Impact of Situational Legitimacy and Assertiveness-related Anxiety/Discomfort

on Motivation and Ability to Generate Effective Criticism Responses

SERGE PICCININ, M I C H A E L McCARREY, DAVID F A I R W E A T H E R , DIANA VITO, and G R E T C H E N CONRAD

Universi ty o f Ot tawa

This study compares the motivation and the quality of criticism responses of 697 undergraduates who were divided into three levels of situation legitimacy (high, mod- erate, and low) and two levels (top versus bottom 40 percent) of anxiety related to previous generalized assertiveness behaviours. The impact of gender was also studied. The results showed the legitimacy of the situation for a critical response (preassessed with peer hold-out groups) significantly affected participants' motivation to criticize as well as the quality of their critical responses, notwithstanding the poor quality of all criticism responses. Anxiety related to previous global assertiveness was related to high motivation but not to quality of criticism responses. There were no gender effects. Results are interpreted within an avoidance learning paradigm wherein the connotative meaning of criticism is incongruent with harmonious long-term relation- ships so that it is suppressed until virtually forced by the specifics of highly legitimate situations.

~ T R O D U C T I O N

Assertive behaviour has been a major focus of behaviour research and therapy. Studies examining the link between social cognition and assertive behaviour have found that high versus low assertive people differ in frequency of positive and nega- tive self-statements (Bruch, 1981; Heimberg, Chiauzzi, Becker, & Madrazo-Peterson, 1983), self-ratings of level of anxiety and effectiveness (Alden & Cappe, 1981), the likelihood that they will endorse irrational beliefs (Alden & Safran, 1978), their beliefs that assertive behaviour will lead to positive consequences (Fiedler & Beach, 1978; Kuperminc & Heimberg, 1983), and the importance that they place on the conse- quences of assertive behaviour (Kuperminc & Heimberg, 1983). Despite the vast number of studies devoted to assertive behaviour, there is still no integrative model explaining the link between social cognitions, motivation, and assertive behaviour, which will be the focus of this study.

Recently, Chiauzzi and Heimberg took an important step in this regard, testing a social problem-solving process model of assertive behaviour applied in request-refusal situations. In conceptualizing assertive behaviour within an interpersonal problem-

Current Psychology: Developmental �9 Learning ~ Personality ~ Social Spring 1998, Vol. 17, No. 1, 75-92.

76 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

solving framework (D'Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971; D'Zurilla & Nezu, 1980, 1982), their aim was to identify the sequence of cognitions that high versus low assertive people go through as they recognize, define, and respond to situations in which they are faced with a direct request.

They found that high assertives showed superior problem-solving skills. High assertives demonstrated superior problem orientation, definition, and formulation skills, and in the light of these reported higher situational efficacy, viewing themselves as more capable of responding effectively.

Chiauzzi and Heimberg did not, however, find actual performance differences be- tween high and low assertives. They had hypothesized that high assertives would be able to generate more effective responses than low assertives (taking into account the pre-measured "legitimacy" of the request situation for the offering of such responses). Surprisingly, the only differences in responses generated were a function of differ- ences in the pre-measured "legitimacy" of the request situation--not a function of assertiveness classification.

Finally, Chiauzzi and Heimberg assessed the differential decision-making skills of high versus low assertives by asking them to assess a written list of alternative re- sponses (some pre-measured as "effective," and some as "ineffective"). It was found that high assertives' decision-making skills were superior in recognizing/identifying better responses. That is, high assertives were better able than low assertives to iden- tify "effective responses as those which led to better expected outcomes" (1986: 5), even though, as just mentioned, they were unable to produce better responses them- selves. Surprisingly, however, there were no differences between high and low assertives in the degree to which they recognized "ineffective" responses as leading to desirable versus undesirable outcomes. Further, compared to the low assertives, the high assertives believed they would be more able to actually use the "effective responses" and thus they reflected greater "efficacy expectation."

Therefore, although Chiauzzi and Heimberg made an important contribution, their findings were not clear-cut. Their contribution was placing assertive behaviour within a social problem-solving framework, and drawing attention to the importance of pre- measuring the "legitimacy" of request-refusal situations using peer hold-out groups. Nevertheless, it was puzzling that high assertives were not able to generate better responses than low assertives. It was also surprising that, although high assertives were better able to recognize more effective responses as such, they were no better than low assertives at recognizing the dysfunctional utility of ineffective responses. These problematic findings require clarification.

One possible explanation for the absence of performance differences between high and low assertives is that Chiauzzi and Heimberg's measures of effective responding were relatively broad and subjective (1986: 17). They classed effective responses as those which gained/maintained reinforcement and/or were clear and concise. This may confound clarity with reward instrumentality; many responses may be clear and con- cise but not effective in the sense that they do not lead to reward. Ineffective responses were defined as those that lost reinforcement, were indirect/vague, were off the topic, and/or were aggressive. The authors do not provide criteria for such judgements nor do

Piccinin et al. 77

they deal with the classification problem that emerges when a response combines both effective and ineffective elements.

