Just War in Onasander's ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ

James T Chlup

Just War in Onasanderrsquos ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ

Abstract In addition to providing practical advice on how a Roman general oughtto undertake a military campaign Onasanderrsquos Strategikos explores and advo-cates for the principles of the Just War (Latin bellum iustum Greek δίκαιοςπόλεμος) Onasander delineates three aspects of the Just War ius ad bellum(where the reasons for war must be just) ius in bello (actions conducted duringhostilities must be just) and ius post bellum (activities concerning the end-phaseof the war must be just) Through a close reading of the text two important facetsof Onasanderrsquos approach to the Just War come into sharper focus first that thegeneralrsquos character plays an important part in ensuring that a war will be foughtaccording to the principles of the Just War and by extension a Just War engagedin by a good general has the potential to improve the body politic Second JustWar is a sagacious policy in that it provides the best chance for ending a warexpeditiously

Keywords Onasander Just War Roman warfare Roman generalship Romanmilitary manuals

DOI 101515jah-2014-0008

ldquoWar does not determine who is right ndash only who is leftrdquondash attributed to Bertrand Russell

In ancient Rome the concept of the Just War (bellum iustum) allegedly dates to thereign of the mythical king Ancus Marcius in the seventh century BCE when theelaborate rules for the declaration of war ndash the rerum repetitio ndash were formalised1

These rules were notionally still in place six centuries later when Cicero discusses

James T Chlup Department of Classics University of Manitoba Winnipeg MB CanadaR3T 2M8 E

˗ Mail jameschlupumanitobaca

1 Liv 13212ndash13 See Ogilvie (1965) 135ndash6 Cf Dion Hal 3362ndash3 where the author does notmention it explicitly although onemay infer it from his description of Marciusrsquo desire to recommitthe Romans to religious practice See also McDonald and Walbank (1937) Bickerman (1945) Rich(1976) 56ndash64 Watson (1993) 20ndash30 Reventlow (1994) 169ndash70 Bedermann (2001) 231ndash41Petrocelli (2008) 162ndash3 and Ando (2010) 34ndash8

JAH 2014 2(1) 37ndash63

Authenticated | jameschlupumanitobaca authors copyDownload Date | 82614 812 PM

them in his De officiis2 the spirit of which a generation later Augustus affirmswhen he claims that he never unjustly attacked a nation3 As a community whichfought so many wars (sometimes multiple wars concurrently) first to defendthemselves against their Italian neighbours then to establish and defend theirempire it is only natural that the Romans would have sought to formalise rulesfor the ways and means of war that is they developed a series of legal require-ments for the declaration of war on the one hand and the tactical parametres bywhich war could be waged successfully on the other4

Themilitary treatise was designed to elucidate the latter but it does sowithoutdiscussion of moral considerations of warfare Onasanderrsquos Στρατηγικός wouldappear to be the exception representing anew vademecumonwarfare inwhich theauthor deftly interweaves a moral frame to the practical advice on how victory canbeachieved5Asaphilosopher (he is said tohaveauthoredacommentaryonPlatorsquosRepublic)6 Onasander is preeminently qualified to make the case for δίκαιοςπόλεμος since the concept would have formed part of his reflection upon thenature of Justice7 This στρατηγικῆς περὶ θεωρίας (as Onasander describes it in the

38 James T Chlup

2 De Off 133ndash40 on which see Dyck (1996) 133ndash53 Ciceromay also have included discussion onthe law of war at De Rep 334 as a fragment from Augustine (De Civ Dei 226) suggests nullumbellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute ldquono war is to be undertaken by aworthy state unless either under good faith or sound reasonrdquo See Buumlchner (1984) 325 Reventlow(1994) 170 Eckstein (2006) 216ndash213 RG 263Alpes a regione ea quae proxima est Hadrianomari ad Tuscumpacari feci nulli genti belloper iniuriam inlato ldquoI brought under [Roman] control the Alps from the region which is closest tothe Adriatic Sea as far as the Tyrrhenian Sea no people having been attacked unjustlyrdquo Cf SuetAug 212 nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit tantumque afuit a cupiditatequoquomodo imperium vel bellicam gloriam augendi ldquonor did he bringwar to any nationwithout ajust and necessary cause and he was so far from the desire for expanding the empire or militaryglory for any reasonrdquo4 The law of war would presumably belong within the Romansrsquo broad understanding of iusgentium See Bedermann (2001) 41ndash75 Onasander scholarship is regrettably exiguous Ambaglio (1981) Le Bohec (1998) Smith(1998) Galimberti (2002) andmore recently the thorough commentary of Petrocelli (2008) are theonly substantial focused studies Campbell (1987) and (2004) provide discussion as part of awider study of the genre of the military treatise Tejada (2004) provides a good overview of theliterary and historical contexts of the genre of themilitary treatise6 Onasanderrsquos entry in the Suda reads thus Ὀνόσανδρος φιλόσοφος Πλατωνικός Τακτικά Περὶστρατηγημάτων Ὑπομνήματα εἰς τὰς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας It would appear that Onasander infact wrote two military treatises one on general strategy (which is lost) and one on generalship(the treatise under discussion)7 See Low (2007) 134ndash5 with additional bibliography One passage of the Strategikos clearlyinfluenced by Platonic thought is the authorrsquos recommendation that in battle the general placebrothers next to brothers friends next to friends and lovers next to their beloved (an allusion to


opening sentence) is the λόγος which he shares with his reader insisting on itsrecognition as the sine qua non of military enterprise8 This is an aspect of Onasan-derrsquoswritingwhichhasbeenacknowledgedbut notdiscussed9 Closer examinationof the Strategikoswould therefore appear to represent an opportunity to explore theextent towhich a Roman author could argue for the ethical practice of warfare andenhance further understanding of the ancient discourse of the JustWar10

I Onasanderrsquos Preface

If ldquothe burden of the treatise is really ethics morale and the general principlesof success in armsrdquo11 as William Oldfather suggests in the introduction to theStrategikos in the Loeb edition then such an approach ought to be evident in the

Just War in Onasanderrsquos ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ 39

Symp 178dndash179a) such a general Onasander perceives as φρόνιμος (241) See Petrocelli (2008)237 But note the view of Whitehead (2008) 142 ldquoIn truth readers of Onasandrosrsquo Stratecircgikos(Generalrsquos Handbook) are hard pressed to find much Platonism in it Nonetheless in taking thecommanderrsquos own standpoint it does address some philosophical issues (in the realms of whatnowadays would be called ethics and psychology)rdquo8 On θεωρία see Petrocelli (2008) 129ndash309 Ambaglio (1981) 355 Smith (1998) 165 Formisano (2011) 4410 The Just War theorem might be as old as the universe itself ndash at least as far as the ancientGreeks and Romans were concerned It appears in Hesiodrsquos Theogony where the war which leadsto Zeusrsquo ascension results in the birth of Eunomia Dike and perhaps ironically Eirene (lines902ndash903) see Most (2011) A good summary of the Just War theorem in the ancient world may befound in Orend (2006) 10ndash13 and Whetham (2009) 34ndash40 longer studies include Phillipson(1911) Albert (1980) Clavadetscher-Thuumlrlemann (1985) and Brooks (2012) Seckel (1915) andHarris (1979) 166ndash75 provides a Roman-specific discussion See also Webster (1994) Eckstein(2006) 218ndash22 Bellamy (2006) 18ndash29 Ager (2008) Yakobson (2008) Ando (2010) 37ndash63 Heuser(2010) 42ndash53 Drexler (1959) examines the concept in Livy Ramage (2001) does the same forCaesarrsquos Bellum Gallicum Mattern-Parkes (2003) discusses Just War and Roman revenge forCrassusrsquo Parthian misadventure Russell (1977) 16ndash39 discusses the topic in Augustine and otherearly Christian authors see also Gmuumlr (1971) Tooke (1965) and Reventlow (1994) Adeney (1988)discusses it from amoral and faith perspective OrsquoDonovan (2003) explores the (modern) Christianperspective Adolf (2009) 46ndash55 provides a summary through the perspective of peace Wang(2011) 18ndash19 summarises the ancient Chinese view on war where it would appear that Just Warfalls broadly into the Confucian concept of li which governs human intercourse including theprotocols of international relations see Schwartz (1985) 67ndash75

Scholarship on themodern discourses of JustWar is understandably vast given its relevanceto history law philosophy and politics See for instance Schwarzenberger (1962) 236ndash40Johnson (1987) Walzer (2006) Bellamy (2006) Orend (2008) Girardet (2007) offers a completeoverview from Cicero to themid-twentieth century See also below 56ndash8 on ius post bellum11 Aeneas Tacticus Asclepiodotus Onasander [LCL 156] 350


expansive preface This Onasander indeed provides contrasting his approachwith his predecessors in the genre

ὅθεν εἰ καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς φανείη νενοημένα τὰ παρrsquo ἐμοῦ συντεταγμένα καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂνἡσθείην ὅτι μὴ μόνον στρατηγικὰς συνεταξάμην ὑφηγήσεις ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγικῆς ἐσ-τοχασάμην καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς φρονήσεως (Prae 3)

ldquoIf what I have composed should seem to have been devised already by many others eventhen I should be pleased because I have not only compiled precepts of generalship buthave also endeavoured to reveal the art of the general and the wisdom that is an inseparablepart of its principlesrdquo12

Onasander blends the practical with the philosophical introducing the former toserve as the theoretical discursive space to validate the latter To be sureφρόνησις is a broad word but it allows the author to suggest that there is aphilosophical element ndash something more than a strictly practical τέχνη ndash to thepractice of warfare which he intends to explore13 Thus as Olivier Battistiniobserves Onasander provides ldquoen arriegravere-plan une veritable penseacutee de lrsquoart ducommandement un logos qui transcende les operations militaire formant enensemble intellectuel coherent une sorte de meacutetastrategierdquo14 This ldquothought onthe art of commandrdquo in the Strategikos constitutes an innovation of the genreallowing Onasander to chart boldly a different course from the restrictive genericconventions delineated by his predecessors15

