Human Security and the Emergence of a Global Conscience

Ralf Bodelier, Human Security and the Emergence of a Global Conscience. 2011

1

Chapter 2

Human Security and the Emergence of a Global Conscience

Published in:

The New Faces of Victimhood: Globalization, Transnational Crimes and Victim

Rights. Studies in Global Justice. Rianne Letschert (Editor), Jan van Dijk (Editor)

Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2011

Ralf Bodelier

Abstract

There is a new cosmopolitanism in the air, serving as a mindset essential to the process of

globalization. This new cosmopolitanism brought forth at least two policy concepts,

human development and human security. Where human development focuses

exclusively on the interests of the other, human security deals with both the interests of

the other and those of the self. A central concept in new cosmopolitanism is human

dignity. It should be possible to integrate human development and human security

through concentrating on human dignity.

1. Introduction

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the tsunami on Boxing Day 2004, the focus of policy

makers, academics and intellectuals has been moving steadily towards new

cosmopolitanism.1 After the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the process of globalization

had been the point of focus. Today, however, attention has shifted towards the

cosmopolitan mindset essential to this process of globalization. This cosmopolitanism is

new in two respects. It unites the interests of the Self, firmly rooted in one’s own region

and nation, with those of the Other, who is seen as member of the global community. But

new cosmopolitanism also stands for two different phenomena: global fear and global

empathy. Fear results in an increased concern for the self; empathy results in an

increased concern for the other. A central concept related to this concern for the self and

the other is dignity. The self and the other possess an intrinsic dignity that has to be

safeguarded. New cosmopolitanism goes beyond mere philosophizing. It has brought

1 I realize that the choice for 9/11 and the 2004 tsunami is debatable. To illustrate an idea similar to the one in this

paper, Derrida and Habermas choose two different but equally impacting incidents in the spring of 2003. The security

aspect is the morally obscene support (in their opinion) of several European countries for the war US president Bush

wages on Iraq (January 2003). The concern aspect is represented by the protests against this very war in London,

Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin and Paris on 15 February 2003.

Habermas, Jürgen and Jacques Derrida (2003), ‘Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas’, Frankfurter

Allgemeinen Zeitung, 31 May.


2

forth at least two policy concepts, human development and human security. Where

human development focuses exclusively on the interests of the other, human security

deals with both the interests of the other and those of the self. Of the two, human security

is therefore more closely linked to new cosmopolitanism. Due to its exclusive focus on the

interests of the other, it was possible to translate the human development program into a

Human Development Index and incorporate the program into the Millennium

Development Goals. Impressive global support followed. Human security, on the other

hand, did not easily translate into concrete tools or applications. There are no Human

Security Goals, there is no Human Security Index, and only relatively few have heard of

human security at all. Why is it that this concept does not take hold; it fits new

cosmopolitanism like a glove. What has to be done to flesh it out? A possible answer can

be found in integrating the two concepts and in seriously rethinking and researching its

origins, i.e. new cosmopolitanism and its related concept dignity.

2. A new cosmopolitanism

Whereas the last decennia of the 20th century were characterized by globalization, the

first decennium of the 21st century clearly shows increased interest in the mindset of

globalization: cosmopolitanism. Or rather: New Cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism is a moral and political concept. The concept of an ideal

community, which contrary to traditional communities, does not exist by virtue of

excluding the other. Whereas a traditional community is organized around exclusive

concepts like family, tribe, people, religion or nation, and ignores, excludes, conquers,

assimilates or even kills those that do not belong to this family, tribe, people, religion or

nation, cosmopolitanism focuses on an inclusive principle, on the belief that a number of

basic human values allow people to unite. These human values are equality, mutual

respect, tolerance, justice, non-violence and compassion.

In turn, these human values protect that what makes man human: his intrinsic

dignity; the fact that he can never be a means to an end – he can only be the end itself.

Immanuel Kant clearly distinguishes between dignity and value. Whereas values are

always ascribed by people, human dignity is original, it is an absolute inner value. The

human values that aim to protect human dignity therefore coincide with what Kant called

“the moral law within me,” as a compelling and basic notion of right and wrong; A notion

that without being hampered by religious or regional moral codes or views includes a

fundamental idea of what our society is and what it should be.2

A global community based on dignity, or rather human dignity, protected by human

values. This is the essence of cosmopolitanism. New cosmopolitanism claims that this

2 Obviously, this view does not go unchallenged. Martha Nussbaum painfully points out that Kant is referring to a

very specific member of the human race: the intelligent, active, male citizen. Women, the handicapped, and ‘non

human animals’ do not enter Kant’s definition. This, however, did not stop John Rawls from building the most

influential defence of justice in the 20th century entirely on Kant’s views. Nussbaum, Martha (2006), Grensgebieden

van het Recht. Over sociale rechtvaardigheid, Amsterdam, p. 57.


3

rather abstract form of global citizenship can exist next to a mild form of patriotism.3

“What makes modern cosmopolitanism modern, is not so much that it stands for a

universal human community over and above local loyalties, but rather that it seeks to

reconcile the idea of universal species wide human solidarity with particular solidarities

that are smaller and more specific than the human species,” states sociologist Robert

Fine.4 Philosopher Alain Finkielkraut chooses the following words: “To give the other

what he is due, to honour him as a human being and as other, to acknowledge the

similarities and at the same time welcome the differences between people, who would not

embrace this great ambition?”5

The main difference between our time and Immanuel Kant’s 18th century is that

exploring the world is no longer the exclusive domain of a select group of intellectuals,

merchants or the establishment. There are practically no limits to travel, economies the

world over have almost completely merged into a global economy, global networks of the

Internet, radio, television, telephone and newspaper; all these phenomena make it

possible for increasingly large numbers of people to follow what is happening in the lives

of others. It also opens ways to intervene in the lives of others or to assume a degree of

responsibility.

In a global community it is also possible to finally be a true kosmou politês. For

the first time in history we can actually test the cosmopolitan philosophy in real life.

“The important fact now is that the human condition has itself become

cosmopolitan,” writes Ulrich Beck, one of the world’s most leading thinkers where

globalization is concerned:

We need only highlight the fact that the most recent avatar in the genealogy of global risks, the

threat of terror, also knows no borders. The same is true in the protest against the war in Iraq.

For the first time a war was treated as an event in global domestic politics, with the whole of

humanity participating simultaneously through the mass media. (…) In this way

cosmopolitanism has ceased to be merely a controversial rational idea; in however distorted

form, it has left the realm of philosophical castles in the air and has entered reality. 6

Since the start of the new millennium new cosmopolitanism has become the subject of

intellectual discourse among a wide range of academics; not only Martha Nussbaum,

3 Only recently fiercely defended by Kwame Anthony Appiah, commuting between his Ghanese place of birth Kumasi

and global Princeton. Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2006), Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Stranger, London.

4 Fine, Robert (2007), Cosmopolitanism, London, Routledge, p. 15.

5 According to Alain Finkielkraut. Finkielkraut, Alain and Peter Sloterdijk (2005), De hartslag van de wereld,

Nijmegen, p. 37.

6 Beck, Ulrich (2007), The Cosmopolitan Vision, Cambridge, Introduction.


4

Robert Fine, Kwame Anthony Appiah and Alain Finkielkraut, but also Peter Singer,7

Amartya Sen,8 Jacques Derrida9 and Jürgen Habermas.10

They all elaborate on the idea that this global view, this cosmopolitan state of mind, is

essential in order to recognize and address global issues. Moreover, they are all convinced

that – in whatever form – this new cosmopolitanism is here to stay.

Obviously, this view will also meet fierce opposition. In the eyes of quite a few skeptics

cosmopolitanism is a runaway project of a small minority who will profit from the process

of globalization11, but who have completely lost touch with “ordinary citizens” and their

fears, needs and interests. To them cosmopolitanism represents estrangement and

artificiality.

The American political scientist Benjamin Barber, for instance, labels

cosmopolitanism as “McWorld” and uses the phrase “toxic cosmopolitanism of global

markets” to express his disapproval.12 “In an overly tribalized world, cosmopolitanism

might be a useful counterpoint,” states Barber. “But ours is a world disenchanted in

which Gemeinschaft and neighborhood, have for the most part been supplanted by

Gesellschaft and bureaucracy. What we require are healthy, democratic forms of local

community and civic patriotism rather than abstract universalism and the thin gruel of

contract relations.”13

Skeptics like Barber are convinced of the fact that cosmopolitanism and e.g.

nationalism or regionalism, are non-comparable phenomena. Whereas the latter are

coloured by emotion and originality, cosmopolitanism is primarily a project of detached

intellectuals. These skeptics doubt the globalization of morality and warn against

overrating the powers of compassion. Cosmopolitan projects, they state, would have to be

discontinued, starting with the European Union.14

7 The world can no longer do without global morality, states ethicist Peter Singer. In earlier days morality could hide

in the extensive family, the village or the region; today the world is a global village. Therefore, our morality has to be a

global morality. ‘We must develop an ethical basis on which to build a communal world in the next century.’

Singer, Peter (2002), One World: Ethics and Globalization, New Haven.

8 Sen, Amartya (2006), Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, New Dehli.

9 Derrida, Jacques (2001), On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (Thinking in Action), London and New York,

Routledge.

