quoted cases the simultaneous inventions were far


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enough apart in time to suggest the possibility of a transfusion of the idea from one point to

another?” (Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman 1969: 172). We thus see that all three of the

fundamental criteria for independent invention have come under assault.

Judging from current theoretical perspectives on invention, the issue of independent

invention has largely been forgotten or ignored since the pioneering works of the first half of the

century. Still, even the most central question, the cause of the phenomenon, has been only poorly

answered. Most authors agree that the role of the genius is primarily as the individual who may

develop an idea or technology earliest and most fully, but the source of the inspiration for their

particular inventions has not been greatly studied. While Merton recognizes that independent

invention can occur in an inter-cultural, rather than an intra-cultural framework, he fails to pursue

the question of the similarities and differences of the two types of independent invention (Merton

1973: 369).

The term “culture” has been bandied about by various writers as the source of independent

inventions, but, as far as I am aware, no one has ever attempted to verify the mechanisms by

which independent invention can occur. The large number of scholars who accept

unquestioningly the assertion that independent invention is a result of a large supply of pre-

existing ideas within a culture which are “in the air”, waiting to be plucked from the sky and put

to their immediately evident function, indicates a lack of consideration of this question (Wiener

1993, Kroeber 1948, Kuhn 1957, 1962, Merton 1973, Hart 1959). It further suggests that despite

the willingness of scholars to accept a social basis for independent invention, few are as willing

even to consider the possibility that it may have a basis in material conditions. The lone


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exception to this general rule of which I am aware is Heilbroner (1967), who, while expressing a

belief that independent invention provides strong support for his technological determinist

position, does not explain why this is the case, nor is it his purpose to discuss independent

invention in great detail. I believe one of the reasons for the current lack of literature on

independent invention to be the lack of a new paradigm for considering its theoretical causes and

implications. While this analysis must necessarily be a preliminary one, and surely incomplete in

fact, a shift to a materialist view of invention through history may be a necessary step in enabling

a re-evaluation of the phenomenon of multiple invention.

Simultaneity and historical scales of independent invention

All of the above writers in the history of the concept of multiple invention have focused

exclusively on independent invention in modern Western scientific and technological contexts.

Whether this is truly the case has not been tested. If, alternately, independent invention has been

a relatively regular occurrence throughout prehistory and history, then we are forced to reevaluate

our theoretical conception of the cultural milieu as the sole source for inventive ideas, and to look

to cross-culturally recurring problems as a subject of inquiry. As I will show, many inventions

which are extremely complex, or which are not intuitively evident solutions to problems, have

recurred independently throughout history.

Appendix A provides a list of twenty-three inventions which I believe were

independently developed two or more times, prior to the current age of professional technological

and scientific discovery. Recognizing that continental boundaries are cultural constructs, I


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nevertheless omitted any invention which appeared twice in the same continent, as it is highly

likely that independence may have been compromised. I also omitted instances where it was

apparent that strong cultural ties existed (as between the Roman Empire and the Middle East, for

instance) for the same reason.1 In a few cases, the similarity of a pair of inventions has been

called into question; these, too, have been omitted. For reasons that will become clear below,

simultaneity was not a criterion used in the construction of this list.

It is apparent, despite the extraordinary coincidence of very similar inventions arising

independently, often thousands of kilometres apart and under extremely divergent environmental

conditions, that simultaneity is not a characteristic of most early instances of independent

invention. Although three of the independent inventions (gimbals, padlocks and the water mill)

occurred within a century of one another, all of these were simultaneously developed in the

Mediterranean and in China, which perhaps indicates that independence is not as securely

established as the current literature indicates. Even if these turn out to be independent,

simultaneity measured on the scale of decades and centuries must be at least quantitatively

distinct from that of weeks or months, as is often the case with modern science.

I can see only two possibilities for the evident lack of simultaneity in early inventions: a)

the phenomenon of independent invention in earlier times is processually distinct from that of

Western science, thus refuting my argument; or b) simultaneity may be increasing through time.

In particular, I am intrigued by the possibility that if the rate of innovation in general is

1 A partial exception to this criterion may be the inventions which spread from China to the West, or vice versa. To

compensate for the economic ties which may have led to the diffusion of ideas, I have included Chinese-Western


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increasing, then an increase in simultaneity of independent inventions may simply be a statistical

consequence of larger historical trends in innovation. It is to this latter argument that I will now

turn, in order to support the plausibility of my argument. I have calculated, for nineteen of the

twenty-three instances where absolute dates are available, the “lag time” of the inventions of

Appendix A, which is the time elapsed between instances of independent invention in each case.2

However, looking at the resulting figures, there is no obvious correlation between the absolute

chronology of either initial or secondary invention and the time between multiples. In fact,

several of the longest lag times are found to exist for inventions whose recurrence was not until

modern times (blood circulation, seismographs). On the surface, then, the factual evidence for an

increase in simultaneity over time seems to be lacking. At the very least, more evidence would be

required to support such an assertion.