40 James T Chlup

12 Translations (modified) of Onasander come from the Loeb edition13 Although Xenophon uses φρόνησις in a military context at Hipp 74 it is not used widely inmilitary texts see Wheeler (1988) 35ndash6 He observes that ldquophronesis is the determination ofwhat ought to be done and what ought not to be donerdquo (36) and that military authors indeedborrowed words such as φρόνησις from philosophers (38) For the skills of a general (στρατη-γική) as τέχνη see Arist Nic Eth 1096a32 and 1094a9 War as τεχνικός Plat Rep 374b4 in LeoVIrsquos Tactica it is ἐπιστήμη (11) and τέχνη (12) On these words in their Platonic context(s) seeLyons (1963) 139ndash228

The Latin equivalent varies Vegetius refers to military endeavour as an ars on a fewoccasions eg 2 Prae 1 3 Prae 1 but he calls it a disciplina at 1281 later at 32638 he refers tothe vincendi artificium Frontinus prefers scientia in his opening sentence On sapientia as militaryknowledge see Wheeler (1988) 69ndash72 One might also consider Anchisesrsquo words to Aeneas inVirgil Aeneid 6851ndash3 tu regere imperio populos Romane memento |(hae tibi erunt artes) paciqueimponere morem |parcere subiectis et debellare superbos ldquoyou Roman remember to rule thepeople (these are your arts) and to impose the custom of peace to spare the subjected and topush down the arrogantrdquoOn strategy as an ldquoartrdquo or ldquosciencerdquo see Heuser (2010) 3ndash914 Battistini (1994) 95ndash9615 Ambaglio (1981) efficiently delineates Onasanderrsquos relationship with Aeneas Tacticus Ascle-piodotus and several texts of Xenophon See also Petrocelli (2008) passim The author of the


Onasanderrsquos bold assertion of the didactic potential of his treatise and there-fore its merit as a text has been recognised16 But the theoretical moral framewhich the author desires to introduce runs the risk of encountering readerresistance Onasanderrsquos awareness of this is clear when a few sentences later hecontextualises his philosophical inquiry in terms familiar to a Roman audience

τὸ δὲ σύνταγμα θαρροῦντί μοι λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν ὡς στρατηγῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἄσκησις ἔσταιπαλαιῶν τε ἡγεμόνων κατὰ τὴν σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα εἰσόμεθά τε καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλοπαρrsquo ἣν αἰτίαν οἵ τε πταίσαντες ἐσφάλησαν τῶν στρατηγησάντων οἵ τε εὐπραγήσαντεςἐγέρθησαν εἰς δόξαν μάλιστα δὲ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀρετὴν ἐννοήσομεν ὡς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτεπόλις οὔτε ἔθνος μεῖζον ἡγεμονίας ἐκρατύνατο μέγεθος ἀλλrsquo οὐδrsquo εἰς ἶσον ἤλασεν ὥστετοσούτοις βεβαιώσασθαι χρόνοις ἀκίνητον δυναστείαν οὐ γὰρ τύχηι μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπεράρ-αντες τοὺς τῆς Ἰταλίας ὅρους ἐπὶ πέρατα γῆς ἐκτεῖναι τὴν σφετέραν ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ πράξεσιστρατηγικαῖς (Prae 4ndash5)

ldquoIt remains for me to say with good courage of my work that it will be a school for goodgenerals and a resource for retired commanders in these times of holy peace and we shallknow if nothing else for what reason some generals having stumbled fell but others havingprospered were raised to fame And we shall consider above all the excellence of theRomans how that neither king nor state nor people got possession of greater authority noranyone drove to be their equal so that to have raised themselves up in time to be anirrefutable empire For they seem to me having not by chance but by deeds of good general-ship having overrun the limits of Italy to have extended their influence to the edges of theearthrdquo

First and foremost Onasander imagines his work will produce positive resultscreating not successful generals but those who are ἀγαθοί The author does notwant to create generals who are successful only but rather are of the sort who willapply moral principles

It was Aristotle who implied the naturalness of war that is war as a means toacquire17 possibly as the first instance of the concept of the just war18 Thispassage builds upon that accepted truth while at the same time guiding the


introduction to Onasander in the Loeb edition declares Xenophonrsquos Cyropaedia and Anabasis tobe very strong influences on the Strategikos to which the author of this article would like to addtheAgesilaus (see below 45)16 Whitehead (2008) 142 ldquoits aspiration expressed in its preface to be didactic ndash of practicaluse to those who are commanding troops ndash is not absurd and for that and allied reasons it isarguably the most rewarding work in this group of treatisesrdquo The ldquogrouprdquo to which Whiteheadrefers includes Asclepiodotus Aelian Arrian and Onasander17 Pol 1256b20 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσταιhellipὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸνπόλεμον ldquoeven the science of warfare will in a way be a natural part of property acquisitionhellip thissort of warfare is naturally justrdquo18 Reventlow (1994) 168ndash9


authorrsquos more philosophically generalised opening sentences towards the histor-ical specificity of the Roman military experience Beginning his argument from aposition which ndash in theory ndash aligns itself with the prevailing historical and moraldiscourse on the rise of Rome to the dominant world power19 Onasander situateshis ethical arguments initially at least in an ideologically familiar discursivespace which facilitates the Roman readerrsquos acceptance of what is presumably aminor alteration or enhancement of Roman thought on war Arguing that theRomans built their empire not through chance (τύχη) but through virtue (ἀρετή)the author aligns his historical analysis of the rise of Rome with say Polybiusand Livy20 one might argue that the passage above could easily come from eitherof these historians or another intellectual defender of the imperium Romanumsuch as Cicero21 It was during the period of Cicero and Livy that the Romanconception of the moral rectitude of the empire became firmly engrained22 butone can perhaps reach further back Onasander also draws upon and contributesto philosophical discourses on Roman imperialism which extend back at leastto the second century BCE23 Military success and the empire which was its

42 James T Chlup

19 Petrocelli (2008) 134 detects that Onasander is restating CicManil 37 and Vegetius appearsto carry on the official state line sed nos disciplinam militarem populi Romani debemus inquirerequi ex parvissimis finibus imperium suum paene solis regionibus et mundi ipsius fine distendit ldquobutwe ought to examine the military science of the Roman people who extended their own empirefrom the smallest territories nearly to the regions of the sun and the end of the world itselfrdquo(189) See Charles (2007) 165ndash73 on the conception of the Roman empire in Vegetius20 Galimberti (2002) 145ndash6 and 150 detects Polybius the following statement of Livy from hisPreface (9) also seems relevant ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum quae vita quimores fuerint per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sitldquoIn my opinion each man should keenly exert his mind towards these things what life and whatcustoms were there through which men and by which arts at home and abroad the empire wasacquired and expandedrdquo Note Reventlow (1994) 169ndash70 ldquoof course reality did not alwaysconform to theory we can read in Livius and Polybius how ndashwhile formally maintaining the rulesof lsquojust warrsquo ndash one could find ways to wage wars of conquest which resulted in the enormousextension of the Roman Empirerdquo On fortune (τύχη) and virtue (ἀρετή) see idem 147ndash9 Petrocelli(2008) 134ndash6 Reasonably similar is the Chinese concept of jen or ldquoperfect virtuerdquowhich a leadermust espouse see Schwartz (1985) 7521 De Rep 32422 Ando (2010) 39 and Richardson (2008)23 To consider other possible influences on Onasander Carneades and Panaetius are surelyviable candidates the former famously delivered lectures in Rome on the topics of justice andinjustice in 155 BCE He considered the Roman empire (and presumably the wars which causedher to come into existence) to be an example of injustice On Greek authors on Roman imperialismin general see Capelle (1931) See Lefegravevre (2001) and Mohay (2007) on Panaetius and Erskine(1990) 181ndash204 on Panaetius (with additional information 211ndash4) and Carneades On Carneadessee also Wilkerson (1988) and Glucker (2001) The question of the justice and injustice of the


primary (by)product the author argues allows for a strong moral body politicfollowing the principles of the Just War would presumably strengthen furtherthe virtue of the nation24

The author firmly tethers this assessment in the realties of Roman warfarethrough his reference in the final clause not to principles but deeds (ἀλλὰ πράξεσιστρατηγικαῖς) This establishes that Onasander understands and his reader canexpect that the treatise will not be an exclusively philosophical argument butwill address the realities of warfare In fact taken as a whole the author confirmsthat the theoretical and the real spheres of war are symbiotic with each serving tovalidate the other

II General Qualities of a General

If the general is responsible for ensuring adherence to the principle of the JustWar then an appropriate initial step for Onasander is to delineate the charactertraits which the general is expected to evince ldquostrength of character and moraluprightness are well to the fore among the qualities requiredrdquo25 A generalrsquosdemeanour is also critical to the armyrsquos success as Machiavellirsquos Fabrizio ob-serves ldquothat which above every other thing keeps the army united is the reputa-tion of the captain which arises through his virtue alonerdquo26 Onasander in thePreface prepares for describing his ideal general by refuting the notion which heassumes has prevailed heretofore that a general can rely on his ldquoshrewdnessrdquo(ἀγχίνοια) alone27 His full summary of the kind of man who is ideally suited to bea general runs thus


Roman Empire was revisited in the essays of Alberico Gentili (ie in the seventeenth and eight-eenth centuries) see Kingsbury and Straumann (2009) Their introduction (xxndashxxv) covers therelationship(s) between Gentilirsquos arguments and those of Carneades Panaetius and Cicero24 On virtue as demonstrated through eschewing imperialism see Badian (1971) 1ndash1525 Campbell (1987) 13 See also idem 2326 Art of War 6204 See Lynch (2003) 195ndash200 Machiavelli appears to follow Onasander in hisoutline of the general qualities of the general at 152ndash64 In his treatise it is clear that Machiavelliaims to reintroduce Roman values of war but he appears to rely primarily on and to paraphraseor merely translate Vegetius and Frontinus drawing upon also Polybius Thucydides Josephusand naturally Livy see Lynch (2003) xv Butters (2010) 71 Houmlrnqvist (2010) 12127 Prae 9 ldquonor have I failed to perceive that as an author seeking greater praise from credulousreaders would prefer to have it appear that the source of all military stratagems he described washimself and his own shrewdness rather than the sagacity of othersrdquo


