How Smart (and Just) is Ressentiment?

Guy Elgat

Final Draft

Forthcoming in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies

Abstract

The article argues that attention to Nietzsche’s analysis of

ressentiment in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals reveals a

hitherto unnoticed feature of ressentiment, namely, that ressentiment

comes with degrees of epistemic acuity – a varying ability to

correctly identify and focus on the object which gives rise to it

in the first place. After showing how internally and externally

induced ressentiment differ with regard to their epistemic acuity,

the paper turns to focus on the relation between ressentiment and

justice and explains Nietzsche’s claim, in the second essay of

the Genealogy, that justice’s origin cannot be traced back to

ressentiment.

Introduction

Ressentiment – a powerful affect of revenge arising in response to

a perceived injury1 – is for Nietzsche a concept of central

psychological explanatory significance, and thus makes up one of

Nietzsche’s most important analytic tools in his attempt to delve

into the human psyche and fathom its depth. As Walter Kaufmann

says, it ‘constitutes one of [Nietzsche’s] major contributions to

psychology’.2 As such, it has been justly awarded ample attention

by scholars in the secondary literature. However, while

Nietzsche’s employment of ressentiment in the first essay of the On

the Genealogy of Morals (GM I) has been widely addressed and

analyzed,3 Nietzsche’s discussion of this psychic force in the

third and second essay of this work (GM II, III) has not enjoyed a

similar extensive treatment. But given that ‘it is hard to

overestimate the importance of this notion in the Genealogy as a

whole’4 this is somewhat surprising.

In this paper I will argue that close attention to

Nietzsche’s analysis of ressentiment in the third essay can reveal

a hitherto unnoticed feature of Nietzsche’s discussion of

ressentiment, namely, that ressentiment comes with what I will call

degrees of epistemic acuity – its varying ability to identify and

focus on its proper aim. In other words, I will argue that not

all outbursts of ressentiment are equally smart. In conclusion, I

will offer some initial thoughts about how this discussion can

also throw light on Nietzsche’s discussion of ressentiment and

justice in the second essay of the Genealogy. Let me start my

discussion with a hopefully uncontroversial account of

ressentiment’s function in GM I and GM III.

Ressentiment in GM I and GM III

What is ressentiment? In a recent paper Peter Poellner has

provided a rather precise and value-neutral definition of this

phenomenon. I will now quote his valuable explanation at some

length:

1) Ressentiment as Nietzsche presents it…is a psychological condition

which has at its core an experience of pain, or discomfort, or

frustrated desire. This pain or discomfort…is experienced by the

subject of ressentiment as caused by other subjects…2) This interpretation

of a “not-self” (GM I 10) as the cause of one’s suffering motivates a

negative affective response, resentment in a non-technical, everyday

sense – Nietzsche calls it hatred – toward those Others. 3) The

original pain and the negative affect towards its presumed cause

jointly motivate a desire for mastery or superiority in the subject of

ressentiment…4) The final element of the dynamic of ressentiment is the

subject’s hitting upon a new evaluative framework that allows him to

remove his pain or discomfort by making possible either self-

affirmation or mental mastery over the external source of pain.5

Even though there are some aspects of this otherwise very precise

definition that I disagree with – its fourth element being too

exclusive, since not all ressentiment is necessarily creative – it is

nevertheless extremely helpful in setting the stage for the analysis

of ressentiment in GM I and GM III.

As is well known, the vengeful affect of ressentiment is

introduced by Nietzsche in the first essay of the On Genealogy of

Morals in order to account for the emergence of the ‘slave revolt

in morality’ (GM I 10). In GM I 10 Nietzsche explains that in

the slave revolt ‘ressentiment itself becomes creative’: the

ressentiment of beings who are denied the true reaction of deeds

and make do with an imaginary revenge – revenge ‘in effigy’ (GM

I 10) – upon their oppressors, the physiologically and

politically ruling masters, who systematically deprive them of

various social and material goods.6 This imaginary revenge

manifests itself in the creation of a whole new moral scheme,

consisting of new valuations, new metaphysical and religious

beliefs and new principles of action and judgment. There

results a fresh new ethical system, or ‘evaluative

orientation’,7 which stands in competition with ‘master

morality’ (BGE 260), the morality of the nobles, and eventually

has (almost completely) managed to overthrow it (GM I 16).