10 Habermas, Jürgen (2001), The Postnational Constellation, Cambridge MIT Press.

11 Bovens, Mark and Anchrit Wille (2009), Diploma Democracy. On the Tensions between Meritocracy and

Democracy, Verkenning for the NWO programme Contested Democracies, Utrecht/ Leiden.

12 Barber, Benjamin R. (1996), ‘Constitutional Faith’ in Martha C. Nussbaum, For Love of Country?, Boston, Beacon

Press, p. 36.

13 Ibid. p. 31.

14 Ritter, Henning (2004), Nahes und Fernes Unglück. Versuch über das Mitleid, München, Beck.

Cuperus, René (2006,) ‘Europe and the Revenge of National Identity’ in: René Cuperus , K.A. Duffek , E. Fröschl T.

Mörschel (eds.), The Eu. A Global Player?, Münster, pp. 129-144.


5

However, this proposition that a cosmopolitan view were an artificial construct

which could never compare to more direct forms of human compassion – e.g. at the level

of a small village community – does not show great knowledge of historic developments.

At one time, at the transition from village Gemeinschaft to national Gesellschaft, a

similar reaction was seen: nationalism was thought to be strange and artificial. Nowadays

it is completely natural for almost each individual to consider himself subject of a nation,

and to stand up for those fellow subjects that live within the boundaries of that nation.

Therefore, there is little reason to assume that this circle of sympathy would not spread.

At this point I could put forward the sociological question whether or not this new

cosmopolitanism is indeed spreading in this first decennium of the 21st century. The

question, whether or not the intellectual debate actually represents a social development

or – as is suggested by the skeptics – whether it is merely limited to a prominent but

small group of western intellectuals. I will try to answer this question at a later point in

this paper.

First, I choose to put forward a rather more philosophical question. How relevant

is it to actually know whether or not the number of protagonists of cosmopolitan morality

is indeed increasing? It might be much more relevant to know about the organizing

potential of new cosmopolitanism. Or, to be like Robert Fine15 and rephrase a quote by

Immanuel Kant, who wrote in 1784, commenting on his age: “If it is now asked whether

we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is no. But we do live in an age of

enlightenment.” Today, Fine repeats Kant’s words:

We do not live in a cosmopolitan age but we do live in an age of cosmopolitanism. As things

are, we have a long way to go but we do have distinct indications that the way is being cleared

for a cosmopolitan future so long as artificial measures are not deliberately adopted to prevent

it. The age of cosmopolitanism may be understood more as a normative perspective for viewing

the potentialities and necessities of our age than as an objective characterization of the age

itself.16

Fine makes an important observation. By surpassing the question whether or not we will

become cosmopolites, he defines the phenomenon as a magnetic field which – in an age

of globalization – organizes our way of thinking. Cosmopolitanism provides us with a tool

to understand the start of the third millennium. Albeit that the boundaries of

cosmopolitanism are still vague and that, for now, we can only speak of it in probing

terms.

This open attitude towards new cosmopolitanism seems right to me. The concept

is broad (ranging from a moral understanding between individuals, aimed at maintaining

dignity, at any one place on this earth, to a global legal order and a political ideology). At

the same time cosmopolitanism is “old,” often discussed and judged, subject to

15 Fine, Robert (2007), Cosmopolitanism, London, Routledge, p. 33.

16 Ibid.


6

traditional definitions and therefore not easily transferred into a promising subject of

well-defined research or policymaking.

At this point in time, cosmopolitanism is mainly to be seen as a sign of the times, a

sociological umbrella term and perhaps even a rallying cry that defines an actual

development in general terms and assigns it a number of general characteristics.

Two of these characteristics are the following. First of all there is the unification

of the individual’s global human dignity with the need for local patriotism. The second

characteristic is the fact that it moves around two phenomena, viz. a growing need for

security and a growing need for development, a worldwide realization of global risks and

an equally worldwide realization of global suffering.

3. Global fear and concern for the self

Around the globe, the attacks of September 11 awakened an already existing but so far

dormant fear17 and subsequently these attacks mobilized the global concern for the self.

For many the Al Qaida attacks were a first confrontation with what we could describe as

mutual vulnerability. Suddenly we realized that globalization not only meant buying

tickets in Mumbai for a New York concert; we saw that it works both ways. Terrorists

from Jeddah appeared to have unlimited access to airports in New Jersey.

It was this realization that Ulrich Beck described in its basic form in his

mid-eighties book Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne.18 Contrary

to what the title seems to suggest, this book does not state that we live in an ever more

risk-ridden society. The point is Beck reasons, that we become more and more conscious

of shared risks. This in its turn results in increasingly organizing our society around these

risks. Many of these risks, we have come to realize, are largely self-induced. Modernity

has not only brought us enormous advantages, it also increased the possible occurrence

of large-scale accidents. This realization makes us sensitive to the achievements of our

day. Beck’s “andere Moderne” is thus a reflexive modernity; a modernity that continually

scrutinizes itself.

The September 11 attacks showed the vulnerability of this modernity. In one

crushing blow the crashing planes destroyed the nationwide misconception that modern

day dangers could be successfully averted on the national level. The dangers of a high

tech, state of the art society can only be understood and overcome globally. More than

twenty years after the publication of Risikogesellschaft the risks have proved to be global,

viz. climate change, SARS, avian influenza or bird flu, international terrorism. What is

more, September 11 also triggered the universal realization that these risks were here to

stay. We no longer live in a Risikogesellschaft – Risk Society – but in a

Weltrisikogesellschaft – World Risk Society.19

17 Moisi, Dominique (2009), De geopolitiek van emotie. Hoe culturen van angst, vernedering en hoop de wereld

veranderen, Amsterdam, p. 145.

18 Beck, Ulrich (1986), Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt am Main.

19 Beck, Ulrich (2007),Weltrisikogesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main.


7

Rather pleasantly surprised Beck states that on the rebound this increasing global

risk awareness guides us towards a cosmopolitan society; a society which searches global

solutions for global issues, at the same time critically reflecting on our global modernity.

But there is more. Beck’s cosmopolitan view not only focuses on concern for the self, i.e.

the concern stemming from risk realization. He also expresses a wish for revival of a

historic “European” form of cosmopolitanism. A global citizenship which shows concern

for the other, for the immigrant and the stranger, whom we need to treat with respect and

empathy for his being different.20

Ulrich Beck was a true pioneer in 1986. Perhaps international society was not

ready to receive and notice his views. Not surprisingly, his Risikogesellschaft was not

translated in English until a good six years after its first publication.21 In 1993, a year

after Beck’s English translation, German essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger wrote his

Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg. Enzensberger noticed global chaos and situated it in a

region where people were less likely to feel at risk: in Western Europe. He saw advancing

terrorists and cunning Mafiosi. He introduced his readers to ruthless skinheads, drugs

gangs, vandals and death squads. And it appeared that they mainly came from abroad;

from Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom and Latin America. Enzensberger not only

saw German left-wing radicals celebrate their atavistic freedom in squatted properties.

He also saw Polish car thieves hang around covered car parks, he saw Columbian drugs

cartels ship their goods into Europe and he read how British office workers turned into

football hooligans over the weekend.22

Enzensberger concluded that Europe – becoming ever more globalized – was entirely

helpless against this “pandemonium of mindless violence, drugs tourism, football

supporters, alcohol abuse, child porn, gunrunning, hypodermics, broken beer bottles,

dildos and guns,” as Jaffe Vink – a Dutch fellow-publicist – described it several years

later. 23

What Enzensberger did for Europe, American journalist Robert Kaplan did for

the United States. Kaplan traveled through West Africa when researching his article and

(afterwards) his book The Coming Anarchy (1994). He predicted that what he saw in

Liberia and Sierra Leone, would also become America’s fate:

West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal

stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger. Disease,

overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing

erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies,

20 An argument soon subject to the criticism that Beck allowed himself to be led by his cosmopolitan ambition. That

– in his desire to establish a globalist outlook – Beck seemed to have forgotten his critical analysis of the risk society.

Martell, Luke (2008), ‘Beck’s Cosmopolitan Politics’, Contemporary Politics, 14(2): 129-43.

21 Beck, Ulrich (1992), Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, New Delhi.

22 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus (1993), Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg, Frankfurt am Main.

23 Vink, Jaffe (2001), Brief aan mijn dochter. Amsterdam.


8

security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a

West African prism. West Africa provides an appropriate introduction to the issues, often

extremely unpleasant to discuss, that will soon confront our civilization. To remap the political

earth the way it will be a few decades hence – as I intend to do in this article – I find I must

begin with West Africa.24

Now that the story of the risk society had turned into a cruel and unwelcome reality, a

growing need for a new perspective on security became more and more obvious. Whether

or not Enzensberger and Kaplan were right, whether the insecurities and risks of our

global society were indeed increasing, it hardly mattered. Beck’s global risk society had

become a political issue, which no government could ignore any longer.

Due to the fact that the threat no longer came from government armies (cf. the

Cold War), but from private armies, security firms and international drugs cartels

(Kaplan) and skinheads, vandals and death squads (Enzensberger) retreating to the

safety of the state’s national borders was not enough. Even less so because now the front

line was not made up of brave warriors but of ordinary people who were confronted with

drugs, child porn and guns while at work or engaged in leisure activities. State Security

was clearly no guarantee for the personal security of individuals, no matter where on the

globe they found themselves. For the first time in modern history the national borders –

sacrosanct since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 – were deemed less important than the

safety of those living within these borders.

