How can Democratization leadto ethnic conflicts?

Burma is currently undergoing a Democratization process, whichcoincides with a rise in ethnic conflicts.

How can Democratization lead to ethnic conflicts?

Subject: World PoliticsName: Tristan Bouan

Candidate number: 000969 0116Session: May 2014

School: Mahindra United World College of IndiaSchool Number: 00969Advisor: Vinay Jawahar

Word Count: 3999

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my advisor Vinay Jawahar for hisunconditional and unlimited help as well as his precioussupport at all times. Additionally, I would like to thank

Isabelle Bouan for taking time sharing her knowledge of Burma.

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Abstract

The aim of this essay is to study the following question: How can Democratization lead to ethnic conflicts? This is an important question in today’s increasingly democratic world and is answered with the use of an extensive academic literature on the subject, primary and secondary sources.

As it is generally agreed that Democratization increases the likelihood of ethnic conflicts in the transition period, the investigation of this essay was limited in analysing in which way this could be done. After a short section providing important historical background, the method provides a conceptual framework with which we will answer how 3 specific mechanisms can lead to ethnic conflicts from democratization in separate sections.The first section examines how the lack of basic institutions and the incapacity of the new democratic government to supply

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the demand for democracy lead to instability/conflicts. The second section analysed how the advent of democracy revives historical tensions between ethnic, which evolve into conflicts no longer repressed by an omnipotent military.Lastly, this section studies the implication of groups threatened by democracy with inflexible interests in voluntarily obstructing democratization—with the use of ethnicconflicts.

This essay concludes that although democratization leads to ethnic conflicts through various mechanisms, additional factors are required. In Burma’s case, a multitude of ethnic groups with mistrust between each other contributed towards the rise of ethnic conflicts. Most importantly, we conclude that the 3 analysed mechanisms were effectively used in the Burmese situation to move from democratization to ethnic conflicts.Lastly, after acknowledgment that these 3 mechanisms are powerful (as seen by their effect on Burma) some strategies and plans are proposed which, if implemented, could prevent a failure of democratization.

Abstract word count: [279]

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Table of Contents

Background………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………5

Method………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….6

Effects of the Democratization process

…………………………………………………………………………………….7

Reviving historic tensions and scars

………………………………………………………………………………………….9

Ethnic conflicts: a last resort for inflexible interests of

threatened groups ...............................12

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….14

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….16

Appendix A and B…………..……………………………………………………………………………………………………….….20

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Background

Ethnic conflicts are not new in Burma1. Due to its plurality ofethnics (135 ethnics spread in 7 states and 7 divisions, seen in Appendix A), religions and unequally shared resources, Burma is vulnerable to ethnic tensions and conflicts. The Burman which are one ethnic, constitute about two-thirds of the whole population, leading to strong majority-minority tensions. Ethnic conflicts have been created and used at multiple occasions in the Burmese history by the British colonial forces, in order to divide and rule the nation (Bless, 1990).When the British delivered Burma its independence in 1948, theethnic groups’ reaction to come was at the centre of the talks(Kramer, 2009). Both the British and the Burmese government knew that to ensure a peaceful transition from colonialism to

1 Burma was recently renamed the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. For the sake of consistency, “Burma” will be used throughout this essay.

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freedom and to unite the nation to avoid disintegration would be the paramount objectives. The inexperienced government failed, and within a year the whole country was in turmoil which would last for a decade (Kramer, 2009). Different states were demanding independence, creating militias2 which would fight against government forces or each other. In 1958, the government called in the Tatmadaw3 to solve this endless and lost situation. The Tatmadaw, led byGeneral Ne-Win did bring peace back (Kramer, 2009). Stability and an increasing tolerance of separatism — which angered the military (BBC, 2013) — resulted in a democratically elected government in 1960.In 1962, however, General Ne Win staged a coup d’état and began a military dictatorship which would last for decades until March 2011, when the military junta was officially dissolved in favour of the new democratically elected president Thein Sein.This was a result of an increasingly powerful democratization process which has been catalysed by the Saffron Revolution4 in September 2007, and is still in progress nowadays.