Nietzsche characterizes the bearers of the ressentiment

responsible for this ‘inversion of values’ (BGE 195) as ‘weak’,

‘impotent’, ‘unhappy’ and ‘pitiable’ (GM I 10.)

In GM I, we thus see, the cause of the slavish herd’s

ressentiment lies in their being oppressed and downtrodden by the

noble class. But in GM III Nietzsche identifies a different cause

for this ‘most dangerous of all explosives’ (GM III 15),

namely, the suffering of the sick, their physiological

exhaustion and lack of vitality, about the origin of which

Nietzsche raises a number of naturalistic (and highly)

speculative hypotheses.8 That ressentiment arises as a result of

this suffering as well is clear because ‘every sufferer

instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an

agent; still more precisely a guilty agent who is susceptible to

suffering’ (GM III 15). In other words, here too, in the case

of endemic physiological suffering, the subject of ressentiment

will search for a guilty agent responsible for her suffering in

order to take revenge upon her and thus re-establish her

superiority or sense of control. The danger, however, Nietzsche

explains, is that this powerful explosive affect, if let loose,

will ‘blow up herd and herdsman’ (GM III 15): in their attempt to

discharge this violent affect members of the herd will be at each

other’s throats – if not averted, there is a worry that it will be

violently discharged upon one’s ‘friends, wives, children, and

whoever else stands closest’ (GM III 15). Consequently, it is crucial

that ressentiment should not be freely discharged but restrained. The

solution for this predicament is well known: the genius of the

ascetic priest, according to Nietzsche, lies precisely in that

he manages to change the course of the discharge of ressentiment

by directing it back at its possessors. As Nietzsche says of the

ascetic priest: ‘[T]o detonate this explosive that it does not

blow up herd and herdsman is his essential art, as is his

supreme utility; if one wanted to express the value of the

priestly existence in the briefest formula it would be: the

priest alters the direction of ressentiment’ (GM III 15).

The priest alters the direction of ressentiment and inflects it,

by means of his ascetic teachings, back at the downtrodden subjects of

ressentiment. Instead of directed outwardly, ressentiment is now harnessed

to various practices of self-flagellation and self-torture, chief

amongst which is the ‘exploitation of the sense of guilt’ (GM III 20)

into which ressentiment gets transformed on the background of the

priest’s allegation that it is the sufferers themselves who are to

blame for their own suffering. Their suffering, the priest explains,

is a punishment (GM III 20) for their transgressions against God.

The sufferers, consequently, should feel guilty about their

transgressions and torture themselves with guilt. So much for the

standard, familiar picture.

But the point just made about the danger of and need to

redirect ressentiment in GM III raises questions about the

functioning of ressentiment which are by and large overlooked by

the secondary literature. Specifically, why does ressentiment in

GM III threaten to discharge itself on others (herd and

herdsman) to begin with? Why does it not spontaneously direct

itself at its possessor, thus at least eliminating the danger

that it poses to the other members of the community? After all,

in the first essay, as we saw, ressentiment directs itself

naturally in the direction of that which caused it, namely, the

masters – so why does it not behave similarly here, in the

third essay, and inflect itself spontaneously on its

possessors? A related question is this: why is ressentiment in GM

III seen as potentially dangerous to the other members of the

herd while in the first essay it is not so described? Further,

why should the ascetic priest of GM III not let ressentiment, as

in GM I, be expressed in a vengeful creative manner in the

direction of the masters? Why, in other words, not exploit its

aggressive dynamism further and utilize it for the sake of the

slave revolt in morality but rather turn it back against the

slaves themselves?

