Group Dynamics - Government Arts College Coimbatore

Group Dynamics

FI FTH ED IT ION

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DONELSON R. FORSYTHUniversity of Richmond

Group Dynamics

FI FTH ED IT ION

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Group Dynamics, Fifth EditionDonelson R. Forsyth

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Brief Contents

PREFACE xvi i

1 Introduction to Group Dynamics 1

2 Studying Groups 30

3 Inclusion and Identity 56

4 Formation 87

5 Cohesion and Development 116

6 Structure 143

7 Influence 177

8 Power 214

9 Leadership 245

10 Performance 281

11 Decision Making 313

12 Teams 351

13 Conflict 379

14 Intergroup Relations 410

15 Groups in Context 443

16 Groups and Change 474

17 Crowds and Collective Behavior 500

REFERENCES 529

AUTHOR INDEX 635

SUBJECT INDEX 664

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Contents

PREFACE xvi i

1 Introduction to Group Dynamics 1

The Nature of Groups 2

What Is a Group? 2

Describing Groups 5

Types of Groups 10

The Nature of Group Dynamics 14

Are Groups Real? 15

Are Groups Dynamic? 18

The Multilevel Perspective 19

The Practicality of Group Dynamics 22

Topics in Contemporary Group Dynamics 23

Summary in Outline 26

For More Information 28

2 Studying Groups 30

Measurement in Group Dynamics 31

Observation 31

Self-Report Measures 37

Research Methods in Group Dynamics 40

Case Studies 40

Experimental Studies 42

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Correlational Studies 44

Selecting a Research Method 46

Theoretical Perspectives in Group Dynamics 47

Motivational and Emotional Perspectives 48

Behavioral Perspectives 49

Systems Theory Perspectives 49

Cognitive Perspectives 50

Biological Perspectives 51

Selecting a Theoretical Perspective 52



3 Inclusion and Identity 56

From Isolation to Inclusion 57

The Need to Belong 58

The Pain of Exclusion 59

Evolution and Inclusion in Groups 65

From Individualism to Collectivism 67

Social Relations 68

Social Obligations 70

Social Self 72

Variations in Collectivism 74

From Personal Identity to Social Identity 76

Social Identity Theory: The Basics 77

Motivation and Social Identity 79



4 Formation 87

Joining Groups 88

Personality 88

Men, Women, and Groups 91

Social Motivation 92

Anxiety and Attachment 93

Experience and Preference 95

viii CONTENTS

Affiliation 96

Social Comparison 96

Downward (and Upward) Social Comparison 98

Social Support 100

Companionship 104

Attraction 105

Principles of Attraction 105

The Economics of Membership 111



5 Cohesion and Development 116

The Nature of Cohesion 117

Components of Cohesion 118

Antecedents of Cohesion 122

Indicators of Cohesion 127

Cohesion and Commitment over Time 129

Stages of Group Development 129

Cycles of Group Development 134

Consequences of Cohesion 135

Member Satisfaction and Adjustment 135

Group Dynamics and Influence 136

Group Productivity 137



6 Structure 143

Norms 145

The Development of Norms 146

The Transmission of Norms 146

Roles 149

Role Differentiation 150

Group Socialization 152

Role Stress 155

Intermember Relations 158

Social Network Analysis 158

Status Networks 161

CONTENTS ix

Attraction Networks 165

Communication Networks 168

Social Structures and Interactions: SYMLOG 170



7 Influence 177

Majority Influence: The Power of the Many 179

Influence in the Asch Situation 179

Predicting Majority Influence 184

Minority Influence: The Power of the Few 190

Conversion Theory of Minority Influence 191

Predicting Minority Influence 192

Dynamic Social Impact Theory 194

Sources of Group Influence 196

Informational Influence 196

Normative Influence 198

Interpersonal Influence 200

Application: Understanding Juries 204

Jury Dynamics 204

How Effective Are Juries? 207

Improving Juries 207



8 Power 214

Obedience to Authority 215

The Milgram Experiments 216

Milgram’s Findings 217

The Power of the Milgram Situation 221

Sources of Power 221

Bases of Power 221

Bases and Obedience 227

Power Tactics 227

Power Processes 228

Who Seeks Power? 231

Hierarchies of Dominance 231

x CONTENTS

The Power of Commitment 234

Power and the Fundamental Attribution Error 235

The Metamorphic Effects of Power 235

Changes in the Powerholder 236

Reactions to the Use of Power 239

Questioning Authority 241



9 Leadership 245

The Nature of Leadership 246

Leadership Myths 247

What Is Leadership? 249

What Do Leaders Do? 251

Leadership Emergence 255

Personal Qualities of Leaders 255

The Look of Leaders 260

Who Will Lead? 262

Leader Effectiveness 266

Fiedler’s Contingency Model 266

Style Theories 269

Leader–Member Exchange Theory 271

Participation Theories 272

Transformational Leadership 274

The Future of Leadership 277



10 Performance 281

Social Facilitation 282

Studies of Social Facilitation 283

Why Does Social Facilitation Occur? 285

Conclusions and Applications 290

Process Losses in Groups 293

The Ringelmann Effect 293

Motivation Loss: Social Loafing 294

CONTENTS xi

Causes of and Cures for Social Loafing 295

Coordination Problems in Groups 298

Process Gains in Groups 304

Brainstorming 305

Does Brainstorming Work? 305

Improving Brainstorming Sessions 307



11 Decision Making 313

Groups and Decisions: The Functional Perspective 315

Orientation 316

Discussion 318

Decision 321

Implementation 323

Who Decides—Individuals or Groups? 324

Groups as Imperfect Decision Makers 325

Group Discussion Pitfalls 326

The Shared Information Bias 327

Cognitive Limitations 330

Group Polarization 332

The Risky-Shift Phenomenon 332

Polarization Processes in Groups 333

What Causes Group Polarization? 334

The Consequences of Polarization 335

Victims of Groupthink 336

Symptoms of Groupthink 337

Defective Decision Making 339

Causes of Groupthink 341

The Emergence of Groupthink 342

Alternative Models 344

Preventing Groupthink 345



xii CONTENTS

12 Teams 351

Working Together in Teams 352

What Is a Team? 353

Types of Teams 353

When to Team? 356

The I-P-O Model of Teams 358

Building the Team 359

The Team Player 360

Knowledge, Skill, and Ability (KSA) 361

Diversity 363

Men, Women, and Teams 365

Working in Teams 366

Teamwork 366

Team Cognition 369

Maintaining Cohesion 371

Team Performance: Evaluating Effectiveness 373

Defining Team Effectiveness 373

The Success of Teams 373

Suggestions for Using Teams 374



13 Conflict 379

The Roots of Conflict 381

Winning: Conflict and Competition 381

Sharing: Conflict over Resources 387

Controlling: Conflict over Power 391

Working: Task and Process Conflict 391

Liking and Disliking: Personal Conflicts 392

Confrontation and Escalation 393

Uncertainty ! Commitment 393

Perception ! Misperception 395

Soft Tactics ! Hard Tactics 396

Reciprocity ! Upward Conflict Spiral 398

CONTENTS xiii

Few ! Many 398

Irritation ! Anger 399

Conflict Resolution 399

Commitment ! Negotiation 399

Misperception ! Understanding 401

Hard Tactics ! Cooperative Tactics 401

Upward ! Downward Conflict Spirals 403

Many ! Few 405

Anger ! Composure 405

Conflict versus Conflict Management 406



14 Intergroup Relations 410

Intergroup Conflict: Us versus Them 411

Competition and Conflict 412

The Discontinuity Effect 413

Power and Domination 416

Norms of Engagement 417

Anger and Scapegoating 420

Evolutionary Perspectives 420

Intergroup Bias: Perceiving Us and Them 421

Conflict and Categorization 422

The Ingroup–Outgroup Bias 422

Cognitive Bias 424

Intergroup Emotions 427

Categorization and Identity 430

Intergroup Conflict Resolution: Uniting Us and Them 430

Intergroup Contact 431

Cognitive Cures for Conflict 434

Conflict Management 436

Resolving Conflict: Conclusions 438



xiv CONTENTS

15 Groups in Context 443

Places: Group Settings 444

Comfort in Contexts 445

Stressful Group Settings 447

Behavior Settings 449

Spaces: The Ecology of Groups 454

Personal Space 454

Reactions to Spatial Invasion 457

Seating Arrangements 459

Locations: Group Territoriality 462

Group Territories 463

Territoriality Within Groups 466

Groups in Context: Beyond Apollo 13 470



16 Groups and Change 474

Group Approaches to Change 475

Group Psychotherapy 476

Interpersonal Learning Groups 480

Support Groups 483

Sources of Change in Groups 486

Universality and Hope 486

Social Learning 488

Group Cohesion 490

Disclosure and Catharsis 491

Altruism 492

Insight 492

The Effectiveness of Groups 494

Perceptions versus Behaviors 495

Evidence of Negative Effects 495

Types of Groups and Effectiveness 496

The Value of Groups 497



CONTENTS xv

17 Crowds and Collective Behavior 500

The Nature of Collectives 502

What Is a Collective? 503

Crowds 504

Collective Movements 509

Collective Dynamics 514

Le Bon’s Crowd Psychology: Contagion 514

Who Joins In: Convergence 515

Loss of Identity: Deindividuation 517

Emergent Norm Theory 521

Collectives and Social Identity 522

Collectives Are Groups 523

The Myth of the Madding Crowd 523

Studying Groups and Collectives 525



REFERENCES 529

AUTHOR INDEX 635

SUBJECT INDEX 664

xvi CONTENTS

Preface

This book serves as an introduction to the theories, studies, and empirical find-ings pertinent to groups. More primer than comprehensive handbook, Group

Dynamics only samples the results of scientific explorations of the nature ofgroups, but it strives to integrate, whenever possible, theory and research, basicscience and application, classic and contemporary work, and psychological andsociological analyses of groups.

But why study groups? Why learn about the processes that unfold in inter-acting, dynamic groups? Why study theories that explain these processes? Whyextend these theories to explain more and more about groups?

Because groups matter. On a practical level, much of the world’s work isdone by groups, so by understanding groups we move toward making themmore efficient. If we want to improve productivity in a factory, problem solvingin a boardroom, or learning in the classroom, we must understand groups.Groups, too, hold the key to solving such societal problems as racism, sexism,and international conflict. Any attempt to change society will succeed only ifthe groups within that society change.

But groups are also the keys to understanding people—why they think, feel,and act the way they do. Human behavior is so often group behavior that peoplecannot be studied in isolation, away from their families, friendship cliques, workgroups, and so on. All kinds of societies—hunting/gathering, horticultural, pas-toral, industrial, and postindustrial—are defined by the characteristics of the smallgroups that compose them. Societal forces, such as traditions, values, and norms,do not reach directly to individuals, but instead work through the groups towhich each individual belongs.

Groups are also important for personal reasons. You will spend your entirelife being in groups, getting out of groups, leading groups, and changing groups.Through your membership in groups, you define and confirm your values andbeliefs and take on or refine a social identity. When you face uncertain situations,in groups, you gain reassuring information about your problems and security in

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companionship. In groups, you learn about relations with others, the types ofimpressions you make on others, and the ways in which you can relate withothers more effectively. Groups influence you in consequential ways, so youignore their influence at your own risk.

FEATURES

Every attempt has been made to create a textbook that teaches group dynamicsrather than one that simply reports basic principles and research findings. Thechapters progress from basic issues and processes to the analysis of more special-ized topics, but this order is somewhat arbitrary.

Terms, Glossary, and Names

Key terms are set in boldface type and defined at the bottom of the page wherethey are first mentioned. Citations are given in the style of the AmericanPsychological Association, and usually include investigators’ last names and thedate of the publication of the research report or book. A small number of re-searchers and theorists are mentioned by name in the text rather than in the cita-tions; in such cases their first and last names are included.

Outlines, Summaries, and Readings

The first page of each chapter asks several questions examined in that chapter,and also outlines the chapter’s contents. Each chapter uses three levels of head-ings. The primary headings are printed in all capitals, the secondary headings areprinted in capital and lowercase letters, and the tertiary headings begin individualparagraphs. Each chapter ends with a summary and a list of sources to consult formore information.

Focuses

Each chapter includes boxed inserts that examine an empirical, theoretical, orpractical aspect of groups. These boxes focus on key themes that are woventhrough the book, such as the impact of computer-mediated communications ongroup interaction and the differences between men and women when in groups.

Cases

Chapters 3–17 use case studies to illustrate and integrate the chapter’s contents.The chapter on group formation, for example, focuses on the impressionists, andthe chapter dealing with leadership highlights the work of an outstanding leader.All the cases are or were real groups rather than hypothetical ones, and the in-cidents described are documented events that occurred within the group(although some literary license was taken for the Chapter 7 case).

xviii PREFACE

CHANGES FROM THE FOURTH EDIT ION

This book’s aims have changed over the years. I wrote the first chapters of thefirst edition of this book in 1979. Following in the footsteps of such scholars asMarvin Shaw (author of Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Groups, 1978) andPaul Hare (Handbook of Small Group Research, 1976), I sought to write a relativelycomprehensive summary of the key principles and findings in group dynamics.Writing now, some 30 years later, I cannot hope for the book to be comprehen-sive, for groups have been the focus of hundreds of prolific and talented re-searchers in such fields as communications, computer science, management andorganizational behavior, social psychology, and sociology. A comprehensive re-view would require 17 volumes, rather than the 17 chapters in the current work.

This book’s new aim is more circumspect: to encourage the reader to over-come the natural tendency to consider individuals as primary causes and insteadbegin to consider in more detail complex interpersonal, group-level processes.Each chapter returns to this theme by showing how most forms of human activ-ity—from social identity to influence and power to group performance andproductivity—can be best understood when group-level processes are considered.

This book also bears the stamp of my discipline’s paradigm. Since I’m a so-cial psychologist, I stress influence and interpersonal processes in general, andtend to view other processes, such as productivity, communication, and mentalhealth, through this lens. The text reviews hundreds of empirical studies of groupprocesses, but most studies extend a social psychological understanding of groups.This emphasis on theory-grounded knowledge sometimes means that less centralbut nonetheless interesting topics are slighted, but whenever possible the curiousreader is referred to other sources for additional information.

Reviewing the work done by my distinguished colleagues in the field ofgroup dynamics has left me in awe of the scope of the field itself. Judging fromthe quantity and quality of new work on groups, groups remain a central topicof concern in many disciplines, and this revision strives to communicate this ex-citement to its newest initiates. This assessment of the field’s bright future is alsobased on societal developments that have changed the way people live and workin groups. Societies that were once viewed as mere collections of individuals aregradually being transformed into cultures that embrace a more collectivistic ori-entation. Corporations continue to evolve into multinational organizations, andwith that global perspective comes increased interest in harnessing the power ofgroups for productive purposes. As society adjusts to a more technological andunited world, and as the economic success of countries springs from group deci-sions and work team efforts, understanding groups and their dynamics willbecome increasingly relevant, practical, and important.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Most things in this world are accomplished by groups rather than by single in-dividuals working alone. This book is no exception. Although I am personally

PREFACE xix

responsible for the ideas presented in this book, many colleagues have providedme with indispensable comments, suggestions, and materials. They include DomAbrams, Traci Craig, Brent Elwood, Lowell Gaertner, Stan Gully, Verlin Hinsz,Tim Hopthrow, Chuck Huff, Steve Karau, Jared Kenworthy, Norbert Kerr,John Levine, Julian Lichtsteiner, Glenn Littlepage, Susan Losh, RebeccaMacNair-Semands, Richard Moreland, Paul Moxnes, Linda Muldoon,Randolph New, Ernest O’Boyle, Dave Ouellette, Randall Peterson, AnthonyPratkanis, John Robinson, Natalia Sanders, Jim Sidanius, Royce Singleton,Richard Sorrentino, Dennis Stewart, Paul Story, Clifford Stott, TojoThatchenkery, Thomas Treadwell, and Will Wattles.

Groups, too, helped me along the way. My social psychological colleagues atthe University of Richmond include Jeni Burnette, Al Goethals, Crystal Hoyt,and Scott Allison, and I have benefited from their wise counsel on many topics.My classes at the University of Richmond provided me with the opportunity torefine my presentation of the materials, for my students were all too eager to giveme feedback about ambiguities and weaknesses. I particularly appreciate the in-puts from my advanced group dynamics class taught in the Fall of 2007. Theysuffered through a variety of readings and activities associated with such topics asentitativity, team building, and groupthink. The members of the productionteams at Wadsworth/Cengage, including Jon-David Hague, Vernon Boes,Trina Tom, and at Pre-PressPMG, including Abigail Greshik, also deserve specialthanks for their capable efforts.

My most important group—my family—also deserves special acknowledge-ment. They provided me with a stream of much-needed respites from themarathon revision sessions, confirming again and again what they say aboutgroups and well-being. So, a special thanks to Claire, David, Rachel, andCarmen (the family dog).

—Donelson R. Forsyth

xx PREFACE

1

Introduction to Group

Dynamics

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The tendency to join with others ingroups is perhaps the single most im-portant characteristic of humans, andthe processes that unfold within thesegroups leave an indelible imprint ontheir members and on society. Groupdynamics are the influential processesthat take place in groups and also thediscipline devoted to the scientificanalysis of those dynamics.

■ What is a group?■ What are some common charac-

teristics of groups?■ Are there different types of

groups?■ What assumptions guide research-

ers in their studies of groups andtheir processes?

■ What fields and what topics areincluded in the scientific study ofgroup dynamics?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

The Nature of Groups

What is a Group?

Describing Groups

Types of Groups

The Nature of Group Dynamics

Are Groups Real?

Are Groups Dynamic?

The Multilevel Perspective

The Practicality of GroupDynamics

Topics in Contemporary GroupDynamics

Summary in Outline

For More Information

Media Resources

1

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Who can deny the power of groups? Althoughsome may bemoan the growing alienation of indi-viduals from the small social groups that oncelinked them securely to society-at-large, the singleman or woman who has no connection to othermen and women is an extraordinarily rare humanbeing. People are in many respects individuals seek-ing personal, private objectives, yet they are alsomembers of groups that constrain them, guidethem, and sustain them. Members of the speciesHomo sapiens are capable of surviving alone, butfew choose to, for virtually all human activities—working, learning, worshiping, relaxing, playing,and even sleeping—occur in groups. To understandpeople, we must understand their groups.

Sages, scholars, and laypersons have been puz-zling over group dynamics—the actions, pro-cesses, and changes that occur within groups andbetween groups—for centuries. Why, they asked,do humans so frequently join with others in groups?How do members coordinate their efforts andenergies? What factors give rise to a sense of cohe-sion, esprit de corps, and a marked distrust for thoseoutside the group? And how do groups and theirleaders hold sway over members? Their inquiriesinto such questions provide the scientific basis forthe field of group dynamics, which is the scientificdiscipline devoted to studying groups and groupprocess.

This book uses the results of that work tounravel many of the mysteries of groups. It beginswith this chapter’s two orienting, but essential,questions. First, what is a group? What distinguishesa group from a mere collection of people? Whatfeatures can we expect to find in most groups,and what kinds of processes provide the foundationfor their dynamics? Second, what is this field of studywe are calling group dynamics? What assumptionsguide researchers as they describe, analyze, andcompare the various groups that populate theplanet?

THE NATURE OF GROUPS

Fish, swimming in synchronized unison, are called aschool. A pack of foraging baboons is a troupe. A three-some of crows cawing their way through a meadowis a murder. A gam is a group of whales. But what is acollection of human beings called? A group.

What is a Group?

Take a moment and make a mental list of all thegroups of which you are a part. Would you includeyour family? The people you work or study with?How about your neighbors, or people who usedto be neighbors but moved away? If you usethe Internet, do you consider the people you textmessage, email, or “friend” in Facebook to be agroup? How about people of your same sex, race,and citizenship, and those who share your politicalbeliefs? Are African American men, Canadians, andRepublicans groups? Are you in a romantic rela-tionship? Did you include you and your partneron your list of groups? Which collections ofhumans are groups and which are not?

Theorists are not of one mind when it comesto defining the word group. Some stress the impor-tance of communication between members; othershighlight the key role played by mutual depen-dence. Still others suggest that a shared purpose orgoal is what turns a mere aggregate of individualsinto a bona fide group. Most, however, wouldagree that a group requires at least two people.With the exception of individuals with extremelyrare psychological disturbances, it takes two peopleto make one group: you cannot be a group untilyou join with another person. Second, groups con-nect people to one another. We understand intui-tively that three persons seated in separate roomsworking on a long list of math problems can hardlybe considered a group; they are not linked in anyway to each other. If, however, we create a con-nection among them, then these three individualscan be considered a rudimentary group. Third, inmost cases the connection is a socially meaningfulone. Members of a group are not linked by surfacesimilarities or their accidental gathering in a specific

group dynamics The influential actions, processes, andchanges that occur within and between groups overtime; also, the scientific study of those processes.

2 CHAPTER 1

location but by relatively enduring personal rela-tionships that enfold the members within a collec-tive. A consanguine family is a group because themembers are connected, not just by genetic similar-ities but also by social and emotional bonds that arepersonally meaningful to each member. Peoplewho work together are linked not only by the col-laborative tasks that they must complete collectivelybut also by friendships, alliances, and inevitable an-tagonisms. Students in a class all recognize that theyare members of a smaller subset within the largereducational community and that those who are notin their class are outsiders. Thus, a group is two ormore individuals who are connected by and within socialrelationships.

Two or More Individuals A group can range insize from two members to thousands of members.Very small collectives, such as dyads (two members)and triads (three members) are groups, but so are verylarge collections of people, such as mobs, crowds, andcongregations (Simmel, 1902). On average, however,most groups tend to be relatively small in size, rang-ing from two to seven members (Mullen, 1987).One researcher who diligently counted the numberof people in 7405 informal, spontaneously formedgroups discovered that most were small, usuallywith only two or three members. Deliberately for-med groups, such as those created in government orwork settings, were also small, with an average of 2.3members ( James, 1951). When observers watched asindividuals and groups ate their meals in a cafeteria ona college campus, they noticed that the majority ofthe groups were dyads, particularly when the cafeteriawas crowded (Jorgenson & Dukes, 1976; see Figure1.1). Although groups come in all shapes and sizes,they tend to “gravitate to the smallest size, two”(Hare, 1976, p. 215).

A group’s size influences its nature in manyways, for a group with only two or three memberspossesses many unique characteristics simply becauseit includes so few members. The dyad is, by defini-tion, the only group that dissolves when one member

leaves and the only group that can never be brokendown into subgroups (Levine & Moreland, 1995).The members of dyads are also sometimes linkedby a unique and powerful type of relationship—love—that makes their dynamics more intense thanthose found in other groups. Larger groups also haveunique qualities: the members are rarely connecteddirectly to all other members, subgroups are verylikely to form, and one or more leaders may beneeded to organize and guide the group. By defini-tion, however, all are considered groups.

Who Are Connected The members of any givengroup are networked together like a series of inter-connected computers. These connections, or ties,may be based on strong bonds, like the links be-tween the members of a family or a clique of closefriends. The links may also be relatively weak onesthat are easily broken with the passage of time or theoccurrence of relationship-damaging events. Evenweak ties, however, can create robust outcomes,

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0Alone Dyad

Size of Group

Triad Quad+P

erce

nta

ge

Crowded

Uncrowded

F I G U R E 1.1 The percentage of people who dinedalone, in dyads, triads, and larger groups (quads) in acrowded or uncrowded cafeteria.

SOURCE: “Deindividuation as a Function of Density and Group Members,” byD. O. Jorgenson and F. O. Dukes, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1976, 34, 24–29. Copyright 1976 by the American Psychological Association.

group Two or more individuals who are connected byand within social relationships.

I NTRODUCT ION TO GROUP DYNAMICS 3

such as when a group member you hardly knowprovides you with critical information that is com-mon knowledge in that person’s social circles(Granovetter, 1973).

The larger the group, the more ties are neededto join members to each other and to the group.The maximum number of ties within a group inwhich everyone is linked to everyone else is givenby the equation n(n-1)/2, where n is the number ofpeople in the group. Only one relationship is neededto create a dyad, but 10 ties would be needed to joineach member of a 5-person group to every othermember, 45 for a 10-person group, and 190 rela-tionships for a 20-person group. Note, too, thattwice as many ties are needed if they are directedrelations; rather than just A is linked to B, but Alinks to B and B links to A. Hence, many ties be-tween members within the boundaries of the groupare indirect ones. Person A might, for example, talkdirectly to B but B may talk only to C, so that A islinked to C only through B. But even in largegroups, members often feel connected to the major-ity of the group’s members and to the group as awhole (Katz et al., 2005).

By and Within Social Relationships Definitionsof the word group vary, but many stress one key con-sideration: relationships among the members. Thus,“a group is a collection of individuals who have rela-tions to one another” (Cartwright & Zander, 1968,p. 46); “a group is a social unit which consists of anumber of individuals who stand in (more or less)definite status and role relationships to one another”(Sherif & Sherif, 1956, p. 144); and a group is “abounded set of patterned relations among members”(Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000, p. 34). Just aspeople who are friends are joined in friendship, or allthe senior members of a law firm are part of a partner-ship, people in a group are said to be linked by theirmembership.

Group relationships link each member to oneanother and to the group as a whole. They also

define who is in the group itself, for groups, unlikenetworks, have boundaries. To become part of anetwork a person must establish a link with a personwho is already in the network. Business professionalssay they are networking when they are busy establish-ing ties with other individuals. Groups, in contrast,usually have stable but permeable boundaries—sometimes unstated but also sometimes explicitlydefined—that differentiate between those who arewithin the group and those who are outside of thegroup. As social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1972)explained, group members share a common identitywith one another. They know who is in their group,who is not, and what qualities are typical of insidersand outsiders. This perception of themselves as mem-bers of the same group or social category—this socialidentity—creates a sense of we and us, as well as asense of they (Abrams et al., 2005). Social identity canbe thought of as the “sum total of a person’s socialidentifications, where the latter represents sociallysignificant social categorizations internalized as aspectsof the self-concept” (Turner, 1985, p. 527).

This definition of a group, two or more indivi-duals who are connected by and within social rela-tionships, although consistent with many theoreticalperspectives on groups, is but one definition of many(Greenwood, 2004). The definition is also somewhathopeful, for it suggests that collections of people canbe easily classified into two categories—group andnongroup—when in actuality such classification israrely so clear-cut. Some groups, such as work teamsor families, easily meet the definition’s “by and withinsocial relationships” requirement, but others do not.For example, five strangers waiting on a city sidewalkfor a bus may not seem to fit the definition of a group,but they may become a group when one passengerasks the others if they can change a dollar bill. And

membership The state of being a part of, or includedwithin, a social group.

network A set of interconnected individuals or groups;more generally, any set of social or nonsocial objects thatare linked by relational ties.social identity Aspects of the self-concept that derivefrom relationships and memberships in groups; in partic-ular, those qualities that are held in common by two ormore people who recognize that they are members ofthe same group or social category.

4 CHAPTER 1

what about people playing a MMORPG (MassivelyMultiplayer OnlineRole-Playing Game) together onthe Internet? As Focus 1.1 asks, are people who areconnected to one another by computer-based com-munication networks a group?

The definition is also limited by its brevity. Itdefines the barest requirements of a group, and so itleaves unanswered other questions about groups. Ifwe want to understand a group we need to askmany more questions: What do the people do inthe group? Does the group have a leader? Howunified is the group? How has the group changedover time? Deciding that a collection of peoplequalifies as a group is only the beginning of under-standing that group.

Describing Groups

Each one of the billions of groups that exist at thismoment is a unique configuration of individuals,

processes, and relationships. A group of fivestudents in a university library reviewing materialfor an upcoming test displays tendencies and quali-ties that are unlike any other study group that hasever existed or ever will exist. The family living at103 Main Street is different in dozens of ways fromthe family that lives just next door to them. Theteam of workers building automobiles in Anytown,U.S.A., is unlike any other team of workers in anyother factory in the world.

But all groups, despite their distinctive charac-teristics, possess common properties and dynamics.When researchers study a group, they must gobeyond its unique qualities to consider characteristicsthat appear with consistency in most groups. Someof these qualities, such as what the group membersare doing and the tasks they are attempting, are rela-tively obvious ones. Other qualities, such as thedegree of interdependence among members or thegroup’s overall unity, are harder to discern. Here we

F o c u s 1.1 Are Online Groups Real Groups?

Members only may post or reply to messages buteveryone is welcome to visit.— Message at http://maritimeracers.proboards33.com

When people think of a group they tend to think of agathering of individuals in some specific location. Afamily picnicking, a football team practicing, a team ofworkers assembling a machine, or a clique of friendsgossiping about the weekend’s events; these aregroups. Some groups, however, do not fit people’sintuitive conception of the typical group. Consider, forexample, 10 people who never see each other face-to-face but only communicate with one another usingcomputers connected to the Internet. Are these peoplemembers of a network or a group?

The Internet has transformed people’s lives,including their groups. Friendship cliques, supportgroups, work teams, families, clubs, and even loversneed not meet face-to-face, but may instead congre-gate via the World Wide Web. This unique, “virtual”environment in which these groups meet undoubtedlyinfluences their dynamics: members of an online groupwill not interact in precisely the same way as will mem-bers of a group that meet together “offline” (face-to-face). Yet, in many cases, their dynamics are similar to

those of more traditional, face-to-face groups. Suchgroups develop norms, admit new members, identifygoals, and experience conflict. Members of such groupstake the lead, offer suggestions, ask questions, and in-fluence one another. New members must often sufferthrough a period of initiation; for example, members ofmany multiplayer game worlds are given the derisivelabel of newb and are ignored until they develop theirskills. Members also identify with their online groupsand react differently to those who are in their groupsand those who are not (McKenna & Seidman, 2005).

Are Internet-based groups true groups? Thisquestion is, at core, an empirical one. As researchersexplore the dynamics of these groups, they will likelyidentify aspects of these groups that are consistentwith what is known about groups in general: how theyform, how members interact with one another, andhow they perform over time. But, given their uniquesetting, researchers will likely also discover thesegroups are unique in some ways. If their distinctivenessoutweighs their similarities to traditional groups, thena case could be made to place Internet groups in theirown category. However, until research suggests other-wise, we will cautiously consider online groups to begroups.

INTRODUCT ION TO GROUP DYNAMICS 5

http://maritimeracers.proboards33.com

start with group’s easily detectable qualities beforeturning to those that are often hidden from view.

Interaction Robert F. Bales (1950, 1999) spenthis career searching for an answer to the question,“What do people do when they are in groups?” Hewould find naturally existing groups or create groupsin his laboratory and then watch them closely. As heexpected, these groups’ interactions were quite var-ied. Group members exchanged information witheach other, through both verbal and nonverbal com-munication; they got into arguments, talked over is-sues, and made decisions. They upset each other, gaveone another help and support, and took advantage ofeach other’s weaknesses. They worked together toaccomplish difficult tasks, but they sometimes slackedoff when they thought others would not notice.Group members taught each other new things andthey touched each other literally and emotionally.Group interaction is as varied as human behavioritself.

Bales, however, eventually concluded that thecountless interactions he had witnessed were of twobasic types. Relationship interaction (or socioemo-tional interaction) pertains to the interpersonal, socialside of group life. If group members falter and needsupport, others will buoy them up with kind words,suggestions, and other forms of help. When groupmembers disagree with the others, they are oftenroundly criticized and made to feel foolish. Whena coworker wears a new suit or outfit, others in hisor her work unit notice it and offer compliments orcriticisms. Such actions sustain or undermine theemotional bonds linking the members to oneanother and to the group. Task interaction, incontrast, includes all group behavior that is focusedprincipally on the group’s work, projects, plans, andgoals. In most groups, members must coordinate

their various skills, resources, and motivations sothat the group can make a decision, generate a prod-uct, or achieve a victory. When a jury reviews eachbit of testimony, a committee argues over the bestcourse of action to take, or a family plans its summervacation, the group’s interaction is task focused. Wewill review the method that Bales developed forobjectively recording these types of interactions,his Interaction Process Analysis (IPA), in Chapter 2.

Goals Groups usually exist for a reason. A teamstrives to outperform other teams in competitions.A study group wants to help members get bettergrades. A jury makes a decision about guilt or inno-cence. The members of a congregation seek reli-gious and spiritual experiences. In each case, themembers of the group are united in their pursuitof common goals. In groups, people solve problems,create products, develop standards, communicateknowledge, have fun, perform arts, create institu-tions, and even ensure their safety from attacks byother groups. Put simply, groups make it easier toattain our goals. For this reason, much of the world’swork is done by groups rather than by individuals.

Just as Bales identified the basic types of inter-actions that occur within groups, so Joseph E.McGrath’s (1984) circumplex model of grouptasks brings order to the many goal-related activi-ties that groups undertake. McGrath’s model distin-guishes among four basic group goals: generatingideas or plans, choosing a solution, negotiating a solu-tion to a conflict, or executing (performing) a task.As Figure 1.2 indicates, each of these basic catego-ries can be further subdivided, yielding a total ofeight basic goal-related activities.

■ Generating: Groups that concoct the strategiesthey will use to accomplish their goals (Type 1:planning tasks) or to create altogether new ideasand approaches to their problems (Type 2:creativity tasks).relationship interaction Actions performed by group

members that relate to or influence the emotional andinterpersonal bonds within the group, including bothpositive actions (social support, consideration) and nega-tive actions (criticism, conflict).task interaction Actions performed by group membersthat pertain to the group’s projects, tasks, and goals.

circumplex model of group tasks A conceptual tax-onomy developed by Joseph McGrath that orders grouptasks in a circular pattern based on two continua:cooperative–competitive and conceptual–behavioral.

6 CHAPTER 1

■ Choosing: Groups that make decisions aboutissues that have correct solutions (Type 3:intellective tasks) or questions that can beanswered in many ways (Type 4: decision-making tasks).

■ Negotiating: Groups that must resolve differ-ences of opinion among members regardingtheir goals or decisions (Type 5: cognitive conflicttasks) or resolve competitive disputes amongmembers (Type 6: mixed-motive tasks).

■ Executing: Groups that do things, includingtaking part in competitions (Type 7: contests/

battles/competitive tasks) or working togetherto create some product or carry out collectiveactions (Type 8: Performances/psychomotortasks).

McGrath’s model also distinguishes betweenconceptual–behavioral goals and cooperation–conflictgoals. Some of the goals that groups pursue requirethem to take action (Tasks 1, 6, 7, and 8).Others focuson deliberation, for they require a conceptual review(Tasks 2, 3, 4, and 5). Some of the tasks are purelycollaborative ones—they require that group memberswork together to accomplish their goals (Types 1, 2,

Solvingproblems

withcorrect

answers

Generatingideas

Generatingplans

Executingperformance

tasks

Resolvingconflictsof power

Resolving conflictsof interest

Decidingissueswith no

rightanswer

Resolving conflictsof viewpoint

Type 2:Creativity

tasks

Type 3:Intellective tasks

Type 4:Decision-making

tasks

Type 1:Planning

tasks

Type 8:Performances/

psychomotor tasks

Type 5:Cognitive

conflict tasks

Type 7:Contests/battles/

competitivetasks

Type 6:Mixed-motive

tasks

Quadrant IGenerate

Quadrant IVExecute

Quadrant IIINegotiate

Quadrant IIChoose

BehavioralConceptual

Co

nfl

ict

Co

op

erat

ion

F I G U R E 1.2 McGrath’s task circumplex model of group tasks. The theory identifies eight basic activities un-dertaken by groups—planning, creating, solving problems, making decisions, forming judgments, resolving conflicts,competing, and performing—and arranges them in a circle based on two dimensions: executing–choosing andgenerating–negotiating. Tasks in the upper four quadrants require cooperation among members, whereas conflict ismore likely when groups undertake those tasks in the lower quadrants. Tasks on the right side of the circle are be-havioral ones, whereas those on the left side of the circle are more intellectual, conceptual tasks.

SOURCE: McGrath, Groups: Interaction and Performance, 1st, © 1984. Reproduced by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.


3, and 8). Others goals, in contrast, tend to pit in-dividuals and/or groups against each other (Types 4,5, 6, and 7). Some groups perform tasks from nearlyall of McGrath’s categories, whereas others concen-trate on only one subset of goals (Arrow &McGrath,1995).

Interdependence When people join groups theysoon discover that they are no longer masters of theirown fate. The acrobat on the trapeze will drop tothe net unless her teammate catches her outstretchedarms. The assembly line worker is unable to com-plete his work until he receives the unfinished prod-uct from a worker further up the line. The businessexecutive’s success and salary is determined by howwell her staff completes its work. She can fulfill herpersonal tasks skillfully, but if her staff fails, then shefails as well. In such situations, members are obli-gated or responsible to other group members, forthey provide each other with support and assistance.This interdependence means that members dependon one another; their outcomes, actions, thoughts,feelings, and experiences are determined in part byothers in the group.

Some groups create only the potential forinterdependence among members. The outcomesof people standing in a queue at the checkoutcounter in a store, audience members in a darkenedtheater, or the congregation of a large mega-churchare hardly intertwined at all. Other groups, such asgangs, families, sports teams, and military squads,create far higher levels of interdependency sincemembers reliably and substantially influence oneanother’s outcomes over a long period of timeand in a variety of situations. In such groups theinfluence of one member on another also tends tobe mutual; member A can influence B, but B canalso influence A in return (see Figure 1.3). In othergroups, in contrast, influence is more unequal andmore one-directional. In a business, for example,

the boss may determine how employees spend theirtime, what kind of rewards they experience, andeven the duration of their membership in thegroup. These employees can influence their bossto a degree, but the boss’s influence is nearly uni-lateral: The boss influences them to a greater degreethan they influence the boss.

Structure Group members are not connected toone another at random, but in organized and predict-able patterns. In all but the most ephemeral groups,patterns and regularities emerge that determine thekinds of actions that are permitted or condemned:who talks to whom, who likes whom and who dis-likes whom, who can be counted on to perform par-ticular tasks, and whom others look to for guidanceand help. These regularities combine to generate

Unilateralinterdependence

Mutual, reciprocalinterdependence

A

C DB

B CA

B CA

A

C DB

Reciprocal, unequalinterdependence

Sequentialinterdependence

F I G U R E 1.3 Examples of interdependence amonggroup members. Interdependence results when theoutcomes of one or more group members aredetermined, in part, by other group members. Influenceis sometimes mutual and reciprocal: all membersinfluence one another. But influence can be unilateral, aswhen a leader influences others but is not influenced bythem. More typically, influence is reciprocal but unequal;a leader’s influence over followers is substantially greaterthan followers’ influence on the leader. In some casesinfluence is sequential, as when A influences B whoinfluences C.

interdependence The state of being dependent to somedegree on other people, as when one’s outcomes,actions, thoughts, feelings, and experiences are deter-mined in whole or in part by others.

8 CHAPTER 1

group structure—the complex of roles, norms, andintermember relations that organizes the group.Roles, for example, specify the general behaviorsexpected of people who occupy different positionswithin the group. The roles of leader and follower arefundamental ones in many groups, but other roles—information seeker, information giver, elaborator,procedural technician, encourager, compromiser,harmonizer—may emerge in any group (Benne &Sheats, 1948). Group members’ actions and interactionsare also shaped by their group’s norms—consensualstandards that describe what behaviors should andshould not be performed in a given context.

Roles, norms, and other structural aspects ofgroups, although unseen and often unnoticed, lie atthe heart of their most dynamic processes. When peo-ple join a group, they initially spend much of their timetrying to come to terms with the requirements of theirrole. If they cannot meet the role’s demand, they mightnot remain a member for long. Norms within a groupare defined and renegotiated over time, and conflictsoften emerge as members violate norms. In groupmeetings, the opinions of members with higher statuscarry more weight than those of the rank-and-filemembers. When several members form a subgroupwithin the larger group, they exert more influenceon the rest of the group than they would individually.When people manage to place themselves at the hubof the group’s information exchange patterns, theirinfluence over others also increases. If you had tochoose only one aspect of a group to study, you wouldprobably learn the most by studying its structure.

Unity Just as a book is not just a set of sequencedpages or a cake just sugar, flour, and other ingredi-ents mixed together and baked, so a group is notjust the individuals who compose it. A group,viewed holistically, is a unified whole; an entity

formed when interpersonal forces bind the mem-bers together in a single unit with boundaries thatmark who is in the group and who is outside of it.In consequence, when we speak about groups werefer to them as single objects: for example, a gangis menacing or the club meets tomorrow.

This quality of “groupness,” or solidarity, isdetermined, in part, by group cohesion. In physics,the molecular integrity of matter is known as cohesive-ness. When matter is cohesive, the particles that con-stitute it bond together so tightly that they resist anycompeting attractions. But when matter is not cohe-sive, it tends to disintegrate over time as the particlesdrift away or adhere to some other nearby object.Similarly, in human groups, cohesion is the integrity,solidarity, and unity of a group. All groups require amodicum of cohesiveness, else the group would dis-integrate and cease to exist as a group (Dion, 2000).

Groupness is also related to entitativity. Eventhough an aggregation of individuals may not bevery cohesive, those who observe the group—andeven the members themselves—may believe that thegroup is a single, unified entity. Entitativity, then, ishow unified the group appears to be to the perceiver;that is, perceived unity rather than the group’s actualunity. Were you to observe six people playing pokeror a family of five picnicking in a park you wouldlikely conclude that both were groups; they seem tobe cohesive, impermeable units. But what about theaudience at the movie theatre? Thousands of specta-tors at a soccer match? Onlookers may conclude thatthat they are not groups at all, but just unrelated in-dividuals who happen to be in the same place.Entitativity is cohesiveness perceived, and thereforeoften is in the eye of the beholder.

What factors determine a group’s entitativity?Donald Campbell (1958a), who originally coinedthe word entitativity, suggested that a group’s enti-tativity depends on certain perceptual cues that

group structure The underlying pattern of roles, norms,and relations among members that organizes groups.role A coherent set of behaviors expected of people whooccupy specific positions within a group.norm A consensual and often implicit standard thatdescribes what behaviors should and should not be per-formed in a given context.

group cohesion The strength of the bonds linkingindividuals to and in the group.entitativity As described by Donald Campbell, theextent to which an assemblage of individuals is perceivedto be a group rather than an aggregation of independent,unrelated individuals; the quality of being an entity.


perceivers rely on intuitively to decide if an aggre-gation of individuals is a true group or just a collec-tion of people. For example, the spectators at afootball game may seem to be a disorganized massof individuals who happen to be in the same placeat the same time, but the tendency of the spectatorsto shout the same cheer, express similar emotions,and move together to create a “wave” gives thementitativity. Entitativity, according to Campbell, issubstantially influenced by

■ Common fate: Do the individuals experience thesame or interrelated outcomes?

■ Similarity: Do the individuals perform similarbehaviors or resemble one another?

■ Proximity: How close together are the indivi-duals in the aggregation?

Consider four people seated at a table in a library.Is this a group? They could be four friends study-ing together, or just four independent individuals.To answer the question, you must consider theircommon fate, similarity, and proximity. The prin-ciple of common fate predicts that the degree of“groupness” you attribute to the cluster would in-crease if, for example, all the members beganlaughing together or moved closer to one another(Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2002). Yourconfidence that this cluster was a real group wouldalso be bolstered if you noticed that all four werereading from the same textbook or were wearingthe same fraternity shirt. Finally, if the membersgot up and left the room together, you wouldbecome even more certain that you were watch-ing a group (Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006). As Focus 1.2explains, labeling an aggregation a group is notjust a matter of semantics, since people responddifferently to groups than they do to clusters ofindividuals.

Types of Groups

The qualities summarized in Table 1.1—interaction,goals, interdependence of members, structure, andunity—are typical of most groups, but even morestriking are the many ways groups differ from one

another. Groups come in a variety of shapes andsizes and perform functions that are vast and varied,so the differences among them are as noteworthy astheir similarities. Here we consider four basic typesof groups, but admit that these four are only a sam-ple of the many types of groups that have beenidentified by theorists.

Primary Groups In 1860, two young, strugglingartists, Claude Monet and Camille Pissarro, met byhappenstance and immediately became friends.They spent hours together sharing their ideas aboutart and politics, and soon other like-minded artistsjoined with them. The group, challenged by thosewho criticized their work, became highly unified.They met regularly, each Thursday and Sunday, ina café in Paris to discuss technique, subject matter,and artistic philosophies. They often painted as agroup, sharing ideas about style and technique.When one of them fell ill or faced financial crises,the others were there to provide support. In timetheir approach was recognized by the art commu-nity as a new school of painting and the groupbecame famous: they were the impressionists(Farrell, 2001; see Chapter 4).

Primary groups, such as family, friends, ortight-knit peer groups, are relatively small, person-ally meaningful groups that are highly unified. Themembers are very involved in the group, so muchso that they feel a part of something larger thanthemselves. Because the members interact withone another regularly, and usually face-to-facewith many other members present, they knoweach other very well. Even when the group is notconvened, members nonetheless know that they are“in” the group, and they consider the group to be avery important part of their lives.

primary group A small, long-term group, such as fam-ilies and friendship cliques, characterized by face-to-faceinteraction, solidarity, and high levels of member-to-group interdependence and identification; CharlesCooley believed such groups serve as the primary sourceof socialization for members by shaping their attitudes,values, and social orientation.

10 CHAPTER 1

Sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1909)referred to these kinds of groups as primary groupsbecause they are typically the first group people

join, but also because they fulfill such an importantrole in people’s lives. Cooley thought that primarygroups protect members from harm, care for themwhen they are ill, and provide them with shelter

F o c u s 1.2 When Is Seeing (a group) Believing (in the group)?

He stood up, and then others stood up and rangedthemselves behind him. They looked like a gangnow, with their captain out in front to lead them.Riccio sat where he was, looking up at one face afteranother.—James F. Short (1968, p. 39) Gang Delinquency and

Delinquent Subcultures

W. I. Thomas once stated that “if men define situationsas real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas &Thomas, 1928, p. 572). This statement, now known asthe Thomas Theorem, has been called “the single mostconsequential sentence ever put in print by anAmerican sociologist” (Merton, 1976, p. 174). A corol-lary, for groups, would be: if people define groups asreal, they are real in their consequences. Once peoplethink an aggregate of people is a true group—onewith entitativity, as Donald Campbell (1958a)suggested—then the group will have importantinterpersonal consequences for those in the group andthose who are observing it.

People act differently when they are members ofa group that they feel is high in entitativity. Groupmembers are much more likely to identify with suchgroups (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2002), andthis tendency is particularly strong when people feeluncertain about themselves and the correctness oftheir beliefs (Hogg et al., 2007). Because proximity in-fluences entitativity, people display more group-levelreactions when they meet face-to-face in a single lo-cation than when they meet across long distances intelephone conference calls or through computer-mediated discussions (Kiesler & Cummings, 2002).When researchers repeatedly told women working inisolation that they were nonetheless members of a

group, the women accepted this label and later ratedthemselves more negatively after their “group” failed(Zander, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1960). Groups that are highin entitativity also tend to be more cohesive (Zyphur &Islam, 2006) and the members of such groups may alsoexperience enhanced feelings of social well-being(Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008).

People also think differently about entitativegroups and the people in them. Entitativity likely playsa role in stereotyping and prejudice, for people aremore likely to make sweeping judgments about spe-cific individuals based on their membership in a groupprovided that entitativity is high rather than low(Rydell et al., 2007). People tend to think members ofsuch groups are basically interchangeable (Crawford,Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002), and they more quicklydraw comparisons between them (Pickett, 2001).Observers are more likely to hold the members of suchgroups collectively responsible for the actions of one ofthe group members (Denson et al., 2006), and they findthe arguments offered by such groups to be morepersuasive than those of individual members (Rydell &McConnell, 2005). A sense of essentialism tends topermeate perceivers’ beliefs about groups that arehigh in entitativity, for people think that such groupshave deep, relatively unchanging essential qualitiesthat give rise to their more surface-level characteristics(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Yzerbyt, Judd, &Corneille, 2004).

In sum, all groups “are not created equal in themind’s eye” (Prentice & Miller, 2007, p. 202). Thosewho proclaim, “We are a group” or say, “They are agroup” perceive the world differently than those whosee themselves surrounded only by individuals ratherthan groups.

Thomas Theorem The theoretical premise, put forwardby W. I. Thomas, which maintains that an individual’sunderstanding of a social situation, even if incorrect, willdetermine how he or she will act in the situation; “Ifmen define situations as real, they are real in their con-sequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

essentialism The belief that all things, including indivi-duals and groups, have a basic nature which makes themwhat they are and distinguishes them from others; thisbasic essence, even though hidden, is relatively unchang-ing and gives rise to surface-level qualities.


and sustenance. But he believed that their mostimportant function was in creating a bridgebetween the individual and society at large:

Primary groups are primary in the sensethat they give the individual his earliest andcompletest experience of social unity, andalso in the sense that they do not change inthe same degree as more elaborate rela-tions, but form a comparatively permanentsource out of which the latter are everspringing. (Cooley, 1909, pp. 26–27)

In many cases, individuals become part of pri-mary groups involuntarily: Most are born into afamily, which provides for their well-being untilthey can join other groups. Other primary groupsform when people interact in significant, meaning-ful ways for a prolonged period of time.

Social Groups In 1961, John F. Kennedy and hisadvisors were considering a plan to help a group of1400 Cuban exiles invade Cuba at a place calledBahía de Cochinos, the Bay of Pigs. This group’smembers boasted years of experience in makingmonumentally important governmental decisions,and various warfare specialists from the CIA andthe military attended all the meetings. The groupmet for many hours, and believed their plan wasnearly perfect. Unfortunately, the attack ended incomplete disaster, and the members spent the fol-lowing months wondering at their shortsightedness

and cataloging all the blunders they had made(Janis, 1972, 1982, 1983; see Chapter 11).

Cooley (1909) maintained that, in earlier eras,individuals belonged only to small, primary groups.They could live out their entire lives without leavingtheir small, close-knit families, tribes, or communi-ties. But, as societies became more complex, so didtheir groups. These groups drew people into thelarger community, where they joined with othersin social groups. These groups are larger andmore formally organized than primary groups, andmemberships tend to be shorter in duration and lessemotionally involving. The boundaries of suchgroups are more permeable, so members can leaveold groups behind and join new ones. These groupsare, in general, more instrumental ones: they arelikely to stress the performance of tasks rather thanenjoying relationships. Various terms have been usedto describe this category of groups, such as secondarygroups (Cooley, 1909), associations (MacIver & Page,1937), task groups (Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman,2001), and Gesellschaften (Toennies, 1887/1963).

Collectives At exactly 1:30 in the afternoon on asunny day outside the student union two students—one dressed in white and another in green—bowedto each other before launching into a barrage of

T A B L E 1.1 Characteristics of Groups

Feature Description

Interaction Groups create, organize, and sustain relationship and task interactions among members

Goals Groups have instrumental purposes, for they facilitate the achievement of aims or outcomessought by the members

Interdependence Group members depend on one another, in that each member influences and is influencedby each other member

Structure Groups are organized, with each individual connected to others in a pattern of relationships,roles, and norms

Unity Groups are cohesive social arrangements of individuals that perceivers, in some cases, considerto be unified wholes

social group A relatively small number of individualswho interact with one another over an extended periodof time, such as work groups, clubs, and congregations.

12 CHAPTER 1

mock karate chops punctuated with shouts of“Wha-cha.” At that moment, nearly all the peoplenear them—30 to 40 fellow college students—alsopaired off in make-believe mêlées, which lasted un-til one of the original combatants fell to the ground.When he collapsed, all the other fighters collapsedas well, leaving but one person standing. As hewalked away, the students all stood up, picked uptheir knapsacks, and went their separate ways. It wasa flash crowd, or smart mob, organized by the use ofcell phone technology and instant messaging(Rheingold, 2002; see Chapter 17).

A collective, if taken literally, would describe anyaggregate of two or more individuals and, hence,would be synonymous with the term group(Blumer, 1951). Most theorists, however, reservethe term for larger, more spontaneous and looserforms of associations among people. Collectivesare larger groups whose members act in similarand sometimes unusual ways. A list of collectiveswould include a street crowd watching a buildingburn, an audience at a movie, a line (queue) of peo-ple waiting to purchase tickets, a mob of collegestudents protesting a government policy, and a pan-icked group fleeing from danger. But the list wouldalso include mass movements of individuals who,though dispersed over a wide area, display commonshifts in opinion or actions.

Categories Cuneo was driving a battered Cometand his buddy, Boyle, sat by his side. They werekeyed up after working as bouncers at a local barand were very drunk. On a nearby street Bookerand Wilson were in a maroon Buick, headed homeafter working a shift at the nearby medical center.When the two cars stopped side-by-side at a red light,Boyle began shouting insults at Booker. A savagefight broke out, with the four men using baseballbats, a bottle, a knife, a piece of a picket fence,jumper cables, and even a car to injure each other.Why? Were these old enemies who were settling agrudge? Gang members who had sworn a vow todefend their turf? Drug dealers fighting over territory?

No. The two sets of men were strangers to one an-other. But Cuneo and Boyle were white, Wilson andBooker were black, and these categories created rea-son enough (Sedgwick, 1982; see Chapter 14).

A category is an aggregation of individualswho are similar to one another in some way. Forexample, people who live in New York City areNew Yorkers, Americans whose ancestors were fromAfrica are African Americans, and those who rou-tinely wager sums of money on games of chanceare gamblers. If a category has no social implications,then it only describes individuals who share a fea-ture in common and is not a meaningful group. If,however, these categories set in motion personal orinterpersonal processes—if two students in collegebecome friends when they discover they grew up inthe same town, if people respond to a person dif-ferently when they see he is an African American,or if a person begins to gamble even more of herearnings because her social identity includes the cat-egory gambler—then a category may be transformedinto a highly influential group (Galinsky, Ku, &Wang, 2005). In such cases, categories can behigher in entitativity and essentialism than othertypes of groups.

Perceiving Groups: Intuitive Typologies Theo-rists are not the only people who divide groups upinto coherent clusters like those listed in Table 1.2.When researchers Brian Lickel, David L. Hamilton,Steven J. Sherman, and their colleagues asked lay-people to think about various kinds of groups, mostpeople intuitively drew distinctions between socialgroups, public groups, collectives, and categories.This study presented people with a list of 40types of human aggregations: a local street gang, ci-tizens of America, members of a jury, people at a busstop, Jews, members of a family, students studyingfor an exam, plumbers, and the like. They thenasked people to rate them in terms of their size,duration, permeability, amount of interaction amongmembers, importance to members, and so on. Whenthey examined these data using a statistical procedure

collective A relatively large aggregation or group of in-dividuals who display similarities in actions and outlook.

category An aggregation of people or things that sharesome common attribute or are related in some way.


called cluster analysis, they identified the basic typesof groups listed in Table 1.2 (which they labeledintimacy groups, task groups, loose associations,and social categories). They then asked people tosort the 40 aggregates into stacks. Again, analysisidentified the same basic types of groups. They alsoasked people to list 12 groups that they belong to.When unbiased raters reviewed these lists, onceagain the four types were in evidence (Lickelet al., 2000).

The research team also asked the perceivers ifthey considered all these kinds of aggregations ofindividuals to be true groups. They did not forcepeople to make an either/or decision about eachone, however. Recognizing that the boundary be-tween what is and what is not a group is perceptuallyfuzzy, they instead asked participants to rate the ag-gregations on a scale from 1 (not at all a group) to 9(very much a group). As Figure 1.4 indicates, primarygroups and social groups received high average rat-ings, whereas collectives and categories were ratedlower. These findings suggest that people are morelikely to consider aggregations marked by strongbonds between members, frequent interactionsamong members, and clear boundaries to be groups,but that they are less certain that such aggregations as

crowds, waiting lines, or categories qualify as groups(Lickel et al., 2000, Study 3).

THE NATURE OF

GROUP DYNAMICS

Group dynamics describes both a subject matter anda scientific field of study. When Kurt Lewin (1951)described the way groups and individuals act andreact to changing circumstances, he named theseprocesses group dynamics. But Lewin also used thephrase to describe the scientific discipline devotedto the study of these dynamics. Later, DorwinCartwright and Alvin Zander supplied a formal def-inition, calling it a “field of inquiry dedicated toadvancing knowledge about the nature of groups,the laws of their development, and their interrela-tions with individuals, other groups, and larger in-stitutions” (1968, p. 7).

Group dynamics is not even a century old.Although scholars have long pondered the natureof groups, the first scientific studies of groups werenot carried out until the 1900s. Cartwright andZander (1968), in their review of the origins ofgroup dynamics, suggest that its slow development

T A B L E 1.2 Types of Groups

Type of Group Characteristics Examples

Primary groups Small, long-term groups characterized by face-to-faceinteraction and high levels of cohesiveness, solidarity, andmember identification

Close friends, families, gangs,military squads

Social groups Small groups of moderate duration and permeabilitycharacterized by moderate levels of interaction amongthe members over an extended period of time, often ingoal-focused situations

Coworkers, crews, expeditions,fraternities, sports teams, studygroups, task forces

Collectives Aggregations of individuals that form spontaneously, lastonly a brief period of time, and have very permeableboundaries

Audiences, bystanders, crowds,mobs, waiting lines (queues)

Categories Aggregations of individuals who are similar to oneanother in some way, such as gender, ethnicity, religion,or nationality

Asian Americans, New Yorkers,physicians, U.S. citizens, women

14 CHAPTER 1

stemmed in part from several unfounded assump-tions about groups. Many felt that the dynamics ofgroups was a private affair, not something that scien-tists should lay open to public scrutiny. Others feltthat human behavior was too complex to be studiedscientifically and that this complexity was magnifiedenormously when groups of interacting individualsbecame the objects of interest. Still others believedthat the causes of group behavior were so obviousthat they were unworthy of scientific attention.

The field also developed slowly because theor-ists and researchers disagreed among themselves onmany basic theoretical and methodological issues.The field was not established by a single theoristor researcher who laid down a set of clear-cut as-sumptions and principles. Rather, group dynamicsresulted from group processes. One theorist wouldsuggest an idea, another might disagree, and thedebate would continue until consensus would bereached. Initially, researchers were uncertain howto investigate their ideas empirically, but throughcollaboration and, more often, spirited competition,researchers developed new methods for studyinggroups. World events also influenced the study ofgroups, for the use of groups in manufacturing,warfare, and therapeutic settings stimulated theneed to understand and improve such groups.

These group processes shaped the field’s para-digm. The philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn

(1970) used that term to describe scientists’ sharedassumptions about the phenomena they study.Kuhn maintained that when scientists learn their field,they master not only the content of the science—important discoveries, general principles, facts, andso on—but also a way of looking at the world thatis passed on from one scientist to another. Theseshared beliefs and unstated assumptions give them aworld view—a way of looking at that part of theworld that they find most interesting. The paradigmdetermines the questions they consider worth study-ing using the methods that are most appropriate.

What are the core elements of the field’s para-digm? What do researchers and theorists noticewhen they observe a group acting in particularway? What kinds of group processes do they findfascinating, and which ones do they find less inter-esting? In this chapter, we begin to answer thesequestions by considering some of the basic assump-tions of the field and tracing them back to theirsource in the work of early sociologists, psycholo-gists, and social psychologists. We then shift from thehistorical to the contemporary and review currenttopics and trends in the field. Chapter 2 continuesthis analysis of the field’s paradigm by consideringpractices and procedures used by researchers whenthey collect information about groups.

Are Groups Real?

When anthropology, psychology, sociology, andthe other social sciences emerged as their own

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0Primary

Type of Group

Social Collective Category

En

tita

tivi

ty

F I G U R E 1.4 The entita-tivity ratings of four types ofgroups: Primary groups, socialgroups, collectives, andcategories.

SOURCE: “Varieties of Groups and thePerception of Group Entitativity,” by B. Lickel,D. L. Hamilton, G. Wieczorkowska, A. Lewis,S. J. Sherman, and A. N. Uhles, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 2000, 78,223–246. Copyright 2000 by the AmericanPsychological Association.

paradigm Scientists’ shared assumptions about the phe-nomena they study; also, a set of research procedures.


unique disciplines in the late 1800s, the dynamics ofgroups became a topic of critical concern for all ofthem. Sociologists studying religious, political, eco-nomic, and educational social systems highlightedthe role groups played in maintaining social order.Anthropologists, as they studied one culture afteranother, discovered similarities and differencesamong the world’s small tribal groups. Politicalscientists’ studies of political parties, voting, andpublic engagement led them to the study of smallgroups of closely networked individuals. In 1895,Gustave Le Bon, who was trained as a physician,published Psychologie des Foules (Psychology ofCrowds), which describes how individuals aretransformed when they join a group. WilhelmWundt (1916), recognized as the founder of scien-tific psychology, also studied groups extensively.His book Völkerpsychologie is sometimes translatedas “folk psychology,” but others suggest that thebest translation is “group psychology.” It combinedelements of anthropology and psychology by ex-amining the conditions and changes displayed byelementary social aggregates, and how group mem-berships influence virtually all cognitive and per-ceptual processes.

Level of Analysis Almost immediately theoristsdisagreed about the level of analysis to takewhen studying groups. Some favored anindividual-level analysis that focused on the personin the group. Researchers who took this approachsought to explain the behavior of each group mem-ber, and they ultimately wanted to know if suchpsychological processes as attitudes, motivations,or personality were the true determinants of socialbehavior. Others advocated for a group-level analysisthat assumes each person is “an element in a largersystem, a group, organization, or society. And what

he does is presumed to reflect the state of the largersystem and the events occurring in it” (Steiner,1974, p. 96; 1983, 1986). Sociological researcherstended to undertake group-level analyses and psy-chological researchers favored the individual-levelanalysis.

Researchers working at both levels asked thequestion, “Are groups real?” but they often settledon very different answers. Group-level researchersbelieved that groups and the processes that occurredwithin them were scientifically authentic. ÉmileDurkheim (1897/1966), for example, argued that in-dividuals who are not members of friendship, family,or religious groups can lose their sense of identityand, as a result, are more likely to commit suicide.Durkheim strongly believed that widely sharedbeliefs—what he called collective representations—arethe cornerstone of society, and went so far as tosuggest that large groups of people sometimes actwith a single mind. He believed that such groups,rather than being mere collections of individuals ina fixed pattern of relationships with one another,were linked by a unifying collective conscious(Jahoda, 2007).

Many psychologists who were interested ingroup phenomena questioned the need to go be-yond the individual to explain group behavior.Floyd Allport, the foremost representative of thisperspective, argued that group-level phenomena,such as the collective conscious, simply did not ex-ist. In 1924, Allport wrote that “nervous systems arepossessed by individuals; but there is no nervoussystem of the crowd” (p. 5). He added, “Onlythrough social psychology as a science of the indi-vidual can we avoid the superficialities of thecrowdmind and collective mind theories” (p. 8).Because Allport believed that “the actions of allare nothing more than the sum of the actions ofeach taken separately” (p. 5), he thought that afull understanding of the behavior of individuals

level of analysis The specific focus of study chosenfrom a graded or nested sequence of possible foci. Anindividual-level analysis examines specific individuals inthe group, a group-level analysis focuses on the group asa unit, and an organizational level examines the individ-ual nested in the group, which is, in turn, nested in theorganizational context.

collective conscious (or groupmind) A hypotheticalunifying mental force linking group members together;the fusion of individual consciousness or mind into atranscendent consciousness.

16 CHAPTER 1

in groups could be achieved by studying the psy-chology of the individual group members. Groups,according to Allport, were not real entities. He isreputed to have said, “You can’t trip over a group.”Allport’s reluctance to accept such dubious con-cepts as group-level mind helped ensure the field’sscientific status. His hard-nosed attitude forced re-searchers to ask some basic questions about groupsand their influence on individual members and onsociety (see Focus 1.3).

Are Groups More Than the Sum of TheirParts? The debate between individual-level andgroup-level approaches waned, in time, as theoristsdeveloped stronger models for understandinggroup-level process. Kurt Lewin’s (1951) theoretical

analyses of groups were particularly influential. Hisfield theory is premised on the principle of interaction-ism, which assumes that the behavior of people ingroups is determined by the interaction of the per-son and the environment. The formula B = ƒ(P,E)summarizes this assumption. In a group context, thisformula implies that the behavior (B) of groupmembers is a function ( ƒ ) of the interaction of theirpersonal characteristics (P ) with environmental fac-tors (E ), which include features of the group, the

F o c u s 1.3 Do Groups Have Minds?

Under certain circumstances, and only under thosecircumstances, an agglomeration of men presents newcharacteristics very different from those of theindividuals composing [the group]

—Gustave Le Bon (1895/1960, p. 23),Psychologie des Foules

Groups that undertake extreme actions under the ex-hortation of exotic, charismatic leaders fascinate bothlayperson and researcher alike. Although groups are socommonplace that they usually go unnoticed and un-scrutinized, atypical groups—cults, violent mobs, ter-rorist cells, communes—invite wild speculation. Someearly commentators on the human condition went sofar as to suggest that such groups may develop a groupmind that is greater than the sum of the psychologicalexperiences of the members and that it can become sopowerful that it can overwhelm the will of theindividual.

Very few of these investigators, however, believedthat groups literally had minds. They used such con-cepts such as groupmind and collective conscious asmetaphors to suggest that many psychological pro-cesses are determined, in part, by interactions withother people, and those interactions are in turn shapedby the mental activities and actions of each individualin the collective. When Durkheim, for example, wroteof the “esprit de group” (groupmind) he was not

describing a hive-like mentality that creates a meta-physical bond between members, but only suggestingthat individuals and groups are inextricablyintertwined:

“individuals are all that society is made of . . . thementality of groups is not that of individuals (par-ticuliers), precisely because it assumes a plurality ofindividual minds joined together. A collectivity hasits own ways of thinking and feeling to which itsmembers bend but which are different from thosethey would create if they were left to their owndevices” (Durkheim, 1900/1973, pp. 16–17).

Terms such as groupmind and collective consciousare controversial ones, however, and have contributedto a continuing scientific distrust of group-level con-cepts. Allport, for example, never backed down fromhis anti-group position. Even though he conductedextensive studies of such group phenomena as rumorsand morale during wartime (Allport & Lepkin, 1943)and conformity to standards (the J-curve hypothesis;Allport, 1934, 1961), he continued to question the sci-entific value of the term group. He did, however,eventually conclude that individuals’ actions are oftenbound together in “one inclusive collective structure”but he could not bring himself to use the word groupto describe such collectives (Allport, 1962, p. 17, italicsin original).

B = ƒ(P,E) The interactionism formula proposed byKurt Lewin that assumes each person’s behavior (B) is afunction of his or her personal qualities (P), the socialenvironment (E), and the interaction of these personalqualities with factors present in the social setting.


group members, and the situation. Lewin believedthat, because of interactionism, a group is a Gestalt—a unified system with emergent properties thatcannot be fully understood by piecemeal examina-tion. Adopting the dictum, “The whole is greaterthan the sum of the parts,” he maintained thatwhen individuals merged into a group somethingnew was created and that the new product itselfhad to be the object of study.

Are Group Processes Real? Even the earliest re-searchers doubted the existence of a groupmind.However, just because this particular group-levelconcept has little foundation in fact does notimply that other group-level processes, phenomena,and concepts are equally unreasonable. Consider,for example, the concept of a group norm. Asnoted earlier, a norm is a standard that describeswhat behaviors should and should not be per-formed in a group. Norms are not just individualmembers’ personal standards, however, for they areshared among group members. Only when mem-bers agree on a particular standard does it functionas a norm, so this concept is embedded at thelevel of the group rather than at the level of theindividual.

The idea that a norm is more than just the sumof the individual beliefs of all the members of agroup was verified by Muzafer Sherif in 1936.Sherif literally created norms by asking groups ofmen to state aloud their estimates of the distancethat a dot of light had moved. He found that themen gradually accepted a standard estimate in placeof their own idiosyncratic judgments. He alsofound, however, that even when the men werelater given the opportunity to make judgmentsalone, they still based their estimates on the group’snorm. Moreover, once the group’s norm had de-veloped, Sherif removed members one at a timeand replaced them with fresh members. Each newmember changed his behavior, in time, until itmatched the group’s norm. If the individuals in

the group are completely replaceable, then wheredoes the group norm “exist”? It exists at the grouplevel rather than the individual level (MacNeil &Sherif, 1976).

Are Groups Dynamic?

Kurt Lewin (1943, 1948, 1951), who many haveargued is the founder of the movement to studygroups experimentally, chose the word dynamic todescribe the activities, processes, operations, andchanges that transpire in groups. This word suggeststhat groups are powerful and influential: they changetheir members and society-at-large. Dynamic sys-tems are also fluid rather than static, for they developand evolve over time. Do groups deserve to be calleddynamic?

Groups Influence Their Members As research-ers gathered more and more data about groups andgroup processes they became more firmly convincedthat if one wishes to understand individuals, onemust understand groups. Groups, they concluded,have a profound impact on individuals; they shapeactions, thoughts, and feelings. Some of thesechanges are subtle ones. Moving from isolation to agroup context can reduce our sense of uniqueness,but at the same time it can enhance our ability toperform simple tasks rapidly. In one of the earliestexperimental studies in the field, Norman Triplett(1898) verified the discontinuity between people’sresponses when they are isolated rather than inte-grated, and this shift has been documented timeand again in studies of motivation, emotion, andperformance. Groups can also change their membersby prompting them to change their attitudes andvalues as they come to agree with the overall con-sensus of the group (Newcomb, 1943). As Cooley(1909) explained, people acquire their attitudes, va-lues, identities, skills, and principles in groups, andbecome practiced at modifying their behavior in re-sponse to social norms and others’ requirements.As children grow older their peers replace the familyas the source of social values (Harris, 1995), andwhen they become adults, actions and outlooks are

groupmind A supra-individual level of consciousnessthat links members in a psychic, telepathic connection.

18 CHAPTER 1

then shaped by an even larger network of intercon-nected (Barabási, 2003).

Groups also change people more dramatically.The earliest group psychologists were struck by theapparent madness of people when immersed incrowds, and many concluded that the behavior of aperson in a group may have no connection to thatperson’s behavior when alone. Stanley Milgram’s(1963) classic studies of obedience offered furtherconfirmation of the dramatic power of groups overtheir members, for Milgram found that most peopleplaced in a powerful group would obey the orders ofa malevolent authority to harm another person.Individuals who join religious or political groupsthat stress secrecy, obedience to leaders, and dog-matic acceptance of unusual or atypical beliefs (cults)often display fundamental and unusual changes inbelief and behavior. Groups may just be collectionsof individuals, but these collections change theirmembers (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003).

Groups Influence Society At the same time re-searchers were verifying the dramatic ways in whichgroups influence individuals, researchers studyingsocietal structures were documenting the role thatgroups played in maintaining religious, political,economic, and educational systems in society. Afterthe industrial revolution, legal and political sys-tems developed to coordinate actions and makecommunity-level decisions. Organized religions pro-vided answers to questions of values, morality, andmeaning. Educational systems took over some ofthe teaching duties previously assigned to the family.Economic systems developed to regulate productionand the attainment of financial goals. All these socialsystems were based, at their core, on small groups andsubgroups of connected individuals. Religiousgroups provide a prime example. Individuals oftenendorse a specific religion, such as Christianity orIslam, but their connection to their religion occursin smaller groups and congregations. These groups areformally structured and led by a religious authority,yet they provide members with a sense of belonging,reaffirm the values and norms of the group, andstrengthen bonds among members (Krause, N.,2006). At the collective level, communities, organi-

zations, and society itself cannot be understood apartfrom the groups that sustain these social structures.

Groups Are Living Systems A holistic perspec-tive on groups prompted researchers to examine howa group, as a unit, changes over time. Some groupsare so stable that their basic processes and structuresremain unchanged for days, weeks, or even years, butsuch groups are rare. Bruce Tuckman’s theory ofgroup development, for example, assumes thatmost groups move through the five stages summa-rized in Figure 1.5 (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman &Jensen, 1977). In the forming phase, the group mem-bers become oriented toward one another. In thestorming phase, conflicts surface in the group as mem-bers vie for status and the group sets its goals. Theseconflicts subside when the group becomes morestructured and standards emerge in the norming phase.In the performing phase, the group moves beyond dis-agreement and organizational matters to concentrateon the work to be done. The group continues tofunction at this stage until it reaches the adjourningstage, when it disbands. Groups also tend to cyclerepeatedly through some of these stages as groupmembers strive to maintain a balance between task-oriented actions and emotionally expressive beha-viors (Bales, 1965). A group, in a very real sense, isalive: It acquires energy and resources from its envi-ronment,maintains its structure, and grows over time(Arrow et al., 2005).

The Multilevel Perspective

In time the rift between individual-level andgroup-level researchers closed as the unique contri-butions of each perspective were integrated in amultilevel perspective on groups. This approach,illustrated in Figure 1.6, suggests that group dynam-ics are shaped by processes that range along the

group development Patterns of growth and changethat emerge across the group’s life span.multilevel perspective Examining group behaviorfrom several different levels of analysis, including individ-ual level (micro), group level (meso), and organizationalor societal level (macro).


micro-meso-macro continuum. Micro-level factorsinclude the qualities, characteristics, and actions ofthe individual members. Meso-level factors aregroup-level qualities of the groups themselves,such as their cohesiveness, their size, their compo-sition, and their structure. Macro-level factors are thequalities and processes of the larger collectives thatenfold the groups, such as communities, organiza-tions, or societies. Groups, then, are nested at themeso-level, where the bottom-up micro-level vari-ables meet the top-down macro-level variables.

Crossing Levels Hackman and his colleagues’studies of performing orchestras illustrate the valueof a multilevel approach (Allmendinger, Hackman,& Lehman, 1996; Hackman, 2003). In their questto understand why some professional orchestrasoutperformed others, they measured an array of

micro-, meso-, and macro-level variables. At themicro-level they studied the individual musicians:Were they well-trained and highly skilled? Werethey satisfied with their work and highly motivated?Did they like each other and feel that they playedwell together? At the group-level (meso-level) theyconsidered the gender composition of the group(number of men and women players), the qualityof the music the orchestra produced, and the finan-cial resources available to the group. They also tooknote of one key macro-level variable: the locationof the orchestras in one of four different countries(U.S., England, East Germany, or West Germany).

Their work uncovered a complex array of inter-relations among these three sets of variables. As mightbe expected, one micro-level variable—the skill ofthe individual players—substantially influenced thequality of the performance of the group. However,

Performing

Norming

Storming

Forming

Task

Adjourning

F I G U R E 1.5 Stages of group development. Tuckman’s theory of group development suggests that groupstypically pass through stages during their development: formation (forming), conflict (storming), structure (norming),productivity (performing), and dissolution (adjourning).

20 CHAPTER 1

one critical determinant of the talent of individualplayers was the financial health of the orchestra;better-funded orchestras could afford to hire betterperformers. Affluent orchestras could also affordmusic directors who worked more closely with theperformers, and orchestras who performed betterthan expected given the caliber of their individualplayers were led by the most skilled directors. Thecountry where the orchestra was based was also animportant determinant of the group members’ satis-faction with their orchestra, but only when one alsoconsidered the gender composition of the orchestras.Far fewer women were members of orchestras inWest Germany, but as the proportion of women inorchestras increased, members became increasinglynegative about their group. In contrast, in the U.S.,with its directive employment regulations, morewomen were included in orchestras, and the propor-tion of women in the groups was less closely relatedto attitude toward the group. Given their findings,

Hackman and his colleagues concluded that the an-swer to most of their questions about orchestras was“it depends”: on the individuals in the group, on thenature of the orchestra itself, and the social contextwhere the orchestra is located.

Interdisciplinary Orientation The multilevelperspective gives group dynamics an interdisciplin-ary character. For example, researchers who preferto study individuals may find themselves wonderingwhat impact group participation will have on indi-viduals’ cognitions, attitudes, and behavior. Thosewho study organizations may find that these largersocial entities actually depend on the dynamics ofsmall subgroups within the organization. Socialscientists examining such global issues as the devel-opment and maintenance of culture may find them-selves turning their attention toward small groups asthe unit of cultural transmission. Political scientistswho study national and international leaders may

Member

Organization OrganizationOrganization Organization

Community

Group Group GroupGroup

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Individuals

F I G U R E 1.6 A multilevel perspective on groups. Researchers who study groups recognize that individuals arenested in groups, but that these groups are themselves nested in larger social units, such as organizations, communi-ties, tribes, nations, and so on. Researchers may focus on one level in this multilevel system, such as the group itself,but they must be aware that these groups are embedded in a complex of other relationships.


discover that such leaders are centers of a small net-work of advisors, and that their political actions can-not be understood without taking into account thedynamics of these advisory councils. Although thelisting of disciplines that study group dynamics inTable 1.3 is far from comprehensive, it does conveythe idea that the study of groups is not limited toany one field. As A. Paul Hare and his colleaguesonce noted, “This field of research does not ‘belong’to any one of the recognized social sciences alone. Itis the common property of all” (Hare, Borgatta, &Bales, 1955, p. vi).

The Practicality of Group Dynamics

A multilevel perspective makes it clear that many ofthe most important aspects of human existence—

including individuals, organizations, communities,and cultures—cannot be fully understood withoutan understanding of groups. But, practically speak-ing, why study groups when one can investigatebrain structures, cultures, biological diseases, orga-nizations, ancient civilizations, or even other pla-nets? In the grand scheme of things, how importantis it to investigate groups?

Groups are relevant to many applied areas, asTable 1.3 shows. Much of the world’s work is doneby groups, so by understanding groups we move to-ward making them more efficient. The study ofgroups in the work setting has long occupiedbusiness-oriented researchers, who are concernedwith the effective organization of people (Anderson,De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2004; Sanna & Parks, 1997).Social workers have also found themselves dealing

T A B L E 1.3 The Interdisciplinary Nature of Group Dynamics: Examples of Topics Pertainingto Groups in Various Disciplines

Discipline Topics

Anthropology Groups in cross-cultural contexts; societal change; social and collective identities;evolutionary approaches to group living

Architecture and Design Planning spaces to maximize group-environment fit; design of spaces for groups,including offices, classrooms, venues, arenas, and so on

Business and Industry Work motivation; productivity in organizational settings; team building; goal setting;management and leadership

Communication Information transmission in groups; discussion; decision making; problems in commu-nication; networks

Criminal Justice Organization of law enforcement agencies; gangs and criminal groups; jury deliberations

Education Classroom groups; team teaching; class composition and educational outcomes

Engineering Design of human systems, including problem-solving teams; group approaches tosoftware design

Mental Health Therapeutic change through groups; sensitivity training; training groups; self-helpgroups; group psychotherapy

Political Science Leadership; intergroup and international relations; political influence; power

Psychology Personality and group behavior; problem solving; perceptions of other people; motiva-tion; conflict

Social Work Team approaches to treatment; community groups; family counseling; groups andadjustment

Sociology Self and society; influence of norms on behavior; role relations; deviance

Sports and Recreation Team performance; effects of victory and failure; cohesion and performance

22 CHAPTER 1

with such groups as social clubs, gangs, neighbor-hoods, and family clusters, and an awareness ofgroup processes helped crystallize their understand-ing of group life. Educators were also influenced bygroup research, as were many of the medical fieldsthat dealt with patients on a group basis. Manymethods of helping people to change rely on groupprinciples.

The application of group dynamics to practicalproblems is consistent with Lewin’s call for actionresearch. Lewin argued in favor of the intertwiningof basic and applied research, for he firmly believedthat there “is no hope of creating a better worldwithout a deeper scientific insight into the functionof leadership and culture, and of other essentials ofgroup life” (1943, p. 113). To achieve this goal, heassured practitioners that “there is nothing so prac-tical as a good theory” (1951, p. 169) and chargedresearchers with the task of developing theories thatcan be applied to important social problems (Bargal,2008).

Also, on a personal level, you spend your entirelife surrounded by and embedded in groups.Through membership in groups, you define andconfirm your values and beliefs and take on or refinea social identity. When you face uncertain situations,in groups you gain reassuring information aboutyour problems and security in companionship. Ingroups, you learn about relations with others, thetype of impressions you make on others, and theway you can relate with others more effectively.As Focus 1.4 explains, groups influence people inconsequential ways, so you ignore their influenceat your own risk.

Topics in Contemporary

Group Dynamics

Throughout the history of group dynamics, someapproaches that initially seemed promising have

been abandoned after they contributed relativelylittle or failed to stimulate consistent lines ofresearch. The idea of groupmind, for example,was discarded when researchers identified morelikely causes of crowd behavior. Similarly, suchconcepts as syntality (any effects that the grouphas as a functioning unit; Cattell, 1948), groupality(the personality of the group; Bogardus, 1954),and lifespace (all factors that define an individual’spsychological reality; Lewin, 1951) initially at-tracted considerable interest but stimulated littleresearch.

In contrast, researchers have studied other to-pics continuously since they were first broached(Berdahl & Henry, 2005; Forsyth & Burnette,2005). Table 1.4 samples the topics that currentlyinterest group experts and it foreshadows thetopics considered in the remainder of this book.Chapters 1 and 2 explore the foundations of thefield by reviewing the group dynamics perspective(Chapter 1) and the methods and theories of thefield (Chapter 2).

Chapters 3 through 6 focus on group forma-tion and development—how groups come intoexistence and how they change and evolve overtime. Chapters 3 and 4 consider the demands andopportunities of a life in a group rather thanalone, including the personal and situationalforces that prompt people to join groups or re-main apart from them. Chapter 5 focuses morefully on group development by considering thefactors that increase the unity of a group and theway those factors wax and wane as the groupchanges over time. Chapter 6 turns to the topicof group structure—how groups develop systemsof roles and intermember relationships—with aparticular focus on how structure emerges asgroups mature.

A group is a complex social system—a micro-cosm of powerful interpersonal forces that signifi-cantly shape members’ actions—and Chapters 7through 9 examine the flow of influence and inter-action in that microcosm. Chapter 7 looks at theway group members sometimes change their opi-nions, judgments, or actions so that they match theopinions, judgments, or actions of the rest of the

action research The term used by Kurt Lewin to de-scribe scientific inquiry that both expands basic theoreti-cal knowledge and identifies solutions to significant socialproblems.


T A B L E 1.4 Major Topics in the Field of Group Dynamics

Chapter and Topic Issues

Foundations

1. Introduction to group dynamics What are groups and what are their key features? What do we want to knowabout groups and their dynamics? What assumptions guide researchers in theirstudies of groups and the processes within groups?

2. Studying groups How do researchers measure the way groups, and the individuals in thosegroups, feel, think, and behave? How do researchers search for and test theirhypotheses about groups? What are the strengths and weaknesses of thevarious research strategies used to study groups? What general theoreticalperspectives guide researchers’ studies of groups and the people in them?

Formation and Development

3. Inclusion and identity Do humans, as a species, prefer inclusion to exclusion and group membership toisolation? What demands does a shift from individuality to collectivity make on

F o c u s 1.4 Are Groups Good or Bad?

Humans would do better without groups.—Christian J. Buys (1978a, p. 123)

For centuries, philosophers and scholars have debatedthe relative value of groups. Some have pointed outthat membership in groups is highly rewarding, for itcombines the pleasures of interpersonal relations withgoal strivings. Groups create relationships betweenpeople, and in many cases these connections are moreintimate, more enduring, and more sustaining thanconnections formed between friends or lovers. Groupsprovide their members with a sense of identity, sup-port, and guidance, and they are often the means ofacquiring knowledge, skills, and abilities. In groupspeople can reach goals that would elude them ifalone.

Groups have a downside, however. They are oftenthe arena for profound interpersonal conflicts that endin violence and aggression. Even though group mem-bers may cooperate with one another, they may alsoengage in competition as they strive to outdo one an-other. When individuals are members of very largegroups, such as crowds, they sometimes engage in be-haviors that they would never undertake if they wereacting individually. Many of the most misguided deci-sions have not been made by lone individuals but bygroups of people who, despite working together, stillmanaged to make a disastrous decision. Even thoughpeople tend to work together in groups, in many casesthese groups are far less productive than they should

be, given the talents and energies of the individuals inthem. Given these problems, psychologist and historianChristian Buys whimsically suggested that all groups beeliminated because “humans would do better withoutgroups” (1978a, p. 123).

Although Buys’s suggestion is a satirical one, itdoes make the point that groups are neither all goodnor all bad. Groups are so “beneficial, if not essential,to humans” that “it seems nonsensical to search foralternatives to human groups” (Buys, 1978b, p. 568),but groups can generate negative outcomes for theirmembers. Researchers, however, are more often drawnto studying negative rather than positive processes,with the result that theory and research in the fieldtend to stress conflict, rejection, dysfunction, and obe-dience to malevolent authorities and to neglect coop-eration, acceptance, well-being, and collaboration. Thisnegative bias, Buys suggested, has led to an unfair un-derestimation of the positive impact of groups onpeople.

Buys’s comments, by the way, have prompted anumber of rejoinders by other group researchers. Onegroup-authored response (Kravitz et al., 1978) sug-gested that Buys wrongly assigned responsibility forthe problems; its authors argued that humans woulddo better without other humans rather than withoutany groups. Another proposed that groups would dobetter without humans (Anderson, 1978), whereas athird simply argued that groups would do betterwithout social psychologists (Green & Mack, 1978).

24 CHAPTER 1

T A B L E 1.4 (Continued)


people? How do group experiences and memberships influence individuals’identities?

4. Formation Who joins groups and who remains apart? When and why do people seek outothers? Why do people deliberately create groups or join existing groups?What factors influence feelings of liking for others?

5. Cohesion and development What factors promote the increasing solidarity of a group over time? What iscohesion? As groups become more unified, do they develop a shared climateand culture? How do groups develop over time? What are the positive andnegative consequences of cohesion and commitment?

6. Structure What are norms, and how do they structure interactions in groups? What areroles? Which roles occur most frequently in groups? How and why do statusnetworks develop in groups? What factors influence the group’s socialstructure? What are the interpersonal consequences of relational networks(based on status, attraction, and communication) in groups?

Influence and Interaction

7. Influence When will people conform to a group’s standards, and when will they remainindependent? How do norms develop, and why do people obey them? Dononconformists ever succeed in influencing the rest of the group?

8. Power Why are some members of groups more powerful than others? What types ofpower tactics are most effective in influencing others? Does power corrupt?Why do people obey authorities?

9. Leadership What is leadership? If a group without a leader forms, which person willeventually step forward to become the leader? Should a leader be task focusedor relationship focused? Is democratic leadership superior to autocraticleadership? Can leaders transform their followers?

Working in Groups

10. Group performance Do people perform tasks more effectively in groups or when they are alone?Why do people sometimes expend so little effort when they are in groups?When does a group outperform an individual? Are groups creative?

11. Decision making What steps do groups take when making decisions? Why do some highlycohesive groups make disastrous decisions? Why do groups sometimes makeriskier decisions than individuals?

12. Teams What is the difference between a group and a team? What types of teams arecurrently in use? Does team building improve team work? How can leadersintervene to improve the performance of their teams?

Conflict

13. Conflict in groups What causes disputes between group members? When will a small disagree-ment escalate into a conflict? Why do groups sometimes splinter intosubgroups? How can disputes in groups be resolved?

14. Intergroup relations What causes disputes between groups? What changes take place as aconsequence of intergroup conflict? What factors exacerbate conflict? How canintergroup conflict be resolved?


group (conformity). Chapter 8 extends this topic byconsidering how group members make use of socialpower to influence others and how people respondto such influence. Chapter 9 considers issues ofleadership in groups.

Questions of group performance form thefocus on Chapters 10 through 12, for peoplework in groups across a range of contexts and set-tings. Chapter 10 examines basic questions of groupproductivity, including brainstorming, whereasChapter 11 examines groups that share informationto make decisions. We study processes and pro-blems in teams in Chapter 12.

Chapters 13 and 14 examine conflict and co-operation in groups. Groups are sources of stability

and support for members, but in some cases con-flicts erupt within groups (Chapter 13) and betweengroups (Chapter 14).

The final chapters deal with groups in specificsettings. All groups are embedded in a social andenvironmental context, and Chapter 15 considershow the context in which groups exist affects theirdynamics. Chapter 16 reviews groups in thera-peutic contexts—helping, supportive, and change-promoting groups. Chapter 17 concludes ouranalysis by considering groups in public, societalcontexts, including such relatively large groups asmobs, crowds, and social movements.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What is a group?

1. No two groups are identical to each other, buta group, by definition, is two or more indivi-duals who are connected by and within socialrelationships.

■ Groups vary in size from dyads and triadsto very large aggregations, such as mobsand audiences.

■ Group-based relations are memberships.■ Unlike networks, groups usually have

boundaries that define who is in the group.

2. Social identity, according to Tajfel and his col-leagues, is a sense of shared membership in agroup or category. People who meet regularlyvia computers display many of the definingcharacteristics of a group.



Contexts and Applications

15. Groups in context What impact does the social and physical setting have on an interacting group?Are groups territorial? What happens when groups are overcrowded? How dogroups cope with severe environments?

16. Groups and change How can groups be used to improve personal adjustment and health? What isthe difference between a therapy group and a support group? Are groupapproaches to treatment effective? Why do they work?

17. Crowds and collectivebehavior

What types of crowds are common? Why do crowds and collectives form? Dopeople lose their sense of self when they join crowds? When is a crowd likely tobecome unruly?

26 CHAPTER 1

What are some common characteristics of groups?

1. People in groups interact with one another.Bales’s Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) sys-tem distinguishes between relationship interactionand task interaction.

2. Groups seek goals, such as those specified inMcGrath’s circumplex model of group tasks (gen-erating, choosing, negotiating, and executing).

3. Groups create interdependence among the groupmembers (unilateral, reciprocal, etc.).

4. Interaction is patterned by group structure, in-cluding roles, norms, and interpersonal relations.

5. Group cohesion, or cohesiveness, determines theunity of the group. Entitativity is the extent towhich individuals perceive an aggregation to bea unified group.

■ The perception of entitativity, accordingto Campbell, is substantially influenced bycommon fate, similarity, and proximitycues within an aggregation.

■ The Thomas Theorem, applied to groups,suggests that if individuals think an aggre-gate is a true group then the group willhave important interpersonal consequencesfor those in the group and for those whoare observing it.

■ Groups that are high in entitativity areassumed to have a basic essence thatdefines the nature of their members(essentialism).

Are there different types of groups?

1. A number of different types of groups havebeen identified.

■ Primary groups are relatively small, person-ally meaningful groups that are highlyunified. Cooley suggested such groups areprimary agents of socialization.

■ Members of social groups, such as workgroups, clubs, and congregations, interact

with one another over an extended periodof time.

■ Collectives are relatively large aggregationsor groups of individuals who display simi-larities in actions and outlook.

■ Members of a category share some commonattribute or are related in some way.

2. Research conducted by Lickel, Hamilton,Sherman, and their colleagues suggests thatpeople spontaneously draw distinctions amongprimary groups, social groups, collectives, andmore general social categories.

What assumptions guide researchers in their studies ofgroups and the processes within groups?

1. Lewin first used the phrase group dynamics todescribe the powerful processes that take placein groups, but group dynamics also refers to the“field of inquiry dedicated to advancingknowledge about the nature of groups”(Cartwright and Zander, 1968, p. 7).

2. Early researchers and theorists who pioneeredthe study of groups include:

■ Le Bon, a physician best known for hisbook on the psychology of crowds andmobs, Psychologie des Foules.

■ Wundt, a psychologist who wroteVölkerpsychologie.

■ Durkheim, a sociologist who argued thatsociety is made possible by the collectiverepresentations of individuals.

■ Allport, a psychologist who avoided ho-listic approaches to groups.

3. A number of assumptions shape the field’sconceptual paradigm, including the following:

■ Groups are real. Early researchers disagreedabout the level of analysis to take whenstudying groups. Some, such as Allport,objected to such group-level concepts asthe groupmind and collective conscious.


■ Groups are more than the sum of their parts. Insome cases the characteristics of groupscannot be deduced from the individualmembers’ characteristics. Lewin’s field the-ory maintains that behavior is a function ofboth the person and the environment, ex-pressed by the formula B = ƒ(P, E).

■ Group processes are real. Research studies,such as Sherif’s study of norm formation,suggest that group-level processes can becreated through experimentation.

■ Groups are influential. Groups alter theirmembers’ attitudes, values, and percep-tions. Triplett’s early study of group per-formance demonstrated the impact of oneperson on another, and Milgram’s workdemonstrated that a group situation canpowerfully influence members to causeharm to others.

■ Groups shape society. Groups mediate theconnection between individuals andsociety-at-large.

■ Groups are living systems. Tuckman’s theoryof group development, for example, assumesthat over time most groups move throughthe five stages of forming, storming,norming, performing, and adjourning.

■ Groups can be studied on several levels.Individuals are nested in groups, and thesegroups are usually nested in larger socialaggregations, such as communities andorganizations. Hackman’s studies oforchestras illustrate the importance of amultilevel perspective that cuts across severallevels of analysis.

■ The field of group dynamics is an interdisci-plinary one.

What fields and what topics are included in the scientificstudy of group dynamics?

1. Understanding groups is the key to solving avariety of practical problems.

■ Many researchers carry out action research byusing scientific methods to identify solu-tions to practical problems.

■ Despite the many problems caused bygroups (competition, conflict, poor deci-sions), Buys notes that humans could notsurvive without groups.

2. Researchers have examined a wide variety ofgroup processes, including group development,structure, influence, power, performance, andconflict.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Introduction to Groups■ Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group

Processes, edited by Michael A. Hogg andScott Tindale (2001), includes 26 chaptersdealing with all aspects of small groupbehavior.

■ Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, edited byDorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (1968),is a classic in the scientific field of groups, withchapters dealing with such topics as groupmembership, conformity, power, leadership,and motivation.

■ “Elements of a Lay Theory of Groups: Typesof Groups, Relationship Styles, and thePerception of Group Entitavity,” by BrianLickel, David L. Hamilton, and StevenJ. Sherman (2001), describes a programmaticseries of investigations into the psychologicalbases of group typologies.

Group Dynamics: History and Issues■ A History of Social Psychology: From the

Eighteenth-Century Enlightenment to the SecondWorld War, by Gustav Jahoda (2007), is a fas-cinating history of the early emergence of social

28 CHAPTER 1

psychology in general and, group dynamics inparticular.

■ The Disappearance of the Social in AmericanSocial Psychology, by John D. Greenwood(2004), takes a controversial position byarguing that researchers too often overlooktruly social processes—particularly individualprocesses that are influenced by how one thinksother members of a social group wouldrespond.

■ The Psychology of Group Perception: PerceivedVariability, Entitativity, and Essentialism, editedby Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, andOlivier Corneille (2004), draws togetherthe work of expert researchers who are

investigating when and why groups are per-ceived to be real or only ephemeral.

Contemporary Group Dynamics■ “Learning More by Crossing Levels: Evidence

from Airplanes, Hospitals, and Orchestras,” byJ. Richard Hackman (2003), provides one lucidexample after another of the advantages of a mul-tilevel approach to understanding group behavior.

■ “Small-Group Research in Social Psychology:Topics and Trends over Time,” by GwenM. Wittenbaum and Richard L. Moreland(2008), takes a hard look at trends in groupresearch and offers recommendations for areasthat need further study.

Media ResourcesVisit the Group Dynamics companion website at www.cengage.com/psychology/forsyth to access onlineresources for your book, including quizzes, flash cards, web links, and more.


www.cengage.com/psychology/forsyth

2

Studying Groups

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

How can we learn more about groupsand their complex processes? Just asscientists use exacting procedures tostudy aspects of the physical and naturalenvironment, so do group researchersuse scientific methods to further theirunderstanding of groups. Throughresearch, theorists and researchers sepa-rate fact from fiction and truth frommyth.

■ What are the three criticalrequirements of a scientificapproach to the study of groups?

■ How do researchers measureindividual and group processes?

■ What are the key characteristics ofand differences between case,experimental, and correlationalstudies of group processes?

■ What are strengths and weak-nesses of case, experimental, andcorrelational methods?

■ What theoretical perspectivesguide researchers’ studies ofgroups?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Measurement in Group Dynamics

Observation

Self-Report Measures

Research Methods in Group Dynamics

Case Studies

Experimental Studies

Correlational Studies

Selecting a Research Method

Theoretical Perspectives in GroupDynamics

Motivational and EmotionalPerspectives

Behavioral Perspectives

Systems Theory Perspectives

Cognitive Perspectives

Biological Perspectives

Selecting a TheoreticalPerspective

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

30

✵

Everyone is interested in groups. Aristotle discussedgroups in detail, eventually concluding that humansare by nature group-seeking animals. Shakespeareworked groups into his plays, which are all themore interesting for their vivid accounts of theshifting dynamics of group and intergroup relations.Centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli consideredhow one should manage groups, particularly ifone aims to increase one’s power over the peoplein them. Ralph Waldo Emerson opined, “Thereneed be but one wise man in a company and allare wise, so a blockhead makes a blockhead of hiscompanions.” More recently Bono, lead singer forthe group U2, explained why most rock groupsbreak up: “It’s hard to keep relationships together”(CNN, 2005).

These historical and contemporary analyses ofgroups are insightful, but limited in one importantway: They are all conjectures based on personal opin-ion rather than scientific research. Are humans trulysocial creatures? Is the key to controlling people con-trolling their groups? What happens when an incom-petent person—one “bad apple”—joins a group?Why do groups that are initially unified eventuallyfall into disarray? Why do groups and their membersact, feel, and think the way they do? Without scien-tific analysis, we cannot be certain.

This chapter reviews three basic activities thatscience requires: measurement, research, and theo-rizing. As sociologist George Caspar Homansexplained, “When the test of the truth of a relation-ship lies finally in the data themselves” and “nature,however stretched out on the rack, still has a chanceto say ‘No!’—then the subject is a science” (1967,p. 4). Homans’s definition enjoins researchers to“stretch nature out on the rack” by systematicallymeasuring group phenomena and group processes.Scientists must also test “the truth of the relation-ship” by conducting research that yields the datathey need to understand the phenomenon that in-terests them. Emerson’s belief that “one bad applecan ruin the barrel” may apply to groups, but wecannot be sure until this hypothesis is put to the testempirically. But scientists do not just measure thingsand collect data through research. They also createconceptual frameworks to organize their findings.

Homans recognized that “nothing is more lostthan a loose fact” (1950, p. 5) and urged the devel-opment of theories that provide a “general form inwhich the results of observations of many particulargroups may be expressed” (p. 21).

MEASUREMENT IN GROUP

DYNAMICS

Science often begins with measurement. Biologistsmade dozens of discoveries when they perfected thecompound microscope, as did astronomers whenthey peered into the night sky with their telescopes.Researchers’ success in studying groups was alsotied, in large part, to their progress in measuringgroup members’ interpersonal actions and psycho-logical reactions. Here, we trace the growth andimpact of two important measurement methods—observing groups and questioning group members—that gave group dynamics a foothold in the scientifictradition.

Observation

Researchers who study groups often begin withobservation. No matter what the group that inter-ests them—temporary gatherings of people in publicplaces, teams in factories, gangs in the inner city,sports teams, families with only one parent, frater-nities, classrooms, performing orchestras, gamers onthe Internet, and so on—they often watch as thegroup members interact, perform their tasks, makedecisions, confront other groups, seek new mem-bers and expel old ones, accept direction from theirleaders, and so on. Researchers take various ap-proaches to observation, but the essence of themethod remains: watch and record the actions takenby group members.

William Foote Whyte (1943) used observationin his classic ethnography of street corner gangs in

observation A measurement method that involveswatching and recording individual and group actions.

STUDY ING GROUPS 31

Italian American sections of Boston. These groupswere composed of young men who joined togetherregularly, usually at a particular street corner in theirneighborhood. Whyte eventually moved into theneighborhood and joined one of the groups, theNortons, and also participated in a club known asthe Italian Community Club. Whyte observed andrecorded these groups for three and a half years,gradually developing a detailed portrait of this com-munity and its groups.

Whyte’s study underscored the strong link be-tween the individual members and the group, but italso illustrated some key features of observationalmeasures. He focused on observable actions andavoided making inferences about what group mem-bers were thinking or feeling if he had no directevidence of their inner states. He also focused hisobservations, for he realized that he could not recordevery behavior performed by every corner boy.Instead, he concentrated on communication, leader-ship, and attempts at gaining status. He also sampledacross time and settings (McGrath & Altermatt, 2001).

Whyte, like all researchers, made a series ofdecisions as he planned and conducted his study.He decided he would use observation as his basicassessment tool, but he did not use trained, objectiveobservers as some researchers do; he did the watchinghimself. He also decided to take part in the group’sactivities, and he revealed his identity to the groupmembers, who knew they were part of a study.Whyte also decided against quantifying his observa-tions. He did not count, time, or methodically trackthe Nortons’s actions. Instead, he described what heobserved in his own words and tried to record, ver-batim, the things that the Nortons had said. Thesedecisions shaped his study and its conclusions.

Covert and Overt Observation Whyte made noattempt to hide what he was doing from theNortons. Because he used overt observation helet the Nortons know that he was a student of

groups and would be studying their behavior for abook he was researching. Other researchers, in con-trast, prefer to use covert observation, wherebythey record the group’s activities without thegroup’s knowledge. Researchers interested in howgroups organize themselves by race and sex inschools sit quietly in the corner of the lunchroomand watch as students choose their seats. To studygatherings of people in a public park a researchermay set up a surveillance camera and recordwhere people congregate throughout the day. AsFocus 2.1 explains, covert observation of behaviorin public places raises few ethical issues, so long as itdoes not violate people’s right to privacy.

Participant Observation Some researchers ob-serve groups from a vantage point outside the group.A researcher may examine carefully videotapes oftherapy groups during a treatment session. Anotherresearcher, seated behind a special one-way mirror,may observe groups discussing issues. But someresearchers, like Whyte, use participant observa-tion: they watch and record the group’s activitiesand interactions while taking part in the group’ssocial process. Whyte went bowling with theNortons, gambled with Nortons, and even lentmoney to someof themembers. Heworked so closelywith the group that Doc, one of the key figures in theNortons, considered himself to be a collaborator inthe research project with Whyte, rather than one ofthe individuals being studied (Whyte, Greenwood, &Lazes, 1991). A diagram of the Norton’s structure,shown in Figure 2.1, includes a member named“Bill”; that would be Bill Whyte himself.

Whyte, as a participant observer, gained accessto information that would have been hiddenfrom an external observer. His techniques also gavehim a very detailed understanding of the gang.Unfortunately, his presence in the group may havechanged the group itself. As Doc remarked, “You’veslowed me down plenty since you’ve been down

overt observation Openly watching and recordinggroup behavior with no attempt to conceal one’s re-search purposes.

covert observation Watching and recording groupbehavior without the participants’ knowledge.participant observation Watching and recordinggroup behavior while taking part in the social process.

32 CHAPTER 2

here. Now, when I do something, I have to thinkwhat Bill Whyte would want to know about it andhow I can explain it. Before, I used to do things byinstinct” (Whyte, 1943, p. 301).

This tendency for individuals to act differentlywhen they know they are being observed is oftencalled the Hawthorne effect, after research con-ducted by Elton Mayo and his associates at theHawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company.

These researchers studied productivity in the work-place by systematically varying a number of featureswhile measuring the workers’ output. They movedone group of women to a separate room andmonitored their performance carefully. Next, theymanipulated features of the work situation, such as

F o c u s 2.1 Is It Ethical to Study Groups?

Primum non nocere. (First, do no harm.)—Galen, 1st century AD

Group researchers, given their commitment to learningall they can about people in groups, pry into matters thatother people might consider private, sensitive, or evencontroversial. Observers may watch groups—a sportsteam playing a rival, a class of elementary school childrenon the playground, a sales team reviewing ways to im-prove their productivity—without telling the groups thatthey are being observed. Researchers may deliberatelydisguise their identities so that they can join a group thatmight otherwise exclude them. Experimenters often ma-nipulate aspects of the groups they study to determinehow these manipulations change the group over time.Do researchers have the moral right to use these types ofmethods to study groups?

In most cases the methods that group researchersuse in their studies—watching groups, interviewingmembers, changing an aspect of the situation to seehow groups respond to these changes—raise few ethi-cal concerns. People are usually only too willing to takepart in studies, and investigators prefer to get groupmembers’ consent before proceeding. If they do watcha group without the members’ knowledge, it is usuallya group in a public setting where members have noexpectation of privacy or where their identities areconcealed. Group researchers strive to treat the sub-jects in their research with respect and fairness.

In some cases, however, researchers have collecteddata using methods that raise more complex issues ofethics and human rights. One investigator, for exam-ple, used participant observation methods in a study ofmen having sex with one another in a public restroom.

He did not reveal that he was a researcher until later,when he tracked them down at their homes (many ofthem were married) and asked them follow-up ques-tions (Humphreys, 1975). Other researchers, with thepermission of a U.S. district judge, made audio record-ings of juries’ deliberations without the jurors’ knowl-edge. When the tapes were played in public, an angryU.S. Congress passed legislation forbidding researchersfrom eavesdropping on juries (see Hans & Vidmar,1991). In other studies researchers have placed partici-pants in stressful situations, as when researchers stud-ied obedience in groups by arranging for an authorityto order participants to give an innocent victim painfulelectric shocks. The shocks were not real, but someparticipants were very upset by the experience(Milgram, 1963).

These studies are exceptional ones, and they wereconducted before review procedures were developedto protect participants. Present-day researchers mustnow submit their research plans to a group known asan Institutional Review Board, or IRB. The IRB, usingfederal guidelines that define what types of proce-dures should be used to minimize risk to participants,reviews each study’s procedures before permittingresearchers to proceed. In most cases researchers areexpected to give participants a brief but accuratedescription of their duties in the research before gain-ing their agreement to take part. Researchers also usemethods that minimize any possibility of harm andthey treat participants respectfully and fairly. Aninvestigator might not need to alert people that theyare being studied as they go about their ordinaryactivities in public places, but it is best to let an impar-tial group—the IRB—make that decision.

Hawthorne effect A change in behavior that occurs whenindividuals know they are being studied by researchers.

Institutional Review Board (IRB) A group, usuallylocated at a university or other research institution, thatis responsible for reviewing research procedures to makecertain that they are consistent with ethical guidelines forprotecting human participants.

STUDY ING GROUPS 33

the lighting in the room and the duration of rest per-iods. They were surprised when all the changes led toimproved worker output. Dim lights, for example,raised efficiency, but so did bright lights. Mayo andhis researchers concluded that the group memberswere working harder because they were being ob-served and because they felt that the company wastaking a special interest in them (Mayo, 1945;Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).

Reviews of the Hawthorne studies suggested thatother factors besides the scrutiny of the researchers con-tributed to the increased productivity of the groups.The Hawthorne groups worked in smaller teams,members could talk easily among themselves, and theirmanagers were usually less autocratic than those whoworked the main floor of the factory, and all thesevariables—and not observation alone—may have con-tributed to the performance gains. Nonetheless, theterm Hawthorne effect continues to be used to describeany change in behavior that occurs when people feelthey are being observed by others (see Bramel &Friend, 1981; Franke&Kaul, 1978;Olson et al., 2004).

Structuring Observations Whyte conducted aqualitative study of the Nortons. Like a fieldanthropologist studying a little-known culture, hetried to watch the Nortons without any preconcep-tions about what to look for, so that he would notunwittingly confirm his prior expectations. Nor didhe keep trackof the frequencies of any of the behaviorshe noted or try explicitly to quantify members’ reac-tions to the events that occurred in the group. Insteadhe watched, took notes, and reflected on what he sawbefore drawing general conclusions about the group.

Qualitative methods generate data, but the datadescribe general qualities and characteristics ratherthan precise quantities and amounts. Such data are of-ten textual rather than numeric, and may include ver-bal descriptions of group interactions developed bymultiple observers, interviews, responses to open-ended surveys questions, notes from conversationswith group members, or in-depth case descriptionsof one or more groups. Such qualitative observationalmethods require an impartial researcher who is a keenobserver of groups. If researchers are not careful toremain objective, they may let initial, implicit expecta-tions shape their records (Dollar & Merrigan, 2002;Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Albert Hastorf and Hadley Cantril’s (1954)classic “They Saw a Game” study demonstrated justsuch a bias by asking college students to watch a film

qualitative study A research procedure used to collectand analyze nonnumeric, unquantified types of data, suchas text, images, or objects.

34 CHAPTER 2

Text not available due to copyright restrictions

of two teams playing a football game. They selecteda game between Dartmouth and Princeton thatfeatured rough play and many penalties against bothteams. When Hastorf and Cantril asked Dartmouthand Princeton students to record the number andseverity of the infractions that had been committedby the two teams, the Princeton students were notvery accurate. Dartmouth students saw Princetoncommit about the same number of infractions asDartmouth. Princeton students, however, saw theDartmouth team commit more than twice as manyinfractions as the Princeton team. Apparently, thePrinceton observers’ preference for their own teamdistorted their perceptions.

Structured observational methods offer re-searchers a way to increase the objectivity of their ob-servations. Like biologists who classify living organismsunder such categories as phylum, subphylum, class, andorder, or psychologists who classify people into variouspersonality types, researchers who use a structured ob-servational method classify each group behavior intoan objectively definable category. First, they decidewhich behaviors to track. Then they develop unam-biguous descriptions of each type of behavior they willcode. Next, using these behavioral definitions as aguide, they note the occurrence and frequency of thesetargeted behaviors as they watch the group. This typeof research would be a quantitative study, because ityields numeric results (Weingart, 1997).

Robert Freed Bales developed two of the best-known structured coding systems for studying groups(Bales, 1950, 1970, 1980). As noted in Chapter 1,Bales spent many years watching group membersinteract with each other, and for many years he struc-tured his observations using the Interaction Process

Analysis, or IPA. Researchers who use the IPAclassify each behavior performed by a group memberinto one of the 12 categories shown in Figure 2.2.Six of these categories (1–3 and 10–12) pertain tosocioemotional, relationship interaction. As noted inChapter 1, these types of actions sustain or weakeninterpersonal ties within the group. Complimentinganother person is an example of a positive relation-ship behavior, whereas insulting a group member is anegative relationship behavior. The other six catego-ries (4–9) pertain to instrumental, task interaction, suchas giving and asking for information, opinions, andsuggestions related to the problem the group faces.Observers who use the IPA must be able to listen toa group discussion, break the content down intobehavioral units, and then classify each unit into oneof the 12 categories in Figure 2.2. If Crystal, for ex-ample, begins the group discussion by asking “Shouldwe introduce ourselves?” and Al answers, “Yes,”observers write “Crystal–Group” beside Category 8(Crystal asks for opinion from whole group) and“Al–Crystal” beside Category 5 (Al gives opinion toCrystal). If Rupert later angrily tells the entire group,“This group is a boring waste of time,” the coderswrite “Rupert–Group” beside Category 12 (Rupertshows antagonism towards entire group).

Bales improved the system over the years. Hisnewer version, which generates more global sum-maries of group behavior, is called the SystematicMultiple Level Observation of Groups, orSYMLOG. SYMLOG coders use 26 differentcategories instead of only 12, with these categoriessignaling members’ dominance–submissiveness,friendliness–unfriendliness, and accepting–opposingthe task orientation of established authority (Hare,2005). When a group begins discussing a problem,for example, most behaviors may be concentratedin the dominant, friendly, and accepting authoritycategories. But if the group argues, then scores in

structured observational method A research proce-dure that classifies (codes) group members’ actions intodefined categories.quantitative study A research procedure used to collectand analyze data in a numeric form, such as frequencies,proportions, or amounts.Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) A structured cod-ing systemdeveloped byRobert Bales used to classify groupbehavior into task-oriented and relationship-orientedcategories.

Systematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups(SYMLOG) A theoretical and structured coding systemdeveloped by Robert Bales which assumes that groupactivities can be classified along three dimensions: domi-nance versus submissiveness, friendliness versus unfriend-liness, and acceptance of versus opposition to authority.

STUDY ING GROUPS 35

the unfriendly, opposing authority categories maybegin to climb. Chapter 5 uses SYMLOG todescribe changes in relationships among groupmembers that occur over time.

Reliability and Validity of ObservationsStructured observation systems, because they canbe used to record the number of times a particulartype of behavior has occurred, make possible com-parison across categories, group members, andeven different groups. Moreover, if observers arecarefully trained, structured coding system such

as IPA and SYMLOG will yield data that areboth reliable and valid. Reliability is determinedby a measure’s consistency across time, compo-nents, and raters. If a rater, when she hears thestatement, “This group is a boring waste oftime,” always classifies it as a Category 12 behav-ior, then the rating is reliable. The measure has

Shows solidarity, raises other’s status,gives help, reward

SOCIAL-EMOTIONALAREA:

POSITIVEREACTIONS

TASK AREA:ATTEMPTEDANSWERS

TASK AREA:QUESTIONS

SOCIAL-EMOTIONALAREA:

NEGATIVEREACTIONS

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Shows tension release, jokes, laughs,shows satisfaction

Agrees, shows passive acceptance,understands, concurs, complies

Gives suggestion, direction,implying autonomy for other

Gives opinion, evaluation, analysis,expresses feeling, wish

Gives orientation, information,repeats, clarifies, confirms

Asks for orientation, information,repetition, confirmation

Asks for opinion, evaluation,analysis, expression of feeling

Asks for suggestion, direction,possible ways of action

Disagrees, shows passive rejection,formality, withholds help

Shows tension, asks for help,withdraws out of field

Shows antagonism, deflates other’s status,defends or asserts self

a b d e fc

F I G U R E 2.2 Robert F. Bales’s original Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) coding system for structuring observa-tions of groups. Areas A (1–3) and D (10–12) are used to code socioemotional, relationship interactions. Areas B (4–6)and C (7–9) are used to code task interaction. The lines to the right (labeled a–f) indicate problems of orientation (a),evaluation (b), control (c), decision (d), tension-management (e), and integration (f).

SOURCE: Adapted from Personality and Interpersonal Behavior by Robert Freed Bales. Copyright 1970 by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.

Reliability The degree to which a measurement tech-nique consistently yields the same conclusion at differenttimes. For measurement techniques with two or morecomponents, reliablility is also the degree to which thesevarious components all yield similar conclusions.

36 CHAPTER 2

interrater reliability if different raters, working inde-pendently, all think that the statement belongs inCategory 12. (Researchers once had to arrange forteams of observers to watch the groups they stud-ied, but now they usually videotape the groups forlater analysis.) Validity describes the extent towhich the technique measures what it is supposedto measure. The IPA, for example, is valid only ifobservers’ ratings actually measure the amount ofrelationship and task interaction in the group.If the observers are incorrect in their coding, orif the categories are not accurate indicators ofrelationship and task interaction, the scores arenot valid (Bakeman, 2000).

Given the greater reliability and validity of struc-tured observations, why didWhyte take a qualitative,unstructured approach? Whyte was more interestedin gaining an understanding of the entire communityand its citizenry, so a structured coding system’s focuson specific behaviors would have yielded an undulynarrow analysis. At the time he conducted his study,Whyte did not know which behaviors he shouldscrutinize if he wanted to understand the group.Whyte was also unfamiliar with the groups he stud-ied, so he chose to immerse himself in fieldwork. Hisresearch was more exploratory, designed to developtheory first and validate hypotheses second, so he usedan unstructured observational approach. If he hadbeen testing a hypothesis bymeasuring specific aspectsof a group, then the rigor and objectivity of a struc-tured approach would have been preferable.Qualitative methods, in general, “provide a richer,more varied pool of information” than quantitativeones (King, 2004, p. 175).

Self-Report Measures

Whyte did not just watch Doc, Mike, Danny, andthe others as they interacted with one another andwith others in the community. Time and again,Whyte supplemented his observations by question-ing the group members. Whenever he was curious

about their thoughts, perceptions, and emotions, hewould ask them, as indirectly as possible, to describetheir reactions: “Now and then, when I was con-cerned with a particular problem and felt I neededmore information from a certain individual . . . Iwould seek an opportunity to get the man aloneand carry on a more formal interview” (Whyte,1955, pp. 303–304).

Self-report measures, despite their variations,are all based on a simple premise: if you want toknow what a group member is thinking, feeling, orplanning, then just ask him or her to report thatinformation to you directly. In interviews the re-searcher records the respondent’s answer to variousquestions, but questionnaires ask respondents to re-cord their answers themselves. Some variables, suchas members’ beliefs about their group’s cohesivenessor their perceptions of the group’s leader, may be socomplex that researchers need to ask a series of in-terrelated questions. When the items are selectedand pretested for accuracy, a multi-item measureis usually termed a test or a scale.

Sociometry Jacob Moreno (1934), a pioneer inthe field of group dynamics, used self-report meth-ods to study the social organization of groups ofyoung women living in adjacent cottages at an insti-tution. The women were neighbors, but they werenot very neighborly. Discipline problems were ram-pant, and disputes continually arose among thegroups and among members of the same groupwho were sharing a cottage. Moreno believed thatthe tensions would abate if he could regroup thewomen into more compatible clusters and put thegreatest physical distance between hostile groups. Sohe asked the women to identify five women whomthey liked the most on a confidential questionnaire.Moreno then used these responses to construct moreharmonious groups, and his efforts were rewardedwhen the overall level of antagonism in the commu-nity declined (Hare & Hare, 1996).

validity The degree to which a measurement methodassesses what it was designed to measure.

self-report measure An assessment method, such as aquestionnaire, test, or interview, that ask respondents todescribe their feelings, attitudes, or beliefs.

STUDY ING GROUPS 37

Moreno called this technique for measuring therelations between group members sociometry. Aresearcher begins a sociometric study by asking groupmembers one or more questions about the othermembers. Tomeasure attraction, the researchermightask, “Whomdo you likemost in this group?” but suchquestions as “Whom in the group would you like towork with the most?” or “Whom do you like theleast?” can also be used. Researchers often limit thenumber of choices that participants can make. Thesechoices are then organized in a sociogram, which is adiagram of the relationships among group members.As Figure 2.3 illustrates, each group member is repre-sented by a circle, and arrows are used to indicate wholikes whom. The researcher can organize the groupmembers’ responses into a more meaningful pattern,say, by putting individuals who are frequently chosenby others at the center of the diagram, and the leastfrequently chosen people could be placed about theperiphery. Sociometric data can also be examinedusing more elaborate statistical methods, such as pathdiagrams, factor plots, and cluster analysis (Brandes etal., 1999; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Computer pro-grams suchasNetdraw(Borgatti, 2002b), Sociometrics(Walsh, 2003), and KrackPlot (Krackhardt, 2003) cangenerate mathematically accurate sociograms.

A sociogram yields information about individualmembers, relationships between pairs of members,and the group’s overall structure. Depending ontheir place in the group’s sociogram, and the numberof times they are chosen by others, members can becompared and contrasted:

■ populars, or stars, are well-liked, very populargroup members with a high choice status: theyare picked by many other group members

■ unpopulars, or rejected members, are identifiedas disliked by many members and so theirchoice status is low

■ isolates, or loners, are infrequently chosen byany group members

■ positives, or sociables, select many others as theirfriends

■ negatives select few others as their friends■ pairs are two people who choose each other,

and so have reciprocal bonds■ clusters are individuals within the group who

make up a subgroup, or clique

Sociograms also yield group-level social networkinformation (Borgatti, 2002a). As Chapter 6 explains,highly cohesive groups contain a substantial proportionof mutual pairs and very few isolates. Centralizedgroups are ones where a relatively small number ofpeople are liked by many others in the group, butdecentralized groups have no sociometric stars.Schismatic groups are ones with two or more sub-groups with few cross-subgroup ties. Sociograms thusprovide the means to identify cliques, schisms, hierar-chies, and other relational regularities and oddities.

Reliability and Validity of Self-Report Meas-ures Self-report methods, such as sociometry, haveboth weaknesses and strengths. They depend verymuch on knowing what questions to ask the groupmembers. A maze of technical questions alsoconfronts researchers designing questionnaires. Ifrespondents do not answer the questions consis-tently—if, for example, Jos indicates that he likesGerard themost onMonday but on Tuesday changeshis choice to Claire—then the responses will be un-reliable. Also, if questions are not worded properly,the instrument will lack validity, because the respon-dents may misinterpret what is being asked. Validityis also a problem if group members are unwilling todisclose their personal attitudes, feelings, and percep-tions or are unaware of these internal processes.

Despite these limitations, self-report methodsprovide much information about group phenom-ena, but from the perspective of the participantrather than the observer. When researchers are

sociometry A research technique developed by JacobMoreno that graphically and mathematically summarizespatterns of intermember relations.sociogram A graphic representation of the patterns ofintermember relations created through sociometry. Inmost cases each member of the group is depicted by asymbol, such as a lettered circle or square, and the typesof relations among members (e.g., communication links,friendship pairings) are depicted with capped lines.

38 CHAPTER 2

88

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Group A Group B

Group C Group D

F I G U R E 2.3 Examples of sociograms. Sociograms chart group structure by identifying relationships among themembers. Group A is a centralized group, but B is relatively decentralized. Group C has a number of subgroups thatare not well-linked, and Group D is relatively disorganized.

STUDY ING GROUPS 39

primarily interested in personal processes, such asperceptions, feelings, and beliefs, self-reportmethods may be the only means of assessing theseprivate processes. But if participants are biased,their self-reports may not be as accurate as wewould like. Self-reports may also not be accurateindicators of group-level processes, such as cohe-siveness or conflict (See Focus 2.2).

RESEARCH METHODS IN

GROUP DYNAMICS

Good measurement alone does not guarantee goodscience. Researchers who watch groups and askgroup members questions can develop a detaileddescription of a group, but they must go beyond de-scription if they are to explain groups. Once research-ers have collected their data, they must use thatinformation to test hypotheses about group phe-nomena. They use many techniques to check theadequacy of their suppositions about groups, butthe three most common approaches are (1) case stud-ies, (2) experimental studies that manipulate one ormore aspects of the group situation, and (3) correla-tional studies of the naturally occurring relationshipsbetween various aspects of groups.

Case Studies

Irving Janis (1972) was puzzled. He had studied awide variety of groups in many contexts, but whenhis daughter asked him why U.S. President JohnF. Kennedy’s advisors encouraged him to supportan invasion of Cuba he had no answer. The mem-bers of this group were the top political minds inthe country, and they had reviewed their recom-mendation carefully, yet it was a decidedly mistakenone. What caused this group to perform so far be-low its potential?

Janis decided to study this group in detail. Relyingon historical documents, minutes of meetings, diaries,letters, and group members’ memoirs and publicstatements, he analyzed the group’s structure, itscommunication processes, and its leadership. He also

expanded his study to include other groups that madedisastrous errors, including the military personnelresponsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor before itsattack inWorldWar II and advisors who urged greaterU.S. involvement in Vietnam. His analyses led him toconclude that these groups suffered from the sameproblem. Over time they had become so unifiedthat members felt as though they could not disagreewith the group’s decisions, and so they failed to exam-ine their assumptions carefully. Janis labeled this loss ofrationality caused by strong pressures to conformgroupthink. Chapter 11 examines Janis’s theory inmore detail.

Conducting a Case Study One of the best waysto understand groups in general is to understandone group in particular. This approach has a longand venerable tradition in all the sciences, withsome of the greatest advances in thinking comingfrom the case study—an in-depth examinationof one or more groups. If the groups have notyet disbanded, the researcher may decide to ob-serve them directly, but in many cases they cullfacts about the group from interviews withmembers, descriptions of the group written byjournalists, or members’ biographical writings.Researchers then relate this information back tothe variables that interest them and therebyestimate the extent to which the examined casesupports their hypotheses (Cahill, Fine, & Grant,1995; Yin, 2009).

Researchers have conducted case studies of allsorts of groups: adolescent peer groups (Adler &Adler, 1995), artist circles (Farrell, 2001), crisis inter-vention teams in psychiatric hospitals (Murphy &Keating, 1995), cults (Festinger, Riecken, & Schach-ter, 1956), drug-dealing gangs (Venkatesh, 2008),families coping with an alcoholic member(Carvalho & Brito, 1995), focus groups (Seal,

groupthink A strong concurrence-seeking tendencythat interferes with effective group decision making,identified by Irving Janis.case study A research technique that involves examin-ing, in as much detail as possible, the dynamics of a singlegroup or individual.

40 CHAPTER 2

Bogart, & Ehrhardt, 1998), government leaders atinternational summits (Hare & Naveh, 1986), indus-trialists and inventors (Uglow, 2002), Little Leaguebaseball teams (Fine, 1987), mountain climbers(Kayes, 2006), naval personnel living in an undersea

habitat (Radloff & Helmreich, 1968), presidentialadvisors (Goodwin, 2005), religious communes(Stones, 1982), rock-and-roll bands (Bennett, 1980),fans of rock-and-roll bands (Adams, 1998), search-and-rescue squads (Lois, 2003), sororities (Robbins, 2004),

F o c u s 2.2 Is Drinking a Group-Level Phenomenon?

Bars and parties are conceptually nested within largercommunity subsystems and represent the actualdrinking situations and environments in which studentsdrink and experience alcohol-related problems.

—John D. Clapp and colleagues (2007, p. 427)

Most people drink alcohol collectively. College stu-dents, for example, sometimes drink alone in theirdorms or apartments, but in most cases groups are thecontext for drinking. In fact, in the course of an even-ing, students often drink in one group after another.Early in the evening they “pregame” in dyads or othersmall groups. They then continue drinking in largergroups—in bars, at parties in private homes, or frater-nity and sorority organizations located near campus.

Parties are difficult to study. Asking people aboutthe party they attended the night before would likelyyield invalid data, as they may not remember the de-tails and they may edit their reports to avoid embar-rassment. So when John Clapp decided to study thisunique type of group, he assembled a team of obser-vers and interviewers and trained them to enter partiesand collect data. Every Thursday, Friday, and Saturdaynight the teams would patrol the area around campus,looking for parties. Some nights they found only 2 or 3,but on others as many as 20; the average number ofparties was 7. The team then chose, at random, fourparties to study that evening. If the hosts agreed totake part in the study—and most did—then seven-person crews, carrying notebooks and clip boards andwearing “College Drinking Survey” sweatshirts, en-tered the party and recorded such variables as numberof guests rowdiness, loudness of the music, kind offood available, type of alcohol and drugs being used(e.g., beer, mixed drinks, shots, marijuana), and thedistribution of people in the physical location. Clapp’steam did not interfere with the natural progression ofthe party, but they did administer short questionnairesto partygoers and checked their Breath AlcoholConcentrations, or BrAC, as they entered the party andagain when they left. They also arranged for rides fordrunken partygoers who needed to get home. The

team included a security person who remained outsidethe party in case problems occurred (Clappet al., 2007, 2008).

Some 224 parties later the researchers concludedthat group-level factors played a major role in deter-mining people’s BrAC. When alcohol consumption wasthe party’s primary activity, participants had higherBrACs, particularly if they thought that others weredrinking excessively. If the party’s primary activity wassocializing among the guests, then participants drankless. Parties where the students played drinking gamesalso yielded more intoxicated guests, as did partieswhere people were costumed (e.g., theme parties andHalloween parties). Women, in particular, had higherBrACs levels at theme parties compared to men.Students’ intoxication levels dropped as the parties in-creased in size, disconfirming the idea that the studentsbecome more uninhibited in large groups. This effecthowever, may have been due to the logistics of gainingaccess to alcohol rather than inhibition. The larger theparty, the longer it took students to get a drink.

Clapp and his colleagues, by combining varioustypes of data, succeeded in shedding light on oneof the most dynamic of groups—the college party—and their findings suggest ways to minimize the healthrisks of these groups. Excessive drinking causes thou-sands of injuries and deaths among students each year.Physical and sexual assault are associated with alcohol,and the tendency for students to binge on weekendsmay lead, over time, to alcoholism. Curtailing alcoholconsumption is therefore a beneficial goal and can beaccomplished through relatively simple alterations ofgroup goals and norms. To shift the group’s goals tofocus on socializing rather than drinking per se, hostsshould discourage drinking games and avoid themeparties with costumed partygoers. Because people alsodrink more to keep pace with others’ degree of intoxi-cation, hosts should not make it too easy for theirguests to drink excessively. Banning shots and kegs,providing food, and encouraging social interaction area few ways to increase the social value of the event andminimize the harm done by drinking too much alcohol.

S TUDY ING GROUPS 41

sports fans (St. John, 2004), support groups (Turner,2000), the Supreme Court (Toobin, 2007), and, ofcourse, advisory groups making critically importantdecisions pertaining to national policy and defense(Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Janis, 1972). Althoughonce considered to be questionable in terms of scien-tific value, case studies that are carried out with care andobjectivity are now widely recognized as indispensibletools for understanding group processes (Yin, 2009).

Advantages and Disadvantages All research de-signs offer both advantages and disadvantages, andcase studies are no exception. By focusing on a lim-ited number of cases, researchers often providerichly detailed qualitative descriptions of naturallyoccurring groups. If the groups have disbandedand researchers are relying on archival data, theyneed not be concerned that their research will sub-stantially disrupt or alter naturally occurring groupprocesses. Case studies also tend to focus on bonafide groups that are found in everyday, naturalcontexts. Unlike groups that are concocted by re-searchers in the laboratory for a brief period of timeand then disbanded, bona fide groups are embed-ded in a natural context. Whyte, for example, stud-ied bona fide groups, for the corner gangs existedon the streets of Boston long before he startedwatching them, and they continued on long afterhe finished his observations. Families, gangs, workteams, support groups, and cults are just a few of themany naturally occurring groups that researchershave studied by going into the field, locating thesegroups, and then collecting information about themby observing their members’ activities (Frey, 2003).

These advantages are offset by limitations.Researchers who use the case study method mustbear in mind that the group studied may be unique,and so its dynamics say little about other groups’dynamics. Also, researchers rarely use quantitativemeasures of group processes when conducting casestudies, so their interpretations can be influenced by

their own assumptions and biases. In addition, theessential records and artifacts may be inaccurate orunavailable to the researcher. Janis, for example,was forced to “rely mainly on the contemporaryand retrospective accounts by the group membersthemselves . . . many of which are likely to havebeen written with an eye to the author’s own placein history” (1972, p. v). In the case of the Bay ofPigs, when many key documents were eventuallydeclassified they suggested that the group did notexperience groupthink, but instead was misled delib-erately by some of the group members (Kramer,2008). Finally, case studies only imply but rarely es-tablish causal relationships among important variablesin the group under study. Janis believed that group-think was causing the poor decisions in the groupshe studied, but actually some other unnoticed factorcould have been the prime causal agent.

Experimental Studies

Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph Whitestarted with one basic question: Are people moreproductive and more satisfied when working for ademocratic, group-centered leader rather than anautocratic, self-centered leader? To find an answerthey arranged for 10- and 11-year-old boys to meetafter school in five-member groups to work onhobbies such as woodworking and painting. Anadult led each group by adopting one of three stylesof leadership: autocratic, democratic, or laissez-faire.The autocratic leader made all the decisions for thegroup; the democratic leader let the boys themselvesmake their own decisions; and the laissez-faire leadergave the group members very little guidance(Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939; White, 1990;White & Lippitt, 1968).

The researchers observed the groups as theyworked with each type of leader and measuredgroup productivity and aggressiveness. When theyreviewed their findings, they discovered that theautocratic groups spent more time working (74%)than the democratic groups (50%), which in turnspent more time working than the laissez-fairegroups (33%). Although these results argued infavor of the efficiency of an autocratic leadership

bona fide group A naturally occurring group (particu-larly when compared to an ad hoc group created by aresearcher in a laboratory study), such as an audience,board of directors, club, or team.

42 CHAPTER 2

style, the observers also noted that when the leaderleft the room for any length of time, the democrat-ically led groups kept right on working, whereasthe boys in the autocratic groups stopped working.Lewin, Lippitt, and White also noted high rates ofhostility in the autocratically led groups, as well asmore demands for attention, more destructiveness,and a greater tendency to single out one groupmember to serve as the target of almost continualverbal abuse. The researchers believed that thistarget for criticism and hostility, or scapegoat,provided members with an outlet for pent-up hos-tilities that could not be acted out against the pow-erful group leader.

Conducting Experiments Lewin, Lippitt, andWhite’s study of leadership styles possesses thethree key features of an experiment. First, theresearchers identified a variable that they believedcaused changes in group processes and then sys-tematically manipulated it. They manipulated thisindependent variable by giving groups differenttypes of leaders (autocratic, democratic, or laissez-faire). Second, the researchers assessed the effects ofthe independent variable by measuring such factors asproductivity and aggressiveness. The variables thatresearchers measure are called dependent variables,because their magnitude depends on the strength andnature of the independent variable. Lewin, Lippitt,and White hypothesized that group leadership stylewould influence productivity and aggressiveness,so they tested this hypothesis by manipulating the

independent variable (leadership style) and mea-suring the dependent variables (productivity andaggressiveness).

Third, the experimenters tried to maintaincontrol over other variables. The researchers neverassumed that the only determinant of productivityand aggressiveness was leadership style; they knewthat other variables, such as the personality charac-teristics and abilities of the group members, couldinfluence the dependent variables. In the experi-ment, however, the researchers were not interestedin these other variables. They therefore made cer-tain that these other variables were controlled in theexperimental situation. For example, they tookpains to ensure that the groups they created were“roughly equated on patterns of interpersonal rela-tionships, intellectual, physical, and socioeconomicstatus, and personality characteristics” (White &Lippitt, 1968, p. 318). Because no two groupswere identical, these variations could have resultedin some groups working harder than others. Theresearchers used random assignment of groups toeven out these initial inequalities. Thus, they hopedthat any differences found on the dependent mea-sure would be due to the independent variablerather than to uncontrolled differences among theparticipating groups.

In sum, when researchers conduct experimentsthey manipulate one or more independent variables,assess systematically one or more dependent vari-ables, and control other possible contaminating vari-ables. When the experiment is properly designedand conducted, researchers can assume that any dif-ferences among the conditions on the dependentvariables are produced by the independent variablethat is manipulated, and not by some other variableoutside their control.

Advantages and Disadvantages Why do re-searchers so frequently rely on experimentation totest their hypotheses about groups? This preferencederives, in part, from the inferential power of ex-perimentation. Researchers who design theirexperiments carefully can make inferences aboutthe causal relationships linking variables. If the in-vestigators keep all variables constant except for the

scapegoat An individual or group who is unfairly heldresponsible for a negative event and outcome; the inno-cent target of interpersonal hostility.experiment A research design in which the investigatormanipulates at least one variable by randomly assigningparticipants to two or more different conditions andmeasuring at least one other variable.independent variable Those aspects of the situationmanipulated by the researcher in an experimental study;the causal variable in a cause–effect relationship.dependent variable The responses of the participantmeasured by the researcher; the effect variable in acause–effect relationship.

STUDY ING GROUPS 43

independent variable, and the dependent variablechanges, then they can cautiously conclude thatthe independent variable caused the dependent var-iable to change. Experiments, if properly con-ducted, can therefore be used to detect causal rela-tionships between variables (Hoyle, 2005).

Experiments offer an excellent means of testinghypotheses about the causes of group behavior, butthey are not without their logistical, methodolo-gical, and ethical problems. Researchers cannotalways control the situation sufficiently to manipu-late the independent variable or to keep other vari-ables constant. Moreover, to maintain control overthe conditions of an experiment, researchers mayend up studying closely monitored but artificialgroup situations. Experimenters often work in lab-oratories with ad hoc groups that are created just forthe purpose of research, and these groups may differin important ways from bona fide groups. Althoughan experimenter can heighten the impact of thesituation by withholding information about thestudy, such deception can be challenged on ethicalgrounds. Of course, experiments can be conductedin the field using already existing groups, but theywill almost necessarily involve the sacrifice of somedegree of control and will reduce the strength ofthe researchers’ conclusions. Hence, the majoradvantage of experimentation—the ability todraw causal inferences—can be offset by the majordisadvantage of experimentation—basing conclu-sions on contrived situations that say little aboutthe behavior of groups in more naturalistic set-tings. (These issues are discussed in more detailby Anderson & Bushman, 1997 and Driskell &Salas, 1992.)

Correlational Studies

The students who attended Bennington College inthe 1930s were changed by the experience—notjust intellectually but politically. When they firstentered school most of them were conservative,but by the time they graduated they had shiftedto become more liberal. In fact, in 1936 fully 62%of the first-year class preferred the Republican pres-idential candidate. But only 15% of the juniors and

seniors endorsed the Republican candidate, evi-dence of a profound shift in political beliefs.

Theodore Newcomb (1943), a faculty mem-ber at Bennington College in the mid-1930s, be-lieved that the first-year students were changingtheir group allegiances to match the prevailingpolitics of Bennington. The younger studentswere, in effect, accepting seniors as their refer-ence group, which is a group that provides indi-viduals with guidelines or standards for evaluatingthemselves, their attitudes, and their beliefs(Hyman, 1942). Any group that plays a significantrole in one’s life, such as a family, a friendshipclique, colleagues at work, or even a group oneadmires but is not a member of, can function asa reference group (Singer, 1990). When studentsfirst enrolled at Bennington, their families servedas their reference group, so their attitudes matchedtheir families’ attitudes. The longer students re-mained at Bennington, however, the more theirattitudes changed to match the attitudes of theirnew reference group—the rest of the college pop-ulation. Their families had conservative attitudes,but the college community supported mainly lib-eral attitudes, and Newcomb hypothesized thatmany Bennington students shifted their attitudesin response to this reference-group pressure.

Newcomb tested this hypothesis by adminis-tering questionnaires and interviews to an entireclass of Bennington students from their entrancein 1935 to their graduation in 1939. He found aconsistent trend toward liberalism in many of thestudents and reasoned that this change resultedfrom peer-group pressure because it was morepronounced among the popular students. Thosewho endorsed liberal attitudes were (1) “both capa-ble and desirous of cordial relations with the fellowcommunity members” (Newcomb, 1943, p. 149),(2) more frequently chosen by others as friendly,

reference group A group or collective that individualsuse as a standard or frame of reference when selectingand appraising their abilities, attitudes, or beliefs; includesgroups that individuals identify with and admire and cat-egories of noninteracting individuals.

44 CHAPTER 2

and (3) a more cohesive subgroup than the conserva-tive students. Individuals who did not become moreliberal were less involved in the college’s social life, orthey were very family-oriented. These referencegroups changed the students permanently, for the stu-dents who shifted were still liberals when Newcombmeasured their political beliefs some 25 years later(Newcomb et al., 1967).

Conducting Correlational Studies Newcomb’sBennington study was a nonexperimental, correla-tional study; he examined the naturally occurringrelationships among several variables without mani-pulating any of them. Newcomb believed, for exam-ple, that as students came to identify more closelywith other students, their attitudes and values changedto match those of their peers. Therefore, he assessedstudents’ popularity, their dependence on their fami-lies, and changes in their political attitudes. Then heexamined the relationships among these variables bycarrying out several statistical tests. At no point did hetry to manipulate the group situation.

Correlational studies are so named because, atleast initially, researchers indexed the strength anddirection of the relationships among the variablesthey measured by calculating correlation coeffi-cients. A correlation coefficient, abbreviated as r,can range from −1 to +1, with the distance fromzero (0), the neutral point, indicating the strengthof the relationship. If Newcomb had found that thecorrelation between students’ popularity and liberalattitudes was close to 0, for example, he would haveconcluded that the two variables were unrelated toeach other. If the correlation was significantly dif-ferent from 0—in either a positive or a negativedirection—his study would have shown that these

two variables were related to each other. The signof the correlation (− or +) indicates the direction ofthe relationship. If, for example, the correlationbetween popularity and liberal attitudes was +.68,this positive correlation would indicate that bothvariables increased or decreased together: themore popular the student, the more liberal her atti-tude. A negative correlation, such as −.57, wouldindicate that the variables were inversely related:More popular students would tend to have less lib-eral attitudes. Thus, a correlation is a handy way ofsummarizing a great deal of information about therelationship between two variables. Researchers donot always analyze their data by computing correla-tions, but the term correlational study continues to beused to describe studies that measure variables ratherthan manipulating them.

Advantages and Disadvantages Researchers usecorrelational designs whenever they wish to knowmore about the relationship between variables. Aregroup leaders usually older than their followers? Dogroups become more centralized as they growlarger? Do people who are more committed to theirgroup tend to express attitudes that match theirgroup’s position? These are all questions that re-searchers might ask concerning the relationship be-tween variables. When coupled with valid measures,correlational studies clearly describe these relation-ships without disrupting or manipulating any aspectof the group.

Correlational studies, however, yield onlylimited information about the causal relationshipbetween variables, because the researcher does notdirectly manipulate any variables. Newcomb’s data,for example, indicated that the attitude changes hemeasured were related to reference-group pressures,but he could not rule out other possible causes.Perhaps, unknown to Newcomb, the most popularstudents on campus all read the same books, whichcontained arguments that persuaded them to give uptheir conservative attitudes. Newcomb also couldnot be certain about the direction of the relationshiphe documented. He believed that individuals whojoined the liberal reference group became more lib-eral themselves, but the causal relationship may have

correlational study A research design in which the in-vestigator measures (but does not manipulate) at least twovariables and then uses statistical procedures to examinethe strength and direction of the relationship betweenthese variables.correlation coefficient A statistic that measures thestrength and direction of a relationship between twovariables. Often symbolized by r, correlations can rangefrom −1 to +1.

STUDY ING GROUPS 45

been just the opposite: People who expressed moreliberal attitudes may have been asked to join moreliberal reference groups. Although these alternativeexplanations seem less plausible, they cannot be elim-inated, given the methods used by Newcomb.

Selecting a Research Method

Researchers who study groups rather than individ-ual human beings face some unique logistic and sta-tistical problems. Individuals change over time, buttheir development tends to be gradual and continu-ous. Groups, in contrast, can change rapidly anddramatically, so that the group that is studied atone point in time may evolve into a very differentgroup when studied again. The group may alsochange because its composition changes; if a mem-ber joins or leaves a group, the group’s structuresand processes may change. The interactions thattake place within groups are also complex andnuanced, so researchers sometimes encounter moredata than they can objectively record and process.“Group process carries literally hundreds of mes-sages,” so “even after applying one, two, three, ormore content analysis schemes to it, more informa-tion remains to be gathered and interpreted” (Mills,1979, p. 415).

Researchers use a variety of empirical proce-dures to deal with these complexities. Someobserve group processes and then perform a quali-tative analysis of their observations, whereas othersinsist on quantitative measurement methods andelaborate controlled experiments. Some researchersconduct their studies in field situations using bonafide groups, whereas others bring groups into the lab-oratory or even create groups to study. Some re-searchers undertake exploratory studies with no clearidea of what results to expect, whereas other researchstudies are designed to test hypotheses carefullyderived from a specific theory. Some study groupphenomena by asking volunteers to role-play groupmembers, and others simulate group interaction withcomputers.

Advances in instrumentation, design, and statis-tical procedures have also eased some of the laborand time costs of conducting group research.

Information technologies provide opportunities tostudy groups using the Internet, and software cannow search out and model the structure of groups.Researchers have even begun developing tools thatwill allow them to create virtual reality groups, wherecomputers are used to immerse individuals ingroups that seem to be real but are actually createdby virtual environment technologies (Blascovichet al., 2002; Hoyt & Blascovich, 2003).

This diversity of research methods does notreflect researchers’ uncertainty about which tech-nique is best. Rather, the diversity stems from theunique advantages and disadvantages offered byeach method. Case studies limit the researcher’sability to draw conclusions, to quantify results, andto make objective interpretations. But some topics,such as groupthink, are difficult to study by anyother method. As Janis (1982) himself pointed out,it would be difficult to examine groups that makedecisions about national policies—including warand civil defense—through traditional quantitativemethods such as experimentation. But the real forteof the case study approach is its power to providegrist for the theoretician’s mill, enabling the investi-gator to formulate hypotheses that set the stage forother research methods.

Such stimulation of theory is also frequently aconsequence of correlational research. Correlationalstudies are limited in causal power, but they yieldprecise estimates of the strength of the relationshipsbetween variables. Experimentation provides thefirmest test of causal hypotheses by showing thatvariable X will cause such and such a change invariable Y. In a well-designed and -conducted ex-periment, the researcher can test several hypothesesabout groups, making the method both rigorousand efficient. However, when an artificial settingwould yield meaningless results, when the indepen-dent variable cannot bemanipulated, orwhen too littleis known about the topic even to suggestwhat variablesmay be causal, some other approach is preferable. Thesolution, then, is to study groups using multiplemethods (see Focus 2.3). As Joseph McGrath ex-plained, “All methods have inherent flaws—thougheach has certain advantages. These flaws cannot beavoided. But what the researcher can do is to bring

46 CHAPTER 2

more than one approach, more than one method, tobear on each aspect of a problem” (1984, p. 30).

THEORET ICAL PERSPECT IVES

IN GROUP DYNAMICS

Successful researchers do not just develop ingeniousmethods for measuring and studying group pro-cesses. They also develop compelling theoreticalexplanations for group phenomena. Science, more

F o c u s 2.3 What Is the Unit of Analysis When Studying Groups?

Should we not assume that just as the eye, the hand,the foot, and in general each part of the body clearlyhas its own proper function, so man too has somefunction over and above the function of his parts?

—Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

A research team carries out an intriguing study of someaspect of groups, such as group loyalty or absenteeismat meetings. They locate 20 groups, each with fivemembers, and measure things like loyalty, conscien-tiousness, and duration of membership. But, when itcomes time to analyze the data, the researchers face abasic question. How many subjects are in the study: 100individuals or 20 groups?

The answer depends on the unit of analysis in theresearch. If the researchers choose the individualmembers as the unit of analysis they may predict thatmembers who have been in a group longer tend tobe more loyal to the group, or that members withcertain personality characteristics will have fewer ab-sences. But if the group is the unit of analysis the re-searchers may count how many times the members saythe word we during a group meeting and use thisvariable to predict turnover in membership orabsenteeism.

Group data are usually multilevel data, since indi-viduals are nested in groups, which are often nested insome larger organization or community. Researchersmust therefore exercise special care when designingtheir measures and examining their data. If they wantto examine an individual quality, such as loyalty andabsenteeism, they should use questions that focus onthe individual: “Are you loyal to this group?” and“How many meetings of this group have you missed inthe last year?” But, if they want to know the group’sclimate of loyalty they might average each member’sresponses to the “Are you loyal?” question to get anindex of group loyalty, but only if most of the mem-bers give similar answers to this question. They may

also rephrase the question, so that it asks about thegroup: “Are most members loyal to the group?”

Researchers also exercise special care when exam-ining their data so that they do not attribute effectscaused by group-level processes to individual-level pro-cesses and vice versa. The investigators may be thrilled,for example, to find that members’ individual loyaltyscores predict the regularity of their attendance ofmeetings, until they realize that people who are in thesame groups have unusually similar loyalty scores dueto some group-level process. It may be that when thegroups formed, the members naturally sorted them-selves into groups in which members were relativelysimilar in their loyalty to the group, or a norm of loy-alty emerged within a group and most people eventu-ally adopted the group’s norm as their own. As a result,most of the variability in loyalty is not between peoplebut between groups, so that when the researchers takeinto account which group a person belongs to, theeffect of individual-level loyalty disappears.

Advances in statistical procedures offer researchersways to deal with these problems. If data are collectedfrom individual group members, researchers can checkfor group-level interdependencies by computing intra-class correlations (ICC), average deviation scores (e.g.,rWG scores), or within-and-between analysis (WABA)statistics. These analyses will indicate if the individual canserve as the unit of analysis or if interdependencyamong the members’ data is so high that their responsesshould be aggregated at the group level. Some statisticalprocedures, such as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM),are designed specifically for multilevel data and so arecapable of disentangling cause–effect relationships andprocesses that operate simultaneously at two or morelevels (Zyphur, Kaplan, & Christian, 2008). These ad-vances, taken together, highlight the growing method-ological sophistication of group researchers as theyidentify new ways to deal with the challenge of studyingindividuals nested in groups (Sadler & Judd, 2001).

unit of analysis The focus of empirical and theoreticalinterest selected when individuals or objects under studyare nested in a series of increasingly inclusive or gradedclusters; the source of the data the researcher seeks.

STUDY ING GROUPS 47

than any other approach to gaining knowledge, ad-vocates the long-term goal of increasing and sys-tematizing knowledge about the subject matter.Theories provide the means of organizing knownfacts about groups and so create orderly knowledgeout of discrete bits of information. Theories also yieldsuggestions for future research. When researchers ex-tend existing theories into new areas, they discovernew information about groups, while simultaneouslytesting the strength of their theories.

Researchers have developed hundreds of theo-ries about groups and their dynamics. Some of thesetheories are relatively narrow, for they focus on somespecific aspect of groups. Others, in contrast, are farbroader in scope, for they offer general explanationsfor groups across a wide variety of times and contexts.These theories, despite their variations, often sharecertain basic assumptions about what processes aremore important than others, the types of outcomesthey explain, and the variables that are most influen-tial. This section reviews some of these basic theoret-ical perspectives on groups, but with the caveat thatthese approaches are not necessarily mutually exclu-sive. Most theories embrace assumptions from morethan one of the motivational/emotional, behavioral,systems, cognitive, and biological perspectives.

Motivational and Emotional

Perspectives

Why do some people vie for leadership in theirgroups, whereas others remain content with lessprominent roles? Why do some groups struggleagainst adversity, whereas others give up after thefirst setback? Why do some people shy away fromgroups, whereas others join dozens of them? Theanswers to these “why” questions often lie in peo-ple’s motivations and emotions. Motivations arepsychological mechanisms that give purpose anddirection to behavior. These inner mechanismscan be called many things—habits, beliefs, feelings,wants, instincts, compulsions, drives—but no mat-

ter what their label, they prompt people to takeaction. Emotions often accompany these needsand desires; feelings of happiness, sadness, satisfac-tion, and sorrow are just a few of the emotions thatcan influence how people act in group situations.The words motivation and emotion both come fromthe Latin word movere, meaning “to move.”

Motivational approaches offer insight into awide range of group phenomena. Why, for example,do people take more credit when their group is asuccessful one, but then downplay their connectionto their group when it performs poorly? A motiva-tional explanation of this selectivity might focus onthe role groups play in meeting people’s basic needfor self-esteem. People vary considerably in theirappraisal of their own self-worth; the depressedindividual feels inferior, discouraged, or even worth-less, whereas the narcissist is consumed with self-adoration. Most people, however, are motivated tomaintain and enhance their self-esteem, and so theytend to exaggerate the role they played in theirgroup when things go well and avoid responsibilityfor group failure. In consequence, group memberswho consider the task to be particularly importantor are more invested in their group are more likelyto deny blame for group failures and take credit forsuccesses, relative to those who do not think the task,or the group’s outcomes, have implications for theirself-worth (Savitsky, 2007).

Jennifer George’s (1995) theory of groupaffective tone takes a more emotion-focusedapproach to explaining group behavior. Georgeposits that groups, over time, develop a tendencyto display collective mood states. This general affec-tive tone is not tied to any specific aspect of thegroup’s activities or to any one individual, but ratherpervades all the group’s day-to-day activities. Thegroup’s mood may be so taken for granted that mem-bers do not realize its influence, but George believesthat positive group affect will lead to increases in anumber of pro-group actions, including helping out

motivation Wants, needs, and other psychological pro-cesses that energize behavior and thereby determine itsform, intensity, and duration.

emotion A subjective state of positive or negative affectoften accompanied by a degree of arousal or activation.group affective tone The collective emotional moodof a group.

48 CHAPTER 2

other members, protecting the group, makingconstructive suggestions, and “spreading goodwill”during interpersonal encounters (George & Brief,1992, p. 310). Needless to say, a negative affectivetone sets the stage for any number of anti-group ac-tions, including absenteeism, lowmorale, and conflict(Kelly, 2001).

Behavioral Perspectives

Many theories about groups draw on the seminalwork of psychologist B. F. Skinner (1953, 1971).Skinner’s behaviorism was based on two key as-sumptions. First, Skinner believed that psychologicalprocesses, such as motives and drives, may shapepeople’s reactions in groups, but he also believedthat such psychological processes are too difficult toindex accurately. He therefore recommended mea-suring and analyzing how people actually behave ina specific context rather than speculating about thepsychological or interpersonal processes that mayhave instigated their actions. Second, Skinner be-lieved that most behavior was consistent withthe law of effect—that is, behaviors that are followedby positive consequences, such as rewards, willoccur more frequently, whereas behaviors that arefollowed by negative consequences will becomerarer.

John Thibaut and Harold Kelley’s (1959) socialexchange theory extended Skinner’s behaviorismto groups. They agreed that individuals hedonisti-cally strive to maximize their rewards and minimizetheir costs. However, when individuals join groups,they forego exclusive control over their outcomes.Groups create interdependence among members, sothat the actions of each member potentially influence

the outcomes and actions of every other member.Mara, for example, can spend several days workingon a project, struggling to complete it successfully.But what if Mara collaborates with Steven on theproject? When Mara works alone, she determinesher own success. But when she works with Steven,his actions partially shape her outcomes. Mara mayenjoy certain aspects of her interaction with Steven,but she may also find some of the things he doesirritating. Social exchange theory predicts that Maraand Steven will negotiate throughout their interac-tion to secure greater personal rewards while mini-mizing costs.

Systems Theory Perspectives

Researchers in a variety of fields, including engineer-ing, biology, and medicine, have repeatedly foundthat unique results are obtained when a system isformed by creating dependency among formerly in-dependent components. Systems, whether they arebridges, ecological niches, organisms, or groups, syn-thesize several parts or subsystems into a unifiedwhole.

A systems theory approach assumes groups arecomplex, adaptive, dynamic systems of interactingindividuals. The members are the units of the sys-tem, who are coupled one to another by relation-ships. Just as systems can be deliberately designed tofunction in a particular way, groups are sometimescreated for a purpose, with procedures and standardsthat are designed with the overall goal of the systemin mind. Groups can, however, be self-creating andself-organizing systems, for they may develop spon-taneously as individuals begin to act in coordinated,synchronized ways. Just as a system receives inputsfrom the environment, processes this informationinternally, and then outputs its products, groupsgather information, review that information, andgenerate products. Groups are also responsive to

behaviorism A theoretical explanation of the way or-ganisms acquire new responses to environmental stimulithrough such conditioning processes as stimulus–responseassociations and reinforcement.social exchange theory An economic model of inter-personal relationships which argues that individuals seekout relationships that offer them many rewards while ex-acting few costs.

systems theory A general theoretical approach whichassumes that groups are systems—collections of individualunits that combine to form an integrated, complexwhole.

STUDY ING GROUPS 49

information concerning the context in which theyoperate and their impact on that context, and willadapt in response to feedback about the efficacy oftheir actions. Just as the relaying of information be-tween interdependent units is a key concept in sys-tems theory, so the communication of informationbetween members plays a central role in group sys-tems. Systems theory suggests that parts are, to anextent, interchangeable—specific units can beswapped in and out with no discernable impact onthe system—but in some cases because groups arebuilt up of closely entwined parts they can changeto an extraordinary degree when one of their con-stituent components changes.

Systems theory provides a model for under-standing a range of group-level processes, includinggroup development, productivity, and interpersonalconflict. Input–process–output models of groupproductivity, or I–P–O models, are systems theoriesthat emphasize inputs that feed into the group set-ting, the processes that take place within the group asit works on the task, and the outputs generated bythe system (see Figure 2.4). Inputs would includeany factors that are present in the situation whenthe group begins its work on the task, such as thecharacteristics of the individual members (skill,experience, and training) and group-level factors(group structure and cohesiveness). These input fac-tors all influence, through a variety of paths, the pro-cesses that take place within the group as memberswork together to complete the task, including com-munication, planning, conflict, and leadership. Theseprocesses combine to transform inputs into outputs,which include aspects of the group’s performance(e.g., products, decisions, errors) and changes in thefactors that serve as inputs to the system. If the groupperforms poorly, for example, it may become lesscohesive, or it may seek out new members.Members of successful groups, in contrast, maybecome more satisfied with their group and take

steps to make sure that the group uses the sameprocedures to solve the next problem (Ilgen et al.,2005; Littlepage et al., 1995).

Cognitive Perspectives

A group’s dynamics, in many cases, become under-standable only by studying the cognitive processesthat allow members to gather information, makesense of it, and then act on the results of their mentalappraisals. When people join a group for the firsttime, they immediately begin to form an impressionof the group. This perceptual work prompts them tosearch for information about the other group mem-bers, rapidly identifying those who are outgoing, shy,and intelligent. Group members also search theirmemories for stored information about the groupand the tasks it must face, and they must retrievethat information before they can use it. A groupmember must also take note of the actions of othersand try to understand what caused the other memberto act in this way. Thus, group members are busyperceiving, judging, reasoning, and remembering,and all these mental activities influence their under-standing of one another, the group, and themselves(Hinsz, Tindale, Vollrath, 1997; Hodgkinson &Healey, 2008).

John Turner’s (1991, 1999) self-categorizationtheory, or SCT, offers a cognitive explanation fora range for group processes, including intergroupperception and stereotyping. This theory explainsthe cognitive mechanisms that work to align people’sself-conceptions with their conception of the groupsto which they belong. Turner recognizes that much

input–process–output (I–P–O) model Any one of anumber of general conceptual analyses of groups thatassumes group processes mediate the relationship be-tween individual, group, and situational input variablesand resulting group outcomes.

cognitive process Mental processes that acquire,organize, and integrate information. Cognitive processesinclude memory systems that store data and the psycho-logical mechanisms that process this information.self-categorization theory A conceptual approach de-veloped by John Turner and his colleagues that explains arange of group behavior, including the development ofsocial identity and intergroup relations, in terms of thesocial cognitive categorization processes.

50 CHAPTER 2

of social perception involves categorizing people intogroups based on age, race, nationality, and other cate-gories. Once classified, individuals’ perceptions ofpeople are influenced by any stereotypes they mayhave about the qualities of people in such groups.Turner suggests that people not only categorizeothers, but they also recognize their ownmembershipin social categories. As Chapter 3 explains, this self-categorization process is what turns the individual-level conception of the self into a group-levelconception.

Biological Perspectives

Group members can solve complex problems,communicate with one another using spoken andwritten language, build and operate massive ma-chines, and plan their group’s future. But groupmembers are also living creatures, whose responsesare often shaped by biological, biochemical, andgenetic characteristics. When conflict arises in thegroup, heart rates escalate, and other body changesoccur to help members cope with the stress

Training Knowledge Skills Training Knowledge Skills Training Knowledge Skills

MemberA

MemberB

MemberC

Individual-levelprocesses

Individual-levelprocesses

Group-level processes

ProductsMotivation

Teamwork

Leadership

Conflict

Communication

Group goals

Cohesiveness

Decisions

Evaluations

OutputsGroup-level

inputs

Individual-level

inputs

F I G U R E 2.4 An example of an input–process–output model of group productivity. A systems theory approachto some complex aspect of a group, such as its productivity, assumes that group processes mediate the relationship be-tween input factors and outputs. Individual-level inputs (shown at the top of the diagram) include training, knowl-edge, and skills of each member. Group-level inputs, at the lower left, include motivation, teamwork, leadership, andso on. Individual- and group-level processes are represented by the symbol

N. Outputs include products, decisions, and

evaluations, and feedback loops are depicted by the dotted lines.

STUDY ING GROUPS 51

(Blascovich, Nash, & Ginsburg, 1978). Whengroups are trapped in confining, cramped spaces,members often become physiologically aroused,and this arousal can interfere with their work(Evans & Cohen, 1987). When people feel thatthey have been excluded from a group, theirneurological reactions betray the distress they arefeeling. Their brains display a pattern of activitythat is very similar to the brains of people whoare experiencing physical pain (Eisenberger,Lieberman, & Williams, 2003).

One biological perspective—evolutionarypsychology—argues that these processes may begenetically determined, part of the species’ biolog-ical programming that has evolved through naturalselection. This perspective argues that in the last 15million years, the human species has evolved so-cially as well as physically. Those individuals whowere even slightly genetically predisposed to en-gage in adaptive social behaviors tended to survivelonger, so they were more successful in passingtheir genes along to future generations (Caporaelet al., 2005).

Evolutionary psychology offers insight intoa range of group processes, including affiliation,intergroup conflict, and aggression. For example,why do so many groups include the role of leader,even when the group members are fully capable oforganizing themselves? Evolutionary psychologysuggests that leadership, as a process, likely evolvedover time to help relatively small groups of peoplecope with extremely difficult, life-threatening cir-cumstances. Facing problems of survival, groupmembers needed a way to coordinate their activi-ties and manage the inevitable conflicts that eruptin any group. The person who stepped forward tohelp the group with this collective task was theleader, and over time individuals adapted to acceptthe influence of another, more experienced, group

member. They also developed the mental appara-tus needed to identify those who were most quali-fied to lead their groups. In the modern world,humans often gather in groups that are not facingdanger, yet even in more benign circumstancesthey often expect someone to lead them becauseleadership and followership are evolved adapta-tions. In consequence, group members’ prefer-ences for leaders are sometimes influenced bysuch qualities as strength, sex, and age, eventhough these qualities were only relevant in pre-historic times (Van Vugt, 2006; Van Vugt, Hogan,& Kaiser, 2008).

Selecting a Theoretical Perspective

Group dynamics is rich with theory. Some of thesetheories trace group processes back to psychologicalprocesses—the motivations of the individual mem-bers, the mental processes that sustain their concep-tion of their social environment, and even theirinstinctive urges and proclivities. Other theoriesfocus more on the group as a social system that isintegrated in the surrounding community andsociety.

These different theoretical perspectives, how-ever, are not mutually exclusive paradigms, strug-gling for the distinction as the explanation of groupbehavior. Some researchers test hypotheses derivedfrom only one theory; others draw on several per-spectives as they strive to describe, predict, control,and explain groups and their members. Just as thequestions, “How should I measure this aspect of thegroup?” and, “How should I test my hypothesisabout groups?” can be answered in more than oneway, no one solution can be offered in response tothe question, “What theory explains group behav-ior?” Many of the greatest advances in understand-ing groups have occurred not when one theory hasbeen pitted against another, but when two or moretheories have been synthesized to form a new, moreencompassing theoretical perspective. As Homans(1950) wrote: “We have a great deal of fact towork with, [and] we also have a great deal oftheory. The elements of a synthesis are on hand”(p. 4).

evolutionary psychology A biological approach tounderstanding behavior which assumes that recurringpatterns of behavior in animals ultimately stem from evo-lutionary pressures that increase the likelihood of adap-tive social actions and extinguish nonadaptive practices.

52 CHAPTER 2

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What are the three critical requirements of a scientificapproach to the study of groups (as noted byHomans)?

1. Researchers must use reliable and valid meth-ods to measure group phenomena.

2. Researchers must design research procedures totest their hypotheses about groups.

3. Researchers must develop theories that orga-nize their findings conceptually andcomprehensively.

How do researchers measure individual and groupprocesses?

1. Observation involveswatching and recording eventstranspiring in groups. Varieties include overt obser-vation, covert observation, and participant observation,which Whyte used in his study of corner gangs.

■ Most group research raises few ethics is-sues, but researchers are required to havetheir work approved by an InstitutionalReview Board (IRB).

■ Covert observation reduces the biasinginfluences of the Hawthorne effect.

2. Qualitative studies require the collection ofdescriptive data about groups, but quantitativestudies require the enumeration and quantifi-cation of the phenomena of interest.

■ Structured observational measures requireobservers to assign each coded activity to aspecific category.

■ Bales’s Interaction Process Analysis (IPA), astandard group coding system, classifiesbehaviors into two categories: relationshipand task interaction.

■ Bales’s more recent structured coding sys-tem is called SYMLOG (Systematic MultipleLevel Observation of Groups).

3. Reliability and validity are essential qualities of allmeasures, for they must be consistent and they

must measure what they are designed tomeasure.

4. Self-report measures ask group members to de-scribe their own perceptions and experiences.

■ Moreno’s sociometry method asks membersto report whom they like the most. Thenominations are used to generate a socio-gram, or visual image of the interpersonalrelations in the group.

■ Clapp used a combination of self-reportand observational methods to study alco-hol consumption in groups (parties).

What are the key characteristics of and differences betweencase, experimental, and correlational studies of groupprocesses?

1. A case study is an in-depth analysis of one ormore groups based on interviews with mem-bers, observation, and so on.

■ Janis used a case study design in his analysisof groupthink in government decision-making groups.

■ By studying naturally occurring, bona fidegroups, case study researchers can be morecertain that the processes they study arenot artificial ones influenced by the re-search process.

2. In an experiment, researchers examine cause–effect relationships by manipulating aspects ofthe group situation (independent variables).

■ Lewin, Lippitt, and White studied the im-pact of autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire leaders on groups by conducting anexperiment. They manipulated the inde-pendent variable (leadership style), assessedseveral dependent variables (aggressiveness,productivity, etc.), and limited the influenceof other possible causal factors by control-ling the situation and assigning groups toexperimental conditions at random.

STUDY ING GROUPS 53

■ Lewin, Lippitt, and White’s study indicatedthat productivitywas high in both democraticand autocratic groups, but that the partici-pants were more aggressive in the autocraticgroups. In some cases, one group member(a scapegoat) was bullied by the others.

3. In a correlational study, the investigator, ratherthan manipulating aspects of the situation,gauges the strength of the naturally occurringrelationships between such variables.

■ Newcomb examined the relationship be-tween members’ political attitudes andtheir popularity in the group in an earlystudy of reference groups.

■ Nonexperimental studies are usually calledcorrelational studies because the magnitudeof the relationship between variables isoften expressed as a correlation coefficient.

What are strengths and weaknesses of case, experimental,and correlational methods?

1. The conclusions drawn from case studies canbe highly subjective, but they stimulate theoryand provide detailed information about natural,bona fide groups.

2. Groups studied in experimental settings maynot display the dynamics of naturally occur-ring groups, but experimentation providesthe clearest test of cause-and-effecthypotheses.

3. Correlational studies provide only limitedinformation about causality, but they yieldprecise estimates of the strength of therelationship between two variables and raisefewer questions of ethics for researchers.

4. Researchers also exercise care when selectingthe unit of analysis and when analyzing theirfindings so as to not attribute effects causedby group-level processes to individual-levelprocesses and vice versa. Researchers whostudy multilevel processes must be ever waryof interdependence in their data.

What theoretical perspectives guide researchers’ studies ofgroups?

1. Theories that focus on members’ motivationsand emotions explain group behavior in terms ofmembers, wants, needs, drives, and feelings.Members’ need to maintain self-esteem influ-ences their response to group outcomes, andGeorge’s work suggests that groups candevelop a collective group affective tone.

2. Theories based on Skinner’s behaviorism, suchas Thibaut and Kelley’s social exchange theory,assume that individuals act to maximize theirrewards and minimize their costs.

3. A systems theory approach assumes that groupsare systems. An input–process–output model(I–P–O model) of group performance exem-plifies the systems approach.

4. Turner’s self-categorization theory (SCT) is acognitive process approach, for it assumes thatgroup members’ tendency to categorize otherpeople and themselves influences a wide rangeof group behavior.

5. Biological perspectives, such as evolutionarytheory, argue that some group behaviors,including leadership, may be rooted in people’sbiological heritage.


Studying Groups

■ “Methods of Small Group Research,” by NorbertL. Kerr, Joel Aronoff, and Lawrence A. Messé

(2000), examines the techniques and measuresused by investigators in a wide variety of groupresearch.

54 CHAPTER 2

■ The Handbook of Group Research and Practice,edited by Susan A. Wheelan (2005), includeschapters by experts who offer their insightsinto problems and approaches to studyinggroups.

Research Methods■ “Observation and Analysis of Group Interaction

over Time: Some Methodological and StrategicChoices,” by Joseph E. McGrath and T. WilliamAltermatt (2001), is a complete analysis of struc-tured approaches to group observation.

■ Applications of Case Study Research, by R. K. Yin(2009), updates and reaffirms the advantages ofcase study methods.

■ Street Corner Society, by William Foote Whyte(1943), remains one of the best examples of

applying the case study method to under-standing a group’s dynamics.

Advances in Group Research Methods■ “Overcoming Dependent Data: A Guide to

the Analysis of Group Data,” by MelodyS. Sadler and Charles M. Judd (2001), outlinesthe statistical procedures to use when data arecollected from intact groups.

■ Theories of Small Groups: InterdisciplinaryPerspectives, edited by Marshall Scott Pooleand Andrea B. Hollingshead (2005),describes, reviews, and synthesizes the fullrange of theoretical perspectives in groups,including evolutionary approaches, networkapproaches, and feminist and functionalistperspectives.


STUDY ING GROUPS 55


3

Inclusion and Identity

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Most people prefer group membershipto isolation, but once they join withothers they find they must sometimesdo what is best for the group ratherthan what benefits them personally.Groups blur the boundary betweenthe self and the others, for membersretain their personal qualities—theirmotives, emotions, and outlooks—but add to them a sense of self thatincorporates their collective ratherthan their individual characteristics.Groups transform the me into the we.

■ Do humans, by nature, seek soli-tude or inclusion in groups?

■ When do people embrace collec-tivism by putting the group’sneeds before their own?

■ What processes transform an in-dividual’s sense of self into a col-lective, social identity?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

From Isolation to Inclusion

The Need to Belong

The Pain of Exclusion

Evolution and Inclusion in Groups

From Individualism to Collectivism

Social Relations

Social Obligations

Social Self

Variations in Collectivism

From Personal Identity to SocialIdentity

Social Identity Theory: The Basics

Motivation and Social Identity

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

56

✵

Brian Palmer and Joe Gorman illustrate what hasbeen called “the master problem” of social life:What is the connection between the individual andsociety, including groups, organizations, and commu-nities (Allport, 1962)? Healthy adult human beingscan survive apart from other members of the species,yet across individuals, societies, and eras, humans con-sistently seek inclusion in groups, where they mustbalance their personal needs and desires against thedemands and requirements of their groups. Some,like Palmer, never sink too deeply into theirgroups; he remained an individualist who was soself-reliant that he refused to rely on others in hisrush to personal success. Others, however, respondmore like Gorman, who put the group’s interests be-fore his own personal needs. He did not just joingroups; he identified so strongly with his groups thathis sense of self came to be defined by them.

In this chapter, we consider three essential pro-cesses that combine to transform the lone individualinto a group member: inclusion, collectivism, andidentity. Through inclusion, the single individualchanges from an outsider into an insider by joining

a group. Through collectivism, group members beginto think about the good of the group as a wholerather than what the group provides them. Throughthe transformation of identity, individuals change theirconception of who they are to include their group’squalities as well as their own individual qualities.

FROM ISOLAT ION TO

INCLUS ION

Some species of animals are solitary. The cheetah,giant panda, orangutan, and opossum remain apartfrom other members of their species and congregatein some cases only to mate or rear offspring. Otheranimals, such as chimps, hyena, deer, and mice, aresocial creatures, for they usually forage, feed, sleep,and travel in small groups. What about humans? Dowe tend to keep to ourselves, guarding our privacyfrom the incursions of others, or are we group-oriented animals, who prefer the company of otherpeople to a life alone?

Palmer and Gorman: From Individualism to Collectivism

When Brian Palmer was in college his professors won-dered if he would ever find success after graduation.Brian himself admits that he did not work all that hardat his studies, for he was more concerned with satisfy-ing his own needs than impressing his professors. Butafter graduation he got serious about his career,working 60 to 70 hours a week to prove himself. “I’mvery competitive. I like to win,” he explained in an in-terview (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 5). He rose through theranks until he could afford a comfortable lifestyle. Heowned a nice car and large home, his sons attendedthe best schools, and his wife lunched at the countryclub. But, on the day that he sold his house to moveto a larger one she told him that she would not bemoving with him: She wanted a divorce. When Brianrecovered from the shock he realized that his single-minded devotion to his career had taken all his timeand his energy. He had provided well for his family,financially, but he was not involved in their lives. “I gottotally swept up in my own progress, in promotionsand financial successes” (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 68).

Joe Gorman lives far away from Brian Palmer,both geographically and psychologically. Palmermoved from one community to the next wheneverhe needed to relocate for work, but Gorman has livedhis entire life in his hometown. Gorman works fulltime, but he spends much of his leisure time withfamily and friends. A skilled organizer, he frequentlyends up in charge of various community fundraisers,parades, and festivals. He was the go-to person, forexample, for a series of events celebrating the town’sfounding, and through his hard work the event wasa tremendous success. When asked why he gave somuch of his time to this task, he explained that hedid it for the community that he loves “being a partof” (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 10). When Gorman’semployer offered him a promotion with a highersalary he turned it down because it would require hemove to another town: “I was born here . . . Wewill always stay here. It is my home” (Bellah et al.,1985, p. 11).

INCLUS ION AND IDENT I TY 57

Most theorists, when identifying the funda-mental psychological processes that drive humans’actions across a range of situations and settings, in-clude a need to belong on their list (Maslow,1970; Pittman & Zeigler, 2007). All human beings,write Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary (1995,p. 497), “have a pervasive drive to form and main-tain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive,and impactful interpersonal relationships”. Theylikened the need to belong to other basic needs,such as hunger or thirst. A person who has noteaten will feel hungry, but a person who has littlecontact with other people will feel unhappy andlonely. In this section we review the evidencethat backs up their claim that group membershipfulfills a generic need to establish positive, enduringrelationships with other people.

The Need to Belong

Aristotle famously suggested that “Man is by naturea social animal; and an unsocial person who is un-social naturally and not accidentally is either unsat-isfactory or superhuman.” Henry David Thoreaudisagreed with Aristotle, and to prove his pointspent two years relatively secluded at WaldenPond. He deliberately kept his group membershipsto a minimum during this period, although hemaintained ties to his family and some friends. Heexplained,

Society is commonly too cheap. We meetat very short intervals, not having had timeto acquire any new value for each other.We meet at three meals a day and giveeach other a taste of that old musty cheesethat we are. Certainly less frequency wouldsuffice for all important and hearty com-munication. (Thoreau, 1962, p. 206)

Spending time alone, away from others, can bea rejuvenating, pleasurable experience. People,when surveyed about their reactions to isolation,

report enjoying the self-discovery, contemplation,and increased spirituality that occurs when one isphysically isolated from interactions with and ob-servations by others (Long et al., 2003). Whenalone, people report they can “discover who Iam,” “determine what I want to be,” “meditateand reflect,” “try out some new behaviors,” “re-cover my self-esteem,” “protect myself from whatothers say,” and “take refuge from the outsideworld” (Pedersen, 1999, p. 399). Some philoso-phers, writers, and artists have reached the apex oftheir creativity during times of isolation, when theywere not distracted by other people (Storr, 1988;Suedfeld, 1997).

But even though people express a desire forprivacy, most people spend the majority of theirwaking hours in the company of other people—only unmarried or widowed adults over the ageof 45 reported spending more time alone thanwith others. The sheer number of groups that existat any moment in time is also clear evidence of thestrength of the need to belong. Voluntary associa-tions, such as churches, farming cooperatives, frater-nal clubs, hobby groups, civic service associations,and community councils, are not rare but extremelycommon (Bonikowski & McPherson, 2006). Withgroups ranging from the small and distinctive, suchas the Pecan Grove Garden Club and the Model TFord Club of Tulsa, to the large and diverse, such asthe American Association of Retired Persons(AARP) and the Assembly of First Nations (AFN),there is a group for anyone who wants to join one,and most people do (see Figure 3.1). Americansare above average in their involvement in voluntaryassociations, but some countries’ citizens—theDutch, Canadians, Scandinavians—are “groupier”still (Curtis, Baer, & Grabb, 2001).

Even more numerous are the many informalkin-based and social groups, such as family, friends,and acquaintances who meet regularly, that satisfymembers’ need for inclusion. When surveyed,87.3% of Americans reported that they lived withother people, including family members, partners,and roommates (Davis & Smith, 2007). The major-ity, ranging from 50% to 80%, reported doingthings in groups of friends and relatives, such as

need to belong The dispositional tendency to seek outand join with other humans.

58 CHAPTER 3

attending a sports event together, visiting oneanother for the evening, sharing a meal together,or going out as a group to see a movie (Putnam,2000). People also satisfy their need to belong, atleast temporarily, by joining in larger collectives andcategories. People could perform a variety of activ-ities alone—they could learn individually by read-ing books and studying papers, watch DVDs in theprivacy of their homes, and dine each night at theirkitchen counters—but most do not: they prefer toperform these activities in groups. Even thoughpeople’s involvement in certain types of groupshas dropped in the last few years—fewer people,for example, belong to bowling leagues nowthan in the 1960s—joining with others in groupsremains a universally observed characteristic ofhumans across all known societies (see Focus 3.1).

The Pain of Exclusion

The strength of the need to belong is seen evenmore clearly when this need is thwarted. Most peo-ple, both young and old, find protracted periods ofsocial isolation disturbing (Zubek, 1973). The dia-ries of individuals who have been isolated from

others for long periods of time—stranded explorers,scientists working in seclusion, and prisoners in sol-itary confinement—often stress the psychologicalcosts of their ordeal rather than physical depriva-tions. As their isolation wears on, they report fear,insomnia, memory lapses, depression, fatigue, andgeneral confusion. Prolonged periods of isolationare also marked by hallucinations and delusions, aswhen one solo sailor at sea was startled when hethought he saw a pirate steering his life raft(Burney, 1961).

Jean Twenge, Roy Baumeister, and their col-leagues have explored how people react to isolationin a series of “life alone” studies. They first gaveparticipants an extensive personality test to con-vince them they had knowledge of their basic per-sonality. Then they told some people, at random,that their answers indicated their future would be asolitary one: “You’re the type who will end upalone later in life. You may have friends and rela-tionships now, but . . . these are likely to be short-lived and not continue . . . the odds are you’ll end upbeing alone more and more” (Twenge et al., 2007,p. 58). Others were told that they would enjoymeaningful relationships with others throughout

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F I G U R E 3.1 Percentage of Americans reporting membership in various types of groups.

SOURCE: General Social Surveys, 1972–2006. [machine-readable data file]. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center. Storrs, CT: The RoperCenter for Public Opinion Research. Available at http://www.norc.uchicago.edu.


http://www.norc.uchicago.edu

their life, and those in a second control conditionwere told they would become accident-prone laterin life and so experience a series of misfortunes.

Those told that they will likely live out theirlives alone displayed a range of negative reactions.They were more critical of others and were more

likely to punish others by exposing them to noxiousnoise levels. They were also more likely to engagein a number of irrational, self-defeating behaviors,such as taking unnecessary risks and procrastinating.They also became less helpful towards others andmore competitive overall. In addition, those whowere given the prediction of a life alone could notthink as clearly as those in the control conditions,for they scored lower on a series of general cogni-tive aptitude measures. These deleterious effects ofthe “life alone” prognostication could, however, beundone if people had the chance to reinstate their

F o c u s 3.1 Are Americans Bowling Alone?

The most whimsical yet discomfiting bit of evidence ofsocial disengagement in contemporary America that Ihave discovered is this: More Americans are bowlingtoday than ever before, but bowling in organizedleagues has plummeted in the last decade or so.

— Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (1995, p. 69)

The numbers tell the tale. In 1975 people reportedplaying card games together, like poker and bridge,about 14 times a year. By 2000, that number had beenhalved. In the 1970s 50% of the people surveyedagreed that their family usually eats dinner together.By the end of the century only about 33% reportedregular family meals and the family vacation was alsobecoming more rare. Today fewer people report visit-ing with neighbors frequently and they are less likelyto join social clubs, such as the Kiwanis and gardenclubs. Membership in organized sports leagues is alsowaning. As Robert Putnam (2000) wrote in his bookBowling Alone, in the 1960s 8% of all adult Americanmen belonged to a bowling league, as did nearly 5%of all adult women. However, even though the totalnumber of bowlers in Americans’ continues to increaseover time, fewer and fewer belong to bowling leagues.Putnam worried that Americans’ withdrawal fromgroups and associations signals an overall decline insocial capital, which is determined by the strength of“networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coor-dination and cooperation for mutual benefit”(Putnam, 1995, p. 66). Just as financial resources de-termine economic capital, so the scope and strength ofconnections with others defines one’s social capital.

Putnam’s findings suggest that the types ofgroups people join are changing. People are not as

interested in joining traditional types of communitygroups, such as garden clubs, fraternal and profes-sional organizations, or even church-based groups.These social trends likely reflect, however, changes inhow people meet their need to belong rather than abasic change in human nature. Some types of groups,such as book groups, support groups, teams at work,and category-based associations (e.g., the AARP) areincreasing in size rather than decreasing. Individualsare also more involved in online associations, interac-tions, and networks, such as MySpace and Facebook.For example, in a recent survey, 91.1% of the indivi-duals who used the Internet regularly reported that atleast one of the individuals they interact with regularlyvia the Internet had become a good friend. It is alsodifficult to track the extent to which the trendsPutnam reported reflect a shift toward more informalassociations. Rather than joining formally organizedgroups, individuals may be spending more time withinformal groups, such as friends, coworkers, and ac-quaintances. These social groups are the ubiquitous“dark matter” of social capital, for they knit peopletogether in social relations but are often overlooked intallies that track the number and variety of more for-mal and official groups (Smith D. H., 2000). In fact,even though Putnam’s book title suggests that peopleare bowling alone rather than in groups, Putnam ad-mits that hardly anyone bowls individually. People maynot be joining bowling leagues, but bowling remains agroup-level activity: people bowl with friends, co-workers, and family members rather than in organizedcompetitive leagues. These groups may be lower interms of social capital, but they nonetheless are suffi-cient to meet people’s need to belong.

social capital The degree of functional interconnected-ness of a group of people thought to promote coordi-nated action for mutual benefit; analogous to other formsof capital, such as human or economic capital.

60 CHAPTER 3

connections to other people—for example, byreflecting on their relationship with a family memberor friend (Baumeister et al., 2007; Gardner et al.,2005; Twenge et al., 2001; Twenge et al., 2007;Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002).

Ostracism People’s need to belong is slaked whena group accepts them, but they are most satisfiedwhen a group actively seeks them out. In contrast,people respond negatively when a group ignores oravoids them, and this negative reaction is exacerbatedif the group ostracizes, abandons, or banishes them(see Figure 3.2; Leary, 1990). To be isolated fromothers due to circumstances or accident is one thing,but to be deliberately ignored and excluded byothers—ostracism—is particularly distressing.

The word ostracism dates to the Greeks, whovoted to punish a member of the community withbanishment using shards of clay called ostraca(Williams, 2007). Contemporary forms of ostracism

range from formal rejection of a member from agroup—as when a church excommunicates a mem-ber or a club permanently bans a patron—to moresubtle interpersonal tactics, such as the “silent treat-ment” or the “cold shoulder.” Cliques of adolescentgirls, for example, use the threat of exclusion and os-tracism itself to control the activities of members, withexcluded girls finding that they are suddenly outcastsinstead of trusted friends. Many religious societiesshun members who have broken rules or traditions.People who do not toe the line in work or classroomgroups are sometimes ignored by the rest of thegroup, sometimes for months or even years. Evennonhuman groups practice ostracism, for a variety ofsocial species, including wolves, bees, and primates,sometimes exclude an individual from the group—usually with fatal consequences. The ostracized feelthey have been betrayed by the other groupmembers,and they sometimes report frustration, shock, and sur-prise. Whereas people who are included value theirexperiences in the group, the excluded sometimes feelas if they are invisible—as if they do not even existsocially.

Ostracism is extremely stressful. When asked,the excluded describe themselves as frustrated,

RejectionAcceptance

Maximuminclusion

Activeinclusion

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F I G U R E 3.2 The inclusion–exclusion continuum. When individuals are actively sought out by groupsthey experience maximal inclusion, and when groups actively ostracize them people experience maximal exclusion.

SOURCE: Leary, 1990.

ostracism Excluding a person or group of people from agroup, usually by ignoring, shunning, or explicitly ban-ishing them.

I NCLUS ION AND IDENT I TY 61

anxious, nervous, and lonely (Williams, 2007),sometimes using such intensely negative words asheartbroken, depressed, and worthless (Barnett,2006). Ostracized people evidence physiologicalsigns of stress, including elevated blood pressureand cortisol levels (a stress-related hormone). Brainimaging research even suggests that the pain of ex-clusion is neurologically similar to pain caused byphysical injury. Investigators in one study chartedthe neurological reactions people have when ex-cluded using a functional magnetic resonance imag-ing scanner, or fMRI. Such scanners indicate whatportions of the brain are more active than others bymeasuring cranial temperature and blood flow.When people were left out of a group activity, aspecific area of the brain—the dorsal anterior cingu-late cortex (dACC)—was particularly active. Thisarea of the brain is associated with the experienceof physical pain sensations and other negative socialexperiences (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams,2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005).

Kipling Williams (2007) suggests that people’sinitial, reflexive reaction to exclusion is followed by amore deliberative, reflective stage during which indivi-duals consider the reasons for their rejection and re-spond accordingly. Depending on the results of theseruminations, people will display one of five character-istic stress responses: freeze, fight, flight, tend, or be-friend. In rare cases, ostracism can lead to a generalshutdown in behavioral and emotional reactivity.Such individuals report little change in mood or emo-tion other than numbness and lethargy; they freeze up(DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). A fight-or-flight or atend-and-befriend response is more typical, however.The fight-or-flight response to stress involvesfighting back against the exclusion or escaping thesituation. Those who display the fight response be-come hostile and aggressive when rejected by others.They may confront group members directly, attempt

to force their way into the group, insist that the groupexclude someone else, and derogate those who haveexcluded them. In more extreme cases they mayrespond violently. Others, in contrast, accept theirrejection passively and withdraw from the group(Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; see Focus 3.2).

In some cases, however, people display a tend-and-befriend response to exclusion (Taylor et al.,2000). Rather than fighting or fleeing the group,they nurture, protect, and support others (tend) orthey take steps to strengthen their interpersonal re-lations (befriending); they express more interest inmaking new friends, become more cooperative,and treat new acquaintances more positively(Maner et al., 2007). Women are more likely thanmen to respond to exclusion by tending: they dothings to help the group, such as working harder oncollective tasks, apologizing for previous behaviors,and making sacrifices for others (Williams &Sommers, 1997).

Williams and his colleagues demonstrated theearnestness of the excluded in three-person groupsthat included only one real participant and twoconfederates. When the experimenter left theroom, the confederates began to bounce a ballback and forth between them. In some cases, theconfederates included the participant in their game,but in other cases, they stopped bouncing the ballto the participant after about a minute. The parti-cipants, when later asked how much they liked theother two group members, rated their partnersmore negatively when they had been ostracized.Women who had been ostracized, however,worked harder on a subsequent collective task, ap-parently to regain acceptance by the rest of thegroup. Women were also more likely to blamethemselves for their ostracism (e.g., “I have troublemaking a good impression with others”). Men, incontrast, did not compensate by working harder,

fight-or-flight response A physiological response tostressful events characterized by the activation of thesympathetic nervous system (increased heart rate, pupildilation) that readies the individual to counter the threat(fight) or to escape the threat (flight).

tend-and-befriend response An interpersonal re-sponse to stressful events characterized by increased nur-turing, protective, and supportive behaviors (tending)and by seeking out connections to other people(befriending).

62 CHAPTER 3

nor did they take the blame for their rejection(Williams & Sommer, 1997).

Cyberostracism Groups no longer meet only inface-to-face situations but also in multi-user forums,email discussions, and game sites on the Internet.Just as people sometimes exclude others from groupactivities in face-to-face activities, online membersalso sometimes ignore others, effectively excluding

them from the interaction. Williams has labeled thisform of exclusion cyberostracism.

Given that the members of computer-basedgroups communicate at a distance and are, in some

F o c u s 3.2 Does Social Rejection Lead to Violence?

For all of his 23 years of life the most frequentobservation made by anyone about him was thatSeung Hui Cho had absolutely no social life.

—Report of the VirginiaTech Review Panel (Dupue, 2007, p. N-3)

On December 1, 1997, Michael Carneal walked with hissister Kelly to the main doors of Heath High School inKentucky. Once there he took a handgun from his bagand began shooting members of Agape, the Christiangroup that began each day with a communal prayer.Three students died and five were severely injured. Inthe spring of 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, bothstudents at Columbine High School, used semiauto-matic weapons, shotguns, and rifles to kill 13 studentsand teachers in a carefully planned attack. OnNovember 7, 2007, a student at Jokela High School inFinland named Pekka-Eric Auvinen killed six students,the school principal, the school nurse, and then himselfafter setting fire to the school. On April 16, 2007,Seung Hui Cho, a 23-year-old senior at Virginia Tech,killed 32 people and wounded 17 others before com-mitting suicide (Leary et al., 2003; Newman et al., 2004).

How could these students turn against their fel-low classmates and teachers with such monstrous hos-tility? There is no simple answer to this question, forsuch horrific actions spring from a complex of interre-lated psychological and interpersonal factors.However, when Mark Leary and his colleagues exam-ined 15 cases of post-1995 shootings in schools in theU.S. they found that these terrible acts of violencewere tied together by a common thread: rejection. Inmost cases the aggressors were individuals who did notbelong to any groups or take part in common socialactivities. They were often described as loners, as wasSeung Hui Cho, the Virginia Tech gunman:

Cho lived a life of quiet solitude, extreme quietand solitude. For all of his 23 years of life the mostfrequent observation made by anyone about himwas that Seung Hui Cho had absolutely no sociallife. During all of his school years he had no realfriends. He had no interest in being with others. Infact, he shied away from other people andseemed to prefer his own company to the com-pany of others. (Dupue, 2007, p. N-3).

Some shooters, such as Cho, were never mis-treated by other people, yet they still felt rejected andisolated. In most instances, however, they had beenostracized by others at their schools and were the tar-get of malicious teasing, ridicule, and bullying. Theseindividuals usually chose their targets deliberately,seeking revenge against those who had excludedthem. They did not try to blame their behavior onpsychological problems, their parents, the media, orthe influence of their friends. Nearly all claimed thatthey had been pushed into violence by a specific groupof people who excluded them. Exclusion, by itself, isnot associated with behavioral problems in adoles-cents, but those who are isolated and report “prob-lematic peer encounters” are at risk for a variety ofnegative outcomes (Kreager, 2004).

Ostracism was not the sole cause of these inci-dents. In nearly all cases aggressors had a history ofpsychological problems, although the severity of theirtroubles was often unrecognized. They were also oftenpreoccupied with violence and death, and were inter-ested in guns and weapons in general. Exclusion,however, was a key social factor in most cases. Theharm that these individuals have wrought cannot beundone, but their actions serve as a reminder to curbthe sometimes too-human tendency to exclude othersfrom our social lives.

cyberostracism The exclusion of one or more indivi-duals from a technologically mediated group interaction,such as a computer-based discussion group.


cases, completely anonymous, one might think thatsuch cyberostracism is relatively inconsequential. Thedata, however, suggest otherwise. In one study,Williams and his colleagues invited people from 62different countries to take part in what they thoughtwas an Internet-based study of creative visualization.They thought they would be linked to two othervolunteers and that the three would play a game ofvirtual catch by passing a flying disk from one playerto another. In actuality, however, the other twoplayers were simulated, and the participants wererandomly assigned to one of four conditions: over-inclusion (thrown the disk 50% of the time), inclu-sion (33%), partial ostracism (20%), and completeostracism (they never received a throw after the ini-tial round of tosses). When the game was over andthe participants completed a brief survey over theWeb, those who had suffered ostracism displayedthe same sorts of negative reactions as evidenced bypeople in face-to-face groups. Even though thegame was meaningless and their partners were totalstrangers, their social self-esteem dropped, theirmoods turned negative, and they admitted thatthey felt rejected (Williams, Cheung, & Choi,2000). Williams reported similar reactions to exclu-sion in his studies of chat rooms and text-messaging(Williams et al., 2002).

Sociometer Theory One of the surest ways tolower individuals’ self-esteem is to reject them.Imagine, for example, that you are working with fiveother people on a joint task. Following the collabora-tive session you rate each other on a questionnaire,indicating with whom you would most want towork. The researchers, after collecting the question-naires, then explain that you will be leaving the groupbecause you received the fewest popularity votes.

How would you respond if you were so ostra-cized? When Mark Leary and his colleagues carriedout this procedure they discovered that those whowere rejected reported feeling less competent, ade-quate, useful, smart, and valuable than did the in-cluded group members—provided the rejectionwas an interpersonal one. In half the sessions, theresearchers said that the group-versus-individual de-cision was determined by a random drawing. In suchcases individuals would have to leave the group, butit was not because the group rejected them. AsFigure 3.3 indicates, isolation caused by bad luckdid not sting as much as ostracism caused by agroup’s deliberate rejection (Bourgeois & Leary,2001; Leary et al., 1995).

As noted in Chapter 2, across situations indivi-duals act in ways to protect and enhance theirself-esteem: many theorists consider the need for

64 CHAPTER 3


self-esteem to be a master motive. Leary’s socio-meter theory, however, suggests that the need tobelong may be the primary motivational force atwork rather than a striving for positive self-regard.This theory posits that “self-esteem is part of a socio-meter that monitors peoples’ relational value in otherpeople’s eyes” (Leary, 2007, p. 328). Self-esteem,then, is not an index of one’s sense of personal value,but instead an indicator of acceptance into groups.Like a gauge that indicates how much fuel is left inthe tank, self-esteem indicates the extent to which aperson is included in groups. If the gauge drops, thenexclusion is likely. So when we experience a dip inour self-esteem, people search for and correct char-acteristics and qualities that have put them at risk ofsocial exclusion. The sociometer model concludesthat most people have high self-esteem not becausethey think well of themselves but because they arecareful to maintain inclusion in social groups(Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In consequence, self-esteem rises when people feel included in groupsand liked by others (Srivastava & Beer, 2005) orwhen they just think about a time when others in-cluded them in a group and made them feel like theybelonged (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). The modelalso explains why people who have been excluded arefar more attentive to and more likely to rememberaccurately the details of a group’s interaction: Theyare searching for the cause of their dismissal fromthe group (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000).