φημὶ τοίνυν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐ κατὰ γένη κρίνοντας ὥσπερ τοὺς ἱερέας οὐδὲ κατrsquoοὐσίας ὡς τοὺς γυμνασιάρχους ἀλλὰ σώφρονα ἐγκρατῆ νήπτην λιτόν διάπονον νοερόνἀφιλάργυρον μήτε νέον μήτε πρεσβύτερον ἂν τύχηι καὶ πατέρα παίδων ἱκανὸν λέγεινἔνδοξον (11)

ldquoI assert then that a general to be selected not being chosen because of noble birth as inthe case of priests nor because of wealth as guardians of the gymnasia but because he istemperate self-restrained vigilant frugal hardened to labour alert free from avariceneither too young nor too old indeed a father of children if possible a ready speaker and aman with a good reputationrdquo

The lack of specific Roman signifiers in this excerpt permits the author to engagewith or initiate a wider transhistorical and transcultural discourse on the idealgeneral28 extending backwards to Aeneas Tacticus29 and beyond to Homericepic30 while at the same time sharing with the reader an awareness of and awillingness to engage with the political realities of Rome in his day where thegeneral is very likely the emperor31 If this is the case this passage establishes asubtle (sub)text in the treatise providing generalised and optimistic discourse onthe qualities of the emperor where knowledge of the ars militariswould appear tounderline or perhaps prove the existence of the ars of imperial government ingeneral32 To be sure the challenge before the author is significant since ldquoin aninternational society where the ruler of the state is responsible only to his ownconscience a doctrine with as many loopholes as that of bellum iustum wasbound to degenerate into an ideology serving the interests which it was supposedto controlrdquo33 This Onasander should be seen as striving to eliminate or at thevery least restrict and by so doing he strengthens the moral and political legiti-

44 James T Chlup

28 See Petrocelli (2008) 15 138ndash9 Cf Formisano (2011) 44 ldquo[the textrsquos] norms and rules have amoral and ahistorical significancerdquo see idem 45 Leo VI in the second ldquoconstitutionrdquo in hisTactica reiterates very closely this chapter of Onasander29 ldquo[A]nd let the man who is to lead and have charge [of the army] be not merely prudent andvigorous (φρόνιμος καὶ εὔρωστος)rdquo (17)30 At 17 Onasander quotes Od 736 and at 231 he quotes Il 13122 See Petrocelli (2008) 142ndash3Homeric epic is of course where themilitary treatise begins see Tejada (2004) 130ndash131 This brings up the question of the date of the Strategikos see below 59 n 84 On generalshipin a Roman context see Goldsworthy (1996) and Kagan (2006) More generally Keegan (1987)remains themain (initial) point of reference32 Cf Charles (2007) 87ndash123 where Vegetius considers that the emperor and the general were(almost) never the one and the same See also Campbell (1987) 22ndash3 This is a Chinese conceptalso where Mo-Tzu suggests that respect for a leader at least in part comes from his skills in thearts of war Schwartz (1985) 162ndash333 Schwarzenberger (1962) 239


macy of the princeps This is a subtext of the Strategikos to which the authorreturns that the practice of war a regular facet of Roman culture is a good in andof itself allowing the Romans to demonstrate their positive qualities and thusstrengthening Roman character in general In this instance the author imaginesan emperor who benefits from the practice of the Just War which in turn benefitsthe Roman state through his demonstration of virtue

Catherine Gilliver on the other hand grounds this passage firmly in theRepublican period when she traces similarities between what Onasander writeshere and Cicerorsquos speech in favour of Pompeyrsquos appointment to the Easterncommand34 Pompey certainly is a good model from which the author can deriveinspiration It would surely be very easy to detect other influences If one expandsthe temporal parametres to include the ancient Greek world for instance Ona-sander is arguably describing the Spartan regent Agesilaus especially as repre-sented by Xenophon35 The Spartan admirably executed his dual role as militarycommander and a king who adhered to the constitution and laws of his state thisis what Onasander wants his ideal general the Roman emperor to emulate Thusthrough the atemporal centre of his philosophical argument Onasander simulta-neously directs the readerrsquos attention backwards (generalship in the Republic andgeneralship in Greece) and forwards (generalship under the current and futureemperors)

The author devotes the remainder of this expansive chapter to explainingeach characteristic (12ndash25) the cumulative effect of which is a theoretical morallyunambiguous general of diverse positive characteristics who presumably willpractise ethical war The near-exhaustive detail of this chapter enables Onasanderto engrain firmly these characteristics in his readerrsquos mind upon which he canmethodically build in subsequent chapters in turn reinforcing emphaticallysapientia rei militaris36


34 Gilliver (1996) 220 referring to De Leg Man 10ndash16 see also De Leg Man 28ndash9 36 49 DeOff 1108 ProMur 22 and in various passages in his correspondence See Campbell (1987) 2335 See above 40ndash41 n 1536 These requirements appear still to be desired in sixth century Byzantium where the anon-ymous author of the Treatise on Strategy writes about community leaders in the following termsldquoall persons in authority should possess natural intelligence be upright in their way of lifeexperienced in the matters committed to them in control of their actions and especially of theiremotions and not be more concerned about themselves than their subjectsrdquo (3) He goes on in thenext paragraph to describe counsellors as a separate category noting that they should not havean interest in luxury By beginning the treatise with a generalised description of the state and therole of each kind of citizen within it the author establishes that good leadership in war stemsfrom and feeds back into the health of the community This would seem to be precisely the point


III Onasanderrsquos General as a Purveyor of Just War

The ldquomoral reality of warrdquo37 is generally divided into two interdependent aspectsfirst the reason(s) for war must be legitimate that is ldquoarms should be reservedfor the last extremity when all other means prove insufficientrdquo38 second armiesmust adhere to a code of conduct These two aspects are given the titles ius adbellum and ius in bello respectively Both of these terms are restrictive that isthey primarily seek to define very narrowly the when (or ldquoifrdquo) and how ofwarfare39

It is in the fourth chapter of the Strategikos that Onasander insists that thegeneral make the case for war with a reasonable cause ndash ius ad bellum40 The titleof this unambiguously states this περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἐξεὐλόγου αἰτίας ἐπάγειν41 Onasander the philosopher boldly exposes his λόγος tothe reader ndash the εὔλογος αἰτία for going to war He unequivocally states his beliefin the need for reasonable cause in the first sentence of the chapter τὰς δrsquo ἀρχὰςτοῦ πολέμου μάλιστά φημι χρῆναι φρονίμως συνίστασθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαιοῦπασι φανερὸν γίγνεσθαι πολεμοῦντα ldquothe causes of war I say should be laid outwith the greatest care it should be evident to all that one fights on the side ofjusticerdquo (41)42 The authorial insertion of φημι ndash this is only one of two instancesof this in the text (see above 44) ndash stresses the importance of this argument tothe author εὐλόγου and φρονίμως43 duplicate and amplify φρόνησις from thepreface Here one also infers that one of the characteristics which Onasanderidentifies in his description of the ideal general ndash rhetorical acumen ndash is being

46 James T Chlup

Onasander aims to convey and perhaps the author of this treatise has been influenced by theStrategikos See Dennis (1985)37 The title of the first part of Walzer (2006) His first historical example is the Athenians at Melos(5ndash13)38 Machiavelli Thoughts of a Statesman 2339 Schwarzenberger (1962) 257 ldquoit is the function of the rules of warfare to attempt to imposesome barriers however ineffective against the return to complete anarchy by the imposition ofminimum standards on the conduct of warrdquo On the (seemingly very fluid) relationship betweenthese terms see Bellamy (2006) 128ndash30 who expanding upon Walzer (2006) notes that a warmight adhere to one principle but not the other See Adeney (1988) 98ndash100 on the contradictionbetween the two concepts40 On ius ad bellum see Adeney (1988) 95ndash841 Marek and Kalivoda (1977) 56442 Cf Leo VI Tactica 20 169 where the same thought is expressed but the author prefaces hiscomment with a philosophical platitude μάλιστα μὲν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης παντὸς ἔργου ἀπάρχεσθαιδεῖ ldquocertainly justice must be the beginning of every actionrdquo This is the second time Leo insistsupon ius ad bellum he does so previously at 23043 This word appears in a similar context at XenHipp 71 Cf Leo VI Tactica 20169


effectively employed which in turn establishes the authorrsquos hope that the practiceof the Just War just both in cause and in its actual undertaking will extendnaturally from the ideal generalrsquos good character

Onasanderrsquos unwavering belief in the Just War is conveyed in a variety ofways in the sentences which follow First Onasander defines immediately and(very) narrowly in the next sentence the conditions in which a war may be just adefensive war Here the author reiterates the thought of Cicero vis-agrave-vis war44

Having indicated his approval of Rome building her empire which one mustpresume includes offensive warfare he now unequivocally closes down thispossible line of militarist thought the Aristotelian perception of war as a legit-imate means to acquire is no longer valid45 Onasander therefore boldly insistsupon a realignment of Roman attitudes towards war To facilitate the readerrsquosacceptance of this line of thought Onasander employs the topos of ease tosuggest that a Just (defensive) War is one which presents the best chance ofreceiving wide-scale public support and therefore victory

εἰδότες γάρ ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλrsquo ἀμύνονται τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντεςἐντελῆ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται ὡς ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῶι παρὰ τὸδίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον αὐτῆι τῆι οἰήσει κἂν μή τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαντήσεινμέλληι προκατορρωδοῦσιν (42)

ldquoFor knowing that they do not initiate [a war] but defend themselves their consciencesbeing free from evil designs [soldiers] employ complete courage while those who believean unjust war displeases the divine they have a sense even if they are not to face dangerfrom the enemy they are filled with dreadrdquo