Ressentiment’s Epistemic Acuity

In order to answer these questions I will focus on the etiology

of ressentiment in both essays and turn my attention specifically

to an important difference between the causes of ressentiment in

the first essay on the one hand and the third essay on the

other.

Let us look again at Nietzsche’s discussion in GM I.

There, the slaves’ ressentiment had right from the beginning a

clear and true target: the noble warrior caste. In the story of

the slave revolt the slaves9 did not have to invent the object

of their ressentiment, for they knew exactly who the agent

responsible for their miserable state was, who was

systematically depriving them of certain goods.10 Their low

social standing, their poor economic condition, their being

exploited, mistreated and oppressed (to speak morally): it was

no secret amongst the slaves who the cause of all this was.

Consequently, the powers of ressentiment were already attuned to

their proper object. The forces of ressentiment in GM I are not

blind, and indeed, it would be implausible to hold that the

slaves lack any awareness as to the cause of their chagrin,

much like it would be implausible for the boxer in the ring to

lack any awareness as to the cause of the blow he has just

received to his right cheek.

In the case of GM III, however, things stand differently.

In order to better appreciate this difference let us recall the

first element in Poellner’s definition above: ‘This pain or

discomfort [at the origin of ressentiment]…is experienced by the

subject of ressentiment as caused by other subjects’.11 This is

quite correct, but what Poellner does not sufficiently

emphasize is that this propensity of ressentiment to look

outwardly is accompanied by the flip-side of an inability to

introspect and search for the causes of one’s suffering within

oneself. As Nietzsche says, ‘this need to direct one’s view

outward instead of back to oneself belongs to ressentiment as well

[gehört eben zum Ressentiment]’(GM I 10, translation modified).

In other words, ressentiment is instinctively outward looking and

does not spontaneously engage in introspection in its search

for the cause of one’s pain: it is an eye that looks outside

and is as a default blind to the inside.

Now, the initial cause of ressentiment in GM III does not

lie in some external factor that brought about the suffering of

the downtrodden. Rather, it is their inbuilt physiological

constitution that causes them to be weary of life and suffer

from it. Consequently, since ressentiment in its basic nature

directs itself outwardly in the search for an object upon which

to vent itself, it is bound to be blind to its true cause,

which in this case lies within. But since ressentiment

instinctively is on the lookout for a guilty agent on which it

can vent itself, there was a danger that, lacking the ability

to focus on the true source of their pain (the sufferers

themselves), ressentiment would be discharged in an indiscriminate

manner, thus putting at risk not only the nobles, but also

“herd and herdsman”. As Nietzsche puts it in the third essay,

‘”Someone or other [Irgend Jemand] must be to blame for my

feeling ill”- this kind of reasoning is common to all the sick,

and is indeed held the more firmly the more the real cause of their feeling

ill, the physiological cause, remains hidden’ (GM III 15, emphasis added).

In other words, the subject of ressentiment tends to misidentify

the true cause of her suffering and so to vent it arbitrarily

on “someone or other” the more this cause remains hidden from

view, that is, the more the real cause lies within, rather than

in the external world. And given that one characteristic of the

“sick” is that their suffering is caused from within, they will

tend to misidentify the true cause of their misery.

Consequently, in order to preserve the integrity and stability

of his flock, the priest had to find a way to safely detonate

this explosive affect, for ressentiment creates for itself, willy-

nilly, a responsible guilty subject on which to vent itself.

But because in this case there is no clear external culpable

agent there is a danger that it will be violently discharged

upon one’s ‘friends, wives, children, and whoever else stands

closest’ (GM III 15). Thus we see why the ressentiment of the

third essay cannot spontaneously direct itself against its

proper target and why, in contrast to the ressentiment of the

first essay, it poses a threat to “herd and herdsman”.