Human security, argued Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, one of its most

prominent advocates, “(It) is, in essence, an effort to construct a global society where the

safety of the individual is at the centre of international priorities and a motivating force

for international action.”25

4. Global empathy and the concern for the other

The global concern for the other became apparent in the wave of charity that rolled over

the world after the December 2004 tsunami. Over 230 thousand lives were lost; one

million were left in despair and shock. Their fate triggered a so far unheard of need to

help others. Largely in that part of the world where people have access to the global

media networks of CNN and BBC. The part with economic, technological and cultural

ties: the global part. This part of the world donated no less than thirteen billion dollars in

aid for the victims of the tsunami. Many traveled to Asia over their Christmas holidays to

help tsunami victims.

Skeptics were quick to point out that tsunami victims received these billions of

dollars because of the rosy Christmas mood, the horrifyingly vivid images of the tsunami

24 Kaplan, Robert (1994), ‘The Coming Anarchy’, The Atlantic Monthly, February.

www.theatlantic.com/doc/199402/anarchy/2 (Accessed 20 August 2008).

25 Lloyd Axworthy talks to Canada World View.

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/special/se1t3-en.asp (Accessed on 14 August 2008).

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199402/anarchy/2

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/special/se1t3-en.asp


9

and the fact that many had visited the holiday destinations of Thailand and Sri Lanka.

They were not entirely wrong.

Even so, this generosity proves that not only our concern but also our need to

help turns global. In an often-cited comment which he wrote shortly after the tsunami,

British historian Timothy Garton Ash used the term moral globalization for this

phenomenon. 26 According to Ash we feel a moral obligation towards those who are less

fortunate, regardless of where they find themselves on this globe.

Ash turned out to be right sooner than he would have hoped. October 8, 2005:

the earth moved in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. Eighty thousand lives were lost. In

November, a month after the quake, almost six billion dollars in aid had been put aside.

This time the money was not meant to help countries well known by tourists. And

this time neither CNN nor BBC presented spectacular television coverage of this natural

disaster. Not one of the victims was a white holidaymaker. All of the victims appeared on

TV were bearded orthodox Muslims who lived in an inaccessible mountain area where

few tourists ever set foot.

Ash observed that “rich westerners increasingly identify with those living in other

(far away) parts of the world, towards whom they feel a moral responsibility.” Again, he

was probably right.

Neither the global concern for the self nor the global concern for the other can be

separated from the process of globalization. People from the south and people from the

west will undeniably enter each others “worlds” and because of their mere presence they

create the conditions to know the other(s) as fellow humans.

He who is conscious of the vulnerability of others – even if they live on the other

side of the globe – is likely to commit himself to these others. American psychologist C.

Daniel Batson proposed that empathy, the ability to share and understand another’s

feelings and emotions, triggers altruism, the wish to support and aid the other. Batson

calls this his “empathy – altruism hypothesis.”27 People who feel genuinely committed to

others often feel the need to help them; especially when they have the means to do so.

Even though they personally have no ties whatsoever with the person who caused the

suffering, nor (do they have) any personal ties with the victim. Even possible drawbacks

connected to this help are taken for granted.

According to Daniel Batson, we have to amend our view of human motivation.

The idea that people are solely motivated by personal gain is obsolete. The more people

are able to understand another’s situation, the sooner they are prepared to lend

support.28 Sociologists have not yet named the phenomenon, but it appears that we not

26 Garton Ash, Timothy (2005), ‘What will be left? This wave of global solidarity must not end in a detritus of broken

promises’, The Guardian, 6 January.

27 Batson, C. Daniel (2004), ‘Not All Self-Interest After All’. Economics of Empathy-Induced Altruism, Invited paper

Kellogg School of Management, 17 October.

28 Batson et al., C. Daniel (1981), ‘Is empathic emotion a source of altruistic motivation?’, Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 40, pp. 290-302.


10

only live in a global risk society, but also in a global care society. New Cosmopolitanism

is only one of the terms used to describe this growing global care. We also come across:

Global Citizens Movement, Ethical Globalization, Moral Cosmopolitanism,

Cosmopolitan morality, Global Civil Society, Moral Globalization or New Cosmopolitan

Ethics. Whatever the term, we can safely state that the phenomenon is triggered by the

fact that we are increasingly aware of people on the other side of the globe. We are quite

literally more and more “exposed” to the other. Not only to the danger he possesses, also

to his cry for help and protection.29

The nerve center of these needs and desires is globalization itself. Or rather: the

capitalist structure that enables modern globalization. Although an unrestricted

orientation on market values can cause severe human suffering, at the same time the

market acts as a giant global magnet, pulling people towards each other. The market

works as intermediary, as a nexus, which triggers moral action.

Sociologist Natan Sznaider claims that global capitalism draws more and more

people into our circle of sympathy. “The market seems consistently to excite a politically

significant mass of people to believe that cruelty and harm can and must be remedied.

And, crucially, the market provides the means to do something about it. It brings people

inside the circle not only of sympathy, but of effective sympathy.”30

This contemporary combination of global fear and global care becomes apparent

in the growing involvement of the west with the south. The most obvious developments

occur on the part of a growing number of IGO’s (Intergovernmental Organizations) like

UNHCR, the World Bank or the movement that led to the establishment of the

International Criminal Court. Far more interesting than these largely invisible

organizations, is western involvement that travels through newspapers, television and the

Internet and thus reaches the public in their homes. Only public reactions to these global

activities may give an indication of the extent to which this “new cosmopolitanism” finds

fertile ground. And these public reactions exist.

First, there is ethical consumerism. As one of the most visible expressions of

ethical consumerism, Fair Trade has been reporting impressive growth figures, year after

year. In 2006 Fair Trade showed a 42% growth worldwide.31 Second, there is public

support for development aid. “There is concern among the public about aid effectiveness,

Toi et al, M. (1982), ‘More evidence that empathy is a source of altruistic motivation’, Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 43, pp. 281-292.

29 ‘And this is one of the key social foundations of cosmopolitanism. By moral cosmopolitanism, we mean the belief

that our duty to ameliorate the suffering of individuals is more important than any artificial political barrier that may

stand in our way.’

Levy, Daniel and Natan Sznaider (2004), ‘The institutionalization of cosmopolitan morality: the Holocaust and

human rights’, Journal of Human Rights, 3, 2, pp. 143–157.

30 Ibid. 143–157.

31 <http://www.fairtrade.org.uk>


11

but it exists alongside continued high support for aid.”32 A third reaction is widespread

support for humanitarian interventions in conflict areas. Military intervention in war

regions, intended to open the way for humanitarian aid, has the support of nearly 75%of

the Dutch.33 Nearly 70%of all US citizens feel positive about sending troops to Africa in

order to facilitate humanitarian military interventions when genocide occurs. Fourth, an

increasing number of people support an INGO; an International Non-Governmental

Organization, ranging from Abolition 2000 to the World Federation of Trade Unions. In

2008 there were approximately sixty thousand international organizations; in 1985 the

UIA reported twenty thousand. In 1910 there were a mere 200.34

A fifth reaction is support for CSR. Corporate social responsibility is what

corporations contribute to the humanitarian empire. When CSR came into existence in

the seventies of the last century, companies felt the pressure of their stakeholders when it

came to sustainable entrepreneurship. Towards the end of the 21st century CSR became a

matter of course. Stuart Hart calls this sea change “From Obligation to Opportunity”; for

companies new opportunities presented themselves with this concern for environment

and human rights.35

A sixth phenomenon is the small charities. A rough estimate shows that a small

country like the Netherlands has between ten and fifteen thousand of these small (aid)

charities. 36 Most of these private initiatives originated in the nineties and numbers are

still growing. Faced with dire needs of people on the other side of the globe, increasingly

more people decide to do “just something.”37

The seventh public reaction is philanthropy. Private Americans donated 34.8

billion dollars in third world aid in 2006, set against 23.5 billion in official development

aid by the US Government.38 Researchers predicted at the close of the 20th century that

philanthropic US aid donations will reach fifty billion a year in 2010. Although there is

hardly any comparable research in Europe, expectations are that in Europe, too, the

situation looks promising. We might find ourselves on the eve of a “Golden Age of

32 Solignac Lecomte, Henri-Bernard, Ida Mc Donnell and Liam Wegimont (2003), Public Opinion and the Fight

against Poverty, OECD, Paris.

33 NCDO. Burgers over de ontwikkeling in de wereld en het Nederlandse buitenlandbeleid. Participatie NCDO

Mentality-meting, 2005.

34 <http://www.uia.be/en/yearbook>

35 Hart, Stuart (2005), Capitalism at the Crossroads. The unlimited business opportunities in solving the most

difficult problems, Pearson Education Inc., New Jersey.

36 NCDO. Draagvlak voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking binnen Nederland en de rol van NCDO. Amsterdam 2005.

37 Vossen, Mirjam (2007), Eerste Hulp bij Ontwikkelingswerk, Tilburg.

38 Index of Global Philanthropy 2008 Hudson Institute. Press release ‘Index of Global Philanthropy shows

innovative private giving transforming aid to developing countries’, 12 May 2008.