Introduction

In a world with an increasing number of democracies, it is of the utmost importance to be aware of the consequences of this process. As a result, an extensive academic literature alreadyexists on the subject, and will be used in this essay.

2 To give an idea of the chaos at that time, one of the 7 states (Shan state) had more than 42 different militias (Tom Kramer, 2009; TransnationalInstitute).3 The powerful and independent Burmese army.4 The Saffron revolution in 2007 was the largest popular uprising since 1988 and was led by monks who wore saffron robes, hence the name.

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First and foremost, it is crucial to establish clear definitions of the democratization process and democratizing states, as variations between different scholars have led to an ambiguity and situations of misinterpretation. Thus, Democratization is defined as a “political change movingin a democratic direction from less accountable to more accountable government, from less competitive elections to fuller and fairer competitive elections, from severely restricted to better protected civil and political rights, from weak autonomous associations to more autonomous and more numerous associations in civil society” (David Potter, p.5 1997). A democratizer is a state which undergoes the changes mentioned in the previous definition.As Burma undergoes a remarkable democratization process, this coincides with the creation or revival/rejuvenation of ethnic conflicts in several states, notably in the Kachin and Rakhinestates. Despite being relatively similar in terms of location,these 2 state conflicts differ on many points, justifying their uses. The Kachin conflict opposes the Kachin Independence Organisation5 which seeks a semi-autonomous state,against the Burmese who refuse to lose the state and its immense natural resources. The Rakhine conflict opposes the ethnic Rohingya Muslims against the Rakhine Buddhists. The Buddhists desire to eject the Rohingya deprived of citizenshipin 1982, and who are considered as Bangladeshi illegal immigrant, even though many of them can trace their ancestry in the Rakhine state for decades. The question whether a rise in ethnic conflicts can be observed during the democratization process has been answered by a large literature of scholars who are generally unanimous in affirming that “Democratizing states are more likely to fight intra-state (including ethnic conflicts) or inter-state wars than states that have undergone no change in regime” (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). Scholars such as Renee de Nevers

5 Hereafter referred to as KIO.

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(1993) or Horowitz (1993) have also revealed similar conclusions.Building on the previous question, one can inquire: How can the democratization process lead to Ethnic conflicts?

Method

The previous question seen above will be answered by investigating and analysing 3 different mechanisms, with respect to existing literature from various scholars. Firstly, ethnic conflicts can occur because of the government’s incapacity to deal with demands of democratization which did not exist prior to the process. Second, democratization can lead to ethnic conflicts by liberating or reviving (ethnical) tensions which already existed prior to the process and could precipitate the countryinto war. Thirdly, ethnic conflicts can be created or supported by opponents to democracy with inflexible interests as a mean to hamper the process.For each mechanism we will analyse, with the use of miscellaneous primary (such as racist leaflets or the Constitution) and secondary sources, if Burma’s Kachin and Rakhine conflicts apply as examples to the existing literatureand theories on the subject.

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Liberalization and incapacity

Democratization is a very powerful process which can potentially have devastating results on the nation (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). During the democratization process, changinggovernance, changing restrictions on political/civil rights, and the liberalization of society amidst multiple other factors can bring instability in the nation.

Observing David Potter’s (1997) table in Appendix B we can observe 4 criterions which determine the position of a nation among 3 different stages: liberal democracy, partial (illiberal) democracy and authoritarian regime. A nation undergoing democratization would therefore improve these

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criterions. However would the movement be the same in each criterion? Indeed, a nation could have been more dynamic on one criterion and stagnant on another one, which could lead toinstability. Similarly, Samuel P. Huntington demonstrated in his book “Political Order in Changing Societies” (1968) that violence and instability were “in a large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” (Huntington, 1968, p-4). Snyder (2004) further supports the claim that “countries transitioning to democracy,with weak political institutions, are more likely than other states to get into international and civil wars”.