Evolution and Inclusion in Groups

Why do people usually choose membership overisolation? Why do people respond so negativelywhen others exclude them? Why do groups oftendeliberately exclude members? Why do peoplemonitor their acceptance in groups, and questiontheir self-worth when others shun them?Evolutionary theory offers a single answer to all

these questions: the need to belong to groups ispart of human nature.

The Herd Instinct The idea that humans are in-stinctively drawn to gather with other humans isnot a new one. Over a century ago, WilliamMcDougall (1908) argued that humans are inexora-bly drawn to “the vast human herd,” which “exertsa baneful attraction on those outside it” (p. 303).Advances in evolutionary psychology have revital-ized this old idea, however, by specifying both thebiological and interpersonal mechanisms that sustainthis herd instinct.

Evolutionary psychology uses Charles Darwin’stheory of natural selection to explain why contem-porary humans act, feel, and think the way they do.Darwin dealt primarily with biological and anatomi-cal adaptations, but evolutionary psychologists as-sume that recurring patterns of psychological andsocial tendencies also stem from evolutionaryprocesses that increase adaptive actions and extin-guish nonadaptive practices. Nature did not justencourage the development of webbed feet onducks or a keen sense of smell in dogs, but also cer-tain psychological and social tendencies in humans.Humans’ capacity to introspect, to read the emotionin others’ faces, to understand the meaning of others’vocal utterances, and even the ability to considerwhat future event may become more likely if a spe-cific action is undertaken now may all reflect adapta-tions that were shaped by natural selection. Similarly,humans’ preference for living in groups rather thanalone may also be sustained by psychological andbiological mechanisms that evolved over time tohelp individuals solve basic problems of survival.

Living in groups yielded both costs and benefitsfor early humans. Compared to a single individual, agroup of humans roaming the ancient forests andplains probably attracted the attention of more pre-dators. Moreover, when with others, those whofound a food patch or made a kill could anticipatelosing much of their meal to others in the group.They would also be more likely to suffer from com-municable diseases and be harmed by more aggressivehumans. But the benefits of sociality are far moresubstantial than these costs. Those who joined with

sociometer theory A conceptual analysis of self-esteemproposed by Mark Leary that argues self-esteem is not anindex of perceived self-worth, but instead is a psycholog-ical monitor of one’s degree of inclusion and exclusion insocial groups.


others in an organized band to hunt large animals orforage for patches of food were likely more successfulthan individuals who remained alone. Individuals ingroups could maintain superior surveillance againstpredators, they could join forces to ward off preda-tors’ attacks, and they could rely on other members oftheir group to protect them from the aggressive ac-tions of other humans. Human infants cannot survivealone. They must be in a group that cares for themuntil they can reach an age where they can fend forthemselves. Groups, too, bring together men andwomen who can then form the pair-bonds neededfor mating and procreation.

Evolutionary theory assumes that these advan-tages of group life, over multiple generations, even-tually sewed sociality into the DNA of the humanrace. In the modern world, the advantages of grouplife over solitude are not so clear. People who buytheir food in grocery stores and live in houses with

deadbolts on the doors do not need to worry muchabout effective food-gathering strategies or protec-tion from predation. These modern conditions,however, cannot undo 130,000 years of natural se-lection. Because those individuals who were genet-ically predisposed to join groups (“joiners”) weremuch more likely to survive and breed than peoplewho avoided social contacts (“loners”), with eachpassing generation, the genes that promoted soli-tude seeking were weeded out of the gene pool,and the genes that encouraged group joining pros-pered (Marsh & Morris, 1988; see Figure 3.4). Inconsequence, gregariousness flourished as part ofthe biological makeup of humans. Your ancestorswere, in all likelihood, joiners rather than loners(Kameda & Tindale, 2006).

Evidence and Issues Do humans instinctivelyseek membership in groups? A variety of evidence

A’s gene type: Affiliation

Action Mating PoolEnvironmental Challenges

Joiner

Persons and Genes

Joins

B’s gene type: Solitary Stays apart

C’s gene type: Affiliation Joins

D’s gene type: Affiliation Joins Joiner

E’s gene type: Solitary Stays apart

F’s gene type: Solitary Stays apart Loner

G’s gene type: Solitary Stays apart

H’s gene type: Affiliation Joins Joiner

I’s gene type: Affiliation Stays apart

J’s gene type: Solitary Stays apart

F I G U R E 3.4 A schematic representation of the process of natural selection of group-oriented individuals. Ifhumanity’s ancestors lived in an environment that favored those who lived in groups, then over time those who affili-ated would gradually outnumber those who were self-reliant loners. Note, too, that one’s genetic endowment inter-acts with the environment, and so not all individuals who are genetically predisposed to affiliate or remain alone willdo so (see, for example, person I).

66 CHAPTER 3

supports the evolutionary argument. Anthropologistshave documented the great diversity of human socie-ties, but across all these variations, they have foundone constancy: People live in groups rather thanalone (Mann, 1988). Careful analysis of the artifactsleft behind by prehistoric humans—primarilybones and stone implements—suggest that evenancient humans lived in groups (Caporael, 2007).Other primates, such as chimpanzees and bonobos,also live in small groups with dynamics of inclusionand exclusion that are similar to those seen in hu-man groups (de Waal, 2006). The young of thespecies instinctively form strong emotional bondswith their caregivers, and babies who are deprivedof close human contact have higher mortality rates(Bowlby, 1980). Humans are also consistently co-operative in their dealings with other people, solong as these other people are members of a groupto which they belong and not outsiders. As thenext section of this chapter notes, cooperativegroup life is a more stable strategy in evolutionaryterms than competition and individualism (Axelrod& Hamilton, 1981).

Evolutionary explanations of social behaviorremain controversial, however. Researchers areonly now subjecting the theory to close scrutiny,so its assumptions should be considered skeptically.The theory is difficult to test experimentally, andits basic premise—that characteristics that enhanceour fitness have a genetic basis—is arguable.Just because groups are useful does not mean thatpeople are instinctively drawn to them (Francis,2004). The theory also requires an accurate under-standing of humanity’s evolutionary past, butthe fossil record of prehistoric humans is a meagerone (Festinger, 1983). Moreover, even if peopleare gregarious by instinct, other factors alsoplay a role in determining decisions to join orleave a group. Childhood experiences, for exam-ple, influence who prefers groups membershipsand who does not (Harlow & Harlow, 1966).Nonetheless, the evolutionary approach offers acompelling answer to the question, “Why do peo-ple seek out other people?” We instinctively valuethe contribution that a group can make to ourgenetic destiny (Caporael, 2007).

FROM INDIV IDUAL ISM

TO COLLECT IV ISM

Brian Palmer and Joe Gorman, like most humanbeings, were members of many groups. Theyboth had families and in their free time they relaxedwith their children and spouses. When working,they spent most of their time with a relatively smallgroup of fellow employees. They also belonged toan assortment of other groups and associations, suchas cliques of friends, country clubs, professional as-sociations, church congregations, political parties,and so on. But Palmer and Gorman viewed theirmemberships very differently. Palmer remainedever mindful of his personal needs and interests.He joined groups, but he never put the group’sneeds above his own. Gorman, in contrast, wasless concerned with his own gains than he waswith the group’s outcomes. Unlike the self-centered Palmer, he was group-centered.

Palmer and Gorman personify the differences be-tween individualism and collectivism. Individualismis based on the independence of each individual.This perspective assumes that people are autono-mous and must be free to act and think in waysthat they prefer, rather than submit to the demandsof the group. Each person is also unique—a trueindividual—and all people are encouraged to striveto achieve outcomes and goals that will personallybenefit them. Collectivism recognizes that humangroups are not mere aggregations of independent in-dividuals, but complex sets of interdependent actorswho must constantly adjust to the actions and reac-tions of others around them. Each person, if evenrecognized as an independent entity, is inseparablyconnected to the group or community. Social exis-tence is centered on group relations, for it is the group

individualism A tradition, ideology, or personal outlookthat emphasizes the primacy of the individual and his or herrights, independence, and relationships with otherindividuals.collectivism A tradition, ideology, or personal orienta-tion that emphasizes the primacy of the group or com-munity rather than each individual person.


that creates social obligations based on respect, trust,and a sense of community. People are groupmembersfirst, individuals second (Lukes, 1973).

Individualism and collectivism are complex,multifaceted concepts, with no simple set of quali-ties that distinguishes one from another. Most treat-ments of these concepts agree, however, that thesetwo orientations differ in their emphasis on rela-tionships versus independence, on social obligationsversus personal freedom, and on how the self isviewed: as independent versus overlapping, inpart, with others’ selves. The following sections re-view these three elements, as well as cross-culturalvariations in individualism–collectivism. (For moredetailed analyses and very differing opinions on theissue of the core dimensions of individualism andcollectivism see Brewer & Chen, 2007; Chen &West, 2008; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis &Suh, 2002.)

Social Relations

When John Winthrop, the first governor ofMassachusetts Bay Colony, spoke to a gatheringof the men and women who were about to colo-nize America in 1630, he urged them to alwaysthink first of the group before they thought ofthemselves:

We must delight in each other, makeothers’ conditions our own, rejoyce to-gether, mourn together, labor and suffertogether, always having before our eyesour community as members of the samebody. (Winthrop, 1630/1667, p. 19).

Both individualism and collectivism recognize thehuman need for belonging and connection, but acollectivistic orientation puts more value on theserelationships. Collectivists feel close affinity withone another and, so, are more likely to adopt acommunal orientation to their groups (Moemeka,1998). They value their memberships in theirgroups more, consider these relationships to be sta-ble and long-lasting, and so are less willing to severtheir memberships. Individuals who are collectivistsseek jobs that will enhance the quality of their

relationships with other people, and their satisfac-tion with their work depends on the quality of theirrelationships with their coworkers. Independentschoose jobs that are personally fulfilling and thatoffer them opportunities for advancement (Leary,Wheeler, & Jenkins, 1986). Collectivists, comparedto individualists, have a more favorable attitude to-ward group-level rewards for collective work(Haines & Taggar, 2006), and they are more likelyto be corporate citizens who help coworkers ratherthan compete with them (Leung, 2008). Indi-vidualists stress their superiority over others onattributes that pertain to autonomy and indepen-dence, but collectivists think of themselves asmore relational and self-sacrificing than others(Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). Womenlean more toward collectivism, at least in Westerncultures, where women more often stress connec-tions with other people, whereas men tend to stressindependence and autonomy (Cross & Madson,1997; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Collectivists aremore firmly rooted to their communities: they re-port having moved less frequently than individual-ists (Oishi, Lun, & Sherman, 2007).

Exchange and Communal Relations Individua-lists and collectivists tend to differ in their overallconceptualization of relationships themselves, withindividualism associated with the exchange ofresources and collectivism focusing on sharing com-munal resources. Individuals in exchange relation-ships monitor their inputs into the group, strive tomaximize the rewards they personally receivethrough membership, and will become dissatisfiedif their group becomes too costly for them. Theyexpect to receive rewards in exchange for their in-vestment of time, energy, and other personal re-sources. If individuals cannot identify any personalbenefit from helping others in the group or com-munity, then they will not offer any help (Ratner &

exchange relationship An interpersonal association be-tween individuals based on each person’s desire to in-crease the rewards they receive from others in therelationship.

68 CHAPTER 3

Miller, 2001). In contrast, people in communalrelationships are more concerned with what theirgroup receives than with their own personal out-comes. When individuals work in communalgroups, they help fellow members more, prefer tothink of their work as a joint effort, and feel disap-pointed if other members insist on reciprocatingany help given (Clark et al., 1987). They are alsomore likely to consider the consequences of theiractions for others and are more diligent in makingsure that others’ needs are met (Mills et al., 2004).

Reciprocity This difference between an ex-change and communal orientation is particularlyclear when the group must allocate resources tomembers. Individualists think of their relationswith others as a “strictly economic exchange”(Fiske, 1992, p. 702). When faced with a commonresource pool or a project that requires combinedeffort individualists favor an evenly balanced, one-for-one exchange. They “often mark their relation-ship with very concrete operations of balancing,comparing, or counting-out items in one-for-onecorrespondence” (Fiske, 1992, p. 691). Their inter-actions also tend to be guided by the norm ofreciprocity. This norm enjoins members to payback in kind what others give to them. When thisnorm guides groups, members they cooperate withothers to pay back past favors and to create obliga-tions for future favors (Gouldner, 1960).

Collectivists, in contrast, are not so concernedwith equality of allocations or reciprocity. Whensharing a resource, group members would bemore likely to “take what they need and contributewhat they can, without anyone attending to howmuch each person contributes or receives. A persondoes not need to give something in order to getsomething in return—simple membership in the

group is sufficient to entitle one to the use of what-ever resources the group controls, and long-run im-balance is not a violation of the relationship” (Fiske,1992, p. 693).

Reciprocity becomes problematic when mem-bers of the groups do not share equally in the work,but nonetheless seek an equal share of the rewards(Leung, 1997). Whenever groups earn rewards orcover costs, a fair means must be developed to de-termine how these rewards and costs are distributedacross members. Imagine, for example, that yourgroup has earned a reward by winning a lotteryor must pay a fine because one of the group mem-bers accidentally broke something. The equitynorm recommends that group members should re-ceive outcomes in proportion to their inputs. If anindividual has invested a good deal of time, energy,money, or other types of inputs in the group, thenhe or she could expect to receive a good deal of thegroup payoff. Similarly, individuals who contributelittle should not be surprised when they receivelittle. The equality norm, on the other hand, re-commends that all group members, irrespective oftheir inputs, should be given an equal share of thepayoff. If your group includes all best friends, andcollectivism is high, members would likely favorallocating the winnings on an equal-share basis:All should benefit, even if just one of the groupmembers was the one who picked the winning lot-tery numbers. However, collectivists may also re-quire that the costs be borne more heavily by theindividual member who caused a problem, becausethe group as a whole must be protected againstinjury (Utz & Sassenberg, 2002). Individualism, incontrast, would favor an equity norm, because thecontributions of each member are recognized andrewarded (or punished).

Members do not, however, share with every-one—in many cases this communal orientation isstrictly reserved, for members of one’s own group.

communal relationship An interpersonal associationbetween individuals who are more concerned withwhat others get rather than what they themselvesreceive.norm of reciprocity A social standard that enjoins in-dividuals to pay back in kind what they receive fromothers.

equity norm A social standard that encourages distrib-uting rewards and resources to members in proportion totheir inputs.equality norm A social standard that encourages distrib-uting rewards and resources equally among all members.


Collectivists are more likely to divide the world upinto “us” and “we”—the ingroup—versus “them”and “they”—the outgroup. When individualiststhink about group membership, they consider it toconsist of relatively loose associations that are selectedby members and not the groups themselves.Collectivists, in contrast, define belonging as “be-longing securely,” and they tend to view boundariesbetween one group and another to be relatively im-permeable. Individualists are less likely to restricttheir relationships to the ingroup, and they aremore trusting of strangers than are collectivists.Collectivists spend more time in group interactions,and they are not as trusting of people who are notmembers of their groups (Fiske & Yamamoto, 2005).

Social Obligations

Long ago, the philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseausummed up the problem of collaboration ingroups in his story of the Stag Hunt. When agroup is hunting a stag everyone realizes thatthey must work together by staying at their postsin readiness should they flush a deer. But what if arabbit hops by, wondered Rousseau? Will not thehunter be tempted to head off in pursuit of therabbit, as it is easy prey to catch, but in doing solet down the group? The hunter who forgoes therabbit will have made the right choice—to coop-erate with the others—only if the others are alsocooperative. Should the others abandon their postsand seek rabbits too, then the group-oriented staghunter will come home with nothing (Skyrms,2004).

A collectivist orientation requires a willingnessto cooperate with others, and a degree of optimismthat these others are also committed more to thecommon good than to their own personal out-comes. Rousseau’s term for this assurance is thesocial contract, which he believed individuals

intuitively accept when they enter into cooperativearrangements with others, including groups, com-munities, and societies. Rousseau recognized thetension between collectivism and individualism,for as he explained, “What man loses by the socialcontract is his natural liberty and the absolute rightto anything that tempts him and that he can take;what he gains from the social contract is civil lib-erty” (1968, p. 65).

If the goals of the group perfectly matched theindividual members’ goals, then individualists andcollectivists would be indistinguishable. By helpingthe group prosper, the members help themselvesprosper. However, if members must choose be-tween maximizing their own personal goals orhelping their group reach its goals, then the self-interest of the individualists will prompt them tofurther their own ends. Individualists tend to beself-serving, or egocentric—they strive to extractall the resources they can, while minimizing theircontribution of personal resources. Collectivists, incontrast, are group-serving, or sociocentric—theystrive to increase the well-being of the communityas a whole (see Focus 3.3).

The collectivist is obligated, by the social con-tract, to have respect for those who hold positionsof authority and avoid disagreement or dissent(Schwartz, 1994, 2007). A group, to a collectivist,“binds and mutually obligates” each member(Oyserman et al., 2002, p. 5), and so the individualhas no right to create disagreement or to disruptconvened group proceedings. Collectivists prefer,in fact, acquiescence to disagreement and compro-mise to conflict. They carry out their duties withintheir groups, and the successful fulfillment of theirroles and responsibilities is the primary source ofself-satisfaction (Schwartz, 1994). Alan Fiske(1992, p. 701) suggests that groups need a system

social contract As described by Jean Jacques Rousseau,an agreement, often only implicitly recognized, that ob-ligates the individual to support the “general will” ofsociety as an “indivisible part of the whole.”

self-serving Emphasizing one’s own needs, perspective,and importance, particularly in contrast to those of otherindividuals or the group (egocentric).group-serving Emphasizing the group’s needs, perspec-tives, and importance, particularly in contrast to those ofindividual members or oneself (sociocentric).

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F o c u s 3.3 How Would You Split the “Pie” in the Ultimatum Game?

Two men who pull at the oars of a boat, do it by anagreement or convention, tho’ they have never givenpromises to each other.

—David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature

Here is the situation. You are taking part in a simplebargaining simulation called the Ultimatum Game. Youare paired with another person but you do not knowthe person’s identity except that he or she is a memberof your group. You have been allotted $20 (the “pie”)which you must share with your partner. You may of-fer your partner any portion of the $20—from 1¢ to$19.99—but your partner knows the size of the pie. Ifyour partner accepts your offer, the pie will be dividedjust as you proposed, but if your partner rejects your

offer no one gets any money at all. You cannot com-municate with your partner and you will not be given asecond chance if your partner turns you down.

How much will you offer? If you are motivatedsolely by profit, then you should offer very little toyour partner. Economically speaking, even if you onlyoffer $1 your partner should take it because $1, al-though much less than the $19 you will receive, is bet-ter than $0. Yet, when people play the UltimatumGame, they rarely offer or accept so little. People, onaverage, generally offer between 35% to 50% of thepie; in the example, between $7 and $10. People arealso quite willing to reject too low an offer, eventhough it means that they will receive nothing(Henrich et al., 2004). Both the person who offers and

(Continued)



of authority ranking “because stratification and rankdistinctions are essential to motivate people to per-form arduous duties in leadership roles and othercrucial but demanding positions.”

Whereas collectivists are enjoined to follow thedictates of social norms when making choices andselecting a course of action, individualists are guidedby their personal attitudes and preferences. Indi-vidualists are expected to act on the basis of theirattitudes, beliefs, and preferences; they believe theyhave the right to speak their minds and to disagreewith others (Triandis, 1996). Researchers illustratedthis contrast by asking people to complete a shortsurvey. Collectivists were more likely to complywith the survey takers’ request when they weretold that many other members of their group hadagreed to fill out the form, whereas individualistswere more compliant when they were remindedthat they had agreed to a similar request before(Cialdini et al., 1999).

Because of these differences in emphasis onduties versus personal rights, collectivistic groups

respond more negatively to group members whoviolate group norms, procedures, and authority.Their operating principle is, “The tall nail getspounded down.” Individualistic groups are morereserved in their reactions to nonconformityper se, for they assume that “the squeaky wheelgets the grease.” Thus, collectivists hold rule-breakers in contempt, whereas individualists tendto display anger toward those who disregard thegroup’s emphasis on autonomy by seeking to im-pose their will on others (Rozin et al., 1999).

Social Self

A communal orientation is not just about relation-ships and obligations (see Table 3.1). As peopleadopt a more other-centered orientation they alsochange the way they think about themselves.Unique, individualistic qualities—traits, beliefs,skills, and so on—constitute the personal identity.The social identity (or collective identity) includes

their partner recognize that a fair distribution is anearly equal one—selfishness may prompt a person towant to keep as much of the pie as they can, but theyrealize that their partner is willing to pay to make clearthe importance of fairness (Kameda, Takezawa, &Hastie, 2005).

Enterprising researchers have gathered data onresponses to the Ultimatum Game in dozens of indig-enous societies located around the world. As the re-sults in Figure 3.5 indicate, only one group averagedoffers of [According to Figure 3.5, the mean averagefor the Lamalera was 50%, not “more than 50%”] ofthe endowment: the Lamalera of East Indonesia. Thelowest offer was made by the Quichua of SouthAmerica. This variability, although pronounced, was

related to each group’s level of collectivism. Somecommunities stressed the importance of individualityand the family, whereas in others “one’s economicwell-being depends on cooperation with non-relatives” (Henrich et al., 2004, p. 29). These more co-operative communities tended to be more generous intheir allocations in the game, as were those societiesthat created more elaborate economic and social con-nections among various households. As for theLamalera: their high level of generosity reflects theirunique living conditions. The Lamalera are whalers,and traditionally the catch is divided equally among allmembers of the community—even those who did notparticipate in the hunt. The Lamalera are quintessen-tial collectivists.

F o c u s 3.3 (Continued)

Ultimatum Game An experimental bargaining situa-tion in which one individual, the allocator, must proposea division of a shared resource to other members; if theyreject the allocator’s proposal, no one receives any of theresource.

personal identity The “me” component of the self-concept that derives from individualistic qualities suchas traits, beliefs, and skills.social identity (or collective self ) The “we” componentof the self-concept that includes all those qualities atten-dant to relationships with other people, groups, andsociety.

72 CHAPTER 3

all those qualities that spring from membership ina vast array of social groups, including families,cliques, work groups, neighborhoods, tribes, cities,regions, and countries. The idea of a self as privateand highly personalized is more characteristic of anindividualistic outlook; in the collective identityview, some portion of the group becomes repre-sented in each member, so that their individualselves share some qualities in common. The personalidentity is the me of the self, and the social identity isthe we (Turner et al., 1987).

If asked to describe the self, an individualistlike Brian Palmer would likely mention his physi-cal qualities such as height, weight, and physicalappearance; enduring personality traits and beliefs;attitudes and interests; and personal goals and ex-periences (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001). Hewould be less likely to mention other people or hisrelations with them, because the self is consideredto be independent of others. The self of the collec-tivist, in contrast, includes all those qualities thatspring from his or her relationships with other peo-ple and group memberships.

Marilyn Brewer and her colleagues further dividethe group-level self into two components: the rela-tional self and the collective self (Brewer, 2007;Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996).Joe Gorman’s relational self is defined by his ties toother people; he is a father, a husband, an employee,

and a leader of his community. Gorman’s collectiveself is determined by his membership in larger groupsand categories; he is a Christian, a man, Irish, andresident of the city where he lives. Few people lacka relational self, for most are members of smallgroups such as friends and families. Collectivists, how-ever, are more likely to identify themselves in termsof their relational and collective selves, and they alsospend more time in activities related to these moregroup-level selves (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000;Gecas & Burke, 1995; Rhee et al., 1995; Thoits,1992).

Independents and Interdependents Most peo-ple’s selves are a combination of both personal andcollective elements, and so their view of themselvescan shift along the continuum from individualisticto collectivistic depending on the situation.People’s answers to the question, “Who am I?”will change to include more collectivistic elementsif they are first asked to imagine themselves in agroup or if they have just read texts that containmany plural pronouns such as we or us. Askingthem to think about how different they are fromothers, or reading texts with many I’s and me’s, incontrast, switches on the individualistic self(Oyserman & Lee, 2008).

People however, do vary by disposition in theirtendency to respond in an individualistic or a

T A B L E 3.1 Common Attributes of Individualism and Collectivism

Attribute Individualism Collectivism

Social relations Focus on establishing and maintaining rela-tionships that yield personal rewards withfew costs (exchange orientation); concernfor maintaining equity in relations withothers

Focus on fostering nurturing and harmoniousrelations with others with less emphasis onexchange (communal orientation); resourcesare distributed on the basis of need

Social obligations Individuals act to promote their own inter-ests before considering the needs of others;satisfaction comes from personal triumphs incompetition with others

Members are obliged to cooperate withothers in the pursuit of shared goals; concernfor group success; behavior is guided by groupnorms and roles

Social identity The independent self is based on one’spersonal, idiosyncratic characteristics; eachself is autonomous and unique

The interdependent self is based on group-level relationships, roles, and social identitiesrather than on individual personal qualities


collectivist way. Independents, or idiocentrics,are emotionally detached from their groups; theyput their own personal goals above the goals ofthe group (Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996;Triandis, 1995). They value equality, social justice,and self-reliance (Kashima et al., 1995; Triandiset al., 1990). Interdependents, or allocentrics, incontrast, put their groups’ goals and needs abovetheir own (Markus et al., 1996; Triandis, 1995).They are respectful of other members of theirgroups, and they value their memberships in groups,their friendships, and traditions.

Individuation in Groups Individuals who aremore independent than interdependent also tend tostress their unique, unusual qualities. One measure ofthe tendency to set oneself apart from other people—the Individuation Scale—asks people to indicate theirwillingness to engage in attention-getting behaviors,such as self-disclosure and nonconformity (Maslach,Stapp, & Santee, 1985). People who score high onthe Individuation Scale report a greater frequency ofowning distinctive possessions (such as a special kindof car), having a unique self-expressive symbol (suchas a nickname), expressing unique opinions, criticiz-ing someone in front of others, making controversialstatements, and looking directly into someone’s eyeswhile talking to him or her. People scoring low onthe scale report a greater frequency of wearing thekind of clothes that others wear, owning standardpossessions, avoiding distinctive nicknames, avoidingaccessories or colors that get attention, controllingdistracting gestures, expressing popular opinions,agreeing with other people, not criticizing others,remaining quiet in a group, and avoiding eye contact.They are more likely to engage in conventional be-haviors and seek social acceptance. When these scalesare used in collectivistic societies, the respondents

distinguish between two forms of individuatingbehaviors: taking the lead and drawing attention tooneself. Taking the lead was considered to be slightlymore acceptable than drawing attention to oneself inone study of Japanese students (Kwan et al., 2002).

Optimal Distinctiveness Although interdepen-dent types of people are often contrasted with inde-pendent types, in all likelihood these two orientationsare continuous dimensions of personality that varyin their influence across time and situations. AsMarilyn Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theorysuggested, most people probably have at least threefundamental needs: the need to be assimilated by thegroup, the need to be connected to friends and lovedones, and the need for autonomy and differentiation.She hypothesized that individuals are most satisfied ifthey achieve optimal distinctiveness: Their uniquepersonal qualities are noted and appreciated, theyare emotionally bonded with intimates, and theyfeel similar to other group members in many respects(Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Brewer & Pickett,2002). Achieving a sense of uniqueness is as importantas satisfying the need to belong (Snyder & Fromkin,1980). This theory has implications for how groupmembers think about themselves and others, andwe will consider these self-processes in more detailin the final section of this chapter.

Variations in Collectivism

When the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville vis-ited the United States in the 1830s, he was struck byAmericans’ self-reliance and independence. He notedthey frequently joined together to achieve some col-lective goal, but even when they were working ingroups, they still took inordinate pride in their per-sonal autonomy and self-reliance. It seemed to himthat all Americans act as if they “owe no man

independent(or idiocentric) An individual who is dis-positionally predisposed to put his or her own personalinterests and motivations above the group’s interests andgoals.interdependent(or allocentric) An individual who isdispositionally predisposed to put the group’s goals andneeds above his or her own.

optimal distinctiveness theory A conceptual analysisproposed by Marilyn Brewer that assumes individualsstrive to maintain a balance between three basic needs:the need to be assimilated by the group, the need to beconnected to friends and loved ones, and the need forautonomy and differentiation.

74 CHAPTER 3

anything and hardly expect anything from anybody.They form the habit of thinking of themselves in iso-lation and imagine that their whole destiny is in theirown hands” (de Tocqueville, 1831/1969, p. 508). Heused the word individualism to capture this uniquelyAmerican spirit of self-reliance (Lukes, 1973).

Cultural Differences The view of people as inde-pendent, autonomous creatures may be peculiar toWestern society’s individualistic leanings. When re-searchers measured the relative emphasis on the indi-vidual and the group in countries all around theworld, they found that the United States, otherEnglish-speaking countries (e.g., England, Australia),and Western European countries (e.g., Finland,Germany) tended to be more individualistic thanAsian, Eastern European, African, and MiddleEastern countries (Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman et al.,2002). Latin and South American countries weremore varied, with such countries as Puerto Ricoand Chile exhibiting greater individualism thanothers (e.g., Mexico, Costa Rica).

The Gahuku-Gama of Highland New Guinea,for example, do not recognize individuals apartfrom their roles as father, mother, chief, and soon. They do not even grasp the concept of friend-ship, for such a concept requires liking betweentwo individuals (Read, 1986). The Akaramas ofPeru paint their bodies so elaborately that indivi-duals are unrecognizable. Tribes sleep in same-sexgroups of 10 or 12, and when individuals die, theirpassing goes unnoticed (Schneebaum, 1969).Students in the United States, more than studentsin China, assume that people’s behaviors are causedby personality traits rather than by factors in thesituation (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997).

People from individualistic and collectivisticcultures even insult one another differently.Personal insults, such as “You are stupid,” charac-terize conflicts in individualistic cultures, whereasremarks about one’s family and group typify dis-putes between two collectivists (Semin & Rubini,1990). The very idea of self may differ across cul-tures. In Japan, a relatively collectivistic culture,the word for self, jibun, means “one’s portion ofthe shared space” (Hamaguchi, 1985). To the

Japanese, “the concept of a self completely inde-pendent from the environment is very foreign,” aspeople are not perceived apart from the existingsocial context (Azuma, 1984, p. 973).

Harry Triandis and his colleagues illustrated thisdifference by asking people from various countriesto describe themselves. As expected, these self-descriptions contained more references to rolesand relationships when people were from collectiv-istic countries (e.g., Japan, China). Some individualsfrom the People’s Republic of China describedthemselves exclusively in interpersonal terms.And some U.S. residents used only personaldescriptors—they reported no elements of a col-lective self (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990; cf.Oyserman et al., 2002). Other research has sug-gested that people from collectivistic countriesresist describing their qualities if the social contextis not specified. Japanese, for example, describedthemselves differently when they were with differ-ent people and in different social situations.Americans, in contrast, described themselves simi-larly across different situations (Cousins, 1989).

These observations are only generalities, how-ever, for people within a culture may not adopt theirhome country’s orientation. Triandis and his collea-gues (2001) found that about 60% of the people incollectivistic cultures are interdependent types, just asabout 60% of the people in individualistic culturesare independent types. They also reported that inter-dependent individuals in individualistic countriestend to join more groups, but that independent in-dividuals in collectivistic cultures “feel oppressed bytheir culture and seek to leave it” (Triandis & Suh,2002, p. 141). Each culture, too, likely expresses itscollectivism and individualism in unique ways. Somecollectivistic cultures, for example, are much morehierarchically structured (vertical) than others, likethe culture of India with its caste system, which stres-ses tradition, duty, and compliance with authority.Other collectivistic cultures, however, stress com-monality, and so their society’s status and authoritystructures are relatively flat (horizontal). Some collec-tivistic societies also tolerate considerable conflictwithin their groups. Members of Israeli kibbutzes,for example, often engage in heated debates, whereas


Koreans strive for harmony and avoid discord. Bothcultures are relatively collectivistic, yet their ap-proaches to resolving disputes differ substantially(Triandis, 1995, 1996). In contrast, Scandinavians areextremely individualistic, but they are also noncom-petitive (Fiske, 2002). It may be that the dichotomybetween individualism and collectivism reflects, inpart, the cognitive biases of the Western theoristswho first proposed this distinction (Fiske, 2002;Gaines et al., 1997).

Regional and Ethnic Differences Classifyingentire cultures along a continuum from individual-istic to collectivistic also overlooks significant varia-tions across subgroups within a culture and acrossindividuals within a culture (Miller, 2002). In theUnited States, for example, certain areas are moreindividualistic, whereas others are more collectivistic(Vandello & Cohen, 2004). Communalism is prom-inent in the south of the United States, which re-mains more rural, agricultural, and hierarchicallystructured than the rest of the country. Whenpolled, its residents were more likely to agree tosuch statements as, “It is better to fit in with peoplearound you,” and “It is more important to be a coop-erative person who works well with others.” Indi-viduals living in the western portions of the UnitedStates, where the frontier, pioneer tradition stressesself-reliance, are more individualistic. Residents ofthis part of the country felt that “It is better to conductyourself according to your own standards, even if thatmakes you stand out,” and “It is more important to bea self-reliant person able to take care of oneself ”(Vandello & Cohen, 1999, p. 285).

Ethnic groups in the United States also exhibitremarkable variations in individualism and collectiv-ism. When Oyserman and her colleagues (2002)combined the findings obtained across a number ofstudies they found that Asian Americans tended to bemore collectivistic than European Americans, butthat Japanese and Koreans are more similar toEuropean Americans than were the more collectivis-tic Chinese Americans. Hispanic Americans did notdiffer from European Americans in their level of in-dividualism, but they were more collectivistic. Eventhough Afrocentric cultural traditions, like those

emphasized in the African American celebration ofKwanzaa, stress strong family ties and mutual help,the researchers discovered that African Americanstended to score higher than European Americanson measures of individualism and lower thanEuropean Americans on measures of collectivism.

Generational Differences Entire generations ofindividuals living in a given culture may also displayoverall differences in individualism and collectivism.Robert Putnam (2000) notes that the generation ofAmericans born during the first portion of the 20thcentury were so willing to sacrifice for the collectivegood that they were dubbed the Greatest Generation.Their children—the Baby Boomers born after theSecond World War—displayed a strong work ethic,but their commitment to their employers meant thatthey had less time to donate to volunteer activities.Gen-Xers, born between 1965 and 1980 or so, and themost recent generation, variously labeled Gen-Y, theMillennials, and theMe Generation, are characterized bystronger needs for autonomy, individualism, confir-mation, and support. Jean Twenge (2006), in herbook Generation Me, maintains that the youngest gen-eration to join the workforce is more individualisticthan any previous one. Members of this generationare more interested in gratifying their personal needs,less likely to be concerned with the recommendationsof authority and less likely to follow social rules.

FROM PERSONAL IDENT ITY

TO SOCIAL IDENT ITY

Brian Palmer and Joe Gorman would probably havevery different answers to the question, “Who areyou?” Palmer, the individualist, might answer “I’mBrian Palmer” and then list his accomplishments, hispersonal qualities, and his goals. Gorman, the collec-tivist, would talk about his family, his community,and his hometown. But how does a group become apart of one’s social identity? What impact does thisacceptance of the group into one’s identity haveon one’s self-concept and self-esteem? In this finalsection we consider one compelling theoretical ans-wer to these questions: social identity theory. (For

76 CHAPTER 3

detailed analyses of groups and identity, seeAshmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004;Hogg, 2005; Roccas et al., 2008).

Social Identity Theory: The Basics

Henri Tajfel, John Turner, and their colleaguesoriginally developed social identity theory, orSIT, in an attempt to understand the causes ofconflict between groups. To investigate this pro-cess, they created the most minimal of groups—just gatherings of people with no history, nofuture together, and no real connection to oneanother. They planned to add elements to thisminimal intergroup situation to identify whenconflict began to erupt between groups. So, theyrandomly assigned participants to one of twogroups, but they told the participants that the di-vision was based on some irrelevant characteristic,such as art preference. Next, the participants weregiven a series of booklets asking them to decidehow a certain amount of money should be allo-cated to other participants in the experiment. Thenames of the individuals were not given in thebooklets, but the participant could tell whichgroup a person belonged to by looking at his orher code number.

Tajfel and Turner’s research revealed a system-atic bias even in this minimal intergroup situation.Participants did not know one another, they wouldnot be working together in the future, and theirmembership in the so-called group had absolutelyno personal or interpersonal implications. Yet, theyfavored the ingroup over the outgroup, and this biaspersisted even though (1) members of the samegroup never interacted face-to-face, (2) the identities

of ingroup and outgroup members were unknown,and (3) no one gained personally by granting moreor less money to any particular person (Tajfel &Turner, 1979, 1986). How could these “purely cog-nitive” groups—groups that had no interpersonalmeaning whatsoever—nonetheless influence peo-ple’s perceptions and actions? Social identity theory’sanswer: Two cognitive processes—categorization andidentification—combine to transform a group mem-bership into an identity (Abrams et al., 2005;Hogg, 2005; Oyserman, 2007).

Self-Categorization Social identity theory isbased, fundamentally, on the process of social cat-egorization. As noted briefly in Chapter 2, peoplequickly and automatically classify other people intosocial categories: if we met Joe Gorman on the streetwe would rapidly slot him into such social groupingsas man, middle-aged, American, and white, for ex-ample. And once categorized, our perceptions ofGorman would be influenced by our beliefs aboutthe qualities and characteristics of the prototypicalAmerican, middle-aged white man. These beliefs,which are termed prototypes or stereotypes, de-scribe the typical characteristics of people in varioussocial groups. They also include information abouthow a group is different from other groups (the me-tacontrast principle).

People do not, however, only categorize otherpeople; they also classify themselves into variousgroups and categories. Joe Gorman would realizethat he is a man, an American, white, and middle-aged—that he belongs in these social categories. Hemight then apply stereotypes about the people in thosecategories to himself. Gorman might, for example,believe that the prototypical American man his agetends to act as a leader, is involved in business outsidethe home, is logical and objective in his thinking, anddoes not get his feelings hurt easily (Broverman, et al.,social identity theory A theoretical analysis of group

processes and intergroup relations that assumes groupsinfluence their members’ self-concepts and self-esteem,particularly when individuals categorize themselves asgroup members and identify with the group.minimal intergroup situation A research proceduredeveloped by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in theirstudies of intergroup conflict that involved creating tem-porary groups of anonymous, unrelated people.

social categorization The perceptual classification ofpeople, including the self, into categories.prototypes (or stereotypes) A socially shared set ofcognitive generalizations (e.g., beliefs, expectations)about the qualities and characteristics of the typical mem-ber of a particular group or social category.


1972). Then, through self-stereotyping, Gormanwouldalsoapply those stereotypes tohimself andwouldcome to believe that he, like most American men hisage, leads rather than follows, is engaged in his work,bases his decisions on logical analysis, and is emotionallytough (Abrams &Hogg, 2001; Mackie, 1980).

Identification Most people belong to manygroups and categories, but many of these membershipshave no influence on their social identities. Gormanmay be a right-hander, a Democrat, and brown-eyed,but he has never given much thought to these cate-gories. Only some of his memberships, such as hisinvolvement with the town council and his team ofcolleagues at work, are core elements of his sense ofself. He identifies with these social categories, and soaccepts the group as an extension of himself. He alsoknows that the other group members similarly iden-tify with the group, and so they too possess the quali-ties that qualify them for membership in the group. AsMichael Hogg (2004, p. 136), a leading theorist andresearcher in the area of social identity, explains:

They identify themselves in the same wayand have the same definition of who theyare, what attributes they have, and how they

relate to and differ from specific outgroupsor from people who are simply not ingroupmembers. Group membership is a matter ofcollective self-construal—we, us, and them.

As social identification increases, individualscome to think that their membership in the groupis personally significant. They feel connected andinterdependent with other members, are glad theybelong to the group, feel good about the group, andexperience strong attachment to the group. Theirconnection to the group also becomes more affec-tively toned—a “hot” cognitive reaction rather thana “cold” recognition of membership—as individualsincorporate the group into their social identity, “to-gether with the value and emotional significanceattached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981,p. 255). Their self-descriptions also become increas-ingly depersonalized as they include fewer idiosyncraticelements andmore characteristics that are common tothe group. As indicated by Figure 3.6, the sense of selfchanges as the group is, literally, included in the self(Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 2002).

Self and Identity Research suggests that in somecases, identification with a group is so great that across

self-stereotyping (or autostereotyping) Acceptingsocially shared generalizations about the prototypicalcharacteristics attributed to members of one’s group asaccurate descriptions of oneself.

social identification Accepting the group as an exten-sion of the self, and therefore basing one’s self-definitionon the group’s qualities and characteristics.

78 CHAPTER 3


situations people think of themselves as group mem-bers first and individuals second, and, within their selfconcept, their personal idiosyncratic qualities are faroutnumbered by their group-level qualities (Phinney& Ong, 2007). More typically, however, the self willshift from me to we if something in the situation in-creases the salience of one’s membership. Individualswho find that they are the only representative of aparticular group—for example, the only man ina group of five women, or the only left-hander in aclass of otherwise all right-handers—may suddenlybecome very aware of that aspect of themselves(McGuire & McGuire, 1988). People who feel thatthey are being uniquely scrutinized by other peopleare more likely to think of themselves as individualsthan as group members (Mullen, Rozell, & Johnson,1996).

One of the most important situational triggers ofa collective self-representation is the presence ofmembers of the outgroup. As Tajfel and Turner(1986) confirmed in their initial studies of the mini-mal intergroup situation, categorization and iden-tification become more likely when one groupencounters another group. For example, if 10 menare seated in a room, they may not think of them-selves as men, but when a group of 10 women entersthe room then their sense of membership in thecategory man is activated.

Researchers have also confirmed that individualssometimes generalize from their stereotypes abouttheir groups to themselves. Children as young asfive years of age, when their identity as boys and girlsis made salient, are more likely to describe themselvesin stereotypical ways (Bennett & Sani, 2008). Whenwomen in sororities rated themselves and otherwomen in their sorority on traits often ascribed tosorority women (e.g., popular, well-dressed, con-ceited, shallow, spoiled), they gave themselves andtheir group nearly identical ratings—the correlationbetween self-rating and group rating was .98(Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996). In groups that in-cluded both men and women, men’s self-descriptionsemphasized their masculinity and women’s their fem-ininity only when a disagreement had split membersalong sex lines—men taking one side in the argumentand the women the other (Hogg & Turner, 1987).

Another group-level determinant of self-categorization is the relative size of one’s group com-pared to other groups. People in groups with fewermembers, such as minority groups based on ethnic-ity, race, or religion, tend to categorize themselves asmembers more quickly than do those people whoare members of the larger, dominant, majoritygroup. The experience of being in the minority ap-parently increases the salience of the social identitybased on that membership, and so people are morelikely to apply the stereotypical features of the mi-nority group to themselves. Researchers informedsome participants that a survey they had just com-pleted suggested that they were extraverted and thatonly 20% of the general population is extraverted.These individuals then gave themselves higher rat-ings on such traits as sociable and lively than did peoplewho were told that 80% of the population is extra-verted (Simon & Hamilton, 1994).

Motivation and Social Identity

Social identity theory provides key insights into ahost of psychological and interpersonal processes, in-cluding collectivism, perceptions of the outgroup,presumptions of ingroup permeability, tolerance ofdeviance within the group, increased satisfactionwith the group, and feelings of solidarity (Kenworthyet al., 2008; Leach et al., 2008). Later chapters willelaborate on the further implications of this theory,but here we conclude this chapter by considering therole social identityprocessesplay inhelping individualsprotect andmaintain their sense of self-worth.

Evaluating the Self Michael Hogg (2005) sug-gests that at least two basic motives influence theway social categorization and identification pro-cesses combine to shape one’s sense of self. In gen-eral, individuals are motivated to think well ofthemselves, and since their groups comprise a sig-nificant portion of their selves, they maintain theirself-worth by thinking well of their groups.Second, Hogg suggests that self-understanding is acore motive for most people, and that groups offerpeople a means of understanding themselves.

When individuals join groups, their self-conceptbecomes connected to that group, and the value of


that group influences their feelings of personalworth. People who belong to prestigious groupstend to have higher self-esteem than those who be-long to stigmatized groups (so long as they are notreminded that their group’s revered social position isundeserved; Branscombe, 1998). Sports fans’ moods

swing up and down as their favorite team wins andloses. After a loss, they feel depressed and rate them-selves more negatively; but after a win, they feelelated and rate themselves more positively (seeFocus 3.4). Adolescent boys and girls are known toseek out membership in a particular peer group, and

F o c u s 3.4 Can Social Identity Theory Explain Sports Fans?

You may glory in a team triumphant, but you fall inlove with a team in defeat. Losing after great striving isthe story of man, who was born to sorrow, whosesweetest songs tell of the saddest thought.

–Roger Kahn (1973), The Boys of Summer

Fan derives from a slightly longer word: fanatic. A fa-natic is one who engages in extreme, unreasonabledevotion to an idea, philosophy, or practice. Similarly,the die-hard sports fan displays great devotion to ateam, with emotions rising and falling with the team’saccomplishments. Fans are not actually members of theteams they support. They are only watching the gamesfrom the sidelines, and no action they take affects theoutcome. Yet they often seem to be very closely con-nected psychologically to their teams. They are happywhen their team wins, but after a loss, fans experiencea range of negative emotions: anger, depression, sad-ness, hopelessness, and confusion (Platow et al., 1999;Wann et al., 1994). Moreover, the “agony of defeat”appears to be more psychologically profound than the“thrill of victory.” One team of researchers found thatfans’ moods became more positive after their teamwon, but the rise in positive affect did not match thedrop in mood following failure. The impact of a loss wasso great that they concluded the costs of fanship out-weigh the benefits (Hirt et al., 1992).

Social identity theory offers insight into this oddbut exceedingly common group behavior (Mael &Ashforth, 2001). Sports fans identify with their teamand so experience the team’s outcomes as their own.When the team wins, they can share in that victory.They experience a range of positive emotions, includ-ing pride, emotion, happiness, and even joy, and theycan gloat over the failure of their rivals. They can,when interacting with other people, bask in reflectedglory, or BIRG, by stressing their association with thesuccessful group, even though they have contributedlittle to that success (Cialdini et al., 1976; End et al.,2002). They also experience a host of positiveinterpersonal benefits from supporting a specific

team—particularly a local one (Wann, 2006). Fans whosupport the same team may spend considerable time inenjoyable shared activities and from that group expe-rience gain social support, a sense of belonging, andenhanced overall well-being.

But what if their team should lose? Casual fanscan just downplay the loss by switching their allegianceto some other team: cutting off reflected failure, orCORFing (Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983). Dedicatedfans, whose homes are decorated with team insignia,who wear the team’s colors, and who have based muchof their sense of self on their loyalty to the team, can-not CORF. Their team’s loss will be their loss (St. John,2004). But these die-hard fans can and do rely on avariety of psychological and social tactics to ease thepain of the loss. They may blame their failure on ex-ternal factors, such as field conditions or the referee.They may spend time talking about past successes, andconvince one another that better times lie ahead. Theycan take solace in their failure collectively, and mourntheir group’s loss together. They may also take pridein other aspects of their team, such as its sportsman-ship or esprit de corps (Wann, 2006). They may evenvent their frustration by acting violently; fans havebeen known to attack the supporters of otherteams, with fatal outcomes (Doosje, Ellemers, &Spears, 1999).

Fanship, like many social identities, comes with arisk—identifying with a group whose outcomes onecannot control means that one will encounter the joy ofvictory, but also the agony of a shared defeat. That de-spair can be profound: Suicide rates tend to rise and fallwith the success of the local college sports team—atleast in some college towns known for strong fan alle-giance (Joiner, Hollar, & Van Orden, 2006). However,victory can bring great elation. Fewer people committedsuicide on the day the U.S. Olympic Hockey Team beatthe Russian national team (February 22, 1980) than hadon that date from 1972 to 1989. Whereas failure mayset the stage for collective misery, a team victory may bethe “sweetest song of all” (Kahn, 1973).

80 CHAPTER 3

these group memberships influence their identity andtheir self-esteem. One team of researchers, after re-viewing over 40 studies of such adolescent peergroups, identified four cliques as the most common,and labeled them the elites, athletes, academics, anddeviants (Sussman et al., 2007). Those who are mem-bers of the most prestigious groups generally reportfeeling very satisfied with themselves and their group.Those students who want to be a part of an “incrowd” but are not accepted by this clique are themost dissatisfied (Brown & Lohr, 1987), and this in-terpersonal failure can lead to long-term negative ef-fects (Barnett, 2007; Wright & Forsyth, 1997).

Jennifer Crocker and her colleagues examinedthe relationship between people’s self-esteem andtheir feelings about the groups to which they be-longed by developing a measure of collectiveself-esteem. Instead of asking people if they feltgood or bad about themselves, they asked individualsto evaluate the groups to which they belonged.Drawing on prior work on social identity and self-

esteem, the researchers developed items that tappedfour basic issues: membership esteem, private collec-tive self-esteem, public collective self-esteem, andimportance to identity (see Table 3.2). When theycompared scores on the collective self-esteem scaleto scores on more traditional measures of self-esteem, they found that people with high member-ship esteem and public and private collectiveself-esteem scores had higher personal self-esteem,suggesting that group membership contributes tofeelings of self-worth (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990;Crocker et al., 1994; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

Even membership in a group that others maynot admire is generally associated with higher levelsof self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989). Adolescentswith mental retardation do not necessarily havelower self-esteem, even though they know they be-long to the negatively stereotyped social category“special education students” (Stager, Chassin, &Young, 1983). African Americans, despite living ina culture where stereotypes about their group tend tobe negative, have higher self-esteem than EuropeanAmericans (Twenge & Crocker, 2002). Members ofgroups that are criticized often respond by defendingtheir group and reaffirming their commitment to it(Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998). So long as individualsbelieve that the groups they belong to are valuable,they will experience a heightened sense of personalself-esteem (Crocker et al., 1994).

Sometimes, in fact, members of a group will ac-cept, and apply to themselves and to other members

T A B L E 3.2 Items from the Collective Self-Esteem Inventory

Subscale Issue Example Item

MembershipEsteem

Am I a valuable or an ineffective member ofthe groups to which I belong?

I am a worthy member of the social groups Ibelong to.

Private CollectiveSelf-Esteem

Do I evaluate the groups I belong topositively or negatively?

I feel good about the social groups I belong to.

Public CollectiveSelf-Esteem

Do other people evaluate the groups Ibelong to positively or negatively?

In general, others respect the social groupsthat I am a member of.

Identity Are the groups I belong to an important orunimportant part of my identity?

In general, belonging to social groups is animportant part of my self-image.

SOURCE: “A Collective Self-Esteem Scale: Self-Evaluation of One’s Social Identity” by R. Luhtanen and J. Crocker, Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 18, 1992.

collective self-esteem A person’s overall assessment ofthat portion of their self-concept that is based on theirrelationships with others and membership in socialgroups.basking in reflected glory (BIRGing) Seeking director indirect association with prestigious or successfulgroups or individuals.cutting off reflected failure (CORFing) Distancingoneself from a group that performs poorly.


of their group, stereotypical qualities that are negativerather than positive. A professor who arrives for classa few minutes late and admits that he left behindall the papers he was to return that day to his class,mumbles something about being an “absent-mindedprofessor.” A fair-haired young woman who com-plains about the amount of statistical information dis-cussed in a class opines, “I’m just a blonde–I don’treally like math.” Such negative in group stereotypinghas been shown to protect individuals’ feelings of self-worth. Women who had just discovered they haddone poorly on a math test, when reminded of thestereotype of women as weak at math had higherself-esteem than those in a control condition. A secondstudy indicated that it was women with higher self-esteem who embraced the stereotype after failurerather than women with lower self-esteem (Burkley& Blanton, 2008). These studies suggest that a socialidentity can protect the self, even if the identity is onethat includes qualities that are objectively negativeones (Simon, Glässner-Bayerl, & Stratenwerth, 1991).

Protecting the Collective Self When indivi-duals identify with their group, they also tend toexaggerate the differences between their groupand other groups. Once people begin to think interms of we and us, they also begin to recognizethem and they. The tendency to look more favorablyon the ingroup is called the ingroup–outgroupbias. Gang members view their group more posi-tively than rival gangs. Teammates praise their ownplayers and derogate the other team. If Group Aand Group B work side by side, members of Awill rate Group A as better than B, but membersof B will rate Group B more favorably than A.

The ingroup–outgroup bias often intensifies con-flicts between groups (see Chapter 14), but it alsocontributes to the self-esteem and emotional well-being of group members. Social identity theory positsthat people are motivated to maintain or enhance

their feelings of self-worth, and because members’self-esteem is linked to their groups, their feelings ofself-worth can be enhanced by stressing the relativesuperiority of their groups to other groups.

Even if the group falters, members can none-theless find ways to protect the group and, in sodoing, protect their own selves. A setback, particu-larly at the hands of another group, calls for socialcreativity: Group members compare the ingroupto the outgroup on some new dimension. Membersof a last-placed ice hockey team (1 win and 21losses), when asked if their team and their oppo-nents were aggressive, dirty, skilled, and motivated ad-mitted that their opponents were more skilled, butthey also argued that their opponents were moreaggressive and that they played dirty (Lalonde,1992). When emergency medical technicians(EMTs) were told that their group had performedmore poorly than another group of EMTs, theylater claimed their group members had nicer per-sonalities (Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001). Hospitalemployees, when asked to evaluate their hospitaland a second hospital that was larger and betterequipped, gave the other hospital higher ratings onsuch variables as community reputation, challenge,and career opportunity, but claimed that their hos-pital was a better place to work because everyonegot along better (Terry & Callan, 1998).

Protecting the Personal Self People protecttheir collective self-esteem just as they protect theirpersonal self-esteem. They deny that their grouppossesses negative qualities. They consider theirgroup to be superior to alternative groups. Theygive their group credit for its successes, but blameoutside influences when their group fails. Shouldother, more rewarding groups stand willing andready to take them in, individuals remain loyalto their original group. Identity is the glue thatbinds individuals to their groups (Van Vugt &Hart, 2004).

ingroup–outgroup bias The tendency to view the in-group, its members, and its products more positively thanother groups, their members, and their products. Ingroupfavoritism is more common than outgroup rejection.

social creativity Restricting comparisons between theingroup and other groups to tasks and outcomes wherethe ingroup is more successful than other groups andavoiding areas in which other groups surpass the ingroup.

82 CHAPTER 3

However, there are limits to what individualswill tolerate. In some cases, individuals strive to re-sist being seen as a member of a group to whichthey belong, particularly if they do not wish tohave the stereotypes about that group applied tothem personally. A college professor may not wishto be labeled absent-minded, a blonde-hairedwoman may prefer to be recognized for her scien-tific acumen rather than her sense of fashion, and aman may wish to be considered sensitive and caringrather than sports-oriented. When such individualsenter into situations where they are at risk of beingjudged on the basis of stereotypes that they wish toresist, they may experience stereotype threat.They worry that they might confirm the stereotypesthat others may be tempted to apply to them. As aresult, they fail to perform as well as they could, andthe stereotype becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy(Steele & Aronson, 1995).

In general, people are more disturbed by threatsto their personal self-esteem than to their collectiveself-esteem. They are more likely to deny the accu-racy of negative individualized information relativeto negative group information, and they more read-ily claim positive feedback when it focuses on them

rather than on their group. For example, an individ-ual, if told “you did very poorly—you must beslow” or “you are excessively moody,” will reactmore negatively than a person who is part of agroup told “your group did very poorly—youmust be slow” or “people in your group are exces-sively moody” (Gaertner et al., 2002; Gaertner &Sedikides, 2005). Personal failure is more troublingthan collective failure, in most cases.

People will also turn away from a group thatcontinues to threaten their personal self-esteem.When people can choose the groups they belongto or identify with, they often shift their allegiances,leaving groups that are lower in status or prone tofailure and seeking membership in prestigious or suc-cessful groups (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002).The technical term for such a change in allegianceis individual mobility (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,1997). More common ways to describe this processinclude resigning, dropping out, quitting, breakingup, resigning, escaping, bailing, and ditching: themember leaves the group for a more promising one.As the analysis of group formation in Chapter 4shows, when people’s groups are too much trouble,they leave them in search of better ones.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

Do humans, by nature, seek solitude or inclusion ingroups?

1. Baumeister and Leary suggest that much ofhuman behavior is motivated by a basic needto belong. Solitude is sometimes rewarding, butmost adults prefer the company of others.

■ Most adults live with others, they spendmost of their time with others, and anenormous number of groups exist.

■ Putnam suggests that levels of social capitalare decreasing due to reductions ininvolvement in groups, but the shifts hedocuments may indicate changes in thekinds of associations people seek ratherthan a reduction per se.

2. People react negatively if excluded or isolatedfrom groups.

■ Participants in “life alone” studies con-ducted by Twenge, Baumeister, and othersindicate that the prospect of life alone

stereotype threat The anxiety-provoking belief thatothers’ perceptions and evaluations will be influencedby their negative stereotypes about one’s group whichcan, in some cases, interfere with one’s ability to performup to one’s capabilities.

individual mobility Reducing one’s connection to agroup in order to minimize the threats to individualself-esteem.


triggers a number of negative social andpsychological reactions in people.

■ Ostracism, or deliberate exclusion fromgroups, is highly stressful, as indicated byself-reports of negative affect as well asanalyses of brain activity.

3. Williams maintains that people respond bothreflexively and reflectively to ostracism andusually exhibit one of the freezing, fight-or-flight,or tend-and-befriend responses.

■ Extreme forms of violence, such as massshootings in schools, have been linked toostracism by groups.

■ Individuals also react negatively to exclu-sion from computer-mediated interaction,or cyberostracism.

4. The sociometer theory of self-esteem developedby Leary explains the relationship betweenexclusion and self-esteem by hypothesizing thatself-esteem provides individuals with feedbackabout their degree of inclusion in groups.

5. Evolutionary psychology suggests that the needto belong resulted from natural selection asindividuals who were affiliated with groupswere more likely to survive.

When do people embrace collectivism by putting thegroup’s needs before their own?

1. Individualism and collectivism are distinguishablein their relative emphasis on individuals andgroups, with individualism stressing the personand collectivism the group. These two orien-tations adopting differing orientations with re-gards to interpersonal relationships, obligations,and self-conceptions.

2. Fiske concludes collectivism’s emphasis onrelationships is manifested in the emphasis oncommunal relationships over exchange relationships.The norm of reciprocity and the norm of equityare more consistent with individualism. Thenorm of equality which is associated withcollectivism.

3. Social obligations, as described by Rousseau’sconcept of a social contract and illustrated in theUltimatum Game, are more central incollectivism.

■ Self-serving tendencies are more likely inindividualistic settings, in contrast to thegroup-serving tendencies seen in collectivis-tic settings.

■ A collectivistic orientation stresses hierar-chy and reacts more negatively tononconformity.

4. Self-concepts differ in individualistic and col-lectivistic contexts, with greater emphasis onpersonal identity in the former and greater em-phasis on social identity (or collective identity) inthe latter.

■ Brewer distinguishes between two group-level selves: the relational self and the col-lective self.

■ Individuals differ in the emphasis on thepersonal and collective selves, with inde-pendents stressing individualism and inter-dependents putting their groups’ goals andneeds above their own. Some indivi-duals, too, seek individuation when ingroups.

■ Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory sug-gests that individuals strive to maintain anoptimal balance between their personaland collective identities.

5. Cultures and subgroups within countries varyin their relative emphasis on individualism andcollectivism.

■ People who live in collectivistic cultures(e.g., Asian, Eastern European, African,and Middle Eastern countries) think ofthemselves as group members first andindividuals second, whereas people wholive in individualistic cultures (Westerncountries) are self-centered rather thangroup-centered (see research byTriandis).

84 CHAPTER 3

■ Some ethnic groups, such as AsianAmericans and Hispanic Americans, aremore collectivistic than individualistic, butresearch conducted by Twenge suggeststhat individuals may be shifting in a moreindividualistic direction.

What processes transform an individual’s sense of self intoa collective, social identity?

1. Social identity theory, developed by Tajfel,Turner, Hogg, and their colleagues, traces thedevelopment of a collective identity back to twokey processes (categorization and identification)that occur even in minimal intergroup situations.

2. Social categorization involves automatically clas-sifying people into categories.

■ Through self-categorization individualsclassify themselves into categories.

■ Self-stereotyping occurs when individualsapply the prototypes (stereotypes) of thosecategories to themselves.

3. Identification involves bonding with and takingon the characteristics of one’s groups.

■ When people identify strongly with agroup, their self-descriptions become in-creasingly depersonalized as they includefewer idiosyncratic elements and morecharacteristics that are common to thegroup (see Hogg’s research).

■ Identification and categorization becomemore likely when outgroups are salient andwhen people are members of smallergroups.

4. Self-esteem is shaped both by individuals’ per-sonal qualities and by the perceived value ofthe groups to which they belong.

■ Those who join prestigious groups oftenhave higher collective self-esteem than thosewho belong to less positively valued groups.

■ Individuals who identify strongly with agroup, such as sports fans, experience thegroup’s outcomes as their own.

■ By basking in reflected glory (BIRGing), indi-viduals can stress their association with suc-cessful groups. By cutting off reflected failure(CORFing), theyminimize their connectionto stigmatized or unsuccessful group identities.

5. Individuals are motivated to protect both theirindividual and collective self-esteem.

■ Members of stigmatized groups, failinggroups, or groups that are derogated bynonmembers often protect their collectiveself-esteem (as defined by Crocker and herassociates) by rejecting negative informa-tion about their group, stressing the rela-tive superiority of their group (the ingroup–outgroup bias), and selectively focusing ontheir group’s superior qualities (socialcreativity).

■ When stereotype threat is high, membersbecome concerned that they will bestereotyped if considered a member of aparticular group. Individuals may minimizetheir association with groups that are per-forming poorly or resign from the group(individual mobility).


Chapter Case: Palmer and Gorman■ Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment

in American Life, by Robert N. Bellah, RichardMadsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler,

and Steven M. Tipton (1985), uses detailedcases, including those of Palmer and Gorman,to describe the connection between individualsand their groups.


Inclusion, Exclusion, and Belonging■ “Ostracism,” by Kipling D. Williams (2007),

provides a theoretically driven description ofrecent empirical investigations into the natureand consequences of exclusion from groups forboth those who are excluded and those whodo the excluding.

■ “Evolutionary Theory for Social and CulturalPsychology,” by Linnda R. Caporael (2007),details the implications of an evolutionaryperspective for understanding groups and theirdynamics.

Individualism and Collectivism■ “Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism:

Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions andMeta-Analyses,” by Daphna Oyserman,Heather M. Coon, and Markus Kemmelmeier(2002), thoroughly explores the psychologicalimplications of individual and cultural differ-ences in individualism and collectivism, and isfollowed by a number of fascinating com-mentaries by experts in this area (Bond, 2002;Fiske, 2002; Kitayama, 2002; Miller, 2002).

■ “Where (Who) Are Collectives inCollectivism? Toward Conceptual Clarificationof Individualism and Collectivism,” by

Marilynn B. Brewer and Ya-Ru Chen (2007),reviews cross-cultural work on self-conception,with a focus on how the components of indi-vidualism and collectivism are assessed.

Social Identity■ “An Organizing Framework for Collective

Identity: Articulation and Significanceof Multidimensionality,” by RichardD. Ashmore, Kay Deaux, and TracyMcLaughlin-Volpe (2004), examines themultiple components of collective identity,concentrating on categorization, evaluation,importance, belonging, embeddedness,involvement, and meaning.

■ “The Social Identity Perspective,” by MichaelA. Hogg (2005), provides a compact butcomprehensive review of the basic theoreticalassumptions of social identity theory.

■ “Understanding the Positive Social Psycho-logical Benefits of Sport Team Identification:The Team Identification–Social PsychologicalHealth Model,” by Daniel L. Wann (2006),offers a theoretically grounded analysis of theidentification processes that sustain fans’ com-mitment to their teams.


86 CHAPTER 3


4

Formation

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Groups form through a combination ofpersonal, situational, and interpersonalprocesses. Formation depends on themembers themselves; some people aremore likely than others to join together,and when they do a group is born.Groups also come into existence whenthe press of environmental circum-stances pushes people together ratherthan keeping them apart. They alsospring up, sometimes unexpectedly,when people discover that they likeone another, and this attraction providesthe foundation for the development ofinterpersonal bonds.

■ Who joins groups?■ When do people seek out others?■ What processes generate bonds of

interpersonal attraction betweenmembers of groups?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Joining Groups

Personality

Men, Women, and Groups

Social Motivation

Anxiety and Attachment

Experience and Preference

Affiliation

Social Comparison

Downward (and Upward) SocialComparison

Social Support

Companionship

Attraction

Principles of Attraction

The Economics of Membership

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

87

✵

We can ask many questions about the artists whofounded impressionism. How did they settle themany conflicts that threatened their group? Whydid Manet become the group’s idol, Monet thegroup’s inspirational leader, and Edgar Degas themalcontent? How did the group counter the con-straints imposed by the status quo? But one ques-tion—perhaps the most basic of all—concerns thegroup’s origin. Why did it come into existence inthe first place? In 1858, Manet, Monet, and theothers were busy pursuing their careers indepen-dently. But by the late-1860s they had joined toform the most influential artists’ circle of all time.What were the circumstances that drove these in-dividuals to combine their resources in a group thatendured for more than 30 years?

This chapter answers this question in three parts.It begins with the artists themselves, for people’s per-sonalities, preferences, and prior experiences influ-ence the extent to which they seek out membershipin groups. Some are joiners and some are loners. Next,it considers the situation, for even a collection ofhighly sociable joiners must affiliate on at least oneoccasion before a group will form. Some situations

push people together; others keep them apart.Affiliation, however, only sets the stage for groupformation; if the individuals who find themselves to-gether are not attracted to each other, then a long-lasting group like the impressionists likely will notform. Some people like each other; some do not.

JO IN ING GROUPS

Monet and Vincent van Gogh were both brilliantartists, but Monet worked with others wheneverpossible and van Gogh kept to himself. Not every-one who joins a group is a “joiner,” and peoplewho prefer independence over association are notnecessarily “loners.” But due to differences in per-sonality, motivations, and past experiences somepeople, like Monet, are more likely than others toseek out membership in groups.

Personality

When Monet learned that Renoir, Bazille, andSisley were meeting each evening to discuss new

The Impressionists: The Group That Redefined Beauty

The group formed in Paris, France, in the early 1860s.Some of the group’s members—Frederic Bazille, ClaudeMonet, Auguste Renoir, and Alfred Sisley—were allyoung art students studying with Charles Gleyre.Others, such as Edouard Manet, had establishedreputations for being open-minded—if not radical—painters. Separately, they were just a few artists strug-gling to learn their craft, define their style, and earnenough to pay the bills. But when they joined togetherto form a group, they transformed themselves andtheir art, and in time they redefined the world’sconception of beauty (Farrell, 1982, 2001).

On the surface, they shared little in common. Somewere the sons of relatively wealthy families, but othershad working class backgrounds. Some were outgoingand confident, but others were quiet and uncertain.Some had been working at their craft for many years,but others were struggling to learn the basics. But theywere united in their belief that the state-supported

Academy of Fine Arts was too restrictive and rigid. TheAcademy alone determined which paintings and sculp-tures could be displayed at the national gallery, theSalon, and most artists acquiesced to the Academy’sguidelines. But this small group of renegade paintersshared a different vision. They wanted to capture thebeauty of everyday life; outdoor scenes and real peopleinstead of posed portraits and technically precise studiopaintings of religious, historical, and mythic scenes.

The young artists developed a new approach topainting, often journeying into the countryside to paintlandscapes. They sometimes painted side by side and cri-tiqued one another’s work. They alsomet in cafés in Paristo discuss technique, subject matter, and artistic philoso-phies. Art critics rejected their approach for years, andthe artists scarcely earned enoughmoney to survive. But,in time, they were recognized by the art community as anew school of painting—the impressionists—and theirpaintings are now worth millions.

88 CHAPTER 4

approaches to painting, he was quick to join thegroup. Why? Part of the answer lies in his basicpersonality. Monet, like all people, possessed certaintraits and dispositional characteristics that, taken to-gether, defined his personality. He was the kind ofperson who enjoyed being with other people, buthe was also very creative and unconventional.Some described him as egotistical, but most thoughthe was a warm, friendly person. Once he joined thegroup, he quickly became its leader.

Extraversion Researchers have studied hundredsof personality traits, but five of the most central onesare described in the aptly named Big Five theory ofpersonality. This theory recognizes that people differfrom each other in many ways, but it assumes thatthe five dimensions summarized in Table 4.1—extra-version, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuro-ticism, and openness—describe the most essentialways in which people vary (Costa & McCrae, 1988).

The first of these five dimensions, extraversion,is a particularly influential determinant of group be-havior (Asendorpf &Wilpers, 1998). First identifiedby the psychologist Carl Jung (1924), extraversion

is the tendency to move toward people or awayfrom people. Those on the introversion end of thispersonality dimension, the introverts, tend to bewithdrawn, quiet, reclusive, and shy. Their oppo-sites, the extraverts, are sociable, outgoing, gregari-ous, and talkative. Extraverts are likely to prefer thecompany of others, particularly in pleasant and en-joyable situations (Lucas & Diener, 2001). Differentcultures imbue introversion and extraversion withunique, culture-specific meaning, but people allover the world spontaneously appraise their ownand others’ social tendencies (Yang & Bond, 1990).

Extraverts may seek out groups because suchinteractions are stimulating, and extraverts appreci-ate stimulating experiences more than introverts do(Eysenck, 1990). Extraverts’ affinity for being partof a group may also be based on assertiveness, forthey tend to be influential group members ratherthan quiet followers. Groups may also seek out ex-traverts rather than introverts. Some qualities, likeintelligence, morality, and friendliness, are difficultto judge during initial encounters, but observers areparticularly good at detecting extraversion in others(Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988). If a group is

Big Five theory A conceptual model of the primarydimensions that underlie individual differences in person-ality; the five dimensions are extraversion, agreeableness,conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experi-ence; different theorists sometimes use different labels.

extraversion The degree to which an individual tendsto seek out social contacts. Introverts are oriented pri-marily toward inner perceptions and judgments of con-cepts and ideas, whereas extraverts are oriented primarilytoward social experiences.

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looking for people who will be sociable and con-nect easily with others, it might recruit extravertsmore actively than introverts (Judge & Cable,1997). Also, as Focus 4.1 explains, extraverts tendto be happier than introverts, and their positivitymay make them more desirable members than theirless cheerful counterparts.

Relationality As noted in Chapter 3, people varyin their attentiveness to their relations with otherpeople. Unlike those who view themselves as loneindividuals interacting with other autonomous indi-viduals, people who are higher in relationality—that is, their values, attitudes, and outlooks

emphasize and facilitate establishing and maintainingconnections to others—are more likely to seek outand more highly prize group memberships. Suchindividuals more frequently play team sports suchas volleyball or soccer, and they do so becausethey prefer exercising with other people ratherthan alone. They seek jobs that will enhance thequality of their relationships with other people,and their satisfaction with their work depends onthe quality of their relationships with their cowork-ers (Leary, Wheeler, & Jenkins, 1986). In termsof the big five personality traits, relationality is asso-ciated with both extraversion and agreeableness(Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000).

Social science writer Malcolm Gladwell (2000)uses the term connector to describe individuals who areso high in relationality that they have far more ties toother people than most people. Most individuals are

F o c u s 4.1 Are Extraverts Happier than Introverts?

People who need people are the luckiest people in theworld.

—Jule Styne and Bob Merrill, Funny Girl

Extraverts and introverts diverge in their overall levelof gregariousness, but they also differ in their level ofhappiness. Do you enjoy talking to strangers? Enjoyworking with others? Like making decisions in groups?Do you like to go to parties? If yes, then you are in alllikelihood a happier person than someone who avoidsgroups and enjoys solitary activities (Lucas et al., 2000,p. 468). This difference appears to know no cultural ornational boundaries, for when researchers studied stu-dents in 39 countries those who were more extravertedwere also the ones who were happiest. Apparently,people who need people are the happiest people inthe world (Lucas et al., 2000; Lucas & Fujia, 2000).

Why are extraverts so happy? Primarily, becauseextraverts join more frequently with other people, andstrong social relationships are a fundamental determi-nant of well-being (e.g., Lee, Dean, & Jung, 2008).Extraverts may, however, just be in better moods thanintroverts, for even when they are alone extravertsreport that they are happier than do introverts. Theymay also be adept at regulating their mood states bydealing with negative events in psychologically healthyways, and so they keep their mood elevated

(Augustine & Hemenover, 2008; Lischetzke & Eid,2006). Extraverts are more sensitive to rewards thanintroverts, and so their positivity may be due to theirmore positive reaction to pleasant experiences (Lucas,2008). Alternatively, introverts may be more negativein their mood because social demands cause them toassociate so frequently with other people, even thoughthey would prefer to be alone.

Extroverts’ happiness may also be due to the factthat the kinds of behaviors that define extraversion aremore pleasurable than those that characterize intro-version. When introverts and extraverts recorded theirbehavior five times a day for two weeks, researchersdiscovered that even introverts talking to other people,interacting in groups, and so on reported experiencingmore positive emotions. The researchers then went onestep further. Reasoning that acting in an extravertedway may directly influence happiness, they askedvolunteers taking part in a group discussion to betalkative, energetic, and active (extraverted) or re-served, quiet, and passive (introverted). Those whoacted in extraverted ways ended the study in bettermoods than did people who were told to act as if theywere introverted (Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002;McNiel & Fleeson, 2006). These findings suggest thatgroups hold the key to happiness, for people arehappier when they are connected to other people.

relationality The degree to which one’s values, atti-tudes, and outlooks emphasize, and facilitate establishingand maintaining, connections to others.

90 CHAPTER 4

embedded in a network of friends, family, and ac-quaintances, but connectors are the hubs of a morevast and far-flung web of relationships. Some of theseconnections are one-to-one relationships, but con-nectors are also participants and leaders of dozens ofdifferent groups and associations. Partially supportingGladwell’s conjecture, in one study women’s rela-tionality did not predict how many relationshipsand memberships they had, but it did predict theircommitment to those relationships. Women interact-ing briefly in dyads who were high in relationalityenjoyed the group interaction more, as did thoseinteracted with someone who was high in relation-ality (Cross et al., 2000).

Men, Women, and Groups

Studies of relationality frequently find the sexes differin their emphasis on connecting interpersonally withother people: women are more relational than men(e.g., Gore & Cross, 2006). Yet, nearly all the im-pressionists were men; Berthe Morisot and MaryCassatt were exceptions. Are men or are womenthe more social sex?

Studies find that men and women differ in theirtendency to join groups, but the differences are farfrom clear. Women tend to be somewhat more extra-verted thanmen, particularly on facets of the trait con-cerned with interpersonal warmth and gregariousness(Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). Women re-member more details about their relationships thando men, and they more accurately recount eventsthat occurred in their social networks (Ross &Holmberg, 1992; Taylor et al., 2000). Women reportthat their relationships are more important to them—that they feel pride, for example, when someone closeto them succeeds (Gore&Cross, 2006).When asked totake photographs that describe how they see them-selves, women are more likely to include pictures ofthemselves with other people rather than alone(Dollinger et al., 1996). Overall, women tend to adopta more collectivistic, interdependent orientation thandomen (see Chapter 3).

Other studies, however, have questioned themagnitude and meaning of these differences be-tween the sexes. Even though women may put

more value on their relationships, they may not beany more social than men. One survey of 800 adultsin the United States found that men belonged tomore professional groups, governing boards, politicalparties, and military organizations than women butwomen spent more time in their groups than didmen (Booth, 1972). The sexes do not differ in thetime they spend in solitary activities; their involve-ment in community groups; or their membershipin more unusual types of groups, such as cults andsatanic covens (Osgood et al., 1996; Parkum &Parkum, 1980; Pittard-Payne, 1980).

The differences that emerge, although subtle,indicate that women seek membership in smaller,informal, intimate groups, whereas men seekmembership in larger, more formal, task-focusedgroups. These tendencies may reflect women’s andmen’s differing interpersonal orientations, withwomen more likely to define themselves in termsof their memberships in groups and their relation-ships with other people. The sexes may also differin their emphasis on achieving power and estab-lishing connections with others. Both these goalscan best be achieved in groups, but they requiremembership in different types of groups. Men,seeking power and influence, join competitive,goal-oriented groups, where they can vie for sta-tus. Women, seeking intimate relationships,would be more likely to join small, supportivegroups (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997).

These sex differences are also entangled withrole differences and cultural stereotypes. In cultureswhere men and women tend to enact different roles,the roles may shape opportunities for involvementin groups. If women are primarily responsible fordomestic duties and childbearing, their opportunitiesfor membership in groups may be limited (Nielsen,1990). Hence, as attitudes toward the role of womenhave changed in contemporary society, differences insocial participation have also begun to diminish(Lal Goel, 1980; Smith, 1980). Sexism also works toexclude women and men from certain types ofgroups.Women, for example, were until recently de-liberately excluded from juries in the United States.(The United States Supreme Court ruled thatwomen could not be excused from jury duty because

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of their sex in 1975.) In Paris, in the 1860s, womenmodeled for artists, but few could be artists them-selves. As sexist attitudes decline, differences in mem-bership in various types of groups may also abate.

Social Motivation

Why did Monet refuse to follow his father’s adviceand study with an established teacher of art? Whydid Manet refuse to join the group during its firstpublic exhibition? Why did the group try to excludePaul Cézanne? Such “why” questions can often beanswered by considering motivations: psychologicalprocesses that energize actions and guide group mem-bers in one direction rather than another. These innermechanisms can be calledmany things—habits, beliefs,feelings, wants, instincts, compulsions, drives—but nomatter what their label they prompt people to takeaction. Social motivations, unlike the more bio-logically based motivations such as hunger and thirst,influence people’s interpersonal behaviors, and includethe need for affiliation, intimacy, and power.

Need for Affiliation People who seek out con-tact with other people often have a high need foraffiliation. People with a high need for affiliationtend to join groups more frequently, spend more oftheir time in groups, communicate more with othergroup members, and accept other group membersmore readily (McAdams & Constantian, 1983;McClelland, 1985; Smart, 1965). However, theyare also more anxious in social situations, perhapsbecause they are more fearful of rejection by others(Byrne, 1961; McAdams, 1982, 1995). Whenothers treat them badly or reject them, they avoidpeople rather than seek them out (Hill, 1991).

Need for Intimacy Individuals who have a highneed for intimacy, like those who have a highneed for affiliation, prefer to join with others.Such individuals, however, seek close, warm rela-

tions and are more likely to express caring and con-cern for other people (McAdams, 1982, 1995).They do not fear rejection but, instead, are morefocused on friendship, camaraderie, reciprocity, andmutual help. In one study, researchers gave peopleelectronic pagers for one week and asked them towrite down what they were doing and how theyfelt each time they were beeped. People who had ahigh need for intimacy were more frequently inter-acting with other people when beeped. They werealso happier than people with a low need for inti-macy if they were with other people when theywere beeped (McAdams & Constantian, 1983).

Need for Power Because group interactions pro-vide many opportunities to influence others, thosewith a high need for power also tend to seekout groups (McAdams, 1982; Winter, 1973).Researchers studied college students’ power needsby asking them to recall 10 recent group interactionsthat lasted for at least 15 minutes. The students de-scribed what had happened in each episode, what hadbeen discussed, and their role in the group. Thosewith a high power motive took part in relativelyfewer dyadic interactions but in more large-groupinteractions (groups with more than four members).They also reported exercising more control in thesegroups by organizing and initiating activities, assum-ing responsibility, and attempting to persuadeothers. This relationship between the need for powerand participation in groups was stronger for men(McAdams, Healy, & Krause, 1984).

FIRO William Schutz (1958, 1992) integratedthe need for affiliation, intimacy, and power in hisFundamental Interpersonal Relations Orient-ation theory, or FIRO (rhymes with “I row”).Schutz identified three basic needs that can be satisfied

need for affiliation The dispositional tendency to seekout others.need for intimacy The dispositional tendency to seekwarm, positive relationships with others.

need for power The dispositional tendency to seekcontrol over others.Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation(FIRO) A theory of group formation and developmentproposed by William Schutz that emphasizes compatibil-ity among three basic social motives: inclusion, control,and affection.

92 CHAPTER 4

by groups. Inclusion—the desire to be part of a groupand to be accepted by a group—is similar to theneed for affiliation. The second motive, control,corresponds to the need for power. Affection, oropenness, is the desire to experience warm, positiverelations with others, which is similar to the need forintimacy.

Schutz believed that these needs influence groupbehavior in two ways: They determine how peopletreat others and how people want others to treatthem. Inclusion refers to people’s desire to joinwith others but also their need to be accepted bythose others. Control is the need to dominate othersbut also the willingness to let others be dominant.Affection is a desire to like others as well as a desireto be liked by them. The FIRO-B scale, whichSchutz developed, measures both the need to expressand the need to receive inclusion, control, and affec-tion (see Table 4.2).

Groups offer members a way to satisfy thesebasic needs. If, for example, Angela has a strongneed to receive and express inclusion, she willprobably prefer to do things in a group ratherthan to perform tasks individually. If she needs toexpress control, she may seek membership in agroup that she can control. Or if she wishes to re-ceive affection from others, she may seek out otherpeople who seem warm and friendly. In general,then, the greater the intensity of these needs inany given individual, the more likely that person

is to take steps to create or seek out membershipin a group (Schutz, 1958, 1992).

Anxiety and Attachment

Just as one’s personality and social motives maypush people toward groups, other personal qualitiesmay push them away. People who are socially in-hibited, or shy, do not join groups as readily asothers, and they do not find group activities to beas enjoyable. As early as age 2, some children beginto display fear or inhibition when they encounter aperson they do not recognize (Kagan, Snidman, &Arcus, 1992). Some grade school children consis-tently seek out other people, whereas others showsigns of shyness and withdrawal when they are ingroups (Asendorpf & Meier, 1993). Shy adults re-port feeling awkward, uncomfortable, and tensewhen interacting with people they do not knowvery well (Cheek & Buss, 1981). Shy people, ratherthan entering a new group alone, often take afriend with them. This “social surrogate” helpsthem transition into the group by doing much ofthe work needed to establish connections withothers. In some cases, the surrogate takes the placeof the shy members during initial interactions, untilthey overcome their initial social anxieties(Bradshaw, 1998). Shy people also react differently,neurologically, when they see a stranger’s face.Nonshy people’s brains show an activation response

T A B L E 4.2 Example Items from the Fundamental Interpersonal RelationsOrientation–Behavior (FIRO-B) Scale

Inclusion (I) Control (C) Affection (A)

Expressedtoward otherpeople

� I try to be with otherpeople.

� I join social groups.

� I try to take charge ofthings when I am withpeople.

� I try to have other peopledo things I want done.

� I try to be friendly to people.� I try to have close relationshipswith people.

Wanted fromother people

� I like people to invite meto things.

� I like people to includeme in their activities.

� I let other people decidewhat to do.

� I let other people takecharge of things.

� I like people to act friendlytoward me.

� I like people to act closetoward me.

SOURCE: FIRO: A Three-Dimensional Theory of Interpersonal Behavior by W. C. Schutz. Copyright 1958 by Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc.

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in the bilateral nucleus accumbens when they seeunfamiliar faces, but shy people’s brains displayheightened bilateral activity in the amygdala; anarea of the brain that is responsible for emotionalresponses, including fear (Beaton et al., 2008).

Social Anxiety Most people manage to cope withtheir shyness. In some cases, however, shyness escalatesinto social anxiety (Vertue, 2003). Historical ac-counts of the troubled life of van Gogh, for example,comment on his anxiety over his failed relationships.He had some friends, and he tried to join his fellowartists, but he could not sustain these relationships.

Social anxiety sets in when people want tomake a good impression, but they do not thinkthat their attempts to establish relationships willsucceed (Leary, 2001; Leary & Kowalski, 1995).Because of these pessimistic expectations, whenthese individuals interact with other people, theysuffer troubling emotional, physiological, and be-havioral side effects. They feel tense, awkward,uncomfortable, and scrutinized. They become physi-ologically aroused to the point that their pulse races,they blush and perspire, and they feel “butterflies” intheir stomach. This anxiety can cause them to disaffil-iate by reducing social contact with others (Leary &Kowalski, 1995, p. 157). Socially anxious people,even when they join groups, do not actively partici-pate; they can be identified by their silence, downcasteyes, and low speaking voice. They may also engagein innocuous sociability (Leary, 1983): They merge intothe group’s background by indicating general interestin the group and agreement with the other groupmembers while consistently minimizing their per-sonal involvement in the group interaction.

Attachment Style People with certain types ofattachment styles are particularly likely to experienceanxiety when faced with the prospect of joining agroup. Attachment theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1980) explains

the way people differ in their relationships, or attach-ments, to others. From an early age, some childrenseem very secure and comfortable in their relation-ship to their caregivers, but others seem to be moreuncertain of their caregivers’ supportiveness andsome even seem to ignore other people altogether.These childhood differences emerge in adulthood asvariations in attachment style—one’s basic cogni-tive, emotional, and behavioral orientation when in arelationship with others (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).Some people enjoy forming close relationships withother people, and they do not worry about beingabandoned by their loved ones. Others, however, areuncomfortable relying on other people, they worrythat their loved ones will reject them, or they aresimply uninterested in relationships altogether. Thefour basic styles shown in Figure 4.1—secure, preoc-cupied, fearful, and dismissing—reflect twounderlyingdimensions: anxiety about relationships and avoidanceof closeness and dependency on others (Brennan,Clark, & Shaver, 1998).

Eliot Smith and his colleagues theorized thatpeople also have group-level attachment styles.They suggested that some individuals are anxiousabout their group experiences, for they questiontheir acceptance by their group and report feelingas if they were unworthy of membership. Theytend to agree with such statements as “I often worrymy group will not always want me as a member”and “I sometimes worry that my group doesn’t valueme as much as I value my group” (Smith, Murphy,& Coats, 1999, p. 110). Others, however, are avoi-dant; they are not interested in getting close to theirgroup, for they agreed with such statements as “Iprefer not to depend on my group or to have mygroup depend on me” and “I am comfortable notbeing close to my group” (1999, p. 110). Smith’sresearch team discovered that people with anxiousgroup attachment styles spend less time in theirgroups, engage in fewer collective activities, and

social anxiety A feeling of apprehension and embarrass-ment experienced when anticipating or actually interact-ing with other people.

attachment style One’s characteristic approach torelationships with other people; the basic styles includesecure, preoccupied, fearful, and dismissing, as defined bythe dimensions of anxiety and avoidance.

94 CHAPTER 4

are less satisfied with the level of support theyreceived from the group. Those with avoidant groupattachment styles felt that the group was less impor-tant to them, and they were more likely to claim thatthey were planning to leave the group. When re-searchers followed up these ideas by watching peoplewith varying attachment styles interacting in smallgroups they discovered that people with secure at-tachment styles contributed to both the instrumentaland the relationship activities of the group. Thosewith more anxious attachment styles, in contrast,contributed less to the group’s instrumental work,and those with avoidant attachment styles contrib-uted less to both instrumental and relationship activ-ities (Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). When individualswho were high and low in avoidance and anxietywere given small hand-held computers that trackedtheir activities throughout the day, researchers dis-covered that it was the avoidant individuals whospent more of their time alone rather than withothers (Brown et al., 2007).

Experience and Preference

Not everyone is thrilled at the prospect ofjoining groups. In many situations people have

the opportunity to join a new group—a new club,a group of people who socialize together, an ama-teur sports team, for example—but their prior ex-periences in groups may make them think twicebefore joining in. Those with little prior experiencemay be too uncertain to take part, and those withnegative experiences in the past may avoid groupsas a general rule. Only those group veterans withmany positive prior experiences are likely to seekthem out (Bohrnstedt & Fisher, 1986; Corning &Myers, 2002; Ickes & Turner, 1983).

Richard Moreland, John Levine, and their col-leagues’ studies of college students’ decision to joinone of the many groups that abound on universitycampuses underscore the impact of one’s past his-tory with groups on one’s future in groups. In onestudy they surveyed more than a thousand first-yearstudents at the University of Pittsburgh, askingthem if they took part in groups in high schooland if they expected to join groups in college.They identified those students who had positiveexperiences in their high school groups—they ratedtheir high school groups as both important and en-joyable. These students, when they enrolled in col-lege, actively investigated the groups available tothem. These “joiners” tried harder to find a group

Preoccupied:Seek out

membership butexcessively worry

about rejection

Secure:Self-confident andwilling to rely on

others

Fearful:Insecure aboutthemselves and

so they fearrejection

Highanxiety

Dismissing:Uninterested injoining groups

Lowanxiety

Lowavoidance

Highavoidance

F I G U R E 4.1 Group attachmentstyles. The four basic styles—secure,preoccupied, fearful, and dismissing—are defined by two dimensions: level ofanxiety and degree of avoidance. If, forexample, an individual is low in avoid-ance but high in anxiety, he or shewould display a preoccupied attach-ment style.

FORMAT ION 95

on campus to join, for they recognized that suchmemberships would be useful to them in achievingpersonal goals. They were also more optimistic intheir evaluations of potential groups, for they ex-pected that the positive aspects of joining a groupwould be particularly rewarding. Experience ingroups in high school dampened that enthusiasmsomewhat, at least for the specific groups thatinterested them. For example, those who were instudent government in high school and were inter-ested in taking part in student politics in college feltthat this group would be rewarding, but they alsorecognized that it would impose costs as well.These students tended to be more deliberate intheir review of potential groups, and displayedcommitment to a specific group throughout thesearch process (Brinthaupt, Moreland, & Levine,1991; Pavelchak, Moreland, & Levine, 1986).

AFF IL IAT ION

Why do people join together with others ingroups? In part, the motivation comes from withinthe members themselves, for people’s personalities,preferences, and other personal qualities predisposethem to affiliate with others. But the tendency toaffiliate with others also comes from without—fromthe situation itself. People often seek the companyof others when they need information, social sup-port, or companionship.

Social Comparison

The young impressionists faced uncertainty eachtime they stood before a blank canvas. They wereconvinced that the methods taught by the tradi-tional Parisian art schools were severely limited,but they were not sure how to put their alternativeapproach into practice. So they often painted to-gether, exchanging ideas about colors and techni-ques, as they refined their approach to art.

Leon Festinger (1950, 1954) maintained thatpeople often rely on others for information aboutthemselves and the environment. Physical reality isa reliable guide in many cases, but to validate social

reality people must compare their interpretations tothose of other people. Festinger called this processsocial comparison, and suggested that it beginswhen people find themselves in ambiguous, confus-ing situations. Such situations trigger a variety ofpsychological reactions, most of which are unset-tling, and so people affiliate with others to gainthe information they need to reduce their confu-sion. As Figure 4.2 indicates, the final result of socialcomparison is cognitive clarity, but as the researchreviewed in this section suggests, people engage insocial comparison for a variety of different reasons—to evaluate their own qualities, to set personal goals,to help other people, or to confirm their belief thatthey are superior to the people around them (Suls &Wheeler, 2000; Wood, 1996).

Misery Loves Company How do people reactwhen they find themselves in an ambiguous, andpossibly dangerous, situation? Stanley Schachter(1959) believed that most people, finding them-selves in such a predicament, would chose to joinwith other people to gain the information theyneed to allay their anxiety. To test his idea he re-cruited young women college students to meet athis laboratory. There they were greeted by a re-searcher who introduced himself as Dr. GregorZilstein from the Medical School’s Departmentsof Neurology and Psychiatry. In serious tones, heexplained that he was studying the effects of electricshock on human beings. In one condition (low anx-iety), the room contained no electrical devices; theexperimenter explained that the shocks would be somild that they would “resemble more a tickle or atingle than anything unpleasant” (p. 14). Participantsassigned to the high-anxiety condition, however,faced a vast collection of electrical equipment andwere informed, “These shocks will hurt, they willbe painful . . . but, of course, they will do no per-manent damage” (p. 13). The researcher then askedthe participant if she wanted to wait for her turnalone or with others. Approximately two-thirds of

social comparison Evaluating the accuracy of personalbeliefs and attitudes by comparing oneself to others.

96 CHAPTER 4

the women in the high-anxiety condition (63%)chose to affiliate, whereas only one-third of thewomen in low-anxiety condition (33%) chose towait with others. Schachter’s conclusion: “miseryloves company” (1959, p. 24).

Misery Loves Miserable Company The major-ity of the women Schachter studied chose to affiliate,but what was their primary motivation for joiningwith others? Did they wish to acquire informationthrough social comparison, or were they just sofrightened that they did not want to be alone?Schachter examined this question by replicating thehigh-anxiety condition of his original experiment,complete with the shock equipment and Dr.Zilstein. He held anxiety at a high level, but manip-ulated the amount of information that could begained by affiliating with others. He told half ofthe women that they could wait with other womenwho were about to receive shocks; these womenwere therefore similar to the participants. He toldthe others that they could join women who werewaiting for advising by their professors; these womencould only wait with people who were dissimilar.Schachter hypothesized that if the women believedthat the others could not provide them with anysocial comparison information, there would be noreason to join them. The findings confirmed hisanalysis: 60% of the women asked to wait withothers if they all faced a similar situation, but noone in the dissimilar condition expressed affiliativedesires. Schachter’s second conclusion: “Miserydoesn’t love just any kind of company, it lovesonly miserable company” (Schachter, 1959, p. 24).

Schachter, by suggesting people love “miserablecompany,” meant they seek out those who face thesame threat and so are knowledgeable. So how

would people respond if offered the chance towait with someone who had participated in thestudy the previous day? Such individuals would beideal sources of clarifying information, for they notonly faced the same situation; they had survived it.When given such an alternative, participants pre-ferred to join someone who had already gonethrough the procedure (Kirkpatrick & Shaver,1988). A similar preference for someone who had“been there, done that” has been documented inpatients who are awaiting surgery. When given achoice, 60% of pre-surgery patients requested aroommate who was recovering from the same typeof operation, whereas only 17% wanted “miserablecompany”—a roommate who was also about toundergo the operation (Kulik & Mahler, 1989).The patients also reported talking with their room-mate about the operation more if their roommatehad already had the operation and was recovering(Kulik, Mahler, & Moore, 1996). These studiessuggest that people are more interested in gainingclarifying information than in sharing the experi-ence with someone, particularly when the situationis a dangerous one and they can converse openlywith other group members (Kulik & Mahler,2000).

Embarrassed Misery Avoids Company Evenwhen people need information about a situation,they sometimes refrain from joining others becausethey do not wish to embarrass themselves. Whenalone, people might feel foolish if they do some-thing silly, but when they are in a group foolishnessturns into embarrassment. In some cases, this fear ofembarrassment can be stronger than the need tounderstand what is happening, resulting in inhibi-tion instead of affiliation.

Ambiguous,confusing

circumstances

Affiliationand social

comparisonwith others

Cognitiveclarity

Psychologicalreaction

• Negativeemotions

• Uncertainty• Need for

information

F I G U R E 4.2 Festinger’s (1954)theory of social comparison assumesthat people, when facing ambiguoussituations, seek out others and com-pare their reactions and interpreta-tions to their own.

FORMAT ION 97

Researchers examined this process by chang-ing the Schachter-type situation to include an ele-ment of public embarrassment. The investigatorsasked four to six strangers to meet in a room la-beled with the sign “Sexual Attitudes: Please WaitInside.” In the fear condition, the room containedseveral electrical devices and information sheetsthat suggested that the study involved electricshock and sexual stimulation. In the ambiguouscondition, the participants found only two card-board boxes filled with computer forms. In theembarrassment (anxiety-provoking) condition, theresearchers replaced the equipment and boxeswith contraceptive devices, books on sexuallytransmitted diseases, and pictures of naked menand women. Observers behind a two-way mirrorwatched the group for 20 minutes, recording thefive types of behavior shown in Figure 4.3: interac-tion (talking about the situation), action (e.g.,examining the equipment), withdrawal (e.g., read-ing a book), controlled nonreaction (e.g., talkingabout something other than the experiment), andescape (Morris et al., 1976).

The observers discovered that the group mem-bers engaged in social comparison the most when

they were fearful. As Figure 4.3 indicates, groupswho faced the ambiguous situation spent about12% of the time talking among themselves, butgroups sitting in a room with the fear-inducingelectrical equipment spent nearly 30% of the timegathering information through communication.Groups who thought that the study involved sexualbehavior did very little talking and they showedmore withdrawal. Embarrassment blocked affilia-tion in this situation, but this situation was not adangerous one. If the need for information or sup-port becomes overwhelming then embarrassment-related anxiety may not keep people away fromtheir groups (Buunk & Hoorens, 1992; Davison,Pennebaker, & Dickerson, 2000).

Downward (and Upward) Social

Comparison

Monet, by joining with the other artists, gained in-formation about art, technique, and ways of dealingwith the officials who judged art exhibitions inParis. This information undoubtedly reduced hisconfusion, but this cognitive clarity may have

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0Interaction Action Withdrawal Nonreaction Escape

Reaction

Pro

po

rtio

nFearfulEmbarrassedAmbiguous

F I G U R E 4.3 Five types of behavioral reactions—interaction, action, withdrawal, nonreaction, and escape—to three different kinds of situations: fear-provoking (fearful), embarrassing (embarrassed), and ambiguous. Peoplewho faced an ambiguous situation did not talk among themselves as much as people who were fearful. Peoplewho were anxious and embarrassed, in contrast, interacted the least and they often withdrew from the group(Morris et al., 1976).

98 CHAPTER 4

come at an emotional cost. Renoir, like Monet, wasexperimenting with many new methods, but Renoirwas prospering; his art sold well in the Parisianmarket. Compared to Renoir, Monet was a failure.And how did Monet feel when he spoke to hisfriend Sisley? Sisley’s work was never considered tobe collectible, and he lived on the brink of povertyfor much of his life. When Monet compared himselfto Sisley, he must have felt a sense of relief that hisown situation was not so bleak, but at the same time,he must have worried that his own career couldtake a turn for the worst at any moment.

People compare themselves to others whenthey lack information about the situation theyface, but they are not indiscriminate when selectingtargets for comparison. When they want informa-tion, they select people who are similar to them orare likely to be particularly well-informed. Butwhen self-esteem is on the line, people engage indownward social comparison by selecting tar-gets who are worse off than they are (Wills,1991). Monet, for example, by contrasting himselfto the struggling Sisley, could think to himself,“Things are not going so well for me, but at leastI’m better off than poor Sisley.” Students reviewingtheir academic progress with other students, spousesdiscussing their relationships with other husbandsand wives, patients talking with other patientsabout their success in coping with their illness,medical students taking part in a training class, andexpectant mothers talking about their pregnanciesall show the tendency to seek out, for comparisonpurposes, people who are doing more poorly thanthey are (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007).

What if Monet had, instead, compared himselfto the more prosperous Renoir? Such a comparisonwould be an example of upward social compar-ison, which occurs when a person compares him-self or herself to others who are better off than he

or she is. Renoir may have been an inspiration toMonet—when he started to wonder if he wouldever be a success he could perhaps find reassurancein Renoir’s accomplishments (Collins, 2000).Monet, by identifying with Renoir, could bask inthe reflected glory (BIRG) of Renoir’s fame, claimthat he had a hand in Renoir’s success, or elevatehis appraisal of his own work since it was connectedto that of Renoir’s (Zuckerman & Jost, 2001). Butupward social comparison can leave people feelinglike failures. When students were asked to keeptrack of the people they compared themselves toover a two-week period, they reported feeling de-pressed and discouraged when they associated withmore competent people (Wheeler & Miyake,1992). Even if people know they have performedbetter than average, if they compare themselves tosomeone who has far outperformed them they feeldiscouraged (Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2006).

When will people choose upward comparisonover downward comparison? Abraham Tesser’sself-evaluation maintenance (SEM) modelsuggests that people often graciously celebrateothers’ accomplishments—but not when they arebested in a domain that they value greatly. Insuch cases, others’ success will more likely triggerresentment, envy, and shame rather than pride andadmiration (Smith, R. H., 2000). The SEM model,using Monet as an example, predicts he would pre-fer to join with people who (1) performed worsethan he did at tasks that were important to himpersonally, but (2) performed very well on tasksthat were not central to his sense of self-worth(Beach & Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 1988, 1991).

Tesser and his colleagues examined this tensionbetween sharing others’ successes and highlighting

downward social comparison Comparing oneself toothers who are performing less effectively relative tooneself.upward social comparison Comparing oneself toothers who are performing more effectively relative tooneself.

self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) model A theoryproposed by Abraham Tesser which assumes that indivi-duals maintain and enhance self-esteem by associatingwith high-achieving individuals who excel in areas thatare not relevant to their own sense of self-esteem andavoiding association with high-achieving individualswho excel in areas that are important to their sense ofself-esteem.

FORMAT ION 99

their failures by asking elementary school studentsto identify the types of activities (sports, art, music,math) that were personally important to them. Thestudents also identified their most and least pre-ferred classmate. One week later, the students ratedtheir ability, their close classmate’s ability, and theirdistant classmate’s ability in one area they felt wasimportant and one area they felt was unimportant.As Figure 4.4 indicates, if the students thought thatthe task was important, they judged their perfor-mance to be superior to that of their close friend.If the task was not important to them personally,they felt that they had performed relatively worse(Tesser, Campbell, & Smith, 1984). Similarly, in astudy of married couples, Tesser and his colleaguesdiscovered that happy couples felt that it was morepleasant to be outdone by one’s partner in an areathat their partner valued but to outperform thepartner in an area that he or she did not value.Unhappy couples did not recognize this secret in-gredient for marital bliss (Beach et al., 1998).

Given the negative consequences of outper-forming others, people who perform well oftenkeep their success to themselves—particularly whenthey do well on tasks that are very important to theother group members (Tal-Or, 2008). They mayalso, however, maintain their superiority over theirfriends by sabotaging, indirectly, others’ perfor-mances on tasks that are central to their sense ofself-worth. Investigators asked students to keep trackof every single one of their interactions with otherpeople for six days. After each interaction, they wereto note if the interaction involved academic mattersor social matters, what their relationship to the per-son was (e.g., acquaintance, stranger, close friend),and if they shared information with that person thatthey thought would help the other to improve. Asthe SEM model suggests, these students gave helpfulinformation to their friends when the interactionspertained to social matters, but when it came to aca-demics, they helped their friends less than theyhelped strangers. This tendency was even more pro-nounced when the students thought that their friendwas already performing better than they were(Pemberton & Sedikides, 2001; see Focus 4.2).

Social Support

Monet initially sought to change the art worldsingle-handedly, but he soon found that he neededhelp from others. When his work was condemnedby the critics, he shared his feelings of rejectionwith the other artists, who offered him encourage-ment and advice. Frequently penniless, he sold hiswork to other artists so he could buy food and payfor his lodging. He could not afford his own studio,so Bazille and Renoir invited him to share one withthem. When Monet injured his leg, Bazille caredfor him. The group did not just provide him with“cognitive clarity” but with social support intimes of turbulence and trouble.

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

Student Closeclassmate

Distantclassmate

Stu

den

t R

atin

gs High importance

Activity

Low importance

F I G U R E 4.4 Ratings of an individual’s own perfor-mance and the performance of others on activities that areimportant or unimportant to the individual doing therating. When students rated their own performance on atask they felt was important to them, they rated themselvesas somewhat better than their close friend and much betterthan the distant classmate. But students rated their friendmore positively than themselves when the task had noimplications for their self-worth (Tesser, Campbell, & Smith,1984).

SOURCE: “Friendship Choice and Performance: Self-evaluation maintenance inchildren”by Tesser, J. Campbell, and M. Smith, in J. Suls and A.G. Greenwald(Eds.), Psychological Perspectives on the Self (vol. 2). Copyright 1983.Reprinted by permission of Abraham Tesser.

social support A sense of belonging, emotional support,advice, guidance, tangible assistance, and spiritual per-spective given to others when they experience stress,daily hassles, and more significant life crises.

100 CHAPTER 4

Stress and Affiliation Schachter (1959) did notjust confuse people: he frightened people. Thewomen he studied affiliated with others to acquireclarifying information through social comparison,but they probably also were seeking reassurance.Two people, facing the prospect of receiving electricshocks, simply could review the situation, but alsothey could talk about their misgivings, calm eachother down, and help one another should problemsarise. Given a choice between people who are equalin their knowledge of the situation but vary in theiremotional reaction to the threat—some are veryfearful, but others are calm—people choose to waitwith those who are calm (Rabbie, 1963).

Humans are group-seeking animals, but theirgregariousness becomes particularly robust under

conditions of stress (Rofé, 1984). In times of trouble,such as illness, divorce, catastrophe, natural disaster,or personal loss, people seek out friends and relatives(Dooley & Catalano, 1984). College students whoare experiencing problems, academically or socially,spend between 28% and 35% of their time interact-ing with people they feel are supportive (Harlow &Cantor, 1995). Individuals experiencing work-related stress, such as the threat of layoffs, time pres-sures, or inadequate supervision, cope by joiningwith coworkers (Bowling et al., 2004; McGuire,2007). Individuals who have been reminded of their

F o c u s 4.2 Who Is the True Group Animal?

If you do not compare yourself with another you willbe what you are. Through comparison you hope toevolve, to grow, to become more intelligent, morebeautiful. But will you?

—Jiddu Kristnamurti, Freedom from the Known(1969, p.64)

One of the members of your study group gets thehighest grade on the exam. A member of your workteam is singled out by management for a raise. A sin-gle player out of 42 is chosen for the all-star team. Itisn’t you.

Joining together with highly competent peopleworking on shared tasks can be, at the same time, bothinspirational and threatening. We can be happy forothers when they succeed and strive to emulate theiraccomplishments ourselves but, then again, when wecompare ourselves to our betters our own efforts andaccomplishments seem all the more meager. Becauseupward comparison can be so discouraging, people maydeliberately avoid joining groups that include peoplewho will outperform them in spheres they consider tobe personally important (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).

Social comparison researcher Bram Buunk and hiscolleagues (2007) suggest that some people havefound a way to escape this downside to group life;they do not compare themselves to other group mem-bers, and they are happier people for it. To test thishypothesis, they first measured people’s overall

affiliation orientation by asking them if they “like togo to places and settings with lots of people” or “loveteamwork” (p. 79). But, they also measured people’ssocial comparison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk,1999). They reasoned that, just as people vary in theiraffiliative desires, they may also vary in their tendencyto compare themselves to other people. So they askedpeople if they agreed with such statements as “I oftencompare myself with others with respect to what Ihave accomplished in life” and “I always pay a lot ofattention to how I do things compared with howothers do things” (p. 74).

When they used these measures to predict whowas most satisfied with their membership in theirgroups, they discovered affiliation orientation and so-cial comparison orientation combine to determinegroup satisfaction. The participants were generally sat-isfied with their groups, but people who were highlyaffiliative and low in their social comparison orientationwere particularly happy with membership. Apparently,those who could not resist comparing themselves toothers could never completely avoid the negative emo-tional consequences of upward social comparison. Sowho is the person who most enjoys being a member ofa group? Buunk and his colleagues concluded “that thetypical ‘group animal’ is someone who has a strongpreference for affiliation, combined with a low ten-dency to compare him- or herself with others” (Buunk,Nauta, & Molleman, 2005, p. 69).

social comparison orientation The dispositional ten-dency to compare oneself to others.

FORMAT ION 101

own mortality are more likely to sit closer to otherpeople, even if these other individuals do not sharetheir opinions on important social issues (Wisman &Koole, 2003).

People also react to large-scale traumatic eventsby joining with others. When U.S. President JohnF. Kennedy was assassinated, 60% of adult Americansreported seeking solace by talking to others(Sheatsley & Feldman, 1964). In the days followingthe terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 98% ofall adult Americans reported talking to others aboutthe attacks, 60% reported taking part in a group ac-tivity, and 77% sought to strengthen their connec-tion to their loved ones (Schuster et al., 2001). Manyindividuals joined virtual groups via the Internet.Internet usage declined overall, but discussion areas,forums, and chat room use surged, as did e-mailrates. Nearly three-quarters of all Internet users(72%) used e-mail to contact family and friends orto share news about the attack (Ranie & Kalsnes,2001). Individuals who were already heavy users ofthe Internet tended to be the ones who used thistechnology to affiliate with others, whereas lightusers were more likely to rely on more traditionalmethods (Kim et al., 2004).

As Figure 4.5 suggests, affiliation with others playsa key role in both fight-or-flight and tend-and-befriendresponses to stress. When the group members face animminent threat, they can work together to fightagainst it—they can rally against attackers, organize a

concerted response to a disaster, and so on. Groups alsoenhance survival as members escape. If escape routesare not restricted, the dispersion of a group can confuseattackers and increase the chances that all members ofthe group will escape unharmed. A group can alsoorganize its escape from danger, with stronger mem-bers of the group helping less able members to reachsafety. If, in contrast, the group faces a long-termthreat, then the group may cope by increasing nurtur-ing, protective, and supportive behaviors (tending) andby seeking out connections to other people (befriend-ing). As the work of Shelley Taylor and her colleaguessuggests, women are more likely to respond to stress byaffiliating with others. Both men and women,however, show a disproportionate preference to joinwith women when stressed (Taylor, 2006; Tayloret al., 2000).

Sources of Support Table 4.3 lists a number ofexamples of the ways that groups provide supportfor their members, beginning with belonging: byletting troubled members know that they are val-ued members, the group reassures them that theyare not alone in facing their problems (Krause &Wulff, 2005). Group members provide emotionalsupport when they express their caring and concernfor one another, often by listening to others’ pro-blems without offering criticism or suggestions,encouraging them, and showing general approval(McGuire, 2007). Informational support pertains to

Threat to well-being

Type ofThreat

GroupProcesses

StressResponse

Concerted response tosource of the danger“Fight”

“Flight”

“Tend”Long-term

threat

Organized escapefrom the situation

Support and nurturingof group members

Elaboration of supportiverelations among members“Befriend”

Imminentthreat

F I G U R E 4.5 Group-level responses to stress. The two basic responses to stress—fight-or-flight andtend-and-befriend—are both enhanced when members rely on resources made available by their groups.

102 CHAPTER 4

advice and guidance, instrumental support providesmembers with tangible resources, and spiritual sup-port helps members deal with existential dilemmasand threats to their worldview (see Uchino, 2004).

Admittedly, some groups fail to deliver on theirpromise of support. They may even add stressors bystirring up conflicts, increasing responsibilities, andexposing members to criticism (e.g., Newsom et al.,2008). Overall, however, groups are more fre-quently supportive than burdensome. People whoenjoy strong social bonds with other people tendto experience less stress in their lives, are less likelyto suffer from depression and other psychologicalproblems, and are physically healthier (Stinson et al.,2008). Social support is particularly valuable whenpeople find themselves in threatening circum-stances—a divorce, a job change, a move, or thelike. Stressful life circumstances leave people at riskfor psychological and physical illness, but groupscan serve as protective buffers against these negative

consequences (Taylor, 2007). Researchers verifiedthis buffering effect in studies of stressors, includinghealth crises, personal tragedies, terrorist attacks,and intergroup conflict. For example, individualstrying to recover from a devastating crisis (e.g.,the death of a spouse or child) who were morefirmly embedded in a social network of friends, re-latives, and neighbors were less depressed than peo-ple who were not integrated into groups (Norris &Murrell, 1990). Firefighters who felt they were sup-ported by their peers and their supervisor reportedless stress than those who did not feel as closelyconnected to their group members (Varvel et al.,2007). A survey of New York City residents fol-lowing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in-dicated that those who were members of groups oraffiliative organizations (e.g., church groups, discus-sion groups, veterans groups) were more resilient tothe stressful effects of the attacks (Bonanno et al.,2007). Participants who played the role of prisoners

T A B L E 4.3 Some Forms of Social Support Provided by Groups

Type Definition Examples

Belonging Inclusion in a group � Expressing acceptance� Reassurance of belonging� Reaffirming membership� Encouraging identification� Group activities

Emotional support Expressing caring andconcern for one another

� Expressing respect and approval� Encouragement� Listening� Sharing feelings� Responding nonverbally in positive ways

(e.g., hugging, nodding)

Informational support Providing advice andguidance

� Sharing helpful information� Giving directions, advice, suggestions� Demonstrating a way to perform a task� Problem solving

Instrumental support Providing tangible resources � Doing favors� Lending money or possessions� Assisting with work, duties� Transportation� Providing a place to stay

Spiritual support Addressing issues of mean-ing and purpose

� Explaining challenging events� Allaying existential anxiety, fear of death� Sharing faith� Reconfirming one’s world view

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in a simulation of a prison (in England) providedone another with substantial social support, and inconsequence they were relatively unaffected bysituational stressors (Haslam & Reicher, 2006). Allthese studies suggest that a group offers members asafe haven from the storm of stress.

Companionship

Memberships are not static. At some point in his orher life, an individual may find that he or she be-longs to many groups. At other times, however,people may feel that their relationships with othersare too few or too superficial. In such situations,people often experience loneliness, and to escapeit they turn to groups for companionship.

Types of Loneliness Loneliness is not the same asbeing alone, for in some situations people are nottroubled by isolation or a relative paucity of relationswith others. Loneliness, instead, is an aversive psy-chological reaction to a lack of personal or socialrelations with other people. Emotional loneliness oc-curs when the problem is a lack of a long-term,meaningful, intimate relationship with another per-son; this type of loneliness might be triggered bydivorce, a breakup with a lover, or repeated roman-tic failures. Social loneliness, in contrast, occurs whenpeople feel cut off from their network of friends,acquaintances, and group members. People whohave moved to a new city, children who are rejectedby their peers, and new employees of large compa-nies often experience social loneliness, because theyare no longer embedded in a network of friends andacquaintances (Green et al., 2001). Both types ofloneliness create feelings of sadness, depression, emp-tiness, longing, shame, and self-pity.

Groups Alleviate Loneliness Groups can pro-vide the antidote to loneliness by (1) organizing

and integrating connections with other individuals,and (2) promoting the development of warm, sup-portive, intimate relationships between members(Shaver & Buhrmester, 1983). College studentswho belonged to a cohesive, satisfying group re-ported much less loneliness than students who be-longed to poorly integrated groups (Anderson &Martin, 1995; Schmidt & Sermat, 1983). Membersof groups with extensive interconnections amongall the members were less lonely than members ofgroups with less dense networks (Kraus et al., 1993;Stokes, 1985). Children with friends—even friendswho were considered odd or unusual by theirpeers—were less lonely than friendless children(Asher & Paquette, 2003). People who belongedto groups (e.g., service organizations, religious orchurch organizations, business or professional or-ganizations, and social clubs) were healthier andhappier than individuals who did not (Harlow &Cantor, 1996). They even lived longer than lonelyloners (Stroebe, 1994; Sugisawa, Liang, & Liu,1994).

All groups are not equally effective in bufferingtheir members from both forms of loneliness. AsTable 4.4 suggests, transitory, impersonal collectivesdo little to ease either social or emotional loneliness.Sitting with other people in a theater or striking upa conversation with a stranger on a bus creates aconnection momentarily, but only groups that sus-tain stable, reliable alliances among members canward off social loneliness (Jones & Carver, 1991).Likewise, only groups that connect people togetherin an intimate, meaningful way reduce feelings ofemotional loneliness. Having many superficialrelationships with others is far less satisfying thanhaving a few high-quality relationships character-ized by high levels of social support, mutual caring,and acceptance (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Berntson,2003). In consequence, groups that create connec-tions among their members, such as amateur ath-letic teams, social clubs, or work groups, will reducemembers’ feelings of social loneliness, but onlymore intimate, involving types of groups—families,romantic couples, or very close friendship cliques—will meet members’ social and emotional needs(Stroebe et al., 1996).

loneliness Feelings of desperation, boredom, self-deprecation, and depression experienced when indivi-duals feel their personal relationships are too few or toounsatisfying.

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ATTRACT ION

Renoir and Bazille met, quite by happenstance, be-cause both were students of Gleyre. Their desire tolearn more about their craft and their enrollment inthe same school combined to bring them together.But this chance meeting by itself was not sufficientto spark the formation of the group that would, intime, become the impressionists. Bazille and Renoirwould not have chosen to spend more and moretime together discussing art, politics, and Parisiansociety if they had disliked each other. Affiliationmay set the stage for a group to form, but attractiontransforms acquaintances into friends.

Principles of Attraction

Theodore Newcomb’s classic study of the acquain-tance process anticipated the methods used in manycontemporary reality television programs. Thoseprograms arrange for strangers to live together in amansion, a house, or an island, and then just recordthe ebb and flow of likes and dislikes among themembers. Similarly, Newcomb offered 17 youngmen starting their studies at the University ofMichigan free rent if they answered a detailed sur-vey of their attitudes, likes, and dislikes each week.Then he watched as the 17 students sorted them-selves out into friendship pairs and distinct groups(Newcomb, 1960, 1961, 1979, 1981).

Even though attraction is often thought to be ahighly capricious and unpredictable social process,Newcomb identified a small number of principlesthat explain when liking is more likely. As the sec-tions that follow indicate, people are more likely to

associate with certain people—those who are nearby,those who express similar attitudes and values, andthose who respond positively to them—and such as-sociations often culminate in the creation of a group.

The Proximity Principle Group members oftenassume that their groups result from rational plan-ning or common interests. But the proximityprinciple suggests that in some cases, people joingroups that just happen to be close by. Newcomb(1960) assigned the participants roommates at ran-dom, but by the study’s end most roommates hadbecome close friends. When teachers assign studentsseats in classrooms, cliques of pupils in adjacent seatsdevelop (Segal, 1974). City dwellers who regularlyassemble in the same physical location—commutersat subway stops, patrons at local bars, and frequentpicnickers in parks—eventually gel into identifiablegroups (see Gieryn, 2000). College students living indorms send far more emails to those who live nearthem than they do to those who live in more distantrooms (Sacerdote & Marmaros, 2005).

Leon Festinger and his colleagues tracked theemergence of networks of attraction in a housingresidence at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-nology (MIT). Not only did the majority of bestfriends live in the same building, they lived nextdoor; 41% of the next-door neighbors were identifiedas people “seen socially.” The numbers then droppedwith each increase in distance, so that only 22% ofthe neighbors two doors down were identified as

T A B L E 4.4 The Effectiveness of Different Types of Groups in Ameliorating Loneliness

Effectiveness in Reducing Emotional Loneliness

Low High

Effectiveness in ReducingSocial Loneliness

Low Collectives (passengers,queues, audiences)

Intimate Groups (couples,long-term close friendshippairs)

High Social Groups (congregations,work groups, regulars at a bar,social clubs, amateur athletic teams)

Primary groups (families,communes, very close-knitfriendship cliques)

proximity principle The tendency for individuals toform interpersonal relations with those who are close by.

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members of the student’s social group, 16% of thosethree doors down, and only 10% of those four doorsaway. The distances were relatively small ones—22feet (next door) to 88 feet, but proximity mattered(Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950).

We do not form groups with people who happento be nearby because we are shallow or indiscriminat-ing. First, people show a preference for things—including people—that seem familiar to them(Bornstein, 1989). When people continually encoun-ter other people because their offices, homes, desks, orrooms are located adjacent to theirs, these strangersquickly become acquaintances. So long as this re-peated exposure does not reveal that those nearbyothers have contemptible qualities, then familiaritywill breed contentment rather than contempt(Norton, Frost, Ariely, 2007).

Second, proximity increases interaction be-tween people, and interaction cultivates attraction.As Richard Moreland (1987) noted in his social in-tegration theory of group formation, groups emergegradually over time as individuals find themselvesinteracting with the same subset of other individualswith greater and greater frequency. Repeated inter-actions may foster a sense of groupness as the peoplecome to think of themselves as a group, and thoseoutside the group begin to treat them as a group(Arkin & Burger, 1980). One investigator watched,for weeks, the interactions of 12 women whoworked at separate desks organized in three rows.The individuals’ work did not require that theycollaborate extensively with one another, but theyfrequently spoke to each other. Every 15 minutesthe observer would note who was interacting withwhom, and eventually recorded over 1,500 distinctconversations. The conversations took place pri-marily between neighbors, or at least between theworkers who were seated in the same row, andthese interactions accurately predicted the forma-tion of smaller cliques within the larger group ofwomen (Gullahorn, 1952).

Proximity usually promotes interaction, butshould it fail to do so, then it could lead to dislikingrather than liking. When people were asked to nametheir friends, most identified people who lived closeby and whom they interacted with very frequently.

But when they named someone they disliked, theyalso tended to pick a near neighbor, but someonewith whom they rarely interacted. Also, onlinecommunities, such as Facebook, Second Life, andmultiplayer games, lack propinquity but they stimu-late high levels of interaction among members, re-sulting in the formation of stable groups(Ducheneaut et al., 2006). Perhaps, then, it is inter-action rather than propinquity that creates attraction(Ebbesen, Kjos, & Konecni, 1976).

The Elaboration Principle Groups, as self-organizing, dynamic systems, tend to increase in com-plexity over time. A group that begins with only twomembers tends to grow in size as these individuals be-come linked to other nearby individuals. According tosystems theory, “the basic dynamic of elaboration is theproliferation of elements and ties,” which “are linkedtogether to form a functional unit called a group”(Arrow et al., 2000, pp. 91–92; Parks, 2007).

Newcomb’s groups, for example, conformedto this elaboration principle, for cliques usuallyevolved from smaller, dyadic pairings. The firstfriendships were two-person pairs—usually room-mates or people living in adjoining rooms who be-came friends. Over time, these dyads expanded toinclude other individuals who were attracted to oneor both of the original members. This same kind ofself-organizing process has been documented inother emerging groups, such as adolescents’ peergroup associations, leisure groups, and social move-ments (Benford, 1992). As Focus 4.3 explains, gangsform when three friends refer to themselves with ashared name and recruit other friends to join thegroup (Tobin, 2008). Friendships are very likelyto form between students who were linked to thesame individuals (Gibbons & Olk, 2003). Groupsform when otherwise unrelated individuals aredrawn to a single individual, who becomes thehub for gradually developing bonds among the var-ious members (Redl, 1942). The impressionists

elaboration principle The tendency for groups to ex-pand as members form dyadic associations with someonewho is not in the group and thereby draw the nonmem-ber into the group.

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developed into a group through such a self-organizing process. Each member of the core groupdrew in others, until in time the group included art-ists, sculptors, and writers (see Figure 4.6).

The Similarity Principle Newcomb found thatthe 17 men clustered naturally into two groupscontaining nine and seven members; one personremained at the fringe of both groups. The seven-man group was particularly unified, for when askedto indicate who they liked out of the total list of 17they gave relatively high rankings to one anotherand not to those young men in the other cluster.The members of the other group did not show thesame level of mutual attraction as the smaller clique.

When Newcomb (1963) examined these sub-groups he noticed that subgroup members’ values,

beliefs, and interests were similar. One clique, for ex-ample, contained men who endorsed liberal politicaland religious attitudes, were all registered in the artscollege, came from the same part of the country, andshared similar aesthetic, social, theoretical, economic,political, and religious values. The members of thesecond subgroup were all veterans, were majors inengineering, and shared similar religious, economic,and political values. Newcomb had found strongevidence for the similarity principle: People are at-tracted to those who are similar to them in some way.

Similarity is a social magnet that creates allkinds of relationships. People tend to marry peoplewho are similar to them; they join groupscomposed of others who are like them; and theylive in communities where people are more alikethan different. Although these similarities oftenreflect agreements in attitudes, values, and beliefs,they are also based on irrelevant demographiccharacteristics, such as race, ethnicity, sex, andage (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). As a result,homophily—similarity of the members of agroup in attitudes, values, demographic character-istics, and so on—is common in groups. The cli-ques that form in large volunteer organizations tietogether people who are similar in some wayrather than dissimilar (Feld, 1982). If a group de-creases in size, the first individual who is droppedfrom membership will likely be the one who is theleast similar to the other members; ties betweensimilar people are maintained, but ties with dissim-ilar people dissolve. “Birds of a feather flock to-gether” describes most groups.

Why are people drawn to others who are sim-ilar to them in some way? Homophily appears to besustained by a number of psychological, sociologi-cal, and relational factors that combine to promote

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F I G U R E 4.6 The elaboration of groups over time.Groups that begin as simple two-person groups becomemore complex over time as individuals who are initiallylinked together only in one-to-one, dyadic relationships(e.g., person 1 and 2, person 3 and 8) expand their net-works to include additional elements (members).

similarity principle The tendency to affiliate with or beattracted to similar others; this tendency causes groups andother interpersonal aggregates to be composed of indivi-duals who are similar to one another rather than dissimilar.homophily The tendency for group members to displaycertain affinities, such as similarities in demographicbackground, attitudes, values, or so on; the overall de-gree of similarity of individuals within the same group.

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F o c u s 4.3 Why Join a Gang?

It’s like a comfortable feeling, you got someone toback you up and protect you.

“Billy,” 21-year-old North Side Crip(Decker & Van Winkle, 1996, p. 74)

Gangs are often characterized as disruptive, violentgroups of delinquents who commit robberies, hijack cars,distribute drugs, murder, and generally live outside theboundaries of “normal” society. But objective analyses ofthe characteristics of gangs suggest that violence andsocial disorganization are rarely the defining features ofsuch groups. Gangs do may contend against legal au-thorities and members may use violence to establish sta-tus and control in the group. Gangs are, however, rela-tively stable associations within many communities, andtheir members also connect to their community throughmore traditional social groups (church congregations,families, schools). Larger gangs also tend to be hierar-chically organized, much like a business or formal orga-nization, and the members vary in their commitment totheir groups (Vankatesh, 2008). The few core members(called, variously, ancients, old gangsters, veteranos) mayremain in the group for many years, and for them thegang dominates their social lives. Most members, how-ever, only take part in some gang-related activities(Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003).

Gangs also emerge for many of the same reasonsthat any group is formed. One study of gangs in EastLos Angeles, for example, traced many of these groupsback to a much smaller cluster of friends who livednear one another (Moore, 1991). The founders of thegroup were very similar to one another in terms ofethnicity and age, and they were committed to in-creasing the level of safety in their neighborhoods.Over time, more people joined the groups, whichgradually became more formally organized, more ter-ritorial, and more likely to engage in criminal behavior.Gangs also tend to be relatively task focused(Venkatesh, 2008). When members were asked whythey joined the gang, most stressed practical outcomes,such as safety and financial gain (see Figure 4.7). Asone member remarked, “There’s money in a gang. Iwant to be in it, you see a lot of money in it, man.That’s why I really got in the gang, money and all”(quoted in Decker & Van Winkle, 1996, p. 74). Manygang members also agreed that gang membershipincreased their status in the community and helpedthem socially. “One thing I like about gangs it’s morepeople to be around, more partners to go placeswith . . . social stuff” (quoted in Decker & Van Winkle,1996, p. 75).

0 20 40 60 80 100

Percent

Use drugs

Family member belongs

Impress girls

Buy drugs

Nothing to do

Impress friends

Impress neighborhood

My neighborhood

Defend neighborhood

Make money

Sell drugs

Protection

F I G U R E 4.7 Gang members’ explanations for their decision to become a gang member. Those who joingangs are more likely to mention instrumental concerns, such as protection and the need to make money sellingdrugs, than a concern for gaining status and impressing other people. Other factors, such as having a familymember in the gang or a gang’s access to drugs, were also mentioned as reasons for joining.

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contacts between people who share similaritiesrather than differences (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, &Cook, 2001). Because people who adopt the samevalues and attitudes that we do reassure us that ourbeliefs are accurate, we find association with suchpeople very rewarding (Byrne, 1971). People mayalso assume, with some justification, that futuregroup interactions will be more cooperative andconflict-free when members are all similar to oneanother (Insko & Schopler, 1972). Similarity mayalso increase a sense of connectedness to the otherperson (Arkin & Burger, 1980). Two strangerschatting casually on an airplane, for example, feelunited if they find that they share even the smallestsimilarity, such as the same middle name or favor-ite television program. Disliking a person whoseems similar may also be psychologically distres-sing. After all, if a person is similar to us, it followslogically that he or she must be attractive (Festinger,1957; Heider, 1958). Homophily also tends to begethomophily. Because communities, schools, andmostworkplaces bring people together who are similarin terms of race, attitudes, religion, and ethnicity,people’s options for relationships are limited to thosewho are already similar to them in these ways(McPherson et al., 2001).

The Complementarity Principle In most casessimilarity trumps dissimilarity when it comes to at-traction. People generally associate with similarothers, and they are repulsed by those who are dis-similar to them (Rosenbaum, 1986). In one-on-onerelations, people are sometimes attracted to indivi-duals who have very desirable personal qualities, butwhen evaluating groups people base their prefer-ences on the degree of similarity between the groupand themselves (Clement & Krueger, 1998).

If, however, people’s qualities complementeach other—they are dissimilar but they fit welltogether—then this unique form of dissimilaritymay encourage people to associate with one another.If, for example, Claude enjoys leading groups, hewill not be attracted to other individuals who alsostrive to take control of the group. Instead, he willrespond more positively to those who accept hisguidance (Tiedens, Unzueta & Young, 2007).

Similarly, individuals who are forming a group mayrealize that the members’ skills and abilities mustcomplement each other if the group is to be success-ful (Kristof-Brown, Barrick, & Stevens, 2005). Thesecases are consistent with the complementarityprinciple, which suggests that people are attractedto those who possess characteristics that complementtheir own personal characteristics (Winch, 1958).

Which tendency is stronger, similarity or com-plementarity? Some investigators, working primarilywith dyads, have found that similarity is much morecommon than complementarity (Miller, Perlman &Brehm, 2007). Other researchers, however, havefound that the members of close-knit groups tendto possess compatible but somewhat dissimilar needs(Kerckhoff & Davis, 1962; O’Connor & Dyce,1997). In all likelihood, group members respondpositively to both similarity and complementarity.We may, for example, be attracted to people whosequalities complement our own, yet we may also feelthat we are very similar to such people (Dryer &Horowitz, 1997). We may also prefer people whoare similar to us in some ways, but who complementus in other ways. Studies of interpersonal comple-mentarity indicate that people prefer to interactwith others who match their general level of friend-liness, warmth, and positivity. Positive behaviors,such as seeming sociable, reassuring, and considerate,tend to elicit similar levels of friendliness in response.However, people generally respond to dominantbehaviors by acting submissively and vice versa; soleaders seek out followers, and the strong seek outthe weak (e.g., Tracey, Ryan, & Jaschik-Herman,2001).

Schutz (1958), in his FIRO theory of groupsdiscussed earlier in this chapter, suggested that com-patibility can be based on both similarity and oncomplementarity. Interchange compatibility ex-ists when group members have similar expectations

complementarity principle The tendency for groupmembers to like people who are dissimilar to them inways that complement their personal qualities.interchange compatibility As described by WilliamSchutz, compatibility between group members based ontheir similar needs for inclusion, control, and affection.

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about the group’s intimacy, control, and inclusive-ness. Interchange compatibility will be high if all themembers expect that their group will be formallyorganized with minimal expressions of intimacy,but it will be low if some think that they can sharetheir innermost feelings whereas others want a morereserved exchange. Originator compatibility ex-ists when people have dissimilar, but complemen-tary, needs with regard to expressing and receivingcontrol, inclusion, and affection. For example, origi-nator compatibility would be high if a person with ahigh need to control the group joined a groupwhose members wanted a strong leader.

Schutz tested his theory by constructinggroups of varying compatibilities. He createdoriginator compatibility by placing in each groupone member with a high need for control, onemember with a high need for inclusion, and threemembers with lower needs for control and inclu-sion. Moreover, interchange compatibility wasestablished by grouping people with similar needsfor affection. All the groups in this set were com-patible, but levels of affection were high in half ofthe groups and low in the other half. A set ofincompatible groups was also created by includinggroup members who varied significantly in theirneed for affection, ranging from high to low. AsSchutz predicted, (1) cohesiveness was higher inthe compatible groups than in the incompatiblegroups, and (2) the compatible groups workedon problems far more efficiently than the incom-patible groups. He found similar results in studiesof groups that formed spontaneously, such asstreet gangs and friendship circles in fraternities(Schutz, 1958).

The Reciprocity Principle When GrouchoMarx joked, “I don’t want to belong to any clubthat will accept me as a member,” he was denying

the power of the reciprocity principle—thatliking tends to be mutual. When we discover thatsomeone else accepts and approves of us—they givefriendly advice, compliment us, or declare their ad-miration for us—we usually respond by liking themin return. Newcomb (1979) found strong evidenceof the reciprocity principle, as did other investiga-tors in a range of different situations (e.g., Kandel,1978). Some group members, like Groucho Marx,may not like to be liked, but these exceptions to thereciprocity principle are relatively rare. When aperson expresses liking for us, it implies that theadmirer will treat us with respect, compassion, andbenevolence on future occasions (Montoya &Insko, 2008).

Negative reciprocity also occurs in groups: Wedislike those who seem to reject us. In one study,college students discussed controversial issues ingroups. Unknown to the true participants in theexperiment, two of the three group members wereconfederates of the experimenter, who either ac-cepted or rejected the comments of the participant.During a break between the discussion and the com-pletion of a measure of attraction to the group, therejecting confederates excluded the participant fromtheir discussion by talking among themselves andgiving the participant an occasional dirty look.Naturally, participants were less attracted to theirco-members if they had been rejected by them.The rejection also served to lower participants’ opi-nions of themselves (Pepitone & Wilpinski, 1960).

The Minimax Principle Social exchange theoryoffers one final, and particularly important, principlefor predicting group formation. The theory assumesthat people, as rational creatures, strive to minimizetheir troubles, their worries, and their losses and insteadmaximize their positive outcomes, their happiness, andtheir rewards. Like shoppers searching for a bargain,they are drawn to groups that impose few costs yetoffer them the greatest rewards. If a group seems to bea costly one—it will demand much time or willoriginator compatibility As described by William

Schutz, compatibility between group members that oc-curs when individuals who wish to express inclusion,control, or affection within the group are matched withindividuals who wish to receive inclusion, control, oraffection from others.

reciprocity principle The tendency for liking to be metwith liking in return; if A likes B then B will tend to like A.

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require members to do things that they would ratheravoid if possible—then the value of the group willdrop and people will be less likely to join. But, ifthe group offers considerable rewards to its members,such as prestige, desired resources, or pleasant experi-ences, then they will seek it out. These two basicrequirements, taken together, provide the basis for so-cial exchange theory’s minimax principle: Peoplewill join groups and remain in groups that providethem with the maximum number of valued rewardswhile incurring the minimum number of possible costs(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

What kinds of rewards do people seek and whatcosts do they hope to avoid? When researchers askedprospective group members to identify the rewardsand costs they felt a group might create for them,40% mentioned such social and personal rewards asmeeting people, making new friends, developingnew interests, or enhancing their self-esteem. Theyalso mentioned such rewards as learning new skills,increased opportunities for networking, and fun.These prospective members also anticipated costs,however. More than 30% expected to lose timeand money by joining a group. Other frequentlymentioned costs were social pressures, possible injuryor illness, and excessive demands made by the groupfor their time. Nonetheless, the prospective mem-bers in this study optimistically felt that the groupsthey were considering would offer them far morerewards than costs (Brinthaupt, Moreland, &Levine, 1991; Moreland, Levine, Cini, 1993).

The group members themselves are also animportant source of rewards and costs. People areusually attracted to groups whose members possesspositively valued qualities and avoid groups of peoplewith objectionable characteristics. People prefer toassociate with people who are generous, enthusiastic,punctual, dependable, helpful, strong, truthful, andintelligent (Bonney, 1947; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).People tend to dislike and reject as potential group

members those individuals who possess socially unat-tractive personal qualities—people who seem pushy,rude, self-centered, or boring (Gilchrist, 1952;Iverson, 1964). Those who complain too frequentlyare also viewed negatively (Kowalski, 1996), as arepeople who sidetrack the group unnecessarily, showlittle enthusiasm, and seem preoccupied with them-selves (Leary et al., 1986). Many of the impressionists,for example, considered having to interact withDegas a major cost of membership. In a letter toCamille Pissarro, Gustave Caillebotte wrote, “Degasintroduced disunity into our midst. It is unfortunatefor him that he has such an unsatisfactory character.He spends his time haranguing at the Nouvelle-Athènes or in society. He would do much better topaint a little more” (quoted in Denvir, 1993, p. 181).

The Economics of Membership

Why did such artists as Manet, Pissarro, and Bazillejoin with Monet to create an artists’ circle? As wehave seen, the group offered its members a numberof advantages over remaining alone. By joiningMonet, the impressionists gained a sounding boardfor ideas, social support, help with tasks they couldnot accomplish alone, and friends. But the groupalso created costs for members, who had to spendtime and personal resources before they could enjoythe benefits the group offered. The minimax prin-ciple argues that those who joined the group musthave felt that the benefits outweighed the costs.

Do we, then, join any group that promises us afavorable reward/cost ratio? Howard Kelley and JohnThibaut argued that although we may be attracted tosuch groups, our decision to actually join is based ontwo factors: our comparison level and our comparison levelfor alternatives. Comparison level (CL) is the standardby which individuals evaluate the desirability of group

minimax principle The tendency to prefer relation-ships and group memberships that provide the maximumnumber of valued rewards and incur the fewest numberof possible costs.

comparison level (CL) In John Thibaut and HaroldKelley’s social exchange theory, the standard by whichthe individual evaluates the quality of any social relation-ship. In most cases, individuals whose prior relationshipsyielded positive rewards with few costs will have higherCLs than those who experienced fewer rewards andmore costs in prior relationships.

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membership. The CL derives from the average of alloutcomes known to the individual and is usuallystrongly influenced by previous relationships. If, forexample, Degas’s prior group memberships yieldedvery positive rewards with very few costs, his CLshould be higher than that of someone who has ex-perienced fewer rewards and more costs throughgroup membership. According to Thibaut andKelley, groups that “fall above CL would be relatively‘satisfying’ and attractive to the member; those entail-ing outcomes that fall below CL would be relatively‘unsatisfying’ and unattractive” (Thibaut & Kelley,1959, p. 21; see also Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).

Comparison level, however, only predictswhen people will be satisfied with membership ina group. If we want to predict whether people willjoin groups or leave them, we must also take intoaccount the value of other, alternative groups.What if Degas could have joined several artists’ cir-cles, all of which surpassed his CL? Which onewould he then select? According to Thibaut andKelley (1959), the group with the best reward/cost balance will determine Degas’s comparisonlevel for alternatives (CLalt). Thibaut andKelley argued that “CLalt can be defined informallyas the lowest level of outcomes a member willaccept in the light of available alternative opportu-nities” (1959, p. 21).

Entering and exiting groups is largely determinedby CLalt, whereas satisfaction with membership is de-termined by CL (see Table 4.5). For example, whydid Degas initially join the impressionists, but even-tually leave the group? According to Thibaut andKelley, Degas intuitively calculated the positive andnegative outcomes that resulted from membership inthe group. This index, at least at first, favored theimpressionists. If Degas believed that joining thegroup would surpass his comparison level (CL),then he would likely be satisfied with membership.But over time, the demands of the group became toogreat and the rewards too small, the group’s valuedropped below his CL, and he became dissatisfied.If the group’s value dropped below Degas’s intuitiveestimations of the value of other groups (his CLalt),then he would likely leave the impressionists and joinanother, more promising group. In Degas’s case, thealternative of remaining alone established the lowerlevel of his CLalt.

The rest of the impressionists, however, re-mained friends. They often exhibited their worksindividually and spent months in isolation, butthey still provided each other with help as neces-sary. Indeed, for many years, they met regularly atthe Café Riche, where they would discuss art, pol-itics, and literature. In time, they reached their goalof fame and fortune. By the turn of the century,most were invited, at last, to present in traditionalshows, and collectors paid handsome prices for theirwork. As individuals, they came to Paris to learn topaint; but as a group they changed the world’sdefinition of fine art.

T A B L E 4.5 The Impact of Comparison Level (CL) and Comparison Level forAlternatives (CLalt) on Satisfaction with Group Membership and the Decisionto Join a Group

Membership in the Group is

Above CL Below CL

Membership in theGroup is

Above CLalt Membership is satisfying,will join group

Membership is dissatisfying, butwill join group

Below CLalt Membership is satisfying,but will not join group

Membership is dissatisfying andwill not join group

SOURCE: Adapted from Thibaut & Kelley, 1959.

comparison level for alternatives (CLalt) In JohnThibaut and Harold Kelley’s social exchange theory,the standard by which individuals evaluate the qualityof other groups that they may join.

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SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

Who joins groups?

1. The tendency to join groups is partly deter-mined by individuals’ personal qualities,including personality traits, sex, social motives,and prior experiences.

2. Personality traits, such as extraversion andrelationality, influence who affiliates withothers and who does not.

■ Extraversion is a primary dimension ofpersonality identified by Jung and the BigFive theory of personality. Extraverts aremore likely to seek out groups than areintroverts.

■ Extraverts tend to be happier thanintroverts.

■ Individuals who are high in relationality are,in Gladwell’s terms, connectors, for they aremore attentive to their relations withothers.

3. Women seek membership in smaller, informal,intimate groups, whereas men seek member-ship in larger, more formal, task-focusedgroups, but these differences are not substantialones.

4. The strength of social motives, such as the need foraffiliation, the need for intimacy, and the need forpower also predict one’s group-joining procli-vities. Schutz’s Fundamental Interpersonal RelationsOrientation (FIRO) theory explains how peopleuse groups to satisfy their need to receive andexpress inclusion, control, and affection.

5. Individuals who are socially inhibited, shy, andanxious are less likely to join groups.

■ Individuals who experience social anxietyfeel threatened in group settings.

■ Smith’s analysis of group-level attachmentstyle (i.e., secure, preoccupied, fearful, anddismissing) indicates that one’s anxiety andavoidance pertaining to relationshipsinfluence orientation toward groups.

6. Research Moreland and Levine indicates thatindividuals who have had prior positiveexperiences in groups tend to seek out furthergroup memberships.

When do people seek out others?

1. Festinger’s theory of social comparison assumesthat people seek the company of others whenthey find themselves in ambiguous, frightening,and difficult circumstances.

2. Schachter, when putting people into a threat-ening situation, found that they affiliated withothers rather than remain alone (“misery lovescompany”). However,

■ People prefer to affiliate with individualswho likely have useful information about asituation and others who are in a similarsituation (“misery loves miserablecompany”).

■ When people worry that they will beembarrassed when they join a group,they usually do not affiliate withothers (“embarrassed misery avoidscompany”).

3. By choosing comparison targets who areperforming poorly compared to themselves(downward social comparison), individualsbolster their own sense of competence; and bychoosing superior targets (upward socialcomparison), individuals can BIRG, as well asrefine their expectations of themselves.

■ Tesser’s self-evaluation maintenance (SEM)model argues that people prefer to associatewith individuals who do not outperformthem in areas that are very relevant to theirself-esteem.

■ Buunk’s work suggests that people whohave a high affiliative tendency but a lowsocial comparison orientation most enjoy beingin groups.

FORMAT ION 113

4. Groups provide their members with socialsupport during times of stress and tension.

■ Group behaviors facilitate “fight-or-flight”responses to stress, but also the kinds of“tend-and-befriend” responses identified byTaylor and her colleagues.

■ Basic types of support from groups includea sense of belonging and emotional,information, instrumental, and spiritualsupport.

5. Groups help members avoid two basic forms ofloneliness: social and emotional.

What processes generate bonds of interpersonal attractionbetween members of groups?

1. Newcomb, in his studies of the acquaintanceprocess, found that people who like one an-other often bond together to form a group.Attraction patterns are generally consistent withthe following principles:

■ Proximity principle: People tend to likethose who are situated nearby, in partbecause it increases the likelihood ofincreased social interaction (Moreland’ssocial integration theory).

■ Elaboration principle: From a systems per-spective, groups often emerge when addi-tional elements (people) become linked tothe original members.

■ Similarity principle: People like otherswho are similar to them in some way. Inconsequence, most groups tend towardincreasing levels of homophily.

■ Complementarity principle: People like otherswhose qualities complement their ownqualities. Schutz identified two key formsof compatibility: interchange compatibility(based on similarity) and originatorcompatibility (based on complementarity).

■ Reciprocity principle: Liking tends to bemutual.

■ Minimax principle: Individuals are attractedto groups that offer them maximumrewards and minimal costs.

2. Thibaut and Kelley’s social exchange theorymaintains that satisfaction with group member-ship is primarily determined by comparison level(CL), whereas the comparison level for alternatives(CLalt) determines whether members will join,stay in, or leave a group.


Chapter Case: The Impressionists■ Collaborative Circles, by Michael P. Farrell

(2001), provides a richly detailed analysis of theimpressionists and a number of other influentialgroups, and offers a stage theory that describeshow these highly creative groups develop overtime.

■ The Chronicle of Impressionism, by B. Denvir(1993), provides the timeline for the develop-ment of the impressionists and includes repro-ductions of both their art and their personalcorrespondence.

Affiliation■ The Psychology of Affiliation, by Stanley

Schachter (1959), describes the exacting scien-tific methods he used to document when andwhy people seek out others.

■ Handbook of Social Comparison: Theory andResearch, edited by Jerry Suls and Ladd Wheeler(2000), includes chapters on virtually all aspectsof social comparison processes.

■ “Social comparison: The end of a theory andthe emergence of a field,” by Abraham P.Buunk and Frederick X. Gibbons (2007), is a

114 CHAPTER 4

masterful review of the voluminous literaturedealing with comparison processes.

Attraction

■ “The Formation of Small Groups,” by RichardL. Moreland (1987), provides an overallframework for understanding group formationby describing four ways individuals

become integrated into a group: environmentalintegration, behavioral integration, affectiveintegration, and cognitive integration.

■ Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective,by Kimberly Tobin (2008), is a concise,up-to-date overview of gangs as groups.

Media ResourcesVisit the Group Dynamics companion website at www.cengage.com/psychology/forsyth to access onlineresources for your book, including quizzes, flash cards, web links, and more!

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5

Cohesion and Development

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Groups, like all living things, developover time. The group may begin as acollection of strangers, but uncertaintygives way to cohesion as members be-come bound to their group by strongsocial forces. Cohesion, though, is notjust group unity or the friendliness ofmembers, but a multifaceted processthat influences a wide range of inter-personal and intragroup processes. Ascohesion and commitment ebb andflow with time, the group’s influenceover its members rises and falls.

■ What is group cohesion?■ Why do some groups, but not

others, become cohesive?■ How does cohesion develop over

time?■ What are the positive and nega-

tive consequences of cohesion?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

The Nature of Cohesion

Components of Cohesion

Antecedents of Cohesion

Indicators of Cohesion

Cohesion and Commitment over Time

Stages of Group Development

Cycles of Group Development

Consequences of Cohesion

Member Satisfaction andAdjustment

Group Dynamics and Influence

Group Productivity

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

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The U.S. team was inferior to the Russian team innearly all respects. The U.S. players were mostlycollege students or recent graduates. They weresmaller, slower, and less experienced. The teamwas relatively unpracticed, for only six months be-fore, Herb Brooks had recruited each player fromschools and jobs across the country. But for all theirweaknesses, they had one quality that the Russianteam lacked: They were cohesive. They were filledwith a sense of purpose, of duty, and esprit de corps.No one player took credit for the victory, but in-stead spoke only of “we,” repeating “we beat thoseguys” over and over as the bewildered Russian teamlooked on.

Many believed that the team’s cohesiveness wasthe deciding factor in their victory. But what isgroup cohesion, after all? Why did the U.S. teamhave this unique quality, and why did the Russianteam lack it? Is cohesiveness such a valuable com-modity that it can offset inadequate training andskills and thereby turn a mediocre group into agreat group? Is cohesiveness so wondrous that weshould strive to make all our groups cohesive ones?This chapter considers the mysteries of cohesivenessby specifying its nature, development over time,and consequences.

THE NATURE OF COHES ION

Cohesion can lay claim to being group dynamics’most theoretically important concept. A uniquelygroup-level concept, cohesion comes about if, andonly if, a group exists. Without at least somedegreeofcohesion, groups would disintegrate as each memberwithdraw from the group. Cohesiveness signals, ifonly indirectly, the health of the group. A cohesivegroup will be more likely to prosper over time,since it retains its members and allows them to reachgoals that would elude a more incoherent aggre-gate. The group that lacks cohesion is at risk, for iftoo many members drift away the group may notsurvive.

The concept of cohesiveness, too, offers insightsinto some of the most intriguing questions peopleask about groups: Why do some groups disintegratein the face of adversity, whereas others grow evenstronger? When do members put the needs of theirgroup above their own personal interests? How doesa group, with only meager resources, manage to bestanother group that is superior in terms of both ex-perience and talent? What is the source of the feelingof confidence and unity that arises in some groupsand not in others? If one understands the causes and

The U.S. Olympic Hockey Team: Miracle Makers

They were underdogs, and they knew it. Their mission:To represent their country, the United States, in the1980 Winter Olympics. Their goal: To win a bronze,silver, or gold medal in hockey. Their task: To defeatteams from such hockey-rich countries as Sweden andGermany. Their major obstacle: The world-famousU.S.S.R. National Championship Team. The Russianplayers were practically professionals. They were allmembers of the Russian army, and they were paid topractice and play their sport. The Russian team haddominated hockey for many years, and were poised totake their fifth consecutive gold medal in the sport.When they played the U.S. team in an exhibition gameheld just a few days before the start of the OlympicGames, the final score was Russia 10, U.S. 3.

But strange things can happen when groupscompete against groups. The U.S. team made

its way through the preliminary rounds and facedthe Russian team in the medal round. The U.S.team fell behind by two goals, and it looked asthough the Russians would take victory withease. But the plucky U.S. team struggled on, finallytaking the lead with eight minutes left to play.During the game’s last minutes, the Russianslaunched shot after shot, but all the while the U.S.coach, Herb Brooks, calmed his players by telling them“Play your game!” As the game’s end neared, theannouncer counted down the seconds into hismicrophone before asking his listeners, “Do youbelieve in miracles?” What else could explain thegame’s outcome? The U.S. Olympic Hockey Team,expected to win a game or two at most in theentire series, had just beaten an unbeatableteam.

COHES ION AND DEVELOPMENT 117

consequences of cohesion, then one is further alongin understanding a host of core processes that occurin groups, including productivity, members’ satisfac-tion and turnover, morale, formation, stability, influ-ence, and conflict.

Components of Cohesion

What, precisely, is group cohesion? Intuitively, weknow the difference between cohesive groups andgroups that are not cohesive. Cohesive groups areunified and morale is high. Members enjoy interact-ing with one another, and they remain in the groupfor prolonged periods of time. But what about thegroup where all the members like one another—they are close friends—but they have no commit-ment to the group as a whole? The group where

members no longer feel emotionally connected toone another but still feel proud of their group?The group whose members fit together like partsin a fine watch—so closely conjoined that they func-tion as a single productive unit—yet they do not likeone another? Cohesiveness takes so many differentforms and fulfills so many functions that some theor-ists have complained that the concept, ironically,lacks cohesion (e.g., Casey-Campbell & Martens,2008; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 2002; Mudrack,1989; see Table 5.1).

This diversity of meanings and interpretationsreflects the complexity inherent in the concept itself.Cohesion is not a simple, unitary process but a multi-component process with a variety of indicators. Manycohesive groups are similar to the U.S. HockeyTeam—the members worked well together, they

T A B L E 5.1 A Sampling of Definitions of Cohesion

Core Concept Definition and Source

Attraction among themembers of a group

The cohesiveness of small groups is defined in terms of intermember attraction . . .that group property which is inferred from the number and strength of mutualpositive attitudes among the members of a group. (Lott & Lott, 1965, p. 259)

Attraction of the members tothe group as a whole

Cohesiveness refers to attraction of members to a group as a whole . . . a kind ofsynthetic or aggregative property of the sum of the feelings of attraction to thegroup of each of the individual group members. (Nixon, 1979, p. 76)

Relational cohesion [is] the sense of coming together, of something larger thatunifies actors and actions. (Thye, Yoon, & Lawler, 2002, p. 146)

Belonging and morale Perceived cohesion encompasses an individual’s sense of belonging to a particulargroup and his or her feelings of morale associated with membership in the group.(Bollen & Hoyle, 1990, p. 482)

Strength of the social forcesthat keep an individual fromleaving a group

Cohesiveness of a group is here deemed as the result of all the forces acting on themembers to remain in the group. These forces may depend on the attractiveness orunattractiveness of either the prestige of the group, members in the group, or theactivities in which the group engages. (Festinger, 1950, p. 274)

Tendency to stick together(cohere)

Social cohesion should also be understood as a state of affairs concerning howwell people in a society “cohere” or “stick” to each other. (Chan, To, & Chan, 2006,p. 298)

Cohesion is now generally described as group members’ inclinations to forge socialbonds, resulting in members sticking together and remaining united.(Casey-Campbell & Martens, 2008, p. 2)

Trust and teamwork The essence of strong primary group cohesion, which I believe to be generallyagreed on, is trust among group members (e.g., to watch each other’s back)together with the capacity for teamwork (e.g., pulling together to get the task orjob done). (Siebold, 2007, p. 288)

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became good friends as well as teammates, they wereunified, and they played with great emotionalintensity—but another cohesive group may notexhibit all of these qualities. As a result, there is nosuch thing as a typical cohesive group. Nor is there asingle theory of cohesion that group experts agreeadequately identifies the core components of cohe-sion. Some, for example, stress the strength of bondsbetween members, others highlight the group’s abilityto retain itsmembers, and others emphasize the degreeof emotional intensity expressed by members duringthe group’s activities. Recognizing that our reviewcannot be comprehensive, the following sectionsexamine four interrelated processes—social relations,task relations, perceived unity, and emotions—thatserve as the glues that hold groups together (Dion,2000; Friedkin, 2004; Siebold, 2007).

Social Cohesion Kurt Lewin and Leon Festingerand his colleagues conducted some of the earlieststudies of cohesion. As early as 1943, Lewin usedthe term cohesion to describe the forces that keepgroups intact by pushing members together as wellas the countering forces that push them apart.Festinger and his colleagues also stressed social forcesthat bind individuals to groups, for in their studiesthey defined group cohesion as “the total field of forceswhich act on members to remain in the group”(Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950, p. 164). Butwhen they measured cohesion, they focused onone force more than all others: attraction. Theyasked the group members to identify all their goodfriends and calculated the ratio of ingroup choices tooutgroup choices. The greater the ratio, the greaterwas the cohesiveness of the group (Dion, 2000).Attraction between individuals is a basic ingredientfor most groups, but when these relations intensifyand proliferate throughout a group they can trans-form a conjoined group into a cohesive one.

Cohesion, however, is a multi level process aswell as a multi component one, so group membersmay be bonded to their groups in a number ofways. At the individual level, specific group mem-bers are attracted to other group members. Many ofthe young men on U.S. Hockey Team, for exam-ple, were friends from their days playing together in

college, and these likes created personal relationsamong them when they found themselves togetheronce more on the U.S. team. At the group level,members are attracted to the group itself rather thanspecific individuals in the group. The players on thehockey team, for example, described their team as a“great group of guys” and were proud to be mem-bers. Moving further upward in terms of levels ofassociation, the hockey team was just one team inthe entire U.S. Olympic Team for 1980—and themembers were bonded to that larger group as wellas their specific team. The men were also playingfor their country, and so their affective bonds notonly linked them to each other, to their team, andto their organization but also to their country(Bliese & Halverson, 1996). These various levelsof attraction usually covary; for example, friendshipamong the members of a group tends to generateliking for and pride in the group as a whole (Carless& De Paola, 2000). But forms of attraction neednot go hand in hand, particularly if groups focus onwork or performance rather than leisure or socializ-ing. When cohesion is based on individual-levelattraction and those who are liked leave the group,the remaining members are more likely to quit.When cohesion is based on group-level attraction,people remain members even when specific mem-bers leave the group (Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004;Mobley et al., 1979).

Some researchers prefer to reserve the term co-hesion for group-level attraction only. Michael Hoggand his colleagues, for example, draw on social iden-tity theory in their analysis of cohesion in large ag-gregates. Hogg noted that although members ofcohesive groups usually like one another, this per-sonal attraction is not group cohesion. Rather, groupcohesion corresponds to a form of group-level at-traction that Hogg labeled social attraction—a likingfor other group members that is based on their statusas typical group members. Unlike personal attrac-tion, which is based on relationships between spe-cific members, social attraction is depersonalized,since it is based on admiration for individuals whopossess the kinds of qualities that typify the group.Hogg found that any factor that increases members’tendency to categorize themselves as group members


(e.g., conflict with other groups, the presence of anoutgroup, activities that focus members’ attention ontheir group identity) will reduce personal attractionbut increase depersonalized, social attraction. Hogg’sanalysis means that cohesiveness is not limited tosmall groups in which members know one anotherwell but is also a feature of larger collectives andcategories (see Hogg, 1992, 2001, for a review).

Task Cohesion Each year since 1954, the maga-zine Sports Illustrated has identified one individualfrom the world of sports for the honor of “Athleteof the Year”—but not in 1980. That year, theAthlete of the Year was a group: the U.S. HockeyTeam. The U.S. Women’s World Cup SoccerTeam was similarly honored in 1999.

Many theorists believe that cohesion has moreto do with members’ willingness to work togetherto accomplish their objectives than it does with pos-itive interpersonal relations. Studies of sports teams,for example, find that most players, when asked todescribe their team’s cohesiveness, stress the qualityof their teamwork (Carron, 1982; Yukelson,Weinberg, & Jackson, 1984). Task-oriented groups,such as military squads or flight crews, are unified bymembers’ shared drive to accomplish their goals(Siebold, 2007). Much of the unity of the U.S.Hockey Team was based on the members’ commit-ment to their sport and their quest for a gold medal.

Agroupwhosecohesiveness is generatedbya sharedtask focus tends to be high in collective efficacy.Unlike general optimism or overall confidence inthe group, collective efficacy derives from group

members’ shared beliefs that they can accomplish allthe components of their group’s task competentlyand efficiently. Group members may think, “Weare a powerful, successful hockey team,” but thisoverall conception of the group is not collective effi-cacy. Members of a group with collective efficacythink, “We are fast on the ice,” “We can block effec-tively,” and “We have an excellent transition game.”These beliefs must also be widely shared by groupmembers. One or two members may doubt thegroup’s potential for success, but overall, the consen-sus is positive rather than negative. This confidence isalso based on the members’ belief that the groupmembers will competently coordinate their individ-ual actions in skilled, collective performance, so thereis a sense of interdependence and shared resources(Zaccaro et al., 1995). Hence, collective efficacy is“a group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities toorganize and execute the courses of action requiredto produce given levels of attainment” (Bandura,1997, p. 476).

Perceived Cohesion Cohesion applies to bothphysical objects as well as social groups. A cohesiveobject, such as a molecule, a compound, or even aplanet, forms a single, unified entity that resists dis-integration. It may not, in fact, appear to have anyparts at all, as the various components are unified ina single whole. Similarly, cohesive groups are per-ceived to be highly unified and integrated—indivi-duals fused together to form a whole. At the grouplevel, members and nonmembers alike consider thegroup to be high in entitativity: those who encoun-ter the group will be convinced that it is a unified,tightly bonded group rather than a loose aggrega-tion of individuals (see Chapter 1). At the individuallevel, members express a sense of belonging to thegroup by stressing their commitment to the group;they are loyal to the group, identify with the group,and readily classify themselves as members.

Group members often reveal their perceptionsof their group’s unity in the words that they use todescribe their connection to it. When asked, theyagree that there is a “a feeling of unity and cohesionin this group” (Moos, Insel, & Humphrey, 1974);that members tend to spend much of their time

teamwork The combined activities of two or more in-dividuals who coordinate their efforts to make or dosomething. In many cases, each individual performs aportion of the task, which, when combined with others’work, yields a total group product.collective efficacy The belief, shared among a substan-tial portion of the group members, that the group is ca-pable of organizing and executing the actions required toattain the group’s goals and successfully complete itstasks.

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together, even when they do not need to (Chang &Bordia, 2001). When members talk about themselvesand their group, they use more plural pronouns thanpersonal pronouns: “Wewon that game” or “We gotthe job done” rather than “I got the job done”(Cialdini et al., 1976). They use words like family, com-munity, or just we to describe their group. They mayalso refuse to differentiate among the members of thegroup, as when one member refuses to take responsi-bility for the victory or win and insists that the team asa whole deserves the credit. Members, when asked tocomment directly on their sense of belonging to thegroup, are more likely to say “I feel a sense of belong-ing to my group” (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990), “I think ofthis group as a part of who I am” (Henry, Arrow, &Carini, 1999), and “I see myself as a member of thegroup” (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

Was the U.S. Hockey Team cohesive in thissense? Not at first, for many of the players hadcompeted against each other in college, and theyremembered their bitter rivalries. But the teamcoach, Herb Brooks, required each player to passa series of difficult psychological and physical chal-lenges before earning a spot on the team, and thesequalifying trials created a sense of shared adversity.Brooks also stressed the importance of team unity.His goal was to “build a ‘we’ and ‘us’ in ourselves asopposed to an ‘I,’ ‘me,’ ‘myself’” (Warner HBO,2001). This unity reached its peak in the medalceremonies after the U.S. team had won its goldmedal. Team captain Eruzione waved to the teamto join him on the small stage, and somehow theentire team crowded onto the small platform. Thecaptain did not represent the group. The entiregroup, as a whole, received the medal.

Emotional Cohesion Napoleon is said to haveproclaimed that the great strength of an army liesnot in the skill of its leaders, but in the élan—theemotional intensity—of its members. Durkheim,in discussing the nature of ritualized interactionsin cohesive groups, stressed how they develop in-tense emotional experiences, for when all “cometogether, a sort of electricity is formed by theircollecting which quickly transports them to anextraordinary degree of exaltation” (1912/1965,

p. 262). Durkheim was describing the large gather-ings of local communities in New Guinea, but hebelieved that collective effervescence resulted from thesharing of emotional reactions within a group. Asthe positive and elevated mood of one person ispicked up by the next, the group members eventu-ally display a shared emotional experience (seeFocus 5.1).

A variety of terms is used to describe group-levelemotional states, including élan, morale, esprit decorps, and positive affective tone, but no matterwhat its label, this shared positive emotion is one ofthe most obvious features of many cohesive groups.The Russian and U.S. teams were equal in confidenceand collective efficacy, for both groups had the talentneeded to win at hockey. But they differed dramati-cally in their level of emotionality. The Russian teamwas confident but unenthusiastic. The U.S. team wasnot so confident, but the team was brimming withenergy, enthusiasm, and team spirit. A group withhigh levels of collective efficacy may expect to suc-ceed, but a group with esprit de corps has emotionalvitality, passion, vim, and vigor. Esprit de corps, orpositive affective tone, predicts a number of positive be-haviors in the group, including helping teammates,protecting the organization, making constructive sug-gestions, improving one’s personal performance,spreading goodwill, and even enhancing survival(Spoor & Kelly, 2004; Zhou & George, 2001). Itwas this emotionality that Coach Brooks whippedup to its peak intensity before the U.S. team’s gamewith the Russians. He told them that the Russianswere taking their victory for granted, but “we canbeat them.” He told his team, “you were born tobe a player,” you were “destined to be here today,”and this is “our time.” When he told them to “spit inthe eye of the tiger,” they did.

Emotional cohesion, like the other componentsof cohesion, is a multi level process. Emotions, al-though traditionally thought to be personal reactionsrather an interpersonal ones, can be collective. In

esprit de corps A feeling of unity, commitment, confi-dence, and enthusiasm for the group shared by most orall of the members.


some cases, individuals experience emotions even ifthey personally have not experienced the emotion-provoking event (e.g., all the members become angrywhen they learn one of their own has been mis-treated). Collective emotions are also socially shared,in the sense that all the group members experiencethe same emotional reaction, as if they had reachedconsensus on the feelings they should be experienc-ing. These group-level emotions also become moreintense when individuals strongly identify with theirgroup—although this tendency is stronger for positiveemotions than for negative ones (Smith, Seger, &Mackie, 2007).

Antecedents of Cohesion

Table 5.2 suggests that the strength of the bondslinking members to one another and their groupdepends on a number of components, includingattraction relations (social cohesion), the degree towhich the group members coordinate their efforts

to achieve goals (task cohesion), the sense of be-longing and unity in group (perceived cohesion),and the intensity of the members’ communal emo-tions (emotional cohesion). These qualities, in part,define the nature of cohesion, but they also suggestthe antecedents of cohesiveness as well. Considersocial cohesion, as an example. Because one of thekey components of cohesion is degree of attractionamong members, any variable that influences likingamong the members will contribute to the devel-opment of cohesion within a group, and any factorthat discourages the development of attraction willlimit cohesion. In this section we review, briefly,some of the factors that set the stage for the emer-gence of cohesion in groups, with the caveat thatour review is more illustrative than comprehensive.

Interpersonal Attraction As Chapter 4 explained,groups often form when individuals develop feel-ings of attraction for one another. But just as suchfactors as proximity, frequency of interaction,

F o c u s 5.1 Does Collective Movement Build Cohesion?

Drill, dance, and battle belong together. All threecreate and sustain group cohesion.

—William McNeill,Keeping Together in Time (1995, p. 10).

Some rituals and practices, such as collective singing,chanting, praying, and marching, result in the devel-opment of a shared emotional elevation among groupmembers. Historian William McNeill (1995), in his bookKeeping Together in Time, describes this feeling bydrawing on his personal experience as a new recruitduring basic training in the U.S. Army.

Marching aimlessly about on the drill field, swag-gering in conformity with prescribed military pos-tures, conscious only of keeping in step so as tomake the next move correctly and in time some-how felt good. Words are inadequate to describethe emotion aroused by the prolonged movementin unison that drilling involved. A sense of perva-sive well-being is what I recalled; more specifically,a strange sense of personal enlargement; a sort ofswelling out, becoming bigger than life, thanks toparticipation in collective ritual (p. 2).

McNeill suggests that much of the history of modernforms of warfare can be traced to the cohesion-building effects of close-group training. His collective-movement hypothesis offers, for example, a solution toone of military history’s great mysteries: How did theGreek forces of Athens and Sparta, in the period from600 B.C. to 300 B.C., manage to overwhelm vastlysuperior forces? McNeill’s proposal: The Greeks reliedon highly cohesive groups of ground forces that movedforward as a synchronized unit. This formation isknown as a phalanx, from the Greek word for fingers.These units varied in size, but were typically at leasteight rows deep and stretched wide enough across afield of battle to prevent flanking. In some cases, eachman’s shield was designed so that it covered the soldierbeside him as well, thereby further increasing the unityof the group. The men of these phalanxes trained to-gether over long periods of time, and they becamesynchronized to the point that they acted as a singleunit that could inflict great damage against even thebest-trained individual soldiers. These phalanxes even-tually gave way to other means of organizing men inbattle, given their vulnerability to cavalry and moremaneuverable adversaries.

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similarity, complementarity, reciprocity, and re-warding exchanges can prompt a group to form,so too can they turn the rudimentary group into ahighly cohesive one (Lott & Lott, 1965).

Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif documented manyof these processes and their impact on cohesivenessin a series of unique field studies conducted in1949, 1953, and 1954. During the summers ofthose years the Sherifs would run a camp for 11-and 12-year-old boys that was, for the most part,just a typical summer camp experience—with ca-noeing, campfires, crafts, hikes, athletics, and so on.But, unbeknownst to the campers, the Sherifs alsorecorded the behavior of the boys as they reacted toone another and to situations introduced by theinvestigators. In the 1949 study, conducted in aremote location in northern Connecticut, the 24campers all bunked in one cabin for three days.During this period, friendships developed quicklybased on proximity of bunks, similarities in inter-ests, and maturity. The Sherifs then intervened, andbroke the large group into two smaller ones: theBulldogs and the Red Devils. In creating thesegroups they deliberately split up any friendship pairsthat had formed by assigning one best friend to theBulldogs and the other to the Red Devils. They

equated the members with respect to “size,strength, ability in games, intelligence, and ratingson personality tests” (Sherif & Sherif, 1956, p. 197).

Even under these conditions—with the factorsthat produced attraction between the boys mini-mized—new attractions formed quickly and re-sulted in high levels of cohesion within bothgroups. The Sherifs made certain that the boys’ firstfew days in their new groups were spent in a varietyof positive experiences (hiking, cookouts, games),and before long the boys, when asked to name theirfriends, chose members of their new groups ratherthan the boys that they had liked when camp firstbegan. When first split up, 65% of the boys pickedas friends those in the other group. But when thegroups became cohesive, fewer than 10% namedboys as friends who were in the other group.Another of the Sherifs’ studies, the well-knownRobbers Cave experiment, which is discussed inmore detail in Chapter 14’s analysis of conflict be-tween groups, yielded similar findings.

Stability of Membership During an exhibitiongame just prior to the Olympics, defensive playerJack O’Callahan was so badly injured that he couldnot play in the tournament. But rather than send

T A B L E 5.2 A Multicomponent Conception of Cohesion in Groups

Component Description Examples

Social cohesion Attraction of members to one anotherand to the group as a whole

I have many friends in this group.

I love this group.

This group is the best.

Task cohesion Capacity to perform successfully as acoordinated unit and as part of thegroup

This group is effective.

This group is the best at what it does.

I do my best for this group.

Perceived cohesion The construed coherence of the group;sense of belonging to the group; unity

United we stand.

This is a unified group.

I am one with this group.

Emotional cohesion Emotional intensity of the group andindividuals when in the group

This group has tremendous energy.

This group has team spirit.

I get excited just being in this group.


him home and replace him with a new player,Coach Brooks kept him on the roster—he didnot want to alter the chemistry of the team hehad been developing for so long.

As Brooks surmised, cohesiveness tends to in-crease the longer members remain in the group.Consider, for example, the findings from a year-long study of 138 women living in one of 13apartment-like dormitories at the University ofMinnesota. These dorms were relatively small—the largest housed only 16 women—but theynonetheless varied substantially in membership sta-bility. In some dorms as many as 90% of the stu-dents were new residents, but in others residentswere returning for a second or third year in thesame dorm. The dorms varied, too, in turnoverduring the year itself, with some seeing more stu-dents move out to take up residence elsewhere. Asexpected, the more stable dorms were also themore cohesive ones. These dorms often had acore of faithful members, and each year new mem-bers would enter into the group to replace thosewho graduated. The members usually remained intheir group for the entire year, and were not luredaway by some other living arrangement. Thosegroups with more unstable membership faced in-fluxes of new members each year and during theyear itself (Darley, Gross, & Martin, 1951).

These findings are consistent with Robert Ziller’s(1965) distinction between open groups and closedgroups. Ziller maintained that groups differ in theextent to which their boundaries and membershiprosters are open and fluctuating versus closed andfixed. In open groups, members are voted out of thegroup, quit the group for personal reasons, or joinother groups. Regardless of the reasons for thesechanges in membership, open groups are especiallyunlikely to reach a state of equilibrium, since membersrecognize that they may lose or relinquish their place

within the group at any time. In contrast, closedgroups are often more cohesive, because competitionfor membership is irrelevant and group members an-ticipate future collaborations. Thus, in closed groups,individuals tend to focus on the collective nature ofthe group and are more likely to identify with theirgroup as they work together to accomplish a collectivegoal. Ziller’s theory suggests that open groups, by theirvery nature, are less cohesive (Burnette & Forsyth,2008).

Group Size The dorms in the Minnesota studywere all relatively small, ranging in size from 7 to16 women, but the smaller dorms tended to bemore cohesive nonetheless. They had member turn-over at the end of each year when residents gradu-ated from college, but they had less turnover duringthe academic year, confirming other research thatfinds smaller groups tend to be more unified thanlarger ones. Studies of classes, for example, find thatstudents learn more in small classes, in part becausethese groups are higher in social engagement as wellas academic engagement (Finn, Pannozzo, &Achilles, 2003). Investigations of neighborhoods in-dicate that size determines sense of community(Vela-McConnell, 1999). As groups increase insize, a larger proportion of the members no longertakes part in all the group activities (Bales & Borgatta,1955). In small juries, for example, most jurors takepart in the discussions, but in larger juries delibera-tion is dominated by a small subset of members.

The impact of group size on cohesion is, in part,a consequence of the sheer number of interpersonaldemands that larger networks make of their mem-bers. As a group increases in size the number ofpossible relations among individuals increases so rap-idly that members can no longer maintain strong,positive ties with all group members. In a five-person group, for example, only 10 ties are neededto join every single member to every other member.But, if the group is relatively large—say, 20 members—then 190 relationships would be needed to createa completely connected group. Maintaining such re-lationships becomes burdensome as groups increasein size, and in consequence “the common featuresthat fuse its members into a social unit become ever

open group A group whose boundaries are so perme-able that membership varies considerably as members en-ter and leave the group.closed group A group whose boundaries are closed andfixed; as a result, membership is relatively unvarying.

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fewer . . . . The variety of persons, interests, eventsbecomes too large to be regulated by the center”(Simmel, 1950, pp. 397–398).

Structural Features Cohesion is related to groupstructure in two basic ways. First, cohesive groupstend to be relatively more structured ones. TheU.S. Hockey Team, for example, was a well-structured one in that each player had a positionon the ice that he played; off the ice each individualwas joined in specific ways to others; the group hada leader, whose authority was well-established; andthe group had clear rules about how it operatedand what kinds of behaviors were acceptable. Asgroups become more and more structured—in thesocially organized sense rather than the bureaucraticsense—they tend to become more cohesive as well.

Second, certain types of group structures are as-sociated with higher levels of cohesion than areothers. The members of one group, for example,may be linked primarily to other group members,rather than to outsiders. If asked to name their bestfriends, the people they respect, or those they com-municate with most frequently, they identify othergroup members. The members of another group, incontrast, may name people outside of the groupwhen asked these questions. The higher the propor-tion of ties to nongroup members relative to ties togroup members, the lower the overall cohesivenessof the group (McPherson & Smith-Loving, 2002).

The patterning of relations within the groupitself may also be more or less conducive for thedevelopment of cohesion. When the U.S. HockeyTeam began practicing, for example, a number ofsubgroups, or cliques, formed within the group asa whole. Some of the young men had played forBoston University whereas others were from theMidwest—many had graduated from Minnesota.These two cliques created a schism within thegroup, and tensions between the groups sometimessurfaced during practices. Coach Brooks brokethese cliques down in various ways, reaching suc-cess when the men stopped referring to their col-leges in their self-descriptions (e.g., “I played forMinnesota”) and instead shifted to a team-basedidentity (e.g., “I am a U.S. hockey player”).

Other structural patterns, besides cliques, thatinfluence cohesion include the centrality, density,and the number of isolates within the group. Bothof the groups studied by the Sherif and Sherif(1953, 1956), for example, included 12 youngboys, but different structures developed within thetwo groups. As Figure 5.1 indicates, the Red Devilsteam was more stratified than the Bulldogs. Whenthe boys were asked to name as many as 5 friends atthe camp, 9 of the 12 Bulldogs named each other ina tightly knit pattern of reciprocal and overlappingchoices. The remaining 3 individuals received nofriendship nominations, but they picked otherswho were part of the main cluster as friends andwere not rejected. In the Red Devils, liking wasmore concentrated: the two most-liked individualsin the group garnered 50% of all friendship choices.The Red Devils also included several cliques, aswell as one member who was rejected by the othergroup members. The Red Devils lost the tourna-ment between the two groups.

Initiations Many groups require prospectivemembers to pass an initiation test before they jointhe group. Initiates in biker gangs, for example,must earn the right to wear the letters and emblemsof their gang—their “colors”—by performing a va-riety of distasteful behaviors (Davis, 1982). Pledgesto fraternities at some universities are rituallybeaten, subjected to ridicule and embarrassment,and required to drink unhealthy amounts of alcohol(Nuwer, 1999). Sports teams often test new playersin various ways, both physically and mentally, as domilitary units. Many religious groups require newmembers to pass through a period of review beforethey gain acceptance as full members.

Initiations—formal and informal requirementsthat must be met before an individual can gainmembership in a group—contribute to a group’scohesion by strengthening the bond betweenthe individual and the group. Groups with initia-tion policies may also be more attractive to mem-bers, since their exclusiveness may make themseem more prestigious. Since membership mustbe earned, people who join do so more inten-tionally, and therefore will more likely be active,


contributing members. Groups with less stringentrequirements are hampered by the unevenness ofthe contributions of members: some may contrib-ute a great deal to the group, but others mayactually draw out more resources than they con-tribute. Groups with strict membership policies,including initiations, avoid this problem by screen-ing and monitoring members closely and dismiss-ing those individuals who do not demonstratetheir worth (Iannaccone, 1994).

People who join emotionally involving groupssuch as fraternities, social movements, or cults mayalso become more committed to the group as a resultof cognitive dissonance. This psychological process,first proposed by Leon Festinger (1957), suggests thatinitiations force the prospective members to invest inthe group, and that these investments will increase

their commitment. Because the two cognitions, “Ihave invested in the group” and “The group is loath-some” are dissonant, these beliefs cause the memberspsychological discomfort. Although people can reducecognitive dissonance in many ways, one frequentmethod is to emphasize the rewarding features ofthe group while minimizing its costly characteristics.

Festinger and his colleagues (1956) investigatedthis process in their study of an atypical group thatformed around a psychic, Marion Keech. Keech con-vinced her followers that the world was coming to anend, but that the inhabitants of a planet named Clarionwould rescue the group before the apocalypse. Manymembers of the group committed all their personalresources to the group or gave away their possessionsin the weeks before the scheduled departure fromthe planet. Yet the group did not disband evenwhen the rescuers never arrived. Keech claimed thatthe dedication of the group had so impressed God thatthe Earth had been spared, and many of the membersresponded by becoming even more committed to

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F I G U R E 5.1 The attraction relations among the Bulldogs (on the left) and the Red Devils (on the right), asdocumented by Sherif and Sherif (1956) in their field studies of group processes.

cognitive dissonance An adverse psychological statethat occurs when an individual simultaneously holdstwo conflicting cognitions.

126 CHAPTER 5

their group. Membership was costly, but each invest-ment tied them more strongly to the group.

Other researchers have tested the impact of costsand commitment using more traditional researchprocedures (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Axsom, 1989;Gerard & Mathewson, 1966). Elliot Aronson andJudson Mills, for example, manipulated the invest-ments that individuals made before joining a groupdiscussing topics related to sexual behavior. Theyrandomly assigned female college students to one ofthree experimental conditions: a severe initiationcondition, a mild initiation condition, and a controlcondition. Participants assigned to the severe initiationcondition had to read aloud to the male experi-menter a series of obscene words and two “vivid de-scriptions of sexual activity from contemporarynovels.” In the mild initiation condition, participantsread five sex-related but nonobscene words. In thecontrol condition, participants were not put throughany kind of initiation whatsoever.

After the initiation the researchers told thewomen that the group they would be joining wasalready meeting, but that they could listen in usingan intercom system. But instead of listening to anactual group, the researchers played a recording ofa discussion that was contrived deliberately to beexceedingly boring and dull. After listening for atime the participants rated the group they had lis-tened to on a number of dimensions. As predicted,women who experienced the severe initiation ratedthe group more positively than those who had ex-perienced a mild initiation or no initiation at all.

Aronson and Mills concluded that the initiationincreased cohesion by creating cognitive disso-nance; but other factors may also account for theinitiation–cohesion relationship. Individuals mayfind strict, demanding groups attractive becausethe group’s stringent standards ensure that othermembers will be highly involved in the group, soall members will likely contribute equally and athigh rates to the group (Iannaccone, 1994). Theirpublic expressions of liking for such groups mayalso stem more from a desire to save face after mak-ing a faulty decision than from the psychic discom-fort of cognitive dissonance (Schlenker, 1975).Initiations also fail to heighten attraction if they

frustrate new members or make them angry(Lodewijkx & Syroit, 1997). As Focus 5.2 explains,extreme initiations may harm new members ratherthan binding them to the group.

Indicators of Cohesion

Cohesion is the strength of the bonds linking indi-viduals to and in the group, but a variety of factorsinfluence the group’s social, task, perceptual, andemotional unity. These components have multiplecauses, and they also cut across levels of analysis, withsome pertaining to relations among individuals andothers connecting individuals to the group itself.Given the complexity of this process, what unifiesthe members of a work group may not unify themembers of a religious congregation, a classroom,or a military squad (Ridgeway, 1983).

Just as theorists have debated the precise meaningof the concept of cohesiveness, so have researchersproposed a variety methods for measuring cohesion.Some researchers use social network methods,indexing the unity of a group by considering socio-metric choices and group structure. Others rely onobservational strategies, monitoring interpersonalrelations among members, noting instances of conflictor tension, and judging how smoothly the groupworks together as a unit (e.g., Fine & Holyfield,1996). In many cases, too, investigators hope thatgroup members are accurate observers of their group’scohesiveness and, if asked, will share these perceptions.Investigators have used a variety of questions to tapinto cohesion, including, “Do you want to remain amember of this group?” and “How strong a sense ofbelonging do you feel you have to the people youwork with?” (Schachter, 1951; Indik, 1965, respec-tively). Researchers also use multi-item scales thatinclude many questions that can be combined toyield a single index of cohesiveness, such as theGroup Environment Scale (Moos et al., 1974), GroupAttitude Scale (Evans & Jarvis, 1986), GroupEnvironment Questionnaire (Widmeyer, Brawley, &Carron, 1992), Perceived Cohesion Scale (Bollen &Hoyle,1990), Group Identification Scale (Henry et al., 1999),Sports Cohesiveness Questionnaire (Martens, Landers, &Loy, 1972),Gross Cohesion Questionnaire (Stokes, 1983),


theGroupCohesion Scale-Revised (Treadwell et al., 2001),and the Questionnaire sur l’Ambiance du Groupe (Butonet al., 2007).

Cohesion, as a multilevel concept, can also bemeasured at multiple levels. Those who consider co-hesion to be a psychological quality that is rooted inmembers’ feelings of attraction for others, the group,and a sense of unity measure cohesion at the individuallevel. They might ask members of a group to onlydescribe their own attraction to and commitmentto the group through such questions as, “Are youattracted to the group?” or “Do you feel a strong sense

of belonging to the group?”Other researchers, in con-trast, may feel that only a group can be cohesive, and socohesion should be located at the group level (Mason& Griffin, 2002). These investigators may ask groupmembers to estimate the group’s cohesion directlythrough such questions as, “Are members attracted tothis group?” and “Is this group a cohesive one?” Theymight also decide to have the group answer these typesof questions as a group (see Paskevich et al., 1999).

This plethora of operational definitions cancreate challenges for researchers. When theymeasure cohesiveness in different ways, they oftenreport different conclusions. A study using a self-report measure of cohesion might find that cohesivegroups outproduce groups that are not cohesive,but other investigators may not replicate this find-ing when they use observational measurement

F o c u s 5.2 Why Do Groups Haze Their Members?

You don’t understand that everything we have donehas a meaning and a purpose . . . . When you aresisters, you will understand.

—Sorority member to a pledge class(in Nuwer, 1999, p. 147)

Most groups have banned severe initiations, known ashazing, yet this practice continues unofficially. Somemild rites and rituals—as when new members musttake a public oath of loyalty, endure teasing, or carry adistinctive object about—cause little harm, but in othercases, new members must endure physical and psycho-logical abuse before they are accepted into the group.Many university fraternities, for example, haze newmembers because they believe that hazing has manypositive benefits, including building group unity, in-stilling humility in new members, and perpetuatinggroup traditions (Nuwer, 1999). Each year, however,many students are killed or seriously injured in hazingincidents (Goldstein, 2002).

Many members of groups defend their right tohaze, citing the benefits of initiation for increasing thecohesion of the group. However, research does notoffer very much support for this position. One team ofinvestigators asked the members of a number ofgroups and teams to differentiate between appropri-ate and inappropriate activities on a list of 24 practicescommonly used in initiations and hazing. Appropriate

activities included requirements to take part in groupactivities, swearing an oath, taking part in skits andteam functions, doing community service, and main-taining a specific grade point average. Inappropriateactivities, in contrast, included kidnapping and aban-donment, verbal abuse, physical punishment (spank-ings, whippings, and beatings), degradation andhumiliation (such as eating disgusting things or drink-ing alcohol in excessive amounts), sleep deprivation,running errands, and exclusion. Somewhat unexpect-edly, a number of the behaviors that the researchersfelt belonged on the list of inappropriate hazing be-haviors, such as wearing inappropriate clothing, headshaving, and sexual activities, were viewed as relativelyinnocuous by participants (Van Raatle et al., 2007).

Did these experiences work to build a cohesivegroup? Some of these practices were rarely used bygroups, but groups that did use inappropriate hazingmethods were judged to be less cohesive rather thanmore cohesive. Hazing, and illicit hazing in particular,backfired, for it did not contribute to increased cohe-sion, whereas more positive forms of team-building did(Van Raatle et al., 2007). Given that hazing is illegal ina number of states, is aggressive in character, yieldsunhealthy consequences, and does not even work toincrease cohesion, groups should consider other meth-ods to increase new members’ commitment to thegroup and the group’s overall cohesiveness.

hazing An initiation into a group that subjects the newmember to mental or physical discomfort, harassment,embarrassment, ridicule, or humiliation.

128 CHAPTER 5

methods (Mullen et al., 1994). Moreover, someoperational definitions of cohesion may correspondmore closely to the theoretical definition thanothers. A measure that focuses only on group mem-bers’ perceptions of their group’s cohesiveness,for example, may be assessing something very dif-ferent than a measure that focuses on the actualstrength of the relationships linking individuals totheir group.

COHES ION AND

COMMITMENT OVER T IME

The U.S. Olympic Hockey Team that faced theRussian team in February of 1980 was, without ques-tion, cohesive. The team was extraordinarily unified—most of the members liked one another, and theyworked diligently to achieve their goals. But the groupdid not become cohesive all at once. When CoachBrooks first invited the best amateur hockey players toa training camp in Colorado Springs in July 1979, theplayers showed few signs of camaraderie, fellowship, orcohesion. Coach Brooks was tough on them; many hadplayed against one another in college and still heldgrudges, and some were so temperamental that no onewould befriend them. But the hockey team changedover time. Initial uncertainties gaveway to stable patternsof interaction; tensions betweenmembers waned; manyplayers were cut from the team and replaced by newones; and members abandoned old roles to take onnew ones. Over time, the team grew from a collectionof talented individuals into a cohesive team.

The U.S. Hockey Team’s evolution over timefollowed a predictable course. Few groups becomecohesive, efficient teams from the moment theirmembers first meet. Instead, they experience groupdevelopment—a pattern of growth and change be-ginning with initial formation and ending, in mostcases, with dissolution.

Stages of Group Development

The group dynamicist William Fawcett Hill was atone time so intrigued by developmental processes

in groups that he diligently filed away each theorythat he found on that subject. Over the years, hiscollection grew and grew, until finally the numberof theories reached 100. At that moment, Hillnoted, the “collecting bug was exterminated, asthe object of the quest had lost its rarity” (Hill &Gruner, 1973, p. 355; see also Hare, 1982;Lacoursiere, 1980).

The morass of theoretical models dealing withgroup development, though daunting, is not alto-gether irremediable. Theoreticians are at varianceon many points, but most agree that groups passthrough several phases, or stages, as they develop.Just as humans mature from infancy to childhood,adolescence, adulthood, and old age, stage modelsof group development theorize that groups movefrom one stage to the next in a predictable,sequential fashion. The U.S. Hockey Team, for ex-ample, became unified, but only after progressingthrough earlier stages marked by confusion, conflict,and growing group structure.

What stages typify the developmental progres-sion of groups? The number and names of thestages vary among theorists. Many models, how-ever, highlight certain interpersonal outcomes thatmust be achieved in any group that exists for aprolonged period. Members of most groups must,for example, discover who the other members are,achieve a degree of interdependence, and deal withconflict (Hare, 1982; Lacoursiere, 1980; Wheelan,1994). Therefore, most models include the basicstages shown in Table 5.3 and illustrated earlier inChapter 1’s Figure 1.4. First, the group membersmust become oriented toward one another.Second, they often find themselves in conflict,and some solution is sought to improve the groupenvironment. In the third phase, norms and rolesdevelop that regulate behavior, and the groupachieves greater unity. In the fourth phase, thegroup can perform as a unit to achieve desiredgoals. The final stage ends the sequence of develop-ment with the group’s adjournment. BruceTuckman (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen,1977) labeled these five stages forming (orientation),storming (conflict), norming (structure development),performing (work), and adjourning (dissolution).


Forming: The Orientation Stage The first fewminutes, hours, days, or even weeks of a newlyformed group’s life are often marked by tension,guarded interchanges, and relatively low levels ofinteraction. During this initial forming stage, membersmonitor their behavior to avoid any embarrassinglapses of social poise and are tentative when expres-sing their personal opinions. Because the group’sstructure has not had time to develop, the membersare often uncertain about their role in the group,what they should be doing to help the group reachits goals, or even who is leading the group.

With time, tension is dispelled as the ice is bro-ken and group members become better acquainted.After the initial inhibitions subside, group memberstypically begin exchanging information aboutthemselves and their goals. To better understandand relate to the group, individual members gatherinformation about their leaders’ and comembers’personality characteristics, interests, and attitudes.In most cases, too, members recognize that theothers in the group are forming an impression ofeach other, and so they facilitate this process byrevealing some private, personal information duringconversations and Internet-based exchanges. Thisgradual, and in some cases tactical, communicationof personal information is termed self-disclosure, and it

serves the important function of helping members toget to know one another ( Jourard, 1971). Eventually,the group members feel familiar enough with oneanother that their interactions becomemore open andspontaneous.

Storming: The Conflict Stage As the relativelymild tension caused by the newness of a groupwanes, tension over goals, procedures, and author-ity often waxes. On the U.S. Hockey Team, forexample, the players from the schools in the easternpart of the United States often excluded the playersfrom the Midwest. Several players were consideredhotshots more interested in their personal perfor-mance than in team success. And nearly all theplayers rebelled against the hard-driving coachingstyle of Herb Brooks. He would yell, insult, swear,and curse the players whenever they failed to per-form up to his standards, and he often threatened tocut players from the team.

The storming stage is marked by personal con-flicts between individual members who discoverthat they just do not get along, procedural conflictover the group’s goals and procedures, and compe-tition between individual members for authority,leadership, and more prestigious roles. In groupsthat have an official leader, like the U.S. Hockey

T A B L E 5.3 Stages of Group Development

Stage Major Processes Characteristics

Orientation: Forming Members become familiar with each otherand the group; dependency and inclusionissues; acceptance of leader and groupconsensus

Communications are tentative,polite; concern for ambiguity,group’s goals; leader is active;members are compliant

Conflict: Storming Disagreement over procedures; expression ofdissatisfaction; tension among members;antagonism toward leader

Criticism of ideas; poor attendance;hostility; polarization and coalitionformation

Structure: Norming Growth of cohesiveness and unity; establish-ment of roles, standards, and relationships;increased trust, communication

Agreement on procedures; reductionin role ambiguity; increased“we-feeling”

Work: Performing Goal achievement; high task-orientation;emphasis on performance and production

Decision making; problem solving;mutual cooperation

Dissolution: Adjourning Termination of roles; completion of tasks;reduction of dependency

Disintegration and withdrawal;increased independence andemotionality; regret

130 CHAPTER 5

Team, the conflict often centers on relationshipsbetween the leader and the rest of the group. Inthe orientation stage, members accept the leader’sguidance with few questions, but as the group ma-tures, leader–member conflicts disrupt the group’sfunctioning. Members may oscillate between fightand flight. Some may openly challenge the leader’spolicies and decisions (fight), whereas others mayrespond by minimizing contact with the leader(flight). In groups that have no formally appointedleader, conflicts erupt as members vie for statusand roles within the group. Once stable patternsof authority, attraction, and communication havedeveloped, conflicts subside, but until then, groupmembers jockey for authority and power (Bennis &Shepard, 1956; Wheelan & McKeage, 1993).

Many group members are discouraged by thisoutbreak of conflict in their young groups, but con-flict is as common as harmony in groups. As Chapter13’s analysis of the roots of conflict suggests, the dy-namic nature of the group ensures continual change,but along with this change come stresses and strainsthat surface in the form of conflict. In rare instances,group members may avoid all conflict because theiractions are perfectly coordinated; but in most groups,the push and pull of interpersonal forces inevitablyexerts its influence. Low levels of conflict in a groupcan be an indication of remarkably positive interper-sonal relations, but it is more likely that the groupmembers are simply uninvolved, unmotivated, andbored (Fisher, 1980).

Conflict is not just unavoidable, however; it maybe a key ingredient for creating group cohesion. Ifconflict escalates out of control, it can destroy agroup. But in some cases, conflict settles matters ofstructure, direction, and performance expectations.Members of cohesive groups must understand oneanother’s perspectives, and such understanding some-times deepens when hostility has surfaced, been con-fronted, and been resolved (Bennis & Shepard, 1956;Deutsch, 1969). Conflicts may “serve to ‘sew thesocial system together’ by canceling each other out,thus preventing disintegration along one primary lineof cleavage” (Coser, 1956, p. 801). However, asChapter 13’s analysis of conflict concludes, mild con-flict over issues that are relevant to the group’s task

might improve performance, but other types ofconflict likely cause more loss than gain (De Dreu &Weingart, 2003). Most groups that survive resolveconflicts quickly, before the disagreement causespermanent damage to members’ relationships.

