Impact, or The Business of the University

p t, r Th B n f th n v r t

David F. Bell

SubStance, Volume 42, Number 1, 2013 (Issue 130), pp. 28-39 (Article)

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Impact, orThe Business of the UniversityDavid F. Bell

The Research Excellence Framework (REF, available online at http://www.ref.ac.uk/pubs/2011-02/), which guides the annual evaluation and assessment of British universities and their teaching personnel, has a well-described history that need not be rehearsed in detail here.1 Suffice it to say that the Thatcher government undertook to professionalize the university in a way that had not been obvious prior to Thatcher’s term as prime minister, purportedly to bring educational practices into line with the demand to train students in higher education institutions in a man-ner appropriate for a modern economy. In the sweep of this “reform,” university teaching personnel were to be transformed into producers of results, both as pedagogues and as researchers, in ways that were to be measured by contemporary management practices and frameworks. Whatever other effects this transformation might have had, one thing is certain: it brought into the stark light of day the uncomfortable relation-ship between the university and the modern Western market society in which it exists. If the debate about impact and how to measure it quickly became a cause célèbre for academics worldwide, it was clearly because relations between the university and the society at large were anything but comfortable in the second half of the twentieth century and in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The impact measurement culture that exists within the university system in the United States—and I will argue that there is indeed such a culture—has not had a crystallizing moment of the sort provoked by the Thatcher initiative and its eventual codification in the form of the new-est version of the REF. It has been developing in a more insidious and decentralized fashion, quite typical of the distributed federalism that is a characteristic governance mode of the United States. The recent fiasco that played out in June 2012 at the University of Virginia brought the market forces pressuring American universities into unusually clear focus, how-ever. The board of visitors of the university (the equivalent of a board of trustees in many American universities) forced the university president, Dr. Teresa Sullivan, chosen by the same board a mere two years earlier, to resign, only to reverse the decision and to reinstate her two weeks later

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29Impact, or the Business of the University

(see Pérez-Peña for a more detailed presentation of the sequence of events in question). The commentary generated by this incident was extremely symptomatic of the state of affairs in the contemporary American univer-sity. Characteristically, it prompted statements expressing the nostalgic yearning for an ideal American university that has never actually existed:

In the 19th century, robber barons started their own private universities when they were not satisfied with those already available. But Leland Stanford never assumed his university should be run like his railroad empire. Andrew Carnegie did not design his institute in Pittsburgh to resemble his steel company. The University of Chicago, John D. Rockefeller’s dream come true, assumed neither his stern Baptist val-ues nor his monopolistic strategies. That’s because for all their faults, Stanford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller knew what they didn’t know. (Vaidhyanathan)

It is extremely doubtful that this cursory overview would stand up to analysis, since at minimum, turning social and political attention away from monopolistic business practices by founding supposedly disinter-ested “higher culture” institutions (universities) could easily be viewed as just another obfuscating strategy on the part of the founders of American big capital. What is obvious in the remark is an ongoing desire to situate the American university in a space beyond the market.

As the Sullivan affair made abundantly clear, however, the present governance of American universities is intimately bound up with market forces. The University of Virginia board of visitors rector, Helen Dragas, and other board members (although not all) were appointed by the Vir-ginia state governor as a result of their business world and political world experience and acumen, and collectively they had little connection to the day-to-day governance and educational mission of the university (their deep commitment to the success of the university as alumni and long-time university supporters is not in question here). Dragas and her close collaborators became particularly alarmed when they contemplated the fast-paced development of online course offerings backed increasingly by major American universities: “In many of the e-mails, which were obtained by The Cavalier Daily, the rector and vice rector of the Board of Visitors—Helen E. Dragas and Mark J. Kington, respectively—com-mented on articles about online education and the open-course ventures in which top research universities like Harvard, Stanford, and others, are engaged” (Hebel). This is an extremely telling email exchange, because it refers directly to the veritable explosion of initiatives to gain a foothold in the market for online courses, which I would characterize as one of the principal present frontier spaces for debates about the public impact of American research universities. I will return to the issue of online courses in more detail in a moment, but for now suffice it to say that in pressing