A second possible explanation for their problematic findings is that effectance moti- vation expectancies, to which they gave only limited consideration, might play a crucial role in relation to people's ability to perform effectively. Maddux, Norton, and Stoltenberg (1986), building on Bandura's (1982) model, identified three components of effectance motivation: (a) self-efficacy expectancy, (b) outcome expectancy, and (c) outcome value. They found that each of these contributed over and above the other two in predicting behavioural intent. Other research (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) has also demonstrated the utility of behavioural intent in predicting actual behaviour. It would seem that these motivational expectancies are an important factor relating to people's ability and willingness to engage in assertive behaviour. One would expect that motivational expectancies should be a function of people's discomfort/anxiety around behaving assertively in the sense that discomfort/anxiety would play an inhibitory role on motivation. Studying the differences between high versus low assertives in their effectance motivation may shed some light on what determines people's ability and willingness to engage in assertive behaviour, and may help reconcile some of the problematic findings of Chiauzzi and Heimberg (1986).

Accordingly, one aim of the present study is to examine the relative effectance motivation expectancies of participants with low versus high anxiety (related to previ- ous generalized assertiveness behaviours), and investigate how this "assertiveness anxi- ety" is related to ability to generate/produce another important class of social behaviours: the giving of balanced criticism. We wish to compare high versus low assertives in their ability to generate effective critical responses as well as their motivational social cognition related to doing so.

Furthermore, because of our questions about Chiauzzi and Heimberg's broad, sub- jective criteria of effective responding, we take a different approach. We use multiple behaviourally anchored rating scales developed on the basis of literature which identi- fies the specific verbal and nonverbal components of effective criticism behaviour (Baron, 1990; Bright, 1988; Butler, 1981; Curran & Monti, 1982; Weisinger & Lobsenz, 1981). In addition, because Chiauzzi and Heimberg (1986) found that the "legitimacy" of the situation affected subjects' behavioural intent and ability to respond effectively in request-refusal situations, we also want to investigate the impact of situational legitimacy in scenarios involving the giving of criticism.

Finally, because previous studies in the areas of assertive behaviour and giving criticism suggest that gender differences may play an important role in affecting moti- vation to behave assertively, we compare men versus women in their motivation and ability to give criticism. We have found, for example, that women reported greater discomfort and viewed themselves as being less effective in the area of giving criti- cism, even though observers rated the women's responses as equally effective to those of males (McCarrey, Piccinin, Welburn, & Chislett, 1989). Moreover, assertiveness has often been associated more with men than women (Bem, 1974) although evidence for the presence of such gender differences is mixed (cf. Galassi & Galassi, 1978; Heimberg et al., 1977; Rich & Schroeder, 1976). Accordingly, we wish also to investi-

78 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

gate the relationship of gender to participants' motivation and ability to give criticism. In investigating the impact of assertiveness-related anxiety, situational legitimacy,

and gender on motivation and ability to provide effective criticism, this study aims to contribute to the development of an integrative model to link social cognitions, moti- vation, and assertive behaviour.

We have framed six hypotheses. We hypothesize first that high assertive (low anxi- ety) people will be more motivated to give criticism than will low assertive (high anxiety) people. By definition, we would expect high assertives to report higher levels of self-efficacy expectancy, outcome expectancy, and outcome value with regard to giving criticism in specific situations that warrant it. We base this hypothesis on the notion that low assertives have greater dysfunctional motivational cognition with re- spect to the connotative meaning of giving criticism based on their own less successful attempts in the past. Second, because several prior studies have pointed to gender differences in assertiveness, we would also predict that females will report lower motivation to give criticism than will males. This hypothesis is based on the findings noted above, and on the possibility that the standards females use in evaluating their interpersonal skills are more demanding than are those of males, thereby inhibiting their motivation to respond. Third, we expect that people with low versus high assertiveness-related anxiety will tend to view situations differently in terms of how reasonable it would be for them to offer a critical response. Fourth, we expect that high assertives (low anxiety) will generate higher quality responses than will low assertives (high anxiety). Fifth, we predict that, despite their lower motivation to give criticism, the quality of females' responses will be equivalent to that of males. Sixth, we predict that the differential "legitimacy" for giving criticism of the specific scenarios pre- sented to them (premeasured via peer hold-out groups) will affect both participants' motivation to give criticism, and their production of effective responses.