44 De Rep 334ndash5 nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute hellip illainiusta bella sunt quae sine causa suscepta ldquono war is to be undertaken by a worthy state unlesseither under good faith or sound reason hellip those are unjust wars which are undertaken withoutdue causerdquo See also Dyck (1996) 142ndash3 on De Off 136 ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetialipopuli Romani iure perscripta est ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod autrebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit indictum ldquoas for war humane laws touching it aredrawn up in the fetial code of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion and from thisit may be gathered that no war is just unless it is entered upon after an official demand forsatisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declarationmaderdquo45 To a modern philosopher Onasander would appear to be introducing the concept of rightintention (or correct motivation) one of the six elements of the modern Just War see Orend(2006) 46ndash8 This is not simply a declaration that onersquos cause is Just but that the war about to becommenced will achieve some good possibly for both sides


The use of two verbs of thinking in this sentence ndash οἷδα and νομίζω ndash demonstratethat the general must take into account the thoughts of those he commands andmore importantly the thoughts of the general and the soldiers must be in agree-ment

Significant also is the identification of the emotion of fear (stated veryemphatically by the compound verb προκατορρωδοῦσιν) which Onasander per-ceives as a dangerous element and which he discusses later in the treatise (seebelow 54ndash6) This is clearly not a new idea but one with a very rich pedigreeappearing in Greek authors including Thucydides Xenophon Polybius andDionysius of Halicarnassus46 Thus Onasander does not claim originality in histhought but rather expects the reader to infer that he is expanding upon thenegative emotional impact of war as delineated by these earlier authors Thispassage would therefore appear to encapsulate the broad message vis-agrave-vis thepotentially dangerous effect of fear in a variety of theatres of war includingpotentially fear as expressed by those who fight the Romans

The reference to the divine is a subtle and significant aspect of this passage Itbegins the process of refining the authorrsquos argument to a more Roman-specificcontext connecting formally Onasanderrsquos thesis on the Just War to the religiousrules for the declaration of war in Roman culture the institution of which Livydescribes Onasander presents a similar version to Livy (43 51)47 To undertake awar which is ἄδικος or sine causa Onasander implies ndash appealing to his readersrsquoinferred predisposition to religious pietas ndash is to invite the godsrsquo anger andpossible retribution48

This chapter is especially important in that it introduces the authorrsquos modusscribendi whereby he presents two possible outcomes for a course of action49 Hefirst describes a positive outcome based upon his advice being followed He thendescribes a negative outcome when the general undertakes a different course ofaction

εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ καθότι οὐ μόνον οἰκίας καὶ τείχους ἑδραιότερον ὑφίστασθαι δεῖ τὸν θεμέλιονὡς ἀσθενοῦς γε ὄντος συγκαταρρυησομένων καὶ τῶν ἐποικοδομουμένων ἀλλὰ καὶ πολέμου

48 James T Chlup

46 Ambaglio (1981) 355 On the law of war in ancient Greece see Ober (1994) and Low (2007)esp 77ndash128 although her focus is more on laws of Greek interstate relations A chapter on war inancient Rome is surprisingly absent from the volume inwhich Oberrsquos essay appears47 It also appears not dissimilar to the Hebrew Bible where all of Davidrsquos wars were just becausebefore battle he consulted God (2 Sam 519ndash20) Reventlow (1994) 16248 Leibeschultz (1979) 42 n 5 where he points out three examples of divine retribution on theRomans the Gallic capture of Rome the Caudine Forks and Caesarrsquos Gallic campaign (assuggested by CatoMinor Plut Caes 224)49 Eg 382ndash6 see below 53


τὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ κατασκευασάμενον ἰσχυρῶς καὶ κρηπῖδα περιθέμενον ἀσφαλείας οὕτωςἐξάγειν τὰς δυνάμεις ὧν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ τὰ πράγματά ἐστιν ἐπειδὰν οὗτοι μέγα βάρος ἀναλά-βωσιν πολέμου ταχὺ θλίβονται καὶ ὑστεροῦσιν (44)

ldquoHe should know that not only is a firm foundation necessary for houses and walls ndash for ifthis is weak the superstructures will also collapse ndash but that in war also it is only after onehas prepared a firm beginning and has laid a safe foundation that he should take to thefield For those whose cause is weak when they take up the heavy burden of war arequickly crushed by it and failrdquo

The metaphor of the house is an effective one since it allows the reader to inferthat should the general not provide a legitimate cause for war the consequencemay be the literal collapse of the state herself ndash the synecdoche of the walls of thehouse for the walls of the city-state is an obvious inference for the Roman readerto make One might argue that Onasander subtly implies that a Just War is a warthat is not undertaken the topos of difficulty ndash he describes war here as μέγαβάρος ndash indicates war as a physical as well as moral burden whichmirabile factuought to be avoided wherever possible50

The early chapters of the Strategikos are superfluous if Onasanderrsquos intentionis to provide practical advice on generalship only Rather their inclusion andplacement early in the treatise is clear evidence that the author seeks to imposeon his reader the moral frame of war all subsequent chapters are intended to beread through the moral filter established here A potential problem arises sincethe reason for war could be just but the actions which take place therein mightnot be That a war ought to be undertaken according to the principles of ius inbello is Onasanderrsquos preoccupation in the subsequent chapters Thus Onasanderconforms to what Alex J Bellamy argues is a hierarchal relationship between iusad bellum and ius in bello51 To Bellamy failure to adhere to ius in bello under-mines ius ad bellum in order for what Onasander writes above to apply and tounderline the treatise as a whole therefore he must methodically argue for ius inbello52


50 Smith (1998) 165 humourously proffers that ldquoOnasanderrsquos ideal campaign would be comple-tely bloodless on both sides two perfectly matched armies would employ so many feints andcounterfeints that they would never come to blowsrdquo51 Bellamy (2006) 12852 One aspect of ius in bello is absent from Onasander the case of the supreme emergency Onecan safely infer that the author believes that this no longer applies to Rome there will be nofurther instances of Hannibal ad portas It is probably for this reason that Onasander describesonly an offensive campaign that is he does not provide advice on defense of a city under siege asAeneas Tacticus or Vegetius


IV Just War andas Military Strategy

For the bulk of the work Onasander follows the conventions set down by hispredecessors in the military treatise a platitudinous provision of practical adviceto achieve victory To be sure there is nothing innovative here many chaptersdiscuss what an aspiring general would consider common sense for examplemaintaining military formation (6) the use of vigorous military drills (101ndash6)and the holding of troops in reserve (221ndash4) but not peculiarly the generalentering battle himself (331ndash6)53 The latter would appear to run counter to theRoman war experience especially given the first-hand general narrative of Cae-sar

Onasanderrsquos innovation is his seamless insertion of arguments in favour ofius in bello into this common sense strategy Thus ldquothe ethical framework blendsin with the performance of the general in the field The interesting point is that hellipOnasander still feels that his work was not merely of antiquarian interestbut would be of direct relevancerdquo54 A minimalist interpretation of a war foughtaccording to ius in bello might insist upon the adherence to the principle ofmutually agreed open battle only55 Onasanderrsquos allowance for the tactics ofdeception reveals his understanding of the realities of warfare It is probably forthis need to demonstrate ldquodirect relevancerdquo then that Onasander argues for theuse of deception in warfare for example he advocates the use of spies (109)other tactics of deception include the secret retreat of the army (1013) theacceptance of deserters and traitors (1015)56 and making secret plans (1022ndash4)in another instance he argues for the feigned withdrawal through fear quicklyturning about to charge the pursuing army (219)57 That the tactics are clusteredin one chapter indicates the authorrsquos possible discomfort with them consolidatedinto a single chapter near the beginning of the treatise their potential contamina-tion of the text a distraction to the overarching ius in bello argument is appreci-ably reduced In fact as the latter chapters of the treatise testify the author

50 James T Chlup

53 SeeMespleacute (2004) 29ndash3154 Campbell (2004) 95 Cf idem (1987) 14 ldquothe tremendous popularity of Onasander in theRenaissance and even among soldiers of later ages suggests that his work had some kind ofgeneral relevancerdquo55 See Niditch (1993) 106ndash22 on deception in warfare and conflict in the Hebrew Bible Whetham(2009) 1ndash33 provides a useful overview of military thought on the use of deception from Sun-Tzuto the First World War He notes that ldquolegitimate deception includes things such as the use ofcamouflage decoys mock operations and the spreading of misinformationrdquo (3)56 SeeMespleacute (2004) 31ndash257 Onasander would appear to let his discomfort with deception infiltrate the text only once inhis discussion of siege engines (423ndash6) where he refrains from insisting on their use


indirectly discounts deception as an effective means of waging a campaignarguing instead for transparency in dealing with the enemy

It is in reading Onasanderrsquos elucidation of military stratagems to be employedby the general that one peculiar facet ndash or deficiency ndash of the treatise presentsitself the lack of discussion of specific examples or citations of other militarywriters or historians (although at Prae 8 he claims that πάντα διὰ πράξεων καὶἀληθινῶν ἀγώνων κεχωρηκότα μάλιστα μὲν Ῥωμαίοις ldquoall the principles aretaken from authentic exploits and battles especially of the Romansrdquo)58 This leadsCampbell to a less than positive assessment of the treatise ldquomuch of his materialis rather bland lacking a specific context and could refer to most armies in thefield since he is principally interested in the principles of command and thecharacter and demeanour of the commanderrdquo59 This may be exactly Onasanderrsquospoint he wants a generalised text that could apply to all audiences includingRomans of all historical periods and their adversaries60 Moreover the omission ofexempla allows the author to avoid having to address directly those instanceswhere the Romans did not apply the principles of ius in bello the less thanadmirable behaviour of the past does not cast its shadow on the optimistic presentof the treatise To have to explain (that is justify) why the Romans did not practiseius in bello would be a distraction which would potentially undermine theauthorrsquos thesis

The main arguments in favour of ius in bello appear in the authorrsquos discussionof the final stages of a war where in anticipation of victory the general ldquoshouldobserve a code of restraint and moderation in his personal conductrdquo61 The mainfocus of Onasanderrsquos argument is the treatment of those who surrender and thosewho might be induced to surrender He covers the former thus