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for the University of Virginia to move into this market, Dragas and her allies deployed an array of management terminology and conceptualiza-tions that are extremely easy to caricature (see Keep and Vaidhyanathan). The fundamental debate quickly centered on the applicability of business models to the running of the university. In fact, the faculty governance structure of many American universities, based on a discussion and consensus model rather foreign to the business world, was culturally entrenched enough to become a major stumbling block to the presiden-tial replacement coup attempted by Dragas and her allies. The faculty and eventually the upper-level campus administrators of the university united in a backlash that quickly forced Dragas and her allies to retreat and reinstate Sullivan. One should not idealize such university faculty governance structures, of course, because they can easily be manipulated by a strong and savvy university president or provost, as the recent conflict about Yale’s plans to open a liberal arts campus in Singapore has amply demonstrated (see Corey Robin, whose blog post does an excellent job at summarizing this chain of events at Yale). In the Virginia case, let us say that the board of visitors was anything but savvy.

My purpose in citing the University of Virginia events is to fore-ground a recent clear example of the longstanding uneasy relations between the university and the market society that is its social and political context. Even without the vociferous public debate prompted by heavy-handed intervention into the academic governance of the University of Virginia by board members largely informed by business world practices, these relations have never been far from the attention of university teaching and administrative personnel. One cannot overlook the proliferation and market weight of private ratings systems undertaken in American periodicals and in numerous guides purporting to furnish objective rankings to help prospective university students decide where to invest their tuition money for their undergraduate or graduate degree studies (Peterson’s guides to undergraduate and graduate education are good examples: http://www.petersons.com). And, of course, in this same vein, one inevitably encounters the US News and World Report’s annual “Best Colleges” issue, which has become a veritable fetish for American university administrators. Provosts and presidents of universities assign their wisest statisticians to analyze the methodology used by US News in order to game the system to the best of their capacity by shifting resources in their annual reports toward categories that carry the most weight in the US News ratings system. The methodology is supposedly secret, but this hardly prevents intelligent analysts from engaging in reverse engi-neering and identifying what counts most, nor does it prevent university administrators at different institutions from talking among themselves

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and sharing information.2 In short, the ritual of responding to a college or university’s ranking as reflected in the “Best Colleges” issue has become a yearly event. Everyone in college and university administrations knows that the rankings, putatively “objective,” contain a large part of arbitrary and subjective judgment, precisely because data points like the size of a faculty and the amount of money spent on instructional or enrichment activities are only grossly approximating barometers of the quality of the educational experience a university offers to its students. But they cannot ignore the exercise precisely because of its impact on the market of prospective applicants and its decided impact on the wider public prestige of the university.

Even doctoral programs, notoriously difficult to evaluate on the grounds of their productive results (after all, basic research does not “translate”—the new university mantra—into practical social or cultural results in any direct manner), have not escaped attempts at assigning rankings measuring their results against other US doctoral programs. The National Academy’s Research Doctorate Programs in the United States: Con-tinuity and Change (1995) (http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/Resdoc/index.htm), which followed an earlier study in 1982 to present data on the success of individual doctoral programs (and, of course, their failings), was widely criticized for its methodology. It supposedly encouraged an “aura effect”: if a PhD granting program happened to be located in a prestigious Ivy League or University of California system university, for example, it gained a rankings edge even if by itself it might not have been at the level of other PhD programs for which these prestigious universi-ties were known. The criticism of the analytical methodology and the data gathering undertaken for the 1995 study led the National Academy to a sustained reflection on the methodology that would undergird their next programmed study of doctoral programs, A Data-Based Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States (2009), for which data gathering began in earnest in 2005. Almost every Council of Graduate Schools annual meeting between 2004 and 2009, when the study finally appeared, had multiple sessions devoted to rather heated debates about the new methodology formulated and proposed by the National Acad-emy (with input from top graduate school administrators), as the most powerful universities lined up to try to influence the new study’s results in directions that would favor their institutions.3 The fact that the tone of these sessions was a good deal less polite and genteel than any CGS meeting sessions in recent memory was a testimony to the public impact graduate school administrators anticipated upon the publication of this study. The inflection of the 2009 study’s title, moreover, is a rather eloquent commentary on the culture of output assessment that had intervened be-

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tween 1995 and 2009: instead of a grand overview of the state of doctoral education in the United States, which was the broad perspective of the 1995 publication, the new study had morphed into an assessment exercise, ostensibly data driven, designed in part to give pertinent information to prospective graduate students to facilitate their choice of the best program to fit their interests (the culture of the Peterson’s guides had permeated the National Academy!). And since the National Academy had seen the study become a minefield of methodological contestation, in which university administrators were jockeying to get the best results, the publication was accompanied by a defense and illustration of the analytical approach employed: A Guide to the Methodology of the National Research Council As-sessment of Doctorate Programs, released as a pre-publication document to accompany the anticipated inevitable endless interpretation of the results by the press and the public.