<http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/gpr%20release%20for%20mailing.pdf> (Accessed 2 September 2008)


12

Philanthropy.” People in developing countries can count on considerably more concern,

money and protection in the future.39

5. Human Development

New cosmopolitanism, a twentieth century phenomenon with a focus on human values

which protect human dignity; it has so far brought us two major concepts: Human

Development and Human Security, two concepts that place the concern for the self and

the concern for the other in a global perspective and aim to translate them into workable

strategies.

The first and most widely known concept is that of human development. This

concept continually stresses the unacceptability of extreme poverty. Viewing the world in

terms of human development started in the early eighties of the last century. Before that,

it was customary to define development in terms of economic development, i.e. economic

growth and national income.

Human development left this economic perspective and began to focus on a much wider

sense of development. Using the motto People First, human development pioneers stated

that development first and foremost has to focus on actual people and on the potential of

people to bring about actual change in their situation. The United Nations Development

Program states on its website that human development stands for “creating an

environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive,

creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. People are the real wealth of

nations. Development is thus about expanding the choices people have to lead lives that

they value.”40

The human development concept was designed in 1980 by the Pakistani

economist Mahbub ul Haq and has since been used by the UNDP in its annual Human

Development Reports. Ul Haq’s human development vision is to a large extent based on

the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen.41 This economist, who finds a

supporter in philosopher Martha Nussbaum42, believes development should not be

focusing on e.g. economic growth or alleviation of hunger and disease, in fact it should

augment people’s potential and thus enable them to develop themselves. Sen states:

Capabilities are the range of things that people can do or be in life. The most basic capabilities

for human development are to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access

to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of

39 Havens, John J. and Paul G. Schervish (1999), Millionaires and the Millennium: New Estimates of the

Forthcoming Wealth Transfer and the Prospects for a Golden Age of Philanthropy, Boston.

40 UNDP. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/>

41 Sen, Amartya (1999), Development as freedom, Oxford.

42 Nussbaum, Martha C. and Amartya Sen (eds.) (1993), The Quality of Life, Oxford, Clarendon Press.


13

the community. Without these, many choices are simply not available, and many opportunities

in life remain inaccessible.43

The most tangible and widely known implementation of the human development concept

is found in the Millennium Development Goals. 44 Contrary to earlier economic

programs, these goals embody the first development plan that is closely connected to new

cosmopolitanism; this is mainly due to the practical approach of “Human Development

Meets Result-Based Management.”45 It (the plan) also fits in with moral globalization,

the willingness of those in the wealthy and safe north to dedicate themselves to less

poverty and insecurity in the south. Many western nations use these goals to prioritize

within their aid programs. The Netherlands, for instance, chose HIV/AIDS, water,

environment and reproductive health as main objectives of their aid policy, not arbitrarily

but mainly because they contribute to the Millennium Goals.46

The results, and – no less important – the lack of results can be found in the

Human Development Index. This HDI, which was developed in 1990, compares three sets

of data, viz. life expectancy, education and purchasing power and translates them into a

global ranking of 177 nations (out of a total of 192). These nations can then be subdivided

in three categories: nations showing (very) high human development, medium human

development or low human development. In this last category we find no less than 25

nations that – without exception – are located on the African continent (HDI 2008).

With a minor reservation, it is safe to state that most people in these 25 nations

must be categorized as belonging to the “absolute poor.” Efforts to stimulate human

development should therefore first and foremost be directed at these absolute poor, as is

suggested by advocates of the Millennium Development Goals. These efforts should

certainly not be directed at those inhabiting the remaining 152 nations.

Accelerating progress in human development and eradicating the worst forms of human

poverty are within our reach, despite challenges and setbacks. We know what to do. And the

world has the resources needed to do it. Success is now to be found in strengthening

partnerships, building political momentum for reform and pledging strong commitments for

action followed by real action.47

43 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/> (Accessed January 3 2009).

44 Human Development Report 2003, Millennium Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Human

Poverty, New York.

45 Hulme, David (2007), The Making of the Millennium Development Goals: Human Development Meets

Results-Based Management in an Imperfect World, Brooks World Poverty Institute BWPI Working Paper, 16

December.

46 Policy document Foreign Aid 2007-2011 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/pdf/os-subsidies/080029_een-zaak-van-iedereen.pdf> (Accessed 11 January

2009).

47 Human Development Report 1998, Chapter 1. The state of human development, New York, p. 37.


14

The realization of the Human Development Index by means of the Millennium Goals is

widely supported, by the United States, countries in the EU and Japan, but also by such

institutions as the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD. Through these Millennium Goals

the human development concept also attracts a lot of support and attention from the

general public.48 The June 2005 Live8 concerts – Make Poverty History – were aired by

182 television channels and 2000 radio stations. The broadcasters stated they reached

three billion people.49

6. Human Security

Not only human development but also human security is closely connected to the human

values of new cosmopolitanism. Human security may even be more closely connected,

although the concept is relatively new and not as widely known as human development.

In a way human security is both a further specialization and an extension of

human development. It was Mahbub ul Haq, the designer of the Human Development

Index, who placed human security on the global agenda. In the 1994 Human

Development Report New Dimensions in Human Security50 he again adheres to the

People First concept. However, he now argues that realistic options for people to actively

change their situations should also include a security component.

Where human development focuses exclusively on a long and healthy life, on

education and access to health care, human security also mentions violation of human

rights and vulnerability caused by crime and political violence.

The most widely accepted and discussed concept of human security51 includes

seven subcategories: 1. Economic security, 2. Food security, 3. Health security, 4.

Environmental security, 5. Personal security, 6. Community security and 7. Political

security.

The first four are well-known to most, as they are included verbatim in the

Millennium Development Goals. Inclusion of the last three lends human security a

considerably more comprehensive scope than human development. It rightly focuses on

those areas that have been unjustly neglected by the aid industry, such as personal,

communal and political security.

We know, after all, that extreme poverty is not limited to un(der)employment,

hunger, disease and an exhausted environment. Large-scale research among the most

48 Although in Europe the term Millennium Development Goals is known to only 18 per cent of the population. Only

four per cent know exactly what they are. Ergo, 82 per cent of all Europeans have no notion of the MDGs. When

asked, however, most Europeans do fully support the goals. The European Commission, Europeans and

Development Aid, Report, June 2007.

49 <http://www.live8live.com/whathappened/>

50 Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions in Human Security

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>

51 It is this – probably most widely supported - model of Human Security that will be elaborated on in this paper. For

a clear overview of other definitions, go to wikipedia

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security>


15

severely deprived (Voices of the Poor project in 200052) shows that the extreme poor

experience lack of security as an immense problem. Moreover, a large majority state that

they feel a lot less safe than during the late eighties of the last century.

This lack of security combined with fear results in a narrowing chasm between

the poor of the south and those of the wealthy west, who – due to the dynamics of

globalization – feel increasingly less secure, as Rianne Letschert and Jan van Dijk rightly

state in the first chapter of this book.

By attaching this much importance to the security aspect, human security – more

powerfully than human development – represents the new cosmopolitan ambition or

dream as some would have it53, that the Good Life must be within everyone’s reach.

“Everyone” includes not only the slum dweller in Kinshasa, but also the single mother in

the notoriously criminal Watts District in Los Angeles and the business man in his Kyoto

gated community.

It is an all-encompassing claim, made more explicit by the authors of the 1994

Human Development Report. Thus, they state 1. Human security is a universal concern.

It is relevant to people everywhere in the world. 2. The seven components are

interdependent and interwoven at the global level 3. Human Security focuses on

prevention rather than intervention. 4. Human Security focuses on people rather than

nations. 54

This broad concept of human security makes for an even more ambitious goal

than that of its already ambitious predecessor human development.

Human Security is “a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, an

ethnic tension that did not explode, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that

was not crushed.”55

The concept is not only more ambitious because it includes a rather high level of

international relations, human rights and crime prevention. Its main asset is that it has

extended its territory to the global level. Where human development had restricted its

focus to the one and a half billion extremely poor in the south, human security addresses

all six billion people worldwide. Not only the slum dweller in poverty stricken Zambia

may count on the protection of human security, but also the well-to-do citizen of the

Netherlands.

Contrary to human development, human security does not place the major safety

threats a priori in the south. The architects of human security state that in a globalized

52 World Bank, Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? Washington, 2000.

53 ‘A humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from poverty and despair, is still a dream for

many and should be enjoyed by all.’ Human Security Network 1999, A Perspective on Human Security. Chairman's

Summary 1st Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Lysøen, Norway, May 20.

<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php> (Accessed on 12 August 2008).

54 Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions in Human Security, pp. 23 -24.

55 Ul Haq, Mahbub (1995), Reflections on Human Development, Oxford, p.116.


16

world, each individual is confronted with severe instances of insecurity. Those in the

west no less than those in the south.

Therefore, New Dimensions in Human Security (1994) should not be seen as an

isolated publication of its time. In the same decennium, books like Enzensberger’s

Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg (1993), Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy (1994) and the

American translation of Beck’s Risk Society (1992) were published. The seven categories

of global insecurity mentioned in the report, intertwine the car park fears of Enzenberger

with Kaplan’s African hell and Beck’s growing risk consciousness.

Not only does human security break with the former distinction of the secure north

versus the insecure south, it also refuses to rigidly judge in terms of perpetrators and

victims. In a globalized society also the rich and powerful may become victims. Similarly

the poor may turn into perpetrators.