Despite this lack of evidence, a number of authors have asserted that historical trends of

increasing rapidity of invention are evident using several independent indices of inventive speed.

One of the earliest such analyses is that of Lilley (1948). Arguing in a Marxist and materialist

vein, Lilley argues that by calculating “the number of different fundamental tools and machines at

mankind’s disposal and their importance”, we are thereby able to calculate the overall

technological potential of humanity at any given time (Lilley 1948: 182-3). The curve obtained

thereby, not surprisingly, tends to increase both in the number of available technologies and,

although more sporadically, in the rate of development of new technologies over time. While

independent invention only when evidence to the contrary had been considered and dismissed. 2 Where necessary, I have used the mean for inventions dated in terms of time ranges or centuries as a rough

approximation of the actual time of invention (recognizing that time of invention cannot always be established at a

single point in time even in modern industrial societies).


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modern sensibilities would argue with Lilley’s use of the term “progress”, as well as his overly

optimistic statements regarding the value of technology for human development, his point is well

taken. I would also question Lilley’s motives in producing a scorecard for human technological

development as a whole, obscuring trajectories of technological growth within specific societies

and tending to reinforce an ethnocentric view of technology with the West at the top of the scale.

But, for our purpose here, which is to discern cross-cultural trends of invention, Lilley’s model

serves admirably well. As a species, we now have more technologies at our disposal than ever

before, and we are making new discoveries faster than ever. Why is this the case?

George Basalla offers one possible solution to this question in suggesting that it is the

nature of Western science which has led to the process of invention rising to the consciousness of

modern scientists and inventors, thus accelerating the pace of innovation. Using the work of

Alexander and others, Basalla proposes that there are two basic models for the social context of

innovation. The first of these is found in “primitive societies” and is an unselfconscious process,

in which, as I understand his argument, innovation operates on a trial-and-error basis and its

results are not recorded, and thus innovation fails to accumulate significantly (Basalla 1988:

108). This is in direct contrast with the form of innovation found in modern societies, where

innovation is a conscious process of seeking solutions and thus becomes a normal feature of the

work of technical specialists, rather than an unusual chance event (Basalla 1988: 108). Thus, the

development of conscious invention and research as social phenomena will lead inexorably to a

sharp increase in the rate of invention.


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However, I do not find Basalla’s arguments particularly convincing. Firstly, as a historian

with a broad familiarity with the anthropological and archaeological literature, Basalla must

surely be aware that there is no social, political or intellectual “chasm” separating “primitive” and

“modern” societies as the only two stages of human existence. Furthermore, the evidence for

early invention as wholly unselfconscious and modern invention as wholly selfconscious seems

overblown and supported by very meagre evidence. While the creation of such a divide may be

reassuring to scientists who wish to inflate their position in history, I suspect that, were an

analysis to be undertaken of the processes by which scientists reach their conclusions, one would

find a disturbing amount of unselfconscious thought going into any programme of research.

I am somewhat more heartened by the work of Hornell Hart, whose relatively early work

into statistical trends in social and technological change, while perhaps overly simplistic,

illustrate the ways in which broad mathematical concepts may be usefully employed in analysing

complex social phenomena such as multiple invention. Like Lilley, Hart’s work may be overly

progressive in its outlook, which forecasts a continuing rapid increase in life expectancy and

scientific innovation, and furthermore measures human accomplishment, thus obscuring the

development of any one society (Hart 1959: 214-215). And, like Basalla, he may be exaggerating

the “rock-ribbed conservatism” of small-scale societies with regards to new inventions (Hart

1959: 212). Hart’s argument is also unusual in that, despite accepting the existence of

independent invention, he seeks to downplay its importance by denying its frequency, in

particular, because he believes that the notion that multiples imply that certain inventions will

inevitability occur “might give rise to the feeling that inventors are unimportant, and that no

social policy need be developed to encourage innovation” (Hart 1959: 228). As I will describe


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below, not only does independent invention not imply the inevitability of any particular invention,

the mechanisms causing independent invention are inherently related to the ability to supply

resources for inventors.

Despite these flaws, Hart uses a wide variety of data to support his argument that not only

has there been an increase in efficiency in technological innovation over time, but that there has

been in an increase in the rate of change over time. He argues that the primary sources of this

increase are a) the accumulation of cultural and technological elements producing new inventive

combinations; b) the increase in power of the available cultural units; c) an acceleration in the

diffusion and communication of ideas; d) the invention of better methods of invention; and e)

continuing motivation (or demand) for new innovation (Hart 1959: 210-213). As such, while

acknowledging that reality is going to be far more complex in its details, and that mathematical

curves can produce only broad approximations of the vagaries of history, Hart presents a model in

which logarithmic trends, particularly but not only in fields related to technological innovation,

are clearly visible.