A major federal legislative initiative in the field of education had intervened between 1995 and 2009, the effect of which should not be underestimated, and one can certainly speculate that it had an important influence on the perspective adopted by the National Academy in its analysis of PhD graduate programs in the United States. The George W. Bush administration, with much public fanfare, had sought and obtained bipartisan support for the No Child Left Behind Act, approved by the United States Congress and signed into law by Bush in January 2002. The premise of this legislation was the following: in order to improve educa-tion in the United States, clearly-stated goals for the educational process had to be set at every level, and, important for my purposes here, success or failure at meeting these goals had to be measured and assessed (see “No Child” for a succinct summary of this legislation). Identifying learning outcomes in ways that could be measured became a veritable national ob-session—because the delivery of certain federal funds to state educational systems was closely tied to the provisions of the act—and this culture of assessment measurement quickly had a direct effect on universities. One of the six regional accrediting agencies authorized by the United States Department of Education to accredit universities by reexamining their programs every ten years, thus giving them access to certain types of federal funding, namely, the Southern Association of Schools and Col-leges (SACS), became a vanguard regional body, asking universities in the southern region of the US to state learning outcome goals in every degree program offered, and to outline the means to measure success or failure at meeting those goals. A system of periodic reports describing how the faculty had measured success in reaching the stated goals and how they had used this information to improve the structure and delivery of degree programs was strongly recommended, if not to say mandated,

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by SACS. The assessment of learning outcomes in graduate research degree programs, notoriously difficult because of the unpredictability of the translational uses of basic research, was not spared in this exercise. The research universities in the southern US were suddenly put on notice that reaccreditation would not be granted if all educational programs did not institute processes to state and measure learning outcomes. This may not have been Thatcher’s Great Britain, but it was most certainly Bush’s United States. I can personally attest to the administrative pain inflicted by the infamous SACS “Institutional Effectiveness” rubric, number 3.3.1 in the accrediting standards document, Principles of Accreditation: Founda-tion for Quality Enhancement, which serves as the model for universities in the SACS region to present their reaccreditation materials to the agency (http://sacscoc.org/pdf/2012PrinciplesOfAcreditation.pdf). The SACS reac-creditation exercise put to rest any illusions still entertained by research degree faculty that they could escape the scrutiny of federal agencies charged with evaluating how the university is actually educating its stu-dents for the contemporary economy. In an opinion piece published in the Chronicle of Higher Education shortly after he delivered it as an address at the December 2010 meeting of the Council of Graduate Schools, Carlos Alonso stated this rather eloquently:

What is the place of graduate studies in higher education’s current culture of accountability? At some level, at least, the question itself is moot, since there is no argumentative ground from which we could claim that anything is outside our current “culture of accountability.” Culture, education, and the university have become commodities and purveyors of commodities; they must answer to the logic of account-ability—and there is no space outside that logic. (Alonso)

Little did Alonso know at the time that his post-Marxist formula-tion of the university as a commodity was closer to the truth than even he believed—but for reasons he had not anticipated: literally within months of the publication of his remarks, the online course landscape in American universities was to become a deeply fascinating and rapidly-evolving environment that had everything to do with the impact and marketability of the university as an institution. Recall that the University of Virginia incidents of June 2012 were in part provoked by the fact that the rector of the university had read two or three articles about initiatives at several prestigious universities to create and offer quality online instruction (Stan-ford, in particular). Her interpretation of this trend went immediately to the heart of the matter: an extremely volatile market for online course offerings is in the process of being constituted in the United States, and the evolution is so rapid and unpredictable that between the writing of the present article and its publication, other landmark events will undoubt-

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edly have occurred. My contention is that online course offerings are a new impact frontier in the American university.