Burma is unfortunately also experiencing unequal dynamics in its democratization process with a large increase in the demand for democratic rights whilst the government’s supply ofdemocracy through political institutions has not advanced at the same rate—thus leading to violence and instability. The effervescence that came when the censorship was lifted in on newspapers websites or even social tools such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or cell-phones has led to a massive liberalization of society, which was an encouraging sign for democracy. However, this may have reverse effects on democratization.In Burma, and especially in the Rakhine state, this liberalization is showing its power and efficiency in transmitting hate messages and creating conflicts. With the liberalisation of society, organisations and individuals whichwere previously forbidden by the military junta to communicatetheir political ideologies are now liberated from any restriction, which is in certain situations democratically counter-productive—especially when there is a lack of political institutions. This lack of basic modern state institutions when competitive elections are established is the

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main criticism that Richard Rose & Doh Chull Shin (2001) present towards the Third Wave6 democracies (Huntington, 1991). A current example of violence created by a lack of political institutions in Burma is seen with the anti-Muslim “969” movement, led by the monk Wirathu. This movement has been circulating numerous hate messages towards the Muslims which have been relayed by the social media (France 24, 2013). This is especially dangerous for the Burmese people who have solelybeen confronted to blatant government propaganda in the past decades.Burmese are now overwhelmed by messages on twitter, Facebook or leaflets debating why the Rohingya’s Muslim should be hatedand thrown out of Burma. Such arguments can be found on rohingyaaremurderers.blogspot.fr (or similar websites) as well on leaflets distributed in the Yangon’s streets. One of the many anti-Rohingya flyer displays in large, bold, red font multiple affirmations such as “Rohingya owns thousands of guns to shoot Rakhine people and rape underage girls” or “Rohingya are trained by fundamentalist Taliban and Al Qaeda” (Mwe Yaw, 2012). The bias and fallacies of these claims are not evident to citizens anteriorly deprived from the possibility to develop their critical sense, making them more susceptible to believe what they read or are told. Although tensions already existed between the two parties, there is no doubt that the liberalisation of society and the inefficiency of under-numbered political institutions has greatly contributed to the2012 Rakhine states riots7.

Hence, unequal dynamics in the democratization process can lead to instability, which in turn may evolve into ethnic

6 The third wave of Democracy began in 1974 in Portugal with the revolutionof the Carnations and has not yet ended.7 The 2012 Rakhine riots opposed the Rohingya Muslims against the Rakhine Buddhists after Rohingya allegedly raped a Buddhist girl. 10 Muslims were then hanged by an angry mob, triggering the violent riots which are estimated to have caused the death of approximately 200 and displaced 200,000.

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conflicts. Because of democratization and an increased liberalization in Burma, political participation such as in the “969” movement has increased, along with its negative effects.Huntington (1968) claimed that if “the rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high” whilst “the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low” this would lead to “political instability and disorder.” Following Huntington’s logic, the effects of movement such as “969” could have been neutralised or mitigated if the “development of political institutions accelerated at the samerhythm as socio-economic changes” (Huntington, 1968). Unfortunately, the Burmese government did not have the capacity nor the political institutions to refrain riots such as the 2012 Rakhine state from occurring; clearly exposing Thein Sein’s government current incapacity to match the supplywith the demand for democracy.

Reviving historic tensions and scarsDemocratization can lead to ethnic conflicts by liberating, orreviving tensions which already existed prior to the democratization process.

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In countries with a great ethnic diversity and a sense of self-determination, underlying tensions and problems are inevitable. Because democratization is a marking process wheremany elements are overturned, some of the pre-existing tensions are brought to the surface. The surfacing of these tensions can sometimes evolve into violent conflicts; however,paramount powers such as colonisers or the military in military dictatorships generally control those outbursts with the use of threats and force. Thus, when these local hegemons leave power and a new power vacuum is created, tensions cannotbe buried anymore and generally, things fall apart as ethnic conflicts arise.This mechanism is clearly seen in the revival and escalation of the Kachin and Rakhine conflicts. Both had tensions before the process but were only fully ignited by the advent of democratization and the departure of the military. We will here investigate how historical tensions could have led to ethnic conflicts after being revived by the democratization process. For the sake of depth, we will only investigate this with the support of the Kachin conflict.