Both the 2001 attacks and the 2004 tsunami violently proved this analysis of the

human security concept. Suddenly not only the persecuted and detained leader of the

Myanmar opposition or the HIV infected Zambian appeared under threat. Also the

successful American business man who unwittingly entered an – Afghan made – flying

bomb on 11 September 2001 suddenly became part of the World Risk Society. Not only

the poor Thai fisherman on his way to his small vessel, but also the wealthy Swedish

tourist lounging in this beach chair after a rich Christmas breakfast, drowned in an

immense wall of water in 2004.

Where the human development concept finds its roots in global empathy for the

poor regions of the world, the human security concept is based on the realization that – in

a global society like ours – one’s security depends increasingly on the security of the

other.56 He who expects to find security in Oslo or Taipei must also ensure it in Tbilisi

or Zimbabwe. Global security is only as strong as its weakest link. Human security

intertwines the fate of the Kinshasa slum dweller with that of an Amsterdam millionaire.

“Insecurity can no longer be contained – violence has a tendency to cross

borders,” writes Mary Kaldor. “Not in the form of attacks by foreign regimes but through

terrorism, organized crime or extreme ideologies.”57 “Human Security is not a problem

confined only to the developing world,” agree Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy.

56 ‘Security threats emerge as a direct consequence of dysfunctional regimes in their multiple, though overlapping,

sub-systemic dimensions. The reproduction and expansion of mutual vulnerabilities (and insecurity), at both the

micro and macro levels, expresses itself through closely related and interconnected thrusts. The same is the case with

its opposite — security.’

Nef, Jorge 1999, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. The Global Political Economy of Development and

Underdevelopment (2nd edition), Canada.

Available on the internet:

<www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9383-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html> (Accessed 19 August 2008).

57 Kaldor, Mary (2007), Human Security, p. 196.


17

And the North does not have all the ‘solutions’ for it through interventions, financial assistance

or responsibility to protect. The concept easily extends itself to Western societies threatened as

they are by urban violence, job insecurities, epidemics, privatization of social delivery,

militarization of societies, etc. The challenge of studying the scope of human security issues in

Western societies is, perhaps, more than before and more than in other areas of the world, an

imperative.58

If new cosmopolitanism is characterized by two phenomena – the concern for the self

and the concern for the other – human security as a concept that at present correlates

strongest with new cosmopolitanism. “Human Security concerns transcend the

traditional statist confines of national security and tend to focus on elimination or

prevention of the causes of threats to human security.” Moreover, where “state security”

had been exclusive since the 17th century, mainly focusing on the own society, human

security is inclusive and universal.59 “Basically, it is the cosmopolitan alternative.”60

7. Human Security and cosmopolitanism

Expressly because of this correlation with new cosmopolitanism human security adopts

some of its characteristics. In a similar way to the characterization of new

cosmopolitanism as a “normative perspective for viewing the potentialities and

necessities of our age than as an objective characterization of the age itself”61, such a view

could also hold true for human security. Human security as a magnetic field which

organizes our chain of thought on security and poverty in a global world, rather than

leading to immediate priority setting or action agendas. In this it clearly differs from the

human development concept which led to both the Millennium Development Goals and

the Human Development Index.

While the intellectual Human Development Concept materialized in the

Millennium Development Goals, it is not inconceivable that human security will remain

an intellectual concept lacking the potential to create a toolbox for implementing security

on a global scale. In that case, Human Security will continue describing an actually

occurring development in general terms and providing it with general characteristics. It is

precisely that, what has been happening since the launch of human security in 1994. Over

the past fifteen years it has mainly been the subject of political and intellectual discourse.

Fierce polemics developed between those researchers and policy makers who denounced

the concept for its wide scope, and those who advocated it for precisely that reason, its

wide scope and universal qualities. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy’s

comprehensive work on human security is actually an enormous attempt to define the

58 Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha M. Chenoy (2007), Human Security. Concepts and Implications, New

York, p. 243.

59 Hayden, Patrick (2005), Cosmopolitan Global Politics. The pursuit of a humane world order, Burlington, p. 72.

60 Johnson, Alan (2007), New Wars and Human Security: An Interview with Mary Kaldor, London.

<http://www.democratiya.com/review.asp?reviews_id=117>

61 Ibid.


18

concept and to redesign it into a manageable model for research and policymaking. To

that effect it makes use of a large number of charts, diagrams and graphs. 62

Thus, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy cite no less than 21 academic definitions of human

security. The various ways in which national governments address human security is

ranging from a narrow minimalist variety aimed at military protection to a maximum

variety aimed at creating dignity.

One critic who continually surfaces in the polemics with only one article is Roland

Paris. He jogs the debate in autumn 2001 by asking (himself) whether human security is

a paradigm shift or merely hot air. He states it could be a paradigm shift because it has

actually brought about some changes. Signs of a possible paradigm shift can – according

to Paris and others – be found in the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997 and the lobby that would

eventually lead to the International Criminal Court in 2002.

In the end Paris chooses the hot air qualification because the concept of human

security remains elusive where it comes to clearly defining it. “The term appears to be

slippery by design,” he writes and he believes there are forces at work. Paris states that

the human security concept is to a large extent embraced by a conglomerate of so called

“middle power states,” aid organizations and NGOs that would soon crumble if the

concept were to be clearly defined.

In 2005 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh summarizes the then current debate in “seven

challenging questions.”63 Should these seven questions remain unanswered, the concept

enters the danger zone and may not survive. Tadjbakhsh, too, believes that the major

challenge is the matter of defining the concept. “Without a consensus on the definition of

human security, it will be difficult to implement and decide on a common human security

program. Today, there is an agreement that human security should be taken from a

people-centered more than a state-centered approach, but as mentioned above, the

definition or scope of human security is still vague.”

She also raises the question: who is ultimately responsible for the implementation of

human security? And, which priorities it should set; which threats and insecurities

deserve more attention than others? “Once again this also raises the issue of the scope of

security.” The answers to such questions will most likely not be found without a proper,

i.e. clear definition of human security.

8. Differenzierungsverlust

This lack of a clear definition of human security and, therefore, the lack of a carefully

drafted list of priorities and an action agenda, has obvious implications. Among other

things, it will lead to views on insecurity of individuals worldwide, without taking into

consideration the difference in level of insecurity of e.g. a random entrepreneur in a


York.

63 Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou (2005), Human Security : The Seven Challenges of Operationalizing the Concept.

‘Human Security: 60 minutes to Convince’, UNESCO, September 13, 14-09-2005, Paris, France.

<http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/unesco_13-09-05.pdf> (Accessed 9 January 2009).


19

wealthy Canadian suburb and an equally random entrepreneur in a Brazilian favela

severely ravaged by gang wars. Similarly, it may lead to views in which obesity in

Australia may appear to be an equally serious form of insecurity as hunger in Ethiopia.

A concrete example of this “indifference” towards insecurity levels is found in the very

report that formed the basis of the entire concept: the Human Development Report 1994.

New Directions in Human Security.64 Although the authors clearly intend to stress the

extreme conditions under which many people have to live, it barely differentiates between

the most diverse forms of insecurity.

To illustrate this: in one and the same paragraph the authors state “In both the

United States and the European Union nearly 15% of the people live below the poverty

line (…) But the most acute problems are in the developing countries where more than a

third of the people live below poverty line.”65 Of course, this statement holds true, but it

entirely ignores the fact that the poverty of an unemployed teacher in Denmark can

hardly be compared to that of a pavement dweller in Bangladesh.

A second example taken from the Human Development Report 1994 is lack of

security for women.

Among the worst personal threats are those to women. In no society are women secure or

treated equally to men. Personal insecurity shadows them from cradle to grave. In the

household, they are the last to eat. At school, they are the last to be educated. At work, they are

the last to be hired and the first to be fired. And from childhood through adulthood, they are

abused because of their gender.66

Here, again, there is no differentiation between e.g. countries like Ukraine or Pakistan

where women are notoriously in danger of being (trafficked and) forced to work as

prostitutes, or in danger of becoming victims of honour murders, and countries like

Norway or Canada where the differences between men and women are practically

negligible.

The same problem is found in a second basic document: Human Security Now.

Protecting and empowering people67 of 2003, a report by the Commission on Human

Security which was initiated by Kofi Annan. This report – of which the authors’

commitment to the people who are absolute insecure is not questioned in any way –

hardly differentiates between relative and absolute insecurity.

Thus, in one and the same paragraph it unites malnutrition in Africa with

unemployment in the west. “In Sub-Saharan Africa, death by starvation or malnutrition is

at the horizon of everyday life, a threat that erodes the social fabric. In developed

64 Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions in Human Security.

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>

65 Ibid. p. 26.

66 Ibid. p. 31.

67 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now. Protecting and Empowering People, New York, 2003.


20

countries, continuous unemployment means not only loss of income but also a sense of

total failure and exclusion from society.”68

Nor does Human Security Now differentiate between countries where HIV/AIDS

has become a chronic but controllable disease with hardly any impact on health statistics,

and those countries where the disease leaves a path of destruction causing death and

immense misery. “The HIV/AIDS epidemic alone has made it clear that there is no place

in the world from which a country is disconnected. Increased international cooperation

will be required for effective monitoring, control and eradication of infectious diseases, to

prevent further outbreaks and decrease transmission both within and between

countries.”69

Strictly seen, all these observations are correct – AIDS knows no borders, hunger and

unemployment lead to social isolation, sexual violence occurs in every nation – but they

do suffer from Differenzierungsverlust. They suffer from the inability to see the

differences beyond the similarities, usually the difference between life and death.