Hart’s findings are supported by D.A. Spratt, who, apparently unaware of Hart’s work,

observes that “the processes [of innovation] preceded much more slowly in early societies than in

modern ones, even though incentives were great.” (Spratt 1989: 255). Spratt, as an archaeologist,

is much better equipped than Hart to explore the implications of long-term diachronic processes,

and has the further advantage of three decades of added historical and archaeological knowledge

since Hart’s pioneering work. In particular, Spratt is interested in the delay between the first

invention of a new technology and its widespread acceptance within a society. Taking eleven


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new technologies developed in Europe and the Middle East from 9000 BC to the present, Spratt

has discovered that new inventions are being accepted more and more rapidly into overall societal

milieux (Spratt 1989: 256). While this is surely a small sample, the evidence for acceleration of

technological and innovative processes is now beginning to mount.

I currently view increasing simultaneity of independent invention as a testable hypothesis

suggested by the intriguing work of the above authors, but far from proven. The accumulation of

technologies over time seems, at present, to be the most likely cause for a general increase in

several factors relating to rates of innovation, including rate of overall innovation and lag time

between invention and widespread adoption. If this is the case, then increasing simultaneity of

multiples over time would be a likely (but not a necessary) statistical consequence of

technological accumulation, and as such would explain the fact that modern multiples occur

within a much shorter time frame than do earlier multiples. Of course, more data, particularly the

ratio of multiples to non-multiples at any given time, would be required to prove this assertion,

and the fact that much data may be lost may render my hypothesis untestable. The second

possibility, which I have not considered to any great extent, but which may be just as likely as the

argument from the accumulation of cultural and technological traits, is that particular instances of

independent invention occur within one society will more often share common causal factors at

the same time than instances of multiples between separate societies.

If I am incorrect in my assertion regarding simultaneity, the evident alternative is to

reduce or eliminate its importance by allowing, as mentioned above, that the question of

simultaneity in any particular instance may depend on the chronological context of the invention.


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This appears to be the position advocated by Merton, who asserts, “Even discoveries far removed

from one another in calendrical time may be instructively construed as ‘simultaneous’ or nearly

so in social and cultural time, depending upon the accumulated state of knowledge in the several

cultures and the structures of the several societies in which they appear” (Merton 1973: 369).

However, I remain unconvinced by this assertion, which basically enables the researcher to claim

simultaneity for any multiple at all. A more precise framework, rather than more exceptions to

the rule, is our current theoretical need.

Invention as the mother of necessity as the mother of invention

What is the source, or proximate cause, of invention as a general concept (as opposed to

the cause of an invention, which may be much more historically situated)? Three models come

immediately to mind - supply, demand, and accident.3 A supply theory of invention views

invention as inevitable given certain preconditions, such as earlier inventions or adequate raw

materials. This model is not incompatible with the assertion that an invention, once it presents

itself, creates its own demand if it is a successful one. Proponents of this theory often argue that

ideas are “in the air”, and thus inevitably emerge from a given cultural climate. In opposition to

this school, proponents of a demand-based theory argue that inventions only emerge given a

particular set of social circumstances wherein the particular invention would be useful. Ideas may

indeed be “in the air”, but until a specific problem exists for which the invention in question is a

full or partial solution, it will not be implemented. This model presumes that every invention has

a function, and also that societal or disciplinary problems are adequately perceived by inventors.


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A third possibility is that inventions emerge without regard to the supply of prior ideas or

inventions, and do not necessarily come at a time and place where they are most needed. Instead,

some other force, be it random mutation, innate human creativity, or blind luck, leads to most

inventions. At least in principle, invention solely based on accident would rarely if ever produce

multiples.

From this preliminary sketch, it appears that each model imperfectly describes the

inventive process as it occurs in reality; however, no other general categories of model are

immediately evident. Thus, I will argue, we should seek a multi-causal model for invention in

general, and multiple invention in particular. A combination of supply and demand factors are

always at work producing invention, and while accident sometimes provides opportunities, it

cannot be the only source of inventive ideas. This model has important consequences for our

understanding the reasons why the criterion of independence of invention is so often fulfilled.

It would, of course, be foolish to ignore the need for some sort of supply of ideas in order

to produce an invention, even if only a certain degree of knowledge of the necessary concepts.

This does not imply that such an invention is workable in any meaningful way. For instance, we

understand the principles behind cold fusion and faster-than-light space travel; we can also

envision possible ways in which such an invention might occur and can (and do) devote

significant resources to these problems. However, this does not imply that anyone has invented

either of these, nor does it imply that either of these is necessarily possible. However, without

advanced atomic theory and relativistic physics, respectively, these are not even conceivable as

3 A scheme quite similar to this one is that offered in rough outline by Schmookler (1966: 12).


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research problems.4 This point is made admirably by Qian, who, while failing to provide

adequate evidence for the specific situation to which he is referring, rightly notes that “positive

scientific results acquired by scientific pathbreakers usually grow in a step-by-step manner” in

which each antecedent idea enables the subsequent discovery of further principles and

technologies (Qian 1985: 380).