Massive Open Online Courses, or MOOCs as they are often called now, became publicly visible as a growth trend in 2011-2012 at every major university in the United States.4 It has long been the case that the most prestigious American universities are in a market to sell their “brand,” that is, to attract the most and the best applicants not only locally, but increas-ingly globally, by offering the best research and teaching environment, as measured by the many secret formulas of comparison devised by various parties who publish rankings. The impact of an American university in terms of its presence within the broader society is, among other things, a variant of brand name valorization and notoriety, the effect of which is to draw ever increasing numbers of applicants, since the size and quality of the applicant pool serves in turn to illustrate the importance of a given university within the public sphere. The massive open online course movement, barely two years old, has the potential to change the way university “brands” are perceived, disseminated, and leveraged—that is, the very form taken by their broader social and cultural impact. What if the number of applicants to a given university no longer mattered, because the university’s best and brightest faculty members have begun offering courses online to a global public of potential students whose size is growing in increments of tens of thousands?5 What if there were alternate ways to become educationally credentialed that did not require actual tuition-paying attendance at a university’s physical location?

In the immediate, the growth of MOOCs offers elite universities a convenient means to argue that what they do really has a broad outreach component of great social worth, touching people far beyond their walls. This is a perfect vehicle to demonstrate that they have a substantial impact on the world at large and that they are in fact eager to educate whomever they might encounter in the broader society. If a participant in such a course does not have to undergo a rigorous application process and pay an elevated tuition in order to have access to the best academic minds in the country and in the world, if she need only register for a MOOC of-fered by an expert, say, at Stanford, Harvard, or Duke, is this not a major contribution to the general social good? It is hard to quarrel with this perspective, at least on the surface, and there is little doubt that some of the participants in these courses will derive a tangible personal and social benefit through an experience of collaboration organized around a cutting-edge researcher and the multiple fellow participants with whom they might interact. But this raises suspicions of the sort evoked above concerning the motives behind the efforts of Leland Stanford, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller to found universities whose

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values seemed to fly in the face of their own efforts to create unbridled monopolies in the US variety of the capitalist market economy. There must be something else behind the surprisingly rapid realization on the part of elite universities that they absolutely have to get into this game. I think it is clear that a major motivation behind the rapid development of MOOCs is quite simply the following: this is a market. It is not an open and free market, however, because from the outset the most prestigious universities are going to have an enormous advantage:

When competing for free hits from the public, Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) from household-name Ivy League universities have a decided edge over Worthy Local College.It’s not just an advantage, it’s complete domination. When it comes to lesson content, MOOCs and their celebrity professors blow ordinary local universities and their professors out of the water.Open courseware has the same logic as the winner-takes-all markets in celebrity actors or top movies or music discussed by Cornell sociologist Robert Frank. A tiny handful of producers and products dominate the global market, overwhelmingly. There is only one Elvis, and only one Harvard. (Marginson)

So much for the notion that the best universities are getting into the MOOC game out of generosity alone. In fact, they will be using their names in ways that can only enhance the brand. This is a prestige market in fun-damental ways, and if a university does not establish its presence—and as quickly as possible—other universities successfully negotiating their relationship with this new domain of endeavor will become leaders, to the serious detriment of those who hesitate.

But if this is indeed a market, the natural question is the following: is there money to be made here? I think that question is impossible to answer at this point—or at the very least, it is impossible to know exactly how money could be made, even though one might suspect that it can be made somewhere. When the higher education consulting firm Ithaka released a white paper in May 2012 on interactive online learning trends developing in a sample of US colleges and universities, the following telling statement occurred prominently near the beginning of the report: “[W]e note that very few institutions are attempting to do serious cost accounting for either online or traditional education so, for now, […] [any] assumptions remain speculative” (Bowen et al., 13). The field of MOOCs is something like that of other startup moments that have occurred in the fast-paced world of services emerging from Internet and digital network-ing in all of its forms: the companies that are presently appearing almost overnight (Udacity, Coursera, 2U, for example) are very unlikely to be in existence two or three years from now. But from this chaotic mixture will emerge a few winners, and at that later stage, a more stable set of standards

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in shared digital platforms will help everyone avoid the startup problems created by going with a company and a set of platform standards that might quickly disappear, obliterating the potential to recycle previously produced materials.6