M E T H O D

Participants

In the preliminary phases of this study, four hold-out groups of university under- graduates (mean age 22.4 years, 24 percent male) participated: a situation-generating group of 49 people, two legitimacy rating groups of N = 44 and N = 41, and a pilot testing group of 67 individuals. In the main phase, the participants were a group of 697 university undergraduates under age 25 (mean age 19.7 years, 30.4 percent male).

Independent Measures

The independent variables in this study were gender;, high, medium, and low levels of situation legitimacy; and high and low levels of assertiveness-related anxiety.

Legitimacy of situations for critical behavior. A first hold-out group of 35 females and 14 males generated 147 behavioral situations in which they gave criticism to someone and felt their criticism was: (1) reasonable, fair and accurate; (2) not fair,

Piccinin et aL 79

unreasonable; and (3) partly reasonable/fair and partly unreasonable/unfair. Four script writers transformed these 147 situations so that all were in the present

tense, with the provoking context clearly represented as either reasonable, unreason- able, or partly reasonable and partly unreasonable. The words reasonable or legitimate, however, did not appear in any of the situation descriptions. The actual criticism behavior of the author was removed. Here is an example of a situation description: "You are washing the dishes and your dad walks in and whines that your dishwashing technique is all wrong. As he explains why, you realize he's got a good point."

Subsequently, two additional hold-out groups (N = 44 & N = 41, 24 percent male) rated the 80 clearest nonredundant situations of the 147 given earlier. These judges rated each situation's "reasonableness" for a critical response--the degree to which offering some kind of a criticism response would be appropriate, justified, legitimate in each situation----on a seven-step scale running from 1 = very unreasonable to 4 = moderately reasonable to 7 = very reasonable. Criteria for reasonableness were:

1. Provision of criticism seems to you to be logical, fair and sensible;

2. You have the expertise so that giving criticism seems acceptable given your relationship with the other person;

3. Criticism will not lead to public embarrassment/humiliation (your intent is to be helpful).

Judges were told to imagine they were in the situation and to rate its reasonableness for them to give a critical response, given that "there are situations in which it may or may not be reasonable to give criticism to another person."

After these ratings, six situations were chosen for the main study: two situations which were seen to be highly reasonable (high legitimacy), two moderately reasonable (medium legitimacy), and two highly unreasonable (low legitimacy). These three pairs of situations were selected such that there was no significant difference in mean reasonableness ratings within each level, while the reasonableness ratings between levels was significantly different from the other two. Moreover, the variability around each mean was as small as possible.

The Assertion Inventory (AI). The generalized tendency to experience difficulty in using assertive skills in interpersonal situations was measured by the Assertion Inven- tory (AI) of Gambrill and Richey (1975). The inventory measures the respondent's level of anxiety/discomfort in relation to situations involving requests, giving criticism, compliments, and expressing approval/disapproval on a five-point scale (1 = none to 5 = very much), as well as the person's probability of response in relation to the same situations. In a pretest, a correlation of .77 was obtained between participants' anxiety/ discomfort scores and the probability of response scores. Given this high correlation and time constraints, the anxiety/discomfort measure alone was administered in the main phase of this study. Test-retest reliability for this forty-item anxiety/discomfort measure has been reported at .87 by Gambrill and Richey (1975). Furthermore, the authors report discriminant validity of the scale across normal versus clinical groups: t(66) = 2.27, p<.05.

80 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

Dependent Measures

Effectance Motivation. The approach of Maddux, Norton and Stoltenberg (1986) was used such that we measured: (a) self-efficacy expectancy--level of agreement with statements such as, "it would be easy to learn the skills necessary to give criticism in this situation" (1 = no agreement to 9 = agree very strongly [3 items]); (b) outcome expectancy--level of agreement with statements like, "maintaining eye contact and offering both positive and negative feedback in a calm fashion would be an effective way to offer criticism in this situation" (scale as above, 3 items) and (c) outcome value--the importance the participants gave to critical behavior as measured by their agreement with statements like, "I believe in this situation the benefits of offering criticism far outweigh the negative consequences" (scale as above, 3 Items). In this way, we measured the degree to which each participant expected that: (a) he/she could demonstrate effective criticism response skills; (b) using these skills would lead to a relatively immediate desired outcome; and (c) using these skills would lead to more long-term, subjectively valued outcomes. Moreover, a composite motivation-multipli- cative score (self-efficacy expectancy x outcome expectancy x outcome value) was calculated.

Norms of Society and Friends. Participants also indicated the norms of both society and those of people whose opinion was important to them with respect to the appropri- ateness of criticism behavior in these situations. This was measured by respondents indicating their level of agreement with the statement "our society would place high value on people giving criticism in this situation" and "people whose opinion I care about would feel it is important to offer criticism in this situation" (scales as above).