58 OnOnasanderrsquos sources seeMespleacute (2000) and Petrocelli (2008) passim59 Campbell (2004) 95 Hemakes these comments in his introduction to the author which comesafter an excerpt from the Prae 4ndash6 see above 39ndash43) Whitehead (2008) 142ndash3 ldquoYet even soOnasandros gives no hint of drawing on any military experience of his own and even as anlsquoarmchairrsquo expert he fails to back up his advice (and in the process stylistically vary it) withconcrete examplesrdquo60 See Formisano (2011) 45ndash50 Not discussing specific examples from Roman history allows theauthor to avoid an unfortunate reality of the Roman war experience that while the Romansperceived themselves as wanting to practise ius in bello their enemies almost entirely ignored itBedermann (2001) 247ndash8 provides the most (in)famous examples which weighed on the Romansrsquominds61 Campbell (1987) 14 On restraint in ancient warfare see Bedermann (2001) 242ndash9


ταῖς δὲ προσχωρούσαις πόλεσιν εἴ τινες ἐπιτρέποιεν αὑτὰς ἀρξάμεναι φιλανθρώπως καὶχρηστῶς προσφερέσθω προσαγάγοιτο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡ γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ τῶναὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι δελεάζουσα προσάγεται τοὺς πολλοὺς αὑτοὺς ἑκόντας ἐγχειρίζειν (381)

ldquoWith respect to surrendering cities if any should surrender themselves early in the war he[sc the general] should treat them in a manner both humane and advantageous for thus hewould induce the other cities also to submit The enticing hope of a similarly fortunate fateleads the majority to surrender voluntarilyrdquo

One perhaps can trace the origins of this statement to Cicero who in the DeOfficiis reflects upon promises made to an enemy ndash both Romans to foreignersand foreigners to Romans62 Compassion (φιλανθρωπία) being useful (χρηστός)recasts and emphatically restates the authorrsquos main argument that a Just War isone in which there is the best hope for success This statement also reiterates theauthorrsquos stipulation ante bellum that the general confirm that he ldquois not deliber-ately seeking hellip to ruin the enemyrdquo (43) The practice of φιλανθρωπία ndash and trust(ἄδεια) a term which appears in the title of the chapter (περὶ τοῦ τὰς προσαγομέ-νας πόλεις ἐν ἀδείαι ἔχειν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαι) ndash stands out as the central element ofthe authorrsquos argument for the adherence to the principles of ius in bello

More precisely Onasanderrsquos desire for the exhibition of φιλανθρωπία consti-tutes the authorrsquos structuring his argument so that it corresponds closely to if notaligns precisely with the Latin clementia thus the author works within theexisting Roman moral framework established in this instance by Cicero andCaesar the latter of whom was the Roman general par excellence and wouldseem to Onasander to be the ideal Roman model to imply63 While the formertheorised the utility of clementia the latter validated it through action64 This is

52 James T Chlup

62 De Off 138 See Dyck (1996) 146ndash50 Onasander appears to exclude non-standard warfarethat is where the enemy is not a state note Cicerorsquos comment on pirates atDe Off 13463 Cic De Rep 32335 semper debemus demonstrare tamen magnum officium in bello etmagnam clementiam post victoria ldquowe must always demonstrate nevertheless great duty in warand great clemency after victoryrdquo Here officium could imply ius in bello and semper conveysCicerorsquos perception of the permanency of this course of action64 On Onasanderrsquos conception of φιλανθρωπία and its seemingly close relation to Caesarrsquospractice of clementia see Gilliver (1996) 221ndash2 and 230ndash1 Bauman (1999) 75ndash7 and Petrocelli(2008) 255ndash6 who notes that Sun-Tzu makes a similar statement (736) Cf Front Strat 441ndash2who appears to think along the same lines as Onasander in his (brief) discussion of iustitia

There may also be a connection between φιλανθρωπία in Onasander and clementia asproffered by Seneca who at De Clem 1213 argues in favour of restoring the defeated king to hiskingdom but as a client See Braund (2009) 358ndash9 see eadem 33ndash8 for a history of the clementiaLeniency with respect to punishment was an essential characteristic of Senecan clementia whichNero rather enthusiastically practised at least at first Bauman (1999) 79ndash82


perhaps a good example of where Onasanderrsquos disinclination to discuss militarystrategy through specific example weakens his argument For the moral lesson tocross from the theoretical to the historical would emphasise in clear terms howthis policy was beneficial

If in this passage the author implies the Roman concept fides then Onasandercould be insisting upon the Roman concept of deditio in fidem a form of surrenderin which the Roman generalrsquos power to impose punishment was limited Thealternative deditio in potestatem in which Rome could exact punishment withoutrestraint appears to be a recourse which Onasander does not consider a desir-able ndash or viable ndash course of action65 Thus Onasander categorically appears todeny the punitive annihilation of ndash or any kind of punitive action against ndash theenemy

This passage is also important in that it reveals one of Onasanderrsquos mainarguments about the generalrsquos obligations in war to end hostilities at the earliestopportunity This helps explain other passages in the treatise where the authorrecommends courses of action which stricto sensu might seem to run counterto the principles of ius in bello for example in a later chapter he recommendssending women and children into an enemy city for the purpose of depleting itsfood supply (4223ndash4 see also above 48)66 To Onasander this action is doneχρηστῶς because it expedites the enemyrsquos surrender and one might infer that thegeneral would demonstrate φιλανθρωπία as the author argues in the excerptabove

To reinforce his point in this chapter and to close off any predilection on thepart of the general to strive for a potentially harsh(er) course of action Onasanderemploys the topos of difficulty ndash emphatically conveyed by the phrase ὥστε καὶτὸν πόλεμον αὑτωι ἐπίπονον καὶ τὴν νίκην δύσελπιν κατασκευάζειν 382 ndash whenhe explains the situation which may arise from such an approach (382ndash6) Hehypothesises an enemy who fears harsh punishment which naturally increasestheir intransigence

οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτως κατασκευάζει γενναίους ὡς φόβοςὧν μέλλουσι πείσεσθαι κακῶν εἴξαντεςἡ γὰρ προσδοκία τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ καθυφεῖσθαι τὰ σφέτερα δεινὴν ἐντίθησι φιλοτιμίανἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χαλεπαὶ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπεγνωσμένους πεῖραι μάχης οὐδὲν γὰρχρηστότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τοῦ παραχωρεῖν ὧν πείσονται κινδυνεύοντες αἱρουνται μετὰ τοῦπολλὰ δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν (384ndash5)


65 Bedermann (2001) 262ndash3Watson (1993) 51ndash266 Cf Veg 47 Battistini (1994) 96 perceives a unity to these chapters of the Strategikos ldquosafaccedilon drsquoenvisager la conduite drsquoun chef le sort des prisonniers des traicirctres ou drsquoune cite vaincueparticipe de cette philosophie de la guerrerdquo


ldquoFor nothing makes men so brave as the fear of what evils they will suffer if they surrenderindeed the expectation of the horrors which will ensue from their subjection produces aterrible pertinacity in danger Moreover fighting is dangerous against desperate men whoexpect from surrender no amelioration of fate which will be theirs if they continue to fightand therefore prefer if they can inflict much harm also to suffer muchrdquo67

Here one detects a central concept of ancient thought which is persevered as partof the modern conception of the laws of war reciprocity68 This proves a valuabletool by which Onasander can advance his argument in favour of φιλανθρωπία Inthis passage κακῶν is a powerful albeit vague word which nonetheless enablesthe author to make effectively the point that those who would seize upon thedefeated side behave inappropriately and by extension the general who permitssuch action risks being perceived as κακός This is a situation which interest-ingly earlier in the treatise the author suggests soldiers ought to avoid τὰς ψυχὰςἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες (42 see above 47ndash8) What Onasander perceivesas being κακός then runs directly counter to the authorrsquos desire for what isδίκαιος The general here must assuage the concerns of both his enemy and hisown soldiers Onasander makes attacking the defeated an unattractive proposi-tion when he asserts that such a course of action is dangerous (χαλεπαί) In thispassage therefore Onasander deftly combines moral and practical advice dan-ger produces uncertainty uncertainty is what a military treatise endeavours toexcise from war through detailed elucidation of strategy The avoidance of dangerthrough the practice of φιλανθρωπία excises danger

The topic of fear as a powerful motivation for ldquonegative reciprocityrdquo reap-pears near the end of the treatise Onasander underlines the danger of fear nearthe end of the monograph in a short chapter (421) in which he warns against itas a ldquofalse prophetrdquo (ὁ γὰρ φόβος ψευδὴς μάντις) Onasander covers again thegeneralrsquos conduct post-victory after the capture of an enemy city (4218ndash22)where he argues that the unarmed ought not to be killed Although in this passagehe does not use the word φιλανθρωπία Onasander clearly intends for the term toapply making his argument not on moral but practical grounds employinganother counterexample ἕως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἐλπίζει ληφθεὶς τεθνήξεσθαι βούλεταιφθάνειν δράσας καὶ πάσχων ἀλλά τι καὶ δρᾶν ldquofor so long as every man expects tobe killed after capture he wishes first to do some deed of bravery and even

54 James T Chlup

67 Cf Front Strat 26 surprisingly at 28 he argues the opposite course of action insisting that toterrorise an enemy inclines them to surrender68 Whetham (2009) 3 quoting also Schwarzenberger (1962) 257 ldquothe laws of war attempt to limitthe lsquochain reaction of negative reciprocityrsquo towards complete anarchy by installing some barrierssetting out certainminimum standards of the conduct of warrdquo


though he suffers to accomplish somethingrdquo (4219)69 Reiterating a point hemakes earlier (384ndash5) Onasander underlines fear as a powerful if not theprimary motivation for resistance which the general can expeditiously obviatethrough φιλανθρωπία70 In this instance the author outlines a possible positiveoutcome he recommends the publication of a proclamation which guarantees thesafety of the enemy which he prophesies will produce immediate results thatis the cessation of conflict