Similarities and differences can only be revealed by means of explicit normative criteria.

Only those criteria can decide at what moment an individual’s insecurity becomes

destructive enough to be unacceptable.

Only then will it be possible to define extreme violence in the west, in Europe and

the United States of America. Only then will it be possible to explain why members of a

Hungarian Roma clan need more protection than a noble family in Ghana. Or why the

poverty of the American unemployed and that of Pakistani workers in Dubai deserve

equal attention.

This conclusion is also reached by Sharbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M.

Chenoy at the end of their significant book: “The most urgent research agenda, in our

opinion, is the study of Human Security indicators and by extension the identification of

a threshold of insecurity below which life is unbearable to human beings and should not

be tolerated by those who can do something about it.”70

9. The importance of an index

Would it be possible to view global insecurity in the same way we view global poverty?

Would it be possible to think in terms of absolute and relative insecurity, following the

example of absolute and relative poverty?

Those who speak about poverty, about human underdevelopment, do so based on

this very difference. Terms like absolute and relative poverty are not only clearly defined

by the World Bank. They are also firmly grounded in our social consciousness. For

instance, by the UNDP campaign introducing the first Millennium Development Goal: to

“eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” 71 and by public initiatives through social

68 Ibid. p. 74.

69 Ibid. p. 98.


York, p. 241.

71 <http://www.undp.org/mdg/goal1.shtml>


21

movements, globally managed by the Global Call to Action Against Poverty.72 Moreover,

the status quo of Human Development is reported in the Human Development Index and

conceptualized in the Millennium Development Goals.

Absolute poverty is a fact of life for 1.4 billion people globally. They lack almost

every conceivable commodity: clean drinking water, health care, education, a blanket for

the night and a roof over their heads. The only certainty they have, is the certainty of a

dead-end life and an early death. Their poverty is absolute, because there is no way

anyone could be poorer than they are. The absolute poor find themselves at the very

bottom of human existence. Or: their human dignity is in the balance. Their poverty is

inacceptable to all human beings.

The standard to measure absolute or extreme poverty as applied by the World

Bank is a purchasing power of less than $ 1.25 per day73. This does not even buy enough

food to provide minimum nourishment for the body. It means that 80% of the extremely

poor go hungry every single day. Every year eight million people die simply because they

cannot afford to live. The 1.4 billion extremely poor concentrated on the southern half of

the globe, are perishing.

In contrast, the top half of the income pyramid is represented by 3.3 billion

people who do have access to proper food. Their children go to primary and secondary

schools. They can count on health care and three meals a day. They have electricity,

running water and heating; they use public transport or drive their own cars. Of these 3.3

billion approximately 800 million may count themselves among the absolute rich.

Here too, poverty occurs; A different kind of poverty. This form of poverty is not

only less extreme, it is “relative.” Relative in the sense of “less,” but also in the sense of

“compared to the average income” of the people of the rich country in question.

According to the standards of the OECD – the organization of the thirty richest countries

– a person is relatively poor when he has less than 50% of the average income in his

country. Based on this standard, the total number of poor in the European Union

fluctuates around 10%.74 In the United States – although by a different method – the

official number of poor is 13%.75 Nevertheless, the average poor American family has a

72 <http://www.whiteband.org/>

73 The absolute poverty standard of $1.25 per day was set in August 2008, following the $1 per day standard of 1985.

The sum represents a person’s purchasing power. It allows us to make purchasing power comparisons between

countries, the so-called purchasing power parity. Surviving on $1.25 per day means that you have a daily

consumption of the equivalent you can buy for this sum in the country of the dollar, the United States. The produce

generated by the people in question e.g. crops of rice or corn is included in this $1.25. It means that the actual income

of people living on $1.25 (or less) is significantly less.

74 For the poverty definition of the OECD:

Förster, Michael and Marco Mira d’Ercole (2005), ‘Tackling Poverty’, OECD Observer, March.

<http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1586/Tackling_poverty.html> (Accessed on 16 September

2008).

75 For the poverty definition applied by the United States: U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. The 2007

HSS Poverty Guidelines.


22

car, their own home, air conditioning, a fridge, central heating, a washing machine and a

dryer, a microwave, two cable or satellite televisions, a video player and a dvd player.76

Can and should we make a similar distinction with respect to the insecurity of

individual world citizens? That is, with respect to their human insecurity? Is relative

insecurity in that case insecurity in a society which is highly capable of curbing these

insecurities? And, following this line of thought, is absolute insecurity that of

communities entirely lacking control over potential calamities? Where besides poverty,

also lurking criminals, corrupt governments or sudden natural disasters claim their

victims? Where – in short – human dignity hangs in the balance?

There is currently no comparative standard to define absolute and relative

insecurity. That a distinction exists, as is the case with poverty, is a valid observation.

Absolute insecurity reigns unmistakably in countries at war. Or in areas where the level of

insecurity is such that, although not at war in the strict sense, a situation exists as if this

were the case. A world devoid of any sense of security or protection, in which people are

subjected to danger all the time, and in which each disaster is a matter of life and death.

If we choose to make this distinction between absolute and relative, we need an

explicit standard, a criterion similar to the $ 1.25 per day standard applied by the World

Bank, or the rather more qualitative definition of poverty used by the Human

Development Index.

In our search for an instrument to interpret absolute and relative insecurity, a

Human Security Index would definitely be of help. An HSI, modeled on the Human

Development Index, the HDI. A similar index for human security would not only bring

conceptual clarity, it could also produce a list of priorities as a basis for policy making.

Although we have been using the term human security since 1948,77 sixty years later we

still have to do without a Human Security Index to register and report on the security of

people around the world. The strong appeal of Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider on social

scientists to transform their nationalist agendas into cosmopolitan agendas, 78 is

increasingly finding fertile ground. However, for human security this has had little result.

It must be said that some initiatives to arrive at a comprehensive index were taken, but

each time these attempts either fell through or petered out.79

<http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/07poverty.shtml> (Accessed on 16 September 2008).

76 ‘The mountain man and the surgeon. Reflections on relative poverty in North America and Africa’, The Economist,

24 December 2005.

77 MacFarlane, S. Neil and Yuen Foong Khong (2006), Human Security and the UN. A Critical History,

Bloomington.

78 Beck, Ulrich and Natan Sznaider (2006), ‘Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda’,

The British Journal of Sociology, (57)1.

79 Suggestions for a Human Security Index based on the broad concept of 1994 were made by (among others) the

following academics:

Bajpai, Kanti (2001), Human Security: Concept and Measurement.

<www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_19_1.PDF> (Accessed 16 September 2008).


23

The fact that human security still has no index has its reasons. First of all, a large number

of methodological criteria are impeding the development of an HSI. Data of many –

mainly insecure – countries are not available. If by chance, they do exist, the information

in these datasets is hard to compare. Moreover, it is notoriously complex to define the

criteria necessary for comparison. For instance, how do you compare obesity in the US to

aids in Zimbabwe, or “mindless violence” in the Netherlands to piracy in Somalia?

Thus, it remains unclear what an HSI should reveal in a serious attempt to

answer questions like these. Many variables will have to be “ignored,” which immediately

raises the question which elements the HSI is unintentionally covering up. “Even if it

were possible to create a composite human security index, it is not clear that doing so

would be desirable,” Andrew Mack states in his Human Security Report 2005. “While

composite indices have distinct advantages, simplicity also has a downside. Composite

indices can conceal more information than they convey.”80

There are also numerous political objections. A global Human Security Index will

by definition rank some countries at the top and some at the bottom of the index. A

country at the bottom is apparently not capable of protecting its people, assuming the

government itself is not an immediate threat to its subjects. Due to increasing

international consensus about the sovereignty of a state being directly related to the

ability to protect its people, a low HSI ranking may constitute an invitation to foreign

powers to step in and take over the government. This happened in Kosovo, East Timor,

Haiti, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, a low ranking on the index

might be desirable, because it opens ways to apply for aid worldwide.

And lastly, an HSI can have adverse diplomatic consequences when designed or adopted

by an organization like the UN. “Any ranking exercise that reflects badly on governments

will generate both resistance and resentment – the reason why UN agencies have long

been discouraged from creating a Human Rights Index.”81

These are important objections, but no matter how relevant they are, at the same

time they do little to reassure those who are seriously concerned about the insecurity of

billions of people. In the end, the absolute insecurity of real people worldwide will have to

King, Gary and Christopher Murray (2001), ‘Rethinking HS’, Political Science Quarterly, 2001-2 116(4)

<http://gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf> (Accessed 19 September 2008).

Booysen, Frikkie (2002), ‘The extent of and Explanations for International Disparities in Human Security’, Journal of

Human Development, 3, 2, pp. 273-300.

A well-documented outline of the debate on Human Security and a Human Security Index is given by

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha M. Chenoy (2007), Human Security. Concepts and Implications, New York,

pp. 241-242.

80 Human Security Report. Creating a human security index?, pp. 90-91.

81 Mack, Andrew (2002), ‘Report on the feasibility of Creating an Annual Human Security Report’. Quoted by

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou and Anuradha M. Chenoy (2007), Human Security. Concepts and Implications, New York,

p. 241.