In the case of the Kachin conflict and other conflicts, there is a history in Burma which justifies the existent tension between different ethnics and the Burmese majority. This tension is primarily based on the mistrust that the ethnics have towards the Burmese, which has been on-going since the British colonial rule (Jha, 2012). Indeed, when Japan invaded Burma, the Burmese majority allied with them whilst some ethnics such as the Karen and the Kachin fought on the Allies’side. What created a total resentment from the ethnic towards the Burman was only the fact that the Burman majority massacred entire hill tribe villages, but also that the Burmancunningly switched sides at the very end of the war, overshadowing the ethnic’s war effort (BBC, 2011). The most important event in the history of mistrust in Burma is the Panglong agreement which was signed as a result of the Panglong conference. In 1947, the newly formed Burmese

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government with Aung San8 at its head invited different ethnicsto join the Union of Burma. Aung San had many tempting promises to different ethnics leaders, the most important being a guarantee of self-determination, internal autonomy, and an equality of resources. Few important states, such as the Kachin state were also promised even more autonomy (Linn, 2013). However, the “spirit of Panglong” was gone few months later as Aung San was assassinated. The succeeding government was to completely ignore the clauses signed at the Panglong conference (see above), leading to an indignation among the concerned ethnics towards the Burman and thus commencing armedconflicts which were to last decades. Decades later, in the 1990’s, ethnics signed cease-fires beingpromised rights. These ethnics still await most of these promises, convincing them of the Burmese unreliability and untruthfulness. Nothing can illustrate better the mistrust that ethnics have towards the Burman than the following response of the Kachin state secretary to Aung San Suu Kyi’s invitation to peace talks: “We respect her, but we can’t trusther. After all, she is Burman too.” (Jha, 2012)With democracy breaking through in Burma it can be said that anew hope for autonomy or at least for more political freedom has risen throughout Burma’s ethnics and that the “spirit of Panglong” has returned. This is clearly shown by the Kachin demand during the 2012 cease-fire talks that “A second Panglong Conference must be held” (Paul Keenan, 2012). With democratization the scars of the Panglong’s have been reopened and ethnics areonce again seeking for their rights – fighting, as negotiatingwith the government in the past century has proven to be unsuccessful. Indeed, “how can the ethnics trust the government and have peace talks, while at the same time more troops have been deployed in the region?” (Nyein, 2012)

Democratization has brought hope and the Panglong spirit back to ethnic tribes, yet it has also brought old existent tensions/memories about the Burman back to the surface. These 8 Father of Aung San Suu Kyi.

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tensions and memories were enough for the ethnics to take up the arms rather than coming to the negotiating table. Additionally, the departed junta could not suppress the violences erupting in different parts of the country anymore. Thus, it can effectively be said that a specific mechanism allows the democratization process to liberate underlying tensions which can then lead to, or favour ethnic conflicts.

Ethnic conflicts: a last resort for threatened groups with inflexible interests.