Norming: The Structure Stage With each crisisovercome, the U.S. Hockey Team became morestable, more organized, and more cohesive.Eruzione emerged as the group’s leader and wasselected to be captain. The players revised their ini-tial impressions of each other and reached morebenevolent conclusions about their teammates.The players still complained about the team rules,the practice schedules, and the coach’s constant cri-ticisms, but they became fiercely loyal to the team,their teammates, and their coach.

Groups in the third stage of group development,the norming stage, become both unified and organized.Whereas groups in the orientation and conflict stagesare characterized by low levels of intimacy, friend-ship, and unity, the group becomes a unified wholewhen it reaches the structure-development stage.Mutual trust and support increase, members cooper-ate more with each other, and members try to reachdecisions through consensus. The group becomescohesive (Wheelan, 1994).

As the group becomes more organized itresolves the problems that caused earlier conflicts—uncertainty about goals, roles, and authority—andprepares to get down to the work at hand. Norms—those taken-for-granted rules that dictate how mem-bers should behave—emerge more clearly and guidethe group members as they interact with one another.Differences of opinion still arise, but now they aredealt with through constructive discussion and nego-tiation. Members communicate openly with oneanother about personal and group concerns, in partbecause members know one another better. On theU.S. Hockey Team, the players did not always agreewith the coach, but they changed the way they dealtwith disagreement. Instead of grumbling about theirtreatment, several players started compiling a book ofBrooksisms—the odd expressions Coach Brooks usedduring practice to motivate his players. Nearly everyplayer, interviewed 20 years after they played for


Brooks, remembered such Brooksisms as “You areplaying worse every day and now you are playinglike the middle of next week” and “Gentlemen, youdon’t have enough talent to win on talent alone.”

Performing: The Work Stage The U.S. HockeyTeam played 41 games against other teams in prep-aration for the Olympics and won 30 of thosematches. They reached their peak of performancewhen they beat the Russian team to qualify for thefinal, gold-medal game against Finland. Before thatgame, Coach Brooks did not give them a pep talk,as he had before the Russian game. Instead, he onlysaid, “You lose this game and you will take it toyour . . . graves” (Warner HBO, 2001). They won.

Few groups are productive immediately; instead,productivity must usually wait until the group ma-tures. Various types of groups, such as conferences,factory workers assembling relay units, workshopparticipants, and the members of expeditions, be-come more efficient and productive later in theirgroup’s life cycle (Hare, 1967, 1982; Hare & Naveh,1984). The more “mature” a group, the more likelythe group will spend the bulk of its time workingrather than socializing, seeking direction, or arguing.When researchers coded the content of group mem-bers’ verbal interactions they discovered task-focusedremarks are found to occur later rather than sooner inthe group’s life (Bales & Strodtbeck, 1951; Borgatta &Bales, 1953; Heinicke & Bales, 1953). Conflict anduncertainty also decrease over time as work-focusedcomments increase. Groups that have been togetherlonger talk more about work-related matters, whereasyounger groups are more likely to express conflict oruncertainty and make requests for guidance(Wheelan, Davidson, & Tilin, 2003). Once the groupreaches the performing stage “members shift their atten-tion fromwhat the group is towhat the group needs todo” (Bushe & Coetzer, 2007, p. 193).

Not all groups, however, reach this productivework stage. If you have never been a member of agroup that failed to produce, you are a rare individ-ual indeed. In a study of neighborhood actioncommittees, only 1 of 12 groups reached theproductivity stage; all the others were boggeddown at the forming or storming stages (Zurcher,

1969). An early investigation of combat units foundthat out of 63 squads, only 13 could be clearly clas-sified as effective performance units (Goodacre,1953). An analysis of 18 personal growth groupsconcluded that only 5 managed to reach the taskperformance stage (Kuypers, Davies, & Glaser,1986). These studies and others suggest that timeis needed to develop a working relationship, buttime alone is no guarantee that the group will beproductive (Gabarro, 1987). Chapter 12 examinesissues pertaining to team performance in detail.

Adjourning: The Dissolution Stage SusanWheelan’s (1994) Group Development Questionnaire,summarized in Table 5.4, measures the group’sstage of development by asking members to de-scribe their group’s success in dealing with issuesof orientation, conflict, structure, and productivity.Some groups, however, move through these fourbasic stages to a fifth one: the adjourning stage. TheU.S. Hockey Team, for example, was invited to theWhite House to meet the President of the UnitedStates after their victory. That ceremony markedthe end of the group’s existence, for the team neverreconvened or played again. After meeting thePresident, the teammates clapped one another onthe back one last time, and then the groupdisbanded.

A group’s entry into the dissolution stage canbe either planned or spontaneous. Planned dissolutiontakes place when the group accomplishes its goalsor exhausts its time and resources. The U.S.Hockey Team meeting the President, a wildernessexpedition at the end of its journey, a jury deliver-ing its verdict, and an ad hoc committee filing itsfinal report are all ending as scheduled. Spontaneousdissolution, in contrast, occurs when the group’s endis not scheduled. In some cases, an unanticipatedproblem may arise that makes continued group in-teraction impossible. When groups fail repeatedlyto achieve their goals, their members or some out-side power may decide that maintaining the groupis a waste of time and resources. In other cases, thegroup members may no longer find the group andits goals sufficiently satisfying to warrant their con-tinued membership. As social exchange theory

132 CHAPTER 5

F o c u s 5.3 Why Do Soldiers Fight?

From this day to the ending of the world,But we in it shall be remembered.We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;For he today that sheds his blood with meShall be my brother;

—William Shakespeare,Henry V, Saint Crispin’s Day Speech

The military unit is the epitome of the cohesive group.Combat units must develop bonds of trust and com-mitment, for they face situations where a lack of co-hesiveness may threaten their survival. These groups,too, are formed deliberately and their development isa guided one; each step along the way is designed tomaximize their cohesiveness using methods that—based on experience and commonsense—are consis-tent with research findings about cohesiveness(Siebold, 2007).

Basic training, where recruits are transformed intoa cohesive group, is a study in accelerated group de-velopment. Recruits are deliberately clustered intosubunits of 10 or less, all under the watchful eye of ahighly involved leader. When forming details, everyattempt is made to assign duties to intact groupsrather than rotating individuals from one task toanother. Basic training is a form of severe initiation,for recruits experience harsh conditions that theymust endure to be accepted into the group. The

environments’ demands are arranged so that virtuallyall activities—eating, sleeping, marching, working—areperformed within the same basic group, and thegroups are kept segregated from other groups. If timeis given for the soldiers to leave camp, they areencouraged to remain together when off-duty. Themilitary provides strong leadership, but of a moresocial, inspirational style rather than a bureaucratic,managerial style. When possible, rewards the soldiersreceive are meted out by their immediate superior,rather than high-level leaders. The norms of the groupencourage unity, mutual support, and respect for thevalues of the nation (Henderson, 1985). Cohesivenessreaches its peak during deployment, since the squadsare no longer in contact with family or friends, andmembers can devote their full attention to the groupand its needs. As the group approaches the end of itstour, then cohesion sometimes decreases, as the groupreadies for the adjourning stage (Bartone & Adler, 1999).

The cohesiveness created through these experi-ences is robust, and is only tempered further by combat.In one study, it was found that World War II veterans’combat units were still cohesive some 40 years after thewar, particularly in those groups that saw substantialaction in the war. Units that had been in combat andhad casualties were the most cohesive, those that hadbeen in combat but had suffered no casualties were lesscohesive, and those that had not been in combat werethe least cohesive (Elder & Clipp, 1988).



maintains, when the number of rewards providedby group membership decreases and the costlyaspects of membership escalate, group membersbecome dissatisfied. If the members feel that theyhave no alternatives or that they have put too muchinto the group to abandon it, they may remain inthe group even though they are dissatisfied. If,however, group members feel that other groupsare available or that nonparticipation is preferableto participation in such a costly group, they willbe more likely to let their current group die(Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).

The dissolution stage can be stressful for members(Birnbaum & Cicchetti, 2005). When dissolution isunplanned, the final group sessions may be filled withconflict-laden exchanges among members, growingapathy and animosity, or repeated failures at thegroup’s task. Even when dissolution is planned, themembers may feel distressed. Their work in the groupmay be over, but they still mourn for the group andsuffer from a lack of personal support. Members ofdisbanding partnerships sometimes blame one anotherfor the end of the group (Kushnir, 1984).

Cycles of Group Development

Tuckman’s model, which can be operationalizedusing measures like the ones in Table 5.4, is asuccessive-stage theory: It specifies the usual order ofthe phases of group development. Sometimes, how-ever, group development takes a different course.

Although interpersonal exploration is often aprerequisite for group solidarity, and cohesion andconflict often precede effective performance,this pattern is not universal. Some groups manageto avoid particular stages; others move throughthe stages in a unique order; still others seem todevelop in ways that cannot be described byTuckman’s five stages (McMorris, Gottlieb, &Sneden, 2005). Also, the demarcation between stagesis not clear-cut. When group conflict is waning, forexample, feelings of cohesion may be increasing, butthese time-dependent changes do not occur in a dis-continuous, stepwise sequence (Arrow, 1997).

Many theorists believe that groups repeatedlycycle through stages during their lifetime, rather

than just moving through each stage once (e.g.,Arrow, 1997). These cyclical models agree that certainissues tend to dominate group interaction duringthe various phases of a group’s development, butthey add that these issues can recur later in the lifeof the group. Very long-term groups, such as teamsof software engineers who work on products formany years, show signs of shifting from task-focused stages back to conflict (re-storming) andnorming (re-norming) stages (McGrew, Bilotta, &Deeney, 1999). Robert Bales’s equilibriummodel of group development therefore assumesthat group members strive to maintain a balancebetween accomplishing the task and enhancingthe quality of the interpersonal relationships withinthe group. In consequence, groups cycle back andforth between what Tuckman called the normingand performing stages: A period of prolongedgroup effort must be followed by a period ofcohesion-creating, interpersonal activity (Bales &Cohen, 1979). The discussion groups that Balesstudied followed this general pattern of oscillationbetween the two types of group activity.

Punctuated equilibrium models agree withBales’s view, but they add that groups often gothrough periods of relatively rapid change. Thesechanges may be precipitated by some internal crisis,such as the loss of a leader, or by changes in the typeof task the group is attempting (Eldredge & Gould,1972). The halfway point in the group’s life, too,can trigger dramatic changes in the group, as mem-bers realize that the time they have available tothem is dwindling (Arrow, 1997; Gersick, 1989).

TheU.S.HockeyTeam’s development, althoughstage-like in many respects, also changed more rapidlyfollowing specific, critical events. Perhaps the most

equilibrium model A conceptual analysis of group de-velopment, proposed by Robert Bales, that assumes thefocus of a group shifts back and forth between thegroup’s tasks and the interpersonal relationships amonggroup members.punctuated equilibrium model A group developmenttheory that assumes groups change gradually over timebut that the periods of slow growth are punctuated bybrief periods of relatively rapid change.

134 CHAPTER 5

dramatic turning point in the group’s life occurredwhen the team lost an exhibition game to a weakteam.Coach Brooks believed the team playedwithoutany heart or energy, and after the game he kept themon the ice rather than letting them shower and change.He made the players skate back and forth between thegoals (the players called these drills “Herbies”) for whatseemed like hours. Even when the arena managerturned off the lights and went home, Brooks kept theteam skating back and forth in the dark. The experi-ence created a feeling of unity in the group, and thiscohesiveness carried them through the remainder oftheir games and on to victory. Such turning pointsmay, however, be relatively rare in groups.More typi-cally, the shift from an initial orientation focus to a taskfocus occurs gradually as groups and their memberspace their progress toward the completion of their finalgoal (Seers &Woodruff, 1997).

CONSEQUENCES OF

COHES ION

Cohesion is something of a “purr word.” Most ofus, if asked to choose between two groups—onethat is cohesive and another that is not—wouldlikely pick the cohesive group. But cohesivenesshas its drawbacks. A cohesive group is an intensegroup, and this intensity affects the members, thegroup’s dynamics, and the group’s performance inboth positive and negative ways. Cohesion leads toa range of consequences—not all of them desirable.

Member Satisfaction and Adjustment

Many of the men of the U.S. Hockey Team, yearslater, said that their six months together in 1980 was aspecial time in their lives. People are usually muchmore satisfied with their groups when the group iscohesive rather than noncohesive. Across a range ofgroups in industrial, athletic, and educational settings,people who are members of highly compatible, co-hesive groups report more satisfaction and enjoymentthan members of noncohesive groups (Hackman,

1992; Hare, 1976; Hogg, 1992). One investigatorstudied teams of masons and carpenters working ona housing development. For the first five months, themen worked at various assignments in groups formedby the supervisor. This period gave the men a chanceto get to know virtually everyone working on theproject and natural likes and dislikes soon surfaced.The researcher then established cohesive groups bymaking certain that the teams only contained peoplewho liked each other. As anticipated, the masons andcarpenters were much more satisfied when theyworked in cohesive groups. As one of them ex-plained, “Seems as though everything flows a lotsmoother . . . . The work is more interesting whenyou’ve got a buddy working with you. You certainlylike it a lot better anyway” (Van Zelst, 1952, p. 183).

A cohesive group creates a healthier workplace,at least at the psychological level. Because people incohesive groups respond to one another in a morepositive fashion than the members of noncohesivegroups, people experience less anxiety and tension insuch groups (Myers, 1962; Shaw & Shaw, 1962). Instudies conducted in industrial work groups, for exam-ple, employees reported less anxiety and nervousnesswhen they worked in cohesive groups (Seashore,1954). Investigations of therapeutic groups routinelyfind that the members improve their overall level ofadjustment when their group is cohesive (Yalom withLeszcz, 2005). People also cope more effectively withstress when they are in cohesive groups (Bowers,Weaver, & Morgan, 1996; Zaccaro, Gualtieri, &Minionis, 1995).

Cohesive groups can, however, be emotionallydemanding (Forsyth & Elliott, 1999). The oldsergeant syndrome, for example, is more commonin cohesive military squads. Although the cohesive-ness of the unit initially provides psychological supportfor the individual, the loss of comrades during battle

old sergeant syndrome Symptoms of psychologicaldisturbance, including depression, anxiety, and guilt, ex-hibited by noncommissioned officers in cohesive unitsthat suffer heavy casualities. Strongly loyal to their unitand its members, these leaders feel so responsible for theirunit’s losses that they withdraw psychologically from thegroup.


causes severe distress. When the unit is reinforcedwith replacements, the original group membersare reluctant to establish emotional ties with the new-comers, partly in fear of the pain produced byseparation. Hence, they begin restricting their interac-tions, and these “old sergeants” can eventually becomecompletely isolated within the group. Some highlycohesive groupsmay also purposefully sequestermem-bers from other groups in an attempt to seal membersoff from competing interests. Individuals who leavehigh-demand religious groups due to changes in beliefsor social mobility may experience loneliness, chronicguilt and isolation, a lingering distrust of other peopleand groups, and anxiety about intimate relationships(Yao, 1987).

Individuals who are members of cohesivegroups—with cohesion defined as a strong sense of

belonging to an integrated community—are moreactively involved in their groups, are more enthusi-astic about their groups, and even suffer from fewersocial and interpersonal problems (Hoyle &Crawford, 1994). Members are also more commit-ted to their groups, where commitment is indicatedby the degree of attachment to the group, a long-term orientation to the group, and intentions toremain within the group (Arriaga & Agnew,2001; Wech et al., 1998). They will even sacrificetheir own individual desires for the good of thegroup (Prapavessis & Carron, 1997).

Group Dynamics and Influence

As cohesion increases, the internal dynamics ofthe group intensify. In consequence, the pressure

F o c u s 5.4 Can Cohesion Make a Bad Job Good?

My account of how one group of machine operatorskept from “going nuts” in a situation of monotonouswork activity attempts to lay bare the tissues ofinteraction which made up the content of theiradjustment.

—Donald F. Roy, on “Banana Time” (1960, p. 158)

Cohesiveness increases with interaction, for the morepeople do things together as a group—talking, work-ing, eating, relaxing, socializing, traveling, and so on—then the more cohesive the group will become. Thisgeneralization, however, comes with qualifications, forany number of situational factors can turn interactioninto a negative rather than a positive. If the interac-tions take place in a hostile environment; if a substan-tial number of group members are interpersonallyirritating in some way; if the group interactions areuncoordinated and boring; if many of the membersfeel that they are unfairly excluded from the group’sactivities, the interaction–cohesion relationship will nothold.

This relationship, however, is a surprisingly resil-ient one, as Donald Roy’s (1960/1973) “banana time”case study reveals. Roy worked, for two months, in12-hour shifts lasting from 8 AM to 8:30 PM, with threeother men in an isolated room in a garment factoryoperating a press machine. The work was not just

tedious, but menial, repetitive, and tiring, since he stoodthe entire day feeding material to the press. He felt hecould not last more than a week, but that was before hewas drawn into the interaction of the small group.The group filled its days with jokes, teasing, kiddingaround, and horseplay that gave structure and meaningto their work. To break up the day into smaller seg-ments, the men stopped from time to time for variousrefreshments and breaks. There was, of course, lunchtime, but the men added many others, such as coffeetime, peach time, fish time, and banana time. These ri-tuals and social activities, collectively called “bananatime” by Roy, turned a bad job into a good one.

All cohesive groups have their banana times—interaction rituals that elevate the degree of socialconnection among the members. Like traditional ri-tuals, such as grace said before meals or singing thenational anthem, such interaction rituals providestructure and meaning for the group and its members.Reading the minutes of the last meeting, introducingnew members, joking about the member who is alwayslate, or commenting on someone’s appearance, are allsimple rituals that ensure that the group’s activities willunfold in a predictable and orderly way. Rituals havebeen linked to increases in a shared focus amongmembers, increased emotional energy, and increasedoverall cohesiveness (Collins, 2004).

136 CHAPTER 5

to conform is greater in cohesive groups, and indi-viduals’ resistance to these pressures is weaker.When members of cohesive groups discoveredthat some others in their group disagreed withtheir interpretations of three ambiguous stimuli,they tried to exert greater influence over their part-ners than did members of noncohesive groups.Partners also conformed more in cohesive dyads,perhaps because they wanted to avoid confron-tation (Back, 1951). When the group norms em-phasize the value of cooperation and agreementmembers of highly cohesive groups avoid dis-agreement more than members of noncohesivegroups. Irving Janis’s (1982) theory of groupthinksuggests that these pressures undermine a group’swillingness to critically analyze its decisions. AsChapter 11 explains, in some cases, this break-down in decision-making effectiveness can bedisastrous.

Anecdotal accounts of highly cohesive groups—military squads, adolescent peer groups, sports teams,fraternities and sororities, and cults—often describethe strong pressures that these groups put on theirmembers (Goldhammer, 1996). Drug use and illegalactivities are often traced back to conformity pres-sures of adolescents’ peer groups (Giordano, 2003).Cohesive gangs exert strong pressure on members(Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003). Cults may demandextreme sacrifices from members, including suicide.Even sports teams, if highly cohesive, may extractboth compliance and sacrifice from members(Prapavessis & Carron, 1997). Cohesion can also in-crease negative group processes, including hostilityand scapegoating (French, 1941; Pepitone &Reichling, 1955). In one study, cohesive and nonco-hesive groups worked on a series of unsolvable pro-blems. Although all the groups seemed frustrated,coalitions tended to form in noncohesive groups,whereas cohesive groups vented their frustrationsthrough interpersonal aggression: overt hostility, jokinghostility, scapegoating, and domination of subordinatemembers. The level of hostility became so intense inone group that observers lost track of howmany offen-sive remarks were made; they estimated that the num-ber surpassed 600 comments during the 45-minutework period (French, 1941).

Group Productivity

Most people consider cohesion to be a key ingredi-ent for group success. The cohesive, unified grouphas, throughout history, been lauded as the mostproductive, the most likely to win in battle, andthe most creative. The Spartans who held the passat Thermopylae were a model of unity, courage,and strength. The explorers on the ship Endurance,which was crushed by ice floes during a voyage tothe Antarctic, survived by working together underthe able leadership of Ernest Shackleton. The en-gineers at the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)invented the personal computer and other assortedtechnologies, including the mouse, a graphical in-terface (clickable icons), e-mail, and laser printers.When the U.S. Hockey Team won, most sportscommentators explained the victory by pointingto the U.S. team’s cohesiveness, even suggestingthat a unified team could work “miracles.” But isthis folk wisdom consistent with the scientific evi-dence? Are cohesive groups really more productive?

Do Cohesive Groups Outperform Less UnifiedGroups? Studies of all kinds of groups—sportsteams, work groups in business settings, expedi-tions, military squads, and laboratory groups—generally confirm the cohesion–performancerelationship: Cohesive groups tend to outperformless unified groups. But a series of meta-analyticstudies, in which researchers combined the resultsof all available research, statistically, suggests that therelationship does not emerge in all studies and in allgroups (Beal et al., 2003; Carron et al., 2002; Gully,Devine, & Whitney, 1995; Mullen & Copper,1994; Oliver et al., 1999). One analysis of 49 studiesof 8702 members of a variety of groups reportedthat 92% of these studies supported cohesive groupsover noncohesive ones. However, this cohesion–performance relationship was stronger (1) in bonafide groups than in ad hoc laboratory groups, (2) incorrelational studies than in experimental studies,and (3) in smaller groups than in larger groups(Mullen & Copper, 1994). The relationship be-tween cohesion and performance was also strongestin studies of sports teams, somewhat weaker in


military squads, weaker still in nonmilitary bonafide groups, and weakest overall in ad hoc, artificialgroups (Carron et al., 2002).

Are Cohesion and Performance Causally Con-nected? Prior studies of groups that work on taskshave found that “nothing succeeds likes success”when it comes to cohesion. When a group performswell at its identified task, the level of cohesion in thegroup increases, but should it fail, disharmony, dis-appointment, and a loss of esprit de corps are typi-cally observed. These effects of performance oncohesion occur even when groups are identical inall respects except one—when some are arbitrarilytold they performed well, but others are told theydid not do well. Even under these highly controlledcircumstances, groups given positive feedback be-came more cohesive than groups that are told theyperformed poorly. These studies suggest that cohe-sion is related to performance, not because cohesioncauses groups to perform better, but because groupsthat perform better become more cohesive (e.g.,Forsyth, Zyzniewski, & Giammanco, 2001).

Brian Mullen and Carolyn Copper (1994)examined the flow of causality in the cohesion–performance relationship by comparing experimentalstudies that manipulated cohesion with studies thatused correlational designs. Because the cohesion–performance relationship emerged in both types ofstudies, they concluded that cohesion causes improvedperformance. However, the relationship between co-hesion and performance is stronger in correlationalstudies. This disparity suggests that cohesion aids perfor-mance, but that performance also causes changes in co-hesiveness.Mullen andCopper closely examined seven

correlational studies that measured cohesion andperformance twice rather than once. These studies sug-gested that a group’s cohesiveness at Time 1 predictedits performance at Time 1 and at Time 2. But in thesestudies, group performance at Time 1was a particularlypowerful predictor of cohesiveness at Time 2! Thesefindings prompted Mullen and Copper to concludethat the cohesion–performance relationship is bidirec-tional: Cohesion makes groups more successful,but groups that succeed also become more cohesive(see Figure 5.2).

What Is It About Cohesive Groups ThatMakes Them More Effective? Cohesive groupsdo outperform less cohesive groups. But what is itabout a cohesive group that makes it more successful?Does the high level of attraction among membersreduce conflict, making it easier for the group to con-centrate on its work? Or perhaps group members aremore dedicated to their group if it is cohesive, and thissense of dedication and group pride prompts them toexpend more effort on behalf of their group.

The success of cohesive groups lies, in part, in theenhanced coordination of their members. In nonco-hesive groups, members’ activities are uncoordinatedand disjointed, but in cohesive groups, each member’scontributions mesh with those of the other groupmembers. Cohesion thus acts as a “lubricant” that“minimizes the friction due to the human ‘grit’ in thesystem” (Mullen & Copper, 1994, p. 213). Membersof cohesive groups all share the same “mental model”of the group’s task and its demands, and this sharedprescription for how the task is to be accomplishedfacilitates their performance. Hence, cohesive groupsare particularly likely to outperform noncohesive

Group pride Performance

Socialcohesion

Task cohesion

Taskinterdependence

Cohesion

.17

.25

.24.25

.51

F I G U R E 5.2 The relationship betweenthree components of cohesion (social and taskcohesion, and group pride), cohesion, and per-formance. Meta-analyses suggest that cohesioninfluences performance (and task cohesion isstrongest predictor of cohesion), but that theimpact of performance on cohesion is strongerthan the impact of cohesion on performance.

138 CHAPTER 5

groups when the group’s task requires high levels ofinteraction and interdependence. The degree of inter-dependency required by the type of tasks the group isworking on also determines the size of the cohesion–performance relationship; the more group membersmust coordinate their activities with one another, themore likely a cohesive group will outperform a lesscohesive one (Beal et al., 2003; Gully et al., 1995).

These meta-analytic studies also show supportfor the value of a multicomponent conceptualiza-tion of cohesion, for they suggest that even whencohesion is operationalized in different ways, thecohesion–performance relationship still holds true.In their analysis, Mullen and Copper (1994) gavethe edge to task cohesion, particularly in studiesinvolving bona fide groups rather than artificialones. Subsequent analyses, however, found evi-dence that all three components—social, task, andperceptual (“group pride”) cohesion—were relatedto performance when one looked only at group-level studies (Beal et al., 2003). Figure 5.2 synthe-sizes the findings from these meta-analytic reviews.

These analyses confirm the relative perfor-mance gains achieved by cohesive groups, but

they suggest that attraction and pride are not alwaysenough: without task cohesion and commitment tothe group’s goals, a cohesive group may be surpris-ingly unproductive. In a field study of this process,researchers surveyed 5871 factory workers whoworked in 228 groups. They discovered that themore cohesive groups were not necessarily moreproductive, but their productivity level from onemember to the next was less variable. The indivi-duals working in cohesive groups produced nearlyequivalent amounts, but individuals in noncohesivegroups varied considerably from one member to thenext in their productivity. Furthermore, fairly lowstandards of performance had developed in some ofthe highly cohesive groups; thus, productivity wasuniformly low in these groups. In contrast, in cohe-sive groups with relatively high performance goals,members were extremely productive (Seashore,1954; Langfred, 1998). As Figure 5.3 indicates, solong as group norms encourage high productivity,cohesiveness and productivity are positively related:The more cohesive the group, the greater its pro-ductivity. If group norms encourage low productiv-ity, however, the relationship is negative.

Cohesiveness

Pro

du

ctiv

ity

Low High

Groups with norms thatstress productivity

Groups with norms thatstress low productivity

F I G U R E 5.3 The relationship between cohesion and productivity when norms stress high and low productivity.If the group’s norms encourage productivity, cohesiveness and productivity will be positively correlated. If the groupstandards for performance are low, however, cohesiveness will actually undermine productivity.


This tendency for the group’s norms aboutproductivity tomoderate the strength of the cohesion–performance relationship was also confirmed experi-mentally by manipulating both cohesion andproduction norms (Berkowitz, 1954; Gammage,Carron, & Estabrooks, 2001). In one illustrative study,cohesive and noncohesive groups worked on a simpleassembly-line type task.Then, during the task,messageswere ostensibly sent from oneworker to another to es-tablish performance norms. In some instances, themes-sages called for increased production (positive messages),but in other instances, the messages requested a slow-down (negative messages). As expected, the impact ofthe messages was significantly greater in the cohesivegroups than in the noncohesive groups. Furthermore,

thedecreases inproductivitybroughtaboutbythenega-tive messages were greater than the increases broughtabout by the positive messages (Schachter et al., 1951).

The take-home lesson from these studies—thatcreating social cohesiveness may make membershappy but not productive—does not apply to theU.S. team. Every one of the team members wascommitted to the goal of winning the Olympics, sothere was no worry that the performance normwould be set too low. In addition, because of theintervention of a thoughtful coach who skillfully builtthe group’s unity, their cohesion developed overtime until its peak during the Olympics. The team’striumph was called a miracle by some; but in retro-spect, it was due to effective group dynamics.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What is group cohesion?

1. Group cohesion is the strength of the bondslinking members to a group. Cohesiveness is anindication of the health of the group and isrelated to a variety of other group processes.

2. Theorists have debated the nature of thisconstruct, but a multicomponent, multilevelapproach assumes cohesion has a variety ofindicators, including:

■ Social cohesion: Lewin and Festinger,taking a social psychological approach tocohesion, emphasized the impact of at-traction (in both individuals and groups)on cohesion. Hogg’s concept of social at-traction stresses a specific form of group-level attraction based on social identityprocesses.

■ Task cohesion: The strength of the group’sfocus on a task, and the degree of (a)teamwork displayed by group members asthey coordinate their efforts and (b) thegroup’s level of collective efficacy.

■ Perceived cohesion: The extent to whichthe group members feel as though they

belong in the group (individual-level) andthe overall entitativity of the group(group-level).

■ Emotional cohesion: The affective inten-sity of the group, often described as élan,morale, esprit de corps, or positive affectivetone. Group-level, consensual emotionsare distinct from an individual-levelemotions.

Why do some groups, but not others, become cohesive?

1. A number of factors combine to determine agroup’s level of cohesiveness, including:

■ Attraction: Sherif and Sherif, using aunique field-study method in a boys’summer camp, found that the same sorts ofvariables that influence liking and groupformation also influence the cohesivenessof the group that is formed.

■ Stability, size, and structure: As defined byZiller, open groups display less cohesion thanclosed groups. Smaller groups tend to bemore cohesive than larger groups, as dogroups with particular structural features

140 CHAPTER 5

(such as the absence of subgroups, lesshierarchy, etc.).

■ Initiations: Festinger’s theory of cognitivedissonance explains why initiations can in-crease commitment to a group, andAronson and Mills confirmed that peoplewho go through some kind of initiation tojoin a group tend to like that group more.However, when an initiation is severe,such as some extreme hazing practices, itdoes not increase cohesiveness.

2. Researchers have developed a number ofoperational definitions of cohesion, usingobservation, structured observation, and self-report methods. Cohesion, as a multilevel con-cept, can also be measured at multiple levels.

How does cohesion develop over time?

1. Cohesion is, in most cases, the consequence ofa period of group development—a pattern ofgrowth and change beginning with initial for-mation and ending, in most cases, withdissolution.

2. As Hill notes, many theories have been devel-oped to explain group development. Most,however, are consistent with Tuckman’s five-stage model:

■ Orientation (forming) stage: Members ex-perience tentative interactions, tension,concern over ambiguity, growing interde-pendence, and attempts to identify thenature of the situation.

■ Conflict (storming) stage: Members expressdissatisfaction with the group, respondemotionally, criticize one another, andform coalitions.

■ Structure (norming) stage: Unity increases,membership stabilizes, members report in-creased satisfaction, and the group’s inter-nal dynamics intensify.

■ Work (performing) stage: The group’sfocus shifts to the performance of tasks and

goal attainment. Not all groups reach thisstage, for even highly cohesive groups arenot necessarily productive.

■ Dissolution (adjourning) stage: The groupdisbands. A group’s entry into the dissolu-tion stage can be either planned or spon-taneous, but even planned dissolution cancreate problems for members as they workto reduce their dependence on the group.

3. Wheelan’s Group Development Questionnairemeasures group development.

4. Tuckman’s model is a successive-stage theory—it specifies the usual order of the phases of groupdevelopment. Cyclical models, such as Bales’sequilibrium model, maintain that groups cyclethrough various stages repeatedly. Punctuatedequilibrium models suggest that groups sometimesmove through periods of accelerated change.

What are the positive and negative consequences ofcohesion?

1. In most instances, cohesion is associated withincreases in member satisfaction and decreasesin turnover and stress. Roy’s analysis of“banana time” in work groups illustrates howgroups maintain cohesiveness through ritualand social interaction.

2. Cohesion intensifies group processes. Cohesivegroups can be so psychologically demandingthat they cause emotional problems for mem-bers (e.g., the old sergeant’s syndrome).Dependence, pressure to conform, and accep-tance of influence are greater in cohesivegroups, and can result in the mistaken decisionsidentified by Janis in his theory of groupthink.

3. Cohesion and performance are linked, bothbecause success increases a group’s cohesionand because cohesive groups tend to outper-form less cohesive groups. Meta-analytic stud-ies by Mullen, Copper, and other researcherssuggest that each component of cohesioncontributes to task proficiency.


■ Even though cohesive groups tend tooutperform less cohesive groups, this rela-tionship is strongest when members arecommitted to the group’s tasks. If group

norms do not encourage high productiv-ity, then cohesiveness and productivity arenegatively related.


Chapter Case: U.S. Olympic Hockey Team■ Do You Believe in Miracles? The Story of the 1980

U.S. Hockey Team, a videotape produced byWarner HBO (2001), provides details aboutthe team and the coach.

Defining and Measuring Cohesion■ “Group Cohesion: From ‘Field of Forces’ to

Multidimensional Construct,” by Kenneth L.Dion (2000), reviews key issues in the study ofcohesion, with a focus on definitional debatesand problems in measurement.

■ The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: FromAttraction to Social Identity, by Michael A. Hogg(1992), thoroughly reviews conceptual analysesof the concept of cohesion and bases its inte-grative theoretical reinterpretation on socialidentity theory.

Group Development■ Group Process: A Developmental Perspective, by

Susan A. Wheelan (1994), provides anextensive analysis of each stage that marks thematuration of most groups.

■ “Traces, Trajectories, and Timing,” byHolly Arrow, Kelly B. Henry, MarshallS. Poole, Susan Wheelan, and RichardMoreland (2005), provides a conceptuallysophisticated review of research and theorythat considers group dynamics from atemporal perspective.

Consequences of Cohesion■ “Cohesion and Performance in Groups: A

Meta-Analytic Clarification of ConstructRelations,” by Daniel Beal, Robin Cohen,Michael Burke, and Christy McLendon(2003), carefully considers the methodolog-ical issues involved in examining thecohesion–performance relationship and thenprovides clear documentation of thatrelationship.

■ “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,”by Guy L. Siebold (2007), provides a clearintroduction to the standard model ofcohesion that guides experts’ analyses ofcohesion in combat groups.

Media ResourcesVisit the Group Dynamics companion website at www.cengage.com/psychology/forsyth to access online re-sources for your book, including quizzes, flash cards, web links, and more!

142 CHAPTER 5


6

Structure

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Group processes are shaped by unob-servable, but influential, group struc-tures. All but the most ephemeralgroups develop written and unwrittennorms that dictate conduct in thegroup, expectations about members’roles, and networks of connectionsamong the members.

■ What is group structure?■ Why do norms, both formal and

informal, develop to regulategroup behavior?

■ What kinds of roles are commonin groups and how do theyinfluence members?

■ How can the social structure of agroup be measured?

■ What are status, attraction, andcommunication networks?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Norms

The Development of Norms

The Transmission of Norms

Roles

Role Differentiation

Group Socialization

Role Stress

Intermember Relations

Social Network Analysis

Status Networks

Attraction Networks

Communication Networks

Social Structures and Interactions:SYMLOG

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

143

✵

The group that came down from the Andes wasnot the same group that began the chartered flight.Many members were lost to the group forever,and the trauma changed each one of the survivorspermanently. But its group structure—the underly-ing pattern of roles, norms, and networks of rela-tions among members that define and organize thegroup—also changed. The group of survivors hadnew norms that defined and regulated members’actions. The group began the flight with one setof roles and positions—a captain, a coach, parents,supporters, and friends—but ended with an en-tirely different set of roles, including commanders,lieutenants, and explorers. The network of relation-ships linking members one to another, in terms ofstatus, liking, and communication, also changed.Men who were at first afforded little respect orcourtesy eventually earned considerable statuswithin the group. Some who were well-likedbefore the crash became outcasts. Some who had

hardly spoken to the others before became activecommunicators within the group.

Any group, whether stranded in the Andes, sit-ting at a conference table, or working to manufac-ture some product, can be better understood byexamining its structure. Such an analysis assumesthat despite widespread differences among groups,all share a common structural core. In a sense, exam-ining group structures is like studying an individual’spersonality. An acquaintance’s personality cannot beobserved directly, but people assume that his or herbehavior is the external manifestation of basic traitsand dispositions. Similarly, a structural analysis as-sumes that interaction among members follows apredictable, organized pattern because it is regulatedby influential interpersonal structures. In this chapter,we examine three of the most commonly noted as-pects of a group’s “personality”: norms, roles, andintermember relations (see Biddle, 2001; Hechter &Op, 2001 for reviews).

Andes Survivors: One Group’s Triumph over Extraordinary Adversity

The group chartered the Fairchild F-227 to travel fromUruguay to Chile. Most of the passengers on the flightwere either members of the Old Christians amateurrugby team or their family and friends. But they neverreached their destination. The pilot and copilot mis-judged their course and began their descent far toosoon. The plane clipped the peak of Mt. Tinguiriricaand crashed deep in the snow-covered Andes of SouthAmerica.

Author Piers Paul Read (1974) recounts the chal-lenges facing those who survived the crash. They werelost, without food or water, in the harsh, subzerotemperatures of the barren Andes. During the firstdays of the ordeal they argued intensely over the like-lihood of a rescue. Some insisted that searchers wouldsoon find them. Others wanted to climb down fromthe mountain. Some became so apathetic that theydidn’t care. At night the cries of the injured were oftenanswered with anger rather than pity, for the crampedsleeping arrangements created continual conflict. Butthe search planes never spotted them and then a sec-ond tragedy struck the group: Early one morning, an

avalanche filled the wrecked fuselage where they sleptwith snow and many died before they could dig theirway out.

A lone individual would have certainly perished inthe harsh climate, but the group managed to survive bypooling their resources and skills. They organized theirwork, with some cleaning their sleeping quarters, sometending the injured, and others melting snow intodrinking water. When their food ran out, they madethe difficult decision to eat the frozen bodies of thosewho had died in the crash. And when starvation seemedimminent, they sent two men, Fernando Parrado andRoberto Canessa, down the mountain to seek help.After hiking for 14 days the two explorers, running lowon food and supplies, stumbled into a farmer tendinghis cattle. Parrado himself guided the rescue helicoptersback to the crash site. All of them, when asked howthey survived, credited the “unity” of the group (Read,1974, p. 310). And when they read Read’s book abouttheir ordeal, they complained of only one inaccuracy:They felt that Piers Paul Read failed to capture the“faith and friendship which inspired them” for 70 days.

144 CHAPTER 6

NORMS

The survivors of the crash needed to coordinatetheir actions if they were to stay alive. With food,water, and shelter severely limited, they wereforced to interact with and rely on each other con-tinually, and any errant action on the part of oneperson would disturb and even endanger severalother people. So members soon began to follow ashared set of rules that defined how the groupwould sleep at night, what types of duties eachhealthy individual was expected to perform, andhow food and water were to be apportioned.

Norms are the emergent, consensual standards thatregulate groupmembers’ behaviors. They are emergent,in that they develop gradually during the course ofinteraction among members—in some cases throughdeliberation and choice but often only gradually asmembers’ actions align. They are also consensual be-cause norms are shared rules of action; norms are socialstandards that are accepted by a substantial proportionof the group.

A group’s norms regulate the group’s activitiesby identifying what is normal and what is not. Just asa physician’s prescription recommends a medicine, soprescriptive norms define the socially appropriateway to respond in a social situation. Proscriptivenorms, in contrast, are prohibitions; they definethe types of actions that should be avoided if at allpossible (Sorrels & Kelley, 1984). For example, someof the prescriptive norms of the Andes group were“Food should be shared equally,” “Those who arenot injured should work to help those who are in-jured,” and “Follow the orders of the leader,”whereas some proscriptive norms were “Do not uri-nate inside the airplane” and “Do not take morethan your share of food and water.” Descriptivenorms describe what most people usually do, feel,

or think in a particular situation. In a business group,for example, most people arrive for the meeting ontime. Very few people fall asleep during the meeting.Most people clap when the speaker finishes.Injunctive norms are more evaluative—they de-scribe the sorts of behaviors that people ought to per-form. People who do not comply with descriptivenorms may be viewed as unusual, but people whoviolate injunctive norms are negatively evaluated andare open to sanction by the other group members. Inthe Andes group, for example, those who failed todo their fair share of work were criticized by theothers, given distasteful chores, and sometimes evendenied food and water (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren,1990; Miller & Prentice, 1996).

Some norms are specific to a given group, butothers are accepted across groups. When onegroup meets it may be appropriate to interruptothers when they are talking, to arrive late andto leave early, and to dress informally. In anothergroup, however, such behaviors would be consid-ered inappropriate violations of group norms ofdress and decorum. Some social norms, in con-trast, are so widely adopted within a given contextand culture that they structure behavior acrossgroups.

Norms are a fundamental element of a group’sstructure, for they provide direction and motiva-tion, organize social interactions, and make otherpeople’s responses predictable and meaningful.Simple behaviors such as choice of clothing(“Wear shoes in public”), manners (“Do not inter-rupt others”), and conventions of address (“Call theprofessor ‘Dr.’”) reflect norms, but so do generalsocietal principles of fairness (“Help others whenthey are in need”), morality (“Do not lie to mem-bers of the group”), and value (“Work hard for thegroup”). Each group member is restrained to a de-gree by norms, but each member also benefits fromthe order that norms provide.

prescriptive norm A consensual standard that identifiespreferable, positively sanctioned behaviors.proscriptive norm A consensual standard that identifiesprohibited, negatively sanctioned behaviors.descriptive norm A consensual standard that describeshow people typically act, feel, and think in a givensituation.

injunctive norm An evaluative consensual standard thatdescribes how people should act, feel, and think in agiven situation rather than how people do act, feel, andthink in that situation.

STRUCTURE 145

The Development of Norms

Groups sometimes discuss and formally adopt normsas their group’s rules, but more frequently norms areimplicit standards rather than explicit ones. Becausemembers gradually align their behaviors until theymatch certain standards, they are often not evenaware that their behavior is dictated by the normsof the situation. People do not, for example, spenda great deal of time wondering, “Should I be quiet inthe library?” “Should I nap during the group meet-ing?” or “Should I stop when the light turns red?”They take these norms for granted so fully that theycomplywith themautomatically (Aarts,Dijksterhuis,&Custers, 2003).

The Andes survivors, for example, grew up in aculture that condemned cannibalism, but this taboowas largely unstated. But when the group grewweak from starvation one member casually remarkedthat the only source of nourishment was the frozenbodies of the crash victims. The others took the re-mark to be a joke until the tenth day, when “thediscussion spread as these boys cautiously mentionedit to their friends or those they thought would besympathetic” (Read, 1974, p. 76). When the topicwas discussed by the entire group, two cliquesemerged; one favored eating the corpses, but a sec-ond group claimed that they could not bring them-selves to think of their dead friends as food. The nextday, however, they learned by radio that the air forcehad given up the search. Most of the members thenate a few pieces of meat and, in the end, cannibalismbecame the norm (Parrado, 2006).

Muzafer Sherif, as noted briefly in Chapter 1,studied this norm emergence process by taking advan-tage of the autokinetic (self-motion) effect. This visualillusion occurs when a person stares at a pinpoint oflight in an otherwise dark room. Ordinarily the visualsystem compensates for naturally occurring motions ofthe eye, but when only a single light is visible with noframe of reference, the light appears to wander inunpredictable directions and at variable speeds. Sheriffound that when individuals judged the dot’s move-ment repeatedly, they usually established their ownidiosyncratic average estimates, which varied from1 to 10 inches. But when people made their

judgments in groups, their personal estimates blendedwith those of other group members. One group, forexample, included three people who had already beentested individually. During these initial tests, Person Athought the light moved very little—about 1 inch.Person B estimated the movement at 2 inches, butC’s estimates were higher, averaging about 7 inches.When these three people made their estimates of themovement aloud when seated together, their judg-ments converged. It took three meetings, but by thethird session, a norm had emerged: All the membersfelt the light was moving about 3 inches. Figure 6.1graphs this convergence process: Over time, indivi-duals with the highest and lowest estimates revise theirjudgments to match the group average.

The Transmission of Norms

Sherif confirmed that norms emerge, gradually, asgroup members’ behaviors, judgments, and beliefsalign over time. But Sherif also arranged for peopleto make their judgments alone after taking part inthe group sessions where a norm emerged. Did theseindividuals revert back to their original estimates ofmovement, or did they continue to base their esti-mates on the norm that emerged within their group?Sherif discovered that, even though the other groupmembers were no longer present, the individualsretained the group norm (Sherif, 1966). They hadinternalized the norm.

Norms, because they are both consensual (ac-cepted by many group members) and internalized(personally accepted by each individual member),are social facts—taken-for-granted elements of thegroup’s stable structure. Even if the individuals whooriginally fostered the norms are no longer present,their normative innovations remain a part of theorganization’s traditions, and newcomers mustchange to adopt that tradition. Researchers havestudied this norm transmission experimentally usinga generational paradigm: They create a group, andthen add newcomers to it and retire old-timers untilthe entire membership of the group has turnedover. Do these succeeding generations of membersremain true to the group’s original norms, even ifthese norms are arbitrary or cause the group to

146 CHAPTER 6

make errors and mistakes (Focus 6.1)? In one auto-kinetic effect study, researchers established an ex-treme norm by planting a confederate in eachthree-member group. The confederate steadfastlymaintained that the dot of light was moving about15 inches—an excessive estimate given that mostestimates averaged about 3 to 4 inches. Once theconfederate deflected the group’s distance normupward, he was removed from the group and re-placed by a naive participant. The remaining groupmembers, however, still retained the large distancenorm, and the newest addition to the group gradu-ally adapted to the higher standard. The researcherscontinued to replace group members with new par-ticipants, but new members continued to shift theirestimates in the direction of the group norm. Thisarbitrary group norm gradually disappeared as judg-ments of distance came back down to an average of3.5 inches, but in most cases, the more reasonablenorm did not develop until group membership hadchanged five or six times (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961;MacNeil & Sherif, 1976). In another generationalstudy, researchers gave groups feedback that suggested

that their norm about how decisions should be madewas causing them to make errors, but this negativefeedback did not reduce the norm’s longevity acrossgenerations (Nielsen & Miller, 1997).

Because norms tend to resist revision, somegroup’s norms may seem pointless and arbitraryrather than reasonable and functional (Rimal &Real, 2005). They are, however, aspects of thegroup’s structure, and even odd or unusual normsorganize interactions, increase predictability, andenhance solidarity (Collins, 2004). The traditionalgroup that moves at seemingly glacial speedthrough a formal agenda of roll call, approvingthe minutes, old business, new business, and ad-journment, is moving along at a pace and througha process that is defined by its norms. Adults whowant to take part in an ongoing game of “pickup”basketball learn to ask the question “Who hasnext?” to inform the other players that they wishto play and that they will complain if they arepassed over for a player who arrived after they did(Jimerson, 1999). When a Little League baseballteam takes to calling an opposing team “the string

Alone GroupSession 1

GroupSession 2

GroupSession 3

Ave

rag

e D

ista

nce

Est

imat

es

PersonC

PersonB

PersonA

Convergence

F I G U R E 6.1 Sherif’s experimental creation of group norms. Individuals’ private, pre-group judgments differedmarkedly, but when they joined with others their judgments converged.

SOURCE: Data from M. Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms, 1936, Harper & Row.

STRUCTURE 147

F o c u s 6.1 Are Groups Bad for Your Health?

Everyone on the [cheerleading] squad binges andvomits. That’s how I learned.

—Laura (quoted in Squire, 1983, p. 48)

Theodore Newcomb, in his 1943 study of politicalattitudes discussed in Chapter 2, discovered that studentschanged their attitudes until their political preferencesmatched the attitudes of their classmates and professors.Some 40 years later, Christian Crandall (1988) documen-ted similar shifts in a study of bulimia—a pernicious cycleof binge eating followed by self-induced vomiting orother forms of purging. Certain social groups, such ascheerleading squads, dance troupes, sports teams, andsororities, tend to have strikingly high rates of eatingdisorders (Petrie & Greenleaf, 2007). In explanation,Crandall noted that such groups adopt norms that en-courage binging and purging. Rather than viewing theseactions as abnormal and a threat to health, the sororitiesthat Crandall studied accepted purging as a normalmeans of controlling one’s weight. The women whowere popular in such groups were the ones who bingedat the rate established by the group’s norms. Even worse,women who did not binge when they first joined thegroup were more likely to take up the practice the lon-ger they remained in the group. Other studies suggestthat unhealthy eating patterns increase with the per-ceived strength of peer pressure within the sorority andthe longer the woman lives in the sorority house itself(e.g., Basow, Foran, & Bookwala, 2007).

Similar results have been obtained in studies ofother sorts of socially undesirable or unhealthy beha-viors (Smith & Christakis, 2008). Entire college cam-puses can develop unique, and risky, norms pertainingto the need to take precautions, such as the use ofcondoms (Fisher & Fisher, 1993). Interventions designedto help at-risk adolescents by placing them in specialprograms may actually contribute to increased vio-lence, drug use, and other antisocial behaviors whenthese groups develop negative rather than positivenorms (Dishion & Dodge, 2005). On some college cam-puses students abuse alcohol because the norms ofthat subculture encourage excessive alcohol consump-tion and discourage moderation (Kuntsche et al.,2005). Obesity tends to spread among individuals whoare linked together in a social network, in part becausenorms encourage lifestyle choices that promote weightgain rather than fitness (Christakis & Fowler, 2007).

Pluralistic ignorance can also contribute tounhealthy behaviors. Pluralistic ignorance occurs

when the majority of the individuals in a groupprivately disagree with the group’s norm but feel thatthey are alone in their misgivings (Prentice, 2007). So,the norm continues to regulate behavior, due to mis-perception rather than shared consensus. Collegestudents, for example, often misperceive the extent towhich other students drink excessive amounts ofalcohol. Most of the students who participated in onestudy were personally opposed to overindulgence, butthey believed that their campus’s norms encouragedheavy alcohol consumption. The men responded tothis norm by gradually internalizing the misperceivednorm. They began to drink more the longer theystayed at the school. The women, in contrast,responded by distancing themselves from theiruniversity and its norms about drinking (Prentice &Miller, 1993).

Norms may, however, promote healthy actions aswell as unhealthy ones. Individuals who wish to reducetheir negative indulgences often find success by joininga group and accepting that group’s norms as theirown. Many fitness, weight-loss, and anti-addictionprograms, as noted in more detail in Chapter 16, take agroup approach to change. Alcoholics Anonymous, forexample, has clear norms about the types of behaviorsmembers must enact in order to stay sober, and thoseindividuals who become highly involved members areless likely to continue to drink heavily (Bond,Kaskautas, & Weisner, 2003). Groups have also beenfound to be effective in preventing the onset of eatingdisorders, such as bulimia, in young women. Theinvestigators in one clinical trial identified 481 women,averaging 17 years old, who were already experiencingdissatisfaction with their bodies. They then arrangedfor some of these women to meet in small groups tolearn more about nutrition and ways to managetheir weight in healthy ways. In some situations, thesewomen also developed, as a group, argumentsagainst the thin-body norm typical in American society.When the investigators assessed their health threeyears later, they discovered that, compared to those inthe control condition, the women who took part inthese groups were significantly less likely to have de-veloped eating disorders (Stice et al., 2008). Groups,then, can either promote or threaten members’ health,depending on their norms. Some groups may putmembers at risk by encouraging unhealthy actions,whereas others are the path to good health andwellness.

pluralistic ignoranceWhenmembers of a group privately vary in outlook and expectations, but publicly they all act similarlybecause they believe that they are the only ones whose personal views are different from the rest of the group.

148 CHAPTER 6

beans” because of the greenish color of their uni-form, the players share a sense of collusion and se-crecy when their shortstop calls out “bean thebean” to the pitcher (Fine, 1979). Norms do notjust maintain order in the group; they also maintainthe group itself (Youngreen & Moore, 2008; seeTable 6.1).

ROLES

On the day after the Andes crash, Marcelo, thecaptain of the rugby team, organized the efforts ofthose who could work. Two young men and oneof the women administered first aid to the injured.One subgroup of boys melted snow for drinkingwater, and another team cleaned the cabin of theairplane. These various positions in the group—leader, doctor, snow melter, cabin cleaner—are allexamples of roles: coherent sets of behaviors ex-pected of people in specific positions within a groupor social setting.

Roles in a group are similar in some respects toroles in a play. A play’s roles describe the charactersthat the actors portray before the audience. To be-come Juliet in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, forexample, an actor must perform certain actions andrecite her dialogue accordingly. Similarly, roles ingroups structure behavior by dictating the part that

members take as they interact. Once cast in a rolesuch as leader, outcast, or questioner, group mem-bers perform certain actions and interact with othergroup members in a particular way—but this consis-tency reflects the requirements of their role ratherthan their personal predilections or inclinations.But in many cases members can negotiate withinthe group as they move in and out of different roles.For example, group members who want to influ-ence others may seek the role of leader, and thosewho wish to maintain a low profile may seek out therole of follower (Hare, 2003; Moxnes, 1999).

Just as some variability is permitted in theatricalroles, group roles do not structure group members’actions completely. An actor playing the role ofJuliet must perform certain behaviors as part ofher role—she would not be Shakespeare’s Juliet ifshe did not fall in love with Romeo. She can, how-ever, recite her lines in an original way, change herstage behaviors, and even ad-lib. In social groups,too, people can fulfill the same role in somewhatdifferent ways, and so long as they do not stray toofar from the role’s basic requirements, the grouptolerates this variation. However, like the stagedirector who replaces an actor who presents an un-satisfactory Juliet, the group can replace memberswho repeatedly fail to play their part within thegroup. The role often supersedes any particulargroup member. When the role occupant departs,

T A B L E 6.1 Characteristics and Varieties of Norms

Common Features Description

Descriptive Describe how most members act, feel, and think

Consensual Shared among group members, rather than personal, individual-level beliefs

Injunctive Define which behaviors are considered “bad” or wrong and which are“good” or acceptable

Prescriptive Set the standards for expected behavior; what should be done

Proscriptive Identify behaviors that should not be performed

Informal Describe the unwritten rules of conduct in the group

Implicit Often so taken for granted that members follow them automatically

Self-generating Emerge as members reach a consensus through reciprocal influence

Stable Once they develop, resistant to change and passed from current membersto new members

STRUCTURE 149

the role itself remains and is filled by a new member(Stryker & Burke, 2000).

Role Differentiation

As with norms, groups sometimes deliberately cre-ate roles to organize the group and thereby facilitatethe attainment of the group’s goals. A group maydecide that its efficiency would be augmented ifsomeone takes charge of the meetings and differenttasks are assigned to subcommittees. In some cases,too, someone outside the group, such as the group’ssupervisor, may mandate roles within the group(Stempfle, Hübner, & Badke-Schaub, 2001). Buteven without a deliberate attempt at creating a for-mal group structure, the group will probably developan informal role structure. Members may initiallyconsider themselves to be just members, basicallysimilar to each other. But in time, some group mem-bers will begin to perform specific types of actionsand interact with other group members in a particu-lar way. As this role differentiation process unfolds,the number of roles in the group increases, whereasthe roles themselves gradually become more narrowlydefined and specialized. In the Andes survivors, forexample, the roles of leader, doctor, and cleaner emergedfirst, soon followed by the inventor, who createdmakeshift snowshoes, hammocks, and water-meltingdevices; explorer, who was determined to hike downfrom the mountain; and complainer, pessimist, optimist,and encourager. This rapid proliferation of roles is typi-cal of groups facing difficult problems or emergencies(Bales, 1958).

Types of Roles What roles tend to emerge as agroup becomes organized? Certainly, the role ofleader is a fundamental one in many groups, butother roles should not be overlooked. Many ofthese roles, such as expert, secretary, and organizer,are similar in that they revolve around the task

the group is tackling. People who fulfill a taskrole focus on the group’s goals and on the mem-bers’ attempts to support one another as they work.Marcelo, in the Andes group, was a task-orientedleader, for he organized work squads and controlledthe rationing of the group’s food supplies, and therest of the members obeyed his orders. He did not,however, satisfy the group members’ interpersonaland emotional needs. As if to offset Marcelo’s in-ability to cheer up the survivors, several groupmembers became more positive and friendly,actively trying to reduce conflicts and to keep mo-rale high. Liliana Methol, in particular, provided a“unique source of solace” (Read, 1974, p. 74) tothe young men. She came to fill a relationshiprole (also frequently termed socioemotional role) inthe Andes group. A group may need to accomplishits tasks, but it must also ensure that the interper-sonal and emotional needs of the members are met.Whereas the coordinator and energizer structure thegroup’s work, such roles as supporter, clown, andeven critic help satisfy the emotional needs of thegroup members.

The tendency for groups to develop both taskroles and relationship roles is consistent withKenneth Benne and Paul Sheats’s (1948) classicstudy conducted at the National TrainingLaboratories (NTL), an organization devoted tothe improvement of groups. Benne and Sheats con-cluded that a group, to survive, must meet twobasic demands: The group must accomplish its tasks,and the relationships among members must bemaintained. Their extensive list of roles, shown inTable 6.2, includes task roles, relationship roles, and

role differentiation An increase in the number of rolesin a group, accompanied by the gradual decrease in thescope of these roles as each one becomes more narrowlydefined and specialized.

task role Any position in a group occupied by a memberwho performs behaviors that promote completion oftasks and activities, such as initiating structure, providingtask-related feedback, and setting goals.relationship role Any position in a group occupied by amember who performs behaviors that improve the na-ture and quality of interpersonal relations among mem-bers, such as showing concern for the feelings of others,reducing conflict, and enhancing feelings of satisfactionand trust in the group.

150 CHAPTER 6

T A B L E 6.2 Benne and Sheats’ Typology of Roles in Groups

Category Types

Task Roles Initiator/contributor: Recommends novel ideas about the problem at hand, new ways toapproach the problem, or possible solutions not yet considered

Information seeker: Emphasizes getting the facts by calling for background informationfrom others

Opinion seeker: Asks formore qualitative types of data, such as attitudes, values, and feelings

Information giver: Provides data for forming decisions, including facts that derive fromexpertise

Opinion giver: Provides opinions, values, and feelings

Elaborator: Gives additional information, examples, rephrasings, implications about pointsmade by others

Coordinator: Shows the relevance of each idea and its relationship to the overall problem

Orienter: Refocuses discussion on the topic whenever necessary

Evaluator/critic: Appraises the quality of the group’s methods, logic, and results

Energizer: Stimulates the group to continue working when discussion flags

Procedural technician: Cares for operational details, such as materials, machinery, and so on

Recorder: Takes notes and maintains records

Relationship Roles Encourager: Rewards others through agreement, warmth, and praise

Harmonizer: Mediates conflicts among group members

Compromiser: Shifts his or her own position on an issue in order to reduce conflict in thegroup

Gatekeeper/expediter: Smooths communication by setting up procedures and ensuringequal participation from members

Standard setter: Expresses or calls for discussion of standards for evaluating the quality ofthe group process

Group observer/commentator: Points out the positive and negative aspects of the group’sdynamics and calls for change if necessary

Follower: Accepts the ideas offered by others and serves as an audience for the group

Individual Roles Aggressor: Expresses disapproval of acts, ideas, and feelings of others; attacks the group

Blocker: Negativistic; resists the group’s influence; opposes the group unnecessarily

Dominator: Asserts authority or superiority; manipulative

Evader/self-confessor: Expresses personal interests, feelings, and opinions unrelated togroup goals

Help seeker: Expresses insecurity, confusion, and self-deprecation

Recognition seeker: Calls attention to him- or herself; self-aggrandizing

Playboy/girl: Uninvolved in the group; cynical, nonchalant

Special-interest pleader: Remains apart from the group by acting as representative ofanother social group or category

SOURCE: Adapted from “Functional Roles of Group Members” by K. D. Benne and P. Sheats, Journal of Social Issues, 1948, 4(2), 41–49. Copyright 1948 by theSociety for the Psychology of Social Issues. Reprinted by permission.

S TRUCTURE 151

individualistic roles—roles in which members em-phasize their own needs over the group’s needs.

Why Differentiation? Why do task roles and re-lationship roles emerge in so many different groups?One answer, proposed by Robert Bales and his col-leagues, suggests that very few individuals can simul-taneously fulfill both the task and the relationshipneeds of the group (Bales, 1955, 1958; Parsons et al.,1953). When group members are task-oriented,they must direct others to act in certain ways, re-strict others’ options, criticize other members, andprompt them into action. These actions may benecessary to reach the goal, but others may reactnegatively to these task-oriented activities—so theythen look to others in the group for socioemo-tional, relational support. The peacekeeper whointercedes and tries to maintain harmony is therelationship specialist. Task and relationship roles,then, are a natural consequence of these two partlyconflicting demands.

Bales’s research team identified these tenden-cies by tracking role differentiation in decision-making groups across four sessions. Bales used hisInteraction Process Analysis (IPA) system to identifycertain specific types of behavior within the groups.As noted in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.2), half of thecategories in IPA focus on task-oriented behaviors—either attempts to solve specific problems in thegroup or attempts to exchange information via ques-tioning. The remaining six categories are reserved forpositive relationship behaviors (shows solidarity, tensionrelease, agreement) or negative relationship behaviors(disagrees, shows tension, shows antagonism). Bales foundthat individuals rarely performed both task and rela-tionship behaviors: Most people gravitated toward ei-ther a task role or a relationship role. Those who tookon a task role (labeled the “idea man”) offered mostlysuggestions and expressed opinions. Those whogravitated to the relationship roles (labeled the“best-liked man”) showed solidarity, more tensionrelease, and greater agreement with other groupmembers. The task roles elicit more questions, dis-plays of tension, antagonism, and disagreement,whereas the relationship roles received more demon-strations of solidarity, tension reduction, and solutions

to problems. Moreover, this differentiation becamemore pronounced over time. During the first session,the same leader occupied both the task and the rela-tionship roles in 56.5% of the groups. By the fourthsession, only 8.5% of the leaders occupied both roles.In most cases, individuals dropped their role as taskleader in favor of the relationship role (Bales, 1953,1958; Bales & Slater, 1955).

Subsequent work suggests that this division oftask and relationship roles is more likely when agroup is experiencing conflict about its goals(Burke, 1967). But role differentiation is not aninevitable occurrence in all groups (Turner &Colomy, 1988). Some individuals are the small-group equivalent of master leaders, for they areboth well-liked and they focus on the work to bedone (Borgatta, Couch, & Bales, 1954). Whenplayers on football teams were asked to identifythe best players on the team and those who con-tributed most to the group’s harmony, many namedthe same person—usually a senior or first-stringplayer—to both roles (Rees & Segal, 1984).When students in classroom groups rated eachother on Benne and Sheats’s (1948) roles listed inTable 6.2, many slotted the same person into bothtask and relationship roles. Groups with memberswho filled both roles were also more cohesive andperformed more effectively (Mudrack & Farrell,1995). Differentiation of these two types of rolesis more common than their combination, however,perhaps because few people have the interpersonaland cognitive skills needed to enact both rolessuccessfully.

Group Socialization

An actor answering a casting call may hope to landthe lead role of Juliet, but the director may insteadoffer her only a smaller part, such as the role of thenurse or Lady Capulet. She may decide that the roleis too insubstantial for her talents and not accept it,or she may decide that any role in the production isbetter than no role at all. Similarly, individuals oftenseek particular roles in groups, but the group maynot permit them to occupy these roles. In the Andesgroup, for example, many sought to be one of the

152 CHAPTER 6

“expeditionaries”—explorers who were selected tohike away from the crash site and seek help. Butonly three were chosen. The group also selectedsome group members to perform certain tasks, andalthough some members openly complained abouttheir roles, the group insisted that they take on therole despite their protestations.

Richard Moreland and John Levine (1982) de-scribed this negotiation of roles between the indi-vidual and the group in their theory of groupsocialization. This theory, which is summarized inFigure 6.2, recognizes that individuals are often askedto take on roles that they would prefer to avoid.

Newcomers must “learn their place” in the groupand acquire the behaviors required by the roles towhich they have been assigned. Veteran group mem-bers must, in some cases, be ready to take on newroles within the group that force them to learn newskills and seek new challenges. But group membersalso feel that their groups should be flexible enoughto change to meet their particular needs. So indivi-duals attempt to influence the group. Hence, groupsocialization is a mutual process; through assimila-tion, the individual accepts the group’s norms, values,and perspectives, and through accommodation, thegroup adapts to fit the newcomer’s needs.

Moreland and Levine’s theory distinguishes be-tween five classes of roles—prospective member, newmember, full member, marginal member, and ex-member.Prior to actually joining a group, individuals maystudy the group and the resources it offers, and partof this reconnaissance involves identifying the type

Investigation Socialization Maintenance Resocialization Remembrance

Entry

Divergence

Exit

Acceptance

Prospectivemember

Newmember

Fullmember

Marginalmember

Ex-member

Recruitment

Reconnaissance

Accommodation

Assimilation

RoleNegotiation

Accommodation

Assimilation

Tradition

Reminiscence

Co

mm

itm

ent

Time

F I G U R E 6.2 The Moreland and Levine theory of group socialization. The model identifies five types of roles (topof the figure), five stages and processes of socialization (bottom of the figure), and four transition points (identified asstars on the curve). The curved line represents the gradual increase (and eventual decrease) of a hypothetical member’scommitment to the group. Commitment increases as the member moves from prospective member to new member tofull member, but then declines as the member moves to the role of marginal member and finally to ex-member.

group socialization A pattern of change in the rela-tionship between an individual and a group that beginswhen an individual first considers joining the group andends when he or she leaves it.

STRUCTURE 153

of role they will be given should they join. Thegroup, in contrast, seeks to recruit new members;often by promising them roles and responsibilitiesthat once they are in the group they will not actuallybe given (Kramer, 1998). Should the individualschoose to enter the group (entry), their commitmentto the group increases, and their socialization by thefull members begins in earnest. To the full members,the newcomers are inexperienced and cannot becompletely trusted until they accept the group’snorms and role allocations.

The role of newcomer can be a stressful one(Moreland & Levine, 2002). New to the groupand its procedures, newcomers lack basic informationabout their place in the group and their responsibili-ties. Although the passage of time will eventuallytransform them into rank-and-file members, new-comers often prolong their assimilation into thegroup by remaining cautiously aloof or by misinter-preting other members’ reactions. Moreland (1985),to study this process, led some members of a newlyformed group to think that they were newcomerssurrounded by more senior members. He arrangedfor groups of five unacquainted individuals to meetfor several weeks to discuss various topics. He toldtwo of the five that the group had been meetingfor some time and that they were the only newco-mers. Although the role of newcomer existed only inthe minds of these two participants, the people whothought themselves newcomers behaved differentlyfrom the others. They interacted more frequentlyand more positively with each other, they were lesssatisfied with the group discussion, and their descrip-tions of the group made reference to members’ se-niority. Thus, the belief that one is a newcomer whowill be treated differently by the old-timers can act asa self-fulfilling prophecy: Just thinking of oneself as anewcomer caused people to act in ways that isolatedthem from the rest of group (Major et al., 1995). This“mistreatment,” which they themselves partiallycause, may undermine their loyalty to the group(Levine, Moreland, & Choi, 2001).

The socialization process does not end whenindividuals become full-fledged group members.Even seasoned group members must adjust as thegroup adds new members, adopts new goals in place

of its old objectives, or modifies status and rolerelationships. Much of this maintenance phase isdevoted to role negotiation. The group may, forexample, require the services of a leader who canorganize the group’s activities and motivate mem-bers. The individual, in contrast, may wish insteadto remain a follower who is responsible for relativelyroutine matters. During this phase, the group andthe individual negotiate the nature and quantity ofthe member’s expected contribution to the group.

Many group members remain in the mainte-nance period until their membership in the groupreaches a scheduled conclusion. An employee whoretires, a student who graduates from college, or anelected official whose term in office expires all leavethe group after months or years of successful mainte-nance. In some cases, however, the maintenanceprocess builds to a transition point that Morelandand Levine labeled divergence. The group may, forexample, force individuals to take on roles thatthey do not find personally rewarding. Individuals,too, may fail to meet the group’s expectations con-cerning appropriate behavior, and role negotiationmay reach an impasse.

When the divergence point is reached, the so-cialization process enters a new phase—resocialization.During resocialization, the former full member takeson the role of a marginal member, whose future inthe group is uncertain. The individual sometimesprecipitates this crisis point, often in response toincreased costs and dwindling rewards, waning com-mitment to the group, and dissatisfaction with re-sponsibilities and duties. The group, too, can be theinstigator, reacting to a group member who is notcontributing or is working against the group’s explicitand implicit purposes (see Focus 6.2). Moreland andLevine identified two possible outcomes of reso-cialization. The group and the individual, throughaccommodation and assimilation, can resolve theirdifferences. In this instance, convergence occurs, andthe individual once more becomes a full memberof the group. Alternatively, resocialization effortscan fail (see Figure 6.2). The group may concludethat the individual is no longer acceptable as a mem-ber and move to expel him or her. Similarly, theindividual may reevaluate his or her commitment to

154 CHAPTER 6

the group and decide to leave. As a result, the diver-gence between the group and the individual becomesso great that a final role transition is reached: exit.

Role Stress

Roles influence group members’ happiness and well-being in significant ways. By taking on a role in agroup, individuals secure their connection to theirfellow members, building the interdependence that isessential for group cohesion and productivity. But roles

also permit group members to express themselves,for even though roles constrain individuals, they arenot so rigid that they undermine the role occupants’sense of control and autonomy (Bettencourt &Sheldon, 2001).

But some roles are more satisfying than others.People prefer to occupy roles that are prestigiousand significant rather than roles that are menialand unimportant, but they also like roles that re-quire specialized skills and talents more than un-challenging, uninvolving roles (Rentach & Steel,

F o c u s 6.2 Are Professors Immune from Socialization?

If professors “speak truth to power,” as they must ifthey are to serve the public good, they are with someregularity bound to disturb or offend those in power—and therefore to require the protection of tenure fromtheir righteous anger or retribution.

—James Axtell, The Pleasures of Academe,1998, p. 227.

Group socialization achieves two purposes. First, it pro-vides the means for group members to change theirgroup, so that it better suits their conception of itspurpose and procedures. Second, and more frequently,group socialization is the mechanism by which a groupwill influence the member to change to meet thegroup’s requirements. Groups, inevitably, attempt tokeep their members focused on group goals and, whenthey stray too far, they apply pressure to bring themback into the fold—they resocialize them, as Morelandand Levine (1982) explain.

Some groups try to limit the impact of the groupon the individual by creating safeguards that will pro-tect errant members from threats, punishment, andexclusion. The group’s norms may stress openness andfreedom of expression, for example, and champion thevalue of diversity for creativity and productivity. Somegroups, too, increase members’ freedom to act withoutfear of recrimination by granting them tenure, which isa guarantee that their position or employment ispermanent.

Tenure is particularly common in educational set-tings, and is designed to ensure academic freedom. Forexample, in many countries professors in colleges anduniversities are recruited into their departments througha careful search process. Once in the department, theythen undergo a prolonged period of probation, duringwhich time their work is monitored closely. In some

departments their membership can be terminated at anypoint during this probationary period, so professors arecareful not to stray too far from the requirements oftheir role. Eventually, however, if they have fulfilledtheir role adequately (as defined by the senior membersof the group), new members transition from untenuredprofessors into the role of tenured professors.

Tenure does not terminate the group socializationprocess, however. Professors who take positions on is-sues that are unpopular with their colleagues, the ad-ministration, or students often find that they are thetargets of pressures to conform to the social norms ofthe group (Hunt, 1999). Tenure can also be “broken” ifthe professor violates a core group norm; for example,an individual can be fired for incompetence, criminalbehavior, or moral turpitude. In most cases, too, pro-fessors themselves do not feel free to violate thegroup’s norms until they have been promoted to therole of senior, or full, professor. Researchers examinedthese normative pressures by asking university profes-sors what a hypothetical professor, Dr. X, should do ifDr. X discovers that his or her colleagues might “frownon” the content of a course Dr. X was thinking ofteaching. All these professors, regardless of their owntenure status, felt that Dr. X should modify thecontents of the course to make it match the group’snorms rather than teach it as planned. Many, too,recommended just forgetting about teaching it alto-gether. The only exception to this cautiousness oc-curred when Dr. X was described as both tenured and asenior, full professor. Only in this case did the profes-sors recommend teaching the course as planned (Ceci,Williams, & Mueller-Johnson, 2006). Seniority, then,was a stronger protection against influence than wastenure, suggesting that “tenure is fine, but rank issublime” (Peters, 2006, p. 583).

STRUCTURE 155

1998). The demands of a role can also be stressfulfor the occupants of that role. One of the youngmen in the Andes group, for example, was told toact as a doctor and tend the sick, but he did nothave any medical training and was worried that hewas doing more harm than good. When a role isambiguously defined, internally inconsistent, or fitsthe occupant poorly, roles can be great challengesfor group members (Kahn et al., 1964).

Role Ambiguity The responsibilities and activitiesthat are required of a personwhooccupies a role are notalways clear either to the occupant of the role (the roletaker) or to the rest of the group (the role senders). Evenwhen a role has a long history in the group (e.g., manygroups have always had a leader, a secretary, and a trea-surer) or the groupdeliberately creates the role for somespecific purpose (e.g., a note taker is appointed) theresponsibilities of the role may be ill-defined. Insuch cases, role takers will likely experience roleambiguity—they wonder if they are acting appro-priately, they perform behaviors that others in thegroup should be carrying out, and they question theirability to fulfill their responsibilities.

Role Conflict In some instances, group membersmay find themselves occupying several roles at thesame time, with the requirements of each role makingdemands on their time and abilities. If the multipleactivities required by one role mesh with those re-quired by the other, role takers experience few pro-blems. If, however, the expectations that define theappropriate activities associated with these roles areincompatible, role conflict may occur (Brief,Schuler, & Van Sell, 1981).

Interrole conflict develops when role takersdiscover that the behaviors associated with one oftheir roles are incompatible with those associatedwith another of their roles. When assembly lineworkers are promoted to managerial positions, forexample, they often feel torn between thedemands of their new supervisory role and theirformer roles as friend and workmate. Similarly,college students often find that their student roleconflicts with other roles they occupy, such asspouse, parent, or employee. If the student rolerequires spending every free moment in thelibrary studying for exams, other roles will beneglected.

Intrarole conflict results from contradictorydemands within a single role. A supervisor in afactory, for example, may be held responsible foroverseeing the quality of production, training newpersonnel, and providing feedback or goal-orienting information. At another level, however,supervisors become the supervised, because theytake directions from a higher level of management.Thus, the members of the team expect the managerto keep their secrets and support them in anydisputes with the management, but the upper ech-elon expects obedience and loyalty (Katz & Kahn,1978).

Role conflict also arises when role takers androle senders have different expectations. The newlyappointed supervisor may assume that leadershipmeans giving orders, maintaining strict supervision,and criticizing incompetence. The work group,however, may feel that leadership entails elicitingcooperation in the group, providing support andguidance, and delivering rewards.

role ambiguity Unclear expectations about the beha-viors to be performed by an individual occupying a par-ticular position within the group, caused by a lack ofclarity in the role itself, a lack of consensus within thegroup regarding the behaviors associated with the role, orthe individual role taker’s uncertainty with regard to thetypes of behaviors expected by others.role conflict A state of tension, distress, or uncertaintycaused by inconsistent or discordant expectations associ-ated with one’s role in the group.

interrole conflict A form of role conflict that occurswhen individuals occupy multiple roles within a groupand the expectations and behaviors associated with oneof their roles are not consistent with the expectations andbehaviors associated with another of their roles.intrarole conflict A form of role conflict that occurswhen the behaviors that make up a single role are incon-gruous, often resulting from inconsistent expectations onthe part of the person who occupies the role and othermembers of the group.

156 CHAPTER 6

Person–Role Conflict Sometimes, the behaviorsassociated with a particular role are completely con-gruent with the basic values, attitudes, personality,needs, or preferences of the person who must enactthe role: A stickler for organization is asked to be incharge of organizing the group’s records; a relation-ship expert must take on a role that requires sensi-tivity and warmth. In other cases, though, role fit ispoor. An easygoing, warm person must give perfor-mance appraisals to the unit’s employees. An indi-vidual with high ethical standards is asked to lookthe other way when the company uses illegal ac-counting practices.

When role fit is low, people do not feel thatthey can “be themselves” in their roles. College stu-dents who held roles in campus groups were asked ifthey felt that their role “reflected their authentic selfand how much they felt free and choiceful as theyfulfilled their role” (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001,p. 1136). Those who felt more authentic when en-acting their role reported more positive mood, lessnegative mood, and a higher level of satisfaction withlife overall. Feeling competent when enacting one’srole was also a powerful predictor of well-being. Inanother study, students first rated themselves on 20different traits (e.g., cooperative, outgoing, imagina-tive). Later in the semester, they were given a list offive discussion roles (idea person, devil’s advocate,moderator, secretary, and announcer) and then askedto indicate how valuable these 20 traits were for en-acting each role. For example, how important is itfor the idea person to be cooperative? Outgoing?Imaginative? Then they were assigned to one ofthese roles in a class discussion. As the concept ofrole fit suggests, individuals assigned to roles that re-quired the kinds of characteristics that they believedthey possessed felt more authentic, and their moodswere more positive (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001).

Role and Well-Being Uncertainty about one’srole, including role ambiguity, role conflict, and

poor role fit, results in stress and tension, and theresults are rarely positive for the group member orfor the group itself. In one study, accountants andhospital employees who reported experiencing rolestress also displayed high levels of tension, decreasedjob satisfaction, and increased employee turnover(Kemery et al., 1985). In another study, athleteswho complained of role ambiguity felt less confi-dent in their ability to fill their roles adequately, andthey also played more poorly (Beauchamp et al.,2002). Although the impact of role ambiguity variesdepending on the type of position in the group,meta-analytic reviews suggest that increases in roleambiguity are associated with increases in deperson-alization, emotional exhaustion, and tension, anddecreases in organizational commitment and perfor-mance (Örtqvist & Wincent, 2006; Tubre & Collins,2000). Role conflict is most strongly associated withdecreased job satisfaction and increased tension butis also linked to organizational commitment andpropensity to quit (Gilboa et al., 2008; Örtqvist &Wincent, 2006).

What can groups and organizations do to helptheir employees cope with role stress? One solu-tion involves making role requirements explicit:Managers should write job descriptions for eachrole within the organization and provide employ-ees with feedback about the behaviors expected ofthem (Pritchard et al., 2008). The workplace canalso be designed so that potentially incompatibleroles are performed in different locations and atdifferent times. In such cases, however, the indi-vidual must be careful to engage in behaviors ap-propriate to the specific role, because slipping intothe wrong role at the wrong time can lead to bothembarrassment and a loss of coordination withinthe group (Goffman, 1959). Some companies, too,develop explicit guidelines regarding when onerole should be sacrificed so that another can beenacted, or they may prevent employees from oc-cupying positions that can create role conflict(Sarbin & Allen, 1968). Managers and the leadersof groups should also be mindful of the character-istics of the members of their groups and be carefulto maximize role fit when selecting members forparticular tasks.

role fit The degree of congruence between the demandsof a specific role and the attitudes, values, skills, and othercharacteristics of the individual who occupies the role.

STRUCTURE 157

INTERMEMBER RELAT IONS

On the 17th day of their ordeal, an avalanche sweptdown on the Andes survivors as they slept, fillingtheir makeshift shelter with snow. Many werekilled, and soon a new order emerged in the group.Three young men stepped forward to take overcontrol of the group. They were cousins, and theirkinship bonds connected them to one another se-curely, but they also were friends with many of theremaining group members.

Connections among the members of a groupprovide the basis for the third component of groupstructure—the network of intermember relations.The Andes survivors were a group, but they werealso many individuals who were connected to oneanother in different ways. Which one of the threecousins had the most authority? Who in a group ismost liked by others, and who is an isolate? Howdoes information flow through a group from oneperson to the next? The answers depend on socialnetworks.

Social Network Analysis

The study of relations among individuals in groups,organizations, and even larger collectives is termedsocial network analysis, or SNA. This approachdates back to some of the earliest work in sociologyand psychology, for these fields’ founders exploredvarious ways to create “maps” of human relation-ships. These efforts, which included sociometricstudies of attraction in groups (e.g., Moreno,1934) and experimental studies of communicationchannels in groups (e.g., Bavelas, 1948; Leavitt,1951), culminated in the 1990s in a set of analysisprocedures defined by (a) a focus on the structuresof social groups and on linkages among groupmembers in particular; (b) the systematic measure-ment of these structures; (c) the use of graphics to

represent these structures; and (d) the application ofstatistical and mathematic procedures to quantifythese structures (Freeman, 2004).

Groups as Networks Figure 6.3 illustrates an ap-plication of SNA to groups. Each network mem-ber, or node, is represented as a point or circle, andthe lines connecting nodes indicate who is linked towhom—say, by a line of communication or byfriendship. The arrows indicate the direction ofthe relationship. A line with a single arrow indicatesthe relationship is an asymmetric, directed one. Forexample, the links between person 2 and persons 3,4, 5, and 6 go out from 2 and are received by 3, 4,5, and 6. A line with arrows at both ends indicates asymmetric, reciprocal relationship (for example, 1and 20). Relations that have no directional flow,such as a conversation in an Internet discussionarea or a face-to-face conversation, are graphedusing undirected links without arrows at all.Distance, in social networks, is defined by relation-ships rather than physical distance. Two peoplewho are directly linked to one another, such aspersons 2 and 3, are separated by a distance of 1.But persons 2 and 15 are separated by a distance of 3,because they are linked by two intermediaries.

Group-level, or network, indexes describe as-pects of the group’s pattern of relationships. Thedensity of a group, for example, is determined byhow many people are linked to one another out ofthe total possible number of links. Consider, for ex-ample, the subgroup formed by persons 1, 2, and 7in Figure 6.3. Since the relationships are directedones in this example (e.g., 1 sends to 2, and 2 sendsback to 1), six relationships are needed to link fullythe three individuals. Since only four of six links arepresent, its density is 4/6, or .66. Thus, a density of1.0 means that all members are linked to one an-other, whereas a density of 0.0 means that no oneis linked to anyone else (and therefore the group isprobably not a group). Looking at the group as a

social network analysis (SNA) A set of analysis pro-cedures used to describe the structure through graphicrepresentations and through mathematical proceduresthat quantify these structures.

density The degree of connectedness of group’s mem-bers, as indexed by the number of actual ties linkingmembers divided by the number of possible ties.

158 CHAPTER 6

whole, density is much lower than 1.0 because manygroup members are only linked to one or two othersand not to all the 19 other members. A 20-persongroup would require 380 directed ties to link all themembers to one another, but only 47 ties are presentin this group. The density of the group is therefore .12(47/380).

Individuals in Networks Individual-level,or egocentric, indexes yield information abouteach member’s location in the network relative tothe others. Unlike sociocentric indexes, which yielda single value for the entire network (or a portion of

the network), egocentric indexes have a value foreach actor. Centrality, for example, depends onhow many connections a person has and wherehe or she is positioned within the network itself.In the terminology of SNA, a member with highdegree centrality is connected to many other ac-tors. Person 20, for example, has the highest degreecentrality (linked to eight others), whereas person

1

2

3

45

6

7

89

10

11

12

13

14

1516

17

18

1920

Subgroup B

Subgroup A

Subgroup C

F I G U R E 6.3 An example of a social network. Person 20 is highest in indegree centrality, outdegree centrality,and closeness, whereas Person 1 is the highest in betweenness. The density of the group itself is .12.

degree centrality The number of ties between groupmembers; the group’s degree centrality is the average ofthe direct connections among group members.

STRUCTURE 159

12, who is not linked to anyone, has the lowest.When relationships are directed ones, a distinctioncan be made between how many relationships ex-tend out from a person and how many he or shereceives from others. Outdegree is the number oflinks to others, whereas indegree is the number oflinks from others. Person 2’s outdegree centrality,for example, is five, since she is linked to 1, 3, 4, 5,and 6 through out-directed relationships. Person 2’sindegree centrality is only 1, however, because onlyperson 1 directs a relationship to person 2. Out-and indegree centrality are equivalent when therelationships linking members are reciprocal orundirected (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; seeBorgatti, 2005, for more information about central-ity indexes).

Degree is a local index of centrality—it de-pends on direct, first-order ties to others in thegroup. Betweenness and closeness are also in-dexes of centrality, but they take into account tiesto more distant actors in the network (Freeman,1979). A position with a high degree of between-ness is one that is located between many of theother individuals in the network. Person 1, for ex-ample, has a much lower degree centrality thanperson 20, but far higher betweenness since he orshe joins together the three subgroups that make upthe entire group. An individual in such a positionoften acts as the “go-between” or “gate-keeper,”linking people in the network who could otherwisenot contact one another. Closeness, on the otherhand, is determined by distance to all other mem-bers of the group. Person 1, for example, can reachall other members through relatively short paths,whereas other group members (such as 4 or 9) areseparated from others by greater distances. Essentially,

closeness centrality involves summing the distancesbetween the actor in question and every other actor,and then taking the inverse of that sum so that theterm “closeness” makes sense (otherwise it would bean index of “distance”).

Groups in Networks Social network analysis canreveal aspects of a group’s structure that often gounnoticed even by members of the group them-selves. Researchers Pamela Paxton and JamesMoody (2003), for example, used SNA to examinethe structure of a specific type of group—a sororityin a university located in the southern UnitedStates that they gave the fictitious name of AlphaBeta Chi, or ABX. ABX appeared to be a highlycohesive group with strong relations among allmembers, but SNA revealed the existence of fourcliques within the overall group, which Paxtonand Moody labeled the Separatists, the Middles,the Random Chapter Members, and the SmallClique. The Separatists were noteworthy in thatthey were relatively isolated from the other mem-bers of the sorority, and their density was muchhigher than the other groups. The Middles, in con-trast, were more likely to have ties to people out-side of their clique. The group also included severalwomen who had high levels of betweenness, la-beled as “liaisons” by the researchers and womenwho were linked to the group by only a single tie(“hangers-on”).

As expected, women’s locations within thisnetwork predicted their commitment to their so-rority and their involvement in its various activities.Those in the Middles, for example, had a strongersense of belonging to the group, particularly incomparison to the Separatists. Paxton and Moodyalso used a specialized method of calculating overalldegree centrality. To index an individual’s con-nection to other well-connected members, theyweighted each person’s centrality by the centralityof those to whom she was tied (Bonacich, 1987).This index was a strong predictor of satisfaction withthe group, as well as sense of belonging. Overallpopularity—as indexed by how many times a womanwas picked as a friend by others (indegree)—was not,however. Also, within any particular clique, those

outdegree For nonsymmetric data, the number of tiesinitiated by the individual.indegree For nonsymmetric data, the number of tiesreceived by the individual.betweenness The degree to which a group member’sposition in a network is located along a path betweenother pairs of individuals in the network.closeness The distance, in terms of ties, of an individualfrom all others in the network.

160 CHAPTER 6

women with more central locations within the cliquetended to be less committed to their sorority as awhole.Devoting one’s relational energies to a small subset ofthe group may leave little time for the interpersonalwork required to maintain good relations with theentire group.

Paxton and Moody based their analysis ofABX’s social network on one particular type of re-lationship: social attraction. They asked the womento describe who they spent time with socially andto identify a best friend. Yet, networks can also bebased on other types of relationships and processes.Some describe patterns of influence, status, andprestige within the group. Still others define thechannels of information that flow from one mem-ber to the next. The sections that follow examinethese three types of networks—status, attraction,and communication—and their influence on theAndes survivors.

Status Networks

Rare is the group where all members enjoy equalamounts of authority. In the Andes group, for ex-ample, some members became more influential astime passed, whereas others found that they coulddo little to persuade others to accept their lead.After the avalanche, Fito Strauch was more influ-ential than the other group members; when he

gave orders, most of the others obeyed. Also, thegroup’s explorers were afforded more authoritythan the rank-and-file members. These stable var-iations in members’ relative dominance and au-thority have such names as authority, power, statusnetwork, pecking orders, chain of command, or prestigeranking.

Initially, group members may start off on anequal footing, but over time, status differentiationtakes place: Certain individuals acquire authorityby laying claim to a position of greater status andby having their claim accepted by the other mem-bers of the group. In the Andes group, for example,Fito Strauch, E. Strauch, and Fernandez formed acoalition that controlled most of the group’s activi-ties (see Figure 6.4). Below this top level was asecond stratum of members who had less powerthan the leaders but more prestige than the occu-pants of lower echelons. These “lieutenants” hadless status than Fito Strauch, but they still com-manded a fair amount of respect. The explorers(“expeditionaries”) occupied a niche just belowthe lieutenants. These individuals had been chosento hike down the mountain in search of help.

Fito Strauch

Parrado Canessa

Zerbino Paez

E. Strauch Fernandez

Algora

Vizintin

Disabled and InjuredMethol, Inciarte,

Nogueira, Echauarren

MalingerersHarley,

Delgado

Younger MembersFrancois, Jabella,

Mangino

Turcatti

F I G U R E 6.4 The chain of command in the Andes group. Before the avalanche killed the team captain, the sur-vivors’ authority structure was based on the rugby team’s structure and seniority. But after the avalanche, the groupbecame organized in a hierarchical, centralized authority structure based on kinship.

status differentiation The gradual rise of some groupmembers to positions of greater authority, accompaniedby decreases in the authority exercised by other members.

STRUCTURE 161

In preparing for their journey, they were givenspecial privileges, including better sleeping arrange-ments and more clothing, food, and water. Therank-and-file members included the youngest menin the group, the injured, and those thought to bemalingering. Hence, the lines of group authoritybecame hierarchical and centralized, rather like thepyramid-shaped organizational charts of formallyorganized groups such as businesses and militaryorganizations (Dale, 1952).

Claiming Status All social animals know howto communicate the message, “I am in charge.”Dominant chimpanzees chatter loudly at potentialrivals, the leader of the wolf pack growls and bareshis teeth at low-ranking wolves, and the rankinglioness in the pride swats another with her paw.Members of these social groups compete for status,for the individual at the top of the hierarchy—theso-called alpha male or female—enjoys greater ac-cess to the group’s resources. These high-rankingmembers maintain their position by threateningor attacking low-ranking members, who in turnmanage to avoid these attacks by performingbehaviors that signal deference and submissiveness.This system of dominance and submission is oftencalled a pecking order because (at least in chick-ens) it determines who will do the pecking andwho will be pecked. Biologists argue that peckingorders limit conflict in groups and increase indi-vidual and group survival (Bergman et al., 2003;Mazur, 2005).

Humans, too, compete for status in theirgroups. Humans rarely snarl at one another to signaltheir status, but they do use such nonverbal cues asa firm handshake, an unwavering gaze, a relaxedbut poised posture, or an unsmiling countenanceto let others know that they should be respected(Chaplin et al., 2000; Leffler, Gillespie, & Conaty,1982). People also seek status by speaking clearly

and loudly, whereas those who speak softly andpepper their comments with nervous giggles areafforded less authority (Lee & Ofshe, 1981;Patterson, 1991). Displays of emotion also signaldifferences in status. Group members who seemangry are thought to be more influential and ac-corded higher status, whereas those who seem sadare thought to be lower in status (Tiedens, 2001;Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000).

People also signal their authority through theirverbal communications. Those seeking status ofteninitiate conversations and shift the discussion totheir own areas of competence (Godfrey, Jones, &Lord, 1986). A person seeking high status would bemore likely to (1) tell other people what theyshould do, (2) interpret other people’s statements,(3) confirm or dispute other people’s viewpoints,and (4) summarize or reflect on the discussion(Stiles et al., 1997). In a study group, for example,a high-status member may say, “I’ve studied thistheory before,” “I know this stuff backward andforward,” or “I think it’s more important to studythe lecture notes than the text.” A low-status indi-vidual, in contrast, may lament that “I always havetrouble with this subject” or “I’m not sure I under-stand the material.” Status seekers use strong ratherthan weak influence tactics and are more likely tovoice their opinions (Bonito & Hollingshead, 1997;Dovidio et al., 1988; Islam & Zyphur, 2005).Group members also assert their authority overthe group by interrupting other speakers frequently(Schmid Mast, 2002).

Perceiving Status People’s status-seeking effortswill be for naught if the group rejects them. In theAndes group, one young man, to attain the high-status role of explorer, tried to impress others byundertaking risky physical adventures. The othergroup members, however, wanted explorers to becautious rather than risk takers, and so they selectedsomeone else for the role. The young man dis-played characteristics and actions that he felt wouldearn him status, but because these claims did notmatch the group members’ intuitive beliefs aboutwho deserved status, his bid for authority failed(Driskell & Salas, 2005).

pecking order A stable, ordered pattern of individualvariations in prestige, status, and authority among groupmembers.

162 CHAPTER 6

Expectation-states theory, developed byJoseph Berger and his colleagues, provides a detailedanalysis of the impact of group members’ expecta-tions on the status-organizing process. This theoryassumes that status differences are most likely to de-velop when members are working collectively on atask that they feel is important. Because the grouphopes that it can successfully complete the project,group members intuitively take note of one another’sstatus characteristics—personal qualities that they thinkare indicative of ability or prestige. Those who possessnumerous status characteristics are implicitly identi-fied and permitted to perform more numerous andvaried group actions, to provide greater input andguidance for the group, to influence others by evalu-ating their ideas, and to reject the influence attemptsof others (Berger, Ridgeway, & Zelditch, 2002;Ridgeway, 2001; Wagner & Berger, 2002).

Expectation-states theorists believe that groupmembers generally take two types of cues into con-sideration when formulating expectations aboutthemselves and other group members. Specificstatus characteristics are qualities that attest toeach individual’s level of ability at the task to beperformed in the given situation. On a basketballteam, for example, height may be a specific statuscharacteristic, whereas prior jury duty may deter-mine status in a jury (Strodtbeck & Lipinski, 1985).In the Andes group, the higher status explorers were

chosen on the basis of several specific status qualities:strength, determination, health, and maturity.

Diffuse status characteristics are more gen-eral qualities that the members assume are relevantto ability and evaluation. Sex, age, wealth, ethnic-ity, status in other groups, or cultural backgroundcan serve as diffuse status characteristics if peopleassociate these qualities with certain skills, as didthe members of the Andes group. Among the sur-vivors, age was considered an important diffuse sta-tus characteristic, with older members gaining greatstatus. In other groups—ones that value youth—theopposite might hold true (Oldmeadow, 2007).

Researchers have largely confirmed expectation-states theory’s prediction that individuals with posi-tively evaluated specific status and diffuse statuscharacteristics usually command more authority thanthose who lack status-linked qualities (Wilke, 1996).In police teams, officers with more work experienceexercised more authority than their less experiencedpartners (Gerber, 1996). Members of dyads workingon a perceptual task deferred to their partner if he orshe seemed more skilled at the task (Foddy &Smithson, 1996). People who are paid more are per-mitted to exert more influence over people who arepaid less (Harrod, 1980; Stewart & Moore, 1992).When air force bomber crews work on nonmilitarytasks, rank predicts influence (Torrance, 1954). Juriesallocate more status to jurors who have previouslyserved on juries or who have more prestigious occu-pations (Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, 1957). Thebulk of the research also confirms the following causalsequence in status allocation: (1) group member Xdisplays specific and diffuse status characteristics, (2)group members form higher expectations about X’scapabilities, and (3) group members allow X to influ-ence them (Driskell & Mullen, 1990).

Status Generalization Groups do not always al-locate status fairly (Schneider & Cook, 1995).Imagine, for example, a jury that includes thesethree individuals:

■ Dr. Prof, a 40-year-old European Americanwoman who teaches in the School of Businessand who has written several books onmanagement.

expectation-states theory An explanation of statusdifferentiation in groups which assumes that group mem-bers allocate status to group members judged to be com-petent at the task at hand and to group members whohave qualities that the members think are indicators ofcompetence and potential.specific status characteristic In status characteristicstheory, task-specific behavioral and personal characteristicsthat people consider when estimating the relative compe-tency, ability, and social value of themselves and others.diffuse status characteristic In status characteristicstheory, general personal qualities such as age, race, andethnicity that people consider when estimating the rela-tive competency, ability, and social value of themselvesand others.

STRUCTURE 163

■ Mr. Black, a 35-year-old African Americanhigh school principal.

■ Dr. White, a 58-year-old European Americanmale physician who has an active practice.

Considerable evidence suggests that a jury ofmiddle-class European Americans, when selecting aforeman, would be biased against Dr. Prof andMr. Black and in favor of Dr. White. Dr. Prof andMr. Black, despite their specific status credentials,may be disqualified from positions of status in thegroup by their (completely irrelevant) diffuse statuscharacteristics. In contrast, Dr. White poses littleincongruency for the group if the group membersunfairly consider advanced age, pale skin, an M.D.degree, and upper-class social status to be positivefeatures (York & Cornwell, 2006). This phenomenonis known as status generalization: Group memberslet general status (i.e., diffuse status) characteristics in-fluence their expectations, even though these charac-teristics may be irrelevant in the given situation(Molm, 1986; Ridgeway & Balkwell, 1997).

Status generalization explains why women andAfrican Americans are given less status and authorityin groups than European Americans and men.Despite changes in sexist and racist attitudes in soci-ety, stereotypical biases still make gaining status insmall groups a difficult task for women, AfricanAmericans, and other minorities (Nielsen, 1990).Women and racial minorities report more dissatis-faction about how status is allocated in groups(Hembroff, 1982). Women are less likely to be se-lected as leaders of their groups, and they are morelikely to be assigned to lower status roles (Eagly &Carli, 2007). Women and minorities must put extraeffort into their groups and reach higher perfor-mance standards just to reach the same level ofrespect and authority granted to less productive

European American men (Biernat & Kobrynowicz,1997; Foschi, 1996). Groups, failing to recognizewomen’s expertise, tend to underperform whenwomen, rather than men, have the expertise a taskdemands (Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 2004).

These unfair status allocation processes aremagnified when individuals who are members ofstereotyped minority societal groups are also under-represented in the group itself. Women, for exam-ple, react more negatively than do men to solostatus—being the only representative of their socialcategory (in this case, the only woman) in the group.Solo status causes minority members to feel that theother group members are categorizing them in termsof their social group rather than as a comember.In consequence, they are less likely to identify withthe group, will not be as loyal to the group, and willnot contribute as much to the group’s activities—especially when they do not feel they will be ableto influence prestige allocations (Branscombe et al.,2002; Jetten et al., 2003). They may experience adecline in self-confidence when they work in thegroup, and their performance may also suffer(Biernat et al., 1998; Sekaquaptewa & Thompson,2002, 2003). In one study, women preferred reas-signment to a different group if they were going tobe a solo member, whereas men showed no aver-sion to being the only man in the group (Cohen &Swim, 1995). Solo members are also rarely allocatedhigh status in groups (Carli, 2001).

These negative status effects often fade overtime as group members gain experience in workingtogether. Groups that initially allocate status un-fairly revise their hierarchies as they recognize theskills and abilities of previously slighted members(Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 1993). Given en-ough time, women and minorities find that theyno longer need to continually prove themselves tothe others (Hembroff & Myers, 1984; Markovsky,Smith, & Berger, 1984). Women and minorities

status generalization The tendency for individualsknown to have achieved or been ascribed authority, re-spect, and prestige in one context to enjoy relativelyhigher status in other, unrelated, contexts (e.g., a celeb-rity who exercises influence in a group even though thisdiffuse status characteristic is not relevant in the currentgroup context).

solo status The state of being the only group memberwho is a representative of a specific social category in anotherwise homogenous group (e.g., a man in an other-wise all female group).

164 CHAPTER 6

who communicate their involvement in the groupto the other members also tend to gain status morerapidly, as do those who act in a group-orientedrather than a self-oriented way (Carli et al., 1995;Ridgeway, 1982). If a solo woman in an otherwiseall-male group remains actively involved in thegroup by asking questions, the negative effects ofher solo status are eliminated (Fuegen & Biernat,2002). When men who deliberately adopted eithera cooperative, friendly interaction style or an emo-tionally distant, self-absorbed style joined otherwiseall-female groups, they achieved high status nomatter what style they exhibited. Women solomembers in male groups, in contrast, achievedhigh status only if they displayed a group-orientedmotivation. External authorities can also undo un-fair status generalizations by explicitly stressing thequalifications of women and minorities or by train-ing group members to recognize their biases(Ridgeway, 1989). Moreover, groups may reducebiases in the allocation of status to their members bymaking use of computer-based technology to makedecisions and exchange information (see Focus 6.3).

Attraction Networks

Some of the 19 Andes survivors rose to positions ofauthority, whereas others remained relatively power-less. Yet to describe the group in just these termswould miss a vital part of the group’s structure. Theindividuals were not just leaders and followers, pow-erful and powerless; they were also friends andenemies. This network of likes and dislikes amonggroup members is called by many names, includingattraction network, social status, or sociometric structure.

Sociometric Differentiation Jacob Moreno, thedeveloper of sociometry, maintained that the ten-dency to react to one another on a spontaneous,affective level imparts a unique quality to humangroups (Moreno, 1934). Consider, for example,

the relationships among the rank-and-file groupmembers and the four designated explorers in theAndes group, Turcatti, Parrado, Vizintin, andCanessa. Nearly everyone admired Turcatti andParrado; their warmth, optimism, and physicalstrength buoyed the sagging spirits of the others.Vizintin and Canessa, in contrast, “did not inspirethe same affection” (Read, 1974, p. 141). Theyliked each other but had few other friends withinthe group. Mangino, one of the younger men, wasan exception; he liked them both. Most of theothers, however, quarreled with them constantly.

Attraction patterns like those in the Andesgroup are not a disorganized jumble of likes anddislikes but a network of stable social relationships(Doreian, 1986). Just as status differentiation resultsin variations in status, so, too, sociometric differ-entiation results in a stable ordering of membersfrom least liked tomost liked (Maassen, Akkermans, &van der Linden, 1996). Some members are liked bymany, some are rejected by most; some havefew friends in the group, others are liked by severalothers within a small subset of the group. The Andessurvivors, for example, showed signs of reciprocity,transitivity, and clustering.

Reciprocity, or mutual liking, is a powerful ten-dency in most settings; as noted in Chapter 4, it hasbeen documented repeatedly in a variety of groups,including football teams, police squads, psychother-apy groups, and classroom groups. Vizintin likedCanessa, and Canessa liked Vizintin in return.

Transitivity is the passing of a relationship fromone element to the next: If person A likes person B,and B likes C, then the structure is transitive if A likesC as well. In the Andes group, for example, Canessaliked Mangino, Mangino liked Vizintin, and, in con-firmation of transitivity, Canessa liked Vizintin.

Clusters, or cliques, also existed in the Andesgroup, for Vizintin, Canessa, and Mangino formeda unified coalition within the larger group. Others

attraction network Patterns of liking/disliking, accep-tance/rejection, and inclusion/exclusion among mem-bers of a group.

sociometric differentiation The development of stron-ger and more positive interpersonal ties between somemembers of the group, accompanied by decreases in thequality of relations between other members of the group.

STRUCTURE 165

rarely hesitated to show their disdain for the mem-bers of this subgroup, but these three were joinedby strong bonds of attraction. As Paxton andMoody’s (2003) analysis of a southern sorority

suggests, members of cliques tend to be more simi-lar to each other than to the rest of the group, so asa result cliques are higher in homophily. Membersof the same racial category, for example, may join

F o c u s 6.3 Do Online Groups Allocate Status More Fairly Than Face-to-Face Groups?

Somewhere in desolate wind-swept spaceIn Twilight land, in No-man’s landTwo hurrying Shapes met face to face

—Thomas Bailey Aldrich

When people meet offline—in face-to-face, collocatedgroups—to make decisions or solve problems, theirimpact on the final outcome is often a function of theirstatus in the group. Those who have risen to the top ofthe group’s hierarchy speak as much as 40 to 50% ofthe time (Stephan & Mischler, 1952), even when themeeting is supposed to be a discussion. The remainderof the speaking will be done by two or three othergroup members, but these people will have higherstatus than the rank-and-file members (Gibson, 2003).Those at the bottom of the “speaking order” may saynothing at all during the course of a meeting.Contributions to the discussion also tend to be clus-tered. Once individuals enter the discussion stream,they tend to concentrate their comments during peri-ods of high vocality, or megaturns (Dabbs & Ruback,1987; Parker, 1988). This pattern occurs, in part, be-cause some individuals are too slow to speak when theprevious speaker concludes, so they never manage tocapture the floor. Moreover, as expectation-statestheory suggests, individuals who are more influentialare given more latitude in speaking than are thosewho are low in status (Bonito & Hollingshead, 1997).

What happens when groups meet online, via theInternet, rather than face to face? In many onlinegroups, the effects of status on participation aremuted, resulting in a participation equalization effect(Hollingshead, 2001). One early investigation of parti-cipants who varied in status tracked their involvementin discussions conducted via e-mail or in face-to-facemeetings. E-mail reduced the participation differencesbetween group members, with the result that low-status members participated more and high-statusmembers participated relatively less (Dubrovsky,Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991). Studies of online discussions incollege classes also indicated that students participatemore equally than they do in face-to-face discussionsand that differences in participation due to the culturalbackground (Kim & Bonk, 2002) or the sex of the

student (Davidson-Shivers, Morris, & Sriwongko, 2003)are reduced. Students who eventually earn bettergrades are more active in such online discussions, butthese differences in contribution likely reflect motiva-tional differences rather than status differences(Wang, Newlin, & Tucker, 2001).

Other studies, however, have suggested thatpeople in online groups behave, in most respects, likethose in offline groups. Many of the cues that peopleimplicitly use to allocate status to others are minimizedwhen people interact via computers—a group mem-ber’s height, age, sex, and race can be kept private inonline groups, and the computer-mediated formatprevents the exchange of nonverbal signs of domi-nance and authority. There can be no raised voice, nolong stare, and no rolling of the eyes when membersare connected only by a computer. Online groups,however, still exhibit signs of structural differentiation.Participants, through the content of their messages,level of involvement, and style of communication (e.g.,punctuation; capitalization such as I AGREETOTALLY!!!!; slang; humor; and emoticons—text-basedfaces created with periods, commas, parentheses,semicolons, and so on) lay claim to characteristics thatdefine their place within the group. In some cases,group members may even be more influenced by ir-relevant diffuse status characteristics in online groups,because they have no other information to use toguide their perceptions of the other members. If all Edknows about his partner in a discussion is that his orher name is Jolina, then he may inevitably draw con-clusions about her personality and interests from hername alone (Spears, Lea, & Postmes, 2007).

In consequence, in most studies, the format of thegroup has little impact on status and attraction differ-entiation. Those who possess qualities that would likelyearn them high status in face-to-face groups tend toparticipate more in computer-based groups as well(Driskell, Radtke, Salas, 2003). The goal of creating on-line groups that escape the implicit biases introduced bya group’s tendency to favor the powerful—the utopianvision of a group where all members are createdequally—remains elusive (McKenna, 2008; McKenna &Green, 2002).

166 CHAPTER 6

to form a coalition, or the group may separate nat-urally into all-male and all-female cliques (Hallinan,1981; Schofield & Whitley, 1983; Thorne, 1993).Group members also often deliberately form andmanipulate cliques within larger groups by system-atically including some individuals and excludingothers (Adler & Adler, 1995).

Maintaining Structural Balance Why do mostgroups tend toward reciprocity, transitivity, and clus-ters? According to Fritz Heider’s balance theory,some patterns of relationships in groups are morestructurally sound, or balanced, than others, and sogroups naturally tend to gravitate toward theserather than toward unbalanced states (Cartwright &Harary, 1956, 1970; Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1963).Consider, for example, the triad of Vizintin, Canessa,and Mangino. This triad was balanced because every-one in it liked one another; all bonds were positive.What would happen, however, if Mangino came todislike Canessa? According to Heider, this groupwould be unbalanced. Such a group pattern is consid-ered so unstable that it has been given the ominousname “the forbidden triad” (Granovetter, 1973). Ingeneral, a group is balanced if (1) all the relationshipsare positive, or (2) an even number of negative rela-tionships occurs in the group. Conversely, groups areunbalanced if they contain an odd number of nega-tive relations.

Because unbalanced sociometric structuresgenerate tension among group members, peopleare motivated to correct the imbalance and restorethe group’s equilibrium. Heider noted that this res-toration of balance can be achieved either throughpsychological changes in the individual members orthrough interpersonal changes in the group(Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005). If Mangino

initially likes only Vizintin and not Canessa, he maychange his attitude toward Canessa when he recog-nizes the strong bond between Vizintin and Canessa.Alternatively, group members who are disliked bythe other group members may be ostracized, asin the case of Delgado (Taylor, 1970). Finally, be-cause the occurrence of a single negative relation-ship within a group can cause the entire group tobecome unbalanced, large groups tend to includea number of smaller, better balanced cliques(Newcomb, 1981). The Andes group, for example,was somewhat unbalanced overall, but its subgroupstended to be very harmonious. As a result, thegroup was high in cohesiveness.

Determinants of Attraction Structure Why didParrado gain social standing in the group, and whywas Delgado held in disregard? One’s popularity, inlarge part, is determined by the interpersonal factorsreviewed in Chapter 4—similarity, complementar-ity, reciprocity, personal qualities, and even physicalattractiveness can influence one’s sociometric rank-ing in a group. Parrado was similar to the others inage and background, and he possessed qualities thatthe others admired: He was optimistic, handsome,dependable, helpful, and strong. Delgado, unfortu-nately, did not possess such attributes. Interactionwith Delgado incurred considerable costs andyielded very few interpersonal rewards (Thibaut &Kelley, 1959).

Popularity cannot be predicted solely on thebasis of the group members’ personal qualities, fordifferent groups value different attributes. Thequalities that earn a person popularity in a board-room differ from those that predict sociometricstanding on a baseball team or in a biker gang.Thus, predictions of social standing must takeinto account the person–group fit: the degree towhich individuals’ attributes match the qualitiesvalued by the group to which they belong. In an-other group, Delgado might have been well-liked,for he was quite articulate and socially skilled. Inthe Andes group, however, the fit between hispersonal qualities and the group was poor(Anderson et al., 2001; Bukowski, Newcomb, &Hartup, 1996; Hubbard et al., 2001).

balance theory A conceptualization advanced by FritzHeider which assumes that interpersonal relationships canbe either balanced (integrated units with elements that fittogether without stress) or unbalanced (inconsistent unitswith elements that conflict with one another). Heiderbelieved that unbalanced relationships create an unpleas-ant tension that must be relieved by changing some ele-ment of the system.

STRUCTURE 167

Communication Networks

In the Andes group, the three leaders stayed in closecommunication, discussing any problems amongthemselves before relaying their interpretations tothe other group members. The other members usu-ally routed all information to the threesome, whothen informed the rest of the group. In contrast, theinjured members were virtually cut off from commu-nication with the others during the day, and theyoccasionally complained that they were the last toknow of any significant developments. These regularpatterns of information exchange among members ofa group are called communication networks.

Centrality Effects Patterns of communicationamong group members, like other structural fea-tures of groups, are sometimes deliberately set inplace when the group is organized. Many compa-nies, for example, adopt a centralized, hierarchicalcommunication network that prescribes how infor-mation is passed up to superiors, down to subordi-nates, and horizontally to one’s equals. Even whenno formal attempt is made to organize communica-tion, an informal communication network will usu-ally take shape over time. Moreover, this networktends to parallel status and attraction patterns. Takethe Andes group as a case in point: Individuals whooccupied high-status roles—the explorers, the foodpreparers, and the lieutenants—communicated atmuch higher rates and with more individuals thanindividuals who occupied the malingerer and in-jured roles (Shelly et al., 1999).

Communication networks become more com-plex and varied as groups increase in size, but someof their basic forms are graphed in Figure 6.5. In awheel network, for example, most group memberscommunicate with just one person. In a comcon, allmembers can and do communicate with all othermembers. In a chain, communication flows fromone person to the next in a line. A circle is a closedchain, and a pinwheel is a circle where informationflows in only one direction (Shaw, 1964).

Centrality is a particularly important feature ofcommunication networks. With centralized net-works, one of the positions in the group has a veryhigh degree of centrality—it is located at the cross-roads (the hub) of communications—relative to theother positions in the group (e.g., the wheel, thekite, or the Y in Figure 6.5). Groups with this typeof structure tend to use the hub position as the data-processing center, and its occupant typically collectsinformation, synthesizes it, and then sends it back toothers. In decentralized structures, like the circle orcomcon, the number of channels at each position isroughly equal, so no one position is more “central”than another. These groups tend to use a variety oforganizational structures when solving their pro-blems, including the so-called each to all pattern, inwhich everyone sends messages in all directions untilsomeone gets the correct answer (Shaw, 1964, 1978).

Early studies of communication networks sug-gested that groups with centralized networks outper-formed decentralized networks (Bavelas, 1948, 1950;Bavelas & Barrett, 1951; Leavitt, 1951). A groupwith a wheel structure, for example, took less timeto solve problems, sent fewer messages, detected andcorrected more errors, and improved more withpractice than a group with a decentralized structure,such as a circle or comcon (Shaw, 1964, 1978). Theonly exceptions occurred when the groups wereworking on complicated tasks such as arithmetic,sentence construction, problem solving, and discus-sions. When the task was more complex, the decen-tralized networks outperformed the centralized ones.

These results led Marvin E. Shaw to propose thatnetwork efficiency is related to information saturation.When a group is working on a problem, exchanginginformation, and making a decision, the central posi-tion in the network can best manage the inputs andinteractions of the group. As work progresses and thenumber of communications being routed through thecentral member increases, however, a saturation pointcan be reached at which the individual can no longerefficiently monitor, collate, or route incoming andoutgoing messages. Shaw noted that saturation canoccur in a decentralized network, but it becomesmore likely when a group with a centralized structureis working on complex problems. Because the

communication network Patterns of informationtransmission and exchange that describe who communi-cates most frequently and to what extent with whom.

168 CHAPTER 6

“greater the saturation the less efficient the group’sperformance” (Shaw, 1964, p. 126), when the taskis simple, centralized networks are more efficientthan decentralized networks; when the task is com-plex, decentralized networks are superior. In conse-quence, groups tend to gravitate naturally to moredecentralized network structures when the tasks they

must accomplish become more complex and multi-faceted (Brown & Miller, 2000).

These different types of centrality also influencerole allocations, overall commitment, and satisfactionwith membership in the group (Krackhardt & Porter,1986; Lovaglia & Houser, 1996). Individuals whooccupy positions of high betweenness in centralized

Wheel Comcon Pinwheel

Y Circle ComconWheel

Kite Circle ComconWheel

Centralized Non-centralized

3-personnetworks

4-personnetworks

5-personnetworks

F I G U R E 6.5 Examples of common communication networks in small groups. These networks are a sample ofthe various kinds of communication networks that can be created by opening and closing lines of communicationamong members. In most of these examples the lines are undirected ones, with information flowing back and forthbetween members. Only the pinwheel has directed, one-way communication links.

SOURCE: Adapted from "Communication Networks," by M.E. Shaw. In L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 1). Copyright© 1964 by Academic Press. Reprinted by permission.

S TRUCTURE 169

communication networks, such as a wheel or a Y (seeFigure 6.5), are nearly always thought to be theleader of their group, even when they are randomlyassigned to this position (Leavitt, 1951). In studies ofemployees in work groups, those who are more cen-tral in their network are less likely to quit than areemployees at the periphery of the company’s com-munication network (Feeley, 2000). Peripheral mem-bers are also more likely to quit in clumps. Becauseindividuals in decentralized positions are connectedto very few of the other members, when one periph-eral member leaves the group, the individuals locatednear that person in the network also tend to leave thegroup (Krackhardt & Porter, 1986). Finally, central-ized networks, by definition, have fewer centralizedpositions than decentralized positions. In conse-quence, the overall level of satisfaction in a central-ized group is almost always lower than the level ofsatisfaction in a decentralized group (Shaw, 1964).

Directional (Up–Down)Effects Only small groupswith decentralized communication networks out-perform groups with centralized networks. Oncethe group becomes too large, members can no lon-ger keep up with the high rate and quantity ofinformation they are receiving. Therefore, mostlarger groups and organizations manage informa-tion flow by adopting hierarchical communicationnetworks (Goetsch & McFarland, 1980). In suchnetworks, information can pass either horizontallybetween members on the same rung of the com-munication ladder or vertically up and down fromfollowers to leaders and back (Jablin, 1979).

Upward communications tend to be very differ-ent from downward communications (Sias, Krone,& Jablin, 2002). Downward-flowing informationmoves from the leaders to the followers of the group,and so generally includes explanations of actions tobe taken, the reasons for actions, suggestions to actin a certain manner, and feedback concerning per-formance. In some cases, too, up-down messages areurgent ones, sent using more immediate channelsof communication such as e-mail rather than face-to-face meetings (Byrne & LeMay, 2006). Upwardcommunications from subordinates to superiors, incontrast, include information on performance,

insinuations about a peer’s performance, requests forinformation, expressions of distrust, factual informa-tion, or grievances concerning the group’s policies.These upward communications, moreover, tend tobe fewer in number, briefer, and more guarded thandownward communications. In larger organizations,the upward flow of information may be much im-peded by the mechanics of the transferral processand by the low-status members’ reluctance to sendinformation that might reflect unfavorably on theirperformance, abilities, and skills (Bradley, 1978;Browning, 1978; Manis, Cornell, & Moore, 1974).This reticence of low-status members means thatgood news travels quickly up the hierarchy, whereasthe top of the ladder will be the last to learn bad news.

Social Structures and Interactions:

SYMLOG

Robert Freed Bales’s theory of group structure andprocess, Systematic Multiple Level Observationof Groups, or SYMLOG, provides a fitting conclu-sion to the structural analysis of the Andes group. Asnoted inChapter 2, Bales and his associates have spentyears searching for regularities in group interaction(Bales, 1950, 1970, 1980, 1999; Bales, Cohen, &Williamson, 1979). Initially, they assumed that mostof the variation in group behavior revolved aroundrole structures. Hence, their initial system,Interaction Process Analysis (IPA), underscored thedifferences between task-oriented and socioemo-tional behavior. In time, however, Bales expandedhis model to include two additional structuraldimensions—status (dominance/ submission) andattraction (friendly/unfriendly).

The 26 basic roles identified by SYMLOG arelisted in Table 6.3. Each role is labeled (e.g., U, DNF,

Systematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups(SYMLOG) Robert Bales’s theory and observational sys-tem which assumes that group activities can be classifiedalong three dimensions (dominance versus submissiveness,friendliness versus unfriendliness, and acceptance versusnonacceptance of authority) and that groups are moreeffective when these three aspects of the group align.

170 CHAPTER 6

UPB) depending on its location along SYMLOG’sthree basic dimensions of group structure:

■ Up versus Down, or dominance/submissive-ness: Is this member active, outgoing, andtalkative, or passive, quiet, and introverted?

■ Positive versus Negative, or friendliness/un-friendliness: Is this member warm, open, andpositive or negative and irritable?

■ Forward versus Backward, or acceptance of thetask-orientation of the established authority/non-acceptance of authority: Is this memberanalytic and task-oriented or emotional, un-traditional, and (in some cases) resentful?

Observers, or the group members themselves, canrate each individual in the group using the 26 cate-gories shown in the table. The group leader’s

STRUCTURE 171


behaviors, for example, might be concentrated inthe “active, dominant, talks a lot” category ratherthan the “passive, introverted, says little” category.A disillusioned group member, in contrast, mightget high scores for “irritable, cynical, won’t coop-erate.” These ratings can be used to chart the flowof a group’s interaction over time. When a groupfirst begins to discuss a problem, most of the beha-viors may be concentrated in the dominant, friendly,and accepting authority categories. But if the groupis wracked by disagreement, then scores in the un-friendly, non-accepting authority categories maybegin to climb. SYMLOG can also be used to cre-ate a graph of the group profile of each member’s

location on the dominance, friendliness, and author-ity dimensions (Hare, 1985, 2005; Hare & Hare,2005; Isenberg & Ennis, 1981; Polley, 1989).

Although SYMLOG ratings were never com-pleted for the Andes group, Figure 6.6 presents ahypothetical map of the group’s structure based onBales’s model. The vertical axis corresponds to therole-related behavior in the group. People like FitoStrauch and Fernandez rank near the task-oriented,accepting of authority end of this dimension,whereas Harley and Mangino are located near theopposing authority end of this dimension becausethey tended to resist group pressures and to expresstheir feelings and emotions within the group. The

Canessa

ACCEPTING TASK ORIENTATION OF AUTHORITY

OPPOSING TASK ORIENTATION OF AUTHORITY

F. Strauch

Parrado

Turcatti

E. Strauch

F

N P

B

Paez

Delgado

Vizintin

ManginoInciarte

Methol

Harley

Zerbino

Fernandez FRIENDLYBEHAVIOR

UNFRIENDLYBEHAVIOR

F I G U R E 6.6 Possible locations of a subset of the Andes group members in the three-dimensional spacedescribed by the SYMLOG rating system.

172 CHAPTER 6

horizontal axis pertains to attraction relations amongthe members. Parrado and Turcatti, for example, oc-cupy positions at the friendly end of this dimensionbecause they were both very popular within thegroup, whereas Delgado’s and Canessa’s low socialstanding places them at the unfriendly end. Bales usescircles of varying size to illustrate the third structuraldimension: dominance/submission. The larger thecircle, the greater the group member’s status in thegroup; hence, Fito Strauch is represented by a verylarge circle, whereas Harley (one of the malingerers)is represented by a very small circle.

SYMLOG, by taking into account role, status,and attraction, yields an integrative and in-depthpicture of the organization of groups (Hare et al.,

2005). The task-oriented acceptance of authority/non-acceptance of authority dimension focuses onrole structure, the dominant/submissive dimensionparallels status structure, and the friendly/unfriendlydimension pertains to attraction structure. Also, al-though communication structure is not consideredexplicitly, studies of task-performance groups indicatethat individuals who are task-oriented and friendlycommunicate more frequently with others, whereasthose who are dominant tend to receive more com-munications from others. Thus, SYMLOG is apowerful conceptual and methodological tool thatprovides a clearer understanding of the unseengroup structures that underlie recurring patterns ofinterpersonal behaviors in groups.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What is group structure?

1. Groups are not unorganized, haphazard col-lections of individuals, but organized systems ofinteractions and relationships regulated bygroup structure.

2. Three important elements of group structureare norms, roles, and networks of connectionsamong the members.

Why do norms, both formal and informal, develop toregulate group behavior?

1. Norms are implicit, self-generating, and stablestandards for group behavior.

■ Prescriptive norms set the standards for ex-pected group behavior.

■ Proscriptive norms identify behaviors thatshould not be performed.

■ Descriptive norms define what most peopledo, feel, or think in the group.

■ Injunctive norms differentiate between de-sirable and undesirable actions.

2. Norms develop gradually over time as mem-bers align their actions with those displayed by

others, but Sherif’s work using the autokineticeffect indicates that group members do notmerely imitate others; rather, they often inter-nalize these consensual standards.

3. Because norms are transmitted to other groupmembers, they tend to be consensual, implicit,self-generating, and stable.

4. In some cases, individuals may engage in un-healthy behavior as a result of normative pressures,as documented by Crandall in his study of eatingdisorders in groups, and due to pluralistic ignorance.

What kinds of roles are common in groups and how dothey influence members?

1. Roles specify the types of behaviors expectedof individuals who occupy particular positionswithin the group.

2. As members interact with one another, theirrole-related activities become patterned (roledifferentiation) with

■ Task roles pertaining to the work of thegroup, and

■ Relationship roles pertaining to maintainingrelations among members.

STRUCTURE 173

3. The same person rarely holds both the task roleand the relationship role in the group.

4. Moreland and Levine’s theory of group sociali-zation describes the ways roles are allocated toindividuals and the ways in which memberstransition through the roles of prospectivemember, new member, full member, marginalmember, and former member.

5. The role differentiation and socialization pro-cesses often create stress and tension for groupsand group members.

■ Role ambiguity occurs when the behaviorsassociated with a role are poorly defined.

■ Role conflict occurs when group membersoccupy two or more roles that call for in-compatible behaviors (interrole conflict) orwhen the demands of a single role arecontradictory (intrarole conflict).

■ When role fit is low, members do not feelthat they match the demands of theirroles.

How can the social structure of a group be measured?

1. Social network analysis, or SNA, offers re-searchers the means to describe a group’sstructure both visually and quantitatively.Common indexes used in SNA include den-sity, degree centrality, indegree, outdegree, be-tweenness, and closeness.

2. Paxton and Moody’s study of a southernsorority suggested that those members withhigh centrality indexes for a clique within theoverall group were less committed to the so-rority as a whole.

What are status networks?

1. Most groups develop a stable pattern of varia-tions in authority and power (e.g., status net-works, chains of command) through a statusdifferentiation process.

2. In some instances, people compete with oneanother for status in groups; the resulting

pecking order determines who is dominant andwho is submissive.

3. Group members’ perceptions of one anotheralso determine status. Berger’s expectation-statestheory argues that group members allocate statusby considering specific status characteristics anddiffuse status characteristics.

4. When status generalization occurs, group mem-bers unfairly allow irrelevant characteristicssuch as race, age, or ethnic background to in-fluence the allocation of prestige.

■ Status allocations are particularly unfairwhen individuals who are members ofstereotyped minority societal groups arealso underrepresented in the group itself,with the most extreme case being solo status(being the only individual of that categoryin the group).

■ In many online groups the effects of statuson participation are muted, resulting in aparticipation equalization effect.

What are attraction networks?

1. A group’s attraction network, or, in Moreno’sterms, sociometric structure, develops through asociometric differentiation process that ordersgroup members from least liked to most liked.

2. Attraction relations tend to be reciprocal andtransitive, and clusters or coalitions often existwithin the group that are higher in homophilythan the group as a whole.

3. As Heider’s balance theory suggests, sociometricstructures also tend to reach a state of equilib-rium in which likes and dislikes are balancedwithin the group.

4. Sociometric differentiation generally favorsindividuals who possess socially attractivequalities, such as cooperativeness or physicalappeal, but social standing also depends on thedegree to which the individual’s attributesmatch the qualities valued by the group(person–group fit).

174 CHAPTER 6

What are communication networks?

1. A group’s communication network may parallelformally established paths, but most groups alsohave an informal network that defines whospeaks to whom most frequently.

2. Centralized networks are most efficient,but as Shaw’s concept of information satu-ration suggests, not if tasks are too complexand require high levels of informationexchange.

3. A group’s network, in addition to structuringcommunication, influences a variety of groupand individual outcomes, including perfor-mance, effectiveness, and members’ level ofsatisfaction. Individuals who occupy morecentral positions in communication networksare often more influential than those located at

the periphery. Because centralized networkshave lower levels of closeness, the overall levelof member satisfaction in such groups tends tobe lower.

4. More information generally flows downwardin hierarchical networks than flows upward,and the information that is sent upward is oftenunrealistically positive.

5. Bales’s Systematic Multiple Level Observation ofGroups, or SYMLOG, model of interaction andstructure assumes that structure is based onthree dimensions: dominance/submissiveness(Up/Down), friendliness/unfriendliness(Positive/Negative) and acceptance of task-orientation of authority/non-acceptance oftask-orientation of authority (Forward/Backward).


Chapter Case: The Andes Survivors■ Alive, by Piers Paul Read (1974), is the best-

selling account of the young men who crashedin the Andes and survived by creating a potentgroup.

■ Miracle in the Andes, by Nando Parrado(2006), with Vince Rause, is a first-personaccount of the collective spirit of the rugbyteam. Parrado, the author, was one of themen who hiked down from the mountain tobring back help.

Norms and Roles■ “Role theory,” by Bruce J. Biddle (2001),

provides a concise summary of the history ofrole theory in the social sciences, as well as areview of current applications and trends.

■ Social Norms, edited by Michael Hechter andKarl-Dieter Op (2001), is a collection of out-standing theoretical and empirical reviews ofthe nature of norms and their influence ingroups.

■ “A meta-analysis of work demand stressors andjob performance: Examining main andmoderating effects,” by Simona Gilboa, ArieShirom, Yitzhak Fried, and Cary Cooper(2008), synthesizes the results of 169 studies of35,265 employees and their experiences withrole-related stress.

Intermember Relations■ The Development of Social Network Analysis: A

Study in the Sociology of Science, by LintonC. Freeman (2004), traces the roots of SNAback to some of the earliest work in the socialsciences, and then attempts to explain why themethods grew relatively slowly until theexplosion of interest in this method thatoccurred in the 1990s.

■ “Social Status and Group Structure,” by CeciliaL. Ridgeway (2001), offers a brief overview ofthe voluminous research and theory dealingwith expectation states and status allocations ingroups.

STRUCTURE 175

■ Analysis of Social Interaction Systems, edited byA. Paul Hare, Endre Sjøvold, Herbert G.Baker, and Joseph Powers (2005), includes 26chapters dealing with a variety of aspects of the

SYMLOG method of group analysis, withsections pertaining to leadership, organizationaldevelopment, cross-cultural implications, andmethodology.


176 CHAPTER 6


7

Influence

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

An interpersonal undercurrent flowsbeneath the surface of most groups thatpushes groupmembers together, towardgreater consensus, uniformity, homoge-neity, and conformity. But other forcespush members in divergent directions,promoting dissension, uniqueness, het-erogeneity, and independence. Groupsrequire both conformity and rebellion ifthey are to endure.

■ When do people conform ingroups?

■ When do people resist the group’sinfluence and, instead, change thegroup?

■ Why do people conform?■ Do social influence processes

shape juries’ verdicts?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Majority Influence: The Powerof the Many

Influence in the Asch Situation

Predicting Majority Influence

Minority Influence: The Powerof the Few

Conversion Theory of MinorityInfluence

Predicting Minority Influence

Dynamic Social Impact Theory

Sources of Group Influence

Informational Influence

Normative Influence

Interpersonal Influence

Application: Understanding Juries

Jury Dynamics

How Effective Are Juries?

Improving Juries

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

177

✵

This jury’s deliberationswere described byReginaldRose inhis playTwelveAngryMen (Rose&Sergel, 1955).Although a dramatization, the play is based on Rose’sexperiences when he was summoned to jury duty. Likethe jurors in the play, Rose found himself in the midst ofan angry group of argumentative jurors who struggled tofind common ground. As Rose explained: “I was over-whelmed. Iwas on a jury for amanslaughter case, andwegot into this terrific, furious, eight-hour argument in thejury room” (Internet Movie Database, 2008).

How did the jury reach its verdict? Theanswer lies in social influence—interpersonal

processes that produce, sometimes directly butoften very subtly and indirectly, changes in otherpeople. A jury member changing his vote, cliquemembers mimicking the mannerisms of thegroup’s leader, children endorsing the politicalviews of their parents, and the uncertain restaurantpatron using her small fork for her salad becauseeveryone else at the table used that fork are allinfluenced by other people rather than by theirown private ideation.

Much of this influence flows from the group tothe individual, as Figure 7.1 suggests. When themajority of the group’s members champion a par-ticular view, they may pressure the few dissentinggroup members to change for the sake of thegroup’s unity. However, social influence also flows

Twelve Angry Men: Social Influence in Juries

On the sixth day of the trial, the judge faced the juryand explained:

Murder in the first degree . . . premeditatedhomicide . . . is the most serious charge tried inour criminal courts. You have heard a long andcomplex case, gentlemen, and it is now yourduty to sit down and try and separate the factsfrom the fancy. One man is dead. The life ofanother is at stake. If there is a reasonable doubtin your minds as to the guilt of the accused—thenyou must declare him not guilty. If—however—there is no reasonable doubt, then he must befound guilty. Whichever way you decide, theverdict must be unanimous (Rose & Sergel, 1958,p. 9).

The jurors file out and make their way to theJury Room. There, the men find their seats as theforeman reminds them of their task and its serious-ness; a son is accused of attacking, stabbing, and killinghis own father. Yet, without discussing any of theevidence or the judge’s instructions, the juryimmediately pushes to take a straw vote to discoverwhere it stands. The foreman asks who favors aguilty verdict; four jurors immediately raise theirhands, and then another five join in. When Jurors #9and #11 slowly raise their hands as well, all eyes turnto look at Juror #8, who looks down at the tablein front of him. “Eleven to one,” announces theforeman.

The jurors, from that moment onward, beginthe task of bending Juror #8 to the will of thegroup. Juror #3 leans across the table and muttersto #8, “You are in left field.” Juror #4 urges Juror #8to be reasonable—it is far more likely that the elevenwho agree on guilt are correct and that the loneindividual is wrong. Juror #3 tries to bully the holdout,exclaiming, “You sat right in the court and heardthe same things I did. The man’s a dangerous killer.You could see it!” (Rose & Sergel, 1958, p. 14). Juror #7,who wants to end the discussion quickly since hehas plans for the evening, tells #8 that it is hopelessto resist the group’s decision: “I think the guy’sguilty. You couldn’t change my mind if you talkedfor a hundred years” (Rose & Sergel, 1958, p. 15).Juror #8 answers back, “I want to talk fora while.”

And, talk they do. As Juror #8 explains thesource of his doubts, suggests alternative interpreta-tions of the evidence, and questions the accuracy ofsome of the witnesses, the jurors become uncertain.They vote time and time again, and with each vote thenumbers favoring guilt and innocence shift; from 11against 1 to 10 against 2 to 9 against 3 until, in time,the tables are turned. Juror #3, who was so sure thatthe son was guilty, finds that he is now the loneholdout. The group then pressures him to change,and grudgingly, angrily, he admits he was wrong, andthe shift of opinion is complete. The jury’s verdict:not guilty.

social influence Interpersonal processes that change thethoughts, feelings, or behaviors of another person.

178 CHAPTER 7

from the individual to the group. If the group is tomeet new challenges and improve over time, itmust recognize and accept ideas that conflict withthe status quo. In the jury described in Twelve AngryMen, for example, the lone minority prevailed.He held his ground, offered reasons for his views,and in time the currents shifted and he prevailed.Whereas majority influence increases the consen-sus within the group, minority influence sustainsindividuality and innovation. In this chapter, weconsider the nature of this give-and-take betweenmajorities and minorities and the implications ofthis influence process for understanding how juriesmake their decisions.

MAJORITY INFLUENCE :

THE POWER OF THE MANY

Lone individuals are free to think and act as theychoose, but group members must abandon someof their independence. Once they walked into thejury room, the 12 jurors had to coordinate theiractions with the activities of the other group mem-bers. Each one strove to change the group to suithis personal inclinations, but at the same time, thegroup influenced its members: It swayed their judg-ments, favored one interpretation of reality overanother, and encouraged certain behaviors whilediscouraging others. When the group first polledthe members, several members were uncertainthat the young man was guilty. But when theysaw so many others voting that way, they quicklyagreed with them. They displayed conformity.

How strong is the urge to conform? MuzaferSherif (1936; see Chapter 6) verified that groupmembers modify their judgments so that theymatch those of others in their groups. TheodoreNewcomb, in his 1943 study of Bennington stu-dents (see Chapter 2), showed that members of agroup will gradually take as their own the group’sposition on political and social issues. But it wasSolomon Asch who most clearly demonstrated thepower of the many to influence the few (Asch,1952, 1955, 1957).

Influence in the Asch Situation

If you were a participant in Asch’s experiment, youwould have entered the test room thinking youwere taking part in a simple study of visual acuity.After you and the rest of the participants sat downaround the table, the experimenter would explainthat he wanted the group to make a series of judg-ments about the length of some test lines. On eachtrial (or round), he would show you two cards.One card had a single line that was to serve as the

Majority Influence

Minority Influence

F I G U R E 7.1 Majority and minority influence ingroups. In many cases, group members change as a re-sult of direct group pressure by the majority (majorityinfluence), but in other cases, one or more groupmembers succeed in changing the entire group. Thisminority influence is indicated by the curved lines ofinfluence from the lone minority back to the majoritygroup members.

majority influence Social pressure exerted by the largerportion of a group on individual members and smallerfactions within the group.minority influence Social pressure exerted by a loneindividual or smaller faction of a group on members ofthe majority faction.

conformity A change in opinion, judgment, or actionto match the opinions, judgments, or actions of othergroup members or the group’s normative standards.

I N F LUENCE 179

standard. Three lines, numbered 1, 2, and 3, weredisplayed on the second card (see Figure 7.2). Yourjob? Just pick the line that matched the standard linein length. As one test line was always the same lengthas the standard line, the correct answer was fairlyobvious. Few people made mistakes when makingsuch judgments alone.

On each trial, the experimenter displayed twocards and asked the participants to state theiranswers aloud, starting at the left side of the table.The first few trials passed uneventfully, with every-one in the group picking the correct answer. Buton the third trial, the first participant picked Line 2,even though Line 1 was a closer match to the stan-dard stimulus. To your surprise, each of the othergroup members followed the first participant’s leadby selecting Line 2 as the correct answer. Whenyour turn came to answer, would you go alongwith the group and select Line 2, or would youstand your ground and select Line 1?

The majority’s mistaken choice was no accident,for only one group member was an actual partici-pant; all others were trained confederates who delib-erately made errors on 12 of the 18 trials to see ifthe real participant would conform to a unanimousmajority’s judgments. When the participant arrived,he was seated so that he would answer only after

most of the other participants did. He would studythe lines, identify the correct answer, but heareveryone else make a different selection. Whenthey heard the first person name the incorrect lineas the best match, they probably thought little of it.But when the second person agreed with the first,they must have started to wonder. Then a third, afourth, and a fifth person—all agreeing with one an-other, all selecting the wrong answer. What shouldthey do?

Many conformed when placed in the Aschsituation, showing a “marked movement towardthe majority” (Asch, 1963/2003, p. 297). In fact,across several studies, Asch discovered that peopleconformed on about one third of the trials. Someparticipants, as Table 7.1 indicates, never conformed,but most did so at least once, and a few did onevery single trial of the experiment. Between 75%and 80% of the participants agreed with the errone-ous group at least once.

1 2 3

F I G U R E 7.2 An example of the problems given to participants in the Asch study. Subjects were told to look atthe standard line (on the card on the left) and then match it to one of the three lines on the card at the right. Thetask was an easy one, but all of the group members save the one true subject were Asch’s confederates who deliber-ately made many mistakes. For example, of the lines shown here the standard line was 8 inches long, and comparisonLine 1 was the correct answer. However, the group chose Line 2, which was actually 7 inches long.

SOURCE: Asch, 1952.

Asch situation An experimental procedure developedby Solomon Asch in his studies of conformity to groupopinion. Participants believed they were making perceptualjudgments as part of a group, but the other members wereconfederates who made deliberate errors on certain trials.

180 CHAPTER 7

Asch himself was surprised by his findings(Gleitman, Rozin, & Sabini, 1997). He had ex-pected that his participants would resist the pressureto conform and speak out against the incorrect ma-jority’s view. Some did, but each time the groupmade its judgment many of the participants sidedwith the incorrect majority (Leyens & Corneille,1999). Had the group been making importantdecisions—deliberating over a verdict in a murdertrial, forging a plan to deal with an emergency, orcrafting a solution to a difficult problem—then theparticipants would have let the group make a mis-take at least one out of every three times.

In search of an explanation, Asch and otherresearchers tested a series of hypotheses about con-formity. First, did it matter that the participantsfaced the others alone—just one voice disagreeingwith an entire group? Second, what about groupsize? Did people conform so much because thegroup was so large that it overwhelmed them?Finally, did the people in Asch’s study really acceptthe others’ estimates as more accurate than theirown, or were they just acquiescing? In other words,did they publicly agree, but privately disagree?

All Against One Juror #8 in Twelve Angry Menfaced 11 other men who disagreed with him. Asch’sparticipants faced a similar situation, for they were the

only ones in the group who favored the correct line;all of the other group members chose a different lineas the correct one. Did some of the force of the Aschsituation derive from the unanimity of the majority?

Asch examined this possibility by running hisstudy again, but this time he provided each subjectwith a partner; either another subject or a confed-erate who gave the correct answer on certain trials.This second individual sat in the fourth seat, andthe participant sat in the eighth seat. As predicted,when participants had an ally, their conformity rateswere cut to one fourth their previous levels. In yetanother variation, Asch arranged for some confed-erates to disagree with the majority but still give anincorrect answer. Participants did not agree withthe erroneous nonconformist, but his dissent madeit easier for them to express their own viewpoint(Asch, 1955).

Why is a unanimous majority so influential?First, individuals who face the majority alone, with-out a single ally, bear 100% of the group’s pressure.Psychologically, being completely alone is very dif-ferent from having another person join with youagainst the others (Allen, 1975). Gaining a partner,however, helps one withstand the pressure to con-form only as long as the partner remains supportive.Asch discovered that if the partner reverts back tothe majority position, then subjects do as well.Second, the larger the size of the minority coalition,the smaller the majority’s coalition—each time amember of the majority shifts to the minority theminority grows stronger and the majority weaker(Clark, 1990). Third, a partner makes a very em-barrassing situation less so. The kinds of judgmentsthat Asch studied were simple ones, so most parti-cipants probably realized that if they dissented, theywould make an odd impression on others. After all,“the correct judgment appeared so obvious thatonly perceptual incompetents, fools, or madmencould err” (Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976,p. 149). But if two members of the group disagree,then the situation’s potential to lead to great em-barrassment is lessened. A partner—and particularlyone who is the first to dissent—takes much of therisk for going against the group (Sabini, Garvey, &Hall, 2001).

T A B L E 7.1 Results of Asch’s Study ofConformity

Measure Result (%)

How many members made atleast one error?

76.4

How many times did the averagemember conform?

36.8

How many group members neverconformed?

24.0

How many group members conformed10 times or more?

11.0

How many individuals made at leastone error when tested alone?

5.0

SOURCE: Data from Asch, 1952, 1957.

INF LUENCE 181

Strength in Numbers (Up to a Point) Howmany people does it take to create maximum con-formity? Is two against one enough? Are smallergroups less influential? Is 11 to 1 too many, sinceindividuals feel so anonymous in large groups theycan resist group forces? Asch explored these ques-tions by studying groups with 2 to 16 members. Hisfindings, summarized in Figure 7.3, confirm thatlarger majorities are more influential—but only upto a point. People in two-person groups conformedvery little; most were unsettled by the erroneouschoices of their partner, but they did not go alongwith him or her (3.6% error rate). But the error rateclimbed to 13.6% when participants faced two op-ponents, and when a single individual was pittedagainst three others, conformity jumped to 31.8%.Asch studied even larger groups, but he found thatwith more than three opponents, conformity in-creased only slightly (reaching its peak of 37.1% inthe seven-person groups); even 16 against 1 didnot raise conformity appreciably above the levelachieved with three against one (Asch, 1952,1955). As Focus 7.1 explains, “there is a marginallydecreasing effect of increased supplies of people”(Latané, 1981, p. 344).

Rod Bond (2005), in a meta-analytic review ofsubsequent studies that used Asch’s line-lengthjudgment task, concluded that most studies confirmthe pattern shown in Figure 7.3, but that the preciseshape of the relationship between size and influencedepends on a number of situational factors. When,for example, individuals in larger groups state theiropinions publicly, the findings tend to match theAsch pattern. But when they keep their opinionsto themselves, people are more likely to dissent. Alarge group can also lose some of its influence whenits members do not reach their decisions indepen-dently of one another. If individuals learn that a six-person group disagrees with them, but they believethat the group members worked together as agroup to make their decision, then the size of thedissenting group matters little. But when individualsbelieve that the other group members reached theirconclusions independently of one another, thentheir influence increases as the number of sourcesincreases. In fact, two 2-person groups (two separateentities) are more influential than one 4-persongroup whose members worked together (Wilder,1977, Experiment 2; see also Jackson, 1987;Latané, 1981; Mullen, 1987; Wolf, 1987).

0 2 4 7 151 3 6 9

Co

nfo

rmit

y

Number of Sources of Influence

Conformitylow

with 1source

Adding more sources does not appreciablyincrease conformity

Increased conformity with 2 or 3 sources

F I G U R E 7.3 The relationship between conformity and group size. Studies conducted in a number of settingssuggest that few people conform when they face just one other person who disagrees with them, but that conformityrises rapidly when a lone individual faces a group of two or three. Adding more people to the majority beyond threedoes not appreciably increase conformity.

182 CHAPTER 7

Forms of Social Reponse Juror #2 in TwelveAngry Men sided initially with the majority, votingin favor of guilt. Was he just going along with thegroup? Or did he truly believe the defendant was

guilty, and was just voting his conscience when hecast his ballot?

When a group member goes along with the de-cisions favored by others they may be displaying oneof three different kinds of social responses to group

F o c u s 7.1 When Is a Group’s Impact Strongest?

During a staff meeting, discussion focuses on whetheror not your company should purchase Windows com-puters or Apple computers. You strongly favor Apples,but everyone else favors computers that run Windows.Will you go along with the group’s position, or con-tinue to hold out for Apples?

Bibb Latané’s social impact theory offers a compel-ling answer. This theory’s Principle of Social Impact sug-gests that social influence is a function of the strength(S), the immediacy (I), and number (N) of sources pres-ent, or Impact = “f(SIN)”. Imagine, for example, whathappens when you turn on a single lamp in an otherwisedark room. The room is illuminated, but the amount oflight in the room depends on, for example, the strengthof the lightbulb in the lamp—a 25-watt bulb gives justenough light to see by, while a floodlight might reachevery corner. And where is the lamp located? A lamp inthe corner may leave the opposite corner of the room inshadows, but if you want more light, you can alwaysturn to more lamps. However, if you continue to addlight from whatever source, eventually the room willbecome so bright that turning on more lights will notmake much difference. In an analogous fashion, yourreaction to the Windows contingent depends upon therelative strength of the other group members. If youhave just joined the company, then they have morestrength than you do. You are a 25-watt bulbsurrounded by 100-watt bulbs and you will likely choseto conform (Jetten, Hornsey, & Yorno, 2006).

Social impact theory also assumes that immediacyis correlated with influence, for people who are physi-cally present in the room will have more of an impactthan people who are absent. For example, the com-pany’s tech consultant may have been unable to attendthe meeting, so she might have sent a message sayingshe preferred Apples; therefore, her immediacy is low,since she is not part of the face-to-face group meetings.

Sheer numbers are also critical. How manypeople oppose you? Four? Eight? Twelve? As withlight bulbs, the more people, the more impact they willhave on you—up to a point. The first light you turnon in a dark room has more of an impact than thehundredth. Similarly, the first person who disagreeswith you has more impact than the hundredth personadded to a majority that disagrees with you. Thus,conformity pressures do not increase at a constantrate as more people join the majority (Latané, 1981,1996, 1997; Latané & Bourgeois, 2001; Latané &Wolf, 1981).

Social impact theory explains people’s reactionsacross a range of influence settings, including Asch’sconformity studies, reactions to emergencies, attitudechange among dormitory residents, the formation ofspontaneous crowds on street corners, donations tocharities, and even a society’s cultural practices(Harton & Bullock, 2007; Latané, 1997). One study, forexample, asked college students to imagine them-selves singing the “Star Spangled Banner” alone orwith others in front of audiences of one, three, or ninelisteners who were either music experts or studentswho were partially tone deaf. As the theory suggests,performers were more nervous when the audience washigh rather than low in strength (experts vs. students)and nervousness increased at a decreasing rate as theaudience grew larger. Performers also felt less anxietywhen they imagined themselves performing, or actu-ally performed, in front of audiences when theythemselves were part of a group. Size, however, stillmattered. People’s anxiety declined when their groupsincreased from two, to three, to four, but once theyreached four members, adding members did notappreciably reduce anxiety (Jackson & Latané, 1981).For these performers there was “safety in numbers,”and the number was four.

social impact theory An analysis of social influencedeveloped by Bibb Latané which proposes that the impactof any source of influence depends upon the strength, theimmediacy, and number of people (sources) present.

compliance Change that occurs when the targets ofsocial influence publicly accept the influencer’s positionbut privately maintain their original beliefs.

I N F LUENCE 183

pressure. If showing compliance (or acquiescence),they privately disagree with the group but publiclyexpress an opinion that matches the opinion expressedby themajority of the group. If conversion (or privateacceptance), their agreement indicates a true change ofopinion; they personally accept the influencer’s posi-tion as their own. If congruence, they agree with thegroup, but in a strict sense they are not conforming.Their opinion matches the group’s from the outset, sothey do not need to shift their opinion in the directionadvocated by the group.

Nonconformity can involve at least two differ-ent processes. People who refuse to bend to the willof the majority may be displaying independence(or dissent)—the public expression of ideas, beliefs,and judgments that are consistent with their per-sonal standards. On ballot after ballot, Juror #8refused to vote “guilty”; he remained independent.Second, nonconformity can reflect anticonformity(or counterconformity)—the expression of ideas or thetaking of actions that are the opposite of whateverthe group recommends. In some cases, anticonfor-mity is motivated by rebelliousness or obstinacyrather than by the need to accurately express oneself.In other cases, however, members will play the“devil’s advocate” to make sure that the groupconsiders alternatives carefully. Juror #8 in Twelve

Angry Men, for example, initially voted “not guilty,”even though he believed the defendant was guilty.He explained, however, that he had voted “notguilty” to ensure that the jury would review all theevidence thoroughly. Figure 7.4 summarizes thesefive types of social responses. (Nail, MacDonald, &Levy, 2000, provided a detailed analysis of these andother forms of social response.)

Asch’s subjects displayed two predominantforms of social response to the group pressure: com-pliance and independence. Of those who con-formed, some questioned their own accuracy andended up believing that the others were right.Most, however, thought the majority was wrong,but they went along with the group’s choice. AsAsch explained, they “suspected that the majoritywere ‘sheep’ following the first responder, or thatthe majority were victims of an optical illusion;nevertheless, these suspicions failed to free them atthe moment of decision” (1955, p. 33).

Nearly all of the subjects, however, disagreedwith the majority more frequently than they agreed.People conformed, on average, 3 of 12 times, butthat means they disagreed 9 out of 12 times. Asch’sstudy is often used to suggest that people are, bynature, conformists who tend to go along unthink-ingly with whatever the majority favors. The data,however, suggest otherwise. Participants did notcomply on all the trials; instead, their more frequentsocial response was to remain independent. Theyspoke their minds even when confronted with aunanimous majority, and agreed with the othersonly occasionally—when their error was a slightone or by choosing an answer that was intermediatebetween the correct answer and the majority’s mis-taken one (Hodges & Geyer, 2006).

Predicting Majority Influence

Asch studied young men (mostly) making publicjudgments about relatively inconsequential matters.All lived in the United States at a time whentheir culture was politically conservative. Wouldhis findings hold with other kinds of people, fromother cultures, and in other groups facing differentissues?

conversion Change that occurs when group memberspersonally accept the influencer’s position; also, themovement of all members of a group to a single, mutu-ally shared position, as when individuals who initiallyoffer diverse opinions on a subject eventually come toshare the same position.congruence Unprompted, natural agreement betweenthe individual and the group.independence Expressing opinions, making judgments,or acting in ways that are consistent with one’s personalbeliefs but inconsistent with the opinions, judgments, oractions of other group members or the group’s norms.anticonformity (or counterconformity) Deliberatelyexpressing opinions, making judgments, or acting inways that are different from those of the other groupmembers or the group’s norms in order to challengethe group and its standards rather than simply for thepurpose of expressing one’s personal preferences.

184 CHAPTER 7

Conformity Across People Asch discoveredthat people differed, to an extraordinary degree, intheir reaction to the conformity situation. Thosewho conformed often became increasingly disor-iented as the study progressed, hesitating beforethey disagreed and apologizing to the others fortheir temerity. Others, in contrast, remained confi-dent and self-assured throughout the experiment,never wavering from their convictions as they dis-agreed time and time again with the others. As oneparticipant remarked, “The answers of the othersdidn’t change my mind—an honest answer was ex-pected. I did not change my answer once.” Whenasked about the others in the group, he simply said“They were wrong” (Asch, 1952, p. 467).

Table 7.2 summarizes some of the differencesbetween those who yield and those who remain res-olute in the face of social pressure. Conformists tendto be more rigid in their thinking; their convention-ality, conservative values, and unwillingness to con-front authority increase their willingness to acceptthe majority’s opinion. They let the situation andother people influence their perceptions, opinions,and outlooks. People who rely on situational cueswhen making perceptual judgments, self-consciousindividuals, and those who are continually checkingto see how well they are fitting into the group orsituation (high self-monitors) are more likely tomake certain that their actions match the group’sstandards. People who conform show a greater

Disagreeswith Group

Disagreeswith Group

Disagreeswith Group

Agrees withGroup

(or neutral)

Agreeswith Group

Agreeswith Group

Disagreeswith Group

Disagreeswith Group

Agrees withGroup

(or neutral)

Agreeswith Group

Agreeswith Group

Agreeswith Group

Disagreeswith Group

Disagreeswith Group

Agreeswith Group

SocialResponse

PrivatePosition After

Discussion

PublicPosition After

Discussion

Compliance:publicly agrees with group,

but privately disagrees

Conversion:agrees with group

publicly and privately

Independence:disagrees with grouppublicly and privately

Anticonformity:disagrees with group publiclybut agrees (or has no opinion

or interest) privately

Congruence:agrees with group

publicly and privately

BeforeDiscussion

F I G U R E 7.4 Forms of social response. When people react to group pressures, conformity can belabeled compliance, and nonconformity can be thought of as anticonformity. In the opposite situation, when theresponse is prompted by one’s personal standards, conformity becomes conversion, and nonconformity,independence. People who agree with the group from the outset are not technically conformists, because they donot shift their opinion in the direction advocated by the group; they already hold that position. They displaycongruence with their groups.

INF LUENCE 185

interest, overall, in other people. They have a higherneed for social approval, are more interpersonallyoriented, and are more fearful of social rejection.

Factors that undermine self-confidence—lowself-esteem, incompetence, low intelligence—alsoincrease conformity.

T A B L E 7.2 A Sampling of Personality Characteristics That Are Reliably Associatedwith Conformity and Nonconformity

Characteristic Reaction to Influence

Age Conformity increases until adolescence, and then decreases into adulthood(Costanzo & Shaw, 1966).

Authenticity Individuals who are higher in dispositional authenticity tend to resist externalinfluences (Wood et al., 2008).

Authoritarianism Authoritarians respect and obey authorities and social conventions (Altemeyer, 1988; Feld-man, 2003).

Big Fivepersonalityfactors

Introverts experience more discomfort when disagreeing with a group, and so conformmore (Matz, Hofstedt, & Wood, 2008). Agreeableness, conscientiousness, and stability areassociated with greater conformity (DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2002), but openness withless conformity (McCrae, 1996).

Birth order First-born children tend to conform more than later-born children, who tend to be morerebellious and creative (Sulloway, 1996).

Dependency People who are high in dependency (a strong motivation to please other people) displayheightened compliance, conformity, and suggestibility (Bornstein, 1992).

Gender identity Masculine individuals and androgynous individuals conform less on gender-neutral tasksthan feminine individuals (Bem, 1982).

Individualism–

collectivismPeople from collectivistic cultures (e.g., Asians) value conformity as a means of achievingharmony with others, whereas those from individualistic cultures (e.g., European Americans)value uniqueness (Kim & Markus, 1999).

Individuation People with a high desire to publicly differentiate themselves from others (high individuators)are more willing to express dissenting opinions and contribute more to group discussions(Whitney, Sagrestano, & Maslach, 1994).

Intelligence Less intelligent people and individuals who are uncertain of their abilities conform more(Crutchfield, 1955).

Need for closure Conformity pressures are stronger in groups with a preponderance of members with ahigh need for closure (De Grada et al., 1999).

Need foruniqueness

Individuals with a high need for uniqueness (NFU) are more likely to make unusual choicesand prefer the unconventional to the conventional (Simonson & Nowlis, 2000).

Self-blame Adolescents who tend to blame themselves for negative outcomes conform more thanindividuals low in self-blame (Costanzo, 1970).

Self-esteem Individuals with low self-esteem conform more than individuals with moderate andhigh-self esteem (Berkowitz & Lundy, 1957); however, adolescents with high self-esteemconform more than those with low self-esteem (Francis, 1998).

Self-monitoring High self-monitors, because of their higher self-presentational tendencies, conform morewhen striving to make a positive impression (Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996).

Yea-saying Yea-sayers, particularly when working under a cognitive load, say “yes” faster and morefrequently than individuals who thoughtfully consider their position (Knowles & Condon, 1999).

186 CHAPTER 7

Conformity across the Sexes Did Asch under-estimate the urge to conform by studying mostlymen? Is it not true, “at least in our culture, thatfemales supply greater amounts of conformity un-der almost all conditions than males” (Nord, 1969,p. 198)? That “women have been found to yieldmore to a bogus group norm than men” (Hare,1976, p. 27)? Meta-analytic reviews suggest womenconform more than men, but only to a small degreeand in specific kinds of situations—when, for exam-ple, in face-to-face groups discussing nonpersonalissues or stating opinions aloud. In more anonymous,low surveillance situations, differences between menand women are almost nonexistent (Bond & Smith,1996; Cooper, 1979; Eagly & Carli, 1981; Leaper &Ayres, 2007).

Why do women only conform more than menin face-to-face groups? The difference may reflectwomen’s relatively greater concern for maintainingpositive relationships with others. Whereas men tendto use disagreement to dominate others or even toseparate themselves from the group, women mayuse agreement to create consensus and cohesion(Leaper & Ayres, 2007; Maslach, Santee, & Wade,1987). These differences may also reflect continuingbiases in the allocation of status to women. Despitechanges in stereotypes about women and men,groups traditionally reward men for acting in domi-nant, nonconforming ways and women for actingin cooperative, communal ways. If women feelthat they should behave in a traditional way, theymay conform more than men (Eagly, Wood, &Fishbaugh, 1981). Women who do not accept thetraditional role of women, however, do not conformmore than men (Bem, 1985). Sexism in groups andin society at large may also prevent women fromexpressing their dissent in groups. The studies ofstatus allocation reviewed in Chapter 6, for exam-ple, have indicated that groups only grudginglyallocate status to qualified women. This sexistbias against women undermines their resistance toinfluence and weakens their power to influenceothers (Eagly, 1987). As women have becomemore successful in work and educational settings,their social status has risen, along with their inde-pendence and assertiveness (Twenge, 2001).

Conformity across Cultures and Eras In theyears since Asch first published his findings, otherresearchers have replicated his basic procedure indozens of countries, including the United States,Britain, Belgium, Fiji, Holland, Kuwait, Portugal,and Zimbabwe. When Rod Bond and Peter Smith(1996) surveyed these studies, they concluded thatAsch may actually have underestimated conformityby studying people living in a relatively individual-istic culture. As noted in Chapter 3, the individual-istic cultures typical of Western societies tend toplace the individual above the collective. Collectiv-istic societies, which are more prevalent in Asia,Africa, and South America, stress shared goals andinterdependence. As a result, people tend to con-form more in collectivistic cultures, especially whenthe source of influence is family members or friends(Frager, 1970).

Bond and Smith also checked for changesin conformity during the period from 1952 to1994 to determine if conformity rates fluctuated associety’s tolerance of dissent waxed and waned.When Asch carried out his work in the 1950s, socialnorms stressed respect for authority and traditionalvalues, whereas the late 1960s were marked bystudent activism and social disobedience. Thisperiod of rebelliousness was followed by a pro-longed period of social stability. Do entire genera-tions of people become more or less conforming,depending on the sociopolitical climate of thetimes in which they live? Bond and Smith discov-ered that conformity rates have dropped since the1950s, but they found no support for the idea thatconformity is a “child of its time.” Conformity isdecreasing, but this decline was not sharper inthe 1960s or more gradual in the relatively placid1970s and 1980s (Larsen, 1982; Perrin & Spencer,1980, 1981).

Conformity across Contexts Asch studied con-formity in newly formed groups working on a verysimple task that was not particularly consequential.The members did not know each other; they sattogether in a well-lit room, and they made theirdecisions by announcing their choice aloud. Themembers of juries, in contrast, first meet when the

I N F LUENCE 187

trial begins, and sometimes spend days, weeks, oreven months together. Juries have a leader chargedwith keeping order, and the members vote bysecret ballot—unless they decide otherwise. Juriesare also making extremely important decisions:some juries make life-and-death decisions.

Just as some individuals lean toward conformityrather than independence, so some group situationscreate more pressure to conform than do others (seeTable 7.3). Groups that are cohesive, larger in size,

unanimous, and more highly structured increasemembers’ conformity, but ones with internal dis-sention, norms that encourage creativity, or a his-tory of poor decision making are easier to resist.Similarly, such factors as anonymity, allies, andhigh status bolster the individual’s position withinthe group, and therefore reduce the pressure to con-form. Other situational factors, however, undercutgroup members’ capacity to resist the group—forexample, accountability, commitment to the group,

T A B L E 7.3 A Sampling of Group and Situational Characteristics That Reliably Increase andDecrease Conformity

Factor Conformity Increases If Conformity Decreases If

Accountability (Quinn &Schlenker, 2002)

Individuals are striving foracceptance by others whosepreferences are known

Individuals are accountable fortheir actions and are striving foraccuracy

Accuracy (Mausner, 1954) Majority’s position is reasonableor accurate

Majority position is unreasonableor mistaken

Ambiguity (Spencer & Huston,1993)

Issues are simple andunambiguous

Issues are complex and difficult toevaluate

Anonymity (Deutsch & Gerard,1955)

Responses are made publicly inface-to-face groups

Responses are anonymous andmembers cannot see each other

Attraction (Kiesler & Corbin,1965)

Members are attracted to thegroup or its members

Members dislike each other

Availability of mating partners(Griskevicius et al., 2006)

Individuals are motivated to standout from the crowd

Nonconformists could be revealed asincorrect

Awareness (Krueger & Clement,1997)

Individuals are aware they disagreewith the majority

Individuals do not realize theirposition is unusual

Cohesion (Lott & Lott, 1961) Group is close-knit and cohesive Group lacks cohesion

Commitment to position (Gerard,1964)

Individuals are publicly committedto their position from the outset

Members’ responses are not known tothe other group members

Commitment to membership(Kiesler, Zanna, & DeSalvo, 1966)

Individuals are committed toremaining in the group

Groups or membership are temporary

Existential threat (Renkemaet al., 2008)

Aspects of the situation triggerexistential anxieties

Situation buffers individual fromexistential threat

Priming (Epley & Gilovich, 1999) Unnoticed cues in the settingprime conformity

Situational cues prime independence

Size (Asch, 1955) Majority is large Majority is small

Task (Baron, Vandello, &Brunsman, 1996)

Task is important but verydifficult

Task is important and easy, or taskis trivial

Unanimity (Asch, 1955) Majority is unanimous Several members disagree with themajority

188 CHAPTER 7

and the difficulty of the task. These aspects of thesituation are therefore associated with increasedconformity.

Consider, for example, the difference betweenthe Asch situation and the so-called Crutchfieldsituation. Participants in Asch’s studies statedtheir choices aloud under the watchful eyes of allthe other members, and this procedure likelyincreased their feelings of embarrassment and ofbeing evaluated. His procedure was also inefficient,for many confederates were required to study justone participant. Richard Crutchfield (1955) solvedthis latter problem by eliminating the confederates.In Crutchfield’s laboratory, the participants madetheir judgments while seated in individual cubicles(see Figure 7.5). They flipped a small switch on aresponse panel to report their judgments to theresearcher, and their answers would supposedlylight up on the other group members’ panels aswell. Crutchfield told each person in the groupthat he or she was to answer last, and he himselfsimulated the majority’s judgments from a mastercontrol box. Thus, during the critical trials,Crutchfield could lead participants to think that allthe other participants were giving erroneousanswers.

The Crutchfield situation sacrifices face-to-faceinteraction between the participant and confeder-ates, but was efficient: Crutchfield could study fiveor more people in a single session, and he did notneed to recruit confederates. Because group mem-bers’ responses were private, however, fewer peopleconformed in the Crutchfield situation relative tothe Asch situation (Bond & Smith, 1996). Indeed,the change that takes place in such groups mayreflect conversion rather than a temporary compli-

ance that disappears when the individual is sepa-rated from the group and its influence.

Conformity across the Internet Crutchfield’sstudies of individuals making decisions as a groupbut connected only electronically anticipated theuse of computer-based networks to facilitate groupinteraction. In his day, most groups met in face-to-face settings, but today’s groups often interact incomputer-mediated meetings. Freed from the con-straints of public evaluation and the immediatescrutiny of others, individuals might be expectedto conform less and dissent more when their inter-actions take place via e-mail, in chat rooms, orthrough instant messaging (Kraut et al., 1998).Yet, research suggests that online groups’ dynamicstend to be similar to face-to-face, offline groups(Bargh & McKenna, 2004). Through discussion,consensus emerges within the group, and membersmove in the direction of agreement rather thancontinually debating issues. Online groups developnorms that structure interactions and status, andnew members are socialized to follow these rules.Members sometimes act in ways that violate thegroup’s norms of etiquette (“netiquette”) by ex-pressing hostility and exchanging insults, but suchdeviations are usually sanctioned, and offenderswho do not conform are eventually ostracizedfrom the group (Straus, 1997).

Conformity may actually be more prevalent inonline groups rather than offline groups, and theSocial Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects—orSIDE for short—explains why (Spears, Lea, &Postmes, 2007). SIDE suggests that in the relativelyanonymous online world, individuals tend to definethemselves in terms of their collective, social iden-tities rather than their individualistic, personal iden-tities. Online interactions are depersonalized ones,but only in the sense that individual motivations,qualities, and beliefs become less salient. One’s col-lective, shared attributes, in contrast, become moresalient, and so the social component of the selfcomes to the fore. Some people, faced with in-creased depersonalization, may strive to reasserttheir individuality by acting in unusual, distinctiveways, but if their group identity is salient they will

Crutchfield situation An experimental procedure de-veloped by Richard Crutchfield to study conformity.Participants who signaled their responses using an elec-tronic response console believed that they were makingjudgments as part of a group, but the responses of theother members that appeared on their console’s displaywere simulated.

I N F LUENCE 189

more likely conform to the group’s norms (Spearset al., 2002). Because of these “SIDE effects,” whenindividuals receive electronic messages from otherindividuals—even people they do not know andwill not communicate with in the future—they fre-quently change their decisions to match therecommendations of these anonymous strangers(Lee & Nass, 2002). When small groups of studentsuse e-mail in classes, each group develops idiosyn-cratic norms that regulate the group’s interactions,and conformity to these norms increases throughthe semester (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000).People comply with norms of reciprocity and co-operation in online groups even when completelyanonymous, provided they identify with the group(Cress, 2005). Members of groups will also trusteach other to fairly share financial resources, pro-vided these others are members of the same onlinegroup (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). Apparently, theurge to conform, which Asch found so powerful inface-to-face settings, is no less powerful when peo-ple who are separated by space and time are unitedby an Internet connection.

MINORITY INFLUENCE :

THE POWER OF THE FEW

The other 11 members of the Twelve Angry Menjury relentlessly pressured Juror #8 to change hisverdict to guilty, but he refused to yield. Despitepressure from religious authorities, Galileo insistedthat the planets revolve around the Sun rather thanthe Earth. Many in the civil rights movement of the1960s favored using violence, if necessary, to over-come discrimination and racism, but Dr. MartinLuther King Jr. ensured that the movement suc-ceeded through the application of nonviolentmethods. Sigmund Freud actively rebuked criticsof his theory of the unconscious mind until it wasgrudgingly accepted by many psychologists. Thecomposer Igor Stravinsky was denounced as amusical heretic when The Rite of Spring was firstperformed, but he refused to change a note.

These historical examples demonstrate that themajority does not always overwhelm the dissenter,for sometimes it is the minority that is the influen-cer and the majority that is influenced. Asch found

F I G U R E 7.5 Conformity in the Crutchfield situation. Crutchfield studied conformity by seating subjects inindividual booths and gathering their responses electronically. When asked a question such as “Which one of thefigures has a greater area, the star or the circle?” subjects answered by flipping the appropriate switch in theirbooth. They thought that their answers were being transmitted to the experimenter and the other subjects, but inactuality the experimenter was simulating the majority’s judgment from a master control panel.

SOURCE: Wrightsman, 1977.

190 CHAPTER 7

that the majority can bring powerful and potentiallyoverwhelming pressure to bear upon the minority,but other studies have shown that minorities canfight back with pressure of their own.

Conversion Theory

of Minority Influence

Just as Asch’s studies highlighted the power of themajority, so the work of Serge Moscovici and hiscolleagues underscored the power of the minority.Moscovici, in an insightful analysis of conformity inscience itself, suggested that for too long theoristsand researchers assumed that change comes fromwithin existing social systems rather than from ex-ternal revolutionary sources; that the victory ofthe majority is more democratic than the victoryof the minority; and that innovation occurs as aresult of direct rather than indirect interaction be-tween the majority and minority. In contrast to thismajority-rules model of social influence, Moscovici’sconversion theory maintains that disagreementwithin the group results in conflict, and that thegroup members are motivated to reduce that con-flict—sometimes by getting others to change butalso by changing their own opinions (Moscovici,1976, 1980, 1985).

Conversion theory suggests that minoritiesinfluence in a different way than majorities do.Minorities, Moscovici theorized, influence througha validation process. When someone in the groupbreaks the group’s unanimity—such as Juror #8arguing “not guilty”—members take notice of thissurprising turn of events. The minority capturestheir attention, and though most do not believethat the minority is correct, they nonetheless con-sider the arguments closely. The majority’s message,in contrast, is less intriguing to members. When peo-ple discover where most of the group stands on aposition, through a comparison process they check to

see if they can join the majority. Because being inthe majority is, in most cases, more rewarding thanmembership in the minority—those in the majorityusually find that they control the group’s resourceswhereas those in the minority may have little say inthe group’s decisions—people usually change tocomply with the group’s consensus. This compliancereflects a desire to be included within the group,however, rather than any kind of in-depth reviewof the majority’s reasons for their position. In con-sequence, the change is relatively superficial andmay evaporate once the individual leaves the group.

Moscovici maintained that the validation pro-cesses instigated by a minority are more long-lastingthan those triggered by the comparison processesof majority influence. Comparison results in directinfluence as members public comply. Validation, incontrast, leads to private acceptance, making minor-ities a source of innovation in groups. They shakethe confidence of the majority and force the groupto seek out new information about the situation.This conversion process takes longer, however,than the compliance process, and so the effects of aminority on the majority sometimes do not emergeuntil some time has passed. In some cases, the influ-ence of minorities becomes evident only when thegroup has completed its initial deliberations andmoved on to another task (Moscovici, 1994; seealso Maass, West, & Cialdini, 1987; Nemeth, 1986).

Moscovici and his colleagues, in one of the firsttests of the theory, reversed the usual Asch situationby planting two confederates in six-person groupsand then arranging for the confederates to system-atically disagree with the majority’s decision. Insteadof judging lines, Moscovici’s subjects judged, aloud,the color and brightness of a series of color slides.All of the 36 slides were shades of blue, varying onlyin luminosity. But when it was their turn to namethe color of the slides the confederates consistentlysaid “green” rather than “blue.” In some cases, theconfederates answered first and second, but in othergroups one answered first and the other answeredfourth (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969).

Moscovici and his colleagues confirmed thepower of the minority. When tested alone, oneperson said two of the slides were green: a 0.25%

conversion theory Serge Moscovici’s conceptual anal-ysis of the cognitive and interpersonal processes thatmediate the direct and indirect impact of a consistentminority on the majority.

I N F LUENCE 191

error rate. When in the presence of the green-saying confederates, this error rated jumped to8.4%—not as much influence as that found byAsch in his studies of majority influence, but a sig-nificant amount considering the obviousness of thecorrect answer. Moscovici also found evidence ofthe delayed effects of the minority on the majority.After the public judgment task, a second experi-menter entered the room and explained that hewas also doing a study of vision. Participants werethen shown another set of colors that included3 blue slides, 3 green slides, and 10 slides in theblue-green range, and they privately labeled eachone either blue or green. Those who had beenpreviously exposed to a minority-group opinionwere more likely to label the ambiguous slides asgreen rather than blue, and this bias was moremarked among those members who did not changetheir public choices when they first encounteredthe minority. This delayed, indirect impact of mi-norities on the majority has been documented in awide variety of laboratory and field studies, whichindicate that “minorities tend to produce profoundand lasting changes in attitudes and perceptions thatgeneralize to new settings and over time . . .whereas majorities are more likely to elicit compli-ance that is confined to the original influence set-ting” (Maass et al., 1987, pp. 56–57).

Predicting Minority Influence

Moscovici’s conversion theory began as a minorityopinion that many researchers rejected, but it even-tually won over even the most stubborn membersof the opposition—confirming the theory’s ownpredictions. The question changed, over time,from “Are minorities influential?” to “When areminorities influential?” Answers to that question,which are reviewed briefly in the next sections,suggest that minorities who argue consistently fortheir positions but all the while manage to remainmembers in good-standing in the group given time,will shift the group’s consensus away from themajority’s position toward the one they favor (seeCrano & Seyranian, 2007; Martin & Hewstone,2008, for reviews).

Consistency and Influence In Twelve Angry Men,Juror #8 always voted in favor of “not guilty.” Hedid not waver, for a moment, as the majority pres-sured him to change his vote. He did not alwayshave compelling arguments to back up his position,but he was always consistent in the defense of hisview.

A consistent minority is an influential one.Moscovici verified the importance of maintainingconsistency in his original blue–green study byalso including a condition in which the confede-rates labeled the blue slides green on two-thirds ofthe trials instead of all of the trials. The error ratedropped down to 1.25%—hardly any influence atall (Moscovici et al., 1969; Moscovici & Personnaz,1980).

Subsequent studies have confirmed the impor-tance of behavioral consistency on the part of theminority, but also suggest that minorities must walkthe line between appearing self-assured and unrea-sonable. Minorities are particularly influential whenthe majority interprets the consistency positively(Wood et al., 1994) and if minorities offer coherent,compelling arguments that contradict the majority’sposition (Clark, 1990). They are also more influen-tial if they signal their confidence in their opinionby sitting at the head of the table (Nemeth &Wachtler, 1974) or by reminding the group of theirexperience (Shackelford, Wood, & Worchel,1996). Successful minorities grant minor conces-sions to the majority (Pérez & Mungy, 1996), orengage in small talk about unrelated matters priorto revealing their position (Dolinski, Nawrat, &Rudak, 2001). In general, minorities are more in-fluential when they are perceived to be team playerswho are committed, competent, and group cen-tered (Levine & Russo, 1987).

An influential minority also avoids threateningthe integrity of the group itself. Many groups willtolerate debate and disagreement, but if the dissentcreates deep divisions in the group, the majoritymay take steps to quash the minority or exclude itsmembers from the group. If a group is just a looseconglomeration of individuals with no clear senseof identity, then the members of this “group” donot feel threatened by disagreement. But if the

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group members identify strongly with their group,and they feel that the dissenter is undermining itscollective identity, they are more likely to feel asense of loss when members begin to take a minor-ity’s arguments seriously (Prislin, Brewer, & Wilson,2002). In such cases, an individual who is not evena member of the group may be more influentialthan an ingroup member (Phillips, 2003).

Idiosyncrasy Credits In Twelve Angry Men, Juror#8 was influential, but so was Juror #11. That jurorvoted guilty on the first ballot, as did the other 10jurors. But, when Juror #8 noted several conflictingaspects of the evidence, Juror #11 changed hismind and shifted his vote. Did prefacing his dissentwith conformity increase or decrease his influence?

Edwin Hollander (1971) developed the con-cept of idiosyncrasy credits to explain the group’spositive reaction to a minority who prefaces dissentwith conformity. According to Hollander, idiosyn-crasy credits are “the positive impressions of aperson held by others, whether defined in the nar-rower terms of a small face-to-face group or a largersocial entity such as an organization or even a totalsociety” (1971, p. 573). These credits accumulate asmembers interact—typically as the member contri-butes to the progress of the group toward desiredgoals. Because high-status members have usuallycontributed more in the past and possess more val-ued personal characteristics, they have more idio-syncrasy credits. Therefore, if they do not conform,their actions are more tolerable to the other mem-bers. The low-status members’ balance of credits is,in comparison, very low; hence, they are permitteda smaller latitude for nonconformity. The idiosyn-crasy model, which has been supported experimen-tally, suggests that influence levels in a group areincreased by careful conformity to group norms

during the early phases of group formation, fol-lowed by dissent when a sufficient balance of idio-syncrasy credit has been established (Hollander,2006).

Hollander’s advice about early conformity con-trasts to some extent with Moscovici’s recommen-dations concerning consistent nonconformity.Hollander warned that dissenters who challengethe majority without first earning high status inthe group will probably be overruled by the major-ity, but Moscovici argued that consistent noncon-formity will lead to innovation and change. Bothtactics, however, may prove effective. Researcherscompared the two in group discussions of threeissues. One minority built up idiosyncrasy creditsby agreeing on the first two issues that the groupdiscussed, but then disagreeing on the third. Thesecond minority built up consistency by disagreeingwith the group on all three issues. Both minoritieswere influential, but the minority who built upidiosyncrasy credits was more influential in all-malegroups (Bray, Johnson, & Chilstrom, 1982).

The Diligence of Dissenters Part of the secret ofthe unique influence of minorities lies in the qualityof their argumentation. Those who know that theyare members of the majority position on an issuefeel less pressure to articulate their points clearly, forthey expect that, with numbers on their side, theyare likely to carry the day. But the individual whoholds the minority position feels more intently theneed to craft persuasive messages. Disagreeing withothers is not a situation most people find enjoyable,and so few enter into this predicament withoutconsidering the strength of their own argumentsand their reasonableness. Minorities are likely tohave put more thought into the issue, and as a resultthey are able to ready a stronger defense of theirposition (Guinote, Brown, & Fiske, 2006).

Researchers tested the augmented argumenta-tive skill of minorities by asking individuals to readabout a controversial medical case and then decideif they supported the physicians’ decision in thematter. Before being given the opportunity tomeet with others to discuss the case, the participantswere told that they agreed either with the majority

idiosyncrasy credit In Edwin Hollander’s explanationfor the leniency groups sometimes display toward highstatus members who violate group norms, the hypothet-ical interpersonal credit or bonus that is earned each timethe individual makes a contribution to the group but isdecreased each time the individual influences others,makes errors, or deviates from the group’s norms.

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or the minority of the group. Those assigned to themajority condition were told that 78% of the othersagreed with them, and those in the minority con-dition were led to believe that only 22% sharedtheir view. Participants then were asked to providetheir arguments and reasons in support of their po-sition in writing. The researchers then gave thesewritten arguments to raters who evaluated the mes-sages for creativity and strength. As expected, the“minorities” crafted better arguments than thosein the “majority” (Kenworthy et al., 2008). In arelated study, researchers found that individualswho knew they would be arguing against the viewsof the majority prepared more diligently for theirmeetings (Van Hiel & Franssen, 2003).

Decision Rules and Dissent Juror #8 faced adifficult situation—he alone disagreed with all theothers in the group—but one aspect of the groupsituation helped him cope: the group’s decisionrule. The law required the group to operate underthe rule of unanimity, meaning that all group mem-bers had to agree on the decision before the casewas closed. If a group operates under a unanimityrule, then the lone minority has far more power overthe others. But if the group adopts a majority-rulesprocedure, then the majority can reach its decisionwithout having to even consider the validity ofthe minority’s position (Thompson, Mannix, &Bazerman, 1988). A unanimity rule helps the mi-nority, and the majority-rules procedure benefitsthe majority.

Investigators examined the impact of thegroup’s decision rule on the relative influence ofmajorities and minorities by asking three-persongroups to role play owners of three small businessesnegotiating to rent a shared marketplace. Two ofthe members agreed with one another on several ofthe key issues, but the third member was the loneminority. Some of the groups worked under a una-nimity rule, which stipulated that all three partiesmust agree to the terms of the final decision, butothers were bound by the majority-rules stipula-tion. As expected, the group working under theunanimity rule reached a decision that was fairerto all three of the parties than did the groups that

operated under the majority-rules order, but whenthe group based its decision on majority-rules, themajority formed a coalition that blocked the mi-nority. Group members’ personal motivations,however, moderated this tendency in a significantway, for the pernicious effects of the groups’ deci-sion rule only occurred when members were moti-vated to maximize their own personal rewardsrather than the rewards for the entire group (TenVelden, Beersma & De Dreu, 2007).

Dynamic Social Impact Theory

Why did the members of the Twelve Angry Men juryinitially vote, 11 to 1, in favor of a guilty verdict?And why did they, over time, change their votes?From the majority’s perspective, change takes placewhen group members recognize the wisdom ofthe collective and conform to its choices. From theminority’s perspective, change takes place when themajority reexamines and possibly revises its position.But change in groups is actually a mutual process—the majority influences the minority, and the mi-nority influences the majority.

Dynamic social impact theory, as proposedby Bibb Latané and his colleagues, describes theprocesses underlying this give-and-take between themajority and the minority. As noted in Focus 7.1,social impact theory suggests that influence is deter-mined by the strength, immediacy, and number ofsources present. Dynamic social impact theory ex-tends this basic principle by describing how groups,as complex systems, change over time. Groups arenot static, but constantly organizing and reorganiz-ing in four basic patterns: consolidation, clustering,correlation, and continuing diversity (Harton &Bullock, 2007; Latané, 1996, 1997; Latané &Bourgeois, 1996, 2001; Vallacher & Nowak, 2007).

dynamic social impact theory Bibb Latané’s exten-sion of his social impact theory, which assumes that in-fluence is a function of the strength, the immediacy, andthe number of sources present, and that this influenceresults in consolidation, clustering, correlation, and con-tinuing diversity in groups that are spatially distributedand interacting repeatedly over time.

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1. Consolidation. As individuals interact withone another regularly, their actions,attitudes, and opinions become more uniform.For example, even when individuals areassigned at random to rooms in collegedormitories, over the course of the academicyear their attitudes on a variety of topicsbecome more and more similar (Cullum &Harton, 2007). The opinions held by amajority of the group tend to spreadthroughout the group, and the minoritydwindles in size.

2. Clustering. As the law of social impact suggests,people are more influenced by their closestneighbors, so clusters of group members withsimilar opinions emerge in groups. Clustering ismore likely when group members communi-cate more frequently with members who areclose by and less frequently with more distantgroup members, and if members changelocations to join similar others.

3. Correlation. Over time, the group members’opinions on a variety of issues—even onesthat are not discussed openly in the group—converge, so that their opinions becomecorrelated. Students living on the same floorof a dorm, for example, find that they agreeon topics that they have discussed during theyear—such as the value of certain majors or thebest times to work out in the fitness center—but that they also agree on topics they havenever discussed or even considered discussing:the value of labor unions, the benefits of theGreek system, and human cloning (Cullum &Harton, 2007).

4. Continuing diversity. Because of clustering,members of minorities are often shielded fromthe influence attempts of the majority, andtheir beliefs continue within the group.Diversity drops if the majority is very large andif the members of the minority are physicallyisolated from one another, but diversitycontinues when the minority members who

communicate with the majority resist themajority’s influence attempts.

Helen Harton and her colleagues identified allfour patterns in a study of classroom groups (Hartonet al., 1998). They asked students to answer severalmultiple-choice questions twice—once on theirown, and once after talking about the questionswith the two people sitting on either side ofthem. Consolidation occurred on several of thequestions. On one question, 17 of the 30 studentsfavored an incorrect alternative before discussion.After discussion, 5 more students changed theiranswers and sided with the incorrect majority—including 3 students who had initially answeredthe question correctly. The majority increasedfrom 57% to 73%. Clustering was also apparent;11 students disagreed with both of their neighborsinitially, but after discussion, only 5 students dis-agreed with both neighbors—indeed, two largeclusters of 6 and 13 students who all agreed withone another emerged. Students within clusters alsotended to give the same answers on other items(correlation), and some individuals refused to changetheir answers, even though no one else agreed withthem (continuing diversity).

These four patterns vary depending on thenumber of times the group holds its discussion, thedispersion of the group members, the group’scommunication network, the status of particularindividuals, the group members’ desire to reachagreement, and other aspects of the situation(Kameda, 1996; Kameda & Sugimori, 1995;Latané, 1997). The four tendencies are robust, how-ever, and answer some key questions about influencein groups. Do most groups eventually converge on asingle opinion that represents the average across allmembers? Dynamic social impact theory says no—groups tend to become polarized on issues as clustersform within the group. Does social pressure eventu-ally force all those who disagree with the majority toconform? Again, dynamic social impact theory sug-gests that minorities, particularly in spatially distrib-uted groups, are protected from influence. So longas minorities can cluster together, diversity in groupsis ensured (Nowak, Vallacher, & Miller, 2003).

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SOURCES OF GROUP

INFLUENCE

Many people think of conformity in a negativeway. They assume that people who change to agreewith others are so weak-willed that they lack theindependence to stand up for their personal beliefs.This pejorative view, unfortunately, underestimatesthe complexity of social influence, for individuals inany group change their behavior for a variety ofreasons. First, conformity is often the most reason-able response in a situation: when others are well-informed but we ourselves are ignorant, it’s wise touse them as an informational resource. Second,people often conform because they implicitly ac-cept the legitimacy of the group and it’s norms.Last, conformity is often interpersonally rewarding:Groups tend to be aggregations of like-minded in-dividuals and so those who do not go along withthe majority find that they are pressured to change.These three causes of conformity—the informa-tional, the normative, and the interpersonal—areexamined in the next section (Deutsch & Gerard,1955; Kelley, 1952).

Informational Influence

In the Twelve Angry Men trial, Juror #11 changed hisverdict from guilty to not guilty, but he did notmindlessly go along. Rather, when #11 learnedthat #8 had a “reasonable doubt,” he wondered,“Why did #8 draw different conclusions about thecase than I did?” and “Am I correct in my interpre-tation of the evidence?” He reconsidered his positionbecause another group member provided him withclarifying information.

Informational influence occurs when groupmembers use the responses of others in the group asreference points and informational resources. If a

group member learns that 99 other people favorPlan A over Plan B, that individual will likely adoptPlan A simply because “everyone else does.” If onegroup member smiles or laughs, soon after, othergroup members will begin smiling (Semin, 2007).Frowns, too, are contagious, and will spread fromone group member to another (Bourgeois & Hess,2008). If a sufficiently large number of people beginto adopt a new fashion, hairstyle, or attitude, therest of the group and community may adopt thecraze as well (Gladwell, 2000). As Robert Cialdini’s(2009) principle of social proof suggests, people assumethat a behavior is the correct one when they seeothers performing it.

Social Comparison Social comparison theoryassumes that group members, as active informationprocessors, evaluate the accuracy of their beliefs andgauge the quality of their personal attributes bycomparing themselves to other individuals. If indi-viduals facing questions with no clear solution—“Isthe defendant guilty?” “Is Plan A better thanPlan B?” “Is majority influence stronger thanminority influence?”—cannot reduce this uncer-tainty by consulting objective sources of informa-tion, they turn to the views endorsed by others inthe group (see Chapter 4). In some cases, groupsdeliberately gather information about their mem-bers’ opinions. Many deliberating groups, includingjuries, stop their discussions periodically to take aso-called straw poll to see which way the group, asa whole, is leaning (picture the wind blowing acrossa field of straw). In most cases, however, informa-tion about others’ views is gathered during routineinteractions (Gerard & Orive, 1987). Like pollsterswho gauge public opinion by sampling opinions insurveys of communities, people informally takenote of their fellow group members’ actions andbeliefs and revise their own positions accordingly.Festinger and his colleagues put it this way:

The “social reality” upon which an opin-ion or attitude rests for its justification isthe degree to which the individual per-ceives that this opinion or attitude is sharedby others. An opinion or attitude that is

informational influence Interpersonal processes thatpromote change by challenging the correctness of groupmembers’ beliefs or the appropriateness of their behaviordirectly (e.g., though communication and persuasion) orindirectly (e.g., through social comparison processes).

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not reinforced by others of the sameopinion will become unstable generally.(Festinger et al., 1950, p. 168)

Members’ sampling of others’ opinions is not,however, systematic or objective. They oversample,for example, the opinions of those in their owngroup compared to those of people outside of theirgroup (Denrell & Le Mens, 2007). If people happento interact more frequently with some group mem-bers than with others, in time the opinions of thosemore frequent contacts will come to define theirinferences about the group’s overall position onissues—even if the frequent contacts are only a smallsample of the group. Those on the group’s peripherymay endorse positions that are not fully consistentwith the group, but not because the group ostracizedthem. Their isolation prevents them from accessingthe social information they need to hone their opi-nions and also prevents the other group membersfrom gaining their unique insights. As a result,both members of the majority and the minoritydisplay a false consensus effect: they assume thatthere is more support for their position than thereactually is (Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Clement,1997; see, too, McGregor et al., 2005).

Dual Process Approaches Judging from thenumber of models proposed by theorists, those whostudy majority and minority influence must be non-conformists themselves. Robin Martin and MilesHewstone (2008) examined no fewer than eight dis-tinct theories that seek to explain when group mem-bers change their opinions and judgments and whenthey hold fast to their original positions. Most of thesetheories, despite their differences in emphases, aredual process theories of influence. They agree

that both majority and minority influence, like per-suasion and other types of influence processes, resultfrom direct and indirect cognitive processes. Directprocesses (or central, systematic processes) entail athoughtful analysis, or elaboration, of the issues athand. Group members, confronted with an opinionthat is different from their own, review the argu-ments, look for weaknesses, reexamine their ownideas on the topic, and revise their position if revisionis warranted. Indirect processes (or peripheral, heuristicprocesses), in contrast, do not require very muchmental effort or elaboration. During a group discus-sion members may not pay much attention, they donot really understand the arguments completely, andthey forget what other people have suggested. Yetthey still change their minds (Maio & Haddock,2007).

Diane Mackie (1987), for example, tracedmuch of the impact of a majority on a minorityback to direct informational influence. She led herparticipants to believe that they were part of a smallminority that disagreed with a majority on suchmatters as foreign policy and juvenile justice. Afterthey listened to members of both the minorityand the majority argue their positions, Mackieasked them to record their thoughts and reactions.When Mackie examined these cognitive reactions,she found that participants recalled more of thearguments offered by the majority, and they hadmore positive reactions to the majority’s view afterthe discussion. Mackie also found that people whomore extensively processed the majority’s messagechanged their opinions more than those who didnot process the message. Exposure to others’positions—in addition to providing further infor-mation and prompting a more thorough analysisof that information—can also cause group membersto reinterpret or cognitively restructure key aspectsof the issue (see Martin & Hewstone, 2008, for areview).

Minorities’ viewpoints, too, can stimulate cog-nitive elaboration of decision-relevant information.As Moscovici argued, minorities influence majori-ties by creating cognitive conflicts that challengethe status quo of the group and call for a reevalua-tion of issues at hand. Minority dissent can

false consensus effect Perceivers’ tendency to assumethat their personal qualities and characteristics are com-mon in the general population.dual process theories of influence In general, a con-ceptual analysis arguing that individuals change in re-sponse to direct forms of influence (such as persuasion)and indirect forms of influence (such as mimickinganother’s response).

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undermine the majority’s certainty and force thegroup to seek out new information about the situ-ation. When minority opinion is present, groupstake longer to reach their conclusions and aremore likely to consider multiple perspectiveswhen drawing conclusions (Peterson & Nemeth,1996). If the majority considers the minority to bepart of the ingroup, it will think positively ratherthan negatively about the minority position (Crano& Seyranian, 2007). Minorities also prompt groupmembers to use more varied strategies in solvingproblems and to devise more creative solutions(Nemeth, 1986). In some cases, groupmembers recallinformation presented by the minority more clearlythan information presented by the majority (Nemethet al., 1990; cf. Walther et al., 2002).

These direct informational influence processesare complemented by more indirect, less rationalprocesses (Moskowitz & Chaiken, 2001). Particu-larly when members’ cognitive resources are limitedor when group members are not motivated to dothe cognitive work necessary to weigh the informa-tion available to them, they will use simplifyinginferential principles, termed heuristics, to reachdecisions quickly. They might, for example, basetheir decision on their general mood rather thanthe quality of others’ arguments—people in goodmoods tend to conform more than those in badones (Tong et al., 2008). If someone in the groupspeaks eloquently using very general, abstract termsrather than specifics, the group may assume thatperson knows what he or she is talking about andgravitate toward their position (Sigall, Mucchi-Faina, & Mosso, 2006). And, as the principle ofsocial proof suggests, people tend to have faith inthe collective wisdom (Cialdini, 2009). Is a restau-rant a good place to eat? Is this a good book? Peo-ple tend to assume that a restaurant is a good oneif many people dine there, and that best-sellingbooks are better than unranked ones. Behavioraleconomists call this preference for popular choices

herding, and underscore its rational basis: there isinformation revealed in the choices other peoplemake (Venkatesh & Goyal, 1998).

A minority’s influence also depends, in part, onthese kinds of cognitive shortcuts. Because groupmembers are also sensitive to shifts in the group’sgeneral opinion, if members notice that the minor-ity position is gaining ground on the majority, thenthey may shift sides as well—creating a cascade ofopinion shift (Chamley, 2004). Russell Clark (1999,2001) examined this process by measuring obser-vers’ verdicts after each round of balloting in ajury trial. He first provided observers with a detaileddescription of a hypothetical trial and jury delibera-tion patterned after the one described in TwelveAngry Men. He then asked the observers to ratethe guilt of the defendant after learning that onthe first ballot, the vote was 11 against 1, with themajority favoring a guilty verdict. Nearly allthe observers agreed with the majority, but as thedeliberations progressed, the observers learned thatthe minority position was growing from 9 to 3, to 6to 6, to 3 to 9, and eventually 0 to 12. With eachprogressive vote, the observers shifted their ownratings from guilty to not guilty. Other researchhas suggested that individuals are particularly likelyto join an expanding minority when the minorityoffers cogent arguments supporting its position andwhen other defectors are thought to have beenswayed by the logic of the minority’s argumentsrather than by self-interest (Gordijn, De Vries, &De Dreu, 2002).