Independent of the question about which companies are appearing in this field and which ones might be successful,7 MOOCs are quickly raising some fundamental questions about the structure of existing uni-versities. The wildly successful MOOC on artificial intelligence pioneered by Sebastian Thrun and Peter Norvig at Stanford in 2011 (over 160,000 registrants by their count) immediately led to the question of how to credential the students who successfully completed it. Predictably—and logically—Stanford refused to entertain the idea of granting credit for the course in the same way the university’s other undergraduates receive credit: “Stanford blocked formal certificates and credits into its conven-tional degrees but Thrun negotiate[d] a compromise. Students complet-ing the free programme would receive a ‘Statement of Accomplishment’ that carried the Stanford brand” (Marginson). Almost with the stroke of a pen, a hybrid credentialing system was created. Even though formal transcript credit for the course was not granted, Stanford nonetheless af-fixed its imprimatur on a credential certifying that the successful students had completed a course offered by Stanford faculty. And the same stroke of a pen created a potential revenue stream: what if Stanford were to charge a modest fee for producing this hybrid credential for successful completers? Suddenly, the “open” in massive open online courses would not quite be free, and a revenue stream would be there for the taking. Thrun, who quickly spun off a MOOC-offering private company, Udac-ity, realized immediately that the credentialing offered by a prestigious university might not actually be necessary—there was a potential market of students who, although they could not afford traditional tuition at a prestigious private university, could at least pay modest fees for MOOC courses successfully completed. Moreover, if companies were willing to recognize Udacity certification for successful MOOC completion, nothing else really counted. The Udacity website states this explicitly: “In return for your hard work, Udacity offers a range of certification options that are recognized by major technology companies who are actively recruiting from the Udacity student body” (http://www.udacity.com). In certain key areas of the information economy, it seems that instruction can be delivered online by a private company and recognized by employers desperately seeking talent in these crucial economic areas.8

Let’s pause for a moment, then, and consider a scenario that one of my colleagues described to me recently. Imagine that in a year or two, or maybe three at the outside, a very bright high school senior applies to

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and is accepted at a prestigious American university. She decides that the tuition and time commitment required for four full years of her life spent on a campus somewhere is really not worth it. She politely declines admission and then begins to assemble a curriculum composed of the best MOOCs offered by the best experts in various fields from humanities to social sciences to engineering or computer science. The cost is dramati-cally lower than if she had actually attended the university where she had been accepted, and she has had the freedom to choose courses she really wants and to complete them at a pace she sets. After successfully completing a certain number of such courses, in a year or two, or perhaps three at the outside, she applies for a job at a very prestigious American software or hardware company. She argues that she has been recognized by one of the best universities in the country as worthy of acceptance (and she produces the acceptance letter as proof), but she decided to compose a curriculum of her own making, which perfectly fits the requirements for the position the company has advertised. She is eventually hired, even though some of her toughest competition in the applicant pool for the position she is seeking are candidates who possess a degree from the very university she chose not to attend.

Fiction or eventual fact? It is impossible to decide at this point, but there certainly is a challenge brewing. Paradoxically, the very act of offer-ing a service to the wider society in the form of MOOCs puts into ques-tion the longstanding traditional organization of university education (a set period of time spent on a physical site where instruction is organized around face-to-face interaction with an established faculty). MOOCs also raise very basic infrastructure questions at an institutional level, for ex-ample, does a large state university system invest in building yet another satellite campus, or does it opt to set up online-only instructional delivery to students in a certain location? (see Choudaha on these matters). Will the faculty who eventually deliver online instruction actually be a part of the physical university’s faculty or a separate group with a different social and economic status? One could multiply these structural ques-tion at will, I think, but there is little doubt that the movement toward online instruction, whether it is in the form of MOOCs or campus-only courses for students registered in degree programs, will be a transforming trend. Courses delivered in new formats, moreover, will not simply be “canned” versions of traditional courses; they will be part of new hybrid instructional models taking better advantage of the possibilities offered by networked collaborative technologies.9

My contention is ultimately that the notion of impact in an Ameri-can context, constrained by models of outcome assessment in the past two decades or so, models that have been applied in a way that is quite

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characteristic of American distributed governance (combining govern-ment and private intervention), has been shaken considerably by very vigorous initiatives to conceive and deliver online instruction. If devel-opments continue along the vectors I have outlined, those judging the impact of higher education institutions on the wider society will have to recalibrate their perspectives, and the market, supposedly the driving force pushing universities to produce adequately prepared workers for a market economy, will exercise a different sort of influence. For if indeed universities begin to see MOOCs and other sorts of online delivery of instruction as revenue sources, this trend would seem destined to trans-form them structurally quite radically, and ultimately the university, one of the oldest functioning institutions in the Western world, might soon be a very different, potentially unrecognizable, entity.