Still, few scholars today would advocate a position which bases invention solely on

factors of supply. The most obvious reason for this is that some inventions, despite the adequate

supply of antecedent ideas, historically did not emerge immediately but were delayed, sometimes

for millennia, for whatever reason. Most notable among these are the large number of artistic and

philosophical ideas of classical Greece and Rome which were largely forgotten until the

Renaissance. However, I think that we would also have to include a large number of purely

technological innovations such as the steam engine and the automobile in any list of inventions

which did not emerge ex nihilo from a given cultural milieu but in which other factors, such as

demand, played an important role.

A greater number of writers advocate theories based primarily or entirely on factors of

demand, both in prehistoric and modern frameworks. James Brown, in discussing the origins of

pottery, acknowledges that a long period of experimentation with fired clay will often precede the

use of pottery, which he sees as “an innovation in a container-starved environment in which

water-tight, fire-resistant vessels are in greater demand than existing sources of supply can

deliver” (Brown 1989: 221). In constructing a fundamentally economic model of innovation,

4 They may, however, still be feasible as science fiction!


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21

Brown does not entirely ignore the role of supply; for instance, a supply of adequate clay is

necessary. He clearly does not see pottery as an inevitable invention within any given culture,

but, given the long delays between knowledge of and adoption of pottery in various regions,

Brown is arguing that it is only when needs such as prolonged boiling of cereal grains emerge that

pottery will be accepted (Brown 1989: 205). As such, Brown acknowledges the mutuality of

supply and demand, and produces an argument which is sufficiently subtle to account for the

complex histories of pottery in many areas.

Again, it is possible to see modern technological and scientific parallels with prehistoric

innovations such as outlined by Brown. Basalla, in particular, relates the development in human

land speed records to increasing demand for inter-regional transportation, noting that “[h]uman

needs are constantly changing, and the speeds of land travel appropriate to one time and culture

are not necessarily appropriate to another” (Basalla 1988: 212). Still, Basalla does not see this

model as a complete solution, arguing instead that “there are a host of deeply felt needs in the

world at any time, needs that create potential markets, and yet only a very small number of these

recurrent demands are ever fulfilled” (Basalla 1988: 144). The situation is obviously more

complex than the continuous influence of market pull. In the same vein I see Thomas Kuhn’s

work on scientific revolutions as fundamentally representing a complex “supply + demand”

argument for modern innovation in the field of science. Kuhn is arguing essentially that a supply

of pre-existing ideas with emergent properties for a paradigm shift (supply) will come in time to

coexist with unresolved questions and scientific impetus to produce resolutions to such problems

(demand), thus requiring a rapid and often dramatic shift in theoretical perspective to enable a


Stephen Chrisomalis

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fuller accounting of the facts (Kuhn 1962). Thus, while he does not use the economic

terminology of supply and demand as I have, I feel that his model fits very well with my own.

The role of historical (and sometimes physical) accident in shaping the course of inventive

trajectories is a thorny issue, particularly in the case of multiples. If we presume that a particular

accident is a necessary condition for any particular invention, we could perhaps lump accident

with supply as a means of producing the final supply of ideas needed for an invention. This

requires, of course, that in the case of independent invention, that multiple independent accidents

occur. This is not as implausible as it might appear, particularly in longer time frames where the

sheer number of accidents must have led to some recurrence. In the case of pottery, Childe

argues, “A molded lump might easily have fallen into the fire and been baked hard. Apparently

an intelligent mammoth-hunter at Dolni Vestonice (Moravia) noted the result of such an accident

and repeated it deliberately” (Childe 1963 [1953]: 48). What is more amazing is that Dolni

Vestonice is an Upper Paleolithic site, where pottery appears to have existed millennia before its

rediscovery in Jomon period Japan and elsewhere. Childe continues: “Pottery had to be

rediscovered at the end of the Ice Age, perhaps more than once!” (Childe 1963 [1953]: 49). The

situation becomes even more complex when we realize that the most widely accepted scenario

among archaeologists for the development of copper smelting is that cuprous pigments used to

glaze and colour pottery may have left copper beads as runoff - yet a further accident. The

resulting sequence, however improbable, is as follows:

accident accident

clay pottery copper


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23

At least in principle, this sequence of accidents was repeated in several locales throughout

the last ten millennia! Of course, accidental invention is by no means restricted to prehistoric

contexts. Significant modern discoveries which appear to have an accidental component include

Roentgen’s X-rays (Kuhn 1962: 57), Fleming’s penicillin (Kroeber 1948: 353-4), and Daguerre’s

photography (Kroeber 1948: 354). If we accept the tale of Newton’s discovery of gravity being

stimulated by the falling of an apple, we would have to add this to the list. It is notable that there

is again no contradiction between invention being multiple and occasioned by an accident;

Ogburn and Thomas list Daguerre-Niepe’s and Talbot’s simultaneous discovery of photography

in 1839, while Kroeber notes that Daguerre’s discovery was accidental in that his first “exposure”

was prompted by a vial of mercury accidentally left open (Ogburn and Thomas 1975 [1922]: 74,

Kroeber 1948: 354).