Reasonableness. This was a measure of the degree to which offering some kind of a criticism response would be appropriate, legitimate within the context of a given situation. Participants judged a situation's reasonableness on a seven-step scale: 1 = very unreasonable, to 4 = moderately reasonable, to 7 = very reasonable. Criteria for reasonableness were identical to those stated earlier for the independent measure legitimacy.

Criticism Response Quality: Development and use of four scales measuring criti- cism aggression, avoidance, delay, and global assessment. From the literature on the various criteria that have been used to assess the quality of people's criticism re- sponses, four provisional nine-point scales were devised. In order to revise and refine these scales into their final form, the research team members tested out each scale, rating various criticism responses (which had been generated earlier by a pilot testing group). At weekly meetings, differences in ratings were discussed, and more precise scale-definers were developed until high levels of inter-rater agreement had been achieved (av. Cronbach Alpha = .93, p<.001).

The criticism aggression scale measured the hostility and aggressiveness evident in the criticism response. A score of 1 indicated an outright aggressive response (e.g., "Shut up! Get out!"). A mid-range score of 5 indicated that the person at least heard the other person's side, although he/she did not acknowledge it (e.g., "I don't care if you're using the photocopier; I can't work with you loud-mouthing"). A score of 7

Piccinin et al. 81

indicated the presence of some light sarcasm or teasing. A score of 9 indicated that there was no aggression evident in the criticism response.

The criticism avoidance scale measured the degree to which the person's criticism response dealt directly and explicitly with the situation at hand. A score of 1 indicated total avoidance (e.g., "I 'd leave the room"). A score of 5 indicated a direct acknowledgement of the problem, but no explicit suggestion was offered (e.g., "I 'm finding it hard to work with that radio blaring"). A score of 9 indicated that the person was dealing directly and explicitly with the situation with word and/or deed (e.g., "Excuse me, this is the second time you've interrupted me, and I find that annoying. I 'd like to finish my point").

The criticism delay scale measured the time-lag, the immediacy with which the person gave the criticism response. A score of 9 indicated no delay; the person offered an active verbal criticism response immediately. A score of 7 indicated a delay of about one hour. A score of 5 indicated that the person intended to give criticism within a half day or so. A score of 3 reflected an intention to give criticism within about a week. Finally, a score of 1 indicated no Critical response at all (e.g., "I would just put on my headphones, and try to forget about the situation").

The criticism global assessment scale measured each criticism response according to five criteria, giving a broad, overall assessment of the quality of the response. The five criteria were as follows: (1) 'T' statements, i.e., the person assumes responsibility for his/her criticism (e.g., "I feel very angry when you talk to me in that tone of voice" as opposed to "You are infuriating when you talk in that tone"); (2) Specificity regarding the problem (e.g., "It is impossible to work with that radio playing so loudly" as opposed to "It's really noisy in here"); (3) Empathy; (4) Explicit changes suggested (e.g., "Please turn that radio down" as opposed to "Gee, that radio is annoying"); (5) Bidirectionality, or roundedness (e.g., "You're a great cook, Mom; I 'm finding that, for some reason, this casserole tastes strange to me. I 'm wondering if you didn't mistakenly use sugar instead of salt"). A score of 1 on the global assessment scale indicated the presence of none of these criteria (or absence of a critical response). A score of 3 indicated the presence of 1 criterion. A score of 4 indicated the presence of 2 criteria. A score of 5 indicated that 3 criteria were evident. A score of 7 indicated the presence of 4 criteria. A score of 9 indicated that all 5 criteria were present.

Procedure

Each participant was presented with one of three pretested written situations---either one in which criticism was clearly warranted and called for (high legitimacy), or one in which criticism may or may not have been warranted (medium legitimacy), or one in which criticism was clearly not warranted (low legitimacy). The participants were asked to imagine that they were in the given situation and instructed to generate as many realistic alternative responses as they could in a three-minute period.

Participants were then presented with another situation (of equivalent legitimacy level), and half of them were asked, at random, to indicate how reasonable they thought it would be for them to give criticism in that situation; the other half were

82 Current P~ychology / Spring 1998

asked to indicate their level of effectance motivation (i.e., their level of self-efficacy expectancy, outcome expectancy, and outcome value) with respect to making a critical response towards another person in that situation. Finally, all participants were asked to complete the anxiety/discomfort scale of the Assertion Inventory (AI) of Gambrill and Richey (1975).

The participants' criticism responses were rated on the criticism aggression, avoid- ance, delay, and global assessment scales by three judges trained in the use of these measures. Each rater scored each criticism response on all four scales. At weekly meetings, any major discrepancies among the raters (i.e., discrepancies of 2 or more scale points) were resolved via consensus. Inter-judge agreement was monitored regu- larly using Cronbach Alpha reliability analyses, and agreement was consistently very high for all four scales. Indeed, for the entire pool of 3,158 criticism responses (gener- ated by the 697 participants), Cronbach Alpha reliabilities for the four scales were .923 (aggression), .941 (avoidance), .942 (delay), and .928 (global assessment).