In contrast, when the cause of one’s suffering lies

outside oneself, ressentiment tends to better identify it and

focus on it, as we can see in the discussion of the slave

revolt in the first essay. In other words, ressentiment comes with

degrees of epistemic acuity in correlation with whether its causes are

internal or external: not all outbursts of ressentiment are

equally smart.

More precision, however, is called for here. First, to say

that in GM I, in contrast to GM III, the cause of ressentiment

was only external is to slightly simplify things, for surely the

slaves experienced ressentiment not only because they were

constantly provoked by the nobles, but also because they were

prone to experience it given their poor physicality. In

contrast, as Nietzsche explains, the ‘ressentiment of the noble

man’, precisely because of his over-flowing vitality, ‘fails to

appear at all on countless occasions in which it inevitably

appears in the weak and impotent’ (GM I 10). So we should claim

that in the case of the slaves, while their weak physiological

constitution is a background internal condition for their

experiencing ressentiment – a distal cause, we can say – the

nobles’ oppressing them is the proximate cause, much like

oxygen and the striking of a match. Lacking certain

physiological and psychological characteristics, the slaves

would not have suffered to an extent that causes ressentiment to

flare up. Thus, when ressentiment’s proximal cause is external, it

tends to be more epistemically accurate.

Secondly, while, as explained above, externally caused

ressentiment tends to better identify and focus on its true cause,

this is not always and invariably the case. Complex and opaque

lines of causal influence can discombobulate even externally

caused ressentiment, leading it to be epistemically in the dark,

and consequently potentially open to manipulation. Thus, for

example, financially hurt individuals who suffer under the

current ills of the economic system might find it difficult to

identify the true causes of their predicament and are thus open

to manipulation by various interested parties (“it is not we,

the top one percent, who are to blame for your woes, it is the

government, the unions, etc.”).

To return to the Genealogy, since the suffering of the

physiologically inhibited of the third essay was endemic to

them and was not caused from without, the priest, on the basis

of his psychological insightfulness, concocted an explanation

according to which their suffering was their fault – an explanation

which, accordingly, enabled the inflection of ressentiment back to

its source in the agent herself. The sufferer seeks someone to

blame for his suffering, to which the priest answers: ‘quite

so, my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself

are this someone, you alone are to blame for it – you alone are to

blame for yourself!’ (GM III 15). In other words, the sufferer,

teaches the ascetic priest, ‘must seek [the cause for his

suffering] in himself, in some guilt, in a piece of the past, he

must understand his suffering as a punishment’ (GM III 20) from

God.

Thus we see how according to Nietzsche the priest is as a

matter of fact intuitively12 quite insightful about the working

of ressentiment, for in the hands of the priest the different

charges of ressentiment get traced back to (and consequently

directed at) their real causes: externally caused ressentiment is

traced back to its external causes, while internally caused

ressentiment is traced back inwardly, back to the agent herself.13

Consequently, externally directed ressentiment, gives rise to a

revenge ‘in effigy’ in the form of new values, while internally

directed ressentiment, involves a narrative of self-culpability

which makes up a part of the priestly ascetic ideal – the ideal

that champions values of self-denial. This narrative culminates

with what Nietzsche calls the ‘guilty’ ascetic techniques of

self-punishment, chief amongst which are the self-lacerations

of the feeling of guilt. It is to these techniques that

ressentiment gets harnessed and thus detonated.

But even if the priest manages in fact to direct each

quota of ressentiment at its proper target, what importance does

this epistemic insightfulness has? To put it differently, and

to return to the question I raised above, why can’t the

ressentiment of sickness, questions of epistemic veracity

notwithstanding, be directed at the masters as well via the

conduit of the slave revolt and thus exploited to further the

goal of taking revenge on, and poisoning the souls of the

masters?