οἵ τε ἕτοιμοι πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι μέχρι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλπίδα κεκήρυκται σωτηρίας εἰ καὶ μὴγνώμηι ἀλλrsquo ἀνάγκηι τὸ ἐπιὸν ἀμύνονται κακόν ἐπειδὰν δὲ μικρὰν ἐλπίδα τοῦ σώζεσθαιλάβωσιν ἱκέται τὸ λοιπὸν ἀντὶ πολεμίων ὑπαντῶσιν οὕτως τε ὁ μὲν κηρύξας καὶ τοὺς τὰὅπλα φυλάττειν βουλομένους ῥίπτειν αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζει (4220ndash1)

ldquoThose who are ready to protect their own lives so long as no hope of safety has beenannounced strive to avert the imminent danger if not as they wish then as they must butwhen they perceive a small hope of safety from then on they become suppliants instead ofenemies Thus the one who makes this proclamation compels even those who wish to keeptheir arms to throw them downrdquo

As Christopher Smith points out Onasander stresses the responsibility of thegeneral to remove the handicap of fear from his soldiers this he calls part of theldquopsychological qualities of leadershiprdquo71 Onasander has already introduced thisresponsibility when he insists that the general demonstrate courage even inadversity (131ndash3)72 and provide good news during battle even if it be false (231ndash3) and that the general should provide ldquoencouragementrdquo to his army should it bedefeated (363ndash6)73 Thus the final chapters of the Strategikos demonstrate asubtle shift whereby the author transitions from discussing the generalrsquos respon-


69 Cf Veg 4251 who confirms that this fear is very much realistic innumerabilibus declaraturexemplis saepe caesos ad internicionem hostes qui pervaserant civitatem quod sine dubio evenitldquocountless examples demonstrate that enemies have often slain to a man after they had invaded acity This is the certain resultrdquo Milner (1993) 136 n 3 appears to see this passage of Vegetius asgrounded in Onasander 4218ndash2270 Thus Onasander would appear to excise from the general or his community the right toimpose punishment on the defeated enemy On punishment post-bellum see Blane and Kingsbury(2010)71 Smith (1998) 158 n 35 who also observes that this idea has a solid grounding in philosophicalthought being discussed by both Plato and Aristotle Smith discusses specifically the latter onfear and bravery in theNic Eth (160ndash1) See also Rosenstein (2007) esp 231ndash272 Cf Veg 39 31273 Cf Veg 325 This is a very interesting chapter of the Strategikos to be sure since it is the onlypoint in the treatise where the author imagines defeat for his ideal general Defeat for the primary


sibilities towards his own soldiers to responsibilities towards his own soldiers andthose of the enemy which he does by implying that the best way for the generalto protect the former is by striving to protect the latter Removing fear from bothallows for victory for his own soldiers to fight bravely for his enemiesrsquo tosurrender expeditiously These passages draw to a close Onasanderrsquos argumentsituating the general at the crossroads of the practical and ethical aspects of waror rather as the intersection at the same time marking the potential point oftransition for the general from leading one army against another to assumingcontrol of a unified state in a new condition of peace

V Onasander and ius post bellum

Onasander is unique in extant military Greek and Roman authors in that hedevotes significant discussion to events following the cessation of hostilities Thisallows him to introduce an additional element to his moral enterprise ius postbellum74 Here further evidence of the authorrsquos concern for the generalrsquos regard forthe enemy may be found enabling him to build a stronger case for φιλανθρωπίαius post bellum builds upon and therefore necessitates ius in bello and ius adbellum Indiscriminate pillaging ought not to be allowed (351ndash3) killing ofprisoners ought to be avoided (354ndash5) and the general should not order theattack of a city when a truce has been made (371ndash5) Onasander is not naiumlve healso cautions against his general being unguarded (αὐτὸς ἀφύλακτος) The im-portance of maintaining a negotiated peace is stressed through reference to thedivine context implied in any treaty καὶ παρὰ σοὶ μὲν ἔστω τὸ βέβαιον τοῦ μὴἀδικῆσαι διὰ τὸ εὐσεβές παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὐπονοείσθω τὸ μὴ πιστὸν διὰ τὸἀπεχθές ldquolet your part be a firm resolution not to transgress because of thesacred nature of the treaty but suspect a breach of faith on the part of the enemydue to their hostilityrdquo (373)75 ἀδικῆσαι enables the author to weave into hisargument his belief that to violate a treaty runs directly against the notion ofJustice as a verb it indicates that violation is a potential course of action It ispresented as a course of action away from which the general must turn avoiding

56 James T Chlup

side (that is the readerrsquos community and not that against which he fights) is a topic which isalmost entirely absent in themilitary treatise74 This is a new facet of Just War discourse see Orend (2002) (2006) 160ndash219 and (2007) withadditional bibliography See also Bedermann (2001) 260ndash3 Blane and Kingsbury (2010) Leo VIdevotes the sixteenth constitution of his Tactica to post bellum activities the first fourteenchapters of which follow quite closely chapters 34 to 37 of the Strategikos75 Petrocelli (2008) 253ndash4


the negative situation which he outlines in the next chapter (384ndash5) The refer-ence to the divine reiterates aspects of the Just War which are internal andexternal to the treatise first it restates the duty of the general to perform theappropriate religious rituals before commencing a campaign (51) and to interpretomens before battle (1025ndash8) second it allows the author to allude to and thereader to infer once again the rules for declaration of war as explained by Livyand Cicero which are grounded in religious ritual76

Preparation for war serves to uphold the peace because it constitutes anincentive to the (former) enemy not to violate the treaty ἀσφαλὴς γὰρ οὖτος καὶπρομηθής ὃς οὐδὲ βουληθεῖσι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπιθέσθαι τὸν τοῦ δύνασθαι παρα-σπονδῆσαι καιρὸν ἀπολείπει ldquothat general is wise and cautious who affords theenemy even when they desire to attack no opportunity to break their agreementrdquo(373) Preparing for war and engaging in it when necessary serves the aims ofpeace ndash this goes back to Aristotle77 Here Onasander appears to anticipate orrather lay the theoretical foundation for Vegetiusrsquomost famous maxim igitur quidesiderat pacem praeparet bellum qui victoriam cupit milites inbuat diligenterldquotherefore he who desires peace may he prepare for war he who strives forvictory let him train diligently soldiersrdquo78 Onasanderrsquos phrase ἀσφαλὴς γὰροὖτος καὶ προμηθής emphatically validates the intellectual dimension of militarycommand προμηθής reiterates φρόνησις The interpretation of ius post bellumwhich Onasander proffers therefore would appear to be a maximalist onewhereby additional responsibility is assigned to the general the ensuring of thepeace after the conflict In other words the general must first win the war hemust then win the peace

The cumulative effect of these passages provide a context for the final chapterof the monograph where in the final sentence Onasander concludes with a broadplatitude which underlines this ethical thesis ἀνὴρ οὖν ἀγαθὸς οὐ μόνον πατρί-δος τε καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ πλήθους ἄριστος ἡγεμών ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν εἰς αἰεὶεὐδοξίας ἀκινδύνου οὐκ ἀνόητος στρατηγός ldquoa good man then will be not onlya brave defender of his country and a competent leader of an army but also for thepermanent protection of his own reputation will be a sagacious strategistrdquo (4226)To be sure it is a circular but effective argument allowing Onasander to end hismonograph and at the same time emphasise the moral argument he makes at the(near) beginning of his exposition of his enquiry beginning and ending from theldquosaferdquo theoretical space of the philosophical to be a good leader and a good


76 On religion in Romanwar seeWatson (1993) 62ndash7277 Reventlow (1994) 169 and n 3678 3 Prae 8 See Milner (1993) 63 n 3 See idem xxiindashxxiii on the possible influence ofOnasander on Vegetius On deterrence theory see Haase (1977)


strategist requires being a good man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός) and to demonstrate ἀρετή79

To Onasander being a good man and being a good general are mutually inclu-sive concepts one must be a good man in order to be ideally suited to being agood general to execute successfully the duties of a general by following themoral principles of the just war ensures that he and by extension the commu-nity he serves are and will continue to be ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί80 The treatise there-fore comes full circle fulfilling the authorrsquos desire to create good generals ThusOnasander would appear to support the poetics of aristocratic competitionwhich still pervaded at least in theory if not in actual practice Roman politicaldiscourse of the early principate whereby Romans would demonstrate theirvalue to the community through political and military service as mutuallyinclusive activities It is the latter which Onasander appears to support as beinga moral good in and of itself serving to ameliorate continuously the Romanbody politic a facet of Roman political culture which can be further improvedthrough adherence to the principles of the Just War as Onasander delineatesthem in the treatise81

VI Just War from Onasander to Obama

In his speech to accept the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 Barack Hussein Obamaacknowledged that despite the ubiquity of war in the human experience thereeventually emerged an attempt to restrict its damage

ldquoOver time as codes of law sought to control violence within groups so did philosophersclerics and statesmen seek to regulate the destructive power of war The concept of a lsquojustwarrsquo emerged suggesting that war is justified only when it meets certain preconditions if itis waged as a last resort or in self-defense if the force used is proportional and if where

58 James T Chlup

79 See Petrocelli (2008) 272ndash380 On this term as it relates to interstate relations see Low (2007) 136ndash40 Vegetius appears toargue broadly along the same lines quatenus virtute pariter ac dispositione mirabilis rei publicaetuae et imperatoris officium exhiberes et militis ldquoin order that by the virtue coupled with thestrategy of your glorious state you may manifest your role of both commander and soldierrdquo(32638)81 The same is true for Machiavelli as Mallett (1990) 174 observes ldquogood laws and good armsthe concern to recreate the links between the civilian and military spheres to draw the militaryworld of war back into the heart of political and civic life to use military training to encouragecivic virtue and patriotism these were all messages that Machiavelli conveyedmore clearly morecoherently than any of his contemporariesrdquo


possible civilians are spared from violence hellip [f]or most of history this concept of just warwas rarely observedrdquo82