RESULTS

Manipulation Check

Legitimacy. The situational legitimacy manipulation had a significant main effect on the participants' views about how reasonable it would be for them to give a criticism response. Specifically, mean ratings for reasonableness (on a 7-point scale) for the low (n=73), mid (n= 81), and high legitimacy condition (n=72) were 3.30, 4.30, and 5.57, respectively. Significant differences were found between all three group means: F(2,214) = 33.64, p<.001. This finding indicates a successful manipulation check, revealing that the three prestandardized situations were in fact viewed by our participants as having three different degrees of reasonableness for offering a criticism response.

Major Analyses

The factorial design was a 2 x 2 x 3 with gender, assertiveness-related anxiety (high versus low), and situation legitimacy (high versus mid versus low) as the independent variables. No two-way or three-way interaction effects were found. Various main effects were found for assertiveness-related anxiety and legitimacy. The gender of participants was unrelated to all dependent measures.

Main Effects

Association between assertiveness-related anxiety and motivation. To investigate the impact of assertiveness-related anxiety, a 40-40 split was chosen to enable meaningful contrasts between participants with low (top 40 percent) versus high (bottom 40 per- cent) anxiety related to the generalized use of assertiveness skills. Our decision to contrast the top versus the bottom 40 percent was guided by the need to have clearly different levels of anxiety/discomfort. Given the psychometric measurement error of

Piccinin et aL 83

TABLE 1 Association between Participants' Degree of Assertiveness-linked

Anxiety and Motivation to Offer a Criticism Response

Mean Scores (+n-sizes) for Univariate Dependent each anxie~, group F-values

with Variable Low High (1 ,288) df

(n =140) (n = 160)

self-efficacy expectancy 19.90 16.14 27.23 *** (27-pt. scale)

outcome value 19.84 17.52 18.95 ***

(27-pt. scale)

motivation multiplic. 9551 6860 27.17 ***

Note: ***p<.001.

the Gambrill-Richey subscale, contrasts between the top versus the bottom 40 percent seemed optimal for this purpose. A main effect emerged on three dependent variables, all of which measured the participants' motivation to offer a critical response in a given situation (see Table 1). Specifically, low anxiety participants obtained signifi- cantly higher scores (p<.001) than did high anxiety participants on self-efficacy expect- ancy, outcome value, and on the composite motivation-multiplicative measure.

Lack of association between assertiveness-related anxiety and reasonableness. Low anxiety participants did not construct or view situations as different in terms of how reasonable they were for the giving of criticism. On the 1-7 scale, the means of the low anxiety group (4.56) and the high anxiety group (4.19) were not statistically different (p>.05).

Association between situational legitimacy and quality of response. Legitimacy of the situation (high versus mid versus low) was significantly associated with the quality of the participants' criticism responses. Specifically, level of legitimacy covaried with aggression, avoidance, delay, and overall quality (global score) of the participants' criticism responses (see Table 2). In all cases, the high legitimacy group differed significantly from both of the other two groups (mid and low), reflecting more aggres- sion, less avoidance, less delay, and better global criticism responses (p<.05). No significant differences were found between the mid versus low legitimacy groups on these quality of response measures.

Association between legitimacy and motivation. Situational legitimacy was signifi- cantly related to participants' reported motivation to give a critical response (see Table 3). Legitimacy level was related with outcome value scores (i.e., the degree to which

84 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

TABLE 2 Association between Situational Leg/t/macy and

Qua//ty of Partidpants' Criticism Responses

Mean Scores (+n-sizes) for Dependent each legitimacy group Univariate

F-values Variable High Mid Low with

(n=168) (n=167) (n=162) (2,494) df

aggression 5.78 8.42 8.51 171.6 *** (9-pt. scale)

avoidance 4.10 2.96 2.76 28.48 * (9-pt. scale)

delay 5.70 4.68 4.62 46.53 * (9-pt. scale)

global 2.42 2.14 1.96 7.40 * (9-pt scale)

Note: In each comparison, the high legitimacy group is significantly different (/7<.05) from both the mid and low legitimacy groups. There are no statistically significant differences between the mid and low legitimacy groups. *p <.05; ***p<.O01.

criticism was viewed as valuable, important, useful in the given situation). Also sig- nificant was the association between legitimacy and participants' reported levels of outcome expectancy and overall motivation to give a criticism response (as measured by motivation-multiplicative). In addition, situational legitimacy was significantly re- lated to participants' views about societal norms and friends' norms regarding the giving of criticism. In other words, the legitimacy level of the situation was associated with participants' opinions on whether or not society (in general) and their friends (in particular) would support the giving of criticism in a particular situation.