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Ethnic conflicts can be created or supported by opponents to democracy who wish to derail the democratization process. In Democratization and War (1995), Mansfield and Snyder affirm that “Groups threatened by social changes and democratization, including still-powerful elites, are often compelled to take and inflexible view of their interests” and more importantly how “In extreme cases, there may be only one solution that will maintain the social position of that group”. In Burma today, the largest and most powerful opposition to the democratization process is unsurprisingly the military junta. Unsurprisingly because since “military bureaucracies occupied key positions, most interests threatened by democratization are bound to the military” (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). We will investigate how the military conforms to Mansfield and Snyder’s theory. The Tatmadaw has generally always been opposed to any form of democracy or conceding power and held absolute power. However, in the past years several factors have complicated the absolute rule of the Tatmadaw, and have forced the military to put forward a Democratization process.Nevertheless, the institution was not yet ready to hand over its full power; hence some precautions were set so that the pace of democratization would not accelerate out of control. These precautions taken are easily seen in the 2008 Burmese constitution. While reading the different sections of the constitution, 2 clauses especially are a clear evidence of military attempts to impede the democratization process. Clause 109 states that from the 440 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (the Burmese House of Representatives), there will be “not more than 110 Pyithu Hluttaw representatives (25%) who are the Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services” (Burmese Constitution, 2008).Effectively this gives the military a Veto over the Pyithu Hluttaw’s decisions as 75% of the votes are required to pass legislation, resulting in Aung San Suu Kyi (2013) declaring that “The Burmese constitution is one of the most difficult

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constitution to amend in the world”. Clause 413 affirms that if the nation is in a state of emergency, “the President shalldeclare the transferring of legislative, executive and judicial powers of the Union to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services”. This clause has been rightfully criticised by many such as Bertil Lintner (2013), as this was the way Ne Win initially got hold of the power—called by the democracy tobring the chaotic nation back to discipline and order.

With President Thein Sein which had previously been in the army for 4 decades, heavily involved with the regime and was judged as a moderate, added to the other precautions, the armywas persuaded of having a period of slower democratization. This assumption was justified as “at no stage in his career did Thein Sein display any political independence or initiative and (…) always said and did what he was told” (Bertil Lintner, 2013). However, many were surprised by the new president who was thought to be “Than Shwe's most malleable puppet” (Irrawaddy, 2011). Since his election Thein Sein has freed political prisoners, ended censorship, authorized trades unions and protests, pursued peace with ethnic minority insurgents and passed legislation on everything from land reform to foreign investment. He did, andeffectively still does everything he can do to democratize, liberalise and open up the Burmese nation.

The military had not anticipated that Thein Sein would be so perseverant and that the Burmese parliament could be effective and pass amendments as well as legislations. The military junta has been in power for decades and despite Thein Sein’s reformist government showing a certain success; they were still opposed to give away their privileges and control. With the eye of the world on Burma, it was not conceivable for the army to come back to power using force. AsMansfield and Snyder (1995) claimed, still-powerful threatenedelites (such as the military) have “inflexible interests and short-time

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horizons” to secure their interests, even if requires reckless policy-making conducive to war.Thus, in Burma the military used ethnic conflicts, a powerful tool in a nation composed of 135 ethnics, with which they could obstruct democratization. In the objective of creating an impasse on the road to democracy, the military have hampered the democratization process in the recent years by creating or fuelling ethnic conflicts using known methods, such as the one used during the2003 Depayin massacre9. U Aung Htoo, the general secretary of the Asian Human Rights Commissioner declared, after a scrupulous investigation of the massacre: “It was a well-organized heinous crime, committed by about 5000 perpetrators under the direct control of theauthorities”. The government is suspected of once again using this strategy to ignite the violences in the Rakhine state, the Shan state and in the Kachin state during which crimes against humanity were committed. Eye-witnesses, journalists and UN officials affirm that those who started these violences were not locals,but outsiders. In the Kachin, residents recall how the man—allegedly a Muslim—who started all the violence by setting fire to a Buddhist woman, was not a local (Perdana Global Peace Foundation, 2013). Similarly, a Buddhist abbot told a reporter that the monks involved in the fighting were strangers (Swe N. 2013). Corresponding testimonies have been recorded in the rest of the Kachin and the Rakhine state. Although it is true that simply because these mobs were “outsiders” does not mean that they were military, few organizations would have legitimate reasons to create such violences and tragedies. Apart from the military, the potential culpable would be the radical “969” movement.

9 On the May the 30th 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi and supporters of her party (the National League for Democracy) were attacked outside of Depayin by a junta-sponsored mob during the Nobel laureate’s famous tour of the nation, one year after her release. With her popularity growing exponentially, the government organized this massacre (70 killed supporters) and blamed the cause on Aung San Suu Kyi, sending her back to house arrest.