Onasander should be considered one of the philosophers to whom Obama referssince his definition of the Just War although a very broad generalisation alignswith the concept as explored in the Strategikos In turn Obama like all militaryleaders has the potential to be the ideal general described by Onasander ThatObamawas accepting an award for peace at a timewhen the nationwas engaged intwo military campaigns would not have bothered Onasander The concepts ofproportionality and non-assault of civilians however would seem strange toOnasander and his reader these are post-Roman alterations83 UnfortunatelyObama reveals that the conventions of theδίκαιοςπόλεμοςuponwhich theStrategi-kos insists appear not to have been successfully implemented or have been signifi-cantly deviated from Onasanderrsquos project therefore remains a work in progress

Interweaving the concept of the Just War into the fabric of the practical adviceenables Onasander to engage with and expand Roman discourse on Justiceattaching it formally enthusiastically and irrevocably to the Roman game of warWhen in his preface Onasander looks back on several centuries of Roman successhe imagines the continuation of that trajectory with the additional moral framewhich he articulates Thus from the zero-sum level of the peace in which he lived(Prae 4 σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα) the 50s or 60s CE which must have seemedthe ideal time to contemplate and hopefully realign the nature of warfare84

Onasander could have reasonable expectation that future conflicts would befought μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου This would be Romersquos Sonderweg in warfare The purpose


82 Obama (2009) cf Walzer (2006) 3 ldquoFor as long as men and women have talked about warthey have talked about it in terms of right and wrong And for almost as long some among themhave derided such talk called it a charade insisted that war lies beyond (or beneath) moraljudgment War is a world apart where life itself is at stake where human nature is reduced to itselemental forms where self-interest and necessity prevail Here men and women do what theymust to save themselves and their communities and morality and law have no place Inter armasilent leges in time of war the law is silentrdquo The Latin phrase is modified from Cicerorsquos expressionsilent enim leges inter arma at ProMil 1183 On the use of civilians see above 5384 The communis opinio is that the probable date of composition for the Strategikos is the reign ofClaudius or Nero Onasander mentions only one person by name Quintus Veranius to whom thetreatise is dedicated This may be the Veranius who was consul in 49 CE and governor of Britainin 58ndash9 See Bayer (1947) Ambaglio (1981) 353 Le Bohec (1998) 170ndash2 Smith (1998) 151ndash6Petrocelli (2008) 6 eadem 133ndash4 reads σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα as a specific reference to thepax deorum of Augustus This would seem to ignore the (clear) illegality of Gaiusrsquo and Claudiusrsquocampaigns Onemight speculate that Onasander intended for his treatise to guide Veranius in anypossiblemilitary campaigns during his time in Britain


of the military treatise as set forth by Aeneas Tacticus the first author whose textis preserved was to present ldquoan idealized structure of battle hellip to make warunderstandablerdquo85 This Onasander does with the added element of his philoso-phical training and additional historical knowledge the idealised structure ofbattle can only be fully realised through the ideal general who employs theprinciples of the ideal moral framework for waging war The Strategikos thereforerepresents the bold expansion of the theoretical scope of the genre of the militarytreatise imbuing the τέχνη of warfare with the λόγος of the JustWar86

Bibliography

Adeney Bernard T Just War Political Realism and Faith Metuchen NJ Scarecrow Press 1988Adolf Antony Peace A World History London Polity Press 2009Ager Sheila L ldquoRoman perspectives on Greek diplomacyrdquo In Diplomats and Diplomacy in the

RomanWorld edited by Claude Eilers 15ndash43 Leiden Brill 2008Albert Sigrid Bellum iustum Die Theorie des ldquogerechten Kriegesrdquo und ihre praktische Be-

deutung fuumlr die auswaumlrtigen Auseindersetzungen Roms in republikanischer Zeit KallmuumlnzLassleben 1980

Ambaglio Delfino ldquoIl trattato lsquoSul Comandantersquo di Onasandrordquo Athenaeum 59 (1981) 353ndash77Ando Clifford 2010 ldquoEmpire and the Laws of War a Roman archaeologyrdquo In The Roman

Foundations of the Law of Nations Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire edited byBenedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann 30ndash52 Oxford UP 2010 [Reprinted in hisLaw Language and Empire in the Roman Tradition Philadelphia University of Penn-sylvania Press 2011 37ndash63]

Badian Ernst Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic Second Edition Ithaca NY Cornell UP1971

Battistini Olivier La guerre Trois tacticiens grecs Eacuteneacutee Ascleacutepiodote Onasandre Paris Nil1994

Bauman Richard A Human Rights in Ancient Rome London Routledge 1999Bayer E ldquoDie Entstehungszeit des StrategikosrdquoWuumlrzburger Jahrbuumlcher fuumlr die Altertum-

wissenschaft 2 (1947) 86ndash90Bedermann David J International Law in Antiquity Cambridge Cambridge UP 2001Bellamy Alex J Just Wars from Cicero to Iraq London Polity Press 2006Bickerman Elias J ldquoBellum Philippicum some Roman and Greek views concerning the causes of

the SecondMacedonian Warrdquo Classical Philology 403 (1945) 137ndash48

60 James T Chlup

85 Tejada (2004) 14686 An earlier (and shorter) version of this paper was presented at the conference ldquoJustice in theGreco-Roman Worldrdquo held at the University of Western Ontario in March 2010 I warmly thankKelly Olson for including me in the conference and the audience for the discussion I also thankMark Joyal and Michael Stack for the comments on an earlier draft of this paper and usefuldiscussions


Blane Alexis and Kingsbury Benedict ldquoPunishment and the ius post bellumrdquo In The RomanFoundations of the Law of Nations Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire edited byBenedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann 241ndash65 Oxford Oxford UP 2010

Le Bohec Yann ldquoQue voulait Onesandrosrdquo In Claude de Lyon Empereur Romain edited by YvesBurnand Yann Le Bohec and Jean-Pierre Martin 169ndash79 Paris Presses de lrsquoUniversite deParis-Sorbonne 1998

Braund Susanna Seneca De Clementia Oxford Oxford UP 2009Brooks Thom editor Just War Theory Leiden Brill 2012Buumlchner Karl Cicero De Re Publica Heidelberg Karl Winter Verlag 1984Butters Humfrey ldquoMachiavelli and the Medicirdquo In The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli

edited by John M Najemy 64ndash79 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2010Campbell Brian ldquoTeach yourself how to be a generalrdquo JRS 77 (1987) 13ndash29Campbell Brian Greek and RomanMilitary Writers Selected Readings London Routledge

2004Capelle W ldquoGriechische Ethik und roumlmischer Imperialismusrdquo Klio 25 (1932) 86ndash113Charles Michael B Vegetius in Context Stuttgart Franz Steiner Verlag 2007Clavadetscher-Thuumlrlemann Silvia ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ und bellum iustum Versuch einer Ideen-

geschichte Zurich Juumlris 1985Dennis George T Three Byzantine Military Treatises Cambridge MA Harvard UP 1985Drexler Hans ldquoIustum Bellumrdquo Rheinisches Museum fuumlr Philologie 102 (1959) 97ndash140Dyck Andrew R A Commentary on Cicero De Officiis Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

1996Eckstein Arthur MMediterranean Anarchy Interstate War and the Rise of Rome Berkeley

University of California Press 2006Erskine Andrew The Hellenistic Stoa Political Thought and Action London Bristol Classical

Press 1990Formisano Marco ldquoThe Strategikoacutes of Onasander taking military texts seriouslyrdquo Technai 2

(2011) 39ndash52Galimberti Alessandro ldquoLo Strategikos di Onasandrordquo In Guerra e diritto nel mondo greco e

romano edited by Marta Sordi 141ndash53 Milan Vita e Pensiero 2002Gilliver Catherine ldquoThe Roman army andmorality in warrdquo In Battle in Antiquity edited by

Alan B Lloyd 219ndash38 London Duckworth Classical Press of Wales 1996Girardet Klaus M ldquolsquoGerechter Kreigrsquo von Ciceros Konzept des bellum iustum bis zur UNO-

Chartardquo Gymnasium 114 (2007) 1ndash35Glucker John ldquoCarneades in Rome some unsolved problemsrdquo In Cicerorsquos Republic edited by

J G F Powell and J A North 57ndash82 [Bulletin of the Institute of Classics Studies Supple-ment No 76] London Institute of Classical Studies 2001 57ndash82

Gmuumlr Harry Thomas von Aquino und der Krieg Leipzig Teubner 1933Goldsworthy Adrian C The Roman Army at War 100 BC ndash AD 200 Oxford Oxford UP 1996Haase Wolfgang ldquolsquoSi vis pacem para bellumrsquo Zur Beurteilung militaumlrischer Staumlrke in der

roumlmischen Kaiserzeitrdquo In Limes Akten des XI internationalen Limeskongresses 1976 editedby J Fritz 721ndash55 Budapest Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1977

Harris William VWar and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327ndash70 BC Revised Edition OxfordOxford UP 2000

Houmlrnqvist Mikael ldquoMachiavellirsquos military project and the Art of Warrdquo In The CambridgeCompanion to Machiavelli edited by John M Najemy 112ndash27 Cambridge Cambridge UP2010



Heuser Beatrice The Evolution of Strategy Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present Cam-bridge Cambridge UP 2010

Johnson James Turner The Quest for Peace Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural HistoryPrinceton Princeton UP 1987

Kagan Kimberly The Eye of Command Ann Arbor Michigan UP 2006Keegan John The Mask of Command London Penguin Books 1987Kingsbury Benedict and Straumann Benjamin Alberico Gentili the Wars of the Romans

Oxford Oxford UP 2011Leibeschultz J H W G Continuity and Change in Roman Religion Oxford Oxford UP 1979Lefegravevre Eckhard Panaitiosrsquo und Ciceros Pflichtenlehre Stuttgart Franz Steiner 2001Low Polly Interstate Relations in Classical Greece Morality and Power Cambridge Cambridge