Normative Influence

Informational influence occurs because others’ res-ponses convey information concerning the natureof the social setting and how most people areresponding to that setting. Normative influence,

heuristic An inferential principle or rule of thumb thatpeople use to reach conclusions when the amount of avail-able information is limited, ambiguous, or contradictory.

normative influence Personal and interpersonal pro-cesses that cause individuals to feel, think, and act inways that are consistent with social norms, standards, andconvention. Because individuals internalize their group’snorms, they strive to act in ways that are consistent withthose norms.

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in contrast, occurs when members tailor their actionsand attitudes to match the norms of the group situa-tion. The members of the majority in the TwelveAngry Men jury, for example, did more than justthink, “Most everyone in the group agrees withme.” They also recognized that their position wasthe normative one: “This group has decided the de-fendant is guilty and anyone who believes differentlyis going against the norms of this group.”

Normative influence causes members to feel,think, and act in ways that are consistent with thegroup’s norms. At an interpersonal level, people feelcompelled to act in accordance with norms becausea variety of negative consequences could resultfrom nonconformity. People who consistentlyviolate their group’s norms are often reminded oftheir duty and told to mend their ways. Normativeinfluence has, however, a personal, psychologicalfoundation. Norms are not simply external con-straints but internalized standards. When peopleidentify with their groups, they feel duty-bound toadhere to the group’s norms; they accept the legiti-macy of the established norms and they recognizethe importance of supporting these norms. Thus,people obey norms not only because they fear thenegative interpersonal consequences—ostracism,ridicule, punishment—that their nonconformitymay produce, but also because they feel personallycompelled to live up to their own expectations.

Normative influence generates conformity in arange of everyday situations. Even in relativelyfleeting social encounters, individuals are loath toviolate the implicit rules that specify the “normal”way to act. Milgram (1992) examined this process,informally, by asking people to deliberately violatesocial norms and then describe how they felt after-wards. His student researchers broke the “first-come,first-served” norm of subway seating by asking sub-way riders in New York City to give up their seats.Many people turned over their seats to the students,but Milgram was more interested in how the stu-dents felt. The students were volunteers who knewthey were breaking an inconsequential norm in thename of research, but all “felt anxious, tense, andembarrassed. Frequently, they were unable to vocal-ize the request for a seat and had to withdraw”

(Milgram, 1992, p. 42). Milgram, who also per-formed the norm violation task himself, describedthe experience as wrenching and concluded thatthere is an “enormous inhibitory anxiety that ordinar-ily prevents us from breaching social norms” (p. xxiv).

This negative psychological reaction to discov-ering one has managed to wander outside of thegroup’s norms generates a negative reaction that isakin to cognitive dissonance. As noted in Chapter 5,Festinger (1957) suggested that cognitive dissonanceis such an unpleasant state that people are motivatedto take steps to reduce dissonance whenever it oc-curs. Dissonance theory originally focused on howpeople respond when they hold two inconsistentcognitions, but researchers have confirmed thatpeople also experience dissonance when they dis-cover that they do not agree with other group mem-bers. In one study, individuals with extreme opinionson issues were led to believe they were going to dis-cuss these issues with four or five other people whohad directly opposing opinions. Before the discus-sion, the participants described their emotions, andas expected they were not positive: participants re-ported feeling more uneasy, uncomfortable, tense,bothered, and concerned—all indications of cogni-tive dissonance (Matz & Wood, 2005).

The discomfort of disagreeing with others canbe so great that it even triggers activity in portionsof the brain associated with pain, fear, and stress. Toexamine brain activity during conformity andindependence, investigators used a functional mag-netic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner to monitorparticipants’ neuronal activity. Volunteers were toldthat the study would examine their spatial-relationsabilities by asking them to decide if two rotated3-dimensional objects were identical. To createsocial influence during the mental rotation task, asparticipants made their judgments, they were pre-sented with the responses of four peers who, on halfof the trials, chose the wrong answer. The research-ers discovered that when participants agreed withthe group (even when the group was incorrect)portions of their brain associated with processingvisual information were most active—they assumedthe others’ responses were valid and adopted theirsolution as their own. But when they disagreed

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with the group, portions of the brain that are re-sponsible for strong emotional responses (the amyg-dala) showed evidence of high neuronal activity(Berns et al., 2005).

Given its emotional impact, normative influ-ence often leads to more potent and longerlasting influence than informational influence (seeFocus 7.2). Robert Cialdini and his colleagues con-trasted these two forms of influence in their studiesof pro-environment actions (Cialdini, Kallgren, &Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990).Cialdini’s research team put handbills under thewindshield wipers of cars in a parking lot, andthen they watched to see if people threw thesescraps of paper on the ground when they returnedto their cars. They then manipulated the salience ofnorms about littering across three conditions. Tocreate information influence, some participants,while walking toward their car, passed by a confed-erate who carefully dropped a bag of trash into agarbage can. This condition suggested, “Most peo-ple do not litter.” In a second condition, partici-pants saw a confederate actually pick up a piece oflitter (the same bag of trash) and dispose of it in thegarbage can. Cialdini and his colleagues believedthat this confederate made salient the injunctivenorm, “It is wrong to litter!” In the control condi-tion, the confederate merely walked by the partici-pant. Participants encountered the confederateeither in the lot where the participant’s car wasparked or on the path leading to the parking lot.

These researchers discovered that the informa-tional influence worked only for a short period oftime. Participants who saw the confederate throwaway his trash just before they got to their car wereless likely to litter than those who saw him or heron the path leading to their car. In contrast, theinjunctive norm became more powerful overtime. No one who saw the confederate pick uplitter on the path leading to the parking lot littered(Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993, Study 3).

Interpersonal Influence

Western societies claim to value nonconformity andindependence, but in most situations dissent is not

rewarded. In fact, it is met with interpersonalinfluence: social responses that encourage, or evenforce, group members to conform. In the TwelveAngry Men jury the men did not dispassionately dis-cuss their perceptions of the evidence calmly andcarefully. Instead, they complained, demanded,threatened, pleaded, negotiated, pressured, manip-ulated, insulted, and shouted—even threateningone another with physical harm—in an attempt tochange one another’s opinions so the group couldreach a unanimous decision. When informationalinfluence (“But we all believe he is guilty”) andnormative influence (“This jury has decided thatthe defendant is guilty, and as a member of thisgroup you should accept this decision”) failed, thenthe group tried to force its members to conform.

Stanley Schachter (1951) documented inter-personal influence by planting three kinds of con-federates in a number of all-male discussion “clubs.”The deviant always disagreed with the majority. Theslider disagreed initially, but conformed over thecourse of the discussion. The mode served as a con-trol; he consistently agreed with the majority.Schachter also manipulated the groups’ cohesive-ness by putting some of the participants in clubsthat interested them and others in clubs that didnot interest them. He assumed that people withcommon interests would be more cohesive thanthose with disparate interests. He also had thegroups discuss a topic that was either relevant orirrelevant to the group’s stated purpose.

Schachter was interested in how group memberswould pressure the deviant during the course of thediscussion, so he kept track of each comment di-rected to the deviant, slider, and mode by the othergroup members. He predicted that the group wouldinitially communicate with the mode, deviant, andslider at equal rates. But once the group becameaware of the deviant’s and slider’s disagreement,group members would concentrate on these twoparticipants. Schachter believed that communication

interpersonal influence Social influence that resultsfrom other groupmembers selectively encouraging confor-mity and discouraging or even punishing nonconformity.

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would continue at a high rate until the dissentercapitulated to the majority opinion (as in the caseof the slider) or until the majority concluded thatthe deviant would not budge from his position (asin the case of the persistent deviant), but thatthis reaction would be exacerbated by the group’scohesiveness and the relevance of the task.

Influence and Ostracism Figure 7.6 summarizesSchachter’s findings. In most cases, the group com-municated with the slider and the mode at a rela-tively low rate throughout the session, whereascommunications with the deviant increased duringthe first 35 minutes of discussion. At the 35-minutemark, however, some groups seemed to haverejected the deviant. These groups were cohesiveones working on a task that was relevant to thegroup’s goals and whose members developed a neg-ative attitude toward the deviant. Schachter discov-ered that not all groups disliked the deviant, andthat this level of liking played a key role in howthe deviant was treated. If the group developed morepositive feelings for the deviant, communication

increased all the way up to the final minute. If thegroup disliked the deviant, communication droppedprecipitously.

Schachter’s findings highlight the differencebetween inclusive and exclusive reactions to minor-ities (see Levine & Kerr, 2007, for a review). Mostof the groups displayed an inclusive reaction to thedeviant: Communication between the majority andthe minority was intensive and hostile, but the mi-nority was still perceived to be a member of theingroup. If an exclusive reaction occurred, however,communication with the deviant dwindled alongwith overt hostility, and the deviant was perceptu-ally removed from the group by the majoritymembers. An exclusive reaction becomes morelikely when group members think that theirgroup is very heterogeneous (Festinger, Pepitone,& Newcomb, 1952; Festinger & Thibaut, 1951).Highly cohesive groups, too, will sometimes “rede-fine the group’s boundary” if the dissenter is inflex-ible and the issue is important (Gerard, 1953).So-called double minorities—individuals who dis-agree with the group and also possess one or more

To excludeddeviants

To mostdeviates

To the mode

To the slider

Time

Co

mm

un

icat

ion

Rat

e

F I G U R E 7.6 Communication rates with a mode, a slider, a deviant who is excluded, and a deviant whois included. Schachter’s (1951) study of communication found that the person who disagreed with the others(the deviant) usually received the most communication throughout the discussion period. The only exception occurredin cohesive groups working on a relevant task whose members disliked the deviant. In this case, communications ta-pered off. The average number of communications addressed to the mode increased slightly over the session, whilecommunication with the slider decreased.

INF LUENCE 201

other unique qualities that distinguish them fromthe rest of the group—are also more likely to faceexclusion (Sampson & Brandon, 1964).

Interpersonal Rejection The group membersdid not just argue with the deviant—they also re-jected the deviant. When Schachter’s participantsrated each other on likability, the deviant was thesociometric outcast, whereas the mode was likedthe most. The deviant was also saddled with the sec-retarial chores of the group; the mode and slider wereassigned more desirable positions. This rejection wasmore pronounced in the more cohesive groups.

The group’s dislike of dissenters even extendedto the slider. Sliders, it could be argued, do little toprovoke rejection. They begin the discussion bytaking a position that few favor, but after a timethey listen to reason and shift. What’s not to likeabout such a reasonable person? Yet, Schachter’sfindings show that the slider was not as well-likedas someone who sided with the majority all along(the mode). Indeed, any disagreement with a groupis enough to lower one’s interpersonal acceptance.John Levine and his associates, across a series ofstudies, have examined reactions to all types of de-viants: ones who start off neutral and then conform,others who begin as extreme deviants and then shiftover to the majority, and even those who start offwith the majority and then slide toward dissent(see Levine, 1980; Levine & Kerr, 2007). Levinelike Schachter, found that nonconformists andthose who were initially neutral but eventually dis-agreed were liked the least. Moreover, even theindividual who abandons his or her initial positionto agree with the group is liked less than a conform-ist. These reactions to the dissenter likely reflectgroup members’ sensitivity to the size of shiftingmajorities and minorities. Majority members aregratified when a member of the minority converts,but they are particularly troubled when a memberof the majority “goes over to the other side” (Prislin,Limbert, & Bauer, 2000).

Subsequent studies have replicated this rela-tionship between rejection and nonconformity,although these studies also identify certain situa-tional factors that increase the magnitude of this

relationship. Task relevance, cohesiveness, group con-sensus, interdependence, behavior extremity, and thedegree of threat posed by the dissenter all work toincrease rejection. The deviant’s contribution to thetask, apologies for deviation, and history of previousconformity reduce the likelihood of rejection, as donorms that encourage deviation and innovation(Levine & Kerr, 2007; Tata et al., 1996).

Social identity processes play a particularlycritical role in determining members’ reactions todeviants and conformists. Social identity theory, asdiscussed in Chapter 3, suggests that members sharea common identity that defines the prototypicalqualities of a member and encourages a distinctionbetween members and nonmembers. Group mem-bers find deviants within their midst to be distres-sing because they call into question the group’spositive identity and make hazy the distinctivenessof the ingroup relative to outgroups. These psycho-logical processes, which are referred to as subjectivegroup dynamics, will cause individuals to reactnegatively to dissenters with whom they share onlycategory memberships. A fan of the Arsenal soccerteam, for example, will react negatively to anotherArsenal fan who expresses admiration for the play ofthe Manchester United forward—even though thetwo fans might never actually meet. One intriguingconsequence of subjective group dynamics: ingroupmembers are sometimes judged more harshly thanoutgroup members when they perform identicalbehaviors. A statement that Manchester Unitedplayed brilliantly will be tolerated when spoken bya Man U fan, but if an Arsenal fan expresses such abelief he or she would be roundly criticized by otherArsenal fans. This tendency is termed the black-sheep effect (Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005).

subjective group dynamics Psychological and inter-personal processes that result from social categorizationand identification processes, including members’ desireto sustain the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup andthe validity of its shared beliefs.black-sheep effect The tendency for group members toevaluate a group member who performs an offensivebehavior more harshly than an outgroup member whoperforms the same offense.

202 CHAPTER 7

F o c u s 7.2 Are Groups Apathetic?

We are discreet sheep; we wait to see how the drove isgoing, and then go with the drove.

—Mark Twain

In the early morning of March 13, 1964, a youngwoman named Catherine Genovese (“Kitty” to herfriends) was attacked and killed in Queens, New York.Thirty-eight people witnessed the murder, but none ofthem helped. Only one person even called the police(Seeman & Hellman, 1975).

Many blamed this failure on the bystanders, sug-gesting that the urbanites were cruel, apathetic, orlacking the moral compunction needed to compelthem to act. But when Bibb Latané and John Darley(1970) read about the murder of Kitty Genovese, theywere struck by the large number of witnesses. Couldsocial pressures, they wondered, have interfered withpeople’s capacity to respond in a helpful way to theemergency? Latané and Darley investigated this possi-bility by creating a false emergency in their laboratory.While male college students completed some bogusquestionnaires, Latané and Darley pumped whitesmoke through an air vent into the test room. Someparticipants were alone in the room, but othersworked in three-person groups consisting of oneparticipant and two confederates. The confederatespretended to be participants, but they ignored theemergency. As the room filled with smoke, they non-chalantly glanced at the vent, shrugged, and wentback to their questionnaires. If the participant men-tioned the smoke to them, they said merely “I dunno.”In a third condition, all three members of the groupwere actual participants.

When tested alone, participants usually left theroom to report the smoke within two minutes; 75%reported the emergency within the six-minute timelimit. Participants tested in groups behaved very dif-ferently. Only 10% of the participants tested with thepassive confederates ever reported the smoke, and thereporting percentage reached no higher than 15%even when all three group members were actual

participants. By the time the six-minute period was up,the room was so smoky that participants could not seethe far wall. They coughed and rubbed their eyes, butthey stayed at their tables, fanning the fumes away fromtheir papers so they could finish their questionnaires.

Latané and Darley’s work demonstrated thebystander effect—people are less likely to helpwhen in groups rather than alone—and soon otherinvestigators confirmed these results. A statisticalreview of approximately four dozen studies of nearly6000 people who faced various apparent emergenciesalone or in a group indicated that groups impedehelping. Across these various studies, about 75% of theparticipants tested alone intervened, but only 53% ofthe participants in groups helped (Latané & Nida, 1981).

But why do people in groups not help as much assingle individuals? First, informational influenceprompts individuals to rely on the actions of the otherbystanders to guide their interpretation of the situa-tion. Unfortunately, because emergencies are some-times ambiguous, each nonresponding bystander sendsthe same inaccurate message to every other nonre-sponding bystander: “It’s OK; no help is needed.” Insituations that are obviously emergencies, the by-stander effect disappears (Clark & Word, 1972, 1974).

Second, normative influence does not enjoin by-standers to help. In most everyday situations “commonlaw” (the natural norms that dictate proper conduct)does not require one act as a Good Samaritan(Feigenson, 2000). What bystanders do worry about,however, is breaking norms of civil inattention. Mostpeople prefer to appear poised and normal in socialsettings, and actively avoid doing anything that maylead to embarrassment. In an ambiguous emergency,people fear that they will look foolish if they offer as-sistance to someone who does not need it, so they lookthe other way rather than get involved (Schwartz &Gottlieb, 1976).

Third, people feel less responsible when in groupscompared to alone, and this diffusion of responsibilityleaves bystanders feeling that it is not their

bystander effect The tendency for people to help lesswhen they know others are present and capable of helping.The effect was initially thought to be the result of apathy anda selfish unwillingness to get involved, but research suggestsa number of cognitive and social processes, includingdiffusion of responsibility and misinterpretation that help isnot needed, contribute to the effect.

diffusion of responsibility A reduction of personalresponsibility experienced by individuals in groups andsocial collectives identified by John Darley and BibbLatané in their studies of bystanders’ failures to helpsomeone in need.

(Continued)

I N F LUENCE 203

APPL ICAT ION :

UNDERSTANDING JUR IES

Groups have served as the final arbiter of guilt and in-nocence for centuries. As far back as the 11th century,the neighbors of those accused of wrongdoing wereasked both to provide information about the actionsof the accused and to weigh the evidence. Witnessesand experts now provide the evidence, but the juryremains responsible for weighing the testimony ofeach person before rendering a verdict. More than300,000 juries convene each year in American court-rooms alone (Hyman & Tarrant, 1975).

Jury Dynamics

The jury situation is designed to foster careful deci-sion making and tolerance for all viewpoints, but atits core, a jury is a group. The jury’s final decisiondepends not only on the evidence presented at thetrial, the attorneys’ arguments, and the judge’sinstructions, but also on social influence.

Stories, Evidence, and Verdicts The ChicagoJury Project, conducted in the 1950s, was one ofthe first attempts to study, systematically, the waysjuries carry out their responsibilities and rendertheir verdicts. Using a variety of methods, includingjury simulations, recording actual deliberations, andpost-trial interviews, the investigators discoveredthat most juries follow the same basic proceduresduring deliberation. Juries usually begin by electinga leader and deciding if balloting will be secret or

public. Most juries take a straw poll of their initialpreferences, and more than 30% reach completeconsensus on that first ballot (Kalven & Zeisel,1966). But when members disagree, they initiate aconsensus-seeking process. During this phase of thedeliberation, the group may ask the judge for in-structions and request additional information con-cerning the evidence. The group spends most of itstime, however, discussing points related to the ver-dict (Hans & Vidmar, 1991).

The jury’s approach to the deliberations de-pends, in part, on how it structures the task. Juryresearchers Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod, and NancyPennington (1983), in their story model of jurydeliberation, noted that jurors generally approachthe decision in one of two ways. Some jurors ap-pear to be verdict driven. They reach a decision aboutthe verdict before deliberation and cognitively or-ganize the evidence into two categories: evidencethat favors a verdict of guilty and evidence thatfavors a verdict of not guilty. Evidence-driven jurors,in contrast, resist making a final decision on theverdict until they have reviewed all the availableevidence; then they generate a story that weavestogether the evidence of trial and their own expec-tations and assumptions about people and similarsituations in a coherent narrative (Pennington &Hastie, 1986, 1992). Should the jurors find, duringdeliberations, that their stories are relatively similar,

responsibility to help. “The pressures to intervenedo not focus on any one of the observers; instead, theresponsibility for intervention is shared among allthe onlookers and is not unique to any one” (Darley &Latané, 1968, p. 378). Simply imagining that one willbe with others in a group is sufficient to reduce feelingsof accountability and helpfulness (Garcia et al., 2002).

These factors, although relatively mundanesocial processes in most contexts, combine to cause

bystanders to overlook the suffering of others. Thebystander effect is not caused by apathy or a lossof humanity that overtakes people when theybecome part of a collective. The effect is, instead,the predictable result of group-level social influenceprocesses that leave members confused, uncertainof the proper course of action, and unable totake action.


story model A theory of cognitive processing of trialinformation that suggests jurors mentally organize evi-dence in coherent, credible narratives.

204 CHAPTER 7

then the group will be able to reach a verdictquickly. If, however, their stories are differentthen they spend time discussing alternative storiesuntil a consensus can be reached.

When juries contain both verdict-driven andevidence-driven jurors, the approach preferred bythe majority of the jurors is generally used to struc-ture the deliberations. When researchers createdmock three-person juries containing two memberswho shared the same type of cognitive orientation,this cognitive majority dominated the deliberations,and in most cases, the individual with the alternativeviewpoint restructured his or her approach so that itmatched the majority’s approach (Kameda, 1994).

Minority Influence in Juries Most of the TwelveAngry Men jury, as they listened to the evidence

presented during the trial, made sense of it allwith a simple story: the ungrateful, disrespectfulson fought with his father and, in a fit of anger,killed him. Juror #8, in contrast, developed a dif-ferent story: the father, who had many enemies inthe neighborhood, was attacked by one of them,who stabbed him with a knife identical to oneowned by the man’s son. These two stories leadin very different directions in terms of the verdict,but over the course of the deliberations Juror #8managed to convince all the others that his storywas more credible than theirs.

The success of Juror #8 was a rarity. AsFigure 7.7 indicates, the verdict favored by themajority of the jurors—7 to 11 jurors in a regular12-person jury—on the first ballot becomes thejury’s final decision in 90% of all jury trials

Most vote notguilty

Majority vote notguilty

Closelysplit

Majority voteguilty

Most voteguilty

First Vote Outcome

%

20

25

30

15

10

5

0

Not guiltyHungGuilty

F I G U R E 7.7 The percentage of different types of outcomes in jury trials by initial distribution of votes. In mostcases, the decision favored by the majority of the jurors when deliberations first begin is the verdict returned by thatjury. Minority influence, although rare, occurred in about 10% of the cases when the majority favored acquittal and15% of the cases when the majority favored conviction.

INF LUENCE 205

(Devine et al., 2001). Most jurors implicitly adopta majority-rules decision norm: If a significantmajority of the members (say, two-thirds) favora verdict, then everyone in the group shouldagree with that verdict. In fact, a computer modelthat simulates jury deliberations (DICE) assumesthat a 3-person coalition in a standard 12-personjury will be relatively weak, but a 4- or 5-personcoalition will be fairly influential (Hastie et al., 1983).

Minorities are not powerless, however. Eventhough the majority tends to prevail in juries, asFigure 7.7 suggests, the minority convinces the ma-jority to change in about 1 trial out of every 10. Forexample, in the trial of the second defendant in theOklahoma City Bombing, Terry Nichols, the firstvote was 10 to 2 for acquittal (Bartels, 2001). Butthe two lone jurors who favored a guilty verdictdug in to their position and carefully reviewed theevidence for six long days. One of the jurors, ageophysicist, used his skill, logic, and persuasivetalents to craft a compromise verdict of guilty ofconspiracy but not guilty of first-degree murder.He was successful, in part, because of his recognizedexpertise and the rapid change in votes by four ofthe other jurors. These findings confirm the impor-tance of encouraging juries to take the time theyneed to deliberate before rendering a final decision(Hans et al. 2003).

Minorities can also deadlock the jury by refus-ing to conform to the majority’s verdict, resultingin a hung jury if a unanimous verdict is required.The origin of the term “hung jury” is not certain,but it was apparently first used to describe Americanjuries that could not reach a verdict. It matches“most closely to the meaning of the word hung ascaught, stuck, or delayed” (Hans et al., 2003, p. 33).Hung juries generally occur when the evidencedoes not clearly favor one verdict, and even thenoccur only in approximately 10% of such cases.When a hung jury does occur, it is often just oneor two jurors holding out against the majority(Hans et al., 2003).

Status and Influence Some members of theTwelve Angry Men jury had higher status withinthe group than the other rank-and-file members:

Juror #4, for example, was a stockbroker, whereasJuror #6 worked in construction. Is it a coincidencethat the jury paid far more attention to the ideasand suggestions of Juror #4 rather than #6?

Fairly or unfairly, people who have high prestigeor status are more influential than low-statusmembers. Researchers in the Chicago Jury Projectcarefully replicated all aspects of an actual trial. Theyselected sets of 12 individuals from a pool of eligiblejurors, simulated the pretrial interview process de-signed to eliminate biased jurors (voir dire), and assem-bled the group in the courtroom. A bailiff then playeda recording of a trial and asked the group to retire toa jury room to decide on a verdict. Except for theuse of a recording, the groups were treated just likeactual juries (Strodtbeck & Hook, 1961; Strodtbecket al., 1957; Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956).

Consistent with Chapter 6’s analysis ofexpectation-states theory, juries favored people ofhigher socioeconomic status (proprietors and clericalworkers) over those of lower socioeconomic status(blue-collar workers) when choosing a foreman,even though no mention of occupation was made(Strodtbeck & Lipinski, 1985). High-status membersalso participated more frequently in the jury’s dis-cussions, often by offering more suggestions andproviding more orientation to the task. High-statusmembers were also more successful in convincingthe others that their judgments on the case werethe most accurate. The correlation between privatepredeliberation opinion and the jury’s final decisionwas .50 for proprietors, but it dropped all the waydown to .02 for laborers (Strodtbeck et al., 1957).

In these studies, conducted in the 1950s, sex andrace differences were also apparent in juries. Womenand racial minorities joined in the discussion lessfrequently than men (James, 1959; Strodtbecket al., 1957). Furthermore, women’s commentswere more often relational in nature, showing soli-darity and agreement, whereas men’s commentswere more task-focused (Strodtbeck & Mann,1956; see also Nemeth, Endicott, & Wachtler,1976). These inequities, however, have faded overtime. Recent analyses suggest that race and sex nolonger determine influence in juries, but that socialstatus remains a potent factor; those jurors who are

206 CHAPTER 7

more affluent or well-educated continue to be moreinfluential than others (York & Cornwell, 2006).

How Effective Are Juries?

Given what we know about conformity and non-conformity in groups, should the jury system bemodified? Asch’s studies tell us that people oftenconform and that even a correct minority often losesto an incorrect majority. As we have seen, norma-tive, informational, and interpersonal influence arepowerful forces in groups, and they can quash indi-viduals’ freedom to speak their minds. Juries are atime-honored tradition, but are they effective?

Determining the effectiveness of juries as deci-ders of guilt or innocence is a complicated task, forwe can never know when the jury has been corrector incorrect in condemning or freeing a defendant.If a clear criterion for determining guilt existed,juries would not be necessary in the first place.Several bits of evidence, however, provide partialsupport for the effectiveness of juries as decisionmakers. First, jurors seem to take their role veryseriously. One jury expert, after studying the re-sponses of more than 2000 jurors participating inthe Chicago Jury Project, concluded,

The most consistent theme that emergedfrom listening to the deliberations was theseriousness with which the jurors ap-proached their job and the extent to whichthey were concerned that the verdict theyreached was consistent with the spirit ofthe law and with the facts of the case.(Simon, 1980, p. 521)

Second, juries do well when compared withjudges’ decisions. In a survey of nearly 8000 actualcriminal and civil trials, judges and juries disagreedon only 20% of the cases; for criminal trials, thejury was somewhat more lenient than the judge,but for civil trials, the disagreements were evenlysplit for and against the defendant. Furthermore,80% of these disagreements occurred when theweight of the evidence was so close that the judgeadmitted that the verdict could have gone eitherway. This match between verdicts may explain

why 77% of the judges surveyed felt that the jurysystem was satisfactory, 20% felt that it had dis-advantages that should be corrected, but only 3%felt the system to be so unsatisfactory that itsuse should be curtailed (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).

Third, jurors are hardly unbiased, rationalweighers of evidence; the defendant’s physicalappearance, the lawyer’s style of questioning, andthe sequencing of evidence are just a few of the fac-tors that bias jurors’ decisions (Dane & Wrightsman,1982; Hastie et al., 1983; Kaplan, 1982; Wrightsman,Nietzel, & Fortune, 1998). These biases are largelycontrolled, however, by relying on group decisionsrather than individual decisions. Simulations of juriessuggest that the lone juror’s initial biases and prefer-ences have very little impact on the group’s finaldecision, no matter what the size of the jury(Kerr & Huang, 1986).

Each of these pro-jury arguments, however,can also be countered by other, more disquietingdata about juries and their capabilities. In recentyears, a number of very high-profile juries havemade decisions that in retrospect appear to havebeen based on emotion and prejudice rather thanon the thoughtful analysis of the evidence. Studiesof their deliberation processes indicate that a hand-ful of group members dominated the group discus-sion, and these individuals succeeded, in most cases,in determining the final verdict. When investigatorshave asked jurors about their understanding of thelegalities of the case, they discovered that many un-derstood less than half of the judges’ instructionsto the jury (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000). Jurymembers also have a particularly difficult time fol-lowing the arguments and evidence introduced incomplex, time-consuming trials (Cecil, Hans, &Wiggins, 1991). These findings have promptedsome to suggest that the jury system should be abol-ished, but others favor a more moderate solution—improving juries by modifying their structure anddynamics.

Improving Juries

The judicial system is long on tradition, but in re-cent years, several innovations have been suggested

I N F LUENCE 207

and even implemented (Vidmar & Hans, 2007).Some of these reforms, such as reducing the sizeand the decision rules of juries, are designed toimprove the general efficiency of juries and the fair-ness of their procedures. Others, such as note tak-ing, help jurors to process the evidence andtestimony that they must consider when reachingtheir decision.

Jury Size In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court re-turned a landmark ruling in the case of Williams v.Florida (National Center for State Courts, 1976).Williams sought to have his conviction overturnedon the grounds that the deciding jury had includedonly six persons. The Supreme Court, however,found in favor of Florida, ruling that a six-personjury is large enough to promote group deliberation,protect members from intimidation, fairly representthe community, and weigh the facts in the case(Williams v. Florida, 1970). Psychology and law ex-pert Michael J. Saks, however, has suggested thatthe Supreme Court should have taken group dy-namics research into consideration before makingits decision. As he noted, modifying jury size couldinfluence:

■ Group structure. Members of smaller juries par-ticipate at more equal rates; smaller juries aremore cohesive; and members of larger juriesexchange more information.

■ Representativeness. Smaller groups are not asrepresentative of the community as larger ones.For example, if a community was 10% Latinoand 90% Anglo, in all probability, about 80% ofthe 12-person juries selected from that com-munity would include at least one Latino, butonly 40% of the 6-person juries would containLatinos.

■ Majority influence. The majority’s influence maybe greater in smaller juries, because the likeli-hood of finding a partner for one’s minoritycoalition becomes smaller.

Further, Saks contended that the Court erred inassuming that a 5 to 1 vote in a 6-person jury was thesame as a 10 to 2 split in a 12-person group. With the

10 to 2 vote, one is joined by a dissenting partner,whereas in the 5 to 1 vote, one faces the majorityalone. As a result, the likelihood of a hung jury isgreater in larger juries (Kerr & MacCoun, 1985).Saks also noted, however, that despite size-relatedchanges in group dynamics, small juries and large ju-ries do not appear to differ significantly in the types ofverdicts reached—except in certain civil cases, wheresmaller juries tend to return larger damages (Saks,1977; Saks & Hastie, 1978; Saks & Marti, 1997).

Unanimity In 1972, three men were convicted,in separate trials, of assault, grand larceny, and bur-glary by the court system of Oregon. They appealedto the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that theirright to a fair trial had been violated because thevotes of the juries had not been unanimous. Tothe defendants’ dismay, the Supreme Court ruledin favor of Oregon (Apodoca v. Oregon, 1972),concluding that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.Constitution guarantees only that a “substantialmajority of the jury” must be convinced of thedefendant’s guilt. Later in the ruling, the SupremeCourt suggested that a 75% agreement constitutesan acceptable minimum for most juries.

The Court’s conclusion is, for the most part,justified by the empirical evidence. The verdict pre-ferred by the majority of the jurors on their firstvote usually becomes the final verdict in a largepercentage of the cases, with or without a unanim-ity rule. The minority’s opinion sometimes prevails,but in such cases, the minority is usually so substan-tial that a 9 out of 12 majority would not have beenreached anyway. Most juries implicitly operate ac-cording to either a basic two-thirds or a 10 out of12 rule (Davis, Bray, & Holt, 1977; Davis et al.,1975; Stasser, Kerr, & Bray, 1982).

Relaxing the requirement for unanimity, how-ever, changes the decision-making process in juries.Juries that do not have to reach a unanimousdecision render their judgments twice as quicklyand are far less likely to come to a stalemate (Foss,1981; Kerr et al., 1976). Saks and Hastie (1978)feared that juries that do not deliberate to unanim-ity do not deliberate sufficiently and make more

208 CHAPTER 7

mistakes—“convictions when the correct decision isacquittal; acquittals when the correct decision isconviction” (pp. 84–85).

Procedural Innovations Whereas jurors wereonce forbidden from taking notes or discussingthe case prior to deliberations, in a series of mod-ifications, courts have experimented with varioustypes of procedural changes to determine if noteshelp jurors to remember and process the volumes ofinformation they receive during the trial. For ex-ample, the courts have worked to try to clarify in-formation about the legal terms used in the caseunder consideration. The revised wording of suchconcepts as “reasonable doubt” and “preponder-ance of evidence,” for example, has triggeredchanges in how long juries deliberate and in theireventual verdicts (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996).Courts have studied ways to make the instructionsgiven to the jurors prior to deliberation clearerand more understandable (Ellsworth & Reifman,2000). Some courts also permit jurors to (1) takenotes during the presentation of evidence and usethese notes during deliberation; (2) submit ques-tions to the court that, after review by judge andlegal counsel, can be considered in summary state-ments during the trial or in the presentation ofadditional evidence; and (3) discuss the trial amongthemselves while the trial is ongoing (Vidmar &Hans, 2007). These innovations are generally asso-ciated with increased involvement of jurors in thedeliberation process, but their impact on decisionoutcomes appears to be modest (Devine et al.,2001).

Voir Dire The selection of jury members from apool of potential participants occurs through a pro-cess known as voir dire. Voir dire—an alteration ofthe French phrase vrai dire, which means “to speaktruly”—calls for verbal or written questioning

of prospective jurors to uncover any biases orprejudices that may stand in the way of fairnessand impartiality (Hans & Vidmar, 1982).

Until the 1970s, voir dire was left primarily tothe judge’s discretion; defense lawyers could submitquestions, but judges were free to disregard them ifthey desired. However, when convictions wereoverturned on appeal because trial judges had dis-allowed defense participation in voir dire (e.g., Hamv. S. Carolina, 1973), trial courts began openingup the jury selection procedure to attorneys.Systematic jury selection, where lawyers carefullystudy the prospective jurors in the pool and usevoir dire to identify sympathetic and antagonisticjurors, is now a common practice in major trials.Voir dire is regularly used, for example, in cases inwhich the defendant, if convicted, faces the deathpenalty. By rejecting from the jury anyone whoobjects to the death penalty, the prosecution canassemble what is termed a death-qualified jury.

Systematic jury selection is controversial.Proponents argue that in many political and crimi-nal trials, biases produced by unfair publicity, re-gional prejudices, and unrepresentative jury rostersmust be controlled if the defendant is to receive justtreatment. Critics feel that systematic jury selectionis tantamount to jury rigging, as it produces biasedrather than fair juries and works to exclude certaintypes of people from juries. Death-qualified juries,for example, are not just willing to impose a deathsentence, but they are also more conviction pronethan non–death-qualified juries (Filkins, Smith, &Tindale, 1998).

Lawrence Wrightsman, an expert on psychol-ogy and the law, has argued that judges should limitthe number of jurors that lawyers can challengeduring voir dire. He also recommended stricterguidelines for lawyers, who sometimes use thevoir dire process to influence the jurors in theirfavor. Wrightsman suggested that voir dire ques-tioning be carried out carefully, so that jurorswill respond honestly, and that judges supervisethe process more closely. Voir dire is a useful wayof identifying highly biased individuals, but itshould not be a means of manipulating the compo-sition of the jury (Wrightsman et al., 1998).

voir dire The oral or written questioning of prospectivejurors by counsel or the judge.

I N F LUENCE 209

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

When do people conform in groups?

1. Social influence in groups occurs when the ma-jority of the members influence smaller sub-groups within the group to change (majorityinfluence) and when the minority memberssucceed in converting the majority ofgroup members to their position (minorityinfluence).

2. Asch studied conformity by measuring people’sdecisions when the majority of their group’smembers made errors judging line lengths(the Asch situation).

■ Approximately one-third of the peoplethat Asch studied conformed.

■ Conformity increased when the majoritywas large and unanimous, but increasingthe majority beyond four did not signifi-cantly increase conformity. This decreasingimpact of increased numbers of sources ofinfluence is consistent with Bond’s meta-analytic review and Latané’s social impacttheory (the principle of social impact sug-gests Impact = f SIN).

■ When group members change their posi-tion, their conformity may result fromtemporary compliance to the group’s pres-sure rather than true conversion (privateacceptance). Those who do not complymay be displaying independence or deliber-ate defiance of the group (anticonformity).When congruence occurs, members were inagreement from the outset.

3. Conformity rates vary across time, cultures,sexes, and group settings.

■ Certain personality traits are related toconformity. People who conformconsistently in groups tend to be moreauthoritarian but seek social approval.Nonconformists are more self-confident.

■ Women conform slightly more than men,primarily in face-to-face groups. Womenmay use conformity to increase groupharmony, whereas men use nonconformityto create the impression of independence.

■ Bond and Smith’s review suggests groupmembers in collectivistic societies yield tomajority influence more often than thosein individualistic societies.

■ Conformity rates have dropped slightly inthe last half of the 20th century.

■ Majority influence varies in strengthdepending on the size, structure, cohe-siveness, and goals of the group and thenature of its tasks. For example, fewergroup members conform when they canrespond anonymously via secret ballot orfrom a distance (the Crutchfield situation).

■ Individuals in groups engaged incomputer-mediated interactions conformat rates equal to and sometimes greaterthan face-to-face groups (Social IdentityModel of Deindividuation Effects—or SIDEeffects).

When do people resist the group’s influence and insteadchange the group?

1. Moscovici’s conversion theory suggests that con-sistent minorities will be influential, althoughthat influence may in some cases be indirectand delayed. Minorities, therefore, create moreconversion and innovation, whereas majoritiestend to create compliance.

■ Moscovici found that a minority, particu-larly if behaviorally consistent, can influ-ence the majority.

■ Hollander suggests that minorities that areaccorded high status in the group can alsoinfluence the majority, for their idiosyncrasycredits protect them from sanctions whenthey display nonconformity.

210 CHAPTER 7

■ Minorities exert more effort in their at-tempts to influence than do majorities, andthe decision rule the group adopts willdifferentially influence the success of ma-jorities (majority-rules) and minorities(unanimity).

2. Latané’s dynamic social impact theory uses the pro-cesses of consolidation, clustering, correlation,and continuing diversity to explain majorityand minority influence in spatially distributedgroups that interact repeatedly over time.

Why do people conform?

1. Informational influence takes place whenevergroup members base their reaction onCialdini’s principle of social proof: they look toothers for information.

■ As social comparison theory notes, peopleare a valuable source of information,although individuals often misjudge theextent to which others agree with theirviewpoint (the false consensus effect).

■ Dual process theories, as reviewed by Martinand Hewstone, recognize that socialinfluence occurs when group memberssystematically process available information(direct process) or base their choices onnonrational processes, such as heuristics andemotional responses (indirect process).

2. Normative influence prompts group members tofeel, think, and act in ways that are consistentwith their group’s social standards.

■ Milgram documented the negative emo-tions associated with violating norms in hisstudy of seat requests on the subway.

■ Cialdini’s work suggests that, in somecases, normative influence is a more potentand longer lasting form of influence thaninformational influence.

3. Latané and Darley’s analysis of the KittyGenovese incident concludes that individualssometimes take others’ inaction in emergencies

(the bystander effect) to be a sign that no help isneeded. Informational and normative influencecontributes to the bystander effect, as does dif-fusion of responsibility.

4. Interpersonal influence includes verbal and non-verbal tactics—complaining, demanding,threatening, pleading, negotiating, pressuring,manipulating, rejecting, and so on—designedto induce change.

■ Schachter’s analysis of group rejectionindicates that a nonconformist is generallyless liked by others in the group.

■ Communication with a disliked devianteventually diminishes, at least when cohe-sive groups are working on relevant tasks.Schachter’s findings, as well as those byLevine and his colleagues, indicates thatany dissent from the group mode willreduce likability.

■ Reaction to deviants results, in part, fromsubjective group dynamics triggered by socialidentity processes. Group members whoviolate norms can trigger the black-sheepeffect—they will be evaluated more nega-tively than an individual who is not agroup member who performs the sametype of action.

Do social influence processes shape juries’ verdicts?

1. The magnitude of social influence suggests thatthe decisions reached by groups, including ju-ries, are shaped by social processes rather thanby an unbiased weighing of evidence.

■ The Chicago Jury Project and work byHastie, Penrod, and Pennington suggests thatjurors, through deliberation, develop narra-tives to account for evidence (story model).

■ Juries tend to use either verdict-driven orevidence-driven deliberation strategies. Inmost cases, they choose the method ofdeliberation favored by the majority of themembers.

I N F LUENCE 211

■ The verdict favored by the majority of themembers prior to deliberation (or on thefirst straw poll) is usually the jury’s finalverdict.

■ Jurors who have higher status occupationstend to dominate the group’s discussion.

2. Available evidence suggests that juries are sat-isfactory vehicles for making legal decisions.

■ Despite size-related changes in groupdynamics, small and large juries do notappear to differ significantly in the types ofverdicts reached.

■ Juries that do not have to reach a unani-mous decision render their judgmentstwice as quickly and are far less likely to behung juries.

■ Several alterations of procedure have beendeveloped to help jurors remember andprocess trial information, but their impactis not yet known.

■ Voir dire procedures are often used to selectjury members, but Wrightman maintainsthis process can undermine the represen-tativeness of the jury.


Chapter Case: Twelve Angry Men■ Twelve Angry Men: A Play in Three Acts, by

Reginald Rose and Sherman L. Sergel (1958),is a play based on Rose’s experience whileserving on a jury. Although a fictional drama-tization, the play demonstrates the pressures toconform present in groups. Both movie ver-sions of the play, one made in 1957 and starringHenry Fonda as Juror #8, and a 1997 versionwith Jack Lemon taking the role, are illustrativedepictions of group processes.

Majority and Minority Influence■ “Majority and Minority Influence,” by

William D. Crano and Viviane Seyranian(2007), is a concise summary of the last 30 yearsof research investigating minority and majorityinfluence in groups.

■ “Dynamic Social Impact: A Theory of theOrigins and Evolution of Culture,” by HelenC. Harton and Melinda Bullock (2007), re-views recent studies of dynamic social impacttheory and applies the theory to explain theorigins of consistencies in human culture.

Social Influence■ “Majority Versus Minority Influence, Message

Processes, and Attitude Change: The Source–Context–Elaboration Model,” by RobinMartin and Miles Hewstone (2008), is a de-tailed review of a number of theories of influ-ence in groups, including conversion theory,convergent–divergent theory, objective con-sensus theory, source-based congruity theory,conflict elaboration theory, context/categori-zation theory (or “leniency contract theory”),dual role theory, and the authors’ own source–context–elaboration theory.

■ “Social Influence: Compliance and Conform-ity,” by Robert B. Cialdini and Noah J.Goldstein (2004), reviews the recent researchand literature on social influence.

■ “Inclusion and Exclusion: Implications forGroup Processes,” by John M. Levine andNorbert L. Kerr (2007), integrates a number ofliteratures pertaining to motives for remainingin groups, including how groups respond tomembers who consistently disagree with themajority.

212 CHAPTER 7

Juries■ Inside the Jury, by Reid Hastie, Steven D.

Penrod, and Nancy Pennington (1983), pre-sents a masterful analysis of communication,influence, and decision-making in juries.

■ American Juries, by Neil Vidmar and Valerie P.Hans (2007), is a carefully researched analysis ofthe strengths and possible weaknesses ofthe jury system.


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8

Power

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Power is essential to group life.Authoritiescoordinate activitiesofmembers andguidethem toward their goals, but membersexert influence in returnby formingcoop-erative alliances. Power, however, can beused against the group, for authoritiessometimes demand actions that memberswould otherwise never consider. Wewould not be social beings if we wereimmune to the impact of power, butpower can corrupt.

■ What are the limits of an author-ity’s power over group members?

■ What are the sources of power ingroups?

■ Who seeks power and what groupprocesses limit their success?

■ How do people react when theyuse their power to influenceothers?

■ How do those without powerreact when power is used toinfluence them?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Obedience to Authority

The Milgram Experiments

Milgram’s Findings

The Power of the MilgramSituation

Sources of Power

Bases of Power

Bases and Obedience

Power Tactics

Power Processes

Who Seeks Power?

Hierarchies of Dominance

The Power of Commitment

Power and the FundamentalAttribution Error

The Metamorphic Effects of Power

Changes in the Powerholder

Reactions to the Use of Power

Questioning Authority

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

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✵

Why did the group members obey Jones’s order?What force is great enough to make parents givepoison to their children? Many blamed Jim Jones—his persuasiveness, his charisma, his depravity.Others emphasized the kind of people who joinsuch groups—their psychological instability, theirwillingness to identify with causes, and their reli-gious fervor. Still others suggested more fantasticexplanations—mass hypnosis, government plots,and even divine intervention.

Such explanations underestimate the power ofgroups and their leaders—their capacity to influ-ence members, even when members try to resistthis influence (Cartwright, 1959). As Chapter 7noted, groups influence the way their membersfeel, think, and act. But in some cases this influencecan be extraordinarily strong. Rather than subtlyshaping members’ opinions and choices, powerfulpeople and groups can compel obedience amongmembers who would otherwise resist the group’swishes. Here we consider the sources of that power

and the consequences of power for those whowield it as well as those who are subjected to it.

OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY

Bertrand Russell concluded many years ago that“the fundamental concept in social science isPower, in the same sense in which Energy is thefundamental concept in physics” (1938, p. 10). Fewinteractions advance very far before elements ofpower and influence come into play. The coachdemanding obedience from a player, the policeofficer asking the driver for the car’s registration,the teacher scowling at the errant student, and theboss telling an employee to get back to work are allexerting their social power over others. Power,although notoriously difficult to define, suggests in-fluence, the potential to influence, and control overoutcomes (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Lukes, 2005).Powerful people can influence other people in

The People’s Temple: The Metamorphic Effects of Power

Jim Jones was the founder and minister of the People’sTemple Full Gospel Church of San Francisco. Jones wasa visionary, inspiring leader, who decried the racism,inequality, and spiritual emptiness of American society.Under his charismatic leadership the congregationgrew to 8000 members, and Jones was recognized bymany for his good works and moral fortitude—untilrumors of improprieties and unusual practices began tocirculate within the community. Former membersreported that at some services, people were beatenbefore the whole congregation, with microphonesused to amplify their screams. Jones, some said, insistedon being called Father, and he demanded absolutededication and obedience from his followers. Heasked members to donate their property to thechurch, and he even forced one family to give himtheir six-year-old son.

Jones, to transform his church into a collectivesociety free from the interference of outsiders, movedhis entire congregation to Guyana, in South America.He called the isolated settlement Jonestown, andclaimed that it would be the model for a new way

of living where all would find love, happiness, andwell-being. But the men, women, and children ofJonestown did not find contentment. They found,instead, a group that exercised incredible power overtheir destiny. Jones asked members to make greatpersonal sacrifices for the group, and time and againthey obeyed. They worked long hours in the fields.They were given little to eat. They were forbidden tocommunicate with their loved ones back in the UnitedStates. Then disaster struck when church membersattacked and killed visitors who were part of a con-gressional delegation from the United States. Jones,fearing the dismantling of his empire, ordered his fol-lowers to take their own lives.

Authorities who first reached the settlement weremet by a scene of unbelievable ghastliness. On Jones’sorders, more than 900 men, women, and children hadeither killed themselves or been killed by other fol-lowers. Jones’s body lay near his chair, where he satbeneath the motto “Those who do not remember thepast are condemned to repeat it” (Krause, 1978;Reston, 2000).

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significant ways: “A has power over B to the extentthat he can get B to do something that B would nototherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, p. 202). In some cases,power is a potential to influence that is not actuallyput into practice, and it is often rooted in inequal-ities in control over resources, outcomes, or activi-ties. Power is, fundamentally, a group-level process,for it involves some members of a group conform-ing to the requirements of others in situations thatrange from the purely cooperative and collaborativeto those rife with conflict, tension, and animosity.

But can social power—a commonplace pro-cess that shapes nearly all group interactions—generate such a dramatic and disastrous outcomeas the Jonestown mass suicide? Can group membersbe so bent to the will of an authority that theywould follow any order, no matter how noxious?Stanley Milgram’s (1974) laboratory studies of obe-dience to authority suggest that the answer to thesequestions is yes.

The Milgram Experiments

Milgram analyzed power by creating small groupsin his laboratory at Yale University. In most cases,he studied three-man groups: One member was avolunteer who had answered an advertisement; onemember was the experimenter who was in chargeof the session; and one member appeared to beanother participant recruited from the communitybut was in actuality a confederate, who was part ofthe research team. The confederate looked to bein his late 40s, and he seemed friendly and a littlenervous. The experimenter, in contrast, acted self-assured as he set the group’s agenda, assigned tasksto the group members, and issued orders. He as-signed the participants to one of two roles—teacheror learner. Those given the “teacher” role read aseries of paired words (blue box, nice day, wild day,etc.) to the “learner,” who was supposed to mem-orize the pairings. The teacher would later checkthe learner’s ability to recall the pairs by reading the

first word in the pair and several possible answers(e.g., blue: sky, ink, box, lamp). Failures would bepunished by an electric shock. What the volunteerdid not know, however, was that the confederatewas always assigned to the learner role and that thelearner did not actually receive shocks.

After assigning the participants to their roles,the experimenter took both group members intothe next room. The teacher then watched as theexperimenter strapped the learner into a chair thatwas designed “to prevent excessive movement dur-ing the shock.” The learner sat quietly while anelectrode was attached to his wrist. When he askedif the shocks were dangerous, the experimenterreplied, “Oh, no. Although the shocks can beextremely painful, they cause no permanent tissuedamage” (Milgram, 1974, p. 19).

The experimenter then led the participant backto the other room and seated him at the shockgenerator. This bogus machine, which Milgramhimself fabricated, featured a row of 30 electricalswitches. Each switch, when depressed, would sup-posedly send a shock to the learner. The shock levelof the first switch on the left was 15 volts (v) thenext switch was 30, the next was 45, and so on, allthe way up to 450 v. Milgram also labeled the volt-age levels, from left to right, Slight Shock, ModerateShock, Strong Shock, Very Strong Shock, Intense Shock,Extreme Intensity Shock, and Danger: Severe Shock.The final two switches were marked XXX. Therest of the face of the shock generator was takenup by dials, lights, and meters that flickered when-ever a switch was pressed.

The experimenter administered a sample shockof 45 v to the participant, supposedly to give him anidea of the punishment magnitude. The study thenbegan in earnest. Using a microphone to communi-cate with the learner, the teacher read the list of wordpairs and then began “testing” the learner’s memory.Each time the teacher read a word and the responsealternatives, the learner indicated his response bypushing one of four numbered switches that werejust within reach of his bound hand. His response litup on the participant’s control panel. Participantswere to deliver one shock for each mistake andincrease the voltage one step for each mistake.

social power The capacity to influence others, evenwhen these others try to resist influence.

216 CHAPTER 8

Milgram set the stage for the order-givingphase by having the learner make mistakes deliber-ately. Although participants punished that first mis-take with just a 15-v jolt, each subsequent failurewas followed by a stronger shock. At the 300-v level,the learner also began to protest the shocks bypounding on the wall, and after the next shock of315 v, he stopped responding altogether. Most par-ticipants assumed that the session was over at thispoint, but the experimenter told them to treat afailure to respond as a wrong answer and to continuedelivering the shocks. When the participants balked,the experimenter, who was seated at a separate desknear the teacher’s, would use a sequence of prods togoad them into action (Milgram, 1974, p. 21):

q Prod 1: “Please continue,” or “Please go on.”

q Prod 2: “The experiment requires that youcontinue.”

q Prod 3: “It is absolutely essential that youcontinue.”

q Prod 4: “You have no other choice; you mustgo on.”

The situation was extremely realistic and servedas a laboratory analog to real-world groups whereauthorities give orders to subordinates. The experi-menter acted with self-assurance and poise. He gaveorders crisply, as if he never questioned the correct-ness of his own actions, and he seemed surprisedthat the teacher would try to terminate the shocksequence. Yet from the participants’ point of view,this authority was requiring them to act in a waythat was harmful to another person. When theyaccepted the $4.50 payment, they implicitly agreedto carry out the experimenter’s instructions, butthey were torn between this duty and their desireto protect the learner from possible harm. Milgramdesigned his experiment to determine which sidewould win in this conflict.

Milgram’s Findings

Milgram was certain that very few of his partici-pants would carry out the experimenter’s orders.He went so far as to purchase special equipmentthat would let him record precisely the duration

of each shock administered, expecting that few par-ticipants would give more than four or five shocks(Elms, 1995). He also polled a number of psycho-logical researchers and psychiatrists on the subject,asking them to predict how people would react inhis study. None believed that participants wouldshock to the 450-v level; they predicted that mostwould quit by the 150-v level.

Milgram and the other experts, however, un-derestimated the power of the group situation. Ofthe 40 individuals who served as teachers in theinitial experiment, 26 (65%) administered the full450 v to the presumably helpless learner (seeFigure 8.1). None broke off before the 300-v level,and several of the eventually disobedient partici-pants gave one or two additional shocks before fi-nally refusing to yield to the experimenter’s prods.The comments made by the participants during theshock procedure and their obvious psychological dis-tress revealed that they were reluctant to go on butfelt unable to resist the experimenter’s demands forobedience.

Milgram studied nearly 1000 people in a seriesof replications and extensions of his original study.In these later studies, some of which are discussedhere, different aspects of the setting were systemati-cally manipulated, allowing Milgram to assess theirinfluence on obedience rates. Although he contin-ued to search for the limits of obedience, again andagain his participants buckled under the pressure ofthe experimenter’s power.

Harm versus Rights Surprised that so few peo-ple disobeyed authority, Milgram wondered if theparticipants fully realized what was happening tothe learner in the next room. All they heard wasan ambiguous pounding on the wall, which theexperimenter told them to ignore. So Milgram, insubsequent studies, added additional cues that sig-naled the learner’s suffering and his unwillingness tocontinue in the study.

To make it clear that the learner did not wish tocontinue participation, Milgram added an explicitdeclaration of refusal. In the voice-feedback conditionthe learner’s shouts and pleas (carefully rehearsed andtape-recorded) could be heard through the wall.

POWER 217

The learner grunted when shocked at levels below120 v and complained about the pain. At 150 v,he cried out, “Experimenter, get me out of here!I won’t be in the experiment any more! I refuseto go on!” (Milgram, 1974, p. 23). He continuedscreaming and demanding release until the 300-vlevel, when he refused to answer any more questions.

These cues did not substantially reduce thelevel of obedience seen in the initial study, for fully62.5% of the participants still obeyed to the 450-vlevel. Moreover, those who did disobey seemedto be responding more to the learner’s demand tobe released than to his suffering. If participants weregoing to disobey, they usually did it when thelearner retracted his consent to continue—at the150-v mark. Those who passed that milestone usu-ally continued to 450 v, even though the learnerscreamed in pain until he eventually lapsed intosilence (Packer, 2008). Faced with the orders of theauthority to continue and the learner’s demand to bereleased, the majority sided with the authority.

To test whether participants would respond ex-plicitly to the learner’s signs of suffering, Milgramincreased the possibility of significant harm befallingthe learner in the heart problem condition. When theexperimenter connected the wires to his arm, the

learner mentioned that he had a heart conditionand asked about complications. The experimentersaid that the shocks would cause no permanentdamage. When shocked the learner’s groans andshouts of protest could be heard through the wall,and he also repeatedly complained that his heartwas bothering him. Even when the learner stoppedresponding after 330 v, 65% of the participants con-tinued to administer shocks to the 450-v level.

Proximity and Surveillance Effects In earlierpilot studies the teacher and learner were separatedonly by a glass observation window. Milgram no-ticed that, even though teachers could see thelearner react to the shocks, most averted their eyesand expressed discomfort at having to watch. So, tomake the consequences of their actions even clearerto subjects, Milgram moved the learner into thesame room as the teacher. In the proximity condition,the learner sat in the same room as the teacher,voicing the same complaints used in the voice-feedback condition and writhing with pain at eachshock. Obedience dropped to 40%. In the mostextreme of all the variations, the touch-proximity con-dition, the learner sat next to the teacher andreceived his shock when he put his hand on a shock

218 CHAPTER 8


plate. At the 150-v level, he refused to put his handdown on the plate, so the experimenter gave theparticipant an insulated glove and told him to pressthe learner’s hand down onto the plate as hedepressed the shock switch. Still, 30% obeyed.

Milgram also examined the impact of increaseddistance between the experimenter and the teacheron rates of obedience by having the experimenterleave the room after he reviewed the procedureswith the participant. He continued giving ordersto the participant by telephone, but he lost his abil-ity to monitor the subject’s actions. In this low sur-veillance condition, 25% of the participants stopped assoon as the learner insisted on release (the 150-vlevel). Only 20% of the participants were obedientto the 450-v level, and many participants disobeyedby deceiving the authority—they assured theexperimenter that they were administering increas-ingly large shocks with each mistake, when theywere actually only delivering 15 v.

Prestige and Legitimacy Milgram conducted hisinitial studies on the campus of Yale University,which most people recognize as a prestigious centerof learning and science. Milgram was concernedthat people obeyed the experimenter because hewas perceived to be a “Yale scientist” and couldtherefore be trusted to act appropriately. So, in theoffice-building condition, Milgram moved the studyaway from prestigious Yale University. He set upthe study in an office building located in a shoppingarea. “The laboratory was sparsely furnished,though clean, and marginally respectable in appear-ance. When subjects inquired about professionalaffiliations, they were informed only that we werea private firm conducting research for industry”(Milgram, 1974, pp. 68–69). Obedience droppedto 48%—still a surprisingly large figure given theunknown credentials of the staff.

Milgram next lowered the legitimacy of theexperimenter, who was trained to exude confi-dence and scientific expertise; he seemed to knowexactly what he was doing throughout the shockprocess. Milgram therefore arranged, in some con-ditions, for the orders to come from someone otherthan the expert experimenter. In the ordinary-man

variation, he added a fourth member to the group,who was given the task of recording the shocklevels used. The experimenter explained the study,as in the other conditions, but gave no instructionsabout shock levels before he was called away. Thenew participant, who was actually a confederate,filled the role of the authority; he suggested thatshocks be given in increasingly strong doses andordered the participant to continue giving shockswhen the learner started to complain. Obediencedropped to 20%. But when the participants refusedto continue, the confederate left the experimenter’sdesk and began administering the shocks. In thiscase, most of the participants (68.75%) stood byand watched without stopping the confederate—although one “large man, lifted the zealous shockerfrom his chair, threw him to a corner of thelaboratory, and did not allow him to move untilhe had promised not to administer further shocks”(1974, p. 97).

Milgram further explored the legitimacy of theauthority in the authority-as-victim condition. Here theexperimenter agreed to take the role of the learner,supposedly to convince a reluctant learner that theshocks were not harmful. The experimenter toler-ated the shocks up to 150 v, but then he shouted,“That’s enough, gentlemen!” The confederate, whohad been watching the procedure, then insisted,“Oh, no, let’s go on. Oh, no, come on, I’m goingto have to go through the whole thing. Let’s go.Come on, let’s keep going” (Milgram, 1974, p. 102).In all cases, the participant released the experimenter;obedience to the ordinary person’s command toharm the authority was nil.

Group Effects Milgram (1974) studied obedi-ence rather than conformity, since the authoritydid not himself engage in the action he demandedof the teacher, and the teacher faced the power ofthe authority alone. Milgram considered, however,the possibility that in most cases other group mem-bers are present, and the group may be a secondsource of power in the situation—either in standingagainst the authority or taking sides with him.

Milgram verified that a compliant group onlymakes people more obedient. In the peer administers

POWER 219

shock condition, the subjects did not have to admin-ister the shock: a confederate, who was fully com-pliant, did so. In this variation, 92.5% obedientlyfulfilled their tasks without intervening. Membershipin a defiant group, however, did contribute todisobedience. To examine the relative power ofconformity versus obedience, in the two peers rebelcondition Milgram added two more confederates tothe situation. They posed as peers of the real partici-pant and the three worked together to deliver theshocks to the learner. One read the list of words, onegave the verbal feedback to the learner, and the par-ticipant pushed the shock button. As shown inFigure 8.2, the subject sat before the shock machine,and the other group members sat on either side.

The confederates played out their roles untilthe learner cried out in pain at 150 v. Then, oneof the confederates refused to continue, and left thetable. The experimenter could not convince him toreturn, and so ordered the remaining two to con-tinue. However, at the 210-v mark the second con-federate quit as well, explaining, “I’m not goingto shock that man against his will” (1974, p. 118).Only the real subject was left to give the shocks,and in most cases he sided with the group and re-fused to obey. Only 10% of the participants werefully obedient—although these individuals had toadminister the shocks as the disobedient confeder-ates looked on. Membership in a group helpedparticipants defy the authority.

220 CHAPTER 8


The Power of the Milgram Situation

Milgram’s results sparked controversies that are un-resolved even today (Blass, 2000b; Miller, 2004).Some researchers believe that the participantswere not taken in by Milgram’s subterfuge. Theysuggested that the participants knew that noshocks were being administered, but they playedalong so as not to ruin the study (Mixon, 1977;Orne & Holland, 1968). Milgram’s research team,however, carefully interviewed all the participants,and fewer than 20% challenged the reality of thesituation (Elms, 1995). Moreover, if participantssaw through the elaborate duplicity, then why didthey become so upset? According to Milgram,

Many subjects showed signs of nervousnessin the experimental situation, and espe-cially upon administering the more pow-erful shocks. In a large number of cases thedegree of tension reached extremes thatare rarely seen in sociopsychological labo-ratory studies. Subjects were observed tosweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips,groan, and dig their fingernails into theirflesh. (1963, p. 375)

The distress of the participants was so great thatthe publication of the study sparked a controversyover the ethics of social–psychological research(Blass, 2004). Even a museum exhibit that featuredthe Milgram experiment sparked public debate overits ethics when it toured U.S. science museums(Marsh, 2000).

Other experts, when trying to explain why somany people obeyed in the study, have pointedto the participants themselves—their personalities,their temperaments, their society’s views of obedi-ence. Just as many people, when first hearing of theGuyana tragedy, wondered, “What strange peoplethey must have been to be willing to kill them-selves,” when people are told about Milgram’s find-ings, they react with the question, “What kind ofevil, sadistic men did he recruit for his study?” Yetby all accounts, Milgram’s participants were normaland well-adjusted, and subsequent attempts to linkobedience to personality traits have been relatively

fruitless (see Blass, 1991, for an analysis). Also, eventhough Milgram’s participants were mostly men,they were paid for their time, and they lived at atime when people trusted authorities more thanthey do now, his findings appear to be highly reli-able over time and across situations. Replications ofthe study using different procedures and participantshave generally confirmed Milgram’s initial findings(see Blass, 2000a). Many believe that the level ofobedience that Milgram documented in his labora-tory matches levels found in military, organiza-tional, and educational settings (Fiske, Harris, &Cuddy, 2004; Hinrichs, 2007; Pace & Hemmings,2007; see Focus 8.1).

SOURCES OF POWER

More than 4000 members of the UnificationChurch married each other in a mass ceremonybecause their leader, Reverend Sun MyungMoon, told them to do so. The Branch Davidiansremained barricaded in their compound until theirleader, David Koresh, ordered them to set it on fire.Thirty-seven members of the religious groupHeaven’s Gate took their own lives because theirleader convinced them that they were leaving theirbodies to join extraterrestrials in a nearby spaceship.Members of the People’s Temple drank cyanide-laced punch and died. Sixty-five percent ofMilgram’s participants administered painful electricshocks to an innocent person as he begged them tostop.

Reverend Moon, Jim Jones, Milgram’s exper-imenter, coaches, police officers, and teachersexact obedience from others. But where doesthis remarkable power come from? Here we seekanswers by considering the bases of power ingroups, as well as the tactics members often useto influence others.

Bases of Power

John R. P. French and Bertram Raven (1959), in abrilliant analysis of the roots of power in groups and

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organizations, identified the six key power basesshown in Table 8.1. Group members who control

these bases are more influential than those who failto secure a base of power.

Reward Power In many cases, power is closelytied to the control of valued resources. The membersof the People’s Temple, for example, thought thatJim Jones possessed the things that they needed—security, economic support, companionship, poli-tical reform, and spirituality. His ability to control,

F o c u s 8.1 How Strong Are Pressures to Obey in the Cockpit?

The pilot in command of an aircraft is directlyresponsible for, and is the final authority as to,the operation of that aircraft.

—Federal Aviation Agency, Code of FederalRegulation, Paragraph 91.3

Commercial jetliners are not piloted by individuals, butby groups. No one individual could carry out the manyand varied actions needed when taxiing, at takeoff,when aloft, in final approach, and when landing, sothe captain and crew work together to pilot the planesafely to its destination. In some cases, however, thesmooth teamwork of the crew is disrupted by powerdynamics. Flight personnel are organized along quasi-military lines of authority, with rank defining powerand responsibility. Most larger aircraft require the ser-vices of a pilot, a copilot, and a flight engineer but, as asignal of the authority of each position, these roles arealso labeled captain, first officer, and second officer.Captains are, by law, the final authority on board, andin many cases, they exert their power over the rest ofthe crew in both subtle and unsubtle ways (Sexton &Helmreich, 2000). The flight deck of the craft is oftencalled the cockpit, which is also the name of the penwhere contests between fighting roosters (cocks) areheld (Foushee, 1984).

Investigations conducted by the NationalTransportation Safety Board (NTSB) traced several fatalcrashes back to two group-level sources: (1) a captain’srefusal to comply with the suggestions of other crewmembers, and (2) the crew’s excessive obedience to thecaptain’s authority (NTSB, 1994). When a DC-8 ran outof fuel and crashed in Portland, analysis of the flightrecorder indicated that the flight engineer repeatedlyreminded the pilot of their dwindling fuel, but thepilot ignored him (Milanovich et al., 1998). The pilot ofNorthwest Express Flight 5719 spent much of the flight

issuing orders to the first officer, many of which wereconsidered unnecessary. The copilot eventually failedto correct the pilot’s error on the approach, and theplane crashed (Tarnow, 2000). A copilot on a flightinvolved in a near miss—two aircraft almost colliding inmidair—claimed that he warned the captain to reduceairspeed, but that the captain ignored him (Foushee,1984, p. 888):

After several attempts to convey the information,the captain responded by saying, “I’ll do what Iwant.” Air traffic control inquired as to why theaircraft had not been slowed, advised the crewthat they had almost collided with another air-craft, and issued a new clearance that was alsodisregarded by the captain despite repeated clar-ification by the copilot. Following the last advisoryfrom the copilot, the captain responded by tellingthe copilot to “just look out the damn window.”

Aviation and group experts, recognizing thedestructive impact of excessive obedience by flightcrews and the abuse of power by pilots, have institutedchanges in personnel training. Rather than attempt tochange the long-standing norms of hierarchy, control,and deference in the cockpit, these programs insteadseek to improve communications between all membersof the flight crew. Through workshops, structuredgroup activities, and simulations, copilots learn howto challenge errors made by the pilot, and pilots areencouraged to accept warnings from crew membersrather than ignore them. Many airlines carry out team-based training using advanced flight simulators (Line-Oriented Flight Training, or LOFT) and deliberatelysimulate emergencies that can only be solved if thecrew members communicate clearly and decisivelywith the captain (Ginnett, 1993; Helmreich & Foushee,1993; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996).

power bases Sources of social power in a group, includ-ing one’s degree of control over rewards and punish-ment, authority in the group, attractiveness, expertise,and access to and control over information needed bygroup members.

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exclusively and completely, the distribution ofmaterial and symbolic rewards, secured his rewardpower within the group.

Raven (1992) draws a distinction between im-personal and personal rewards. Impersonal rewardsare material resources, such as food, shelter, protec-tion, promotions, wages, and awards. Personal

rewards are positive interpersonal reinforcements,such as verbal approbation, compliments, smiles,and promises of liking or acceptance. As social ex-change theory suggests, both types of rewards arepotent sources of power, particularly during timesof scarcity. Money and food, for example, arevalued resources, but they become a source ofpower when the rest of the group is penniless andstarving. Rewards that one controls exclusively arealso more likely to augment one’s power, for groupmembers who depend on someone for a rewardwill likely comply with that individual’s requests.

T A B L E 8.1 French and Raven’s Six Bases of Power

Power Base Sample Indicators

Reward: The capability of controlling the distributionof rewards given or offered to the target.

determines pay level

gives desirable job assignments

can promote

compliments and praises

Coercive: The capacity to threaten and punish thosewho do not comply with requests or demands.

can terminate employment (fire)

controls who is given undesirable assignments

can suspend without pay

verbal reprimands and warnings

Legitimate: Authority that derives from the legitimateright to require and demand obedience.

duly appointed supervisor, manager, etc.

representative of the group or organization

role is sanctioned by the group or organization

has the right to make demands of others

Referent: Influence based on the identification with,attraction to, and respect of others.

is a person meriting respect

is someone who is admired by others

someone with whom others identify

is a nice person

Expert: Influence based on others’ belief that thepowerholder possesses superior skills and abilities.

can devise clever solutions to problems

can provide sound task-related advice

source of needed technical knowledge

shares considerable experience/training

Informational: Influence based on the potential use ofinformational resources, including rational argument,persuasion, or factual data.

explains the basis for request

gives good reasons for exactions

uses reason to handle problems

promotes understanding of procedures and changes

SOURCE: Adapted from French & Raven, 1959; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998; Schriesheim, Hinkin, & Podsakoff, 1991.

reward power Power based on one’s control over thedistribution of rewards (both personal and impersonal)given or offered to group members.

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Once Jones moved the church to Jonestown hebecame the sole source of rewards that membersonce acquired from non-church sources (Cook,Cheshire, & Gerbasi, 2006; Emerson, 1962).

Ironically, the tendency for the “rich to getricher” also applies to reward power, because groupmembers often implicitly assume that the rewardsgiven them by powerful people are more valuablethan the rewards given them by those withoutpower. When members of groups were given theopportunity to trade goods of equal monetary valuewith other group members, most were willing topay more for goods they received from a high-status group member, and they considered thoseresources to be more valuable, important, and worthhaving. Because powerful individuals’ rewards wereovervalued by others, they did not need to expendas many of their resources to achieve the same levelof success in the exchange as did those memberswith low power, so their resources tended to growrather than diminish (Thye, 2000).

Coercive Power Accounts of the People’sTemple describe Jones’s reliance on physical andpsychological punishment as a means of exactingobedience from his followers. When membersbroke the rules or disobeyed his orders, he wasquick to punish them with beatings, solitary con-finement, denials of food and water, and long hoursof labor in the fields.

Coercive power derives from one’s capacity todispense punishments, both impersonal and personal,to others (Raven, 1992). Terrorists attacking othercountries, employers threatening employees withthe loss of pay or dismissal, and teachers punishingmischievous students with extra assignments are re-lying on impersonal coercive bases of power.Disagreeing friends insulting and humiliating one an-other, the boss shouting angrily at his secretary, andreligious leaders threatening members with loss ofgrace or ostracism derive their power from personal

sources (Raven, 1992; Raven, Schwarzwald, &Koslowsky, 1998).

Certain people consistently rely on coercionto influence others (Kramer, 2006; see Focus 8.2).Most people, however, only turn to coercivepower when they feel it is the only means theyhave to influence others. In consequence, and iron-ically, individuals in positions of authority who feelrelatively powerless are more likely to use coercionthan more powerful individuals. Some parents andteachers, for example, feel that their children andstudents are controlling them even though theyoccupy a position of greater authority in thehome or school. These individuals feel relativelypowerless, and so, in contentious situations, theytend to use coercive threats, punishments, and abusemore than do empowered authorities (Bugental &Lewis, 1999). In contrast, when individuals whoare equal in coercive power interact, they oftenlearn over time to avoid the use of their power(Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988; Lawler & Yoon,1996). Group members also prefer to use rewardpower rather than coercive power if both are avail-able and they fear reprisals from others in the groupshould they act in a coercive way (Molm, 1997).

Legitimate Power Individuals who have legiti-mate power have the socially sanctioned right toask others to obey their orders. The security person-nel at the airport telling a passenger to remove hershoes, the drill sergeant ordering the squad to atten-tion, the professor waiting for the class to becomequiet before a lecture, and the minister interpretingthe Gospel for the congregation are powerful becausethey have the right to command others, and othersare obligated to obey. Jones, for example, was thelegitimate head of the People’s Temple. He was anordained minister; his work had been commended bymany political and religious leaders, and he had re-ceived such honors as the Martin Luther King Jr.,

coercive power Power based on one’s ability to punishor threaten others who do not comply with requests ordemands.

legitimate power Power based on an individual’ssocially sanctioned claim to a position or role that givesthe occupant the right to require and demand compli-ance with his or her directives.

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Humanitarian Award. When individuals joined thePeople’s Temple, they tacitly agreed to followJones’s orders. Thus, “legitimacy empowers author-ity. Normative regulation is the price that power paysfor legitimacy” (Zelditch, 2001, p. 8).

F o c u s 8.2 Bullying: A Harmless Phase or Coercive Abuse?

Courage is fire, and bullying is smoke.—Benjamin Disraeli

Each day, as Erick boards the bus, Jonathan berateshim, making fun of his hair and clothes. No one willsit with Erick for fear of being drawn into the abuse.Donzella and her friends deliberately circulate nastyrumors about Carol, who was once part of theDonzella clique but who is now considered an outcast.Each day at recess, Greg finds Albert on the play-ground and, after teasing him, pushes him up againstthe school wall and punches him. At Columbine HighSchool, a clique of athletes made loud, negativeremarks about a group of outcasts who did not fitinto any of the school’s other cliques.

Bullying is a form of coercive interpersonal influ-ence. It involves deliberately inflicting injury ordiscomfort on another person repeatedly throughphysical contact, verbal abuse, exclusion, or othernegative actions. Both males and females bully, butthey tend to do so in different ways: girls are relation-ally aggressive, for they use gossip, criticism, andexclusion against their victims. Boys tend to be physi-cally aggressive. Bullying, as Dan Olweus (1997) noted,signals a marked imbalance in the power relationshipbetween the bully and his or her victim. The victim ofabuse “has difficulty in defending himself or herselfand is somewhat helpless against” the bully (p. 216).Bullying, then, is not retaliation between parties in adispute or conflict, but the mistreatment of a lesspowerful person by someone with power. Bullying wasonce considered a phase that children pass throughon their way to adulthood, but instances of bullyingescalating into violence and catastrophic reactions ofvictims to bullying have caused a shift in this view.Bullying is not “child’s play” but aggression—a form ofpeer abuse. Bullying is common in school settings, butit also occurs in military, business, and professionalorganizations (Geffner et al., 2004).

Bullying is also a group behavior. Victims aresometimes isolated and friendless children abandonedto their fate by the rest of the school, but in manycases, groups of children are abused by groups of

bullies. Similarly, although bullies are often thought tobe poorly adjusted children who are expressing angerby picking on those who cannot defend themselves,bullies are often relatively popular members of theschool. They often are involved in sports, for example(for the boys) and considered attractive and more ma-ture (for the girls), and are known as school leadersand trend setters (Vaillancourt, Hymel, & McDougall,2003). Yet, they tend to be disliked, as most condemnthe way they treat other people of lower status in thegroup. Bullying also involves more than just the bullyand the victim, as other children are drawn into theharmful bully–victim exchange. Some children take therole of henchmen or facilitators; they do not initiatethe abuse, but they take an active part once the bully-ing event has begun. Others encourage bullies or sig-nal support by smiling and laughing. Others impas-sively watch the interaction without speaking, and afew members of the bystander group may intercede onbehalf of the victim, either directly or by seeking helpfrom officials or authorities (O’Connell, Pepler, & Craig,1999; Olweus, 2000).

Because bullying is rooted in both power dynam-ics and group dynamics, experts recommend school-and group-level interventions for preventing peerabuse. Olweus’s (1997) pioneering program stressedrestructuring the role of teachers in schools to increasetheir control over social behavior as well as instruction.Olweus recommended creating a school atmospherethat is warm and supportive, but also closely moni-tored by authorities who consistently enforce anti-bullying norms. These norms must be supportedthrough the dissemination of information aboutbully–victim problems and by discussing expectationswith students in classes and schoolwide assemblies.Victims of bullying can also be supported through thedevelopment of buddy systems, cooperative learningactivities, and the use of peer-conflict mediationprograms. Families, too, can be involved in reducingbullying by monitoring children’s behavior closely andby setting standards for appropriate conduct(Giannetti & Sagarese, 2001; Horne, Stoddard, & Bell,2007).

Bullying Repetitively teasing, ridiculing, provoking, ortormenting others through various types of irritating,harassing, or aggressive actions, such as name-calling,threats, insults, and physical injury.

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Those who rely on reward or coercive poweroften find that their authority dwindles when theircontrol over the resources diminishes. In contrast,those who achieve a position of authority throughmethods that the group considers fair or proper gen-erally find that their decisions are accepted, withoutresistance, by others in the group (Tyler 2005).Members obey these legitimate authorities becausethey personally accept the norms of the group.Their obedience is not coerced but voluntary, for itsprings from an internalized sense of loyalty to thegroup rather than the desire to gain resources or avoidharm. Even duly appointed or selected authorities willlose their legitimate power, however, if they violateprinciples of fairness, social responsibility, and recipro-city (Lammers et al., 2008). Those who engage inunethical behavior, for example, or do not showproper respect for their subordinates run the risk oflosing the members’ loyalty—and once loyalty isgone so is willingness to obey (Tyler &Blader, 2003).

Referent Power Who is the best-liked memberof the group? Who is the most respected? Is theresomeone in the group whom everyone wants toplease? The individual with referent power lies atthe interpersonal center of the group. Just as groupmembers seek out membership in selective, desirablegroups, so they identify with and seek close associa-tion with respected, attractive group members. Themembers of the People’s Temple were devoted toJones—to the point where they loved, admired, andidentified with him. Many made financial and emo-tional sacrifices in the hope of pleasing him. As oneof his followers explained, Jones “was the God Icould touch” (quoted in Reston, 2000, p. 25).

The concept of referent power explains howcharismatic leaders manage to exert so much controlover their groups. It was sociologist Max Weberwho first used the term charisma to account for

the almost irrational devotion that some followersexhibit for their leaders. People often refer to acharming leader as charismatic, but Weber reservedthe term to describe the tremendous referent andlegitimate power of the “savior–leader.” Charismaoriginally described a special power given by Godto certain individuals. These individuals were capa-ble of performing extraordinary, miraculous feats,and they were regarded as God’s representativeson Earth (Weber, 1921/1946). Weber argued thatcharismatic leaders do not have unique, wondrouspowers, but they succeed because their followersthink they have unique, wondrous powers. Weberhimself was struck by the charismatic leader’s powerto demand actions that contradict established socialnorms: “Every charismatic authority . . . preaches,creates, or demands new obligations” (1921/1946,p. 243). Charismatic leaders such as Jones usuallyappear on the scene when a large group of peopleis dissatisfied or faces a stressful situation. The leaderoffers these people a way to escape their problems,and the masses react with intense loyalty.

Expert Power Group members often defer toand take the advice of those who seem to possesssuperior skills and abilities. A physician interpretinga patient’s symptoms, a local resident giving direc-tions to an out-of-towner, a teacher spelling a wordfor a student, and a computer technician advisinga user all transform their special knowledge intoexpert power.

As with most of the power bases identified byFrench and Raven, a person does not actually needto be an expert to acquire expert power; the personmust only be perceived by others to be an expert(Kaplowitz, 1978; Littlepage & Mueller, 1997).Researchers demonstrated the impact of perceivedexpertise on influence by arranging for dyads towork on a series of problems. Half of the partici-pants were led to believe that their partner’s abilityon the task was superior to their own, and the rest

referent power Power based on group members’ identi-fication with, attraction to, or respect for the powerholder.charisma Derived by Max Weber from the Greekxarisma (a divine gift of grace), the ascription of extra-ordinary or supernatural acumen, ability, and value to aleader by his or her followers.

expert power Power that derives from subordinates’ as-sumption that the powerholder possesses superior skillsand abilities.

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were told that their partner possessed inferior abil-ity. As the concept of expert power suggests, indi-viduals who thought that their partners wereexperts accepted their recommendations an averageof 68% of the time, whereas participants pairedwith partners perceived as inferior accepted theirrecommendations only 42% of the time (Foschi,Warriner, & Hart, 1985).

Informational Power In 1965, Raven separatedout informational power from expert power:Group members can turn information into powerby providing it to others who need it, by keeping itfrom others, by organizing it, increasing it, or evenfalsifying it. Some individuals achieve informationalpower by deliberately manipulating or obscuringinformation, or at least making certain that theinformation remains a secret shared by only a fewgroup members (Messick, 1999). Other individualsare recognized as the keepers of the group’s truthsor secrets, and these individuals must be consultedbefore the group makes a decision (Fine & Holyfield,1996). People who share information with otherscan achieve informational power, even by passingunverified and, in some cases, private informationthrough the group’s “grapevine” (Kurland & Pelled,2000).

Bases and Obedience

French and Raven’s power base theory explainswhy so many people obeyed Jim Jones, but it alsooffers insights into participants’ reactions in theMilgram experiments. Even though the experimenterwas not an authority in a traditional sense—he wasnot formally identified as the group’s leader andgiven an impressive title such as captain, president,director, or doctor—he did draw power from all sixof the bases identified by French and Raven(1959). His power to reward was high, because hegave out the payment, and also because he was animportant source of positive evaluations; participants

wanted to win a favorable appraisal from thisfigure of authority. He also used coercive prods:“The experiment requires that you continue,”and, “You have no other choice, you must goon” warn of possible negative consequences of dis-obedience. Many participants also assumed that theexperimenter had a legitimate right to control theiractions and that the learner had no right to quitthe study. The participants also respected YaleUniversity and recognized the importance of sci-entific research, so the experimenter had referentpower. Very few participants knew much aboutelectricity, either, so they considered the experi-menter an expert. He also persuaded them to con-tinue by telling them that the study was importantand that its findings would answer questions abouthow people learn.

Thomas Blass (2000a) confirmed the power ofthe experimenter in the Milgram study by asking agroup of unbiased observers to review a 12-minutevideotape of Milgram’s procedures. The observersthen reviewed six possible reasons why the partici-pant obeyed the experimenter’s orders. The reasonswere derived from French and Raven’s power basemodel. The coercive power explanation, for exam-ple, asked if people obeyed because the experi-menter insisted they continue and seemed to“warn of negative consequences” (Blass, 2000a,p. 42) The expert power explanation, in contrast,suggested that the participants assumed that the ex-perimenter was an expert and that his explanationof the procedure reassured them. These observersranked the experimenter as higher on expert, legit-imate, coercive, and informational power, butlower on reward power, and lower still on referentpower. The experimenter adopted a very brusquemanner during the study, so he did not seem par-ticularly likable; hence his low referent power. Hisstern, no-nonsense manner, however, apparentlymade him seem like a duly appointed expert whoseorders could not be disobeyed.

Power Tactics

People do not use only promises, rewards, threats,punishment, expertise, and information to influence

informational power Power based on the potential useof informational resources, including rational argument,persuasion, or factual data.

POWER 227

people—they have far more power tactics at theirdisposal when they need to poke, prod, or promptothers into action. Table 8.2 gives examples of someof these tactics, which differ in terms of their soft-ness, rationality, and laterality (Falbo & Peplau,1980; Raven et al., 1998).

■ Soft and hard. Soft tactics exploit the relation-ship between the influencer and the target toextract compliance. When individuals use suchmethods as collaboration, socializing, friend-ships, personal rewards, and ingratiation theyinfluence more indirectly and interpersonally.Hard tactics, in contrast, are often described asharsh, forcing, or direct because they rely oneconomic, tangible outcomes, such as imper-sonal rewards or threats to well-being. Hardtactics are not, however, necessarily morepowerful than soft ones; threatening peoplewith exclusion from a group or publicembarrassment may lead to substantially greaterchange than the threat of some deprivation orcorporal punishment (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007).

■ Rational and nonrational. Tactics that emphasizereasoning, logic, and good judgment are rationaltactics; bargaining and persuasion are examples.Tactics such as ingratiation and evasion arenonrational tactics of influence, because theyrely on emotionality and misinformation.

■ Unilateral and bilateral. Some tactics are interac-tive, involving give-and-take on the part ofboth the influencer and the target of theinfluence. Such bilateral tactics include persua-sion, discussion, and negotiation. Unilateraltactics, in contrast, can be enacted without thecooperation of the target of influence. Suchtactics include demands, faits accomplis,evasion, and disengagement.

People vary in their habitual use of one type ofpower tactic over another. When asked the question,“How do you get your way?” more interpersonallyoriented people—those more concerned with being

liked and accepted—showed a preference for soft,indirect, and rational power tactics (Falbo, 1997).Those who espoused a Machiavellian, manipulativephilosophy when dealing with others tended to useindirect/nonrational tactics, as did those who scoredlower in terms of agreeableness and emotional sta-bility (Butkovic & Bratko, 2007). Extraverts use agreater variety of tactics than introverts (Caldwell &Burger, 1997). Men and women also differ some-what in their choice of power tactics (Keshet et al.,2006). Men and women who supervised an ineffec-tive employee used both rewards and criticism, butwomen intervened less frequently with a more lim-ited range of tactics. They promised fewer pay raisesand threatened more pay deductions than men, andthey were more likely to criticize subordinates(Instone, Major, & Bunker, 1983). The sexes alsodiffer in their use of power in more intimate rela-tionships, for men tend to use bilateral and directtactics, whereas women report using unilateral andindirect methods (Falbo & Peplau, 1980).

People also choose different power tactics de-pending on the nature of the group situation(Yukl & Michel, 2006). A person who has high sta-tus in a group that is already rife with conflict willuse different tactics than an individual who is low instatus and wants to minimize conflict. In a corporatesetting, authorities rely on referent and expertpower, but in an educational setting teachers mayturn to reward and punishment power (Krause &Kearney, 2006). Who one is attempting to influencecan also dictate choice of power tactic; for example,people report using a variety of soft and hard meth-ods to influence subordinates but, when dealing withsuperiors, they rely heavily on rational methods suchas persuasion and discussion (Kipnis et al., 1984).People also shift from soft to hard tactics whenthey encounter resistance (Carson, Carson, & Roe,1993; Teppner, 2006). The interpersonal conse-quences of the use of these various types of influencemethods will be considered later in this chapter.

POWER PROCESSES

The micro-society of the group is not, in mostcases, egalitarian. The members of a newly formed

power tactics Specific strategies used to influenceothers, usually to gain a particular objective or advantage.

228 CHAPTER 8

T A B L E 8.2 A Sampling of the Many Power Tactics People Use to InfluenceOther People in Everyday Situations

Tactic Examples

Apprise I point out what she will gain.

I note the personal benefits he’ll receive.

Bully I yell at him.

I push him around.

Collaboration I offer to help.

I provide assistance as needed.

Complain I gripe about all the work I have to do.

I grumble about having to study.

Consulting I ask him to help me with the project.

I get her involved in the work.

Criticism I point out her limitations.

I find fault with their work.

Demand I demand that the problem be solved.

I order her to continue.

Discuss I give him supporting reasons.

We talk about it.

Disengage I give him the cold shoulder.

I stop talking to her.

Evade I change the subject when it comes up.

I skip the meeting.

Expertise I let her know I’m an expert.

I rely on my experience.

Fait accompli I just do it.

I don’t get anyone’s permission.

Humor I try to make a joke out of it.

I tell a funny story.

Ingratiate I flatter her.

I compliment him on the way he looks.

Inspire I appeal to her sense of fair play.

I cheer him on.

Instruct I teach him how to do it.

I set an example.

(continued)

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group begin as equals, but before long, somemembers gain greater influence over others.Influence often settles on the shoulders of thosewho most seek it, for some wish to not only controltheir own outcomes, but others’ outcomes as well.

Power, however, is a group-level process, and so therise to a position of authority also depends on thegroup itself: its status hierarchies, systems of roles andduties, and reciprocal networks of influence amongmembers (Stolte, Fine, & Cook, 2001).


Tactic Examples

Join forces I get the boss to agree with me.

I turn the group against her.

Manipulate I lie.

I leave out important details.

Negotiate I offer her a bargain.

I wheel and deal.

Persist I don’t take no for an answer.

I reiterate my point.

Persuade I coax her into it.

I convert him to my side.

Promise I promise to never do it again.

I offer to do some of his work for him.

Punish I fire her.

I slap him.

Put Down I insult him.

I say something like, “You are an idiot.”

Request I ask him to do me a favor.

I tell her what I expect.

Reward I increase his pay.

I give her a present.

Socialize I make small talk for a while.

I ask about the family.

Supplicate I plead.

I beg humbly for permission.

Threaten I threaten legal action.

I tell him that he might get fired.

SOURCE: Drawn from various studies of influence, including Caldwell & Burger, 1997; Dillard & Fitzpatrick, 1985; Emans, Munduate, Klaver, & Van de Vliert,2003; Falbo, 1977; Falbo & Peplau, 1980; Fu, Peng, Kennedy, & Yukl, 1997; Howard, Blumstein, & Schwartz, 1986; Instone, Major, & Bunker, 1983;Kipnis, 1984; Littlepage, Nixon, & Gibson, 1992; Stets, 1997; Wiseman & Schenck-Hamlin, 1981; Yukl & Michel, 2006.

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Who Seeks Power?

Not everyone seeks power over others. Somemembers are content to be rank-and-file members,equal in responsibilities and influence to most of theothers in the group, and so do not desire to riseupward in the group’s hierarchy. Other individualsseek only personal power: They wish to control theirown individual outcomes and experiences, but theyare not concerned about controlling other’s out-comes (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). Some, however,lust for the power to control other people, and theypursue it across time, groups, and situations.

People who are high in their need or hope forpower, for example, tend to pursue status and pres-tige more vigorously than others. They describethemselves as hoping to have power in the future:“I want to have power in every aspect of my life”(Harms, Roberts, & Wood, 2007). Need for power,measured when people are first hired for a large com-pany, predicts their rise to positions of authority inthe corporation’s management hierarchy some 8 to16 years later (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982). Theyare more likely to hold offices in groups and organi-zations. They report feeling more powerful whenthey interact with others (Fodor & Riordan, 1995),but if they are not able to act on this need, they tendto have high blood pressure and other health pro-blems (McClelland, 1975). When individuals whowere high in need for power watched a videotapeof someone acting very assertively rather than submis-sively they reported experiencing negative emotionsand exhibited physiological signs of tension, such asmuscle activity in the corrugator supercilli of the brow(Fodor, Wick, & Hartsen, 2006).

Individuals who seek and use power also tend toview the world—and the individuals and groupswithin it—as ordered in terms of relative dominance.This social dominance orientation (SDO) is,at its core, a general predisposition towardanti-egalitarianism within and between groups,

manifested by a preference for “group-based hierarchyand the domination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’groups” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 48). Individualswho are high in SDO strive to protect and evenincrease the differences between group members,and they prefer membership in hierarchical groups.They are dominant and assertive rather than submis-sive and passive, and match the prototype of thedriven, tough, and relatively uncaring seeker ofpower who views the world as a “dog-eat-dog”jungle where only the strong survive (Cozzolino &Snyder, 2008; Duckitt, 2006). Men tend to be higherin SDO than women (Wilson & Liu, 2003).

SDO also predicts reactions to outgroups. Justas individuals who are high in SDO believe that apecking order of individuals structures groups, sothey feel that a group-level pecking order ranksall societies. They would tend to agree with suchstatements as, “Some groups of people are simplyinferior to other groups” and “It’s probably a goodthing that certain groups are at the top and othergroups are at the bottom” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999,p. 67). In consequence, SDO is a powerful predic-tor of stereotyping and prejudice (Whitley, 1999).

Hierarchies of Dominance

Jack Washington, a participant in Milgram’s exper-iment, administered all the shocks up to 450 v withbarely a hesitation. The experimenter never prod-ded Jack to continue, but throughout he seemedsubdued—almost sad. When later asked why he fol-lowed orders, he said, “I merely went on. BecauseI was following orders. I was told to go on. And Idid not get a cue to stop” (Milgram, 1974, p. 50).

Humans, like many social species, live in groupswith organized systems of power relations. Field stud-ies of many primates, such as chimpanzees, baboons,and bonobos, reveal complex patterns of powerrelations that determine various privileges and re-sponsibilities. As an evolutionary account of humangregariousness would suggest, group members acceptinfluence from others because such behavioralresponses are adaptive. So long as the authority ismotivated to advance the interests of the group,then those lower in the status hierarchy—the low

social dominance orientation (SDO) A dispositionaltendency to accept and even prefer circumstances thatsustain social inequalities, combined with a general pref-erence for hierarchical social structures.

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men or women on the totem pole—tend to do asthey are told by those with higher status (Kessler &Cohrs, 2008). “Each member’s acknowledgement ofhis place in the hierarchy stabilizes the pack”(Milgram, 1974, p. 124). Those with lower statusare not powerless, however. When observers lookedcloser they noted that, along with the classic domi-nance of the alpha male or female, there was a com-plex pattern of control exercised by subordinates (deWaal, 2006). By forming coalitions with others, se-lectively disobeying unreasonable demands, and bydirectly challenging selfish authorities they redressedany abuses of power by those at the top of the statushierarchy. Power in social species, then, is a dy-namic, negotiated process rather than a top-downchain of influence (Keltner et al., 2008).

Interpersonal Complementarity The inter-personal complementarity hypothesis suggeststhat obedience and authority are reciprocal, com-plementary processes. This hypothesis assumes thateach group member’s action tends to evoke, or“pull,” a predictable set of actions from the othergroup members (Carson, 1969). If, for example, anindividual seems agreeable, pleasant, and coopera-tive, the other group members would tend to reactin kind: they would behave in positive, friendlyways. Friendly behaviors are reciprocated by friendlybehaviors. But what if group members act in dom-inant, firm, directive ways—issuing orders, takingcharge, giving advice? Such behaviors would tendto evoke submissive responses from the other groupmembers. People also report feeling more comfort-able when interacting with someone who displayscomplementary rather than similar reactions. Groupmembers who display signs of submissiveness whentalking to someone who seems powerful are betterliked, as are those who take charge when

interacting with docile, submissive individuals(Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). The interpersonal com-plementary hypothesis thus predicts that (1) positivebehaviors evoke positive behaviors and negative be-haviors evoke negative behaviors, and (2) dominantbehaviors evoke submissive behaviors and submis-sive behaviors evoke dominant behaviors (Sadler &Woody, 2003).

Researchers put this hypothesis to the test byarranging for young women to work, for a shortperiod of time, with a partner who was trained toenact a particular behavioral style. When she enacteda dominant, leading style she exuded confidence andauthority. In some cases, she added a degree offriendliness to her dominance, frequently interveningto keep the group working. In others, she was dom-inant, but less friendly; she stressed her superiorityand autonomy, and her self-confidence bordered onself-absorption and conceit. In other conditions, sheacted in more submissive, self-effacing ways. Ratherthan take charge, she would seem timid, uncertain,passive, and inhibited (Strong et al., 1988).

The videotapes of the sessions revealed clearevidence of complementarity. Participants whowere paired with a dominant confederate actedsubmissively; they acquiesced, behaved passively,and showed respect for their partner. Only rarelydid a participant respond in a dominant mannerwhen faced with a dominant interaction partner.Conversely, if the confederate behaved in a docilemanner, then the participants tended to take chargeby acting in a dominant fashion—strong evidenceof the power of complementarity.

Power of Roles When participants arrived forthe Milgram experiment, they were carefully castinto the role of teacher. The duties of that rolewere made clear to them, and it was not until theshock sequence progressed that they realized thedemands that their role would put on them.Their role required their actions.

Phillip Zimbardo and his colleagues examinedthe power of roles in their Stanford PrisonExperiment. Zimbardo selected two dozen healthy,intelligent, and psychologically normal men from alarge group of student volunteers to serve as either

interpersonal complementarity hypothesis The pre-dicted tendency for certain behaviors to evoke behaviorsfrom others that are congruous with the initial behavior,with positive behaviors evoking positive behaviors, neg-ative behaviors evoking negative behaviors, dominantbehaviors evoking submissive behaviors, and submissivebehaviors evoking dominant behaviors.

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guards or prisoners in a simulated prison. The stu-dents randomly assigned to the role of prison guardwere issued khaki uniforms, billy clubs, whistles,and reflective sunglasses. They were then put incharge of a mock prison that Zimbardo and hiscolleagues had constructed in the basement ofthe psychology building at Stanford University.The students assigned to the role of prisoner were“arrested” by uniformed police, booked, and trans-ported to the prison. There they were sprayed witha deodorant, searched, issued an identification num-ber, and outfitted in a dresslike shirt, heavy anklechain, and stocking cap.

The study was scheduled to run for two weeks,but was terminated after only six days. Why?According to Zimbardo (2007), the participants be-came too immersed in their roles. The prisonersseemed literally to become prisoners; althoughsome rebelled, the majority became withdrawnand depressed. The guards also changed as the studyprogressed; many became increasingly tyrannicaland arbitrary in their control of the prisoners. Theywoke the prisoners in the middle of the night andforced them to stand at attention for hours, lockedthem in a closet, strictly enforced pointless rules,and censored prisoners’ mail. Some of their actionscrossed the line between intimidation and abuse.They threatened the prisoners with physical injury,ran hooded prisoners into walls as they walkedthem to the bathrooms at night, and forced themto engage in feigned sexual activities (“floor-humping” and mock anal intercourse). Zimbardoconfessed that even he found himself sinking toodeeply into the role of superintendent, worryingover possible “prison breaks” and autocraticallycontrolling visiting procedures (Haney, Banks, &Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, Maslach, & Haney,2000; Zimbardo, 2004, 2007).

Why did the prisoners respond so obedientlyand the guards so autocratically? Zimbardo believedthat the participants felt compelled to act consis-tently with their roles. All of the participants hada general idea of what it meant to act like a prisoneror like a guard. As the study progressed, theybecame more and more comfortable in their roles.Eventually, to be a guard meant controlling all

aspects of the prison and protecting this controlwith force if necessary. Prisoners, on the otherhand, were supposed to accept this control andtry to get through the experience as easily as possi-ble by obeying all the prison’s rules. Participants whorefused to obey these norms were pressured by theother participants to bring their behavior back in line;nonconformity was not tolerated. Zimbardo con-cluded that the “Stanford Prison Experiment madeit evident that initially our guards were ‘good apples,’some of whom became soured over time by powerfulsituational forces” (2007, p. 329). Zimbardo calls thetendency for people to be corrupted by negativegroup environments the Lucifer effect.

Responsibility and the Agentic State One’spower in a group and one’s responsibility for whathappens in the group tend to covary. Those whooccupy positions of authority—leaders, executives,managers, and bosses—are generally viewed as moreaccountable than those who occupy such low-statuspositions as subordinate or employee (Blass, 1995,1996; Hamilton & Sanders, 1995). Because respon-sibility is thought to be concentrated in the role ofthe superior, however, subordinates in hierarchicallyorganized groups sometimes no longer feel person-ally responsible for their own actions. They enterwhat Milgram called the agentic state—they be-come agents of a higher authority (Milgram, 1974).They feel “responsibility to the authority” but “noresponsibility for the content of the actions that theauthority prescribes” (Milgram 1974, pp. 145–146).Like Jack Washington, who was just “followingorders” when he shocked the screaming learner,many individuals who have little power in thegroup assume that they are supposed to carry out

Lucifer effect The transformation of benign individualsinto morally corrupt ones by powerful, but malevolent,social situations; named for the biblical character Lucifer,an angel who fell from grace and was transformed intoSatan.agentic state A psychological state described by StanleyMilgram that occurs when subordinates in an organized sta-tus hierarchy experience such a marked reduction in auton-omy that they are unable to resist authorities’ orders.

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the orders of the authority without questioningthose orders. They no longer feel that they are incontrol of their own actions, and so they becomewilling cogs in the group machine, carrying outauthorities’ orders without considering their impli-cations or questioning their effects (Hamilton &Sanders, 1999; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989).

Researchers examined this loss of responsibilityin chains of command by adding a second layer tothe hierarchy in the usual obedience situation(Kilham & Mann, 1974). They modified the basicMilgram experiment to include a transmitter, whorelayed orders, and an executant, who actually deliv-ered the shocks. As predicted, transmitters weremore obedient than executants (54% versus 28%).In this study, men were more obedient than women,but other studies found either no difference betweenmen and women (Milgram, 1974) or heightenedobedience among women (Sheridan & King, 1972).

Milgram himself documented the relationshipbetween a feeling of responsibility and obedienceby asking his participants to allocate responsibilityfor the situation among the three participants—the experimenter, the teacher, and the learner.Obedient participants gave more responsibility tothe experimenter than they gave to themselves.They also gave twice as much responsibility to thevictim as did disobedient participants. These dis-obedient participants, in contrast, took moreresponsibility than they attributed to the experi-menter (Mantell & Panzarella, 1976; Meeus &Raaijmakers, 1995; West, Gunn, & Chernicky,1975). Milgram’s analysis of responsibility is alsoconsistent with studies of diffusion of responsibility:People feel less personally responsible when theyare in groups than when they are alone. Other neg-ative group behaviors, such as reductions in collec-tive effort, conflict, mob behaviors, and vandalismhave all been attributed to the diffusion of respon-sibility that occurs in groups (see Focus 7.2).

The Power of Commitment

Jim Jones’s order to commit suicide did not surprisehis followers. Jones had talked about mass suicideeven before the People’s Temple moved to Guyana.On more than one occasion, Jones had told the

congregation that he had poisoned the sacramentalwine and that all would be dead within the hour.He went so far as to plant confederates in theaudience who feigned convulsions and death. Herepeated this ceremony in Jonestown, calling itthe White Night. After enough repetitions, thethought of suicide, so alien to most people, becamecommonplace in the group.

Jones’s White Night tactic illustrates the powerof behavioral commitment. Jones did not suddenlyorder his followers to commit suicide. Instead, heprefaced his request with months of demands thatincreased in their intensity. Similarly, Milgram didnot ask participants to push a lever that would de-liver 450 v to the learner at the outset of the study.Instead, he asked them only to give the learner amild shock if he answered incorrectly. No one re-fused. Over time, however, the demands escalated,and participants were unable to extricate themselvesfrom the situation. Once they began, they could notstop (Gilbert, 1981; Modigliani & Rochat, 1995).

Studies of the influence tactics used by pan-handlers, salespeople, fundraisers, and authoritiesconfirm the power of gradually escalating demands(Cialdini, 2009). The foot-in-the-door technique,for example, works by prefacing a major requestwith a minor one that is so inconsequential thatfew people would refuse to comply. Investigatorsdemonstrated the strength of this technique byasking home owners to post a large, unattractivesign in their yards. Nearly all refused—unless thismajor request had been preceded by a smallerrequest (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Similar studieshave also found that the two requests called for bythe foot-in-the-door technique are superior to a sin-gle request formany types of behaviors, although suchfactors as the sex of the influencer and the amount oftime that elapses between the two requests moderatethe power of the foot-in-the-door method (Beamanet al., 1983; Dillard, 1991).

foot-in-the-door technique A method of influence inwhich the influencer first makes a very small request thatthe target will probably agree to; once the target agreesto the minor request, he or she is more likely to agree tothe influencer’s more important request.

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Interrogators often use behavioral commitmentto extract compliance from detainees. Chinese mili-tary personnel, for example, used the foot-in-the-door tactic in the so-called “brainwashing” methodsduring the Korean War. They began by subjectingU.S. prisoners of war to physical hardships and stress-ful psychological pressures. The men were oftenfatigued from forced marches, and their sleep wasdisrupted. Their captors broke down the chain ofcommand in these units by promoting nonrankingsoldiers to positions of authority, and friendshipsamong the men were systematically discouraged.

Although the Chinese relied heavily on tradi-tional methods of influence, such as persuasion,indirect techniques proved more effective. The pris-oners were initially asked to perform inconsequentialactions, such as copying an essay out of a notebook oranswering some questions about life in the UnitedStates. Once the men agreed to a minor request, amore significant request followed. They might beasked to write their own essays about communismor discuss the problems of capitalism. Each small con-cession led to a slightly larger one, until the menfound themselves collaborating with the Chinese.The Chinese rarely succeeded in permanently chang-ing themen’s attitudes and values, but they did extractobedience to their authority: Morale within theprison was poor, and the men rarely tried to escape(Schein, 1961; Segal, 1954).

Power and the Fundamental

Attribution Error

A church member obediently swallowing poison. Asoldier executing innocent civilians. A worker in-stalling substandard building materials. A participantin an experiment giving an innocent victim painfulshocks. On first hearing about such events, peopleoften fall prey to the fundamental attributionerror (FAE): They blame the personalities of the

individuals rather than the powerful group pro-cesses at work that forced them to obey. In extremeinstances, when a powerholder inflicts tremendoussuffering and misfortune on people, the groupmembers blame themselves for their misery. Themembers of the People’s Temple may have felt sodeserving of their fate that they chose to sufferrather than escape suffering. These feelings of self-condemnation may account for their willingness totake their own lives (Clark, 1971; Fanon, 1963).

Yet obedience is not a reflection of the natureof the individuals in the group, but an indication ofthe power of the group itself. By controlling keybases of power, using power tactics, exploiting thenature of the subordinate–authority relationship,and prefacing large demands with minor ones, au-thorities exert great influence on group members.As John Darley explained, “Many evil actions arenot the volitional products of individual evil-doers.Instead, they are in some sense societal products, inwhich a complex series of social forces interact tocause individuals to commit multiple acts of stun-ning evil” (Darley, 1992, p. 204).

THE METAMORPHIC EFFECTS

OF POWER

The metamorphic effects of power have long fasci-nated observers of the human condition (Kipnis,1974). In their tragedies, the Greeks dramatizedthe fall of heroes who, swollen by past accomplish-ments, conceitedly compared themselves to thegods. Myth and folklore are replete with tales ofthe consequences of too much power, as in thecase of Icarus, whose elation at the power of flightcaused his own death. As Lord Acton warned,“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power cor-rupts absolutely.” But what of those withoutpower? The ancients also pitied those who werepowerless to control their own destinies, for theywere doomed to “a dark and meaningless exis-tence” (Griffin, 1983, p. 143). No one, Nietzschebelieved, could survive if they lose the will topower. In the next sections, we consider the meta-phoric effects of power: how power changes both

fundamental attribution error (FAE) The tendencyto overestimate the causal influence of dispositional fac-tors and underemphasize the causal influence of situa-tional factors.

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those in positions of power and those who are thetargets of that influence.

Changes in the Powerholder

Approach/inhibition theory, developed byDacher Keltner and his colleagues (2003, 2008),agrees with the wisdom of the ancients, for its as-sumes that power—having power, using power,even thinking about power—transforms individuals’psychological states. The theory notes that mostorganisms display one of two basic types of reactionsto environmental events. One reaction, approach, isassociated with action, self-promotion, seekingrewards and opportunities, increased energy, andmovement. The second reaction, inhibition, is asso-ciated with reaction, self-protection, avoidingthreats and danger, vigilance, loss of motivation,and an overall reduction in activity. Significantly,the approach/inhibition model suggests that powerincreases approach tendencies, whereas reductionsin power trigger inhibition. Power activatespeople—it causes them to experience increases indrive, energy, motivation, and emotion—and sooften leads to positive consequences. The powerfulcan bring their heightened energy, clearer insights,and positive emotions to bear on the issues facingthe group, and so help the group overcome diffi-culties and reach its goals. But power, and theactivation it brings, also has a dark side, for it cancreate a Jim Jones or an Adolph Hitler as often as aMahatma Gandhi or an Abraham Lincoln.

The Positive Effects of Power Power promptspeople to take action rather than remain passive.Powerful individuals are usually the busiest peoplein the group and organization, for they are engagedwith the group and responsive to changes withinthe group and its environment (Keltner et al.,2008). They are proactive; they would rather speakfirst during a debate, make the first move in a com-

petition, or make the first offer during a negotiation(Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Their ac-tions also tend to be more focused on the goalsappropriate to the given situation. If in a leisuresetting, powerful people plan to enact more relax-ing activities than less powerful people. In a worksetting, they plan more task-related activities(Guinote, 2008). These effects of power more oftenoccur in individuals who occupy positions that aremore prestigious or influential (leaders, bosses,managers), but as Focus 8.3 explains, they also oc-cur when power is primed by subtle features of thesituation.

Powerful people also tend to experience, andexpress, more positive emotions than those who arelower in power. High-power individuals usuallyfeel good about things—their moods are elevated,they report higher levels of such positive emotionsas happiness and satisfaction, and they even smilemore than low-power group members (Berdahl &Martorana, 2006; Watson & Clark, 1997). In astudy of dyads, those with more power than theirpartner reported feeling such positive emotions asmore happiness, pride, and amusement. Their part-ners, unfortunately, reported more anger, fear, ten-sion, and sadness (Langner & Keltner, 2008). Poweris also associated with optimism about the future,apparently because more powerful individuals tendto focus their attention on more positive aspects ofthe environment (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).

One’s level of power also influences what onenotices in others and in any given situation.Individuals with power seek out rewards and aremore likely to realize when desirable resources canbe acquired. Those without power, in contrast, aremore likely to be watching out for threats and pun-ishments and, therefore, are more likely to interpretambiguous situations as threatening ones (Keltneret al., 2003). Those with power also tend to thinkmore globally—they focus on the forest rather thanthe trees (Guinote, 2007; Smith & Trope, 2006).Those with power seem to carry out executive cog-nitive functions more rapidly and successfully, in-cluding general internal control mechanisms thatcoordinate attention, decision-making, planning,and goal-selection (Smith et al., 2008).

approach/inhibition theory An integrative concep-tual analysis of the transformative effects of power thatfinds power to be psychologically and behaviorally acti-vating but the lack of power inhibiting.

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Does Power Corrupt? The positive consequ-ences of power, in terms of action orientation,emotions, and judgmental tendencies, can also beliabilities. Powerful people are proactive, but insome cases their actions are risky, inappropriate, orunethical ones (Emler & Cook, 2001). Just as theirmoods tend to be positive, they tend to generatenegative emotional reactions in their subordinates,particularly when there is disagreement and con-flict in the group (Fodor & Riordan, 1995). Some

individuals, driven by their need for power, over-step the boundaries of their authority or engagein inappropriate actions. When individuals gainpower, their self-evaluations grow more favorable,whereas their evaluations of others grow more neg-ative (Georgesen & Harris, 1998). If they feel thatthey have a mandate from their group or organiza-tion to get things done, they may do things they arenot empowered to do (Clark & Sechrest, 1976).When individuals feel powerful, they sometimes

F o c u s 8.3 Is Power a State of Mind?

On the first day, he said “I felt a king, like I rule thembrown-eyes. Like I was better than them. Happy.” Thesecond day, he said, “I felt down, unhappy, like Icouldn’t do anything, like I was tied up and couldn’tget loose.”

—Raymond Hansen, quoted in A Class Divided(Peters, 1987, p. 88).

Are you a powerful person? Do you have the capacityto influence others, even if they resist you? Some peo-ple, across time and settings, feel more interpersonallypowerful than others. When they describe themselvesthey are apt to say, “I can get people to listen to whatI say” or “If I want to, I get to make decisions,” and“I think I have a great deal of power” (Anderson &Galinsky, 2006). Yet, a sense of power also depends onthe situation; if you win an election, are appointed to aposition of influence in an organization, or are grantedmembership in a high-status group, in all likelihoodyou will experience a feeling of heightened power thatcomes from the circumstances (Keltner et al., 2008).

The subjective feeling of power was vividly dem-onstrated by Jane Elliott’s well-known classroomdemonstration of prejudice. On one day, she told herblue-eyed third graders that they were superior tobrown-eyed children, and gave them specialprivileges appropriate for their elevated status. Then,on the next day, she reversed the favoritism. The shiftin the emotions, actions, and moods of the twogroups of children from one day to the next was clearevidence of the psychological effects of power (Peters,1987).

A sense of power can also be triggered in moresubtle ways. Environmental or cognitive cues can primea sense of power, by activating pre-existing beliefs,concepts, or memories of experiences relevant topower. The researchers in one study primed power by

asking people to complete a task that involved lookingfor words embedded in a table of letters. Those whosearched for power-related words, such as authorityand boss rather than house or clock, were more likelyto act on the basis of their personal preferences. Asimilar result occurred when power was primed byseating people in a “power chair” in a professor’s of-fice. Those students who were seated in the professor’schair, behind the desk, acted in more powerful waysthan those who sat in the chair reserved for visitors(Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001).

Individuals’ own thoughts about their experienceswith power can also “empower” them. In one study,researchers first asked some people to think back to atime when they had power over other individuals.Others thought of a time when they had little power.They were then left to wait for the next phase of thestudy at a table positioned too close to an annoyingfan blowing directly on them. Some of the participantsjust put up with this irritation, but others took steps tosolve the problem: they moved the fan or turned it off.As predicted, 69% of the individuals who recalled atime they were powerful removed the bothersome fan,compared to only 42% of less powerful participants(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).

These studies all suggest that power is, to someextent, a subjective experience. Some individuals whooccupy positions of authority and influence report thatthey feel powerless and without any control overevents that transpire in their lives. Yet, other indivi-duals, who face situations that seem to be ones thatthey cannot in any way influence and control, reportfeeling very powerful and in charge. They may nothave power, yet they feel powerful. Power, then, is inpart a state of mind—a feeling of authority rather thanauthority per se. Feeling powerful may well be the firststep to being powerful.

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treat others unfairly, particularly if they are moreself-centered rather than focused on the overall goodof the group (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001).Some individuals (primarily men) associate powerwith sexuality, and so when they are empowered,they engage in inappropriate sexual behaviors,including sexual harassment (MacKinnon, 2003).

Powerful people often misjudge, misunder-stand, and even derogate their subordinates.Powerholders can be discerning judges of thosewho work for them, but often only when their per-sonal success depends on recognizing the strengthsand weaknesses of subordinates (Overbeck andPark, 2001). Power tends to weaken one’s socialattentiveness, with the result that powerful peoplehave a more difficult time understanding otherpeople’s point of view (Galinsky et al., 2006).Powerful individuals also spend less time gatheringand processing information about their subordinatesand, as a result, may perceive them in a stereotypicalfashion (Fiske, 1993a)—particularly if their primaryloyalty is to the organization rather than to the in-dividuals who are subordinate to them (Overbeck &Park, 2001).

Powerful people tend to be more behaviorallyoriented, but in some cases that means they use theirpower unnecessarily. David Kipnis (1974) examinedthis tendency by arranging for advanced businessstudents to participate as managers in a simulatedmanufacturing company. Some had considerablepower, in that they could award bonuses, cut pay,threaten and actually carry out transfers to otherjobs, give additional instructions, and even fire aworker, but others could not. Kipnis controlledthe level of productivity of the fictitious workers(all performed adequately), but powerful managersnonetheless initiated roughly twice as many at-tempts at influence as the less powerful managers.Moreover, power determined the power tacticsmanagers used—the powerless ones relied on per-suasion, whereas the powerful ones coerced or re-warded their workers. Other studies have yieldedsimilar support for the idea that people with powertend to make use of it, but the magnitude of thiseffect depends on many other factors (Fiske &Berdahl, 2008).

Once power has been used to influence others,changes in powerholders’ perceptions of themselvesand of the target of influence may take place. Inmany instances, the successful use of power as ameans of controlling others leads to self-satisfaction,unrealistically positive self-evaluations, and over-estimations of interpersonal power (Galinsky,Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008). When Kipnis (1974)asked participants if their subordinates were per-forming well because of (1) the workers’ highself-motivation levels, (2) their manager’s commentsand suggestions, or (3) their desire for money, thehigh-power managers believed that their workerswere only in it for the money (which the managercould control). The low-power managers believedthat the workers were “highly motivated.” Otherstudies have also revealed this tendency for powerfulindividuals to assume that they themselves are theprime cause of other people’s behavior (Kipniset al., 1976). Powerholders tend to (1) increase thesocial distance between themselves and nonpowerfulindividuals, (2) believe that nonpowerful individualsare untrustworthy and in need of close supervision,and (3) devalue the work and ability of less powerfulindividuals (Kipnis, 1974; Strickland, Barefoot, &Hockenstein, 1976).

The Iron Law of Oligarchy Some people arepower hungry. They seek power, not becausethey can use it to achieve their goals, but becausethey value power per se. Hence, once such peopleattain power, they take steps to protect their sourcesof influence. This protective aspect of power trans-lates into a small-group version of Robert Michels’s(1915/1959) iron law of oligarchy—individualsin power tend to remain in power. Eventually,too, powerholders may become preoccupied withseeking power, driven by a strong motivation toacquire greater and greater levels of interpersonalinfluence (McClelland, 1975, 1985; Winter, 1973).

iron law of oligarchy Robert Michels’s principle ofpolitical and social control which predicts that in anygroup where power is concentrated in the hands of afew individuals (an oligarchy), these individuals willtend to act in ways that protect and enhance their power.

238 CHAPTER 8

This need for power, as noted earlier in the chapter,is a prominent personality characteristic in indivi-duals who rise to positions of authority in organiza-tions and politics. Evidence also indicates, however,that when those with a high power motivationcannot exercise that power, they experience in-creased tension and stress (McClelland, 1985).Under such conditions, they also exaggerate theamount of conflict that exists in the group andoverlook group members’ efforts at cooperation(Fodor, 1984, 1985).

Reactions to the Use of Power

Power, by its very nature, suggests tension, conflict,and turmoil. In many cases, power does not justinclude power with people and over people, butalso power against people. Powerholders can influ-ence, sometimes dramatically, the outcomes ofthose who have little power, prompting them todo things they would rather not. How do peoplerespond—behaviorally, cognitively, and emotion-ally—when the directives of authorities conflictwith the goals they have set for themselves?

Reactions to Power Tactics Approach/inhibitiontheory suggests that individuals who find them-selves without power, relative to others, avoidrather than approach. They not only lack resources,but they are dependent on others for the resourcesthat they need. They therefore tend to displaymore negative affect, they are sensitive to threatsand punishments, and they tend to follow closelythe dictates of the norms of the group (Keltneret al., 2003).

These negative effects of power differentials aremore or less pronounced, however, depending onthe type of power tactic used by powerholders.Studies conducted in a range of settings, includingschools, military organizations, prisons, and families,suggest that harsh influence tactics—such as punish-ment (both personal and impersonal), legitimateauthority (such as rule-based sanctions), and non-personal rewards—are less effective than soft influ-ence methods—expert power, referent power, andpersonal rewards (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Pierro,

Cicero, & Raven, 2008). Harsh tactics generate arange of negative emotions, including hostility, de-pression, fear, and anger, whereas those influencedby softer methods tend to reciprocate with cooper-ation (Krause, D. E., 2006). Moreover, even whenmildly coercive methods, such as threats, are used,people often overreact and respond with evenstronger counterthreats, setting in motion an up-ward spiral of conflict (Youngs, 1986). Hence, al-though coercive powerholders may be successful ininitial encounters, influence becomes more difficultin successive meetings as the target’s anger and resis-tance to pressure grow. Coercive and reward powercan also cause group members to lose interest in theirwork. Supervisors who create feelings of autonomysustain their subordinates’ intrinsic interest in theirwork, whereas those who use coercive or rewardingmethods find that productivity dwindles when theyare not monitoring the group (Deci, Nezlek, &Sheinman, 1981; Pelletier & Vallerand, 1996).Organizational experts advocate sharing power withsubordinates by delegating responsibilities, empower-ing workers, and making use of self-directed workteams (Hollander & Offermann, 1990).

The conflict created by coercive influence candisrupt the entire group’s functioning. Studies of class-rooms, for example, indicate that many teachers relyheavily on coercion, but that these methods causerather than solve disciplinary problems (Kounin,1970). Coercive tactics, such as physical punishment,displays of anger, and shouting, not only fail tochange the target student’s behavior but also leadto negative changes in the classroom’s atmosphere(Kounin & Gump, 1958). When misbehaving stu-dents are severely reprimanded, other students oftenbecome more disruptive and uninterested in theirschoolwork, and negative, inappropriate social activ-ity spreads from the trouble spot throughout theclassroom. This disruptive contagion, or ripple effect, isespecially strong when the reprimanded students arepowerful members of the classroom status structureor when commands by teachers are vague and am-biguous. On the basis of these findings, researchershave suggested that teachers avoid the ripple effect byrelying on other influence bases, including rewardpower, referent power, and expert power.

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Resistance to Coercive Influence Group mem-bers do not always rebel against a “benevolentdespot.” A powerholder who uses coercive influ-ence tactics, such as threats and punishments, is of-ten tolerated by group members when the group issuccessful (Michener & Lawler, 1975), the leader istrusted (Friedland, 1976), and the use of such tacticsis justified by the group’s norms (Michener & Burt,1975). Coercive methods are also more effectivewhen they are applied frequently and consistentlyto punish prohibited actions (Molm, 1994).

In some cases, however, group members resistthe authority’s influence. They may escape thepowerholder’s region of control or apply influencein return. Members contend against those in powerindividually—particularly when they feel that othersin the group have more power than they do. Butwhen members feel a sense of shared identity withthe other low-power members of the group, theyare more likely to join with them in a revolution-ary coalition that opposes the powerholder(Dijke & Poppe, 2004; Lawler, 1975). In one studyof group rebellion, group members worked underthe direction of a leader who was appointed to thatpost because he or she had outscored them on abogus test of ability. The leader then proceededto keep more than half of the money earned bythe group, giving each participant less than onefourth. If the leader had personally decided howto apportion payment, 58% of the participantsrebelled by forming a coalition with the otherlow-status participants. If the leader was not respon-sible for the payment scheme, only 25% revolted(Lawler & Thompson, 1978, 1979).

Group members are also more likely to resist anauthority who lacks referent power, uses coerciveinfluence methods, and asks the group members tocarry out unpleasant assignments (Yukl, Kim, &Falbe, 1996). Such conditions can generate reactancein group members. When reactance occurs, indi-viduals strive to reassert their sense of freedom by

affirming their autonomy (Brehm, 1976). In onestudy, in which teammates had to make a choicebetween two alternatives marked 1-A and 1-B,73% chose 1-A if their partner said, “I prefer 1-A,”but only 40% chose 1-A if the partner demanded,“I think we should both do 1-A” (Brehm &Sensenig, 1966). In another study, 83% of the groupmembers refused to go along with a group partici-pant who said, “I think it’s pretty obvious all of usare going to work on Task A” (Worchel & Brehm,1971, p. 299).

Compliance and Conversion Both Milgram’sparticipants and the People’s Temple members didas they were told, but the two groups differed inone crucial respect: Most of Milgram’s participantsstruggled to withstand the authority’s pressure, forthey believed that the learner should not be heldagainst his will. Many of Jones’s followers, in con-trast, zealously followed his orders. They did notstrain against his authority; they had converted tohis way of thinking (Darley, 1995; Lutsky, 1995;Staub, 1989, 2004).

Herbert Kelman (1958, 1961, 2006) identifiedthree basic reactions that people display in responseto coercive influence (see Table 8.3). In some cases,the powerholder only produces compliance—thegroup members do what they are told to do, butonly because the powerholder demands it. Privately,they do not agree with the powerholder, but pub-licly they yield to the pressure. Like Milgram’sparticipants, they obey only when the powerholdermaintains surveillance. Identification occurs when thetarget of the influence admires and therefore imi-tates the powerholder. When group members iden-tify with the powerholder, their self-image changesas they take on the behaviors and characteristicsof the person with power. Many members of thePeople’s Temple admired Jones and wanted toachieve his level of spirituality. They obeyed hisorders because they identified with him.

revolutionary coalition A subgroup formed within thelarger group that seeks to disrupt or change the group’sauthority structure.

reactance A complex emotional and cognitive reactionthat occurs when individuals feel that their freedom tomake choices has been threatened or eliminated.

240 CHAPTER 8

Identification, if prolonged and unrelenting,can lead to the final stage—internalization. Wheninternalization occurs, the individual “adopts theinduced behavior because it is congruent with hisvalue system” (Kelman, 1958, p. 53). The groupmembers are no longer merely carrying out thepowerholder’s orders; instead, their actions reflecttheir own personal beliefs, opinions, and goals.Even if the powerholder is not present, the groupmembers will still undertake the required actions.Extreme obedience—such as occurred withJonestown, the murder of millions of Jews by theNazis during World War II, the My Lai massacre,and the Heaven’s Gate group—often requires inter-nalization. The group members’ actions reflect theirprivate acceptance of the authority’s value system(Hamilton & Sanders, 1995, 1999; Kelman &Hamilton, 1989).

Kelman’s three-step model of conversion ex-plains how groups convert recruits into ferventmembers over time. Cults, for example, insist thatthe members adopt the group’s ideology, but in theearly stages of membership, they only require com-pliance. New recruits are invited to pleasant groupfunctions, where they are treated in a warm, posi-tive way. Once they agree to join the group for alonger visit, the veteran members disorient themby depriving them of sleep, altering their diet,and persuading them to join in physically exhilarat-ing activities. The recruits are usually isolatedfrom friends and family to prevent any lapses in

influence, subjected to lectures, and asked to takepart in group discussions. Compliance with thesesmall requests is followed by greater demands,as with the U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.Eventually, the recruits freely agree to make per-sonal sacrifices for the group, and these sacrificesprompt a further consolidation of their attitudes(Baron, 2000; Baron, Kerr, & Miller, 1992). Oncerecruits reach the consolidation stage, they havefully internalized the group’s ideology and goals.

Questioning Authority

In 1976, Jim Jones fought for the improvement ofhousing and for progressive political change in theSan Francisco area, and his followers worked dili-gently toward the goals outlined by their leader. In1978, he was accused of human rights violations,physical assault, and illicit sexual practices. Powerchanged all the members of the People’s Temple,including Jones himself.

Authority is essential to group life. Without itsorganizing guidance, group members could not co-ordinate their efforts and achieve their goals. Yetauthorities that overstep their boundaries can un-dermine members’ motivations, create conflict,and break the bonds between members. Authori-ties, too, must be wary of their own power, forpower is easily misused. Who should questionauthority? Those who have it and those who arecontrolled by it.

T A B L E 8.3 Kelman’s Compliance-Identification-Internalization Theory of Conversion

Stage Description

Compliance Group members comply with the powerholder’s demands, but they do not personally agree withthem. If the powerholder does not monitor the members, they will likely not obey.

Identification Group members’ compliance with the actual or anticipated demands of the powerholder aremotivated by a desire to imitate and please the authority. The members mimic thepowerholder’s actions, values, characteristics, and so on.

Internalization Group members follow the orders and advice of the powerholder because those demands arecongruent with their own personal beliefs, goals, and values. They will perform the requiredactions even if not monitored by the powerholder.

SOURCE: Kelman, 1958.

POWER 241

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What are the limits of an authority’s power over groupmembers?

1. Social power is the capacity to influence others,even when these others try to resist thisinfluence.

2. Milgram tested people’s ability to resist apowerful authority who ordered them to givepainful and potentially harmful electric shocksto a confederate.

■ A majority (65%) of Milgram’s participantsobeyed, apparently because they feltpowerless to refuse the orders of theauthority.

■ Obedience rose and fell systematically asMilgram manipulated various aspects ofthe setting, including the risk of the pro-cedure to the victim, the proximity of thevictim to the group member, the prestigeof the research location, surveillance by theexperimenter, the legitimacy of theauthority, and the presence of groups.

■ Critics noted methodological flaws of theprocedures and suggested that the personalcharacteristics of Milgram’s participantsprompted them to obey, but Milgramargued that his studies substantiated thepower of authorities.

3. Milgram’s studies suggest that obedience iscommon in hierarchically organized groups,such as those found in military, educational,and organizational settings. Studies of flightcrews, for example, suggest that aircraftaccidents are in some cases due to excessiveobedience to the pilot’s authority.

What are the sources of power in groups?

1. French and Raven’s theory of power basesemphasizes six sources of power—reward power,coercive power, legitimate power, referent power,expert power, and informational power. Blass

confirmed empirically that the experimenter inthe Milgram experiments derived power fromall six bases.

2. Bullying is the use of coercive influence againstanother, less powerful person. It can involvephysical contact, verbal abuse, exclusion, orother negative actions. Bullying can and shouldbe prevented by restructuring the groupsituation.

3. Group members’ influence over others dependson their control of these six power bases.Weber’s concept of charisma suggests thatcertain charismatic leaders, for example, exerttheir influence by relying on legitimate powerand referent power.

4. Power tactics are specific methods, such as per-suasion, bargaining, and evasion, that peopleuse to attain the goal of influencing others.These methods vary in a number of ways(hard–soft, rational–irrational, lateral–bilateral),with individuals selecting particular tacticsdepending on their personal characteristics andthe nature of the group setting.

Who seeks power and what group processes limit theirsuccess?

1. Personal characteristics, such as need for powerand social dominance orientation, predict thoseindividuals who are more likely to strive forpower over others.

2. A number of group and structural processessustain variations in power in groups.

■ Individuals tend to obey orders in groupswith clear superior–subordinatehierarchies.

■ Individuals tend to respond submissivelywhen they confront authority, and theytend to behave assertively when they en-counter someone who is submissive (theinterpersonal complementarity hypothesis).

242 CHAPTER 8

■ Individuals feel compelled to comply withthe requirements of the role they occupywithin the group, as Zimbardo’s simulatedprison study confirms. The Lucifer effectsuggests that, in extremely powerfulgroups, even benign individuals can beinduced to perform extremely negative,immoral actions.

■ Milgram’s theory of the agentic state tracesobedience back to the nature of theauthority–subordinate relationship. Whenindividuals become part of an organizedhierarchy, they tacitly agree to follow theleader’s orders. They also experience areduction of responsibility.

■ Powerholders extract obedience fromgroup members by taking advantage of thefoot-in-the-door technique, prefacing majordemands with minor, inconsequentialones. This method played a role in the so-called “brainwashing” methods used byChinese military personnel during theKorean War.

■ People who blame obedience on theindividuals in the situation may be dis-playing the fundamental attribution error(FAE), which underestimates the powerof group-level processes.

How do people react when they use their power to influ-ence others?

1. The idea that “power corrupts, and absolutepower corrupts absolutely” is consistent withKeltner’s approach/inhibition theory, whichsuggests that power activates the approachresponse system whereas the loss of powerinhibits actions.

2. The positive effects of power include increasedresponsiveness, more positive emotions, a nar-rowing of attention, and increased executivefunctioning.

3. The negative effects of power includeexcessive self-regard, an increased tendency toact in a risky or inappropriate way, loss ofperspective-taking, and the tendency tomisjudge others.

■ Kipnis’s studies of the metamorphic effectsof power found that people who are givencoercive power will use this power, andthat once it is used, the powerholders tendto overestimate their control over othersand devalue their targets.

■ Powerholders may become so enamoredof power that they are preoccupied withgaining it and using it to the exclusionof all other goals (Michels’s iron law ofoligarchy).

How do those without power react when power is used toinfluence them?

1. Coercive methods have been linked to anumber of dysfunctional group processes, in-cluding revolutionary coalitions, reactance, increasesin conflict as more group members rebelagainst authority (the ripple effect), and disruptedinterpersonal relations.

2. People also react more negatively to direct,irrational power tactics than to power tacticsthat are more indirect, rational, andbilateral.

3. Kelman’s compliance–identification–inter-nalization model predicts that targets ofinfluence may begin by merely complyingwith the authority’s request, but over time,they may experience identification and internali-zation. When group members identify withthe authority or internalize the authority’sdemands, their obedience reflects their personalbeliefs rather than the constraints of thesituation.

POWER 243


Chapter Case: The People’s Temple■ Our Father Who Art in Hell: The Life and Death

of Jim Jones, by James Reston, Jr. (2000), relieson the analysis of over 800 hours of taperecordings, as well as personal interviews withJonestown survivors, to develop a full analysisof the People’s Temple.

■ Guyana Massacre: The Eyewitness Account, byCharles A. Krause (1978), provides a factualanalysis of the demise of the People’s Temple,as well as commentaries on cults in general.

Obedience to Authority■ Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the

Milgram Paradigm, edited by Thomas Blass(2000b), provides both a personal and anobjective analysis of the study that some feel is“one of the best carried out in this generation”(Etzioni, 1968, pp. 278–280).

■ Obedience to Authority, by Stanley Milgram(1974), describes his classic obedience studies ingraphic detail.

Source of Power in Groups■ “Social Power,” by Susan T. Fiske and Jennifer

Berdahl (2007) provides is a concise analysis ofthe nature of power, with sections dealing withdefinitional issues, bases of power, andantecedents.

■ Influence: Science and Practice, by Robert B.Cialdini (2009), presents an engaging discussionof the techniques that “compliance profes-sionals”—salespeople, advertisers, charityworkers, and panhandlers—use to influenceothers.

■ The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How GoodPeople Turn Evil, by Philip Zimbardo (2007),describes in detail the methods and results ofthe Stanford Prison Experiment, and appliesthe insights gained to suggest ways to resistsituational influences.

Metamorphic Effects of Power■ “Power, Approach, and Inhibition,” by Dacher

Keltner, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and CameronAnderson (2003), offers a sophisticated theo-retical analysis of how power influencesbehavior based on the idea that power activatesapproach but that loss of power leads toinhibition.

■ “A Reciprocal Influence Model of SocialPower: Emerging Principles and Lines ofInquiry,” by Dacher Keltner, Gerben A. VanKleef, Serena Chen, and Michael W. Kraus(2008), discusses power as an interactionaloutcome, possibly rooted in evolutionarymechanisms.


244 CHAPTER 8


9

Leadership

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Groups generally require guidance asthey strive to reach their goals, andthe individual who coordinates andmotivates the group can fundamen-tally shape the group’s future. If asked,“What one thing would you changeto turn an inept group into a produc-tive one?” most people would answer,“The leader.”

■ What is leadership?■ Who will lead?■ Why do some leaders succeed and

others fail?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

The Nature of Leadership

Leadership Myths

What Is Leadership?

What Do Leaders Do?

Leadership Emergence

Personal Qualities of Leaders

The Look of Leaders

Who Will Lead?

Leader Effectiveness

Fiedler’s Contingency Model

Style Theories

Leader–Member Exchange Theory

Participation Theories

Transformational Leadership

The Future of Leadership

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

245

✵

Over the years since Kopp first founded the orga-nization, Teach for America has placed thousands ofteachers in schools, many of whom decided to stayin the schools and become permanent teachers oncetheir two-year term ended. The board, the staff,and the teachers of TFA deserve much of the creditfor the success of the organization, but it wasWendy Kopp’s leadership that made the differ-ence. Her success, and the successes of others likeher, raise many questions about the complicatedand intricate interpersonal process called leadership.First, what is leadership? What did Kopp do as sheled her staff in the pursuit of its challenging goals?Second, why did Kopp take on the role of leader?Third, Kopp was not just a leader, but a successfulleader: TFA faced one difficulty after another andnearly collapsed under the pressure of criticism,

funding limitations, and internal restructuring. YetKopp managed to guide her organization success-fully through each new quagmire, and each yearTFA attracted applications from the best collegesand universities. Why did she succeed where othersmight have failed?

THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP

People have probably been puzzling over leadershipsince the first hominid cave dweller told the rest ofthe group, “We’re doing this all wrong. Let’s getorganized.” Egyptian hieroglyphics written 5000years ago include the terms leader and leadership (Bass,1990). The great epics, such as Beowulf, the Song ofRoland, and the Odyssey, are filled with the exploitsof leaders of small bands of adventurers. Leaders, likesex, language, and groups, make the anthropologist’slist of universals that have been identified as commonto all cultures and all civilizations, without exception(Brown, 1991). But what is leadership?

Wendy Kopp: Transforming Groups through Leadership

Wendy Kopp kept putting off writing her senior thesisuntil she finally found a topic that she truly caredabout: the uneven quality of public education inAmerica. How, she wondered, could injustices and dis-crimination in American society be eliminated if thequality of schooling depends so much on the wealth ofthe community where one was raised? For her thesis,she proposed the creation of a national teacher corps,similar to the Peace Corps, whose members would berecent college graduates who were willing to spendtwo years teaching before starting their corporatecareers or graduate studies.

After graduation she decided to follow throughon her idea. That first summer she worked alone indonated office space in New York City, sending out anendless stream of letters seeking donations of thefunds she needed to get the program started. Shecalled her corps Teach For America (TFA) and workedtirelessly talking to potential corporate sponsors.Many of those who met her told her to start small tosee if the approach would work before shifting to a

larger scale. But she held fast to her original vision,explaining that “this was not going to be a littlenon-profit organization or model teacher-trainingprogram. This was going to be a movement” (Kopp,2003, p. 23).

By late fall, she had appointed boards of directorsand advisors and hired a staff. They worked tirelessly ina hive-like office space deep in Manhattan, but theyalso traveled out across the nation to recruit potentialstudents on college campuses. By the spring they hadattracted thousands of applicants from across thecounty, and Kopp had succeeded in gaining commit-ments from funders for the 2.5 million dollars neededto run TFA for a single year. So, in the spring of 1990,500 new corps members attended a summer institutein Los Angeles in preparation for two years of teachingin schools located in low-income areas of the U.S.Asked how she managed to succeed at such a monu-mental task so quickly, Kopp explained, “There wasnothing magical about it. I simply developed a planand moved forward step by step” (2003, p. 47).

leadership Guidance of others in their pursuits, oftenby organizing, directing, coordinating, supporting, andmotivating their efforts; also, the ability to lead others.

246 CHAPTER 9

Leadership Myths

The political scientist James McGregor Burns(1978) has asserted that leadership is “one of themost observed and least understood phenomenaon earth” (p. 2). Other experts have expressed dis-may at the prevalence of misunderstanding aboutleadership, complaining that most people “don’thave the faintest concept of what leadership is allabout” (Bennis, 1975, p. 1) and that “the nature ofleadership in our society is very imperfectly under-stood” (Gardner, 1965, p. 3). Many prescriptivesuggestions are offered to leaders, but they are toooften based on some questionable assumptionsabout leadership.

Is Leadership Power? Many people, includingsome prominent political leaders, assume that goodleaders are those capable of manipulating, controlling,and forcing their followers into obedience. Adolf

Hitler, for example, defined leadership as the abilityto move the masses, whether through persuasion orviolence, and Ho Chi Minh once said that a goodleader must learn to mold, shape, and change peoplejust as a woodworker must learn to use wood (seeTable 9.1). But people who use domination andcoercion to influence others—whether they arekings, presidents, bosses, or managers—are notnecessarily leaders. Constructive leaders act in thebest interests of a group with the consent of thatgroup. Leadership is a form of power, but powerwith people rather than over people—a reciprocalrelationship between the leader and the led.

Are Leaders Born or Made? Aristotle believedthat leadership was an innate talent: “Men aremarked out from the moment of birth to rule or beruled.” Some people, he believed, are born leaders,for their unique dispositional qualities predestinethem for the role of leader, just as others are born

T A B L E 9.1 Political Leaders’ Comments on the Nature of Leadership

Source Conception of Leadership

Napoleon Bonaparte “A leader is a dealer in hope.”

George W. Bush “Leadership to me means duty, honor, country. It means character, and it meanslistening from time to time.”

Benjamin Disraeli “I must follow the people. Am I not their leader?”

Dwight D. Eisenhower “Leadership is the ability to decide what is to be done, and then to get others towant to do it.”

Adolf Hitler “To be a leader means to be able to move masses.”

Jesse Jackson “Time is neutral and does not change things. With courage and initiative, leaderschange things.”

Ho Chi Minh “To use people is like using wood. A skilled worker can make use of all kinds ofwood, whether it is big or small, straight or curved.”

Theodore Roosevelt “The best executive is the one who has the sense enough to pick good men to dowhat he wants done, and self-restraint enough to keep from meddling with themwhile they do it.”

Margaret Thatcher “If you want something said, ask a man; if you want something done, aska woman.”

Harry S. Truman “A leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don’twant to do, and like it.”

Lao Tzu “A leader is best when people barely know that he exists, not so good whenpeople acclaim him, worst when they despise him.”

LEADERSH I P 247

to be followers. But studies of leadership develop-ment and effectiveness suggest that nurture, as wellas nature, plays a role in determining who will leadand who will follow. Some people, by nature, pos-ess certain highly stable personal qualities—such asparticular temperaments, intelligence, or skill indealing with people—that predispose them to beselected as leaders and to be successful in that role.But most people—through diligent effort and care-ful mentoring—can acquire the skills needed tobecome an effective leader.

Do All Groups Have Leaders? Groups can func-tion without a leader, but this role is usually the firstto emerge in a newly formed group (see Chapter 6).In groups that exist only briefly, all members mayshare leadership responsibilities, but groups workingfor an extended duration on more complex tasksrequire coordinated action, as do those experienc-ing conflict. The size of the group is also critical:members of larger groups are more likely to rely onone of their members to make rules clear, keepmembers informed, and make group decisions. Ingeneral, leaders appear in groups when (1) membersfeel that success on the group task is within theirreach, (2) the rewards of success are valued, (3) thetask requires group effort rather than individualeffort, and (4) an individual with previous experi-ence in the leadership role is present in the group. Agroup that is facing a stressful situation—such as apotential failure or danger—is also likely to embracea leader’s guidance (Guastello, 2007;Hemphill, 1950).

Some evidence suggests that a group of menwill be more likely to include a leader than will agroup of women (Schmid Mast, 2002). Investiga-tors tested for this sex difference by arranging forthree- to five-person groups to meet over threeweeks. Some of the groups were all male, somewere all female, and some included two men andtwo women. At the end of each day’s session, thegroup members rated one another on leadership,and the researchers used these ratings to determineif control over the group’s activities was concen-trated, by consensus, on one group member.Centralization decreased, over time, in all thegroups, but it remained higher across the three

weeks in the all male-groups. The investigatorsconcluded that men, in general, are more tolerantof inequality than women, so they favor socialhierarchy and centralization (Berdahl & Anderson,2005).

Do Followers Resist Leaders? Some laypersonsand experts have suggested that groups functionbest without leaders—that reliance on a central au-thority figure weakens the group and robs membersof their self-reliance. Some, too, have noted thatgroups chafe under the control of a leader, forthey begrudge the authority and power of theleader (Gemmill, 1986). Yet most people prefer tobe led rather than be leaderless. Group members areusually more satisfied and productive when theirgroups have leaders (Berkowitz, 1953). Groupmembers often complain about the quality of theirleaders—surveys that ask employees to identify theworst thing about their job find these complaintstend to converge on the leader—but they seekout better leaders rather than avoiding them alto-gether (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). Most people do notjust accept the need for a leader but appreciate thecontribution that the leader makes to the group andits outcomes (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Stewart &Manz, 1995).

This “need for a leader” becomes particularlystrong in groups that are experiencing interpersonalturmoil and can sometimes cause members to seeleadership potential in people where none exists.Members of troubled groups, compared to moretranquil groups, exaggerate the potential of possibleleaders. They even misremember crucial details,tending to recall their prospective leader as havingperformed any number of leader-consistent beha-viors and forgetting any past behaviors that conflictwith their image of the person as a suitable leader.Thus, members do not resist having a leader; in-stead, they conspire to create leaders both interper-sonally and psychologically (Emrich, 1999).

Do Leaders Make a Difference? In 1991, Koppgot a job offer. An entrepreneur was starting up anew company devoted to educational reform, andhe wanted Kopp to join his staff. What would have

248 CHAPTER 9

happened if Kopp had taken that job? Would TFAbe as successful today? Would it even exist at all?

Leaders influence their groups in significantways. Studies of leaders in all kinds of groupsituations—flight crews, politics, schools, militaryunits, and religious groups—all suggest that groupsprosper when guided by good leaders. Groups ofindividuals, when they face an emergency, oftenfail to respond; but if a leader is present in thegroup this bystander effect is less likely to occur(Baumeister et al., 1988). Groups, when discussingsolutions to problems, tend to spend too much timediscussing information shared by many members—unless a leader is present in the group who controlsthe group’s tendency to focus on shared informa-tion (Larson et al., 1996). When a company gets anew CEO, its performance tends to climb (Jung,Wu, & Chow, 2008). Newly appointed leaderswho inspire and excite members with fresh ideasand strategies can spur the group on to great achieve-ments and successes (Zaccaro & Banks, 2001).

Unfortunately, the difference leaders make isnot always a positive one. Leaders sometimes taketheir group in directions it should not go. They actto promote their own personal outcomes and over-look the good of the group. Leaders manipulatefollowers, persuading them to make sacrifices, whilethe leaders enjoy the rewards of their power andinfluence. They push their agendas too hard, theirgroups obey their demands, and only later do allrealize their mistakes (Lipman-Blumen, 2005). Suchleaders are influential—but in a negative way.

Do Leaders Make All the Difference? Leaderssignificantly influence their group’s dynamics, butsometimes people think that leaders do everything.In Western cultures, in particular, people assumethat leaders are so influential that they, and theyalone, determine their group’s outcomes. Thisromanticized view of leaders as rescuers and heroeshas been aptly termed the romance of leadership(Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich 1985).

This romance of leadership ignores both thelimited influence wielded by most leaders and themany other factors that influence a group and itsdynamics. When a team fails, those in charge oftenreplace the group’s leaders, for they assume that adifferent leader could have rescued the failing team.When people give all the credit for a group’s suc-cess to the leader, or blame him or her for a failure,they overlook the contributions of the other groupmembers. Leaders like Wendy Kopp are influential,but few leaders deserve all the blame for theirgroup’s failures, and fewer still are heroes who canfairly claim the lion’s share of credit for their group’sachievements (Meindl, Pastor, & Mayo, 2004).

What Is Leadership?

Leadership is not the power to coerce others, aninborn trait, a necessity of group life, or a mysteri-ous capacity to heal sick groups. Instead, leadershipis the process by which an individual guides othersin their collective pursuits, often by organizing, di-recting, coordinating, supporting, and motivatingtheir efforts. Leadership, then, is not a static charac-teristic of an individual or a group, but a complex ofinterpersonal processes whereby cooperating indivi-duals are permitted to influence and motivate othersto promote the attainment of group and individualgoals. These processes are reciprocal, transactional,transformational, cooperative, and adaptive.

■ Leadership is a reciprocal process, involving theleader, the followers, and the group situation.The leader does not just influence the groupmembers; rather, the leader–follower relation-ship is mutual. An interactional view assumesthat leadership cannot be understood inde-pendently of followership—the skills and qual-ities displayed by nonleaders (Hollander, 2006;Messick, 2005; see Focus 9.1.

■ Leadership is a transactional process, in whichleaders and followers work together,

romance of leadership The tendency to overestimatethe amount of influence and control leaders exert ontheir groups and their groups’ outcomes.

followership Working effectively with a leader andother group members.

LEADERSH I P 249

F o c u s 9.1 What Is a Leader Without Followers?

Unhappy the land that has no heroes. No, unhappythe land that is in need of heroes.

—Bertolt Brecht

Many cultures emphasize the role of the leader in de-termining the group’s outcome, but this leader-centricview overlooks the equally important role played bynonleaders—often described with words that lack thepotency of the word leader, for they are followers,subordinates, assistants, or merely reports. Leadershipand followership are reciprocal social processes, andthe group depends as much on the actions of thosewho accept others’ influence as it does on those whoprovide guidance and direction. Followers are the yinto the leader’s yang.

But just as bad leaders are mixed with the goodones, so followers vary in their effectiveness. RobertKelley (1988, 2004), who has examined the nature offollowership closely, asks two basic questions aboutfollowers: Are they active or passive and are they in-dependent or dependent? First, the best followers arecommitted to the group and their role within it; theyare actively engaged in their work rather than passiveand withdrawn. Second, effective followers can beself-reliant, when necessary. By definition, they follow

the leader, but they must also be able to exercise theirindependence and monitor themselves and theirprogress. Ineffective followers are overly dependent onthe leader, and they are unable to think for themselves.Kelley, by considering these two aspects of followers—degree of active engagement and independence—identifies the five basic types shown in Figure 9.1.

■ Conformist followers (yes people) are active and

energized, but they are devoted to the leader;

they do not think to question the leader’s direc-

tions and will defend him or her vigorously.

■ Passive followers (sheep) follow the lead of others,

but without great enthusiasm or commitment. They

put time into the group and will eventually finish

their assignments, but they must be continually

monitored or they will simply stop contributing.

■ Pragmatic followers are the rank-and-file mem-

bers of the group; they are neither active nor

passive, conforming or independent, but likely to

remain in the background and contribute what

they can.

AlienatedFollowers

PassiveFollowers(Sheep)

ExemplaryFollowers

(Stars)

Independent/criticalthinking

ConformistFollowers

(Yes Persons)

Dependent/uncriticalthinking

Negativeenergy/passive

Positiveenergy/

engaged

PragmaticFollowers

F I G U R E 9.1 Kelley’stheory of followers.

SOURCE: “Kelley’s Follower Gride”reprinted by permission of HarvardBusiness Review. From “In Praise ofFollowers”, 1988. Copyright © 1988 bythe Harvard Business School PublishingCorporation. All rights reserved. Also inKelley, Robert E. “Followership.”Encyclopedia of Leadership. Vol. 2.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Reference,2004. 504–513. Reprinted by permissionof Sage Publications.

250 CHAPTER 9

exchanging their time, energies, and skills toincrease their joint rewards (Avolio, 2004).

■ Leadership is a transformational process, for lea-ders heighten group members’ motivation,confidence, and satisfaction by uniting mem-bers and changing their beliefs, values, andneeds (Burns, 2003).

■ Leadership is a cooperative process of legitimateinfluence rather than sheer power. The right tolead is, in most instances, voluntarily conferredon the leader by some or all members of thegroup, with the expectation that the leader ismotivated by the group’s collective needsrather than his or her own interests (Avolio &Locke, 2002).

■ Leadership is an adaptive, goal-seeking process,for it organizes and motivates group members’attempts to attain personal and group goals(Parks, 2005).

A distinction is often drawn between leadershipand other forms of influence in groups and organi-zations, such as management and supervision.Leaders often hold supervisory positions in groups,but holding a position does not always translate intoleadership; there are many bosses, supervisors, andmanagers who are not leaders. Conversely, manyindividuals in groups and organizations who do

not hold formal positions of authority are leaders,for they influence others as they pool their efforts inthe pursuit of shared goals (Bedeian & Hunt, 2006;Kotter, 1990; see Rost, 2008, for a discussion ofissues involved in defining leadership).

What Do Leaders Do?

Wendy Kopp, as the leader of TFA, hired person-nel and supervised them closely, providing themwith feedback about their strengths and weaknesses.She spent much of her time planning and organi-zing the organization, focusing on both day-to-dayoperations as well as long-range goals years in thefuture. She made minor and major decisions every-day, from picking furnishings for the offices to thedifficult choice of who to let go when the organi-zation could no longer afford to pay the salaries ofall the staff members. Kopp also represented TFA indealings with funding agencies and school systems,coordinated the meetings held regularly among thestaff, and delivered motivational speeches to thecorps members before they began their workshopson teaching skills. Leading, for Kopp, involved anumber of interrelated activities, including analyz-ing, consulting, controlling, coordinating, deciding,monitoring, negotiating, organizing, planning, re-presenting, and supervising (Mintzberg, 1973).

■ Alienated followers are not committed to the

group or its goals, in part because they steadfastly

maintain their independence from others’ influ-

ence. They are often sullenly silent, but when they

speak they are critical of their fellow members for

remaining true to the group, and they question

the leader’s choices. They often think of them-

selves as the rightful leader of the group, and

refuse to invest in the group or its activities until

they are accorded their rightful position.

■ Exemplary followers (stars) are actively engaged in

the group, but they do not simply do what they

are told. If they have issues with the leader’s

position, they express their dissent openly, but

constructively. The leader can delegate responsi-

bilities to them, and they can be trusted to com-

plete the task with an enthusiasm that springs

from their concern for the group’s interests.

The leader’s task, suggests Kelley (1988, 2004), isto transform the followers into exemplary followers,using any means possible. Groups with “many lea-ders,” he concludes, “can be chaos. Groups withnone can be quite productive” (1988, p. 148)—so longas these followers are exemplary ones who areactively engaged in their work, treat one another ascolleagues, and engage in constructive debate withtheir leaders.


LEADERSH I P 251

The Task-Relationship Model Wendy Koppcarried out a staggering array of diverse activities asthe Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of TFA, butthe task-relationship model of leadership assumesthat these many and varied behaviors cluster intoone of two basic categories described in Table 9.2.

■ Task leadership focuses on the group’s work andits goals. To facilitate the achievement of groupgoals, the leader initiates structure, sets stan-dards and objectives, identifies roles and posi-tions members in those roles, develops standardoperating procedures, defines responsibilities,establishes communication networks, givesevaluative feedback, plans activities, coordi-nates activities, proposes solutions, monitorscompliance with procedures, and stresses theneed for efficiency and productivity (Lord,1977; Yukl, 2006).

■ Relationship leadership focuses on the interper-sonal relations within the group. To increasesocioemotional satisfaction and teamwork in

the group, the leader boosts morale, givessupport and encouragement, reduces interper-sonal conflict, helps members to releasenegative tensions, establishes rapport, andshows concern and consideration for the groupand its members (Lord, 1977; Yukl, 2006).

Different situations require different skills ofleaders, but researchers have identified these twodimensions of leadership in study after study ofwhat leaders actually do when they are in groups.For example, in the Ohio State UniversityLeadership Studies conducted in the 1950s, investi-gators first developed a list of hundreds of types ofbehaviors observed in military and organizationalleaders—behaviors that included initiating new prac-tices, providing praise, interacting informally withsubordinates, delegating responsibilities, representingthe group, and coordinating group action. Theythen refined the list by asking members of variousgroups to indicate how many of these behaviors theirleaders displayed. Using factor analysis, a statisticaltechnique that identifies clusters of interrelatedvariables, they discovered that 80% of the variabilityin followers’ ratings could be explained by the twobasic factors: task leadership (initiation of structure)and relationship leadership (consideration for groupmembers; Fleishman, 1953; Halpin & Winer, 1952).

T A B L E 9.2 Task and Relationship Leadership: Definitions, Related Terms, andSample Behaviors

Factor Terms Sample Behaviors

Task leadershippromoting task completion; regulat-ing behavior, monitoring communi-cation, and reducing goal ambiguity

Task-oriented, agentic, goaloriented, work facilitative,production centered, administra-tively skilled, goal achievement

• Assigns tasks to members

• Makes attitudes clear to the group

• Critical of poor work

• Sees to it that the group is work-ing to capacity

• Coordinates activity

Relationship leadershipmaintaining and enhancing positiveinterpersonal relations in the group;friendliness, mutual trust, openness,recognizing performance

Relationship oriented, commu-nal, socioemotional supportive,employee centered, relationsskilled, group maintenance

• Listens to group members

• Easy to understand

• Friendly and approachable

• Treats group members as equals

• Willing to make changes

task-relationship model A descriptive model of lead-ership which maintains that most leadership behaviorscan be classified as either performance maintenance orrelationship maintenance.

252 CHAPTER 9

The Ohio State researchers built these twodimensions into their Leader Behavior Description Ques-tionnaire (LBDQ; Kerr et al., 1974; Schriesheim &Eisenbach, 1995). Group members complete theLBDQ by rating their leader on items such as thosepresented in the right-hand column of Table 9.2.The totals from the two separate sets of behaviors in-dex the two dimensions of leadership specified in thetask-relationship model.

Researchers in many countries who have stud-ied many different types of groups have repeatedlyconfirmed this two-dimensional model of leadershipbehaviors. Although the labels vary—work-facilitativeversus supportive (Bowers & Seashore, 1966),production-centered versus employee-centered (Likert,1967), administratively skilled versus relations-skilled(Mann, 1965), goal achievement versus group mainte-nance (Cartwright & Zander, 1968), and performanceversus maintenance (Misumi, 1995)—the two basicclusters emerge with great regularity (Shipper &Davy, 2002).

Leadership Substitutes The task-relationshipmodel assumes that leaders, despite their widelyvarying methods and styles, tend to do two basicthings when they lead others—they coordinatethe work that the group must accomplish and theyattend to the group’s interpersonal needs. But thesetwo forms of leadership, though commonplace, arenot needed in every leadership situation. Kopp, forexample, spent much of her time initiating struc-ture: planning, strategizing, organizing, and solicit-ing funding. She did not need to spend very muchtime attending to the interpersonal needs of thegroup members because the young staff of TFAwas such a highly cohesive group and so committedto the work that Kopp did not need to monitortheir interpersonal needs.

The TFA case is consistent with leadershipsubstitutes theory, which maintains that substi-tutes for leadership sometimes “negate the leader’s

ability to either improve or impair subordinate sat-isfaction and performance” (Kerr & Jermier, 1978,p. 377). As Table 9.3 indicates, aspects of the group(e.g., members’ indifference to rewards), the task(e.g., the level of intrinsic reward), and the groupor organization (e.g., the cohesiveness of the group)can make leadership unnecessary and unlikely. InTFA, for example, the staff members were chosenfor their commitment to equality in education, andthis shared vision served as a substitute for relation-ship leadership. TFA was not, however, a formallyorganized group with specified staff functions. Thusthe group responded well to, and very muchneeded, Kopp’s task-oriented approach to leader-ship (Dionne et al., 2005).

Sex Differences in Leadership Behavior Leader-ship has two sides—the task side and the relationshipside—and humans come in two varieties—manand woman. Do these variations in leadership cor-respond to sex differences in leadership? Are mentask-oriented, whereas women are more relation-ship-oriented?

Despite changes in the role of men and womenin contemporary society, when men and womengather in groups, the men tend to be agentic—taskoriented, active, decision focused, independent, goaloriented—whereas women are more communal—helpful to others, warm in relation to others, under-standing, aware of others’ feelings (Abele, 2003).Women, to speak in generalities, when asked todescribe themselves to others in just-formed groups,stress their communal qualities with such adjec-tives as open, fair, responsible, and pleasant. Mendescribe themselves as influential, powerful, andskilled at the task to be done (Forsyth et al., 1985).Women, more so than men, engage in relationshipmaintenance, including giving advice, offering as-surances, and managing conflict (Leaper & Ayres,2007). In day-to-day activities with same-sex friends,women tend to be more agreeable than men (Suhet al., 2004). Women connect more positively toother group members by smiling more, maintain-ing eye contact, and responding more tactfully toothers’ comments (Hall, 2006). These differencescan be seen in groups of children, with boys

leadership substitutes theory A conceptual analysis ofthe factors that combine to reduce or eliminate the needfor a leader.

LEADERSH I P 253

undertaking physical activities, competing with oneanother, and playing in rough ways, and girls carry-ing out coordinated activities with a minimum ofconflict (Maccoby, 2002). These differences mayeven reflect evolutionary pressures that encouragedthe development of communal tendencies inwomen and task-focused activity in men (Van Vugt,Hogan, &Kaiser, 2008; comparewith Eagly &Karau,2002).

This sex difference is only a tendency, and itdoes not manifest itself across all groups and situa-tions. Kopp, for example, remains a task-focusedleader: she is not the type of leader who likes to“walk around, rally the troops, and make sure thateveryone was feeling good” (2003, p. 66). Nor does

it determine how men and women respond whenthey become a group’s leader. When Alice Eaglyand Blair Johnson (1990) reviewed more than 150studies that compared the leadership styles adoptedby men and women, they discovered that as theagentic–communal tendency suggests, women per-formed more relationship-oriented actions in labo-ratory groups and also described themselves as morerelationship-oriented on questionnaires. The sexesdid not differ, however, in studies conducted inorganizational settings (Dobbins & Platz, 1986).Indeed, as leaders, women tended to be both task-and relationship-oriented, whereas men were pri-marily task-oriented (Stratham, 1987). Women andmen often adopted different styles of leadership,

T A B L E 9.3 Characteristics That Can Substitute for and Neutralize Relationship andTask Leadership

Substitutes for or Neutralizes

CharacteristicRelationshipLeadership

TaskLeadership

Of the group member

1. Has ability, experience, training, knowledge X

2. Has a need for independence X

3. Has a “professional” orientation X X

4. Is indifferent to group rewards X X

Of the task

5. Is unambiguous and routine X

6. Is methodologically invariant X

7. Provides its own feedback concerning accomplishment X

8. Is intrinsically satisfying X

Of the organization

9. Is formalized (has explicit plans, etc.) X

10. Is inflexible (rigid, unbending rules, etc.) X

11.Has specified staff functions X

12.Has cohesive work groups X X

13.Has organized rewards not controlled by leader X X

14.Has physical distance between leader and members X X

SOURCE: “Substitutes for leadership: Their meaning and measurement” by S. Kerr & J.M. Jermier, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 22, 1978.© 1978 by Academic Press. Reprinted by permission.

254 CHAPTER 9

but they did not differ in their agentic and communaltendencies.

LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE

Manet was the leader of the impressionist painters.Fito Strauch took control of the day-to-day activi-ties of the Andes survivors. Jim Jones was the charis-matic leader of the People’s Temple. John F.Kennedywas elected president of the United States. WendyKopp is the CEO of TFA. But why Manet and notDegas?Why Strauch and not Canessa?WhyKennedyand not Nixon? Why did Kopp, armed with justher senior thesis written in her last semester in college,emerge as the CEO of an internationally success-ful nonprofit organization and remain the leader ofthat group for all these years? What determines whowill lead their groups, organizations, and countries?What determines leadership emergence?

Scholars have debated this question for centu-ries. In the 19th century, for example, the historianThomas Carlyle offered up his great leader theoryof history (Carlyle called it the “great man” theory).He asserted that leaders do not achieve their posi-tions by accident or twist of fate. Rather, theseindividuals possess certain characteristics that markthem for greatness. Carlyle (1841) believed that lea-ders are different from followers, so history couldbe best studied by considering the contributions ofthe few great men and women. The Russian nov-elist Leo Tolstoy disagreed. To Tolstoy, such lea-ders as Alexander the Great and Napoleon came toprominence because the spirit of the times—thezeitgeist—was propitious for the dominance of asingle individual, and the qualities of the person werelargely irrelevant to this rise to power. Tolstoy’s

zeitgeist theory posited that the conquests andlosses of military leaders such as Napoleon werecaused not by their decisions and skills but byuncontrollable aspects of the historical situation(Tolstoy, 1869/1952).

These two perspectives—Carlyle’s great leadertheory and Tolstoy’s zeitgeist approach—continueto shape theoretical analyses of leadership emer-gence. The great leader theory is consistent with atrait approach to leadership, which assumes that lea-ders possess certain personality traits and characteris-tics and that these characteristics are responsible fortheir rise in the leadership ranks. Tolstoy’s zeitgeistview, in contrast, is consistent with situationism,which suggests that leadership is determined by ahost of variables operating in the leadership situation,including the size of the group, its cohesion, thequality of leader-member relations, and the type oftask to be performed.

An interactional approach to leadership, how-ever, reconciles these two models by asserting thattraits and situations interact to determine who willlead and who will not. If a group is about to disin-tegrate because of heated conflicts among themembers, for example, the effective leader will besomeone who can improve the group’s interper-sonal relations (Katz, 1977). Similarly, if individualspossess skills that facilitate performance on intellec-tual tasks but undermine performance on artistictasks, then they are likely to emerge as effectiveleaders only if the group is working on intellectualtasks (Stogdill, 1974). Lewin’s B = ƒ(P, E) formulafor interactionism, applied to leadership, suggeststhat a leader’s behavior is a function both of thecharacteristics of the person and the characteristicsof the group situation (see Chapter 1).

Personal Qualities of Leaders

Kopp was fresh out of college when she startedTFA, and so she lacked the skills of a seasoned

leadership emergence The process by which an indi-vidual becomes formally or informally, perceptually orbehaviorally, and implicitly or explicitly recognized asthe leader of a formerly leaderless group.great leader theory A view of leadership, attributed tohistorian Thomas Carlyle, which states that successfulleaders possess certain characteristics that mark them forgreatness, and that such great leaders shape the course ofhistory.

zeitgeist theory A view of leadership, attributed to LeoTolstoy, which states that history is determined primarilyby the “spirit of the times” rather than by the actions andchoices of great leaders.

LEADERSH I P 255

leader with years of experience. Yet, she knew howto organize people to work together on tasks, andin college she was the manager of a staff of 60working for a nonprofit called Foundation forStudent Communications. She was not trained tolead, yet she had a natural talent for it.

Personality Traits Early leadership researchersbelieved that leaders possessed certain personalitytraits that set them apart from others. This trait ap-proach, which in its strongest form assumed thatsome people were natural-born leaders, faded in pop-ularity as researchers reported a series of failures to findany consistent impact of personality on leadership be-havior across a wide variety of situations. After con-ducting hundreds of studies, researchers began towonder if personality made much of a differencewhen trying to predict who would emerge as a leaderand who would not (Mann, 1959; Stogdill, 1948).

In retrospect, this rejection of the trait approachwas premature. When researchers used more precisemeasures of personality—and ones that theoreticallyshould have been related to leadership—strongerrelationships were identified. They also discoveredthat single traits sometimes said little about emer-gence, but when they looked at personality profilesthat took into account several traits then clearerpatterns emerged (e.g., Smith & Foti, 1998).More sophisticated research procedures also yieldedstronger evidence of the power of personality as apredictor of leadership emergence. For example,longitudinal designs that involved tracking peopleover a long period of time indicated that personalitymeasured as long as 20 years before successfullypredicted promotion to positions of leadership inbusiness settings (Miner, 1978). Rotational designs,as noted in Focus 9.2, suggested that leadershipmight be rooted in the person (e.g., Foti &

F o c u s 9.2 Does the Great Leader Theory Apply to Groups?

An oak boasted to the reed of his strength, but in astrong wind the reed bent, but did not break. The oak,standing firm, was torn out by the roots.

—Aesop (620–560 BC)

During World War II, Germany, America, and Englandall experimented with various methods for identifyingnatural leaders to serve in the military. In many casesthey used the so-called leaderless-group tests, inwhich a group of individuals, strangers to oneanother, were given a task to complete. For example, agroup might be assembled on one side of a ravineand told to use the available boards, ropes, and beamsto build a temporary bridge to the other side (Eaton,1947).

These creative methods of measuring leadershipleft one significant question unanswered: would theindividuals who emerged as leaders be chosen, again,by another group of men or women? Their uniquepersonal qualities may have destined them to be leaderin that group and others as well, but it may be thattheir rise to leadership was context specific: the resultof the group’s zeitgeist, and not their personalities. Tosolve this problem, researchers turned to rotationaldesigns. Individuals worked in leaderless groups on atask, but once that work was done the groups were

broken up and reformed. If an individual emerges asthe leader again and again despite the changes ingroup composition, then this pattern suggests some-thing about the person, and not the group, isresponsible (Borgatta, Couch, & Bales, 1954).

Stephen Zaccaro and his colleagues used a rota-tional design in their analysis of personality and lead-ership, but with yet another twist. They not onlyrotated individuals through new groups but they alsochanged the types of tasks the groups performed.Some of the tasks, such as group discussions of con-troversial topics, called for a leader who was good withpeople. Other tasks, in contrast, called for a leader whowas task-oriented. Even with this new challenge, lead-ership tended to follow individuals. If the group wasworking on a task that required good “people skills,”natural leaders became more interpersonally oriented.But when the group needed a directive, task-orientedleader, these individuals shifted their style to addressthe task. These findings suggest that flexibility may beone of the most important qualities to look for in aneffective leader. Skilled leaders will respond to thedemands of the situations they face, but some leaders“may be better than others at perceiving theserequirements and responding accordingly” (Zaccaro,Foti, & Kenny, 1991, p. 312).

256 CHAPTER 9

Hauenstein, 2007). Statistical advances also pro-vided better tools for testing the strength of re-lationship, allowing researchers to distinguishbetween group-level determinants of leadershipemergence and personality factors. Meta-analysisalso helped researchers sift through all the findings,for this type of review catalogs the findings frommultiple studies more precisely by using statistics

rather than subjective interpretation (Zaccaro,2007; Zaccaro, Gulick, & Khare, 2008).

Table 9.4 samples the results of just a few of thehundreds of studies of leadership emergence andsuch personality qualities as assertiveness, authentic-ity, strength of character, dominance, narcissism,self-efficacy, self-monitoring, and social motivation.These studies examine a wide range of personality

T A B L E 9.4 A Sampling of Personality Characteristics That Are Reliably Associatedwith Leadership Emergence

Characteristic Relationship to Leadership Emergence

Assertiveness The relationship between assertiveness and leadership emergence is curvilinear;individuals who are either low in assertiveness or very high in assertiveness are less likelyto be identified as leaders (Ames & Flynn, 2007).

Authenticity Individuals who are more aware of their personality qualities, including their values andbeliefs, and are less biased when processing self-relevant information, are more likely tobe accepted as leaders (Ilies, Morgeson, & Nahragang, 2005).

Big Five personalityfactors

Those who emerge as leaders tend to be more extraverted, conscientious, emotionallystable, and open to experience, although these tendencies are stronger in laboratorystudies of leaderless groups (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002).

Birth order Those born first in their families and only children are hypothesized to be more drivento seek leadership and control in social settings. Middle-born children tend to acceptfollower roles in groups, and later-borns are thought be rebellious and creative(Grose, 2003).

Character strengths Those seeking leadership positions in a military organization had elevated scores on anumber of indicators of strength of character, including honesty, hope, bravery, industry,and teamwork (Matthews et al., 2006).

Dominance Individuals with dominant personalities—they describe themselves as high in the desire tocontrol their environment and influence other people, and are likely to express theiropinions in a forceful way—are more likely to act as leaders in small-group situations(Smith & Foti, 1998).

Gender identity Masculine individuals are more likely to emerge as leaders than are feminine individuals(Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986).

Narcissism Individuals who take on leadership roles in turbulent situations, such as groups facing athreat or ones in which status is determined by intense competition among rivals withinthe group, tend to be narcissistic: arrogant, self-absorbed, hostile, and very self-confident(Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006).

Self-efficacy forleadership

Confidence in one’s ability to lead is associated with increases in willingness to accept aleadership role and success in that role (Hoyt & Blascovich, 2007).

Self-monitoring High self-monitors are more likely to emerge as the leader of a group than are low self-monitors, since they are more concerned with status-enhancement and are more likely toadapt their actions to fit the demands of the situation (Bedeian & Day, 2004).

Social motivation Individuals who are both success-oriented and affiliation-oriented, as assessed byprojective measures, are more active in group problem-solving settings and are morelikely to be elected to positions of leadership in such groups (Sorrentino & Field, 1986).

L EADERSH I P 257

traits, but the results are generally consistent withthe Big Five model of personality discussed inChapter 4 (see Table 4.1 and Figure 9.2). One ofthe most influential determinants of leadership isthe quality that observers judge most easily inothers: introversion–extraversion. When researchersask five strangers to talk for 30 minutes about anytopic, by the session’s end the person who is higherin extraversion—dominance, gregariousness, powermotivation, and so on—is generally named by theothers as the leader. Conscientiousness (dependabil-ity, self-regulation, drive, and need to achieve)comes in second in its predictive power, followedby openness and emotional stability. The only BigFive personality factor that is not reliably associatedwith leadership emergence is agreeableness; leaders,apparently, need not be warm and kind (Hogan,2005). Note, though, these two caveats. First, stud-ies involving students generally found stronger re-lationships between personality and leadershipemergence than studies of leaders in military, gov-ernment, and business settings. Second, as Figure9.2 indicates, agreeableness did not predict leader-ship emergence, but it did predict effectiveness—even more so than conscientiousness (Judge et al.,2002).

Intelligence Wendy Kopp has many qualities,but when people describe her they often startwith one word: smart. Intelligence and leadershipemergence and effectiveness go hand in hand. The

average correlation is small, between .25 and .30,but is consistent across studies, populations, and set-tings (Stogdill, 1948, 1974). Leaders tend to scorehigher than average on standard intelligence testsand they make superior judgments with greaterdecisiveness. They tend to be knowledgeable bothgenerally and about their particular field, and theirverbal skills—both written and oral—are superiorrelative to nonleaders.

Leaders, however, typically do not exceed theirfollowers’ intellectual prowess by a wide margin(Simonton, 1985). Groups generally prefer leaderswho are more intelligent than the average groupmember, but too great a discrepancy introducesproblems in communication, trust, and social sensi-tivity. Although highly intelligent individuals maybe extremely capable and efficient leaders, theirgroups may feel that large differences in intellectualabilities translate into large differences in interests,attitudes, and values. Hence, although high intelli-gence may mean skilled leadership, a group prefersto be “ill-governed by people it can understand”(Gibb, 1969, p. 218).

Emotional Intelligence When people think ofintelligence, they often stress cognitive abilitiessuch as mathematics, verbal skill, and intellectualproblem solving. But some people are also inter-personally intelligent: They have the ability tounderstand and relate to people, for they deal withothers wisely and effectively. They have elevated

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Extraversion

Aggreeable

Conscientious

Stability

Openness

Correlation

Effectiveness

Emergence

F I G U R E 9.2 The relationshipbetween the personality factors identifiedin the Big Fivemodel of personality andleadership emergence and effectiveness.When researchers usedmeta-analysis tocombined the results of 222 correlationalfindings generated in 73 samples of thepersonality-leadership relationship, theyfound that extraversion is the strongestpredictor of emergence and agreeablenessis the weakest (Judge, Bono, Ilies, &Gerhardt, 2002).

SOURCE: “Personality and leadership: A qualitative andquantitative review” by T.A. Judge, J.E. Bono, R. Ilies, &M.W. Gerhardt, Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,2002. Reprinted by permission.

258 CHAPTER 9

emotional intelligence: “the ability to perceiveemotions in self and others; to understand howemotions blend, unfold, and influence cognitionand behavior; to use emotions to facilitate thinking;and to manage emotions in self and others” (Lopes& Salovey, 2008, p. 81; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso,2008).

Skill in communicating and decoding emotionsis essential for an effective leader. The emotionallyintelligent leader can see problems coming, for suchproblems are often conveyed indirectly by others’moods and emotions. Better able to read the poli-tics of the situation, such leaders can detect shiftingalliances and recognize where to put their energiesand when to bide their time. They can also com-municate their ideas to others in more robust ways,for they can use their own emotional energy toinfluence others. They are also less likely to losecontrol of their emotions—they are not inappropri-ately angry, critical, or histrionic. In consequence,emotional intelligence is associated with various as-pects of leadership, including emergence as a leader,willingness to cooperate with others, empathy forothers, the tendency to take others’ perspectives,and the emotional intensity of one’s interpersonalrelations (Goleman, Boyatizis, & McKee, 2002).

Skills and Experience When groups work col-lectively on tasks, individuals with more expertiseusually rise higher in the group’s leadership hierar-chy. One review of 52 studies of characteristicstypically ascribed to the leader discovered that tech-nical, task-relevant skills were mentioned in 35% ofthe studies (Stogdill, 1974). Groups are more accept-ing of leaders who have previously demonstratedtask ability and are more willing to follow thedirections of a task-competent person than thoseof an incompetent person (Goldman & Fraas, 1965;Hollander, 1965). Furthermore, although high task

ability facilitates leadership, low task ability seems tobe an even more powerful factor in disqualifyingindividuals from consideration as leaders (Palmer,1962). Initially, if group members do not knowone another well, then theymay rely on diffuse statuscharacteristics such as rank, age, and tenure with thegroup to infer expertise, but over time they willshift to specific, behavioral cues to determine whois competent and who is not (Bunderson, 2003).Given enough experience in working together,most group members can distinguish between theskilled and the unskilled (Littlepage, Robison, &Reddington, 1997; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992).

Field studies of leadership in organizational andmilitary settings suggest that individuals who possessvalued skills are more often recognized as leaders.The successful head of the accounting department,for example, is usually recognized as a better ac-countant than his or her subordinates or other,less highly regarded managers (Tsui, 1984). Studiesof ratings of military leadership ability have alsofound that physical ability and task performanceskills are highly correlated with leadership emer-gence (Rice, Instone, & Adams, 1984). Particular,task-specific skills are more important in determin-ing leadership emergence in performance-oriented,service–delivery-oriented groups, whereas interper-sonal and conceptual skills are more important inupper-echelon leadership positions (Yukl, 2006).

Participation Individuals with much to offer thegroup—those who are intelligent, emotionally ad-ept, and highly skilled at the tasks the group mustcomplete—may nonetheless not emerge as a leaderif they are disengaged from the group and its activi-ties. Leaders are active within their groups ratherthan aloof; they show up for meetings, they askquestions, they offer comments and suggestions,they talk to other members on the phone, andthey send out emails. The correlation betweenleadership emergence and most personal character-istics usually averages in the low .20s, but the cor-relation between participation rate and leadershipranges from .61 to .72 (Littlepage & Mueller,1997; Malloy & Janowski, 1992; Stein & Heller,1979).

emotional intelligence The component of social intel-ligence that relates to one’s capacity to accurately per-ceive emotions, to use information about emotionswhen making decisions, and to monitor and controlone’s own and others’ emotional reactions.

LEADERSH I P 259

Group members take note of participant ratein part because it tells them who is interested inthe group and is willing to take responsibility forits performance. One of the surest ways to escapeserving as the leader of a group is to not say muchduring meetings. But which matters more: qualityor quantity of participation? Do people who talk alot at meetings but add little of substance rise topositions of leadership, or does quality count more:the value of the ideas expressed rather than the vol-ume of one’s words?

Some studies support the so-called babble effect:quantity of participation is more important thanquality of contribution. One study, for example, ex-amined this effect by manipulating both the quantityand quality of the statements of a trained confederatein a problem-solving group. The researchers createdfour-person groups and set them to work, but oneof the group members was a confederate who sys-tematically offered either many comments or fewcomments that were either high in quality (they pro-moted success on the tasks) or low in quality (theypromoted failure on the tasks). When the partici-pants later rated the confederate’s confidence, influ-ence, and contributions, both quantity and qualitycounted, but the effects due to quantity were stillstronger (Sorrentino & Boutillier, 1975).

Other work, however, calls into question thegenerality of the babble effect. Eric Jones and JaniceKelly (2007) noted that comparing quality to quan-tity is like comparing apples to oranges. Since theyare two different variables that can range in inten-sity from high to low, comparing their relativeimpact on leadership requires that they be matchedin terms of strength. They therefore conducted aseries of studies where they pitted quantity againstquality, but they first calibrated the strength of thesetwo variables so that each one had a fair chance ofoverpowering the other one. As in prior research,they created low- and high-quality arguments andlow- and high-quantity messages, but they alsomade sure the high conditions were twice the levelof the low conditions for both variables. The high-quality arguments were viewed as twice as goodas the low-quality arguments, and they used twiceas many messages in the high-quantity condition

than the low-quantity condition. In this way theymade sure that low and high were proportional toone another. What they discovered was that quan-tity did matter; but only if the comments offeredwere of high quality. As Figure 9.3 indicates, peo-ple who made low-quality comments during thegroup discussion received relatively low ratingson leadership potential, even when they offered asubstantial number of these comments. Quantitydid boost one’s leadership ratings, but only ifthe comments were of high quality. Rationality(quality) trumped babble (quantity), at least inthis case.

The Look of Leaders

When Kopp, fresh out of college, first met withfunders and other experts in education they oftenexpressed their incredulity, for they did not thinkthat a young woman in her twenties could leadthe organization successfully. One executive askedher, point blank, “Who is going to run this?” WhenKopp answered that she was, the executive said,

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

Low High

Quality of Ideas

Lea

der

ship

Low quantity

High quantity

F I G U R E 9.3 The impact of quantity and qualityof participation on leadership emergence in smallgroups.

SOURCE: Copyright © 2007 by the American Psychological Association.Reproduced with permission. The official citation that should be used inreferencing this material is Contributions to a group discussion andperceptions of leadership: Does quantity always count more than quality?by Jones Eric E.; Kelly, Janice R, from Group Dynamics: Theory, Research,and Practice, March 1, 2007. The use of APA information does not implyendorsement by APA.

260 CHAPTER 9

“That’s just not going to work” (quoted in Kopp,2003, p. 19). Kopp’s qualities were not those thatthese people expected in a leader, for leadershipemergence depends not only on personal qualifica-tions and achievements but also on general demo-graphic characteristics, such as age, race, and sex.

Physical Appearances Leaders tend to differphysically from their subordinates. They are oftenolder, taller, and heavier than the average groupmember. Ralph Stogdill (1948, 1974), after thor-oughly reviewing the relationship between heightand leadership, noted that correlations varied from–0.13 to +0.71, but the average was about +0.30.Group members seem to associate height withpower, but the relationship is not so strong thatheight is a prerequisite for leadership. Leaders alsotend to be more physically fit. The smaller a man’swaist-to-hip ratio (an indicator of fitness, becausethose with larger ratios tend to be out of shape),the more others rated him as leader-like whenworking in leaderless groups that were observedby others (Campbell et al., 2002).

Stogdill found that the link between age andleadership emergence is more complicated. Leadersin informal discussion groups vary in age, whereaspolitical and business leaders are often older thantheir subordinates. Stogdill suggested that in orga-nizations and political settings, the climb up theladder of leadership takes time. Fewer than 1% ofthe corporate executives for the top Fortune 700companies are under 40 years of age, and 81% are50 or older (Spencer Stuart, 2004). As Stogdillnoted, “Organizations tend to rely upon adminis-trative knowledge and demonstration of successthat comes with experience and age” (1974, p. 76).Furthermore, if group members assume that age isan indicator of wisdom, experience, and sagacity,they are likely to prefer a leader who is older ratherthan younger.

Even hair color predicts who will lead and whowill follow. A study of the 500 top CEOs inEngland discovered fewer blonds and more red-heads than might be expected given the distributionof these hair colors in the overall population of thecountry. The authors suggest that stereotypes about

blondes—that they are less cognitively swift—andred heads—that they are mean but competent—may be sufficient to cause their under- and over-representation in leadership positions. However,of these 500 CEOs, only two were women, andthey both had brown hair (Takeda, Helms, &Romanova, 2006).

Diversity The CEO of TFA (Wendy Kopp) iswhite, and the majority (61%) of the corps mem-bers are white as well. The president of the studentgovernment association of Florida A&M University,which is a traditionally African American university,is a black woman. The executive director of theOrganization of Chinese Americans is a ChineseAmerican. The director of the Mexican AmericanCommunity Services Agency is a Latino woman.In 2007, how many African Americans were leaders(CEOs) of a Fortune 500 company in the UnitedStates? Only nine.

Leadership is not limited to any particular cul-tural, ethnic, or racial group, for the role of leaderis firmly embedded in the traditions of African,European, Latino, Asian, and Native Americangroups (Smith & Bond, 1993; Zamarripa &Krueger, 1983). But how do the members of a sub-culture fare in groups where they are outnumberedby members of another ethnic group?

First, minorities tend to be less influential inheterogeneous small groups and, as a result, are lesslikely to emerge as leaders (Bass, 1990; Mai-Dalton,1993). For example, when Mexican American andEuropean American women interacted in groups,the Mexican American women exerted less influ-ence than the European American women (Roll,McClelland, & Abel, 1996). In a study conducted inAustralia that paired Chinese students with Australianstudents, the Chinese students were less influentialthan the Australian students (Jones et al., 1995).

Second, minorities tend to be underrepresentedin leadership roles in business and organizationalsettings (Bass, 1990). African Americans in U.S. or-ganizations and military groups, for example, aretypically denied leadership positions in racially di-verse groups, even if their experience qualifies themfor these roles (Molm, 1986; Webster & Driskell,

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1983). When senior managers review the leadershippotential of lower-level managers, they give highermarks to European Americans than to AfricanAmericans and Asian Americans (Landau, 1995).Asian Americans, despite their success in scientificand technical fields, are less likely than EuropeanAmericans and African Americans to achieve posi-tions of leadership in their fields (Tang, 1997).Ethnic and racial minorities are underrepresentedin the leadership world (Hooijberg & DiTomaso,1996; Scandura & Lankau, 1996).

Sex Kopp, as both a woman and a leader, issomething of an exception. Although the gendergap in leadership has narrowed in recent years, ithas not closed. Both men and women, when sur-veyed, express a preference for a male rather than afemale boss (Eagly & Carli, 2007). Women receivelower evaluations and fewer promotions than men,even when actual performance data or behaviorsare held constant (Heilman, Block, & Martell,1995). A recent survey of over 40 countries, includ-ing Austria, Israel, and Singapore, indicated thatwomen hold 20–30% of the governmental, legisla-tive, and managerial positions in those countries(Schein, 2007). The percentage has risen steadilyover the years, but men still hold a near monopolyon high-level leadership positions (Eagly & Carli,2007). In 2008, only 12 women were the CEOsof Fortune 500 companies. Female managers aremore likely to feel excluded from career-relatedand informal interactions with senior managersthan are male managers (Cianni & Romberger,1995), and some have also expressed less confidencein their leadership abilities (Watson & Hoffman,1996). The term glass ceiling is often used to repre-sent many of the barriers that block women’s riseinto top management positions.

This gender difference also shapes men’s andwomen’s actions in small-group settings. Men arefive times more likely to enact leadership behaviorsthan women in small, mixed-sex, leaderless groupsand so are more likely to emerge as leaders (Walkeret al., 1996). Both leaders and subordinates perceivefemale leaders to be less dominant than male leaders(Carli, 2001). The lone man in an otherwise

all-female group often becomes the leader, whereasthe lone woman in an otherwise all-male grouphas little influence (Crocker & McGraw, 1984).When a woman exerts influence in a group, mem-bers tend to frown and tighten their facial muscles;but when a man takes charge, members are morelikely to nod in agreement (Butler & Geis, 1990).The tendency for men to dominate women ininformal discussion groups was observed even whenthe men and women were all deemed to be androg-ynous (Porter et al., 1985), when group memberswere personally committed to equality for men andwomen (Sapp, Harrod, & Zhao, 1996), when thewomen in the group were dispositionally more dom-inant than the men (Megargee, 1969; Nyquist &Spence, 1986), and when the men and womenwere equally extraverted (Campbell et al., 2002).When researchers paired together a person whotended to be interpersonally powerful with onewho was more submissive, the dispositionally domi-nant person emerged as the leader in 73% of same-sexdyads. But in mixed-sex dyads, the dominant manbecame the leader 90% of the time, and the dominantwoman became the leader only 35% of the time(Nyquist & Spence, 1986).

This tendency for men to emerge as leadersmore frequently than women is particularly ironicbecause studies of sex differences in the qualitiesthat have been shown to predict leadershipeffectiveness—extraversion, conscientiousness, skillin working with others, acknowledging the goodwork of subordinates, communicating clearly, andfacilitating others’ development—all suggest thatwomen are superior in these qualities to men.Hence, although women are more qualified to beleaders, they are less likely to become leaders(Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & Engen, 2003).

Who Will Lead?

The individual who emerges as the group’s leader isoften the one who is the most conscientious, expe-rienced, socially intelligent, flexible, and capable.But not always, for some groups let themselves beled by people who are outgoing, talkative, older,and male. Why?

262 CHAPTER 9

Implicit Leadership Theory Implicit leadershiptheory (ILT) offers a cognitive explanation forthese partially conflicting tendencies. This theory,developed by Robert Lord and his colleagues, as-sumes that each group member comes to the groupequipped with a set of expectations, beliefs, andassumptions about leaders and leadership. Thesecognitive structures are termed implicit leadership the-ories or leader prototypes. These structures are de-scribed as implicit because they are not overtly statedand are called theories because, like formal theories,they include generalities about leadership and hy-potheses about the qualities that characterize mostleaders (Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984; Lord &Maher, 1991).

Consider the hypothetical ILT shown in Figure9.4. A follower who adopted this ILT would be-lieve that social skill, intelligence, dedication, anddynamism are closely associated with leadership,

but that dedication and dynamism are somewhatmore closely associated with leadership than socialskill and intelligence. This ILT also indicates howsuch specific traits as sincerity and strength are linkedto more general traits, which are in turn associatedwith leadership itself. Sincerity is linked to sensiti-vity, for example, but not to dedication; hard-working is associated with dedication, but notintelligence. Also, certain qualities, such as bossinessand attractiveness, are not associated with leadershipbut are linked to other qualities outside the ILT(Epitropaki & Martin, 2004). Although each groupmember may have a unique conception of leader-ship, most people’s ILTs include task skills—theleader should be active, determined, influential, andin command—and relationship skills—the leadershould be caring, interested, truthful, and open toothers’ ideas (Kenney et al., 1996).

Members rely on their ILTs to sort groupmembers into one of two categories—leader or fol-lower. They intuitively note the actions and char-acteristics of the individuals in their group, comparethem to their ILTs, and favor as leader the individ-ual who matches that prototype of a leader. ILTsalso guide subordinates’ evaluations of their leaders.

Knowledgeable

Understanding

Leadership

DynamismSocialSensitivity

Intelligence

Dedication

Motivated

Hardworking

Attractive

Energetic

Strong

Clever

Educated

Sincere

Helpful

Bossy

F I G U R E 9.4 A representation of the associations that make up an implicit leadership theory.

implicit leadership theories (ILTs) Group members’taken-for-granted assumptions about the traits, character-istics, and qualities that distinguish leaders from the peo-ple they lead.

LEADERSH I P 263

If members believe that leaders should be domi-nant, for example, they may only remember theirleader acting dominantly and forget the times whentheir leader engaged in submissive behavior. Lordand his colleagues illustrated the biasing effects ofILTs in one study by arranging for raters to watcha videotape of a group interaction. After the tape,they asked the observers to identify behaviors that theleader had or had not performed. Lord found that theraters were less accurate, less confident, and slower torespond when trying to judge behaviors that werepart of their ILTs but had not been performed by theleader they had watched (Foti & Lord, 1987).

If ILTs were like actual scientific theories, thengroup members would discard them when they failto explain who is and who is not an effective leader.But ILTs, because they are implicit theories, arerarely recognized or revised. In consequence, if in-dividuals’ ILTs are biased in favor of individualswho are white, masculine, tall, or just highly vocal,then members with these qualities will rise to posi-tions of authority in the group, even if they are notqualified for these positions. Lord (1985) concludedthat when subordinates describe their leaders, theseratings reflect the subordinates’ ILTs more thantheir leaders’ actions (see Forsyth & Nye, 2008,for a review).

Social Identity Theory Michael Hogg and hiscolleagues believe that social identity processes,which were discussed in Chapter 3, influence awide range of leadership processes, including whothe group selects to be their leader. They theorizethat individuals who identify with their groupinclude in their self-definition—their socialidentity—qualities that they share in commonwith other group members. They also develop anidealized image of the prototypical member of thegroup, similar to an ILT, and over time consensuswill emerge on these characteristics. Applied toleadership, social identity theory maintains thatindividuals who most closely match the qualitiesof the shared prototype will be more likely toemerge as leaders. For example, groups that prizecooperation and sensitive communication amongmembers should favor relationship-oriented

leaders, whereas groups of individuals who pridethemselves on their action and productivity willsupport task-oriented leaders (Hogg, 2007, 2008;Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005).

As Hogg notes, social identity theory best ap-plies to choices of leaders in groups where membersstrongly identify with their groups. In a test of thishypothesis, Hogg and his colleagues formed ad hocgroups in the laboratory, and then appointed onemember as leader of each group. They manipulatedthe psychological salience of the groups by tellingsome members that everyone in the group sharedcertain qualities, whereas others were told thegroups were just loose aggregations with no com-monalities. They also circulated some backgroundinformation about the leader among the membersto indicate that he or she matched the fictitiousgroup prototype or did not match it. As predicted,group members who identified with the groupwere more positive about the prototypical leader(Hains, Hogg, and Duck, 1997).

Social Role Theory Alice Eagly’s social roletheory, like ILT and social identity theory, suggeststhat group members have definite expectationsabout what kind of qualities are needed in a personwho will fill the role of leader. These expectationstend to emphasis the agentic, task-oriented side ofleadership rather than the communal and interper-sonal. When group members are asked to describethe qualities needed in a leader, they stress the impor-tance of competition with peers, high energy, domi-nance, forcefulness, and skill at taking command andcontrolling a situation (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

These expectations, however, favor men rela-tive to women as leaders. Although gender stereo-types vary across time and place, people in virtuallyall cultures, when asked to describe women, speakof their expressive qualities, including nurturance,

social role theory A conceptual analysis of sex differ-ences developed by Alice Eagly recognizing that menand women take on different types of roles in many so-cieties, and that these role expectations generate genderstereotypes and differences in the behavior of womenand men.

264 CHAPTER 9

emotionality, and warmth. They expect a “she” to besentimental, affectionate, sympathetic, soft hearted,talkative, gentle, and feminine. When describingmen, they stress their instrumental qualities, includingproductivity, energy, and strength (Williams & Best,1990). In consequence, the expectations associatedwith leadership mesh with the male gender rolestereotype, but the leadership role is inconsistentwith widely held stereotypes about women(Forsyth, Heiney, & Wright, 1997). When peoplethink “leader,” they think “male” (Schein, 2007).