My general impression regarding accidental invention is that, while its occurrence

certainly prompts wonderment, there is no theoretical reason why accident should not operate as a

fruitful stimulus, producing a “Eureka” effect (reminding us of yet another historic accident5) so

long as other preconditions have been met. We would not expect accidents out of a general range

of sequential variation; in other words, Archimedes could not have split the atom while sitting in

the bathtub. This further adds to the role which the individual genius may play in producing

inventions, by making connections between accidents and previously known concepts in order to

solve real and current problems. The role of genius as connector and recombiner of ideas, even if

one of them is entirely fortuitous, should not be underestimated.


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For the purposes of this discussion, though, what possible connection exists between the

causative factors of invention and the occurrence of independent invention frequently throughout

history? I am intrigued by the idea that supply of antecedent ideas inherently limits the paths

which future invention may take, while demand produces simultaneity within a society. If this is

the case, then the question of simultaneity between inventions in different societies becomes

much less important; simultaneity thus becomes a characteristic of a given social milieu in which

supply and demand act in combination at the same time, exerting equal pressure on many

workers. (As I have stated above, I am not fully convinced that this is the case, but offer the

possibility as a testable notion).

Independent invention, then, provides a great deal of support for the mutuality of supply

and demand in inventive processes in both long and short time scales. The existence of the

necessary supply of conditions of production, technical prerequisites and material resources

enables inventions to be made independently. At the same time, demand for whatever product or

idea is in question makes it possible, if not likely, that an invention will emerge in a given society

at a certain time. In long-term time frames, the concept of simultaneity requires us to adopt a

relatively loose chronology in order to account for the fact that supply and demand do not

coincide as frequently between societies as within them. But these are fundamentally matters of

degree, not of kind.

5 While Qian (1985: 386) questions the validity of the Chinese discovery of the principle of specific gravity on the

basis that the discovery made by Han scientists was dissimilar in fact from that of Archimedes, I remain unconvinced


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25

I am therefore in accord with Schmookler’s assertion that “chance factors aside, the joint

determinants of invention are (a) the wants which inventions satisfy, and (b) the intellectual

ingredients of which they are made” (Schmookler 1966: 11). In particular, independent invention

(which, of course, Schmookler denies) then will tend to emerge from social climates where the

supply of antecedent ideas and necessary material conditions are widely available, and where

certain problems are accurately perceived by many individuals as requiring a solution.6 I am

quite certain that individuals who are able to adequately perceive the problems faced by a society

or discipline are few, and that those who are also technically or academically equipped to solve

the problem reduces the number of potential inventors to a very small number. It is from this

small pool of “geniuses” that multiples are likely to originate. Far from seeing independent

invention as a denigration of the ability of the genius, then, I would argue that insofar as the

individual is merely responding to particular needs having been given a limited supply of

antecedents, the fact that certain individuals share priority for an idea indicates that in some

meaningful way their joint answer is a correct one. This leads to the question of how many

correct answers to a given problem there may be, and how to establish their equivalency, to which

I will now turn.

Equivalency of inventive solutions

by his assessment and prefer to see this as a further instance of multiple and accidental invention. 6 I agree to an extent with Basalla that supply and demand factors are “combined with a large measure of ideology,

militarism, fad, and current conceptions of the good life” (Basalla 1988: 190); however, I feel that these factors are

much more likely to be important in short-term time scales, and that in the long run, ideological factors will cancel

each other out.


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26

To begin, let us take an important if relatively simple technological invention, such as the

screwdriver. In reality, this invention consists of a number of related and easily distinguishable

sub-types: Phillips (star-head), Robertson (square-

head) and slotted-head, shown above, and others

which will not be considered. This is not to say

that these are the only types of screwdriver which

could possibly be invented, but only that a certain

problem (how to apply the necessary torque to make screws efficient tools) has a number of

solutions. The question I am interested in is, “Why were Phillips screwdrivers invented?” The

banal and tautological answer to this question is “To fit Phillips screw heads.” Of course, this

trite response tells us nothing about the nature of the invention process; obviously, the

screwdriver and screw head had to be developed simultaneously in order to be of any use.

Let us now consider a scenario in which three societies, P, R and S, each develop one and

only one form of screwdriver - Phillips, Robertson and slotted, respectively - independently of the

other two. Each society, given the problem of developing a screw head to allow the application

of torque, has thus developed an independent solution which, while sharing the basic requirement

of fulfilling the need at hand, is slightly different from the other two. I am not qualified to assess

the actual merits of each variety of screwdriver as they apply in real-life problems. Let us

assume, for the sake of argument, that each screwdriver is equally good at performing its task

within its corresponding society. The more important question now arises: “Why, of all possible

screw types, did Phillips (or Robertson, or slotted) heads develop in the particular circumstances

they did?”