UP 2007Lynch Christopher Niccolograve Machiavelli the Art of War Chicago Chicago UP 2003Lyons John Structural Semantics An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato Oxford Black-

well Academic 1963McDonald A H and Walbank F W ldquoThe origins of the SecondMacedonianWarrdquo JRS 27 (1937)

180ndash207Mallett Michael ldquoThe theory and practice of warfare in Machiavellirsquos Republicrdquo InMachiavelli

and Republicanism edited by Gisela Bock Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli 173ndash80Cambridge Cambridge UP 1990

Markus R A ldquoSaint Augustinersquos views on the lsquoJust Warrsquordquo In The Church and War edited byW J Sheils 1ndash13 [Studies in Church History 20] Oxford Blackwell Academic 1983

Marek V and Kalivoda J Antickeacute Vaacutelečneacute Uměniacute Prague Svoboda Press 1977Mattern-Parkes Susan P ldquoThe defeat of Crassus and the Just Warrdquo CW 964 (2003) 387ndash98Mespleacute Pierre Eacutetude sue le commandement militaire des sources litteacuteraires aux eacutecrits drsquoOno-

sandre M A Thesis Universiteacute de Nantes 2000Mespleacute Pierre ldquoPour une relecture des strateacutegistes antiques lrsquoexemple du Strategicos drsquoOno-

sandrerdquo In Dialogue militaire entre Anciens et Modernes edited by Jean-Pierre Bois 25ndash38Rennes Rennes UP 2004

Milner N P Vegetius Epitome of Military Science Liverpool Liverpool UP 1993Mohay Gergely ldquo Imperium Iustum Panaitiosrsquo Theorie bei Polybiosrdquo Acta Antiqua Academiae

Scientiarum Hungaricae 47 (2007) 175ndash84Most Glenn W ldquoWar and Justice in Hesiodrdquo InWar in Words Transformations of War from

Antiquity to Clausewitz edited by Marco Formisano and Hartmut Boumlhme 13ndash22 BerlinDe Gruyter 2011

Niditch SusanWar in the Hebrew Bible a Study in the Ethics of Violence New York Oxford UP1993

Obama Barack Hussein ldquoA just and lasting peacerdquo [speech made to the Nobel Committee10 December 2009 Oslo Norway] Full text accessed from the English website of Al Jazeera(httpenglishaljazeeranetnewsamericas2009122009121111141197843html)

Ober Joshua ldquoClassical Greek timesrdquo In The Laws of War Constraints on Warfare on the WesternWorld edited by Michael Howard George J Andreopoulos and Mark R Shulman 12ndash26Revised Edition New Haven Yale UP 1997

OrsquoDonovan Oliver The Just War Revisited Cambridge Cambridge UP 2003Ogilvie R M A Commentary on Livy Book 1ndash5 Oxford Oxford UP 1965Orend Brian ldquoJustice after Warrdquo Ethics and International Affairs 161 (2002) 43ndash57Orend Brian The Morality of War Peterborough ON Broadview Press 2006

62 James T Chlup


Orend Brian ldquoIus Post-Bellum the perspective of a Just War theoristrdquo Leiden Journal of Interna-tional Law 20 (2007) 571ndash91

Orend Brian ldquoWarrdquo Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Revised entry Online resource(httpplatostanfordeduarchivesfall2008entrieswar)

Petrocelli Corrado Onasandro Il generale Bari Edizioni Dedalo 2008Phillipson Coleman The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome Two

Volumes London MacMillian 1911Ramage E S ldquoThe Bellum Iustum in Caesarrsquos De Bello Gallicordquo Athenaeum 89 (2001) 145ndash70Reventlow Henning Graf ldquoThe biblical and classical Traditions of the lsquoJust Warrsquordquo In Politics and

Theopolitics in the Bible and Postbiblical Literature edited by Henning Graf Reventlow YairHoffman and Benjamin Uffenheimer 160ndash75 Sheffield JSOT Press 1994

Rich J W Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine ExpansionBrussels Latomus 1976

Richardson John The Language of Empire Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third CenturyBC to the Second Century AD Cambridge Cambridge UP 2008

Rosenstein Nathan ldquoWar and peace fear and reconciliation at Romerdquo InWar and Peace in theAncient World edited by Kurt A Raaflaub 226ndash44 Oxford Oxford UP 2007

Russell Frederick H The Just War in the Middle Ages Cambridge Cambridge UP 1977Schwartz Benjamin I The World of Thought in Ancient China Cambridge MA Harvard UP

1985Schwarzenberger Georg The Frontiers of International Law London Stevens and Sons 1962Seckel E Uumlber Krieg und Recht in Rom Berlin Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt

1915Smith Christopher J ldquoOnasander on how to be a generalrdquo InModus Operandi Essays in Honour

of Geoffrey Rickman edited by Michel Austin Jill Harries and Christopher J Smith 151ndash66London Institute for Classical Studies 1998

Tejada Joseacute Vela ldquoWarfare history and literature in the Archaic and Classical periods thedevelopment of Greek military treatisesrdquo Historia 532 (2004) 129ndash46

Tooke Joan D The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius London SPCK 1965Walzer Michael Just and Unjust Wars Fourth Edition New York Basic Books 2006Wang Yuan-kang Harmony and War Confucion Culture and Chinese Power Politics New York

Columbia UP 2011Watson Alan International Law in Archaic Rome War and Religion Baltimore John Hopkins

UP 1993Webster Jane ldquoThe Just War Graeco-Roman texts as colonial discourserdquo In TRAC 94 Proceed-

ings of the Fourth Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference edited by S CottamD Dungworth S Scott and J Taylor 1ndash10 Oxford Oxbow 1994

Whetham David Just War andMoral Victories Surprise Deception and the Normative Frameworkof European War in the Later Middle Ages Leiden Brill 2009

Wheeler Everett L Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery Leiden Brill 1988Whitehead David ldquoFact and fantasy in Greek military writersrdquo Acta Antiqua Academiae Scien-

tiarum Hungaricae 48 (2008) 139ndash55Wilkerson K E ldquoCarneades at Rome a problem of Sceptical rhetoricrdquo Philosophy amp Rhetoric

212 (1988) 131ndash44Yakobson Alexander ldquoPublic opinion foreign policy and lsquoJust Warrsquo in the late Republicrdquo In

Diplomats and Diplomacy in the RomanWorld edited by Claude Eilers 45ndash72 Leiden Brill2008



them in his De officiis2 the spirit of which a generation later Augustus affirmswhen he claims that he never unjustly attacked a nation3 As a community whichfought so many wars (sometimes multiple wars concurrently) first to defendthemselves against their Italian neighbours then to establish and defend theirempire it is only natural that the Romans would have sought to formalise rulesfor the ways and means of war that is they developed a series of legal require-ments for the declaration of war on the one hand and the tactical parametres bywhich war could be waged successfully on the other4

Themilitary treatise was designed to elucidate the latter but it does sowithoutdiscussion of moral considerations of warfare Onasanderrsquos Στρατηγικός wouldappear to be the exception representing anew vademecumonwarfare inwhich theauthor deftly interweaves a moral frame to the practical advice on how victory canbeachieved5Asaphilosopher (he is said tohaveauthoredacommentaryonPlatorsquosRepublic)6 Onasander is preeminently qualified to make the case for δίκαιοςπόλεμος since the concept would have formed part of his reflection upon thenature of Justice7 This στρατηγικῆς περὶ θεωρίας (as Onasander describes it in the

38 James T Chlup

2 De Off 133ndash40 on which see Dyck (1996) 133ndash53 Ciceromay also have included discussion onthe law of war at De Rep 334 as a fragment from Augustine (De Civ Dei 226) suggests nullumbellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute ldquono war is to be undertaken by aworthy state unless either under good faith or sound reasonrdquo See Buumlchner (1984) 325 Reventlow(1994) 170 Eckstein (2006) 216ndash213 RG 263Alpes a regione ea quae proxima est Hadrianomari ad Tuscumpacari feci nulli genti belloper iniuriam inlato ldquoI brought under [Roman] control the Alps from the region which is closest tothe Adriatic Sea as far as the Tyrrhenian Sea no people having been attacked unjustlyrdquo Cf SuetAug 212 nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit tantumque afuit a cupiditatequoquomodo imperium vel bellicam gloriam augendi ldquonor did he bringwar to any nationwithout ajust and necessary cause and he was so far from the desire for expanding the empire or militaryglory for any reasonrdquo4 The law of war would presumably belong within the Romansrsquo broad understanding of iusgentium See Bedermann (2001) 41ndash75 Onasander scholarship is regrettably exiguous Ambaglio (1981) Le Bohec (1998) Smith(1998) Galimberti (2002) andmore recently the thorough commentary of Petrocelli (2008) are theonly substantial focused studies Campbell (1987) and (2004) provide discussion as part of awider study of the genre of the military treatise Tejada (2004) provides a good overview of theliterary and historical contexts of the genre of themilitary treatise6 Onasanderrsquos entry in the Suda reads thus Ὀνόσανδρος φιλόσοφος Πλατωνικός Τακτικά Περὶστρατηγημάτων Ὑπομνήματα εἰς τὰς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας It would appear that Onasander infact wrote two military treatises one on general strategy (which is lost) and one on generalship(the treatise under discussion)7 See Low (2007) 134ndash5 with additional bibliography One passage of the Strategikos clearlyinfluenced by Platonic thought is the authorrsquos recommendation that in battle the general placebrothers next to brothers friends next to friends and lovers next to their beloved (an allusion to













40 James T Chlup













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Bibliography











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50 James T Chlup













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Bibliography











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48 James T Chlup













50 James T Chlup













52 James T Chlup















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Bibliography











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Bibliography











60 James T Chlup










































62 James T Chlup




































50 James T Chlup













52 James T Chlup















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Bibliography











60 James T Chlup










































62 James T Chlup




































52 James T Chlup















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Bibliography











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Bibliography











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Bibliography











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Bibliography











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Just War in Onasander's ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ

Documents

Transcript of Just War in Onasander's ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