This role incongruity not only disqualifies womenfrom taking the lead in groups, but it also creates adouble standard for women once they achieve aposition of leadership. Women, to be evaluated aspositively as men, must outperform men. WhenEagly and her colleagues reviewed 61 different stud-ies that asked people to evaluate the performanceof male and female leaders, they found that the be-haviors and outcomes achieved by men were viewedmore positively than the exact same outcomesachieved by women (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky,1992). Ironically, this bias reaches its peak when afemale leader adopts a more task-oriented approachto leadership. In a classic example of a “Catch-22,”women are urged to act more like male leaders, butwhen they do, they are denigrated for not being“ladylike” (Hoyt, 2007; Rudman & Glick, 2001).Caught in this double-bind, women respond byavoiding taking the role of leader, by underperform-ing as leaders due to the pressure of the negativestereotypes, or by actively resisting the stereotypesand doing what they can to invalidate members’negative expectations (Hoyt & Chemers, 2008).

Terror Management Theory Many theoristshave suggested that humans have a fundamentalneed for leaders. Sigmund Freud (1922), for exam-ple, is best known for his insightful analyses of per-sonality and adjustment, but he also undertook ananalysis of group behavior. Freud suggested that, forpsychological reasons, humans have a “thirst forobedience”: people, used to life in the primalhorde, willingly accept guidance from parental fig-ures who are forceful, directive, and charismaticleaders (Goethals, 2005; Moxnes, 1999).

The idea that people are drawn to powerfulleaders for less than rational reasons is consistentwith terror management theory (TMT). Thistheory assumes that humans, perhaps uniquely, areaware that someday their earthly existence willcome to an end. This awareness of one’s inevitabledemise, if cognitively inescapable, would be thesource of continuous existential anguish, so the hu-man mind has developed defenses against thoughtsof death. TMT suggests, for example, that culturediminishes this psychological terror by providingmeaning, organization, and a coherent world view.Self-esteem and pride, too, function to elevate one’ssense of worth, and serve as a defense against theintrusive thoughts of death (Greenberg, Solomon, &Pyszczynski, 1997).

TMT explains why the popularity of a leaderoften grows, exponentially, during times of tumultand crisis. The theory, as an explanation of leader-ship emergence and endorsement, suggests that fol-lowers will show a marked preference for strong,iconic leaders when their mortality is made salientto them. After the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in2001, for example, U.S. citizen’s approval ratings ofthen-president George W. Bush jumped from 40–50% to 90%. TMT suggests that the attack madecitizens aware of their mortality, and also threat-ened their world view. Bush, by promising to findthe terrorists responsible for this horrible action andbring them to justice swiftly, provided an antidoteto their existential concerns.

Researchers have put TMT to the test by re-minding some people of their motality and thenassessing their preferences for different types of lea-ders (Cohen et al., 2004, 2005; Landau et al., 2004).One study, for example, compared preferences forthree candidates for political office. The task-orientedleader stressed setting difficult but achievablegoals, strategic planning, and initiating structure.The relationship-oriented leader communicated

terror management theory (TMT) A conceptualanalysis of the implicit psychological processes thoughtto defend individuals from the emotionally terrifyingknowledge that they are mortal and will someday die.

LEADERSH I P 265

compassion, respect, trust, and confidence in others.The charismatic leader spoke of long-term goals, theunique value of the nation, and working together.Before evaluating these candidates, participants inthe mortality-salience condition were reminded oftheir eventual demise in a not-so-subtle way: theywere asked to describe the emotions that thethought of their own death aroused in them, andto write down what will happen to them, physi-cally, when they die. Those in the control condi-tion were asked parallel questions, but about theirnext exam rather than their death. The results indi-cated that in the control condition people weremore positive towards the task- and relationship-oriented leaders relative to the charismatic one.Conversely, in the mortality-salience condition,ratings of the charismatic leader climbed and ratingsof the relationship-oriented leader dropped. Thetask-oriented leader was the most favorably ratedin both conditions (Cohen et al., 2004). Otherresearch finds that, as social role theory might sug-gest, individuals reminded of their mortality preferas their leaders (a) members of their own group, or(b) men rather than women (Hoyt, Simon, & Reid,in press).

Evolutionary Theory Evolutionary psychologyalso offers an answer to the question, “Who willlead?” As noted briefly in Chapter 2, evolutionarypsychology suggests that leadership is an adaptation:a heritable characteristic that developed in a popu-lation over a long period of time. Adaptations, inthe language of Darwin, increase individuals’ fitness,for they increase the chances of their genetic mate-rial being represented in future generations of thespecies. Leadership, as an adaptation, evolved be-cause it contributed so substantially to the survivalof human beings in the environment of evolutionaryadaptation (EEA). For much of their evolutionarypast, humans likely lived in relatively small groups,or tribes, of genetically related individuals. Thesegroups moved constantly, in search of water andfood, often in response to seasonal and climatechanges. Hence, someone often took the role ofthe leader of the group, with a quite literal mean-ing: this individual guided the group from one

place to the next, and as their facilitative impactwas an improvement over more diffuse, unorga-nized movement, over time individuals learnedto follow. Humans also developed the mental app-aratus needed to identify those who were mostqualified to lead their groups. The acceptance of aleader, and one with particular qualities, is thereforebased on instincts that evolved during a time whenhumans lived in much harsher settings (Van Vugt,2006; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008).

Little is known about the EEA, and so evolu-tionary psychology can only speculate about thenature of the environmental pressures that shapedthe evolution of leadership. If, however, the EEAwas similar to the situations faced by many indige-nous people—competition with other adjoiningtribes for scarce food resources, high rates of infantmortality, subsistence living from hunting and gath-ering rather than agriculture, and high stability ingroup membership and cohesion—then it is nowonder that people prefer leaders who can helptheir group reach its goals and solve disputes thatoccur within the group, but who do not take unfairadvantage of others once they are installed in theirposition of authority.

LEADER EFFECT IVENESS

Alexander the Great controlled a huge empirewithout any modern means of transportation orcommunication. General George S. Patton inspiredthose under his command by displaying high levelsof personal confidence, sureness, and an immensestrength of character. Wendy Kopp built TFA fromthe ground up and steered the company through aperiod of organizational and funding nightmares.Alexander, Patton, and Kopp are not simply lea-ders. They are effective leaders. But what is the keyto their effectiveness?

Fiedler’s Contingency Model

Fred Fiedler spent years studying groups thatworked to achieve collective goals under the direc-tion of an appointed, elected, or emergent leader.

266 CHAPTER 9

He focused his attention on groups that generatedproducts and performances that could be evaluated,and he measured aspects of the groups’ settings andtheir leaders to see what combinations consistentlyled to good results. His basic conclusion was that aleader’s effectiveness cannot be predicted just byconsidering the leader’s qualities. Nor can it be pre-dicted on the basis of the situation. Rather, Fiedler’scontingency theory assumes that leadership effec-tiveness is contingent on both the leaders’ motiva-tional style and the leader’s capacity to control thegroup situation (Fiedler, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1978,1981, 1993, 1996).

Motivational Style Consistent with the task-relationship model of leadership, Fiedler suggeststhat leaders naturally tend to adopt one of two lead-ership styles, which he measured using the LeastPreferred Co-Worker Scale (LPC). Respon-dents first think of the one individual with whomthey have had the most difficulty working at sometime. They then rate this person, dubbed the leastpreferred coworker, on bipolar adjective scales such as“pleasant–unpleasant,” “friendly–unfriendly,” and“tense–relaxed.” People with high scores on theLPC are assumed to be relationship-oriented; afterall, they even rate the person they do not like towork with positively. Low LPC scorers are assumedto be task-oriented.

Situational Control Just as leadership style is thekey personal variable in contingency theory, controlis the key situational factor in the model. If leaderscan control the situation, they can be certain that

decisions, actions, and suggestions will be carriedout by the group members. Leaders who have trou-ble gaining control, in contrast, cannot be certainthat the group members will carry out their as-signed duties. What factors determine control?Fiedler highlighted leader–member relations, taskstructure, and position power.

■ Leader–member relations. What is the quality ofthe relationship between the leader and thegroup? If the group is highly cohesive andrelatively conflict-free, the leader will be lessconcerned with peacekeeping and monitoringbehavior.

■ Task structure. Do group members clearly un-derstand what is expected of them? When taskstructure is high, the group’s tasks are straight-forward and have only one right solution,whose correctness is easily verified. Tasks thatare unstructured, in contrast, are ambiguous,admit many correct solutions, and offer no onecorrect way of reaching the goal.

■ Position power. How much authority does theleader possess? Leaders with high positionpower can control rewards, punishments, sala-ries, hiring, evaluation, and task assignment. Insome groups, on the other hand, the leadermay have relatively little power.

Figure 9.5 summarizes the relationship be-tween these three variables and the favorability ofthe leadership situations. Octant I in the chart is themost favorable setting—leader–member relationsare good, the task is structured, and the leader’spower is strong. Octant VIII is the least favorablesituation, for all three variables combine in a groupthat is difficult for the leader to control.

Predicting Leadership Effectiveness Fiedler didnot believe that either type of leader—task-moti-vated or relationship-motivated—is better overall.Instead, he predicted that task-oriented leaders(low LPC score) would be most effective in situa-tions that are either highly favorable or highly un-favorable, whereas relationship-oriented leaders(high LPC score) would be most effective in

contingency theory Fred Fiedler’s conceptual analysisof leadership which posits that a leader’s success is deter-mined by his or her leadership style and the favorabilityof the group situation; more generally, any analysis ofleadership that suggests that the effectiveness of leadersdepends on the interaction of their personal characteris-tics and the group situation.Least Preferred Co-Worker Scale (LPC) An indirectmeasure, developed by Fred Fiedler, of the tendency tolead by stressing the task (low LPC) or relationships (highLPC).

LEADERSH I P 267

middle-range situations. If, for example, Kopp is alow-LPC leader (task-motivated), then she will getthe most out of groups in Octants I, II, and III,where situational favorability is high, as well as inOctant VIII, the least favorable situation. Were shea high-LPC leader, her groups would perform bestin the middle-range situations—Octants IV to VII.Why? Fiedler suggested that in difficult groups(Octant VIII), task-motivated leaders drive thegroup toward its goals, but relationship-motivatedleaders spend too much time repairing relations. Inhighly favorable (Octants I through III) situations,in contrast, task-oriented leaders become moreconsiderate, yielding a more satisfied workgroup.

Studies of a variety of working groups supportthe complex predictions charted in Figure 9.5(Ayman, Chemers, & Fiedler, 2007). For example,

when Fiedler (1964) studied anti-aircraft artillerycrews, he measured both the commander’s leader-ship style (high or low LPC) and the favorability ofthe situation. In most crews, the leaders enjoyed astrong position of power because their authoritywas determined by rank. Moreover, task structurewas high because the same sequence of decisionshad to be made for each target. In some crews,however, the commander was well liked—placingthe crew in the most favorable situation (Octant I),whereas in other crews, the commander was dis-liked (Octant V). Thus, a low-LPC leader shouldbe more effective for Octant I crews, but groups inOctant V should perform better with a high-LPCleader. Supporting this prediction, Fiedler (1955)found that LPC scores were negatively correlatedwith effectiveness for artillery squads in Octant I

268 CHAPTER 9


(r = −0.34), but positively correlated with effective-ness in Octant V (r = 0.49).

The effectiveness of a unique leadership train-ing program, called Leader Match, also supports thevalidity of contingency theory. Although many dif-ferent programs and techniques have been devel-oped to train leaders, the results of these proceduresare typically disappointing (Stogdill, 1974). Fiedler,however, suggested that these programs fail becausethey place too much emphasis on changing theleaders—making them more supportive, more deci-sive, more democratic, and so on. He suggestedinstead that the situation should be engineered tofit the leader’s particular motivational style. Hecalled his training program LeaderMatch because hetaught trainees to modify their group situation untilit matched their personal motivational style (Fiedler,Chemers, & Mahar, 1976). Studies of the effective-ness of this innovative training program suggestthat trained leaders outperform untrained leaders(Burke & Day, 1986; Csoka & Bons, 1978; Fiedler,1978).

Questions and Conclusions Contingency the-ory, like all theories, has both weaknesses andstrengths. Despite years of research, experts are di-vided on the model’s validity, with some arguingthat evidence supports the model and others argu-ing against it (see Chemers, 1997, for a review).Investigators have challenged not only the strengthof the relationships that provide the basis of thepredictions in the eight octants in Figure 9.5, butthey have also questioned the methods that Fiedlerused to measure leaders’ motivational style. Indefense of contingency theory, however, the contin-gency model was one of the first theories of leader-ship effectiveness that fully considered both personalfactors (LPC score) and situational factors (situa-tional control). Few would dispute its key take-home message—that the effectiveness of a leadercannot be predicted without taking into accountboth the leader’s perceptions of his or her followersand the leader’s degree of control in the situation(Chemers, 2000; Rice, 1979). The work also ledFiedler to examine how leaders respond to stressfulleadership settings (Fiedler, 1986).

Style Theories

Fiedler’s contingency model assumes that leadershave a preferred “style” of leading: Some tend to berelationship-oriented leaders, and others are task-oriented leaders. Many other leadership theoriesaccept this basic premise, but add that some leadersintegrate both task and relationship elements in theirapproach to leadership. These style theories arguethat effective leaders balance these two basicingredients in the groups they lead (see Northouse,2007, for a review).

The Leadership Grid Robert Blake and JaneMouton hypothesized that leadership style dependson how one answers two basic questions: (1) Howimportant is the production of results by the group?(2) How important are the feelings of group mem-bers? To some leaders, the key goal is achievingresults. For others, positive feelings in the groupare so important that they emphasize teamworkand personal satisfaction. Others may feel thatboth these goals are important (Blake & McCanse,1991; Blake & Mouton, 1964, 1982, 1985).

Blake and Mouton summarized these differencesin their Leadership Grid (formerly called theManagerial Grid), which is presented in Figure 9.6.Both dimensions—concern for people and concernfor results—are represented as 9-point scales rangingfrom low concern to high concern. Although a person’sorientation could fall at any of 81 possible positionson the grid, Blake and Mouton emphasized the fivelocated at the four corner positions and the center.An apathetic, impoverished 1,1 leader is hardly aleader, for he or she is not interested in either sub-ordinates’ feelings or the production of results. The9,1 individual (high on concern for production, butlow on concern for people, located in the lowerright corner of the grid) is a taskmaster, who seeksproductivity at any cost. The 1,9 leader, in contrast,

Leadership Grid A theory of management and leader-ship, proposed by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, as-suming that people vary in their concern for results andtheir concern for people, and that individuals who arehigh on both dimensions (9,9) are the best leaders.

LEADERSH I P 269

adopts a “country club” approach that makes subor-dinates feel comfortable and relaxed in the group.The “middle-of-the-roader,” located at 5,5, tries tobalance both performance and morale but sometimessacrifices both when results and individuals’ feelingscome into conflict. Finally, the 9,9 leader values bothpeople and products highly and therefore tacklesorganizational goals through teamwork—“a highdegree of shared responsibility, coupled with highparticipation, involvement, and commitment”(Blake & Mouton, 1982, p. 41).

Blake and Mouton (1982) were not contingencytheorists; they felt that the 9,9 leadership style was themost effective style overall. In their initial studies,they found that managers who adopted the 9,9 stylewere far more successful in their careers than man-agers who adopted other methods. They also notedthat studies conducted in educational, industrial, andmedical organizations supported the utility of the 9,9leadership style, as did the favorable results of theirmanagement training system. These results are

impressive, but many experts still question theirstrong claim that the 9,9 style works in all situations.9

2 3 4 5 6 9871Low Concern for production High

Con

cern

for

peo

ple

1,9 ManagementThoughtful attention toneeds of people for satisfying relationshipsleads to a comfortable, friendly organizationatmosphere andwork tempo.

9,9 ManagementWork accomplishment isfrom committed people; interdependence througha “common stake” in organization’s purposeleads to relationships of trust and respect.

5,5 ManagementAdequate organizationperformance is possible through balancing thenecessity to get outwork with maintainingmorale of people at asatisfactory level.

1,1 ManagementExertion of minimumeffort to getrequired work doneis appropriate tosustain organizationmembership.

9,1 ManagementEfficiency in operationsresults from arranging conditions of work insuch a way that humanelements interfere toa minimum degree.

Low

High

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

F I G U R E 9.6 The Leadership Grid (formerly, theManagerial Grid). This model distinguishes between fivebasic leadership styles, and recommends the 9,9 styleabove all others.

SOURCE: Adapted from Leadership Dilemmas - Grid Solutions, p. 29, p.Robert R. Blake and Anne Adams McCanse. Copyright © 1991 by Robert R.Blake and the Estate of Jane S. Mouton. Used with permission. All rightsreserved.

270 CHAPTER 9


Leader–Member Exchange Theory

Most theories of leadership, such as Fiedler’s (1978)contingency theory and Blake and Mouton’s (1980)Leadership Grid, focus on the leader’s style or strategyand how the group responds as a whole to variousinterventions. But such a “one size fits all” approachdoes not always match the needs of specific groupmembers. Whereas one group member may workwell with a task-oriented leader, others may prefera leader who provides them with support.

Leader–member exchange theory (LMX the-ory) uniquely stresses the quality of the one-to-onerelationship between a leader and a subordinate.

LMX theory (and its predecessor, vertical dyadlinkage theory) notes that leaders have dyadic rela-tionships with each group member and that thesedyadic relationships may be substantially differentwithin the total group. Some leaders may workwell with only a subset of the group memberswho are more engaged in the group and its tasks.Other group members, however, may not respondas positively to the leader, so their responses aredefined by their role and their fixed responsibilities(Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995).

LMX theory suggests that group members tendto cleave into subgroups within the overall group.One group, the ingroup, or inner group, includes thoseindividuals with positive linkages to the leader.Leaders spend more time working with these mem-bers, value their inputs more, and also provide themwith more resources. These group members respondby working harder for the group, taking on addi-tional role responsibilities, and declaring their loyaltyto the leader and the group. They are less likely toleave the group and more likely to earn higher per-formance evaluations, get promoted more rapidly,express more commitment to the organization, voicemore positive attitudes about their work and thegroup, and garner more attention and support fromtheir leader. They often view their relationship withtheir boss as a partnership. The second group, theoutgroup, or outer group, includes individuals withless satisfying linkages to the leader. These individualsdo their work, but do not contribute as much to thegroup. They also express less loyalty and support forthe leader (Dienesch & Liden, 1986).

LMX theory’s basic assumptions have beenverified empirically (Gerstner & Day, 1997; cf.Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999). Research-ers have documented the natural tendency for sub-groups to develop within groups, and for disparitiesin performance to exist between these two cliques(Bass, 1990). Those who enjoy a positive LMX aremore likely to do things that benefit their groupand organization. These organizational citizenshipbehaviors include helping other group members,common courtesy, job dedication, civic virtue, sup-porting organizational changes, and so on (Ilies,

leader–member exchange theory (LMX) A dyadic,relational approach to leadership assuming that leadersdevelop exchange relationships with each of their subor-dinates, and that the quality of these leader–memberexchange (LMX) relationships influences subordinates’responsibility, decision influence, access to resources,and performance.

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Nahrgang, & Moregeson, 2007). Individuals whoare not satisfied with their LMX tend to performmore poorly, but the strength of this relationshipdepends, in part, on the degree of differentiationwithin the group. In undifferentiated groups thereis little variation in LMX—no ingroup and out-group at all. In highly differentiated groups, in con-trast, the LMX relation varies substantially fromone member to the next; there are those whowork well with the leader, and those who do not.Such variation can lead to dissatisfaction, overall,since it is inconsistent with principles of fairnessand equal treatment (Hooper & Martin, 2008).Therefore, leaders who recognize this tendencycan improve their overall relations with theirgroup by minimizing the number of people in theouter group (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991). However,some research suggests that differentiation can be mo-tivating. In such groups, low LMX members recog-nize that they may, through hard work, meet theleader’s standards, for they view the leader as a dis-criminating judge of group members (Liden et al.,2006).

LMX theory’s dyadic approach—stressingthe relationship between each member and theleader—also provides an additional way of lookingat leadership in general. Researchers have returnedto other leadership theories, such as Fiedler’s con-tingency model, and have begun to explore thetype of leadership style that leaders use with eachgroup member. These dyadic-level approaches add asecond layer of information about leadership to themore common group-level analysis (Yammarino &Dansereau, 2008; Yammarino et al., 2005).

Participation Theories

Some leaders do all the leading—they, and theyalone, make decisions, dole out assignments, super-vise work quality, communicate with other groups,set goals, and so on. Such leaders adopt a command-and-control leadership style; they give the orders andsubordinates carry them out. Other leaders, how-ever, share their leadership duties with others in thegroup (Burns, 2003). Kopp, for example, set thegeneral goals for TFA, but she expected the other

staff members and recruiters to make choices, createstructures, and recommend changes in procedures.She adopted a participatory leadership style.

The Lewin–Lippitt–White Study As noted inChapter 2, Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and RalphWhite conducted one of the earliest laboratory stud-ies of interacting groups to determine the relativeeffectiveness of shared and unshared approachesto leadership. They arranged for groups of 10- and11-year-old boys to meet after school to work onvarious hobbies. In addition to the boys, eachgroup included a man who adopted one of threeleadership styles (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939;White & Lippitt, 1960, 1968):

■ The authoritarian, or autocratic, leader took noinput from the members in making decisionsabout group activities, did not discuss the long-range goals of the group, emphasized hisauthority, dictated who would work onspecific projects, and arbitrarily paired the boyswith their work partners.

■ The democratic leader made certain that allactivities were first discussed by the entiregroup. He allowed the group members tomake their own decisions about work projectsor partners and encouraged the development ofan egalitarian atmosphere.

■ The laissez-faire leader rarely intervened in thegroup activities. Groups with this type ofatmosphere made all decisions on their ownwithout any supervision, and their so-calledleader functioned primarily as a source oftechnical information.

In some cases, the boys were rotated to a differentexperimental condition, so that they could experi-ence all three types of participation.

The three types of leadership resulted in differ-ences in efficiency, satisfaction, and aggressiveness.The autocratic groups spent as much time workingon their hobbies as the democratic groups, butthe laissez-faire groups worked considerably less(see Figure 9.7). When the leader left the room,however, work dropped off dramatically in the

272 CHAPTER 9

autocratically led groups, remained unchanged inthe democratic groups, and actually increased in thelaissez-faire groups. Furthermore, members ofgroups with an autocratic leader displayed greaterreliance on the leader, expressedmore critical discon-tent, and made more aggressive demands forattention. Democratic groups tended to be friendlierandmore group oriented.Overall, the boys preferreddemocratic leaders to the other two varieties.

Although these findings seem to recommenddemocratic leadership over the two alternatives,the findings of Lewin, Lippitt, and White were notas clear-cut as Figure 9.7 implies. Several of thegroups reacted to the autocratic leader with hostility,negativity, and scapegoating, but others respondedvery passively to their authoritarian leaders. In theselatter groups, productivity was quite high (74%)when the leader was present, but it dropped to29% when he left the room. Aggression—very ap-parent in some of the autocratically led groups—was replaced in these passive groups by apathyand acceptance of the situation. Although thegroup became aggressive if the autocratic leaderwas replaced with a more permissive one, whenhe was present, the group members worked hard,

demanded little attention, only rarely engaged inhorseplay, and closely followed his recommenda-tions. As a methodological aside, the findingsshould also be interpreted with caution because thelaissez-faire condition was not originally includedwhen Lewin and his team designed the study. Butwhen one of the experimenters was unable to enactan autocratic style correctly and instead just dis-tanced himself from the groups, the investigatorsrelabeled the leadership style he used as laissez-faire leadership (White, 1990).

Shared Leadership Lewin, Lippitt, and White’s(1939) findings, although far from definitive evi-dence of the superiority of democratic leadership,offer some support for sharing leadership responsi-bility across the entire group. Such decentered lead-ership models go by many names—co-leadership,collective leadership, democratic leadership, dele-gated leadership, empowerment, peer leadership,self-leadership, shared leadership, team leadership,and participatory leadership—but underlying thesevarious models is a common emphasis on breakingthe leader’s monopoly on power, influence, and au-thority in the group and distributing responsibility

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for core leadership functions to all the group mem-bers (Pearce & Conger, 2003).

When people think about leadership, they gen-erally think of it as concentrated in a single position,rather than distributed across a group (Seers, Keller,& Wilkerson, 2003). In consequence, groups some-times move away from shared leadership to morevertical forms of leadership—with an up-downform of organization rather than side-to-side andup-and-down (Pearce, Conger, & Locke, 2008).However, if the members’ reactions to their workare a key factor in maintaining and evaluating success,a participatory approach will be superior to a moreleader-centered method (Levin, 2006; Miller &Monge, 1986). As Stogdill (1974) noted after re-viewing more than 40 studies of various leadershipmethods that ranged along the participation con-tinuum, satisfaction with the group seems to behighest in democratic groups, as opposed to auto-cratic and laissez-faire groups. Shared methods ofleadership are also more effective in smaller ratherthan in larger groups, and so are well-suited to or-ganizations that rely on small, self-directed teams ornetworks of distributed, relatively independentemployees (Vroom & Mann, 1960). Groups oftenshare leadership when making decisions and whenorganized to function as a team, so we will re-examine issues related to participatory leadership inChapters 11 (Decision Making) and 12 (Teams).

Transformational Leadership

Wendy Kopp is no ordinary CEO. She does notjust set goals and plan future initiatives, but she in-spires, excites, and captures the imaginations ofthose who work for her. When she spoke to thefirst group of future teachers at the start of theirsummer training, she inspired them with her visionof their work and their future. TFA’s mission: “Oneday, all children in this nation will have the oppor-tunity to attain an excellent education” (Kopp, 2003,p. 185).

Kopp is a transformational leader. She is notcontent with the status quo or with merely makingcertain TFA functions smoothly; she seeks tochange the people who work in TFA, the teachers

who join her corps, the school systems where theteachers are placed, and America itself. She focuseson change or, more precisely, transformation: sheseeks to elevate herself, her followers, her organiza-tion, and even society.

Early theory pertaining to transformationalleaders focused on their charismatic qualities. Suchleaders, like Kopp, through the force of theirpersonality, their spoken word, and their dynamicpresentational style, profoundly affect others. MaxWeber (1921/1946), as noted in Chapter 8, usedthe word charisma to describe such leaders, for theyseem to possess a “divinely inspired gift” that setsthem apart from other, more commonplace leaders.Charismatic leaders inspire others, often by expres-sing ideas that are both appealing and easily under-stood. They tend to act in ways that provide theirgroup members with a model that they can emulate(Gardner, 1995; House & Baetz, 1979).

But it was James McGregor Burns (1978) whoset forth the basic assumptions of the transfor-mational approach to leadership in his bookLeadership. Burns argued that most leaders engageprimarily in what he called transactional leader-ship. The follower and the leader cooperate withone another in the pursuit of a shared goal, but theirrelationship is based on the exchange of resources,which can include time, money, help, and instruc-tion. Transactional leadership “occurs when oneperson takes the initiative in making contact withothers for the purpose of an exchange of valuedthings” (Burns, 1978, p. 19). It is “pursuit of changein measured and often reluctant doses” (Burns,2003, p. 24). The only thing that unites the leaderand follower are the resources that are exchanged.In contrast, transformational leadership “occurs

transactional leadership A traditional form of leader-ship that involves contributing time, effort, and otherresources in the pursuit of collaborative goals in ex-change for desired outcomes.transformational leadership An inspiring method ofleading others that involves elevating one’s followers’motivation, confidence, and satisfaction, by unitingthem in the pursuit of shared, challenging goals andchanging their beliefs, values, and needs.

274 CHAPTER 9

when one or more persons engage with others insuch a way that leaders and followers raise one an-other to high levels of motivation and morality”(1978, p. 20, italics in original). Burns believedthat transformational leaders not only change theirgroups, organizations, and societies, but they alsotransform themselves and their followers.

Bernard Bass (1997), drawing on Burns’s work,identified the components of both transactional andtransformational leadership and contrasted these twomethods with laissez-faire leadership. Most leaders,Bass suggests, are transactional: They define expec-tations, offer rewards, “formulate mutually satisfac-tory agreements, negotiate for resources, exchangeassistance for effort, and provide commendationsfor successful follower performance” (Bass, 1997,p. 134). Transformational leaders, however, go be-yond rewards and punishments. These leaders tendto be self-confident and determined, and theircommunications with their followers are usuallyeloquent and enthusiastic (Yammarino & Bass,1990). In contrast to both transactional and transfor-mational leadership, some leaders adopt a passive/avoidant, or laissez-faire, style. They point outmembers’ failings or ignore problems until they be-come dire.

Bruce Avolio and Bass (1995) developed theMultifactor Leadership Questionnaire to measure thekey components of transformational, transactional,and passive/avoidant leadership. Transformationalleadership’s four components, the so-called 4Is,include (paraphrased from Bass, 1997, p. 133):

■ Idealized influence: Leaders who express theirconviction clearly and emphasize the impor-tance of trust; they take stands on difficult issuesand urge members to adopt their values; theyemphasize the importance of purpose, com-mitment, and the ethical consequences ofdecisions.

■ Inspirational motivation: Leaders who articulatean appealing vision of the future; theychallenge followers with high standards, talkoptimistically with enthusiasm, and provideencouragement and meaning for what needs tobe done.

■ Intellectual stimulation: Leaders who question oldassumptions, traditions, and beliefs; they stim-ulate in others new perspectives and ways ofdoing things, and they encourage the expres-sion of ideas and reasons.

■ Individualized consideration: Leaders who dealwith others as individuals; they considerindividual needs, abilities, and aspirations;they listen attentively and further individualmembers’ development; they advise, teach,and coach.

Transactional leadership’s two key compo-nents are (paraphrased from Bass, 1997, p. 134):

■ Contingent reward: Leaders who provide rewardsto followers contingent on performance, rec-ognize achievements, and provide directionand positive feedback; they define expectations,arrange mutually satisfactory agreements, andnegotiate for resources.

■ Management by exception (active): Leaders whosupervise followers’ performances and inter-vene if they detect failures to reach goals ormaintain standards.

Passive/avoidant forms of leadership (andnonleadership) include (paraphrased from Bass,1997, p. 134):

■ Passive management by exception: Leaders whoare uninvolved in the group activity until aserious problem occurs; they do not takeaction until mistakes are brought to theirattention.

■ Laissez-faire: These individuals are not, accord-ing to Bass, leaders, for they do not accept theresponsibility of the role; they are often absentwhen needed, ignore their followers’ requestsfor help, and do not make their views and va-lues known to others.

Both transactional and transformational leaders aremore effective than passive leaders, but groupsworking with transformational leaders often achievethe best results of all. A meta-analytic review, of 87studies concluded that transformational leadership

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was more strongly associated with followers’ jobsatisfaction, satisfaction with the leader, motiva-tional levels, performance quality, and ratings ofthe leader’s effectiveness than transactional leader-ship—although transactional leadership predictedthese positive outcomes as well. Passive forms ofleadership were unrelated to these outcomes orwere negatively related (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).Meta-analysis also suggests that women tend to bemore likely to use transformational styles of

leadership, whereas men are more likely to enactlaissez-faire and transactional styles (Eagly,Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 2003; Eagly& Johnson, 1990; van Engen, 2001). Cross-cultural research, as discussed in Focus 9.3, supportsBass’s (1997) belief that the transactional–transfor-mational distinction applies across all world cul-tures. Last, confirming the idea that “there is noth-ing so practical as a good theory” (Lewin, 1951, p.169), leadership training programs based on the

F o c u s 9.3 What Do People Look for in an Effective Leader?

Leaders must invoke an alchemy of great vision.—Henry A. Kissinger

Leadership is not recognized as a positive force in allcountries and cultures, but nearly all societies considertransformational leaders who maintain high moralstandards to be superior to less virtuous authorities. Toexplore leadership around the world, researchers in theGlobal Leadership and Organizational BehaviorEffectiveness (GLOBE) Program asked 15,022 managersin 62 countries to describe desirable and undesirablecharacteristics of a leader. They then identified thosequalities that nearly all of the individuals agreed werecritical by calculating indexes of agreement for eachcountry. As Table 9.5 suggests, many of the qualitiesidentified as desirable in an outstanding leader weretransformational ones such as visionary, inspirational,and high in integrity. Those qualities that were con-sidered to be most undesirable in a leader were thoseassociated with a lack of integrity, self-centeredness,and asocial tendencies (House & Javidan, 2004).

Some countries, however, had relatively uniqueconceptions of their ideal leaders. Whereas most peo-ple surveyed expected effective leaders to be charis-matic and team-focused, some cultures stressed thesequalities more than in others. Highly collectivistic soci-eties, for example, favored charismatic leaders more sothan more individualistic cultures. Cultures that dis-played higher levels of gender egalitarianism stressedparticipative, team-focused leadership. Those indivi-duals who lived in cultures marked by hierarchicalpower structures and greater levels of elitism weremore tolerant of self-centered leaders who were statusconscious and formalistic. The GLOBE researchers alsodiscovered that certain specific traits were highly val-ued in some cultures but seen as harmful to leadershipin others. Even such questionable qualities as risk-taking, cunning, elitism, micromanagement, and will-fulness were viewed as positive qualities in some cul-tures, suggesting that some aspects of leadership aredependent on local norms (Dorfman, Hanges, &Brodbeck, 2004).

T A B L E 9.5 Cross-cultural, Universal Qualities That Are Considered Desirableand Undesirable in a Leader

Type General Dimension Specific Examples

Desirable qualities Visionary, inspirational, integrity,group focused, diplomatic, adminis-tratively competent, decisive,performance-oriented

Has foresight, plans ahead, dynamic, positive,encouraging, confidence builder, motiva-tional, trustworthy, just, honest, informed,communicative, coordinator, team builder,win–win problem solver, effective bargainer

Undesirablequalities

Self-centered, malevolent, ruthless,egocentric, face-saver

Asocial, loner, irritable, noncooperative,nonexplicit

SOURCE: Data from Den Hartog, House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, Dorfman et. al., 1999.

276 CHAPTER 9

model have also proven to be a relatively effectivemeans of improving performance in businesses andother organizations (e.g., Dvir et al., 2002).

The Future of Leadership

The future promises many changes in the nature andapplication of leadership principles. As organizationscontinue to become more decentralized—flatterrather than hierarchically organized—leadershipmethods will likely shift from leader-centeredapproaches to group-centered ones. Also, the in-crease in the use of information technologies likelywill also change the way leaders interact with theirfollowers, as traditional forms of leadership give wayto new forms of e-leadership (Avolio, Walumbwa, &Weber, 2009; Coovert & Burke, 2005). Increases indiversity across groups will also create challengesfor leaders, particularly if they must adapt their

methods and style to match the varied needs ofheterogeneous work groups (Hooijberg &DiTomaso, 1996).

The future may see increased numbers ofwomen rising to positions of leadership in groupsand organizations. As noted earlier, male and femaleleaders differ to a degree in their basic approaches toleadership, but the sexes are equivalent when itcomes to providing members with task-orientationand relational support (Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani,1995). However, given that women tend to be par-ticipative and transformational leaders rather thanautocratic, laissez-faire, and transactional ones, andgiven that these styles are more effective methods ofleadership, as prejudicial biases give way to fairerpromotional practices, the Wendy Kopps of theworld will become the standard rather than theexception.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What is leadership?

1. Contrary to common myths pertaining toleadership, leadership is neither power overgroup members nor resisted by them.■ Certain personality variables are associated

with effective leadership, but leadership isnot an inborn trait.

■ Not all groups have leaders, but as groupsincrease in size and complexity, most selectsomeone to lead. The power in all-malegroups is more likely to be centralized.

■ Most people prefer to be led rather than beleaderless.

■ Leaders make a difference, for groupsprosper when guided by good leaders.

■ People sometimes assume that leaders areso influential that they, and they alone,determine their group’s outcomes(the romance of leadership).

2. Leadership is the process by which an individ-ual guides others in their pursuits, often by

organizing, directing, coordinating, support-ing, and motivating their efforts. This processcan be characterized as reciprocal, transac-tional, transformational, cooperative, andadaptive.

3. Kelly’s theory of followership suggests thatfollowers vary along two dimensions: active/passive and independent/dependent. Heidentifies five types of followers: conformist,passive, pragmatic, alienated, and exemplary.

4. The task-relationship model identifies two basicsets, or clusters, of leadership behavior:

■ Task leadership focuses on the group’swork and its goals.

■ Relationship leadership focuses on theinterpersonal relations within the group.

■ The Ohio State University LeadershipStudies identified these clusters, and theLeader Behavior Description Questionnaire(LBDQ) assesses both task and relationshipleadership.

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5. Leadership substitutes theory suggests that certainfeatures of the situation can fulfill criticalinterpersonal and task functions and so reducethe need for a leader.

6. Men tend to be more agentic and task orientedin groups, whereas women are more com-munal and relationship oriented. The sexes differonly negligibly, however, in their emphasis ontask versus relationship leadership when theyoccupy positions of leadership.

Who will lead?

1. Paralleling Carlyle’s great leader theory andTolstoy’s zeitgeist theory, early analyses of lead-ership emergence adopted either a trait model ora situational model. Most modern theories areinteractional models that base predictions onthe reciprocal relationships among the leader,the followers, and the nature of the groupsituation.

2. Certain personal qualities (traits) are associatedwith the rise to a position of leadership, including:

■ personality traits, such as extraversion, con-scientiousness, and openness. Studies usingrotational designs, such as those conductedby Zacarro, suggest that leadership is partlybased on personal skills and qualities.

■ intelligence (with groups preferring leaderswho are somewhat more intelligent thanthe average group member) and emotionalintelligence (degree of social skill).

■ expertise, skill, and experience.■ level of participation in discussion, for

people who speak more in groups arelikely to emerge as leaders (the babbleeffect), although work by Jones and Kellysuggests that quality of comments is moreinfluential than sheer quantity.

3. Leadership is also associated with demographicvariables:

■ Leaders tend to be older, taller, and heavierthan the average group member.

■ Ethnic minorities and women are lesslikely to be selected as leaders in groups.

■ The bias against women is ironic because, ingeneral, women possess more of the skillsneeded to be a successful leader.

4. A number of theories offer an explanation forleadership emergence processes.■ Lord’s implicit leadership theory suggests

that individuals who act in ways thatmatch the group members’ leader proto-types are likely to emerge as leaders.

■ Hogg’s social identity theory predicts thatleaders will closely match the groupmembers’ shared prototype of a member.

■ Eagly and her colleagues’ social role theorymaintains that stereotypes of sex roles andleadership roles can create negativeexpectations for women leaders.

■ Terror management theory, like Freud, suggeststhat individuals may have a deep-seatedneed for leaders, particularly in times ofcrisis, when mortality is salient.

■ Evolutionary theory suggests that leadershipis an evolutionary adaptation that improvesthe fitness of both leaders and followers.

Why do some leaders succeed and others fail?

1. Fiedler’s contingency theory suggests thatleadership effectiveness is determined by theleader’s motivational style and the favorabilityof the situation.■ The leader’s motivational style can be

either task motivated or relationshipmotivated, as measured by the LeastPreferred Co-Worker Scale (LPC).

■ Situational favorability is determined byleader–member relations, the task struc-ture, and the leader’s power.

■ Fiedler’s theory predicts that task-motivated(low-LPC) leaders will be most effective insituations that are either extremely unfa-vorable or extremely favorable, whereas

278 CHAPTER 9

relationship-motivated leaders are mosteffective in intermediate situations.

2. Leadership style theorists assume that effec-tiveness depends on the leader’s task andrelationship behaviors.■ The Leadership Grid, proposed by Blake and

Mouton, assumes that people vary in theirconcern for results and in their concern forpeople, and that individuals who are high onboth dimensions (9,9) are the best leaders.

■ The situational leadership theory, proposedby Hersey and Blanchard, suggests thatgroups benefit from leadership thatmeshes with the developmental stage ofthe group.

3. Leader–member exchange theory (LMX) focuses onthe dyadic relationship linking the leader toeach member of the group and notes that inmany cases, two subgroups of linkages exist(the inner group and the outer group). Groupswith more inner-group members are moreproductive.

4. Participation theories of leadership extend theearly findings of Lewin, Lippitt, and Whiteregarding the effects of autocratic, democratic,and laissez-faire leaders. This approach providesthe theoretical and empirical basis for shared

leadership models, such as co-leadership,collective leadership, and peer leadership.

5. Transformational theories of leadership exam-ine how charismatic leaders promote change.■ Burns distinguished between transactional

leaders and transformational leaders, andsuggested that the latter are able to elevateboth themselves and their followers.

■ Bass identified four components of transfor-mational (rather than transactional) leader-ship: idealized influence (or charisma),inspirational motivation, intellectual stimu-lation, and individualized consideration, andthey are measured by Bass and Avolio’sMultifactor Leadership Questionnaire.

■ The GLOBE study has identified trans-formational leadership as common incultures across the world.

6. Women tend to adopt participative and trans-formational styles of leadership, whereas menare more likely to enact autocratic, laissez-faire,and transactional styles. Women’s skills areparticularly well suited for organizations of thefuture, which will be less hierarchical and re-quire a collaborative, shared approach toleadership.


Chapter Case: Wendy Kopp■ One Day, All Children . . . , by Wendy Kopp

(2003), provides a first-person account of thefounder of Teach For America, a highlysuccessful educationally focused nonprofitcorporation.

The Nature of Leadership■ Encyclopedia of Leadership, edited by George

R. Goethals, Georgia J. Sorenson, and JamesMcGregor Burns (2004), is a massive compilation

of scholarship dealing with all aspects of leadersand leadership: 1927 pages filled with 1.2 millionwords written by 311 scholars.

■ Leadership in Organizations, by Gary Yukl(2006), is a masterful integration of theory,research, and application of leadership studiesin business and organizations.

■ “Leadership: Current Theories, Research,and Future Directions,” by Bruce J. Avolio,Fred O. Walumbwa, and Todd J. Weber(2009) is a concise summary of the leading

LEADERSH I P 279

edge of leadership research, with sectionsdealing with authentic leadership, implicitleader theory, and e-leadership.

Theoretical Perspectives■ Leadership and Psychology, edited by Crystal

L. Hoyt, George R. Goethals, and DonelsonR. Forsyth (2008), collects together in a singlevolume a variety of papers that examine the re-lationship between a range of social psychologicalprocesses—such as motivation, personality, andsocial cognition—and leadership.

■ Leadership and the Fate of Organizations, byRobert B. Kaiser, Robert Hogan, andS. Bartholomew Craig (2008), makes a

strong case for examining leadership at thegroup level.

Women and Leadership■ “Women and Leadership,” by Crystal L. Hoyt

(2007), is a concise review of research examin-ing sex differences in leadership style and effec-tiveness, with a focus on the impact of sexstereotypes on biases against women as leaders.

■ Through the Labyrinth, by Alice Eagly and LindaL. Carli (2007), examines closely the findingsfrom hundreds of studies of women andleadership, including trends in biases againstwomen as leaders and differences between menand women in their leadership styles.


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10

Performance

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

People join with others in groups toget things done. Groups are the world’sworkers, protectors, builders, decisionmakers, and problem solvers. Whenindividuals combine their talents andenergies in groups, they accomplishgoals that would overwhelm indivi-duals. People working collectively in-evitably encounter problems coordi-nating their efforts and maximizingeffort, but groups are the crucible forcreativity.

■ Do people work better alone orwith others?

■ Do people work as hard when ingroups as they do when workingby themselves?

■ Why are groups more successfulwhen working on some tasks andnot on others?

■ What steps can be taken toencourage creativity in groups?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Social Facilitation

Studies of Social Facilitation

Why Does Social FacilitationOccur?

Conclusions and Applications

Process Losses in Groups

The Ringelmann Effect

Motivation Loss: Social Loafing

Causes of and Cures for SocialLoafing

Coordination Problems in Groups

Process Gains in Groups

Brainstorming

Does Brainstorming Work?

Improving Brainstorming Sessions

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

281

✵

Most of the billions of groups in the world exist toget a particular job done. People use groups to dis-cuss problems, concoct plans, forge products, andmake decisions. When a task would overwhelm asingle person’s time, energy, and resources, indivi-duals turn to groups. Even when tasks can beaccomplished by people working alone (such asstudying group dynamics), people often prefer towork in the company of others. Table 10.1 offersa sampling of various tasks accomplished by groups.

The world relies on groups to achieve its goals,but people sometimes challenge the wisdom of thiscustom. Although groups sometimes turn out ex-cellent products, they often fall short of expecta-tions. One task force may formulate an effectiveplan for dealing with a problem, whereas anothermay create a plan that ends in disaster. A team maypractice diligently, yet still play miserably during thebig game. A group of talented but untried comedictalents may come together in a moment of greatsyncopation and create great humor, but over

time their productivity may dwindle as personalproblems and interpersonal conflicts sap the energyof the group. Why do some groups perform im-pressively whereas others disappoint? Chapters 11and 12 examine groups making decisions andworking as teams, respectively. This chapter ex-plores productivity and performance in all types ofgroups, beginning with the simplest type of groupsituation—two people working side by side onseparate tasks—and then progressing to more com-plex forms of group performance in which mem-bers are highly interdependent.

SOCIAL FAC IL I TAT ION

Many of the tasks that people must perform eachday—cooking, cleaning, dining, studying, writing,reading, watching television, and virtually all formsof work—could be performed in isolation, butrarely do we attempt such tasks sequestered away

Saturday Night Live: Working with Others in Groups

Their production schedule was a nightmare. They spentmost of Monday thinking up new ideas for Saturday’sshows and by the night’s end they settled on theirfavorites. They wrote from that point on untilWednesday, at 3 in the afternoon, when they had thefirst reading of each sketch. After selecting the onesthey would put on the show and scrapping the others,they moved on to production—the blocking of theactors in the shots, the camera angle choices, thelighting, set-design, costuming, rewriting, and rehear-sals. By Saturday night, at 11:30 PM, ready or not,the show broadcast live with a “cold open”: a skitdelivered with no warm-up or explanation, endingwith the now stock phrase, “Live from New York: it’sSaturday night!”

The show was the product of a ferociously pro-ductive and creative group of talents. Lorne Michaels,the producer, was given very little direction by NBCexecutives other than to develop a show to fill a gapon Saturday night after the news. Michaels set aboutfinding and recruiting a group of writers who woulddevelop the jokes and skits for the show. He also

tracked down and put on contract young comics fromvarious improvisational and comedy troupes in the U.S.and Canada. These two groups melded into one asthey worked on the show, with writers sometimestaking the stage playing roles in the skits, andthe actors developing characters and working ontheir dialogue.

The result, Saturday Night Live, or SNL, was animmediate sensation. The first few shows lurchedsomewhat as the writers and cast found their rhythmand their style, but by the fifth telecast, as Michaelsexplained, “we sort of hit our stride” (quoted in Shales& Miller, 2002, p. 59). The on-air time for the musicalacts and celebrity hosts shrank, and instead the pro-gram showcased the talents of the repertory company,who included such future stars as Chevy Chase, JohnBelushi, Jane Curtin, Gilda Radner, Dan Aykroyd, andBill Murray. All these group members left the programwithin its first five years, but SNL continues to thriveas each group member is replaced by yet anothertalented new comic—a group that continues to existeven though its original members have moved on.

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from other people. The writers for Saturday NightLive (SNL) could have worked at their tasks in se-clusion, undistracted by others, developing eachepisode’s dialog and sketches. But they chose, in-stead, to work in a crowded, noisy, endlessly messyoffice on the 17th floor of the NBC headquarters atRockefeller Center. Most of them congregated inthat space, for they preferred to be collocated ratherthan separated. Did the presence of other people

help them as they developed their creative ideasor were the others a hindrance?

Studies of Social Facilitation

Norman Triplett (1898) decided to conduct hisexperiment, one of the first in the field of groupdynamics, after watching a series of bicycle races.In some events cyclists raced alone and their

T A B L E 10.1 Some of the Many Goals Accomplished by Groups

Purpose of the Group Typical Groups

Accomplish heavy, arduous tasks Construction crew, assembly line, expeditionary team

Administer a company or organization Executive committee, trustees, regents, administrators

Advise others Consulting group

Build and repair Roofers, team of carpenters, auto shop

Discover new information Research team, professional society

Effect social change Citizens action group, political party

Entertainment–fine arts Orchestra, dance company, drama troupe

Entertainment–informal Parties, dinners, cook-outs

Entertainment–leisure Hobby club, discussion group, book club

Entertainment–sports Baseball team, soccer club, intramural team

Heal members and nonmembers Surgery team, emergency room staff

Home life and care of relatives Families, communes, kibbutzim

Maintain and enforce the law Police, citizen security groups, judicial groups

Make resources available Bank, rental agency

Observe and celebrate Patriotic society, veterans’ groups

Plan strategy, direct others, lead Executives, board of directors

Production Factory, production line

Protect members from harm Neighborhood watch association, gangs, platoons, police units, army

Reduce costs for members Buyers’ cooperative, trade association

Reduce monotony Quilting groups, cohesive work teams

Render decisions on guilt Jury, hearing panel

Respond to problems Firefighters, paramedic squad

Set standards for others to follow Legislative body, ethics review board

Solve problems Committee, commission, task force, research staff

Teach and learn School, class, study group

Transport Airplane crew, ship captain and crew

Worship Religious body, congregation, cult, sangha, ashram

SOURCE: Adapted from Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000; Devine, 2002; Zander, 1985.

PERFORMANCE 283

performance was timed. Other events were compe-titions, with cyclists racing each other. In a thirdtype of race a rider was paced by a motor-drivencycle. Invariably, riders achieved their best timeswhen they competed or they were paced, andthey were slowest when racing alone.

Many observers at the time thought the differ-ences were caused by drafting: the lead cyclist createsa partial vacuum that pulls followers along while alsobreaking down wind resistance. Triplett, however,was more interested in “dynamogenic factors”:

The bodily presence of another rider is astimulus to the racer in arousing the com-petitive instinct; that another can thus bethe means of releasing or freeing nervousenergy for him that he cannot of himselfrelease; and, further, that the sight ofmovement in that other by perhaps sug-gesting a higher rate of speed, is also aninspiration to greater effort. (p. 516)

To eliminate the possibility of drafting, he arrangedfor 40 children to perform a simple reel-turningtask. When the children turned the reels faster inpairs than when they were alone, Triplett had suc-ceeded in experimentally documenting what is nowknown as social facilitation: the enhancement ofan individual’s performance when working withother people rather than when working alone. (Areanalysis of Triplett’s data using modern statisticsconfirmed Triplett’s conclusions, but the differencesbetween the conditions he studied were not verysubstantial. In all likelihood, had he performed hisstudy today instead of in 1898 his fellow researcherswould have sent him back to his laboratory to findmore convincing evidence of those mysterious dy-namogenic factors; see Strube, 2005).

Coaction, Audiences, and Inconsistencies Trip-lett studied coaction: people working in the pres-

ence of other people, but not necessarily interactingwith one another. People digging separate holes ina field, taking a test in a classroom, or riding bicycleswith friends are common coaction situations thatcould trigger social facilitation. But researcherssoon discovered that social facilitation also occurswhen individuals perform for an audience. One in-vestigator discovered that audiences can trigger so-cial facilitation when he watched people exercisingin a weight room. He noted that people who werewatched when working out suddenly could liftheavier weights (Meumann, 1904).

Other studies, however, did not confirm the“presence of people improves performance” effect.Floyd Allport (1920), for example, arranged for par-ticipants to complete tasks twice—once while alonein a small testing cubicle, and once with others at atable. To reduce competition, Allport cautionedparticipants not to compare their scores with oneanother, and he also told them that he himselfwould not be making comparisons. He found thatpeople in groups produced more than isolated in-dividuals, but that their products were often lowerin quality. Likewise, other researchers sometimesreported gains in performance through coactionor when an audience was watching, but they alsodocumented performance decrements (Aiello &Douthitt, 2001).

Zajonc’s Resolution Confusion reigned untilRobert Zajonc (1965) explained why differentstudies yielded such divergent results. Some beha-viors, he noted, are easier to learn and perform thanothers. These dominant responses are located at thetop of the organism’s response hierarchy, so theydominate all other potential responses. Behaviorsthat are part of the organism’s behavioral repertoirebut are less likely to be performed are nondominantresponses. Zajonc observed that studies documentingsocial facilitation focused on well-learned or instinc-tual responses, such as lifting weights, bicycling, or

social facilitation Improvement in task performancethat occurs when people work in the presence of otherpeople.

coaction Performing a task or other type of goal-oriented activity in the presence of one or more otherindividuals who are performing a similar type of activity.

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eating rapidly. Studies involving novel, compli-cated, or unpracticed actions, such as solving diffi-cult math problems or writing poetry, usually foundlittle evidence of social facilitation.

Zajonc’s insight was that the presence of othersincreases the tendency to perform dominant re-sponses and decreases the tendency to perform non-dominant responses. If the dominant response is thecorrect or most appropriate response in a particularsituation, then social facilitation occurs; people willperform better when others are present than whenthey are alone. If the task calls for nondominantresponses, however, then the presence of other peo-ple interferes with performance (see Figure 10.1).Imagine that you must memorize some pairs ofwords. If the pairs are common associations, suchas blue–sky or clean–dirty, then the task is an easyone, for which the dominant response is correct.Hence, your performance will be better if otherpeople are present. If, however, you are trying tolearn some uncommon associations—such as blue–dynamogenic or clean–nondominant—then you are re-quired to make a nondominant response and anaudience will hurt more than help.

Zajonc’s analysis has been supported by a num-ber of studies, including those sampled in Table 10.2and discussed in Focus 10.1. Consistent with thedistinction between dominant and nondominantresponses, the effect is strongest when speed andquantity count more than correctness and quality.

One meta-analysis of 241 different studies of nearly24,000 human subjects verified that people workfaster and produce more when others are present andthey work at simple tasks. Rarely, though, did thepresence of others enhance the quality of performanceeven on simple tasks, and the presence of othersdecreased both the quantity and quality of work oncomplex tasks. Overall, the gains that occurred whenpeople worked together on simple tasks were not asgreat as the losses that occurred when people workedon complex tasks (Bond & Titus, 1983).

Why Does Social Facilitation Occur?

The situations studied by Triplett and Zajonc barelyqualify as groups, for they involved strangers work-ing on individualized tasks without any interaction,influence, shared identity, or common goals. Yet,even in these circumstances the mere presence ofothers was sufficient to improve performance whentasks were simple and interfere with performancewhen tasks were difficult. Zajonc’s analysis ex-plained when social facilitation occurs, but the whyis less certain (see Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Strauss,2002; Uziel, 2007).

Drive Processes Zajonc coined the word compre-sence to describe the state of responding in the presenceof others. Compresence, he hypothesized, touches offa basic arousal response in most social species “simply

Socialfacilitation

Task requires dominantresponses

Dominantresponsesincrease and nondominantresponsesdecrease

Presenceof others

Task requires nondominantresponses

Socialinterference

F I G U R E 10.1 Zajonc’s theory of social facilitation. Zajonc (1965) integrated previous research by notingthat people display more dominant responses, and perform such behaviors more rapidly, when others are present. Ifthe dominant response is appropriate in the situation, the presence of others is facilitating. If, however, the situationcalls for a nondominant response, the presence of others will interfere with performance.

PERFORMANCE 285

because one never knows, so to speak, what sorts ofresponses—perhaps even novel and unique—may berequired in the next few seconds” when others arenearby (Zajonc, 1980, p. 50). Zajonc believed thatcompresence in and of itself elevated drive levels,and these elevated drives triggered social facilitationwhen tasks were so easy that only dominant responsesare needed to perform them.

Zajonc’s drive theory uniquely predicts thatsocial facilitation will occur even when all formsof social interaction, communication, and evalua-tion between the individual and the observer areblocked. Investigators tested this hypothesis by ask-ing people to work on simple or complex tasks inthe presence of an “observer” who was blindfolded

and wore earplugs. Even though the observer couldnot interact with participants in any way, his merepresence still enhanced their performance whenthey worked on simple tasks and slowed their per-formance on complex ones (Schmitt et al., 1986).

But do people actually show signs of physio-logical changes whenever they are joined by other

T A B L E 10.2 A Sampling of Empirical Demonstrations of Social Facilitation and Inhibition

Situation Findings

Makingspeeches

When asked to write out as many words as they could in response to a word, most people (93%)produced more words when another person was present than when they were alone (Allport,1920). When this study was replicated with individuals who stuttered when they spoke, 80% ofthe subjects produced more words when alone rather than with another person (Travis, 1928).

Handwriting College students were told to copy a list of words as quickly as they could. For one list they wrotewith their dominant hand (easy task), but for the other list they used their nondominant hand(hard task). They completed the task in the presence of an image of their favorite televisionpersonality (displayed on a computer screen) or an image of another character from the sameprogram. When the task was easy they wrote more words in the presence of their favoritecharacter; when the task was difficult, the favorite character inhibited their performance(Gardner & Knowles, 2008).

Getting dressed People were asked to perform a familiar task (taking off their own shoes and socks) and a lessfamiliar task (putting on a robe that tied in the back) when alone and when with another person.People removed their shoes and socks three seconds faster if another person was in the room.They were even faster—by two seconds on average—when the observer watched as theyremoved their footwear. In contrast, they donned the unfamiliar clothes more slowly when theobserver was present and watchful (Markus, 1978).

Shooting pool People playing pool were surreptitiously watched to identify skilled and unskilled players. Skilledplayers made at least two-thirds of their shots, and unskilled players missed at least two-thirds.The observer then moved near the pool table and watched their play. Skilled players’performance improved 14% when they were observed, but unskilled players’ performancedropped by more than 30% (Michaels et al., 1982)

Driver’s test Individuals seeking their license to drive an automobile took their driving test with only the testerin the car or with another test-taker in the car, seated in the rear seat. Forty-nine percent of theapplicants passed the test when alone, but only 34% passed when an audience was present(Rosenbloom et al., 2007).

Jogging Solitary women jogging along a footpath encountered, when they rounded a bend, a womanwho either watched them as they ran or sat facing away from them. Joggers accelerated whenthey encountered the watchful observer (Worringham & Messick, 1983).

drive theory In general, an analysis of human motiva-tion that stresses the impact of psychological or physio-logical needs or desires on individuals’ thoughts, feelings,and actions; also an explanation of social facilitationproposed by Robert Zajonc, which maintains that thepresence of others evokes a generalized drive statecharacterized by increased readiness and arousal.

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humans? Researchers have found evidence of in-creased heart rate and blood pressure, with the im-pact of physiological effects dependent on the type ofsituation and on who is watching. James Blascovichand his colleagues (1999), for example, verified thatan audience triggers increases in cardiac and vascularreactivity. Blascovich’s team also discovered, how-ever, that this arousal was physiologically very differ-ent when people worked on an easy task rather thanon a hard one. When the task was easy, people dis-played a challenge response. At the physiological level,they appeared to be ready to respond to the chal-lenge that they faced (elevated heart rate and sympa-thetic nervous system activation). But when the taskwas difficult, people displayed a threat response; theyappeared to be stressed rather than ready for effectiveaction. Other studies found that the presence ofcertain people—such as close friends—can have acalming rather than an arousing influence. Whenwomen performed a difficult math test with a friendwho was merely present—the friend could touchthe participant’s wrist but was preoccupied withanother task and was wearing a headset that blockedall sound—the participant’s cardiovascular responseswere lowered (Kamarck,Manuck, & Jennings, 1990).

Psychoneurologists have also offered suggestiveevidence of the basic neurological reactivity of the

human brain to the presence of other humans. Ateam of researchers used a functional magnetic res-onance imaging (fMRI) scanner to image volun-teers’ brains while they were looking at 36 videoclips of a single individual followed by a short seg-ment of that individual interacting with anotherperson. While watching these clips, areas of thevolunteers’ brains that are thought to be dedicatedto monitoring social information (the medial pari-etal and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices) showedsigns of increased activity, suggesting that simplyseeing other human beings triggers a cortical reac-tion. The scans showed that these areas of the brainwere more active when people watched the clip ofthe interaction, but they also responded when peo-ple watched a clip of just a single person. The in-vestigators concluded that "thinking about socialrelationships is apparently part of the brain’s defaultstate circuitry" (Iacoboni et al., 2004, p. 1171).

Motivational Processes Many of the writers ofSNL had worked for years writing material thatthey sold to other comics and shows. If the jokewas a dud, the only consequence was that no onebought it. But working in a group was different.When they offered up an idea to the others duringa late-night session on the 17th floor they could

F o c u s 10.1 Is Social Facilitation a Uniquely Human Phenomenon?

Social facilitation is not limited to Homo sapiens:horses, puppies, chickens, mice, rats, monkeys, arma-dillos, ants, beetles, and opossums are on the list ofanimals that show signs of increased performance inthe presence of other members of their species(Clayton, 1978). Even the lowly cockroach will workharder when surrounded by other cockroaches. Asanyone who has surprised a roach in the kitchen late atnight knows, cockroaches run from bright lights. SoZajonc and his colleagues (1969) designed two mazeswith a start box near a light and a goal box hiddenfrom the light. One maze was easy, even for a roach—just a straight runway from start to the goal. Thesecond maze was more complex: the roaches had toturn to the right to reach their goal. Zajonc then timedhow quickly 72 roaches (Blatta orientalis) completedthe mazes when alone, when with another roach, or

when watched by other cockroaches—although wecannot be sure the spectator roaches actually watched.They were sealed in small plastic boxes adjacent to themazes, with holes allowing air to circulate betweenspectator and subject.

Zajonc’s findings were consistent with thefindings from studies of humans. In the simple maze,single roaches reached home base in an average of40.6 seconds. Coacting roaches trimmed 7.6 seconds offthis time, returning in just 33 seconds flat. Thistendency reversed when the maze was complex: Singleroaches crawled to the finish line 19.6 secondsfaster than did coacting roaches. Roaches watched byan audience were the slowest contestants of all, butthey were particularly slow when the maze wascomplex—taking nearly two minutes longer thansingle roaches.

PERFORMANCE 287

face ridicule and embarrassment. The group was atough audience.

Nickolas Cottrell (1972) suggested that thisevaluative pressure is one of the reasons why peopletend to be more productive in the presence ofothers. His evaluation apprehension theory as-sumes that individuals have learned through expe-rience that other people are the source of most ofthe rewards and punishments they receive. Thus,individuals learn to associate social situations withevaluation, so they feel apprehensive wheneverother people are nearby. This evaluation apprehen-sion enhances performance on simple tasks, but itbecomes debilitating when people attempt moredifficult projects. Cottrell thus believed that appre-hension, and not the arousal response identified byZajonc, is the source of social facilitation effects.

Self-presentation theory also underscoresthe motivational impact of evaluation apprehension(Goffman, 1959). Self-presentation theory assumesthat group members actively control others’ impres-sions of themselves by displaying social behaviorsthat establish and maintain a particular social image,or face. Group members do not want the others tothink that they possess negative, shameful qualitiesand characteristics, so they strive to make a goodimpression. Performance situations create self-presentational challenges for members, particularlywhen they feel they might fail. To avoid that em-barrassment, group members redouble their effortswhen self-presentational pressures are strong—asthey were in the SNL group (Bond, Atoum, &VanLeeuwen, 1996).

The primary hypothesis that derives uniquelyfrom such motivational models—that any stimulus

increasing the organism’s apprehension overfuture rewards or punishments should increase drivelevels—has received some support. When peoplefind themselves in evaluative situations, they tendto perform dominant rather than nondominantresponses (Seta et al., 1989). When, for example,individuals who were watched by an observer weretold that the observer was evaluating them, theirperformance improved, but only when they wereworking on a simple task (Bartis, Szymanski, &Harkins, 1988). When people who had alreadyfailed once tried the task a second time, they per-formed worse when others were present (Seta &Seta, 1995). Also, situational factors that decreaseevaluation apprehension, such as allowing for pri-vate responses, unevaluative audiences, and theabsence of a definable task that can be evaluated,often eliminate social facilitation effects (Henchy &Glass, 1968). Finally, individuals who are highlyconfident perform better when evaluated by others,whereas those who doubt their ability performbetter when alone (Sanna, 1992).

The presence of other people—even friends—also increases physiological reactivity if these friendsare evaluative. As noted earlier, people were morerelaxed when working on a task with a friendnearby. Their friend, however, was wearing ear-phones and could not evaluate the participant’sperformance (Kamarck et al., 1990). What wouldhappen if the friend was a potential source of eva-luation? When people are watched closely by afriend, they tend to show signs of physiologicalarousal rather than relaxation. In fact, people aremore relaxed when they are with their pets ratherthan with other people. Pets are an ideal source ofsocial support, for they provide reassurance throughtheir presence but they do not (we assume) evaluatetheir owner’s performance (Allen et al., 1991;Allen, Blascovich, & Mendes, 2002).

Other findings, though, do not support thisemphasis on evaluation. Even when the companionrefrains from attending to the individual in anyway, social facilitation still occurs (Berger, 1981;Platania & Moran, 2001). As Focus 10.1 notes,animals that likely lack the capacity to feel nervousor embarrassed—rats, armadillos, and roaches, for

evaluation apprehension theory An analysis of perfor-mance gains in groups arguing that individuals workingin the presence of others experience a general concernfor how these others are evaluating them, and that thisapprehension facilitates their performance on simple,well-learned tasks.self-presentation theory An analysis of performancegains in groups assuming that social facilitation is causedby individuals striving to make a good impression whenthey work in the presence of others.

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example—perform simple tasks better when othermembers of their species are present. Moreover,activities that involve little threat of evaluation,such as eating, drinking, or getting dressed, stillshow social facilitation effects.

Cognitive Processes Zajonc stressed drive levels,Cottrell underscored the importance of evaluation,but several cognitive theories have suggested thatthe presence of others changes people’s capacity toprocess information adequately. When people workin the presence of other people, they must splittheir attention between the task they are complet-ing and the other person (Guerin & Innes, 1982).The presence of an audience may also increaseindividuals’ self-awareness, and as a result, theymay focus their attention on themselves and failto pay sufficient attention to the task (Mullen &Baumeister, 1987).

Distractions, however, do not inevitably under-mine performance. Distraction-conflict theorysuggests that distraction interferes with the attentiongiven to the task, but that these distractions can beovercome with effort. Therefore, on simple tasksthat require dominant responses, the interferenceeffects are inconsequential compared with the im-provement that results from concentrating on thetask, so performance is facilitated. On more com-plex tasks, the increase in drive is insufficient tooffset the effects of distraction, and performance istherefore impaired (Baron, 1986; Sanders, Baron, &Moore, 1978).

Clearly, people are a distraction—the stories ofthe interpersonal dramas, the sexual intrigue, thedrug abuse, and the playful shenanigans of theSNL group as they worked and played togethermake one wonder how they managed to get any-thing accomplished. But, oddly enough, if peopleare working in the presence of other people and

those people are not at all distracting, then socialfacilitation does not occur even when tasks are sim-ple ones (Bond et al., 1996; Sanders et al., 1978).Distractions have also been shown to improve per-formance on certain tasks, such as the Stroop Task.In the Stroop task, participants are shown a colorname (e.g., Red, Blue) printed in a primary color(such as red or blue) and asked to name the color ofthe ink. For example, if the word Red is printed inblue ink, the participant should answer blue. Whenthe ink and the color word match, people have noproblems. But when the ink and the color wordare incongruent, reaction time and errors increase.These errors, however, decrease when individualscomplete the task with others. The presence ofothers may work by helping people narrow theirfocus of attention, and thereby filter out the dis-tracting color name cue (Huguet et al., 1999).The effect may also be due to the (a) extra cognitivedemands imposed on participants by the presence ofthe observer and the need to evaluate the task itself(Klauer, Herfordt, Voss, 2008), or (b) increased at-tentional focusing on the task that is triggered by athreat of self-evaluation (Muller & Butera, 2007).

Personality Processes Alan Zwiebel, one of theSNL writers, talks of how he was so intimidated bythe pressure of the talented group that he hidbehind a potted plant during the first writing sessionuntil Gilda Radner coaxed him out. In contrast,Chevy Chase and writer Michael O’Donoghuethrived under the pressure; they accepted the chal-lenge of the evaluation and it motivated them towork even harder.

Social orientation theory suggests that peo-ple differ in their overall orientation towards socialsituations, and these individual differences in socialorientation predict who will show facilitation in thepresence of others and who will show impairment.

distraction-conflict theory An analysis of performancegains in groups assuming that when others are present,attention is divided between the other people and thetask; this attentional conflict increases motivation, andso it facilitates performance on simple, well-learned tasks.

social orientation theory An analysis of performancegains in groups suggesting individual differences in socialorientation (the tendency to approach social situationsapprehensively or with enthusiasm) predict when socialfacilitation will occur.

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According to this theory, individuals who display apositive orientation are so self-confident that they re-act positively to the challenge the group may throwtheir way; for them, there is “safety in numbers.”Others, in contrast, display a negative orientation. Theyapproach social situations apprehensively, for theyfeel inhibited and threatened by other people.People may be capable of adopting either orientationin a given situation, but people tend to be disposi-tionally either positive or negative in their orienta-tions. Some people, like Chase, are naturally positivein their orientation toward tasks. Others, likeZwiebel, possess personality traits that prompt themto be more negative, such as low self-esteem, self-consciousness, and anxiety. A meta-analysis of previ-ous studies of social facilitation, focusing on onlythose studies that included measures that might beindicators of participants’ degree of positive or negative

orientation, supported the theory. Individuals withqualities that suggested their social orientation waspositive usually showed social facilitation effects,whereas those with a negative orientation showeda social interference effect (Uziel, 2007).

Conclusions and Applications

Social facilitation occurs because humans, as socialbeings, respond in predictable ways when joined byother members of their species (see Table 10.3).Some of these reactions, as Zajonc suggested, arevery basic ones, for the mere presence of otherpeople elevates drive levels. But arousal becomesmore substantial when group members realize thatthe people around them are evaluating themand might form a negative impression of them ifthey perform badly. Cognitive and personality

T A B L E 10.3 Four General Explanations of Social Facilitation

Theory Mediating Process Evidence

Drive theory(Zajonc, 1965)

Unlearned drive: The mere presenceof others elevates drive levels; thisdrive triggers social facilitation whentasks are so easy that only dominantresponses are needed to performthem.

■ People show signs of physiological arousalwhen others are present

■ Many species perform basic tasks more effi-ciently in the presence of other speciesmembers

■ Facilitative arousal occurs primarily for simpletasks

Evaluation appre-hension theory(Cottrell, 1972)

Motivational process: Throughexperience, people learn to associatethe presence of others with evalua-tion; this concern for evaluationfacilitates performance on well-learned tasks.

■ The presence of others is facilitative onlywhen the observers can evaluate the qualityof the performance

■ Facilitative effects are strongest when indivi-duals are striving to make a good impression

Distraction-conflicttheory (Baron, 1986;Sanders, 1981)

Cognitive process: When others arepresent, attention is divided betweenthe other people and the task;attentional conflict increases motiva-tion, which facilitates performance solong as the task is a simple one.

■ Recall is poorer when stimulus is presented inpresence of others, suggesting others aredistracting

■ Facilitation is reduced if the others in the sit-uation are not noticed

■ Presence of others improves performance oninterference tasks (e.g., the Stroop Task)

Social orientationtheory (Uziel, 2007)

Personality process: Individuals whodisplay a positive interpersonalorientation are more likely to displaysocial facilitation effects.

■ Presence of others improves performanceamong individuals with high self-esteem andlow anxiety

■ Those with an attention-seeking tendency(exhibitionism) perform better than self-conscious individuals in coaction settings

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mechanisms that govern how individuals processinformation and monitor the environment alsocome into play when people work in the presenceof others. As the following examples and Focus10.2 illustrate, these physiological, motivational,cognitive, and personality processes influence groupmembers’ reactions across a wide range of perfor-mance settings.

Prejudice and Social Facilitation Prejudices aredeeply ingrained negative attitudes about themembers of other groups. Such prejudices as racismand sexism are increasingly recognized as unfairand socially inappropriate, so individuals who areprejudiced often try to keep their prejudices to

themselves to avoid being labeled a racist or sexist(Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993). But preju-dice is often a well-learned, dominant response; so,ironically, the presence of other people may leadindividuals to express even more biased opinionswhen they are in public rather than in private.The presence of others may work to facilitate pre-judice, rather than keep it in check (Lambert et al.,1996; Lambert et al., 2003).

Electronic Performance Monitoring (EPM) So-cial facilitation is not limited to face-to-face, or col-located, group settings. The presence of others ina virtual sense—made possible when people joinwith others via computers, telephones, or other

F o c u s 10.2 Are Groups Good for the Appetite?

A good meal tastes better if we eat it in the companyof friends.

—Harry F. Harlow (1932, p. 211)

One of the most ubiquitous of all groups is the onethat eats. At breakfast, lunch, dinner, feasts, fêtes, andsnack time, people gather to consume nutrition as agroup. Most people report that they prefer to eat withothers rather than dine alone (Clendenen et al., 1994).A shared meal, however, is a complex interpersonalevent that sets the stage for social facilitation. Whenresearchers ask people to keep track of how much theyeat and whom they eat with, they usually find thatpeople eat more—sometimes 40% to 50% more—when they dine in groups (e.g., de Castro et al., 1997;Patel & Schlundt, 2001). As meals eaten by groups arelonger in duration than the ones eaten by solo indivi-duals, people have more opportunity to keep eatingwhen in groups than alone. Watching someone elseeat also increases social imitation of the eating re-sponse. When the participants in one study witnessedanother person eating 20 soda crackers, they ate farmore crackers themselves than did participants whosaw someone eat only one (Nisbett & Storms, 1974).People even seem to prepare relatively larger portionsfor meals to be eaten in groups than individually, as ifthey anticipate that the group members will be able toconsume more than they would if alone. So long as thegroup does not include a substantial portion of dieters,

the group may continue to eat until all the availablefood is consumed. Solitary eaters are more likely to eatonly until they are sated (Herman, Roth, & Polivy,2003). In general, larger groups trigger greaterincreases in eating, although at a decreasing rate,similar to response patterns suggested by socialimpact theory (Latané, 1981).

Groups do not always facilitate eating, however.Women who are introverted and anxious are less likelyto be motivated to eat in groups; in fact, they aremore likely to display symptoms of eating disorders,such as bulimia (Miller et al., 2006). The socialfacilitation of eating is weak when co-eaters arestrangers or disliked, and strongest when people dinewith families and friends. Social facilitation of eating isalso limited to coaction rather than audience situa-tions. People eat more when others with them areeating, but they tend to eat less when the otherpeople who are present are observing them. Oneexplanation for the inhibiting impact of others oneating suggests that the observers may trigger exces-sive evaluation apprehension, so individuals mayreduce their consumption because they expect thatobservers will not think well of them if they eat toomuch. Diners may also engage in social comparison asthey eat, for only by comparing their own consumptionamounts to those of others at the table can theydetermine if they are eating too much or too little(Herman et al., 2003).

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communication systems—can also enhance perfor-mance on simple tasks but undermine performanceon complicated ones. John Aiello, for example,drew on studies of social facilitation in his analysesof electronic performance monitoring, orEPM. Many businesses can now track the perfor-mance of their employees throughout the workdaywith computer information networks. Whenworkers use their computer to enter data, commu-nicate with one another, or search databases forstored information, their activity can be monitoredautomatically. Does EPM enhance performance, ordoes it create so much evaluation anxiety that per-formance suffers? Aiello found that EPM may en-hance employees’ productivity, but in ways that areconsistent with social facilitation effects. He studiedpeople working on a data entry task. Some werealone, some were working with others, and somewere members of a cohesive group. Aiello discov-ered that EPM enhanced the performance of highlyskilled workers, but interfered with the perfor-mance of less skilled participants. Monitoring alsoincreased workers’ feeling of stress, except amongthose who were part of a cohesive work group(Aiello & Kolb, 1995). Individuals responded morepositively to monitoring when they believed thatthey could turn off the monitoring and that onlytheir job-related activities were being monitored, aswell as when they had the opportunity to partici-pate in decisions about the use of the monitoringsystem (Alge, 2001; Douthitt & Aiello, 2001).

Social Facilitation in Educational SettingsGroups are used in a variety of ways in educationalsettings (small seminars, group discussions, problem-based learning teams, etc.), but perhaps the mostcommon of all educational collectives is the studygroup. Unlike groups created and monitored by

the instructor, study groups are self-organized andself-directive, for they are formed by studentsthemselves for the purpose of studying coursematerial.

“Join a study group” is the advice often given tocollege students who are struggling in their classes,but do study groups fulfill their promise? Studygroups offermembers some advantages over studyingalone. Some groups enhance members’ motivationand help students stay focused on their academic goals(Gillies, 2007). Moreover, if students receive usefulinstruction from other groupmembers, then studentswho are members of study groups outperform stu-dents who do not study in groups (Webb, Troper, &Fall, 1995). Students who are committed to theirgroups and value the learning experiences they pro-vide generally outperform students who react nega-tively to such groups (Freeman, 1996).

Study group, however, may inhibit the acqui-sition of new concepts and skills. The presence ofothers can be distracting, and during the early phasesof learning, this distraction can interfere with learn-ing. The presence of other people also interfereswith overt and covert practicing. When the partici-pants in one project needed to learn a list of words,they were too embarrassed to rehearse the materialby saying it aloud, and their performance suffered(Berger et al., 1981). Studies of athletes acquiringnew skills, of students learning a second language,and of clinicians developing their therapeutic skillshave indicated that learning proceeds more rapidly,at least initially, when learners work alone (Berger etal., 1982; Ferris & Rowland, 1983; MacCracken &Stadulis, 1985; Schauer, Seymour, & Geen, 1985).Once they have learned their skills, however, peopleshould perform with others present if possible(Utman, 1997). Zajonc suggested the student

study all alone, preferably in an isolated cubicle,and arrange to take his examinations in thecompany of many other students, on stage,and in the presence of a large audience. Theresults of his examination would be beyondhis wildest expectations, provided, of course,he had learned his material quite thoroughly.(Zajonc, 1965, p. 274)

electronic performance monitoring (EPM) The useof information technologies, such as computer networks,to track, analyze, and report information about workers’performance.study group A self-organized, self-directive groupformed by students for the purpose of studying coursematerial.

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PROCESS LOSSES IN GROUPS

The SNL writers and actors were very productive,but given their level of talent and comedic genius,did they reach their full potential? Some of the groupmembers, when asked about their experiences, re-called that some of the writers and actors did notpull their weight. One writer, for example, felt thathe and a few others were “coming up with the showalmost every week,”while the others “were hopeless.They did nothing.” Another admitted that he did notdo all that much writing for the show because he wasmore interested in the music: “I spent a lot of timewith the SNL band” instead of working, he explained(Shales & Miller, 2002, p. 214, 215).

Why might people working on group tasks failto be as productive as they could be? Ivan Steiner(1972), in his classic work Group Process andProductivity, drew on the concept of process lossesto provide an answer. Steiner recognized that groupshave great potential, for their resources, expertise,and abilities outstrip those of any single individual.But Steiner also realized that groups rarely reachtheir full potential because a variety of interpersonalprocesses detracts from their overall proficiency. His“law” of group productivity predicts that

Actual productivity = Potential productivity– Losses owing to faulty processes

Thus, even when a group includes skilled memberswho possess all the resources they need to accom-plish their tasks, faulty group processes may preventthem from succeeding. When process losses prolif-erate, the group’s chance to become greater thanthe sum of its parts dwindles.

The Ringelmann Effect

Max Ringelmann (1913), a 19th-century Frenchagricultural engineer, was one of the first research-

ers to study the relationship between process lossand group productivity. Ringelmann’s questionswere practical ones: How many oxen should beyoked in one team? Should you plow a field withtwo horses or three? Can five men turn a mill crankfaster than four? But Ringelmann, instead of spec-ulating about the answers to these questions, set upteams of varying sizes and measured their collectivepower.

Ringelmann’s most startling discovery wasthat workers—and that includes horses, oxen, andmen—all become less productive in groups. Agroup of five writers developing funny skits caneasily outperform a single person, just as a teampulling a rope is stronger than a single opponentor an audience applauding makes more noise thanan individual. But even though a group outper-forms an individual, the group does not usuallywork at maximum efficiency. When Ringelmannhad individuals and groups pull on a rope attachedto a pressure gauge, groups performed below theirtheoretical capabilities (Steiner, 1972). If person Aand person B could each pull 100 units when theyworked alone, could they pull 200 units when theypooled their efforts? No, their output reached only186. A three-person group did not produce 300units, but only 255. An eight-person group man-aged only 392, not 800. Groups certainly outper-formed individuals—but as more and more peoplewere added, the group became increasingly ineffi-cient (see Figure 10.2). To honor its discoverer,this tendency for groups to become less productiveas group size increases is now known as theRingelmann effect (Kravitz & Martin, 1986, pre-sent an excellent summary and interpretation ofRingelmann’s work.)

Ringelmann identified two key sources ofprocess losses when people worked together. First,Ringelmann believed some of the decline in

process loss Reduction in performance effectiveness orefficiency caused by actions, operations, or dynamics thatprevent the group from reaching its full potential, in-cluding reduced effort, faulty group processes, coordina-tion problems, and ineffective leadership.

Ringelmann effect The tendency, first documented byMax Ringelmann, for people to become less productivewhen they work with others; this loss of efficiency in-creases as group size increases, but at a gradually decreas-ing rate.

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productivity was caused by motivation losses: peoplemay not work so hard when they are in groups.Second, coordination losses, caused by “the lack ofsimultaneity of their efforts” (Ringelmann, 1913,p. 9), also interfere with performance. Even on asimple task, such as rope pulling, people tend topull and pause at different times, resulting in a fail-ure to reach their full productive potential. Inthe next section, we consider the role these twoprocesses—loss of motivation and coordinationproblems—play in preventing groups from reachingtheir full potential.

Motivation Loss: Social Loafing

Ringelmann documented what others had noticed:People sometimes do not work as hard as theycould when they are part of a group. After watch-ing a group of prisoners turning the crank of a flourmill, for example, he noted that their performancewas “mediocre because after only a little while,each man, trusting in his neighbor to furnish thedesired effort, contented himself by merely follow-ing the movement of the crank, and sometimeseven let himself be carried along by it” (p. 10; trans-lation from Kravitz & Martin, 1986, p. 938). This

reduction of effort by individuals working in groupsis known as social loafing (Williams, Harkins, &Latané, 1981).

People carrying out all sorts of physical andmental tasks—including brainstorming, evaluatingemployees, monitoring equipment, interpreting in-structions, and formulating causal judgments—havebeen shown to exert less effort when they combinetheir efforts in a group situation. Even worse, loaf-ing seems to go unrecognized by group members.When people in groups are asked if they are work-ing as hard as they can, they generally claim thatthey are doing their best, even though the objectiveevidence indicates that they are loafing. Evidently,people are not aware that they are loafing, or theyare simply unwilling to admit it (Karau & Williams,1993).

Bibb Latané, Kipling Williams, and StephenHarkins examined social loafing by studying groupsperforming an extremely easy task: making noise.They told the men who participated that they

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F I G U R E 10.2 The Ringelmann effect. Ringelmann (1913) recorded how much work single individuals didas well as the output of groups ranging in size from two to eight members. If a group’s performance was basedstrictly on members’ individual efforts, then a two-person group could produce 200 units, a three-person group couldproduce 300 units, and so on. Ringelmann found much less productivity. The means for his groups were 186, 255,308, 350, 378, 392, and 392.

SOURCE: Based on data presented in Group Processes and Productivity by I.D. Steiner. © 1972 by Academic Press

social loafing The reduction of individual effort exertedwhen people work in groups compared to when theywork alone.

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were researching “the effects of sensory feedbackon the production of sound in social groups,” andthat all they needed to do was to cheer as loudly asthey could. They asked the participants to wearblindfolds and headsets, so their performance wouldnot be influenced by “the effects of sensory feed-back” (1979, p. 824). They then asked participantsto shout as loudly as they could while the headsetsplayed a stream of loud noise. Consistent with theRingelmann effect, groups of participants made morenoise than individuals, but groups failed to reachtheir potential. When the participants were testedalone, they averaged a rousing 9.22 dynes/cm2 (aboutas loud as a pneumatic drill). In dyads, each participantshouted at only 66% of capacity, and in six-persongroups, at 36%. This drop in productivity is chartedin Figure 10.3 (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979,Experiment 2, p. 826; see also Harkins, Latané, &Williams, 1980; Williams et al., 1981).

But how much was this drop in productivitydue to social loafing and how much due to coordi-nation problems? Latané and his colleagues sepa-rated out these sources of process loss by testingnoise production in “pseudogroups.” In these con-ditions, participants were led to believe that eitherone other participant or five other participants were

shouting with them, but in actuality, they wereworking alone. (The blindfolds and headsets madethis deception possible.) Thus, any loss of produc-tion obtained in these pseudogroup conditionscould not be due to coordination problems, be-cause there were no other group members shout-ing. Instead, any decline in production couldonly be blamed on the reduced effort broughtabout by social loafing. As Figure 10.3 indicates,when participants thought that one other personwas working with them, they shouted only 82%as intensely, and if they thought that five otherpersons were shouting, they reached only 74% oftheir capacity. These findings suggest that even ifwork groups are so well organized that virtuallyall losses due to faulty coordination are eliminated,individual productivity might still be below parbecause of social loafing.

Causes of and Cures for Social Loafing

Many of the members of SNL never loafed. DanAykroyd, Lorne Michaels, and Rosie Shuster, forexample, worked very long days and took on avariety of tasks to make certain that the group’s

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F I G U R E 10.3 Social loafing and coordination losses in groups. Latané and his colleagues disentangled the twomajor causes of productivity losses in groups working on additive tasks by leading people to think they were workingin groups when they actually were not. The people in these "groups" (labeled the "pseudogroups") suffered frommotivation loss, but not from coordination loss since they were actually working alone. The unshaded portion repre-sents motivation loss (social loafing), and the lightly shaded portion represents coordination loss. They combine tocreate the Ringelmann effect.

SOURCE: Adapted from “Many hands make light the work: The causes and consequences of social loafing: by B. Latané, K. Williams, & S. Harkins, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 37, 1979.

PERFORMANCE 295

performances would be successful. For every slackgroup member—workers leaning on their shovelsinstead of digging with them, meetings that de-generate into gabfests, task forces that perform notasks—there are those who strive to reach new levelsof efficiency and productivity. So what can be doneto reduce the level of social loafing in a group?

Increase Identifiability Studies of social loafingsuggest that people are less productive when theywork with others. But studies of social facilitation,discussed earlier in this chapter, find that people aremore productive when others are present (at leastwhen the task is easy). Which is it?

Both. When people feel as though their levelof effort cannot be ascertained because the task is acollective one, then social loafing becomes likely.But when people feel that they are being evaluated,they tend to exert more effort, and their productiv-ity increases. If the task is an individualistic one, andis easy, the presence of other people increases eva-luation apprehension, so social facilitation occurs.But when group members are anonymous, andtheir contributions are unidentifiable, the presenceof others reduces evaluation apprehension, and socialloafing becomes more likely (Arterberry, Cain, &Chopko, 2007; Harkins & Szymanski, 1987, 1988;Jackson & Latané, 1981).

Researchers illustrated the importance of eval-uation by asking the members of a four-persongroup to generate as many ideas as possible for acommon object. The participants did not discusstheir ideas out loud but simply wrote them on slipsof paper. Some of the participants thought thattheir ideas were individually identifiable, whereasothers thought that their ideas were being collectedin a common pool. Moreover, some participantsbelieved that everyone was devising uses for thesame object, but others thought that each groupmember was working with a different object. Inthis study, loafing occurred not only when ideaswere pooled, but also when the participants be-lieved that their individual outputs were not com-parable or could not be evaluated (Harkins &Jackson, 1985). When each individual member’soutput was identifiable, on the other hand, loafing

was virtually eliminated (Hardy & Latané, 1986;Kerr & Bruun, 1981; Sanna, 1992; Williams et al.,1981).

Minimize Free Riding Thousands of people lis-ten to public radio without making a contributionwhen the radio asks for donations. Some audiencemembers do not clap during the call for an encorebecause they know their applause will not bemissed. Many students avoid group projects wherethe entire group receives the same grade, becauseinevitably one or more members of the group willnot do their share of the work (Hoffman &Rogelberg, 2001).

All these situations invite free riding—members doing less than their share of the workbecause others will make up for their slack.Although norms of fairness warn members to dotheir part, if they feel that the group does notneed them or their contribution, they will betempted to free-ride. When group members thinkthat they are an indispensable part of the group—perhaps because their contribution is unique oressential for the group’s success—they work harder(Kerr & Bruun, 1983). They also free-ride less insmaller groups, because each person plays a largerrole in determining the group’s outcomes (Kamedaet al., 1992). But free riding sometimes increaseswhen members become suspicious of the level ofeffort being invested by the other group members.Rather than looking like a “sucker” by workingharder than the others, group members reduce theirefforts to match the level that they think othergroup members are expending. This sucker effectis strongest when they feel that their fellow groupmembers are competent but lazy (Hart, Bridgett, &Karau, 2001).

free riding Contributing less to a collective task whenone believes that other group members will compensatefor this lack of effort.sucker effect The tendency for individuals to contributeless to a group endeavor when they expect that otherswill think negatively of someone who works too hard orcontributes too much (considering them to be a“sucker”).

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Set Goals Groups that set clear, challenging goalsoutperform groups whose members have lost sightof their objectives. When truck drivers who hauledlogs from the woods to the mill were initially toldto do their best when loading the logs, the menonly carried about 60% of what they could legallyhaul (Latham & Baldes, 1975). When the driverswere later encouraged to reach a goal of 94% ofthe legal limit, they increased their efficiency andmet this specific goal. In a study of groups generat-ing ideas, members were more productive whenthey had a clear standard by which to evaluate thequality of their own work and the group’s work(Harkins & Szymanski, 1989). Other research hassuggested that clear goals stimulate a number ofproduction-enhancing processes, including increasesin effort, better planning, more accurate monitor-ing of the quality of the group’s work, and in-creased commitment to the group (Weldon,Jehn, & Pradhan, 1991). The group’s goals shouldalso be challenging rather than too easily attained.The advantages of working in a group are lost ifthe task is so easy that it can be accomplished evenif the group loafs, so care should be taken to setthe standards high—but not so high that they areunattainable (Hinsz, 1995; Latham & Locke, 2007;Weldon & Weingart, 1993).

Increase Involvement Loafing is less likely whenpeople are involved in their work. Those who en-joy working with other people in groups, becausethey value both the group experience and the re-sults they achieve, are less likely to loaf compared toless group- and achievement-oriented individuals(Stark, Shaw, & Duffy, 2007). So long as the com-petition remains “friendly,” group members maypersevere with much greater intensity when theyare vying with others in the group for the best score(Hinsz, 2005). Challenging, difficult tasks reduceloafing, but so do ones that will determine groupmembers’ personal outcomes—either by reward orby punishment (Brickner, Harkins, & Ostrom,1986; Shepperd, 1993, 1995; Shepperd & Wright,1989). Social loafing is also reduced when rewardsfor successful performance are group-based ratherthan individually based—so long as the group is not

too large in size (DeMatteo, Eby, & Sundstrom,1998) and the reward is divided nearly equally amongall the group members (Honeywell-Johnson &Dickinson, 1999; Liden et al., 2004).

Involvement may even prompt group mem-bers to compensate for the expected failures or in-competencies of their fellow group members byexpending extra effort. Kipling Williams andSteven Karau (1991) documented social compen-sation by convincing individuals that their group’stask was a meaningful one, but that the motivationof other group members was in doubt (apparentlybecause one of the other experimenters consideredthe research topic to be boring). Participants werealso led to expect that their partners were eitherskilled or unskilled at the task. Williams andKarau discovered that group members workedhardest when the task was meaningful and themembers believed that their coworkers’ abilitywas minimal. A field study of loafing in a classroomsetting even suggests that a high level of involve-ment may trump the sucker effect. If students’grades were on the line, when they discoveredthat one of their group members was a loafer theytended to work harder themselves, rather than re-ducing their own effort to look less like a sucker(Liden et al., 2004).

Increase Identification with the Group Socialidentity theory also suggests a way to reduce loaf-ing: increase the extent to which group membersidentify with their group (Haslam, 2004). Many ofthe writers and actors in the SNL team had gravedoubts about the project, because American televi-sion was known more for conformity than for cre-ative innovation. However, as their misgivings wereanswered by the show’s popularity, they came totake considerable pride in their membership inthis very elite group of entertainers.

social compensation The tendency for group membersto expend greater effort on important collective tasks tooffset the anticipated insufficiencies in the efforts andabilities of their co-members.

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Social identity theory suggests that the differ-ence between a hard-working group and a loafinggroup is the match between the group’s tasks and itsmembers’ self-definitions. If people are working to-gether, but the group and its tasks have no meaningto them, they care very little if their group succeedsor fails. But when individuals derive their sense ofself and identity from their membership in thegroup, then social loafing is replaced by social laboringas members expend extra effort for their group.Individuals sometimes work hard when they think,“This task is important to me,” but they are likelyto work even harder when they think, “This task isimportant to us” (Haslam, 2004; cf. Gockel et al.,2008).

TheCollectiveEffortModel Karau and Williams’s(1993, 2001) collective effort model (CEM)provides a comprehensive theoretical frameworkfor understanding the causes and cures of social loaf-ing. Drawing on classic expectancy-value theories ofmotivation, they suggested that two factors deter-mine group members’ level of motivation: theirexpectations about reaching a goal and the valueof that goal. Motivation is greatest when peoplethink that the goal is within their reach (expecta-tions are high) and they consider the goal to bevaluable. Motivation diminishes if expectations arelow or individuals do not value the goal. Workingin a group, unfortunately, can diminish both expec-tations about reaching a goal and the value that isplaced on that goal. In groups, the link betweenour effort and the chance of success is ambiguous.Even if we work hard, others may not, and thegroup may fail. Moreover, even if the group doessucceed, we personally may not benefit much fromthe group’s good performance. Earning a good gradeon a project completed by a group may not be assatisfying as earning a good grade on a project thatwe complet working on our own.

Karau and Williams tested the CEM’s basic pre-dictions in a meta-analysis. Their review of 78 studiessupported their basic theoretical contention that loaf-ing is reduced if individuals’ expectations for successare high and they feel that the goal they are seeking is avaluable one. They also identified a number of otherconsistencies that emerged across studies. For exam-ple, loafing was greater among men than women, inWestern countries compared to Eastern ones, and forsimple tasks rather than complex ones.

Coordination Problems in Groups

Groups, even though they tend to lose some oftheir productivity due to social loafing, usually out-perform individuals. A lone individual in a tug-of-war with a group will lose. Individuals racingeach other will run faster than they would if racingagainst the clock. A group taking a multiple-choicetest will probably get a higher score than an indi-vidual taking the same test. A single person will notwrite a sketch that is as funny as one cooked up by adozen writers. Two heads are better than one.

But howwell do groups performonmore complextasks that require high levels of member coordinationand collaboration? Companies and businesses mustmonitor, regulate, andorganize the activitiesofhundredsof employees. The members of sports teams must syn-chronize their actions if they are towin the game.Workcrewsmustplaneachactionas rawconstructionmaterialsare transformed into a finished building. Members oforchestras must learn their parts, but theymust also learnhow to perform their part in harmony with the otherorchestra members. Mountaineers can climb alone, butmost must work with others to reach the summit.

When individuals work by themselves their per-formance depends strictly on their personal resources,including their talents, skills, and effort. But whenindividuals join together to work in groups their per-formance depends on each individual’s resources plusthe interpersonal processes that determine how theseresources are combined. A group may have all theresources it needs to reach its objectives, but if it failsto coordinate its efforts and activities it may performpoorly. Two heads may be better than one, butsometimes too many cooks spoil the broth.

collective effort model (CEM) A theoretical explana-tion of group productivity developed by Steven Karauand Kipling Williams that traces losses of productivityin groups to diminished expectations about successfulgoal attainment and the diminished value of group goals.

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Steiner (1972) traced problems in coordinationback to one key source: the type of task the group isperforming. Some tasks, Steiner explained, requirehigh levels of coordinated activity on the part ofgroups and can only be completed when each groupmember provides his or her part of the puzzle. Othertasks, in contrast, do not require verymuch in thewayof coordinated action on the part of the group mem-bers; even if group members make little or no attemptto adapt their actions to match those of others thegroupwill still succeed.A groupworkingon an assem-bly line, for example, must combine members’ pro-ducts in ways that differ from the combination process

used by a team playing baseball or writers trying tocreate a comedy sketch for broadcast in three days.

Steiner called the combination processes dictatedby the problem or group activity the task demandsand suggested that they vary depending on the divisi-bility of the task, the type of output desired, and thecombination rules required to complete the task (seeTable 10.4).

T A B L E 10.4 A Summary of Steiner’s Taxonomy of Tasks

Question Task Type Qualities Examples

Component: Can the taskbe broken down into sub-tasks?

Divisible The task has subcomponentsthat can be identified andassigned to specific members

Playing a football gamePreparing a six-course meal

Unitary The task does not have sub-components

Pulling on a ropeReading a book

Quantity versus quality: Isquantity produced moreimportant than quality ofperformance?

Maximizing Quantity: The more producedthe better the performance

Generating many ideasLifting a great weightScoring the most goals

Optimizing Quality: A correct or optimalsolution is needed

Developing the best answerSolving a math problem

Interdependence: How areindividual inputs com-bined to yield a groupproduct?

Additive Individual inputs are addedtogether

Pulling a ropeShoveling snow

Compensatory A decision is made byaveraging together individualdecisions

Estimating a pig’s weight by askingthree people to guess and aver-aging their guessesAveraging ratings of job applicants

Disjunctive The group selects one solu-tion or product from a poolof members’ solutions orproducts

Picking one person’s answer to amath problem to be the group’sanswerLetting one art project representthe entire school

Conjunctive All group members mustcontribute to the product forit to be completed

Climbing a mountainEating a meal as a group

Discretionary The group decides howindividual inputs relate togroup product

Deciding to shovel snow togetherChoosing to vote on the bestanswer to a problem

SOURCE: Adapted from Group Processes and Productivity by I. D. Steiner. Copyright © 1972 by Academic Press.

task demands The effect that a problem or task’s fea-tures, including its divisibility and difficulty, have on theprocedures the group can use to complete the task.

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First, some tasks are divisible—they can be bro-ken down into subtasks that can be assigned to differ-ent members—whereas other tasks are unitary.Building a house, planting a large garden, or work-ing a series of math problems by assigning one to eachgroup member are all divisible tasks, because theentire task can be split into parts. Unitary tasks,however, cannot be divided: Only one painter isneeded for a small closet in a house, only one gar-dener can plant a single seed, and only one person isneeded to solve a simple math problem.

Second, some tasks call for a high rate of pro-duction (maximization), whereas others require ahigh-quality, correct outcome (optimization). Withmaximizing tasks, quantity is what counts. In arelay race, tug-of-war, or block-stacking problem,performance depends on sheer quantity; the em-phasis is on maximal production. For optimizingtasks, a good performance is the one that mostclosely matches a predetermined criterion. Examplesof optimizing tasks include estimating the number ofbeans in a jar or coming up with the best solution toa problem.

Third, members’ contributions to the grouptask can be combined in different ways. On an assem-bly line, for example, the members perform a spe-cific task repeatedly, and the product is finishedwhen each member has made his or her contribution.The members of a rock band, in contrast, all playand sing together, so each member’s contributionmust mesh with the other members’ contributions.Steiner (1972) describes five basic combinatorialstrategies: additive, compensatory, disjunctive, conjunc-tive, and discretionary.

Additive Tasks Additive tasks are divisible andmaximizing, for they require the summing togetherof individual group members’ inputs to maximizethe group product. In consequence, so long as eachgroup member can perform the simple, individual-istic task required—such as pulling on a rope,cheering at a football game, clapping after a con-cert, or raking leaves in a yard—the productivity ofthe group will probably exceed the productivity ofthe single individual. However, as studies of socialloafing have suggested, people in groups do notalways as work hard at additive tasks; as the sayinggoes, “many hands make light the work.”

Compensatory Tasks When groups attemptcompensatory tasks, the members must averagetheir individual judgments or solutions together toyield the group’s outcome. A group may not wantto meet in a face-to-face meeting, for example, somembers submit their votes to the chair, who talliesthem up to reach a conclusion (Lorge et al., 1958).

Legendary 19th-century polymath FrancisGalton was surprised by the accuracy of groupswhen making compensatory decisions. Knownfor his studies of intelligence, Galton questionedwhether a group could possibly make more accu-rate judgments than an expert. He had the oppor-tunity to test his hypothesis when came across a“Guess the weight of an Ox” contest at a localfair. Each contestant estimated the ox’s weight,and the person who came closest to the ox’s actualweight won a prize. Galton took the estimateshome and examined them, expecting that thecrowd would be far off the mark. Yet, the weightof the ox was 1,198 pounds, and the average of thejudgments of the 800 contestants was 1,197, con-firming the “wisdom of the crowd” (Surowiecki,2004). Some people overestimated the ox’s weight,

divisible task A task that can be broken down into sub-components that can then be assigned to individuals or tosubgroups within the group.unitary task A task that cannot be performed piecemealbecause it does not break down into any subcomponents.maximizing task A task or project that calls for a highrate of production.optimizing task A task or project that has a best solu-tion and outcome, thus the quality of the group’s perfor-mance can be judged by comparing the product to aquality-defining standard.

additive task A task or project that a group can com-plete by cumulatively combining individual members’inputs.compensatory task A task or project that a group cancomplete by literally averaging together (mathematicallycombining) individual members’ solutions or recom-mendations.

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but others underestimated, so the “group” judg-ment, which was an average of all the estimatesoffered, was more accurate than the judgmentsmade by experts and by most of the individuals(Shaw, 1981).

The compensatory method owes its advantagesto its relative immunity to group process loss. Inface-to-face groups, those who are well-respectedby the group—but not necessarily any better in-formed—often sway the group’s decision. Theydo not when groups work on compensatory tasks.Because the group members make their judgmentsindependently of others, conformity pressures donot influence their responses. The method doesnot work so well, however, if members are unin-terested in the issue and they have so little informa-tion that they are merely guessing. The increasedaccuracy of compensatory methods springs morefrom the use of multiple judgments than from thegreater accuracy of groups per se. When single in-dividuals make multiple estimates, and their esti-mates are averaged, their judgments are also moreaccurate (Stoop, 1932). The method also requires alarge enough number of judgments to compensatefor the extreme judgments.

Disjunctive Tasks When groups work at dis-junctive tasks, they must generate a single solutionthat will stand as the group’s outcome. Juries mak-ing decisions about guilt or innocence, computertechnicians deciding which program bug to fix first,or the coaching staff setting the lineup for the day’sgame, are all performing disjunctive tasks. Thesetypes of tasks tend to be both unitary and optimiz-ing, for they cannot be broken down into subtasks,and they require a high-quality or correct solutionrather than a large quantity of product.

Disjunctive tasks often require discussion anddecision, and Chapter 11 provides a more detailedanalysis of how groups tackle such tasks. In general,however, groups perform disjunctive tasks betterthan most of the individual members. For example,

if four students complete a quiz as a group, thegroup will likely outscore most of the individualstudents, because more heads means more informa-tion and better detection of errors. If the studentswould have gotten 70%, 80%, 80%, and 90% whentested as individuals, the group will likely score atleast 80%.

The group may even score 90% if it accepts therecommendations of its highest scoring member. Insome cases, once someone in the group mentionsthe correct answer, the group adopts it as the groupsolution—a truth-wins rule. Sometimes, however,the group rejects the correct answer. Rosa may becertain that the answer to the question, “Who firstdocumented the reduction of individual productiv-ity when in groups?” is “Ringelmann,” but hergroup may not accept her solution, because theydoubt her skills or because someone of higher statusmay propose a different solution. Ringelmann is thecorrect answer, but this truth will not win out overerror unless someone in the group supports Rosaand her answer—a truth-supported-wins rule.

The truth-wins rule usually holds for groupsworking on Eureka problems, whereas the truth-supported-wins rule holds for groups working onnon-Eureka problems. When we are told the answer toa Eureka problem, we are very certain that the answeroffered is correct. It fits so well, we react with an“Aha!” or “Eureka!” The answers to non-Eureka pro-blems, in contrast, are not so satisfying. Even afterarguing about them, we often wonder if the recom-mended answer is the correct one. Consider, forexample, the famous horse-trading problem:

A man bought a horse for $60 and sold itfor $70. Then he bought it back for $80and again sold it for $90. How muchmoney did he make in the horse-tradingbusiness? (Maier & Solem, 1952, p. 281)

When 67 groups discussed this problem, manyincluded a member who knew the correct answer,but many of these groups nonetheless adopted thewrong solution. In this case, truth lost becauseknowledgeable members had a difficult time per-suading the other members to adopt their solutions.In fact, some people later changed their answers to

disjunctive task A task or project that is completedwhen a single solution, decision, or recommendation isadopted by the group.

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match the incorrect solution advocated by theirgroups (Maier & Solem, 1952; the answer, by theway, is $20). Thus, groups perform at the level ofthe best member of the group only if (1) the mem-ber who knows the answer shares his or her answerwith the others and (2) the group adopts this answeras the group’s solution (Davis, 1973; Littlepage,1991; Steiner, 1972).

Patrick Laughlin (1980) draws a similar distinc-tion between intellective and judgmental tasks.Intellective tasks, like some Eureka tasks, yield solu-tions that can be objectively reviewed and judgedas right or wrong. They have a demonstrably correctsolution. Judgmental tasks, in contrast, require eval-uative judgments for which no correct answer can beauthoritatively determined. Logic and math prob-lems are intellective tasks, whereas a jury’s decisionin a trial or the question “Is a sketch about people withcone-shapedheads very funny?”wouldbe judgmentaltasks. As tasks move along the continuum from clearlyintellective to clearly judgmental, the superiority ofgroups relative to individual also changes: Groups aremore clearly superior when performing intellectivetasks than when performing judgmental tasks(Bonner & Baumann, 2008; Laughlin, Bonner, &Miner, 2002; Laughlin et al., 2003).

These studies suggest that groups perform verywell on intellective tasks, but can a group outper-form even the best member of the group? If stu-dents score 70%, 80%, 80%, and 90% individually,can they, through discussion, manage to score aperfect 100% when tested as a group? As Focus 10.3notes, such synergistic effects are very rare in groups.

Conjunctive Tasks On most tasks the group’sperformance results from some combination of allthe group members’ efforts. For conjunctive tasks,

however, the group’s overall performance is deter-mined by the most inferior group member (theIGM): the proverbial “weakest link,” who deter-mines the strength of the entire group.

The hosts on SNL were often the show’sweakest link. From its inception, SNL featured aguest host who worked with the cast and writersthroughout the week, learning an opening mono-logue, rehearsing their part in the skits, and evenjoining in the writing. Some of these hosts werecomics themselves, and so were experienced in thefluid creativity the show required of its performers.Others, though, never adapted to the demands ofthe program, and when that happened, they draggeddown the show with their awkward (or sloppy, in-competent, drunken, or drug-addled) performances.Portions of the performance might succeed, butsketches with the host were always risky.

Because such conjunctive tasks are not finisheduntil all members of the group complete their por-tion of the job, the speed and quality of the workdepends on the group’s least skilled member. Thespeed of a group of mountain climbers movingup the slope is determined by its slowest member.The trucks in a convoy can move no faster thanthe slowest vehicle. Because of this coordinationproblem, groups often take steps to improve theirproficiency on conjunctive tasks. If the conjunctivetasks are divisible, then the group can assign groupmembers to the subcomponents that best match theirskill levels. If the least competent member is matchedwith the easiest task, a more satisfying level of perfor-mance may be obtainable. If the least competentmember is matched with a difficult subtask, groupperformance will, of course, decline still further(see Steiner, 1972, Chapter 3, for a detailed reviewof group performance on divisible tasks).

Few group members relish the role of thegroup’s IGM so they often respond to this indignityby expending more effort than they would if theywere working alone—a rare group motivation gainrather than loss. This tendency is known as the

intellective task A project, problem, or other type oftask with results that can be evaluated objectively usingsome normative criterion, such as a mathematics problemwith a known solution or the spelling of a word.judgmental task A project, problem, or other type oftask with results that cannot be evaluated objectively be-cause there are no clear criteria to judge them against.

conjunctive task A task that can be completed success-fully only if all group members contribute.

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Köhler effect, after Otto Kohler, the researcherwho first documented the performance gains of

weaker individuals striving to keep up with theaccomplishments of others in the group (Köhler,1926; Witte, 1989).

Norbert Kerr and his colleagues (2007) studiedthe Köhler effect by arranging for women to com-plete a simple weight-lifting task. They were told tohold a three-pound dumbbell horizontally for aslong as they could. When they lowered the weightit would break a trip wire monitored by a laboratorycomputer, and the trial would end. The longer theyheld the weight, the more money they could possi-bly earn at the end of the study. They completed thistask four times, with both their dominant and non-dominant arm. Women assigned to the control con-dition completed the task without any partner; theythought they were alone. Others, however, were led

synergy The combining of two or more independentsystems that yields an effect that is greater than the sumof the individual effects.assembly bonus effect Producing an outcome as agroup that is superior to the results that could havebeen achieved by a simple aggregation or accumulationof group members’ individual efforts; a gain in perfor-mance that is caused by the way the members fit togetherto form the work group.Köhler effect An increase in performance by groupsworking on conjunctive tasks that require persistencebut little coordination of effort and is likely due to theincreased effort expended by the less capable members.

F o c u s 10.3 Does Synergy Occur in Groups?

Let’s form proactive synergy restructuring teams.—Dogbert, organizational consultant

in Scott Adams’s cartoon Dilbert

Synergy is a critical concept in a number of theoreticalanalyses of biological, physiological, chemical, andphysical systems. Synergy occurs whenever the com-bined effect of two or more discrete systems is greaterthan the effect of these systems when they operateindependently. Two drugs, for example, combinesynergistically if their effects are greater when they aretaken together rather than separately. In groups, ifsynergy occurs, the group as a whole is greater thanthe sum of its parts. For example, four students takinga test may score 70%, 80%, 80%, and 90%, but whenthey work together—if synergy occurs—they should beable to score better than 90%. Synergy is sometimescalled an assembly bonus effect because “the group isable to achieve collectively something which could nothave been achieved by any member working alone orby a combination of individual efforts” (Collins &Guetzkow, 1964, p. 58).

Synergy in groups is relatively rare, however.When individuals work on a collective task, the wholeis often much less than the sum of the parts, as mem-bers exert less effort (social loafing) or let others dotheir share of the work (free riding). Groups oftenoutperform the most incompetent group member (the“better than the worst” effect), and they may performas well as the most competent member (the “equal to

the best” effect), but the “better than the best” effectoccurs only rarely. Patrick Laughlin and his colleagues,for example, found evidence of synergy when groupsworked on extremely complex logic problems, but onlywhen group members who did not know the rightanswer could recognize the correct solution when itwas proposed, and group members who knew theright answer could convince the others they werecorrect (Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002; Laughlinet al., 2003).

Synergy also becomes more likely when the groupmembers are highly motivated to find the correctsolution—when grades, jobs, or lives depend on find-ing the best solution, synergy becomes more likely. Inone study, 222 classroom groups took multiple-choicetests that were counted toward their course grades.These groups often outperformed their best members,suggesting that the groups could identify new andbetter solutions when they worked together in collab-orative groups (Michaelsen, Watson, & Black, 1989).Other investigators replicated these findings, althoughthey concluded that the synergistic effects occurredprimarily because someone in the group other thanthe best member knew the right answer and couldcorrect the best member. Thus, synergistic gains ingroups are not due to mystical processes wherebygroups generate new knowledge, ideas, and energies;instead, they result when the group abandonsincorrect answers when better ideas are proposed bysomeone in the group.

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to believe that an “Anne Roberts” was in the nextroom, and that she was also performing the task. Inboth the coaction and conjunctive conditions, parti-cipants could monitor Anne’s performance on Trials3 and 4 via computer as they themselves struggled tohold up their weight. But in the conjunctive condi-tion, participants were also told that whoever low-ered her weight first would determine the group’sscore. Since Anne did not actually exist and thereforenever tired, subjects were always the IGM. Butreluctant IGMs, judging by how much longer theymanaged to hold up the weight when paired withAnne. They achieved a 20-second gain in the coac-tion condition and a 33-second gain in the conjunc-tive condition.

A recent meta-analysis of 22 studies of groupperformance confirms these findings. Individualswho find that their work is inferior to someoneelse’s show improvement relative to others deprivedof this comparison information, but this perfor-mance gain is particularly dramatic when they arepart of a group working on a conjunctive task.IGMs are much more likely to improve when inface-to-face groups and when information aboutthe quality of other people’s performance is readilyavailable. The Köhler effect is also stronger inwomen than men (Weber & Hertel, 2007).

Discretionary Tasks Steiner noted that a groupcan complete some of the tasks it faces by using a

variety of combination procedures. How, for ex-ample, would a group estimate the temperature ofthe room in which it is working? One simplemethod would involve averaging individual judg-ments. Alternatively, members can determinewhether anyone in the group is particularly goodat such judgments and then use this person’s answeras the group solution. Judging the temperature ofthe room is a discretionary task, because themembers themselves can choose the method forcombining individual inputs.

PROCESS GAINS IN GROUPS

Is a group more or less capable than a single indi-vidual? Steiner’s theory argued that a group’s suc-cess depends, ultimately, on the resources that thegroup members contribute and the processes thatdetermine how their inputs are combined and co-ordinated. In general, as indicated in Table 10.5,groups outperform the most skilled individualwhen the task is an additive one, and they perform

discretionary task A relatively unstructured task thatcan be completed by using a variety of social-combination procedures, thus leaving the methods usedin its completion to the discretion of the group or groupleader.

T A B L E 10.5 A Summary of the Potential Productivity of Groups Working on Various Tasks

Type of Task Productivity Effect

Additive Better than the best: The group exceeds the performance of even the best individualmember.

Compensatory Better than most: The group exceeds the performance of a substantial number of theindividual members.

Disjunctive Better than average and sometimes equal to the best: The group performs best if itaccepts the most capable member’s input as the group solution; groups rarely performbetter than the best member (synergy, or assembly bonus effect).

Conjunctive: Unitary Equal to the worst: The group equals the performance of its least capable member.

Conjunctive: Divisible Better than the worst: Performance will be superior if subtasks are matched tomembers’ capabilities.

Discretionary Variable: Performance depends on the combination rules adopted by the group.

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better than the average group member on manyother kinds of tasks (compensatory, disjunctive,divisible conjunctive with matching, and dis-cretionary).

But can groups actually exceed their potential?Steiner’s (1972) law of productivity pessimisticallypredicted that productivity in groups is equal topotential productivity minus losses owing to suchnegative processes as conflict, tension, and loss ofmotivation. However, when people work in groups,they sometimes gain new solutions, energy, and in-sights into old problems that they would never haveachieved as individuals. If good group processes canyield benefits for groups, then the revised law ofproductivity states

Actual productivity = Potential productivity– Losses owing to faulty processes+ Gains owing to good processes

This final section of this chapter examines processgains: ways to push groups to the limits of theircreative potential.

Brainstorming

The SNL group developed ideas for their show col-lectively. OnMondays they would meet, sometimesfor hours, throwing out ideas for the week’ssketches. Each idea was toyed with, elaboratedupon and refined, and then added to the list of“possibles.”After the meeting, the writers developedat least two of these ideas into full-fledged bits, com-plete with scripts. By Wednesday, the group haddozens of scripts to choose from for the show, andso had the luxury of picking only a few to broadcast.

SNL’s approach is a form of group brain-storming, which is a technique for using groupsto increase creativity. The method was developedby Alex Osborn (1957), an advertising executive, tohelp his colleagues identify novel, unusual, andimaginative solutions. The technique requires an

open discussion of ideas, and is guided by the fourbasic rules:

■ Be expressive. Express any idea that comes tomind, no matter how strange, wild, or fanciful.Do not be constrained or timid; freewheelwhenever possible.

■ Postpone evaluation. Do not evaluate any of theideas in any way during the idea-generationphase. All ideas are valuable.

■ Seek quantity. The more ideas, the better.Quantity is desired, for it increases the possi-bility of finding an excellent solution.

■ Piggyback ideas. Because all ideas belong to thegroup, members should try to modify andextend others’ ideas whenever possible.Brainstorming is conducted in a group, so thatparticipants can draw from one another.

Does Brainstorming Work?

When groups need to think of new ideas the call to“brainstorm” is often raised, but their faith in thismethod may be misplaced. Researchers began test-ing this method by comparing brainstorming groupsto individuals and to so-called nominal groups:groups created by having individuals work aloneand then pooling their ideas (a group “in name”only). These studies offered support to brain-storming. A four-person brainstorming group, forexample, would not only outperform any singleindividual but also a nominal group of four indivi-duals. However, these investigations stacked thedeck against the nominal groups; brainstorminggroups were told to follow the four basic brain-storming rules, whereas the individuals composingthe nominal group were not given any special rulesconcerning creativity. When individuals working

brainstorming A method for enhancing creativity ingroups that calls for heightened expressiveness, post-poned evaluation, quantity rather than quality, and de-liberate attempts to build on earlier ideas.

nominal group A collection of individuals that meetsonly the most minimal of requirements to be considereda group, and so is a group in name only; in studies ofperformance, a control or baseline group created by hav-ing individuals work alone and then pooling theirproducts.

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alone were better informed about the purposes ofthe study and the need for highly creative responses,they often offered more solutions than individualsworking in groups. In one study, for example, four-person groups came up with an average of 28 ideasin their session, whereas four individuals workingalone suggested an average of 74.5 ideas when theirideas were pooled. The quality of ideas was alsolower in groups—when the researchers rated eachidea on creativity, they found that individuals had79.2% of the good ideas. Groups also performedmore poorly even when given more time to com-plete the task (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Mullen,Johnson, & Salas, 1991; see Paulus & Brown,2007, for a review).

Brainstorming groups, like many performinggroups, must struggle to overcome process lossesas they strive to generate ideas. Even though mem-bers strive to expend maximum effort, social loafingdetracts from their performance unless such safe-guards as high identifiability, clear goals, and in-volvement prevent the undercutting of individualeffort (Wegge & Haslam, 2005). But brainstorminggroups also suffer coordination and cognitive losses.The originators of brainstorming thought that hear-ing others’ ideas would stimulate the flow of ideas,but the clamor of creative voices instead resulted inproduction blocking. In brainstorming groups,members must wait their turn to get the floor andexpress their ideas, and during that wait, they forgettheir ideas or decide not to express them. Hearingothers is also distracting and can interfere with one’sability to do the cognitive work needed to generateideas. Even when researchers tried to undo thisblocking effect by giving brainstormers notepadsand organizing their speaking turns, the groups stilldid not perform as well as individuals who were

generating ideas alone (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987,1991; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006).

Evaluation apprehension can also limit theeffectiveness of brainstorming groups, even thoughthe “no evaluation” rule was designed to free mem-bers from such concerns (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987).Groups become even less effective when an author-ity watches them work. Apparently, membersworry that the authority may view their ideas neg-atively (Mullen et al., 1991). Individuals with highsocial anxiety are particularly unproductive brain-stormers and report feeling more nervous, anxious,and worried than group members who are less anx-iety prone (Camacho & Paulus, 1995).

Social comparison processes also conspire tocreate a social matching effect. Although under-contributors are challenged to reach the pace estab-lished by others, overcontributors tend to reducetheir contributions to match the group’s mediocrestandards. Since overcontribution is more effortfulthan undercontribution, over time the high perfor-mers tend to adjust their rate downward to matchthe group’s lower norm (Brown & Paulus, 1996;Seta, Seta, & Donaldson, 1991).

Brainstorming groups are also unproductivebecause they often overestimate their productivity.In many cases, a group has no standard to determinehow well it is performing, so individual memberscan only guess at the quantity and quality of theirgroup’s product and their personal contributions tothe endeavor. These estimates, however, are oftenunrealistically positive, resulting in a robust illusionof group productivity(Stroebe, Diehl, &Abakoumkin, 1992). Members of groups workingon collective tasks generally think that their group ismore productive than most (Polzer, Kramer, &Neale, 1997). Nor do group members feel thatthey are doing less than their fair share. Whenmembers of a group trying to generate solutions

production blocking A loss of productivity that occurswhen group and procedural factors obstruct the group’sprogress toward its goals, particularly when individuals ina brainstorming session are delayed in stating their ideasuntil they can gain the floor and when group membersare distracted by others’ ideas and so generate fewer oftheir own.

social matching effect The tendency for individuals inbrainstorming groups to match the level of productivitydisplayed by others in the group.illusion of group productivity The tendency formembers to believe that their groups are performingeffectively.

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to a problem were asked to estimate how manyideas they provided, each group member claimedan average of 36% of the ideas, when in realitythey generated about 25% of the ideas (Pauluset al., 1993).

Several processes appear to combine to sustainthis error in performance appraisal. Group membersmay intuitively mistake others’ ideas for their own,and so when they think about their own perfor-mance they cognitively claim a few ideas that othersactually suggested (Stroebe et al., 1992). When theybrainstorm in groups, they can also compare them-selves to others who generate relatively few ideas,reassuring them that they are one of the high per-formers (Paulus et al., 1993). Group brainstormingmay also “feel” more successful since the communalprocess means that participants rarely experiencefailure. When alone and trying to think creatively,people repeatedly find that they are unable to comeup with a new idea. In groups, because others’ ideasare being discussed, people are less likely to experi-ence this failure in their search for new ideas(Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2006).

Improving Brainstorming Sessions

Studies of brainstorming offer a clear recommenda-tion: Do not use face-to-face deliberative groups togenerate ideas unless special precautions are takento minimize production blocking, evaluation ap-prehension, social matching, and social loafing.Groups can be creative, but Osborn’s original sug-gestions should be augmented with additional re-quirements (see Paulus & Brown, 2007; Paulus etal., 2006), such as:

■ Stick to the rules: Members should be trainedto follow brainstorming rules and be givenfeedback if they violate any of the basic prin-ciples. Groups that have not practiced brain-storming methods usually generate onlymediocre ideas.

■ Pay attention to everyone’s ideas: The key tobrainstorming is exposure to other’s ideas, butpeople tend to focus on their own suggestionsand pay little attention to other people’s. Many

techniques can be used to force members’attention onto others’ ideas, including listingthe ideas on a board or asking members torepeat others’ ideas.

■ Mix individual and group approaches:Members should be given the opportunity torecord their ideas individually during and afterthe session. One technique, called brainwrit-ing, involves asking members to write downideas on paper and then pass the paper along toothers, who add their ideas to the list. A post-group session during which members generateideas by themselves enhances idea generation(Dugosh et al., 2000).

■ Take breaks: Members should deliberately stoptalking periodically to think in silence(Ruback, Dabbs, & Hopper, 1984).

■ Do not rush: Members should have plenty oftime to complete the task. Groups that workunder time pressure often produce moresolutions initially, but the quality of thosesolutions is lower than if they had spent moretime on the task (Kelly, Futoran, & McGrath,1990; Kelly & Karau, 1993).

■ Persist: Members should stay focused on thetask and avoid telling stories, talking in pairs, ormonopolizing the session; they must continueto persist at the task even through periods oflow productivity.

■ Facilitate the session: Members’ efforts shouldbe coordinated by a skilled discussion leader. Askilled leader can motivate members by urgingthem on (“We can do this!”), correcting mis-takes in the process (“Remember, the rules ofbrainstorming forbid criticism”), and providingthem with a clear standard (“Let’s reach 100solutions!”). A facilitator can also record allideas in full view of the participants, as expo-sure to others’ ideas is critical for successfulbrainstorming.

brainwriting Brainstorming sessions that involve gener-ating new ideas in writing rather than orally, usually byasking members to add their own ideas to a circulating list.

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Alternatives to Brainstorming Many indivi-duals often feel that creativity is a rare quality, andthat only some people—and some groups—are ca-pable of generating fresh ideas and new insights intoold problems. Yet nearly all groups can expandtheir creativity by using creativity-building techni-ques (Sunwolf, 2002). When stumped for newideas, members can break up into buzz groups,which are small subgroups that generate ideas thatcan later be discussed by the entire group. Memberscan jot down a bug list of small irritations pertainingto the problem under discussion, and the groupcan then discuss solutions for each bug. Groupscan use the stepladder technique, which requires ask-ing each new member of the group to state his orher ideas before listening to the group’s position(Rogelberg & O’Connor, 1998). Groups can evenuse elaborate systems of idea generation with suchexotic-sounding names as synectics and TRIZ. Insynectics, a trained leader guides the group througha discussion of members’ goals, wishes, and frustra-tions using analogies, metaphors, and fantasy(Bouchard, 1972). TRIZ is used primarily in scienceand engineering, and involves following a specificsequence of problem analysis, resource review,goal setting, and review of prior approaches to theproblem (Moehrle, 2005).

Several alternative methods, recognizing boththe drawbacks of interacting in face-to-face groupsand the surprising “wisdom” of groups working oncompensatory tasks, integrate individual idea-generating sessions with group-level methods. Thenominal group technique (NGT) minimizesblocking and loafing by reducing interdependenceamong members; it achieves this by starting with anominal group phase before turning to a group ses-sion (Delbecq & Van de Ven, 1971).

Step 1. The group discussion leader introducesthe problem or issue in a short statement that is

written on a blackboard or flip chart. Once mem-bers understand the statement, they silently writeideas concerning the issue, usually working for10 to 15 minutes.

Step 2. The members share their ideas with oneanother in a round-robin; each person states anidea, which is given an identification letter andwritten beneath the issue statement, and the nextindividual then adds his or her contribution.

Step 3. The group discusses each item, focusingprimarily on clarification.

Step 4. The members rank the five solutionsthey most prefer, writing their choices on an indexcard.

The leader then collects the cards, averages therankings to yield a group decision, and informs thegroup of the outcome. The group may wish to addtwo steps to further improve the procedure: a shortdiscussion of the vote (optional Step 5) and a re-voting (optional Step 6). These methods are partic-ularly useful when groups discuss issues that tendto elicit highly emotional arguments. NGT groupsproduce more ideas and also report feeling moresatisfied with the process than unstructured groups.The ranking and voting procedures also provide foran explicit mathematical solution that fairly weightsall members’ inputs and provides a balance betweentask concerns and interpersonal forces (Delbecq &Van de Ven, 1971; Gustafson et al., 1973).

The Delphi technique eliminates the group-level discussion altogether. This method, named forthe legendary Delphic oracle, involves surveyingmembers repeatedly, with the results of each roundof surveys informing the framing of the questionsfor subsequent rounds. The Delphi coordinatorbegins the process by developing a short list ofquestions on the topic, and then gathering the an-swers of a carefully selected group of respondents.Their answers are then pooled and communicated

nominal group technique (NGT) A group perfor-mance method wherein a face-to-face group session isprefaced by a nominal-group phase during which indivi-duals work alone to generate ideas.

Delphi technique A group performance method thatinvolves repeated assessment of members’ opinions viasurveys and questionnaires as opposed to face-to-facemeetings.

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back to the entire group, and members are askedto restate their responses to the original items,comment on others’ responses, or respond tonew questions that emerged in the first round ofsurveying. This process is repeated until a solutionis reached. The method is particularly well-suitedfor problems that cannot be solved by a systematicreview of the available data (Rowe & Wright,1999).

Electronic Brainstorming (EBS) Computer tech-nology offers yet another alternative to face-to-facebrainstorming. Electronic brainstorming (EBS)allows members to communicate via the Internetrather than meeting face-to-face. Using softwaredesigned specifically for groups (called group decisionsupport systems or groupware), group members seated atindividual computers can share information rapidlyand more completely. One program, GroupSystems,opens up several windows on each group member’scomputer—one window is for entering ideas, an-other displays all the ideas, and another shows acounter that tracks how many ideas the group hasgenerated.

EBS offers practical advantages over more tra-ditional face-to-face sessions, such as reducedtravel, time, and cost. But EBS may also be moreeffective than face-to-face brainstorming, since theformat may reduce factors that lead to creativemediocrity. Members do not need to wait theirturn, so EBS reduces production blocking.Working from a distance, participants may alsofeel less evaluation apprehension and nervousnessabout contributing, and they may be able to persistlonger at the task. EBS also enhances one of thekey features of brainstorming—idea building—foronline exposure to others’ ideas tends to stimulatethe production of additional novel ideas (DeRosa,Smith, & Hantula, 2007).

Groups using EBS, although they are freedfrom some of the constraints created by face-to-face meetings, still display problems of social co-ordination and motivation. Computer-mediateddiscussions can overwhelm group members with aflood of information to process (Nagasundaram &Dennis, 1993). Social matching can also occur ingroups if members know how many ideas eachgroup member has contributed (Roy et al., 1996).EBS sessions are also not particularly productive ifthe group members become so focused on generat-ing ideas that they ignore the ideas generated byother members. When researchers arranged forgroups and individuals to use GroupSystems to gen-erate solutions to a problem, they discovered thatEBS groups reached high levels of creativity onlywhen members were told that their memory of theideas expressed by others would be tested later(Dugosh et al., 2000).

More research is needed to explore fully thegains and losses associated with EBS methods, butpreliminary results are positive. In a meta-analysis,investigators compared EBS to (a) traditionalface-to-face groups, (b) nominal groups, and (c)e-nominal groups; individuals who generated ideasin isolation using a computer. They discoveredthat EBS was clearly superior to traditional brain-storming groups, both in terms of productivity andalso members’ satisfaction: they liked the EBS ap-proach better. EBS was generally equal to nominaland e-nominal groups, unless the size of the groupwas large (greater than eight); in this case EBS wassuperior even to nominal groups. Osborn, the in-ventor of brainstorming, surely never could haveimagined the possibility that people in locationswidely dispersed around the world could work to-gether creatively using an adaptation of his brain-storming methods (DeRosa, Smith, & Hantula,2007).

electronic brainstorming (EBS) Generating ideas andsolving problems using computer-based communicationmethods such as online discussions and real-time e-mailrather than face-to-face sessions.

PERFORMANCE 309

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

Do people work better alone or with others?

1. Triplett’s 1898 study of social facilitationconfirmed that people work more efficientlywhen other people are present. Social facilita-tion occurs for both coaction tasks and audiencetasks.

2. As Zajonc noted, social facilitation usuallyoccurs only for simple tasks that require dom-inant responses, whereas social interference orimpairment occurs for complex tasks thatrequire nondominant responses. Studies con-ducted in a variety of settings, such asclassrooms and jogging trails, have confirmedthe effect, which also holds for a variety ofspecies—including cockroaches.

3. Researchers have linked social facilitation toseveral personal and interpersonal processes,including arousal, evaluation apprehension,distraction, and personality differences (seeTable 10.3).

■ Zajonc’s drive theory argues that the merepresence of a member of the same speciesraises the performer’s arousal level bytouching off a basic alertness response;Blascovich’s studies of the challenge-threatresponse and brain imaging work haveconfirmed that people respond physiolog-ically to the presence of others.

■ Cottrell’s evaluation apprehension theoryproposes that the presence of othersincreases arousal only when individuals feelthat they are being evaluated. Self-presentation theory suggests that this appre-hension is greatest when performance maythreaten the group member’s public image.

■ Distraction-conflict theory emphasizes themediational role played by distraction,attentional conflict, and increased motiva-tion. Distractions due to the presence ofother people have been shown to improve

performance on certain tasks, such as theStroop Task.

■ Social orientation theory suggests that indivi-duals who display a positive interpersonalorientation (extraverted and low anxiety)are more likely to display social facilitationeffects.

4. Eating in groups, some forms of prejudice,reactions to electronic performance monitoring, andthe performance of study groups can all beexplained as forms of social facilitation.

Do people work as hard when in groups as they do whenworking by themselves?

1. Steiner, in his analysis of group productivity,suggests that few groups reach their potential,because negative group processes (process losses)place limits on their performance. He believedthat Actual productivity = Potential productivity −Losses owing to faulty processes.

2. Groups become less productive as they increasein size. This Ringelmann effect is caused bycoordination losses and by social loafing—thereduction of individual effort when peoplework in a group.

3. Latané, Williams, and Harkins identified therelative contributions of coordination lossesand social loafing to the Ringelmann effect bystudying groups and pseudogroups producingnoise.

4. Social loafing depends on a number of group-level factors, including,

■ Identifiability: When people feel as thoughtheir level of effort cannot be ascertainedbecause the task is a collective one, thensocial loafing becomes likely. But whenpeople feel that they are being evaluated,they tend to exert more effort, and theirproductivity increases (leading to socialfacilitation if the task is easy).

310 CHAPTER 10

■ Free riding: Individuals in collective worksometimes work less, knowing that otherswill compensate for their lack of produc-tivity. They also work less to avoid beingthe “sucker” who works too hard (thesucker effect).

■ Goals: Groups that set clear, challenginggoals outperform groups whose membershave no clear standard to evaluate theirperformance.

■ Involvement: Loafing is less likely whenpeople work at exciting, challenging, andinvolving tasks. Williams and Karau con-firmed that such tasks reduce loafing andeven trigger social compensation (highly in-volved group members work harder tocompensate for the poor performance ofothers in the group).

■ Identity: According to social identity the-ory, when individuals derive their identityfrom their membership in a group, socialloafing is replaced by social laboring asmembers expend extra effort for theirgroups.

5. Karau and Williams’s collective effort modeldraws on expectancy-value theories ofmotivation to provide a comprehensivetheoretical framework for understandingsocial loafing.

Why are groups more successful when working on sometasks and not on others?

1. Steiner’s typology of group tasks argued thatgroup effectiveness depends on the task thegroup is attempting. Task demands are definedby the task’s divisibility (divisible tasks versusunitary tasks), the type of output desired (maxi-mizing tasks versus optimizing tasks), and thesocial combination rule used to combineindividual members’ inputs.

■ Groups outperform individuals on additivetasks and compensatory tasks. Galton

confirmed the “wisdom of the crowd” byfinding that independent individuals’judgments, when averaged together, tendto be highly accurate.

■ Groups perform well on disjunctive tasks ifthe group includes at least one individualwho knows the correct solution. Thetruth-wins rule usually holds for groupsworking on Eureka problems, whereas thetruth-supported-wins rule holds for groupsworking on non-Eureka problems.

■ Groups are more effective decisionmakers than individuals, particularly whendealing with problems that have aknown solution (intellective tasks) ratherthan problems that have no clear right orwrong answer (judgmental tasks).

■ Groups perform poorly on conjunctive tasks,unless the task can be subdivided, withsubtasks matched to members’ abilities. Insome cases the Köhler effect occurs: thepoorest-performing members increasetheir productivity due to competitivestrivings and the recognition that theirpoor performance is holding the groupback from success.

■ The effectiveness of groups working ondiscretionary tasks covaries with the methodchosen to combine individuals’ inputs (seeTable 10.4).

2. Groups rarely perform better than the bestmember (synergy, or assembly bonus effect).

What steps can be taken to encourage creativity in groups?

1. Brainstorming groups strive to find creativesolutions to problems by following fourbasic rules that encourage the flow of ideasamong members: “Be expressive,” “Postponeevaluation,” “Seek quantity,” and “Piggybackideas.”

2. Brainstorming groups rarely generate as manyideas as individuals in nominal groups. Their

PERFORMANCE 311

less than expected performance has beenlinked to social loafing, production blocking,social matching, and the illusion ofproductivity.

3. Other methods, including brainwriting, synectics,the nominal group technique (NGT), the Delphitechnique, and electronic brainstorming (EBS), offeradvantages over traditional brainstorming.


Chapter Case: Saturday Night Live■ Live from New York, by Tom Shales and James

Andrew Miller (2002), provides details aboutthe inner workings of the writers, performers,musicians, production staff, and executives wholaunched one of the most innovative programsin the history of television.

Social Facilitation and Loafing■ “Social Facilitation from Triplett to Electronic

Performance Monitoring,” by John R. Aielloand Elizabeth A. Douthitt (2001), reviews theliterature on social facilitation before offeringan integrative model of performance processesin groups.

■ “Group Performance and Decision Making,” achapter in the Annual Review of Psychology, byNorbert L. Kerr and R. Scott Tindale (2004),reviews much of the recent work on perfor-mance in both simple and complex groups.

■ “Understanding Individual Motivation inGroups: The Collective Effort Model,” by

Steven J. Karau and Kipling D. Williams(2001), is an updated review of work examin-ing the factors that contribute to motivationloss in groups. This chapter is one of manyexcellent papers in Groups at Work, edited byMarlene E. Turner (2001).

Coordination, Independence, and Performance■ Group Process and Productivity, by Ivan D.

Steiner (1972), is a timeless analysis of groupsthat includes entire chapters examining therelationship between group composition,motivation, size, and performance.

■ “Group Idea Generation: A Cognitive-Social-Motivational Perspective ofBrainstorming,” by Paul B. Paulus and VincentR. Brown (2007), organizes much of theresearch on brainstorming within a cognitive-social-motivational model.

■ Group Genius, by Keith Sawyer (2007), exam-ines in fine detail the collaborative nature ofmost creative innovations.


312 CHAPTER 10


11

Decision Making

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

People turn to groups when they mustsolve problems and make decisions.Groups often make better decisionsthan individuals, for groups can processmore information more thoroughly.But groups, like individuals, some-times make mistakes. When a groupsacrifices rationality in its pursuit ofunity, the decisions it makes can yieldcalamitous consequences.

■ Why make decisions in groups?■ What problems undermine the

effectiveness of decision making ingroups?

■ Why do groups make riskierdecisions than individuals?

■ What is groupthink, and how canit be prevented?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Groups and Decisions: The FunctionalPerspective

OrientationDiscussionDecisionImplementationWho Decides—Individuals orGroups?

Groups as Imperfect Decision MakersGroup Discussion PitfallsThe Shared Information BiasCognitive Limitations

Group PolarizationThe Risky-Shift PhenomenonPolarization Processes in GroupsWhat Causes Group Polarization?The Consequences of Polarization

Victims of GroupthinkSymptoms of GroupthinkDefective Decision MakingCauses of GroupthinkThe Emergence of GroupthinkAlternative ModelsPreventing Groupthink

Summary in Outline

For More InformationMedia Resources

313

✵

ExCom was not unique. Like many othergroups, the committee faced a problem needinga solution. Through discussion, the memberspooled their expertise and information. Theysought out information from available sources,and they thoroughly weighed alternatives and

considered the ramifications of their actions.When their alternatives were narrowed down totwo—to invade or not to invade—they made adecision as a group. But the committee was typicalin another way. Like so many other groups, itmade the wrong decision.

The Bay of Pigs Planners: Disastrous Decisions and Groupthink

The U.S. presidential election of 1960 pitted John F.Kennedy against then vice president Richard M. Nixon.Kennedy, searching for a major issue to stress in hiscampaign, picked Fidel Castro and Cuba. He promisedthat, if elected, he would do something to stem thespread of communism in the world, andwould start closeto home: at that small island located just south ofMiami,Florida. So, once he reached office he faced a basicproblem: What should the U.S. do about Cuba?

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had ananswer: Use a covert operation to topple Castro’sgovernment. Their plan assumed that a squad of well-trained troops could capture and defend a strip of landin the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the southerncoast of Cuba. The men would then launch raids andencourage civilian revolt in Havana. Kennedy sharedthe CIA plan with the executive committee (ExCom) ofthe National Security Council (NSC). This committee, as

diagrammed in Figure 11.1, included White Housesenior advisors and staff members, cabinet members,the CIA and their consultants, and the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (leaders of the branches of the military)—allhighly skilled individuals well-trained in making criti-cally important policy and military decisions. Thisgroup, after thorough review, advised the presidentto give the CIA the go-ahead.

The Bay of Pigs invasion took place on April 17.The assault that was so carefully planned was a disaster.The entire attacking force was killed or capturedwithin days, and the U.S. government had to sendfood and supplies to Cuba to ransom them back.Group expert Irving Janis described the decision asone of the “worst fiascoes ever perpetrated by aresponsible government” (1972, p. 14), and PresidentKennedy lamented, “How could I have been sostupid?” (quoted in Wyden, 1979, p. 8).

Schlesinger

Bundy

Staff

Goodwin

RobertKennedy

Advisors

White House

Dillon

McNamara

Rusk

CabinetMembers

CIA ForeignAffairsExperts

Consultants Joint Chiefsof Staff

PresidentKennedy

F I G U R E 11.1 The members of ExCom, the advisory committee who planned the Bay of Pigs invasion.

314 CHAPTER 11

We owe much to groups. Groups put humanson the moon, built the Empire State Building,performed the first symphony, and invented thepersonal computer. But groups also killed innocentcivilians at My Lai, marketed thalidomide, doomedthe space shuttles Challenger and Columbia, anddecided that the best way to deal with terrorismwas to invade Iraq. Groups have great strengths,but their limitations can only be ignored at greatrisk.

GROUPS AND DECIS IONS : THE

FUNCT IONAL PERSPECT IVE

In office buildings, executives hold conferences tosolve problems of management and production; atthe dinner table, families talk over moving to a newneighborhood; in courthouses, juries weigh evi-dence to determine guilt and innocence; on thebattlefield, a combat squad identifies a target andplans an attack. In these and thousands of othersimilar settings, interdependent individuals makedecisions in groups.

Why this reliance on groups? People turn togroups because, in most cases, groups are betterat choosing, judging, estimating, and problem solv-ing than are individuals (Stasser & Dietz-Uhler,2001). Groups form more accurate perceptions ofpeople than do individuals (Ruscher & Hammer,2006). Groups using Google can find the informa-tion they need faster than single individuals can(Lazonder, 2005). Teams of physicians making adiagnosis are more accurate than single physicians(Glick & Staley, 2007). Students permitted to takea test in groups get better grades than individual stu-dents (Zimbardo, Butler, & Wolfe, 2003). Burglarswho work in groups are less likely to be caughtthan are thieves who work alone (Warr, 2002).Even very powerful leaders—presidents of theUnited States, for example—rarely make decisionswithout consulting others. Instead, they rely ongroups, for they assume that the weighty problemsthat they must handle on a daily basis wouldoverwhelm a lone individual. Apparently “none of

us alone is as smart as all of us together” (Myers,2002, p. 317).

Marjorie Shaw (1932) examined the sagacity ofgroups by putting 21 individuals and 5 four-persongroups to work on several intellective tasks, includ-ing the famous (at least to people who studygroups) missionary–cannibal dilemma:

Three missionaries and three cannibals areon one side of the river and want to crossto the other side by means of a boat thatcan only hold two persons at a time. Allthe missionaries can row, but two canni-bals cannot. For obvious reasons, the mis-sionaries must never be outnumbered bythe cannibals, under any circumstances orat any time, except where no missionariesare present at all. How many crossings willbe necessary to transport the six peopleacross the river?

When the groups and individuals finished the firstset of problems, Shaw reorganized them, so thatthose who worked alone initially solved severalnew problems in groups and those who initiallyworked in groups solved several new problemsindividually.

Shaw’s findings attested to the wisdom ofgroups. Compared to individuals, groups gener-ated more correct solutions, and they were alsobetter at checking for errors in calculations andfaulty inferences about the problems. If a groupmember recommended a solution that was inac-curate, groups were more likely to reject thatsolution. Groups, when they did make mistakes,also erred later in the decision process than didindividuals, in part because groups were moreproficient at noticing and correcting errors thanwere individuals. Groups, however, took longer tocomplete the task than did individuals. (The answerto the missionary–cannibal problem, by the way, is13 crossings! Note, too, that this study was conductedby Marjorie E. Shaw—no relation to Marvin E.Shaw, who also studied groups and whose classic1981 text,Group Dynamics, is this book’s intellectualprogenitor.)

DEC I S ION MAK ING 315

What is the secret to groups’ superiority in mak-ing decisions? A functional theory of group deci-sion making suggests that skilled decision-makinggroups are more likely to make use of group proce-dures that enhance the way they gather, analyze, andweigh information. Although no two groups reachtheir decisions in precisely the same way (and no twotheorists agree on the definitive list of decision func-tions), the stages shown in Figure 11.2 and examinedin this section are often in evidencewhen groupsmakedecisions. The group defines the problem, sets goals,and develops a strategy in the orientation phase. Next,during the discussion phase, the group gathers informa-tion about the situation and, if a decision must bemade, identifies and considers options. In the decisionphase, the group chooses its solution by reaching con-sensus, voting, or using some other social deci-sion process. In the implementation phase, the decisionmust be put into action and the impact of the decisionassessed. Groups that follow these four stages are morelikely tomake better decisions than thosewho sidestepor mishandle information at any particular stage(Hollingshead et al., 2005; Wittenbaum et al., 2004).

Orientation

Decisions begin with a problem that needs asolution. A group of concerned college studentswonders what can be done about the lack ofrecycling in their community and its effect on theenvironment. The president of the United States isbriefed by the CIA on the invasion of Cuba. Thecombat unit is under attack and suffering substantialcasualties. Such situations trigger a decision-makingprocess that often begins with recognition of theunsatisfactory state of the current situation and thesearch for a solution. But groups also meet, moreroutinely, to check progress, review feedback, iden-tify any possible issues, and to identify new goals.

In the first stage of problem solving the groupmust organize the procedures it will use in its work.Members clarify the group’s goals, identify theresources needed to make the decision, enumerateobstacles that must be overcome or avoided, specifythe procedures to be followed in gathering infor-mation and making the decision, and agree onprocedures to follow during the meeting (para-phrased from Gouran & Hirokawa, 1996, p. 76–77).All this planning provides the blueprint for “theorder in which a sequence of operations is to beperformed” (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960,p. 16), so that actions are structured effectively.

The group should, by the end of the orienta-tion phase, understand its purpose, its procedures,and the tasks that it will undertake. Armed witha shared plan, groups no longer simply react tosituations; rather, they proactively influence eventsso that their expectations are affirmed.

Implementation

Orientation

Defining theproblem

Planning theprocess

Discussion

Rememberinginformation

Processinginformation

Exchanginginformation

Decision

Evaluatingthe decision

Adhering tothe decision

Nodecisionreached

Decision reached

F I G U R E 11.2 A functional model of groupdecision making.

functional theory of group decision making A con-ceptual analysis of the steps or processes that groupsgenerally follow when making a decision, with a focuson the intended purpose of each step or process in theoverall decision-making sequence.

316 CHAPTER 11

Defining the Problem One particularly valuableoutcome of this period of orientation is the devel-opment of a shared mental model—a cognitiveschema that organizes declarative and proceduralinformation pertaining to the problem and thegroup that is held in common by the group mem-bers (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Because ofdifferences in prior experiences, knowledge, expec-tations, and so on, each individual may have a dif-fering view of the history of the issue, the currentsituation, and even the methods that will be used toreach a decision. Some of these differences may leadto misunderstandings and inefficiencies as the groupdoes its work, so the emergence of agreement—the shared mental model—will facilitate the group’sfunctioning. When group members adopt the samegeneral conceptualization of their tasks, goals, andprocedures, their final choices reflect the group’s

preferences rather than the group members’ per-sonal biases (Tindale et al., 2001).

Planning Process In a time-urgent world, groupssometimes rush through the orientation stage; theywant to get on with the work, and not waste timewith preliminaries (Varela, 1971). However, re-search clearly favors delaying the discussion of theissue at hand until the group reviews and, if needed,clarifies its goals, procedures, and time constraints(Weingart, 1992; Weldon, Jehn, & Pradhan, 1991).The importance of planning is so great that in somecases it is the only thing that differentiates successfulgroups from unsuccessful ones (Hirokawa, 1980). In astudy of six conferences in which panels of expertsevaluated new medical technologies, participantswere more satisfied when the decisional procedureshad been discussed in advance (Vinokur et al., 1985).Similarly, in a project that experimentally manipu-lated the use of process planning, groups were moreproductive when they were encouraged to discuss

F o c u s 11.1 Do Groups Waste Time?

Groups take minutes but waste hours.—Unknown

Making decisions in groups requires, in many cases, atrade-off between efficiency and accuracy. Groups’decisions are often superior to those of individuals, butgroups require more time to draw conclusions and toreach agreement. The humorist C. Northcote Parkinson(1957) has identified two fundamental “laws” thatgroups all too frequently obey. Parkinson’s first law,which he modestly named Parkinson’s law, states thata task will expand so as to fill the time available for itscompletion. Hence, if a group gathers at 1 PM for aone-hour meeting to discuss five items of business, thegroup will likely adjourn at 2 PM no matter how simpleor routine the issues.

Parkinson’s second law, the law of triviality,states that the time a group spends on discussing any

issue will be in inverse proportion to the consequenti-ality of the issue (Parkinson, 1957, paraphrased fromp. 24). Parkinson described a hypothetical financecommittee dealing with Item 9 on a long agenda,a $10-million allocation to build a nuclear reactor.Discussion is terse, lasting about 2½ minutes, and thecommittee unanimously approves the item. However,when the group turns to Item 10, the allocation of$2350 to build a bicycle shed to be used by the officestaff, everyone on the committee has something tosay. As Parkinson explained,

A sum of $2350 is well within everybody’s com-prehension. Everybody can visualize a bicycleshed. Discussion goes on, therefore, for forty-fiveminutes, with the possible result of saving some$300. Members at length sit back with a feeling ofachievement. (1957, p. 301)

shared mental model Knowledge, expectations, con-ceptualizations, and other cognitive representations thatmembers of a group have in common pertaining to thegroup and its members, tasks, procedures, and resources.Parkinson’s law A task will expand to fill the timeavailable for its completion.

law of triviality The amount of time a group spends ondiscussing any issue will be in inverse proportion to theconsequentiality of the issue.


their performance strategies before working on atask requiring intermember coordination (Hackman,Brousseau, & Weiss, 1976). Planning that addressesdeadlines and time constraints also enhances perfor-mance (see Focus 11.1). Groups are notorious forthe injudicious use of time, but groups that recognizethat their time is limited plan out their work better thangroups that assume their time is unlimited (Sanna et al.,2005). In one survey of 48 self-managing teams, thosewho spent time during their initial stageswith temporalplanning developed strong norms about time, andthese norms helped these groups to perform betterthan groups that did not put enough time into planning(Janicik & Bartel, 2003).

Given the clear benefits of spending time plan-ning process, it is unfortunate that few groups showmuch interest in planning their procedures (Tindaleet al., 2001). When a group member raises the issueof planning, very rarely do any of the other groupmembers respond positively (Hackman & Morris,1975). When groups are given a task, their firsttendency is to begin their task rather than considerprocess-related issues. Even when enjoined toplan, groups believe that planning activities areless important than actual task activities (Shureet al., 1962). This anti-planning bias stems, inpart, from the tendency of groups to apply what-ever method they used in the past to current andfuture projects (Hackman & Morris, 1975). EvenKennedy’s group moved through the orientationstage too hastily. Kennedy had just taken over theoffice of president, and his advisors had notworked together before, so the members shouldhave spent several meetings talking about theproblem and the strategy they would take in solv-ing it. Instead, the planners immediately began todiscuss logistics and operations (Stern, 1997).

Discussion

If information is the lifeblood of decision making,then the discussion phase must be the heart of thatprocess (Kowert, 2002). During the discussionstage, group members gather and process the infor-mation needed to make a decision. As RobertFreed Bales (1955) and his colleagues discovered

when they watched and recorded groups at work,more than 50% of all comments made by membersare suggestions, expressions of opinion, and attemptsat orientation (see Figure 11.3). Group membersalso share information about the problem, expressagreement or disagreement, and ask for moreinformation and clarification. The levels of theseactions shown in Figure 11.3 will vary dependingon the nature of the group discussion and its levelof intensity, but in most groups communicationpeaks during this phase.

What is the value of all this discussion anddebate? An information processing approach to decisionsassumes that people strive, in most cases, to makegood decisions by acquiring the information that isrelevant to the issue and processing that informationthoroughly, so that its implications are clearly un-derstood. A collective information processingapproach to decision making also assumes thatpeople seek out and process relevant information,but that they do this cognitive work during thegroup discussion. Three information processing gainsthat result from discussion are noted in Figure 11.2—improved memory for information, increased in-formation exchange, and more thorough processingof information (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997;Larson & Christensen, 1993; Propp, 1999).

Collective Memory Two heads are better thanone because groups have superior memories for infor-mation relative to individuals. Arthur Schlesinger, forexample, knew a great deal about internationalrelations, but he could not compete with thecombined informational resources of all the Bay ofPigs planners. ExCom’s members’ memories, whencombined, contained a vast assortment of informa-tion about Cuba, Castro, weaponry, and eventhe terrain of the beach where the troops would

collective information processing model A generaltheoretical explanation of group decision making assum-ing that groups use communication and discussionamong members to gather and process the informationneeded to formulate decisions, choices, and judgments.

318 CHAPTER 11

land (Clark, Stephenson, & Kniveton, 1990; Harris,Paterson, & Kemp, 2008; Hirst & Manier, 2008).

A groups’ collective memory is the shared res-ervoir of information held in the memories of two ormore members of a group. Groups remember morethan individuals, because groups draw on more mem-ories that contain different types of information.The CIA operatives who met with the Bay of Pigsplanners knew all about the weapons, tactics, andthe morale of Castro’s troops, but Dean Rusk wasan expert on the relationship between Cuba andthe Soviet Union. When they joined together, theycould pool their individual expertise to form the

group’s decisions. (Unfortunately, no one in thegroup knew that the Bay of Pigs was Castro’s favoritefishing spot, so he was thoroughly familiar with everypath, road, and hill in the area.) Similarly, when stu-dents are permitted to take examinations as a group,they usually outperform individuals, for the studentwho is stumped by the question, “Name four com-mon phases of group decision making,” may be savedby a group member who remembers the mnemonicacronym ODD-I: Orientation, Discussion, Decision,and Implementation (Michaelsen, Watson, & Black,1989; Stasson & Bradshaw, 1995). Groups can also getmore information than individuals can. In many cases,decision-making groups are staffed by individualswho have widely differing experiences, backgrounds,and associations, so each one can acquire a unique setof information that he or she can contribute to thediscussion (Henningsen & Henningsen, 2007).

0 10 20 30 40

Shows Antgonism

Shows Tension

Disagrees

Asks for Suggestion

Asks for Opinion

Asks for Orientation

Gives Orientation

Gives Opinion

Gives Suggestion

Agrees

Shows TensionRelease

Shows Solidarity

Percent Rate

F I G U R E 11.3 Average interac-tion profile for discussion groups (Bales,1999).

SOURCE: Social Interaction Systems: Theory andMeasurement, by Robert Freed Bales, TransactionPublishers, 1999, p. 240.

collective memoryA group’s combined memories,including each member’s memories, the group’s sharedmental models, and transactive memory systems.


But groups are not mnemonic marvels (VanSwol, 2008). When researchers compared thememories of collaborative groups, nominal groups(groups of noninteracting individuals), and indivi-duals, collaborative groups outperformed both theaverage single individual and the best single individ-ual. Collaborative groups did not, however, per-form as well as nominal groups, and the groupsdisplayed many of the characteristics typically seenin individual memory. Individuals, for example,generally have better memory for information thatthey process more deeply and better memory forpictures than for words. Groups displayed thesesame tendencies when their memories were tested(Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). Groups also reportedwords that were not on the original list, and theirmemories were also less well structured (Finlay,Hitch, & Meudell, 2000).

Groups do not remember as much as theycould because members free-ride and loaf. Asnoted in Chapter 10, when members know thatothers will be on hand should they forget any de-tails, they put less effort into processing and storingthe information. But even when factors that pro-duce loafing are eliminated—members are madeidentifiable, each individual is promised a substan-tial reward for performing well, and group cohe-sion is high—three-person groups who workedtogether at a memory task still remembered lessinformation than three individuals whose memorieswere tested when alone (Weldon, Blair, &Huebsch, 2000). Apparently, the complexity ofthe group setting disrupts group members’ abilityto organize information in memory and then re-trieve that information. In consequence, collaborat-ing groups perform particularly poorly when tryingto remember badly organized information, but per-form the same as noninteracting (nominal) groupswhen trying to remember organized information(Basden et al., 1997). These inadequacies in collec-tive memory may be so substantial that groups can-not remember their decisions unless they keep awritten record of them (minutes). Although fewgroup members relish the role of recorder, withoutminutes, details of the group’s actions may beforgotten.

Information Exchange Groups do not merelydraw on a larger pool of information than indivi-duals. They can also exchange information amongthe members of the group, thereby further strength-ening their access to information as well as theirrecall of that information. A group, then, is a “mul-tiagent connectionist” informational network “thatconsists of a collection of individual recurrent net-works that communicate with each other and, assuch, is a network of networks” (Van Overwalle &Heylighen, 2006, p. 606).

When group members exchange information,they may give each other cues that help them re-member things that they would not recall if work-ing alone. This process is known as cross-cueing.For example, President Kennedy may not rememberwhere the force will land, but perhaps he will say,“I think it’s a bay.” This cue may trigger someoneelse’s memories, so that the name “Bay of Pigs” isretrieved by the group, even though none of themembers could generate this name individually(Meudell, Hitch, & Kirby, 1992). Unfortunately, ifa group member offers up a misleading cue—insteadof saying, “I think it’s a bay,” the ExCom membersaid, “I think it’s near a lagoon”—then such cueingcan inhibit memory retrieval rather than facilitate it(Andersson, Hitch, Meudell, 2006).

Transactive memory (TM) also enhances thegroups’ capacity to store and quickly access informa-tion by dividing data among the members. Membersworking in the same group often specialize, to a de-gree, in different areas. These individuals not onlyhave more information on a given topic, but theyare also the ones who should be more responsiblefor storing any new information that is relevant totheir area of expertise. In the committee, for exam-ple, the CIA was recognized as the source of all

cross-cueing The enhancement of recall that occursduring group discussion when the statements made bygroup members serve as cues for the retrieval of informa-tion from the memories of other group members.transactive memory system A process by which infor-mation to be remembered is distributed to various mem-bers of the group who can then be relied upon toprovide that information when it is needed.

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information about the invasion force, so other groupmembers spent little effort deliberately storing infor-mation on that topic. When anyone needed to checka fact pertaining to the commandos, they turned tothe CIA and their memory stores (Hollingshead,2001a; Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985). It wasunfortunate for the ExCom that the CIA was socommitted to the plan that they deliberately misledthe group about conditions in Cuba and the possibil-ity of success (Kramer, 2008). As discussed in moredetail in Chapter 12, TM is enriched through practiceworking as a group and by trust among members.

Processing Information Groups not only recalland exchange information more effectively thanindividuals, they also process that informationmore thoroughly through discussion. Members askquestions, and others offer answers. Alternativeoptions are discussed, and the strengths and weak-nesses of each option are considered. Group mem-bers analyze each others’ ideas and offer correctionswhen they note errors. Members dialogue with oneanother, sharing viewpoints and seeking a sharedmeaning. Ideas are debated, with some group mem-bers seeking to convince others that their position isbetter. The group members also monitor their workand intervene as necessary to bring the group backon task. Most group discussions also include aninterpersonal element that complements the focuson the work to be done (Barge, 2002). Decision-making groups not only share and evaluate in-formation; they also encourage each other, expresscommitment to the group, and help each other( Jehn & Shah, 1997; Weingart & Weldon, 1991).

Just as the orientation period is essential toeffective decision making, so the time spent inactive discussion increases the quality of the group’sdecision (Katz & Tushman, 1979). When research-ers monitored group members’ communicationswhile working on a problem that could be solvedonly by properly sequencing individuals’ responses,they found that the group’s use of essential infor-mation through discussion proved to be the bestpredictor of success (Lanzetta & Roby, 1960).Groups working on collective induction problems—tasks that require a cycle of hypothesis generation

and testing—performed best when membersdiscussed the problems actively and focused theiranalysis on evidence rather than on hypotheses(Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995). Flight crewsthat confront sudden emergencies often overcomethe problem if they share information with one an-other; but those crews that do not take advantage ofgroup discussion often make errors in judgmentthat are not corrected by the group (Paris, Salas, &Cannon-Bowers, 1999; see Focus 8.1). Studies ofonline groups have found that the online formatsubstantially hampers the group’s ability to make aninformed decision if the rate of information ex-change is too low and too slow (Baltes et al.,2002). When researchers watched groups makedecisions, they found that information sharing(talking a great deal, free expression of ideas,thoughts, and feelings) and critical evaluation of ideas(critically evaluating each other’s ideas or works,differences of opinion, disagreement among groupmembers, disagreements on who should do whator how something should be done) were correlatedwith judgmental accuracy (Jehn & Shah, 1997).

Decision

By early April, the Bay of Pigs committee was readyto make its decision. The members had spent daysexamining the CIA’s plan, and even though manyquestions remained unanswered, the group coulddelay no longer. Word of the plan had leaked tothe press, and the group was worried that Castromight begin to shore up his defenses. They neededto make up their minds.

Social Decision Schemes A social decisionscheme is a group’s method for combining individual

social decision scheme A strategy or rule used in agroup to select a single alternative from among variousalternatives proposed and discussed during the group’sdeliberations, including explicitly acknowledged decisionrules (e.g., the group accepts the alternative favored bythe majority) and implicit decisional procedures (e.g., thegroup accepts the alternative favored by the most pow-erful members).


members’ inputs in a single group decision. Somegroups have clearly defined ways of making adecision—their bylaws may state, for example, thatthey will follow a particular rule of order (such asRobert’s Rules). In many cases, though, the social deci-sion scheme is an implicit one that is taken for grantedby group. Not until someone says, “Let’s take a vote”does the group realize that a decision must be madeabout how to make decisions (Ladbury & Hinsz,2005). Some common social decision schemes aredelegation, averaging, voting, consensus (discussion to una-nimity), and random choice (Hastie & Kameda, 2005).

■ Delegating decisions: An individual, subgroup, orexternal party makes the decision for thegroup. Under an authority scheme, the leader,president, or other individual makes the finaldecision with or without input from the groupmembers. When an oligarchy operates in thegroup, a coalition speaks for the entire group.Other forms of delegation include asking anexpert to answer (the best-informed member)or forming a subcommittee made up of a fewmembers to study the issue and reach aconclusion.

■ Averaging decisions: Each group member makeshis or her decision individually (either before orafter a group discussion) and these private re-commendations are averaged together to yielda nominal group decision. As with compensa-tory tasks discussed in Chapter 10, such deci-sions do not necessarily require any interactionamong members. For example, to chooseamong five possible candidates for a jobopening each member could rank the candi-dates from 1 to 5 and the group could thenaverage these rankings.

■ Plurality decisions: Members express their indi-vidual preferences by voting, either publicly orby secret ballot. In most cases, the group selectsthe alternative favored by the majority of themembers (the very common majority-rulesscheme), but in some cases, a more substantialplurality (such as a two-thirds majority scheme) isneeded before a decision becomes final. Somegroups also use ranking methods, with more

points awarded to alternatives that are rankedhigher than others (the Borda count method).

■ Unanimous decisions (consensus): The groupdiscusses the issue until it reaches unanimousagreement without voting. As noted inChapter 7, this decision rule is imposed onmany juries in the United States.

■ Random decisions: The group leaves the finaldecision to chance by, say, flipping a coin.

Each decision scheme has strengths as well asweaknesses. Delegation saves the group time and isappropriate for less important issues. Mandates fromauthorities can, however, leave members feelingdisenfranchised and ignored. As noted in Chapter10, when groups average individual members’ inputs,all the group members’ opinions are considered, andthis procedure often cancels out errors or extremeopinions. But a group that just averages withoutdiscussion may make an arbitrary decision that failsto satisfy any of the group members, all of whommay end up feeling little responsibility for imple-menting the decision.

Most groups, at least in Western cultures, relyon some type of voting procedure to make finaldecisions (Mann, 1986). Voting is a way of makinga clear-cut decision, even on issues that deeply di-vide the group. When researchers compared thesedecision rules, plurality was the most consistent inyielding a superior decision, and it involved theleast amount of effort from individual groupmembers (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). But plurality,despite its overall effectiveness, has limitations.When the vote is close, some members of thegroup may feel alienated and defeated. In conse-quence, they become dissatisfied with member-ship and are less likely to lend support to thedecision (Castore & Murnighan, 1978). Votingcan also lead to internal politics, as members gettogether before meetings to apply pressure, formcoalitions, and trade favors to ensure the passageof proposals that they favor. Also, if the vote istaken publicly, individuals may conform to previ-ously stated opinions rather than expressing theirpersonal views (Davis et al., 1988).

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Some groups avoid these drawbacks by relyingon consensus to make decisions. Consensus decisionschemes are involving and often lead to highlevels of commitment to the decision and to thegroup. Unfortunately, groups may not be able toreach consensus on all issues. Consensus buildingtakes a good deal of time, and if rushed, the strat-egy can misfire. In many cases, too, groups explic-itly claim to be using the unanimity scheme, butthe implicit goal may be something less thanunanimity. When nine people on a jury all favora verdict of guilty, for example, the three remain-ing jurors may hold back information that theybelieve would cause dissent within the group(Kameda et al., 2002). Groups often prefer toreach consensus on questions that require sensitivejudgments, such as issues of morality, but they favora majority-rules voting scheme on problem-solvingtasks (Kaplan & Miller, 1987).

Implementation

When the die is cast and the decision made, twosignificant pieces of work remain to be done.First, the decision must be implemented. If a uniondecides to strike, it must put its strike plan intoeffect. If a city planning commission decides that anew highway bypass is needed, it must take thesteps necessary to begin construction. If an advisorycommittee approves an invasion, its members mustmobilize the necessary military forces. Second, thequality of the decision must be evaluated. Was thestrike necessary? Did we put the highway where itwas needed the most? Was it really such a good ideato invade Cuba?

Procedural Justice Implementation is affected byprocedural justice: group members’ evaluation ofthe fairness in the processes that the group used tomake its decisions. Willingness to endorse and sup-port a group’s decisions depends on such factors asmembers’ sense of control over the process, involve-ment in it, and evaluation of the outcome itself; ifthe group members believe that the procedures thatthe group used to make its decision were fair ones,then they will be more likely to act in supportive,

pro-group ways. For example, many of the membersof the ExCom group were against the Bay of Pigsplan, but they believed that the group had examinedthe issue in a fair, impartial way, and so when thedecision was made they went to work implementingit. People are more likely to regard a decision as a fairone if the decisional procedures are implemented“(a) consistently, (b) without self-interest, (c) onthe basis of accurate information, (d) with opportu-nities to correct the decision, (e) with the interests ofall concerned parties represented, and (f ) followingmoral and ethical standards” (Brockner &Wiesenfeld, 1996, p. 189). The group that usesprocedurally just methods for making decisionswill be more successful during the implementationstage (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Skitka,Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003).

Participation and Voice Many factors influenceperceptions of procedural fairness, but when peoplebelieve that they had a voice in the matter—thatthey could have expressed any concerns they hadand others would have listened and responded—then they tend to be far more engaged in theimplementation of the final decision. This voiceeffect was examined in an early study by LesterCoch and John French (1948). The managementof a clothing mill asked Coch and French to iden-tify a way to improve employees’ commitment tonew production methods. Coch and French sus-pected that employees would respond more posi-tively if they were involved in planning changes,so they devised three different training programs.Employees in the no-participation program werejust given an explanation for the innovations.Those in the participation-through-representation pro-gram attended group meetings where the needfor change was discussed openly and an informaldecision was reached. A subgroup was then cho-sen to become the “special” operators, who

procedural justice Perception of the fairness and legit-imacy of the methods used to make decisions, resolvedisputes, and allocate resources; also, in judicial contexts,the use of fair and impartial procedures.


would serve as the first training group. Employeesin the third program—total participation—followedmuch the same procedures as those in the secondprogram, but here all the employees, not a selectgroup, took part in the training system.

Confirming the voice effect, hostility, turnover,and inefficiency was highest in the no-participationgroup; 17% quit rather than learn the new proce-dures, and those who remained never reached thegoals set by management. Those in the two partici-pation conditions, in contrast, learned their newtasks quickly, and their productivity soon surpassedprechange levels and management goals. Morale washigh, only one hostile action was recorded, and noneof the employees quit in the 40 days following thechange. Furthermore, when the members of the no-participation control condition were run through aprogram of increased voice and involvement severalmonths later they, too, reached appropriate produc-tion levels (cf. Bartlem & Locke, 1981).

Autonomous work groups and self-directed teams arethe modern-day counterparts to Coch and French’stotal-participation groups (Cascio, 1995). Thesegroups vary considerably in composition and goals,but in most cases, they are charged with identifyingproblems that are undermining productivity, effi-ciency, quality, or job satisfaction. These groupsspend considerable time discussing the causes of theproblems and suggesting possible solutions, eitherwith or without a formal leader or supervisor.Once decisions are made about changes (usuallyby consensus), these changes are implemented andevaluated. If the changes do not have the desiredeffect, the process is repeated. These groups areconsidered in more detail in Chapter 12.

Who Decides—Individuals or Groups?

President Kennedy was given the secret documentJCSM-57-61, “Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-military Plan—Cuba,” early in February (Wyden,1979, p. 90). It suggested that the United Statesshould arm and train a group of Cuban exiles, whowould then return to their homeland and lead arevolt against that country’s current leader. Kennedycould have studied the report and made a decision

at that moment. Instead, he turned the decisionover to a group rather than make the choice alone.

Making a decision in a group offers a numberof advantages over making a decision alone.Groups, with their greater informational resourcesand capacity to process that information, may beable to identify better solutions and to detect errorsin reasoning. Members may also find a group’sdecision more satisfying than that of a single indi-vidual, particularly if the group uses a consensus-building decision process. Group decisions, however,can take more time than people wish to give tothem, and so groups too often sacrifice quality fortimeliness. Some issues, too, are so trivial, so con-voluted, or so contentious that a group approachmay end in failure.

Given this mix of benefits and liabilities, VictorVroom’s normative model of decision makingsuggests that different types of situations call for dif-ferent types of decision-making methods (Vroom,2003; Vroom & Jago, 1988, 2007; Vroom & Yetton,1973). In some cases, the decision maker should noteven consult with others before he or she makes achoice. In other cases, however, the leader shouldseek input from the group or even turn the decisionover to the group entirely. Although procedurescan fall anywhere along the continuum fromleader-centered, authoritarian to group-centered,democratic decision making, Vroom’s (2003)most recent model identifies these five basic typesof decision-making process:

■ Decide: The leader solves the problem or makesthe decision and announces it to the group.The leader may rely on information availableto him or her at that time, but may also obtaininformation from group members. The mem-bers only provide information to the leader and

normative model of decision making A theory ofdecision making and leadership developed by VictorVroom that predicts the effectiveness of group-centered,consultative, and autocratic decisional procedures acrossa number of group settings.

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the leader may not tell the group memberswhy the information is needed.

■ Consult (Individual): The leader shares theproblem with the group members individually,getting their ideas and suggestions one-on-onewithout meeting as a full group. The leaderthen makes the decision, which may not reflectthe group members’ influence.

■ Consult (Group): The leader discusses theproblem with the members as a group, collec-tively obtaining their input. Then the leadermakes the decision, which may not reflect thegroup members’ influence.

■ Facilitate: The leader coordinates a collaborativeanalysis of the problem, helping the groupreach consensus on the issue. The leader isactive in the processes, but does not try toinfluence the group to adopt a particular solu-tion. The leader accepts the will of the groupand implements any decision that is supportedby the entire group.

■ Delegate: If the group already functions inde-pendently of the leader, then he or she can turnthe problem over to the group. The groupreaches a decision without the leader’s directinvolvement, but the leader provides support,direction, clarification, and resources as thegroup deliberates.

Vroom’s normative model does not advocateone decision-making method as superior to an-other. Rather, the situation must be consideredand an approach selected that is most suited to thegiven context. One of the most important of allfactors to consider is the significance of the decisionitself—if the problem is not very important then itcan be solved using a method that involves the leastamount of time and the fewest individuals. Butwhen the problem becomes increasingly important,other situational factors must also be considered:Does the leader have substantial knowledge aboutthe issue? Does the group know even more aboutthe problem? Will the group be committed to thesolution and its implementation if it does not getinvolved in the decision-making process, and does

that even matter? How well do the group memberswork together? Is conflict so high in the group thatmembers may not be able to work together on theproblem? In general, when problems are simpleones, the leader is well-informed, and the conse-quences for a poor decision are relatively minor,then in the interest of time the leader should de-cide. A group-focused approach, in contrast, is bestwhenever a high quality solution is needed, alongwith support from the group to implement it.However, choosing between an individual and agroup approach is so complex that Vroom and hiscolleagues have developed a computer programthat guides the choice between deciding, consult-ing, facilitating, and delegating (Vroom, 2003).

The normative model synthesizes studies ofleadership, group decision making, and proceduralfairness to predict when a choice should be made byan authority and when it should be handled by thegroup. Although the model may oversimplify thiscomplex process, it translates theoretical ideas intoconcrete suggestions, and thus is a practical approachto group decision making. Existing research alsosupports the basic assumptions underlying the model.For example, Vroom and his colleagues reportedthat when expert managers read a case study of aleadership decision and then made a recommenda-tion about an appropriate leadership method, theirsuggestions coincided with the predictions of thenormative model (Vroom, 2003).

GROUPS AS IMPERFECT

DEC IS ION MAKERS

People often have harsh words to say about thedecisions made by groups. Members complainabout time wasted in groups and swap jokes suchas “An elephant is a mouse designed by a commit-tee,” “Trying to solve a problem through groupdiscussion is like trying to clear up a traffic jam byhonking your horn,” and “Committees consist ofthe unfit appointed by the unwilling to do theunnecessary.” Although groups, with their vastlygreater informational and motivational resources,have the potential to outperform individuals, they


do not always reach that potential. When and whydo groups make poor decisions?

Group Discussion Pitfalls

Most experts on group communication agree thatmisunderstanding seems to be the rule in groups,with accurate understanding being the exception.On the sender side, many group members lack theskills needed to express themselves clearly. They failto make certain that their verbal and nonverbal mes-sages are easily decipherable and so unintentionallymislead, confuse, or even insult other members. Onestudy of college students reported that 33% couldnot give accurate directions, 49% could not summa-rize the points made by a person who disagreed withthem, and 35% could neither state their point of viewclearly nor defend it (Rubin, 1985). On the receiverside, inaccuracies also arise from the information-processing limitations and faulty listening habits ofhuman beings. Listeners tend to level (simplify andshorten), sharpen (embellish distinctions made bythe speaker), and assimilate (interpret messages sothat they match personal expectations and beliefs)

information offered by others during a discussion(Campbell, 1958b; Collins & Guetzkow, 1964).

Nor do all group members have the interper-sonal skills that a discussion demands (Spitzberg &Cupach, 2002). When researchers asked 569 full-time employees who worked at jobs ranging fromclerical positions to upper-level management to de-scribe “in their own words what happens during ameeting that limits its effectiveness,” they receivednearly 2500 answers. The problems reported,which are summarized in Table 11.1, fell into sevenbasic categories—communication skills, egocentricbehavior, nonparticipation, failure to stay focused(tendency to become sidetracked), interruptions,negative leader behaviors, and negative attitudesand emotions. The participants in this research, andthe research discussed in Focus 11.2, suggested thatthe groups failed more frequently than they suc-ceeded (Di Salvo, Nikkel, & Monroe, 1989).

Sometimes groups use discussion to avoid ratherthan make a decision. People tend to be “reluctantdecision makers” who will do anything to avoidmaking a hard choice (Janis & Mann, 1977).Avoidance tactics include the following:

T A B L E 11.1 Group Members’ Descriptions of Problems Experienced When Tryingto Make a Group Decision

Problem Frequency Description

Communicationskills

10% Poor listening skills, ineffective voice, poor nonverbal communication,lack of effective visual aids, misunderstands or does not clearly identifytopic, is repetitive, uses jargon

Egocentricbehavior

8% Dominates conversation and group; behaviors are loud, overbearing;one-upmanship, show of power, manipulation, intimidation, filibustering;talks to hear self talk; followers or brown-nosers; clowns and goof-offs

Nonparticipation 7% Not all participate, do not speak up, do not volunteer, are passive, lackdiscussion, silent starts

Sidetracking 6.5% Leaves main topic

Interruptions 6% Members interrupt speaker; talk over others; socialize; allow phone calls,messages from customers/clients

Negative leaderbehavior

6% Unorganized and unfocused, not prepared, late, has no control,gets sidetracked, makes no decisions

Attitudes andemotions

5% Poor attitude, defensive or evasive, argumentative, personal accusations, nocourtesy or respect, complain or gripe, lack of control of emotions

SOURCE: Adapted from Di Salvo, Nikkel, & Monroe, 1989.

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■ Procrastination. The group postpones the deci-sion rather than studying alternatives and ar-guing their relative merits.

■ Bolstering. The group quickly but arbitrarilyformulates a decision without thinking thingsthrough completely, and then bolsters thepreferred solution by exaggerating the favor-able consequences and minimizing the impor-tance and likelihood of unfavorableconsequences.

■ Denying responsibility. The group avoids takingresponsibility by delegating the decision to asubcommittee or by diffusing accountabilitythroughout the entire assembly.

■ Muddling through. The group muddles throughthe issue (Lindblom, 1965) by considering“only a very narrow range of policy alternativesthat differ to only a small degree from theexisting policy” (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 33).

■ “Satisficing” (what “satisfies” will “suffice”).Members accept a low-risk, easy solutioninstead of searching for the best solution.

■ Trivializing the discussion. As noted in Focus 11.1,the group avoids dealing with larger issues byfocusing on minor issues.

The Shared Information Bias

The Bay of Pigs planners spent much time talkingabout the incompetence of Castro’s forces and howU.S. citizens would react to the invasion. They didnot spend as much time talking about the weaponsthat the troops would carry, the political climate inCuba, the terrain of the area where the invasionwould take place, or the type of communication sys-tem used by Cuban military forces. Only the CIArepresentatives knew that the morale of the invasionforce was very low, but they never mentionedthat information during the discussion. President

F o c u s 11.2 Are Meetings Interruptions?

The most painful problem in business: Death bymeeting.

—Patrick M. Lencioni (2004)

People in organizational settings attend many meet-ings, and relatively lengthy ones at that. Usuallyscheduled by someone in authority, meetings serve avariety of purposes, including solving problems, shar-ing information, making decisions, identifying goals,establishing procedures, increasing coordination, andproviding feedback. One source estimates the numberof meetings held in the United States in a year’s periodto be about three billion (Nunamaker et al., 1997).

People, however, are not particularly enthusiasticabout meetings. They may be essential tools fororganizing productivity, but those who attend oftenconsider them to be boring, uninteresting, and ineffi-cient. They can also, in some cases, be filled withconflict, so that they are not just boring but alsothreatening. They can also be viewed as interruptionsof the work that must be done, particularly by thosewho do not need to coordinate their activities withothers.

Steve Rogelberg and his colleagues explored thedownside of meetings by asking workers in England,

Australia, and the United States about their involve-ment in meetings and to rate them on a scale from 1(extremely ineffective) to 5 (extremely effective). Theresearchers also measured such variables as job satis-faction, stress (e.g., tension, anxiety, worry, gloom,depression, and misery), and the degree of interde-pendence required by their job. People who thoughttheir meetings were effective felt more enthusiasticabout their work, more satisfied, and more productive.But if they rated their meetings as ineffective, thenthey were more depressed, more anxious, and morelikely to be thinking about quitting—particularly ifthey did not feel that they needed to work closely withother people to accomplish their work-related tasks.Many saw meetings as interruptions—not as ways toget more work done, but as obstacles to productivity(Luong & Rogelberg, 2005; Rogelberg et al., 2006).

These findings suggest that most people wouldappreciate two things: a reduction in the number ofmeetings and an improvement in the quality of thosethat take place. Meetings need not be tedious wastesof time, but to avoid this fate both leaders and fol-lowers should structure their groups so that they areefficient, productive, and interpersonally enjoyable(Lencioni, 2004).


Kennedy had information from many sources thatwould have forced the group to reappraise its deci-sion, but Kennedy kept this information to himselfduring the group discussions (Kramer, 2008).

The good news is that groups can pool their in-dividual resources to make a decision that takes intoaccount far more information than any one individ-ual can consider. The bad news is that groups spendtoo much of their discussion time examining sharedinformation—details that two ormore groupmembersknow in common—rather than unshared informa-tion (Stasser, 1992; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, &Botero, 2004). If all the members of a group discuss-ing an invasion plan know that the majority of U.S.citizens oppose communism, then this topic will bediscussed at length. But if only the CIA representativeknows that the invading troops are poorly trained oronly Kennedy knows that Cuban citizens supportCastro, these important—but unshared—pieces ofinformation might never be discussed.

The harmful consequences of this sharedinformation bias are substantial when the groupmust have access to the unshared information tomake a good decision. If a group is working on aproblem where the shared information suggests thatAlternative A is correct, but the unshared informa-tion favors Alternative B, then the group will onlydiscover this so-called hidden profile if it discusses theunshared information. Garold Stasser and WilliamTitus (1985) studied this problem by giving themembers of four-person groups 16 pieces of infor-mation about three candidates for student bodypresident. Candidate A was the best choice for thepost, for he possessed eight positive qualities, fourneutral qualities, and four negative qualities. Theother two candidates had four positive qualities,eight neutral qualities, and four negative qualities.When the group members were given all the avail-able information about the candidates, 83% of thegroups favored Candidate A—an improvement

over the 67% rate reported by the participants be-fore they joined their group. But groups did notfare so well when Stasser and Titus manipulatedthe distribution of the positive and negative infor-mation among the members to create a hidden pro-file. Candidate A still had eight positive qualities,but Stasser and Titus made certain that each groupmember received information about only two ofthese qualities. Person 1, for example, knew thatCandidate A had positive qualities P1 and P2;Person 2 knew that he had positive qualities P3and P4; Person 3 knew that he had positive quali-ties P5 and P6; and Person 4 knew that he hadpositive qualities P7 and P8. But they all knew thatCandidate A had negative qualities N1, N2, N3, andN4. Had they pooled their information carefully,they would have discovered that Candidate A hadpositive qualities P1 to P8, and only four negativequalities. But they oversampled the shared negativequalities and chose the less qualified candidate 76%of the time (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987).

What Causes the Shared Information Bias? Theshared information bias reflects the dual purposesof discussion. As a form of informational influence,discussions help individuals marshal the evidenceand information they need to make good decisions.But as a form of normative influence, discussionsgive members the chance to influence eachother’s opinions on the issue. Discussing unsharedinformation may be enlightening, but discussingshared information helps the group reach consen-sus. Hence, when group members are motivatedmore by a desire get closure or to convince thegroup to back their initial preferences, biases arestronger; but if members are striving to make thebest decision, the shared information bias becomesless pronounced (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir,2001; Scholten et al., 2007). The bias is strongestwhen groups work on judgmental tasks that do nothave a demonstrably correct solution, as the goal ofthe group is to reach agreement rather than to findthe right answer (Stewart & Stasser, 1998). Groupsare also more biased when their members think thatthey do not have enough information to make afully informed decision (Stasser & Stewart, 1992).

shared information bias The tendency for groups tospend more time discussing information that all membersknow (shared information) and less time examining in-formation that only a few members know (unshared).

328 CHAPTER 11

The shared information bias also reflects thepsychological and interpersonal needs of groupmembers. If group members enter into the groupdiscussion with a clear preference, they will argue infavor of their preference and resist changing theirminds. If the shared information all points in onedirection—as it did in Stasser and Titus’s (1985)study of hidden profiles—then all the group mem-bers begin the discussion with a negative opinionof Candidate A. The group’s final choice reflects theseinitial preferences (Brodbeck et al., 2002; Gigone &Hastie, 1997; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003;Henningsen & Henningsen, 2003).

The shared information bias also reflects thenature of group discussion. Members are strivingto reach the best decision possible, but they haveother motivations as well: they are trying to esta-blish reputations for themselves, secure tighterbonds of attraction with others, and possibly com-pete with and succeed against other group members(Wittenbaum et al., 2004). Therefore, they are selec-tive regarding when they disclose information and towhom they disclose it, often emphasizing shared in-formation to express their agreement with others inthe group. Ironically, people consider shared informa-tion to be highly diagnostic, so they mistakenly be-lieve that people who discuss shared information aremore knowledgeable, competent, and credible thanare group members who contribute unshared infor-mation to the discussion (Wittenbaum, Hubbell, &Zuckerman, 1999). Members, to make a good im-pression with the group, dwell on what everyoneknows rather than on the points that only they un-derstand. Group members who anticipate a groupdiscussion implicitly focus on information that theyknow others also possess, instead of concentrating oninformation that only they possess (Wittenbaum,Stasser, & Merry, 1996).

Can the Shared Information Bias Be Avoided?Even though groups prefer to spend their timediscussing shared information, experienced membersavoid this tendency, and they often intervene tofocus the group’s attention on unshared data(Wittenbaum, 1998). When researchers studiedmedical teams making decisions, they noted that

the more senior group members repeated moreshared information, but they also repeated more un-shared information than the other group members.Moreover, as the discussion progressed, they weremore likely to repeat unshared information that wasmentioned during the session—evidence of their at-tempt to bring unshared information out through thediscussion (Larson et al., 1996). Groups can also avoidthe shared information bias if they spend more timeactively discussing their decisions. Because groupmembers tend to discuss shared information first,groups are more likely to review unshared informa-tion in longer meetings (Larson, Foster-Fishman, &Keys, 1994; Winquist & Larson, 1998). Othermethods of avoiding the bias include increasingthe diversity of opinions within the group (Smith,2008), using an advocacy approach rather than gen-eral discussion (Greitemeyer et al., 2006), emphasiz-ing the importance of dissent (Klocke, 2007), andintroducing the discussion as a new topic (newbusiness) rather than a return to a previously dis-cussed item (Reimer, Reimer, & Hinsz, 2008).

Technology also offers a solution to the bias.Group decision support systems (GDSS) offermembers a way to catalog, more comprehensively,the group’s total stock of information and thenshare that information collectively. Depending onthe GDSS, the group would have access to an arrayof decision-making tools, such as databases, searchengines for locating information, communicationtools for sending messages to specific individualsand to the entire group, shared writing and drawingareas where members can collaborate on projects,and computational tools that will poll membersautomatically and help them to estimate costs, risks,probabilities, and so on (Hollingshead, 2001b). Thevalue of a GDSS—even a simple one that only au-tomated communication among members but didnot structure voting or information search—was

group decision support systems A set of integratedtools groups use to structure and facilitate their decisionmaking, including computer programs that expedite dataacquisition, communication among group members,document sharing, and the systematic review of alterna-tive actions and outcomes.


confirmed by researchers who asked group mem-bers to select between three applicants for a job. Asin previous hidden-profile studies, in some casesthe information about the candidate was distributedto group members so that the shared informationfavored Candidate B, but if all the information wasconsidered, Candidate A would be selected. Parti-cipants worked either in face-to-face groups orused the GDSS, and they also made their choicesbefore any discussion and after the discussion. AsFigure 11.4 indicates, groups that used the GDSSwere more likely to select the best candidate aftertheir discussion (Lam & Schaubroeck, 2000).

Cognitive Limitations

Groups generate decisions through processes thatare both active and complex. Members formulateinitial preferences, gather and share informationabout those preferences, and then combine theirviews in a single group choice. Although thesetasks are relatively ordinary ones, they sometimesdemand too much cognitive work from members.The president’s committee, for example, wanted

to weigh all the relevant factors carefully beforemaking its choice, but the complexity of the prob-lem outstripped the members’ relatively meagercognitive capacity. People’s judgments in suchdemanding situations are often systematicallydistorted by cognitive and motivational biases.People use the information they have available tothem inappropriately, putting too much emphasison interesting information and ignoring statisticalinformation. People sometimes form conclusionsvery quickly and then do not sufficiently revisethose conclusions once they acquire additional in-formation. When people cannot easily imagine anoutcome, they assume that such an outcome is lesslikely to occur than one that springs easily to mind.People overestimate their judgmental accuracy be-cause they remember all the times their decisionswere confirmed and forget the times when their pre-dictions were disconfirmed. People make mistakes(Arkes, 1993; Brownstein, 2003; Plous, 1993).

Groups, unfortunately, are not immune fromthese judgmental biases. When Norbert Kerr,Robert MacCoun, and Geoffrey Kramer (1996a,1996b) reviewed the research literature lookingfor studies of these mental glitches in decision mak-ing, they identified the three general categories ofpotential bias summarized in Table 11.2:

■ sins of commission: the misuse of information■ sins of omission: overlooking useful information■ sins of imprecision: relying inappropriately on

mental rules of thumb, or heuristics, thatoversimplify the decision

After reviewing studies that compared individuals’and groups’ resistance to these types of biases, Kerrand his colleagues cautiously ruled against groups:Groups amplify rather than suppress these biases. Forexample, they use information that has already beendiscredited or they have been told to ignore; theyoverlook statistical information about general tenden-cies; they overemphasize personality as a cause of be-haviors that are due, in part, to pressures of the situa-tion; and they base decisions on information that isreadily available rather than actually diagnostic. Moreso even than individuals, groups know decisional sin.

60

50

40

30

20

10

0Prediscussion Postdiscussion

Session

Per

cen

t C

orr

ect

GDSS

Face-to-face

F I G U R E 11.4 The improvement in performancewhen groups use a decision support system (GDSS).Groups that met in a traditional face-to-face group ses-sion fell prey to the shared information bias, for veryfew of them solved a hidden-profile problem correctly.But groups that met via computer, and could access ashared list of discussion items, were more likely to selectthe best solution to the problem.

SOURCE: Lam & Schaubroeck, 2000.

330 CHAPTER 11

Groups must exercise care to keep these biasesin check (Härtel & Härtel, 1997; Littlepage &Karau, 1997). Consider, for example, individuals’and groups’ resistance to the confirmation bias.In decision-making situations, people often start offwith an initial preference and then seek out addi-tional information to test the accuracy of theirinitial inclinations. Unfortunately, this review isbiased in many cases, for people usually seek outinformation that confirms their preferences, andthey avoid disconfirming evidence. Groups, too,seek out information that supports the prediscussionpreferences of most members, but they can mini-mize this bias if they deliberately ban any publicstatements of initial preferences (Dawes, 1988).

Groups also avoid the confirmation bias whenthey include individuals who adopt divergent mi-nority positions on the issue. Researchers studied thispossibility by giving individuals some backgroundinformation about a company that was considering

relocating its production facilities. Participants indi-cated their initial preference on the matter, andthe experimenters then used those choices to cre-ate three kinds of groups: (1) unanimous groups,composed of individuals who shared the same initialpreference; (2) groups with one member who took aminority position on the issue; and (3) groups withtwo minority members. Participants in these threeconditions were given the opportunity to selectand review 10 additional background readings,which were summarized by short thesis statementsthat indicated they either supported or opposed re-location. A fourth set of participants made thesechoices as individuals. As Figure 11.5 indicates, theconfirmation bias was robust—particularly in the ho-mogeneous group. The inclusion of one dissenterlowered the tendency somewhat, such that thebias was equal to that shown by lone individuals.Including two dissenters, however, tended to sub-due the bias. These results confirm the value ofincluding people with a range of experiences andopinions as members of groups that must makecritical decisions (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000; seealso Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002).

T A B L E 11.2 Types of Errors Made by Individuals and by GroupsWhen Making Decisions

Type of Error Examples

Sins of Commission Belief perseverance: reliance on information that has already been reviewed and foundto be inaccurate

Sunk cost bias: reluctance to abandon a course of action once an investment has been madein that action

Extra-evidentiary bias: the use of information that one has been told explicitly to ignore

Hindsight bias: the tendency to overestimate the accuracy of one’s prior knowledge of anoutcome

Sins of Omission Base rate bias: failure to pay attention to information about general tendencies

Fundamental attribution error: stressing dispositional causes when making attributions aboutthe cause of people’s behaviors

Sins of Imprecision Availability heuristic: basing decisions on information that is readily available

Conjunctive bias: failing to recognize that the probability of two events occurring togetherwill always be less than the probability of just one of the events occurring

Representativeness heuristic: excessive reliance on salient but misleading aspects of a problem

confirmation bias The tendency to seek out informa-tion that confirms one’s inferences rather than discon-firms them.


GROUP POLARIZAT ION

Historians cannot say why President Kennedy de-cided to create a committee to help him reviewthe invasion plan, but he may have acted on theintuitively appealing notion that groups have amoderating impact on individuals. He may haveassumed that a group, if faced with a choice be-tween a risky alternative, such as “Invade Cuba,”and a more moderate alternative, such as “Usediplomatic means to influence Cuba,” would preferthe moderate route. Unfortunately for Kennedy,for his advisers, and for the members of the attackforce, groups’ decisions are often more extremethan individuals’ decisions. Groups do not urge re-straint; instead, they polarize.

The Risky-Shift Phenomenon

At about the time that Kennedy’s committeewas grappling with the problems inherent in theinvasion plan, group experts were initiating stud-ies of the effects of group discussion on decisionmaking. Although some researchers discoveredthat groups preferred more conservative solutionsthan individuals, others found a surprising shift inthe direction of greater risk (Stoner, 1961, 1968).

This shift was often measured using theChoice-Dilemmas Questionnaire, which askedindividuals or groups to consider questions such as:

Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is marriedand has one child, has been working fora large electronics corporation sincegraduating from college five years ago.He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest,though adequate, salary and liberal pensionbenefits upon retirement. On the otherhand, it is very unlikely that his salary willincrease much before he retires. Whileattending a convention, Mr. A is offered ajob with a small, newly founded companywhich has a highly uncertain future. Thenew job would pay more to start and wouldoffer the possibility of a share in the owner-ship if the company survived the competi-tion of the larger firms.

Imagine that you are advising Mr. A.Listed below are several probabilities or oddsof the new company proving financiallysound. Please check the lowest probabilitythat you would consider acceptable tomake it worthwhile for Mr. A to takethe new job.