The answer, I believe, is that channeling this endemically

caused ressentiment in the direction of the masters by means of

the slave revolt would not get rid of enough volume of

ressentiment. We could reasonably assume that the disgruntled

subjects of ressentiment of GM III did in fact direct their

internally induced ressentiment at the healthy and happy nobles as

well, especially given that they were so used to thinking of

them as the cause of their malaise (cf. GM III 14) and given

that there are always going to be masters of some kind or other

around to serve as ready targets for violent spasms of

ressentiment (cf. TI “Skirmishes” 34). Nevertheless, some un-

discharged ressentiment was bound to be left over and had to be

redeployed. After all, the slave revolt, we should remember,

does not amount to genuine revenge, but is only one “in effigy”

(GM I 10). The result of this is that a surplus of ressentiment in

need of an outlet was bound to remain; a left-over quota of

internally induced ressentiment which, as we already know, could

potentially hurt innocent bystanders.

The sufferers’ predicament, as just described, should be

familiar. Suppose you have been feeling dejected this whole

week (inwardly induced ressentiment) and on top of that someone

makes you angry at work (externally induced ressentiment). You

fantasize about all the bad things that happen to your

colleague and all the evil things you do to him (revenge ‘in

effigy’). This offers some relief, but not enough: you might

still lash out at your spouse and start accusing him or her of

your misfortunes, and this precisely because internally caused

ressentiment misleads you into thinking that he or she is really

in some way truly responsible for your discomfort. The ascetic

ideal propagated by the priest provides a solution for just

this problem: be angry at yourself, search for the cause of your

misery in yourself, and let your spouse be.

The fact that ressentiment comes in degrees of epistemic

acuity not only throws light on the aspects of the first and

third essay heretofore not taken into account explicitly by the

secondary literature, it is also of value when we turn to think

about Nietzsche’s remarks on ressentiment and justice in the

second essay of the Genealogy. I will close with a number of

comments on this issue, focusing on just punishment.

Ressentiment and Justice

In GM II 11, Nietzsche argues that in contrast to ‘attempts

that have lately been made to seek the origin of justice in a

quite different sphere – namely in that of ressentiment’, ‘the last

sphere to be conquered by the spirit of justice is the sphere

of the reactive feelings!’(GM II 11). But why is that exactly?

Why can’t ressentiment, which is after all a feeling of revenge

and retribution, constitute the germ out of which just

punishment arises?

To approach an answer to this question, we should

distinguish between at least three elements of a just

punishment of an offense or a crime. First, for a punishment or

retaliation to be in any way just it has to be epistemically

accurate and be directed at the true perpetrator of the crime:

punishment of an innocent person, obviously, cannot be just.

Secondly, the punishment has to be proportional to the crime or

offense: twenty years in prison for a theft of a bag of chips

is, ceteris paribus, unjust. The third condition is the one

Nietzsche, I think, is most interested in in GM II 11. To

punish justly one also has to assess the situation objectively

and without any prejudice. Only this enables one to see whether

the person who actually performed the deed attributed to him

should be punished at all. It involves seeing matters impartially

and from all perspectives in a way which can also unearth

grounds, such as various attenuating circumstances, on the

basis of which the perpetrator might even be released scot-

free. This is something that Nietzsche claims ressentiment is

unable to do since ressentiment, as he says, ‘drives the blood

into the eyes’ (GM I 11) and clouds all objective thinking.

In light of these distinctions, we can say the following.