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Now consider what happens if the three societies are placed in interaction with one

another, at least in the sphere of technology. (The architects of each society, we shall say, are

constantly rotating between the different societies to solve different problems). Immediately, the

compatibility of the various screw heads with each other comes into question. Turning again to

the diagram, we can see that members of society P, with star-shaped heads, will be able to operate

within society R by merely rotating their screwdrivers by 45° in order to fit the square-shaped

Robertson screw heads. Similarly, members of society S can also turn their slotted screwdrivers

by 45° to fit Robertson heads, and will be able to use Phillips head screws as well, but only if the

head in question is wide enough to accept the slotted head. Alas for society R, Robertson screw

heads cannot under any circumstance fit either the Phillips or slotted screw heads. It appears,

then, that a compromise solution might be for all three to use slotted screwdrivers, as this solution

will provide the greatest amount of compatibility with screw heads in all three societies.

The essential point here is that although each society developed a unique solution to a

universal technical problem, these solutions are only equally adequate when considered within a

societal framework, and that, given a situation of interaction, compatibility becomes Lest this

scenario appear overly facile and simplistic, consider that many of today’s technological problems

(such as those relating to international development) result from actions which are directly

analogous to placing Robertson screwdrivers into Phillips societies. We should also not

underestimate the relevance of this model for understanding the ability of a society with a

particular set of material and economic conditions such as the West to adopt major technologies

such as printing and gunpowder from unrelated societies such as China, with very different social


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and political ramifications. In trying to establish the fundamental similarity of particular

inventions, I have used the above scenario to simulate, firstly, similar solutions to identical

problems arising in unrelated societies. Furthermore, I believe this to be an accurate, if simple,

model, indicating the potential effects of culture contact in “selecting for” one particular solution

which is best able to fulfil the continuing needs of all the societies in question for that particular

problem.

At this point, it may appear that I have strayed quite far afield from my overall topic of

analysing independent invention. However, a number of authors have touched on the equivalency

of inventive solutions as an important concept for understanding independent invention both

within and across cultures. I will conclude this section with a summary and analysis of these

authors. The suggestion that there may be distinct sequences or trajectories of inventions is not a

new one, dating at the very latest to Marx’s dictum, “The hand-mill gives you society with the

feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist” (Heilbroner 1967: 335). But the

implications of this assertion, in particular, that societies entirely separated from each other may

pursue different trajectories and yet arrive at a very small set of different solutions to social,

economic and technical problems, has yet to be examined in detail.

One of the earliest scholars to investigate parallel lines of technological development in

detail is Gilfillan’s “Social Implications of Technical Advance” which, while written nearly fifty

years ago, and despite supporting some rather questionable positions7, remains the best analysis

7 In particular, Gilfillan appears to accept axiomatically that different races will have different inherent biological

capacities for technical innovation, a position from which I wish to divorce myself entirely (Gilfillan 1952: 200).


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of this phenomenon. In accepting the reality and frequency of independent invention, Gilfillan

notes, “Inventions are not only duplicated, but also paralleled and usually at about the same time

by devices based on quite different principles, yet serving the same end” (Gilfillan 1952: 197).

This “principle of equivalent invention” is supported by the multiple but limited number of

solutions to a number of problems: thirty-five ways to prove the Pythagorean theorem, for

instance, or twenty-one different principles by which flight may be achieved (Gilfillan 1952:

197). As such, the limitation on the number of solutions suggests to Gilfillan that the various

functional groups should be treated as a single invention as a whole, due to the fact that their

causes and effects appear to be identical.

Gilfillan’s arguments are paralleled in part by Peter Drucker’s arguments regarding the

origins of civilizations. Drucker argues that the parallels between Old World and New World

civilizations require that “the solutions to specific conditions created by new technology have to

be specific and are therefore limited number and scope” (Drucker 1966: 148). While Drucker is

primarily concerned with the social effects of innovation in early societies, the examples of social

effect he adduces in support of his cause - impersonal bureaucracy, class structures, and organized

defense - may also be seen, I think, as inventions, albeit very complex and socially situated ones.

Drucker’s analysis suffers somewhat from a lack of accurate knowledge regarding early

civilizations, and he adopts an “irrigation empire” model based on that of Wittfogel, which is not

entirely surprising for the time. However, I do not believe that his general conclusions are altered

significantly given the new information we have available today.