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

Am

ount

of i

nfor

mat

ion

soug

ht

Group Group (1 minority)

Group (2 minorities)Individuals

F I G U R E 11.5 The magnitude of the confirma-tion bias in groups and individuals. Individuals, whenthey must make a decision, tend to seek out informationthat supports their initial preferences. This tendency iseven stronger in groups, for groups showed a strongerpreference for confirming information. Groups that in-clude two members who initially disagree with the po-sition taken by the majority of the members, however,are somewhat less biased than individuals.

Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire A self-report mea-sure of willingness to make risky decisions that asks re-spondents to read a series of scenarios involving a courseof action that may or may not yield financial, interper-sonal, or educational benefits, then indicate what theodds of success would have to be before they wouldrecommend the course of action.

332 CHAPTER 11

____The chances are 1 in 10 that thecompany will prove financially sound.





____Place a check here if you thinkMr. A should not take the new job nomatter what the probabilities. (Pruitt,1971, p. 359)

When individuals were asked to make decisionsindividually and then they convened in a group torevisit their choices, the group decisions were some-what riskier than those favored by individuals. Forexample, in one study that used the Choice DilemmasQuestionnaire the mean of prediscussion individualdecisions was 5.5 on the scale from 1 (most risky)to 9 (least risky). The mean of the group’s consensualdecision, however, was 4.8—a shift of 0.7 in thedirection of greater risk. This shift also occurredwhen individual judgments were collected after thegroup discussion and when the individual postdis-cussion measures were delayed two to six weeks(the delayed post-tests were collected from male par-ticipants only). Participants in a control conditionshifted very little (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1962).

The finding that groups seem to make riskierdecisions than individuals was dubbed the risky-shift phenomenon. Shifts were reliably demon-strated in countries around the world, includingCanada, the United States, England, France,Germany, and New Zealand, and with many kindsof group participants (Pruitt, 1971). Although com-mentators sometimes wondered about the general-ity and significance of the phenomenon (Smith,1972), laboratory findings were eventually corrob-orated by field studies (Lamm & Myers, 1978).

Polarization Processes in Groups

During this research period, some investigatorshinted at the possibility of the opposite process—acautious shift. For example, when the early risky-shiftresearchers examined the amount of postdiscussionchange revealed on each item of the Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire, they frequently found thatgroup members consistently advocated a less riskycourse of action than did individuals on one partic-ular item (Wallach et al., 1962). Intrigued by thisanomalous finding, subsequent researchers wroteadditional choice dilemmas, and they, too, occa-sionally found evidence of a cautious shift. Then,in 1969, researchers reported evidence of indivi-duals moving in both directions after a group dis-cussion, suggesting that both cautious and riskyshifts were possible (Doise, 1969).

Researchers also discovered that group discus-sions not only amplify choices between risky and cau-tious alternatives, but also group members’ attitudes,beliefs, values, judgments, and perceptions (Myers,1982). In France, for example, where people gener-ally like their government but dislike Americans,group discussion improved their attitude toward theirgovernment but exacerbated their negative opinionsof Americans (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). Similarly,strongly prejudiced people who discussed racial issueswith other prejudiced individuals became even moreprejudiced. However, when mildly prejudiced personsdiscussed racial issues with other mildly prejudicedindividuals, they became less prejudiced (Myers &Bishop, 1970).

Somewhat belatedly, researchers realized thatrisky shifts after group discussions were a part of amore general process. When people discuss issues ingroups, they sometimes draw a more extreme con-clusion than would be suggested by the averageof their individual judgments. The direction ofthis shift depends on their average initial prefer-ences. A group of liberal people who gather to dis-cuss gun control will likely become even moreenthusiastic about regulating handguns after thediscussion. When supporters gather to discuss a can-didate’s strengths and weaknesses, by the meeting’send their opinions will likely become even more

risky-shift phenomenon The tendency for groups tomake riskier decisions than individuals.


favorable toward the candidate. A gathering of stu-dents who are moderately negative about a profes-sor’s teaching methods will become openly hostileafter a discussion. David Myers and Helmut Lammcalled this process group polarization because the“average postgroup response will tend to be moreextreme in the same direction as the average of thepregroup responses” (Myers & Lamm, 1976, p. 603;see also Lamm & Myers, 1978).

Imagine two groups of four individuals whoseopinions vary in terms of preference for risk. AsFigure 11.6 indicates, when the average choice ofthe group members before discussion is closer to therisky pole of the continuum than to the cautiouspole (as would be the case in a group composedof Persons A, B, C, and D), a risky shift will occur.If, in contrast, the group is composed of Persons C,D, E, and F, a cautious shift will take place, becausethe pregroup mean of 6.5 falls closer to the cautiouspole. This example is, of course, something of anoversimplification, because the shift depends on thedistance from the psychological rather than themathematical midpoint of the scale. As Myers andLamm (1976) noted, on choice dilemmas, an initialpregroup mean of 6 or smaller is usually sufficient toproduce a risky shift, whereas a mean of 7 or greater

is necessary to produce a cautious shift. If the pre-group mean falls between 6 and 7, a shift is unlikely.

What Causes Group Polarization?

How do groups intensify individuals’ reactions?Early explanations suggested that groups feel lessresponsible for their decisions and are overly influ-enced by risk-prone leaders, but in time, investiga-tors recognized that polarization results from socialinfluence processes that operate routinely in groups,including social comparison, persuasion, and social iden-tity (Friedkin, 1999; Liu & Latané, 1998).

Social Comparison When people make deci-sions individually, they have no way to determinewhether they are risk-averse or risk-takers; whetherthey are responding as most people do or are over-reacting; whether the position they are defending isreasonable or whether they are arguing for an ideathat most people think is bizarre. But when groupmembers make choices together, they use others asreference points to evaluate their own preferencesand positions (Goethals & Zanna, 1979; Myers,1978). As social comparison theory suggests, indivi-duals spontaneously compare themselves to others,and if they find a difference between their viewand the group’s, they may move toward thegroup’s view (Sanders & Baron, 1977). Polarizationoccurs because group members, through discussion,discover the group’s norm on the issue, and thenthey stake a claim to a position that exceeds that

Risk Caution

A B C D E F

1 20 4 53 7 8 9 106

Group 1mean

Group 2mean

Risky shift Cautious shift

F I G U R E 11.6 A schematic representation of polarization in groups. Imagine that Group 1 includes Person A(who chose 1), Person B (who chose 3), and Persons C and D (who both chose 5); the average of pregroup choiceswould be (1 + 3 + 5 + 5)/4, or 3.5. Because this mean is less than 5, a risky shift would probably occur in Group 1.If, in contrast, Group 2 contained Persons C, D, E, and F, their pregroup average would be (5 + 5 + 7 + 9)/4, or 6.5.Because this mean is closer to the caution pole, a cautious shift would probably occur in the group.

group polarization The tendency for members of a de-liberating group to move to a more extreme position, withthe direction of the shift determined by the majority oraverage of the members’ predeliberation preferences.

334 CHAPTER 11

norm in whatever direction the majority of themembers endorse. If the group discussion indicatesthat themajority of the group likes PlanA, then a desireto create a positive impression in the group mayprompt members to claim that they really like Plan A(Weigold & Schlenker, 1991): “To be virtuous . . . isto be different from the mean—in the right direc-tion and to the right degree” (Brown, 1974, p. 469).

Persuasive Arguments Group members alsochange their opinions in response to others’ argu-ments and ideas. If, for example, the discussionreveals several strong arguments that favor Plan Arather than Plan B, members will shift in that direc-tion. But as persuasive-arguments theory notes,groups usually generate more arguments that sup-port the position endorsed by the majority of thegroup, or the position that is most consistent withdominant social values—in part because membersmay be more willing to express arguments that areconsistent with social norms. As a result, the grouppersuades itself, as more arguments favoring the dom-inant viewpoint are brought up during the discussion(Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973, 1977; Vinokur &Burnstein, 1974, 1978). If discussants are asked to re-peat the arguments raised in the discussion, polariza-tion increases because members are more likely to bepersuaded by the content of the pool of available ar-guments (Brauer, Judd, & Gliner, 1995). The group’ssocial decision scheme may also favor a more extremeposition rather than a moderate one. If, for exam-ple, a group adopts a “risk-supported-wins” rule,and two members of the group express a willingnessto tolerate extreme risk, then the group may shift inthat direction (Davis, Kameda, & Stasson, 1992;Zuber, Crott, & Werner, 1992).

Social Identity Curiously, at least for persuasive-arguments theory, group members sometimes shift

their opinions when they discover others’ positionsbut not their arguments (Blascovich, Ginsburg, &Howe, 1975, 1976). Why? Social identity theorysuggests that people are not persuaded by the con-tent of other’s arguments, but by consensus ofopinion. If, through discussion, members come tobelieve that the prototypical group member holds arelatively extreme attitude on the issue, those whoidentify with the group will shift in that direction(Haslam, 2004). This shift causes the diversity ofopinions in the group to decrease, as members con-verge on what they hold to be the opinion of theprototypical group member. This conception of theprototype may also shift towards more extreme po-sitions to differentiate the ingroup from othergroups. When, for example, group members learnedanother group had taken a risky position on anissue, the group members differentiated themselvesfrom that group by becoming more cautious. Whenthe group learned the other group was cautious, thenthe group shifted in the direction of risk (Hogg,Turner, & David, 1990). Polarization may also resultbecause people are far more likely to respond posi-tively to the arguments offered by ingroup membersthan outgroup members, and so those who hold ashared social identity may end up persuading eachother to take increasingly more extreme positions(Mackie & Queller, 2000).

The Consequences of Polarization

Would people who believe that environmentalpollution is a serious problem be more likely, afterdiscussion, to insist on severe measures to preventpollution? Would bringing together two sides in acommunity conflict and allowing them to meetseparately for an hour before a joint meeting createeven more tensions between the two groups?Would a group of government experts who slightlyfavored an invasion plan enthusiastically endorsethe plan after they discussed it? Do groups amplifygroup members’ shared tendencies? Studies ofpolarization say yes (Sunstein, 2002).

Polarization may, in some cases, yield positiveeffects. Groups, when viewed from an evolutionaryperspective, were designed to monitor risk—hence

persuasive-arguments theory An explanation of po-larization in groups assuming that group members changetheir opinions during group discussion, generally adopt-ing the position favored by the majority of the members,because the group can generate more arguments favoringthat position.


they are sensitive to threats and urge caution whenalarmed (Kameda & Tamura, 2007). A group’s col-lective efficacy may rise as individually optimisticmembers join together and discuss their chances forsuccess. The members of a support group may be-come far more hopeful of their chances for recoverywhen they gather together with others who are mod-erately optimistic. Innovations and new ideas may beadopted by large numbers of people as polarizationamplifies enthusiasm for the new products, methods,or outlooks. Polarization may also encourage thestrengthening of positions within the group thatmight go unexpressed or even be suppressed. Thus,polarization, though sometimes a source of error and

bias, can in some cases have a beneficial impact on thegroup and its members (see Focus 11.3).

VICT IMS OF GROUPTH INK

Irving Janis was intrigued by President Kennedy’sExCom group. The committee, like so manyothers, failed to make the best decision it could.

F o c u s 11.3 Alcohol and Risk: Groupdrink?

It is also their general practice to deliberate uponaffairs of weight when they are drunk. . . . Sometimes,however, they are sober at their first deliberation,but in this case they always reconsider the matterunder the influence of wine.

—Herodotus (480–425 BC), Histories (p. 63)

People have been brewing and consuming alcoholicbeverages for centuries. Ethanol, the active ingredientin beers, wines, and liquors, is a depressant, yet it tendsto disinhibit many forms of behavior, particularly wheningested in larger quantities. But drinking is usuallygroup drinking, or groupdrink. Most people who drinkalcohol do so in social settings with other people,rather than alone. In such groups people become moreinterpersonally active, less task-focused, and moreemotionally labile. Alcohol is also associated with cog-nitive changes, including slowed reaction time andimpaired information processing, and group drinkingmay exacerbate these effects.

Anecdotal accounts of intoxicated groups confirmthe idea that drunken groups behave differently thansober ones; they tend to be more socially dynamic andemotionally intense, and they are also more likely toengage in risky, ill-considered actions (Schweitzer &Kerr, 2000). Laboratory studies of such groups alsosuggest that intoxicated groups take more risks andare more competitive, although some exceptions havebeen noted. For example, in one investigation, re-searchers provided group members either with alcoholor with a placebo before asking them to make a choicebetween two alternatives that varied in risk. The

low-risk choice involved answering a questionnairethat would take about 30 minutes to finish. Thehigh-risk choice involved flipping a coin to make thedecision: if heads they could complete an hour-longquestionnaire but if tails they could skip the question-naire altogether. Only one of the sober groups askedto flip the coin, but six of the nine drunken groupschose the more risky option (Sayette et al., 2004).Other investigators, turning their attention to cooper-ation, found that inebriated groups were less cooper-ative than sober ones (Hopthrow et al., 2007).

Other studies suggest, however, that alcohol mayimprove group functioning by increasing social moni-toring. In one study, investigators provided groupmembers with alcohol or with placebos, and then askedthem to make a series of wagers that varied in level ofrisk. Individuals who were inebriated made more riskydecisions, but the drunken groups did not—thesegroups made their decisions more slowly than the sobergroups, and this slower pace may have helped the groupsrecalibrate the riskiness of their choices (Abrams et al.,2006). These findings suggest that, at least in somecircumstances, drunken groups realize that they mightbe making errors in judgment, and so are more carefulto check for mistakes and misinterpretations. Whenthe group is only slightly intoxicated, members’ diligenceresults in a process gain, and so reduces the likelihoodof risk taking and decisional errors (Frings et al., 2008).Additional research is needed, however, to determineif these gains associated with alcohol occur in groupsoutside of the laboratory and in groups that haveingested higher levels of alcohol.

groupdrink Imbibing alcoholic drinks in a group con-text; also, the psychological and group-level changes thatoccur when groups become inebriated.

336 CHAPTER 11

Its failure, though, was so spectacular that Janiswondered if something more than such commongroup difficulties as faulty communication andjudgmental biases were to blame.

Janis pursued this insight by searching for othergroups that made similar errors in judgment. Andhe found many that qualified: Senior naval officerswho ignored repeated warnings of Japan’s aggres-sive intentions regarding Pearl Harbor and took fewsteps to defend it; President Truman’s policy-making staff who recommended that U.S. troopscross the 38th parallel during the Korean War,prompting China to ally with North Korea againstthe United States; President Nixon’s staff who de-cided to cover up involvement in the break-in atWatergate. After studying these groups and theirgross errors of judgment, he concluded that theysuffered from groupthink—“a mode of thinking thatpeople engage in when they are deeply involved in acohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings forunanimity override their motivation to realisticallyappraise alternative courses of actions” (Janis, 1982,p. 9). During groupthink, members try so hard toagree with one another that they make mistakesand commit errors that could easily be avoided.

Janis sought to identify both the causes ofgroupthink, as well as the symptoms that signal thata group may be experiencing this malady. As Figure11.7 indicates, Janis identified three key sets of ante-cedent conditions that set the stage for groupthink,including cohesion, structural faults of the group ororganization, and provocative situational contexts.These conditions cause members to seek out agree-ment with others (concurrence-seeking tendency),which in turn leads to two classes of observable con-sequences: symptoms of groupthink and symptomsof defective decision-making. In this section, wewill work backwards through the model shown inFigure 11.7: We will start with the warning signsof groupthink and then consider the antecedentconditions.

Symptoms of Groupthink

Like a physician who searches for symptoms that sig-nal the onset of the illness, Janis identified a number

of recurring patterns that occur in groupthink situa-tions. He organized these symptoms into three cate-gories: overestimation of the group, closed-mindedness, andpressures toward uniformity (Janis, 1972, 1982, 1983,1985, 1989; Janis & Mann, 1977; Longley & Pruitt,1980; Wheeler & Janis, 1980).

Overestimation of the Group Groups that havefallen into the trap of groupthink are actually plan-ning fiascoes and making all the wrong choices. Yetthe members usually assume that everything is work-ing perfectly. They even express enthusiasm in theirpublic statements about their wrong-headed deci-sions (Tetlock, 1979). Janis traced this unwarrantedoptimism to illusions of invulnerability and illusionsof morality.

The Bay of Pigs planners, like many groups,overestimated their group’s decisional savvy. Membersfelt that they were performing well, even thoughthey were not. This illusory thinking, though com-monplace, becomes so extreme during groupthinkthat Janis called it an illusion of invulnerability.Feelings of assurance and confidence engulfed thegroup. The members felt that their plan was virtu-ally infallible and that their committee could notmake major errors in judgment. Such feelings ofconfidence and power may help athletic teams orcombat units reach their objectives, but the feelingthat all obstacles can be easily overcome throughpower and good luck can cut short clear, analyticthinking in decision-making groups (Silver &Bufanio, 1996).

The planners also believed in the inherent mo-rality of their group and its decisions. Yet the planto invade Cuba could unsympathetically be des-cribed as an unprovoked sneak attack by a majorworld power on a virtually defenseless country.But the decision makers, suffering from illusions ofmorality, seemed to lose their principles in thegroup’s desire to bravely end Castro’s regime.Although groups are capable of reaching admirablelevels of moral thought, this capability is unrealizedduring groupthink (McGraw & Bloomfield, 1987).

Closed-mindedness Groups that are overtakenby groupthink are not open-minded groups,


searching for new ideas and perspectives. Rather,they are closed-minded—rigidly shut off from alter-natives, merely seeking to bolster their initial deci-sion through rationalization. One key element ofthis closure is the tendency to view other groupsin biased, simplistic ways. For example, the mem-bers of the planning group shared an inaccurate andnegative opinion of Castro and his political ideol-ogy, and they often expressed these stereotypes aboutthe outgroup during group discussions. Castro wasdepicted as a weak leader, an evil communist, anda man too stupid to realize that his country wasabout to be attacked. His ability to maintain an airforce was discredited, as was his control over histroops and the citizenry. The group participants’underestimation of their enemy was so pronouncedthat they sent a force of 1400 men to fight aforce of 200,000 and expected an easy success.The group wanted to believe that Castro was anineffectual leader and military commander, but

this oversimplified picture of the dictator turnedout to be merely wishful thinking.

Pressures toward Uniformity The struggle forconsensus is an essential and unavoidable aspectof life in groups, but in groupthink situations, in-terpersonal pressures make agreeing too easy anddisagreeing too difficult. Tolerance for any sort ofdissent seems virtually nil, and groups may use harshmeasures to bring those who disagree into line. Inthe president’s committee, criticism was taboo, andmembers who broke this norm were pressured toconform. Janis highlighted four indicators of thispressure: self-censorship, the illusion of unanimity,direct pressure on dissenters, and self-appointedmindguards.

Self-censorship is Janis’s term for a personal banon expressing disagreements about the group’s de-cisions. In the planning group, many of the mem-bers of the group privately felt uncertain about the

• Insulation of thegroup

• Leadership style• Other structural

factors

• Omissions in survey ofobjectives and alternatives

• Poor information search• Other errors in processing

information and decisionmaking

Low Probability ofSuccessful Outcome

• Overestimation of the group(illusion of invulnerability,morality)

• Closed-mindedness(collective rationalizations, stereotyping)

• Pressures toward uniformity(self-censorship, illusion ofunanimity, direct pressure,mindguards)

Observable ConsequencesAntecedent Conditions

Decision makersConstitute a

Cohesive Group

Symptoms of groupthink

• High stress fromexternal threats

• Low self-esteem• Other factors

Concurrence-seeking(groupthink) tendency

�

�

Structural Faultsof the Group or

Organization

ProvocativeSituational

Context

Symptoms of DefectiveDecision making

F I G U R E 11.7 Irving Janis’s (1982) original theory of groupthink.

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plan, but they kept their doubts to themselves.Some even sent private memorandums to the pres-ident before or after a meeting; but when the groupconvened, the doubting Thomases sat in silence. AsSchlesinger (1965) later wrote,

In the months after the Bay of Pigs I bit-terly reproached myself for having kept sosilent during those crucial discussions in theCabinet Room, though my feelings ofguilt were tempered by the knowledgethat a course of objection would haveaccomplished little save to gain me a nameas a nuisance. I can only explain my failureto do more than raise a few timid questionsby reporting that one’s impulse to blowthe whistle on this nonsense was simplyundone by the circumstances of thediscussion. (p. 225)

This self-imposed gag order created an illusionof unanimity in the group. The members seemedto agree that the basic plan presented by the CIAwas the only solution to the problem. In laterdiscussions, they appeared to just be “going throughthe motions” of debate. Retrospective accountsreveal that many of the group’s members objectedto the plan, but these objections never surfacedduring the meetings. Instead, a “curious atmosphereof assumed consensus” (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 250)characterized the discussion, as each person wronglyconcluded that everyone else liked the plan. AsJanis (1972) explained, the group members playedup “areas of convergence in their thinking, at theexpense of fully exploring divergences that mightdisrupt the apparent unity of the group” (p. 39).The Bay of Pigs planners, like the group discussedin Focus 11.4, apparently felt that it would be “bet-ter to share a pleasant, balmy group atmospherethan be battered in a storm” (p. 39).

This easygoing, supportive atmosphere did notextend to those who disagreed with the group,however. Direct pressure was applied to dissenters,often by self-appointed vigilantes, or mindguards,who shielded the group from information thatwould shake the members’ confidence in them-selves or their leader. The mindguard diverts

controversial information away from the group bylosing it, forgetting to mention it, or deeming itirrelevant and thus unworthy of the group’s atten-tion. Alternatively, the mindguard may take dis-senting members aside and pressure them to keepsilent. The mindguard may use a variety of strate-gies to achieve this pressure: requesting the changeas a personal favor, pointing out the damage thatmight be done to the group, or informing the dis-senter that in the long run, disagreement woulddamage his or her position in the group (Uris,1978). But whatever the method, the overall goalis the same—to contain dissent before it reaches thelevel of group awareness.

President Kennedy, Rusk, and the president’sbrother, Robert Kennedy, all acted as mindguards.Kennedy, for example, withheld memorandumscondemning the plan from both Schlesinger andFulbright. Rusk suppressed information that hisown staff had given him. One extreme exampleof this mindguarding occurred when Rusk, unableto attend a meeting, sent Undersecretary of StateChester Bowles. Although Bowles was said to behorrified by the plan under discussion, PresidentKennedy never gave him the opportunity to speakduring the meeting. Bowles followed bureaucraticchannels to voice his critical misgivings, but hissuperior, Rusk, did not transmit those concerns tothe committee, and he told Bowles that the planhad been revised. Bowles was fired several weeksafter the Bay of Pigs defeat—partly because a scape-goat was needed, but also because PresidentKennedy disliked him intensely (Kramer, 2008).

Defective Decision Making

If luck had been on the side of the Bay of Pigsplanners—if, for example, one of Castro’s generalshad decided to take over the military on the sameday as the invasion—then the attack might have

mindguard A group member who shields the groupfrom negative or controversial information by gatekeep-ing and suppressing dissent.


F o c u s 11.4 When Is Agreement Difficult to Manage?

We’d just done the opposite of what we wanted to do.—Jerry Harvey (1988, p. 14)

The day was hot and dusty, as was often the case inJuly in the small town of Coleman, Texas. Jerry Harvey,his wife, and his wife’s parents were fanning them-selves on the back porch, playing dominoes anddrinking lemonade. Suddenly, Jerry’s father-in-lawsuggested, “Let’s get in the car and go to Abilene andhave dinner at the cafeteria” (Harvey, 1988, p. 13).Abilene was 53 miles away, it was 104 degrees in theshade, and the only available means of transportationwas an unairconditioned 1958 Buick. But the rest ofthe family chimed in with “Sounds great,” and “Sure,I haven’t been to Abilene in a while.” They traveled allthe way to Abilene, had a miserable time, and onlywhen they were back on the porch did they realizethat none of them had wanted to go in the first place.After blaming each other for the bad decision,

we all sat back in silence. Here we were, four rea-sonably sensible people who—of our own volition—had just taken a 106-mile trip across a godforsakendesert in furnace-like heat and dust storm to eatunpalatable food in a hole-in-the-wall cafeteria inAbilene, when none of us had really wanted to go.To be concise, we’d just done the opposite of whatwe wanted to do. (Harvey, 1988, p. 14)

Groups sometimes make decisions that veer farfrom the plans, desires, and preferences of their indi-vidual members. Organizational expert Jerry Harvey’sAbilene paradox aptly illustrates this tendency,highlighting two factors that can cause members tomismanage their group’s agreement.

First, the Abilene group suffered from a severecase of pluralistic ignorance. The group members mis-takenly believed that their private opinion about theAbilene outing was discrepant from the other group

members’ opinions. Therefore, each group member,wishing to be seen as a cooperative member of thefamily, publicly conformed to what they thought wasthe group’s norm, each one erroneously assuming thathe or she was the only one with misgivings. Jerry wentto Abilene because that is what everyone else wantedto do—or so he thought. Unfortunately, everyone elsewas thinking the same thing, so the group misman-aged its consensus (Miller & McFarland, 1991).Pluralistic ignorance prompts people to conform tonorms that do not actually exist—except in their minds.

Second, the group committed to its decision quickly,and did not reconsider its choice when negativeconsequences—the heat, the cost, the discomfort—mounted. This process is sometimes termed entrapment—a special form of escalation that occurs when the groupexpends “more of its time, energy, money, or other re-sources than seems justifiable by external standards” (Pruitt& Kim, 2004, p. 165). Entrapment occurs when groupsbecome so invested in a course of action that they refuseto reverse their decisions (Brockner, 1995; Brockner &Rubin, 1985). Such situations often lure in groups byraising concerns over investments the group has alreadymade in the choice (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). If a groupdiscovers that the costs for a project are escalating, thenthe members will rarely consider canceling the projectaltogether. Instead, they will continue to fund the proj-ect, because the initial investment, or sunk cost, must behonored. Unfortunately, the money and time investedin a plan of action is already spent and should no longerbe considered in weighing the ultimate value of theproject. Sunk costs, however, can cause groups to con-tinue to expend resources on projects that will ultimatelyfail. Analyses of truly massive, much-criticized projectsthat cost millions of dollars—such as the MillenniumDome in London, EuroDisney, and the DenverInternational Airport—can often be traced to entrap-ment (Nutt, 2002).

Abilene paradox The counterintuitive tendency for agroup to decide on a course of action that none of themembers of the group individually endorses, resultingfrom the group’s failure to recognize and manage itsagreement on key issues.pluralistic ignorance When members of a group hold awide range of opinions, beliefs, or judgments but expresssimilar opinions, beliefs, or judgments publicly because

each member believes that his or her personal view isdifferent from that of the others in the group.entrapment A form of escalating investment in whichindividuals expend more of their resources in pursuing achosen course of action than seems appropriate or justifi-able by external standards.sunk cost An investment or loss of resources that cannotbe recouped by current or future actions.

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succeeded. But the Bay of Pigs planners would stillhave been a groupthink group. Janis did not con-sider the group to be one overtaken by groupthinkonly because it made a bad decision, but because itdisplayed symptoms of groupthink and symptomsof defective decision making. The committee, forexample, discussed two extreme alternatives—eitherendorse the Bay of Pigs invasion or abandon Cubato communism—while ignoring all other potentialalternatives. Moreover, the group lost sight of itsoverall objectives as it became caught up in theminor details of the invasion plan, and it failedto develop contingency plans. The group activelyavoided any information that pointed to limitationsin its plans, while seeking out facts and opinionsthat buttressed its initial preferences. The groupmembers did not just make a few small errors.They committed dozens of blunders. The invasionwas a fiasco, but it was the faulty decisional strate-gies of the group that indicated that the groupsuffered from groupthink.

Causes of Groupthink

To Janis, groupthink is like a disease that infectshealthy groups, rendering them inefficient and un-productive. The symptoms of this disease, such asconformity pressures, illusions, misperceptions, andfaulty decision-making strategies, all signal thegroup’s decline, but they are not the root causesof groupthink. These processes undoubtedly con-tribute to poor judgments, but Janis (1989) distin-guished between symptoms of groupthink and itscauses: cohesiveness, structural faults of the group ororganization, and provocative situational factors (seeFigure 11.7).

Cohesiveness The members of the president’scommittee felt fortunate to belong to a group thatboasted such high morale and esprit de corps.Problems could be handled without too much in-ternal bickering, personality clashes were rare, theatmosphere of each meeting was congenial, andreplacements were never needed, because no oneever left the group. However, these benefits of co-hesiveness did not offset one fatal consequence of a

close-knit group—group pressures so strong thatcritical thinking degenerates into groupthink.

Of the many factors that contribute to the riseof groupthink, Janis emphasized cohesiveness aboveall others. He agreed that groups that lack cohesioncan also make terrible decisions—“especially if themembers are engaging in internal warfare”—butthey cannot experience groupthink (Janis, 1982,p. 176). In a cohesive group, members refrain fromspeaking out against decisions, avoid arguing withothers, and strive to maintain friendly, cordial rela-tions at all costs. If cohesiveness reaches such a levelthat internal disagreements disappear, then the groupis ripe for groupthink.

Measures of cohesiveness were, of course,never collected for the president’s committee. Butmany signs point to the group’s unity. The commit-tee members were all men, and they were in manycases close personal friends. These men, when de-scribing the group in their memoirs, lauded thegroup, suggesting that their attitudes toward thegroup were exceptionally positive. The membersalso identified with the group and its goals; allproudly proclaimed their membership in such anelite body. Robert Kennedy’s remarks, pepperedwith frequent use of the words we and us, betrayedthe magnitude of this identification:

It seemed that with John Kennedy leadingus and with all the talent he had assembled,nothing could stop us.We believed that ifwe faced up to the nation’s problems andapplied bold, new ideas with commonsense and hard work, we would overcomewhatever challenged us. (quoted inGuthman, 1971, p. 88; italics added)

Other evidence, however, suggests that the ExComgroup was not as unified as Janis believed. Themembership of the group was not stable, so differ-ent people were present at different meetings, andtherefore it is likely that no strong sense of identityactually developed. Also, like many groups com-posed of influential, successful individuals, person-alities and differences in style and strategy causedtension within the group. To a large extent, groupmembers were not motivated by group-centered


motives, but by their own political ambitions(Kramer, 2008).

Structural Faults of the Group or OrganizationCohesion is a necessary condition for groupthink,but the syndrome is more likely to emerge whenthe group is organized in ways that inhibit theflow of information and promote carelessness inthe application of decision-making procedures.Insulation of the group from other groups, for ex-ample, can promote the development of unique,potentially inaccurate perspectives on issues andtheir solution. The Bay of Pigs planners workedin secret, so very few outsiders ever came intothe group to participate in the discussion. Thecommittee was insulated from criticism. Many ex-perts on military questions and Cuban affairs wereavailable and, if contacted, could have warned thegroup about the limitations of the plan, but thecommittee closed itself off from these valuableresources.

President Kennedy’s leadership style also shapedthe way the Bay of Pigs planners worked and mayhave contributed to groupthink. By tradition, thecommittee meetings, like cabinet meetings, werevery formal affairs that followed a rigid protocol.The president could completely control the groupdiscussion by setting the agenda, permitting onlycertain questions to be asked, and asking for inputonly from particular conferees (Stasson, Kameda, &Davis, 1997). He often stated his opinion at theoutset of each meeting; his procedures for requiringa voice vote by individuals without prior groupdiscussion paralleled quite closely the methodsused by Asch (1952) to heighten conformity pres-sures in discussion groups. Ironically, Kennedy didnot give his advisors opportunities to advise him(Kowert, 2002).

Provocative Situational Context A number ofprovocative situational factors may push the groupin the direction of error rather than accuracy. Ashumans tend to be reluctant decision makers inthe best of circumstances, they can unravel whenthey must make important, high-stakes decisions.Such decisions trigger greater tension and anxiety,

so group members cope with this provocative de-cisional stress in less than logical ways. Throughcollective discussion, the group members may ra-tionalize their choice by exaggerating the positiveconsequences, minimizing the possibility of nega-tive outcomes, concentrating on minor details, andoverlooking larger issues. Because the insecurity ofeach individual can be minimized if the groupquickly chooses a plan of action with little argu-ment or dissension, the group may rush to reachclosure by making a decision as quickly as possible(Callaway, Marriott, & Esser, 1985). Janis also sug-gested that any factors that work to lower mem-bers’ self-esteem, such as a history of mistakes orprior lapses of morality, may further increase thepossibility of groupthink.

The Emergence of Groupthink

Because of the complexity of the groupthinkmodel, few tests of the entire model have beenconducted. Researchers have, however, attemptedto replicate Janis’s findings through archival casestudies of other historical and political groups.They have also examined specific aspects of thetheory—such as the impact of cohesion and stresson decision-making groups—to determine if its keyassumptions hold up under empirical scrutiny.These studies, which are reviewed briefly hereafter,sometimes support, sometimes challenge, and some-times clarify Janis’s theory.

Archival Case Studies Janis, using an archivalmethod, compared groups that made very poordecisions to groups that made excellent choices todetermine if error-prone groups exhibited more ofthe symptoms of groupthink. In later work, he en-larged his pool of cases to a total of 19 decision-making groups and had external raters who workedfrom the same historical texts rate the groups’ symp-toms. As predicted, the higher the number of group-think symptoms, the more unfavorable the outcomeof the group’s deliberations (r = .62; Herek, Janis, &Huth, 1987, 1989; Welch, 1989).

Other archival studies have yielded checkeredsupport for the groupthink model (Esser, 1998;

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Turner & Pratkanis, 1998b). Philip E. Tetlock (1979),for example, analyzed the content of leaders’ publicspeeches when in groupthink and vigilant decision-making situations. He discovered that leaders in thegroupthink situations showed signs of reduced com-plexity and they were more likely to make positivestatements about the ingroup. Tetlock and his col-leagues (1992; Peterson et al., 1998) extended thesefindings in several studies by applying a sophisti-cated rating system (a Q-sort) to several successfuland unsuccessful groups in political and organiza-tional contexts. They found that structural faultswere related to groupthink, but cohesiveness andprovocative situational context factors were not.Studies of other disasters and mistake-pronegroups, such as the launch of the Challenger and theIran-Contra affair, also provided partial support forJanis’s model (see Baron, 2005, for a review). It maybe, however, that members’ retrospective descrip-tions of their experiences in groups are so distortedthat they are too biased to use as evidence of group-think. Particularly when their groups performedpoorly, members, accounts may reflect their at-tempts to make sense of the experience and hencecorrespond very little to what actually happened(Henningsen et al., 2006).

Cohesion and Groupthink Janis maintained thatgroupthink was a characteristic of cohesive groupsonly. If a group lacked cohesion, it might makepoor decisions, but those decisions would be dueto processes other than groupthink. His basic pre-diction was that cohesion, combined with one ormore of the other potential causes of groupthink(e.g., structural faults, provocative situational con-text), would trigger groupthink. He admitted thatcohesive groups are not necessarily doomed to bevictims of groupthink, but “a high degree of groupcohesiveness is conducive to a high frequency ofsymptoms of groupthink, which, in turn, are con-ducive to a high frequency of defects in decision-making” ( Janis, 1972, p. 199).

A meta-analytic review of the results of sevendifferent studies involving more than 1300 participantsprovided some support for this prediction (Mullenet al, 1994). High cohesiveness impaired decision

making, provided that one or more of the othertriggering conditions for groupthink were presentin the situation. If the other causes of groupthinkwere absent, then cohesiveness increased the qual-ity of a group’s decision-making processes. The co-hesion–groupthink relationship may also dependon the source of the group’s cohesion. Groupsthat derived their cohesiveness from their members’commitment to the task, for example, displayed sig-nificantly fewer symptoms of groupthink, whereasgroups that were interpersonally cohesive displayedmore symptoms of groupthink (Bernthal & Insko,1993).

Structural Faults and Groupthink Janis identi-fied several structural features of groups that cancontribute to groupthink, but researchers have con-centrated most of their attention on the groupleader (Chen et al., 1996; Flowers, 1977). In oneproject, group members discussed evidence pertain-ing to a civil trial. Researchers told some of thegroups’ assigned leaders to adopt a closed style ofleadership: They were to announce their opinionson the case prior to discussion. Open-style leaderswere told to withhold their own opinions untillater in the discussion. Groups with a leader whoadopted a closed style were more biased in theirjudgments, particularly when many of the groupmembers had a high need for certainty (Hodson &Sorrentino, 1997). Groups with leaders with astrong need for power also performed less effec-tively, irrespective of the group’s level of cohesion(Fodor & Smith, 1982). Other evidence, however,suggests that leaders who are highly directive im-prove their group’s decisions, provided that theylimit their control to the group’s decisional pro-cesses rather than the group’s decisional outcomes(Peterson, 1997).

Provocative Situational Context Studies ofgroups under stress suggest that they are more likelyto make errors, lose their focus on the primarygoals, and make use of procedures that membersknow have not been effective in the past. Janis Kellyand her colleagues, for example, have documentedthe negative impact of time pressures on both


group performance and process (Kelly & Loving,2004; Kelly & Karau, 1999). They find that whengroups work under time pressure, members focusmuch of their attention on the task, but doing soleaves them at risk of overlooking important con-textual information. They also tend to concentrateon getting the task completed as quickly as possible,and so become more concerned with efficiencyand quick results rather than accuracy and quality.As a result, time pressures cause groups to “producea less creative, less adequate, and less carefullyreasoned decision. However, when a decision isroutine or straightforward, these strategies canlead to adequate or even good decision making”(Kelly & Loving, 2004, p. 186).

Alternative Models

Groupthink is not an obscure idea known only tothose who study groups. A mere three years afterthe publication of Janis’s 1972 analysis, the termgroupthink appeared in Webster’s New CollegiateDictionary (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998b). The theoryoffers insight into very puzzling groups—those thatmake wrong-headed decisions—and has been appliedto political decision makers, cults, businesses, andcommunities. In 2004, for example, the U.S. SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence concluded thatthe intelligence community of the U.S. govern-ment had displayed a number of the symptomsof groupthink when it erroneously concludedthat the country of Iraq was assembling weaponsof mass destruction (U.S. Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence, 2004). The theory serves as areminder that if we are to understand politicalevents that change the lives of people the worldover, we must understand groups.

Researchers, however, continue to debate thevalidity of the model itself (Baron, 2005). Some,noting the theory’s limited support, suggest that itshould be drastically revised. Others feel that thejury is still out and encourage more research.Others have proposed alternative models.

Group-centrism Theory Arie Kruglanski andhis colleagues (2006), like Janis, have identified a

syndrome that characterizes groups and often causesthem to make faulty decisions. They term this syn-drome group-centrism, because it springs primar-ily from the group members’ striving to maintainand support their group’s unity. Group-centricgroups tend to rush to make judgments on the basisof insufficient information, particularly if they facesituations that interfere with their capacity to pro-cess information—time pressures, severe ambiguity,noise, or fatigue. They are more likely to reject amember who disagrees with the group, and theyexpress a strong desire for agreement with othermembers. Stereotyped thought and tendencies tofavor the ingroup over the outgroup increase, andwillingness to compromise in order to reach inte-grative solutions during bargaining decreases. Thegroup also strives for cognitive closure—“a desirefor a definite answer to a question, any firm answer,rather than uncertainty, confusion, or ambiguity”(Kruglanski et al., 2002, p. 649)—and so adopts amore centralized structure with autocratic leaders.These groups’ discussions are dominated by high-status group members who have a much greaterimpact on the group’s communications and deci-sions than the rank-and-file members. These con-sequences of group-centrism are consistent with thesymptoms of groupthink identified by Janis (DeDreu, 2003).

Social Identity and the Ubiquity Model RobertBaron (2005), after reviewing much of the existingresearch on Janis’s theory, agrees with Janis thatmembers of groups often strive for consensus, andthat in doing so they tend to limit dissent, denigratethe outgroup, and misjudge their own group’scompetence. Baron’s ubiquity model of groupthink,however, suggests that these qualities are ubiquitous

group-centrism A group-level syndrome caused bymembers’ excessive strivings to maintain and support theirgroup’s unity that results in perturbations in a group’sdecision-making capability and intergroup relations.cognitive closure The psychological desire to reach a fi-nal decision swiftly and completely; also, the relativestrength of this tendency, as indicated by a preference fororder, predictability, decisiveness, and closed-mindedness.

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features of groups, rather than rare ones. They onlylead to problems, Baron suggests, when three con-ditions are met. First, it is not group unity per sethat increases groupthink symptoms, but rather athreat to a shared social identity that may resultshould the group fail (Haslam et al., 2006; Turner &Pratkanis, 1998a). Second, the group must be onethat has developed a set of norms that constrainsmembers’ opinions with regard to the topic underdiscussion. Third, groupthink is more likely if groupmembers lack self-confidence. In such cases they arelikely to rely on others’ judgments, with the resultthat the group does not adequately consider its alter-natives (Sniezek, 1992).

Preventing Groupthink

Kennedy did not take his Bay of Pigs failure lightly.In the months following the defeat, he explored thecauses of his group’s poor decision making. He firedthose he felt had misled him, put in place improvedprocedures for handling information, and learnedhow to decipher messages from his military staff.These changes prepared him for the next great issueto face his administration—the Cuban Missile Crisisof 1962. When Kennedy learned that the SovietUnion was constructing a missile base in Cuba, heassembled ExCom again. This time, Kennedy andhis advisors made the right decision. Essentially thesame people meeting in the same room and guidedby the same leader worked equally hard under sim-ilar pressures. Both crises occurred in the same areaof the world, involved the same foreign powers,and could have led to equally serious consequences.Why did the Missile Crisis advisors succeed wherethe Bay of Pigs committee had failed?

Limiting Premature Seeking of Concurrence Ifconformity was the norm in the Bay of Pigs group,dissent was championed by the group during theMissile Crisis. Kennedy deliberately suspended therules of discussion that guided such meetings; agen-das were avoided, and new ideas were welcomed.Although pressures to conform surfaced from timeto time during the discussion, the members feltso comfortable in their role as skeptical, critical

thinkers that they were able to resist the temptationto go along with the consensus. In fact, the groupnever did reach 100% agreement on the decision toturn back Soviet ships.

The atmosphere of open inquiry can be cred-ited to changes designed and implemented byKennedy. He dropped his closed style of leadershipto become an open leader as he (1) carefully refusedto state his personal beliefs at the beginning of thesession, waiting instead until others had let theirviews be known; (2) required a full, unbiased dis-cussion of the pros and cons of each possible courseof action; (3) convinced his subordinates that hewould welcome healthy criticism and condemn“yea-saying”; (4) arranged for the group to meet with-out him on several occasions; and (5) encouraged spe-cific members of the group to take the role of dissenter,or devil’s advocate, during the group discussions.

Kennedy also arranged for this committee tomeet separately in two subgroups. The committeemembers had practiced this approach on other pol-icy issue decisions, and they were satisfied that ityielded many benefits: Arbitrary agreement withthe views of the other subgroup was impossible;the lower-level staff members felt more at ease ex-pressing their viewpoints in the smaller meetings;and the presence of two coalitions in the subse-quent combined meetings virtually guaranteed aspirited debate (Wheeler & Janis, 1980).

Correcting Misperceptions and Biases Janis’simage of people as reluctant decision makers doesnot quite match the executive committee members.The participants fully realized that some course ofaction had to be taken, and they resigned them-selves to their difficult task. Their decisional conflictwas fanned by doubts and worries over questionsthat they could not answer, and at times, theymust have been tempted to ease their discomfortby overestimating American superiority, belittlingthe Russians, and denying the magnitude of thedangers. Yet through vigilant information processing,they succeeded in avoiding these misperceptions,illusions, and errors.

According to the official version of this inci-dent, no trace of the illusion of superiority that


had permeated the planning sessions of the Bay ofPigs invasion was in evidence during the executivecommittee meetings. The men knew that they andtheir decision were imperfect and that wishfulthinking would not improve the situation. PresidentKennedy repeatedly told the group that there wasno room for error, miscalculation, or oversight intheir plans, and at every meeting, the membersopenly admitted the tremendous risks and dangersinvolved in taking coercive steps against theRussians. Each solution was assumed to be flawed,and even when the blockade had been painstak-ingly arranged, the members developed contin-gency plans in case it failed.

As members admitted their personal inadequa-cies and ignorance, they willingly consulted expertswho were not members of the group. No groupmember’s statements were taken as fact until in-dependently verified, and the ideas of younger,low-level staff members were solicited at eachdiscussion. Participants also discussed the group’sactivities with their own staffs and entered eachmeeting armed with the misgivings and criticismsof these unbiased outsiders.

The committee discussed the ethics of the situ-ation and the proposed solutions. For example, al-though some members felt that the Russians hadleft themselves open to any violent response theAmericans deemed appropriate, the majority arguedthat a final course of action had to be consistentwith “America’s humanitarian heritage and ideals”( Janis, 1972, p. 157). Illusions of morality andinvulnerability were supposedly minimized alongwith biased perceptions of the outgroup (see, foran alternative interpretation of this incident,Alterman, 2004).

Using Effective Decision-Making TechniquesThe executive committee is not an example of aneffective decision-making body simply because itssolution to the missile crisis worked. Rather, justas the decision-making methods used by the Bayof Pigs committee ensured its failure, the executivecommittee’s use of effective decision-making tech-niques increased its chances of success (’t Hart,1998). Members analyzed a wide range of alternative

courses of action, deliberately considered and thenreconsidered the potential effects of their actions,consulted experts, and made detailed contingencyplans in case the blockade failed to stop theRussians. Many initially favored military interven-tion, but the majority of the group’s membersinsisted that other alternatives be explored. Thisdemand led to an expanded search for alternatives,and soon the following list emerged:

1. Do nothing.

2. Exert pressure on the Soviet Union throughthe United Nations.

3. Arrange a summit meeting between the twonations’ leaders.

4. Secretly negotiate with Castro.

5. Initiate a low-level naval action involving ablockade of Cuban ports.

6. Bombard the sites with small pellets, renderingthe missiles inoperable.

7. Launch an air strike against the sites with ad-vance warning to reduce loss of life.

8. Launch an air strike without advance warning.

9. Carry out a series of air attacks against all Cubanmilitary installations.

10. Invade Cuba.

Once this list was complete, the men focusedon each course of action before moving on to thenext option. They considered the pros and cons,fleshed out unanticipated drawbacks, and estimatedthe likelihood of success. During this process, out-side experts were consulted to give the membersa better handle on the problem, and contingencyplans were briefly explored. Even those alternativesthat had initially been rejected were resurrected anddiscussed, and the group invested considerable effortin trying to find any overlooked detail. When a con-sensus on the blockade plan finally developed, thegroup went back over this alternative, reconsideredits problematic aspects, and meticulously reviewedthe steps required to implement it. Messages weresent to the Russians, military strategies wereworked out to prevent any slipups that would

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escalate the conflict, and a graded series of actionswas developed to be undertaken should the block-ade fail. Allies were contacted and told of the U.S.intentions, the legal basis of the intervention wasestablished by arranging for a hemisphere blockadesanctioned by the Organization of American

States, and African countries with airports thatcould have been used by Russia to circumventthe naval blockade were warned not to cooperate.To quote Robert Kennedy, “Nothing, whether aweighty matter or a small detail, was overlooked”(1969, p. 60).

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

Why make decisions in groups?

1. Groups working on a variety of problemsprove to be more effective decision makersthan individuals; Shaw’s study of groupsworking on intellective tasks confirmed thesuperiority of group decisions in certainsituations.

2. A functional theory of group decision making iden-tifies four stages that appear consistently inmany groups: orientation, discussion, decision,and implementation (see Figure 11.2).

3. During the orientation stage the group identi-fies the problem to be solved and plans theprocess to be used in reaching the decision.

■ Many groups bypass this stage, but timespent in orientation predicts effectiveness.

■ Groups develop a shared mental model at thisstage, and they may also take steps to im-prove their time focus, thereby avoidingconfirmation of Parkinson’s law and his lawof triviality.

4. As Bales’s work suggests, during the discussionstage the group gathers information about thesituation, identifies and weighs options, andtests its assumptions.

■ A collective information processing modelassumes that groups gather informationand process that information to generatedecisions and judgments.

■ Three information processing gains thatresult from discussion are improvedmemory for information, increased

exchange of information, and more thor-ough processing of information.

■ A group’s collective memory includes thecombined memories of all individualmembers, and cross-cueing and transactivememory systems work to enhance groupmemory.

■ Group memory is weakened by socialloafing, free riding, and by the complexityof the group setting, which disrupts groupmembers’ ability to organize informationin memory and subsequently retrieve thatinformation.

5. During the decision stage the group relies onan implicit or explicit social decision scheme tocombine individual preferences into a collec-tive decision.

■ Common schemes include delegating de-cisions, averaging decisions, plurality deci-sions, unanimous decisions (consensus),and random decisions.

■ Groups generally use consensus whendealing with sensitive issues, but they tendto use a plurality voting scheme whenmaking simple choices.

6. During the implementation stage the groupcarries out the decision and assesses its impact.

■ Implementation is related to procedural jus-tice; as Coch and French’s classic study ofmotivation in the workplace suggests,members were more satisfied and morelikely to implement decisions when they


were actively involved in the decision-making process (the voice effect).

■ Contemporary group-management meth-ods are based on increasing productivity byincreasing participation in the decision-making process.

7. Vroom’s normative model of decision making sug-gests that different types of situations call foreither autocratic (decide), consultative (indi-vidual and group), facilitating, or delegatinggroup decision-making methods.

What problems undermine the effectiveness ofdecision-making groups?

1. The usefulness of group discussion is limited,in part, by members’ inability to expressthemselves clearly and by their limited lis-tening skills. Janis and Mann suggest thatgroups sometimes use discussion to avoidmaking decisions, and they often spend moretime discussing minor matters than importantones. Research conducted by Rogelbergsuggests that meetings are often viewed bygroup members as interruptions of theirworkflow rather than as means to increaseproductivity.

2. Groups are prone to the shared informationbias—they spend more of their discussion timeexamining details that two or more of thegroup members know in common than dis-cussing unshared information. Work by Stasserand Titus confirms that this oversampling ofshared information leads to poorer decisionswhen a hidden profile would be revealed byconsidering the unshared information moreclosely.

■ The shared information bias increaseswhen tasks have no demonstrably correctsolution and when group leaders do notactively draw out unshared information.

■ Groups can avoid the shared informationbias if they spend more time actively

discussing their decisions or if they makeuse of group decision support systems (GDSS).

3. Judgment errors that cause people to overlookimportant information and overuse unimpor-tant information are often exacerbated ingroups.

■ Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer describethree types of errors—sins of commission, sinsof omission, and sins of imprecision—andresearch suggests that groups exacerbatethese errors.

■ Groups, more so than individuals, fall preyto the confirmation bias—they start off withan initial preference and then seek outadditional information to confirm theaccuracy of their initial inclinations.

Why do groups make riskier decisionsthan individuals?

1. Common sense suggests that groups wouldbe more cautious than individuals, butearly studies carried out using the Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire found that groupdiscussion generates a shift in the directionof a more risky alternative (the risky-shiftphenomenon).

2. When researchers such as Myers and Lammlater found evidence of cautious shifts as well asrisky shifts, and a tendency for various types ofattitudes to become more extreme in groups,they realized that the risky shift was a specificcase of group polarization: a shift in the directionof greater extremity in individuals’ responses(e.g., choices, judgments, expressions of opin-ions) when in groups.

3. Group polarization is sustained by the desire toevaluate one’s own opinions by comparingthem to those of others (social comparisontheory), by exposure to other members’ pro-risk or pro-caution arguments (persuasive-arguments theory), and by social identityprocesses.

348 CHAPTER 11

4. Studies of groups whose members have con-sumed alcohol (groupdrink) suggest that suchgroups make riskier choices than do sobergroups.

What is groupthink, and how can it be prevented?

1. Janis argued that fiascoes and blunders such asthe decision to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigsoccur when group members strive for solidarityand cohesiveness to such an extent that anyquestions or topics that could lead to disputesare avoided. Janis called this process groupthink.

2. Groupthink has multiple symptoms, whichJanis organized into three categories:

■ Overestimation of the group: illusion ofinvulnerability and illusion of morality

■ Closed-mindedness: rationalizations,stereotypes about the outgroup

■ Pressures toward uniformity: self-censorship, the illusion of unanimity,direct pressure on dissenters, and self-appointed mindguards.

3. The Abilene paradox, as described by Harvey,occurs when groups mismanage agreement.Studies of pluralistic ignorance have verified thetendency for group members to erroneouslyassume that their private opinion is discrepantfrom the other group members’ opinions.Groups also experience entrapment when theybecome committed too quickly to a decision andcontinue to invest in it despite high sunk costs.

4. Groupthink groups also display defectivedecision-making processes.

5. Janis identified three sets of causes of group-think: cohesiveness, structural faults of the group

or organization (such as isolation and a closedleadership style), and provocative situationalfactors (including decisional stress).

6. Research has yielded partial—but not robust—support for many of Janis’s hypotheses regard-ing decision making in groups:

■ Archival studies conducted by Janis,Tetlock, and other investigators havefound mixed support for the theory’s mostbasic prediction—that groups that displaymore of the symptoms of groupthink tendto make poorer decisions.

■ Studies have suggested that cohesivegroups sometimes display groupthink ten-dencies, provided that one or more of theother triggering conditions for groupthinkare present.

7. Given these limitations, researchers have pro-posed alternative models, including:

■ Kruglanski’s group-centrism theory suggeststhat groups whose members have a highneed for cognitive closure are more likely tomake poorer decisions.

■ Baron’s ubiquity model suggests that manygroups display the negative decisional fea-tures identified by Janis, but that these factorscombined with a shared social identity,restrictive norms, and lack of confidencewill trigger groupthink-like decisions.

8. Janis noted that groups need not sacrificecohesiveness to avoid the pitfall of groupthink.Rather, he recommended limiting prematureseeking of concurrence, correcting mispercep-tions and errors, and improving the group’sdecisional methods.


Chapter Case: The Bay of Pigs Planners■ Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story, by Peter Wyden

(1979), offers a wealth of detail about the

group that planned the invasion, and draws onpersonal interviews with many of the originalgroup members.


Making Decisions in Groups■ “A Look at Groups from a Functional

Perspective,” by Andrea A. Hollingshead,Gwen M. Wittenbaum, Paul B. Paulus,Randy Y. Hirokawa, Deborah G. Ancona,Randall S. Peterson, Karen A. Jehn, andKay Yoon (2005), examines “how groupcomposition, projects, structures, and ecol-ogy affect group interactions and outcomes”(p. 21).

■ “The Emerging Conceptualization of Groupsas Information Processors,” by Verlin B. Hinsz,R. Scott Tindale, and David A. Vollrath (1997),is a wide-ranging synthesis of how such cog-nitive mechanisms as attention, encoding,storage, retrieval, processing, and learningshape group decisions.

■ “Group Performance and Decision Making,”by Norbert L. Kerr and R. Scott Tindale(2004), reviews recent studies of group decisionmaking.

Faulty Decision Making in Groups■ ”Presidential Leadership and Group Folly:

Reappraising the Role of Groupthink in the Bayof Pigs Decisions,” by Roderick M. Kramer(2008), uses declassified documents and historicalrecords not available to Janis before concludingthat many aspects of the Bay of Pigs decisionare inconsistent with the groupthink theory.

■ “So Right It’s Wrong: Groupthink and theUbiquitous Nature of Polarized GroupDecision Making,” by Robert S. Baron (2005),reviews the basic evidence supporting Janis’stheory of groupthink before offering a novelinterpretation that identifies a new set of criticalcauses of groupthink.

■ Why Decisions Fail: Avoiding the Blunders and Trapsthat Lead to Debacles, by Paul C. Nutt (2002),reviews a series of terrible mistakes made bycorporate leaders in the United States, includingthe construction of EuroDisney and the failure torecall dangerous automobiles with known risks.


350 CHAPTER 11


12

Teams

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

When the goals people want toaccomplish are so complex that theywould overwhelm any individual’scapabilities—such as building a bridge,flying a spacecraft to the moon, orperforming Bach’s Brandenburg con-certo—people turn to teams. Teams,when successful, transform groupsinto complex, adaptive, dynamictask-performing systems. Teams aregroups, but not all groups are teams.

■ What are teams and when shouldthey be used?

■ How does the team’s compositioninfluence effectiveness?

■ What group processes mediate theinput-output relationship?

■ How effective are teams, and howcan they be improved?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Working Together in Teams

What Is a Team?

Types of Teams

When to Team?

The I-P-O Model of Teams

Building the Team

The Team Player

Knowledge, Skill, and Ability(KSA)

Diversity

Men, Women, and Teams

Working in Teams

Teamwork

Team Cognition

Maintaining Cohesion

Team Performance: EvaluatingEffectiveness

Defining Team Effectiveness

The Success of Teams

Suggestions for Using Teams

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

351

✵

One hundred years ago most teams wereeither pulling plows or playing games. Groupsassembled for work that required many hands andmuch muscle, but less physically demanding laborwas given over to skilled individuals. Over time,however, the complexity of the tasks that humansundertook grew, and so did their need to work inteams in order to achieve their ends. A single personcould, in theory, perform coronary surgery, designa new telecommunication device, create an onlinedatabase of all knowledge, or pilot a spacecraft tothe moon, but such tasks are now done by groupsof people working in teams.

Those who understand groups are well on theirway to understanding teams, since teams are groups.Like all groups, teams include multiple members,

who are interdependent and share a collectivegoal. But teams, unlike many groups, requiremore from the members in the way of collaborationand coordination. This chapter considers how thesedemands determine the nature of teams by exam-ining issues of team composition, process, andoutcomes. This chapter also reviews the overalleffectiveness of teams as performance tools and ex-amines ways to improve them. After all, teams aregroups, so their success is not always assured.

WORKING TOGETHER

IN TEAMS

Teams are often spawned when one or more indi-viduals confront an obstacle, a problem, or a taskthey wish to overcome, solve, or complete, but

Mountain Medical’s Cardiac Surgery Team

The members of the Mountain Medical Center’s cardiacsurgery team were excited, but also a bit nervous. Theywere about to use a new method for performing themost technically challenging of all surgeries: the repairof the heart. Only last week they had been using thetraditional, open-heart procedure that requires split-ting the patient’s chest at the breastbone, stopping theheart and transferring its duties to a heart-lung bypassmachine, clamping off arteries and values as necessary,isolating and repairing the damaged portions of theheart, and then closing the 8-inch long wound in thechest. But they would not be using those methods to-day. Instead, the team would be carrying out a mini-mally invasive surgical procedure. The surgeon wouldmake a small incision between the patient’s ribs andsnake high-tech instruments to the heart, guided byfeedback from a network of computers, cameras, andultrasound scanners.

These new procedures would make entirely newdemands of the surgical team. Traditional surgicalteammates work closely with one another, but they arenot continually interdependent. The anesthesiologistsedates the patient and monitors his or her breathing.The perfusionist is the technician who operates theheart-lung machine. The surgeon makes the incision,splits the chest, repairs the heart, and then closes the

incisions. The scrub nurse or technician prepares thesterile field, suctions blood from the site, and passesinstruments to the surgeon as needed. The new pro-cedure is not so modularized. The surgeon can nolonger see the heart, but must rely on the computer-enhanced images provided by the perfusionist andanesthesiologist. Because the surgeon cannot applyclamps directly to the heart to stop the flow of blood,that work is done by the anesthesiologist, who threadsa catheter into the aorta through the femoral vein. Thescrub nurse monitors and maintains pressures and vitalsigns and attaches, when needed, forceps, scissors,scalpels, and other surgical tools to the surgeon’soperating mechanicals.

The new procedures require an unprecedenteddegree of teamwork, but the Mountain Medical teamwas ready for the challenge. They had practiced formonths to learn the new method, and their diligenceshowed in their level of coordination and communica-tion in the operating room. The operation took some-what longer than they had expected it would, butthere were no surprises: Their first patient recoveredfully, but also more quickly because of their use of theminimally invasive, and team-intensive, technique(Healey, Undre, & Vincent, 2006; Pisano, Bohmer, &Edmondson, 2001).

team An organized, task-focused group.

352 CHAPTER 12

they recognize that the solution is beyond the reachof a single person. Such situations require colla-boration among individuals, who combine theirpersonal energies and resources in joint activitiesaimed at reaching both individual and team goals(Zander, 1985).

What Is a Team?

The word team is used to describe a wide assortmentof human aggregations. For example, in businesssettings, work units are sometimes referred to asproduction teams or management teams. At a uni-versity, professors and graduate students may forma research team to conduct experiments coopera-tively. In the military, a small squad of soldiers trainas a special operations team. In schools, a teachingteam may be responsible for the education of 500students. In multiplayer games, people use compu-ters to join carefully composed teams to attemptchallenges (“instances”) that require the skills ofmany types of characters.

Despite this diversity in terms of focus, compo-sition, and design, teams are fundamentally groups,and so they possess the basic characteristics of anygroup: interaction, goals, interdependence, struc-ture, and unity. But what sets teams apart fromother groups is the intensity of each these attributeswithin teams. The level of interaction in teams isconcentrated and continuous, and it includesboth task-oriented action as well as relationship-sustaining interactions (e.g., social support, self-disclosure, mutual aid). The sine qua non of teamsis their pursuit of goals, and collective ones at that.With a team, success and failure occurs at the grouplevel, with all members sharing in the outcomeirrespective of their own personal performances.Teams stress outcomes to such an extent that theirvery existence is threatened should they fail toachieve their agreed-upon goals. All group mem-bers are interdependent to a degree, but members ofteams are so tightly coupled that each member’soutcomes are inextricably tied to each other mem-ber’s outcomes. Each member is assumed to havespecialized knowledge, skill, and ability that he orshe contributes to the team and the team’s success

depends on combining these individual inputseffectively. Teams are also relatively well-structuredgroups. The members of an athletic team, such assoccer or baseball, all know what their role is withinthe group because of the specific position theyoccupy on the team. Similarly, in work teamseach member’s role in the group is defined, as arenorms, status, and communication relations. Themembership of teams also tends to be clearlydefined, as does its duration. Last, the close cou-pling of the members of teams means that theyhave a high degree of unity; teams are typicallycohesive, particularly in the sense that their mem-bers are united in their efforts to pursue a commongoal. External pressures may magnify this unity, forteams usually work under some kind of pressure,such as a heavy workload, limited time, or competi-tion with other groups. Teams, then, are hyper-groups: They possess all the basic qualities of anygroup, but to a more extreme degree.

Types of Teams

Teams come in a wide variety of forms, and theyfulfill many different functions in military, educa-tional, industrial, corporate, research, and leisure set-tings. A general distinction, however, can be madebetween teams that process information and teamsthat plan, practice, and perform activities (Devine,2002). Table 12.1 offers an even more fine-grainedanalysis of teams within these two general categories,distinguishing between management, project, andadvisory teams within the information cluster andservice, production, and action teams within theperformance cluster.

■ Executive teams and command teams such asadministrative units, review panels, boards ofdirectors, and corporate executive teams, aremanagement teams. They identify and solveproblems, make decisions about day-to-dayoperations and production, and set the goals forthe organization’s future.

■ Project teams, or cross-functional teams, includeindividuals with different backgrounds andareas of expertise who join together to develop

TEAMS 353

innovative products and identify new solutionsto existing problems. These teams areextremely common in organizational settings,for they often are composed of individualsfrom a variety of departments and are delib-erately organized to reduce the lack of com-munication that isolates units within theoverall organization. Negotiation teamsrepresent their constituencies; commissions arespecial task forces that make judgments, insome cases about sensitive matters; anddesign teams are charged with developingplans and strategies.

■ Advisory teams, such as review panels, qualitycircles, and steering committees are sometimescalled parallel teams because they work outsidethe usual supervisory structures of the company.

■ Work teams, such as assembly lines, manufacturingteams, and maintenance crews, are responsiblefor the organization’s tangible output; they create

products (production teams) or deliver services(service teams). Some of these teams can also beconsidered action teams.

■ Action teams include sports teams, surgery teams,police squads, military units, and orchestras.All are specialized teams that generate a prod-uct or a service through highly coordinatedactions (Devine, 2002; Sundstrom et al., 2000).

Task Forces and Crews Distinctions can also bedrawn between teams and other task-focusedgroups, such as crews and task forces. These threework groups differ in longevity and the scope oftheir tasks. Task forces have a specific, well-definedpurpose, and they exist for only as long as the proj-ect. Crews are teams that use specialized tools orequipment to accomplish their appointed tasks.The staff of an emergency room and the men andwomen piloting a jumbo jet would be crews(Arrow & McGrath, 1995; McGrath, 1984).

T A B L E 12.1 Types of Teams

Type and Subtypes Function Examples

Management

Executive Plan, direct Board of directors, city council

Command Integrate, coordinate Control tower, combat center

Project

Negotiation Deal, persuade Labor management, international treaty

Commission Choose, investigate Search committee, jury

Design Create, develop Research and development team, marketinggroup

Advisory Diagnose, suggest Quality circle, steering committee

Service Provide, repair Fast food, auto service team

Production Build, assemble Home construction, automotive assembly

Action

Medical Treat, heal Surgery, emergency room

Response Protect, rescue Fire station, paramedics

Military Neutralize, protect Infantry squad, tank crew

Transportation Convey, haul Airline cockpit, train crew

Sports Compete, win Baseball, soccer

SOURCE: Adapted from D. J. Devine, 2002

354 CHAPTER 12

Teams also differ in terms of their source ororigin. Some teams, such as the young engineersbuilding a prototype of a computer in a garage, ahighly organized study team, or an expedition wouldall be member-founded teams. Other teams, in con-trast, are begun by individuals or authorities outsidethe team. The team that pulls the tarp over thebaseball field when the rains starts and the teamsthat play on that field during the game would bemandated teams (or concocted teams), because thosewho created them are not actually members of theteam (Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000). Complexorganizations, such as large corporations, usuallyinclude both types of teams.

Appropriate Autonomy One of the key aspectsof teams—one that sets teams apart from manyother groups—is their degree of autonomy. Someteams are semi-autonomous or supervisor-led, for

they have a formally recognized leader who is res-ponsible for organizing the members and reviewingtheir performance. Other teams, in contrast, aremore autonomous, for these teams can managetheir own work-related activities, including theirown operating procedures and structures (Stewart,2006; Sundstrom et al., 2000).

Hackman’s (1986) model of team autonomy isshown in Figure 12.1. The model describes, alongthe left side of the figure, four different levels ofcontrol: execution of the task itself, managing thework process, designing the team itself within theorganization context, and leading the team by set-ting its overall mission and objectives. Each step upthis hierarchy increases the team’s autonomy. Themodel also identifies, along the bottom of the chart,four types of teams that differ in their degree ofresponsibility and autonomy. In a manager-ledteam, members do the work of the team, but

Setting overalldirection

Manager-ledteam

Self-managingteam

Self-designingteam

Self-governingteam

Designing theperforming

team and itscontext

Monitoring andmanaging work

processes

Executing thetask

Team’sOwn

Responsibility

Area ofManagementResponsibility

F I G U R E 12.1 The authority matrix: Four levels of team self-management.

SOURCE: Hackman, J. R. (1986). “The psychology of self-management in organizations.” In Michael S. Pallak and Robert O. Perloff (Eds.), Psychology andwork: Productivity, change, and employment. (pp. 89–136). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. doi: 10.1037/10055-003 p. 92

TEAMS 355

someone external to the group—their manager, forexample—carries out all executive functions for theteam. Members of self-managing teams have moreautonomy, for they are charged with both execut-ing the task and monitoring and managing theteam’s work. Self-designing teams enjoy more dis-cretion in terms of control over their team’s design,for they have the authority to change the team it-self. The team’s leader sets the direction, but theteam members have full responsibility for doingwhat needs to be done to get the work accomplished.Finally, members of self-governing teams have re-sponsibility for all four of the major functions listedin Figure 12.1. They decide what is to be done, struc-ture the team and its context, manage their ownperformance, and actually carry out the work. TheMountain Medical cardiac surgery team was such aself-governing team. The surgeon who founded theteam was the one who lobbied the hospital to try thenew procedure, and he worked closely with staff todesign the team. The team, as it worked, closelymonitored its processes and the team members them-selves completed the work.

When to Team?

Not all tasks require the skills, attentions, and re-sources of a group of people working in closecollaboration. Teams, with their greater resources,goal-focus, and vast potential, are becoming thedefault choice in a variety of performance settings,but some caution is needed before rushing to forma team to solve a problem. Studies of group perfor-mance and decision making (see Chapters 10 and 11,respectively) suggest that groups are not all gainwithout loss. A team may be the best choice in agiven situation, but that choice should be shapedby an analysis of the task at hand rather than thepopularity of the method.

In general, as tasks become more difficult,complex, and consequential, the more likely peoplewill prefer to complete them through coordinatedactivity rather than individual action (Karau &Williams, 1993; Zander, 1985).

■ How difficult is the task? In some circumstances,people are faced with tasks that are well

beyond the skills and resources of a singleindividual. No one person, no matter howtalented, can compile a dictionary of all thewords in the English language, construct anuclear power plant, or overthrow a politicaldictator. Other tasks are difficult ones becausethey require enormous amounts of time orstrength. One talented individual could build acar or dig a 100-yard-long trench, but a crewof workers will accomplish these tasks far morequickly and with better results. The duration ofthe task also influences its difficulty. Projectsthat take months or years to complete are bestattempted by multiple individuals, so that thework continues even when specific individualsleave the team.

■ How complex is the task? A single person cannotperform Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony orcompete against the New York Yankees.Individuals may be able to carry out specificassignments with great skill, but some tasksinvolve multiple interdependent subtasks thatmust each be completed in a specific sequencebefore the goal is reached.

■ How important is the task? Problems are notequal in their overall significance. A flat tire ora bad head cold pale in importance whencompared to inequalities in the criminal justicesystem, uncontrolled pollution, and heart dis-ease. When the effects of succeeding or failingat a task are consequential for many people fora long period of time, individuals are morelikely to collaborate with others.

Other, more psychological and interpersonal,factors also influence people’s interest in collaborat-ing with others. Many people prefer to carry outtheir work in the company of other people, and soeven when others are more of a distraction than ahelp, they prefer to work in teams rather thanalone. When individuals fear that they will beblamed for a bad decision or outcome, they mightform a team to make the decision to avoid fullresponsibility for the negative outcome (Leary &Forsyth, 1987). People may even found a team orjoin an existing team so that they can enjoy the

356 CHAPTER 12

fruits of the team’s labors without having to investvery much of their own personal time. As shown inChapter 10, when people’s individual contributionsto a group’s goal are not easily identified, they oftendo less than their fair share.

Teams are also sometimes used because theyare popular, rather than effective or appropriate.Just as the “romance of leadership” describes peo-ple’s tendency to put too much faith in their leadersas saviors who will rescue them when they face dif-ficult circumstances, the romance of teams is a“faith in the effectiveness of team-based work thatis not supported by, or is even inconsistent with,

relevant empirical evidence” (Allen & Hecht, 2004,p. 440). As Edwin Locke and his colleagues (2001,p. 501) put it: “the emphasis on groups and teamshas gone far beyond any rational assessment of theirpractical usefulness. We are in the age of groupo-mania.” They suggest a careful consideration of thedemands of the task before committing to using ateam to perform it (see Focus 12.1).

F o c u s 12.1 When Were Teams Invented?

The word “team” derives from the old English, Frisianand Norse word for a bridle and thence to a set ofdraught animals harnessed together and, by analogy,to a number of persons involved in a joint action.

—Annett and Stanton (2001, p. 1045)

Teams are everywhere today, but for centuries humansdid not work in teams—the word was reserved forharnessed animals. Apparently groups of humansworking collectively were not called a team until the1600s, when Ben Jonson wrote in Bartholomew Fayre,“Twere like falling into a whole Shire of butter: theyhad need be a teeme of Dutchmen, should draw himout” (OED Online, 1989).

Even then, teams were not the first choice fororganizing individuals in work-related settings. Formany years, experts assumed that people do not like towork and must be prodded into action by the promiseof financial incentives, close supervision, and cleargoals that they can attain with little effort. The expertsconsidered workers to be mere “adjuncts to machines,”and they designed workplaces in which employeesdid not waste time talking to one another (Taylor,1923). There were notable exceptions to this tendency—including the famous Hawthorne studies of productivitythat suggested that gains in performance could beachieved if individuals worked in collaborative, cohesivegroups under favorable conditions—but it was not untilthe second half of the 20th century that teams begantheir ascension to prominence.

Eric Sundstrom and his associates (2000), in theirbrief history of teams, observe that teams were rarelyused outside of sports and military settings even into

the 1950s. It was not until the 1960s that complaintsabout the authoritarian nature of most organizationsprompted a search for alternatives (Likert, 1967;McGregor, 1960). Heeding the call for worker auton-omy and participation in decision making, a number ofcompanies began experimenting with true teams:General Motors used teams rather than an assemblyline in one of its truck factories; General Foods set upautonomous work teams at its Topeka, Kansas plant;the Banner Company, a large manufacturer, set upwork groups with varying levels of authority andorganizational overlap; and Volvo and Saab bothbegan using teams in their production plants.

From these initial beginnings organizations be-gan relying on teams for production, management,distribution, and general decision making. Half theworkers in the United States now belong to at leastone team at work. Almost all Fortune 500 companiesuse project teams, and the majority charge long-termteams with responsibility for a variety of tasks. Teamsare used by a majority of all larger organizations inthe United States, and in countries like Sweden andJapan, the use of teams approaches 100% (Devineet al., 1999). Nonprofit organizations, such as healthcare organizations and public service corporations, areparticularly heavy adopters of team approaches towork (81%), followed by such blue collar industries asconstruction, manufacturing, and retail sales (50%),and white collar industries like banking, real estate,and insurance (34%). The modern organization isno longer a network of individuals, but rather anetwork of interconnected teams (Kozlowski &Bell, 2003).

romance of teams The intuitive appeal of teams as ef-fective means of improving performance in business andorganizational settings, despite the relative lack of defini-tive evidence supporting their utility.

TEAMS 357

The I-P-O Model of Teams

Teams are often conceptualized as complex per-formance systems. They emerge from and in turn sus-tain patterns of coordinated interdependences amongindividual members (see Chapter 2). Teams, becauseof their great emphasis on achievement of desiredgoals, aremore likely thanmost groups to plan, priorto action, a strategy to enact over a given timeperiod, seek feedback about the effectiveness ofthe plan and implementation, andmake adjustmentsto procedures and operations on the basis of thatanalysis (Arrow et al., 2000; Kozlowski et al., 1999).Rather than assuming that variables in the system arelinked to one another in simple, one-to-one rela-tionships, systems theory recognizes factors that setthe stage for teamwork (inputs), that facilitate orinhibit the nature of the teamwork (processes), anda variety of consequences that result from the team’sactivities (outputs). This assumption is the basis ofthe well-known input– process–output model of teamsshown in Figure 12.2.■ Inputs include any antecedent factors that may

influence, directly or indirectly, the team mem-bers and the team itself. These antecedents includeindividual-level factors (e.g., who is on the teamand what are their strengths and weakness),

team- level factors (e.g., how large is the team andwhat resources does it control), and environmen-tal-level factors (e.g., how does this team workwith other units within the organization).

■ Processes are operations and activities thatmediate the relationship between the inputfactors and the team’s outcomes. These pro-cesses include steps taken to plan the team’sactivities; initiating actions and monitoringprocesses; and processes that focus oninterpersonal aspects of the team’s system, suchas dealing with conflict and increasing mem-bers’ sense of commitment to the team (Marks,Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001).

■ Outputs are the consequences of the team’sactivities. The team’s emphasis on outcomemeans that the tangible results of the teameffort draw the most attention—did the teamwin or lose, is the team’s product high inquality or inadequate, did the team successfullycomplete the operation or did it kill thepatient—but other outcomes are alsoimportant, including changes in the team’scohesiveness or the degree to which it changedso that it will be able to deal with similar tasksmore efficiently in the future.

Individual-levelfactors

(e.g., personality,knowledge, skills, abilities) Performance

outcomes(e.g., performance quality, speed to solution, number

of errors) Groupinteraction

process

Team-level factors

(e.g., structure, level of cohesiveness, group size)

Environment-levelfactors

(e.g., reward structure,level of stress)

Other outcomes(e.g., member satisfaction, team adaptation, member

development)

F I G U R E 12.2 The traditional Input–Process–Output (I-P-O) model of team performance.

SOURCE: Adapted from: Hackman, J. R., & Morris, C. G. (1975). “Group tasks, group interaction process, and group performance effectiveness: A reviewand proposed integration.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 8, 47–99. Reprinted by permission of J. Richard Hackman.

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The I-P-O model, despite years of steady ser-vice to researchers studying teams, is a relativelysimplistic model of a highly complex interpersonalsystem, and three specific limitations are worth not-ing. First, the model, with its categorization offactors as inputs, processes, or outputs, understatesthe complex interdependencies among the variablesthat influence team performance. Second, someof the so-called “processes” within the process cat-egory are not actually processes at all, but rathercharacteristics of the team that emerge over timeas members interact with one another. These emer-gent states certainly influence the team’s outcomes,but it would be more accurate to call them media-tors of the relationship between inputs and outputrather than processes. Third, given that the I-P-Omodel is a systems theory, it is essential to alwaysconsider feedback processes that occur over time.The model is often interpreted as a sequential one,with inputs leading to processes/mediators and theseleading to outcomes; but the reverse causal se-quences are also a part of the complete model. Inconsequence, some suggest that the I-P-O modelshould be reconfigured into an Input–Mediator–Output–Input model (the I-M-O-I) to indicatethe diversity of elements in the process stage andthe fact that the outputs feed back to become inputs(Ilgen et al., 2005; Marks et al., 2001).

These limitations not withstanding, the I-P-Omodel provides a heuristic framework for this chap-ter’s examination of teams. The next section con-siders team composition, with a focus on who isrecruited to the team and how their personal quali-ties shape the team’s interaction. The chapter thenturns to issues of process, including teamwork andcognitive work, before considering ways to evalu-ate the effectiveness of teams.

BUILD ING THE TEAM

In 1996, hospitals around the United States beganconsidering adopting noninvasive surgical methodsfor cardiac surgeries. Technological developmentsensured that the procedure was a safe one, buteach hospital needed to determine how to change

from the traditional method to the newer proce-dure (Pisano et al., 2001).

Nearly all hospitals settled on a team approach:They would create teams of physicians, nurses, andtechnicians who would study the method and imple-ment it locally once they had mastered its demands.One hospital, given here the fictitious name ofChelsea Hospital, put the chief of cardiac surgery incharge of building the team. He was an extremelyskilled surgeon, but he did not view the new sur-gery as much of a challenge. He was also verybusy, and did not get involved in selecting themembers of his team. The composition of theChelsea team was determined by seniority andwho was available to attend the three-day offsitetraining session.

Mountain Medical did things a little differentlyfrom Chelsea. The young surgeon, who was newto the hospital, volunteered to get the team started.He talked with the staff in all the departments, andhe picked people for the team “based on theirexperience working together” rather than their sen-iority (Edmondson et al., 2001, p. 128). He waspart of the team during the training sessions, andheld meetings with physicians in other departmentsto share information about the procedure and toidentify the best patients for referrals. The membersof the team met regularly, prior to the procedure,to walk through the basic steps and to share infor-mation about what each of them would be doingand how their actions fit with what the other mem-bers of the team were doing.

Gary Pisano, Richard Bohmer, and AmyEdmondson (2001), who studied 16 hospitals thatused the new method, discovered that thingsworked out differently for Chelsea Hospital andMountain Medical. The Chelsea team did notlose patients, but the operations took longer thanthey should have, even after they gained experiencewith the procedure. Mountain Medical, in contrast,performed the first few operations slowly, but thenbecame one of the fastest and most effective surgicalteams in the group of 16 studied—despite being ledby the one of the least experienced surgeons.

Mountain Medical, like most teams, owesmuch of its success to its composition: the

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individuals who were selected to make up the team.All teams are composites formed by the joiningtogether of multiple, relatively independent indivi-duals. Each member of the group brings to the teama set of unique personal experiences, interests, skills,abilities, and motivations, which merge togetherwith the personal qualities of all the other individualmembers to form the team as a whole (Moreland,Levine, & Wingert, 1996).

The Team Player

Mountain Medical deliberately sought out “teamplayers” for their surgical team. Such people areoften identified on the basis of their personalities,for people assume that some people, by tempera-ment, make better teammates than others. Is acold, emotionally unstable, narrow-minded personsomeone to recruit for a team that is attempting achallenging task where lives are at stake? Or, wouldthe team be more likely to prosper if composed ofpeople who are outgoing, stable, and conscientious?

As with other group processes, including affili-ation (Chapter 4) and leadership (Chapter 9), the

qualities identified in the big five theory of person-ality have been linked, reliably, to team perfor-mance (Bell, 2007; see Table 4.1). The big fivetheory recognizes that people differ from each otherin many ways, but it assumes that extraversion,agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability(low neuroticism), and openness are all qualities thatfacilitate working on teams. As Figure 12.3 suggests,extraversion is consistent with a number of desirablequalities in a teammate: affiliativeness, social percep-tiveness, expressivity, and, to a lesser extent, leader-ship (dominance). Similarly, agreeableness, whichconnotes trust and cooperation, and conscientious-ness’s suggestion of dependability, dutifulness, andachievement are also likely team-promoting quali-ties. Even emotional stability and openness are likelyassociated with success working with others, sincethey are indicators of adjustment, confidence (self-esteem), and flexibility.

A recent meta-analysis confirmed thesepredictions, with some qualifications (Bell, 2007;Peeters et al., 2006). Studies of teams working inlaboratory settings showed little associationbetween personality and performance. The studies

.24.12 .25.16.05

Teamwork

EmotionalStability

Extraversion OpennessAgreeable-

nessConscien-tiousness

Dominance

Affiliation

Socialperceptiveness

Expressivity

FlexibilityAdjustment

Self-esteem

Trust

Cooperation

Dependability

Dutifulness

Achievement

Efficacy

F I G U R E 12.3 Hierarchical model of personality characteristics and facets related to teamwork.

SOURCE: Adapted from Driskell, J. E., Goodwin, G. F., Salas, E., & O’Shea, P. G. (2006). “What makes a good team player? Personality and team effectiveness.”Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 10, 249–271. doi: 10.1037/1089-2699.10.4.249

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of teams in organizational settings, in contrast,revealed the small, but consistent, correlationsshown in Figure 12.3. All were significant, exceptfor the emotional stability–performance relation-ship; this personality trait did not predict howwell the team member performed once on theteam (Driskell et al., 2006).

Researchers have also examined other person-ality variables, in addition to those emphasized bythe big five, including assertiveness (Pearsall & Ellis,2006), Type A tendency (Keinan & Koren, 2002),locus of control (Boone et al., 2004), and achieve-ment motivation (LePine, 2003). In many cases, theeffects of these variables depend, in part, on theentire team’s composition and the situational con-text. In one investigation, for example, researchersdistinguished between people who were Type Asor Type Bs. Type A individuals tend to be aggres-sive, competitive, and excessively time oriented,but they are also high in their achievement orienta-tion. Type B individuals, in contrast, are more re-laxed and slow-going. Researchers then createdteams, being careful to control the number ofType As and Bs in each. They made some teamsall Type A, others all Type B, and some teamswith a mixture of both types. After they workedtogether for a time, the members of these teamswere asked to indicate level of satisfaction with theirteam and its members. In general, people were moresatisfied when their teammates were similar in termsof personality. Teams composed of all Type As orall Type Bs were rated as more satisfying by theirmembers than were teams where Type As and Bswere mixed together. Teams of only Type As did,however, get a lot more done (Keinan & Koren,2002).

Knowledge, Skill, and Ability (KSA)

Some teams fail because they simply do not includepeople with the qualities and characteristics neededfor success at the task. A team struggling to generatesolutions to math puzzles may not have any math-ematicians at the table. A soccer team made up ofslow-moving defensive fullbacks but no offensive

goal scorers will likely lose. A team’s performancedepends, in part, on its members’ knowledge, skills,and abilities, or KSAs.

What KSAs are important to teams? On thetask side, teams whose members are more skilledat the work to be done outperform teams com-posed of less-skilled members. A team of mediocreindividuals can, with enough practice, good leader-ship, and determination, reach lofty goals, but it isdifficult to make a silk purse out of a bunch of sow’sears (Devine & Philips, 2001; Ellis et al., 2003).Teams that succeed in creating new products andsolutions to long-standing problems are generallystaffed by individuals of high intelligence, moti-vation, and energy (see Focus 12.2). Studies ofsport teams indicate that “the best individualsmake the best team” (Gill, 1984, p. 325). In manysports, the players’ offensive and defensive perfor-mances can be tracked so that their skill levels canbe identified accurately. These qualities can then beused to calculate the statistical aggregation of thetalent level of the team, which can be comparedto the team’s outcomes. Such analyses indicatethat the correlation between the aggregation of in-dividual members’ ability and team performance isvery strong: .91 in football, .94 in baseball, and .60in basketball ( Jones, 1974; Widmeyer, 1990). Therelationship is somewhat reduced in basketball be-cause this sport requires more coordination amongmembers and the teams are smaller in size. Hence,the team members’ ability to play together mayhave a larger impact on the outcome of a basketballgame, whereas the sheer level of ability of playershas a greater impact on a football or baseball game’soutcome.

On the social side, members must be able to workwell with others on joint tasks (Cannon-Bowers,Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995; Stevens &Campion, 1994). Although different teams requiredifferent skills of their members, many perfor-mance settings reward individuals who are skilled

KSAs Acronym for knowledge, skills, abilities, and othercharacteristics that are needed to complete a job or tasksuccessfully.

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in conflict resolution, can collaborate with othersto solve problems, and are good communicators(Morgeson, Reider, & Campion, 2005). Conflictresolution KSAs include the ability to distinguishbetween harmful and constructive conflicts andan emphasis on integrative dispute resolutionskills rather than a confrontational orientation.Collaborative problem-solving KSAs involve skillin using group approaches to decision making.Communication KSAs require a range of finelytuned listening and messaging skills, including thecapacity to engage in small talk: “to engage in ritual

greetings and small talk, and a recognition of theirimportance” (Stevens & Campion, 1994, p. 505).

How, for example, would you respond if youfound yourself in the following situation: You andyour coworkers do not agree about “who shoulddo a very disagreeable, but routine task” (Stevens &Campion, 1999, p. 225). Should you:

A. have your supervisor decide, because thiswould avoid any personal bias?

B. arrange for a rotating schedule so everyoneshares the chore?

F o c u s 12.2 What Makes a Team Great?

Great groups are inevitably forged by people unafraidof hiring people better than themselves.

—Warren Bennis and Patricia Ward Biederman(1997, p. 12)

There are good teams, but there are also great teams.Many work crews can build houses and put out fires,but only a handful are capable of building a 40-storyskyscraper or capping a burning wellhead on an oilderrick. Many sports teams play excellent soccer andbaseball, but there is only one Manchester United; onlyone Boston Red Sox. There are excellent-performingorchestras, but only one Berlin Philharmonic. Manyspace crews have flown into orbit around theEarth, but only a few have traveled to the Moonand back.

What are the ingredients for a work group thatmakes remarkable advances in science, technology, art,and education? Warren Bennis and Patricia WardBiederman (1997) studied seven such groups, includingthe Walt Disney Studios of the 1930s, which createdthe first full-length animated film; the members ofLockheed’s Skunk Works, who designed the firstsupersonic jets and stealth fighters; and the Palo AltoResearch Center (PARC), which invented, among otherthings, laser printers, the ethernet and e-mail, themouse, and a graphical user interface for personalcomputers. Although each group was unique in manyways, Bennis and Biederman traced much of theirsuccess back to their composition. Walt Disney, thefounder and leader of the Disney Studios, recruited thefinest animators in the world to work together tocreate his films. The members of PARC were creative

engineers who knew more about computing thananyone else on the planet. Those at Skunk Works wererecruited from every unit in Lockheed and charged towork in secret to build planes that could fly faster thanthe speed of sound.

Many of the members of these groups were rela-tively young men and women who lacked experience,but they had no fear of failure. Many were “fueled byan invigorating, completely unrealistic view of whatthey can accomplish” (Bennis & Biederman, 1997,p. 15). But their most essential characteristic was theirtalent and expertise. If a team is assembled from rela-tively mediocre individuals who are good, but notgreat, at what they do, then that team will likely be amediocre one. People naively assume that synergisticeffects are common in teams, but they rarely outper-form the level of their most effective member. Asinfluential as teams are in terms of organizing andmotivating members, even they can rarely work thetransformational magic needed to turn the adequateinto the excellent. Careful design and leadership can-not take a team beyond the limits set by the skills andcapabilities of the individual members.

Bennis and Biederman did find that skilled lead-ership was critical in all the teams they studied, butthese leaders’ primary contribution to the team wastheir effectiveness in recruiting and retaining giftedindividual members. Leaders must not be afraid to hirepeople who are far more talented than they are, for“recruiting the right genius for the job is the first stepin building many great collaborations. Great groupsare inevitably forged by people unafraid of hiringpeople better than themselves” (p. 12).

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C. let the workers who show up earliest chooseon a first-come, first-served basis?

D. randomly assign a person to do the task and notchange it?

Or what if you wanted to improve the quality andflow of conversations among the members of theteams. Should you:

A. use comments that build upon and connect towhat others have already said?

B. set up a specific order for everyone to speakand then follow it?

C. let team members with more to say determinethe direction and topic of conversation?

D. do all of the above?

According to the Teamwork-KSA Test (Stevens& Campion, 1999), the best choice, in the situationin which you were arguing with others about whomust do the unpleasant chore, is option B.In contrast, the best choice in terms of KSAsfor interpersonal skill for the second question isoption A. An individual who scores well on theTeamwork-KSA test is more likely to cooperate“with others in the team,” “help other team membersaccomplish their work,” and talk “to other teammem-bers before taking actions that might affect them”(Morgeson, Reider, & Campion, 2005, p. 611).

Diversity

The Mountain Medical team was, in some ways, arelatively homogeneous team. Members were simi-lar in terms of ethnicity, skill level, age, motivation,background, and experience with the new proce-dure. They were, however, heterogeneous withregard to sex, status in the hospital, and training.Would these differences make a difference whenthey pulled together to form a team?

The diversity of a team is determined by theextent to which members are different from oneanother. A sample of the many ways that peopledo, in fact, differ from each other is shown inTable 12.2, which identifies six general clusters ofdifferences: social categories, knowledge and skills,values and beliefs, personality, status, and socialconnections (Mannix & Neale, 2005). Some ofthese differences pertain to demographic qualitiesof people, such as race and sex. Others are basedon differences in knowledge and skill, and are bet-ter considered to be informational or functionalvariations.

Diversity and Team Performance From a strictlyinformational perspective, diverse teams shouldwin out against less diverse ones. Diversity bringsvariety to the team, and with that variety shouldcome a broader range of expertise, knowledge,insight, and ideas. A team like Mountain Medical

T A B L E 12.2 Categories and Types of Diversity

Categories Types of Diversity

Social-category differences Race, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, sexual orientation,physical abilities

Differences in knowledge or skills Education, functional knowledge, information, expertise,training, experience, abilities

Differences in values or beliefs Cultural background, ideological beliefs, political orientation

Personality differences Cognitive style, affective disposition, motivational factors

Organizational- or community-status differences Tenure or length of service, title

Differences in social and network ties Work-related ties, friendship ties, community ties, in-groupmembership

SOURCE: E. Mannix and M. A. Neale, “What Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations.” PsychologicalScience in the Public Interest, 6, 31–55. Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Society.

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faces a stressful, difficult situation, and it needs allthe data it can find to help it identify ways tosucceed in such a trying situation. If a team is com-posed of highly similar individuals, then they bringthe same information and insights to the team, sothey are less able to identify new strategies andsolutions. A diverse team, in contrast, should max-imize performance, particularly in situations wheresuccess is not determined by the capacity to applytraditional solutions.

But diversity has a possible downside. Diversitycan also separate members of the team from oneanother (Harrison & Klein, 2007). As social catego-rization theory suggests (Chapters 2 and 3), indivi-duals are quick to categorize other people based ontheir membership in social groups. Although themembers of a team should think of each other as“we” or “us,” when members belong to a variety ofsocial categories some members of the team may beviewed as “they” and “them” (van Knippenberg,De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Diversity may there-fore create faultlines within the team, and whenthe team experiences tension, it may break apartalong these divisions (Lau & Murnighan, 1998).As Chapter 5 noted, because people are attractedto those who are similar to them, homogeneousteams tend to be cohesive teams, and so membersmay be more willing to perform the supportive,cooperative actions that are so essential for teamsuccess.

Given these advantages and disadvantages asso-ciated with diversity, it is no wonder that theresearch literature does not provide a definitive an-swer to the question “Do diverse teams outperformless diverse, homogenous teams?” (Horwitz &Horwitz, 2007; Stewart, 2006). Diversity, whenbased on information and expertise, tends to im-prove team outcomes, particularly on difficult tasks(Bowers, Pharmer, & Salas, 2000). When membersvary in ability, then by definition the team willinclude at least one individual with high ability.Some homogeneous teams will be uniformlyunskilled, so these teams will perform particularlybadly at their task. As studies of social compensationdiscussed in Chapter 10 suggest, heterogeneousteams may also become more productive because

the low-performing members are motivated bythe high standards set by the others in the team,and the others in the team may also be a sourceof help and assistance as the low performers workto increase their performance.

But other types of diversity, such as variationsin ethnicity, race, age, and sex, influence perfor-mance less reliably. Teams of researchers weremore productive when they joined with researchersfrom other disciplines (Pelz, 1956, 1967), but topmanagement teams and work groups were less pro-ductive and experienced more turnover when theirmembers varied noticeably in age and tenure(Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Managementteams in banks that were diverse in terms of theireducational histories and backgrounds were moreinnovative than teams that were homogeneous( Jackson, 1992), but diversity in affective levels—substantial and continuing variations in positive andnegative mood—within top management teamswas associated with declines in the firm’s financialperformance (Barsade et al., 2000). Teams that in-cluded Asian, African, Hispanic, and EuropeanAmericans outperformed teams that only includedEuropean Americans (McLeod, Lobel, & Cox,1996), but a study of 151 teams in three large or-ganizations indicated that those individuals whowere more unlike the other members of their teamsfelt the least psychologically connected to them andhad higher rates of absenteeism (Tsui, Egan, &O’Reiley, 1992).

Designing for Diversity These conflicting find-ings attest to the mixed benefits and limitations of-fered by diversity in teams. Diverse teams may bebetter at coping with changing work conditions,because their wider range of talents and traits en-hances their flexibility. Diverse teams, however, maylack cohesion, because members may perceive oneanother as dissimilar. Heterogeneity may increaseconflict within the team (Mannix & Neale, 2005;van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Williams &O’Reilly, 1998).

Steps can, however, be taken to minimize thenegative side-effects of diversity and maximize di-versity’s gains. First, diverse teams will need time to

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work through the initial period in which differ-ences between people based on their surface-levelqualities—race, sex, age—lower the team’s overalllevel of cohesiveness. Intervention may also be re-quired when, after time, members have discoveredthat these surface-level differences are unimportant,but that their deep-level differences in values and prin-ciples are causing unexpected turbulence in theteam (Harrison et al., 2002). Second, because teamsexist in an organizational context, the nature of thatorganization’s culture will influence how team-mates respond to diversity. If the organization’s cul-ture encourages collectivistic values and minimizesdistinctions based on tenure and status, then diverseteammates tend to behave more cooperatively thanthey would in more traditional organizations(Chatman & Spataro, 2005). Third, to minimizeconflict between team members from different so-cial categories, steps should be taken to minimizeany tendency to draw distinctions between peoplebased on their category memberships (see Chapter 14).Team leaders should remind members of the im-portance of involving all members of the team inthe process, and make certain that individuals in theminority do not become isolated from the rest ofthe team (see Chapter 7’s analysis of minorityinfluence).

Men, Women, and Teams

Same-sex teams are becoming increasingly anachro-nistic. Whereas women were once barred frommany types of teams in business and organizationalsettings, changes in social climate—and in employ-ment law—have increased sex-based diversity inthe workforce.

These changes are not welcomed as progress inall quarters of society, or recognized as adaptive byall theories of collective action. Some evolutionaryanthropologists, for example, argue that the pres-ence of women in previously all-male teams maydisrupt the functioning of such teams in substantialways. This perspective suggests that it was males,and not females, who affiliated in same-sex groupsfor adaptive reasons, so that over time male bond-ing became a stronger psychological force than

female bonding. In consequence, heterogeneouslygendered teams may be less productive than same-sex teams, since all-male teams would be morecohesive than mixed-sex teams. Bonding theoristsalso suggest “the difficulty females experience inmale work groups is not that males dislike femalesbut rather that the force of their enthusiasm for fe-males can disrupt the work and endanger the integ-rity of groups of men” (Tiger & Fox, 1998, p. 145).

The data do not support either the idea thatmales bond more cohesively in all-male groupsthan females bond in all-female groups, or that inconsequence male teams outperform female teams.Wendy Wood (1987), after reviewing 52 studies ofsex differences in group performance, noted thattwo factors covaried with sex differences in groupperformance—task content and interaction style.First, in the studies that favored men, the contentof the task was more consistent with the typicalskills, interests, and abilities of men than of women.Groups of men were better at tasks that requiredmath or physical strength, whereas groups of womenexcelled on verbal tasks. Second, Wood suggestedthat sex differences in performance are influencedby the different interaction styles that men andwomen often adopt in groups. Men more frequentlyenact a task-oriented interaction style, whereaswomen tend to enact an interpersonally orientedinteraction style. Thus, men outperform women(to a small extent) when success is predicated on ahigh rate of task activity, and women outperformmen when success depends on a high level of socialactivity (Wood, Polek, & Aiken, 1985).

But what of mixed-gender teams—teams thatinclude both men and women? Studies of men andwomen working together in teams suggest thatsuch teams, because of their diversity, have greaterinformational resources than same-sex teams, and soexcel at tasks that require a broad range of expertise,experience, and information. However, sexism,sexual harassment, and stereotyping continue todog such teams. As with other forms of diversity,sex-based diversity can create subgroups within theteam and increase levels of conflict. Diverse teamsmust also deal with problems of proportion, partic-ularly when very few men are entering into groups

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that were traditionally staffed by women and viceversa. Teams that achieve diversity by adding onlyone or two members of a social category, such as ateam with one woman and many men, tend toencounter more problems than homogeneousteams. When work groups include a single tokenor “solo,” woman, for example, coworkers aremore likely to categorize each other in terms oftheir sex (see Chapter 6). Solo members are alsoscrutinized more than other group members, andthis unwanted attention may make them so appre-hensive that their performance suffers (Kanter, 1977).Token members are more often targets of sexismand prejudice (Fiske, 1993) and must, in many cases,work harder and express higher levels of commit-ment to the group to overcome other members’biases (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Ridgeway, 1982).

In some cases, teams with token members willoutperform homogeneous teams, even when theteams attempt tasks that are traditionally reservedfor homogeneous teams. For example, one teamof researchers watched groups working on a wilder-ness survival exercise—an activity that favors peoplewho have a knowledge of the outdoors. Groups ofmen generally outperformed women, but groups ofmen that included one woman performed best of all.The researchers speculated that the addition of awoman to the otherwise all-male groups may havetempered the men’s tendency to compete with oneanother and, thus, helped them to function as a team(Rogelberg & Rumery, 1996).

Hackman and his colleagues have explored thecomplex relationships among gender diversity, theproportion of men and women, and the organiza-tional context in their studies of a particular type ofteam: the concert orchestra (Allmendinger, Hackman,& Lehman, 1996; Hackman, 2003). Many of theorchestras they studied were in the midst of a transi-tion from all-male groups to groups that includedboth men and women. Some orchestras were onlybeginning this transition, for they included veryfew women (2% was the lowest), whereas otherswere more heterogeneous (up to 59% women).When they measured members’ work motivationand overall satisfaction with their orchestras, theydiscovered that orchestras with a larger proportion

of female members were viewed more negatively.This tendency was more pronounced among themen in the group, and also in countries with tradi-tional conceptions of the role of men and women insociety. Hackman wrote:

Life in a homogeneously male orchestrasurely is not much affected by the presenceof one or two women, especially if theyplay a gendered instrument such as a harp.Larger numbers of women, however, canbecome a worrisome presence on high-status turf that previously had been anexclusively male province, engenderingintergroup conflicts that stress all playersand disrupt the social dynamics of theorchestra. (2003, p. 908)

WORKING IN TEAMS

Chelsea Hospital and Mountain Medical both facedthe same problem, and they both decided to solve theproblem by forming a team. But they designed theirteams differently. Both teams included a scrubnurse, a perfusionist, an anesthesiologist, and a car-diac surgeon, and each trained so carefully that theywere skilled at the tasks they needed to perform.But the leaders of the two teams had different viewsabout how they should work together. The youngsurgeon who headed the team at Mountain Medicalinsisted that everyone’s ideas would be considered,and during the operation itself he asked that every-one communicate with everyone else and not focuson only their own duties. Chelsea’s head surgeon,in contrast, believed that most of the staff were sowell-trained that they were interchangeable. Hedid not stress the importance of teamwork, andexplained, “Once I get the team set up, I neverlook up [from the operating field]. It’s they whohave to make sure that everything is flowing”(Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001, p. 128).

Teamwork

Before Mountain Medical carried out its first sur-gery the members of the team had already worked,

366 CHAPTER 12

for weeks, as a team. They met regularly to discussthe procedure, and all had trained together for threedays offsite in a simulated operation procedure. Theyhad discussed the sequence of steps that wouldbegin with an anesthetized patient and end with arepaired heart, so that when it was time to worktogether, they functioned as a team.

Teamwork is the psychological, behavioral,and mental work that members of the team carryout as they collaborate with one another on thevarious tasks and subtasks that they must completeto reach their desired goal. A team may includemany talented individuals, but they must learnhow to pool their individual abilities and energiesto maximize the team’s performance. Team goalsmust be set, work patterns structured, and a senseof group identity developed. Individual membersmust learn how to coordinate their actions, andany strains and stresses in interpersonal relationsneed to be identified and resolved (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Cohen & Bailey, 1997).

A functional approach to teamwork beginswith a simple question: What does an effectiveteam look like as it carries out its work? Such ananalysis recognizes that teams are complex systems,but examines closely the tendencies and patterns ofteams’ interactions, searching for the core processesthat sustain that complexity. What, for example, didthe Mountain Medical team do as it prepared for,conducted, and completed each of its operations?And how did Mountain Medical differ from lesseffective teams—ones that were more dysfunctionalrather than effective?

Table 12.3 presents one such functional analy-sis, developed by Michelle Marks, John Mathieu,and Stephen Zaccaro (2001). Their taxonomy ofteamwork functions stresses three key processes:transitioning, acting, and managing interpersonalrelations among members. Marks and her associatespoint out that teams, unlike some performance

groups, act episodically. During the initial phase oftheir work, teams plan out what they will do in laterstages, set their goals, and plan strategy. The groupthen transitions to the actual action stage, where itcarries out its assigned tasks through coordinated ac-tivity. Once this action phase is completed, the teamre-enters the transition phase and begins preparing forsubsequent tasks. Across all phases, the members arealso managing the interpersonal aspects of the team inorder to minimize conflict and maximize motivation.Thus, as Table 12.3 indicates, Marks and her associ-ates break teamwork down into three fundamentalcomponents: transition processes, action processes,and interpersonal processes.

Transition Processes Often, teams attempttasks that are so complex that they cannot becompleted, at least with any degree of success,without advance planning. The first type of tran-sition process, mission analysis, focuses on the cur-rent situation: the tasks and subtasks that must becompleted, the resources available to the team,and any environmental conditions that may influ-ence the team’s work. Teams also engage in goalspecification and strategy formulation between actionepisodes, since experience working together willprovide the members with a clearer idea of theteam’s potential and limitations. Strategy formula-tion is particularly essential if the team is unable toreach the goals it has set for itself, for by review-ing the causes of failure team members may findways to improve their efficiency and outcomes(Cannon & Edmondson, 2005).

Action Processes When teams are at work, theirtask-related actions are so perceptually vivid that theaction processes that make up the teamwork portionof their activities often go undetected. When, forexample, the Mountain Medical team began to repairthe patient’s heart, an observer watching the teamwould see a physician incising and suturing, a nursemonitoring the patient’s vital signs, and an anesthesi-ologist sedating the patient. But Marks, Mathieu, andZaccaro suggest that four other, teamwork-relatedactions are also taking place during the action period.First, the group is monitoring progress towards its goals,

teamwork The process by which members of the teamcombine their knowledge, skills, abilities, and other re-sources, through a coordinated series of actions, to pro-duce an outcome.

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as members implicitly check their own actions as wellas those performed by others. Second, systems monitor-ing involves keeping track of the resources the teamneeds, whether they be physical resources, time, oreven energy. Third, team monitoring and backup behav-ior, considered by some to be a key difference be-tween teams and task groups, occurs when onemember of the team delivers assistance to anothermember, simply because that team member needshelp. Finally, coordination of action involves a changein the behaviors of the team members so that each

one’s actions mesh with other’s actions, resulting insynchrony.

Interpersonal Processes Consistent with studiesof work groups in general, during both the transi-tion and action periods teammates must spendsome of their time tending to the relational sideof their team. To reach a high level of effectiveness,teams require a degree of unity; yet the pressuresoften encountered by groups as they strive to reachtheir goals can produce tension within the group.

T A B L E 12.3 Taxonomy of Team Processes

Process Dimension Definition

Transition processes

Mission analysis Interpretation and evaluation of the team’s mission, including identification of its maintasks as well as the operative environmental conditions and team resources available formission execution

Goal specification Identification and prioritization of goals and subgoals for mission accomplishment

Strategy formulation Development of alternative courses of action for mission accomplishment andidentification of the sequence in which subtasks will be completed

Action processes

Monitoring progresstoward goals

Tracking task and progress toward mission accomplishment, interpreting systeminformation in terms of what needs to be accomplished for goal attainment, andtransmitting progress to team members

Systems monitoring Tracking team resources and environmental conditions as they relate to missionaccomplishment, which involves (1) internal systems monitoring (tracking team resourcessuch as personnel, equipment, and other information that is generated or containedwithin the team), and (2) environmental monitoring (tracking the environmentalconditions relevant to the team)

Team monitoring andbackup behavior

Assisting team members to perform their tasks. Assistance may occur by (1) providing ateammate verbal feedback behavior or coaching, (2) helping a teammate behaviorally incarrying out actions, or (3) assuming and completing a task for a teammate

Coordination Orchestrating the sequence and timing of interdependent action

Interpersonal processes

Conflict management Preemptive conflict management involves establishing conditions to prevent, control, orguide team conflict before it occurs. Reactive conflict management involves workingthrough task and interpersonal disagreements among team members

Motivation andconfidence building

Generating and preserving a sense of collective confidence, motivation, and task-basedcohesion with regard to mission accomplishment

Affect management Regulating member emotions during mission accomplishment, including (but not limitedto) social cohesion, frustration, and excitement

SOURCE: “A Temporally Based Framework and Taxonomy of Team Processes,” by Michelle A. Marks, John E. Mathieu, and Stephen J. Zaccaro. Academy ofManagement Review, 2001, 26, 356–376. Reprinted by permission of Academy of Management via Copyright Clearance Center.

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Members of effective teams tend to reduce thethreat of such conflict to the group’s cohesionthrough conflict management. Other types of interper-sonal work required of the group members includemotivation and confidence building and affect management.

A recent meta-analytic review lends empiricalsupport to this three-level functional model ofteamwork (LePine et al., 2008). A team of research-ers identified over 150 studies that had examinedteam effectiveness and had measured, in someway, one or more of the processes in Table 12.3and also measured team performance. When theyused structural equations modeling to test the pro-posed three-category model, they discovered that itprovided a good fit for the data—the 10 second-order indicators of teamwork were organized, aspredicted, into three superordinate clusters. Theyalso discovered that each of the 10 factors was sig-nificantly correlated with performance, rangingfrom a low of .12 for systems monitoring to ahigh of .30 for both strategy formulation and moti-vation. The average correlation was .24. Thesefindings are encouraging; but even so, the list inTable 12.3 may not be complete. Such factors ascommunication (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006), pacing(Nieva, Fleishman, & Rieck, 1978), role clarifica-tion (Ross, Jones, & Adams, 2008), and creativity(Gibson et al., 2005) have also been suggested asnecessary conditions for effective teamwork.

Team Cognition

Teams need to spend time working togetherbefore they jell into an effective working unit.However, time alone is not what enhances theteam’s expertise but also what happens during thepassage of that time. As noted in the last chapter,teams improve their performance over time as theydevelop a shared understanding of the team and thetasks they are attempting. Some semblance of thismental model is present nearly from its inception,but as the team practices, differences among themembers in terms of their understanding of theirsituation and their team diminish as a consensusbecomes implicitly accepted (Tindale, Stawiski,& Jacobs, 2008).

The team mental model includes shared repre-sentations of the task—how it is to be performed,the type of results sought, the kinds of behaviorsthat are recognized as useful by the team, and soon—as well as shared representations of the team.Although team members, initially, are often poorjudges of members’ abilities, given time they be-come more proficient at recognizing, and takingadvantage of, the strengths of each team member.In one study of this process, members of groupscompleted two geography quizzes about U.S. cities,with such questions as “What city is known as theCrescent City?” and “Through what city does theTrinity River run?” Unbeknownst to the group,one of their members was a confederate who hadbeen prepped with the answers, and he answeredseven of the eight questions correctly on the firsttest. The group used some of his answers (60.3%)on the first test, but when they were given feedbackand a chance to do a second quiz, they used hisanswers almost exclusively (84.7%) (Littlepage,Robison, & Reddington, 1997; see, too, Littlepageet al., 2008; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992). Theylearned to rely on his expertise.

Transactive Memory Teams also need time todevelop transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1987).In the complex world of the operating room duringheart surgery, there is too much information aboutthe equipment, the proper settings, the instruments,the heart-lung machine, and so on, for a single in-dividual to retain it all with any degree of accuracy.The surgical team therefore distributes the informa-tion it needs to each member of the team, depend-ing on his or her role in the team and generalexpertise. Then, when the information is required,the team consults with the team member known tobe the “expert” on that particular matter, who sup-plies the necessary information, to the best of his orher ability. (see Chapter 11).

Richard Moreland and his colleagues(Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996) examinedthe development of transactive memory systemsby training volunteers to build radios from hobbykits. Each kit included a circuit board and dozensof components that had to be put in the correct

TEAMS 369

locations and connected before the radio wouldfunction. All the participants received the sametraining in the first session, but some of themworked alone practicing building the radio whereasothers practiced in three-person teams. One weeklater, the participants returned and assembled a radio,this time with an offer of a cash prize if they per-formed well. All the subjects worked in teams, butonly some of them were assigned to the same teamthey had worked with originally. These individualsoutperformed the subjects who were trained indi-vidually, apparently because they were able toform a collaborative, transactive memory for theprocedures in the first session. Moreland and his col-leagues discovered that teams that performed thebest showed signs of (a) memory differentiation—some of the team members were better at remem-bering certain parts of the assembly procedures thanothers; (b) task coordination—the team-trained teamsworked with less confusion; and (c) task credibility—the teams with stronger transactive memoriestrusted one another’s claims about the assemblyprocess.

Team Learning Because these cognitive founda-tions of teamwork develop as the teammates expe-rience working together, teams require grouprather than individual practice. Although in yearspast organizations often sent their personnel offsiteto individually receive training in team skills at in-stitutes and workshops, team members need to betrained together—as a unit—rather than separately.Only by confronting the learning situation as agroup can the team engage in team learning, whichis a “process in which a group takes action, obtainsand reflects upon feedback, and makes changes toadapt or improve” (Sessa & London, 2008, p. 5).

The success of the Mountain Medical Center’scardiac surgery team illustrates the importance oflearning as a team. The 16 hospitals that Pisano,Bohmer, and Edmondson (2001) studied all usedthe same equipment, and the operating room staffwere all trained by the equipment’s manufacturer.These highly trained surgical teams performed theirwork well, and nearly all of the patients fully recov-ered after their surgery. Some, however, recovered

more rapidly and with fewer complications thanothers, and this gain was indicated by the speed ofthe operation. None of the teams operated tooquickly, but some were relatively slow. With eachpatient, the teams improved—minimizing theamount of time that the patient was on the heart-lung machine is an indicator of recovery time—butsome teams learned more quickly than others.Surprisingly, the educational backgrounds and sur-gical experience of the teams did not predict learn-ing rates, nor did the overall support for the newprocedure by the hospital’s administrative staff. Thestatus of the head surgeon on the team was alsounrelated to learning rate, as was the amount oftime the teams spent in formal debriefing sessionsafter each case.

What did predict learning rates? The way theteams were designed and trained. In the slow-to-learn teams, the surgeons assigned to the teamhappened to be the ones who were available toattend the training session. They showed little in-terest in who was on their surgical team—in fact,the members of the team varied from case to case,violating a basic rule of good team design(Hackman, 2002). These teams did not fully realizehow intense the new surgical methods would be interms of coordination demands, and the surgeonsdid not explicitly discuss the need for greater atten-tion to teamwork.

At places like Mountain Medical, in contrast,the team surgeon was usually an advocate for theprocedure, and he or she was actively involved inselecting all the other members of the team. Theseindividuals worked together during the training ses-sions as a team, and they remained together longerduring the first cases using the new methods. Thesurgeons in these teams also stressed the importanceof working together as a team rather than theacquisition of new individual skills: “They made itclear that this reinvention of working relationshipswould require the contribution of every teammember” (Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001,p. 130). These fast learners also continued to in-crease their efficiency, as they developed an openpattern of communication where all felt free tomake suggestions for improving the work.

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Figure 12.4 provides a partial summary of thefindings for one of the fast-learning teams. Thisteam began slowly, taking much longer to finishthe procedure than most other teams. By the fifthcase, however, this team was performing at thesame speed as most other teams, and they continuedto improve their rate with each new case until theywere able to conduct the operation faster than allthe other teams.

Maintaining Cohesion

Teams owe part of their success to the strength ofthe bonds linking group members one to another.As noted in Chapter 5, teams need not be interper-sonally cohesive, but given the need for honestcommunication, strong commitment to the sharedtask, and willingness to put the needs of the teambefore individual interests, cohesiveness is in mostcases associated with performance gains in teams(Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).

Building cohesion requires augmenting itscomponents: social cohesion (attraction of themembers to one another and to the group as a whole),task cohesion (capacity to perform successfully

as a coordinated unit and as part of the group),perceived cohesion (the construed coherence ofthe group), and emotional cohesion (the affectiveintensity of the group and individuals when in thegroup). Any factor that promotes attraction, such asproximity, similarity in attitudes, and the absence ofnegative personal qualities, will prompt team mem-bers to become friends, and thereby the team tobecomemore cohesive. Organizations can also com-municate a communal perspective to the team throughrhetoric that stresses unity, by not singling out indi-vidual members, and by providing financial incen-tives for good team work rather than for individualwork. Organizations may also place their teams inchallenging environments, so that the memberswill learn teamwork skills but also develop a senseof unity as a result of surviving the ordeal. Team-building adventures, such as backpacking together inthe wilderness, spending the day in a ropes course, orplaying a paintball game against a rival team, con-tinue to be popular methods of increasing cohesion.Some organizations also rely on technology to createpsychologically closer, albeit physically distant, rela-tions between team members (Gajendran &Harrison, 2007; see Focus 12.3).

Average

Est

imat

ed N

et-A

dju

sted

Pro

ced

ure

T

ime

(min

ute

s)

Mountain Medical

Case Number

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

F I G U R E 12.4 Estimated net-adjusted procedure times for Mountain Medical and the average ofall other hospitals.

SOURCE: “Organizational Differences in Rates of Learning: Evidence from the Adoption of Minimally Invasive Cardiac Surgery,” by Gary P. Pisano, RichardM. J. Bohmer, and Amy C. Edmondson (2001). Management Science, 47, 752–768. Copyright 2001 INFORMS. Reprinted by permission.

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virtual teams (VTs) Task-focused groups that work and communicate by using information technologies, such asemail and video conferencing.

F o c u s 12.3 What Will the Team of the Future Look Like?

There is no reason anyone would want a computer intheir home.

—Ken Olson, founder of Digital EquipmentCompany (see Maney, 2005)

The executive leadership team of Donross Industries isexamining the proposed initiative T231. Most membersof the team are willing to endorse it, but Diana is stilluncertain. As the corporate financial officer, she moni-tors all monetary outlays, and the initiative will be acostly one with an uncertain promise of payoff. She asksJames to run the five-year payout simulation one moretime, increasing the risk level and changing several ofthe cost parameters to provide a more pessimistic fore-cast. When the chart is displayed it provokes an ani-mated discussion, and in 10 minutes’ time everyone onthe team has waded in with ideas and suggestions.Except for Giora and Travis. They are whispering backand forth about how to deal with the unexpected res-ignation of one of their most talented young execu-tives. Sensing that all issues have been raised, Eduardoasks James to run the summary of the discussion, andthe group reviews the word count and theme statisticsfor a few minutes. After several clarifying commentsJames then displays the ballot box, and the initiative isapproved. The team moves along on its agenda.

A common enough segment in the life of a seniorleadership team, except that this group is a virtual one.Members are interacting via electronic devices and aredistributed in workplaces across the globe. Diana is at thecompany headquarters in New York. Eduardo is using ahandheld device and is in the back seat of a cab some-where in Tokyo. Giora is still in her pajamas in her den andshe “whispers” to Travis using a private channel on theirteamware program. And, since this fictitious team ismeeting in the future, some of the group members arenot even humans. James, in this example, is a programthat runs the meeting and acts as a simulated secretary.This notion is not that far-fetched. Researchers are al-ready exploring how people work with teammates whoare computers rather than humans (Fogg, 2003).

Virtual teams (VTs), like any other type of team,are task-focused groups characterized by high levels ofinteraction, goal-focus, interdependence, structure,and unity. These teams, however, work from distrib-uted locations, and so are online groups rather thanoffline groups. They meet in cyberspace rather than in

conference rooms, and rely on computer-basedinformation technologies to create channels of com-munication that may include voice, text, and visual in-formation. These differences in their context (see Focus15.2) significantly influence how members interact withone another, and as a result VTs are not identical tooffline teams (for an excellent summary see Martins,Gilson, & Maynard, 2004). Virtual teams take somewhatlonger to make decisions, and in some cases memberscommunicate less when they use technology rather thanoral exchanges. VTs sometimes encounter difficultieswhen planning and strategizing relative to offlinegroups, but they tend to equalize participation ratesamong members. In some VTs members communicateonly formally, but in others members actually disclosemore intimate types of information than they do in face-to-face situations. And the findings with regard to themost crucial question—do VTs generate better productsthan face-to-face groups?—are mixed. Some studiessupport VTs, but others side with offline groups.

These differences are not insignificant ones, butthey suggest that VTs are not qualitatively differentfrom teams in other contexts. Studies find that culturaldifferences influence actions in VT, with people fromindividualistic cultures conforming less. Women feelthat VTs are more inclusive and supportive than domen. People form coalitions in online groups, often toincrease their control over the team’s deliberations.Members of VTs identify with their teams, particularlyif the teams meet for an extended period of time.These same things happen in face-to-face teams, forthe group-level processes that create uniformitiesin the behavior of people in groups are more powerfulthan the situational effects of how members are linkedto one another. Individuals who are interacting viacomputers are, psychologically, members of groups,and all the team-level processes that one can expect tooccur in teams will occur in online groups as well.

Besides, even if VTs are not exactly the same asface-to-face teams, they are close enough in design,process, and performance, so there is little to preventtheir proliferation. Technology will continue to changevirtually all aspects of people’s lives, and teams will notescape untouched. Teams will meet more and morefrequently online rather than offline, until in time theface-to-face meeting of the team may possibly be con-sidered not just atypical, but bizarre.

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TEAM PERFORMANCE :

EVALUAT ING

EFFECT IVENESS

Organizational experts recommend using teams toachieve excellence. No matter what system the ex-perts propose—job enrichment, balanced scorecardmanagement, business process reengineering,activity-based management, or an updated versionof management by objectives—most will tout thebenefits of using teams to get work done. But doteams offer the best means to maximize humanpotential? This section examines the final segmentof the input–process–output model of teams: Whatdo teams generate by way of direct and indirect out-comes? The analysis raises the question of evaluation—how effective are teams?—and also considers ways toimprove teams.

Defining Team Effectiveness

Teams are task-focused groups, and so the majorcriterion for determining their success is their per-formance: Do they reach the goals they, and others,set for them? By this standard, Mountain Medicalwas a success. The team learned to perform the newsurgery quickly and safely, and this efficiency meanta better recovery for the patients and substantial sav-ings for the hospital. The team needed less time inthe operating room, and its efficiency was so highthat it could do more operations than other teams.At a price of approximately $36,000 per case, theteam proved to be both medically and economi-cally profitable.

A team’s productivity, however, is only one ofthe outputs that should be considered when deter-mining its effectiveness. Mountain Medical mayhave become a crack surgical team, but what ifthe demands of the task were too great, so thatmembers felt so pressured they left the group?What if the team was productive, but over timemembers grew to dislike working with each other?What if the Mountain Medical group becamestagnant—repeating the motions required for theoperation with each case, but losing the capacity

to adapt and change that made them a high-performance team in the first place?

Hackman (2002) suggests three key factors thatshould be considered when evaluating the successof a team. Task performance is the first and fore-most criterion. Teams are created for the purpose ofgenerating results, and a successful group is one thatmeets or exceeds agreed-upon “standards of quan-tity, quality, and timeliness” (Hackman, 2002,p. 23). But Hackman adds to this criterion twoother, more indirect, outcomes: adaptive growthof the team as a whole and individual developmentof the members. Many teams can perform their ba-sic work effectively, but over time they fail to profitfrom their experiences of working together. A trulysuccessful team is one that grows stronger overtime, so that it can undertake even more challeng-ing tasks in the future. Hackman (2002, p. 28) alsofeels that a high-performing team should contrib-ute, in positive ways, “to the learning and personalwell-being of individual team members”:

If the group prevents members from doingwhat they want and need to do, if it com-promises their personal learning, or if mem-bers’ main reactions to having been in thegroup are frustration and disillusionment,then the costs of generating the group prod-uct were too high. (Hackman, 2002, p. 29).

The Success of Teams

Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, teams arehighly successful social organisms. As noted inFocus 12.1, from relatively humble beginnings inathletics, farming, and agriculture teams have spreadout to populate much of the world. Teams aregaining popularity as preferred approaches to man-agement, and “how to” books on team methodscontinue to make the bestseller lists. Teams havealso taken the place of some traditional groups aspeople’s source of social connection, for more peoplereport belonging to teams than they do to hobby,community, and social groups. Teams now haveonly one group to overtake in terms of popularity:religious groups (see Figure 3.1).

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But do teams live up to their promise as systemsfor increasing productivity and members’ well-being? Anecdotal evidence and research findingsconverge on a verdict that favors teams, but withreservations. Case study approaches are generally,but not uniformly, positive (Applebaum & Blatt,1994). Texas Instruments, for example, increasedproductivity when it organized its employees intosmall groups whenever possible, took steps to buildup team cohesiveness, and went to great lengths toestablish clear goals based on realistic levels ofaspiration (Bass & Ryterband, 1979). When a man-ufacturer in the United States shifted to teams,supportive supervision, participant leadership, orga-nizational overlap among groups, and intensity ofgroup interaction, employee satisfaction increasedand turnover decreased (Seashore & Bowers, 1970).Case studies have, however, uncovered examplesof spectacularly ineffective teams. For example,Hackman (1990), after examining the effectivenessof 33 teams, had to revise the proposed title of thebook he had planned: Groups That Work was giventhe subtitle (and Those That Don’t) because he foundconsiderable variation in performance quality acrossthe teams he studied.

Field studies of the use of groups and teamdevelopment generally support the wisdom ofrelying on teams (Sundstrom et al., 2000). TheHarley-Davidson Motor Company, for example,dramatically transformed their production methodsby shifting from a traditional command-and-controlculture to one based on self-managing work teams,and the positive results of this conversion appear todepend in large part on the high level of cohesivenessmaintained by these groups (Chansler, Swamidass, &Cammann, 2003). When researchers, through meta-analysis, examined the link between organizationalchange and performance, they found that companiesthat made multiple changes usually improved theirperformance and that group-level interventions weremore closely linked to productivity than individual-level interventions (Macy & Izumi, 1993). A recentsurvey of people’s satisfaction with their team mem-berships, however, suggests that members them-selves are not so happy with their teams. Only 13%of the 23,000 managers, workers, and executives in

one survey agreed that their “teams work smoothlyacross functions” (Covey, 2004, p. 371).

Suggestions for Using Teams

Even the most optimistic appraisal of the availabledata on team effectiveness would suggest that thereis room for improvement in the use of teams inperformance settings. Teams are a group with ex-traordinary promise, but to fulfill that promise theymust be implemented correctly, and members mustbe given assistance to use them to their full advan-tage (Cordery, 2004; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).

Fidelity of Team Innovations The popularity ofteam approaches has brought with it a significantdrawback—in the rush to claim that they are usingteam methods, individuals sometimes call workgroups “teams” even though they lack the definingfeatures of real teams. More than 80% of the ex-ecutives, managers, and team members surveyed inone study reported that their teams lacked cleargoals; that their members did not engage in creativediscussion; that team members did not hold eachother accountable for their assigned tasks; and thatmembers of their team rarely initiated actions tosolve problems (Covey, 2004). These are basic, es-sential qualities of teams, and if they are lacking,then these work groups likely are not actuallyteams.

These responses may indicate that the veryconcept of a team—individuals working collabora-tively to achieve shared goals—is unworkable, butit may also be that team-based methods have notbeen properly implemented. Researchers and the-orists have identified a number of other character-istics that are conditions for highly-effective teams.Some suggest, for example, that to qualify as a teama group must have shared leadership, control itsmethods and purposes, and solve problems throughopen-ended discussion (Katzenbach & Smith, 2001).Others suggest that to be called a team, a group mustwork at a task that cannot be accomplished withoutcollaboration and that membership must be clearlydefined and stable (Hackman, 2002). If a team fails,but it lacked these key ingredients, then the blame

374 CHAPTER 12

most likely rests with those who built the teamrather than the team itself.

Training in Teamwork Too many organizationscreate teams but then do little to help team mem-bers develop the skills they need to work in thoseteams. Only 29% of the organizations in one surveygave their teams any kind of training in teamworkor interpersonal relations, and only 26% basedcompensation (salary, bonuses) on team perfor-mance (Devine et al., 1999). Given the complexityof interpersonal and cognitive demands that teamsrequire, members will likely need assistance inlearning how to work effectively in them.

Fortunately, when implemented team traininghas robust effects on team effectiveness (Kozlowski &Ilgen, 2006). Team expert Eduardo Salas and hiscolleagues, for example, examined the effectivenessof several types of training interventions in ameta-analysis before concluding that (a) mostmethods work, but (b) the best ones focus on im-proving member coordination rather than com-munication strategies (Salas, Nichols, & Driskell,2007). Cross-training, which involves rotatingmembers throughout the various positions withinthe group, was particularly helpful, in that itprovided members with a clearer understanding ofthe demands associated with each role and the inter-connections among members’ responsibilities. Otherstudies suggest that interventions that increase teammembers’ control over and involvement in work, forexample, are more powerful than interventions thatfocus on morale boosting or envisioning goals(Cotton, 1993; Levine & D’Andrea Tyson, 1990).

Situational Support A final condition for imple-menting teams is the degree of organizational sup-port available to the teams. Organizations may, inthe rush to implement teams, create them but thenfail to provide them with the support they need toflourish. Features of the organizational context,such as support for technologically based groupsupport systems, development of group-level rewardsystems to supplement or complement individualrewards, degree of collectivism in the organizationalculture, and the availability of external coaches who

can assist the team to navigate trouble spots, willincrease the probability that team-based approacheswill be successful (Mathieu et al., 2008). Other or-ganizational features, such as traditional leadershipstyles, hierarchical patterns of organization, and in-dividually based compensation systems, will increasethe likelihood that team approaches will notprosper.

The case of quality circles (QCs) provides alesson in the importance of providing support forgroup-level innovations. QCs were popular in the1980s. These small, self-regulated decision-makinggroups usually included 5 to 10 employees whoperformed similar jobs within the organization.The groups were often led by a supervisor whohad been trained for the role, but participation inthe circle was often voluntary and no monetary in-centives were offered to those involved. Thesegroups were thought to be excellent ways to in-crease workers’ participation in the managementof the organization, and to increase productivity,efficiency, quality, and job satisfaction. Yet, by the1990s, most of these groups were gone—the failurerate was between 60 and 70% (Tang & Butler,1997). What happened?

QCs were not teams, and they had their ownunique limitations—participants volunteered andwere not compensated, and in many cases conflictsdeveloped between participants and nonpartici-pants. Worse, however, was the lack of supportprovided the QCs. They were originally viewedas an easy means of increasing involvement and sat-isfaction, but the suggestions of QCs were rarelyheeded by management. They were essentiallypowerless, and members soon realized they werean ineffective means of achieving valued outcomes.A few transformed from QCs into true self-managing teams, but most were just abandoned(Lawler & Mohrman, 1985).

The lesson of QCs should not be ignored. Asmany as 90% of Fortune 500 companies implemented

quality circles (QCs) Small self-regulated groups ofemployees charged with identifying ways to improveproduct quality.

TEAMS 375

such methods in their plants, factories, and meet-ing rooms at the peak of their popularity, but themethod did not take. Without institutional sup-port or proper design, QCs rapidly disappeared. It

would be unfortunate if teams went the way ofquality circles, due to failures to implement themcorrectly, failures to train individuals to work ef-fectively in them, and failures to support them.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What are teams and when should they be used?

1. Teams are specialized types of performancegroups. Teams, like any group, promoteinteraction and interdependence among mem-bers, pursue goals, and are structured andunified, but teams exhibit these qualities withgreater intensity than do groups in general.

2. Teams tend to focus on intellective, informa-tional tasks or performance, action-orientedtasks.

■ Informational teams include management(executive, command), project (negotia-tion, commission, design), and advisoryteams.

■ Performance-focused teams includeservice, production, and action (medical,response, military, transportation, sports)teams.

■ More specific types of teams include taskforces, crews, member-founded teams, andmandated (or concocted) teams.

3. Hackman’s model of team autonomy distin-guishes between four types of groups on thebasis of their control over their processes andgoals: manager-led, self-managing, self-designing, and self-governing.

4. Teams are more likely to be implementedwhen tasks are difficult, complex, and impor-tant. In some cases, however, people useteams because they are popular managementtools (the romance of teams) rather than effectiveones. Locke describes the excessive useof teams in performance settings as“groupomania.”

5. The input–process–output (I-P-O) modelguides much of the theoretical and empiricalstudy of teams.

How does the team’s composition influence effectiveness?

1. Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson examinedthe performance of medical teams and relatedtheir effectiveness to composition and design.

2. Extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness,and openness, all key personality qualitiesdescribed by the big five model, are associatedwith team effectiveness; emotional stabilityis not.

3. Members’ knowledge, skills, and abilities, orKSAs, predict team effectiveness. Highlyeffective groups tend to be staffed by highlyeffective individuals, both in terms of specifictask skills and general social skills.

4. There are advantages and disadvantages associ-ated with team diversity.

■ Diversity increases the team’s resources,providing more perspectives and sources ofinformation.

■ Diverse groups may lack cohesion, becausetheir members may perceive each other asdissimilar. If cohesion is essential for thegroup to succeed, a diverse group will bedisadvantaged.

■ Teams can minimize the negative side-effects of diversity and maximize diversity’sgains.

5. Wood’s meta-analysis of sex differences foundthat men and women do not differ in theireffectiveness as team members.

376 CHAPTER 12

■ Groups that include a lone representativeof a particular social category (tokens, orsolos) may encounter problems of fairness,influence, and so on.

■ Hackman’s studies of performing orchestrasindicate that the group’s history and thelarger social context in which the group isembedded influence the impact of a group’sgender heterogeneity on performance.

What group processes mediate the input–outputrelationship?

1. The three key components of working inteams are teamwork, team cognition, andinterpersonal engagement.

2. Teamwork is the psychological, behavioral, andmental work that members of the team carryout as they collaborate with one another on thevarious tasks and subtasks that they must com-plete to reach their desired goal.

3. Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro’s taxonomy ofteamwork functions stresses three key pro-cesses: transitioning, acting, and managinginterpersonal relations among members.

4. Cognitive processes sustain team processes,including mental models, transactive memory,and learning.

■ Members develop a collective under-standing of the group and its task over time(mental model).

■ Moreland and his associates examined thedevelopment of transactive memory bytraining individuals either in groups or in-dividually, and then examining how muchof that training transferred to a subsequentgroup situation.

■ The Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondsonstudy of surgical teams identified the factorsthat promoted learning in some groupsand reduced the learning capacity of others.

5. As teams work together they spend timemaintaining the quality of social bondsbetween individual members. Cohesivenesspromotes the exchange of information andtrust required for effectiveness. Teams thatmeet online rather than offline—virtual teams—display levels of cohesiveness that arecomparable to face-to-face teams.

How effective are teams, and how can they be improved?

1. Hackman identified three factors that definethe success of a team: task performance, adap-tive growth of the team, and individual devel-opment of the members.

2. Team approaches do not ensure success, butthey are reliably associated with increases ineffectiveness and member satisfaction.

3. Experience with past group-level methods,such as quality circles, suggests that fidelity,training, and support are required to maximizeeffectiveness.


Chapter Case: Mountain Medical’s CardiacSurgery Team■ “Organizational Differences in Rates of

Learning: Evidence from the Adoption ofMinimally Invasive Cardiac Surgery,” by GaryP. Pisano, Richard M. J. Bohmer, and AmyC. Edmondson (2001), examined how thesurgery teams at 16 different medical centers

adjusted to a new surgical procedure thatrequired a higher degree of teamwork (see,too, Edmondson et al., 2001).

Teams■ “Work Groups and Teams in Organizations,”

by Steve W. J. Kozlowski and Bradford Bell(2003), provides a balanced analysis of the useof teams in organizational settings.

TEAMS 377

■ “Team Effectiveness 1997–2007: A Review ofRecent Advancements and a Glimpse into theFuture,” by John Mathieu, M. Travis Maynard,Tammy Rapp, and Lucy Gilson (2008), care-fully examines the ever-expanding researchliterature dealing with teams in organizationsby offering, for each primary topic, a set ofexemplars that illustrate core concerns andconclusions.

■ “Work Group Diversity,” by Daan vanKnippenberg and Michaela C. Schippers(2007), reviews theory and research pertainingto diversity within work groups and teams.

Improving Teams■ Leading Teams, by J. Richard Hackman (2002),

combines years of experience working withteams with extensive research to offer a usefulmodel of ways to help groups reach theirmaximum effectiveness.

■ “Enhancing the Effectiveness of Work Groupsand Teams,” by Steve W. J. Kozlowski andDaniel R. Ilgen (2006), reviews the currentstate of knowledge with regard to teams, withparticularly detailed sections pertaining tocognitive processes in teams; cohesion, emo-tions, and productivity; and team design anddevelopment.

■ “The ‘Romance of Teams’: Toward anUnderstanding of Its PsychologicalUnderpinnings and Implications,” by Natalie J.Allen and Tracy D. Hecht (2004), exploressome of the practical and psychological factorsthat may be sustaining business and industry’scurrent fascination for group-level approachesto productivity, before reviewing researchthat suggests the use of teams may not beappropriate in many contexts.


378 CHAPTER 12


13

Conflict

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Group members do not always getalong well with one another. Even inthe most serene circumstances thegroup’s atmosphere may shift rapidly,so that once close collaborators be-come hostile adversaries. Because con-flict is a ubiquitous aspect of group life,it must be managed to minimize itsnegative effects.

■ What is conflict?■ What are the sources of conflict in

groups?■ Why does conflict escalate?■ How can group members manage

their conflict?■ Is conflict an unavoidable evil or a

necessary good?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

The Roots of Conflict

Winning: Conflict and Competition

Sharing: Conflict over Resources

Controlling: Conflict over Power

Working: Task and Process Conflict

Liking and Disliking: PersonalConflicts

Confrontation and Escalation

Uncertainty à Commitment

Perception à Misperception

Soft Tactics à Hard Tactics

Reciprocity à Upward Conflict Spiral

Few à Many

Irritation à Anger

Conflict Resolution

Commitment à Negotiation

Misperception à Understanding

Hard Tactics à Cooperative Tactics

Upward à Downward ConflictSpirals

Many à Few

Anger à Composure

Conflict versus ConflictManagement

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

379

✵

Jobs versus Sculley was one of corporate America’smost spectacular conflicts, but it was no anomaly.Groups of all kinds experience periods of disagree-ment, discord, and friction. Good friends disagreeabout their weekend plans and end up exchangingharsh words. Families argue over finances, rules, andresponsibilities. Struggling work teams search for aperson who can be blamed for their inefficiency.College classes, angered by their professors’ methodsof teaching, lodge formal complaints with the dean.Rock bands split up when artistic tensions betweenmembers become unacceptable. When conflict

occurs in a group, the actions or beliefs of one ormore members of the group are unacceptable to andresisted by one or more of the other group members.Members stand against each other rather than in sup-port of each other (Levine & Thompson, 1996;Pruitt & Kim, 2004; Wilmot & Hocker, 2007).

Why do allies in a group sometimes turn intoadversaries? This chapter answers that questionby tracing the course of conflict in groups. AsFigure 13.1 suggests, the process begins when theroutine course of events in a group is disrupted byan initial conflict—differences of opinion, disagree-ments over who should lead the group, individualscompeting with each other for scarce resources, andthe like. Whatever the cause of the initial disunity,the conflict grows as persuasion gives way to argu-ing, emotions take the place of logic, and the onceunified group splits into factions and coalitions. This

iConflict: When Group Members Turn Against Each Other

It was a time before the iPod, iPhone, and iMac. AppleComputers had started strong under the leadership ofco-founder Steve Jobs, but now was struggling to holdits own during a downturn in sales of technology andsoftware. Jobs and the executive board decided theyneeded a chief executive officer (CEO) with a moretraditional background in business. They picked JohnSculley, of Pepsi, hoping that he would stabilize Apple,improve efficiency, and increase sales.

All worked well, for a time. Jobs and Sculley ad-mired each other’s strengths as leaders and visionaries,and they conferred constantly on all matters of pro-duction and policy. But they did not see eye-to-eye onkey issues of corporate goals. Their working relation-ship dissolved into a series of disagreements, each onemore problematic than the last. Both men played cen-tral roles as leaders in the company, but their differ-ences in direction, vision, and style were disruptive. Asthe conflict over Jobs’s pet project, the Macintosh(predecessor of the iMac), reached a peak, Sculleyasked the executive board to strip Jobs of much of hisauthority. The group did so, reluctantly (Linzmayer,2004).

Jobs did not go quietly into the night. He met in-dividually with the board members, seeking to reversethe decision and to win approval for his plan to fire

Sculley in a corporate coup. He waited to spring hisplan when Sculley was traveling in China, but Sculleywas tipped off by one of the board members. Sculleycanceled his trip, called a board meeting, and con-fronted Jobs:

“It’s come to my attention that you’d like tothrow me out of the company, and I’d like to ask ifthat’s true.”

Jobs’s answer: “I think you’re bad for Apple and Ithink you’re the wrong person to run this company. . . .You really should leave this company. . . . You don’tknow how manufacturing works. You’re not close tothe company. The middle managers don’t respectyou.”

Sculley, voice rising in anger, replied, “I made amistake in treating you with high esteem. . . . I don’ttrust you, and I won’t tolerate a lack of trust.”

Sculley then polled the board members. Did theysupport Sculley or Jobs? All of them declared greatadmiration for Jobs, but they felt that the companyneeded Sculley’s experience and leadership. Jobs thenrose from the table and said, “I guess I know wherethings stand,” before bolting from the room (Sculley,1987, pp. 251–252). Jobs later resigned from the com-pany he had founded. He would return, eventually, butnot until Sculley had resigned.

conflict Disagreement, discord, and friction that occurwhen the actions or beliefs of one or more members ofthe group are unacceptable to and resisted by one ormore of the other group members.

380 CHAPTER 13

period of conflict escalation is, in most cases, followedby a reduction in conflict through conflict resolution.The board of directors at Apple, for example, man-aged their conflict by backing Sculley and demotingJobs—a rather severe means of dealing with thedispute. This chapter, then, focuses on conflict in-side a group—between two or more members—orintragroup conflict. A second form of conflict—conflict between groups, or intergroup conflict—isexamined in the next chapter.

THE ROOTS OF CONFL ICT

Conflict is everywhere. When the members of 71groups were asked, “Did your group experience anyconflict?” they identified 424 instances of interper-sonal irritation (Wall & Nolan, 1987). When RobertFreed Bales and his colleagues used Interaction ProcessAnalysis (IPA) to record group interactions, some ofthe groups they observed spent as much as 20% oftheir time making hostile or negative comments(Bales & Hare, 1965). Researchers who asked group

members to work together on a frustrating,impossible-to-solve task were startled by the inten-sity of the conflict that overtook the groups. In oneparticularly hostile group, members averaged 13.5antagonistic comments per minute (French, 1941).

Most people, if given the choice, avoid situa-tions that are rife with conflict (Witteman, 1991).Yet conflict seems to be an unavoidable conse-quence of life in groups. When individuals are se-questered away from other people, their ambitions,goals, and perspectives are their own concern. But agroup, by its very nature, brings individuals intocontact with other people—people who have theirown idiosyncratic interests, motivations, outlooks,and preferences. As these individuals interact withone another, their diverse interests and preferencescan pull them in different directions. Instead ofworking together, they compete against one an-other. Instead of sharing resources and power, mem-bers selfishly claim more than their fair share. Insteadof accepting each other for who they are, memberstreat those they like better than those they dislike.

Winning: Conflict and Competition

Before Sculley joined Apple, Scully was independentof Jobs. Sculley’s success or failure in manufacturingand marketing Pepsi did nothing to influence Jobs’soutcomes and vice versa. When they both workedat Apple, that changed. At first, the two worked

ConflictEscalation

Conflict ConflictResolution

Routine GroupInteraction

Routine GroupInteraction

F I G U R E 13.1 The course of conflict in groups.

intragroup conflict Disagreement or confrontation be-tween members of the same group.intergroup conflict A disagreement or confrontationbetween two or more groups and their members thatcan include physical violence, interpersonal discord, andpsychological tension.

CONFL ICT 381

together cooperatively, for each one’s successhelped the other succeed. Their relationshipchanged yet again when they ran headlong into adispute over the Mac. The two men refused tochange their minds, and so their once cooperative re-lationship turned into a competitive one. For Sculleyto succeed, Jobs would have to fail. For Jobs tosucceed, Sculley would have to fail.

When people are independent of each other,their pursuit of their aims and objectives influencesno one else. The lone artist and craftsperson strug-gle alone in the pursuit of their goals, but theirindependence from others means that shouldthey succeed or fail only they are influenced.But people in groups are, by definition, inter-dependent, so their outcomes are often linkedtogether. Many such situations promote coopera-tion between members, for the success of any onemember of the group will improve the chances ofsuccess for the other members. Morton Deutschcalled this form of interaction promotive interdepen-dence (Deutsch, 1949b). But situations can also pitindividuals against one another. When two peopleplay backgammon, one must win and the othermust lose. When two coworkers both want to bepromoted to office manager, if one succeeds theother will fail. In a footrace, only one runner willend up in first place. As Deutsch explained, suchsituations involve competition: The success ofany one person means that someone else must fail.Deutsch (1949b) called this form of interaction con-trient interdependence.

Competition is a powerful motivator ofbehavior. When individuals compete against oneanother, they typically expend greater effort,

express more interest and satisfaction in theirwork, and set their personal goals higher(Tjosvold et al., 2006). But competition can alsopromote conflict between individuals. When peo-ple compete, they must look out for their owninterests, even at the cost to others. They cannottake pride in other group members’ accomplish-ments, for each time someone else in the groupexcels, their own outcomes shrink. In cooperativegroups, members enhance their outcomes by help-ing other members achieve success, but in compet-itive groups, members profit from others’ errors.Because competing group members succeed ifothers fail, they have two options open to them.First, they can improve their own work in thehopes that they rise above the others. Second,they can undermine, sabotage, disrupt, or interferewith others’ work so that their own becomes betterby comparison (Amegashie & Runkel, 2007).

Deutsch studied the dark side of competitionby creating two different grading systems in his col-lege classes. In competitive classes, students’ gradeswere relative: The individual who did the best inthe group would get the highest grade, whereas theindividual who did the worst would get the lowestgrade. Deutsch created cooperative groups as well.These students worked together in groups to learnthe material, and everyone in the group receivedthe same grade. As Deutsch predicted, conflictwas much more pronounced in the competitivegroups. Members reported less dependency onothers, less desire to win the respect of others, andgreater interpersonal animosity. Members of coop-erative groups, in contrast, acted friendlier duringthe meetings, were more encouraging and support-ive, and communicated more frequently (Deutsch,1949a, 1949b, 1980).

Other researchers, too, have found that cooper-ative situations tend to be friendly, intimate, and in-volving, whereas competitive situations are viewed asunfriendly, nonintimate, and uninvolving (Graziano,Hair, & Finch, 1997; King & Sorrentino, 1983).Work units with high levels of cooperation havefewer latent tensions, personality conflicts, and ver-bal confrontations (Tjosvold, 1995). Sports teamstend to be more cohesive and—depending on the

independence A performance situation that is struc-tured in such a way that the success of any one memberis unrelated to the chance of other members’ succeeding.cooperation A performance situation that is structuredin such a way that the success of any one member ofthe group improves the chances of other members’succeeding.competition A performance situation that is structuredin such a way that success depends on performing betterthan others.

382 CHAPTER 13

demands of the particular sport—more successfulwhen coaches instill a desire for team success ratherthan individual success (Schmitt, 1981). Students inclassrooms that stress cooperation rather than individ-ualism or competition work harder, show greateracademic gains, and display better psychologicaladjustment. They also foster stronger and moreemotionally satisfying student-to-student relations(Roseth, Johnson, & Johnson, 2008).

Mixed-Motive Conflict Few situations involvepure cooperation or pure competition; the motiveto compete is often mixed with the motive to coop-erate. Sculley wanted to gain control over the Macdivision, but he needed Jobs’s help with productdevelopment. Jobs valued Sculley’s organizationalexpertise, but he felt that Sculley misunderstoodthe company’s goals. The men found themselves in amixed-motive situation—they were tempted tocompete and cooperate at the same time.

Researchers use a specialized technique, knownas the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), to studyconflict in mixed-motive situations (Poundstone,1992). This procedure takes its name from an anec-dote about two prisoners. The criminals, when in-terrogated by police detectives in separate rooms, areboth offered a deal. They are told they can retaintheir right to remain silent, or they can confess andimplicate their accomplice. If both remain silent,then they will be set free. If both confess, bothwill receive a moderate sentence. But if one con-fesses and the other does not, then the one whoconfesses will receive a minimal sentence, and hispartner will receive the maximum sentence. Theprisoners, as partners in crime, want to cooperatewith each other and resist the demands of the police.However, by defecting—competing with each other

by confessing—then they may end up with a lightersentence (Luce & Raiffa, 1957).

When researchers use the prisoner’s dilemma tostudy conflict, the participants play for points ormoney (see Figure 13.2). The two participantsmust individually pick one of two options, labeledC and D. Option C is the cooperative choice. Ifboth players pick C, then both will earn money.Option D is the defecting, competitive choice. Ifonly one of the two players defects by picking D,that player will make money, and the other willlose money. But if both pick D, both will losemoney. Figure 13.2 shows the payoff matrix thatsummarizes how much money the two will winor lose in each of the four possible situations:

1. If John chooses C and Steve chooses C, bothearn 25¢.

2. If John chooses C and Steve chooses D, Johnloses 25¢ and Steve wins 50¢.

John’s choice

C D

Ste

ve’s

cho

ice

Stevewins25¢

Steveloses25¢

Stevewins50¢

Steveloses10¢

Johnwins25¢

Johnwins50¢

Johnloses25¢

Johnloses10¢

D

C

F I G U R E 13.2 The prisoner’s dilemma game. Twoplayers, John and Steve, must select either option C(cooperation) or option D (defection). These choices areshown along the sides of the matrix. The payoffs forthese joint choices are shown within each cell of the ma-trix. In each cell, John’s outcomes are shown above thediagonal line, and Steve’s outcomes are shown below. Forexample, if Steve picks C and John picks C, they each earn25¢. But if Steve picks C and John picks D, then Steveloses 25¢ and John wins 50¢.

mixed-motive situation A performance setting inwhich the interdependence among interactants involvesboth competitive and cooperative goal structures.prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) A simulation of so-cial interaction in which players must make either coop-erative or competitive choices in order to win; used inthe study of cooperation, competition, and the develop-ment of mutual trust.

CONFL ICT 383

3. If John chooses D and Steve chooses C, Johnwins 50¢ and Steve loses 25¢.

4. If John chooses D and Steve chooses D, bothlose 10¢.

The PDG captures the essence of a mixed-motive situation. Players want to maximize theirown earnings, so they are tempted to defect(Option D). But most people realize that their part-ner also wants to maximize his or her profit—and ifboth defect, then they will both lose money. Sothey are drawn to cooperate (Option C), but arewary that their partner may defect. Players usuallycannot communicate with each other, and theycannot wait to pick until after they learn their part-ner’s choice. In most cases, players also make theirchoices several times. Each pair of choices is termeda trial or round.

How do people react when asked to make achoice in the prisoner’s dilemma game? Somecooperate and some compete, but the proportion ofcooperators to competitors varies depending on therelationships between members, their expectationsand personalities, and a variety of other factors(Weber & Messick, 2004; see Focus 13.1). If, forexample, the gains for competing relative to coop-erating are increased, people compete more. Whenpeople are told they are playing the “Wall StreetGame” they compete more than if the simulationis called the “Community Game” (Ross & Ward1995). If the instructions refer to the other personas the “opponent” then competition increases,but the label “partner” shrinks competitiveness(Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000). And, if peopleknow they will be playing multiple trials against thesame person, then cooperation increases. In onestudy, for example, people played the PDG in largegroups of 30 to 50 other people. The game randomlypaired people together on each trial, but the odds ofbeing paired with the same person repeatedly werevaried experimentally from low to high. The greaterthe chances of playing with a person in the future,the more cooperative players became (Bó, 2005).

When played for several rounds, people’sactions in the PDG are also profoundly influencedby their partner’s choices. When playing with

someonewho consistentlymakes cooperative choices,people tend to cooperate themselves. Those whoencounter competitors, however, soon adopt thisstrategy, and they, too, begin to compete. Gradually,then, behavioral assimilation occurs as groupmembers’ choices become synchronized over time.

This behavioral assimilation is an outwardexpression of a strong regulatory social norm:reciprocity. Reciprocity suggests that when peo-ple who help you later need help, you are obligatedto return their favor. However, reciprocity also im-plies that people who harm you are also deservingof harm themselves. The converse of “You scratchmy back and I’ll scratch yours” is “An eye for aneye, a tooth for a tooth” (Falk & Fischbacher,2006). If one group member criticizes the ideas,opinions, or characteristics of another, the victimof the attack will feel justified in counterattackingunless some situational factor legitimizes the aggres-sion of the former. Unfortunately, negative recipro-city tends to be stronger than positive reciprocity.A cooperative person who runs into a competitivepartner is more likely to begin to compete beforethe competitive person begins to cooperate (Kelley& Stahelski, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c). Negative reci-procity is kept in check if cooperatively orientedindividuals have the opportunity to withdraw fromthe interaction or can communicate their “good”intentions to their partners, but in most situations,a partner turns into an opponent faster than anopponent turns into an ally (Kollock, 1998; Miller& Holmes, 1975).

SVO: Social Values Orientation Both Jobs andSculley were successful, tough-minded businessprofessionals. As they strategized and schemed, theirchoices were shaped by their most basic of motiva-tions. Should they act in ways that will maximize

behavioral assimilation The eventual matching of thebehaviors displayed by cooperating or competing groupmembers.reciprocity The tendency for individuals to pay back inkind what they receive from others.

384 CHAPTER 13

their outcomes and minimize their costs; does theself come first? Or, should they seek first to benefitothers and, if necessary, sacrifice their own interestsfor the greater good?

Degree of concern for other people’s outcomesrelative to one’s own determines a person’s socialvalues orientation (SVO). Many people seek tomaximize their gains; when they play the PDGthey want to earn as many points as they can; theyare said to be proself. But some people are also

concerned with other’s gains and losses. These pro-socials wish to maximize everyone’s outcomes (VanLange et al., 2007). Individualistic and competitiveSVOs are proself, and cooperative and altruisticSVOs are prosocial:

■ Individualistic orientation: Proself individualistsare concerned only with their own outcomes.They make decisions based on what they thinkthey personally will achieve, without concernfor others’ outcomes. They neither interferewith nor assist other group members, for theyfocus only on their own outcomes. Theiractions may indirectly impact other groupmembers, but such influence is not their goal.

■ Competitive orientation: Competitors are proselfindividuals who strive to maximize their own

F o c u s 13.1 Are You a Friend or Foe?

Ah, who is nigh? Come to me, friend or foe, and tellme who is victor.

—Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 3

Television game shows, such as Jeopardy, Weakest Link,Wheel of Fortune, and Survivor, allow the audience towatch competition trigger conflict in groups. OnSurvivor, for example, only one contestant can win thegrand prize, and members must vote a person out ofthe group each time their team loses. On Weakest Link,members cooperate by answering strings of questions,but after each round they vote to identify and eliminatethe weakest player from their teams. The competitionamong players invariably introduces tension, conflict,and hostility, dividing the players one against the other.

One game show, Friend or Foe, is so similar to theprisoner’s dilemma game that researchers have studiedit to learn about people’s choices in high-stakes com-petitions. The six players pair up into three teams whocompete to build up winnings. After each round, theteam with the lowest score drops out, until only oneteam is left. But all the teams, as they leave, must de-cide how they will split their earnings. Each player hasa button, which no one else can see, and they can pressthe button if they wish to compete instead of cooper-ate. The possible outcomes are: Friend-Friend: Neitherplayer presses the button and they split their earnings;Friend-Foe: The player who presses the button keeps

all the earnings; and (c) Foe-Foe: Both players press thebutton and they lose all their earnings.

The situation has some unique features. Thegroups work together to make their money, and theirchoices are public ones—everyone watching knows ifthey pick friend or foe. They are also playing for realmoney, and substantial amounts in some cases. Theaverage amount that the group plays for is $3,705, al-though some teams try for much more—as much as$16,400 in one case. Will people cooperate or competein such a context?

When behavioral economists examined the choicesof over 100 teams making their choice in the game,they discovered that players defected, trying to take allthe money, 50% of the time. Men tended to competemore than women (55% vs. 46%), and younger playerswere much more competitive than older ones (59% vs.37%). Hence, competitive men who were paired witholder women tended to take home much more moneythan all other players. Money, however, did not makepeople either more or less cooperative. Even whenpeople where playing for substantial amounts, theywere as likely to cooperate as they were to compete.This competitive urge ended up saving the gameshow producers a considerable amount of money.Contestants left nearly $100,000 behind as a result oftwo players making the fatal foe-foe choice (List, 2005;Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel, & White, 2003).

social values orientation (SVO) The dispositionaltendency to respond to conflict settings in a particularway; cooperators, for example, tend to make choicesthat benefit both parties in a conflict, whereas competi-tors act to maximize their own outcomes.

CONFL ICT 385

outcomes, but they also seek to minimizeothers’ outcomes. They view disagreements aswin–lose situations and find satisfaction in forcingtheir ideas on others. Concessions and com-promise, they believe, are only for losers. Acompetitor believes that “each person shouldget the most he can” and plays to win evenwhen playing a game with a child (Brenner &Vinacke, 1979, p. 291).

■ Cooperative orientation: Prosocial cooperatorsstrive to maximize their own outcomes andothers’ outcomes as well. They value ac-commodative interpersonal strategies that gen-erate win–win situations. A cooperator wouldargue that “when people deal with each other,it’s better when everyone comes out even.” Ifthey play a game with a child they would bemore likely to make sure “no one really winsor loses” (Brenner & Vinacke, 1979, p. 291).

■ Altruistic orientation: Altruists are motivated tohelp others who are in need. They are low inself-interest and highly prosocial. They will-ingly sacrifice their own outcomes in the hopesof helping others achieve some gain.

Individuals with competitive SVOs are morelikely to find themselves in conflicts. The competitor’sstyle is abrasive, spurring cooperative members to re-act with criticism and requests for fairer treatment.Competitors, however, rarely modify their behaviorin response to these complaints, because they are rel-atively unconcerned with maintaining smooth inter-personal relations (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon,2000). Hence, competitors try to overwhelm coop-erators, who sometimes respond by becoming com-petitive themselves. For cooperators, the perceptionof others’ cooperativeness is positively correlated withtheir own cooperativeness. If they think that otherswill cooperate, they cooperate. For competitors, per-ceptions of others’ cooperativeness is negatively corre-lated with their own cooperativeness. If they thinkthat others will cooperate, they compete (Smeesterset al., 2003). When two competitors meet, the resultis an intense conflict like that seen at Apple, and whencompetitors lose, they often withdraw from the groupaltogether (Shure & Meeker, 1967).

These differences in SVOs have been linked toother personal qualities, including agreeableness,achievement orientation, interpersonal orientation,and trust in others (Van Lange et al. 2007). SVOsalso vary systematically across cultures. ManyWestern societies, for example, openly value com-petition. Their economic systems are based oncompetition, their schools teach children the im-portance of surpassing others’ achievements, andpopular games and sports have winners and losers.More cooperative—and more peaceful—societies,in contrast, condemn competition, devalue individ-ual achievement, and avoid any kind of competitivegames (Van Lange et al., 1997).

Men, Women, and Competition What if JohnSculley were Joanna Sculley—a woman rather thana man? Would she and Jobs have battled as fiercely?Or would Joanna have used other, less competitivemethods for settling the dispute?

Common gender role stereotypes generally as-sume that men are more competitive than women.Stories of executives conjure up images of individualswho are driven, ruthless, self-seeking, and male. Yetexperimental studies of cooperation and competi-tion suggest that women are just as competitive asmen (Sell, 1997). One review of previous workfound that in 21 experiments, women were morecompetitive, but 27 other studies suggested thatwomen were less competitive (Rubin & Brown,1975). Both men and women use more contentiousinfluence methods when they are paired with a manthan with a woman, perhaps because they anticipatemore conflict (Carli, 1989, 1999). When sex differ-ences do emerge, they suggest that men are some-what more competitive than women, particularlywhen competition is a riskier alternative or will yielda greater payoff (Simpson, 2003). Women are alsomore likely to endorse prosocial SVOs, relative tomen (Knight & Dubro, 1984). Women’s reactionsduring conflicts are also more nuanced than men’s.If, for example, their partner is attractive, womenmake more cooperative choices. If they do not liketheir partner, they are more likely to compete.Men, on the other hand, simply compete (Kahn,Hottes, & Davis, 1971).

386 CHAPTER 13

Sharing: Conflict over Resources

Steve Jobs faced a dilemma. The board of directors ofApple had hired John Sculley to be CEO, and theyexpected all the company’s employees to supportSculley’s initiatives. But Sculley called for sacrifices,for he wanted to shift personnel and financial re-sources away from Jobs’s division. Jobs could haveaccepted this decision and gone along with thegroup’s decision, but instead he chose his own path.

Group life, by its very nature, creates socialdilemmas for group members. As noted inChapter 3, the members, as individuals, are moti-vated to maximize their own rewards and minimizetheir costs. They strive to extract all they can fromthe group, while minimizing the amount of timeand energy the group takes from them. Yet, asgroup members, they also wish to contribute tothe group, for they realize that their selfishnesscan destroy the group. Conflicts arise when individ-ualistic motives trump group-oriented motives, andthe collective intervenes to redress the imbalance.

Commons Dilemmas Consider the “tragedy ofthe commons.” Shepherds with adjoining farms allshare a common grazing field. The large pasturescan support many sheep, so the shepherds grow pros-perous. Then, one or two shepherds decide to add afew sheep to their flock, so that they can make moreprofit. Others notice the extra sheep, so they, too,add to their flocks. Soon, the commons is overgrazed,and all the sheep die of starvation (Hardin, 1968).

This social trap, or commons dilemma, oc-curs when members share a common resource thatthey want to maintain for their group, but individualmembers are tempted to take more than their fairshare (Pruitt, 1998). But if everyone acts selfishly,

the common resource will be destroyed. Membersare tempted by the short-term gains that will bringabout long-term losses to the collective (Komorita &Parks, 1994; Shepperd, 1993).

Researchers have studied when people chooseself-interest over group interest by giving groups offour or five people the chance to draw as manytokens as they want from a pool of available tokens.The pool is a renewable resource, for after eachround of harvesting, it regenerates in direct propor-tion to the number of tokens remaining in the pool.If members quickly draw out all the tokens, the poolis permanently exhausted; cautious removal of only asmall number of tokens ensures replenishment of theresource. Nonetheless, group members tend to act intheir own self-interest by drawing out all the tokens,even when they realize that the pool is quite small(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Yamagishi, 1994).

How can groups escape this dilemma? Bothexperience with the situation and communicationamong members appear to be critical factors(Allison & Messick, 1985a; Bischoff, 2007). In onestudy, triads harvested from either a large or a smalltoken pool. The members of half of the groups couldcommunicate with one another, but the rest couldnot. The differences between these groups werestriking. More than 80% of the groups that couldnot communicate bankrupted their pool within aminute. Even when the pool was large, the noncom-municating groups still had problems with overhar-vesting. Many of these groups realized the long-termnegative consequences of overharvesting, but theydid not manage their resources as well as the com-municating groups. These results suggest that groupscan avoid traps if their members can plan a strategyfor dealing with the situation through communica-tion (Brechner, 1977).

Public Goods Dilemmas In a commons di-lemma, group members take more than their fairshare. In a public goods dilemma, they fail to

social dilemma An interpersonal situation where indi-viduals must choose between maximizing their personaloutcomes or maximizing their group’s outcomes.social trap (or commons dilemma) A social dilemmawhere individuals can maximize their outcome by seek-ing personal goals rather than the collective goals, but iftoo many individuals act selfishly then all members of thecollective will experience substantial long-term losses.

public goods dilemma A social dilemma where onemay not contribute any resources in support of a publicgood (such as a park or a highway system) but also cannotbe excluded for failing to contribute.

CONFL ICT 387

give as much as they should (Komorita & Parks,1994). At the community level, individuals may beable to use public parks, enjoy the protection of thepolice, and send their children to public school, eventhough they do not contribute to the community bypaying taxes. At the group level, members who havenot contributed their time, energy, or resources tothe group effort—free riders—may nonetheless ben-efit from group activities and experiences. When stu-dents work on class projects as teams, one membermay miss meetings and leave assignments undone,but still get a good grade because the group scoreswell on the final project. When everyone is asked tobring a covered dish to a reception, a few attendeeswill show up empty-handed.

Free riding can spark group conflict. Whengroup members in a college class described thesources of conflicts in their project groups, morethan 35% of their comments targeted disputes overwork load. People had much to say about the dedi-cation of their comembers to the group’s goals, forsome did not put in as much time, effort, and re-sources as the others expected (Wall & Nolan, 1987).Some groups respond to free riding by extractingpromises of satisfactory contributions from membersand by imposing costs on the free riders—criticism,public humiliation, physical punishment, and finesare all ways to punish free riders. People are evenwilling to impose costs on themselves if it meansthat free riders can be punished in some way(Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008). But some individualgroup members, to counter the inequity of workingin a group with free riders, may reduce their owncontributions or withdraw from the group altogether(the “sucker effect”; see Komorita & Parks, 1994, fora review).

Fairness Dilemmas Groups must often make de-cisions about how their resources will be appor-tioned among and made available to members. Acompany issues wages to workers. More personnelmust be assigned to more important work units.Office space must be allocated to executives, alongwith company cars, staff support, and budgets.Because resources are limited, groups must developa fair means of doling them out to members.

Fairness judgments are determined by twoforms of social justice: procedural and distributive.As discussed in Chapter 11, procedural justice is con-cerned with the methods used to make decisionsabout the allocation of resources. Questions of pro-cedural justice arise when groups do not use consis-tent, open, and agreed-upon methods for allocatingtheir resources. Procedural justice asks, “Did wemake the decision in a fair way?” (van den Bos,Wilke, & Lind, 1998). Distributive justice, incontrast, concerns how rewards and costs are sharedby (distributed across) the group members. Whenone’s piece of cake seems smaller than it should be,when others get the best seats right up near thefront of the bus, when workers who do the samejob are paid different salaries, or when group leadersgive all their attention to one or two favorite mem-bers and ignore the others, group members feel thatdistributive justice has not been done. Distributivejustice asks, “Did I get my fair share?” and the an-swer often depends on distributive norms:

■ Equity: Base members’ outcomes on their in-puts: An individual who has invested a gooddeal of time, energy, money, or other type ofinput in the group should receive more fromthe group than individuals who have contrib-uted little.

■ Equality: All group members, irrespective oftheir inputs, should be given an equal share ofthe payoff. For example, even though a personcontributes only 20% of the group’s resources,he or she should receive as much as the personwho contributes 40%.

■ Power: Those with more authority, status, orcontrol over the group should receive morethan those in lower-level positions (“to thevictor go the spoils”).

■ Need: Those with the greatest needs should beprovided with the resources they need to meetthose needs.

distributive justice Perceived fairness of the distribu-tion of rights and resources.

388 CHAPTER 13

■ Responsibility: Those who have the most shouldshare with those who have less.

Money (and other resources) may not be theroot of all evil, but its distribution often causesconflicts within groups (Allison & Messick, 1990;Samuelson & Allison, 1994; Samuelson & Messick,1995). Members who contribute less to the groupoften argue in favor of the equality norm, whereasthose who contribute more tend to favor the equitynorm. Women prefer equality over equity evenwhen they outperform their coworkers (Wagner,1995). Members of larger groups prefer to baseallocations on equity, whereas members of small-er groups stress equality (Allison, McQueen, &Schaerfl, 1992). Some countries stress equality andneed more than equity, as do different organizationsand groups within each country (Fischer et al.,2007). Members of groups working on tasks whereone individual’s contributions are critically important

for success prefer equitable distributions over egali-tarian ones.

Group members who feel that they are receiv-ing too little for what they are giving—negativeinequity—sometimes withdraw from the group, re-duce their effort, or turn in work of lower quality.Receiving too much for what one has given—positive inequity—sometimes causes people to increasetheir efforts so they deserve what they get, but itis negative inequity that causes conflict (Fortin &Fellenz 2008; Rivera & Tedeschi, 1976). Even mon-keys, as Focus 13.2 explains, respond with hostilitywhen they are the victims of negative inequity.

These reactions are driven, in part, by self-interest. Group members strive to maximize theirpersonal rewards, so they react negatively whenthey are denied what they feel they deserve. Butgroup members are also concerned with the issuesof fairness and justice, because these are indicationsof their status and inclusion in groups. When group

F o c u s 13.2 Are Humans the Only Species That Can Judge What Is Fair?

Conflict is best understood as an integral part of thesocial network. It operates within a set of constraints asold as the evolution of cooperation in the animalkingdom.

—Frans de Waal (2000, p. 590)

Humans are not the only species with a highly evolvedsense of distributive justice, at least according to re-search conducted by Frans de Waal and his colleagues.They trained capuchin monkeys to work for food re-wards. The monkeys, when given a token, would berewarded with a small portion of food when theyhanded the token back. These monkeys would workfor bit of cucumber (low-value reward), but they pre-ferred a grape above all else (high-value reward).

Once trained, de Waal set up several differentpayment conditions to see how the worker monkeyswould respond. In the equity condition, two monkeysworked side-by-side for the same low-value reward;and work they did, diligently exchanging a coin forfood. In the inequity condition, the monkeys did thesame amount of work, but one of them receivedthe high-value reward and the other was only giventhe low-value reward. The latter monkeys were none

too pleased. In addition to vocalized complaints andgestures of defiance, they refused to continue ex-changing the tokens for food, and when given theirfood reward they would indicate their displeasure byreturning it—aiming for the researchers. These reac-tions were worse still in a third, “free food,” condition.Conflict reached its peak when the one monkey wasgiven grapes without even having to trade coins backand forth (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; de Waal, 2006).

De Waal concludes that these monkeys’ reactionswere guided by their instinctive sense of fairness, forthey appeared to recognize the inequity of the situa-tion. He adds, however, that not all primate speciesreact so negatively to such inequities. Rhesus monkeys,for example, do not seem to be sensitive to distributivejustice, perhaps because they live in small groups withvery differentiated chains of authority that creategreat inequalities in the distribution of rewards. DeWaal also notes that the monkeys that prospered un-der the inequitable arrangement showed no sign ofconcern over getting more than their fair share. Theywere not so altruistic that they shared their ill-gottengains with their unrewarded partner. But would Homosapiens have acted any more generously?

CONFL ICT 389

members feel that their group has acted with inte-grity while allocating rewards, they feel a sense ofpride in their group. They also feel that the rewardsthey receive from the group are an indication oftheir prestige and respect within the group. Thesereactions are shaped more by the group’s proceduraljustice than by its distributive justice (Blader &Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003).

Responsibility Dilemmas When a group com-pletes its work, members often dispute who de-serves credit and who deserves blame. The boardof directors at Apple blamed Jobs’s devotion tothe Mac for the company’s economic misfortunes.Sculley credited his skilled marketing interventionsfor Apple’s prosperity in the years following Jobs’sdismissal. Jobs blamed Sculley for ruining thecompany.

Just as individuals carry out extensive appraisalsof their own successes and failures, so do groupmembers devote significant cognitive resources tothe analysis and comprehension of their collectiveendeavors. This appraisal, however, is complicatedby the collaborative nature of group activities.Group members must identify the factors that con-tributed to each member’s performance, assigncredit and blame, and make decisions regarding re-wards, power, and status. Each group member,however, generally sees himself or herself as some-what more worthy of credit than others in thegroup. This tendency, termed egocentrism, canbe easily documented just by asking people toindicate how responsible they feel they are forany group activity, where 0% means they are notresponsible at all and 100% that they alone areresponsible for what the group has achieved.These scores, when summed across group members,invariably exceed 100% (Ross & Sicoly, 1979;Savitsky, 2007).

This bias occurs, in part, because people arefar more aware of their own contributions than thoseof others—they literally see themselves busily con-tributing to the group effort and overlook the work ofothers. Thus, egocentrism can be reduced by askinggroup members to think about their collaborators’contributions; a process termed unpacking. When, forexample, the authors of multi-authored researcharticles were asked to estimate their responsibilityfor the joint project, they were less egocentric if theywere also asked to estimate how much the other co-authors had contributed (Caruso et al., 2006; Savitskyet al., 2005).

Group members’ claims of responsibility can beeither group-serving (sociocentric) or self-serving (ego-centric). After success, members may praise the entiregroup for its good work with such comments as“We all did well,” or “Our hard work really paidoff.” Likewise, after failure, members may join to-gether in blaming outside forces and absolving oneanother of blame. Because these types of responsi-bility claims protect and enhance the group, theylower levels of relationship conflict within thegroup (Peterson & Behfar, 2003). Frequently, how-ever, self-serving members blame one another forthe group’s misfortunes or take the lion’s share ofthe credit after a success (Forsyth, Zyzniewski, &Giammanco, 2002; Rantilla, 2000).

These self-serving attributions result in conflictand a loss of cohesion (Leary & Forsyth, 1987). Inone study, members of successful and unsuccessfulgroups were asked to complete a confidential reportof their responsibility and others’ responsibilities forthe outcome. Then, to their surprise, this report wasshared with other group members. Unbeknownst tothe group members, the actual reports were switchedwith standard ones indicating that another groupmember either took high, moderate, or low res-ponsibility for the outcome. Group members whoblamed others for failure or tried to claim the lion’sshare of responsibility after success were not well-liked (Forsyth, Berger, & Mitchell, 1981). Otherstudies confirmed that those who engage in self-serving attributions in groups are often viewed asbraggarts, narcissists, or even untrustworthy liars, butthat those who share responsibility appropriately are

egocentrism Giving oneself more responsibility for anoutcome or event than is warranted; often indexed bycomparing one’s own judgments of personal responsibil-ity to judgments of responsibility allocated by others.

390 CHAPTER 13

considered trustworthy teammates (Greenberg, 1996;Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001).

Controlling: Conflict over Power

The conflict between Sculley and Jobs was rootedin each man’s desire to control the company. Jobsthought that he would be content to allow anotherperson to make key decisions about Apple’s future,but when those decisions did not mesh with hisown vision, he sought to regain control. Sculleybelieved that Jobs was undermining his authority.Both Jobs and Sculley sought the power theyneeded to control the company, and their powerstruggle caused turmoil within the group.

As noted in earlier chapters, the differentiation ofmembers in terms of status, prestige, and power is aubiquitous feature of groups. As the group strives tocoordinate its members’ task-directed activities, someindividuals will begin to assert more authority overthe others. Those who occupy positions of authorityhave the right to issue orders to others, who areexpected to follow those directives. Once individualsgain power over others, they tend to defend theirsources of power through manipulation, the for-mation of coalitions, information control, and favor-itism. These power processes occur with greatregularity in groups, but they nonetheless causewaves of tension, conflict, and anger to ripplethrough the group (Coleman, 2000; Sell et al., 2004).

Infighting, power struggles, and disputes are par-ticularly common in business and corporate settings.Calvin Morrill (1995) spent several years collectingethnographic data on the sources and consequencesof conflict between executives in corporations. Hisanalysis confirmed the image of companies as arenasfor power struggles, where group members competewith each other for power, promotions, and promi-nence, often by using manipulative, illicit tactics.Contests of authority and power were so common-place in one company that the executives developedan elaborate set of terms and expressions pertainingto company politics, which Morrill recorded muchlike an anthropologist would record the rituals andincantations of the members of an isolated tribe.An ambush was a “covert action to inconvenience

an adversary” (synonyms: bushwhack and cheapshot); blindsiding was “an intentional and surprisingpublic embarrassment by one executive at another’sexpense”; an outlaw was “an executive who handlesconflict in unpredictable ways but who is regarded asespecially task competent.” In some cases, thismaneuvering would result in a meltdown—a “physicalfight between executives” (1995, pp. 263–265).

Working: Task and Process Conflict

As the group goes about its work on shared tasksand activities, members sometimes disagree withone another. This type of conflict is termed taskconflict or substantive conflict because it stems fromdisagreements about issues that are relevant tothe group’s goals and outcomes. No group of peo-ple is so well-coordinated that its members’ actionsmesh perfectly, so conflicts over the group tasks areinevitable. Groups and organizations use such con-flicts to make plans, increase creativity, solve pro-blems, decide issues, and resolve misunderstandings.Sculley and Jobs, as the leaders of Apple, weresupposed to argue and debate over substantiveissues having to do with making and sellingcomputers.

Although task conflicts help groups reach theirgoals, these disagreements can spill over into morepersonal conflicts. People who disagree with thegroup, even when their position is a reasonableone, often provoke considerable animosity withinthe group. The dissenter who refuses to acceptothers’ views is liked less, assigned low-status tasks,and sometimes ostracized. As the group struggles toreach consensus on the substantive issues at hand, itresponds negatively to those group members whoslow down this process (Kruglanski & Webster,1991). Researchers studied this process by plantinga confederate in discussion groups. The confederatedeliberately slowed down the group with such

task conflict (or substantive conflict) Disagreementsover issues that are relevant to the group’s recognizedgoals and procedures.

CONFL ICT 391

interruptions as “What do you mean?” “Do youthink that’s important?” or “I don’t understand.” Insome groups, the confederate had an excuse: He toldthe group that his hearing aid was not working thatday. Other groups, in contrast, received no exculpat-ing explanation. At the end of the session memberswere asked to identify one person to exclude fromthe group. Everyone (100%) picked the disruptiveconfederate if there was no excuse for his actions(Burstein & Worchel, 1962).

Task conflict occurs when ideas, opinions, andinterpretations clash. Process conflict, or proce-dural conflict, occurs when strategies, policies, andmethods clash. Group members may find them-selves uncertain about how to resolve a problem,with some championing continued discussion andothers favoring a vote. The leader of the group maymake decisions and initiate actions without consult-ing the group; but the group may become irritatedif denied an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking (Smoke & Zajonc, 1962). During proce-dural conflicts, groups do not just disagree—theydisagree on how to disagree.

Many groups minimize procedural ambiguitiesby adopting formal rules—bylaws, constitutions,statements of policies, or mission and procedurestatements—that specify goals, decisional processes,and responsibilities (Houle, 1989). Many decision-making groups also rely on specific rules to regulatetheir discussions. The best-known set of rules wasdeveloped by Henry M. Robert, an engineer whowas irritated by the conflict that characterized manyof the meetings he attended. Robert’s Rules of Order,first published in 1876, explicated not only “meth-ods of organizing and conducting the business ofsocieties, conventions, and other deliberative as-semblies,” but also such technicalities as howmotions should be stated, amended, debated, post-poned, voted on, and passed (Robert, 1915/ 1971,p. i). No less than seven pages were used todescribe how the group member “obtains the

floor,” including suggestions for proper phrasingsof the request, appropriate posture, and timing.More complex issues, such as the intricacies of vot-ing, required as many as 20 pages of discussion.Robert purposely designed his rules to “restrainthe individual somewhat,” for he assumed that“the right of any individual, in any community,to do what he pleases, is incompatible with theinterests of the whole” (1915/1971, p. 13). As aresult, his rules promote a formal, technically pre-cise form of interaction, sometimes at the expenseof openness, vivacity, and directness. Additionally,the rules emphasize the use of voting procedures,rather than discussion to consensus, to resolvedifferences.

Liking and Disliking: Personal

Conflicts

Beth Doll and her colleagues (2003) studied conflictat recess—the period of relatively unsupervised in-teraction that many schoolchildren consider to bean oasis of play in the otherwise work-filled schoolday. They discovered that many conflicts stemmedfrom disagreements and power struggles, as childrenargued about the rules of games, what is fair andwhat is not, and who gets to make decisions. Butthe most intense conflicts were personal. Childrenwho disliked each other got into fights. Childrenwho had irritating personal habits were routinelyexcluded by others. Children in one clique weremean to children in other cliques and to thosewho were excluded from all cliques. When chil-dren who said they had a rotten time at recesswere asked why, in most cases they explained,“I had to play alone” and, “Other kids would notlet me join in” (Doll, Murphy, & Song, 2003).

Adults do not always play well together either.Personal conflicts, also called affective conflicts(Guetzkow & Gyr, 1954), personality conflicts (Wall& Nolan, 1987), emotional conflicts (Jehn, 1995), or

process conflict (or procedural conflict) Disagreementover the methods the group should use to complete itsbasic tasks.

personal conflict Interpersonal discord that occurswhen group members dislike one another.

392 CHAPTER 13

relationship conflicts (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), arerooted in individuals’ antipathies for other groupmembers. Personal likes and dislikes do not alwaystranslate into group conflict, but people oftenmention their disaffection for another group mem-ber when they air their complaints about theirgroups (Alicke et al., 1992). Morrill’s (1995) studyof high-level corporate executives, for example, re-vealed both task and power conflicts, but more than40% of their disputes were rooted in “individualenmity between the principals without specific ref-erence to other issues.” Disputants questioned eachothers’ moral values, the way they treated theirspouses, and their politics. They complained aboutthe way their adversaries acted at meetings, the waythey dressed at work and at social gatherings, theirhobbies and recreational pursuits, and their person-ality traits. They just did not like each other verymuch (Morrill, 1995, p. 69).

Just as any factor that creates a positive bondbetween people can increase a group’s cohesion, soany factor that creates disaffection can increase con-flict. In many cases, people explain their conflicts byblaming the other person’s negative personal quali-ties, such as moodiness, compulsivity, incompe-tence, communication difficulties, and sloppiness(Kelley, 1979). People usually dislike others whoevaluate them negatively, so criticism—even whendeserved—can generate conflict (Ilgen, Mitchell, &Fredrickson, 1981). Group members who treatothers unfairly or impolitely engender more con-flict than those who behave politely (Ohbuchi,Chiba, & Fukushima, 1996). People who haveagreeable personalities are usually better liked byothers, and they also exert a calming influence ontheir groups. In a study of dyads that includedpeople who were either high or low in agreeable-ness, dyads with two highly agreeable individualsdisplayed the least conflict, whereas dyads thatcontained two individuals with low agreeablenessdisplayed the most conflict (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996). Agreeable people alsoresponded more negatively to conflict overall.When people described their day-to-day activitiesand their daily moods, they reported feeling un-happy, tense, irritated, and anxious on days when

they experienced conflicts—especially if theywere by nature agreeable people (Suls, Martin, &David, 1998). Because, as Chapter 4 explained,similarity usually triggers attraction and dissimilaritydisliking, diverse groups must deal with conflictmore frequently than more homogenous ones(see Focus 13.3).

CONFRONTAT ION AND

ESCALAT ION

Early in 1985, Sculley and Jobs began moving to-ward a showdown, pushed into conflict by theirincompatibilities, their marked differences of opin-ion about the company, the competitive nature oftheir interdependence, and their refusal to take lessthan they felt was their due. They tried to quell thetension, but by spring, the men were trapped in anescalating conflict.

Conflicts escalate. Although the parties to theconflict may hope to reach a solution to theirdispute quickly, a host of psychological and inter-personal factors can frustrate their attempts tocontrol the conflict. As Sculley continued to arguewith Jobs, he became more committed to his ownposition, and his view of Jobs and his positionbecame biased. Sculley used stronger influence tac-tics, and soon other members of Apple were drawninto the fray. All these factors fed the conflict,changing it from a disagreement to a full-fledgedcorporate war.

Uncertainty à Commitment

As conflicts escalate, group members’ doubts anduncertainties are replaced by a firm commitmentto their position. Sculley, for example, becamemore certain that his insights were correct, and hisdisagreement with Jobs only increased his commit-ment to them (Staw & Ross, 1987). When peopletry to persuade others, they search out supportingarguments. If this elaboration process yields fur-ther consistent information, they become evenmore committed to their initial position. People

CONFL ICT 393

rationalize their choices once they have made them:They seek out information that supports theirviews, they reject information that conflicts withtheir stance, and they become entrenched in their

original position (Ross & Ward, 1995). Moreover,people feel that once they commit to a positionpublicly, they must stick with it. They may realizethat they are wrong, but to save face, they continue

F o c u s 13.3 Which Is Worse: Conflict with a Friend or with a Foe?

Secrets are divulged when friends fight.—Hindu proverb

People prefer to work in cohesive groups that are freefrom conflict: where members are not only linked bytheir communal tasks but also strong relational bondsof friendship. But what happens when conflict eruptsin these more personally unified groups? To disagreewith a colleague whom you respect but do not think ofas a friend is one thing, but this same disagreementwith a friend may be far more disruptive. Was the in-tensity of the dispute between Jobs and Sculley due, inpart, to their friendship as much as their substantivedisagreement?

Such a possibility is suggested by Heider’s balancetheory. As noted in Chapter 6’s analysis of the stabilityof group structures, balance theory suggests that ar-guing and fighting with a friend is particularly jarring.Whereas disagreeing with someone you dislike is cog-nitively “harmonious”—the elements of the situationall “fit together without stress” (Heider, 1958, p. 180)—disagreeing with someone who is liked is an imbal-anced state that will create psychological discomfort.

Could arguing with a friend be worse than argu-ing with someone who is less well liked? SociologistHoward Taylor examined this question by arrangingfor male college students to discuss an issue with an-other student whom they liked or disliked. This studentwas Taylor’s confederate, who unbeknownst to thegroup members was trained to deliberately agree ordisagree on key issues. Taylor then watched the groupsfor evidence of conflict, including tension (nervousness,stammering, blushing, expressions of frustration, andwithdrawal), tension release (giggling, joking, cheer-fulness, silliness), and antagonism (anger, hostility,taunting, and defensiveness).

Figure 13.3 partly summarizes the findings. Asbalance theory suggests, tension was highest in theunbalanced pairs—when disagreeing people liked eachother or when people who disliked each other agreed.People did not like disagreeing with friends, or agree-ing with their foes. The greatest amount of antago-

nism, however, occurred when discussants both dis-agreed and disliked each other. So, the predictions ofbalance theory were only partially confirmed. The mostharmonious groups were ones whose members likedeach other and found themselves in agreement.However, the least harmonious groups were balanced,but by negative rather than positive forces: membersdisliked each other and they disagreed. Taylor (1970)concluded that such groups would likely not long en-dure outside the confines of the laboratory.

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0like/agree

like/disagree

dislike/agree

dislike/disagree

12

10

8

6

4

2

0like/agree

like/disagree

dislike/agree

dislike/disagree

Tens

ion

Hos

tility

F I G U R E 13.3 Levels of tension and hostilitywhen people who disagreed or agreed on an issueand either liked or disliked each other talked for30 minutes.

SOURCE: Taylor, 1970.

394 CHAPTER 13

to argue against their opponents (Wilson, 1992).Finally, if other group members argue too strongly,reactance may set in. As noted in Chapter 8, whenreactance occurs, group members become evenmore committed to their position (Brehm &Brehm, 1981; Curhan, Neale, & Ross, 2004).

The dollar auction illustrates the impact of com-mitment on conflict. Members bid for $1, but onespecial rule is added. The highest bidder gets tokeep the dollar bill, but the second highest biddergets no money and must pay the amount he or shebid. Bids flow slowly at first, but soon the offersclimb over 50 cents toward the $1 mark. As thestakes increase, however, quitting becomes costly.If a bidder who offers 50 cents for the $1 is bestedby someone offering 60 cents, the 50-cent bidderwill lose 50 cents. So he or she is tempted to beatthe 60-cent bid. This cycle continues upward—well beyond the value of the dollar bill in somecases. On occasion, players have spent as much as$20 for the $1 (Teger, 1980).

Perception à Misperception

Individuals’ reactions during conflict are shapedin fundamental ways by their perception of thesituation and the people in that situation. Groupmembers’ inferences about each others’ strengths,attitudes, values, and other personal qualities pro-vide the basis for mutual understanding, but duringconflict these perceptions tend to be so distortedthat they inflame rather than smooth conflict(Thompson & Nadler, 2000).

Misattribution Sometimes group members settleon explanations that sustain and enhance members’interpersonal relations. Jobs, in trying to explainSculley’s actions, may have assumed Sculley wasunder pressure from the board, he was unaccus-tomed to the demands of running a high-techfirm, or that he was dealing with the stress of hisrelocation. But frequently, people explain theirconflicts in ways that make the problem worse. Inthat case, Jobs would think that Sculley’s actionswere caused by his personal qualities, such as

incompetence, belligerence, argumentativeness,greed, or selfishness. Jobs might also believe thatSculley was deliberately trying to harm him, andthat Sculley therefore deserved to be blamed andpunished (Fincham & Bradbury, 1992, 1993). Inshort, Jobs would fall prey to the fundamental attri-bution error (FAE) and assume that Sculley’s behaviorwas caused by personal (dispositional) rather thansituational (environmental) factors (Ross, 1977). Ifthe conflict continued, he may have eventually de-cided it was an intractable one. People expect in-tractable conflicts to be prolonged, intense, andvery hard to resolve (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Misperceiving Motivations When conflict oc-curs in a group, members begin to wonder aboutone another’s motivations. “Why,” Steve Jobs mayhave wondered, “is Sculley not supporting mywork with the Mac? He must know how importantthis project is to the company, so why is he notgiving it the attention it deserves?”

During conflict members often become dis-trustful of one another, wondering if their oncecooperative motivations have been replaced bycompetitive ones. This loss of trust is one of theprimary reasons why people, when they begin tocompete with one another, have difficulty return-ing to a cooperative relationship. Researchers ex-amined just this process by pairing people playing aPDG-like game with partners who used one of fourpossible strategies described earlier: competition,cooperation, individualism, and altruism. Whenlater asked to describe their partners’ motives, theplayers recognized when they were playing withan individualist or a competitor, but they hadmore trouble accurately perceiving cooperationand altruism (Maki, Thorngate, & McClintock,1979).

People with competitive SVOs are the mostinaccurate in their perceptions of cooperation.When cooperators play the PDG with other coop-erators, their perceptions of their partner’s strategyare inaccurate only 6% of the time. When compe-titors play the PDG with cooperators, however,they misinterpret their partner’s strategy 47% of

CONFL ICT 395

the time, mistakenly believing that the cooperatorsare competing (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a, 1970b,1970c; Sattler & Kerr, 1991). Competitors are alsobiased in their search for information, for they aremore likely to seek out information that confirmstheir suspicions—“I am dealing with a competitiveperson”—rather than information that might indi-cate the others are attempting to cooperate (VanKleef & De Dreu, 2002). Competitors also tendto deliberately misrepresent their intentions, some-times claiming to be more cooperatively intentionedthan they actually are (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004).

Soft Tactics à Hard Tactics

People can influence other people in dozens of dif-ferent ways; they can promise, reward, threaten,punish, bully, discuss, instruct, negotiate, manipu-late, supplicate, ingratiate, and so on. Some of thesetactics are harsher than others. Threats, punishment,and bullying are all hard, contentious tactics becausethey are direct, nonrational, and unilateral. Peopleuse softer tactics at the outset of a conflict, but asthe conflict escalates, they shift to stronger andstronger tactics. Sculley gradually shifted fromrelatively mild methods of influence (discussion,

negotiation) to stronger tactics (threats). Eventually,he demoted Jobs (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).

One team of researchers studied this escalationprocess by creating a simulated birthday card factorywhere people were paid a small amount for eachcard they manufactured using paper, colored mar-kers, and ribbons. The work went well until oneof the group members, a confederate of the research-ers, began acting selfishly by hoarding materials thatthe other members needed. As the hour wore on, itbecame clear that this person was going to make farmore money than everyone else, and the group be-came more and more frustrated. It responded byusing stronger and more contentious influence tac-tics. As Table 13.1 indicates, the group tried to solvethe problem initially with statements and requests.When those methods failed, they shifted to demandsand complaints. When those methods failed, theytried problem solving and appeals to a third party(the experimenter). In the most extreme cases, theyused threats, abuse, and anger to try to influence theirritating confederate (Mikolic, Parker, & Pruitt,1997).

People who use harder tactics often overwhelmtheir antagonists, and such methods intensify con-flicts. Morton Deutsch and Robert Krauss (1960)

T A B L E 13.1 Influence Methods Used in Groups Sharing Scarce Resources

Behavior ExamplePercentageUsing

Requests May I use the glue? 100.0

Statements We need the glue. 100.0

Demands Give me the glue, now! 88.9

Complaints What’s wrong with you? Why don’t you share? 79.2

Problem solving You can use our stapler if you share the glue. 73.6

Third party Make them share! 45.8

Angry I’m mad now. 41.7

Threat Give me the glue or else. 22.2

Harassment I’m not giving you any more ribbon until youreturn the glue.

16.7

Abuse You are a selfish swine. 0.7

SOURCE: Mikolic, Parker, & Pruitt, 1997.

396 CHAPTER 13

examined this intensification process in their classictrucking game experiment. They asked pairs ofwomen to role-play the owners of a trucking com-pany. The two companies, Acme and Bolt, carriedmerchandise over the roads mapped in Figure 13.4.Acme and Bolt each earned 60 cents after eachcomplete run, minus 1 cent for each second takenup by the trip.

The truck route set the stage for competitionand conflict between Acme and Bolt. The shortestpath from start to finish for Acme was Route 216and for Bolt was Route 106, but these routesmerged into a one-lane highway. When trucks en-countered each other along this route, one playerhad to back up to her starting position to let theother through. Acme and Bolt could avoid this

confrontation by taking the winding alternateroute, but this path took longer.

All the pairs played the same basic game, butsome were provided with the power to threatentheir opponents, and others were not. In the unilat-eral threat condition, Acme was told that a gate,which only she could open and close, was locatedat the fork in Route 216. When the gate was closed,neither truck could pass this point in the road, mak-ing control of the gate a considerable benefit toAcme. If Bolt attempted to use the main route, allAcme had to do was close the gate, forcing Bolt toback up and enabling Acme to reopen the gate andproceed quickly to her destination. Thus, when onlyAcme possessed the gate, Bolt’s profits were greatlythreatened. In the bilateral threat condition, both sideshad the use of gates located at the ends of the one-lane section of Route 216, and in the control condi-tion, no gates were given to the players.

Deutsch and Krauss’s control participants soonlearned to resolve the conflict over the one-laneroad. Most of these pairs took turns using the

trucking game experiment A research procedure de-veloped by Morton Deutsch and Robert Krauss in theirstudies of conflict between individuals who differ in theircapacity to threaten and punish others.

CONFL ICT 397


main route, and on the average, each participantmade a $1 profit. Winnings dwindled, however,when one of the players was given a gate.Participants in the unilateral threat condition lostan average of $2.03. Bolt’s losses were twice as greatas Acme’s, but even Acme lost more than $1 at thegame. Conflict was even worse when both Acmeand Bolt had gates. In the bilateral threat condition,both players usually took the longer route becausethe gates on the main route were kept closed, andtheir losses in this condition averaged $4.38.