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It is indeed possible to make the claim that it was not the military, but radical extremists such as the “969” group led by the monk U Wirathu who were behind these violences. It would have effectively been possible for “969” to have triggered these anti-Muslim riots, and it is true that after these riots “969” stickers were seen on every wall. Although this claim is tempting, elements show that the “969” members, when involved, were only the pawns of the military involvementin these riots. A Burmese expert from the International CrisisGroup points out that the methodical ways in which Muslim neighbourhoods are brought to the ground and violences are triggered shows a certain degree of advanced planning (Giacoma, 2013). This level of advanced methodology and planning seen in these riots could not have been possible for an impulsive organisation such as 969, suggesting that even though 969 may have been involved, an organised and disciplined organisation such as the military was actually behind these conflicts. Additionally, the fact that attacks occurred in full-view of the police forces (New York Times, 2013) and that policeman weordered to “do nothing but extinguish fires” (International Herald Tribune, 2013) does create suspicions. These two elements, although they not clearly prove the involvement of the military, raise strong accusations against them in the recent conflicts emerging throughout the Burmese nation.

The Tatmadaw set out a design where democratization wouldoccur slowly and ineffectively enough to guarantee them control. However, a constellation of factors has proved wrong to their assumptions, made the precautions set out by the military ineffective and hence accelerated the pace of democratization. Ethnic conflicts are a powerful tool which the army could use as a last resort to, at best to slow down democratization and demonstrate its importance in uniting the nation; or at worst to create chaos in the whole nation and justify its return to power through clause 413.

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This effectively applies to Mansfield and Snyder’s logic that “threatened by social changes and democratization, still-powerful elites are often compelled to take an inflexible viewof their interests” and “In extreme cases, there may be only one solution that will maintain the social position of that group”- in Burma this one solution being ethnic conflicts.

ConclusionThrough a set of 3 mechanisms explored in this essay, the democratization process has led to ethnic conflicts. Of course, external factors are required for democratization to lead to ethnic conflicts otherwise every democracy would experience ethnic conflicts. The study of this essay, Burma, presented signs of vulnerability such as being an extremely ethnically divided society which was held together by the omnipotent military. Ethnic Burman are the majority in the

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nation and have therefore tended to disregard the ethnic minorities in the past by ignoring promises as well as disrespecting their rights. Consequently, Burma’s minorities fear that the majority will marginalize them if their concernsare not addressed in conjunction with democratization.To ensure a peaceful transition from the military regime to democracy, the previously analysed mechanisms should have beenneutralised in manners explored below.

In addition to the effort on democratization, there should be a conjunct work similar to the Panglong conference with ethnics to create a sense of unity and equality in the nation.To deal with the harsh memories, this conference should also be a starting point where both the government and ethnics acknowledge their errors in the past in order to build a new relation.Additionally, only after the basic institutions of a modern state are set up and the state has increased its capacity can the democratization process move onwards—guaranteeing less risks of having ethnic conflicts. The new relation with ethnics established, in addition to the improved institutions and capacity of the state, are enough to deter the third mechanism mentioned: how opponents to democracy use ethnic conflicts to obstruct the process. Precedently, these opponents could have started an ethnic conflict by exploiting the hate and mistrust between 2 sides or the incapacity of the government. However, after the changes mentioned above, the mechanism will be hampered if notterminated.

Democratization is a radical transformation which has a “rockytransition period” (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995), where instability can evolve into ethnic conflicts. In this essay wehave analysed 3 mechanisms which have developed the pathway from democratization to ethnic conflicts, and have seen that they applied to the Burmese situation. Even though the explored mechanisms are powerful (as seen by their effects on

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Burma), there are strategies and plans which can be implemented in Burma to neutralise these processes and preventa rollback of democracy.

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Appendix A

Arakan is the historical name of the Rakhine state.

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Appendix B

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