Internally caused ressentiment will necessarily (unless curbed) be

unjust, for it is epistemically blind and will rage its

violence arbitrarily at ‘someone or other’. Externally caused

ressentiment tends to mark better on this score for it is

typically not blind to its causes, though, as I explained, it

can be, when matters get complicated. So externally caused

ressentiment might possibly fulfill the first requirement of

justice – epistemic veracity. Does it fulfill the second one

(proportionality)? Here things are trickier: on the one hand,

it can be vented in a proportionate manner to the offense. But,

there are at least two hitches: first, if an agent harbors

great volumes of ressentiment derived from elsewhere, which seek

discharge, or if the agent is highly irritable and sensitive,

the punishment could be disproportional to the offense. In

other words, if ressentiment manages to be just in its response,

this is largely a fluke – the guarantees that it will accord

with justice are almost non-existent. But – and this is

Nietzsche’s real concern in GM II 11 – even if the subject of

ressentiment has not accumulated a large charge of ressentiment and

is not constitutionally sensitive, there still is no guarantee

that justice will be served, for the subject of ressentiment

cannot judge matters objectively, and cannot see whether there

are, for example, attenuating circumstances to be taken into

consideration. This is so because, as we saw, ressentiment drives

‘the blood into the eyes – and fairness out of the eyes’ (GM II

11). This it does by narrowing down the subject’s outlook and

thus hindering the attainment of the ‘variety of perspectives’

(GM III 12) necessary for the accomplishment of ‘objectivity’

(ibid.). We can thus see why ressentiment by itself is hardly

reliable for the purpose of attaining justice: only by chance

could a ressentiment driven person punish in a just way, i.e., in

accordance with what an impartial eye would decide. It follows

that Dühring was indeed wrong, for the ‘home of justice’ lies

not in ‘the sphere of the reactive feelings’ (GM II 11).14

1 I define the term more precisely below with the help of Peter Poellner’s“Ressentiment and Morality”, in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide,ed. Simon May (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 120-141. 2 Introduction to the translation of Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals,trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967),7. Otherworks by Nietzsche referred to in this paper: Beyond Good and Evil, trans. WalterKaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966); Twilight of the Idols, trans. Judith Norman(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).3 For some recent views see Bernard Reginster, “Nietzsche on Ressentiment andValuation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57.2 (1997): 281-305; Brian Leiter,Nietzsche on Morality (London; Routledge, 2002); Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness:Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Richard JayWallace, “Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche’sSlave Revolt,” in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (Oxford,UK: Clarendon, 2007), 110-137; Lanier Anderson, “On the Nobility of Nietzsche’sPriests,” in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, ed. SimonMay(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),24-55; Paul Katsafanas, “TheRelevance of History for Moral Philosophy: A Study of Nietzsche’s Genealogy”, inNietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, ed. Simon May (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2011), 170-192; Poellner, “Ressentiment and Morality”.Though a lot is of value in these discussions, none of these authors focusesextensively on ressentiment in the third essay of the Genealogy.4 Reginster, “Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation”.5 Poellner, “Ressentiment and Morality”, 123-124.6 Wallace, “Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche’sSlave Revolt”.7 Katsafanas, “The Relevance of History for Moral Philosophy: A Study ofNietzsche’s Genealogy,”179.8 As Nietzsche says, ‘It may perhaps lie in some disease of the nervus sympathicus, orin an excessive secretion of the bile, or in a deficiency of potassium sulphate andphosphate in the blood….’(GM III 15, cf. GM III 17). 9 Or the priests, if, following Anderson’s “On the Nobility of Nietzsche’sPriests”, we take the priests to be the central ressentiment infused protagonists ofthe first essay of the Genealogy. I do not believe that this differencesignificantly affects the analysis I offer here.10 Wallace, “Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche’sSlave Revolt”.11 Poellner, “Ressentiment and Morality”, 123.12 Assuming that the priest does not have an explicit understanding of ressentiment asNietzsche does.13 The priest’s explanation, however, to use Freud’s distinction, does not provide thematerial truth – it is not really the case that the herd suffers because it is guiltybefore God, nor is it the case that the slaves suffer because the masters are truly‘evil’ – but only the historical truth, ‘insofar as it brings to light something fromthe [individual] past’ of every member of the herd. See Sigmund Freud, Moses andMonotheism (New York: Vintage, 1967), 166-168.14 Contrary to Robert Solomon’s conclusion in his “One Hundred Years of Ressentiment:Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals”, in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s ‘On the

Genealogy of Morals’, ed. Richard Schacht (Oakland: University of California Press,1994) 95-126.