These findings convinced Deutsch and Kraussthat the capacity to threaten others intensifies con-flict. They also noted that establishing a communi-cation link between adversaries does not necessarilyhelp them to solve their dispute (Krauss & Morsella,2000). If one party can or does threaten the otherparty, the threatened party will fare best if he or shecannot respond with a counterthreat (Borah, 1963;Deutsch & Lewicki, 1970; Froman & Cohen, 1969;Gallo, 1966). Equally powerful opponents, how-ever, learn to avoid the use of their power if thefear of retaliation is high (Lawler, Ford, & Blegen,1988).

Reciprocity à Upward Conflict Spiral

Conflict-ridden groups may seem normless, withhostility and dissatisfaction spinning out of control.Yet upward conflict spirals are in many cases sus-tained by the norm of reciprocity. If one groupmember criticizes the ideas, opinions, or characteris-tics of another, the victim of the attack will feeljustified in counterattacking unless some situationalfactor legitimizes the hostility of the former(Eisenberger, et al., 2004).

If interactants followed the norm of reciprocityexactly, a mild threat would elicit a mild threat inreturn, and an attack would lead to a counterattack.But interactants tend to follow the norm of roughreciprocity—they give too much (overmatching) ortoo little (undermatching) in return. In one study,women playing a PDG-like game against a confed-erate could send notes to their opponent and penal-ize her by taking points from her winnings.Reciprocity guided the player’s actions, for the

more often the confederate sent threats, the moreoften the participant sent threats; when the confed-erate’s threats were large, the participant’s threatswere large; and confederates who exacted largefines triggered large fines from the participant.This reciprocity, however, was rough rather thanexact. At low levels of conflict, the participantsovermatched threats and punishments, and at highlevels of conflict, they undermatched their threats.The overmatching that occurs initially may serve asa strong warning, whereas the undermatching athigh levels of conflict may be used to send a con-ciliatory message (Youngs, 1986).

Few à Many

During the Jobs–Sculley conflict, Jobs tried to per-suade each member of the board to side with himin the dispute. His goal was to form a powerfulcoalition that would block Sculley’s plans and swingthe vote of the board in his favor.

Coalitions exist in most groups, but when con-flict erupts, group members use coalitions to shiftthe balance of power in their favor. The initial dis-agreement may involve only two group members,but as conflicts intensify, previously neutral mem-bers often join with one faction. Similarly, evenwhen members initially express many differentviews, with time, these multiparty conflicts are re-duced to two-party blocs through coalition forma-tion. Coalitions can even link rivals who decide tojoin forces temporarily to achieve a specific out-come (a mixed-motive situation). Although alliesmay wish to compete with one another, no singleindividual has enough power to succeed alone.Hence, while the coalition exists, the competitivemotive must be stifled (Komorita & Parks, 1994).

Coalitions contribute to conflicts because theydraw more members of the group into the fray.Coalitions are often viewed as contentious, heavy-handed influence tactics because individuals in thecoalition work not only to ensure their own out-comes but also to worsen the outcomes of non–coalition members. Coalitions form with peopleand against other people. In business settings, forexample, the dominant coalition can control the

398 CHAPTER 13

organization, yet it works outside the bounds of theformal group structure. Those who are excludedfrom a coalition react with hostility to the coalitionmembers and seek to regain power by formingtheir own coalitions. Thus, coalitions must beconstantly maintained through strategic bargainingand negotiation (Mannix, 1993; Murnighan, 1986;Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985).

Irritation à Anger

Few people can remain calm and collected in a con-flict. When disputes arise, tempers flare, and this in-crease in negative emotions exacerbates the initialconflict. Most people, when asked to talk about atime when they became angry, said that they usuallylost their temper when arguing with people theyknew rather than with strangers. Many admittedthat their anger increased the negativity of the con-flict; 49% became verbally abusive when they wereangry, and 10% said they became physically aggres-sive (Averill, 1983). Participants in another study re-ported physically attacking someone or something,losing emotional control, or imagining violenceagainst someone else when they were angry (Shaveret al., 1987). Even when group members began bydiscussing their points calmly and dispassionately, asthey became locked into their positions, emotionalexpression begins to replace logical discussion (DeDreu et al., 2007). Unfortunately, all manner of neg-ative behaviors, including the rejection of conces-sions, the tendering of unworkable initial offers, andthe use of contentious influence strategies, increase asmembers’ affect becomes more negative (Pillutla &Murnighan, 1996; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead,2004). Anger is also a contagious emotion in groups(Kelly, 2001). Group members, when negotiatingwith someone who has become angry, tend to be-come angry themselves (Van Kleef et al., 2004).

CONFL ICT RESOLUT ION

In one way or another, conflicts subside. Evenwhen members are committed to their own view-points, high levels of tension cannot be maintained

indefinitely. Disputants may regain control of theirtempers and break the upward conflict spiral. Thegroup may fissure, splitting into two or more sub-groups whose members are more compatible. Onemember may leave the group, as was the result inthe Jobs–Sculley dispute. In time, group hostilityabates.

Commitment à Negotiation

Just as conflicts escalate when group members be-come firmly committed to a position and will notbudge, conflicts de-escalate when group membersare willing to negotiate with others to reach a solu-tion that benefits all parties. Negotiation is a reci-procal communication process whereby two ormore parties to a dispute examine specific issues,explain their positions, and exchange offers andcounteroffers. Negotiation sometimes amounts tolittle more than simple bargaining or mutual com-promise. In such distributive negotiations, both partiesretain their competitive orientation and take turnsmaking small concessions until some equally dissa-tisfying middle ground is reached. Haggling andbartering (“I’ll give you $20 for it, and not a pennymore!”) illustrate this form of negotiation (Lewicki,Saunders, & Barry, 2006).

Integrative negotiation, in contrast, is a collabo-rative conflict resolution method (Rubin, 1994).Such negotiators are principled rather than com-petitive, to use the terminology of the HarvardNegotiation Project. Harvard researchers, afterstudying how people solve problems through nego-tiation, identified three basic kinds of negotiators—soft, hard, and principled (see Table 13.2). Softbargainers see negotiation as too close to competi-tion, so they choose a gentle style of negotiation.They make offers that are not in their best interests,they yield to others’ demands, they avoid any

Negotiation A reciprocal communication processwhereby two or more parties to a dispute examine spe-cific issues, explain their positions, and exchange offersand counteroffers to reach agreement or achieve mutu-ally beneficial outcomes.

CONFL ICT 399

confrontation, and they maintain good relationswith fellow negotiators. Hard bargainers, in contrast,use tough, competitive tactics during negotiations.They begin by taking an extreme position on theissue, and then they make small concessions onlygrudgingly. The hard bargainer uses contentiousstrategies of influence and says such things as“Take it or leave it,” “This is my final offer,”“This point is not open to negotiation,” “My handsare tied,” and “I’ll see you in court” (Fisher, 1983).

Principled negotiators, meanwhile, seek integra-tive solutions by sidestepping commitment to spe-cific positions. Instead of risking entrapment,principled negotiators focus on the problem rather

than the intentions, motives, and needs of the peo-ple involved. Positional bargaining, they conclude,is too dangerous:

When negotiators bargain over positions,they tend to lock themselves into thosepositions. The more you clarify your po-sition and defend it against attack, themore committed you become to it. Themore you try to convince the other side ofthe impossibility of changing your openingposition, the more difficult it becomes todo so. Your ego becomes identified withyour position. (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 5)

T A B L E 13.2 Comparisons between the Three Approaches to Negotiation

Element Soft Negotiation Hard Negotiation Principled Negotiation

Perceptionof others

Friends Adversaries Problem solvers

Goals Agreement Victory A wise outcome reached effi-ciently and amicably

Concessions Make concessions to culti-vate the relationship

Demand concessions as acondition of the relation-ship

Separate the people from theproblem

People vs.problems

Be soft on the people andthe problem

Be hard on the problemand the people

Be soft on the people, hard onthe problem

Trust Trust others Distrust others Proceed independently of trust

Positions Change your position easily Dig into your position Focus on interests, not posi-tions

Negotiation Make offers Make threats Explore interests

Bottom line Disclose your bottom line Mislead as to your bottomline

Avoid having a bottom line

Losses and gains Accept one-sided losses toreach agreement

Demand one-sided gains asa price of agreement

Invent options for mutualgains

Search Search for a single answer—the one they will accept

Search for a single answer—the one you will accept

Develop multiple options tochoose from; decide later

Criteria Insist on agreement Insist on your position Insist on using objectivecriteria

Contest of will Avoid a contest of wills Win the contest of wills Reach a result based on stan-dards, independent of will

Pressure Yield to pressure Apply pressure Reason and be open to reason;yield to principle, not pressure

SOURCE: Adapted from Fisher & Ury, 1981.

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The Harvard Negotiation Project recommendsthat negotiators explore a number of alternatives tothe problems they face. During this phase, the ne-gotiation is transformed into a group problem-solving session, with the different parties workingtogether in search of creative solutions and newinformation that the group can use to evaluate thesealternatives. Principled negotiators base their choiceon objective criteria rather than on power, pressure,self-interest, or an arbitrary decisional procedure.Such criteria can be drawn from moral standards,principles of fairness, objective indexes of marketvalue, professional standards, tradition, and so on,but they should be recognized as fair by all parties(Kolb & Williams, 2003).

Misperception à Understanding

Many conflicts are based on misperceptions. Groupmembers often assume that others are competingwith them, when in fact those other people onlywish to cooperate. Members think that people whocriticize their ideas are criticizing them personally.Members do not trust other people because theyare convinced that others’ motives are selfish ones.Group members assume that they have incompatiblegoals when they do not (Simpson, 2007).

Group members must undo these perceptualmisunderstandings by actively communicating infor-mation about their motives and goals through dis-cussion. In one study, group members were giventhe opportunity to exchange information abouttheir interests and goals, yet only about 20% did.Those who did, however, were more likely todiscover shared goals and were able to reach solu-tions that benefited both parties to the conflict(Thompson, 1991). Other studies have suggestedthat conflict declines when group members commu-nicate their intentions in specific terms, make explicitreferences to trust, cooperation, and fairness, andbuild a shared ingroup identity (Harinck, 2004;Weingart & Olekalns, 2004).

Communication is no cure-all for conflict,however. Group members can exchange informationby communicating, but they can also create grossmisunderstandings and deceptions. Communication

offers group members the means to establish trustand commitment, but it can also exacerbate conflictif members verbalize feelings of hatred, disgust, orannoyance. For example, when Deutsch and Krauss(1960) let participants in their trucking game experi-ment communicate with each other, messages typi-cally emphasized threats and did little to reduceconflict (Deutsch, 1973). Communication is detri-mental if these initial messages are inconsistent, hos-tile, and contentious (McClintock, Stech, & Keil,1983). Communication can be beneficial, however,if interactants use it to create cooperative norms, if itincreases trust among participants, and if it generatesincreased cohesion and unity in the group (Messick &Brewer, 1983).

Hard Tactics à Cooperative Tactics

Group members cope with conflict in differentways. Some ignore the problem. Others discussthe problem, sometimes dispassionately and ratio-nally, sometimes angrily and loudly. Still others topush their solution onto others, no matter what theothers may want. Some actually resort to physicalviolence (Sternberg & Dobson, 1987). Some ofthese tactics escalate conflicts, but others are reliablyassociated with reduced hostility.

Dual Concerns As with social values orienta-tions, variations in methods of dealing with conflictcan be organized in terms of two essential themes:concern for self and concern for the other person.According to the dual concern model of conflictresolution, some strategies aim to maximize one’sown outcomes; others—such as overlooking aproblem until it subsides—de-emphasize proselfgoals. Some conflict resolution strategies are alsomore other-focused. Yielding, for example, is pro-social, whereas contending and forcing are less pro-social (Pruitt, 1983; Sheppard, 1983; Thomas,1992; van de Vliert & Janssen, 2001).

dual concern model A conceptual perspective onmethods of dealing with conflict that assumes avoiding,yielding, fighting, and cooperating differ along two basicdimensions: concern for self and concern for other.

CONFL ICT 401

When both concern for self and concern forother are taken into account, the dual concernmodel identifies the four core conflict resolutionmodes shown in Figure 13.5.

■ Avoiding: Inaction is a passive means of dealingwith disputes. Those who avoid conflicts adopta “wait and see” attitude, hoping that problemswill solve themselves. Avoiders often tolerateconflicts, allowing them to simmer withoutdoing anything to minimize them. Rather thanopenly discussing disagreements, people whorely on avoidance change the subject, skipmeetings, or even leave the group altogether(Bayazit & Mannix, 2003). Sometimes theysimply agree to disagree (a modus vivendi).

■ Yielding: Accommodation is a passive but pro-social approach to conflict. People solve bothlarge and small conflicts by giving in to thedemands of others. Sometimes, they yield be-cause they realize that their position is in error,so they agree with the viewpoint adopted byothers. In other cases, however, they maywithdraw their demands without really being

convinced that the other side is correct, but—for the sake of group unity or in the interest oftime—they withdraw all complaints. Thus,yielding can reflect either genuine conversionor superficial compliance.

■ Fighting: Contending is an active, proself meansof dealing with conflict that involves forcingothers to accept one’s view. Those who usethis strategy tend to see conflict as a win–losesituation and so use competitive, powerfultactics to intimidate others. Fighting (forcing,dominating, or contending) can take many forms,including authoritative mandate, challenges,arguing, insults, accusations, complaining,vengeance, and even physical violence (Morrill,1995). These conflict resolution methods are allcontentious ones because they involve impos-ing one’s solution on the other party.

■ Cooperating: Cooperation is an active, prosocial,and proself approach to conflict resolution.Cooperating people identify the issues under-lying the dispute and then work together toidentify a solution that is satisfying to both

Yielding

Avoiding

Cooperating

High concernfor other’soutcomes

Fighting

Low concernfor other’soutcomes

Low concernfor own

outcomes

High concernfor own

outcomes

F I G U R E 13.5 The dualconcern model of conflict resolu-tion. Avoiding, yielding, coop-erating, and fighting, as meansof dealing with conflict, differ inthe degree to which they arebased on concern for oneself andconcern for the other person.

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sides. This orientation, which is also describedas collaboration, problem solving, or a win–win orientation, entreats both sides in the dis-pute to consider their opponent’s outcomes aswell as their own.

Some theorists consider conciliation to be a fifth dis-tinct way to resolve conflicts, but trying to win overothers by accepting some of their demands can alsobe thought of as either yielding or cooperating (vande Vliert & Euwema, 1994).

Cooperation and Conflict When conflicterupts, group members can use any or all ofthe basic modes of conflict resolution shown inFigure 13.5, but most conflict-management expertsrecommend cooperation above all others: “workthings out,” “put your cards on the table,” and“air out differences,” they suggest. This advice as-sumes that avoidance, fighting, and yielding areonly temporary solutions, for they quell conflictsat the surface without considering the source.Avoiding and fighting are generally considered tobe negative methods, for they tend to intensifyconflicts (Sternberg & Dobson, 1987) and they areviewed as more disagreeable (Jarboe & Witteman,1996; van de Vliert & Euwema, 1994). The morepositive, prosocial methods, yielding and coopera-tion, mitigate conflict and are viewed as moreagreeable. They are more likely to involve moreof the members in the solution, and hence theytend to increase unity.

Groups may respond well to cooperation whenit is used to deal with task conflicts, but what if theproblems stem from personal conflicts—differences inpersonality, values, lifestyles, likes, and dislikes?Research conducted by Carsten De Dreu and hiscolleagues suggests that, in such cases, collaborativeapproaches may aggravate the group conflict morethan they mollify it (e.g., De Dreu, 1997; De Dreu& Van Vianne, 2001; DeDreu &Weingart, 2003). Inone field study, members of semi-autonomous teamsworking on complex, nonroutine tasks were askedabout the ways they handled conflicts in their teams.All these teams included both men and women, andthey ranged in size from 4 to 13 members. Members

of these teams typically interacted with each other inface-to-face settings at least once a week in planningsessions, and they reported interacting with eachother informally nearly every day. As expected,negative methods of dealing with conflicts, such asarguing and forcing one’s views onto others, wereassociated with negative team functioning. In thesegroups, however, collaborative methods of conflictresolution (e.g., “discussing the issues,” “cooperatingto better understand others’ views,” “settling pro-blems through give and take”) were also negativelycorrelated with team functioning. Only avoiding re-sponses, such as “avoiding the issues,” “acting as ifnothing has happened,” and “hushing up the quarrel”were associated with increases in group adjustment tothe conflict. Apparently, the consistent use of collab-oration to deal with intractable differences or pettydisagreements distracted the groups from the achieve-ment of their task-related goals (De Dreu & VanVianne, 2001).

These findings suggest that groups may wishto heed the advice of one member of a successfulmusical quartet who, when asked how his groupmanaged conflicts, explained, “We have a little sayingin quartets—either we play or we fight” (Murnighan& Conlon, 1991, pp. 177–178). As Focus 13.4 sug-gests, cooperative, prosocial solutions work in manycases, but sometimes groups must ignore the conflictand focus, instead, on the work to be done.

Upward à Downward Conflict Spirals

Consistent cooperation among people over a longperiod generally increases mutual trust. But whengroup members continually compete with eachother, mutual trust becomes much more elusive(Haas & Deseran, 1981). When people cannot trustone another, they compete simply to defend theirown best interests (Lindskold, 1978).

How can the upward spiral of competition anddistrust, once initiated, be reversed? Robert Axelrod(1984) explored this question by comparing a num-ber of strategies in simulated competitions. Afterstudying dozens of different strategies, ranging fromalways competing with a competitor to always co-operating with one, the most effective competition

CONFL ICT 403

reverser to emerge was a strategy called tit for tat(TFT). TFT begins with cooperation. If the otherparty cooperates, too, then cooperation continues.But if the other party competes, then TFT competes

as well. Each action by the other person is counteredwith the matching response—cooperation for coop-eration, competition for competition.

The TFT, strategem, is said to be nice, pro-vocable, clear, and forgiving. It is nice because itbegins with cooperation and only defects followingcompetition. It is provocable in the sense that itimmediately retaliates against individuals who com-pete, and it is clear because people playing againstsomeone using this strategy quickly recognize its

F o c u s 13.4 Is Conflict Managed or Resolved?

Every aspect of organizational life that creates orderand coordination of effort must overcome othertendencies to action, and in that fact lies thepotentiality for conflict.

—Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (1978, p. 617).

Conflict is rooted in some basic problems that peopleface when they must join together in groups. Althoughpeople may hope that conflicts can be resolvedcompletely so that the group need never face un-pleasant disagreements or disruptions, in reality, con-flict can only be managed: controlled by the group andits members so that its harmful effects are minimizedand its beneficial consequences are maximized.

Just as individuals develop certain styles of dealingwith conflict—some people are competitive in theirorientation, whereas others are more likely to avoidconflicts—groups also develop their own set of typicalpractices for managing conflict (Gelfand, Leslie, &Keller, 2008). Kristin Behfar and her colleagues (2008)examined the development of these group-level stylesof conflict management—these “conflict cultures”—ina detailed quantitative analysis of 57 autonomouswork teams. These groups all worked with the sameresources, on the same types of projects, and with thesame time constraints. Over time, some of the groupsbecame more capable in the task realm, but others didnot. Some, too, enjoyed increasingly positive relationsamong members, whereas others exhibited declines inthe quality of their cohesion.

Behfar’s group discovered that these changes intask success and interpersonal bonds were relatedto the group’s methods of dealing with conflict. Allof the groups experienced conflicts as their workprogressed, but they dealt with these problemsin different ways. The 21 best teams proactively fore-casted possible problems before they happened.

They developed schedules and assigned responsibili-ties carefully, in unemotional, fact-driven discussions,to reach consensus. They did not report dealing withrelationship conflict, because they did not have any. Asecond set of 11 high-performance groups had littlecohesiveness, but these groups all expressly discussedtheir lukewarm interpersonal relations and dismissedthe importance of social connections. These groupsresolved task and process conflicts by voting. The 14worst teams, who exhibited both declining perfor-mance and interpersonal dysfunction, also used dis-cussion, but the discussion never resolved their pro-blems. These groups reported trying to deal with theirproblems openly, but members would just give in tomore dominant members because they grew tired ofarguing. They dealt with their performance problemsby rotating duties from one member to another, butthey never analyzed the effectiveness of thistechnique.

These findings suggest that the impact of conflicton a group cannot be predicted until the group’s con-flict culture is known. Groups that take proactive stepsto prevent conflict from arising in the first place tendto be more satisfying to members than those that onlyrespond—and respond poorly at that—to conflictswhen they arise. Successful groups also tended toadopt pluralistic strategies for dealing with conflict,rather than particularistic ones. They resolved conflictsusing methods that applied to the group as a whole,such as developing rules, standardizing procedures,and assigning tasks to members based on skill and ex-pertise rather than status. Less successful groups, incontrast, used strategies that focused on specific indi-viduals’ complaints or the group’s concerns about oneor two members. In these groups, the “squeaky wheelwould get the grease,” but the repair was not suffi-cient to restore the group to health.

tit for tat (TFT) A bargaining strategy that begins withcooperation, but then imitates the other person’s choiceso that cooperation is met with cooperation and compe-tition with competition.

404 CHAPTER 13

contingencies. It is forgiving, however, in that it im-mediately reciprocates cooperation should thecompetitor respond cooperatively.

TFT is also a reciprocal strategy, for it fights firewith fire and rewards kindness in kind. Individualswho follow a tit-for-tat strategy are viewed as“tough but fair”; those who cooperate with a com-petitor are viewed as weak, and those who consis-tently compete are considered unfair (McGillicuddy,Pruitt, & Syna, 1984). Because the effectiveness ofTFT as a conflict reduction method is based on itsprovocability; any delay in responding to coopera-tion reduces the effectiveness of TFT. If a groupmember competes, and this defection is not coun-tered quickly with competition, TFT is less effective(Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991). TFT also losessome of its strength in “noisy” interactions, whenbehaviors cannot be clearly classified as either com-petitive or cooperative (Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, &Tazelaar, 2002; Wu & Axelrod, 1995). It is less ef-fective in larger groups, although this decline isminimized if individual members believe that a sub-stantial subgroup within the total group is basing itschoices on the TFT strategy (Komorita, Parks, &Hulbert, 1992; Parks & Komorita, 1997).

Many à Few

Conflicts intensify when others take sides, but theyshrink when third-party mediators help groupmembers reach a mutually agreeable solution to theirdispute (Kressel, 2000). Although uninvolved groupmembers may wish to stand back and let the dispu-tants “battle it out,” impasses, unflagging conflict es-calation, or the combatants’ entreaties may causeother group members or outside parties to help by:

■ creating opportunities for both sides to expressthemselves while controlling contentiousness

■ improving communication between the dis-putants by summarizing points, asking forclarification, and so on

■ helping disputants save face by framing theacceptance of concessions in positive ways andby taking the blame for these concessions

■ formulating and offering proposals for alterna-tive solutions that both parties find acceptable

■ manipulating aspects of the meeting, includingits location, seating, formality of communica-tion, time constraints, attendees, and agenda

■ guiding the disputants through a process ofintegrative problem solving

However, if the disputants want to resolve the con-flict on their own terms, third-party interventionsare considered an unwanted intrusion (Carnevale,1986a, 1986b; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Raiffa,1983; Rubin, 1980, 1986).

Go-betweens, facilitators, diplomats, advisers,judges, and other kinds of mediators vary consider-ably in terms of their power to control others’ out-comes (LaTour, 1978; LaTour et al., 1976). In aninquisitorial procedure, the mediator questions the twoparties and then hands down a verdict that the twoparties must accept. In arbitration, the disputants pres-ent their arguments to the mediator, who then baseshis or her decision on the information they provide.In a moot, the disputants and the mediator openly andinformally discuss problems and solutions, but themediator can make no binding decisions. Satisfactionwith a mediator depends on how well the inter-mediary fulfills these functions and also on the inten-sity of the conflict. Mediational techniques such asarbitration are effective when the conflict is subdued,but they may not work when conflict intensity ishigh. Overall, most people prefer arbitration, fol-lowed by moot, mediation, and inquisitorial proce-dures (LaTour et al., 1976; Ross, Brantmeier, &Ciriacks, 2002; Ross & Conlon, 2000).

Anger à Composure

Just as negative emotions encourage conflicts, posi-tive affective responses increase concession making,creative problem solving, cooperation, and the use ofnoncontentious bargaining strategies (Forgas, 1998;Van Kleef et al., 2004). Hence, when tempers flare,the group should encourage members to regain

mediator One who intervenes between two personswho are experiencing conflict, with a view to reconcilingthem.

CONFL ICT 405

control over their emotions. “Count to ten,” calling a“time-out,” or expressing concerns in a written, care-fully edited, letter or e-mail are simple but effectiverecommendations for controlling conflict, as is theintroduction of humor into the group discussion(Mischel & DeSmet, 2000). Apologies, too, are effec-tive means of reducing anger. When people areinformed about mitigating causes—background fac-tors that indicate that the insult is unintentionalor unimportant—conflict is reduced (Betancourt &Blair, 1992; Ferguson & Rule, 1983). Groups canalso control anger by developing norms that expli-citly or implicitly prohibit shows of strong, negativeemotion or by holding meetings on controversialtopics online (Yang & Mossholder, 2004).

Conflict versus Conflict Management

Conflict is a natural consequence of joining agroup. Groups bind their members and their mem-bers’ outcomes together, and this interdependencecan lead to conflict when members’ qualities, ideas,goals, motivations, and outlooks clash. Conflict isalso an undeniably powerful process in groups. Inthe case of Apple, the dispute between Jobs andSculley was resolved, but not without a consider-able investment of time, resources, and energy.Two men who were once friends parted asenemies. A company that once profited from theleadership of two visionary thinkers lost one ofthem to competitors. Before the conflict, Applewas an unconventional, risk-taking trendsetter.After the conflict, the company focused on costs,increasing sales, and turning a profit. Conflict sti-mulates change–both positive and negative.

Did Apple gain from the conflict, or did it suf-fer a setback as its top executives fought for power

and control? Conflict, many cases, brings with itdissent, discord, disagreement, tension, hostility,and abuse. It undermines satisfactions, engendersnegative emotions, disrupts performance, and caneven trigger violence. When Carsten De Dreuand Laurie Weingart (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of dozens of studies of conflict in groups,they discovered that, in study after study, conflictundermined satisfaction and lowered performance.Nor did it matter if the difficulties stemmed frompersonal conflicts (disruptions of interpersonalbonds between members) or from substantive, taskconflicts. Conflict undermined performance andsatisfaction.

Is conflict always harmful—a pernicious processthat should be avoided? This question remainsopen to debate, but it may be that the problem isnot conflict, per se, but mismanaged conflict. Asnoted in Chapter 5 many groups pass through aperiod of conflict as they mature. This conflictphase, so long as it is managed well, expands therange of options, generates new alternatives, andenhances the group’s unity by making explicit anylatent hostilities and tensions. Conflict can make agroup’s goals more explicit and help members un-derstand their role in the group. It may force themembers to examine, more carefully, their assump-tions and expectations, and may help the groupfocus on its strengths and diagnose its weaknesses.A group without conflict may be working so per-fectly that no one can identify any improvements,but more likely it is a group that is boring and un-involving for its members. Conflict, then, is not theculprit. It is poor management of the conflicts thatinevitably arise in groups that leads to problems(Bormann, 1975; Jehn, 1997; Jehn & Bendersky,2003).

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What is conflict?

1. When conflict occurs in a group, the actions orbeliefs of one or more members of the groupare unacceptable to and resisted by one ormore of the other members.

2. Intergroup conflict involves two or more groups,and intragroup conflict occurs within a group.

3. Conflict follows a cycle from conflict escalationto resolution.

406 CHAPTER 13

What are the sources of conflict in groups?

1. Many group and individual factors conspire tocreate conflict in a group, but the most com-mon sources are competition, conflicts over thedistribution of resources, power struggles, de-cisional conflicts, and personal conflicts.

2. Deutsch’s early theorizing suggests that indepen-dence and cooperation lower the likelihood ofconflict, whereas competition tends to increaseconflict by pitting members against one another.

■ Mixed-motive situations, like the prisoner’sdilemma game (PDG), stimulate conflictbecause they tempt individuals to competerather than cooperate. Individuals tend tocompete less in the PDG if they play re-peatedly against the same partner.

■ Behavioral assimilation is caused by reciprocity;competition sparks competition and co-operation (to a lesser extent) provokescooperation.

■ Individuals differ in their basic orientationtowards conflict. Those with a competitivesocial values orientation (SVO) are morelikely to compete than are those with co-operative, individualistic, or altruistic or-ientations, even if they think that otherswill be acting in a cooperative fashion.

■ Men and women are equally competitive,although both sexes use more contentiousinfluence methods when they are pairedwith a man rather than with a woman, per-haps because they anticipate more conflict.

3. Social dilemmas stimulate conflict by temptingmembers to act in their own self-interest to thedetriment of the group and its goals. Disputesarise when members:

■ exploit a shared resource (a commons di-lemma or social trap)

■ do not contribute their share (a public goodsdilemma, free riding)

■ disagree on how to divide up resources(distributive justice) or on the procedures to

follow in dividing the resources (proce-dural justice)

■ do not agree on the norms to follow whenapportioning resources (e.g., equality, eq-uity, power, responsibility, and need)

■ take more than their fair share of respon-sibility for an outcome (egocentrism), avoidblame for group failure, or take too muchpersonal responsibility for group successes(self-serving attributions of responsibility)

4. These reactions are driven, in part, by self-interest, but group members respond nega-tively to perceived mistreatment because it callsinto question their status and inclusion. Workby de Waal suggests that other species aresensitive to unfair distributions of resources.

5. Power struggles are common in groups asmembers vie for control over leadership, status,and position.

6. Task conflict stems from disagreements aboutissues that are relevant to the group’s goals andoutcomes. Even though such substantive con-flicts help groups reach their goals, these dis-agreements can turn into personal, unpleasantconflicts.

7. Process conflicts occur when members do notagree on group strategies, policies, and meth-ods. Groups avoid such conflicts by clarifyingprocedures.

8. Personal conflict occurs when individual mem-bers do not like one another. Doll’s work findsthat such conflicts are prevalent in children’sgroups.

■ Any factor that causes disaffection betweengroup members (e.g., differences in atti-tudes, objectionable personal qualities) canincrease personal conflict.

■ Balance theory predicts that group mem-bers will respond negatively when theydisagree with those they like or agree withthose they dislike, but as Taylor’s work

CONFL ICT 407

confirmed, conflict is greatest when groupmembers both disagree with and dislikeeach other.

Why does conflict escalate?

1. Once conflict begins, it often intensifies beforeit begins to abate.

2. When individuals defend their viewpoints ingroups, they become more committed to theirpositions; doubts and uncertainties are replacedby firm commitment.

3. Conflict is exacerbated by members’ tendencyto misperceive others and to assume that theother party’s behavior is caused by personal(dispositional) rather than situational (environ-mental) factors (fundamental attribution error).

4. As conflicts worsen, members shift from softto hard tactics. Deutsch and Krauss studiedthis process in their trucking game experiment.Conflict between individuals escalated wheneach side could threaten the other.

5. Other factors that contribute to the escalationof conflict in groups include:

■ negative reciprocity, as when negative ac-tions provoke negative reactions in others

■ the formation of coalitions that embroilformerly neutral members in the conflict

■ angry emotions that trigger expressions ofanger among members.

How can group members manage their conflict?

1. In many cases, members use negotiation (in-cluding integrative negotiation) to identify theissues underlying the dispute and then worktogether to identify a solution that is satisfyingto both sides.

2. The Harvard Negotiation Project maintainsthat principled, integrative negotiation is moreeffective than either soft or hard bargaining.

3. Because many conflicts are rooted in mis-understandings and misperceptions, group

members can reduce conflict by actively com-municating information about their motivesand goals through discussion.

4. The dual concern model identifies four means ofdealing with conflicts—avoiding, yielding,fighting, and cooperating—that differ alongtwo dimensions: concern for self and concernfor others.

■ In some cases, cooperation is more likelyto promote group unity.

■ Personal conflicts—ones that are rooted inbasic differences in attitude, outlook, andso on—may not yield to cooperative ne-gotiations. De Dreu and his colleaguessuggest that the avoiding method may bethe best way to cope with such conflicts.

5. Behfar and her colleagues suggest that groupsdevelop their own approaches to dealing withconflict, and some of the so-called conflictcultures are more effective than others.

6. If a group member continues to compete, thetit-for-tat (TFT) strategy has been proven byAxelrod and others to be useful as a conflictresolution strategy.

7. Third-party interventions—mediators—canreduce conflict by imposing solutions (inquisi-torial procedures and arbitration) or guidingdisputants to a compromise (moot and media-tion procedures).

8. Just as negative emotions encourage conflict,positive affective responses reduce conflict.

Is conflict an unavoidable evil or a necessary good?

1. Conflict is a natural consequence of joining agroup and cannot be avoided completely.

2. Some evidence suggests that conflicts, whenresolved successfully, promote positive groupfunctioning, but a meta-analysis by De Dreuand Weingart suggests that conflict causes moreharm than good—particularly if it is not ade-quately managed.

408 CHAPTER 13


Chapter Case: iConflict■ Apple Confidential 2.0: The Definitive History of

the World’s Most Colorful Company, by OwenW. Linzmayer (2004), provides a well-researched history of the many conflict-ladenepisodes in the life of Apple, Inc.

Causes of Conflict■ “Conflict in Groups,” by John M. Levine and

Leigh Thompson (1996), is a relatively high-level analysis of the causes, benefits, and liabil-ities of conflict in small groups.

■ Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, andSettlement (3rd ed.), by Dean G. Pruitt andSung Hee Kim (2004), provides a thoroughanalysis of the causes and consequences of in-terpersonal conflict.

■ The Executive Way, by Calvin Morrill (1995), isa compelling analysis of the causes and conse-quences of conflict in the upper echelons oflarge corporations.

Conflict Resolution■ Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without

Giving In (2nd ed.), by Roger Fisher, WilliamUry, and Bruce Patton (1991), describes a step-by-step strategy for resolving conflicts to themutual benefit of both parties.

■ The Handbook of Conflict Resolution, edited byMorton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman(2000), is the definitive sourcebook for gen-eral analyses of conflict resolution but alsoprovides practical recommendations forresolving conflicts.

■ Negotiation, by Roy J. Lewicki, David M.Saunders, and Bruce Barry (2006), is a com-prehensive text dealing with all aspects of ne-gotiation, including power, bargaining, andinterpersonal and intergroup conflictresolution.


CONFL ICT 409


14

Intergroup Relations

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

As a social species, humans strive to es-tablish close ties with one another. Yetthe same species that seeks out connec-tions with others also metes out enmitywhen it confronts members of anothergroup. Intergroup relations are more of-ten contentious than harmonious.

■ What interpersonal factors disruptrelations between groups?

■ What are the psychological foun-dations of conflict betweengroups?

■ How can intergroup relations beimproved?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Intergroup Conflict: Us versus Them

Competition and Conflict

The Discontinuity Effect

Power and Domination

Norms of Engagement

Anger and Scapegoating

Evolutionary Perspectives

Intergroup Bias: Perceiving Usand Them

Conflict and Categorization

The Ingroup–Outgroup Bias

Cognitive Bias

Intergroup Emotions

Categorization and Identity

Intergroup Conflict Resolution:Uniting Us and Them

Intergroup Contact

Cognitive Cures for Conflict

Conflict Management

Resolving Conflict: Conclusions

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

410

✵

Groups are everywhere, and so are conflicts betweenthem. Intergroup conflict occurs at all levels of socialorganization—rivalries between gangs, organized dis-putes in industrial settings, race riots, and interna-tional warfare. Groups provide the means to achievehumanity’s most lofty goals, but when groups opposeeach other, they are sources of hostility, abuse, andaggression. Although conflict between groups is oneof the most complicated phenomena studied by so-cial scientists, the goal of greater understanding andthe promise of reduced tension remain enticing. Thischapter considers the nature of intergroup relations,with a focus on the sources of intergroup conflictand the ways such conflicts can be resolved (for

reviews, see Bornstein, 2003; Brewer, 2007; Dovidioet al., 2003).

INTERGROUP CONFL ICT :

US VERSUS THEM

The researchers’ plans for the Robbers Cave studyworked all too well. In just two weeks they created afull-fledged war-in-miniature between the Rattlersand the Eagles, complete with violent schemes,weapons of destruction, hostility, and mistreatmentof each side by the other. The Sherifs, by startingwith two newly formed groups with no history of

The Rattlers and the Eagles: Group against Group

On two midsummer days in 1954, twenty-two11-year-old boys from Oklahoma City boarded busesfor their trip to summer camp. They were “normal,well-adjusted boys of the same age, educational level,from similar sociocultural backgrounds and with nounusual features in their personal backgrounds”(Sherif et al., 1961, p. 59). Their parents had paid a$25 fee, signed some consent forms, and packed themoff to a camp situated in Robbers Cave State Park,located in the San Bois Mountains of southeastOklahoma.

Robbers Cave was not your everyday summercamp. All the boys had been handpicked by a researchteam that included Muzafer Sherif, O. J. Harvey, JackWhite, William Hood, and Carolyn Sherif. The teamhad spent more than 300 hours interviewing the boys’teachers, studying their academic records, reviewingtheir family backgrounds, and unobtrusively recordingtheir behavior in school and on the playground. Theparents knew that the camp was actually part of agroup dynamics research project, but the boys had noidea that they were participants in an experiment. Thestaff randomly assigned the boys to one of two groupsand brought them to camp in two separate trips. Eachgroup spent a week hiking, swimming, and playingsports in their area of the camp, and both groupsdeveloped norms, roles, and structure. Some boysemerged as leaders, others became followers, andboth groups established territories within the park

(see Figure 14.1). The boys named their groups theRattlers and the Eagles and stenciled these names ontheir shirts and painted them onto flags. The staffmembers, who were also collecting data, noted clearincreases in group-oriented behaviors, cohesiveness,and positive group attitudes.

When the groups discovered another group wasnearby, they expressed wariness about these outsi-ders. After some guarded encounters between mem-bers, they asked the staff to set up a competition todetermine which group was better than the other.Since a series of competitions between the twogroups was exactly what the staff had in mind, theyheld a series of baseball games, tugs-of-war, tent-pitching competitions, cabin inspections, and a(rigged) treasure hunt.

As the competition wore on, tempers flared.When the Eagles lost a game, they retaliated bystealing the Rattlers’ flag and burning it. The Rattlersraided the Eagles’ cabin during the night, tearingout mosquito netting, overturning beds, and carryingoff personal belongings. When the Eagles won theoverall tournament, the Rattlers absconded with theprizes. When fistfights broke out between the groups,the staff had to intervene to prevent the boys fromseriously injuring one another. They moved the twogroups to different parts of the camp, amid shoutsof “poor losers,” “bums,” “sissies,” “cowards,” and“little babies.”

I NTERGROUP RELAT IONS 411

rivalry, succeeded in documenting the social andpsychological factors that combined to push thesetwo groups into an escalating conflict. Each groupat the Robbers Cave viewed the other as a rival tobe bested, and these perceptions were soon joinedby other antecedents of conflict: norms, strugglesfor status, and ever-strengthening negative emotionalreactions. This section examines these causes of con-flict, focusing on the Robbers Cave study but sug-gesting implications for other intergroup situationsas well.

Competition and Conflict

On the ninth day of the Robbers Cave Experi-ment, the Rattlers and the Eagles saw the tourna-ment prizes for the first time: the shining trophy,

Reservoir

Pump house

Robbers Cave

Recreation hall

Stone corral

Water tank

Hill

Rocks

RATTLER AREAEAGLE AREA

Eagle swimming hole

CopperheadHill Mess

hallHill

Dock

O.U. camp

Moccasin CreekPark Road

Rattlesnake Bay

Eaglecabin

Dam

Rattlercabin

Park Road

Athletic field

UpperCamp

Rattlerswimming hole

1 /8

mi.

1 /4 m

i.

N

Robbers Cave State Park Area

F I G U R E 14.1 The layout of the campgrounds in the Robbers Cave Experiment.

Robbers Cave Experiment A field study performed byMuzafer and Carolyn Sherif and their colleagues that ex-amined the causes and consequences of conflict betweentwo groups of boys at Robbers Cave State Park inOklahoma.

412 CHAPTER 14

medals for each boy, and—best of all—four-bladecamping knives. The boys wanted these prizes, andnothing was going to stand in their way. From thenon, all group activities revolved around the ultimategoal of winning the tournament. Unfortunately,although both groups aspired to win the prizes,success for one group meant failure for the other.When groups are pitted against each other in a con-test for resources, intergroup relations that were onceamicable often become antagonistic.

Many of the things that people want and needare available in limited supply. Should one groupacquire and control a scarce commodity—whetherit be food, territory, wealth, power, natural re-sources, energy, or the prizes so desperately desiredby the Rattlers and the Eagles—other groups mustdo without that resource. According to realisticgroup conflict theory, this struggle betweengroups to acquire resources inevitably leads to con-flict (Campbell, 1965; Esses et al., 2005). All groupswould prefer to be “haves” rather than “have-nots,” so they take steps to achieve two interrelatedoutcomes—attaining the desired resources and pre-venting the other group from reaching its goals.Theorists have traced many negative intergroupdynamics—including struggles between the classesof a society (Marx & Engels, 1947), rebellions(Gurr, 1970), international warfare (Streufert &Streufert, 1986), racism (Gaines & Reed, 1995),religious persecutions (Clark, 1998), tribal rivalriesin East Africa (Brewer & Campbell, 1976), policeuse of lethal force against citizens (Jacobs &O’Brien, 1998), interorganizational conflicts (Jehn &Mannix, 2001), and even the development of cultureand social structure (Simmel, 1955)—to competitionover scarce resources.

Robert Blake and Jane Mouton discoveredcompetition’s capacity to create conflict in theirwork with business executives. They assigned par-ticipants in a two-week management training

program to small groups charged with solving a seriesof problems. Blake and Mouton never explicitlymentioned competition, but the participants knewthat a group of experts would decide which grouphad produced the best solution. Many viewed theproject as a contest to see who was best, and theywholeheartedly accepted the importance of winning.Leaders who helped the group beat the opponentbecame influential, whereas leaders of losing groupswere replaced. The groups bonded tightly duringwork and coffee breaks, and only rarely did anyparticipant show liking for a member of anothergroup. In some cases, hostility between the twogroups became so intense that the “experiment hadto be discontinued” and special steps taken to restoreorder, tempers, and “some basis of mutual respect”(Blake & Mouton, 1984, 1986, p. 72). Thesefindings and others suggest that competition—evencompetition that is only anticipated—can spark in-tergroup hostility (Bornstein, Budescu, & Zamir,1997; Polzer, 1996; van Oostrum & Rabbie, 1995).

The Discontinuity Effect

Chapter 13 traced conflict between two or morepeople—intragroup or interindividual—to compe-tition. Correspondingly, when two or more groupscompete, intergroup conflict becomes more likely.In fact, the competition–conflict relationship iseven more powerful at the group level than at theindividual level, resulting in the discontinuityeffect: the competitiveness of groups is out of pro-portion to the competitiveness displayed by indivi-duals when interacting with other individuals. Eventhough individuals in the group may prefer to co-operate, when they join groups, this cooperativeorientation tends to be replaced by a competitive one(see Wildschut et al., 2003, for a theoretically rigorousreview of this area).

realistic group conflict theory A conceptual frame-work arguing that conflict between groups stems fromcompetition for scarce resources, including food, terri-tory, wealth, power, natural resources, and energy.

discontinuity effect The markedly greater competi-tiveness of groups when interacting with other groups,relative to the competitiveness of individuals interactingwith other individuals.


Studies of Discontinuity Chet Insko, JohnSchopler, and their colleagues documented thisdiscontinuity between interindividual conflict andintergroup conflict by asking individuals and groupsto play the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). As notedin Chapter 13, this mixed-motive game offers thetwo participating parties a choice between cooper-ative responding and competitive responding, andcompetition yields the highest rewards only if oneof the two parties cooperates. The sample PDGmatrix in Figure 14.2 illustrates the group’s di-lemma. Option C is the cooperative choice, andD is the competitive, defecting-from-cooperation,choice. Cooperation (option C) will yield the bestoutcomes for both groups if they both select C, butif one picks C and the other picks D, then thecooperative group’s payoff will be small (20 points)compared to the competitive group’s payoff (60points). If both groups select Option D, then theirrewards will be cut in half.

When two individuals played, they averagedonly 6.6% competitive responses over the courseof the game. Competition was also rare when threeindependent, noninteracting individuals played threeother independent individuals (7.5%). But when aninteracting triad played another interacting triad,36.2% of their choices were competitive ones, andwhen triads played triads but communicated theirchoices through representatives selected from withinthe group, competition rose to 53.5% (Insko et al.,1987). These findings are remarkably consistent—ameta-analysis of 48 separate studies conducted in 11different group dynamics laboratories confirmed thatgroups are disproportionately more competitive thanindividuals (Wildschut et al., 2003).

This discontinuity between individuals andgroups is not confined to laboratory groups playinga structured conflict game. When researchers exam-ined everyday social interactions, they found thatgroup activities were marked by more competitionthan one-on-one activities. Participants diligentlyrecorded their interpersonal activities for an entireweek, classifying them into one of five categories:

■ One-on-one interactions: playing chess, walkingto class with another person, and so on.

■ Within-group interactions: interactions withmembers of the same group, such as a clubmeeting or a classroom discussion.

■ One-on-group interactions: the individual partici-pant interacting with a group, such as a studentmeeting with a panel of faculty for careerinformation.

■ Group-on-one interactions: the individual is part ofa group that interacts with a single individual.

■ Group-on-group interactions: a soccer game, ajoint session of two classes, and the like.

As Figure 14.3 indicates, the proportion of com-petitive interactions within each type of interactionclimbed steadily as people moved from one-on-oneinteractions to group interactions. These effects alsoemerged when sports activities, which could haveexacerbated the competitiveness of groups, wereeliminated from the analysis (Pemberton, Insko, &Schopler, 1996).

Rattlers’ choice

C D

Eag

les’

cho

ice

Eagleswin50

Eagleswin20

Eagleswin60

Eagleswin30

Rattlerswins50

Rattlerswin60

Rattlerswin20

Rattlerswin30

D

C

F I G U R E 14.2 The prisoner’s dilemma game payoffmatrix used to study competition and intergroup conflict.Two groups, the Rattlers and the Eagles, must selecteither option C (cooperation) or option D (defection).These choices are shown along the sides of the matrix.The payoffs for these joint choices are shown within eachcell of the matrix. In each cell, Rattlers’ outcomes areshown above the diagonal line, and Eagles’ outcomes areshown below it. Groups tend to select option D muchmore frequently than option C.

414 CHAPTER 14

The discontinuity between groups and indivi-duals is also apparently when members plan andstrategize. When they expect to bargain with agroup they worry more about exploitation andfair play. They often convey their distrust by sayingsuch things as “We don’t trust you” and “You bet-ter not cheat us” to their opponents, so communi-cation between groups does little to quell tensions.People are more likely to withdraw from a com-petitive interaction with a group than an individual(Insko et al., 1990, 1993, 1994; Schopler et al.,1995; Schopler & Insko, 1992).

Causes of Discontinuity The consistency of thediscontinuity effect suggests that it springs from anumber of causes that combine to exacerbate con-flicts between groups, including greed, anonymity,fear, ingroup favoritism, and diffusion of responsi-bility (Pinter et al., 2007). First, individuals aregreedy, but greed is even greater in groups. Whenpeople discover that others in the group are alsoleaning in the direction of maximizing gains by ex-ploiting others, this social support spurs the groupmembers on to greater levels of greed. Whenresearchers changed the PDG matrix payoff sothat greed was no longer so lucrative, groupslearned how to cooperate with each other tomaximize joint gains (Wolf et al., 2008).

Second, people fear groups more than they fearindividuals. They describe groups as more abrasive(competitive, aggressive, proud) and less agreeable(cooperative, trustworthy, helpful) than individuals.

This pessimistic outlook also colors their expec-tations about specific group interactions, for peoplewho were about to play the PDG against a groupfelt that the experience would be more abrasivethan did individuals about to play the game asindividuals (Hoyle, Pinkley, & Insko, 1989). Thisgeneralized distrust, in the extreme, has beentermed intergroup paranoia: the belief held by themembers of one group that they will be mistreatedin some way by the members of a malevolent out-group (Kramer, 2004).

Third, group members may feel that, as partof a group, they should do what they can to maxi-mize the group’s collective outcomes—that part ofbeing good group members or leaders is to do whatthey can to increase the team’s achievements, evenif that comes at a cost to those outside of the group(Pinter et al., 2007). This sense of group duty mayalso trigger a stronger desire to outdo the othergroup as well as generate the best possible outcomefor the ingroup. Groups playing a game wherecooperation would have favored both groupsequally seemed to transform, psychologically, thepayoff matrix from a cooperation-favoring gameinto the more competitive PDG game (Wolfet al., 2008).

Fourth, diffusion of responsibility may alsocontribute to the discontinuity effect (Meier &Hinsz, 2004). In one experiment investigators toldindividuals and groups they were studying people’sreactions to different foods, but that for the pur-poses of experimental control the subjects them-selves would be selecting the amount of food givento others. All the subjects were led to believe thatthey had been assigned to the hot sauce condition,which involved giving helpings of painfully hotspiced sauce to others to eat. They were also toldthat they were paired with either a group or anindividual, and that their partner had measuredout a substantial portion of hot sauce for them toconsume. They were then given the opportunity toselect the amount of sauce to send back to theirpartner in the nearby room.

The study’s results confirmed the discontinuityeffect. Groups allocated, and received, more gramsof hot sauce than individuals, with the result

0 10 20 30 40 50Percent competitive

Group-to-group

Group-to-one

One-to-group

One-to-one

Within group

F I G U R E 14.3 The level of competitiveness offive everyday situations ranging from one-to-oneinteractions to group-to-group interactions.

INTERGROUP RELAT IONS 415

that group-to-group aggression was substantiallyhigher than the individual-to-group and group-to-individual pairs. The individual-to-individual pairsyielded the least amount of aggression relative to thegroup-to-group pairings, replicating the discontinu-ity effect. The greater aggressiveness did not appearto be due to the more aggressive group membersconvincing the others to dispense more punishmentto their partners. Even though the researchers mea-sured each group member’s personal level of aggres-siveness, they did not find that groups with moreaggressive individuals acted more aggressively as agroup. They did find that those in groups reportedfeeling less responsible for their actions, suggestingthat diffusion of responsibility may play a role inproducing the shift towards greater hostility.

What can be done to reduce the exaggeratedcompetitiveness of groups relative to individuals?Insko and his associates find that communicationdoes little to reduce the effect, since in many casesthe two factions communicate negative informa-tion or misinformation. Communication did lowerthe magnitude of the discontinuity, but not bylowering the level of conflict between groups.Instead, it tended to increase the level of conflictbetween individuals, to the point that they were ascompetitive as groups. This unexpected effect ofcommunication was more likely to occur whencommunication was restricted in some way, aswhen interactants could only send written mes-sages (Wildschut et al., 2003).

A tolerant, pacifistic appeasement approach toconflict also proved ineffective in reducing discon-tinuity. As with studies conducted with indivi-duals, when groups respond cooperatively evenwhen the other party competes—hoping to signaltheir good intentions and inviting a reduction inconflict—the other group responds by exploitingthe pacifistic group. A reciprocal strategy, such astit for tat (TFT), was a more effective strategy tocounter discontinuity. As noted in Chapter 13,TFT matches competition with competition andcooperation with cooperation. This strategy,Insko suggests, allays groups’ fears that they willbe exploited, for it reassures them that they cantrust the other group. Other methods for reducing

the discontinuity effect include decreasing therewards of competition (by changing the valuesin the PDG matrix) and increasing individualidentifiability (Wildschut et al., 2003).

Power and Domination

Intergroup conflicts, though initially rooted incompetition for scarce resources, can escalate intointergroup exploitation as one group tries to dominatethe other. Not only do groups wish to monopolizeand control scarce resources but they also wish togain control over the other group’s land, resources,peoples, and identity (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).As Herbert Spencer wrote in 1897, the first priorityof most governments is the identification of“enemies and prey” (p. 547).

Just as groups seek to subdue and exploit othergroups, the targets of these attacks struggle to resistthis exploitation. In some cases, this competition ispurely economic. By manufacturing desirable goodsor performing valuable services, one group can cometo dominate others in the intergroup trade system(Service, 1975). But domination can also occurthrough force and coercion (Carneiro, 1970).European countries, during their period of colonial-ism, established colonies throughout the world andexploited the original inhabitants of these areas botheconomically and through military force. Europeansseized the lands of Native Americans and used cap-tured Africans as slaves in their workforce. BothNapoleon and Hitler sought to expand their empiresthrough the conquest of other nations. In Russia,the ruling class exploited workers until the workersrose up in revolution and established a communistnation.

Social dominance theory, developed byJim Sidanius, Felicia Pratto, and their colleagues,

social dominance theory An approach to oppressionand domination, developed by Jim Sidanius, FeliciaPratto, and their colleagues, assuming that conflictbetween groups results from dynamic tensions betweenhierarchically ranked groups within society.

416 CHAPTER 14

maintains that these conflict-laden relationshipsamong social groups result from the natural ten-dency for people to form subgroups within thelarger society, and then for these subgroups to viewith one another for power and resources. Somegroups come to control more of the resources ofthe society, including wealth, property, status, andprotection. Other groups, in contrast, occupy posi-tions subordinate to these higher status groups, andmay even be oppressed by them. They are unableto secure the resources they need, and so experi-ence a range of negative outcomes, includingpoorer health, inadequate education, higher mor-tality rates, poverty, and crime. Sidanius andPratto further suggest that members of the domi-nant groups tend to believe that this inequitableapportioning of resources is justified by precedent,by custom, or even by law. They may deny that thedistribution of resources is actually unfair or claimthat the dominance of one group over another isconsistent with the natural order (Sidanius et al.,2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

This cycle of domination and resistance occursbetween nations, classes, ethnic groups, the sexes,and even small groups in controlled experimentalsituations (Focus 14.1). Chet Insko and his collea-gues examined exploitation and conflict by creatinga simulated social system in the laboratory. Insko’smicrosocieties included three interdependent groups,multiple generations of members, a communicationnetwork, products, and a trading system (Insko et al.,1980, 1983). Insko assigned the microsocieties toone of two experimental conditions. In the economicpower condition, one group could produce more var-ied products, so it quickly became the center of allbargaining and trading. In the coercive power condition,the group whose members were supposedly betterproblem solvers was given the right to confiscate anyproducts it desired from the other groups. (Inskoreferred to these conditions as the Service conditionand the Carneiro condition, respectively.)

These differences in power had a dramatic ef-fect on productivity and intergroup relations. In theeconomic power condition, all three groups reachedvery high levels of productivity, with the advan-taged group slightly outperforming the others. In

contrast, none of the groups in the coercive powercondition were very productive. As the “idle rich”hypothesis suggests, the members of the powerfulgroup spent less time working when they couldconfiscate others’ work. But the other groups re-acted very negatively to this exploitation, and asthe powerful group continued to steal their work,the members of the other groups held strikes andwork slowdowns and sabotaged their products. (Men,in particular, were more likely to strike back againstthe oppressive group.) Eventually, the groups workedso little that the dominant group could not confiscateenough products to make much profit. These resultssuggest that as with intragroup conflict, one sure wayto create conflict is to give one party more coercivepower than the other (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960).Apparently, when it comes to power, more is notalways better.

Norms of Engagement

Conflicts between groups—protests between riotersand police, war between nations, gang fights, oreven the conflict between the Rattlers and theEagles—are not out-of-control, atypical interper-sonal actions that occur when the social orderbreaks down. Normatively, competition and hostil-ity between groups are often completely consistentwith the standards of conduct in that situation.

Reciprocity Groups, like individuals, tend to obeythe norm of reciprocity. They answer threats withthreats, insults with insults, and aggression withaggression. Consider, for example, the infamousHatfield–McCoy feud, which involved a dispute be-tween two large families in a rural area of the UnitedStates in the late 19th century (Rice, 1978). The con-flict originated with the theft of some hogs by FloydHatfield. The McCoys countered by stealing hogsfrom another member of the Hatfield clan, and soonmembers of the two families began taking potshots atone another. Between 1878 and 1890, more than 10men and women lost their lives as a direct result ofinterfamily violence. Likewise, studies of gangs indi-cate that many street fights stem from some initialnegative action that in reality may pose little threat


to the offended group. The target of the negative ac-tion, however, responds to the threat with a counter-threat, and the conflict spirals. Battles resulting in thedeath of gang members have begun over an ethnicinsult, the intrusion of one group into an area con-trolled by another group, or the theft of one gang’sproperty by another gang (Gannon, 1966; Yablonsky,1959). Large-scale intergroup conflicts, such as raceriots and warfare between countries, have also beencaused by gradually escalating hostile exchanges(Myers, 1997; Reicher, 2001).

A spiral model of conflict intensification accuratelydescribes the unfolding of violence at RobbersCave. The conflict began with minor irritationsand annoyances but built in intensity. Exclusion, amild form of rejection, occurred as soon as the boysrealized that another group was sharing the camp.This antipathy escalated into verbal abuse when thegroups met for the tournament. Insults were ex-changed, members of the opposing team weregiven demeaning names, and verbal abuse ranhigh. Next, intergroup discrimination developed. The

F o c u s 14.1 Do You Believe Your Group Should Dominate Other Groups?

One day God came down to Vladimir, a poor peasant,and said: “Vladimir, I will grant you one wish. Anythingyou want will be yours.” However, God added: “There isone condition. Anything I give to you will be granted toyour neighbor, Ivan, twice over.” Vladimir immediatelyanswered, saying: “OK, take out one of my eyes.”—Eastern European fable (Sidanius et al., 2007, p. 257)

Social dominance theory assumes that all “human so-cieties tend to be structured as systems of group-basedsocial hierarchies” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 31). Thetheory also suggests, however, that individuals within asociety vary in the extent to which they recognize, andeven support, the idea that some groups should bedominant and others oppressed. Do you, for example,agree with these statements?

■ If certain groups of people stayed in their place,we would have fewer problems.

■ Inferior groups should stay in their place.

■ Sometimes other groups must be kept in theirplace.

Or, are these statements more consistent with yourbeliefs about groups?

■ We should do what we can to equalize conditionsfor groups.

■ Group equality should be our ideal.

■ [We should] increase social equality.

These items are drawn from the Social DominanceOrientation (SDO) questionnaire. As noted in Chapter 8,individuals who are high in social dominance tend to bemore interested in gaining and using power, whereas

those who are low in social dominance are more likelyto seek cooperative ways to handle conflicts. But indi-viduals who are high in SDO are also strongly motivatedto maximize their gains relative to other groups. LikeVladimir in the fable who will bear a cost so thathis rival will suffer even more, someone who adopts asocial dominance orientation will forfeit gross gain inorder to maximize relative gain.

Sidanius, Pratto, and their colleagues confirmedthis curious tendency by having individuals who variedin SDO play an experimental simulation they calledVladimir’s Choice. White college students were led tobelieve that they were being consulted by the school’sadministration regarding how student activity fundsshould be spent. They were given a list of seven op-tions that split the funds between White student in-terests and minority student interests. These optionswere contrived so that in order to receive the maxi-mum allocation for their group—19 million dollars—itwould mean that minority groups would receive 25million. In order to lower the amount given to theoutgroup, they had to choose an option that yieldedless money for their group.

The majority of the students, 56%, chose theoption that split the funds equally between the twogroups (13 million to each). Many also favoredallocations that would raise the amount given to bothWhites and minorities, for they apparently were notconcerned with getting more than the outgroup.Some, however, preferred receiving less money toensure that their group received more than theminority group. And who was most likely to base theirchoice on the ingroup’s gain over the outgroup’s?Those who were high in social dominance orientation(Sidanius et al., 2007).

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groups isolated themselves from each other atmeals, and the boys expressed the belief that itwas wrong for the other team to use the campfacilities or to be given an equal amount of food.Last came the acts of physical violence—the raids,thefts, and fistfights. Thus, the conflict at RobbersCave built in a series of progressively more danger-ous stages from exclusion to verbal abuse todiscrimination and, finally, to physical assault(Streufert & Streufert, 1986).

Cultural Norms The extent to which groups re-spond in hostile ways to other groups varies fromculture to culture. The Mbuti Pygmies of Africa,!Kung, and many Native American tribes (e.g., theBlackfoot and Zuñi) traditionally avoid conflict bymaking concessions. The members of these societieslive in small groups and, rather than defend theirterritories when others intrude, they withdraw tomore isolated areas. Men are not regarded as braveor strong if they are aggressive, and war with othergroups is nonexistent (Bonta, 1997). In contrast, theYanomanö of South America and the Mundugumorof New Guinea linked aggression to status withinthe group (Chagnon, 1997; Mead, 1935). The an-thropologist Napoleon Chagnon called theYanomanö the “fierce people,” for during the timehe studied them they seemed to choose conflict overpeace at every opportunity. Among the Yanomanö,prestige was accorded to those who were mostaggressive, with bravery in battle being the mostrevered personal quality one can have. Villagesroutinely attacked other villages, and personal con-flicts were usually settled through violence. Evenamong the Yanomanö, however, conflicts were reg-ulated by a relatively stable set of social norms thatprevented excessive causalities on either side (Chirot& McCauley, 2006).

Somewhat closer to home, Dov Cohen,Richard Nisbett, and their colleagues have examinedthe impact of norms pertaining to honor on conflictin the southern region of the United States. Murder,they note, is a tradition down South; nearly threetimes as many men are murdered each year in thesouthern states as in other parts of the country. Inexplanation, they suggest that when Europeans first

occupied this area they forcefully defended theircrops and herds against others because they couldnot rely on the authorities to provide them withprotection. Over time, they developed a strong“culture of honor” that rewarded men who re-sponded violently to defend their homes, their prop-erty, and their reputations. Southerners are not morepositive about aggression in general, but they aremore likely to recommend aggressive responses forself-defense and in response to insults (Nisbett &Cohen, 1996; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).

These norms of the culture of honor are nowanachronistic, but they are sustained by mispercep-tions about the commonness of aggressive behavior.Just as students who drink excessively on collegecampuses tend to think that many other studentsdrink heavily (see Focus 6.1), so southern men—relative to those in the north—believe that a manis likely to act aggressively when his honor has beenthreatened. They also judge the neutral actions ofothers in conflict situations as more threateningthan northerners do (Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom,2008). These group norms leave them ready to re-spond aggressively when others provoke them.

Group Norms Some groups within the larger so-ciety adopt unique norms and values pertaining tointergroup conflict. In the United States, theMennonites and the Amish avoid interpersonal con-flict and strive instead for cooperative, peaceful liv-ing. Other types of groups, such as urban youthgangs, sports fans, and cliques in schools, acceptnorms that emphasize dominance over other groups.Soccer fans show high levels of ingroup loyalty, butequally intense forms of aggression against fans ofrival clubs (Foer, 2004). Groups of young girls de-velop intricate patterns of ingroup favoritism andoutgroup rejection (Wiseman, 2002). Even thoughthey rarely engage in physical aggression, their rela-tional aggression can be so pointed and unrelentingthat it leads to long-term negative consequences forthose they target. Studies of gangs living in urbanareas suggest that these groups, although violent,use aggression in instrumental ways to maintaingroup structures and patterns of authority. Much ofthe most intense violence is intergroup conflict,


when one gang must defend its area from another,or when the gang decides that it must inflict harmon someone who has acted in ways that underminethe local gang’s authority (Venkatesh, 2008).

Anger and Scapegoating

When intergroup competitions end, one side is oftenbranded the winner and one the loser. Like the victo-rious Eagles, winners experience a range of positiveemotions, including pride, pleasure, happiness, andsatisfaction. Losers, in contrast, experience the“agony of defeat”—humiliation, anger, embarrass-ment, and frustration (Brown & Dutton, 1995).These emotions can contribute to continuing con-flict between groups, for negative emotional experi-ences such as frustration and anger can provoke ag-gression and retaliation. The Rattlers, for example,were very angry when they lost, and they respondedby vandalizing the Eagles’ cabin and stealing theprizes (Meier, Hinsz, & Heimerdinger, 2008).

In most cases, if a group interferes with anothergroup, the injured party retaliates against the perpetrator. If, however, the aggressor is extremelypowerful, too distant, or difficult to locate, thenthe injured party may respond by turning its aggres-sion onto another group. This third group, al-though not involved in the conflict in any way,would nonetheless be blamed and thereby becomethe target of aggressive actions. The third group, inthis case, would be the scapegoat—a label derivedfrom the biblical ritual of guilt transference. Angeroriginally aroused by one group becomes displacedon another, more defenseless group. Attackingthe guiltless group provides an outlet for pent-upanger and frustration, and the aggressive groupmay then feel satisfied that justice has been done.At the Robbers Cave, for example, the cause of theRattlers’ failure was not the Eagles—who beatthem in a fair contest. Rather, it was the experi-menters, who rigged the contest so that the Rattlerswould fail.

The scapegoat theory of intergroup conflictexplains why frustrating economic conditions oftenstimulate increases in prejudice and violence (Poppe,2001). Studies of anti-Black violence in southern

areas of the United States between 1882 and 1930have indicated that outbreaks of violence tend tooccur whenever the economy of that region wors-ened (Hovland & Sears, 1940). The correlation be-tween the price of cotton (the main product of thatarea at the time) and the number of lynchings ofBlack men by Whites ranged from −.63 to −.72,suggesting that when Whites were frustrated by theeconomy, they took out these frustrations by attack-ing Blacks (see also Hepworth & West, 1988, for amore sophisticated analysis of the Hovland-Searsdata).

Scapegoating, as a possible cause of intergrouprather than interindividual conflict, requires a degreeof consensus among group members. Individuals of-ten blame others for their troubles and take out theirfrustrations on them, but group-level scapegoatingoccurs when the group, as a whole, has settled ona specific target group to blame for their problems(Glick, 2005). Scapegoating is also more likely whena group has experienced difficult, prolonged negativeexperiences—not just petty annoyances or a briefeconomic downturn, but negative conditions thatfrustrate their success in meeting their most essentialneeds (Staub, 2004). In such cases the group maydevelop a compelling, widely shared ideology that,combined with political and social pressures, leads tothe most extreme form of scapegoating: genocide.Scapegoating can also prompt oppressed groups tolash out at other oppressed groups. Even thoughthe minority group is victimized by the majoritygroup, minorities sometimes turn against other mi-nority groups rather than confront the more power-ful majority (Harding et al., 1969; Rothgerber &Worchel, 1997).

Evolutionary Perspectives

Evolutionary psychology offers a final set of causes,somewhat more distal than proximate, for conflict

scapegoat theory An explanation of intergroup conflictarguing that hostility caused by frustrating environmentalcircumstances is released by taking hostile actions againstmembers of other social groups.

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between groups. The tendency for conflict toemerge between groups is so pervasive, and so diffi-cult to keep within nonlethal limits, that some ex-perts believe that it may have a genetic basis. Asnoted in Chapter 3, evolutionary psychologistssuggest that, during the longest period of humanevolution, individuals lived in small bands of be-tween 50 and 150. These groups provided such anadvantage to their members in terms of survival that,over time, humans became a social species—readyto cooperate with other humans in the pursuit ofshared goals.

These same evolutionary pressures, however,also left humans ready to respond negatively toany human who was not a member of his or hergroup or tribe. Each group competed, forcefully,against all other groups to the point that each groupplundered the resources of neighboring groups andharmed the members of those groups (the males, inparticular). These groups were likely territorial,staking a claim to exclusive use of a geographicarea, but if a member strayed too far from the safetyof the group then the greatest danger was not fromwild animals but from humans who were outsiders.Because the outgroups were a substantial threat, thehuman mind developed the capacity to recognizeothers and determine, with unerring accuracy, theother persons’ tribal allegiance. Those who failed todistinguish between insiders and outsiders were lesslikely to survive.

Intergroup conflict was also instrumental in fos-tering the conditions needed to promote ingroupcooperation. Few experts believe that humans, as aspecies, could have survived had they not developedthe means to cooperate with one another in thepursuit of joint outcomes. The development of thisremarkable human capacity required a stable com-munity of members, with care focused first on ge-netically related individuals and secondarily on groupmembers who would be present on future occasionswhen the helping could be reciprocated. These con-ditions, so essential to the survival of these fragilegroups, could be maintained only if group memberswere well-known to one another and normativelybound to reciprocate exchanges without unduelevels of selfishness. This capacity for intragroup

cooperation may have been further enhanced bythe presence of outgroups. Facing a threat from anoutgroup, the ingroup became more unified, pro-ducing a level of solidarity that increased each mem-bers’ likelihood of surviving by linking him or her tothe survival of the group as a whole (Van Vugt, DeCremer, & Janssen, 2007).

These aspects of the evolutionary environment,over time, resulted in adaptations that increased thefitness of the individual, but at the price of creatinga generalized hostility for members of other groups.The human species developed an extraordinary ca-pacity for altruism, cooperation, and selflessness, butthese prosocial behaviors are usually reserved formembers of the ingroup and sustained by hostilitytoward the outgroup.

INTERGROUP B IAS :

PERCE IV ING US AND THEM

The boys at Robbers Cave displayed antipathy to-ward the other group even before the idea of acompetitive tournament was mentioned. The Rattlersand Eagles had not even seen each other when theybegan to refer to “those guys” in a derogatory way:

When the ingroup began to be clearly de-lineated, there was a tendency to considerall others as outgroup.… The Rattlersdidn’t know another group existed in thecamp until they heard the Eagles on the balldiamond; but from that time on the out-group figured prominently in their lives.Hill (Rattler) said “They better not be inour swimming hole.” The next daySimpson heard tourists on the trail justoutside of camp and was convinced that“those guys” were down at “our diamond”again. (Sherif et al., 1961, p. 94)

The conflict at the Robbers Cave was fueled bythe competitive setting, situational norms, the strug-gle for power, and the frustrations that followedeach loss, but these factors cannot fully account forthe almost automatic rejection of members of the


other group. Group members reject members ofother groups not because they fear them or becausethey must compete with them, but simply becausethey belong to a different group.

Conflict and Categorization

When Mills, a Rattler, met Craig, an Eagle, on thepath to the dining hall, he spontaneously classifiedhim as an Eagle rather than a Rattler. This socialcategorization process, although adaptive in thelong run, nonetheless provides a cognitive founda-tion for intergroup conflict. Once Mills realized theboy approaching him was an Eagle and not aRattler, he considered him to be one of them—anoutsider who was different from the Rattlers. AsSherif (1966, p. 12) explained, “Whenever indivi-duals belonging to one group interact, collectivelyor individually, with another group or its membersin terms of their group identification, we have aninstance of intergroup behavior.”

Does social categorization, in and of itself,cause conflict? Does the mere existence of identifi-able groups within society, and the cognitive biasesgenerated by this differentiation, inevitably pushgroups into conflict? Research by Henri Tajfel,John Turner, and their colleagues, as discussed inChapter 3, demonstrated the pervasiveness of theintergroup bias in their studies of the minimalgroup situation. Like the Sherifs, they examinedgroups that had no prior group history. But, unlikethe Sherifs, they took this minimalism to its limit,by creating groups that were hardly groups at all.Formed on the basis of some trivial similarity orsituational factor, the group members did not talkto each other, were anonymous throughout thestudy, and could not personally gain in any wayfrom advantaging one person in the study overanother. These were minimal groups, yet partici-pants showed favoritism toward members of theirown group. When given the opportunity to awardmoney, they gave more money to members of theirown group when they could and withheld moneyfrom the outgroup. Tajfel and Turner concludedthat the “mere perception of belonging to two dis-tinct groups—that is, social categorization per se—is

sufficient to trigger intergroup discriminationfavoring the ingroup” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p.13; see also Hogg & Abrams, 1999).

Categorization sets in motion a number of af-fective, cognitive, emotional, and interpersonalprocesses that combine to sustain and encourageconflict between groups. People do not simplysegment people into the categories “member ofmy group” and “member of another group” andthen stop. Once people have categorized others ac-cording to group, they feel differently about thosewho are in the ingroup and those who are in theoutgroup, and these evaluative biases are furthersustained by cognitive and emotional biases thatjustify the evaluative ones—stereotypic thinking,misjudgment, and intensification of emotions. Thissection reviews these processes, beginning withthe most basic: the tendency to favor one’s owngroup.

The Ingroup–Outgroup Bias

The sociologist William Graham Sumner (1906)maintained that humans are, by nature, a speciesthat joins together in groups. But he also noted asecond, equally powerful, human tendency: favor-ing one’s own group over all others. “Each groupnourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itselfsuperior, exalts its own divinities, and looks withcontempt on outsiders” (p. 13). At the group level,this tendency is called the ingroup–outgroup bias. Thisbias, among such larger groups as tribes, ethnicgroups, or nations, is termed ethnocentrism(Sumner, 1906).

The magnitude of the bias depends on a host ofsituational factors, including the group’s outcomes, theway perceptions are measured, ambiguity about eachgroup’s characteristics, and members’ identificationwith the group. Overall, however, the ingroup–out-group bias is robust. A rock band knows its music isvery good and that a rival band’s music is inferior. One

ethnocentrism The belief that one’s own tribe, region,or country is superior to other tribes, regions, or countries.

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ethnic group prides itself on its traditions and alsoviews other groups’ traditions with disdain. Oneteam of researchers thinks that its theory explains in-tergroup conflict and criticizes other researchers’ theo-ries as inadequate. After a bean-collecting game, theRattlers overestimated the number of beans collectedbyRattlers and slightly underestimated the number ofbeans supposedly collected byEagles. Across a range ofgroup and organizational settings, members rate theirown group as superior to other groups (Hewstone,Rubin, &Willis, 2002; Hinkle & Schopler, 1986).

IngroupPositivityandOutgroupNegativity Theingroup–outgroup bias is really two biases com-bined: (1) the selective favoring of the ingroup, itsmembers, and its products, and (2) the derogationof the outgroup, its members, and its products. Butat Robbers Cave, the pro-ingroup tendency wenthand in hand with the anti-outgroup tendency.When they were asked to name their friends,92.5% of the Eagles’ choices were Eagles, and 93.6%of the Rattlers’ choices were fellow Rattlers.When asked to pick the one person they dislikedthe most, 95% of the Eagles selected a Rattler, and75% of the Rattlers identified an Eagle. In manyintergroup conflicts, however, ingroup favoritism isstronger than outgroup rejection. For example, dur-ing a conflict between the United States and Iraq,U.S. citizens may feel very positive about the UnitedStates and its people, but they may not condemnIraqis. Marilyn Brewer, after surveying a numberof studies of intergroup conflict, concluded thatthe expression of hostility against the outgroup de-pends on the similarity of ingroup and outgroupmembers, anticipated future interactions, the typeof evaluation being made, and the competitive orcooperative nature of the intergroup situation (seeBrewer, 1979; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hewstoneet al., 2002).

Implicit Intergroup Biases Group membersoften express their preferences openly. Sports fanscheer on their own team and boo their opponents.The Rattlers expressed pride in their own group’saccomplishments and ridiculed the Eagles. Racistsexpress support for members of their own group

and speak harshly of people with racial backgroundsdifferent from their own.

But in many cases, the ingroup–outgroup bias isan implicit one—subtle, unintentional, and even un-conscious, operating below the level of awareness(Fiske, 2004). Even though people may, whenasked, claim that they are not biased against out-group members and do not favor their own group,their biases emerge when their implicit attitudes aremeasured. One such measure, the Implicit Associa-tion Test (IAT) developed by Anthony Greenwaldand his colleagues, assesses the extent to whichpeople associate one concept—such as the ingroup—with another concept—such as goodness. Whenindividuals are shown pairs of words or imagesthat match their intuitive associations of these twoconcepts, such as ingroup/kind, outgroup/evil, theyrespond more quickly and without error. When,however, they respond to pairings of concepts thatthey do not associate with one another, such as in-group/bad and outgroup/friendly, then they respondmore slowly (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,2008).

The IAT has revealed robust ingroup–out-group biases in dozens of studies using all types ofsocial categories, including race, ethnicity, religion,nationality, age, and sex. These biases occur evenwhen people are striving to suppress their biases orwhen they claim that they are free of such tenden-cies (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). The IAThas also revealed biases in the most minimal of in-tergroup situations. In one study, participants werecategorized on the basis of their supposed prefer-ence for one of two artists; one named Quan andthe second Xanthie (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, &Monteith, 2001). The participants then completedthe IAT, which asked them to classify people intoone of two categories, fan of Quan or fan ofXanthie. To help them, they were told that if aperson’s name included a letter Q somewhere inthe name they preferred Quan, whereas thosewho preferred Xanthie would be indicated by anX in their name. The time it took them to classifypeople into the Quan and Xanthie categories wasrecorded by the computer, which paired various Qand X names with positive adjectives (e.g., joyous,


loving, glorious, happy) or negative adjectives (e.g.,terrible, horrible, nasty, evil). As expected, peopleresponded more quickly when the name they wereshown was from their ingroup and it was associatedwith a positive adjective. If, for example, they hadbeen told they preferred Xanthie, when shown aname with an X paired with a positive adjective(e.g., Merxes/glorious) they classified that personas a lover of Xanthie more quickly than if the Xname had been paired with a negative word (e.g.,Merxes/evil).

Double-Standard Thinking The ingroup–outgroup bias often fuels double-standardthinking. Members rationalize their own group’sactions as fair and just and condemn the actions ofthe outgroup as unfair and unjust. Our warnings arerequests, but the other side calls them threats. We arecourageous, though they consider us stubborn. Pride inour own group is nationalism, but the other grouptakes it as evidence of ethnocentrism. We offer themconcessions, but they interpret them as ploys (DeDreu, Nauta, & Van de Vliert, 1995).

Ralph White found that both sides in the ma-jor Middle East wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973believed the other side to have been the aggressorin all four wars. In two of these wars (1956, 1967),the Palestinians believed that Israel had simply at-tacked without provocation. In the remaining two(1948, 1973), the Palestinians admitted that theyhad initiated hostilities, but believed that they hadbeen forced to do so by the expansionistic policiesof Israel. Conversely, the Israelis felt that the 1948and 1973 wars were examples of blatant, unmiti-gated Palestinian aggression and that the 1956 and1967 wars had been indirectly caused by the threatsand malevolent intentions of the Palestinians(White, 1965, 1966, 1969, 1977, 1998). Similarbiases have been found when students in the

United States are asked to evaluate actions per-formed by their country and by the Soviet Union(Oskamp & Hartry, 1968) and when Whites’ andBlacks’ judgments of ambiguously aggressive actionscommitted by either a Black or a White person arecompared (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). People judgeactions that their own group performs positively,but they negatively evaluate these same actionswhen they are performed by outsiders. Peoplealso attribute other nations’ hostile actions to inter-nal factors—things about that country—but theirnation’s actions to external factors (Doosje &Branscombe, 2003).

Cognitive Bias

When Hill saw Craig he did not merely judge himmore negatively than he would one of his fellowRattlers (the ingroup–outgroup bias). He probablymade inferences about Craig—his physical strength,his athletic skill, even his morality—solely on thebasis of one piece of information: Craig was anEagle. When people categorize others, their per-ceptions of these individuals are influenced moreby their category-based expectations than by theevidence of their senses.

Outgroup Homogeneity Bias Most group mem-bers are quick to point out the many characteristicsthat distinguish them from the other members oftheir own group (“Why, I’m not like them atall!”), but when they evaluate members of out-groups, they underestimate their variability (“Theyall look the same to me”). If you were an Eagle, forexample, you would describe the Rattlers as poorsports who cheated whenever possible. When de-scribing the Eagles, in contrast, you might admitthat a few of the members were sissies and thatmaybe one Eagle liked to bend the rules, but youwould probably argue that the Eagles were so het-erogeneous that sweeping statements about theirtypical qualities could not be formulated. Studies ofa variety of ingroups and outgroups—women versusmen, physics majors versus dance majors, Sorority Aversus Sorority B, Princeton students versus Rutgersstudents, Canadians versus Native Americans, and

double-standard thinking The tendency to considerthe actions and attributes of one’s own group as positive,fair, and appropriate, but to consider these very samebehaviors or displays to be negative, unfair, and inappro-priate when the outgroup performs them.

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Blacks versus Whites—have documented this out-group homogeneity bias. Group members’ con-ceptualizations of other groups are simplistic andundifferentiated, but when they turn their eye totheir own group, they note its diversity and com-plexity (see Boldry, Gaertner, & Quinn, 2007, andLinville & Fischer, 1998, for reviews).

The outgroup homogeneity bias does notemerge across all intergroup settings. The groupthat is disadvantaged in some way is usually viewedas more homogeneous, whereas the more powerfulgroup is viewed as more variable (Guinote, Judd, &Brauer, 2002). The bias can also reverse entirely,resulting in ingroup homogeneity bias (Haslam &Oakes, 1995; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey,1995). Under conditions of extreme conflict, bothtendencies may emerge, prompting group membersto assume that “none of us deserve this treatment,”and “they have harmed us; they must all be pun-ished” (Rothgerber, 1997).

Group Attribution Error Group members tendto make sweeping statements about the entire out-group after observing one or two of the outgroup’smembers. If an African American employee is vic-timized by a European American boss, the victimmay assume that all European Americans are racists.Similarly, a visitor to another country who is treatedrudely by a passerby may leap to the conclusion thateveryone who lives in that country is discourteous.Individuals in intergroup situations tend to fall preyto the law of small numbers: They assume thatthe behavior of a large number of people can beaccurately inferred from the behavior of a few peo-ple (Quattrone & Jones, 1980).

The opposite process—assuming that the char-acteristics of a single individual in a group can be

inferred from the general characteristics of the wholegroup—can also bias perceptions. If we know ourgroup’s position on an issue, we are reluctant to as-sume that any one of us agrees with that position.When we know another group’s position, however,we are much more willing to assume that each andevery person in that group agrees with that position.Researchers studied this group attribution error bytelling students that an election had recently beenheld either at their college or at another collegeto determine how much funding should be givento the college’s athletics programs. They then toldthe students the results of the vote and asked themto estimate the opinion of the “typical student” at thecollege where the vote was taken. When the studentsthought that the vote had been taken at their owncollege, they did not want to assume that the indivi-dual’s opinion would match the group’s opinion. Butwhen they thought that the vote was taken at anothercollege, they were much more confident that theindividual’s opinions would match the group’s opi-nions (Allison & Messick, 1985b; Allison, Worth, &King, 1990).

Ultimate Attribution Error When individualsform impressions of other individuals, the fundamen-tal attribution error (FAE) prompts them to attributethe actions of others to their personal qualitiesrather than to the constraints of the situation. Butwhen group members form impressions of out-group members, the ultimate attribution error(UAE) prompts them to attribute only negative ac-tions to outgroup members’ dispositional qualities

outgroup homogeneity bias The perceptual tendencyto assume that the members of other groups are verysimilar to each other, whereas the membership of one’sown group is more heterogeneous.law of small numbers The tendency for people to basesweeping generalizations about an entire group on obser-vations of a small number of individuals from that group.

group attribution error The tendency for perceivers toassume that specific group members’ personal character-istics and preferences, including their beliefs, attitudes,and decisions, are similar to the preferences of the groupto which they belong; for example, observers may as-sume that each member of a group that votes to reelectthe president supports the president, even though thegroup’s decision was not a unanimous one.ultimate attribution error The tendency for perceiversto attribute negative actions performed by members ofthe outgroup to dispositional qualities and positive ac-tions to situational, fluctuating circumstances.


(Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 2001). If outgroupmembers rob a bank or cheat on a test, then theiractions are explained by reference to their person-ality, genetics, or fundamental lack of morality. Butshould an outgroup member perform a positivebehavior, that action is attributed to a situationalfactor—perhaps good luck or a special advantageafforded the outgroup member. In any case, theperceiver will conclude that the good act, and theoutgroup member who performed it, is just aspecial case. Because of the UAE, the perceiverconcludes that there is no need to reappraise thegroup because the outgroup member is not respon-sible for the positive act.

The linguistic intergroup bias is a more sub-tle form of the UAE. Instead of attributing thebehavior to dispositional factors or to the situation,group members describe the action differentlydepending on who performs it. If an ingroup mem-ber engages in a negative behavior, such as cryingduring a game, then members would describe thatbehavior very concretely—Elliott “shed some tears.”If an outgroup member performed the samebehavior, they would describe the action moreabstractly—Elliott “acted like a baby.” Positive be-haviors, in contrast, are described in abstract termswhen attributed to an ingroup member but in veryconcrete terms when performed by an outgroupmember (Carnaghi et al., 2008; Maass, 1999).

Stereotypes When an Eagle met another Eagleon the trail, he probably expected the boy to befriendly, helpful, and brave. But if he encountereda Rattler, he expected the boy to be unfriendly,aggressive, and deceitful. These expectations arebased on stereotypes—cognitive generalizationsabout the qualities and characteristics of the mem-bers of a particular group or social category. In manyways, stereotypes function as cognitive labor-savingdevices by helping perceivers make rapid judgments

about people based on their category memberships(Schneider, 2004). Because they are widely adoptedby most of the ingroup, stereotypes are group-levelperceptions; shared social beliefs rather thanindividualistic expectations (Bar-Tal, 2000). Butstereotypes tend to be exaggerated rather thanaccurate, negative rather than positive, and resistantto revision even when directly disconfirmed. Peopletend to cling to stereotypes so resolutely that theybecome unreasonable beliefs rather than honestmisconceptions. As Gordon Allport (1954) wrote,“Prejudgments become prejudices only if theyare not reversible when exposed to new knowl-edge” (p. 8).

If stereotypes have all these perceptual andcognitive limitations, why do they persist? WalterLippmann (1922), who first used the word stereo-type to describe mental images of people, arguedthat the stereotype resists disconfirmation because“it stamps itself upon the evidence in the very actof securing the evidence.” When group memberssee through eyes clouded by stereotypes, they mis-perceive and misremember people and events.Because individuals tend to interpret ambiguousinformation so that it confirms their expectations,stereotypes can act as self-fulfilling prophecies(Allport & Postman, 1947). Stereotypes also influ-ence memory, so that recall of information that isconsistent with stereotypes is superior to recall ofstereotype-inconsistent information (Howard &Rothbart, 1980; Rothbart, Sriram, & Davis-Stitt,1996). Because members expect outgroup mem-bers to engage in negative behavior and can moreeasily remember the times that they acted nega-tively rather than positively, they feel vindicatedin thinking that membership in the outgroup andnegative behaviors are correlated (Hamilton &Sherman, 1989).

The stereotypes about any given group includeunique information pertaining to that group, but

linguistic intergroup bias The tendency to describepositive ingroup and negative outgroup behaviors moreabstractly and negative ingroup and positive outgroupbehaviors more concretely.

stereotype A socially shared set of cognitive generaliza-tions (e.g., beliefs, expectations) about the qualities andcharacteristics of the members of a particular group orsocial category.

426 CHAPTER 14

the stereotype content model suggests that moststereotypes are based on two general qualities:warmth and competence. Some groups (includingthe ingroup, in most cases) are viewed as warm,nice, friendly, and sincere, whereas other groupsare considered to be filled with unpleasant, un-friendly, and even immoral people. The second di-mension is competence: Some groups are thought toinclude competent, confident, skillful, able indivi-duals, whereas others are viewed as incompetent orunintelligent. The Rattlers, for example, may haveadopted a stereotypic view of the Eagles that ratedthem as neutral on the warm dimension but morenegatively on the competence dimension (Cuddy,Fiske, & Glick, 2007, 2008; see Figure 14.4).

Intergroup Emotions

People do not just categorize and judge the out-group. They also respond emotionally to the out-group, usually leaning in a negative direction. Thisnegativity may be relatively mild, amounting to littlemore than mild discomfort when interacting withoutgroup members or a general preference to bewith someone from the ingroup rather than the out-group, but this negativity bias can reach the emo-tional extreme of hatred and loathing. In some cases,people may not even admit their negativity towardsmembers of the other group, yet they display itthrough their nonverbal actions, social awkwardness,and nervousness when in the presence of the out-group (Dovidio et al., 2004).

In addition to these more general negative andpositive reactions to the outgroup and ingroup, re-spectively, people may also display specific emo-tions, depending on the nature of the intergroupcontext. Intergroup emotions theory suggests thatwhen individuals are members of a group that haslower social status than other groups, its memberswill experience a different set of intergroup

emotions than will members of higher status groups(Smith & Mackie, 2005). Fear and jealousy, for ex-ample, are more common emotions in members ofthe lower status groups, whereas contempt or angerare characteristic of those who are members ofhigher status groups. Similarly, as Figure 14.4 indi-cates, the stereotype content model links intergroupemotions to expectations about the warmth andcompetence of the outgroup.

■ Envy is most likely when the outgroup, al-though judged negatively, is nonetheless higherin status than the ingroup and this status dif-ference is thought to be due to the competenceof the outgroup. The Eagles, when they lost agame to the Rattlers, were likely to be enviousof the Rattlers’ athleticism. They did not trustthe Rattlers, however, and may have suspectedthat they gained their advantage unfairly.Groups who are envious of other groups covetwhat the outgroup has achieved and view theoutgroup as a competitor.

■ Contempt is one of the most common of in-tergroup emotions, occuring when the out-group is the most negatively stereotyped, thatis, viewed as low in terms of both competenceand warmth. The members of such an out-group are viewed as responsible for their fail-ings, and there is little consideration given tothe idea that the division between the twogroups can ever be lessened.

■ Pity, as an intergroup emotion, is directed atoutgroups that are viewed negatively interms of competence, but are thought to alsohave positive, endearing qualities. Pity isusually directed downward, to outgroups thatare low in the overall status ranking. Outgroupsthat evoke pity are not blamed for theirplight, unlike outgroups that are held incontempt.

■ Admiration is rare in intergroup contexts, forit is experienced when the outgroup isperceived as being both high in warmth andhigh in competence, an unusual occurrence.Intergroup admiration occurs when the

stereotype content model A theory of group percep-tion positing that people’s stereotyped views about socialgroups reflect their beliefs about the warmth and com-petence of the stereotyped group.


outgroup is thought to be completely deservingof its accomplishments, when the outgroup’sgains do not come at a cost to the ingroup,and when the outgroup members aregenerally judged positively. Such an emotionis most likely when individuals can take somepride in association with the outgroup, eventhough they are not an actual member ofthe group.

Group Hate Hatred, as Allport (1954) explainedin The Nature of Prejudice, is usually a group-levelemotion. Drawing on ideas discussed by Aristotle,Allport observed that “anger is customarily felt to-ward individuals only, whereas hatred may be felttoward whole classes of people” (1954, p. 363).And while individuals often regret giving way toanger directed at another person, they feel nosuch remorse about their group-level hatred.“Hatred is more deep-rooted, and constantly desiresthe extinction of the object of hate” (1954, p. 363).

Hate causes a more violently negative reactionto the outgroup than such emotions as fear or an-ger. Often, group members fear the other group,for example, when outgroup members are viewedas competitors who may take harmful action to-wards the ingroup. Anger is also a dominant emo-tion in intergroup conflict settings, when previousnegative exchanges between groups are a cause for

irritation, annoyance, and hostility. Hate, however,is the feeling associated with many of the mostnegative consequences of intergroup conflict. Hateis expressed primarily when group membersbelieve that previously harmful acts done by mem-bers of the outgroup were intentional ones that pur-posely harmed the ingroup, and that the actionswere caused by the intrinsically evil nature of theoutgroup. In one study of people’s reactions to ter-rorist attacks, fear was associated with avoiding theoutgroup and anger with support for improvededucation to improve intergroup relations. Thosewho felt hatred for the other group, in contrast,advocated their destruction, expressed a desire todo evil against them, and called for physical violenceagainst them (Halperin, 2008; Sternberg, 2003).

MoralExclusion andDehumanization Through-out history, the members of one group have donegreat harm to the members of other groups. Whenintergroup conflict reaches extreme levels, withmembers of one group attacking, harming, andkilling members of other groups, the ingroup–out-group bias becomes equally extreme. During ex-treme intergroup conflicts, group members viewtheir own group as morally superior and membersof the outgroup as less than human (Bandura,1999; Leyens et al., 2003; Reicher, Haslam, &Rath, 2008).

Pity

Contempt

Admiration

HighWarmth

Envy

LowWarmth

LowCompetence

HighCompetence

F I G U R E 14.4 The stereotype content model ofintergroup emotions.

SOURCE: The BIAS Map: Behaviors from intergroup affect and stereo-types, by Cuddy, Amy J.C.; Fiske, Susan T.; Glick, Peter from JOURNAL OFPERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, April 1, 2007. The use of APAinformation does not imply endorsement by APA.

428 CHAPTER 14

Such moral exclusion is more likely to occurin cases of extreme violence perpetrated by onegroup against another—European Americans enslav-ing Africans; Nazi Germany’s attempted genocideof Jews; “ethnic cleansing” in Croatia and Serbia;and the continuing warfare between Israelis andPalestinians (Staub, 2004). Those who subjugateothers tend to rationalize their violence by attribut-ing it to the actions, intentions, or character of theirvictims. As their aggression intensifies, however,their rationalizations prompt them to increasinglydevalue their victims. Eventually, the aggressors den-igrate the outgroup so completely that the outsidersare excluded from moral concern, for it is difficultto savagely harm people whom one evaluatespositively or strongly identifies with (Staub, 1990,p. 53). Groups that have a history of devaluing seg-ments of their society are more likely to engage inmoral exclusion, as are groups whose norms stressrespect for authority and obedience. These groups,when they anticipate conflict with other groups,rapidly revise their opinions of their opponents sothat they can take hostile actions against them(Opotow, 2000).

Moral exclusion places the outgroup outsidethe moral realm. Dehumanization moves the out-group outside the human realm. Dehumanizationoccurs when the ingroup denies the outgroup thosequalities thought to define the essence of humannature. Some of these qualities may be onesthought to be uniquely human: culture, refinement,high moral standards, and the capacity to think ra-tionally. Others are qualities that the ingroup associ-ates with humanity’s strengths, such as emotionalresponsiveness, warmth, openness, self-control,and depth (Haslam, 2006). The ingroup may alsocome to believe that the outgroup experiences raw,

primary emotions such as anger or happiness, butnot the more refined emotions that make humanstruly human: affection, admiration, pride, conceit,remorse, guilt, and envy (Leyens et al., 2003).People describe dehumanized outgroup membersas disgusting or revolting because they are thoughtto be sources of contamination and impurity(Chirot & McCauley, 2006; Maoz & McCauley,2008).

This concept of dehumanization is no hyper-bole. When researchers used an fMRI scanner totrack perceivers’ reactions to images of people fromvarious groups, their results suggested that dehuma-nized outgroup members are no longer perceived tobe humans. When individuals viewed general imagesof people, the areas of the brain that typically re-spond when people process social information (themedial prefrontal cortices) showed increased activity.However, when they were shown images of peoplefrom an extreme outgroup—homeless individualsand drug addicts—those same areas did not riseabove their resting state of neuronal activity. Theinsula and amygdala were activated, however; theseportions of the brain are most active when peopleare experiencing strong emotions, such as disgust andcontempt (Harris & Fiske, 2006).

Dehumanization also increases the likelihoodthat the ingroup will aggress against the outgroup.Albert Bandura and his associates tested this possi-bility experimentally by giving groups the opportu-nity to deliver painful electric shocks to a secondgroup each time it performed poorly. In reality,there was no other group, but participants none-theless believed that they could control both theintensity and duration of the shocks they gave thegroup. In one condition, the experimenter men-tioned that the outgroup members—who weresimilar to one another in background but differentfrom the subjects—seemed like nice people. But inthe other condition the experimenter mentioned,in an offhand remark, that they were an “animal-istic, rotten bunch.” As expected, when dehuma-nized by the experimenter the groups increasedtheir hostility and aggression, delivering more in-tense shocks (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson,1975).

moral exclusion A psychological process whereby op-ponents in a conflict come to view each other as unde-serving of morally mandated rights and protections.dehumanization Believing that other individuals or en-tire groups of individuals lack the qualities thought todistinguish human beings from other animals; such de-humanization serves to rationalize the extremely negativetreatment often afforded to members of other groups.


Categorization and Identity

Social identity theory offers a compelling explana-tion for the robust relationship between categoriza-tion and conflict. This theory, as noted in Chapter 3,assumes that membership in groups can substantiallyinfluence members’ sense of self. When the boysjoined the Robbers Cave Experiment and becamefirmly embedded in their groups, their identitieschanged. They came to think of themselves asRattlers or Eagles, and they accepted the group’scharacteristics as their own. The theory also suggeststhat as the boys came to identify with their group,their own self-worth became more closely tied to theworth of the group. If a Rattler dedicated himself tothe group and theRattlers failed, the boywould likelyexperience a distressing reduction in his own self-esteem. Group members, therefore, stress the valueof their own groups relative to other groups as ameansof indirectly enhancing their own personal worth(Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

The basic premise of social identity theory issupported by evidence that people favor theirgroup, even in minimal group conditions, and bythe fact that the biasing effects of group member-ship are even more substantial when (a) individualsidentify with their group rather than simply belongto it and (b) the relative status of existing groupsis salient (Kenworthy et al., 2008). Black Africans’attitudes toward an outgroup (Afrikaans Whites)were negatively associated with the strength of theiringroup identification (Duckitt & Mphuthing,1998). British people’s attitudes toward the Frenchwere negatively correlated with the strength oftheir British identities (Brown et al., 2001). Whenindividuals feel that the value of their group is beingquestioned, they respond by underscoring the dis-tinctiveness of their own group and by derogatingothers (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dietz-Uhler &Murrell, 1998).

Social identity theory’s suggestion that in-group favoritism is in the service of ingroup mem-bers’ self-esteem is also consistent with findingsthat individuals who most need reassurance of theirworth tend to be the most negative towards othergroups. Individuals who experience a threat to

their self-esteem tend to discriminate more againstoutgroups, and low-status, peripheral members ofthe group are often the most zealous in their de-fense of their group and in the rejection of theoutgroup (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995).Individuals are also more likely to draw compa-risons between their group and other groups inareas where the comparison favors the ingroup.The Rattlers, for example, lost the tournament,so they admitted that the Eagles were better thanthe Rattlers at sports. But the Rattlers could stresstheir superiority in other spheres unrelated to thegames, such as toughness or endurance (Reichl,1997). Group members also display group-levelschadenfreude. They take pleasure when othergroups fail, particularly when the failure is in adomain that is self-relevant and when the in-group’s superiority in this domain is uncertain(Leach et al., 2003).

But does condemning other groups raise one’sself-esteem? The effectiveness of this technique forsustaining self-esteem has not been confirmed con-sistently by researchers. In some cases, derogatingoutgroup members raises certain forms of self-esteem, but praising the ingroup tends to bolsterself-esteem more than condemning the outgroup(Brown & Zagefka, 2005). Also, though people arequick to praise their ingroup, they still think thatthey are superior to most people—including all themembers of their own group (Lindeman, 1997).

INTERGROUP CONFL ICT

RESOLUT ION : UNIT ING US

AND THEM

The Robbers Cave researchers were left with aproblem. The manipulations of the first two phasesof the experiment had worked very well, for theRattlers–Eagles war yielded a gold mine of dataabout intergroup conflict. Unfortunately, the situa-tion had degenerated into a summer camp versionofWilliamGolding’s (1954) Lord of the Flies. The twogroups now despised each other. As conscientious

430 CHAPTER 14

social scientists, the Sherifs and their colleagues feltcompelled to try to undo some of the negative effectsof the study—to seek a method through which har-mony and friendship could be restored at theRobbers Cave campsite.

Intergroup Contact

TheRobbers Cave researchers first tried to reduce theconflict by uniting the groups in shared activities.They based their intervention on the contacthypothesis, which assumes that ingroup–outgroupbiases will fade if people interact regularly withmembers of the outgroup. So the Sherifs arrangedfor theRattlers and the Eagles to join in seven pleasantactivities, such as eating, playing games, viewing films,and shooting off firecrackers. Unfortunately, thiscontact had little impact on the hostilities. Duringall these events, the lines between the two groupsnever broke, and antilocution, discrimination, andphysical assault continued unabated. When contactoccurred duringmeals, “food fights”were particularlyprevalent:

After eating for a while, someone threwsomething, and the fight was on. The fightconsisted of throwing rolls, napkins rolledin a ball, mashed potatoes, etc. accompa-nied by yelling the standardized, unflat-tering words at each other. The throwingcontinued for about 8–10 minutes, thenthe cook announced that cake and icecream were ready for them. Some mem-bers of each group went after their dessert,but most of them continued throwingthings a while longer. As soon as eachgobbled his dessert, he resumed throwing.(Sherif et al., 1961, p. 158)

Creating Positive Contact Contact lies at theheart of such social policies as school integration,

foreign student exchange programs, and theOlympics, but simply throwing two groups to-gether in an unregulated situation is a risky wayto reduce intergroup tensions. Contact between ra-cial groups at desegregated schools does not consis-tently lower levels of prejudice (Gerard, 1983;Schofield, 1978). When units of an organizationthat clash on a regular basis are relocated in neigh-boring offices, the conflicts remain (Brown et al.,1986). In some cases students experience so muchtumult during their semesters spent studying abroadthat they become more negative toward their hostcountries rather than more positive (Stangor et al.,1996). Competing groups in laboratory studies re-main adversaries if the only step taken to unitethem is mere contact (Stephan, 1987). Even beforethey initiated the contact, the Sherifs predicted thata “contact phase in itself will not produce markeddecreases in the existing state of tension betweengroups” (Sherif et al., 1961, p. 51).

Why does contact sometimes fail to cure con-flict? Contact situations can create anxiety for thosewho take part, so the contact must be of sufficientduration to allow this anxiety to decrease and forindividuals to feel comfortable interacting with oneanother (Kenworthy et al., 2005). Moreover, ifmembers of the two groups use the contact situa-tion as one more opportunity to insult, argue with,physically attack, or discriminate against one an-other, then certainly such contact should not beexpected to yield beneficial effects (Riordan &Riggiero, 1980). The setting must, instead, createpositive contact between groups by including suchingredients as:

■ Equal status. The members of the groups shouldhave the same background, qualities, andcharacteristics that define status levels in thesituation. Differences in academic backgrounds,wealth, skill, or experiences should be mini-mized if these qualities will influence percep-tions of prestige and rank in the group(Schwarzwald, Amir, & Crain, 1992).

■ Personal interaction. The contact should involveinformal, personal interaction with outgroupmembers rather than superficial, role-based

contact hypothesis The prediction that contact be-tween the members of different groups will reduce inter-group conflict.


contacts. If the members of the groups do notmingle with one another, they learn very littleabout the other group, and cross-group friend-ships do not develop (Cook, 1985; Schofield,1978).

■ Supportive norms. The contact should encouragefriendly, helpful, egalitarian attitudes and con-demn ingroup–outgroup comparisons. Thesenorms must be endorsed explicitly by authori-ties and by the groups themselves (Stephan &Rosenfield, 1982).

■ Cooperation. Groups should work together inthe pursuit of common goals (Gaertner,Dovidio, Rust, et al., 1999).

These ingredients were identified by a team ofresearchers led by Kenneth Clark and includingIsidor Chein, Gerhart Saenger, and Stuart Cook.This group developed the social science statementfiled in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Brown vs.Board of Education, which ruled that segregation ofschools was unconstitutional (Benjamin & Crouse,2002).

The Effects of Contact Does contact, across var-ious types of situations and between various kinds ofgroups, stimulate conflict reduction? ThomasPettigrew and Linda Tropp (2000, 2006) examinedthis question in a meta-analysis of 515 separate stud-ies of contact and conflict. This massive pool of stud-ies examined the responses of nearly a half a millionpeople from around the world. It included studieswith tightly controlled methods as well as those withless stringent controls. Some studies measuredcontact directly, whereas others based measures ofcontact on participants’ own self-reports. Somestudies were experimental, with treatment and con-trol conditions, but others were correlational orquasi-experimental. The studies examined a varietyof intergroup conflicts, including those based onrace, sexual orientation, age, and ethnicity.

Their careful meta-analysis (which took the re-searchers eight years to complete) confirmed theutility of the contact method in reducing conflict.They found that face-to-face contact between group

members reduced prejudice in 94% of these studies,and that the basic correlation between contactand conflict was −.21; the more contact, the lessprejudice between groups. They also noted, how-ever, that contact had a stronger impact onconflict when researchers studied high-quality con-tact situations that included equal status, cooperationbetween groups, and so on. In such studies, thecorrelation between contact and conflict climbedto −.29.

The effects of contact also varied across situa-tions. Contact in recreational and work settings hadthe strongest impact on conflict, whereas contactthat occurred when group members visited anothergroup’s country (i.e., as tourists) had the leastimpact (see Figure 14.5). The impact of contacton conflict also varied across countries. For exam-ple, it was greatest in Australia and New Zealand,followed by the United States and Europe. Contactworked to reduce conflict in all other countries, butits strength was less in some parts of the world(e.g., Africa, Asia, Israel). Some types of intergroupconflicts were also more resistant to the curativepower of contact than others. Heterosexuals’attitudes toward gay men and lesbians improvedthe most after contact, followed by attitudes relatedto race and ethnicity. Contact lost some of itsstrength in studies of contact between people ofdifferent ages. Also, contact had less effect on theattitudes of members of minority groups relative to

0 0.1 0.2 0.40.3

Recreational

Laboratory

Work

Educational

Mixed

Residential

Travel/tourism

F I G U R E 14.5 Degree of conflict reduction betweengroups across seven contact situations.

SOURCE: Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006.

432 CHAPTER 14

members of majority groups (Pettigrew & Tropp,2000).

Pettigrew and Tropp conclude that contactworks best in situations that conform to researchers’recommendations for positive contact, but theywere also heartened by the positive effects obtainedin less-than-ideal situations. Drawing on both theirfindings and social identity theory, they suggest thatcontact works most effectively when it helps reducethe anxiety associated with conflict between thegroups and when membership in the two groupsis salient to their members. They suspect that con-tact fails when members feel threatened by the out-group, and that the level of contact is not enoughto assuage that anxiety (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).This suggestion is also consistent with research thatfinds that stress, as measured by levels of cortisolreactivity, decreases with each additional contactbetween people in a situation that encourages theformation of friendships (Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008).

Contact and Superordinate Goals Contact alsoreduced the conflict at the Robbers Cave site oncethe Sherifs improved the quality of the contact be-tween the Rattlers and Eagles. Following the failureof simple contact, they arranged for the groups towork together in the pursuit of superordinategoals—that is, goals that can be achieved only iftwo groups work together. The staff created thesesuperordinate goals by staging a series of crises. Theysecretly sabotaged the water supply and then askedthe boys to find the source of the problem by tracingthe water pipe from the camp back to the mainwater tank, located about three-quarters of a mileaway. The boys became quite thirsty during theirsearch and worked together to try to correct theproblem. Eventually, they discovered that themain water valve had been turned off by “vandals,”and they cheered when the problem was repaired.Later in this stage, the boys pooled their monetary

resources to rent a movie that they all wanted tosee, worked together to pull a broken-down truck,prepared meals together, exchanged tent materials,and took a rather hot and dusty truck ride together.Like feuding neighbors who unite when a severethunderstorm threatens to flood their homes, orwarring nations that pool their technological skills(in a recurring science fiction theme) to prevent theimagined collision of Earth with an asteroid, theRattlers and the Eagles were reunited when theysought goals that could not be achieved by a singlegroup working alone.

Other factors that enhance the impact of con-tact are friendship, success, and time. StephenWright and his colleagues, for example, have testedwhat they called the extended contact hypothesis:When group members learn that one or moremembers of their group have a friend in the out-group, they express more positive intergroupattitudes (Wright et al., 1997; See Focus 14.2).Intergroup experiences that lead to successes, too,are more effective than intergroup experiences thatlead to negative outcomes (Worchel, 1986). A di-sastrous performance during cooperation will onlyserve to further alienate groups (Blanchard,Adelman, & Cook, 1975). Contact is also moreeffective when groups share a common fate andwhen cues that signal status differences betweenthe groups are minimized (Gaertner, Dovidio,Rust, et al., 1999; Gardham & Brown, 2001).

Contact also takes time to work its cure. In theRobbers Cave research, a whole series of superor-dinate goals was required to reduce animosity.Similarly, when students from two different col-leges worked together on problems, students whoworked with the outgroup just once or not at allrated the members of the outgroup more nega-tively than students who worked with the out-group twice (Wilder & Thompson, 1980). Similarfindings have been obtained in studies of desegre-gated schools. A long period of favorable inter-group contact may reduce prejudice, but if thisfavorable contact is followed by an equally longperiod in which contact is not encouraged, thegroups inevitably drift apart once again (Schofield &Sagar, 1977).

superordinate goal A goal that can only be attained ifthe members of two or more groups work together bypooling their efforts and resources.


Cognitive Cures for Conflict

Intergroup contact does more than just promotepositive interactions between people who wereonce antagonists. When individuals cooperatewith the outgroup, their “us versus them” thinkingfades, along with ingroup favoritism, outgroup

rejection, and stereotyping (Brewer & Brown, 1998;Brewer & Miller, 1984; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007).

Decategorization During the waning days at theRobbers Cave, the boys began to abandon theircollective identities. Some boys became less likely

F o c u s 14.2 Is Friendship Stronger Than Hate?

Tis but thy name that is my enemy:Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.What’s Montague? It is nor hand nor footNor arm nor face nor any other partBelonging to a man. O be some other name.What’s in a name? That which we call a roseBy any other word would smell as sweet.

—Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2

The Robbers Cave Experiment was Sherif’s third fieldstudy of intergroup conflict. One of the earlier studies,in which the Panthers battled the Pythons, had to beaborted when the two groups realized that the campadministration was creating the intergroup friction(Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955). The other, conductedin 1949 in a camp in northern Connecticut, pittedfriendship against intergroup bias (Sherif & Sherif,1953). As noted in Chapter 5, these boys were notseparated into groups until a full week of campwideactivities had been held. During that time, strong pat-terns of friendship developed between the boys, butthe researchers deliberately separated friends whenthey segregated the two groups during the secondweek. Many of the Red Devils had friends on the BullDogs team and many Bull Dogs had Red Devil friends.

Categorization, however, virtually obliteratedthese original friendships. Boys who continued to in-teract with members of the outgroup were brandedtraitors and threatened with bodily harm unless theybroke off their friendships. One member of the BullDogs who did not completely identify with the groupwas partially ostracized, and eventually his parents hadto remove him from the camp. A Red Devil who sug-gested that the two groups get together for a partywas punished by the Red Devil’s leader. This observa-tional evidence was buttressed by the sociometricchoice data collected before and after the groups wereformed. Before the intergroup conflict, more than 60%of the boys reported that their best friends weremembers of what would eventually become the

outgroup. Later, after the groups were separated,cross-group friendships dwindled down to 10%.

Other studies, however, have suggested thatfriendship can sometimes cure intergroup conflict.Thomas Pettigrew (1997), in a study of 3,806 peopleliving in four countries in Europe, discovered thatpeople who reported having friends who were mem-bers of an outgroup (another race, nationality, cul-ture, religion, or social class) were less prejudiced thanthose who had no outgroup friends. Other investiga-tions have confirmed this tendency (Pettigrew &Tropp, 2000). For example, Stephen Wright and hiscolleagues conceptually replicated the Robbers CaveExperiment with college students who spent an entireday working in one of two groups on a variety oftasks. Groups first developed a sense of cohesivenessby designing a logo for their team and sharing per-sonal information. The groups then competed againsteach other, and during lunch, they watched as eachgroup was given prizes and awards for defeating theother group. Later in the day, the groups worked onsolitary tasks, except for two individuals who mettogether—supposedly to take part in an unrelatedstudy. This meeting, however, was designed to createa friendly relationship between these two individuals,who then returned to their groups just before a finalcompetition.

Wright discovered that the two group memberswho were turned into friends were more positive to-ward the outgroup. More importantly, however, thispositivity generalized throughout the rest of thegroup. Even though the other group members had notthemselves developed friendships with members of theoutgroup, the knowledge that someone in their groupconsidered an outgroup member to be likable moder-ated the ingroup–outgroup bias. Wright concludedthat intergroup conflict sometimes prevents friend-ships from forming, but that friendships that cut acrossgroups can undo some of the pernicious effects of theingroup–outgroup bias (Wright et al., 1997).

434 CHAPTER 14

to think of themselves as Rattlers, but insteadviewed themselves as individuals with specific inter-ests, skills, and abilities. This decategorization, orpersonalization, of group members reduces inter-group conflict by reminding group members tothink of outgroup members as individuals ratherthan as typical group members (Brewer, 2007). Inone study, researchers personalized the outgroup bymerging two distinct groups and giving them pro-blems to solve. Some of the groups were urged tofocus on the task, but others were encouraged toget to know one another. This latter manipulationdecreased the magnitude of the ingroup–outgroupbias, although it did not eliminate it completely(Bettencourt et al., 1992). Individuation can alsobe increased by reducing the perceived homogene-ity of the outgroup. When group members weretold that one member of the outgroup strongly dis-agreed with his or her own group during an episodeof intergroup conflict, ingroup–outgroup biaseswere muted (Wilder, 1986b). The participantslooked at the outgroup and saw a collection ofindividuals rather than a unified group (Wilder,Simon, & Faith, 1996).

Recategorization The common ingroup iden-tity model, developed by Samuel Gaertner, JohnDovidio, and their colleagues, recommends reducingbias by shifting group members’ representations ofthemselves away from two separate groups intoone common ingroup category. This recategoriza-tion will undo the conflict-exacerbating cognitivefactors that are rooted in the ingroup–outgroup

bias, but will also permit members to retain theiroriginal identities (so long as they do not conflictwith the recategorized groups). Because people be-long to multiple groups, they may be able to con-ceive of themselves as members of different groupswho are currently members of one, more superordi-nate group. Recategorization can also be achievedby systematically manipulating the perceptual cuesthat people use to define “groupness.” When themembers of competing groups were urged to adopta single name, space was minimized between themembers, and their outcomes were linked, thesecues increased the perceived unity (entitativity) ofthe group members, and ingroup–outgroupbiasesdi-minished (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner,Dovidio, Nier, et al., 1999; Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust,et al., 1999; Gaertner et al., 2000).

Jason Nier and his colleagues (2001) confirmedthis shifting of identities at a football game betweenthe University of Delaware and Westchester StateUniversity. They arranged for European and AfricanAmerican interviewers to approach EuropeanAmerican fans and ask them if they would answer afew questions about their food preferences. The inter-viewers manipulated shared social identity by wearingdifferent hats. For example, when interviewersapproached a Delaware fan, they wore a Delawarehat to signal their shared identity, but a Westchesterhat to indicate they were members of the outgroup.Ingroup–outgroup identity did not influenceEuropean Americans’ compliance with a EuropeanAmerican interviewer’s request. However, theparticipants were more likely to agree to be inter-viewed by an African American if the interviewerand interviewee apparently shared a common univer-sity affiliation.

The Sherifs made use of recategorization in their1949 study by pitting a softball team made up ofmembers from both groups against an outsidecamp (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). This common-enemyapproach was partially successful. During the game,the boys cheered one another on and, when thehome team won, congratulated themselves withoutpaying heed to group loyalties. By introducing thethird party, the common-enemy approach forcedthe boys to redefine themselves in terms of a single

decategorization Reducing social categorization ten-dencies by minimizing the salience of group membershipsand stressing the individuality of each person in the group.common ingroup identity model An analysis of re-categorization processes and conflict, developed bySamuel Gaertner, John Dovidio, and their colleagues,predicting that intergroup conflict can be reduced byemphasizing membership in inclusive social categoriesand the interdependence of the individuals in the groups.recategorization A reduction of social categorizationtendencies by collapsing groups in conflict into a singlegroup or category.


shared group identity. The Sherifs pointed out,however, that combining groups in opposition to acommon enemy “enlarges” the conflict as new fac-tions are drawn into the fray (Kessler &Mummendey,2001). The old conflicts can also return once thecommon enemy is dispatched.

Cross-Categorization Ingroup–outgroup biasesare also minimized when group members’ otherclassifications—in addition to their group identitythat is the focus of the conflict—are made salientto them (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). Cross-categorization, or multiple social categorization,instead of uniting all individuals in a single groupor breaking down groups altogether, decreases thepower of the problematic group identity by shiftingattention to alternative memberships that are lesslikely to provoke ingroup–outgroup tensions. TheSherifs, if they had implemented this strategy at theRobbers Cave, would have introduced at leastone other category and split the Rattlers and theEagles into two new groups. The boys, for exam-ple, were drawn from both the north and the southside of Oklahoma City, so the Sherifs could haveseparated them into these two groups and intro-duced activities that would have made these identi-ties salient.

When others are viewed as belonging to mul-tiple categories rather than just one, intergroup dif-ferentiation decreases, and with it goes intergroupbias. Cross-categorization also prompts individualsto develop a more complex conceptualization ofthe outgroup, which leads in some cases to decate-gorization. The effectiveness of cross-categorizationdepends, however, on individuals’ willingness to dothe cognitive work needed to rethink their concep-tualization of the outgroup and their mood. Ifpressured by time constraints that placed demandson their ability to process information or a

mood-souring situation, the boys at RobbersCave may have fallen back on the older, better-known Eagles–Rattlers distinction (Brewer, 2000;Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Urban & Miller, 1998).

Controlling Stereotyped Thinking Rather thanattacking the categorization process, Patricia Devine(1989, 2005) recommended controlling the impactof stereotypes on perceptions. Although people maynot be able to avoid the activation of stereotypes,they can control their subsequent thoughts to inhibitingroup–outgroup biases. Devine found that theEuropean Americans she studied could easily listthe contents of their culture’s stereotype aboutAfrican Americans. She also found that EuropeanAmericans who were low in prejudice could describethe stereotype as accurately as those who were high inprejudice. The unprejudiced European Americans,however, could control their thoughts after thestereotypes were activated. When asked to list theirthoughts about African Americans, the unprejudicedparticipants wrote such things as “Blacks and Whitesare equal” and “It’s unfair to judge people by theircolor—they are individuals.” Prejudiced people, incontrast, listed negative, stereotypical thoughts.Devine and her colleagues have also found that un-prejudiced EuropeanAmericans feel guiltywhen theyrespond to African Americans in stereotypical ways,whereas prejudiced European Americans do not(see Devine, 2005, for a review).

Conflict Management

Many practical approaches to dealing with conflictbuild on both the contact and cognitive approacheswhile adding elements designed to fit the given sit-uation. These approaches include cultural awarenesstraining, self-esteem workshops, roundtable discus-sions with peers, structured training programs, andcooperative learning interventions (for a compre-hensive review see Paluck & Green, 2009). Theseprograms, when applied with diligence, often yieldsubstantial reductions in conflict, although theirsuccess depends on their duration, their design,and their fidelity to the intervention strategy(Stephan & Stephan, 2005).

cross-categorization A reduction of the impact of so-cial categorization on individuals’ perceptions by makingsalient their memberships in two or more social groupsor categories that are not related to the categories that aregenerating ingroup–outgroup tensions.

436 CHAPTER 14

Jigsaw Learning Groups Studies of publicschools in the United States suggest that desegrega-tion often fails to eliminate racial and ethnic preju-dices. Although integrated schools bring studentsfrom various groups into contact, they do notalways promote cooperation between these groups.Instead of including the necessary ingredients forpositive intergroup interaction, many school sys-tems fail to encourage interaction among themembers of various subgroups, and staff openly ex-press hostile attitudes toward outgroup members.Some schools, too, group students on the basis ofprior academic experiences; as a result, educationallydeprived students are segregated from studentswith stronger academic backgrounds (Amir, 1969;Brewer &Miller, 1984; Cook, 1985; Schofield, 1978).

Desegregation will reduce prejudice only whensupplemented by educational programs that en-courage cooperation among members of differentracial and ethnic groups. One technique that hasyielded promising results involves forming raciallymixed teams within the classroom. In the jigsawmethod, for example, students from different racialor ethnic groups are assigned to a single learninggroup. These groups are then given an assignmentthat can be completed only if each individual mem-ber contributes his or her share. Study units arebroken down into various subareas, and each mem-ber of a group must become an expert on one sub-ject and teach that subject to other members of thegroup. In a class studying government, for example,the teacher might separate the pupils into three-person groups, with each member of the groupbeing assigned one of the following topics: the ju-diciary system (the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates), the duties and powers of the executivebranch (the office of the President), and the func-tions of the legislative branch (Congress). Studentscan, however, leave their three-person groups and

meet with their counterparts from other groups.Thus, everyone assigned to study one particulartopic, such as the Supreme Court, would meet todiscuss it, answer questions, and decide how toteach the material to others. Once they havelearned their material, these students rejoin theiroriginal groups and teach the other members oftheir group what they had learned. Thus, the jigsawclass uses both group learning and student teachingtechniques (Aronson, 2000; Aronson & Patnoe,1997; Aronson et al., 1978).

Learning to Cooperate Intergroup conflicts resistresolution, despite the best intentions of those in-volved to settle the problem amicably. In one ofthe Sherifs’ studies, for example, an informal attemptby one of the Bull Dogs’ leaders to negotiate withthe Red Devils ended in increased antagonism:

Hall…was chosen tomake a peace mission.He joined into the spirit, shouting to theBull Dogs, “Keep your bigmouths shut. I’mgoing to see if we can make peace.We wantpeace.” Hall went to the Red Devil cabin.The door was shut in his face. He called upthat the Bull Dogs had only taken their own[belongings]… and they wanted peace. Hisexplanation was rejected, and his peacefulintentions were derided. He ran from thebunkhouse in a hail of green apples. (Sherif &Sherif, 1953, p. 283)

Conflict experts, such as Herbert Kelman(1992), recommend training people to be more ef-fective managers of intergroup conflict. Kelman andhis colleagues have met repeatedly with high-rankingrepresentatives from countries in the Middle East tosolve problems in that region of the world. Kelmanhas carefully structured the workshops so that parti-cipants can speak freely, and he intervenes only asnecessary to facilitate the communication process.The workshops are completely confidential, discus-sion is open but focused on the conflict, and expec-tations are realistic. The workshops are not designedto resolve the conflict, but to give participants thebehavioral skills needed to solve conflicts themselves(Rouhana & Kelman, 1994).

jigsaw method A team-learning technique developedby Elliot Aronson and his colleagues that involves assign-ing topics to each student, allowing students with thesame topics to study together, and then requiring thesestudents to teach their topics to the other members oftheir groups.


David and Roger Johnson have applied theseprinciples in their school-based cooperative learningprogram. They designed their program to achievethree major goals: to decrease the amount oftension between groups in schools and colleges; toincrease students’ ability to solve problems withoutturning to authorities; and to give students skills theycan use when they become adults. The programteaches students a five-step approach to resolvingconflicts: (1) define the conflict; (2) exchange infor-mation about the nature of the conflict; (3) view thesituation from multiple perspectives; (4) generatesolutions to the conflict; (5) select a solution thatbenefits all parties.

Johnson and Johnson, in evaluations of theprogram, reported substantial reductions in disci-pline problems after training, as well as increasesin academic achievement (Roseth, Johnson, &Johnson, 2008). These programs can be madeeven more effective by structuring the task so thateach group member makes a contribution, ran-domly assigning students to roles within the group,and making certain that all groups contain anequal number of representatives from the groupsbeing merged. Too much of an emphasis onindividual performance—created by assigninggrades based on relative performance or degree ofpreparation—can undermine the effectiveness ofthe program, but research suggests that the interven-tion yields positive gains even in less-than-idealsettings (Miller & Davidson-Podgorny, 1987).

Resolving Conflict: Conclusions

In his classic treatise The Nature of Prejudice, Allport(1954) wrote that “conflict is like a note on an or-gan. It sets all prejudices that are attuned to it intosimultaneous vibration. The listener can scarcely dis-tinguish the pure note from the surrounding jangle”(p. 996).

The Sherifs and their colleagues created justsuch a “jangle” at the Robbers Cave. The Rattlersand the Eagles were only young boys camping, buttheir conflict followed patterns seen in disputes be-tween races, between regions, and between coun-tries. But just as the Robbers Cave Experiment is asobering commentary on the pervasiveness of con-flict, so the resolution of that conflict is cause foroptimism. The Sherifs created conflict, but theyalso resolved it. When it came time to return toOklahoma City, several of the group members askedif everyone could go in the same bus:

When they asked if this might be done andreceived an affirmative answer from thestaff, some of them actually cheered.When the bus pulled out, the seatingarrangement did not follow group lines.Many boys looked back at the camp, andWilson (E) cried because camp was over.(Sherif et al., 1961, p. 182)

If the Robbers Cave conflict can end peace-fully, perhaps others can as well.

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What interpersonal factors disrupt relations betweengroups?

1. Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif and theircolleagues’ carried out the Robbers CaveExperiment to identify the causes of intergroupconflict.

2. Realistic group conflict theory assumes conflictoccurs because groups must compete with oneanother for scarce resources.

■ The heightened competitiveness of groupsis known as the discontinuity effect.

■ Research by Insko and his colleaguessuggests the effect is due to individuals’desire to maximize profit (greed), distrustof groups (fear), group loyalty, and thelack of identifiability. Limiting these ten-dencies can work to reduce the aggres-siveness of groups.

438 CHAPTER 14

3. Conflict increases when one group attempts todominate and exploit another group, and thetarget group resists exploitation.

■ Social dominance theory, developed bySidanius and Pratto, examines tensionsbetween hierarchically ranked groups insociety. Individuals who are high in socialdominance orientation are more likely toprefer allocations that benefit their grouprelative to other groups.

■ Groups exploit other groups botheconomically and coercively, but Insko’sgenerational studies suggest that coerciveinfluence is associated with greaterincreases in conflict.

4. Normative processes instigate and sustainconflict.

■ Intergroup conflict, like intragroup con-flict, tends to escalate over time. Both thenorm of reciprocity and the use of con-tentious influence tactics stimulate conflictspirals.

■ The extent to which groups respond inhostile ways to other groups varies fromculture to culture, with some cultureseschewing intergroup conflict and others(such as the “fierce” Yanomanö studied byChagnon) accepting it routinely.

■ Subgroups within the large cultural con-text may adopt unique norms pertaining toviolence. Work by Nisbett, Cohen, andtheir colleagues suggests that in the Southof the United States men tend to respondmore aggressively to threat.

5. Negative emotional reactions can trigger anti-outgroup reactions. Scapegoat theory explainswhy groups that experience setbacks sometimesfight other, more defenseless groups.

6. Intergroup conflict may be instinctive—theresult of evolutionary pressures that favoredindividuals who preferred ingroup membersover outgroup members.

What are the psychological foundations of conflictbetween groups?

1. Social categorization leads perceivers to classifypeople into two mutually exclusive groups—the ingroup and the outgroup. Individuals inTajfel and Turner’s minimal intergroupsituation displayed the ingroup–outgroup bias,leading them to conclude that social categori-zation may be sufficient to create conflict.

2. Members tend to favor the ingroup over theoutgroup (the ingroup–outgroup bias). Thisbias, when applied to larger groups such astribes or nations, was labeled ethnocentrism bySumner.

■ Ingroup favoritism tends to be strongerthan outgroup rejection, but both forms ofingroup–outgroup bias emerged atRobbers Cave.

■ Implicit measures of bias, such as theImplicit Association Test (IAT) developedby Greenwald and his colleagues, can de-tect subtle, unconscious forms of bias.

■ Double-standard thinking, as described byWhite, occurs when group members framethe behaviors and characteristics of the in-group in more positively than these samebehaviors and characteristics displayed bythe outgroup.

3. During intergroup conflict, group members’judgments are often distorted by a number ofcognitive biases:

■ Outgroup homogeneity bias: The outgroup isassumed to be much more homogeneousthan the ingroup. Members assume thattheir own group is diverse and heteroge-neous, although when the group isthreatened, members may exaggerate thesimilarity of everyone in their group.

■ Law of small numbers: The behaviors andcharacteristics exhibited by a small numberof outgroup members are generalized to allmembers of the outgroup.


■ Group attribution error: Group decisionsare assumed to reflect individual groupmembers’ attitudes, irrespective of theparticular procedures used in making thedecisions.

■ Ultimate attribution error: Group membersattribute the negative behaviors performedby outgroup members to internaldispositions, but their positive behaviorsare explained away as situationally causedaberrations.

■ Linguistic intergroup bias: Actions performedby the ingroup are described differentlythan actions performed by the outgroup.

■ Stereotypes: Lippmann coined the wordstereotypes to describe cognitive generali-zations about the qualities and characteris-tics of the members of a particular group orsocial category. The stereotype content modelsuggests that the contents of most stereo-types reflect judgments of the outgroup’scompetence and warmth.

4. When conflicts become more intense, mem-bers may display more extreme emotionalreactions to outgroups.

■ In addition to a generalized negative reac-tion to the outgroup, individuals may alsoexperience specific emotions, such asenvy, contempt, pity, and admiration,depending on their stereotypes about theoutgroup.

■ As Allport observed, hatred tends to bedirected at groups rather than individuals.

■ Extreme conflict can result in both moralexclusion and dehumanization of members ofthe outgroup. Dehumanized individualsevoke a different reaction, at the neuro-logical level, than those who are notdehumanized, and Bandura’s researchindicates that a group is likely to betreated more negatively when described as“animalistic.”

5. Social identity theory suggests that individuals,by championing the ingroup, maintain andeven raise their self-esteem.

How can intergroup relations be improved?

1. The Sherifs’ first, relatively unsuccessfulattempt to reduce conflict was based on thecontact hypothesis.

2. Pettigrew and Tropp, using meta-analysis,concluded that contact is an effective means ofreducing conflict.

■ The effectiveness of contact increases inmore positive contexts; ones that includethe elements identified by Clark and hiscolleagues. Contact is more effective whenit creates cooperation between the groups,when participants are equal in status, wheninteraction is intimate enough to sustainthe development of friendships across thegroups, and when norms encouragecooperation.

■ Contact is more effective when it createsextensive opportunities for interaction, asin sports and work settings rather thantourist settings.

■ The Sherifs successfully reduced conflictin the Robbers Cave camp by promptingthe boys to work toward superordinate goals.

■ Studies of the extended contact hypothesisposited by Wright and others suggestthat encouraging the development ofcross-group friendship relations reducesprejudice.

3. Cognitive approaches to conflict reductionseek to reverse the negative biases that followfrom parsing individuals into ingroups andoutgroups.

■ Decategorization encourages members torecognize the individuality of the outgroupmembers.

■ The common ingroup identity model devel-oped by Gaertner and Dovidio suggests

440 CHAPTER 14

that recategorization—collapsing theboundaries between groups—reducesconflict yet can promote the retention ofidentities. The common-enemy approachis an example of recategorization.

■ Cross-categorization involves making salientmultiple group memberships.

■ Devine’s studies of stereotypic thinkingindicate that even though individualsmay be aware of the contents ofstereotypes pertaining to outgroups, theycan learn to control the impact of thisbiased cognitive response on theirjudgments.

4. Conflict experts such as Kelman suggest man-aging conflict by teaching group members theskills they need to resolve interpersonal disputes.

■ Aronson’s jigsaw method is an educationalintervention that reduces prejudice byassigning students from different racial orethnic groups to a single learning group.

■ School-based conflict management pro-grams liked those developed by Johnsonand Johnson are designed to reduce con-flict between groups by teaching studentsto recognize conflict, communicate aboutthe source of the conflict, and identifymutually acceptable solutions.


Chapter Case: The Robbers Cave Experiment■ Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers

Cave Experiment, by Muzafer Sherif, O. J.Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, andCarolyn W. Sherif (1961), describes in detailthe well-known study of conflict between twogroups of boys at a summer camp.

Causes of Intergroup Conflict■ “Intergroup Relations,” by Marilyn B. Brewer

and Rupert J. Brown (1998), is a theoreticallysophisticated review of the theory and researchpertaining to intergroup processes.

■ “Beyond the Group Mind: A QuantitativeReview of the Interindividual–IntergroupDiscontinuity Effect,” by Tim Wildschut, BradPinter, Jack L. Vevea, Chester A. Insko, andJohn Schopler (2003), examines prior scholarlyanalyses of the transformation that occurs whenconflict erupts between groups rather than in-dividuals and provides a summary of work onthe discontinuity effect.

Intergroup Relations■ “The Social Psychology of Intergroup

Relations,” by Marilyn B. Brewer (2007),

provides a comprehensive but efficient reviewof research dealing with cognitive factors thatcause and sustain intergroup bias.

■ On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years afterAllport, edited by John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick,and Laurie A. Rudman (2005), draws togetherpapers on Allport’s insights into the nature ofintergroup conflict, with sections pertaining topreferential thinking, sociocultural factors, andprejudice reduction.

■ The Psychology of Stereotyping, by DavidJ. Schneider (2004), examines issues ofstereotype and bias, as well as a wide varietyof cognitive processes that pertain to groups,including perceptions of entitativity,categorization, and ingroup–outgroup bias.

Resolving Intergroup Conflict■ “Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A

Review and Assessment of Research andPractice,” by Elizabeth Levy Paluck andDonald P. Green (2009), reviews a wide vari-ety of methods used to reduce conflict betweengroups, with a focus on the rigor of themethods used to evaluate their efficacy.


■ “An Integrative Theory of IntergroupContact,” by Rupert Brown and MilesHewstone (2005), is a detailed review of theory

and research on intergroup contact, with afocus on the mediating role of group salienceand anxiety.


442 CHAPTER 14


15

Groups in Context

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Just as individuals are embedded ingroups, so groups are embedded inphysical and social environments.Groups alter their environments sub-stantially, but in many cases, it’s theplace that shapes the group. As KurtLewin’s (1951) formula, B = f (P, E ),states, group behavior (B ) is a functionof the persons (P ) who are in thegroup and the environment (E ) wherethe group is located.

■ How does the social and physicalenvironment influence groups andtheir dynamics?

■ What is the ecology of a group?■ What are the causes and conse-

quences of a group’s tendency toestablish territories?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Places: Group Settings

Comfort in Contexts

Stressful Group Settings

Behavior Settings

Spaces: The Ecology of Groups

Personal Space

Reactions to Spatial Invasion

Seating Arrangements

Locations: Group Territoriality

Group Territories

Territoriality within Groups

Groups in Context: BeyondApollo 13

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

443

✵

Groups exist in any number of distinct physicallocations: from classrooms, museums, factories,and boardrooms to coal mines, battlefields, andeven space capsules. The impressionists thrived inParis in the 1860s in the midst of its countlessgalleries, art schools, restaurants, bistros, and parks.The 1980 U.S. Olympic Hockey Team trainedand played for hours and hours on hockey rinksacross the world. The Bay of Pigs planners metin an elegantly appointed conference room, speak-ing to each other in subdued voices across an im-posing mahogany table. The Rattlers and theEagles met, fought, and befriended each other atthe cabins and on the fields of the Robbers CaveState Park. Each one of these groups slept, worked,played, interacted, argued, and fought in a specificenvironmental context, and these places substan-tially influenced their dynamics. This chapterexamines the nature of this environment–grouprelationship, focusing on places, spaces, and terri-torial locations.

PLACES : GROUP SETT INGS

Groups can be found in both natural and built en-vironments. At a post office, workers sort mail innoisy rooms bathed in fluorescent light. Hikers trekthrough the woods, taking care to leave no evi-dence of their passing. Rows of college studentssit in a classroom listening to a lecturer drone.Shoppers crowd into a store to take advantage ofspecial holiday prices. In a corporate conferenceroom, executives sit in leather chairs and stare im-passively at reports projected on a computer screen.The crew of Apollo 13 lived in a high-tech envi-ronment filled with multiple controls and fewcomforts.

Many disciplines, including sociology, environ-mental psychology, ethology, human ecology,demography, and ecological psychology, affirm theimportant impact of environmental variables onhuman behavior (Bell et al., 2001; Gieryn, 2000;Sundstrom, et al., 1996; Werner, Brown, & Altman,

Apollo 13: The Group That Lost the Moon

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy set the goal: tosend Americans to the surface of the moon by the endof the decade. His plan initiated the largest engi-neering project in modern history, with as many as400,000 individuals eventually working together tosolve the endless technical, psychological, and medicalproblems posed by such an unprecedented undertak-ing. On July 20, 1969, Apollo 11 commander NeilArmstrong made history when he stepped on themoon’s surface.

One year later, Apollo 13 commander James Lovellalso made history, but in his case by not stepping on themoon. On April 11, 1970, Lovell, John Swigert, and FredHaise piloted the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) Apollo 13 into space withoutany sign of a problem. Lovell and his crew were tospend four days crowded together in their commandmodule, named the Odyssey, before reaching themoon. The team members had trained for years for the

mission, and throughout the trip they would remainin constant communication with ground control teamsin Houston, Texas. Once in orbit around the moon,Lovell and Haise would descend to the surface of themoon in the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM), theAquarius.

But 56 hours into the mission, Swigert initiated aprocedure designed to stir the cryogenic oxygen tanks.One of the tanks exploded. With oxygen escaping fromtheir ship and battery power dwindling, Lovell coollyradioed NASA his famous understatement, “Houston,we have a problem.” (Actually, he said “Houston,we’ve had a problem.”) During the next three days, thecrew and the teams on the ground identified and re-sponded to one life-threatening challenge after an-other, including near-freezing temperatures and abuildup of carbon dioxide in the cabin. The groupmanaged to return to Earth, and splashed down safelyin the Pacific Ocean on April 17, 1970.

444 CHAPTER 15

2002). All share a concern for the setting or context inwhich behavior occurs. Just as a group-level orienta-tion assumes that individuals’ actions are shaped by thegroups to which they belong, an environmentalorientation assumes that groups are shaped by theirenvironments. As Figure 15.1 suggests, a multilevelanalysis of human behavior recognizes that individualsare nested in a hierarchy of increasingly inclusive socialaggregates, such as groups, organizations, and com-munities. But individuals and their groups also existin a physical setting located in a particular geographiclocality in a specific region of theworld, and that placewill eventually influence the group’s dynamics andoutcomes.

Comfort in Contexts

Sometimes groups and the setting fit comfortablytogether. The place suits the group, leavingmembers free to focus on interpersonal and taskdynamics. Other environments, in contrast, areless comfortable ones for the occupants. Humans’

comfort zone is a relatively narrow one, and whengroups must live and work on the edges of thatzone changes in their dynamics are inevitable.

Physical settings are often said to have ambi-ence, or atmosphere, for they can create a distinctivecognitive and emotional reaction in people whooccupy these spaces (Schroeder, 2007).

We have strong feelings in and aboutplaces. Some places make us feel good: gladto be there, relaxed, excited, warm all over.We are drawn to these places and return tothem as often as we can. Other places makeus feel bad: uncomfortable, insignificant,unhappy, out of place. We avoid theseplaces and suffer if we have to be in them(Farbstein & Kantrowitz, 1978, p. 14)

Although people’s evaluations of places varydepending on their culture, experiences, andpersonal preferences, most are based on two dimen-sions: How pleasant is the place (positive versus neg-ative), and how intense is the place (arousing versusrelaxing)? First, a group environment that isorderly, tastefully decorated, clean, and spacioususually prompts a more favorable reaction thanone that is poorly designed, shabby, unkempt, andodorous (see Figure 15.2). Second, whereas someplaces are restful, others are so stimulating that theyarouse their occupants rather than relax them. Theastronauts and engineers working in the controlroom at Houston all responded positively to theirhighly arousing habitat, and so they considered it anexhilarating place. Visitors to the control room, incontrast, often reacted negatively to its harsh lights,countless monitors, displays, and cacophony ofvoices issuing orders, relaying information, and ask-ing questions. Few considered it boring or tranquil(Russell, 2003; Russell & Snodgrass, 1987).

Groups generally respond best, in terms of per-formance and satisfaction, in affectively pleasant situa-tions. Studies of manufacturing teams in factories,students in classrooms, and workers in offices, for

Person

Organization

Group

Community

Society

All Humanity

Global

Region

Locality

Setting

F I G U R E 15.1 A multi-level model of the embed-dedness of individuals in both social aggregates (e.g.,groups, organizations, communities) and in geographicdomains (e.g., settings, localities, regions).

ambience The psychological reaction (mood, feelings,emotions) evoked by a setting.

GROUPS IN CONTEXT 445

example, have found that they respond better whenworking in attractive spaces that are visually interestingrather than drab (Sundstrom et al., 1996). Physical fea-tures that stimulate or provoke positive emotions—including music, furnishings, art, decor, decorations,color, and lighting—tend to be associated with arange of positive group dynamics, including in-creased cohesion, improved communication, pro-ductivity, and reduced absenteeism (Brief & Weiss,2002). An attractive environment is not, however, arequirement for group effectiveness. Many successfulgroups work, without problems, in relatively shabbysettings. A too-pleasant environmentmay distract thegroup from the task at hand, providing counterpro-ductive levels of comfort. Highly effective groupsmay also be so focused on the task that they canwork anywhere, since what matters is the quality oftheir tools and their personnel rather than the setting(Bennis & Biederman, 1997).

Groups also thrive in stimulating, but not inexcessively stimulating, spaces. Studies of groupsliving in harsh circumstances, such as teams sta-tioned in Antarctica and explorers living for monthson end in a confined space, complain more aboutthe monotony of the environment than about thedanger, discomfort, or isolation (Stuster, 1996). As

one officer aboard a research ship wintering in theArctic wrote, “Monotony was our enemy, and tokill time our endeavor; hardship there was none. . . .Monotony, as I again repeat, was the only disagree-able part of our wintering” (quoted in Mowat,1977, p. 272). Such groups strive to make theirenvironments more interesting, often by decoratingcommon areas extensively. But too much stimula-tion can contribute to overload when complex,stimulating environments overwhelm group mem-bers (Greenberg & Firestone, 1977). In everydaysituations, people cope with overload by reducingtheir contact with others, limiting the amount ofinformation they notice and process, or ignoringaspects of the situation. In Apollo 13, the onlyway astronauts could control the overload was tosleep—which they rarely did.

These coping strategies are often effective.Individuals living in high-density settings who usedscreening strategies to limit their contact with other

ACTIVATION

DEACTIVATION

TenseJittery

UpsetDistressed

SadGloomy

TiredLethargic

PlacidCalm

SereneContented

PLEASUREDISPLEASURE

ElatedHappy

ExcitedEbullient

F I G U R E 15.2 Core affectexperienced by people in varioustypes of group environments.

SOURCE: Russell, J. A. 2003. “Core affectand the psychological construction of emo-tion.” Psychological Review, 110, 145–172.doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.145.

overload A psychological reaction to situations and ex-periences that are so cognitively, perceptually, or emo-tionally stimulating that they tax or even exceed theindividual’s capacity to process incoming information.

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people, for example, tended to be better adjustedthan those who did not (Baum et al., 1982; Evans,Lepore, & Allen, 2000). In other cases, though,these strategies did not reduce members’ stress.Men who coped with environmental stress by with-drawing from the very people who could havehelped them cope with the situation (friends andloved ones), for example, were more maladjustedthan men who did not withdraw (Evans et al.,1989; Lepore, Evans, & Schneider, 1991).

Stressful Group Settings

People often report feeling rejuvenated and ener-gized by the places that their groups occupy. Theyfeel more at ease and content when they can spendtime in places they feel attached to, including theirhomes, their rooms, or even cubicles in an office(Altman & Churchman, 1994; Carlopio, 1996).However, some aspects of the environment can besources of stress—strain caused by environmentalcircumstances that threaten one’s sense of well-being and safety. Groups do not exist in neutral,passive voids, but in fluctuating environments thatare sometimes too hot, too cold, too impersonal,too intimate, too big, too little, too noisy, too quiet,too restrictive, or too open—but rarely just right(Evans & Stecker, 2004; Veitch et al., 2007).

Temperature One of the minor miseries of lifeoccurs when people must work in a room that iseither too hot or too cold. Although people gener-ally rate temperatures from the mid-60s to the mid-80s Fahrenheit as “comfortable,” temperatures thatfall outside this range cause discomfort, irritability,and reduced productivity (Bell, 1992). Whengroups were assigned to work either in a room atnormal temperature (72.4° F) or in a hot room(93.5° F), the overheated group members reported

feelings of fatigue, sadness, and discomfort, whereasparticipants in the normal-temperature room re-ported feeling more elated, vigorous, and comfort-able (Griffitt & Veitch, 1971). Studies have alsosuggested that extremes in temperature can reduceinterpersonal attraction (Griffitt, 1970) and interferewith successful task performance (Parsons, 1976). Oneof the concomitants of high temperatures in groupsis exposure to others’ body odors—a sensation thatmost people find objectionable (McBurney, Levine,& Cavanaugh, 1977). The odor of men’s sweat isperceived as particularly repugnant (Stevenson &Repacholi, 2003).

Groups tend to be more aggressive when theyare hot, as colloquialisms like “hot under the collar”and “flaring tempers” suggest. Collective violence isseasonal, with more riots occurring in the summerthan the winter (Anderson & Bushman, 1997;Rotton & Cohn, 2002). Groups may also disbandwhen the environment they occupy becomes un-pleasantly hot. In one study, researchers measuredpeople’s aggressiveness in a comfortable room versusa hot room. Instead of acting more aggressively in thehot room, the participants responded as rapidly aspossible, so that they could escape the noxiousenvironmental setting. The heat-stressed participantswere angry, but they were so uncomfortable thattheir primary concern was to finish the experimentas quickly as possible (Baron & Bell, 1975, 1976;Bell, 1992).

Extreme temperatures are also physicallyharmful (Folk, 1974). When temperatures arehigh, people are more likely to suffer from exhaus-tion, stroke, and heart attacks. Extreme cold canlead to hypothermia and death. The Apollo 13astronauts, for example, struggled to maintain theirbody heat at healthy levels when the loss of powerforced them to turn off the cabin heaters. It was, asLovell characteristically understated, “very un-comfortable. Basically, the cold made it uncom-fortable” (quoted in Godwin, 2000, p. 109).Accounts of groups struggling in extremely coldnatural environments, such as teams winteringover in Antarctica or mountain climbers, docu-ment the lethal effects of exposure to extremelycold temperatures.

stress Negative physiological, emotional, cognitive, andbehavioral responses to circumstances that threaten—orare thought to threaten—one’s sense of well-being andsafety.


Noise The crew of the Apollo 13 lived with noiseconstantly during their five days in space. The SaturnV rockets were deafening, burning 3400 gallons offuel per second. Once in orbit, the cabin was filledwith the humming of computers, the whirring offans and pumps circulating air and liquids, and thecrackling of transmissions between the crew andCOMCON, the flight controller back in Houston.There was also the one sound that signaled to thecrew that something was wrong; Lovell describedit as a “bang-whump-shudder” that was felt morethan heard (Lovell & Kluger, 1994, p. 94).

Noise is any sound that is unwanted. Sounds inthe range of 0 to 50 decibels (dB) are very soft andgenerally produce little irritation for the listener.Sounds of more than 80 dB, in contrast, may be both-ersome enough to be called noise. In general, thelouder the noise, the more likely it will produce dis-traction, irritation, and psychological stress (Cohen &Weinstein, 1981). Group communication becomesimpossible in such environments, so members haveproblems coordinating their efforts. Coping withchronic noise also exacts a psychological toll. Groupsin noisy places—people who work in noisy offices,families living in homes near airports, and childrenon playgrounds located near major highways—generally find that the noise has a disruptive impacton their social behaviors. People are less likely to in-teract with other people in noisy places, and they alsotend to be less helpful (Edelstein, 2002; Mathews,Canon, & Alexander, 1974; Veitch, 1990).

Much of the unwanted sound in a group ori-ginates within the group itself. Depending on thequalities of the room, 15 people talking infor-mally with one another will create so much noisethat conversation between adjoining pairs is in-hibited. When a conversing group passes by anindividual who is attempting to perform a diffi-cult task, the noise of the group can be distract-ing. People can often ignore ambient sounds, butspeech is another matter. Neurological evidenceindicates that even when people strive to deliber-ately ignore speech by refocusing attention on thetask at hand some of their cognitive resources arebeing used to monitor the overheard conversation(Campbell, 2005).

People can cope with noise for short periods oftime. When researchers bombarded people work-ing on both simple and complex tasks with tape-recorded noise, the participants became so inured tothe stimulus that it had no effect on their perfor-mance (Glass, Singer, & Pennebaker, 1977). Groupscannot, however, cope for long periods of timewith noise. As “individuals expend ‘psychicenergy’ in the course of the adaptive process,”they become “less able to cope with subsequentenvironmental demands and frustrations” (Glass etal., 1977, p. 134). One investigation found thatexposure to low levels of ambient noise in anoffice setting did not cause increases in stress, butpeople had trouble coping with other stressfulevents—an irritating boss or coworker, role ambi-guities, or time pressures—when they worked in anoisy place (Leather, Beale, & Sullivan, 2003).Over time, exposure to loud noise is associatedwith substantial threats to health, including physicalillnesses (headaches, heart disease, allergies, anddigestive disorders), infant and adult mortality rates,mental illness, interpersonal conflict, and even im-potence (Bronzaft, 2002; Wallenius, 2004).

Dangerous Places The astronauts sat atop mil-lions of pounds of rocket fuel at launch, traveledthough space in a thin-shelled spacecraft at speedsof nearly 25,000 miles an hour, and during reentryrelied on a heat shield to deflect the heat away fromthe command module and parachutes that wouldslow the craft’s descent. All the dangers were mini-mized through planning, design, and training, butone danger that all crews faced but could not pro-tect themselves against was always present—a colli-sion with a meteor.

Of all the possible disaster scenarios that astro-nauts and controllers consider in planning a mission,few are more ghastly—or more capricious, or moresudden, or more total, or more feared—than a sur-prise hit by a rogue meteor. At speeds encounteredin Earth orbit, a cosmic sand grain no more than atenth of an inch across would strike a spacecraft withan energetic wallop equivalent to a bowling balltraveling at 60 miles per hour on Earth (Lovell &Kluger, 1994, p. 94)

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Groups sometimes live and work in places filledwith dangers, both recognized and unknown. Somenatural calamity, such as a flood, earthquake, or bliz-zard, may overtake a group. Some groups, too, workat jobs that are riskier than most: Miners, ship crews,police officers, and military units often live and workin circumstances that can be life threatening. Thegroup, too, may occupy an inhospitable environ-ment. Some people live in neighborhoods where vi-olence and aggression are so commonplace that theirlives are often at risk (Herzog & Chernick, 2000).

Groups generally cope with danger by takingprecautions designed to make the situation safer.Astronauts, military combat squads, and explorersall minimize the possibility of exposure to dangerby training, stressing cooperation among members,and monitoring each individual’s connection to thegroup (Harrison & Connors, 1984; Suedfeld, 1987).In consequence, dangerous circumstances often pro-mote an increased level of teamwork. During rou-tine flights, astronauts and the mission specialists onthe ground tend to adopt an “us versus them” ori-entation against each other (Bechtel, 2002).Disagreements and disputes are common, withboth sides viewing the other side as stubborn andmisinformed. These tensions dissolve, however, dur-ing the crucial moments of each mission, and theywere nearly nonexistent during the flight of theApollo 13—the crew and mission control workedtogether seamlessly to solve each problem as it arose.Groups that face dangerous circumstances but do notmanage to work as a team to overcome their pro-blems place themselves at risk (see Focus 15.1).

Behavior Settings

The Apollo 13 was more than a metal spacecraftfilled with expensive instrumentation and equip-ment. It was also a behavior setting—a physicallocation where people’s actions are prescribed by

the features and functions of the situation. Thecounter at a fast food restaurant, the waiting areain a doctor’s office, a computer lab on a collegecampus, a conference room in a business office,and a bench in a park are all behavior settings, foronce people enter these spaces, their behavior isshaped more by the space than by their personalcharacteristics. For example, when people enter afast food restaurant, they join a line, place theirorder, pay for their food, and then find a tablewhere they eat their meal. A group in a conferenceroom sits in chairs, exchanges information, andeventually decides to adjourn. The astronauts,once they entered the Apollo 13, acted in waysthat the situation required.

The concept of a behavior setting was devel-oped by ecological psychologist Roger Barker andhis colleagues in their studies of common interper-sonal situations. Barker, after studying offices,homes, schools, neighborhoods, communities, andentire towns, concluded that most behavior—atleast, most routine, ordinary behavior—is deter-mined by the environmental settings in which itoccurs. These behavior settings tend to be specificspatial areas—actual places where group membersinteract with one another. These places often haveboundaries—such as walls, doors, or fences—thatidentify the edge of one behavior setting and possi-bly the beginning of the next. Some boundaries canalso be temporal, as when a group is present onlyduring a certain time (e.g., a group may occupy aclassroom only on Mondays and Wednesdays from9 to 10:30). Most settings also include both people(group members) and things (equipment, chairs,etc.); Barker called them both components of the set-ting. Barker noted that individuals and settings areoften inseparable, for the meaning of actions oftendepends on the physical features of the situation,just as a situation takes its meaning from the indi-viduals in the setting. Barker believed that peopleroutinely follow a program that sequences their ac-tions and reactions in behavior settings. They may,for example, make use of the settings’ objects in verypredictable, routine ways, as when people who entera room with chairs in it tend to sit on them (Barker,1968, 1987, 1990; Barker et al., 1978).

behavior setting As defined by Roger Barker in histheory of ecological psychology, a physically and tempo-rally bounded social situation that determines the actionsof the individuals in the setting.


Not every physical setting is a behavior setting.Some situations are novel ones, which group mem-bers have never before encountered, so they haveno expectations about how they should act. Someindividuals, too, may enter a behavior setting, butthey are not aware of the norms of the situation, orthey simply do not accept them as guides for theirown action. But in most cases, group members act

in predictable, routine ways in such situations.Libraries, for example, are behavior settings becausethey create a readiness for certain types of action:One should be subdued, quiet, and calm when in alibrary. These normative expectations guide behaviordirectly, and in many cases, group members are noteven aware of how the situation automatically chan-nels their actions. To demonstrate this automatic,

F o c u s 15.1 Why Is Mount Everest So Deadly to Groups?

I felt disconnected from the climbers around me—emotionally, spiritually, physically—to a degree Ihadn’t experienced on any previous expedition. Wewere a team in name only, I’d sadly come to realize.

—Jon Krakauer (1997, p. 163)

On May 10, 1996, two groups led by experts set off toscale Mount Everest, the highest peak in the world.One group, Adventure Consultants Guided Expedition,was led by Rob Hall, who had reached the summit ofMount Everest four times between 1990 and 1995.Scott Fischer was the leader of Mountain MadnessGuided Expedition. Fischer was also an expert guideand climber.

Both teams met with disaster, caused in part by thedangerous environment of Mount Everest. Everest issubject to high winds, bitter temperatures, and icy con-ditions. Climbers prepare for the summit attempt at acamp high on the mountain, but they must reach thepeak and return to that camp in a single day, becausethe chances of surviving a night on the summit ofEverest are slim. But the teams were overtaken by anunexpectedly powerful storm as they descended andthey could not reach the shelter of their camp. Severalmembers of the team also suffered from a lack of oxy-gen, for the air is thin at that altitude. Everest climbersusually carry tanks of oxygen, but even these supple-ments cannot counteract the negative effects of climb-ing treacherous terrain 29,000 feet above sea level.

These negative environmental events interactedwith negative group dynamics in both teams. JonKrakauer (1997), a member of Hall’s group, suggestedthat an inattention to teamwork may have contributedto the failure. Even though the climb is extremelydangerous and many who attempt it are killed, thegroups did not practice together, did not establishroutines for dealing with supplies (including oxygen),and did not set up contingency plans. A hierarchy of

authority was not established, despite the possibilitythat one of the leaders could be injured. Hall and Fischerdid not share their plans for the summit with the group,and they did not remain in contact with the otherguides during the climb. The leaders of both teams alsomade errors in judgment, possibly due to inexperience,the ill effects of too little oxygen (hypoxia), and thedesire to outdo the other team. Even though the clim-bers, before attempting the summit, agreed on a turn-around time—the time during the day when they mustturn back from the summit if they were to reach theirbase safely before nightfall—Hall and Fischer ignoredthat deadline and continued on. The other guides rec-ognized the danger in not returning at the turnaroundtime, but they did not feel that they had the authority tointervene. As a result, several climbers managed toreach the summit, but they were overtaken by thesnowstorm during the descent and perished.

As Krakauer later described, a sense of isolationpervaded the camp on the night before the summitattempt:

The roar of the wind made it impossible tocommunicate from one tent to the next. Inthis godforsaken place, I felt disconnectedfrom the climbers around me—emotionally,spiritually, physically—to a degree I hadn’texperienced on any previous expedition. Wewere a team in name only, I’d sadly come torealize. Although in a few hours we wouldleave camp as a group, we would ascend asindividuals, linked to one another by neitherrope nor any deep sense of loyalty.(Krakauer, 1997, p. 163)

Krakauer’s foreboding proved prophetic. Everestclaimed the lives of eight members of the two teams,including Rob Hall and Scott Fischer.

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unconscious impact of place on people, researchersfirst showed people a picture of either a library or arailroad station. Later, their reaction times to variouswords, including words relevant to libraries (e.g.,quiet, still, whisper), were measured. As expected, peo-ple recognized library-related words more quicklyafter seeing the picture of a library, suggesting thatthe picture activated norms pertaining to the situation(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003).

Synomorphy and Staffing Barker and his col-leagues noted that in some behavior settings, peo-ple are seamlessly embedded in the place itself.The cockpit of the Apollo 13, for example, wasdesigned so that the astronauts could monitor alltheir instruments and reach all their controls. A fastfood restaurant may use a system of guide chainsand multiple cash registers to handle large numbersof customers efficiently. A classroom may containareas where students can work on individual pro-jects, a reading circle where the teacher can leadsmall groups, and an art area where students caneasily access the supplies they need. In other be-havior settings, however, the people do not fit theplace. A classroom may have chairs bolted to thefloors in rows, so the teacher can never have stu-dents work in small groups. An office may havewindows that provide workers with a view of thecity, but the light from the windows preventsthem from reading their computer screens. A con-cert hall may have so few doors that concertgoersclog the exits. Barker used the word synomorphyto describe the degree of fit between the settingand its human occupants. When settings are highin synomorphy, the people fit into the physicalsetting and use its objects appropriately. The peo-ple and the place are unified. Settings that are lowin synomorphy lack this unity, for the people donot mesh well with the physical features and ob-jects in the place.

Allan Wicker’s staffing theory draws on theconcept of synomorphy to explain group perfor-mance (Wicker, 1979, 1987, 2002). Consider officeworkers in a small business, university, or govern-ment agency who are responsible for typing papersand reports, answering the telephone, duplicatingmaterials, and preparing paperwork on budgets,schedules, appointments, and so on. If the numberof people working in the office is sufficient to han-dle all these activities, then the setting is optimallystaffed. But if, for example, telephones are ringingunanswered, reports are days late, and the photo-copier is broken and no one knows how to fix it,then the office lacks “enough people to carry outsmoothly the essential program and maintenancetasks” and is understaffed (Wicker, 1979, p. 71). Onthe other hand, if the number of group membersexceeds that needed in the situation, the group isoverstaffed (Sundstrom, 1987).

Table 15.1 summarizes staffing theory’s predic-tions about the relationship between staffing andperformance. Overstaffed groups may performadequately—after all, so many extra people are avail-able to carry out the basic functions—but overstaff-ing can lead to dissatisfaction with task-relatedactivities and heightened rejection among groupmembers. Understaffed groups, in contrast, oftenrespond positively to the challenging workload.Instead of complaining about the situation, under-staffed groups sometimes display increased involve-ment in their work and contribute more to thegroup’s goals (Arnold & Greenberg, 1980; Wicker& August, 1995). Four-man groups, for example,when placed in an overstaffed situation (too few tasksto keep all members active), reported feeling lessimportant, less involved in their work, less con-cerned with performance, and less needed. Theseeffects were reversed in understaffed groups(Wicker et al., 1976). In another study, the increased

synomorphy In ecological psychology, the quality ofthe fit between the human occupants and the physicalsituation.

staffing theory An ecological analysis of behavior set-tings arguing that both understaffing (not enough peo-ple) and overstaffing (too many people) can be detri-mental.


workload brought on by understaffing increasedprofessionals’ and long-term employees’ involve-ment in their work, but understaffing also led todecreased commitment among new employees andblue-collar workers. Understaffing was also associ-ated with more negative attitudes toward the group(Wicker & August, 1995). Staffing theory alsoexplains why individuals who are part of smallergroups and organizations get more involved in theirgroups; for example, even though a large school of-fers more opportunities for involvement in small-group activities, the proportion of students who joinschool-based groups is higher in smaller schools(Gump, 1990).

How do groups cope with staffing problems?When researchers asked leaders of student groupsthis question, nearly 75% recommended recruitingmore members or reorganizing the group as the bestways to deal with understaffing. Other solutions in-cluded working with other groups and adoptingmore modest group goals (see Figure 15.3). Theseleaders offered a wider range of solutions for over-staffing, including encouraging members to remainactive in the group (often by assigning them specificduties), enforcing rules about participation, dividing

Understaffing

Overstaffing

27

6211

22

17

1512

34

Other

ReorganizegroupRecruit newmembers

Other

Divide

Punish deviance

Restrictmembership

Encouragemembers

F I G U R E 15.3 Leaders’ recommendations for deal-ing with understaffed groups and overstaffed groups.

SOURCE: “Group Staffing Levels and Responses to Prospective and NewGroup Members” by M. A. Cini, R. L. Moreland, & J. M. Levine, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 65. 1993 American PsychologicalAssociation. Reprinted by permission.

T A B L E 15.1 Group Members’ Reactions to Understaffed and Overstaffed Work Settings

Reaction Understaffed groups Overstaffed groups

Task performance Members engage in diligent, con-sistent, goal-related actions

Members are perfunctory, inconsistent,and sloppy

Performance monitoring Members provide one another withcorrective, critical feedback asneeded

Members exhibit little concern for thequality of the group’s performance

Perceptions Members are viewed in terms ofthe jobs they do rather than theirindividual qualities

Members focus on the personalities anduniqueness of members rather than onthe group

Self-perceptions Members feel important, responsi-ble, and capable

Members feel lowered self-esteem, withlittle sense of competence

Attitude toward the group Members express concern over thecontinuation of the group

Members are cynical about the group andits functions

Supportiveness Members are reluctant to rejectthose who are performing poorly

Members are less willing to help othermembers of the group

SOURCE: Adapted from Barker, 1968; Wicker, 1979.

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the group, taking in fewer members, changing thegroup’s structure to include more positions, andadopting more ambitious goals (Cini, Moreland, &Levine, 1993).

Designing Group Spaces In many cases, peoplefail to recognize the close connection betweenindividuals, groups, and their environment. Theymay realize that they are part of nature, but theydo not as easily recognize their connection to anartificial, built environment (Mowday & Sutton,1993; Schultz et al., 2004). Unfortunately, not allphysical settings are designed so carefully as theApollo 13, and as a result, many groups may noteven realize that they are working and playing inareas that lack synomorphy.

Studies of all types of behavior settings—classrooms, factories, offices, playgrounds, high-ways, theaters, and so on—frequently find thatthese areas need to be redesigned to maximize thefit between the people and the place. Groups inworkplace settings, for example, will increase theirproductivity if their work areas promote interac-tion, communication, task completion, and adapta-tion. The group members should have access tocommon spaces, where members can interact on aregular basis without interruption and interference.This shared group space should encourage the devel-opment of a group identity through decorativestyles, boundaries, the use of signs and labels, andso on. The setting should also encourage commu-nication among members. In many cases, buildingsare designed around formally recognized locationsfor communication—such as conference rooms—but groups also meet informally and spontaneously,and these locations should be incorporated into thebuilding’s design. Many high-performance organi-zations go so far as to integrate work areas withother areas to promote additional interaction amonggroup members, as when shared eating facilities andfitness facilities are included in the building’s design.The setting should, however, promote rather thaninhibit task performance. The materials and equip-ment needed for the group members to do theirwork should be readily available and in good work-ing order (Becker, 2004; McCoy, 2002).

The kind of space needed by a group will alsodepend on the type of tasks the group must accom-plish. A group that is working on tasks that requirehigh levels of collaboration and interaction amongmembers will need a very different space than agroup working on divisible tasks that are best solvedby individuals who can concentrate on them forlong periods of time without interruption. FrancisDuffy (1997), by examining a number of groupsworking in large corporations, identified four typesof groups that needed four types of spaces—hives,cells, dens, and clubs.

■ Hives. Members who function as “workerbees” by performing divisible, highly structuredtasks require little interaction with other groupmembers. Such groups function well in open,cubicle-type offices where each individual has adefined, relatively small workspace.

■ Cells. Members working on complex, long-term, relatively individualized projects needprivate spaces to carry out their work. Theymay also be able to work by telecommutingfrom a home office.

■ Dens. When members who are similar interms of skills and responsibilities work to-gether on collective tasks and projects, theyneed an open space that all members share. Solong as the task is highly structured and isfacilitated by a high rate of collaboration andinteraction, such groups do not need individ-ualized areas.

■ Clubs. Members who are talented, well trained,or possess very specialized skills often work ondiverse tasks and projects that vary greatly intheir collaborative demands. Their work spacemust be flexible, permitting them to collabo-rate as needed but also to secure privacy.

Duffy found that club offices tend to be themost productive, but he added that nearly all groupspaces must be changed to increase the fit betweenthe group and its tasks. Even the most carefullydesigned and implemented setting may fail, as thegroup and its tasks change, to meet members’ needsand so require revision.


SPACES : THE ECOLOGY

OF GROUPS

Ecology is the science of the interrelationship oforganisms and their habitats (Lawrence, 2002).Ecologists examine how organisms—whether theyare plant, animal, or microbe—interact with andadapt to other organisms in their environment andto the environment itself. Similarly, those whostudy the ecology of small groups explore howindividuals interact with and adapt to the grouphabitat. Just as frogs issue their croaks from theirfavorite places in the stream, and birds neatly spacethemselves along a telephone wire, so humans dis-play consistent patterns of spacing and seating whenimmersed in a group habitat.

Personal Space

Anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1966) argued thatmuch of our behavior is shaped by a “hiddendimension.” In Apollo 13, this dimension deter-mined where each astronaut sat as he carried outscheduled tasks; how crew members movedthrough the tunnel between the command moduleand the service module; where they positionedthemselves when they looked out the windows oftheir ship as it passed over the surface of the moon.What is this hidden dimension? Space.

People prefer to keep some space betweenthemselves and others. This personal space pro-vides a boundary that limits the amount of physicalcontact between people. This boundary extendsfarther in the front of the person than behind, butthe individual is always near the center of this in-visible buffer zone. Personal space is portable, but itis actively maintained and defended. When some-one violates our personal space, we tend to takesteps to correct this problem (Aiello, 1987). Theterm personal space is something of a misnomer, asthe process actually refers to distances that people

maintain between one another. Hence, it is aninterpersonal space (Patterson, 1975). Some peopleseem to require more space than others. Spatial pro-cesses operate across a broad range of people andsituations.

Interpersonal Zones Different group activitiesrequire different amounts of personal space. Hall,in describing these variations, proposed four typesof interpersonal zones (see Table 15.2). The intimatezone is appropriate only for the most involving andpersonal behaviors, such as arm wrestling and whis-pering. The personal zone, in contrast, is reserved fora wide range of small-group experiences, such asdiscussions with friends, interaction with acquain-tances, and conversation. More routine transactionsare conducted in the social zone. Meetings held overlarge desks, formal dining, and professional presen-tations to small groups generally take place in thiszone. The public zone is reserved for even moreformal meetings, such as stage presentations, lec-tures, or addresses.

Table 15.2 also adds a fifth zone to thosedescribed by Hall. In the years since Hall proposedhis taxonomy of interpersonal zones, groupshave begun to meet more frequently in the remotezone. Many groups now exist, in whole or in part,in a virtual environment. Instead of interactingface-to-face or even via voice communication,these groups use computer-based tools such asemail, chat rooms, social networking sites, andother multi-user support interfaces. The membersof these groups are not physically present witheach other, making online groups considerably dif-ferent—at least spatially—than face-to-face groups.The astronauts, for example, communicated withCOMCON from a distance—a great distance, infact. They used voice messages, in some cases, butthey were also in touch using communication tech-nologies that allowed them to send and receiveinformation via computers (see Focus 15.2).

Closer, smaller spaces are generally reserved forfriendlier, more intimate interpersonal activities. Asa result, cohesive groups tend to occupy smallerspaces than noncohesive gatherings (Evans &Howard, 1973); extraverted people maintain smaller

personal space The area that individuals maintainaround themselves into which others cannot intrudewithout arousing discomfort.

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distances from others than do introverted ones(Patterson & Sechrest, 1970); people who wish tocreate a friendly, positive impression usually choosesmaller distances than do less friendly people (Evans& Howard, 1973); and groups of friends tend tostand closer to one another than do groups of stran-gers (Edney & Grundmann, 1979). Physical distancehas little impact on remote groups, although indivi-duals communicating via computer respond differ-ently when their interface becomes informationallyricher by including voice and video information(Thurlow, Lengel, & Tomic, 2004).

Why does distance influence so many groupprocesses? One explanation, based on an equilib-rium model of communication, suggests thatpersonal space, body orientation, and eye contactdefine the level of intimacy of any interaction. If

group members feel that a low level of intimacy isappropriate, they may sit far apart, make little eyecontact, and assume a relatively formal posture. If,in contrast, the members are relaxing and discussingpersonal topics, they may move close together,make more eye contact, and adopt more relaxedpostures (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Patterson, 1996).By continually adjusting their nonverbal andverbal behavior, group members can keep the inti-macy of their interactions at the level they desire(Giles Wadleigh, 1999).

Men, Women, and Distance Would the amountof personal space maintained by the astronauts inApollo 13 have differed if they had been women?Probably, for studies suggest that women’s personalspaces tend to be smaller than men’s (Hayduk,1983). Relative to men, women allow others toget closer to them, and they approach other peoplemore closely. Men also tend to approach womenmore closely than other men. Women tend to takeup less space by sitting with their arms close to theirsides and by crossing their legs, whereas men claimmore space by assuming expansive, open positions

T A B L E 15.2 Types of Social Activities That Occur in Each Interpersonal Zone

Zone Distance Characteristics Typical Activities

Intimate Touching to18 inches

Sensory information concerning theother is detailed and diverse; stimulusperson dominates perceptual field

Sex, hugging, massage, comforting,jostling, handshakes, slow dancing

Personal 18 inches to4 feet

Other person can be touched ifdesired; gaze can be directed awayfrom the other person with ease

Conversations, discussion, car travel,viewing performances, watchingtelevision

Social 4 feet to 12 feet Visual inputs begin to dominate othersenses; voice levels are normal;appropriate distance for many infor-mal social gatherings

Dining, meeting with business col-leagues, interacting with a receptionist

Public 12 feet or more All sensory inputs are beginning tobecome less effective; voices mayrequire amplification; facial expres-sions unclear

Lectures, addresses, plays, dancerecitals

Remote Differentlocations

Primarily verbal inputs; facial andother behavioral and nonverbal cuesunavailable

Electronic discussions, conference calls,telephone voice mail, e-mail, onlinegaming communities

SOURCE: Adapted from E. T. Hall, 1966.

equilibrium model of communication An explana-tion of distancing behavior in interpersonal settings argu-ing that the amount of eye contact, the intimacy of thetopic influence the amount of personal space required byinteractants.


F o c u s 15.2 Is Cyberspace a Behavior Setting?

I have gotten to know my guildmates in our chatchannel so much better, to the point where I feel havemade new friends among people I barely knew before.

—Kwill, a player on EverQuest, a massivelymultiplayer online fantasy game

Times have changed since Roger Barker studied groupsinteracting in behavior settings and Edward Hall offeredup his theory of interpersonal distances. Neither re-searcher examined one particular type of setting for thesimple reason that it did not exist in their era: cyberspace.The groups they studied interacted in physical, geo-graphical spaces where group members encounteredone another in the same location. Online groups, incontrast to offline groups, meet in cyberspace; they relyon computer-based information technologies to createchannels of communication among individuals who donot occupy the same physical location.

When groups began to meet via computer,experts predicted one of two possible outcomes forthese groups. Some suggested that such groups wouldbe relatively uninvolving for members and their uniquelocale would prevent these gatherings from evenremotely resembling “real” groups. The Internet pro-vided a way to exchange ideas, opinions, and infor-mation, but online meetings were lower in socialpresence than face-to-face meetings; members did not“perceive (sense) the actual presence of the communi-cation participants and the consequent appreciation ofan interpersonal relationship” (Lowry et al., 2006, p.633). When group members interacted via computers,their nonverbal reactions, their personal characteristics,and even their identities remained unknown to others.The members of online groups could not touch oneanother, see what they were wearing, mingle togetherinformally, display nonverbal signs of boredom ormirth, or any of the other forms of connection thatwere possible when collocated.

Other experts, in contrast, expected online groupswould be unstructured, chaotic encounters, with manyindividuals using the anonymity of the online environ-ment to escape the usual constraints that govern more

traditional forms of interaction. Shielded from scrutiny,people would display more openly their emotions—which would likely be hostile ones in most cases, aspeople who disagreed with each other would “flame”one another.

Experience, however, proved both of these per-spectives wrong. Online groups, like any group, includemultiple individuals who are connected to one anotherby andwithin social relationships, so theymeet the basiccriteria for any group. Members often become very in-volved in such groups, and react negatively when theyare denied membership in such groups (cyberostracism,see Chapter 3). Individuals, evenwhen they interact onlyvia a computer network, come to develop strong affec-tive bonds with one another (Chapter 4)—although insome cases relationships that start online move offline.Online groups are structured groups, complete withnorms, roles, and intermember relations (Chapter 6).Members of online groups are as likely to conform asmembers of offline groups—indeed, they are moreconforming in some cases (Chapter 7). Online individualsreact with heightened productivity when joined byothers, and they usually brainstorm in much the sameway offline groups do (Chapter 10). Distributed teams(Chapter 12) are, in some cases, more productive thanare teams that meet frequently in face-to-face settings,and the same kinds of social identity processes seen inoffline groups influence actions of the members of on-line ones (Chapter 17). Groups on the web also lean tothe unselfish side, for they collaborate in open marketssuch as e-Bay, play together in onlinemultiplayer games,and share knowledge and information as contributorsto blogs and wikis.

Members of an online group do not interact inprecisely the same way as do members of a group thatmeet together face-to-face, but then again neither dogroups that occupy widely different physical environ-ments—a group in an office building will act differentlythan this same group walking on a golf course or sittingin a darkened movie theater. Cyberspace, it turns out, isjust another behavior setting where group memberscome together for interaction, influence, and action.

online group A group whose members communicatewith one another solely or primarily throughcomputer-based information technologies that createa virtual group experience regardless of the members’geographic locations.

offline group A group whose members interact withone another in face-to-face, collocated settings.social presence The degree to which individuals feelthat they are in the presence of another person.

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(Henley, 1995). The interactions between the menof Apollo 13 occurred almost exclusively in thepersonal zone, except when Lovell hugged theshivering Haise, who had become increasingly illduring the mission.

Status The type of relationship linking groupmembers plays a particularly significant role indetermining personal space (Hall, Coats, & LeBeau,2005). A study of U.S. Naval personnel, for example,found that subordinates needed more space whenconversing with superiors than when conversingwith peers (Dean, Willis, & Hewitt, 1975). Further-more, many studies suggest that when people are withfriends rather than with strangers or mere acquain-tances, their personal space needs become relativelysmall. This effect occurs in both same-sex andmixed-sex dyads, although the effect is more pro-nounced when women interact (Hayduk, 1983).

Culture Hall (1966) argued that cultures differ intheir use of space. People socialized in the contact cul-tures of theMediterranean, theMiddle East, and LatinAmerica prefer strong sensory involvement withothers, and so they seek direct social contact when-ever possible. In contrast, residents in such noncontactcultures as the United States, England, and Germanytry to limit their spatial openness with others. Giventhat the crew of Apollo 13 included only Americans,they shared similar norms about how much distanceshould be maintained. Crews on space stations, suchas Mir or Salyut, involve astronauts from differentcultural backgrounds, so misunderstandings causedby spatial confusions may be more common(Remland, Jones, & Brinkman, 1995). Culture alsoinfluences how people interact in the remote zone,for people with different cultural backgrounds varyin how much emotion, personal information, andresponsiveness to others they express when commu-nicating via the Internet (Reeder et al., 2004).

Reactions to Spatial Invasion

Individuals cannot always protect their personalspace from intrusion by others. In some cases, groupmembers may find themselves in places where the

available space is so limited that people cannot main-tain appropriate distances between one another. Inother instances, the group may have sufficient space,but for some reason, a member approaches so closelythat he or she seems “too close for comfort.”

How do group members react to such intru-sions? High density does not always lead to feelingsof crowding and other negative interpersonaloutcomes. Density refers to a characteristic of theenvironment—literally, the number of people perunit of space. Crowding, in contrast, refers to apsychological, experiential state that occurs whenpeople feel that they do not have enough space(Stokols, 1972, 1978). Although the density of agiven situation, such as a party, a rock concert, orApollo 13, may be very high, the interactants maynot feel crowded at all. Yet two people sitting in alarge room may still report that they feel crowded ifthey expected to be alone, are engaged in someprivate activity, or dislike each other intensely.Passengers on a train when density was low—therewere plenty of empty seats in the car—displayedthe negative effects of crowding (e.g., more nega-tive mood, evidence of stress, loss of motivation) ifothers were seated near them in their row (Evans &Wener, 2007).

Arousal and Stress Physiologically speaking,what happens to people when they find themselvesin high-density situations? In many cases, they be-come aroused—their heart rate and blood pressureincrease, they breathe faster, and they sometimesperspire more (Evans, 1979). This link between per-sonal space violations and arousal was confirmed in astudy of men using a public restroom (Middlemist,Knowles, & Matter, 1976). Reasoning that arousalwould lead to a general muscular contraction thatwould delay urination onset and reduce its duration,the researchers set up a situation in which men usingwall-mounted urinals were joined by a confederate

density The number of individuals per unit of space.crowding A psychological reaction that occurs whenindividuals feel that the amount of space available tothem is insufficient for their needs.


who used either the next receptacle (near condition) orone located farther down the wall ( far condition).When onset times and duration for men in the nearand far condition were compared with those sametimes for men in a no-confederate control condition,the researchers found that personal space invasionsignificantly increased general arousal.

This arousal is not always stressful, however. Ifthe intruder is a close friend, a relative, or an ex-tremely attractive stranger, closeness can be a plus(Willis, 1966). Similarly, if we believe that the otherperson needs help or is attempting to initiate a friendlyrelationship, we tend to react positively rather thannegatively (Murphy-Berman & Berman, 1978).These findings suggest that the label that individualsuse to interpret their arousal determines the conse-quences of crowding. If people attribute the arousalto others’ standing too close, then they will conclude,“I feel crowded.” If, in contrast, they explain thearousal in some other way—“I drank too much cof-fee,” “I’m in love,” “I’m afraid our ship will burn upin the atmosphere,” and so on—they will not feelcrowded.

Researchers tested this attributional model ofcrowding by seating five-person groups in chairsplaced either 20 inches apart or touching at thelegs. These researchers told the groups that an in-audible noise would be played in the room as theyworked on several tasks. They told some groupsthat the noise was detectable at the unconsciouslevel and would lead to stressful, discomforting ef-fects. They told other groups that the noise wouldhave relaxing and calming effects, or they gave noexplanation for the noise at all. The groups werenot actually exposed to any noise, but, crowdedgroups who thought that the noise would arousethem felt less crowded. Why? Because they attrib-uted the arousal caused by crowding to the sup-posed noise rather than to the proximity of otherpeople (Worchel & Yohai, 1979; see also Worchel& Teddlie, 1976).

Intensity Jonathan Freedman also argued thathigh-density situations are not always aversive situa-tions. His density–intensity hypothesis suggestedthat high density merely intensifies whatever is

already occurring in the group situation (Freedman,1975, 1979). If something in the situation makes thegroup interaction unpleasant, high density will makethe situation seem even more unpleasant. If the situa-tion is a very pleasant one, however, high density willmake the good situation even better. Freedman testedthis notion by placing groups of people in large orsmall rooms and then manipulating some aspect ofthe group interaction to create either unpleasantnessor pleasantness. In one investigation, groups of 6 to 10high school students sat on the floor of either a largeroom or a small room. Each delivered a speech andthen received feedback from the other group mem-bers. Freedmanmade certain that in some groups, thefeedback was always positive, whereas in othergroups, the feedback was always negative. Whenthe participants later rated the room and their group,Freedman discovered that crowding intensified theeffects of the feedback: People liked their group themost when they received positive feedback underhigh-density conditions, and they liked their groupthe least when they got negative feedback whencrowded. Furthermore, Freedman found that theseeffects were clearest for all-female groups as opposedto all-male or mixed-sex groups (see also Storms &Thomas, 1977).

Controllability Crowded situations are unset-tling because they undermine group members’ con-trol over their experiences. Crowded situationsbring people into contact with others they wouldprefer to avoid, and if working groups cannot copewith the constraints of their environment, theymay fail at their tasks. Group members can there-fore cope with crowding by increasing their senseof control over the situation. Just as a sense of highpersonal control helps people cope with a rangeof negative life events, including failure, divorce,illness, and accidents, people are less stressed byenvironmental threats when they feel they can

density–intensity hypothesis An explanation ofcrowding proposed by Jonathan Freedman, predictingthat high density makes unpleasant situations more un-pleasant but pleasant situations more pleasant.

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control their circumstances (Evans & Lepore, 1992;Rodin & Baum, 1978; Schmidt & Keating, 1979;Sherrod & Cohen, 1979).

Researchers tested the benefits of controllabilityby asking groups of six men towork on tasks in eithera small room or a large one. One task required par-ticipating in a 15-minute discussion of censorship,and the second involved blindfolding a memberand letting him wander about within a circle formedby the rest of the group. To manipulate control, oneof the participants was designated the coordinator; hewas responsible for organizing the group, dealingwith questions concerning procedures, and blind-folding members for the second task. A second par-ticipant, the terminator, was given control over endingthe discussion and regulating each member’s turn inthe center of the circle. Significantly, the two groupmembers who could control the group tasks throughcoordination or termination were not as bothered bythe high-density situation as the four groupmemberswho were given no control (Rodin, Solomon, &Metcalf, 1978).

Interference Crowding is particularly trouble-some when it interferes with the group’s work. TheApollo 13 crew, for example, did not react negativelyto their high-density living conditions so long as thecrowding did not undermine their group’s effective-ness. Difficulties only occurred when they needed tofix a problem—such as a hatch that would not secureproperly, where there was only enough room for oneperson to reach it. Similarly, studies that find no illeffects of crowding generally study groups workingon coaction problems that require little interaction.Studies that require the participants to complete in-teractive tasks, in contrast, tend to find negative effectsof crowding (e.g., Heller, Groff, & Solomon, 1977;Paulus et al., 1976).

Researchers demonstrated the importance of in-terference by deliberately manipulating both densityand interaction. All-male groups worked in either asmall laboratory room or in a large one collatingeight-page booklets. The order of the pages wasnot constant, however, but was determined by firstselecting a card that had the order of pages listed in arandom sequence. In the low-interaction condition,

each person had all eight stacks of pages and a setof sequence cards. In the high-interaction condition,the stacks were located at points around the room,so participants had to walk around the room in un-predictable patterns. In fact, the participants oftenbumped into one another while trying to movefrom one stack to another. The interference createdin the high-interaction condition led to decrementsin task performance—provided that density was high(Heller et al., 1977).

Seating Arrangements

At launch and during most key maneuvers, thethree Apollo 13 astronauts were seated side-by-side in front of the control panel, and the seat onthe left was reserved for the mission commander, orthe officer who was piloting the ship. As RobertSommer (1967) noted, seating arrangements play alarge role in creating a group’s ecology. Althoughoften unrecognized, or simply taken for granted,seating patterns influence interaction, communica-tion, and leadership in groups.

Seating Patterns and Social Interaction Groupsbehave very differently if their seating pattern is so-ciopetal rather than sociofugal. Sociopetal spacespromote interaction among group members byheightening eye contact, encouraging verbal com-munication, and facilitating the development of inti-macy. Sociofugal spaces, in contrast, discourageinteraction among group members and can evendrive participants out of the situation altogether. Asecluded booth in a quiet restaurant, a park bench, orfive chairs placed in a tight circle are sociopetal en-vironments, whereas classrooms organized in rows,movie theaters, waiting rooms, and airport waitingareas are sociofugal. Sommer concluded that air-port seating was deliberately designed to disrupt

sociopetal spaces Environmental settings that promoteinteraction among group members, including seating ar-rangements that facilitate conversation.sociofugal spaces Environmental settings that discour-age or prevent interaction among group members.


interaction. He noted that even people seated side byside on airport chairs cannot converse comfortably:

The chairs are either bolted together andarranged in rows theater-style facing theticket counters, or arranged back-to-back,and even if they face one another they are atsuchdistances that comfortable conversationis impossible. The motive for the sociofugalarrangement appears the same as that inhotels and other commercial places—todrive people out of the waiting areasinto cafés, bars, and shops where theywill spend money (Sommer, 1969,pp. 121–122).

Group members generally prefer sociopetalarrangements (Batchelor & Goethals, 1972; Giesen &McClaren, 1976). This preference, however, dependsin part on the type of task undertaken in the situation(Ryen &Kahn, 1975; Sommer, 1969). As Figure 15.4shows, Sommer found that corner-to-corner andface-to-face arrangements were preferred for conver-sation, and side-by-side seating was selected forcooperation. Competing pairs either took a direct,face-to-face orientation (apparently to stimulate com-petition) or tried to increase interpersonal distance,

whereas coacting pairs preferred arrangements thatinvolved a visual separation. As one student stated,such an arrangement “allows staring into space andnot into my neighbor’s face” (Sommer, 1969, p. 63).Similar choices were found with round tables.

Groups in sociopetal environments act differentlythan groups in sociofugal spaces. In one study, dyadswhose members sat facing each other seemed morerelaxed, but dyads whose members sat at a 90-degreeangle to each otherweremore affiliative (Mehrabian&Diamond, 1971). When researchers compared circleseating with L-shaped seating, the circle was associatedwith feelings of confinement but fostered greater inter-personal attraction (Patterson et al., 1979; Patterson,Roth, & Schenk, 1979). People seated in the L-shaped groups, on the other hand, engaged in moreself-manipulative behaviors and fidgeting, and theypaused more during group discussions. Overall, thepositive effects of the circle arrangement relative to theL-shaped arrangement were stronger in female groupsthan in male groups.

Men, Women, and Seating Preferences Womenand men diverge, to a degree, in their preferencesfor seating arrangements. Men prefer to positionthemselves across from those they like, and women

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prefer adjacent seating positions (Sommer, 1959).Conversely, men prefer that strangers sit by theirside, whereas women feel that strangers should sitacross from them. Researchers studied the confusionthat this difference can cause by sending confeder-ates to sit at the same table as solitary women andmen working in a library. After a brief and unevent-ful period, the confederate left. When a second re-searcher then asked the participant some questionsabout the confederate and the library, the research-ers discovered that men were the least favorably dis-posed toward the stranger who sat across from thembut that women reacted more negatively to thestranger who sat next to them (Fisher & Byrne,1975). Clearly, group members should be sensitiveto the possibility that their spatial behaviors will bemisinterpreted by others and should be willing tomake certain that any possible misunderstandingswill be short-lived.

Communication Patterns Bernard Steinzor’searly studies of face-to-face discussion groups indi-cated that spatial patterns also influence communi-cation rates in groups. Although at first he couldfind few significant relationships between seat loca-tion and participation in the discussion, one day,while watching a group, he noticed a participantchange his seat to sit opposite someone he had ar-gued with during the previous meeting. Inspired bythis chance observation, Steinzor (1950) reanalyzedhis findings and discovered that individuals tendedto speak after the person seated opposite themspoke. He reasoned that we have an easier timeobserving and listening to the statements of peoplewho are seated in a position central to our visualfield, so that their remarks serve as stronger stimulifor our own ideas and statements. The tendency formembers of a group to comment immediately afterthe person sitting opposite them is now termedthe Steinzor effect. The phenomenon appears tooccur primarily in leaderless discussion groups, forlater research has suggested that when a leader is

present group members direct more comments totheir closest neighbor (Hearne, 1957).

Head-of-the-Table Effect Where should theleader sit—at the head of the table or in one ofthe side chairs? With great consistency, leadersseek out the head of the table. Sommer (1969),for example, found that people appointed to leadsmall discussion groups tended to select seats at thehead of the table. Those who move to this positionof authority also tend to possess more dominantpersonalities (Hare & Bales, 1963), talk more fre-quently, and often exercise greater amounts of in-terpersonal influence (Strodtbeck & Hook, 1961).When people are shown pictures of groups withmembers seated around a rectangular table, whenasked to identify the likely leader they tend to settleon the person sitting at the head of the table(Jackson, Engstrom, & Emmers-Sommer, 2007).

Sommer suggested two basic explanations forthis intriguing head-of-the-table effect—perceptualprominence and the social meaning associated with sit-ting at the head of the table. Looking first at promi-nence, Sommer suggested that in many groups, thechair at the end of the table is themost salient positionin the group and that the occupant of this space cantherefore easily maintain greater amounts of eye con-tact with more of the group members, can move tothe center of the communication network, and (asthe Steinzor effect suggests) can comment more fre-quently. Moreover, inWestern cultures, where moststudies of leadership have been conducted, the chairat the head of the table is implicitly defined to be themost appropriate place for the leader to sit. Sommerwas careful to note that this norm may not hold inother societies, but in most Western cultures, leader-ship and the head of the table go together.

Both factors play a role in the head-of-the-tableeffect. Investigators manipulated salience by having

Steinzor effect The tendency for members of a groupto comment immediately after the person sitting oppositethem.

head-of-the-table effect The tendency for group mem-bers to associate the leadership role and its responsibili-ties with the seat located at the head of the table; as aresult, individuals who occupy such positions tend toemerge as leaders in groups without designated leaders.


two persons sit on one side of the table and three onthe other side. Although no one sat in the end seat,those seated on the two-person side of the tablecould maintain eye contact with three of the groupmembers, but those on the three-person side couldfocus their attention on only two members.Therefore, group members on the two-person sideshould be able to influence others more and hence bethe more likely leaders. As predicted, 70% of theleaders came from the two-person side, and only30% came from the three-person side (Howells &Becker, 1962).

In another study, the tendency for people toautomatically associate the head of the table withleadership was examined by arranging for confeder-ates to voluntarily choose or be assigned to the endposition or to some other position around a table(Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974). These confederatesthen went about systematically disagreeing with themajority of the group members on the topic underdiscussion, and the extent to which the participantsaltered their opinions to agree with the deviant wasassessed. Interestingly, the deviants succeeded ininfluencing the others only when they had freelychosen to sit in the head chair. Apparently, disagree-ing group members sitting at the “side” locationsaround the table were viewed as “deviants,” whereasthose who had the confidence to select the end chairwere viewed more as “leaders” (Riess, 1982; Riess &Rosenfeld, 1980).

LOCAT IONS : GROUP

TERR ITOR IAL ITY

When Lovell, Swigert, and Haise entered theApollo 13 spaceship for their mission, they entereda cylinder filled with computers, controls, equip-ment, and supplies. But within days, this physicalspace was transformed into the group’s territory.The men stowed personal gear in their lockers.The controls over which they had primary responsi-bility became “their controls,” and they were warywhen any of the other crew members would carryout procedures in their area. Haise, more so than

either Lovell and Swigert, became attached toAquarius, the lunar excursion module. When thetime came to jettison the module prior to their de-scent, Haise collected small objects as momentos,and mission control remarked, “Farewell, Aquarius,and we thank you” (Lovell & Kluger, 1994, p. 329).

Like so many animals—birds, wolves, lions,seals, geese, and even seahorses—human beings de-velop proprietary orientations toward certain geo-graphical locations and defend these areas againstintrusion by others. A person’s home, a preferredseat in a classroom, a clubhouse, a football field, andAquarius are all territories—specific areas that anindividual or group claims, marks, and defendsagainst intrusion by others.

When people establish a territory, they generallytry to control who is permitted access. As IrwinAltman noted, however, the degree of control de-pends on the type of territory (see Table 15.3).Control is highest for primary territories—areas thatare maintained and “used exclusively by individualsor groups . . . on a relatively permanent basis”(Altman, 1975, p. 112). People develop strong placeattachments to these areas, for they feel safe, secure,and comfortable when in them (Hernández et al.,2007). Individuals maintain only a moderate amountof control over their secondary territories. These areasare not owned by the group members, but becausethemembers use such an area regularly, they come toconsider it “theirs.” College students, for example,often become very territorial about their seats in aclass (Haber, 1980, 1982). Control over public territo-ries is even more limited. Occupants can prevent in-trusion while they are physically present, but theyrelinquish all claims when they leave. A bathroomstall or a spot on the beach can be claimed whenoccupied, but when the occupant leaves, anotherperson can step in and claim the space. (Brown,1987, thoroughly reviewed much of the work onhuman territoriality.)

territory A specific geographic area that individuals orgroups of individuals claim, mark, and defend against in-trusion by others.

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Group Territories

Territoriality is, in many cases, a group-level pro-cess. Instead of an individual claiming an area anddefending it against other individuals, a group willlay claim to its turf and prevent other groups fromusing it. South American howler monkeys, forexample, live together in bands of up to 20 indivi-duals, and these groups forage within a fairly well-defined region. The bands themselves are cohesiveand free of internal strife, but when another groupof howlers is encountered during the day’s wander-ing, a fight begins. Among howlers, this territorialdefense takes the form of a “shouting match,” inwhich the members of the two bands simply howlat the opposing group until one band—usuallythe invading band—retreats. Boundaries are rarelyviolated, because each morning and night, themonkeys raise their voices in a communal and far-carrying howling session (Carpenter, 1958).