24

be researched, measured and indexed. And again, in the end we will have to combat this

absolute insecurity as fiercely as we are combating extreme poverty today. Ultimately,

human security will have to be realized by defining one or more concrete goals similar to,

or perhaps as part of, the Millennium Development Goals. The remaining question is:

how?

10. Back to new cosmopolitanism

For a possible answer in general terms we return to the intellectual source of human

security: new cosmopolitanism. That new mindset for a global era which aims to connect

universal human dignity with mild patriotism, and which connects the concern for the

self with the concern for the other. A philosophy that includes both global fear and global

empathy in its considerations.

No matter how diversely this new cosmopolitanism will develop in future, there is

one common starting point: it starts with the dignity of all people and the human values

that protect this dignity, and then it proceeds to fuse the global risk society with the

global care society.

Those who see new cosmopolitanism as a directional world view, e.g. because

they support Robert Fine’s proposition (we do not live in a cosmopolitan age but we do

live in an age of cosmopolitanism), will soon wonder why risk and care are still thought

of as separate entities. Why do human development and human security still occur

separately rather than walking side by side in unity or merging into one comprehensive

concept?

Why do we need two paradigms, two research agendas, two publication channels,

two lobbies towards politicians? Why this competition of academic research, public

attention, political influence and – in the end – the furnishing of funds? Why are there no

joint research agenda, one public and political lobby and central planning in allocation of

funds? Or is this a premature question? Are there by chance initiatives to arrange an

“engagement”? Yes, there are.

10.1 Development and security are coming together

In 1995 it was possible for Mahbub ul Haq, architect of the Human Development Index,

to state:

The human development paradigm is the most holistic development model that exists today. It

embraces every development issue, including economic growth, social investment, people’s

empowerment, provision of basic needs and social safety nets, political and cultural freedoms

and all other aspects of people’s lives. It is neither narrowly technocratic nor overly

philosophical. It is a practical reflection of life itself.82

82 Ul Haq, Mahbub (1995), ‘The Human Development Paradigm’, in Reflections on Human Development, Oxford

University Press, p. 23.


25

Ul Haq wrote down his words in 1994, in the rather optimistic era after the fall of the

Berlin Wall. Although Hans Magnus Enzensberger and Robert Kaplan’s prophecies of

doom were already lining the shelves of the bookstores and the genocidaires of Rwanda

started killing nearly a million people, we were still ignorant of the mass murders of

Srebrenica, the bloodshed in Congo and Darfur, the attacks on New York, Madrid and

London and the most recent Iraq and Afghan wars.

All these conflicts clearly proved that the human development concept was

showing an obvious security void. It simply underexposed crime, terrorism, war, political

violence and instability. Public opinion seems to support this feeling. Public opinion

polling using the Eurobarometer shows that, when Europeans are asked to mention the

three most urgent measures national governments should implement to reach the

Millennium Goals, 20 to 49% of all Europeans mention measures already covered by the

MDGs and 65% supports the measure “Reduce the possibility of armed conflict and

war.”83

Fifteen years after 1995 this security void in human development has reached the

entire scope of the discourse. In current discussions on the future of the Millennium

Development Goals (to be realized in 2015) human security aspects are a given fact.

This focus on security has not exclusively been initiated by the impacting conflicts

of the past fifteen years. For instance, the Voices of the Poor project of the World Bank

showed without a shadow of a doubt that the poor are generally more worried about their

current insecurity than about their structural poverty. Also, more data became available

on the intrinsic link between extreme poverty and violent conflict.

The poorer the household is at the start of the conflict, the higher is the probability of the

household participating and supporting an armed group. The higher the risk of violence, the

higher is the probability of the household participating and supporting armed groups. The

interaction between these two variables varies with the conflict itself and is defined by the direct

and indirect effects of conflict-induced violence on the economic behavior and decisions of

households in combat areas.84

In other words, human security was already merging with human development. And now

human development in its turn is fusing with human security. Moreover, human security

can no longer be ignored in the debate on the post 2015 format of the Millennium

Development Goals. “If the eradication of absolute poverty remains the centerpiece,

many of the present areas would remain relevant, but issues such as empowerment,

rights, security/fragile situations, vulnerability, human security and access to

infrastructure services, would need to be debated,”85 is the opinion of Richard Manning,

83 The European Commission 2005, Attitudes towards Development Aid 2004, February, p. 22.

84 Justino, Patricia (2009), ‘Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of

Warfare’, Journal of Peace Research, 46, 3, pp. 315-333.

85 Manning, Richard (2009), ‘Using Indicators to Encourage Development? Lessons from the Millennium

Development Goals’, DIIS Report 2009:01, February, p. 67.


26

the influential former chairman of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee

(DAC).

In the same way the human security concept drafted by Mahbub ul Haq included

four human development aspects – viz. Economic security, Food security, Health

security and Environmental security – potential post 2015 Millennium Development

Goals will no doubt include aspects that are so far mainly characteristic of human security

– viz. Personal security, Community security and Political security. Human security

strategists acknowledged as early as 1994 that development is a prerequisite for a safe

society; human development strategists now realize that development will never exist

without a sufficient degree of security.86

10.2 The north-south divide is challenged

Not only are development and security concepts merging gradually, we also see the

traditional relations between north and south being challenged. The current Millennium

Development Goals still mention a massive chasm. The north is rich, secure and

powerful; the south is poor, insecure and weak. It is therefore the duty of the north – the

white man’s burden87 – to support the south in its development.

This view is eroding. In many poor countries excessively rich enclaves develop; at

the same time there is increasing poverty in specific groups in the rich countries. The

Bentleys and Rolls Royce’s in the Indian metropolis of Mumbai make a glaring contrast to

the extreme poverty of the Dharavi slum dwellers, but also to the poverty of the clients of

Dutch food banks. The working poor in the US trailer parks are not only far removed

from those living in New York’s residential areas around Central Park, but also from the

Nigerian oil millionaires in Lagos.

Not only the chasm between the poor south and the wealthy north is challenged;

the gap between the insecure south and the secure north, too, seems to be less clearly

defined than had been assumed. September 11 and the attacks in London and Madrid

once and for all ended this dichotomy. Twenty Middle Eastern terrorists were capable of

destroying the commercial heart of the world (the WTC), to attack their military nerves

centre the Pentagon and – in the end – to narrowly miss the political HQ of the world’s

most powerful nation, the White House. On 9/11 the north was proved no less vulnerable

or insecure than the south.

A similar situation applies to the impotence of the south and the power of the

north. Eight years after the invasion of Afghanistan, launched by superpower US and a

coalition of the willing in order to arrest Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and to curb

the powers of the Taliban, we have to conclude that neither goal has been realized.

Sixty-five years ago the United States needed only two years to free both Europe and Asia

of fascism; in today’s Afghanistan a combined action of the armies of the north – in

86 Ball, Nicole (2001), Report of a conference organized by the Programme for Strategic and International Studies,

Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, March 8-9.

87 Easterly, William (2006), The White Man’s Burden. Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill

and So Little Good, Penguin.


27

progress for eight years at this point in time – has so far not resulted in subjecting the

irregular forces of the Taliban.

In the past decennium relations between the west and the rest have changed to

such an extent that Dominique Moisi describes the United States and Europe as the

“cultures of fear” in his Geopolitics of Emotion. It is excessive fear replacing justified fear.

A kind of fear that entirely focuses on lost superiority and the arrival of the Other, the

outsider who has come to claim what is rightfully his. The dreams of those who were

scorned are the nightmares of those who scorned but can no longer do so.

In Asia, however – until the late eighties part of the so-called third world– a

culture of hope reigns. The same holds true for Africa where, according to Moisi, hope is

growing, albeit at the same rate as despair.88

This idea of reconsidering the strict division of north and south has not

exclusively been set in motion by the turbulent developments of the past fifteen years.

Within the scope of the human development discourse the division is also criticized for its

internal criteria. In his widely discussed article “From Universal Values to Millennium

Development Goals: Lost in Translation”89 Ashwani Saith explains that the human

development concept originally possessed a universal scope. A scope that was narrowed

down to represent the Third World, during the process of defining the Millennium

Development Goals.

According to Saith the starting point has been and will be the universal human values.

These were subsequently reduced to human development dimensions and ultimately

translated into well-defined Millennium Development Goals and equally well-defined

criteria of the Human Development Index. In this process of translation and

transformation America and Europe were lost, implying that on these continents human

values were already in force.

In the MDG concept the Third World and more specifically Africa, is presented as

an enclave of poverty:

Even though it professes to be propelled by shared universal values, the entire MDG scaffolding

and accompanying text is insufficiently global in its approach. It tends to ghettoize the problem

of development and locates it firmly in the third world – as if development is fundamentally

and exclusively an issue of absolute levels of living. What happened to poverty and deprivation

in the advanced economies? Are they to be silenced?90

Saith’s recommendation is obvious: we have to leave the assumption that we decide their

agenda. The human development concept – like human security – has to reconnect with

88 Moisi, Dominique (2009), The Geopolitics of Emotion, New York, Doubleday Publishing.

89 Saith, Ashwani (2006), ‘From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation’,

Development and Change, 37, 5, pp. 1167–1199.