Post-hoc analyses

Quality of Response. Despite the fact that few participants generated high quality criticism responses, as measured by the 9-point criticism global assessment scale, it seemed important to determine what distinguished those who did give relatively more effective responses. To explore the differences between high versus low quality re- sponders, we chose to compare the top 20 percent (n=66 approx.) versus the bottom 20 percent (n=66 approx.) of the participants. On this basis, high quality responders

Piccinin et aL 85

TABLE 3 Association between Situational Legitimacy and

Participants' Motivation to Offer a Criticism Response

Dependent Variable

outcome expectancy (27-pt. scale)

outcome value

(27-pt. scale)

Mean Scores (+n-sizes) for Univariate each legitimacy group F-values

with High Mid Low (2, 288) df n=97) (n=98) (n=105)

23.74 22.68 22.25 3.33 *

21.53 I8.43 16.08 25.01"

motivation 9629 8402 6451 8.62 * multiplie.

Societial 6.20 4.56 4.16 26.07 * Norms (9 pt. scale)

Friends' 6.99 5.30 4.57 31.92 * Norms (9 pt. scale)

Note: *p<.05.

obtained scores of 3.0 or higher on this global scale--which meant their criticism responses tended to include one or more criteria of the five criteria possible. Low quality responders obtained scores of 1.58 or lower on this global scale--which meant their criticism responses tended to include none of the criteria the literature had sug- gested would indicate an effective response.

Association between quality of response and motivation. High quality responders differed significantly from low quality responders on four variables tapping motivation to give criticism (see Table 4). High quality responders reported significantly higher levels (p<.05) of self-efficacy expectancy, outcome value, and overall motivation (as measured by motivation-multiplicative), but there were no differences on outcome expectancy. In addition, high quality responders viewed society in general as more supportive of giving criticism (p<.01), but they were no different from low quality responders in their beliefs about how their friends would view giving criticism in these situations.

86 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

TABLE 4 Association between Participants' Qua//ty of Response and Reported Motivation to Offer a Criticism Response

Mean Scores (+n-sizes) for Univariate each quality, group F-values Dependent

with Variable High Low (n =63) (n = 68) (1, 129) d/

self-efficacy expectancy 19.00 16.14 9.05 * (27-pt. scale)

outcome value 19.23 17.06 5.38 *

(27-pt. scale)

motivation multiplic. 9007 6599 10.69 *

society 5.60 3.85 8.94 ** (9-pt. scale)

Note: *p<.05; **p<.01.

DISCUSSION

In investigating the impact of assertiveness-related anxiety, situational legitimacy, and gender on motivation and ability to provide effective criticism, the aim of this study was to contribute to the development of an integrative model to link social cognitions, motivation, and assertive behaviour.

Absence of Gender Effects

In accord with our prediction and previous research (McCarrey, Piccinin, Welburn, & Chislett, 1989; Piccinin, McCarrey, Welbum, Chislett, Bourgon, & Scott, 1990; Piccinin, McCarrey, Welbum, Chislett, Bourgon, & Jacques-Locmelis, 1992), we found that females and males were equally proficient in giving criticism. Our findings con- tribute to an increasing body of evidence suggesting an absence of gender differences in the area of giving criticism. Furthermore, we found no differences between men and women in their motivation to give criticism. Our hypothesis that females would be less motivated was not borne out. The suggestion is that evidence is accumulating for the notion that young men and women are not presently distinguishable in their motivation to give criticism or in their ability to give criticism effectively.

Piccinin et al. 87

Assertiveness-related Anxiety Effects

High assertives (low anxiety), compared to low assertives (high anxiety), reported higher effectance motivation to give criticism, thereby confirming our hypothesis. They reported more confidence in their ability to give criticism effectively. They also placed more importance on the positive outcomes of giving criticism; that is, they were less concerned about possible negative interpersonal repercussions, and were more disposed to believe that giving criticism would lead to favourable consequences. Although they did not, as we had predicted, view the presented scenarios differently in terms of how reasonable it would be to provide criticism, their motivation to do so was nevertheless higher.

Surprisingly, and contrary to our prediction, these motivational differences did not translate into a performance difference. People with low anxiety related to global assertiveness---despite reporting more confidence in their abilities than did the high anxiety group, and despite being more convinced of the benefits of giving criticism-- did not actually generate better criticism responses (as measured by scores on aggres- sion, delay, avoidance, and overall global quality of their responses) in the specific presented situations. Chiauzzi and Heimberg (1986) found similar results in that moti- vational differences between high versus low assertives in responding to request-refusal situations also did not translate into performance differences in specific contexts. We had suspected that their result may have been due to their broad, subjective measures of effective responding. Thus, we decided to use explicit, objective verbal and nonver- bal criteria to assess response quality. Contrary to our expectations, we found as they did that people with varying anxiety related to global assertiveness were equally profi- cient----or deficient--in actually giving criticism in specific contexts.