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Recent analyses tend to confirm Gilfillan’s and Drucker’s theoretical models of

innovative solutions. Qian, a Chinese physicist arguing from within a more general debate on the

role of science throughout Chinese history, argues that modern field (quantum) physics could

only have evolved as an outgrowth of billiard-ball (Newtonian) physics, as opposed to the view of

Sinologists such as Joseph Needham, who see in the Chinese developmental sequence an entirely

different potential scientific trajectory (Qian 1985: 380). This debate thus addresses directly the

question of whether field physics could have been independently invented in China without the

antecedents which it had in the West. In general, Qian’s argument is based upon the

complementarity of the two types of physics, and the need to understand both in order to explain

complex phenomena such as the motion of particles (Qian 1985: 399-400). To my mind, this is a

partial refutation of Needham, whose argument is generally that billiard-ball physics is rather

unnecessary. However, this does not refute the other possibility that the sequence could have

been reversed, and field physics might be the antecedent rather than the consequent form in

another society, including China, if it had had time to develop independently. Other than Qian’s

unsupported assertion that field physics is a “natural extension and development” of the earlier

Newtonian paradigm, there is no evidence that the sequence had to be the way it was in the West.

The implications of the various “limited solutions” models described above are, I think, as

follows. There may be a multiple but limited number of different trajectories of invention in

different societies. These solutions, when interpolated into a new society, are not necessarily

compatible; rather, in identifying them as similar if not identical inventions, I would argue that

their similarity rests on the fulfilment of similar problems, and, in some cases, on the ability of

several similar inventions to occupy the same spot in developmental trajectories of invention.


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31

This definition of equivalence of inventive solution enables us to recognize certain multiples,

despite differences in form and principle, as being functionally equal solutions which lead to a

single conclusion or a single consequence.

Conclusion: idealism and materialism in the inventive process

What, then, are we to make of these findings? The position that independent invention is

merely a product of Western science, either through the sharing of complex webs of ideas or

through intense competition for invention, no longer seems tenable. I do not, therefore, accept

Kuhn’s assertion, “The very fact that a significant scientific novelty so often emerges

simultaneously from several laboratories is an index both to the strongly traditional nature of

normal science and to the completeness with which that traditional pursuit prepares the way for

its own change” (Kuhn 1962: 65). This view, it seems to me, would place many multiples at the

boundaries between scientific paradigms, giving them an importance which does not always seem

to be warranted. Rather, the existence of non-scientific multiples implies that independent

invention is not merely a product of scientific trends, but that we should see it as a regular part of

normal science and normal non-scientific invention as well. It is still possible, of course, that the

organization of inventors and researchers into academic or technical circles greatly increases the

likelihood and the frequency of occurrences of independent invention. But there is no factual

evidence for or against this view, as far as I am aware.

Instead, I accept Childe’s assertion that “modern science, as a body of knowledge based

on individual experience but transmitted and accumulated socially and verified by successful


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32

application to the attainment of socially approved ends, is the offspring of the traditional lore of

preliterate hunters, peasants and craftsmen” (Childe 1963 [1953]: 34). Childe’s view of invention

is generally a materialist and Marxist one, which sees invention as a social process which,

nevertheless, exists because of the material needs of human beings. It is also a historical and

accumulative view of human material culture, in which sequences (if not “stages”) are as

meaningful as any one point or single invention.

This is in direct contrast with the work of Dorn, who argues that scientific and

technological discoveries are the products of a given geographical environment, and that we

should not be looking for trends in history, but rather a closer correlation with the geography and

ecology of a given society and the degree of its scientific prowess (Dorn 1991). While claiming

to use Marxist analysis, Dorn’s rejection of historical trends belies serious errors in reasoning. I

reject this latter viewpoint, on the grounds that almost every region of the world has produced a

number of societies of varying degrees of technological capability. There can be no simplistic

correlation between environment and technology because, as I have described above, there are

factors of supply in which an invention cannot emerge before its antecedents, even given the

highest degree of environmental demand. I do not, for instance, see great potential for the Inuit to

have independently invented space heaters or snowmobiles. Rather, there are a relatively small

number of trajectories for technological accumulation, of which the Western trajectory of

professional science and demand-oriented industrial innovation is the product most often studied

by sociologists of science but by no means the only one needed to understand processes of

invention throughout history.


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33

Nevertheless, I would characterise my analysis as a “materialist” one, if only to contrast it

with certain “idealist” analyses. Let me make my position clear. I agree with Qian, who, in

stating that “software decides”, asserts that the reason for China’s failure to develop modern

science and technology is the dominant ideology of non-questioning “software”, rather than the

actual technologies themselves “hardware” (Qian 1985: 392-93). But Qian also makes it clear that

there are particular developmental sequences for both science and technology which are

fundamentally unalterable, and which were not developed by the Chinese despite certain early

technological innovations. What is the source of these sequences? I have presented a model

which envisions the supply of pre-existing technologies and environmental and social demands as

the primary source of developmental technological trends. While certain thinkers such as da

Vinci may be ahead of their time in foreshadowing later technologies, it is the emergent

properties of invention itself which produce seemingly odd instances of multiple invention.