90 Ibid. p. 1184.


28

the universal human values from which it once originated; it has to reconnect with the

basic ideas of cosmopolitanism.

This view is shared by the United Nations. In a 2008 report on the MDGs the

Secretary-General is quite explicit on this subject. “The MDG’s are universal: they are

intended to embrace not only all countries but also all people within each country. (…)

They encompass universally accepted human values and rights, such as freedom from

hunger, the right to basic education, the right to health and a responsibility to future

generations.”91

And in a recent preview on the post 2015 format of the Millennium Development

Goals, former OECD/DAC chairman Richard Manning, too, argues in favour of a new,

cosmopolitan one-world approach:

There is a prima facie case for a further set of indicators designed to encourage the effective

tackling of the problem of absolute poverty in all its aspects, and to encourage international

support for it, but this needs to be tested against a more ‘one-world’ approach that would be

aimed more at encouraging policy-makers in every country to give greater weight to tackling

systemic global issues, of which absolute poverty would be just one.92

With this new direction of human development we come across the very real danger of

Differenzierungsverlust, the same phenomenon that we found in human security.

How can we prevent that – working with a global aid agenda – large sums are

spent on new laptops for children in Germany’s deprived areas when at the same time

cutting back on school food for hungry children in Sierra Leone? Within the new

cosmopolitan concept how do we differentiate between the sufferings of an Aspen skiing

casualty and that of a Darfur rape victim? How to design new cosmopolitanism in such a

way that it does not pass by those who suffer most from poverty and insecurity?

11. New challenges

1. Because human development and human security are more and more interrelated they

are also increasingly merging. “Human development and human security thus appear as

two parallel processes that go hand in hand. Progress in one enhances the chances of

progress in the other, when failure in one, enhances the chances of failure in the other.

Human security and human development are therefore overall sister concepts with

mutually beneficial cross-contributions.”93

It raises the legitimate question if both concepts still have a separate raison

d’être. Would it not be preferable to find a concept that unites the two? A concept that

fully integrates development and security? A concept with a shared research agenda, one

91 The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008, pp. 4-5.

92 Manning, Richard (2009), ‘Using Indicators to Encourage Development? Lessons from the Millennium

Development Goals’, DIIS Report 2009:01, February, p. 65.


York, p. 116.


29

communal public and political lobby and central planning in allocation of funds? If so,

the question remains which term we should use for the merged concepts.

2. Due to far-reaching changes in the geo-political agenda and because of critical

reflection on the human security and human development concepts, the once obvious

chasm between the west and the south is questioned. In the south inequality is growing;

we can no longer label countries as being “just” poor or “just” insecure. Moreover, the

west appeared to be much more vulnerable than was assumed for a long time. Instead of

thinking and acting in terms of the rich, secure and powerful west versus the poor,

insecure and powerless south, the time seems ripe for a one-world approach; An

approach that also includes poverty, insecurity and lack of power in the west. This

one-world approach will once more unveil the original cosmopolitan ambition behind

human development and human security. It is relevant to ask under which umbrella term

we can realize this one-world approach.

3. For many good reasons the Human Development Index is limited to three datasets,

Life expectancy, Education and Purchasing power. Security, no matter how relevant, is

not measured by the HDI. For many good reasons, too, it is currently neither possible nor

desirable to design an explicit Human Security Index, an index representing the global

security of people. An interesting attempt to say at least something about the status of

human security is the 2005 Human Security Report and the two consecutive

publications, a Human Security Brief and a Human Security Atlas, both in 2009.94

However, the approach in these publications is a narrow approach of human

security; it does not include human development.

This opens the road to research the feasibility of a new index; an index that takes

up the challenge to present a new paradigm, beyond the existing concepts of development

and security; A paradigm that reveals the state of underdevelopment and insecurity of

people worldwide.

Ad. 1 A term that may guide us in our quest for answers to these questions is human

dignity.95 This term not only links Human Security to new cosmopolitanism. More

94 Go to the Human Security Research Project

<http://www.hsrgroup.org/>

95 In this text we stick to the definition of dignity given by Immanuel Kant in Grundlegung zur

Metaphysik der Sitten from 1785. Human Dignity as a concept was fully elaborated for the first time by

Pico Della Mirandola in his Oration of the Dignity of Man in 1486. One of the most influencial defenders

of the concept of dignity in our times is Peter Singer in The Life You Can Save. Acting Now to End World

Poverty published in 2009. From Mirandola through Kant to Singer, the concept changed dramatically.

Peasants, slaves, children and women became included and these days Singer even defends the dignity of

animals. So it is not easy to fix the term dignity to one definition. The same problem appears when we

analyse the use of the term dignity in declarations, conventions or constitutions. ‘Dignity’ appears in

Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as it appeared in the constitution of the


30

importantly, it is this term that makes the human being human, says Immanuel Kant; a

term implying that a human being cannot be merely a means to an end, but only the end

itself.

Dignity represents no value, no “price” that we can set on someone; it is an

intrinsic human characteristic, an absolute inner value in each human being. A

characteristic that is known to every individual because it is part of “the moral law within

me.” It is part of each individual’s basic notion of right and wrong. Moreover, a notion

that encompasses a basic idea of the current state of our society and the ideal state of our

society.96

And, dignity is an essentially contested concept. Meaning that you only use the

concept in a proper way if you keep it open, if you continue to discuss and review it.

Dignity is an essentially contested concept because on the one hand there will be

widespread consensus on its role as basic notion of both human development and human

security, on the other hand it still leaves plenty of room to add (extra) content to its

meaning; a process that will probably continue indefinitely. At this moment, however, the

term dignity has only marginally been adorned with human development or human

security terms.

Ad. 2 No matter how contested, the term human dignity is more than anything else

capable of indicating where poverty and insecurity cross the line from relative to absolute.

To illustrate this: a broken nose after a skiing accident in Aspen probably does not injure

one’s dignity, but a broken nose suffered during a torture session in a Saudi prison

certainly does. The term may also illustrate why the immigrant status in Berlusconi’s Italy

will be felt as a more severe corrosion of one’s dignity than an immigrant status in the

former Bush’s administration of the United States of America.

Human dignity allows us to consider poverty and insecurity inacceptable –

irrespective of where in the world they occur – without ending up in a world of relativism

in which all distinction disappears. In the end human dignity should enable us to define

the moment at which outside interference is morally justified.

Ad. 3 Whereas development and security are in actual fact objectifying criteria that can be

used to clarify an entire process from the most basic to the most elaborate form of

development and security, the rather normative concept of human dignity enables us to

define a threshold; a threshold between acceptable and unacceptable. The concept of

communist German Democratic Republic. However: one country removed ‘dignity’ from its constitution

completely: Nazi-Germany in 1933.

96 But in the end we will have to leave Kant’s definition because the current use of Dignity implies certain rights.

Kant, however, states that dignity mainly implies the (moral) duty to safeguard one’s own dignity and that of the

other. According to Kant we should perfect our moral selves by acting on our dignity.

Sensen, Oliver (2004), How Human Dignity Grounds Human Rights: Two Paradigms. Paper presented at the

annual meeting of The Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 15, 2004.


31

human dignity could thus articulate the moment at which poverty and insecurity cause

the loss of dignity of those suffering them.

Human dignity is not merely a normative criterion; it also leaves room for

subjective criteria. The scope of a possible Human Security Index is not only broad

enough to include data like life expectancy, education, purchasing power and security. It

leaves room for criteria like equality, pride, confidence and wellbeing.

12. In conclusion

Meanwhile new cosmopolitanism continues to develop, albeit in terms of human

development and human security, for now. In January 2009, when I start writing this

paper, all over the world people are protesting the violent Israeli invasion in Gaza. Even

though Israeli authorities do not allow journalists into Gaza, Al Jazeera television

coverage motivates people globally to demonstrate: from Sydney and Tokyo via

Islamabad and Beirut, Salzburg and Oslo, to San José and New Orleans.

While demonstrations fly across the screen on YouTube, my mailbox announces Robert

B. Zoellick’s New Year’s speech; Zoellick is president of the World Bank Group. He states:

“There needs to be a stronger link among security, governance and development in

countries like Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia if the one billion people living today in

fragile states are ever to escape extreme poverty.”97

By the time I finish this chapter, the newspapers report that a “number of Chinese

intellectuals” in an open letter call on Chinese authorities to break off relations with the

“satanic regime” of North Korea and combine forces with the United States to “liberate”

the 22 million North Koreans.

Irrespective of the ultimate results of the Gaza-related demonstrations, the

speech by Zoellick or the appeal of Chinese intellectuals, they represent the power of both

human development and human security. Both are cosmopolitan grand narratives which

entirely support the concept of kosmou politês. The fact that the human development

concept did materialize through the Millennium Development Goals and human security

has not (yet) found its practical realization, does not mean that the concept is lacking

performative power.

Human development and human security; both are concepts that would not have

happened without the rise of new cosmopolitanism in the eighties of the last century. In

the end the cosmopolitan condition is not about human development or human security;

it is not even about the umbrella term of human dignity. In the end it is all about human

responsibility.

97 ‘Security, Governance and Development Need Stronger Link, Zoellick says’, Press release World Bank Group,

January 8, 2009.

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22027863~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~

theSitePK:4607,00.html>

Human Security and the Emergence of a Global Conscience

Documents

Transcript of Human Security and the Emergence of a Global Conscience