This unexpected finding may be related to one of the most striking features of this data set--namely, the overall low quality of criticism responses from our participants. Even the group of 63 "higher quality responders," the top 20 percent of our sample, performed surprisingly poorly according to the criteria used for rating criticism effec- tiveness. In fact, most of this premium group scored only marginally above 3 (out of a possible 9) on the global assessment scale. This means that even our best critics used, on average, only 1 of the 5 criteria (assuming responsibility, specificity regarding problem, empathy, suggestion of changes, bidirectionality) that previous research sug- gested were criteria of effective criticism responding. These low scores, in combina- tion with the low variability in the quality of response scores, may have nullified any potential effect of assertiveness-related anxiety. It may be that people are so lacking in the skills of giving criticism that these deficiencies far outweigh any differential, inhibitory effects that degree of assertiveness-related anxiety might reflect. Previous studies in the area of giving criticism (Piccinin et al., 1990, 1992) have also found low scores in quality of responding prior to specific training. Perhaps the connotative significance of criticizing the behaviour of others is so negative in our culture that few people learn to do it in an effective, balanced fashion. One implication is that research- ers, educators, and trainers might do well to avoid the word "criticism" due to its

88 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

excessively negative, inhibitory, emotional connotation, and to speak of "balanced feedback" instead.

The global nature of the discomfort scale of the Gambrill-Richey Assertiveness Inventory seems to point to another interpretive perspective. Although people may obtain low scores on a global measure of assertiveness-related anxiety such as the Gambrill-Richey discomfort scale, it does not seem to follow that they have (or at least are willing to use) these skills in the specific area of giving criticism. This hypothesis is in accord with the literature suggesting that assertiveness is not a general trait, but rather tends to be highly situation-specific (cf. Fiedler & Beach, 1978). For example, a number of studies (e.g., Kirschner, 1976; McFall & Lillesand, 1971; Young, Rimm, & Kennedy, 1973) have found that treatment of one response class or situation did not result in improvement (generalization) in untreated response classes or situations. Fur- thermore, factor analytic studies of responses to self-report measures have revealed a number of discrete factors rather than a single general assertiveness factor (Bates & Zimmerman, 1971; Galassi & Galassi, 1979; Gambrill & Richey, 1975; Nevid & Rathus, 1979). Giving criticism effectively is a highly complex interpersonal skill. It is likely one that people tend to learn, or rather not to learn, serendipitously rather than systematically. Nevertheless, as we have noted in other studies, it is a skill that can be learned (Piccinin et al., 1990, 1992) and one that people are highly motivated to learn. Indeed, Cooley (1979) and Piccinin (1986) have indicated that it is among the top five social skills that people wish to improve. Our findings highlight the importance and need for social skills programmes that train candidates in the giving of balanced feedback in specific situations.

In this regard, it was a consistent observation of the raters that, of the five response- effectiveness criteria used (assuming responsibility, specificity regarding problem, em- pathy, suggestion of changes, bidirectionality), those most often demonstrated (sug- gestion of changes, and specificity regarding problem) were the two criteria that com- municate a more demanding challenge to the recipient. Participants less often demon- strated the empathetic criteria (ownership-responsibility of criticism, bidirectionality, empathy) that would have made criticism more "receivable." This tendency to demand specific changes without communicating sensitivity, empathy, or balance may be pre- cisely why criticism as it is presently understood is generally so difficult for people to give and receive. It would seem that students' schema for giving criticism is dysfunc- tional to the extent that it seems to include elements that are inherently confrontational to recipients, and simultaneously to exclude elements that could transform the confron- tation into a balanced, reciprocal social exchange. These implications need to be systematically investigated. Future training programs on how to offer balanced feed- back might do well to assess for the presence of these deficiencies and, if warranted, make them specific targets for training.

Situational Legitimacy Effects

The extent to which a critical response was justified by the demands of the situation was found to be the crucial factor impacting on the quality of participants' criticism

Piccinin et al. 89

responses. It also impacted, as did assertiveness-related anxiety, on their motivation to give criticism.

Differences in quality of response tended to occur between the high legitimacy situations versus both the moderate and low legitimacy situations. In other words, only when the more powerful legitimizing effects of the situation came into play did we see even the glimmer of a response, provoking people into giving some minimally accept- able criticisms. In more ambiguous situations, when the legitimacy for giving criticism was more questionable, participants were less able to give effective criticism. As the situation became more "legitimate" for a critical response to be offered, people's responses were less avoidant, less delayed, and were of somewhat higher overall quality. This trend is consistent with Chiauzzi and Heimberg's (1986) prior findings of participants' quality of responding in request-refusal situations.