Duke University

Notes1. See Head and Shepherd, whose commentaries are among the innumerable reactions to

the British government’s attempt to create assessment standards for research and teach-ing in the form of a measurement of their social and economic impact.

2. A recent exposé in the New York Times identifies the egregious gaming in which American law schools have been engaging since the US News ratings became essential reading for law school applicants (Segal, “For Law School Graduates”; Segal, “How Students Lose”).

3. The Council of Graduate Schools is the national lobbying organization of American graduate schools, located in Washington, DC, serving the interests of graduate education as defined by its member schools. It holds an annual meeting in early December during which the latest important topics in graduate education are addressed.

4. I have not yet decided how ironic the acronym MOOC is actually meant to be, but it does lend itself to a certain playfulness. And when Hybrid Pedagogy (http://www.hybridpedagogy.com/) decides to sponsor a MOOC on MOOCs, and illustrates it with images of monsters, frankly, the connotative layers begin to accumulate (http://www.moocmooc.com).

5. One on my colleagues just informed me that enrollment in the MOOC he is offering in fall 2012 has already exceeded 10,000.

6. The cost of producing online course materials will not be insignificant, and the difficulty evaluating that cost within the overall budget of the university is one of the reasons why it is presently not possible to estimate the potential revenue such courses might generate.

7. University professors themselves, who are eager to transform the expertise they have developed in creating online courses into concrete operational forms, are actively creat-ing companies—on the model provided by Sebastian Thrun at Stanford.

8. In fact, it is probably not as simple as I have made it appear. Everyone in Silicon Val-ley knows what is going on at Stanford in computer science and design and doubtless knows of Sebastian Thrun. Stanford’s “aura effect” will likely play an important role in the recognition of any Udacity credential.

9. See Davidson and Goldberg for a detailed discussion of new possible directions for learning in a digital age.

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Works CitedAlonso, Carlos J. “Paradise Lost: The Academy Becomes a Commodity.” The Chronicle of

Higher Education 12 Dec. 2010. Web. 10 Aug. 2012.Bowen, William G. et al. Interactive Learning Online at Public Universities: Evidence from Ran-

domized Trials. Ithaka S+R, 2012. Web. 12 Aug. 2012.Choudaha, Rahul. “Could MOOCs Lead to the Decline of Branch Campuses?” University

World News 233 (2012): n. pag. Web. 16 Aug. 2012.Davidson, Cathy N., and David Theo Goldberg. The Future of Learning Institutions in a Digital

Age. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009. Print.Head, Simon. “The Grim Threat to British Universities.” The New York Review of Books 13

Jan. 2011. Web. 24 July 2012.Hebel, Sara. “UVa Board Members’ E-Mails Reflect Worry About Online Education.” The

Chronicle of Higher Education 20 June 2012. Web. 26 July 2012.Keep, William W. “The Worrisome Ascendance of Business in Higher Education.” The

Chronicle of Higher Education 21 June 2012. Web. 26 June 2012.Marginson, Simon. “Yes, MOOC Is the Global Higher Education Game Changer.” University

World News 234 (2012): n. pag. Web. 13 Aug. 2012.“No Child Left Behind.” Education Week 4 Aug. 2004. Web. 8 Aug. 2012.Pérez-Peña, Richard. “University of Virginia Reinstates Ousted President.” The New York

Times 26 June 2012. Web. 26 June 2012.Robin, Corey. “Eli’s Comin’—Hide Your Heart, Girl: Why Yale Is Going to Singapore.” Corey

Robin. Web. 29 July 2012.Segal, David. “For Law School Graduates, Debts If Not Job Offers.” The New York Times 8

Jan. 2011. Web. 6 Aug. 2012.—-. “How Law Students Lose the Grant Game, and How Schools Win.” The New York Times

30 Apr. 2011. Web. 6 Aug. 2012.Shepherd, Jessica. “Humanities Research Threatened by Demands for ‘Economic Impact’.”

The Guardian. 13 Oct. 2009. Web. 27 July 2012.Vaidhyanathan, Siva. “Strategic Mumblespeak.” Slate 15 June 2012. Web. 26 June 2012.

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