What I reject outright is the usefulness of studies of independent invention who conclude

that inventions are “in the air” within a culture, and, as part of a pool of potential knowledge

specific to that culture, tend to emerge simultaneously in the minds of many inventors. While

most authors now believe that independent invention is proof that invention is a social

phenomenon, they have not taken the next step to see it as a consequence of varying historical

trajectories of technological development. The idealist position is expressed poetically but

mistakenly by Wiener, who uses a viral metaphor for inventive ideas, asserting that “intellectual

ferments, like biological ones, are infectious” and that at the time of invention, “the virus of the

new idea is there, and sooner or later it will break out not merely in one focus but in many places”

(Wiener 1993: 130-1). Wiener thus gives causal priority to the idea itself, without adequately


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34

explaining the social and material antecedents of ideas. Without this basis, we cannot understand

how virtually identical “viruses” emerge, without diffusion, in radically different cultures and

locales.

A metaphor which I feel may be more useful in understanding independent invention is

foreshadowed by Kroeber, who, in arguing for the relevance of “stimulus diffusion”, or the spread

of a concept or idea without a concomitant diffusion of the actual invention, argues,

“Analogically, ordinary diffusion is like adoption, stimulus diffusion like procreation, with the

influencing culture in the role of the father” (Kroeber 1952 [1940]: 357). To extend the organic

analogy somewhat, independent invention’s obvious counterpart is that of identical twins. While

not every birth produces twins, we are able to incorporate the occurrence into our understanding

of the procreative (inventive) process. We do not claim twins to be the result of random forces

producing the same genetic code, or deny their existence entirely on the basis that twins are not

perfectly identical. Similarly, we ought not to ignore the role of the “genetic code” of invention,

which, from time to time, brings forth multiples, nor should we ignore strong similarities which,

while differing slightly, deserve a place in our theoretical framework of invention.

The phenomenon of independent invention remains poorly understood, despite its vital

importance for understanding contentious issues of scientific independence and for discerning

long-term trends in technological development throughout history. While I am certain that my

analysis has raised more questions than it has answered, the time has come for new perspectives

and new directions on the issue, in order to understand independent invention as a product of a

given set of material and historical circumstances interacting in a social environment. The notion


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35

that independent invention is not merely the product of a single Western scientific culture, but

rather is a recurrent part of historical sequences throughout the world, has been foreshadowed by

many authors but has not found its way into anthropological analyses where the necessary data

exist to examine the complex nature of the phenomenon. As such, I believe that further study

will establish that independent invention is crucial, not only in its own right, but also as evidence

for larger trends in the history of humanity.


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Appendix A: Pre-Industrial Independent Inventions

Invention Instance 1 Instance 2 Lag Source

paper Egypt (3000 BC) Teotihuacan (500 AD) 3500 James & Thorpe 1994: 477-

78 sweat baths Europe (2nd mill. BC) Postclassic Maya (600

AD)

2100 James & Thorpe 1994: 450-

53 blood circulation China (200 BC - 200 AD)

W. Europe (17th c.) 1650 James & Thorpe 1994: 9

seismograph China (2nd c. AD) France (1703) 1553 James & Thorpe 1994: 144

dentures Etruscans (700 BC) Maya (600 AD) 1300 James & Thorpe 1994: 33-34

distilling Central Asia (200 AD) Aztec (14th c. AD) 1150 James & Thorpe 1994: 337

odometer Rome (100 BC) China (1027 AD) 1127 James & Thorpe 1994: 73-74

pi China (5th c. AD) W. Europe (16th c. AD) 1100 Yabuuti 1963: 110

bronze working

bronze

Mesopotamia (3000 BC) Thailand (2000 BC) 1000

MacNeil 1990: 62-64

magnetic compass Olmec (1000 BC) China (0 AD) 1000 James & Thorpe 1994: 96-98

paddleboat China (5th - 6th c. AD) England (1500 AD) 900 James & Thorpe 1994: 87

crank China (Han dynasty) W. Europe (9th c. AD) 850 White 1962: 490-1

mechanical clock China (725 AD) W. Europe (14th c. AD) 625 MacNeil 1990: 695

windmill China (4th - 10th c. AD) W. Europe (12th c. AD) 500 Lilley 1948: 39

lock with tumblers China (~1000 BC) Assyria (720 BC) 280 James & Thorpe 1994: 471-

72 wheelbarrow Greece (3rd c. BC) China (1st c. BC) 200 Lewis 1994: 465

padlock Rome (0 AD) China (0-200 AD) 100 James & Thorpe 1994: 472-

73 water mill Turkey (~50 BC) China (AD 31) 81 Gille 1963: 193

gimbals Rome (2nd c. BC) China (100 BC) 50 James & Thorpe 1994: 118

fire piston Southeast Asia W. Europe (1827) ? Singer et al 1959: 226-28

running noose Egypt (pre-dynastic) Mesoamerica ? Singer et al 1959: 166

tranchet adzes Egypt/Palestine Solomon Islands ? Childe 1963: 57

use of ants as sutures Hindu (~1000 BC) Guyana (??? 20th c.) ? James & Thorpe 1994: 16-17


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