Furthermore, the motivating factor that most strongly impacted on people's willing- ness to give criticism appeared to be the perceived long-term benefits of doing so (i.e., outcome value). Situational legitimacy factors did not influence people's beliefs about whether they possessed or could learn the skills to give criticism; self-efficacy expect- ancy did not vary across situations of differing legitimacy. Moreover, there were only minimal differences (about one scale unit on a scale of 27 units) in outcome expect- ancy--which measured people's beliefs that giving criticism would attain the desired immediate results---e.g., a behaviour change from the other person. What this seems to mean is that legitimacy factors impact on people's broad beliefs about the long-term benefits of giving criticism in a particular situation. People tend to give criticism based on whether they believe giving criticism will positively versus negatively affect the long-term quality of their interpersonal relationships--not on their beliefs about whether they have the skills to give criticism effectively, or whether they believe the desired immediate result (i.e., a behaviour change in the other person) would be obtained if they gave criticism.

An implication here would be that future work distinguish between short and longer term outcomes. People may not view critical feedback as congruent with maintaining "satisfactory" longer term personal and work relationships even though they might see it as instrumental to short-terms goals--such as easier concentration when their room- mate complies with a critical, one-sided request to turn the radio down. What are the longer term implications? Retaliatory criticism from the roommate about being too touchy? A termination of the relationship and a request for a new roommate? In plain terms, why offer criticism when one does not feel that it will lead to positive long-term outcomes, even though one does feel able to emit the behaviour, and one feels it will lead to positive short-term outcomes? These issues need to be addressed with more specific outcome measures.

Overall, our findings appear to be consistent with the view that people operate within an avoidance learning paradigm such that they suppress criticism unless the situation loudly calls for it. Their motivation to give criticism tends to be low because they view giving criticism as incongruent with maintaining harmonious interpersonal relationships. Global assertiveness-related anxiety, linked to previous attempts at these assertive social behaviours, may play an inhibitory role up to the point where the

90 Current Psychology / Spring 1998

demands of the situation (their desire for behaviour change on the part of the other person) become greater and force the person to respond, whereupon a relatively poor quality critical response is produced. Such criticism tends to be specific and asks/ implies the other person to change without communicating any empathy, bidirectionality of feedback, nor any personal responsibility (e.g., "l feel upset when...") nor justifica- tion for their criticism. The absence of "sympathetic" components deprives the act of its potentially constructive interpersonal value, and instead increases the probability that it will be viewed by the criticism giver as another negative interpersonal experi- ence, thus solidifying the negative inhibitory cycle, and making future attempts at giving criticism less likely. Our results, in combination with evidence that people are interested in becoming better at giving criticism, highlight the need for training programmes targeting these observed deficiencies. We invite future researchers to further distinguish the motivational factors (perceived short- versus long-term out- comes) that impact on people's willingness to offer effective criticism.

SUMMARY

In investigating the impact of assertiveness-related anxiety, situational legitimacy, and gender on motivation and ability to provide effective criticism, this study aimed to contribute to the development of an integrative model to link social cognitions, moti- vation, and assertive behaviour.

Assertiveness-related anxiety was related to motivation to give criticism, but not to actual response quality. Situational legitimacy played a particularly powerful role in relation to both response quality and motivation, leading us to suggest that critical behaviour is much more influenced by specific situational factors than by more global inherent factors like assertiveness-related anxiety. The absence of gender differences on any of the motivational or proficiency variables contributes to an increasing body of evidence suggesting that presently men and women do not differ in how they view or perform the social behaviour of giving criticism.

Overall, our findings appear to be consistent with the view that people operate within an avoidance learning paradigm such that only when the situation clearly calls for criticism do people actually criticize. Their motivation to give criticism tends to be low because this behaviour is seen by-and-large as incongruent with maintaining har- monious interpersonal relationships. Global assertiveness-related anxiety, linked to previous attempts at these assertive social behaviours, may play an inhibitory motiva- tional role up to the point where the demands of the situation (their desire for behaviour change on the part of the other person) become greater and force the person to re- spond, whereupon a relatively poor quality critical response is produced.

Our results, in combination with evidence that people are interested in becoming better at giving criticism, highlight the need for training programmes targeting these observed deficiencies in people's criticism behaviour. We invite future researchers to further distinguish the motivational factors (perceived short- versus long-term out- comes) that impact on people's willingness to offer effective criticism.

Piccinin et al. 91

N O T E

Accepted for publication: 25 August 1995. Address correspondence to: S. J. Piccinin, Ph.D., School of Pyschology, University of Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5 Canada.

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