Human groups have also been known to territori-alize areas. Classic sociological analyses of gangs, for ex-ample, often highlighted the tendency for youngmen to join forces in defense of a few city blocks thatthey considered to be their turf (Thrasher, 1927;Whyte, 1943; Yablonsky, 1962). Many gangs tooktheir names from a street or park located at the verycore of their claimed sphere of influence and sought

to control areas around this base.Contemporary gangs,despite changes in size, violence, and involvement incrime, continue to be rooted to specific locations.Gangs in San Diego, California, for example, can betraced to specific geographical origins: the Red Stepsand the Crips to Logan Heights and the Sidros to SanYsidro (Sanders, 1994).

Gangs mark their territories through the place-ment of graffiti, or “tags,” and also attack intruders.Philadelphia researchers found that the number ofgraffiti mentioning the local gang’s name increasedas one moved closer and closer to the gang’s homebase, suggesting that the graffiti served as territorialmarkers, warning intruders of the dangers of en-croachment. This marking, however, was not en-tirely successful, for neighboring gangs wouldoccasionally invade a rival’s territory to spray-painttheir own names over the territorial markers of thehome gang or, at least, to append a choice obscen-ity. In fact, the frequency of graffiti attributable tooutside groups provided an index of group powerand prestige, for the more graffiti written by oppos-ing gangs in one’s territory, the weaker was thehome gang (Ley & Cybriwsky, 1974).

Human groups also maintain secondary andpublic territories. People at the beach, for example,generally stake out their claim by using beach towels,coolers, chairs, and other personal objects (Edney &

T A B L E 15.3 Three Types of Territories Established and Protected by Individuals and Groups

Type Degree of Control Duration of Claim Examples

Primary High: Occupants controlaccess and are very likely toactively defend this space.

Long-term: Individuals main-tain control over the space ona relatively permanent basis;owner ship is often involved.

A family’s house, a bedroom,a clubhouse, a dorm room, astudy

Secondary Moderate: Individuals whohabitually use a spacecome to consider it “theirs.”Reaction to intrusions ismilder.

Temporary but recurrent:Others may use the space, butmust vacate the area if theusual occupant requests.

A table in a bar, a seat in aclassroom, a regularly usedparking space, the sidewalk infront of your home

Public Low: Although the occupantmay prevent intrusion whilepresent, no expectation offuture use exists.

None: The individual or groupuses the space only on themost temporary basis andleaves behind no markers.

Elevator, beach, public tele-phone, playground, park, bath-room stall, restaurant counter

SOURCE: The Environment and Social Behavior by Irving Altman, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1976.


Jordan-Edney, 1974). These temporary territoriestend to be circular, and larger groups command big-ger territories than smaller groups. Groups also createterritories when they interact in public places, for inmost cases, nonmembers are reluctant to breakthrough group boundaries. Just as individuals areprotected from unwanted social contact by their in-visible bubble of personal space, so groups seem tobe surrounded by a sort of “shell” or “membrane”that forms an invisible boundary for group interac-tion. Various labels have been used to describe thispublic territory, including group space (Edney &Grundmann, 1979; Minami & Tanaka, 1995), inter-actional territory (Lyman & Scott, 1967), temporarygroup territory (Edney & Jordan-Edney, 1974), jurisdic-tion (Roos, 1968), and group personal space (Altman,1975). No matter what this boundary is called, theevidence indicates that it often effectively serves torepel intruders.

Eric Knowles examined the impermeability ofgroups by placing two or four confederates in a hall-way (Knowles, 1973). Participants who wished tomove through this space were forced either towalk between the interactants or to squeeze throughthe approximately two-foot space between thegroup and the hallway wall. Knowles found that75% of the passersby chose to avoid walkingthrough the group, but this figure dropped to about25% in a control condition in which the interactingindividuals were replaced by waste barrels. Knowlesand his colleagues (Knowles et al., 1976) also discov-ered that when passing by an alcove that was occu-pied by a group, people would shift their path toincrease the distance between themselves and thegroup. People begin invading a group’s public terri-tory only if the distance between interactants be-comes large (Cheyne & Efran, 1972) or if the groupis perceived as a crowd rather than as a single entity(Knowles & Bassett, 1976). Furthermore, mixed-sex groups whose members are conversing withone another seem to have stronger boundaries

(Cheyne & Efran, 1972), as do groups whose mem-bers are exhibiting strong emotions (Lindskold et al.,1976).

Benefits of Territories Studies of territoriality inprisons (Glaser, 1964), naval ships (Heffron, 1972;Roos, 1968), neighborhoods (Newman, 1972), anddormitories (Baum & Valins, 1977) have suggestedthat people feel far more comfortable when theirgroups can territorialize their living areas. For exam-ple, Andrew Baum, Stuart Valins, and their associatesconfirmed the benefits of territories in their studies ofcollege students who were randomly assigned to oneof two types of dormitories. Some students lived in atraditionally designed, corridor-style dorm, whichfeatured 17 double-occupancy rooms per floor.These residents could only claim the bedroomsthey shared with their roommates as their territories.In contrast, students who lived in suite-style dormscontrolled a fairly well-defined territory that in-cluded a private space shared with a roommate aswell as a bathroom and lounge shared with severalsuitemates (Baum & Davis, 1980; Baum, Davis, &Valins, 1979; Baum, Harpin, & Valins, 1975).

Even though nearly equal numbers of indivi-duals lived on any floor in the two types of designs,students in the corridor-style dormitories reportedfeeling more crowded, complained of their inabilityto control their social interactions with others, andemphasized their unfulfilled needs for privacy.Suite-style dorm residents, on the other hand, de-veloped deeper friendships with their suitemates,worked with one another more effectively, andeven seemed more sociable when interacting withpeople outside the dormitory. Baum and Valinsconcluded that these differences stemmed from thecorridor-style dorm residents’ inability to territori-alize areas that they had to use repeatedly.

Territories and Intergroup Conflict Territoriestend to reduce conflict between groups, since theyorganize and regulate intergroup contact by isolatingone group from another. Even in the absence ofopen conflict between groups, members tend to re-main within their group’s territories and avoid tres-passing into other areas. Consider, for example, the

group space A temporary spatial boundary that formsaround interacting groups and serves as a barrier to un-wanted intrusion by nonmembers.

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distribution of people in a cafeteria of a publicuniversity in the United Kingdom. When researchersstudied, over the course of twoweeks, where studentssat for their meals they discovered thatWhite studentstended to sit in one area of the cafeteria, but that Asianstudents tended to sit in a different area. As Figure 15.5indicates, some members of one racial group movedacross territorial lines, but for the most part studentsin this desegregated school tended to resegregatethemselves by forming territories based on theirrace (Clack, Dixon, & Tredoux, 2005).

Group members often feel more comfortablewhen they can establish a territory for their group,

but territoriality can cause conflict if the groups donot agree on their borders. All kinds of intergroupconflicts—from disputes between neighbors, todrive-by gang shootings, to civil wars, to wars be-tween nations—are rooted in disputes over territo-ries (Ardry, 1970). Such conflicts may be based onancient group traditions. Because most human cul-tures harvest the animals and plants from the landaround them, they establish control over certaingeographical areas (Altman & Chemers, 1980).Territories also are defended for symbolic reasons.A group’s power is often defined by the quality andsize of the space it controls, so groups protect their

Kitchen

A

B

C

D

E

F

Serving Area

Doorway

F I G U R E 15.5 Group territories based on race differences in a cafeteria. The white dots indicate Whitestudents, the dark dots Asian students, and the triangles students from other racial categories.

SOURCE: B. Clack, J. Dixon, & C. Tredoux, 2005. “Eating together apart: Patterns of segregation in a multi-ethnic cafeteria.” Journal of Communityand Applied Social Psychology, 15, 1–16. Copyright 2004 John Wiley and Sons.


turf as a means of protecting their reputations. Anurban gang, for example, must be ready to attackintruding gangs because “a gang cannot lay any legit-imate claim to public areas otherwise” (Sanders,1994, p. 18). Most drive-by shootings are territorialdisputes, occurring when the members of one gangdeliberately enter an area controlled by a rivalgang and shoot a member of that gang. Disputesover territories are often one-sided, however, forgroups that are defending their territory usuallytriumph over groups that are invading territories(see Focus 15.3).

Territoriality Within Groups

Territoriality also operates at the level of each indi-vidual in the group. Although members develop at-tachment to the group’s space, they also developspatial attachments to specific areas within the groupspace (Moser & Uzzell, 2003). Such individual territo-ries—a bedroom, a cubicle at work, a park bench noone else knows about, or one’s car—can help groupmembers maintain their privacy by providing themwith a means of reducing contact with others (Fraineet al., 2007). As Altman (1975) noted, depending onthe situation, people prefer a certain amount of con-tact with others, and interaction in excess of this levelproduces feelings of crowding and invasion of pri-vacy. The student in the classroom who is distractedby a jabbering neighbor, employees who are unableto concentrate on their jobs because of their noisyofficemates’ antics, and the wife who cannot enjoyreading a novel because her husband is playing hismusic too loudly are all receiving excessive inputsfrom another group member. If they moderatedtheir accessibility by successfully establishing and reg-ulating a territorial boundary, they could achieve amore satisfying balance between contact with othersand solitude.

Territories also work as organizers of groupmembers’ relationships (Edney, 1976). Once weknow the location of others’ territories, we canfind or avoid them with greater success. Further-more, becausewe often grow to like peoplewe inter-act with on a regular basis, people with contiguous

territories tend to like one another (Moreland, 1987).Territories also work to regularize certain groupactivities. Students must return to a classroom regu-larly, but they do not spend time searching for anavailable seat each class session because they tend toreturn to the same seat over and over again. Finally,territories define what belongs to whom; without asense of territory, the concept of stealing would bedifficult to define, because one could not be certainthat the objects carried off actually belonged tosomeone else.

Territories also help individual group membersdefine and express a sense of personal identity. Officewalls often display posters, diplomas, crude drawingsproduced by small children, pictures of loved ones,or little signs with trite slogans, even when companyregulations specifically forbid such personalizingmarkings. Although such decorations may seem in-significant to the chance visitor, to the occupant ofthe space, they have personal meaning and help turna drab, barren environment into home.

Researchers studied personal territories byphotographing the walls over the beds of studentsliving in campus dormitories. As an incidental find-ing, they discovered that most of the decorationson these walls fit into one of the categories listed inTable 15.4. They also found that students who even-tually dropped out of school seemed to mark theirwalls more extensively—particularly in the catego-ries of personal relations andmusic and theater—thanstudents who stayed in school. Although “stay-ins”used fewer markers, their decorations revealedgreater diversity, cutting across several categories.Whereas a dropout’s wall would feature dozens ofskiing posters or high school memorabilia, the stay-in’s decorations might include syllabi, posters, wallhangings, plants, and family photos. The researchersconcluded that the wall decorations of dropouts“reflected less imagination or diversity of interestsand an absence of commitment to the new universityenvironment” (Hansen &Altman, 1976; Vinsel et al.,1980, p. 1114).

Territory and Status The size and quality of indi-viduals’ territories within a group often indicates theirsocial status within the group. In undifferentiated

466 CHAPTER 15

F o c u s 15.3 The Home Advantage: Real or Myth?

We didn’t rally them there. We never went looking fortrouble. We only rallied on our own street, but wealways won there.

—Doc, leader of the Nortons (quoted inWhyte, 1943, p. 51)

When individuals and groups establish a proprietaryclaim to a place, they usually strive to control who isallowed to enter. Nations patrol their borders to makecertain that people from neighboring countries cannotenter the country easily. Neighborhood associationserect fences and gates to keep others out. Whenfamilies move into a new home or apartment, theyoften install locks and elaborate burglar alarms toprevent intrusions by nonmembers. Students who findsomeone sitting in their usual chair will ask theintruder to leave (Haber, 1980).

These territorial disputes, curiously enough, mostoften end with the defender of the territory van-quishing the intruder—the home advantage. Casestudies of street gangs, for example, find that defend-ing groups usually succeed in repelling invadinggroups, apparently because they are more familiarwith the physical layout of the area and have access tonecessary resources (W. F. Whyte, 1943). One memberof the Nortons, a street gang discussed in Chapter 2,explained that his group never lost a fight (“rally”) solong as it took place on the group’s turf:

Individuals, too, are often more assertive whenthey are within their own territorial confines ratherthan encroaching on others’ turf. College studentsworking with another student on a cooperative taskspent more time talking, felt more “resistant to con-trol,” and were more likely to express their own opin-ions when they were in their own room rather thanin their partner’s room (Conroy & Sundstrom, 1977;Edney, 1975; Taylor & Lanni, 1981). Individuals andgroups seem to gain strength and resolve when thedispute takes place on their home territory, even ifthey are encountering an opponent who is physicallystronger or more socially dominant.

This home advantage also influences the out-come of sporting events, for the home team is morefrequently the victor than the loser (Schlenker et al.,1995a). When a basketball team must travel to therival team’s home court to play, they often makemore errors, score fewer points, and end up the losersrather than the winners of the contest (Schwartz &Barsky, 1977). This advantage becomes even greaterwhen the visiting team must travel longer distancesand when the fans watching the game support thehome team and jeer the opponent (Courneya &Carron, 1991; Greer, 1983). Playing at home, however,can become something of a disadvantage in rarecircumstances. When athletes play must-win gameson their home field and they fear that they willfail, the pressure to win may become too great.And when a team is playing a series of games andit loses an early game at home, it may lose itshome advantage to the emboldened adversary.Overall, however, groups tend to win at home (formore details, see Baumeister, 1984, 1985, 1995;Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Schlenker et al., 1995a,1995b).

home advantage The tendency for individuals and groups to gain an advantage over others when interacting intheir home territory.




societies, people rarely divide up space into“yours,” “mine,” and “ours.” The Basarawa ofAfrica, for example, do not make distinctions be-tween people on the basis of age, sex, or prestige.Nor do they establish primary territories or buildpermanent structures (Kent, 1991). But stratifiedsocieties with leaders, status hierarchies, and classesare territorial. Moreover, the size and quality ofthe territories held by individuals tend to corre-spond to their status within society. The politicaland social elite in the community live in large, finehomes rather than small, run-down shacks(Cherulnik & Wilderman, 1986). Executives withlarge offices hold a higher, more prestigious posi-tion in the company than executives with smalloffices (Durand, 1977). Prison inmates who con-trol the most desirable portions of the exercise yardenjoy higher status than individuals who cannotestablish a territory (Esser, 1973). As one informalobserver has noted, in many large corporations, theentire top floor of a company’s headquarters is re-served for the offices of the upper echelon execu-tives and can only be reached by a private elevator(Korda, 1975). Furthermore, within this executivearea, offices swell in size and become more lavishlydecorated as the occupant’s position in the company

increases. Substantiating these informal observa-tions, a study of a large chemical company headquar-ters, a university, and a government agency found aclear link between office size and status (Durand,1977). The correlation between size of territoryand position in each group’s organization chart was.81 for the company, .79 for the government agency,and .29 for the university.

The link between territory and dominance insmall groups tends to be more variable. Severalstudies have suggested that territory size increasesas status increases (Sundstrom & Altman, 1974).Other studies, however, indicated that territorysize seems to decrease as status in the group in-creases (Esser, 1968; Esser et al., 1965). EricSundstrom and Irwin Altman (1974) suggestedthat these contradictory results occur because terri-torial boundaries are more fluid in small groups. Inone study that they conducted at a boys’ rehabilita-tion center, they asked each participant to rank theother boys in terms of ability to influence others.Also, an observer regularly passed through the resi-dence bedrooms, lounge, TV area, and bathroomsand recorded territorial behaviors. The boys evalu-ated each area to determine which territories weremore desirable than others.

T A B L E 15.4 Displays and Decorations Used by Students to Mark Personal Territoriesin Dorm Rooms

Category Examples of Markers and Identifiers

Entertainment orequipment

Bicycles, skis, radios, stereos, climbing gear, tennis rackets, computers, phones

Personal relations Pictures of friends and family, flowers, photographs of vacations, letters, drawings by siblings

Values Religious or political posters, bumper stickers, ecology signs, flags, sorority signs

Abstract Prints or posters of flowers, landscapes, art reproductions, cartoons

Reference items Schedules, syllabi, calendars, maps

Music or theater Posters of ballet, pictures of rock groups, theater posters

Sports Ski posters, pictures of athletes, motorcycle races, magazine covers, hiking posters

Idiosyncratic Handmade items (wall hangings, paintings), plants, unique items (e.g., stolen road signs),animal skins, stuffed animals

SOURCE: “Privacy Regulation, Territorial Displays, and Effectiveness of Individual Functioning” by A. Vinsel, B. B. Brown, I. Altman, and C. Foss, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1980, 1104–1115. Copyright 1980 by the American Psychological Association.

468 CHAPTER 15

Sundstrom and Altman found evidence of theterritory–dominance relation, but the strength ofthis relation varied over time. During the first phaseof the project, the high-status boys maintained clearcontrol over more desirable areas, but when two ofthe most dominant boys were removed from thegroup, the remaining boys competed with one an-other for both status and space. In time the grouphad quieted back down, although certain highlydominant members continued to be disruptive.When formal observations ended the group’s terri-torial structures were once more beginning tostabilize with higher status members controllingthe more desirable areas.

These findings suggest that dominance–territoryrelations, like most group processes, are dynamic. Inmany small groups, the higher-status members possesslarger and more aesthetically pleasing territories, butchaotic intermember relations or abrupt changes inmembership can create discontinuities in territorialbehavior. Moreover, the hostility that surfaced in thegroup when spatial claims were disputed suggests thatterritories can work as tension reducers by clarifyingthe nature of the social situation and increasing oppor-tunities for maintaining privacy.

Territory and Stress in Extreme and UnusualEnvironments Groups often find themselves inan EUE—an Extreme and Unusual Environment(Suedfeld & Steel, 2000). During the InternationalGeophysical Year (1957–1958), for example, sev-eral countries sent small groups of military and ci-vilian personnel to outposts in Antarctica. Thesegroups were responsible for collecting various dataconcerning that largely unknown continent, butthe violent weather forced the staff to remain in-doors most of the time. Equipment malfunctionedregularly, radio contact was limited, and water ra-tioning restricted bathing and laundering. Asmonths went by and these conditions continued,interpersonal friction frequently surfaced, and thegroup members found themselves arguing overtrivial issues. The members summarized their groupmalaise with the term antarcticitis—lethargy, lowmorale, grouchiness, and boredom brought on by

their unique living conditions (Gunderson, 1973;see also Carrere & Evans, 1994; Stuster, 1996).

These Antarctic groups are by no means unique,for accounts of sailors confined in submarines(Weybrew, 1963), divers living in SEALAB(Helmreich, 1974; Radloff & Helmreich, 1968), astro-nauts in a spacecraft (Sandal et al., 1996),work teams onlarge naval ships (Luria, 1990), and crews on space sta-tions (Stuster, 1996) have reported evidence of stressproduced by EUEs. Although technological innova-tions make survival in even the most hostile environ-ments possible, groups living in these space-age settingsmust learn to cope with age-old problems of interper-sonal adjustment. Leadersmustmake certain that groupmembers remain active and busy, and conflicts must behandled quickly and decisively. Groups that achievehigh levels of teamwork tend to be more successfulthan ones with rigid, traditional hierarchies. Attentionto spatial concerns, however, is critical also, for groupsthat develop individual and group territories tend toprosper, whereas those that fail to territorialize theirspaces founder (Harrison, Clearwater, & McKay,1991; Harrison & Connors, 1984; Leon, 1991;Palinkas, 1991).

Irwin Altman and his colleagues at the NavalMedical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland,studied territoriality in EUEs by confining pairs ofvolunteers to a 12-by-12-foot room equipped withbeds, a toilet cabinet, and a table and chairs (seeAltman, 1973, 1977). The groups worked for sev-eral hours each day at various tasks, but were left toamuse themselves with card games and reading therest of the time. The men in the isolation conditionnever left their room during the 10 days of theexperiment; matched pairs in a control conditionwere permitted to eat their meals at the base messand sleep in their regular barracks.

The members of isolated groups quicklyclaimed particular bunks as theirs. Furthermore,this territorial behavior increased as the experimentprogressed, with the isolated pairs extending theirterritories to include specific chairs and certain po-sitions around the table. Not all of the groups,however, benefited by establishing territories. Insome of the groups, territories structured the groupdynamics and eased the stress of the situation, but in


other dyads, these territories worked as barricades tosocial interaction and exacerbated the strain ofisolation. Overall, withdrawal and time spent sleep-ing increased across the 10 days of the study,whereas time spent in social interaction decreased.Other measures revealed worsened task perfor-mance and heightened interpersonal conflicts, anx-iety, and emotionality for isolates who drew a“psychological and spatial ‘cocoon’ around them-selves, gradually doing more things alone andin their own part of the room” (Altman &Haythorn, 1967, p. 174).

Altman and his colleagues followed up theseprovocative findings in a second experiment by ma-nipulating three aspects of the group environment:(1) availability of privacy (half of the groups lived andworked in a single room; the remaining groups hadsmall adjoining rooms for sleeping, napping, reading,etc.); (2) expected duration of the isolation (pairs ex-pected the study to last either 4 days or 20 days); and(3) amount of communication with the outsideworld. Although the study was to last for eight daysfor all the pairs, more than half terminated their par-ticipation early. Altman explained this high attritionrate by suggesting that the aborting groups tended to“misread the demands of the situation and did notundertake effective group formation processes nec-essary to cope with the situation” (1973, p. 249). Onthe first day of the study, these men tended to keep tothemselves, never bothering to work out any plansfor coping with what would become a stressful situa-tion. Then, as the study wore on, they reacted toincreased stress by significantly strengthening theirterritorial behavior, laying increased claim to partic-ular areas of the room. They also began spendingmore time in their beds, but they seemed simulta-neously to be increasingly restless. Access to a privateroom and an expectation of prolonged isolation onlyadded to the stress of the situation and created addi-tional withdrawal, maladaptation, and eventual ter-mination (Altman, Taylor, & Wheeler, 1971).

Groups that lasted the entire eight days seemedto use territoriality to their advantage in structuringtheir isolation. On the first day, they defined theirterritories, set up schedules of activities, and agreedon their plan of action for getting through the

study. Furthermore, the successful groups tendedto relax territorial restraints in the later stages ofthe project, thereby displaying a greater degree ofpositive interaction. As Altman (1977) described,

The epitome of a successful group was onein which the members, on the first orsecond day, laid out an eating, exercise,and recreation schedule; constructed adeck of playing cards, a chess set, and aMonopoly game out of paper. (p. 310)

The men who adapted “decided how theywould structure their lives over the expected lengthyperiod of isolation” (Altman, 1977, p. 310). Althoughterritorial behavior worked to the benefit of some ofthe groups, the last-minute attempts of some of thefaltering groups to organize their spatial relationsfailed to improve their inadequate adaptation to theisolation.

Groups in Context: Beyond Apollo 13

The Apollo 13 astronauts were not the first groupto face difficult environmental circumstances. Forcenturies, explorers have hiked, sailed, flown, andridden from their homes to distant lands and places,and many of these groups have endured very longperiods of isolation in harsh climates. Sir ErnestShackleton and the crew of Endurance survived thedestruction of their ship on an ice floe in theAntarctic. Fridtjof Nansen and Hjalmar Johansenspent nine months in a hut in the Arctic. Teamsof divers have lived for weeks on end inSEALAB, 200 feet beneath the ocean’s surface.NASA’s crews have endured months in space, andplans are being made for a three-year voyage toMars (Bechtel, 2002; Stuster, 1996).

These groups survived and achieved their goalsbecause they did not underestimate the impact of theenvironment. Whereas harsh environments and cir-cumstances overwhelm lone individuals, groups arecapable of overcoming the limiting conditions cre-ated by these environmental stressors. Some groupsmay not survive in a hostile environment, but othersrespond to stress by becoming better groups—moreorganized, more cohesive, and more efficient.

470 CHAPTER 15

Certainly these groups experience conflicts, andsome degenerate as members continually squabbleover insignificant matters. But many groups notonly persevere in these adverse circumstances; theyfind the experience to be exhilarating. Groups likeApollo 13 and the Shackleton explorers have faceddisaster, death, and ruin at each turn, yet their

autobiographical accounts of their experiences speakeloquently about their adventures—which they donot regret, but instead describe as “a cherished andimportant part of their life, perceived as an impetusto growing, strengthening, and deepening, to be re-membered with pride and enjoyment” (Suedfeld &Steel, 2000, p. 229).

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

How does the social and physical environment influencegroups and their dynamics?

1. An environmental approach recognizes thatindividuals and their groups are embedded in aphysical and social setting, and that the char-acteristics of that setting can substantially in-fluence group dynamics.

2. Physical settings (ambience) are often said tocreate a distinctive cognitive and emotionalreaction in people.

■ Affective reactions to environments rangealong two dimensions: pleasure–displeasure and activation-deactivation.

■ People generally prefer positive, stimulat-ing environments, but excessive stimula-tion can lead to overload.

3. Features of the environment, such as extremesin temperature and noise, information over-load, and dangerousness, can engender stress ingroups and undermine performance.

■ High temperatures are linked to loss ofattention as well as a number of otherunpleasant consequences, including dis-comfort, aggression, and reduced produc-tivity. Extremes in heat and cold are alsophysically hazardous.

■ Group members can cope with exposureto noise for a short duration, butprolonged exposure is associated withpsychological and physical difficulties.

■ Groups that must live or work in danger-ous settings adapt by improving commu-nication and teamwork. Groups that donot emphasize a team approach in suchenvironments, such as the 1996 expedi-tions to Mount Everest, are less likely toescape such situations unharmed.

4. Barker, after studying many groups in theirnatural locations, concluded that most behavioris determined by the behavior setting in which itoccurs.

■ The boundaries, components, and pro-grams of such settings define the functionsof the situation and the type of behaviorsperformed in it.

■ Behavior settings that lack synomorphy areinefficient and distressing.

■ Staffing theory, developed by Wicker, de-scribes the causes and consequences ofunderstaffing and overstaffing.

5. Some groupswork and interact in spaces that needto be redesigned to maximize the fit between thepeople and the place. Duffy suggests that the kindof space needed by a group will depend on thetype of task the group must accomplish.

What is the ecology of a group?

1. Researchers who study the ecology of smallgroups explore how individuals interact withand adapt to the group habitat.


2. Studies of personal space suggest that groupmembers prefer to keep a certain distancebetween themselves and others.

■ Closer distances are associated with greaterintimacy, so space requirements tend toincrease as the situation becomes less inti-mate. The four zones described by Hall arethe intimate, personal, social, and public.

■ Online groups meet in the remote zone.Despite their unusual features—particularlytheir lower level of social presence—membersof online groups display dynamics that aresimilar to those of offline groups.

■ The equilibrium model of communication pre-dicts that individuals will moderate theirdistances to achieve the desired level ofintimacy, but researchers have also foundthat variations in space are linked to thegender, status, and cultural background ofthe interactants.

3. Density describes the number of people per unitof space, whereas crowding is a psychologicalreaction to high physical density.

4. Crowding is exacerbated by a number of fac-tors, including cognitive processes that promptindividuals to make attributions about thecauses of their arousal, group members’ overallevaluation of the high-density setting(Freedman’s density–intensity hypothesis), per-ceptions of control, and the degree to whichothers interfere with task performance.

5. Sommer found that seating arrangements makeup an important part of the ecology of smallgroups. Sociopetal spaces tend to encourageinteraction, whereas sociofugal patterns discour-age interaction. People generally preferinteraction-promoting, sociopetal patterns, butthese preferences vary with the type of taskbeing attempted and the gender of theinteractants.

6. Seating arrangements significantly influencepatterns of attraction, communication, and

leadership. For example, in many groups, in-dividuals tend to speak immediately after theperson seated opposite them (the Steinzoreffect), and leadership is closely associated withsitting at the end of the table (the head-of-the-table effect).

What are the causes and consequences of a group’s ten-dency to establish territories?

1. Like many other animals, humans establish ter-ritories—geographical locations that an individ-ual or group defends against intrusion byothers.

2. Altman distinguished between primary territo-ries, secondary territories, and public territories.

■ Various groups, including gangs, territori-alize areas; they prevent nongroup mem-bers from entering them and they markthem in various ways.

■ Studies of group space suggest that, likeindividuals and their personal space, groupsare surrounded by an interaction boundarythat prevents nongroup members fromapproaching too closely.

■ Individuals feel more comfortable whentheir groups can territorialize their livingareas. Territories promote adjustment andreduce stress, but they also promote inter-group conflict, as in the case of gang-related territoriality.

■ Groups with a home advantage tend tooutperform groups that are outside theirterritories.

3. Individual members of the group establish theirown personal territories within the group’sterritory.

■ Personal territories fulfill privacy, organiz-ing, and identity functions for individualmembers. Territorial markings, for example,are associated with membership stability.

■ Higher-status individuals generally controllarger and more desirable territories;

472 CHAPTER 15

changes in status hierarchies can disrupt theallocation of territory.

4. A group’s capacity to adapt and even thrive inextreme and unusual environments (EUEs)

depends on its members’ judicious manage-ment of the environment, including territories.


Chapter Case: Apollo 13■ Apollo 13: The NASA Mission Reports, edited by

Robert Godwin (2000), provides completedocumentation of the mission, including pressreleases, transcripts of the crew debriefing, thetext of the committee investigations of thecause of the accident, and recordings of thecrew transmissions during the flight.

■ Lost Moon: The Perilous Journey of Apollo 13, byJim Lovell and Jeffrey Kluger (1994), is a forth-right summary of the Apollo 13 mission, withdetails about the group’s dynamics and relationswith ground control teams and family members.

Groups in Context■ Handbook of Environmental Psychology, edited by

Daniel Stokols and Irwin Altman (1987), containschapters written by leading researchers and the-orists in the field of person–environment relations.The 22 chapters in Volume One focus on basicprocesses, and the 21 chapters in Volume Twoconsider applications and cross-cultural implica-tions. The updated Handbook of EnvironmentalPsychology, edited byRobert B. Bechtel andArzahChurchman (2002), supplements the 1987 editionwith expanded coverage of topics dealing withenvironmental preservation.

■ Environmental Psychology, by Paul A. Bell,Thomas C. Greene, Jeffery D. Fisher, andAndrew Baum (2001), is a comprehensive textdealing with environmental psychology in

general, but with key chapters focusing on to-pics of interest to group researchers, includingecological perspectives, personal space, crowd-ing, and territoriality.

Small-Group Ecology and Territoriality■ The Environment and Social Behavior, by Irwin

Altman (1975), remains the definitive analysisof privacy, personal space, territoriality, andcrowding in groups.

■ Personal Space, by Robert Sommer (1969), takesan entertaining look at interpersonal distancingprocesses.

■ The Social Net: Human Behavior in Cyberspace,edited by Yair Amichai-Hamburger (2005),includes research-based reviews of group andindividual behavior in online settings.

Groups in Extreme and Unusual Environments■ Bold Endeavors: Lessons from Polar and Space

Exploration, by Jack Stuster (1996), draws oninterviews, historical documentation, and em-pirical research to develop a comprehensive,detailed analysis of the dynamics of groups thatlive and work in atypical environments, such asbases in Antarctica and space stations.

■ “The Environmental Psychology of CapsuleHabitats,” by Peter Suedfeld and G. DanielSteel (2000), examines the social and psycho-logical consequences of prolonged stays in se-cluded and dangerous environments.




16

Groups and Change

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The usefulness of groups is nowheremore apparent than when groups areused to help their members change.Groups, by their very nature, providetheir members with information, sup-port, and guidance, and so many per-sonal and interpersonal problems canbe resolved more readily when con-fronted in a group rather than alone.

■ What are some of the ways thatgroups are used to help memberschange?

■ How do groups promote change?■ How effective are groups in

bringing about change?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

Group Approaches to Change

Group Psychotherapy

Interpersonal Learning Groups

Support Groups

Sources of Change in Groups

Universality and Hope

Social Learning

Group Cohesion

Disclosure and Catharsis

Altruism

Insight

The Effectiveness of Groups

Perceptions versus Behaviors

Evidence of Negative Effects

Types of Groups and Effectiveness

The Value of Groups

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

474

✵

The idea that a group can be used for therapeuticpurposes is not a new one. For centuries, peoplehave sought help from groups in religious rites, com-munity ceremonies, and tribal sessions intended tohelp those suffering from both physical and psycho-logical problems. These palliative and therapeutic ef-fects of groups were rediscovered by practitioners inthe early years of the 20th century when physiciansbegan to use them to help their patients bettermanagetheir illnesses (Pratt, 1922). At first, they used groupsto increase efficiency, but practitioners soon realizedthat their patients were benefiting from the groupsthemselves. Members supported each other, sharednontechnical information about their illnesses andtreatment, and seemed to appreciate the opportunityto express themselves to attentive and sympatheticlisteners. In time the veracity of Kurt Lewin’s lawof change became widely recognized: “It is usuallyeasier to change individuals formed into a group thanto change any one of them separately” (1951, p. 228).

This chapter asks three questions about groupsas agents of treatment and change. First, what aresome of the ways that groups are used to achievechange in their members? Second, how do groups

and group processes promote change? Third, aregroups effective means of bringing about change?Did the bus group actually help the members, ordid it do more harm than good?

GROUP APPROACHES

TO CHANGE

People join groups to solve many different kinds ofproblems. Some want to get rid of something—weight, sadness, irrational thoughts, or overwhelmingfeelings of worthlessness and despair. Others are seek-ing something—new skills and outlooks, insight intotheir own characteristics, or a new repertoire of be-haviors they can use to improve their relationshipswith others. Still others seek the strength they needto resist an addiction or obsession—the temptationto drink alcohol, use drugs, or batter their spouses.

The Bus Group: Groups as Interpersonal Resources

The group had visited the Taj Mahal and was returningto the ship when the accident happened. They wereteachers and students taking part in Semester-at-Sea:an educational program that combined classes on afloating university with tours to historic sites in coun-tries throughout the world. Their bus fishtailed, flippedtwice, and came to rest in a ravine by the roadside. Ofthe 25 students on the bus, 4 were killed in the trag-edy, along with 3 staff members.

The physicians in area clinics and on the Semester-at-Sea ship dealt with the survivors’ physical injuries,and counselors and therapists sought to help themwith their psychological ones. In the days immediatelyafter the accident, the members of the “bus group,” asthey came to call themselves, met to deal with theiremotions, pain, and uncertainties. The ship continuedon its way, and the group met regularly in therapysessions designed to help members cope with theirgrief and attempt to stave off the long-term negative

consequences of such a horrific experience. With greatsensitivity, the therapists helped each survivor dealwith the painful memories of that night, the recurrentnightmares most reported, and the inability to con-centrate on normal activities. The group also examinedways to remain connected to the other students on theship who were not involved in the accident, and ex-plored existential issues related to their survival andthe loss of the lives of their friends and classmates.Some had more difficulty than others in dealing withthe tragedy, and they worked with therapists in indi-vidual sessions as well as in group sessions. The busgroup met for a dozen times on the ship, in sessionslasting approximately 90 minutes.

When the ship docked at Seattle, Washington, themembers went their separate ways. They left behindthe bus group, but it had served its purpose. A yearafter the tragedy, most “appeared to be coping welland getting on with their lives” (Turner, 2000, p. 147).

Lewin’s law of change Basic principle of attitude andbehavioral change, proposed by Kurt Lewin, stating thatindividuals are more easily changed when they are part ofa group.

GROUPS AND CHANGE 475

The variety of change-promoting groups re-flects the variety of individuals’ goals. The groupformats devised by early psychologists and physi-cians have evolved into today’s jogging and fitnessclubs; consciousness-raising groups; support groupsfor parents, children, grandparents, and ex-spouses;workshops and leadership seminars; marriage andfamily counseling groups; religious retreats; self-help groups; psychotherapy groups; and so on.These groups, despite their many varieties, all helpindividuals to achieve goals that they cannot reachon their own (DeLucia-Waack & Kalodner, 2005).Psychotherapy groups, for example, help peopleovercome troublesome psychological problems.Interpersonal learning groups help individualsgain self-understanding and improve their relation-ships with others. Support groups, or self-help

groups, are voluntarily formed groups of peoplewho help one another cope with or overcome acommon problem. But not all change-promotinggroups fall neatly into one and only one of thethree categories shown in Table 16.1. Many sup-port groups, for example, are formed and organizedby health care professionals, but they nonethelesshave many of the other properties of member-ledgroups (Schubert & Borkman, 1991).

Group Psychotherapy

The therapists who worked with the bus group fromSemester-at-Sea were trained to help people over-come psychological and personal problems. Theyfrequently worked with clients in one-on-one psy-chotherapy sessions, but they also treated some oftheir clients “in groups, with the group itself con-stituting an important element in the therapeuticprocess” (Slavson, 1950, p. 42). When such groupswere initially proposed, skeptics questioned the wis-dom of putting people who were suffering frompsychological problems together in one group.How, they asked, could troubled individuals beexpected to cope in a group when they had failedindividually? How could the therapist guide the ther-apeutic process in a group? History, however, hasproved the skeptics wrong. Group psychotherapyis currently used to treat all types of psychiatric

T A B L E 16.1 Ways Groups Are Used as Agents of Personal and Interpersonal Change

Type Basic Goal Leader Examples

Psychotherapygroup

Improve psychologicalfunctioning and adjustmentof individual members

Mental health professional:psychologist, psychiatrist,clinical social worker

Psychoanalytic and Gestaltgroups, psychodrama,interpersonal,cognitive–behavioralgroup therapy

Interpersonallearning group

Help members gainself-understanding andimprove their interpersonalskills

Varies from trained andlicensed professionals tountrained laypersons

T-groups, encounter groups,seminars and workshops

Support group Help members cope with orovercome specific problemsor life crises

Usually a volunteerlayperson; many groups donot include a leadershipposition

Alcoholics Anonymous, Grow(a group for ex-mentalpatients), support groups forcaregivers

psychotherapy group (or group psychotherapy)Individuals seeking treatment for a psychological prob-lem who meet as a group with a trained mental healthprofessional.interpersonal learning group A group formed to helpindividuals extend their self-understanding and improvetheir relationships with others (e.g., experiential group,growth group).support group (or self-help group) A group of peoplewho meet regularly to help one another cope with orovercome a problem they hold in common.

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problems, including addictions, thought disorders,depression, eating disorders, post-traumatic stress dis-order, and personality disorders (Barlow, Burlingame,& Fuhriman, 2000; Kanas, 1999).

Group therapists vary widely in theoretical ori-entation. Some, for example, are primarily psycho-analytic in orientation, for their basic approach isbased on Sigmund Freud’s therapeutic principles.Others, in contrast, adopt a more interpersonalperspective that stresses the exploration of thesocial processes that unfold in the group. Butmost group therapists are eclectic—they draw onany number of perspectives as they work with thegroup (Ettin, 1992).

Group Psychoanalysis For many people thepsychoanalytic interview—complete with a note-taking therapist and a free-associating client reclin-ing on a comfortable couch—is the prototypicalpsychotherapy session. In multiple sessions the cli-ent talks in detail about such concerns as early lifeexperiences, current problems and difficulties,dreams, worries, and hopes, and the therapist pro-vides interpretations and directions that help theclient recognize the meaning of these materials. Asthe relationship between the therapist and clientbecomes more intense, the client unconsciouslytransfers feelings for and thoughts about others tothe therapist, and the therapist can use this transfer-ence to help the client understand their relationswith others. With time, the client develops healthyinsight into unresolved conflicts that had beenrepressed in the unconscious mind (Langs, 1973).

But Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis also gener-ated the first group therapy: group psychoanalysis.Psychoanalysis, by tradition, was used with onepatient and one therapist who, through directives,free association, interpretation, and transference,helped the patient gain insight into unresolvedunconscious conflicts. But in Group Psychology and

the Analysis of Ego, Freud (1922) recognized thatgroups, in many cases, become an unconsciousmeans of regaining the security of the family. Somehave suggested that Freud himself practiced grouppsychoanalysis when he and his students met to dis-cuss his theories and cases (Kanzer, 1983; Roth,1993). In such groups, the therapist is very muchthe leader, for he or she directs the group’s discussionduring the session, offers interpretations, and sum-marizes the group’s efforts. Just as the goal of indi-vidual therapy is the gradual unfolding of repressedconflicts, in group therapy, as members talk abouttheir memories, fantasies, dreams, and fears, theywill gain insight into their unconscious motivations.

Freud believed that therapy stimulates trans-ference—patients transfer wishes, fantasies, and feel-ings associated with the significant people in theirlives to the therapist. Group psychoanalysis also sti-mulates transference, but in a group, the therapistand the other group members are included in theprocess. Members may find themselves reactingto one another inappropriately, but their actions,when examined more closely, may parallel the waythey respond to people they know in their everydaylives. In the therapy group, for example, clients aredemonstrating transference when they accidentallycall their male therapist Dad, display anger at anothermember who seems to challenge them, or confessthat they want to be mothered by one of the olderfemale group members. Some therapists are morefully Freudian in their orientation than others, butrare is the therapist who does not deal with trans-ference processes, the interpretation of fantasies ordreams, familial tensions, and other latent conflictsduring a group session (see Focus 16.1).

Gestalt Groups and Psychodrama Fritz Perls,the founder of Gestalt therapy, frequently conductedhis therapeutic sessions in groups rather thanwith single individuals. Perls drew his theoretical

group psychoanalysis An approach to group therapythat is grounded in Sigmund Freud’s method of treat-ment, and so includes a directive therapist who makesuse of free association, interpretation, and transferenceprocesses.

transference The displacement of emotions from oneperson to another during the treatment, as when feelingsfor a parent are transferred to the analyst or feelings aboutsiblings are transferred to fellow group members.


principles from Gestalt psychologists, who arguedthat perception requires the active integration of per-ceptual information. The word Gestalt, which meansboth “whole” and “shape,” suggests that we perceivethe world as unified, continuous, and organized.Like Freud, Perls assumed that people often represstheir emotions to the point that unresolved interper-sonal conflicts turn into “unfinished business.” Perls,however, believed that people are capable of self-regulation and great emotional awareness, and heused therapy to help patients reach their potential(Perls, 1969; Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951).

In some cases, Gestalt group therapy is one-to-one Gestalt therapy conducted in a group setting:Group members observe one another’s “work,”but they do not interact with each other. Morefrequently, however, interaction takes place among

group members, with the therapist actively orches-trating the events. Many group therapists make useof unstructured interpersonal activities, such as the“hot seat” or the “empty chair,” to stimulate mem-bers’ emotional understanding. When using the hotseat, one person in the group sits in the center ofthe room and publicly works through his or heremotional experiences. The empty chair methodinvolves imagining that another person or a part ofoneself is sitting in an empty chair and then carryingon a dialogue with that person. These techniques,

F o c u s 16.1 Can Groups Interpret the Meaning of Dreams?

The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to aknowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind.

—Sigmund Freud

Psychoanalytic group therapy involves helping thegroup members identify the sources of dissatisfactionin their lives that clients themselves do not recognize.One means to explore these conflicts is to interpretdreams, which Freud believed symbolize wishes,expectations, and concerns that can only be expressedindirectly.

Dream interpretation is a mainstay of individualpsychoanalytic therapy, but it can also be used ingroups. Members of therapeutic groups are striving toenhance self-development and adjustment by collabo-rating with their peers and the therapist in a personallyinvolving and private setting, but as in any group,members may be unable to surmount unrecognizedbarriers that block their success in reaching therapeuticgoals. Dreams offer the means of bypassing suchblockages, for they can be informative, formative, andtransformative (Friedman, 2008). When informative,they reveal something about the person who tells thedream to the group, but very often the dream yieldsinformation about the group itself. When formative,the dream helps the group and its members achievesome therapeutically positive outcome particularly

when the dream’s meaning helps the group movepast issues that it has been denying or deliberatelyignoring. When transformative, the dream maygalvanize the group into action, changing it in somefundamental and possibly unexpected way.

For example, in one session a group memberrecounted his dream of the entire therapy groupbiking together on a mountain road. The memberexplained that the leader was in the front of the bikersat first, but that eventually the group member passedthe leader to scout the way. The rest of the groupcould not keep up, so the dreamer had to circle backfrequently to make sure that everything was okay(Friedman, 2008).

This highly symbolic dream provided the clientand the group with the opportunity to examine hisrelationship with the group—which was not verysecure, despite his long-term tenure in the group.A highly reserved individual, the dream he told wasviewed by others as one of the most personallyrevealing pieces of information he had ever shared inthe group. It redefined many members’ impressionsof the dreamer, and also revealed to him his feelingsof instability within the group. The dream proved tobe a turning point in the self-development of thedreamer, and changed substantially the course of thegroup’s progress.

Gestalt group therapy An approach to group therapyin which clients are taught to understand the unity oftheir emotions and cognitions through a leader-guidedexploration of their behavior in the group situation.

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when properly applied, often elicit strong emotionalreactions among members, but Gestalt therapists re-sist offering interpretations to their patients (Goulding& Goulding, 1979; Greve, 1993).

Psychodrama, developed by Jacob Moreno(1934), also makes use of exercises to stimulateemotional experiences in group members. Morenoconducted therapeutic groups perhaps as early as1910, and he used the term group therapy in printin 1932. Moreno believed that the interpersonalrelations that developed in groups provided thetherapist with unique insights into members’ per-sonalities and proclivities, and that by taking onroles, the members become more flexible in theirbehavioral orientations. He made his sessions moreexperientially powerful by developing psycho-drama techniques. When role playing, for example,members take on the identity of someone else andthen act as he or she would in a simulated socialsituation. Role reversal involves playing a role for aperiod of time before changing roles with anothergroup member. Doubling is the assignment oftwo group members to a single role, often withone member of the pair playing him- or herself.Moreno believed that psychodrama’s emphasis onphysical action was more involving than passivediscussion, and that the drama itself helped mem-bers overcome their reluctance to discuss criticalissues (Kipper, 2006; Kipper & Ritchie, 2003;Rawlinson, 2000).

Interpersonal Group Psychotherapy An inter-personal approach to psychological disturbancesassumes that many psychological problems, such asdepression, anxiety, and personality disorders, can betraced back to social sources—particularly, interactionswith friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Rather thansearching for psychodynamic causes, interpersonaltheorists assume that maladaptive behavior resultsfrom “an individual’s failure to attend to and correct

the self-defeating, interpersonally unsuccessful aspectsof his or her interpersonal acts” (Kiesler, 1991,pp. 442–443).

Many group therapists, recognizing the socialbasis of psychological problems, use the group set-ting to help members examine their interpersonalbehavior. Irvin Yalom’s interpersonal grouppsychotherapy (also called interactive group psycho-therapy or process groups), for example, uses the groupas a “social microcosm,” where members respondto one another in ways that are characteristic oftheir interpersonal tendencies outside of the group.Therapy groups, as groups, display a full array ofgroup dynamics, including social influence, struc-ture, conflict, and development. The therapist takesadvantage of the group’s dynamics to help memberslearn about how they influence others and howothers influence them. Members do not discussproblems they are facing at home or at work, butinstead focus on interpersonal experiences withinthe group—the here and now rather than the then andthere. Yalom’s process approach assumes that, duringthe course of the group sessions, each member’sunique interpersonal pathologies will begin toexpress themselves, providing an opportunity toreview these limiting tendencies and offer suggestionsfor ameliorating them. When, for example, twomembers begin criticizing each other, someone usespowerful or bizarre influence tactics, or anotherrefuses to get involved in the group’s meetings,therapists prompt group members to examine andexplain the members’ interactions (Yalom, withLeszcz, 2005).

Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy Groups Sometherapists, rather than searching for the cause of theproblematic behavior in unseen, unconscious con-flicts or interpersonal transactions, take a behavioralapproach to mental health. This approach assumesthat problematic thoughts and behaviors are acquired

psychodrama A therapeutic tool developed by JacobMoreno that stimulates active involvement in the groupsession through role playing.

interpersonal group psychotherapy An approach tothe treatment of psychological, behavioral, and emo-tional problems that emphasizes the therapeutic influenceof interpersonal learning.


through experience, so behavior theory teachespeople to exhibit desirable cognitions and behaviorsbut seeks to extinguish undesirable cognitions andbehaviors. Cognitive–behavioral therapy groupsuse these principles with two or more individuals(Emmelkamp, 2004). A cognitive-behavioral ap-proach to the Semester-at-Sea bus group, for exam-ple, may ask members to identify the thoughts thatare triggered by their memory of their experiencesand then provide them with the cognitive and be-havioral skills they need to control those reactions.The therapist may ask the group members to focustheir attention on the accident, and then to share theirreaction with the others in the group. When mem-bers report experiencing dysfunctional ideation—such as “I wonder why I survived and others didn’t?”or “I wonder if I deserve to live”—then the leaderguides the group through the disputation of suchthoughts. The leader might also model, with thegroup members assisting, methods of emotional andcognitive self-regulation such as mood monitoring,relaxation, and thought-stopping (Hollon & Beck,2004).

A group format interfaces seamlessly with theprocess-structuring methods used in behavioraltreatments. In many cases therapists follow a seriesof standard procedures before, during, and afterthe group intervention. Prior to treatment, theycan observe the reactions of each member to thegroup to index the degree of functioning prior toany intervention. Pretherapy reviews, in which thetherapist reviews the theories and procedures thatsustain the intervention, can be carried out in apsychoeducational group setting, and through dis-cussion the members can clarify their expectationsand goals. Therapists can also use public commit-ment to these goals to enhance the bindingstrengths of a behavioral contract that describes inobjective terms the goals the group members aretrying to achieve. During the therapeutic sessions

themselves, the cognitive-behavioral group thera-pist can capitalize on the presence of multipleactors to magnify the effects of modeling, re-hearsal, and feedback. Members of the group canbe asked to demonstrate particular behaviors whilethe group members observe, providing memberswith the opportunity to practice particular skillsthemselves. These practice sessions can be video-taped and played back to the group so that theparticipants can see precisely what they are doingcorrectly and what aspects of their behavior needimprovement. During this feedback phase theleader offers reassurance and praise, and mem-bers add their support and encouragement (e.g.,Franklin, Jaycox, & Foa, 1999; Whittal & McLean,2002).

Interpersonal Learning Groups

Many psychologists are united in their belief thatthe human race too frequently fails to reach itsfull potential. Although human relationships shouldbe rich and satisfying, they are more often thannot superficial and limiting. People are capable ofprofound self-understanding and acceptance, yetmost people are strangers to themselves. These lim-itations are not so severe that the help of a psycho-therapist is needed, but people’s lives would bericher if they could overcome these restraints.

Lewin was one of the first to suggest using smallgroups to teach people interpersonal skills and self-insight. Lewin believed that groups and organizationsoften fail because their members are not trained inhuman relations. He therefore recommended closeexamination of group experiences to give people adeeper understanding of themselves and their groups’dynamics. Other theorists expanded on this basicidea, and by 1965, the human potential movementwas in high gear (Back, 1973; Gazda & Brooks,1985; Lakin, 1972).

Training Groups (T-Groups) How can peoplelearn about group dynamics? Members could learnthe facts about effective interpersonal relations byattending lectures or by reading books about groupdynamics (as you are doing now), but Lewin argued

cognitive–behavioral therapy group The treatmentof interpersonal and psychological problems throughthe application of behavioral principles in a group setting.

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that good group skills are most easily acquiredby directly experiencing human relations. Hence,he developed specialized training groups, orT-groups. Lewin discovered the utility of suchgroups when running educational classes dealingwith leadership and group dynamics. At the end ofeach day, he arranged for observers to discuss thedynamics of the groups with the group leaderswho conducted the training sessions. These discus-sions were usually held in private, until one evening,a few of the group members asked if they couldlisten to the observers’ and leaders’ interpretations.Lewin agreed to their request, and sure enough, theparticipants confirmed Lewin’s expectations bysometimes vehemently disagreeing with the obser-vers. However, the animated discussion that fol-lowed proved to be highly educational, and Lewinrealized that everyone in the group was benefitingenormously from the analysis of the group’s pro-cesses and dynamics (Highhouse, 2002).

One of the most noteworthy aspects ofT-groups is their lack of structure. Although, fromtime to time, the trainees might meet in largegroups to hear lectures or presentations, most ofthe learning takes place in small groups. Eventhough the group includes a designated leader,often called a facilitator or trainer, this individualacts primarily as a catalyst for discussion ratherthan as a director of the group. Indeed, during thefirst few days of a T-group’s existence, group mem-bers usually complain about the lack of structure andthe ambiguity, blaming the trainer for their discom-fort. This ambiguity is intentional, however, for itshifts responsibility for structuring, understanding,and controlling the group’s activities to the partici-pants themselves. As the group grappleswith problemsof organization, agenda, goals, and structure, themembers reveal their preferred interaction styles toothers. They also learn to disclose their feelings

honestly, gain conflict reduction skills, and find enjoy-ment from working in collaborative relationships.

After Lewin’s death in 1947, his colleaguesorganized the National Training Laboratory(NTL). The laboratory was jointly sponsored bythe National Education Association, the ResearchCenter for Group Dynamics, and the Office ofNaval Research (ONR). Researchers and teachersat the center refined their training methods in spe-cial workshops, or laboratories. Although the long-term effectiveness of T-groups is still being debated,training groups continue to play a key role in manyorganization development interventions (Bednar &Kaul, 1979; Burke & Day, 1986; Kaplan, 1979; seeMoreno, 1953, for a completely different historicalperspective on the development of interpersonalskill training).

Growth Groups The T-group was a precursor ofgroup techniques designed to enhance spontaneity,increase personal growth, and maximize members’sensitivity to others. As the purpose of the groupexperience shifted from training in group dynamicsto increasing sensitivity, the name changed fromT-group to sensitivity training group, or en-counter group (Johnson, 1988; Lieberman, 1994).

The humanistic therapist Carl Rogers (1970)was a leader in the development of encountergroups. Rogers believed that most people come toexperience a loss of self-regard because their needsfor approval and love are rarely satisfied. Rogers be-lieved that the encounter group helps people restoretheir trust in their own feelings, their acceptance oftheir most personal qualities, and their opennesswhen interacting with others. “Rogerian” therapistsfocus on emotions and encourage members to “openup” to one another by displaying their inneremotions, thoughts, and worries. Recognizing that

training group or T-group A skill development train-ing intervention in which individuals interact in unstruc-tured group settings and then analyze the dynamics ofthat interaction.

sensitivity training group An unstructured group de-signed to enhance spontaneity, increase personal aware-ness, and maximize members’ sensitivity to others.encounter group A form of sensitivity training thatprovides individuals with the opportunity to gain deepinterpersonal intimacy with other group members.


the group members probably feel insecure abouttheir social competencies, therapists are sources ofunconditional positive regard—meaning that theyavoid criticizing group members if possible. Rogersbelieved that group members, in the security ofthe group, would drop their defenses and facadesand encounter each other “authentically” (Page,Weiss, & Lietaer, 2002).

Structured Learning Groups Both T-groupsand encounter groups are open-ended, unstructuredapproaches to interpersonal learning. Members ofsuch groups follow no agenda; they examine eventsthat unfold spontaneously within the confines of thegroup itself, and give one another feedback abouttheir interpersonal effectiveness when appropriate.Structured learning groups, in contrast, are

planned interventions that focus on a specific inter-personal problem or skill. Integrating behavioraltherapies with experiential learning, the group lead-ers identify specific learning outcomes before thesessions. They then develop behaviorally focusedexercises that will help members practice these tar-geted skills. In a session on nonverbal communica-tion, for instance, group members may be assigned apartner and then be asked to communicate a series offeelings without using spoken language. During as-sertiveness training, group members might practicesaying no to one another’s requests. In a leadershiptraining seminar, group members may be asked torole-play various leadership styles in a small group.These exercises are similar in that they actively in-volve the group members in the learning process.

Thousands of local and national institutes usestructured learning groups in their seminars andworkshops. Although the formats of these structuredexperiences differ substantially, most include thecomponents summarized in Figure 16.1. The leaderbegins with a brief orientation session, in which he or

Didactic overview of the goalsof the exercise

Orientation

Interaction within the group,including role playing, simulations,

discussion tasks

Experience

Summarizing the experience, sharingpersonal reactions and interpretations

Discussion

Making sense of the experience,formulating meaning, drawing

conclusions

Analysis

Identifying implications, proposingchanges to make outside of the

group setting

Application

F I G U R E 16.1 The experiential learning cycle.

structured learning group A planned intervention,such as a workshop, seminar, or retreat, focusing on aspecific interpersonal problem or skill.

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she reviews the critical issues and focuses memberson the exercise’s goals. Next, the group membersexperience the event or situation by carrying out astructured group exercise. When they have com-pleted the exercise, the members engage in a generaldiscussion of their experiences within the group. Thisphase can be open-ended, focusing on feelings andsubjective interpretations, or it, too, can be struc-tured through the use of questioning, informationexchange procedures, or videotape recording. Thisdiscussion phase should blend into a period ofanalysis, during which the consultant helps groupmembers to identify consistencies in their behaviorand the behaviors of others. In many cases, the con-sultant guides the group’s analysis of underlyinggroup dynamics and offers a conceptual analysisthat gives meaning to the event. The interpersonallearning cycle ends with application, as the groupmembers use their new-found knowledge toenhance their relationships at work and at home.

Support Groups

Instead of seeking help from a mental health pro-fessional, the men and women in the bus groupcould also have joined a support group—a volun-tary group whose members share a common prob-lem and meet for the purpose of exchanging socialsupport. Support groups, also known as self-helpgroups or mutual aid groups, exist for nearly everymajor medical, psychological, or stress-relatedproblem. There are groups for sufferers of heartdisease, cancer, liver disease, and AIDS; groups forpeople who provide care for those suffering fromchronic disease, illness, and disability; groups to helppeople overcome addictions to alcohol and other sub-stances; groups for children of parents overcome byaddictions to alcohol and other substances; and groupsfor a wide variety of life problems, including groups tohelp people manage money or time (see Table 16.2).The groups meet at a wide variety of locations in thecommunity, including churches, schools, universities,and private homes. They also meet, in some cases, viacomputer connections to the Internet. As Focus 16.2notes, Internet support groups provide individuals withadvice, support, and information 24 hours a day,

7 days a week (Goodman & Jacobs, 1994; Katz, 1993;Levy, 2000).

Characteristics of Support Groups No twosupport groups adopt identical procedures andstructures, but most focus on a specific problem, en-courage members to form personal relations withone another, and stress mutuality in helping. Somequalities of support groups are as follows:

■ Problem-specific: Unlike general therapeuticgroups or social groups, support groups usuallydeal with one specific type of medical,psychological, stress-related, or social problem.The members face a common predicament,so they are “psychologically bonded by thecompelling similarity of member concerns”(Jacobs & Goodman, 1989, p. 537).

■ Interpersonal: Support groups tend to be per-sonally and interpersonally involving. Eventhough individuals’ identities are often maskedwithin such groups (e.g., AlcoholicsAnonymous), members nonetheless establishpersonal relationships with one anotherthat might continue outside of the confines ofthe group (unlike in psychotherapy groups).Members are expected to be honest and open,

T A B L E 16.2 Varieties of Self-Help Groups

Type of Group Examples

Addictions Alcoholics Anonymous, GamblersAnonymous, TOPS (Take Off PoundsSensibly), Weight Watchers

Family and lifetransitions

In Touch (for parents of childrenwith mental handicaps), AdultChildren of Alcoholics, Al-Anon

Mental andphysical health

The Bell’s Palsy Network, CARE(Cancer Aftercare and RehabilitationSociety), Recovery, Inc. (for recover-ing psychotherapy patients), Reachto Recovery (for breast cancerpatients)

Advocacy Campaign for Homosexual Equality,Mothers Against Drunk Driving(MADD), the Gay Activists’ Alliance


so that they learn to trust and rely on oneanother. Members are also expected to berespectful of one another and one another’sneeds, and to treat people fairly.

■ Communal: Most support groups develop astrong sense of community and sharing withinthe group. Members of the group draw supportand encouragement from the group, but they

F o c u s 16.2 Can Groups Give Support Online?

No one should have to face cancer alone.—Online Cancer Care Support Group(http://supportgroups.cancercare.org)

Just as information technology has changed the waygroups solve problems, collaborate on projects, andmake decisions, so too has it altered many self-helpgroups. Such groups, by tradition, meet regularly atdesignated locations where members share informa-tion and support. Information technology, however,has made it possible for these groups to “meet” acrossgreat distances and at any time. Members, instead ofleaving their homes and traveling to a meeting, cannow take part in a range of group activities using acomputer and a connection to the Internet (Tate &Zabinski, 2004). No matter what problem an individualfaces—a serious physical illness, stress caused by pro-viding care for an ill family member, a negative lifeevent such as divorce or the death of a loved one,addiction and drug dependency, social rejection,prejudice, or problems of adjustment and mentalhealth—an online group likely exists somewhere onthe Internet that can provide self-care information,support, and referral services. Some of these sites areprimarily repositories of information about theproblem or issue, and may be sponsored byprofessionals who treat these problems. Others,however, are true self-help groups, for they werecreated by individuals who all face the same difficultyand are designed to help fellow sufferers connect toand support each other.

Some support groups create synchronouscommunication among members using instantmessaging, discussion boards, and chats. Members loginto a chat room at a preset time, and then all inattendance can send and receive messages during thesession. In many cases, the software identifies all thosewho are logged into the group by their user name, andmembers are asked to announce their presence anddeparture from the group. Other support groups areasynchronous, with members using e-mail andelectronic bulletin boards to read messages from

others and to post messages and responses to others’postings. Both synchronous and asynchronous groupscan be moderated by a group leader who facilitatesthe discussion (and intervenes to remove content asnecessary).

How helpful can these online support groups be,given that they meet in a relatively sterile onlineworld? Studies of online groups for problems rangingfrom cancer to sexual abuse to psychological disorderssuggest that these groups are surprisingly effective,and may even rival face-to-face groups in terms offunctionality. Participants report that they feelsupported and valued by their group and, after takingpart in an online session, feel more hopeful about theirsituation. Members stress the quality and quantity ofthe information they receive from others in the onlinecommunity, and instances of inappropriate commen-tary or hostile postings are rare and inconsequential(Miller & Gergen, 1998).

Some aspects of the online format may evenenhance aspects of a self-help approach to coping withnegative events (Tanis, 2007). Because members arenot identifiable, they report being able to reveal moreintimate information about their experiences and torespond more emotionally to others than they would ifinteracting face to face. Members of online sessionsalso tend to exchange more practical advice andfactual information than they do in face-to-facesessions, and members value this aspect of onlinegroups as well. They report that the information isuseful to them in understanding their condition andin dealing more effectively with their health careproviders (Houston, Cooper, & Ford, 2002). Internetsupport groups are also particularly valuable forindividuals whose illness restricts their mobility and forthose who are suffering from a stigmatized illness,such as prostate cancer or AIDS. Individuals mayfeel self-conscious about their condition, but thecomfort they experience by joining with others whoare “in the same boat” overwhelms this concern aboutembarrassment (Davison, Pennebaker, & Dickerson,2000).

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http://supportgroups.cancercare.org

are also expected to provide support and en-couragement to others within the group. Eachperson, then, is both a provider and a recipientof help and support. The primary determinantof status in such groups is experience with theproblem. Most support groups include veteranindividuals who have more knowledge andexperience with both the problem and withthe means of dealing with the problem, andthese individuals serve as role models for others.

■ Autonomous: Self-help groups usually chargelittle in the way of fees, for in most cases theyare not operated by health care professionals. Infact, they often stand in contrast to moretraditional forms of treatment, for they arisespontaneously because their members’ needs arenot being satisfied by existing educational, social,or health agencies. Local groups may be alignedto national organizations that mandate specificprocedures for all their chapters, but even thisstandardization does not eliminate the emphasison the local group’s control of its methods.

■ Perspective-based: Support groups’ indepen-dence from more traditional approaches isalso manifested in their adoption of a novelperspective with regard to their problemdomain. A grief group may adopt fervently aparticular model of the stages of grieving, andbase its interventions and recommendations onthat perspective. A support group for alcoholicsmay maintain that recovery is never perma-nent, and so one must abstain from all formsof alcohol to overcome the addiction. Theseperspectives may not be complex, nor arethey always explicitly recognized by members,but in many cases the group’s perspective on itsaffliction may become the centerpiece of thegroup’s discussions, with new members urgedto adopt the group’s worldview as a means ofcoping effectively with the problem.

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) Alcoholics Anon-ymous (AA) is an example of a support group. AAwas founded by Bill Wilson in 1935. Wilson hadtried to quit drinking for years, but no matter what

he tried, he always returned to his addiction. After afourth hospital stay for acute alcoholism, Wilsonexperienced a profound, almost mystical experiencethat convinced him that he could overcome hisdrinking problem. To explain the experience, heexamined the writings of psychologists WilliamJames and Carl Jung and eventually concludedthat such experiences could be triggered by periodsof negativity, depression, and helplessness. Wilsonthen connected with a small spiritual group, theOxford Group Movement, and with his physicianfriendWilliam D. Silkworth developed a support sys-tem that included self-examination, admitting pastwrongs, rebuilding relationships and making amends,and reliance on and helping others.

Wilson’s program formed the basis of AlcoholicsAnonymous, which grew to be an internationalorganization with millions of members. DespiteAA’s size, change is still achieved through localchapters of alcoholics who meet regularly to reviewtheir success in maintaining their sobriety. AA meet-ings emphasize testimonials, mutual self-help, andadherence to the 12-stage program (the “12 steps”)described by the AA doctrine. These steps recom-mend admitting one’s powerlessness over alcohol;surrendering one’s fate to a greater power; takingan inventory of personal strengths, weaknesses, andmoral failings; and helping others fight their addic-tion (Flores, 1997).

AA is a multipronged approach to addiction. Itstresses the goal of total abstinence and the need toremain ever vigilant against the pressure to resumedrinking. It asks members to take specific actions toprevent relapse, and assigns veteran members tonewcomers to help strengthen their resilience.Much of the success of the approach also rests onchanging members’ social networks. By participatingactively in AA, members associate with people whoare no longer drinking heavily, and the longer thispositive association continues the more they can re-sist the “negative pull of ‘wet’ social circles that sup-port drinking” (Bond, Kaskutas, & Weisner, 2003,p. 580). One team of researchers studied people oneand three years after they first entered an AA-basedtreatment program. Those who remained abstinentafter one year had attended far more AA meetings


than those who were still drinking: an average of 93meetings compared to only 25. They also reportedhaving fewer heavy drinkers in their social network(7% vs. 17%) and more people who encouragedthem to remain sober (see Figure 16.2; Bond et al.,2003; Kaskutas et al., 2005).

SOURCES OF CHANGE

IN GROUPS

Group approaches to change, despite their widevariations in method, structure, and procedure, havecertain key elements in common (Ingram, Hayes, &Scott, 2000). Some of these common therapeuticfactors are equivalent to the change-promoting

forces that operate in individualistic, one-on-onetherapies, but others are unique to group approachesto change. All therapies, for example, help clientsgain self-insight, but only group approaches stimulateinterpersonal comparisons and provide members witha forum for practicing their interpersonal skills. Alltherapies provide clients with support and help, butin groups, members are also sources of help ratherthan only recipients.

Although no one list of therapeutic factors hasbeen verified by researchers and accepted by practi-tioners, Table 16.3 summarizes some of the mostfrequently identified change-promoting factors.Some of these factors, such as giving hope to groupmembers, are more influential during the earlystages of the group’s history, whereas others be-come more potent with time (e.g., self-insight).Some focus on cognitive processes, whereas otherspromote changes in behavior directly. But all theseprocesses combine to generate changes in groupmembers’ adjustment and well-being (see Yalomwith Leszcz, 2005, for a thorough review of empir-ical studies of these therapeutic factors).

Universality and Hope

In the aftermath of the bus accident, the survivorscoped with their physical injuries, their fears, andtheir grief. In unguarded moments, they may haveflashed back to the accident and psychologically re-lived their loss—so vividly that they may have ques-tioned their own sanity. As they found that theycould not concentrate on their work even monthsafter the accident, they may have started to feel thatthey would never get over the anguish. They mayalso have found that their moods would take unex-pected turns—they may have become inexplicablyangry for little reason or unexpectedly disinterestedin things that once fascinated them.

When suffering alone, individuals may not real-ize that their feelings and experiences are relativelycommon ones. But when surrounded by other peo-ple who are suffering similarly, members recognizethe universality of the problems they face. When allthe members of the bus group compared their stress-related symptoms, they could recognize that they

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Time 1

Nonabstinent Abstinent

Time 3Time 2

F I G U R E 16.2 The percentage of abstinent andnonabstinent participants in AA who indicated theyregularly interacted with a friend who was a heavydrinker when they began the program (Time 1), afterone year (Time 2), and after three years (Time 3).

therapeutic factor An aspect of group settings thataids and promotes personal growth and adjustment; in-cludes such factors as the installation of hope, universal-ity, providing information, altruism, and interpersonallearning.

486 CHAPTER 16

were all in the same boat (literally, in this case).Research confirms that when people are with otherswho face similar problems or troubling events, theyfeel better, in terms of self-esteem and mood, thanwhen they are with dissimilar people (Frable, Platt, &Hoey, 1998). This collective sharing is best illustratedby the AA “hello” ritual: Everyone at an AA meetingpublicly states, “I am an alcoholic,” and this publicdeclaration reassures all the other participants thattheir problem is shared by others.

Yalom (with Leszcz, 2005) believes that thiscollective process results in the “installation ofhope” in members, and research confirms thatgroup-derived hope contributes to well-being, lifesatisfaction, and inspiration (Cheavens et al., 2006).Groups that are designed so that they elevate mem-bers’ sense of hope tend to be more powerful agentsof change than groups that use other procedures(e.g.,Worthington et al., 1997).

These therapeutic gains may be due, inpart, to group members’ tendencies to compare

themselves to other members—the process ofsocial comparison, as described in Chapter 4. Evenwhen the group includes individuals who areexperiencing particularly negative outcomes, theseindividuals can serve as targets for downward socialcomparison. Such comparisons reduce group mem-bers’ own sense of victimization and can raise theiroverall sense of self-esteem (Wills & Filer, 2000).The group may also include individuals who arecoping well with many difficulties, and these upwardsocial comparison targets can encourage members bysymbolizing the possibility of progress (Buunk,Oldersma, & De Dreu, 2001; Taylor & Lobel,1989). Although successful group members—thefellow cancer survivor who is in complete remission,the AA member who has stayed sober for threeyears, or the caregiver who is managing to care forher elderly mother and still attend college—maymake some group members feel like failures, theyalso provide a standard for future gains (Tennen,McKee, & Affleck, 2000).

T A B L E 16.3 Factors That Promote Change in Groups

Factor Definition Meaning to Member

Universality Recognition of shared problems, reducedsense of uniqueness

We all have problems.

Hope Increased sense of optimism from seeingothers improve

If other members can change, so can I.

Vicarious learning Developing social skills by watching others Seeing others talk about their problemsinspired me to talk, too.

Interpersonal learning Developing social skills by interacting withothers

I’m learning to get along better withother people.

Guidance Offering and accepting advice andsuggestions to and from the group

People in the group give me goodsuggestions.

Cohesion and support Comfort, confirmation of feelings;acceptance

The group accepts, understands, andcomforts me.

Self-disclosure Revealing personal information to others I feel better for sharing things I’ve keptsecret for too long.

Catharsis Releasing pent-up emotions It feels good to get things off my chest.

Altruism Increased sense of efficacy from helpingothers

Helping other people has given me moreself-respect.

Insight Gaining a deeper understanding ofoneself

I’ve learned a lot about myself.


Social Learning

When an individual who is striving to change meetswith one other person—whether a trained therapist,counselor, friend, or relative—he or she can discussproblems, identify solutions, and receive supportand encouragement. But even in the most therapeu-tic of dyads, the individual shares perspectives, feed-back, guidance, acceptance, and comfort with onlyone other person. A larger group, with its multiplemembers, is richer in terms of its interpersonal andtherapeutic resources. Within the social microcosmof the small group, individuals experience a fullerrange of interpersonal processes, including feedbackabout their strengths and weaknesses, pressure tochange behaviors that other members find objec-tionable, role models whose actions they can emu-late, and opportunities to practice the very behaviorsthey are seeking to refine. Of the 10 therapeuticfactors in Table 16.3, vicarious learning, interper-sonal learning, and guidance are most closely relatedto social learning processes that help membersexplore themselves, their problems, and their socialrelationships with others.

Vicarious Learning Social learning theory,developed by Albert Bandura (1977, 1986), main-tains that people can acquire new attitudes andbehaviors vicariously—by observing and imitatingothers’ actions. This theory, which explains howinfants learn their native language, why adolescentsadopt the unhealthy habits of their peers, and howviewers of televised violence mimic the aggressiveactions they watch, suggests that group memberscan learn by observing other group members, pro-vided they: (1) are motivated to learn from theirpeers; (2) attend closely to the behavior being mod-eled by the other group member; (3) are able toremember and reenact the behavior they observed;and (4) are aware that the consequences of the

model’s behavior are positive rather than negative(Shebilske et al., 1998).

Groups provide members with multiple modelsto emulate, including the leader or leaders. When,for example, group members who are skilled inexpressing their feelings deftly describe their emo-tional reactions, the less verbally skilled membersmay learn how they, too, can put their feelingsinto words. When two members who regularly dis-agree with each other reach an accord, other groupmembers who watch this reconciliation unfoldlearn how they can resolve interpersonal conflicts.Group leaders can also model desirable behaviorsby treating the group members in positive waysand avoiding behaviors that are undesirable (Dies,1994). In one study, the coleaders of therapy groupsmodeled social interactions that the group membersconsidered difficult or anxiety provoking. The lead-ers then helped the group members perform thesesame behaviors through role playing. Groups thatused explicit modeling methods showed greaterimprovement than groups that only discussed theproblematic behaviors (Falloon et al., 1977).

Interpersonal Learning Although people tendto believe that they can come to know themselvesthrough self-reflection, in reality people learn whothey are—their strengths, their weaknesses, theirtendencies, and their satisfactions—by watchinghow other people react to them. In groups, mem-bers implicitly monitor their impact on the otherpeople in their group and draw conclusions abouttheir own qualities from others’ reactions to them.The other group members become, metaphorically,a “mirror” that members use to understand them-selves (Cooley, 1902). A group member may beginto think that she has good social skills if the groupalways responds positively each time she contributesto the group discussion. Another member may de-cide that he is irritating if his comments are alwaysmet with anger and hostility. This indirect feedbackhelps members perceive themselves more accu-rately. Individuals who are socially withdrawn, forexample, tend to evaluate their social skills negativelyeven though the other group members view thempositively (Christensen & Kashy, 1998). Individuals

social learning theory A conceptualization of learningdeveloped by Albert Bandura that describes the processesby which new behaviors are acquired by observing andimitating the actions displayed by models, such as parentsand peers.

488 CHAPTER 16

also tend to rate themselves as more anxious thanothers tend to perceive them as being (Marcus,1998; Marcus & Wilson, 1996). Extended contactwith others in a group setting should repair thesenegative, inaccurate perceptions.

Groups are also very willing to give direct, un-ambiguous feedback to members when they engagein objectionable or praiseworthy actions (Kivlighan,1985). Kurt Lewin was one of the first theorists toborrow the term feedback from engineering and useit to describe how others’ responses to group mem-bers served as corrective guides for subsequentactions (Claiborn, Goodyear, & Horner, 2001).The individual who is lonely because he alienateseveryone by acting rudely may be told, “Youshould try to be more sensitive,” or “You are alwaysso judgmental, it makes me sick.” Some groupsexchange so much evaluative information thatmembers withdraw from the group rather than facethe barrage of negative feedback (Scheuble et al.,1987). Most group leaders, however, are carefulto monitor the exchange of information betweenmembers so that individuals receive the informationthey need in positive, supportive ways (Morranet al., 1998).

Guidance When group members discuss issues,concerns, problems, and crises, other group membersfrequently help by providing advice, guidance, anddirection. Members of support groups, for example,exchange considerable factual and personal informa-tion about their disorder or concern, as well as sug-gestions for problem management (e.g., LaBarge,Von Dras, & Wingbermuehle, 1998). Group leaders,in addition to guiding the flow of the sessionthrough questioning, summarizing, and rephrasingmembers’ statements, also provide information,suggest solutions, confront the members’ interpre-tations of problems, and offer their own interpre-tation of the causes of the members’ problems(Hill et al., 1988). This guidance ranges from ex-plicit suggestions and directions to suggestions ofminor adjustments to deepen an emotional processor cognitive interpretation (Heppner et al., 1994).

Therapists and facilitators, like all group leaders,vary considerably along the directive–nondirective

dimension. Those who adopt a leader-centeredapproach—typical of psychoanalytic, Gestalt, andbehavioral groups—are more directive. They guidethe course of the interaction, assign various tasks tothe group members, and occupy the center of thecentralized communication network. In some in-stances, the group members may not even commu-nicate with one another, but only with the groupleader. Other facilitators, however, advocate a non-directive style of leadership, in which all groupmembers communicate with one another. Thesegroup-oriented methods, which are typified byinterpersonal approaches, encourage the analysisof the group’s processes, with the therapist/leadersometimes facilitating the process but at other timesproviding no direction whatsoever.

Both directive and nondirective approaches areeffective, so long as the leaders are perceived to becaring, help members interpret the cause of theirproblems, keep the group on course, and meetthe members’ relationship needs (Lieberman &Golant, 2002; Lieberman, Yalom, & Miles, 1973).Moreover, just as effective leaders in organizationalsettings sometimes vary their interventions to fit thesituation, so effective leaders in therapeutic settingsshift their methods over time. During the earlystages of treatment, members may respond betterto a task-oriented leader, whereas in the later stages,a relationship-oriented leader may be more helpful(Kivlighan, 1997).

Several studies have suggested that groups withtwo leaders are more effective than groups withonly one leader. Coleadership eases the burdensput on the group’s leader (Dugo & Beck, 1997).The two leaders can lend support to each other,and they can also offer the group members theircombined knowledge, insight, and experience.Also, male–female teams may be particularly bene-ficial, as they offer a fuller perspective on genderissues and serve as models of positive, nonromanticheterosexual relationships. The advantages of

coleadership Two or more individuals sharing the or-ganizational, directive, and motivational duties of theleadership role.


coleadership, however, are lost if the leaders areunequal in status or engage in power strugglesduring group sessions (Arnardottir, 2002).

Group Cohesion

Just as cohesion is a key ingredient for effectivesports, production, and management teams, so co-hesion is a critical ingredient for effective change-promoting groups. If groups are to be used aschange agents, the members should have a strongsense of group identity and belonging; otherwise,the group will not exert sufficient influence over itsmembers (Cartwright, 1951). Without cohesion,feedback is not accepted, norms do not develop,and groups can not retain their members. Most im-portantly, however, cohesion creates the climate foracceptance that is so critical for therapeutic success.As Yalom (with Leszcz, 2005, p. 56) explains, “It isthe affective sharing of one’s inner world and thenthe acceptance by others that seem of paramountimportance.”

Acceptance and Support Cohesive groups aresuperior sources of emotional and social support fortheir members (Burlingame, Fuhriman, & Johnson,2001). When a group is cohesive, the members aremore engaged in the group and its change-promotingprocesses. Members rarely miss meetings, they takepart in the planning of the group’s topics and activities,and they express a sense of closeness with the othermembers. Avoidance and conflict, in contrast, are clearindicators of a lack of cohesiveness (Kivlighan &Tarrant, 2001; Ogrodniczuk & Piper, 2003). In manycases, members who are hostile and socially inhib-ited attend sessions infrequently, and as a result, arenot sufficiently engaged in the group change process(MacNair-Semands, 2002).

Because group members are more likely toidentify with a cohesive group, members are morelikely to experience gains in collective self-esteemwhen members of such groups (Cameron, 1999;Marmarosh, Holtz, & Schottenbauer, 2005). In onestudy of this process researchers reinforced members’identification with the group by giving them a groupidentification card. They were told to carry their

card with them, to serve as a symbol of their mem-bership in the group, and a reminder that their groupwas with them all the time. Those group membersgiven an identity card reported greater collective self-esteem and displayed more positive treatment gainsthan members in a no-card control condition(Marmarosh & Corazzini, 1997).

Cohesion over Time A group’s cohesivenessfluctuates over time, depending on its longevity andstage of development. Even when the group’s task isa therapeutic one, time is needed to achieve cohe-siveness. In one study, investigators observed andcoded the behaviors displayed by adolescents in aprogram of behavioral change. These groups didnot immediately start to work on self-developmentissues, nor did the group members try to help oneanother. Rather, the groups first moved throughorientation, conflict, and cohesion-building stagesbefore they began to make therapeutic progress (Hill& Gruner, 1973).

Other studies have also suggested that the successof the group depends to a large extent on its move-ment through several stages of development.Although these stages receive various labels from vari-ous theorists, many accept the five emphasized byBruce Tuckman (1965)—forming, storming, norm-ing, performing, and adjourning (see Chapter 1,Figure 1.5). During the forming stage, individual mem-bers are seeking to understand their relationship to thenewly formed group and strive to establish clear inter-member relations. During the storming stage, groupmembers often find themselves in conflict over statusand group goals; consequently, hostility, disruption,and uncertainty dominate group discussions. Duringthe next phase (norming), the group strives to develop agroup structure that increases cohesiveness and har-mony. The performing stage is typified by a focus ongroup productivity and decision making. Finally,when the group fulfills its goals, it reaches its last stageof development—adjourning. If a groupdoes notmovethrough these stages, its members will not be able tobenefit from the experience (MacKenzie, 1994, 1997;Yalom with Leszcz, 2005).

Dennis Kivlighan and his colleagues illustratedthe important impact of group development on

490 CHAPTER 16

therapeutic outcomes by matching interventions tothe developmental “maturity” of the group. Groupmembers were given structured help in expressingeither anger or intimacy before either the fourth orthe ninth group session of their therapy. The infor-mation dealing with anger clarified the value of angeras a natural part of group participation and providedsuggestions for communicating it. The informationdealing with intimacy clarified the value of intimacyin groups and provided suggestions for its appropriateexpression toward others. As anticipated, when theinterventions were matched to the most appropriatedevelopmental stage—for example, when groupmembers received the information on anger duringthe storming phase (Session 4) and the information onintimacy during the norming phase (Session 9)—theparticipants displayed more comfort in dealing withintimacy, more appropriate expressions of intimacyand anger, fewer inappropriate expressions of inti-macy, and more congruence between self-ratingsand other ratings of interpersonal style (Kivlighan,McGovern, & Corazzini, 1984).

Disclosure and Catharsis

Groups become more unified the more the membersengage in self-disclosure—the sharing of personal,intimate information with others (Corey & Corey,1992; Leichtentritt & Shechtman, 1998). Whengroups first convene, members usually focus onsuperficial topics and avoid saying anything too per-sonal or provocative. In this orientation stage, memberstry to form a general impression of each other andalso make a good impression themselves. In theexploratory affective stage, members discuss their per-sonal attitudes and opinions, but they avoid intimatetopics. This stage is often followed by the affectivestage, when a few topics still remain taboo. Whenthe group reaches the final stage, stable exchange, allpersonal feelings are shared (Altman & Taylor, 1973).

Self-disclosure can be something of a challengefor some individuals. Individuals experiencing

personality or psychological disturbances, for exam-ple, often disclose the wrong sorts of informationat the wrong time (McGuire & Leak, 1980). Menand boys, too, are generally more reserved in theirself-disclosure (Brooks, 1996; Kilmartin, 1994;Shechtman, 1994). Thus, therapists must sometimestake special steps to induce the male members oftherapy groups to share personal information aboutthemselves, including modeling disclosure and in-corporating disclosure rituals in the group (Horne,Jolliff, & Roth, 1996). Men’s reluctance to disclosecan even undermine the quality of the group expe-rience for all participants: The more men in thetherapeutic group, the fewer benefits are reportedby participants (Hurley, 1997).

Self-disclosure and cohesion are reciprocally re-lated. Each new self-disclosure deepens the group’sintimacy, and this increased closeness then makesfurther self-disclosures possible (Agazarian, 2001).In sharing information about themselves, membersare expressing their trust in the group and signalingtheir commitment to the therapeutic process(Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Disclosingtroubling, worrisome thoughts also reduces the dis-closer’s level of tension and stress. Individuals whokeep their problems secret but continually ruminateabout them display signs of physiological and psy-chological distress, whereas individuals who havethe opportunity to disclose these troubling thoughtsare healthier and happier (Pennebaker, 1997).

Members can also vent strong emotions ingroups, although the value of such emotional vent-ing continues to be debated by researchers. Someside with Freud’s initial analysis of emotions and ten-sion. Freud believed that strong emotions can buildup, like steam in a boiler. If this psychological steamis not vented from time to time, the strain on thesystem can cause psychological disorders. Therefore,healthy people discharge these emotions in a processFreud called catharsis. Others, however, have sug-gested that “blowing off steam” is rarely helpful, forin the extreme, venting heightens members’ psycho-logical distress and upset (Ormont, 1984).

self-disclosure The process of revealing personal, inti-mate information about oneself to others. catharsis The release of emotional tensions.


Altruism

The group’s leader is not the only source of helpavailable to group members. Other group memberscan sometimes draw on their own experiences tooffer insights and advice to one another. This mutualassistance provides benefits for both parties. Eventhough the group’s leader is the official expert inthe group, people are often more willing to accepthelp from people who are similar to themselves(Wills & DePaulo, 1991). The helper, too, “feels asense of being needed and helpful; can forget self infavor of another group member; and recognizes thedesire to do something for another group member”(Crouch et al., 1994, p. 285). Mutual assistanceteaches group members the social skills that are es-sential to psychological well-being (Ferencik, 1992).

Mutual assistance is particularly important inself-help groups. Mended Hearts—a support groupthat deals with the psychological consequences ofopen-heart surgery—tells its members that “youare not completely mended until you help mendothers” (Lieberman, 1993, p. 297). AA groups for-malize and structure helping in their 12-step proce-dures. Newcomers to the group are paired withsponsors, who meet regularly with the new memberoutside of the regular group meetings. As Focus 16.3notes, collective helping is also an essential compo-nent of group-level approaches to dealing with trau-matic events.

Insight

Individuals’ perceptions of their own personal qual-ities are generally accurate. Individuals who think ofthemselves as assertive tend to be viewed that wayby others, just as warm, outgoing individuals tendto be viewed as friendly and approachable (Kennyet al., 1996; Levesque, 1997). In some cases, how-ever, individuals’ self-perceptions are inaccurate(Andersen, 1984). An individual may believe thathe is attractive, socially skilled, and friendly, whenin fact he is unattractive, interpersonally incompe-tent, and hostile.

Groups promote self-understanding by expos-ing us to the unknown areas of ourselves. Although

we are not particularly open to feedback about ourown attributes, when several individuals provide uswith the same feedback, we are more likely to in-ternalize this information (Jacobs, 1974; Kivlighan,1985). Also, when the feedback is given in thecontext of a long-term, reciprocal relationship, itcannot be so easily dismissed as biased or subjective.Group leaders, too, often reward members foraccepting rather than rejecting feedback, and thesetting itself works to intensify self-awareness. In asupportive, accepting group, we can reveal hiddenaspects of ourselves, and we therefore feel moreopen and honest in our relationships.

Even qualities that are unknown to others andto ourselves can emerge and be recognized duringgroup interactions (Luft, 1984). As self-perceptiontheory suggests, people often “come to ‘know’ theirown attitudes, emotions, and other internal statespartially by inferring them from observations oftheir own overt behavior and/or the circumstancesin which this behavior occurs” (Bem, 1972, p. 2). Ifindividuals observe themselves acting in ways thatsuggest that they are socially skilled—for example,disclosing information about themselves appropri-ately and maintaining a conversation—then theymay infer that they are socially skilled (Robak,2001).

Studies of group members’ evaluations of thetherapeutic experience attest to the importance ofinsight. When participants in therapeutic groupswere asked to identify the events that took place intheir groups that helped them the most, they stresseduniversality, interpersonal learning, cohesion (be-longing), and insight (see Figure 16.3). During latersessions, they stressed interpersonal learning evenmore, but universality became less important(Kivlighan & Mullison, 1988; Kivlighan, Multon, &Brossart, 1996). In other studies that asked groupmembers to rank or rate the importance of thesetherapeutic factors, the group members emphasizedself-understanding, interpersonal learning, and cathar-sis (MacNair-Semands & Lese, 2000; Yalom withLeszcz, 2005). In general, individuals who stress thevalue of self-understanding tend to benefit the mostfrom participation in a therapeutic group (Butler &Fuhriman, 1983).

492 CHAPTER 16

F o c u s 16.3 How Can We Cope with Disasters and Trauma?

Each time I tell my story, I remove one small bit of hurtfrom inside me. I ease my wound.

—Carol Staudacher, Time to Grieve (1994, p. 61).

In rural India, a bus carrying 25 college students andtheir guides crashes, killing 7 and injuring all the otherpassengers. A series of tornadoes crisscrosses NorthCarolina, leaving a path of devastation and death. InColumbine High School, Eric Harris and Dylan Kleboldkill 13 people and wound dozens of others beforekilling themselves. When a cloud of gas from a leak ata petrochemical plant in Texas ignites, 23 workers arekilled and hundreds injured. Millions of Americansgrieve the loss of thousands of fellow citizens killed byterrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

People the world over experience catastrophes,crises, and disasters. Some of these stressful events—such as volcanoes, floods, hurricanes, blizzards, andtornadoes—can be blamed on naturally occurring dis-ruptions in the planet’s meteorological and geologicalsystems. Others, however, are man-made—wars, ter-rorist attacks, violence, nuclear accidents, transporta-tion accidents, building fires, industrial accidents, andso on.

These events take their toll on human adjustmentand well-being. One comprehensive review of dozensof published studies of psychological reactions todisasters concluded that people who survive a stressfulevent are more likely to suffer from anxiety,sleeplessness, and fearfulness. Such stressors also leadto small increases in drug use and depression amongpeople exposed to a hazard. Between 7% and 40% ofthe survivors of disasters will exhibit some sign ofpsychopathology (Rubonis & Bickman, 1991). Many vic-tims of disasters, such as Americans who lived andworked near the sites of the 2001 terrorist attacks,civilians in Bosnia, and victims of sarin attack in Japan,show evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder, even ifnot directly harmed.

These negative mental health consequences(anxiety, depression, sleeplessness, compulsions,intrusive thoughts) can be reduced throughstress management crisis interventions. Theseinterventions—usually designed and implemented bycommunity health professionals—often make use ofgroup-level therapeutic coping processes, including

social comparison, social support, and social learning(Davies, Burlingame, & Layne, 2006; Layne et al., 2001).The students who survived the bus crash in India metwith counselors for six weeks to deal with issues oftrauma, coping, and grief (Turner, 2000). In the after-math of the devastating tornadoes, North Carolina re-sidents met at the local community college to shareworries and anxieties, recount their stories of survivingthe storm, and exchange information about resources,insurance claim procedures, and cleanup efforts(McCammon & Long, 1993). Following the explosionat a petrochemical plant, a response team provideda constant flow of information to the community,conducted group sessions for individuals who lost familymembers in the accident, and organized critical incidentstress debriefing (CISD) sessions for workers who werepart of the emergency team that sought, in vain, tofight the blaze (Mitchell & Everly, 2006).

The effectiveness of such interventions depends,in part, on timing, procedures, and the characteristicsof the individuals involved. Ideally, the interventionoccurs immediately following the event, and providescontinuing treatment as group members progressthrough the cumulative stages of the coping process.Interventions should also be planned carefully inadvance, and in some cases, methods used in tradi-tional therapeutic circumstances must be replaced bymethods that will work in the chaos and confusion ofa disaster or community trauma (Raphael & Wooding,2006). Interventions must also take into account thecharacteristics of the individuals involved. Childrenand elderly people, for example, require a differentset of group experiences than do adults, familymembers, and emergency personnel. Interventionsmust also be sensitive to each individual’s reaction tothe event. Some may appreciate the opportunity tointeract with others who are coping with a disaster,but others may not respond well to the evocativedemands of the group (Foy & Schrock, 2006). Noteveryone can share their grief with others, and thecontinued discussion of the event may onlyexacerbate their anxieties and emotional reprocessing(Melamed & Wills, 2000). A group approach to treat-ment works for many people, but some will requireindividual assistance rather than group help (McNally,Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003).


THE EFFECT IVENESS

OF GROUPS

What would you do if you were bothered by somepersonal problem? Perhaps you have trouble makingfriends. Maybe you are having problems adjusting toa new job or wish that you could bemore productivewhen you are at work. Perhaps you have finallyresolved to stop smoking or drinking, or you justcannot seem to get over the depression that has en-veloped you since your mother passed away last year.Whatever the problem, you have not succeeded inchanging on your own. So you decide to join achange-promoting group.

Would this group really help you achieve thechanges you desire? Researchers and therapists havebeen debating this question for many years.Reviewers, after sifting through hundreds of studiesevaluating the effectiveness of group interventions,rejected many studies as so methodologically flawedthat they yielded no information whatsoever(Bednar & Kaul, 1978, 1979, 1994; Fuhriman &Burlingame, 1994; Kaul & Bednar, 1986). Thosestudies that did use valid methods, however, gener-ally weighed in favor of group-level interventions.

Group methods also earn relatively high marksin meta-analytic reviews of various types of thera-pies. Gary Burlingame and his colleagues, after

statistically combining the results of hundreds ofexperimental, quasi-experimental, and correlationalstudies, concluded that group methods are effectivetreatments for a wide variety of psychologicalproblems (Burlingame, Fuhriman, & Mosier,2003; Burlingame & Krogel, 2005; Fuhriman &Burlingame, 1994; Kösters et al., 2006; McRoberts,Burlingame, & Hoag, 1998). Group methods havealso been found to be effective (1) when used to treatchildren and adolescents (Hoag & Burlingame, 1997),(2) when used for the primary prevention of healthproblems in children (Kulic, Horne, & Dagley,2004), and (3) with incarcerated individuals, particu-larly when cognitive–behavioral methods are pairedwith homework assignments to be completed afterthe sessions (Morgan & Flora, 2002). A comprehen-sive review of support groups also suggested thatindividuals gain positive outcomes through member-ship in such groups, relative to individuals in controlconditions (Barlow et al., 2000).

Individuals who have participated ingroup therapy—the consumers of group-basedtreatments—also give group approaches relativelyhigh marks. One study, conducted by ConsumerReports, asked respondents to rate a variety of treat-ments. All psychological methods, including groupinterventions, were rated positively. AA receivedparticularly positive evaluations in this study(Seligman, 1995, 1996; see also Christensen &

0 5 10 15 20

Insight

Altruism

Catharsis

Self-disclosure

Cohesion

Guidance

Interpersonal learning

Vicarious learning

Universality

Hope

Percentage

F I G U R E 16.3 Group members’ ratings ofthe value of therapeutic factors in groups.

SOURCE: Kivlighan & Mullison, 1988, Participants’ perception oftherapeutic factors in group counseling: The role of interpersonalstyle and stage of group development. Small Group Behavior, 19,1988. Copyright 1988 by Sage Publications, Inc. Reprinted bypermission of Sage Publications, Inc.

494 CHAPTER 16

Jacobson, 1994). In sum, the “accumulated evi-dence indicates that group treatments have beenmore effective than no treatment, than placebo ornonspecific treatments, or than other recognizedpsychological treatments, at least under some cir-cumstances” (Bednar & Kaul, 1994, p. 632).

These positive conclusions, however, requiresome qualification. First, the changes brought aboutby group experiences are often more perceptual thanbehavioral. Second, in some cases, groups can domore harm than good for participants. Third, allgroups are not created equal; some may be moreeffective in promoting change than others. Theseissues are examined next.

Perceptions versus Behaviors

Richard Bednar and Theodore Kaul (1979), afterculling the studies of change that were methodologi-cally flawed, concluded that most studies hadreported changes only on self-report data, but noton behavioral data. Reviews of experiential groups,for example, generally found stronger evidence ofperceptual changes than of behavioral changes(Bates & Goodman, 1986; Budman et al., 1984;Ware, Barr, & Boone, 1982). One review, for in-stance, identified 26 controlled studies of personalgrowth groups that (1) used both pretest and post-test measures, (2) met for at least 10 hours, and (3)had a long-term follow-up (at least one month aftertermination). Summarizing these methodologicallysuperior studies, the reviewers concluded that grouptreatments did result in enduring positive changes,particularly at the self-report level (Berman &Zimpfer, 1980). These and other findings suggestthat groups are most useful in promoting changesin the “ability to manage feelings, directionality ofmotivation, attitudes towards the self, attitudes to-wards others, and interdependence,” but that behav-ior is more resistant to change (Gibb, 1970, p. 2114;Shaw, 1981).

Evidence of Negative Effects

Not everyone who joined the group following thebus accident remained in the group. Four indivi-duals, after the first session, did not return to the

group. Several members attended the sessions dur-ing the return trip only sporadically. One person,when later asked about the experience, said it didnot help at all (Turner, 2000).

Bednar and Kaul noted that groups can fail intwo distinct ways. First, a participant may decide toleave the group before he or she has benefited inany way; such an individual is usually labeled apremature termination, or dropout (Holmes,1983). A casualty, in contrast, is significantlyharmed by the group experience. A casualty might,for example, attempt suicide as a result of the groupexperience, require individual therapy to correctharm caused by the group, or report continueddeteriorations in adjustment over the course ofthe group experience. The number of casualtiesreported in studies has ranged from a low of noneamong 94 participants in a human relations traininglab followed up after five months (Smith, 1975,1980) to a high of 8% of the participants in a studyof 17 encounter groups (Lieberman et al., 1973).A relatively high casualty rate (18%) was obtainedin one study of 50 married couples who partici-pated in marathon encounter groups, but this ratewas inflated by the problems the couples wereexperiencing before entering the group (Doherty,Lester, & Leigh, 1986). No evidence is availableconcerning the rate of casualties in support groups,but statistics maintained by the NTL indicate that25 individuals who participated in the programprior to 1974 experienced a severe psychologicalreaction (Back, 1974). This number representedless than 0.2% of the participants.

Bednar and Kaul (1978) noted that most pre-mature terminations result from failed expecta-tions about the purposes of the group or froman inadequate match between the group mem-ber’s goals and the leader’s methods. Casualties,in contrast, can most often be traced to a

premature termination The withdrawal of a partici-pant from a change-promoting group that occurs beforethe individual has reached his or her therapeutic goals.casualty An individual whose psychological well-beingdeclines rather than improves as a result of his or herexperiences in a change-promoting group.


particularly negative event in the group. In onestudy, for example, an individual sought psychiat-ric treatment immediately after the group attackedher for being overweight:

She stated that the group was anextremely destructive one for her. Thegroup operated by everybody “ganging upon one another, thirteen to one, andbulldozing them until they were left onthe ground panting.” She was bitterlyattacked by the group and finally droppedout after an attack on her in which she waslabeled “a fat Italian mama with a bigshiny nose.” She was also told that sheprobably had “a hell of a time getting anyman to look at her.” (Lieberman et al.,1973, p. 189)

Given these potential problems, group thera-pists, trainers, facilitators, and members themselvesare urged to use care when interacting in theirgroups. Casualties can be minimized by limitingconflict during sessions and by making certain thatthe group atmosphere is supportive, nonevaluative,and nonthreatening (Mitchell & Mitchell, 1984;Scheuble et al., 1987).

Types of Groups and Effectiveness

Change-promoting groups conform to no single setof procedures: Some groups are leader centered (psy-choanalytic or Gestalt groups), whereas others aregroup focused (encounter groups and T-groups);and the group’s activities can range from the highlystructured (interpersonal learning groups) to thewholly unstructured (encounter groups). In somegroups, the members themselves are responsible forrunning the meeting, whereas in other situations, thefacilitator runs the session (structured groups). Grouppractitioners also vary greatly in their orientationsand techniques: Some focus on emotions withGestalt exercises, others concentrate on the hereand now of the group’s interpersonal processes, andstill others train members to perform certain beha-viors through videotaped feedback, behavioralrehearsal, and systematic reinforcement.

Given this diversity of purposes and procedures,one might expect some types of groups to emerge asmore effective than others. Yet differences in treat-ment effectiveness are relatively rare. MortonLieberman, Irvin Yalom, and Matthew Miles (1973),for example, investigated the overall impact of a 12-week experiential group on members’ adjustment.They began by assigning 206 Stanford Universitystudents to 1 of 18 therapy groups representing tendifferent theoretical orientations. Trained observerscoded the groups’ interactions, with particular atten-tion to leadership style. Before, during, immediatelyafter, and six months following the participation, theyadministered a battery of items assessing group mem-bers’ self-esteem, attitudes, self-satisfaction, values, sat-isfaction with friendships, and so on. Measures werealso completed by the comembers, the leaders, and bygroup members’ acquaintances.

Somewhat unexpectedly, the project discoveredthat no one theoretical approach had a monopoly oneffectiveness. For example, two separate Gestaltgroups with different leaders were included in thedesign, but the members of these two groups evi-denced widely discrepant gains. One of the Gestaltgroups ranked among the most successful in stimulat-ing participant growth, but the other Gestalt groupyielded fewer benefits than all of the other groups.

A number of factors could account for this ap-parent equivalence of therapies (Stiles, Shapiro, &Elliott, 1986). First, the various group therapies maybe differentially effective, but researchers’ measuresmay not be sensitive enough to detect these varia-tions. Second, a group’s effectiveness may depend asmuch on who is in the group and who leads thegroup as on the methods used. The question is not“Is Therapy X more effective than Therapy Y?”but, “What type of group run by which therapistis effective for this individual with this type of prob-lem?” (Paul, 1967). Third, although group inter-ventions are based on widely divergent theoreticalassumptions, these assumptions may not lead todifferences in practice. The leader of a Gestaltgroup and the leader of a psychodynamic group,for example, may explain their goals and methodsin very different theoretical terms, but they maynonetheless rely on identical methods in their

496 CHAPTER 16

groups. Fourth, as the concept of therapeutic factorssuggests, despite their heterogeneity in purposes andprocedures, therapeutic groups have certain charac-teristics in common, and these common aspects ofgroups and their dynamics may account for theirtherapeutic effects.

The Value of Groups

Groups are not all benefit with no cost. Groups candemand great investments of time and energy fromtheir members. Although groups provide socialsupport, they are also a source of considerable stressfor their members. Groups, too, can socialize mem-bers in ways that are not healthy and set social

identity processes in motion that increase conflictbetween groups (Forsyth & Elliott, 2000).

The checkered impact of groups, however, in noway detracts from their significance in shaping mentalhealth. Groups help their members define and con-firm their values, beliefs, and identities. When indivi-duals are beset by problems and uncertainties, groupsoffer reassurance, security, support, and assistance.Groups are places where people can learn new socialskills and discover things about themselves andothers. Groups, too, can produce changes in memberswhen other approaches have failed. Both researchersand mental health professionals who understandgroups recognize their healing power, for groupshelp their members change for the better (Lewin,1951, p. 228).

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What are some of the ways that groups are used to helptheir members change?

1. Individuals often turn to groups for help inachieving personal and therapeutic change.As Lewin’s law of change states, “It is usuallyeasier to change individuals formed into agroup than to change any one of themseparately.”

2. Most change-oriented groups focus eitheron therapeutic adjustment (psychotherapygroups), interpersonal and emotionalgrowth (interpersonal learning groups), orovercoming addictions or other life stresses(support groups).

3. Group psychotherapy sessions, conducted bya mental health professional, focus onpsychological problems.

■ In group psychoanalysis, the therapist helpsmembers to gain insight into theirproblems by offering interpretations andworking through transference effects. Suchtherapies use a variety of analytic methodsdrawn from Freud’s approach to treatment,including dream interpretation.

■ Gestalt group therapy, developed by Perls,makes use of experiments, techniques,and extensive role-playing methods tostimulate emotional growth.

■ Psychodrama, developed by Moreno, alsouses role play and physical activities.

■ In interpersonal group psychotherapy, theleader takes advantage of the group’sdynamics to help members learn abouthow they influence others and how othersinfluence them. This method wasdeveloped by Yalom.

■ In cognitive–behavioral therapy groups, thetherapist uses principles derived fromlearning theory to encourage specificbehaviors while extinguishing others. Thisapproach makes use of behavioralmethods, including behavioral contracts,modeling, behavior rehearsal, andfeedback.

4. Interpersonal learning groups involve attemptsto help relatively well-adjusted individuals im-prove their self-understanding and relationshipswith others.


■ In training groups, or T-groups, membersare encouraged to actively confront andresolve interpersonal issues throughunstructured discussions.

■ In growth groups, such as sensitivity traininggroups or encounter groups, individuals areurged to disclose personal aspects ofthemselves to others and to provide othermembers with positive feedback.

■ In structured learning groups, members takepart in planned exercises that focus on aspecific interpersonal problem or skill.Most of these interventions involve alearning cycle that begins with anorienting overview and then moves fromexperience to discussion to analysis toapplication.

5. Support groups often form spontaneouslywhen people combine their energies and effortsin an attempt to cope with or overcome acommon problem. These groups tend to beproblem-specific, highly interpersonal, com-munal, autonomous, and perspective-based.

■ Many support groups, such as AlcoholicsAnonymous (AA), emphasize inspirationaltestimonials, mutual help, shared similari-ties, collective encouragement, andchanging the member’s social networks.

■ Studies of online support groups forproblems ranging from cancer to sexualabuse to psychological disorders havesuggested that these groups provide manyof the same resources to members as doface-to-face support groups.

How do groups promote change?

1. A number of therapeutic factors operate in groupsto promote change.

2. Groups, by providing opportunities to engagein social comparison and mutual support,convince members of the universality of theirproblems and give them hope.

3. Because groups include multiple individuals,rather than just a single therapist/helper and asingle client, they can make use of the sourcesof interpersonal learning described in Bandura’ssocial learning theory.

■ Groups facilitate vicarious learning(modeling of behaviors), interpersonalfeedback, and guidance (direct instruction).

■ Coleadership (two leaders are present at allsessions) provides more opportunities forsocial learning and feedback. Groupfacilitators, like all group leaders, vary con-siderably along the directive–nondirectivedimension.

4. Cohesive groups offer individuals the oppor-tunity to help others and to be helped by them,and they serve as buffers against stress.Therapeutic groups, like all groups, generallybecome more cohesive over time.

5. Groups become more intimate as membersreveal private information about themselves(self-disclosure). When group members ventstrong emotions, the resulting catharsis mayreduce their stress.

6. Group members also benefit from the increasedself-confidence produced by helping others andby gaining insight about their personal qualitiesfrom other group members.

7. Many stress management crisis interventionsimplemented following community disastersand crises make use of group-level thera-peutic coping processes, including socialcomparison, social support, social learning,and mutual help.

How effective are groups in bringing about change?

1. Most group approaches are effective methodsfor helping individuals change their thoughts,emotions, and actions. However,

■ Changes fostered by group experiences areoften more perceptual than behavioral.

498 CHAPTER 16

■ Participation in groups can also lead to anumber of negative consequences, althoughnot every premature termination from a groupis necessarily a psychological casualty.

2. Group methods, despite their diversity, tendto be equally effective. This general but non-specific effectiveness may reflect the operationof common therapeutic factors across mosttherapeutic groups.


Chapter Case: The Bus Group■ “Group Treatment of Trauma Survivors

Following a Fatal Bus Accident: IntegratingTheory and Practice,” by Andrew L. Turner(2000), details the methods used to help collegestudents recover from a tragic bus accident thatoccurred during a semester abroad program.

Group Approaches to Change■ The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy

(5th ed.), by Irvin D. Yalom with MolynLeszcz (2005), describes with cases, theory, andsyntheses of available research Yalom’s basicprinciples of interpersonal group therapy,which stress the therapeutic factors commonto all group approaches to change.

■ “Groups as Change Agents” by Donelson R.Forsyth and John G. Corazzini (2000), providesa general overview of group approaches totreatment.

■ Psychological Effects of Catastrophic Disasters:Group Approaches to Treatment, by Leon A.Schein, Henry I. Spitz, Gary M. Burlingame,and Philip R. Muskin, with Shannon Vargo(2006), is a comprehensive compendium ofgroup-based methods of dealing with traumaticevents.

■ “Self-Help Groups,” by Leon H. Levy (2000),reviews a number of forms of self-help groups,and thoroughly reviews the empirical literaturepertaining to their effectiveness.

Group Effectiveness■ “Small-Group Treatment: Evidence for

Effectiveness and Mechanisms of Change,” byGary Burlingame, K. Roy MacKenzie, andBerhard Strauss (2004), is a cutting-edge syn-thesis of research studies that have investigatedthe nature and efficacy of group psychotherapyempirically.




17

Crowds and Collective Behavior

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The science of group dynamics is basedon one core assumption: People actcollectively. Much of this collectiveaction occurs in relatively small groups,but people sometimes join larger col-lectives, including crowds, mobs, audi-ences, fads, crazes, and social move-ments. For well over a century, mosttheorists and researchers have assumedthat crowds are unique social aggrega-tions, but collectives are, at their core,groups.

■ What is collective behavior?■ What theories explain collective

behavior?■ How different are collectives from

other types of groups?

CHAPTER OUTL INE

The Nature of Collectives

What Is a Collective?

Crowds

Collective Movements

Collective Dynamics

Le Bon’s Crowd Psychology:Contagion

Who Joins In: Convergence

Loss of Identity: Deindividuation

Emergent Norm Theory

Collectives and Social Identity

Collectives Are Groups

The Myth of the Madding Crowd

Studying Groups and Collectives

Summary in Outline


Media Resources

500

✵

The Who Concert Stampede: A Crowd Gone Mad?

The crowd, nearly 8000 strong, was waiting to get intoCincinnati’s Riverfront Coliseum to hear a concert bythe ’70s rock band The Who. Many fans had festivalseating, which meant that they were not assignedspecific seats on the arena floor. So, in order to get aspot near the stage, fans had come to the venueearly so they could enter as soon as the doors opened.But logistical problems delayed the staff from openingthe doors, so by late afternoon thousands of peoplewere massed outside the building in a tightly packedthrong. When pranksters pushed against peoplestanding at the periphery of the crowd, the shovepassed through the group like a ripple through water(see Figure 17.1).

The doors opened at 7:30, and the crowd surgedforward. A crowd of 8000 people is loud, but abovethe din, the concertgoers could hear the band warmingup. As those on the periphery pushed forward,

people near the doors were packed together tighterand tighter. The ticket takers worked as fast as theycould, but too few doors were opened to handle thelarge collective. The back of the group moved fasterthan the front, and the flow jammed near the cloggeddoors. People were literally swept off their feet by thesurge and some slipped to the concrete floor. Thosearound them tried to pull them back to their feet, butthe overcrowded mass of people pushed on towardopen doors and the music. As the rear of the crowdcontinued to push forward the crowd swept past thosewho had fallen, and they were trampled underfoot.

Eleven people died that night, killed by the surge ofa crowd of people. Most suffocated, caught so long inthe press of the crowd that they could not breathe. Manyof those who survived were bruised and battered; their“bodies were marked with multiple contusions, bruises”and “hemorrhages” (“The Who,” 1979, p. A-19).

CROWDS AND COLLECT IVE BEHAV IOR 501


This tragedy is a grim example of collectivebehavior—the actions of a large group of peoplewho are responding in a similar way to an eventor situation. Earlier chapters focused on smallergroups—cliques, work squads, juries, sports teams,corporate boards, crews, and bands of explorers.But individuals also—sometimes unwittingly andsometimes purposely—can become members ofmuch larger aggregates. Some collectives, like theconcertgoers at the Who concert, form whenpeople are concentrated in a specific location.Others, however, occur when widely dispersedindividuals engage in markedly similar actions, aswhen all the individuals in a community, city, orcountry begin to adopt a fad or fashion style. Inmost cases, collectives do not behave in odd, atypi-cal ways. Each day, thousands upon thousands ofcollectives form and disband around the world,and in nearly all cases, these collectives help ratherthan hurt their members. But collectives are, attheir core, groups, and like any other group, theycan go wrong.

This chapter’s analysis of collectives is a mix-ture of description, explanation, and rectification.It begins by first describing the wide variety ofcollectives, for they can range from the accidentalconvergences of unrelated individuals to groupswith faithful followers who remain members formany years. The chapter then considers both classicand contemporary theoretical analyses of collec-tive behavior, beginning with the provocative ar-guments presented by Gustave Le Bon (1895/1960)in his book The Crowd and ending with new theo-ries that strive to rectify common misconcep-tions about these extraordinary forms of humanassociation.

THE NATURE OF

COLLECT IVES

In 1943, Mrs. Mullane, a contestant on a radio pro-gram, was told to collect pennies as a service to thenation’s war effort. The announcer then suggestedthat listeners should send Mrs. Mullane a penny, andgave her address on the air. Within weeks, shereceived more than 200,000 letters and well over300,000 pennies. On Halloween night in 1938,Orson Welles broadcast the radio program TheWar of the Worlds. In some parts of the country peo-ple panicked, thinking the dramatization was a realnews broadcast and that Martian invaders wereattacking Earth. In 1978, only 8% of households inthe United States had microwave ovens. This per-centage increased slowly until 1985, when the per-centage jumped from 34% to 61%. On the afternoonof October 27, 2005, a confrontation between policeand youths in Paris, France, resulted in the tragicaccidental deaths of two young men. The incidenttriggered a series of riots; each night wandering mobsset hundreds of cars on fire. The final numberburned: over 8,000. Recently an Internet prankknown as “rickrolling” spread across message boards,forums, and websites until eventually moving offline.When a viewer clicked on a link that promised con-tent on a particular topic he or she was instead takento a site that showed a video of British singer RickAstley performing the 1987 song “Never GonnaGive You Up.” Self-appointed “rickrollers” tookto playing the song loudly in public places to disruptevents. On the ninth day of the month of hajj, atnoon, more than two million people gather on thePlain of Arafat in Saudi Arabia, the site of theprophet Mohammad’s farewell sermon—arguablythe largest gathering of people to assemble in oneplace at any time in history. In 2008, a Wal-Martemployee died when he was trampled by a largecrowd of shoppers on the biggest shopping day ofthe holiday season in the United States—“BlackFriday.”

The science of group dynamics is based on onecore assumption—that people act collectively.

collective behaviorThe actions of a group of peoplewho are responding in a similar way to an event or situ-ation, including people who all occupy the same loca-tion (a crowd), as well as mass phenomena in whichindividuals are dispersed across a wide area (collectivemovements).

502 CHAPTER 17

Much of this collective action occurs in relativelysmall groups, and the field of group dynamics (andthis book) has concentrated on such groups. But asthese historical examples reveal, people also joinvery large groups, and the impact of these groupson their members can be large as well.

What Is a Collective?

A collective, as noted in Chapter 1, is a relatively largegroup of people who display similarities in actionsand outlook. Families, clubs, juries, a work crew,and teams are not collectives, for they are too small,too structured, and their membership too well-defined and stable. Collectives, as Table 17.1 indi-cates, are larger and more diffuse in character: Acrowd forming around a street magician doing atrick, an audience at a play, a line of people (a queue)waiting their turn to enter a theater, a mob ofParisians setting fire to a parked car, and a panickedgroup trying to escape danger are all examples ofcollectives. The list of such groups would also in-clude people who, even though they are not collo-cated, nonetheless respond to something in a similarway. Individuals on the Internet in a large simulatedworld (such as Second Life) or people responding tothe same television or radio program (say, by votingfor their favorite contestant on American Idol) couldalso be considered a collective.

The diversity of collectives is so great that nosingle classification scheme is sufficient to categorizetheir many forms. They tend to be large, but somecollectives are huge—as when millions of individualsrespond similarly to some fashion craze. In some cases,all the members of a collective are together in oneplace, and so they “can monitor each other by beingvisible to or within earshot of one another” (Snow &Oliver, 1995, p. 572). Some collectives, in contrast,involve individuals who are dispersed across great dis-tances. All collectives, however, are distinguished bytheir members’ “common or concerted” form of

behavior or reaction (McPhail, 1991, p. 159).Members of a crowd, for example, may move inthe same direction or perform the same general typesof behaviors. Members of collective movements, al-though not interacting in face-to-face settings, act insimilar ways to achieve a common purpose—they aremoving in the same direction, even though they aredispersed.

Collectives also vary in their duration and co-hesion. Although some collectives are concocted,planned groups that are created for a specific pur-pose, in most cases they are emergent groups that

T A B L E 17.1 Various Types of Collectives

Type Defining Characteristics

Crowd A temporary gathering ofindividuals who share a commonfocus of interest

Audience Spectators at an exhibition,performance, or event

Queue A waiting line or file ofindividuals

Mob An acting crowd, oftenaggressive in character

Riot A large, less localized and lessorganized mob

Panic A threatened crowd, eitherseeking escape from danger orcompeting for a scarcecommodity

Mass delusionand rumor

The spontaneous outbreak ofatypical thoughts, feelings, oractions in a group or aggregate,including psychogenic illness,common hallucinations, andbizarre actions

Trends (fads,crazes, fashions)

An abrupt but short-livedchange in the opinions,behaviors, life-style, or dress of alarge number of widelydispersed individuals

Social movement A deliberate, organizedattempt to achieve a changeor resist a change in a socialsystem

collective A relatively large aggregation or group of in-dividuals who display similarities in actions and outlook.


result from the press of circumstances or throughself-organizing dynamics (Arrow et al., 2000).They tend to be open groups, for they have nostandards for defining membership and do notadopt operational strategies. In consequence, therelationships between members are more superficialand impersonal than those that link members ofsmaller groups. If a typical group is two or moreindividuals who are connected to one another byinterpersonal relationships, a typical collective is alarge number of individuals who are connected bysimilarity in action and outlook rather than by close,intimate relationships. Collectives, too, are by repu-tation more unconventional than other groups.They tend to exist outside of traditional forms ofsocial structures and institutions, and as a result,their members sometimes engage in atypical, un-ruly, unconventional, or even aberrant behaviors(Turner, R., 2001).

Crowds

The throng of concertgoers massed outside theWho show was a crowd—a group of individualssharing a common focus and concentrated in a sin-gle location. Individuals who are sitting on benchesin a park or walking along a city block occupy acommon location, but they do not become a crowdunless something happens—a fire, a car collision, ora mugging, for example—to create a common fo-cus of attention (Milgram & Toch, 1969). Shoppersin a mall are just individuals, until a woman spanksher small child when he cries too loudly. Suddenly,the hundred pairs of eyes of an instantly formedcrowd focus on the woman, who hurries out thedoor. The most common types of crowds are streetcrowds, queues, mobs, and panics.

Street Crowds Crowds tend to spring up, unex-pectedly and spontaneously; a group of otherwise

unrelated individuals who, while going about theirown personal business, end up in the same generalvicinity and share a common experience (seeFocus 17.1). Variously labeled street crowds, publiccrowds, or gatherings, these crowds form in public orsemi-public places, and are made up of peoplewho are strangers to one another—except for theclusters of intact groups that they enfold. At theWho concert, for example, groups of friendswaited together for the concert to begin, and thesesubgroups remained intact until the fatal crush atthe entrance doors.

Although such crowds are often short-lived,even these fleeting collectives possess a rudimentarysocial structure. Their boundaries are relativelypermeable at the edges of the crowd, where indivi-duals are allowed to enter and exit freely, but perme-ability diminishes as one moves nearer the center ofthe crowd. Also, roles, status hierarchies, and othergroup structures may not be very evident in suchcrowds, but close probing usually reveals some under-lying structure. For example, they usually take on oneof two distinctive shapes—arcs (half-circles with allmembers facing some focal point) and rings (full cir-cles). The focal point is known as a crowd crystal—oneor more individuals who, by drawing attention tothemselves or some event, prompt others to jointhem (Canetti, 1962). Evidence also indicates thatthose who occupy central positions in crowds arelikely to be more actively involved in the experiencethan those who are content to remain on the fringes(Milgram & Toch, 1969).

Consistencies in action parallel these consisten-cies in structure. Clark McPhail and his colleagues,after observing all kinds of public gatherings, iden-tified a number of elementary behaviors commonto such groups (McPhail, 1991, 2006; Tucker,Schweingruber & McPhail, 1999). Their listingincludes:

■ Movement: Actions taken in common by groupmembers, such as clustering, queueing, surging,marching, jogging, and running.

■ Positioning: The stance assumed by members inthe space, including sitting, standing, jumping,bowing, and kneeling.

crowd A gathering of individuals, usually in a publicplace, who are present in the same general vicinity andshare a common focus.

504 CHAPTER 17

F o c u s 17.1 How Do You Trigger Crowd Formation?

We are often told that the dullness of the countrydrives the people to the towns. But that statementinverts the truth. It is the crowd in the towns, the vasthuman herd, that exerts a baneful attraction on thoseoutside it.

—William McDougall (1908, p. 303)

A crowd can spring into existence in a moment, whenotherwise unrelated individuals suddenly becomeentwined in a discernable, if fleeting, collective. Onemoment the street corner or walkway contains onlyindividuals going about their personal activities, andthe next moment a crowd crystallizes as theseindividuals join together to form a group.

Stanley Milgram and his colleagues examined thisprocess by creating, experimentally, crowds on a street inNew York City. On two winter afternoons in 1968 theyattempted to trigger the formation of crowds by havingconfederates stop in the middle of the sidewalk andstare, in rapt attention, at the sixth floor of a nearbybuilding. Theywould remain in place as passersby flowedaround them, and the researchers recorded—from thatvery same window of the nearby building—how manystopped. They selected a busy street for their study, foran average of 50 people passed by during any givenobservation period. And they varied the number ofpeople who planted the seed for the group. In someconditions just one person stood staring up, but otherconditions included as many as 15 confederates.

How many would be drawn by the “banefulattraction” of the crowd and how many would resist?Milgram and his associates discovered that sizemattered when it came to triggering the formation of a

stationary crowd. When they counted the number ofpeople who actually stopped walking and stood withthe group, taking up the collective stare, they discoveredthat more and more people joined in as the stimuluscrowd of confederates grew larger. Only 4% of thepassersby joined a single starer, but 40% stopped in theirtracks and joined the large crowd—swelling the groupin size from 15 to about 35 people (see Figure 17.2).However, if a less stringent criterion for a crowd wasused—people needed only to share the same focus ofattention—then even a single individual was capable ofinfluencing 42% of the passersby to look up. The crowdof 15 influenced even more—86% (Milgram, Bickman, &Berkowitz, 1969). The crowdsmay have grown larger still,but for two factors. First, the confederates dispersed indifferent directions after one minute, and their depar-ture signaled the crowd’s end. Second, the holdingpower of the crowd would have been greater if therewas actually something to observe. With nothing tohold their shared focus, these groups disappeared assoon as the attentional bonds that held their group to-gether faded away.

This study of street crowds confirms the power ofgroups. Even strangers, passing by each other on thestreets of a large and anonymous city, influenced eachother, as each person imitated the actions of the other(Cialdini, 2005). Milgram and his colleagues note,however, that those who joined their crowds were notnecessarily sheep following the crowd, for there is alogical basis for joining in such crowds: “all otherthings being equal, the larger the crowd the morelikely its members are attending to a matter ofinterest” (1969, pp. 81–82).

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

1 2 3 5 10 15

Size of stimulus crowd

Per

cent

of p

asse

rsb

y

who stop

who look up

F I G U R E 17.2 The meanpercentage of people who lookedup or stopped when they passed asingle person or a group of 2, 3, 5,10, or 15 people looking up at abuilding.

SOURCE: From “Note on the Drawing Power ofCrowds of Different Size,” by S. Milgram,L. Bickman, & L. Berkowitz, Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 13, 1969. Copyright 1969by the American Psychological Association.


■ Manipulation: Alternation of objects in thesetting, such as throwing or moving objects.

■ Gesticulation: Gesturing, such as saluting andsignaling (e.g., the raised middle finger,power fist).

■ Verbalization: Communicating throughlanguage forms, such as chanting, singing,praying, reciting, or pledging.

■ Vocalization: Communicating with paralinguis-tic sounds, such as ooh-ing and ahh-ing,cheering, booing, whistling, laughing, orwailing.

■ Orientation: Moving into a particular formationwithin the space, such as clustering, arcing,ringing, gazing, facing, or vigiling.

Audiences A crowd that deliberately gathers in aparticular area to observe some event or activity iscalled an audience (or conventional crowd). Unlike acrowd that forms spontaneously when some eventcreates a shared focus, individuals join audiencesdeliberately, and they are bound more tightly bysocial conventions that dictate their location andmovements (Blumer, 1946). They enter the focalarea via aisles or pathways and occupy locationsthat are determined by seating arrangements orby custom. While observing, they may perform avariety of behaviors, including clapping, cheering,shouting, or questioning, but these actions are usu-ally in accord with the norms of the particularsetting. Moreover, when the event or performancehas ended, the audience disperses in an orderly fash-ion (Hollingworth, 1935).

Queues A queue—a group of persons awaitingtheir turn—is a unique type of crowd. Queue comesfrom the French word for a braid of hair and so pays

etymological homage to the queue’s most commonshape—a relatively straight line. But some settings,such as theme parks, lobbies, and registration of-fices, shape the queue into a zigzag pattern throughthe use of stanchions and ropes. Other establish-ments create dispersed queues by assigning queuersa number and then summoning them through abeeper or announcement when it is their turn.Queues can also be segmented into subgroups thatare permitted to enter together, as when passengersboard a plane in groups based on seat assignment.Some queues, too, are not at all linear, as whenthose waiting to board a bus (or to enter a crowdedconcert venue) move in a relatively unregulatedway toward the entryway.

Like the common crowd, the queue includesstrangers who will probably never meet again. Butlike the members of an audience, those in a queuehave joined deliberately to achieve a particular goal,and thus, as members of the collective, they arebound by certain norms of behavior (Mann, 1969,1970). Queues are an interference, for they preventpeople from immediately achieving their goal ofacquiring tickets, services, or other commodities,but they also protect people from late-arrivingcompetitors for these commodities. As Milgramand his colleagues noted,

As in the case of most social arrangements,people defer to the restraints of the form,but they are also its beneficiary. The queuethus constitutes a classic illustration of howindividuals create social order, on the basisof a rudimentary principle of equity, in asituation that could otherwise degenerateinto chaos. (Milgram et al., 1986, p. 683)

But what prevents the queue from breakingdown into a disorderly crowd? Milgram notedthat in addition to environmental supports, suchas ushers and ropes, queues are also protected bynorms of civility and justice. People in many cul-tures implicitly recognize the basic fairness of theprinciple “first come, first served” (or “first in, firstout,”) which the queue protects (Zhou & Soman,2008). When members join the queue, they acceptits rules, and even though the group will disband

audience A gathering of onlookers who observe someperformance, event, or activity; audiences tend to beconventional in behavior, and they disperse when theevent they are watching concludes.queue A line, file, or set of people who are waiting forsome service, commodity, or opportunity.

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as soon as the event begins, members conform toits norms and enforce them as needed (Miller,2001).

Milgram studied queues by having both maleand female accomplices break into 129 lines waitingoutside ticket offices and the like in New YorkCity. Working either alone or in pairs, the ac-complices would simply say, “Excuse me, I’d liketo get in here,” and then insert themselves in theline. In an attempt to determine who would bemost likely to enforce the norm, Milgram also in-cluded either one or two passive confederates insome of the queues he studied. These individuals,who were planted in the line in advance, stooddirectly behind the point of intrusion (Milgramet al., 1986).

Objections occurred in nearly half of the linesstudied. In a few cases (10.1%), queuers used physi-cal action, such as a tap on the shoulder or a push.In 21.7% of the lines, the reaction was verbal, suchas “No way! The line’s back there. We’ve all beenwaiting and have trains to catch,” or “Excuse me,it’s a line.” In another 14.7% of the lines, queuersused dirty looks, staring, and hostile gestures to ob-ject to the intrusion nonverbally. Objections werealso more prevalent when two persons broke intothe line rather than one, and they were least preva-lent when two confederates separated the intrudersfrom the other queuers. Overall, 73.3% of the com-plaints came from people standing behind the pointof intrusion rather than from people standing infront of the intrusion. Other investigators foundthat queue-breakers encountered less hostilitywhen they appeared to be joining someone theyknew and when they only broke in near the veryend of the line (Schmitt, Dubé, & Leclerc, 1992).These findings suggest that self-interest, as well asthe normative force of the queue’s rules, mediatedreactions to the queue-breakers’ actions.

Mobs When a gathering of people—a crowd, anaudience, or even a queue—becomes emotionallycharged, the collective can become a mob. Mobstend to form when some event, such as a crime, acatastrophe, or a controversial action, evokes thesame kind of affect and action in a substantial

number of people. The hallmark of the mob is itsemotion (Lofland, 1981). Early accounts of mobsargued that individuals in mobs were so over-whelmed by their emotions that they could nolonger control their actions. Unless the situation isdiffused, the mob becomes volatile, unpredictable,and capable of violent action. Mobs, as their nameimplies, are often highly mobile, with membersmoving together from one location to another,massing in a single location, or just milling aboutin unpatterned ways (Hughes, 2003).

Mobs, even though they stimulate their mem-bers’ emotions, are not necessarily irrational, nor arethey necessarily violent. When sports fans celebratea victory, when partiers parade New Orleans streetsduring Mardi Gras, or when patriots celebrate theend of a conflict, the members of a mob share posi-tive emotions—joy, jubilation, and exhilaration—in a carnival-like atmosphere (Vider, 2004). Theiraggressive counterparts, however, tend to be morecommon—or at least they receive more attentionin the media (Milgram & Toch, 1969). Lynch mobsterrorized Black men in the southern United Statesuntil recently. The first documented lynch moboccurred in the United States in 1882, but by1950, lynch mobs had killed thousands. Virtuallyall the victims were Black, and many of the killingswere savagely brutal (Mullen, 1986; Tolnay &Beck, 1996). Hooligans are a specific type of violentsports fans—particularly of football (soccer)—inEurope. These mobs of fans, often intoxicated,mill about in the streets and pubs around the stadi-ums, fighting with fans who support the opposingteam (Dunning, Murphy, & Williams, 1986;Oyserman & Saltz, 1993). The abuse of low-statusgroup members by groups of bullies, which issometimes termed mobbing, is a regular occurrencein both school and work settings (Schuster, 1996;Whitney & Smith, 1993).

mob A disorderly, emotionally charged crowd; mobstend to form when some event, such as a crime, a catas-trophe, or a controversial action, evokes the same kind ofaffect and action in a substantial number of people.


Riots can be construed as mobs on a granderscale. They often begin when a relatively peacefulcrowd is transformed by a negative experience into aviolent mob. For example, on the final night of the1999 Woodstock music festival, an anti-violencegroup named PAX asked the audience to lightcandles as an expression of unity. A small group ofconcertgoers instead used the candles to burn downthe outdoor venue. MTV news correspondent KurtLoder described the incident as “the history ofhuman terrestrial evolution recounted in reverse”(quoted in Vider, 2004, p. 114). In other cases, riotsare an expression of unrest and protest in the generalpopulation. In 1921, for example, Whites in Tulsa,Oklahoma, attacked the highly successful Blackbusiness community of Greenwood. Hundredswere killed, and 35 city blocks of Black-ownedbusinesses were destroyed. In the 1960s, riots dif-fused throughout many large American cities due,in part, to intergroup competition and racial ten-sions (Myers, 1997). In 1980 and 1992, residents ofLiberty City, Florida, and Los Angeles, California,rioted when police officers charged with brutalitywere found not guilty. Riots are also sometimesmotivated by the desire to loot and steal ratherthan by group-level processes. For example, in1969, when the police force of Montreal wenton strike for 17 hours, riots broke out all overthe city. As expected, professional crimes sky-rocketed, but the noncriminal population also ranamok. A heterogeneous crowd, including impo-verished, wealthy, and middle-class people ram-paged along the central business corridor, lootingand vandalizing (Clark, 1969).

Panics Some mobs are charged with a differentset of emotions than anger; they are fearful, anx-ious, and frightened. These mobs have panicked, forthey are either fleeing from an aversive situation(escape panics) or seeking out a limited resource

that they fear will run out (acquisitive panics).Escaping mobs occur when crowds of people areovertaken by some catastrophe, such as a fire, flood,or earthquake, and they must escape en masse fromthe dangerous situation. Many groups exit suchsituations calmly, but if the situation is seen asvery dangerous, and the escape routes are limited,a crowd can become a panicked mob (Strauss,1944). Members, fearing personal harm or injury,struggle to escape both from the situation and fromthe crowd itself:

The individual breaks away and wants toescape from it because the crowd, as awhole, is endangered. But because he isstill stuck in it, he must attack it. . . . Themore fiercely each man “fights for his life,”the clearer it becomes he is fighting againstall the others who hem him in. Theystand there like chairs, balustrades, closeddoors, but different from these in that theyare alive and hostile. (Canetti, 1962,pp. 26–27)

Panics often result in a staggering loss of life. In1903, for example, a panic at Chicago’s IroquoisTheater killed nearly 600 people. When a smallfire broke out backstage, the management tried tocalm the audience. But when the house lights whenout and the fire was visible behind the stage, thecrowd stampeded for the exits. Some were burned,and others died by jumping from the fire escapes tothe pavement, but many more were killed as fleeingpatrons trampled them. One observer described thepanic this way:

In places on the stairways, particularlywhere a turn caused a jam, bodies werepiled seven or eight feet deep. Firemen andpolice confronted a sickening task indisentangling them. An occasional livingperson was found in the heaps, but most ofthese were terribly injured. The heel printson the dead faces mutely testified to thecruel fact that human animals stricken interror are as mad and ruthless as stamped-ing cattle. Many bodies had the clothes

riot A large and often widely dispersed crowd whosewanton and unrestrained behavior violates rules of civiland legal authority (e.g., harassment, looting, destructionof property, assault, violence).

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torn from them, and some had the fleshtrodden from their bones. (Foy & Harlow,1928/1956)

Experimental simulations of panicked crowdssuggest that individuals who must take turns exitingfrom a dangerous situation are most likely to panicwhen they believe that the time available to escapeis very limited and when they are very fearful of theconsequences of a failure to escape (Kelley et al.,1965; Mintz, 1951). Larger groups, even if givenmore time to effect their escape, are also morelikely to panic than smaller ones (Chertkoff,Kushigian, & McCool, 1996). If a large group canbe split up into smaller groups that are led separatelyto exits, the time taken to exit is reduced, butgroups usually are unable to effect this level of controlover their movements during a panic (Sugiman &Misumi, 1988).

The group waiting for the Who concert wasinitially a queue—a disorganized queue, but a queuenonetheless. But when the doors opened, the queuebecame a surging crowd, and then a panic. Althoughthe news media described the crowd as a drug-crazed stampede bent on storming into the concert,police interviews with survivors indicated that thecrowd members in the center of the crush were try-ing to flee from the dangerous overcrowding ratherthan to get into the concert. Also, some individualsin the crowd were clearly fighting to get out of thedanger, but some were Good Samaritans whohelped others to safety ( Johnson, 1987).

Many municipalities and promoters, to preventa repeat of the Who concert tragedy, have bannedgeneral admission seating: all tickets are for specificseats within the venue. However, in places wheregeneral admission seating is permitted, norms oftendevelop to create queues to prevent crowding.Before shows by the band U2 in the United States,for example, fans holding general admission ticketsarrive at the venue hours (or even days) before thedoors open. They organize their wait, however, in afairly elaborate normative system, in which each per-son’s order in the line is recorded by self-appointed“line Nazis.” Line breaking is not tolerated, althoughfriends are permitted to hold places for late-arriving

friends, provided that others nearby in the line arefully informed about the later arrival of additionalqueue members. In general, more committed fansare more adamant about maintaining the queue’snorms (Helweg-Larsen & LoManaco, 2008). Othersteps that can be taken to protect people when incrowds in public places are discussed in Focus 17.2.

Collective Movements

Not all collective phenomena transpire at close dis-tances. In some cases, individuals who are physicallydispersed may act and react in similar and oftenatypical ways. Such curious phenomena are vari-ously termed collective movements, mass move-ments, or dispersed collective behavior, although thisterminology is by no means formalized or univer-sally recognized (Genevie, 1978; Smelser, 1962).But like crowds, collective phenomena come inmany varieties, including rumors, trends, and socialmovements (see Figure 17.3).

Rumors and Mass Delusions In 1954, rumorsthat windshields were being damaged by nuclear fall-out began circulating in the Seattle area. The rumorsescalated into a mild form of mass hysteria as repor-ters devoted much attention to the issue, residentsjammed police telephone lines reporting damage,and civic groups demanded government interven-tion. Subsequent investigation revealed that no dam-age at all had occurred (Medalia & Larsen, 1958).

Rumors provide people with a means of ex-changing information about threatening situationsand, in many cases, have a calming effect on groupsand communities. In some cases, however, rumorscan instigate more negative reactions to uncertainty,and play a part in triggering riots and panics. Futurerioters, for example, often mill about for hoursswapping stories about injustices before taking anyaggressive action. Panics and crazes, too, are oftensustained by rumors, particularly when the mass

collective movement A large aggregation of indivi-duals, widely dispersed across space and time, who striveto attain common goals, interests, or aspirations.


media perpetuate hearsay in news reports andannouncements (Allport & Postman, 1947;Milgram & Toch, 1969). A recent epidemic of koro(a rare delusion characterized by the fear that one’ssex organswill disappear) that swept through theHanregion of China, for example, was traced to exposure

to rumors about the fictitious malady (Cheng, 1997).Similarly, the riot that occurred at the 1999Woodstock music festival was preceded by a day ofrumors circulating through the crowd about whatthe final night of the concert would bring (Vider,2004).

F o c u s 17.2 What Can Be Done to Make Crowds Safer?

The mob has no judgment, no discretion, no direction,no discrimination, no consistency.

—Cicero

A dozen people were killed when a police raid trig-gered a panic in a crowded club in Mexico City, Mexico.When thousands of pilgrims massed on a narrow roadto the Chamunda Devi temple in India, the crowd sud-denly stampeded and 147 people were killed andscores injured. In China, at least three shoppers diedduring a rush on sale items at a superstore located inBeijing. When a rumor raced through a huge gatheringof Shiite Muslims in Baghdad that a suicide bomberwas in their midst, the crowd panicked and pushedforward across a narrow bridge with concrete barriersfor security. Nearly 1,000 people were killed.

The primary cause of such tragedies is that thenumber of people present is too great for the spaceavailable, resulting in partial entrapment. Onceconstrained, if some event causes the group to feelthreatened, then the members may try to move morequickly than they can, given the available space. Thegroup then becomes uncoordinated, as portions of thecrowd begin to move more slowly than other portions.Those caught in the jam lose their footing, fall, andthen are trampled by the rest of the crowd as it passesover them.

Researchers have studied this breakdown inhow group members move together in an attemptto identify ways to prevent tragedies due to over-crowding. In many cases, the work is being conductedby physicists and engineers, who approach the study ofcrowds by considering them to be flow systems ofmovement that obey the same laws that fluids andgasses do. Their basic model of pedestrian movementassumes that these self-organizing systems are stable,so long as volume does not reach critical levels. Oncethe volume surpasses this threshold for safety, then thesystem becomes chaotic and unpredictable—and astampede may occur.

Dirk Helbing and his colleagues (2007), forexample, have examined the causes of stampedes thatoccur, nearly every year, at the Jamarat Bridge duringhajj. The investigators, to determine the source of thedanger, conducted extensive analyses of the tapestaken from videocameras that recorded a deadlystampede in 2006. They discovered that, in most cases,the large group moved slowly, but inconsistently,through the crowded space. Some portions of thegroup moved more quickly than others, and densityvaried significantly across the entire crowd. Moreover,just as in engineering studies of traffic jams, they alsonoted the tendency for the groups to move instop-and-go waves: Portions of the crowd would moveforward more quickly than seemed prudent, given thecongestion, and would then have to stop quickly whenthose in front of them were moving slower. Groupscould tolerate these waves unless density became high,but density did reach very high levels at certain times—as great as 10 people per square meter. When suchlevels occurred, the group transitioned into whatHelbing calls the “turbulence phase,” in which indivi-duals were no longer moving in the same direction.Turbulence, the researchers discovered, caused peopleto lose their footing, and if they fell the denselypacked crowd unintentionally moved over them,killing or injuring them (Helbing, Johansson, &Al-Abideen, 2007; Johansson et al., 2008).

These findings suggest one certain solution:Control the number of people entering the area byconstricting the size of the entry points so that they aresmaller than the size of the exits. Cross-flows withinthe crowd should also be minimized, if possible, bycreating lanes within the space—similar to lanes on ahighway. The researchers also recommend installing“pressure relief valves”: structures that can be openedshould the densities become too great. These recom-mendations are being applied in the renovation of theJamarat Bridge, which includes emergency exit rampsleading down from the sides of the bridge.

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Ralph Rosnow (1980) argued that two condi-tions tend to influence the spread of rumor—thedegree of anxiety that individuals are experiencingand their uncertainty about the true nature of thesituation. He argued that just as individuals oftenaffiliate with others in threatening situations,“ambiguous or chaotic” situations tend to generaterumors. By passing rumors, individuals convey in-formation (albeit false) about the situation. Rumorsalso reduce anxiety by providing, in most cases, re-assuring reinterpretations of the ambiguous event(Walker & Berkerle, 1987). After the Three MileIsland nuclear power plant accident, for example,rumors circulated so rampantly that a rumor con-trol center had to be opened to supply more ac-curate information. Rosnow, after studying thisincident, maintained that even though many ofthe rumors were preposterous, they gave peoplea sense of security in a time of great anxiety(Rosnow & Kimmel, 1979; Rosnow, Yost, &Esposito, 1986).

Rumors also provide the basis for massdelusion—the spontaneous outbreak of atypicalthoughts, feelings, or actions in a group or aggre-gation, including psychogenic illness, commonhallucinations, and bizarre actions (Pennebaker,1982; Phoon, 1982). Such episodes are uncommon,but they have occurred regularly throughout themodern era. For example, the Werther syndrome isnamed for Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749–1832) novel Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers (TheSorrows of Young Werther), which triggered afashion fad (many young men of the time imitatedthe eccentric style of dress of the book’s hero,Werther) but also led to cluster suicides—manyreaders also killed themselves in the same way as

Collectives

Crowds(or gatherings)

Collectivemovements

“Street”crowds Audiences Queues Mobs

Socialmovements

Trends

Aggressivemobs

Panics Fads

Lynchmobs

Riots Escape Acquisitive Crazes

Fashiontrends

F I G U R E 17.3 A classification of collectives.

mass delusion The spontaneous outbreak of atypicalthoughts, feelings, or actions in a group or aggregation,including psychogenic illness, common hallucinations,and bizarre actions.


Werther did.Choreomania is the term used to describethe compulsive dancing crazes of the late MiddleAges. Tulipmania caused financial ruin for manywho speculated in the bulb market in Holland. Inthe 1600s, the price of tulip bulbs skyrocketed inthe Netherlands, and trading for the precious bulbswas frenzied.Many traders lost their life savings whenthe price of bulbs plummeted in 1637. Biting maniawas a 15th-century epidemic ofmass delusion, whichbegan when a German nun developed a compulsiveurge to bite her associates, who in turn bit others,until the mania spread to convents throughoutGermany, Holland, and Italy (see Bartholomew &Goode, 2000, for a review).

In some cases, unexplained epidemics of illnessesare thought to have been cases of psychogenicillness rather than organic illness. For example, inJune 1962, workers at a garment factory began com-plaining of nausea, pain, disorientation, and muscularweakness; some actually collapsed at their jobs or lostconsciousness. Rumors spread rapidly that the illnesswas caused by “some kind of insect” that had infestedone of the shipments of cloth from overseas, and theowners began making efforts to eradicate the bug. Nobug was ever discovered, however, and experts even-tually concluded that the “June Bug incident” hadbeen caused by mass delusion (Kerckhoff & Back,1968; Kerckhoff, Back, & Miller, 1965).

Researchers can never definitively determinewhich cases of widespread illness are socially pro-duced rather than biologically produced, but onestudy of work groups identified 23 separate casesthat involved large numbers of individuals afflictedwith “physical symptoms . . . in the absence of anidentifiable pathogen” (Colligan & Murphy, 1982,p. 35).More than 1200 people were affected by theseoutbreaks, with most reporting symptoms that in-cluded headaches, nausea, dizziness, and weakness.Many were women working in relatively repetitive,routinized jobs, and the illness often spread through

friendship networks. Similarly, studies of pupils inschool often conclude that many epidemics, such asoutbreaks of fainting or nausea, are caused by hyster-ical contagion (Bartholomew, 1997; Bartholomew& Sirois, 1996; Lee et al., 1996). Some experts be-lieve that many of the illnesses and medical com-plaints that are blamed on the presence of irritantsin office buildings and schools—the so-called sickbuilding syndrome—are actually psychogenic illnesses(Murphy, 2006).

How can group-level delusions be controlled?Organizational experts suggest that as soon as thepossibility of a physical cause is eliminated, workersshould be told that their problems are more psycho-logical than physical. A second means of limiting thespread of such delusions involves altering the setting.The outbreaks often occur when employees havebeen told to increase their productivity, or whenthey have been working overtime. Poor labor–man-agement relations have also been implicated, as havenegative environmental factors, such as noise, poorlighting, and exposure to dust, foul odors, or chemi-cals (Colligan, Pennebaker, & Murphy, 1982).Larger outbreaks of rumors and hysteria that sweepacross whole regions and countries can be counteredby providing citizens with clear, accurate informa-tion from trusted sources.

Trends In 1929, as the United States plunged intothe Great Depression, people had little time ormoney to spend playing golf. But several entrepre-neurs set up “miniature golf courses” in cities, and theidea took hold of the nation with a vengeance.Miniature golf spread over the entire country, andsome people were predicting that the game wouldreplace all other sports as the country’s favorite formof recreation. The craze died out within six months(LaPiere, 1938).

Trends are changes in attitudes, actions, and be-haviors that influence large segments of a population,

psychogenic illness A set of symptoms of illness in agroup of persons when there is no evidence of an organicbasis for the illness and no identifiable environmentalcause.

trend The general direction in which the attitudes,interests, and actions of a large segment of a populationchange over time, including fashion trends, fads, andcrazes.

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such as whole communities or regions. Many ofthese changes are relatively pedestrian ones; shiftsin the use of the Internet, for example, illustratethe diffusion of a technological innovation acrossthe world. Others, in contrast, are more capriciousand unpredictable. A fad, for example, is an unex-pected, short-lived change in the opinions,behaviors, or lifestyles of a large number of widelydispersed individuals. Fads such as the Hula Hoop,Live Strong bracelets, and Mood rings are remark-able both because they influence so many people sorapidly and because they disappear without leavingany lasting impact on society. Crazes are similar tofads in most respects, except that they are just a bitmore irrational, expensive, or widespread. Streaking(running naked) on college campuses, the wide-spread use of cocaine in the 1980s, and playinghacky sack all qualify as crazes. Finally, fads thatpertain to styles of dress or manners are generallytermed fashion trends. Clamdiggers gave way to hip-huggers, which were supplanted by bellbottoms,which lost out to blue jeans, which gave way tokhaki. Ties and lapels expand and contract, women’shemlines move up and down, and last season’scolor takes a backseat to this season’s shade (Ragone,1981).

Social Movements In 1096, thousands uponthousands of Europeans, urged on by Pope UrbanII, marched to Jerusalem to “wrest that land fromthe wicked race.” In 1789, large bands of Frenchcitizens fought government forces and eventuallyoverthrew the government. In 1955, Dr. MartinLuther King, Jr., and a dozen other ministersfounded the Montgomery Improvement Associa-tion, which succeeded in dismantling the segregatedbus system in Montgomery, Alabama. In 1971, agroup of protesters, calling themselves Green-peace, organized a campaign to prevent environ-mental degradation. Greenpeace now claims2.9 million supporters (contributors) and is involvedin 40 countries across Europe, the Americas, Asia,and the Pacific.

A social movement is a deliberate, relativelyorganized attempt to achieve a change or resist achange in a social system. Social movements, like

other forms of collective behavior, often arisespontaneously in response to some problem, suchas unfair government policies, societal ills, or threatsto personal values. They are, in a sense, very largesupport groups, seeking to improve the lives ofboth members and nonmembers (de la Roche,1996). Social movements are not short-lived, how-ever. Over time, social movements tend to gainnew members, set goals, and develop leadershipstructures, until eventually they change from spon-taneous gatherings of people into social movementorganizations, or SMOs. SMOs have all the structuralcharacteristics of any organization, including clearlydefined goals, rational planning, and bureaucraticleadership structures (see van Zomeren, Postmes,& Spears, 2008, for a detailed review).

Social movements, like crowds, vary in theirlongevity and their goals (Appelbaum & Chambliss,1995; Cameron, 1966). Reformist movements seek toimprove existing institutions, often through civildisobedience and demonstrations. The U.S. civilrights movement, for example, sought to changeexisting laws that gave unfair power to Whites, butthe movement did not challenge the basic demo-cratic principles of the country. Revolutionary move-ments, in contrast, seek more sweeping changes inexisting social institutions. The revolts in France inthe late 1700s, for example, were revolutionarymovements, for the protesters sought to overthrowthe monarchy and replace it with a democracy.Reactionary movements, instead of trying to achievechange, seek to resist it or even to reinstate extinctsocial systems. The Ku Klux Klan is one suchmovement, as are many militia groups and groupsthat argue against alternative lifestyles. Communi-tarian movements strive to create more ideal livingconditions than currently exist in modern society,often by withdrawing from contact with non-members. The communes of the 1960s werecommunitarian movements, as are such radical

social movement A collective movement making adeliberate, organized attempt to achieve a change orresist a change in a social system.


religious groups as Heaven’s Gate, the BranchDavidians, the People’s Temple, and the SolarTemple.

COLLECT IVE DYNAMICS

Scholars have pondered and debated the vagaries ofcollectives for centuries, seeking to specify the fac-tors that can transform individuals so thoroughlyand so unexpectedly. Although many answershave been offered, this section narrows the analysisby focusing on five theoretical explanations thathave stood the test of time and study. Each theoryfocuses on a different aspect of collective behavior,including motivational mechanisms, normativeinterpretations, and identity and its loss. Each oneis selective in its focus, but taken together theyprovide considerable insight into a wide array ofcollective phenomena.

Le Bon’s Crowd Psychology:

Contagion

Gustave Le Bon published his classic analysis of mobsand movements, The Crowd, in 1895. Le Bon wasfascinated by large groups, but he also feared theirtendency to erupt into violence. Perhaps because ofthese biases, he concluded that a crowd of peoplecould, in certain instances, become a unified entitythat acted as if guided by a single collective mind.Le Bon wrote,

Whoever be the individuals that com-pose it, however like or unlike be theirmode of life, their occupations, theircharacter, or their intelligence, the factthat they have been transformed into acrowd puts them in possession of a sortof collective mind which makes themfeel, think, and act in a manner quitedifferent from that in which each indi-vidual of them would feel, think, and actwere he in a state of isolation.(1895/1960, p. 27)

Le Bon believed that no matter what theindividual qualities of the people in the group, thecrowd would transform them, changing them fromrational, thoughtful individuals into impulsive, un-reasonable, and extreme followers. Once people fallunder the “law of the mental unity of crowds”(1895/1960, p. 24), they act as the collective minddictates.

Le Bon was a physician, so he viewed thecollective mind as a kind of disease that infectedone part of the group and then spread throughoutthe rest of the crowd (see Focus 17.3). After ob-serving many crowds firsthand, Le Bon concludedthat emotions and behaviors could be transmittedfrom one person to another just as germs can bepassed along, and he believed that this process ofcontagion accounted for the tendency of groupmembers to behave in very similar ways (Wheeler,1966).

Many of Le Bon’s speculations have beendiscredited, but he was right about one thing:Contagion is common in groups. People uncon-sciously mimic each other during everyday socialinteraction—if one person stands with her armscrossed over her chest, before long several of the othersin the group will also cross their arms (Chartrand &Bargh, 1999). One person laughing in an audiencewill stimulate laughter in others. Question and answersessions after a lecture usually begin very slowly, butthey soon snowball as more and more questionersbegin raising their hands. Individuals’ emotions tendto converge over time when they interact frequentlyin groups (Anderson, Keltner, & Oliver, 2003).Mimicry of others is so basic a process that researchersbelieve that so-called mirror neurons are active whenothers’ actions are observed, and that these neuronsplay a role in producing the identical behavior inthe observer (Semin, 2007). Mimicry explains whymembers of collectives act as if they are guided bya single mind: As one person imitates the next, thecollective begins to act in a uniform manner.

contagion The spread of behaviors, attitudes, and affectthrough crowds and other types of social aggregationsfrom one member to another.

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Le Bon believed that such contagion processesreflected the heightened suggestibility of crowdmembers, but other processes may be at work aswell. Because many crowd settings are ambiguous,social comparison processes may prompt membersto rely heavily on other members’ reactions whenthey interpret the situation (Singer et al., 1982).Contagion may also arise in crowds through imita-tion, social facilitation, or conformity (Chapman,1973; Freedman & Perlick, 1979; Nosanchuk &Lightstone, 1974; Tarde, 1903).

Herbert Blumer combined these various pro-cesses when he argued that contagion involves cir-cular reactions rather than interpretive reactions(Blumer, 1946, 1951, 1957). During interpretive in-teractions, group members carefully reflect on themeaning of others’ behavior and try to formulate

valid interpretations before making any kind ofcomment or embarking on a line of action. Duringcircular reactions, however, the group’s members failto examine the meaning of others’ actions cautiouslyand carefully and, therefore, tend to misunderstandthe situation. When they act on the basis of suchmisunderstandings, the others in the group alsobegin to interpret the situation incorrectly, and acircular process is thus initiated that eventually cul-minates in full-blown behavioral contagion.

Who Joins In: Convergence

Many explanations of collective behavior, ratherthan considering the processes that transform awide variety of people so that they all act similarly,suggest that the members of the collective may have

F o c u s 17.3 Are Social Trends Infectious?

In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious.—Le Bon (1895/1960, p. 50)

Society changes gradually over time as new ideas,behaviors, and innovations pass from one person andgroup to another in waves. But in the cases of fads,crazes, and other fast-moving trends, diffusionspreads rapidly across large segments of society. In1978, few people owned microwave ovens. By 1990,nearly everyone did. The compact disc was a noveltyfor several years, until it suddenly and almostcompletely replaced vinyl records. Sales of HushPuppy shoes jumped from 30,000 pairs to 430,000pairs in one year.

Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) tipping point theorysuggests that fast-moving trends are flu-like,spreading like contagious diseases through socialgroups. Gladwell drew the concept of a tippingpoint from studies of rapid changes in residentialcomposition that occurred in predominantly Whiteneighborhoods in the 1980s. These neighborhoodschanged little when a few Black families moved in.But when the number of Black families reached acertain value—the tipping point—a large proportionof the prejudiced White residents moved out, andthe neighborhood resegregated. Unlike most socialchanges, which are gradual and ubiquitous, this

“White flight” was an abrupt, threshold-crossingprocess.

An illness, such as the flu, passes from oneperson to another, and individuals who interact withlarge numbers of people when their flu is in itscommunicable stage will infect far more people thanwill a person who stays at home. Similarly, Gladwellnoted that certain types of individuals play prominentroles in the generation of social change. They are thepeople with large social networks (connectors), the in-dividuals who are opinion authorities (mavens), andthose who are able to persuade others to change theirminds (salespeople). Relative to most people, theseinfluential individuals can push an idea much morerapidly to many more people. Connectors, for example,have been identified as one source of the rapid shift inpopularity of new musical groups. When investigatorsasked fans of a new musical group how many otherpeople they told about the band, they discovered thatmost fans told only a few other people. But a smallnumber of the fans—the connectors—told many moreof their friends about the group, including one individ-ual who claimed to have spread the message to morethan 150 people (Reifman, Lee, & Apparala, 2004).Advertisers now target such influential persons, in thebelief that if they win them over as customers, the restof their network will follow (Keller & Berry, 2003).


been similar to one another from the very start—that it was their similarities that prompted them tojoin the collective in the first place.

Convergence theory assumes that individualswho join rallies, riots, movements, crusades, and thelike all possess particular personal characteristics thatinfluence their group-seeking tendencies. Such ag-gregations are not haphazard gatherings of dissimilarstrangers; rather, they represent the convergence ofpeople with compatible needs, desires, motivations,and emotions. By joining in the group, the individ-ual makes possible the satisfaction of these needs,and the crowd situation serves as a trigger for thespontaneous release of previously controlled behav-iors. As Eric Hoffer (1951) wrote, “All movements,however different in doctrine and aspiration, drawtheir early adherents from the same types of hu-manity; they all appeal to the same types ofmind” (p. 9).

But what “types of mind” are likely to joina crowd or movement? Are crowd members“joiners”? Are people who seek out membershipin collective movements different, in terms of theirpersonalities and values, than people who do notjoin such groups? Early conceptions of crowds,which portrayed their members as less intelligent,more easily influenced, more impulsive, and moreviolent, have not received consistent empirical sup-port (Martin, 1920; Meerloo, 1950). Participants inmobs—particularly in connection with sports—tend to be younger men who have engaged inaggressive crowd activities in the past (Arms &Russell, 1997; Russell & Arms, 1998). Peoplewho join radical religious groups are usually teen-agers or young adults, and although they tend to bemore idealistic and open to new experiences, andhigher in psychological dependency, they show nosigns of psychological disturbance (Bromley, 1985;Levine, 1984; Walsh, Russell, & Wells, 1995).

Convergence theory, with its emphasis on thedistinctive characteristics of the individuals who

seek out membership in a collective, explains whyonly some people take part in social movements.Most people recognize the need to take action tomake needed changes in society—to protectthe environment, to reduce discrimination andprejudice, or to influence policy makers, for exam-ple. However, only some individuals within societybecome involved in social movements, raising thequestion of what sets these individuals apart fromothers (Snow & Oliver, 1995).

In a recent meta-analysis of this question,researchers identified three particularly importantpredictors of engagement in a social movement: asense of injustice; efficacy; and social identity(van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). First,people who feel that principles of fairness and jus-tice are violated by the status quo are more likely totake part in social movements. Collectives are oftencomposed of those who are impoverished, perse-cuted, or endangered, but it is more the perceivedunfairness of the deprivation that determines in-volvement in a collective rather than the depriva-tion itself. Relative deprivation is therefore moremotivating than actual deprivation: those who joinsocial movements tend to be people who havehigher expectations but who have not succeededin realizing these expectations.

Second, people who join social movementstend to be higher in a sense of efficacy—they believethat through their personal involvement, they canmake a difference (Snow & Oliver, 1995). Self-confidence, achievement orientation, need for au-tonomy, dominance, self-acceptance, and maturityare all positively correlated with social activism(Werner, 1978). Individuals who have a history oftaking part in collectives tend to jump at the chanceto join new ones (Corning & Myers, 2002), butthose who have a history of avoiding conflict areless likely to join (Ulbig & Funk, 1999).

convergence theory An explanation of collectivebehavior assuming that individuals with similar needs,values, or goals tend to converge to form a single group.

relative deprivation The psychological state that occurswhen individuals feel that their personal attainments(egoistic deprivation) or their group’s attainments ( fraterna-listic deprivation) are below their expectations.

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Third, as social identity would suggest, themore an individual identifies with the group and itspurposes, then the more likely he or she will devotetime and energy to increasing its outcomes (Simon &Klandermans, 2001). As social identity theory ex-plains, individuals do not think of themselves onlyin terms of their individual qualities, but also thosethat are based on their membership in groups.Because of this close connection between the selfand the group, people react negatively if they feelthat their own group does not enjoy the same levelof prosperity as other groups. This group-level senseof deprivation, which is termed fraternal deprivation,tends to be even more motivating than individual-level, or egoistic deprivation (Runcimann, 1966).Individuals who are active in revolutionary socialmovements, such as the national separatist move-ments in Quebec and Ireland, are more likely tobe dissatisfied with their group’s outcomes thanwith their own personal outcomes (Abrams, 1990;Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983).

Loss of Identity: Deindividuation

Philip Zimbardo’s (1969, 2007) theory of deindi-viduation, unlike convergence theory, maintainsthat a collective can be so powerful that it can, underthe right set of circumstances, transform nearly any-one, no matter what their personal characteristics.Stressing the power of the group situation, the the-ory assumes that people escape normative regulationin mobs and crowds. This theory suggests that insome cases people can become so deeply submergedin their group that they feel as though they no lon-ger stand out as individuals, and this feeling cancreate a “reduction of inner restraints” (Festinger,Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952).

Zimbardo’s theory is an input–process–outputmodel, for it identifies factors that cause deindivid-uation (inputs), the process of deindividuation itself,

and the consequences of deindividuation (outputs).The inputs include situational factors, such as de-gree of anonymity and the size of the group, as wellas more psychological factors: sense of responsibil-ity, degree of arousal, and altered states of con-sciousness due to the use of drugs or alcohol.These factors, if present to a sufficient degree andintensity, may cause the members of the collective tobecome deindividuated, which is a state of alteredawareness characterized by minimal self-awarenessand regulation. Once in this state, individualsbecome more irrational, emotional, and impulsive,and so are more likely to perform aggressive, violentactions (Zimbardo, 1969, 1975, 1977a).

Anonymity Deindividuation theory suggests thatcollectives weaken the power of norms to restrainpeople’s actions. Most people follow the norms of agiven situation, both because they have internalizedthese standards but also because they fear publicridicule or legal sanction should they violatethem. But when shielded from scrutiny by the ano-nymity of a crowd, people may engage in behaviorthat they would never consider undertaking asisolated, and highly identifiable, individuals. The10% to 20% reduction in crime in the UnitedKingdom in recent years has been attributed, inpart, to the proliferation of closed circuit television,which increases the identifiability of people whenin public (Welsh & Farrington, 2004).

Any factor that augments the anonymizing ef-fects of collectives further increases the likelihood ofuntoward group behavior. Crowds and mobs thatform at night, under the cover of darkness, tend tobe more unruly and aggressive than daylight crowds(e.g., Mann, 1981). According to anthropologicalevidence, warriors in 92.3% (12 out of 13) of themost highly aggressive cultures—ones known topractice headhunting and to torture captives—disguised themselves prior to battle, whereas only30% (3 out of 10) of the low-aggression culturesfeatured similar rituals (Watson, 1973). Even groupsassembled in classroom and laboratory settingsbehave more inappropriately when their membersare anonymous: They use obscene language, breakconventional norms governing conversation, express

deindividuation An experiential state caused by anumber of input factors, such as group membership andanonymity, that is characterized by the loss of self-awareness, altered experiencing, and atypical behavior.


themselves in extreme ways, criticize one another,and perform embarrassing behaviors (Cannavale,Scarr, & Pepitone, 1970; Lindskold & Finch, 1982;Mathes & Guest, 1976; Singer, Brush, Lublin, 1965).

Zimbardo confirmed anonymity’s impact ex-perimentally by comparing the aggressiveness ofanonymous groups to ones whose members wereidentifiable. Under an elaborate pretense, he askedall-female groups to give 20 electric shocks to twowomen. Anonymous women wore large lab coats(size 44) and hoods over their heads, and theywere not permitted to use their names. Womenwho were identifiable were greeted by name andwore large name tags, and the experimenter em-phasized their uniqueness and individuality.Although identifiability was unrelated to the num-ber of shocks given (the average was 17 of 20), theunidentifiable participants held their switches downnearly twice as long as the identifiable participants(0.90 seconds versus 0.47 seconds).

Zimbardo’s decision to dress his participantsin hoods—the garb of lynch mobs and othercriminals—may have exaggerated the relationshipbetween anonymity and aggression. His partici-pants might have responded to the experimenter’sorders to deliver the shock differently if prosocialcues rather than antisocial cues had been present inthe setting. Researchers verified this tendency,giving the White women who acted as participantscostumes to wear under the guise of maskingindividual characteristics. In the prosocial cuescondition, the experimenter explained that “I wasfortunate the recovery room let me borrow thesenurses’ gowns.” But in the antisocial cues condition,the experimenter mentioned that the costumesresembled Ku Klux Klan outfits: “I’m not muchof a seamstress; this thing came out looking kind ofKu Klux Klannish” ( Johnson & Downing, 1979,p. 1534). Anonymity polarized the groups, makingthem more prosocial or more antisocial dependingon the valence of the situational cues.

Anonymity also polarized responses of partici-pants who were sitting in a totally darkened room.All the participants in this study were escorted to andfrom the room and were assured that the otherparticipants would not be told their identities. The

individuals in the dark room reported feelingaroused, but in no case did the anonymous (andpossibly deindividuated) group members exhibithostility, aggressiveness, or violence. Rather, nearlyall became more intimate and supportive. In thewords of one participant, a “group of us sat closelytogether, touching, feeling a sense of friendship andloss as a group member left. I left with a feeling thatit had been fun and nice” (Gergen, Gergen, &Barton, 1973, p. 129). Apparently, the situationhelped people express feelings that they wouldhave otherwise kept hidden, but these feelingswere those of affection rather than aggression (seeFigure 17.4).

Responsibility As Le Bon argued many yearsago, the crowd is “anonymous, and in consequenceirresponsible” (1895/1960, p. 30). This diffusion ofresponsibility has been verified in dozens of studies ofpeople who faced various emergencies alone or in agroup (see Chapter 7). Members of groups may alsoexperience a reduction in responsibility if an au-thority demands compliance (Milgram, 1974) or ifthey do not recognize the connections betweentheir personal actions and their final consequences.Some groups actually take steps to ensure the diffu-sion of responsibility, as when murderers passaround their weapons from hand to hand so thatresponsibility for the crime is distributed throughthe entire group rather than concentrated in theone person who pulls the trigger or wields the knife(Zimbardo, 1969, 2007).

Group Membership Deindividuation is a group-level process—individuals may feel unrecognizableor uncertain as to their identity, but only groupscreate the sense of anonymity and diffusion of re-sponsibility that generates deindividuation. EdwardDiener and his associates tested this assumption inan ingenious study of Halloween trick-or-treating(Diener et al., 1976). Their participants were 1352children from the Seattle area who visited one ofthe 27 experimental homes scattered throughoutthe city. Observers hidden behind decorative panelsrecorded the number of extra candy bars and money(pennies and nickels) taken by the trick-or-treaters

518 CHAPTER 17

who were told to take one candy bar each. Thechildren came to the house alone or in smallgroups (exceedingly large groups were not in-cluded in the study, nor were groups that includedan adult). An experimenter manipulated anonym-ity by asking some children to give their names andaddresses. As expected, the children took moremoney and candy in groups than alone and whenthey were anonymous rather than identified. Theeffects of anonymity on solitary children were notvery pronounced. However, in the group condi-tions, the impact of anonymity was enhanced (seeFigure 17.5). These findings, which have beensupported by other investigations, suggest thatthe term deindividuation is used most appropriatelyin reference to people who perform atypicalbehavior while they are members of a group(Cannavale, Scarr, & Pepitone, 1970; Mathes &Guest, 1976; Mathes & Kahn, 1975).

Group Size Are larger groups more likely to actin unusual ways? Leon Mann discovered that peo-ple are more likely to respond to religious messageswhen they are part of a larger rather than a smallergroup (Newton & Mann, 1980). At the end ofmany religious meetings, audience members are in-vited to become “inquirers” by coming forward

and declaring their dedication to Christ. In 57religious meetings, the correlation between crowdsize and the proportion of people who moveddown to the stage to become inquirers was .43.On Sundays, the correlation rose to .78. Larger lynchmobs are also more violent than smaller ones.

0

10

20

30

40

50

Nonanonymous

60

Per

cent

age

of c

hild

ren

tran

sgre

ssin

g

Alone Group

Anonymous

F I G U R E 17.5 The combined effects of anonymityand group membership on counternormative behavior.

SOURCE: From data from “Effects of deindividuating variables on stealing byHalloween trick-or-treaters,” by E. Diener, S. C. Fraser, A. L. Beaman, &R. T. Kelem, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 1976. Copyright1976 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.



A review of historical records of 60 such groups re-veals that they ranged in size from 4 to 15,000, butthat larger mobs were more likely to attack morevictims (Mullen, 1986).

Arousal Zimbardo listed a number of other vari-ables that stimulate deindividuated action, includingaltered temporal perspective, sensory overload,heightened involvement, lack of situational struc-ture, and use of drugs. Many of these factors, hesuggested, function by both arousing and distractinggroup members. Zimbardo even suggested that cer-tain rituals, such as war dances and group singing,are actually designed to arouse participants and en-able them to be deindividuated when the fightingstarts: “Among cannibals, like the Cenis or certainMaori and Nigerian tribes, the activity of ritualbonfire dance which precedes eating the flesh ofanother human being is always more prolongedand intense when the victim is to be eaten aliveor uncooked” (1969, p. 257). Aroused individuals,as deindividuation theory suggests, tend to respondmore aggressively, particularly when in a group(Goldstein, 2002).

Self-Awareness Zimbardo’s deindividuation the-ory posits that situational variables, such as anonym-ity and membership in a group, can in some casescombine to induce psychological changes in groupmembers. Deindividuated people, Zimbardo pre-dicted, should feel very little self-awareness, and thisminimization of self-scrutiny is the most immediatecause of the atypical behaviors seen in collectives.

Diener (1979, 1980) tested this hypothesisby making use of an Asch-type experimental situ-ation. He created eight-person groups, but he in-cluded in each group six accomplices trained tofacilitate or inhibit the development of deindivid-uation. In the self-aware condition, the confederatesseemed restless and fidgety. Everyone wore nametags as they worked on tasks designed to heightenself-awareness, such as providing personal re-sponses to questions, sharing their opinions ontopics, and disclosing personal information aboutthemselves. In the non-self-aware condition, Dienershifted the participants’ focus of attention outward

by having them perform a series of mildly distract-ing tasks. The problems were not difficult, butthey required a good deal of concentration andcreativity. In the deindividuation condition, Dienertried to foster feelings of group cohesiveness, una-nimity, and anonymity by treating the members asinterchangeable and by putting the groupsthrough a variety of arousing activities.

When Diener asked the participants to describehow they felt during the study, he identified thetwo clusters, or factors, shown in Table 17.2. Thefirst factor, loss of self-awareness, encompasses a lackof self-consciousness, little planning of action, highgroup unity, and uninhibited action. The seconddimension, altered experiencing, is also consistentwith the deindividuation theory in that it ties to-gether a number of related processes, such as “un-usual” experiences, altered perceptions, and a loss ofindividual identity. When Diener compared the re-sponses of participants in the three conditions of hisexperiment, he discovered that (1) deindividuated

T A B L E 17.2 Characteristics of FactorsThat Combine to Create aState of Deindividuation

Factor Typical Characteristics

Loss of self-awareness

Minimal self-consciousnessLack of conscious planning as behaviorbecomes spontaneousLack of concern for what othersthink of oneSubjective feeling that time is passingquicklyLiking for the group and feelings ofgroup unityUninhibited speechPerforming uninhibited tasks

Alteredexperiencing

Unusual experiences, such ashallucinationsAltered states of consciousnessSubjective loss of individual identityFeelings of anonymityLiking for the group and feelings ofgroup unity

SOURCE: “Deindividuation, Self-Awareness, and Disinhibition,” by E. Diener,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1160–1171. Copyright 1979by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.

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participants displayed a greater loss of self-awarenessthan both the non-self-aware and the self-awareparticipants and (2) deindividuated participantsreported more extreme altered experiencing thanthe self-aware participants.

Steven Prentice-Dunn and Ronald W. Rogers(1982) extended these findings by leading themembers of four-man groups to believe that theywere going to deliver electric shocks to anotherperson. Half of the participants were led througha series of experiences that focused their attentionon the situation, whereas the others were fre-quently reminded to pay attention to their personalfeelings. Moreover, some participants were told thattheir actions would be carefully monitored, whereasothers were led to believe that their actions werenot going to be linked to them personally. Theresults of the study supported Diener’s two-factormodel of deindividuation on three counts. First, theparticipants who were prompted to focus on thesituation were lower in private self-awareness, andthey tended to behave more aggressively. Second,analysis of the participants’ questionnaire responsesrevealed the two components emphasized byDiener: low self-awareness and altered experienc-ing. Third, using a statistical procedure known aspath analysis, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers foundthat both of these components mediated the relation-ship between the variables they manipulated and theparticipants’ aggressive response (Prentice-Dunn &Rogers, 1980, 1982, 1983; Prentice-Dunn &Spivey, 1986; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981).

Emergent Norm Theory

Zimbardo’s theory of deindividuation suggests thatmembers of collectives are more likely to act in ex-treme and unusual ways, and researchers have con-firmed the relationship between such factors asanonymity and increasing group size on negativebehaviors. However, when Tom Postmes andRussell Spears (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of60 studies that examined the theory, they found lit-tle support for the assumption that these factorstrigger psychological changes, or that these changesmediate the relationship between situational factors

and aberrant actions. In fact, their analysis suggestedthat these factors decrease the variability of people’s ac-tions in collectives. Crowd members are not rulebreakers, they concluded, but rather conformistswho are following the example set by others in thegroup.

This analysis is consistent with Ralph Turner andLewis Killian’s emergent norm theory (Turner,1964; Turner & Killian, 1972). Turner and Killianrejected one of the fundamental assumptions of mostcollective behavior theories—that crowds are ex-tremely homogeneous—and concluded that themental unity of crowds is primarily an illusion.Crowds, mobs, and other collectives only seem to beunanimous in their emotions and actions because themembers all adhere to norms that are relevant in thegiven situation. Granted, these emergent norms may beunique and sharply contrary to more general societalstandards, but as they emerge in the group situation,they exert a powerful influence on behavior.

Turner and Killian based their analysis onSherif ’s (1936) classic analysis of the gradual align-ment of action in groups. As noted in Chapter 6,norms emerge gradually in ambiguous situations asmembers align their actions. Individuals do notactively try to conform to the judgments of others,but instead use the group consensus when makingtheir own behavioral choices. In most cases, thegroup’s norms are consistent with more general so-cial norms pertaining to work, family, relations, andcivility. In other cases, however, norms emerge ingroups that are odd, atypical, or unexpected.

A normative approach partly explains the un-usual behavior of some crowds that form nearbuildings where a person is threatening to commitsuicide by leaping to his or her death. In some casesthese crowds transform from relatively passive audi-ences into baiting crowds whose members urge

emergent norm theory An explanation of collectivebehavior suggesting that the uniformity in behavior oftenobserved in collectives is caused by members’ conformityto unique normative standards that develop spontane-ously in those groups.baiting crowd A gathering of people in a public loca-tion whose members torment, tease, or goad others.


the jumper to take his or her life. When Mannstudied members of such crowds, he was unableto identify any similarities in personality or demo-graphic characteristics (as convergence theorywould suggest). He did note, however, that baitingbecame more likely as crowd size increased. Mannsuggested that larger crowds are more likely to in-clude at least one person who introduces the baitingnorm into the group. “In a large crowd at least onestupid or sadistic person will be found who is pre-pared to cry ‘Jump!’ and thereby provide a modelfor suggestible others to follow” (Mann, 1981,p. 707). Mann reported evidence of conformity tothe baiting norm in crowds that not only encour-aged the victim to “end it all” but also jeered andbooed as rescuers attempted to intervene.

Emergent norm theory, in contrast to otheranalyses of crowds and collectives, argues that col-lectives are not out of control or normless. Rather,their behavior is socially structured, but by an un-usual, temporary norm rather than by more tradi-tional social standards. For example, some cults,such as Heaven’s Gate, condone mass suicide.Adolescent peer cliques pressure members to takedrugs and commit illegal acts (Corsaro & Eder,1995; Giordano, 2002). Groups of women, such assororities, can develop norms that promote un-healthy actions such as binge eating and purging(Crandall, 1988). Urban gangs accept norms thatemphasize toughness, physical strength, and the useof drugs (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003; Jankowski,1991). Groups of hooligans at British soccer matchesconsider violence a normal part of the event, andmass media sustain this view (Dunning, Murphy, &Williams, 1986; Ward, 2002). Although theseactions—when viewed from a more objectiveperspective—may seem out of control and verystrange, for the group members they are literally“normal.”

Collectives and Social Identity

Social identity theory, like emergent norm theory,also takes issue with one of deindividuation theory’score assumptions. Deindividuation suggests thatpeople in collectives experience a loss of identity,

but social identity suggests that another aspect oftheir identity—their collective, social identity—isactually augmented in collectives. The act of joininga social movement, for instance, can be one of self-definition (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). For example,the alcoholic who joins Alcoholics Anonymousproclaims, “I am an alcoholic,” just as the manwho joins Promise Keepers lays public claim to hisreligiosity and masculinity (Melucci, 1989).Collectives are also intergroup settings, so when in-dividuals join them, their personal and social identi-ties change (Reicher & Levine, 1994; Reicher,Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Waddington, 2008).

Social Identity and Intergroup Conflict Mobs,riots, and gangs are often intergroup phenomena.Riots in inner cities, for example, usually occurwhen inner-city residents contend against anothergroup: the police (Goldberg, 1968). Violence dur-ing athletic competitions often occurs when thefans of one team attack, en masse, the fans or playersof another team (Leonard, 1980). Protests on col-lege campuses pit students against the university ad-ministration (Lipset & Wolin, 1965). Inner-citygangs vie for turf against other gangs (Sanders,1994). Militia groups rise up to confront civil andjudicial authorities (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989).Lynch mobs were crowds of Whites with high sol-idarity who attacked Blacks (de la Roche, 2002). Alone collective is a rarity, for in most cases, collec-tives emerge in opposition to other collectives.

Collectives, as intergroup phenomena, providemembers with an enlarged view of the self, basednot just on individual qualities but also on collectiv-istic qualities. Such collectives do not lead to dein-dividuation but to a depersonalized sense of self thatreflects group-level qualities rather than individualones. The presence of an outgroup increases thesalience of the collective identity, and members be-gin to perceive themselves and the situation in waysthat reflect the ingroup–outgroup bias: Othermembers of the ingroup are viewed positively, asare their actions, whereas outgroup members andtheir actions are denigrated (see Chapter 14).

Stephen Reicher’s (1984, 1987, 1996, 2001)analyses of participants in riots are consistent with

522 CHAPTER 17

social identity theory. For example, one riot oc-curred when members of the National Union ofStudents organized a demonstration in London.The leaders of the group planned to march to theHouses of Parliament, and as police blocked theirpath, conflict erupted. As the tension between thegroups escalated, the students became more unified.When one member of the group was arrested bythe police, students attacked the police unit as agroup. They also felt that the police were behavingviolently and that they themselves only respondedin self-defense. As one student put it, “To someextent there was a feeling of there was the studentsand there was the police and you knew which sideyou were on so you had to be up in the front withstudents, you know. And there was a lot of crowdempathy” (quoted in Reicher, 1996, p. 126).

Individuation A paradox permeates the analysis ofindividuality and collectives. On the one hand, manytheorists assume that submersion in a group results inthe attainment of power and an escape from societalinhibitions; hence, group members seek and try tomaintain the experience of deindividuation. On theother hand, many psychologists believe that peoplecan enjoy psychological well-being only when theyare able to establish and maintain their own uniqueidentities: “A firm sense of one’s own autonomousidentity is required in order that one may be relatedas one human being to another. Otherwise, any andevery relationship threatens the individual with loss ofidentity” (Laing, 1960, p. 44; see, too,Dipboye, 1977;Fromm, 1965; Maslow, 1968).

An identity affirmation approach to collective be-havior suggests that group members who feel “lost”in a group will try to reestablish their individualidentities. People in large crowds, for example,may act oddly to regain a sense of individuality,not because they feel anonymous. Individuals whotake part in riots may do so not to protest theirgroup’s unfair treatment, but to reaffirm their indi-vidual identities. As one resident of the riot-torncommunity of Watts (in Los Angeles) explained, “Idon’t believe in burning, stealing, or killing, but Ican see why the boys did what they did. They justwanted to be noticed, to let the world know the

seriousness of their state of life” (Milgram & Toch,1969, p. 576). Similarly, members of large groups,such as industrial workers, students in large class-rooms, people working in bureaucraticorganizations, and employees in companies withhigh turnover rates, may perform atypical actionsjust to stand apart from the crowd.

Christina Maslach (1972) examined this individ-uation process by making two people in a four-person group feel individuated; she referred tothem by name, made more personal comments tothem, and maintained a significant amount of eyecontact. She made the other two feel deindividu-ated by avoiding close contact with them and ad-dressing them impersonally. When these individualswere later given the opportunity to engage in afree-response group discussion and to completesome questionnaires, the deindividuated participantsevidenced various identity-seeking reactions. Someattempted to make themselves seem as different aspossible from the other group members by givingmore unusual answers to the questions, makinglonger comments, joining in the discussion morefrequently, and attempting to capture the attentionof the experimenter. Other participants seemed toredefine their identities by revealing more intimatedetails of their personalities and beliefs throughlonger and more unusual self-descriptions.

COLLECT IVES ARE GROUPS

All groups are intriguing, but groups that undertakeextreme actions under the exhortation of exotic,charismatic leaders—cults, mobs, crowds, and thelike—fascinate both layperson and researcher.Although groups are so commonplace that they of-ten go unnoticed and unscrutinized, atypical groupsinvite speculation and inquiry. But are such groupsmad? Do human beings lose their rationality whenthey are immersed in mobs?

The Myth of the Madding Crowd

For well over a century, most theorists and re-searchers have assumed that crowds are unique


social aggregations, a “perversion of human poten-tial” (Zimbardo, 1969, p. 237) where impulse andchaos replace reason and order. Le Bon argued thatcrowds develop a collective mind that leaves indi-vidual members unable to think for themselves.Convergence theories assume that atypical groupsare staffed by atypical people. Groups often developodd, unusual norms, and members may forget whothey are when they sink too deeply into theirgroups. This belief in the “madness of crowds” isso deeply ingrained in our conception of collectivesthat some individuals who commit violent crimes ingroups face reduced sentences. Deindividuated anddriven to conform to their group’s norms, they arenot held personally responsible for their actions(Colman, 1991).

Yet collectives are, at their core, groups, and sothe processes that shape group behaviors also shapecollective behaviors. Many contemporary theorists,rather than assuming that collectives are atypicalgroups that require special theories that includenovel or even mysterious processes, argue that the“madding crowd” is more myth than reality. Col-lective behavior is not bizarre, but instead a rationalattempt by a number of individuals to seek changethrough united action. These groups form, change,and disband following the same patterns that gov-ern other groups, and the internal structures andprocesses of a collective and a group are more simi-lar than they are different.

Clark McPhail (1991) elaborated this view-point in his book The Myth of the Madding Crowd.McPhail maintained that early theorists were toobiased by their preconceived belief that crowdsare crazed. McPhail himself carried out extensivefield studies of actual collective movements over a10-year period so that he could determine firsthandwhat such groups do. His conclusions werethreefold:

First, individuals are not driven mad bycrowds; they do not lose cognitive control!Second, individuals are not compelled toparticipate by some madness-in-common,or any other sovereign psychologicalattribute, cognitive style, or predisposition

that distinguishes them from nonpartici-pants. Third, the majority of behaviors inwhich members of these crowds engagedare neither mutually inclusive norextraordinary, let alone mad. (McPhail,1991, p. xxii)

A hundred years of theory and research thathave pushed the “crowd-as-mad” position is astalwart legacy that cannot be easily dismissed. Yetthe available evidence favors the view that thecrowd is a group. When scholars have reviewedsome of the famous examples of crowd delusions,such as dancing mania and the supposed panicduring the War of the Worlds broadcast, they havediscovered that these events were sensational-ized (Bartholomew & Goode, 2000). Le Bon’s(1895/1960) crowd psychology made dire predic-tions about crowds and mobs, but his analysis wasdriven more by his prejudices than the facts(Bendersky, 2007). The media and laypersons arequick to call crowds irrational and mad, but thedata do not support this conjecture. McPhail (1991),for example, concluded that violence is very rare incrowds. In most cases, individuals in the crowd arecommitted to particular goals, and like any performinggroup, they do their share of the work to increase thegroup’s chances for success.Moreover, when violencedoes occur, it takes the form of intergroup conflictrather than mindless savagery. Even the group at theWho concert did not behave badly. Many expertscondemned the crowd, calling it a stampede, butwhen Cincinnati sociologist Norris Johnson (1987)looked more closely at the evidence, he concludedthat the crowd did not stampede or engage in selfish,destructive behavior. Indeed, the amount of helpingshown by the people in the crowd exceeded what wewould normally expect to find among a group ofbystanders.

The crowd-as-mad and the crowd-as-groupviews must be reconciled in a more complete under-standing of collective behavior. Crowds do, on occa-sion, perpetrate great wrongs—wrongs that seemmore malevolent than any one individual’s capacityfor evil. Yet people in crowds usually act in ways thatare unremarkable. Crowds are groups, and collective

524 CHAPTER 17

dynamics are for the most part the same as smallgroup dynamics. Hence, the next time you hear ofa crowd behaving oddly, do not dismiss its actions asone more illustration of a group gone wrong.

Studying Groups and Collectives

In this book, we have examined many differentgroups—a band of outcasts from the art commu-nity that generated a cohesive movement thatredefined the world of art; a sports team thatsurvived against all odds when their plane crashedin the Andes; a cohesive hockey team thatoutperformed a superior opponent; a jury reachinga verdict by carefully reviewing its mission and theevidence it was given; a group led by a powerfulauthority figure who manipulated the membersthrough deceit and subterfuge; teams that workedto make products and decisions, including militaryand political experts who planned an ill-fated in-vasion; groups that had to deal with conflict withintheir ranks and conflict with other groups; a heroicgroup trying to return to Earth after circling theMoon; and a group of people who made use ofthe restorative, curative impact of a group to gainself-understanding and improve their well-being. Inthis final chapter we have turned to examinecrowds, mobs, and social movements.

These analyses have illuminated many of agroup’s most basic processes—how groups take inand reject members; evolve over time; organize

their members in hierarchies of authority; performtasks, both effectively and ineffectively; make plansand decisions; and succor their members and regu-late behavior in context. But these analyses have alsorevealed that groups, like large collectives, are oftenmisunderstood and mismanaged. It is ironic thatwhereas scientists have studied aspects of the physi-cal world for centuries, only in the last hundredyears have they turned their attention to humanexperiences, and human groups in particular. Yetthe theories and studies of group dynamics wehave examined here repeatedly confirm the impor-tant role that groups play in all aspects of social life.Human beings are in many ways individuals whoare seeking their personal, private objectives, yetthey are also members of larger social units thatmay be seeking collective outcomes. As socialcreatures, embedded in a rich network of mutual,collective, and reciprocal relationships, individualscannot be understood fully without consideringthe social groups to which they belong.

Fortunately, the field of group dynamics offersthe means of reducing our ignorance of this funda-mental aspect of the human condition. StanleyMilgram and Hans Toch, writing 35 years ago,asked this question: If we “do not take up the jobof understanding riots, panics, and social move-ments, who will?” (1969, p. 590). Their questionapplies, with equal force, to the study of groups ingeneral. If we do not take up the job of understand-ing groups, who will?

SUMMARY IN OUTL INE

What is collective behavior?

1. The term collective behavior has many inter-pretations, but in general, it describes instancesin which a relatively large group of peoplerespond in a similar way to an event orsituation. Collectives differ from other types ofgroups in terms of:

■ Size: Collectives tend to be large ratherthan small.

■ Proximity: In some cases, members ofa collective are together in one place(e.g., crowds), but other collectivesinvolve individuals who are dispersedacross great distances (e.g., socialmovements).

■ Duration: Collectives sometimes, but notalways, form and disband rapidly.


■ Conventionality: Members sometimesengage in atypical, unconventional, oreven aberrant behaviors.

■ Relationships between members:Collectives are often weak associationsof individuals rather than cohesive groups.

2. Crowds include common crowds, such asstreet crowds or public gatherings, audiences,queues, and mobs (aggressive mobs and panics).

■ Street crowds, although unstable andshort-lived, display consistent structuresand behavioral tendencies. McPhail hasdocumented the types of behaviors com-mon in such groups and Milgram hasstudied how they form.

■ Audiences and queues are more normativelyregulated than crowds. Milgram’s studiesof line breaking suggest that queue mem-bers are both group- and self-motivated.

■ Mobs include both positive and negativetypes of crowds, such as hooligans, riots,and lynch mobs.

■ Panics occur when crowds seek to escape asituation or when fearful a valued resourcewill run out (acquisitive panics).

■ Studies of very large crowds, such as thoseconducted by Helbing at the JamaratBridge, have identified the factors thatcontribute to injury in such crowds andways to reduce the danger.

3. Individuals need not be concentrated in a singlelocation to display convergence in action, forsuch collective movements as rumors, trends (fads,crazes, fashion trends), mass delusions, psychogenicillness, and social movements can influence widelydispersed individuals.

■ Rosnow suggests that anxiety anduncertainty are key triggers for rumortransmission.

■ Researchers have identified four typesof social movements: reformist,

revolutionary, reactionary, andcommunitarian.

What theories explain collective behavior?

1. Le Bon maintained that crowds are governedby a collective mind and that contagion causescrowd members to experience similar thoughtsand emotions.

■ People tend to imitate each other, therebyincreasing the likelihood that their actionswill become unified and coordinated.

■ Gladwell’s tipping point theory suggeststhat fast-moving trends can spread likecontagious diseases through social groups.

2. Convergence theories propose that the individualswho join groups often possess similar needs andpersonal characteristics.

■ Involvement in social movements is relatedto individuals’ sense of injustice, efficacy,and identity.

■ Studies of relative deprivation, for example,suggest that people whose attainments fallbelow their expectations are more likely tojoin social movements.

3. Zimbardo’s deindividuation theory tracescollective phenomena back to deindividuation,which can be broken down into threecomponents—inputs, internal changes, andbehavioral outcomes. Inputs, or causes, ofdeindividuation include feelings of anonymity,reduced responsibility (diffusion of responsibility),membership in large groups, and a heightenedstate of physiological arousal.

■ Zimbardo’s study of aggression in hoodedcollege students, Diener’s study ofHalloween trick-or-treaters, and Mann’sstudies of religious groups, all support thebasic model.

■ Diener’s work, as well as that of Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, suggests that thedeindividuated state has two basic

526 CHAPTER 17

components—reduced self-awareness (min-imal self-consciousness, etc.) and alteredexperiencing (disturbances in concentrationand judgment, etc.).

4. Ameta-analysis conducted by Postmes and Spears(1998) suggests that individuals in collectives aremore, rather than less, likely to act inways that areconsistent with the group’s norms. These findingssupport Turner and Killian’s emergent norm theory,which posits that crowds often develop uniquestandards for behavior and that these atypicalnorms exert a powerful influence on behavior.The baiting crowd, for example, forms when agroup of onlookers collectively urges someone toinjure him- or herself.

5. Social identity theory suggests that much of thebehavior of individuals in collectives can beexplained by basic identity mechanisms.

■ As Reicher notes, collective behavior isoften intergroup behavior, and so individ-uals maximize their individual sense ofworth by identifying with the ingroup.

■ Work by Maslach and others indicates thatcollective behavior in some cases representsan attempt to reestablish a sense ofindividuality.

How different are collectives from other types of groups?

1. Recent analyses of crowds and collectives havequestioned the “crowd-as-mad” assumption.Collectives differ from more routine groups indegree rather than in kind.

2. Collectives, like groups in general, are oftenmisunderstood and mismanaged, but the fieldof group dynamics offers a means of dispellingthis ignorance.


Chapter Case: The Who Concert■ “Panic at ‘The Who Concert Stampede’: An

Empirical Assessment,” by Norris R. Johnson(1987), provides considerable backgroundinformation and theoretical analysis of thecrowd that pushed through the doors atCincinnati’s Riverfront Coliseum in 1979.

Crowds and Collectives■ “Collective Behavior: Crowds and Social Move-

ments,” by Stanley Milgram and Hans Toch(1969), though written 40 years ago, still offersfundamental insights into collective behavior.

■ Collective Behavior, by Ralph Turner (2001), is asuccinct yet comprehensive overview of thekey theories of “those forms of social behaviorin which the usual conventions cease to guidesocial action and people collectively transcend,bypass, or subvert established institutional pat-terns and structures” (p. 348).

■ “The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason,and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse,and Chaos,” by Phillip G. Zimbardo (1969), isa wide-ranging analysis of the causes and con-sequences of the loss of identity that sometimesoccurs in groups.

■ “Toward an Integrative Social Identity Modelof Collective Action: A Quantitative ResearchSynthesis of Three Socio-PsychologicalPerspectives,” by Martijn van Zomeren, TomPostmes, and Russell Spears (2008), provides ascholarly review of the vast literature on socialmovements, as well as results from theirmeta-analysis of the impact of injustice,efficacy, and identity on social participation.

Collectives as Groups■ The Myth of the Madding Crowd, by Clark

McPhail (1991), expertly synthesizes priortheoretical work on crowds with McPhail’sfield studies of actual crowds to dispel many


absurd myths about crowds and replace themwith data-based propositions.

■ “Rethinking Crowd Violence: Self-Categorization Theory and the Woodstock

1999 Riot,” by Stephen Vider (2004), is aconceptually rich case study of a riot thatoccurred, ironically, during a music festivalcelebrating the peace movement of the 1960s.


528 CHAPTER 17


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http://www.ibmecsp.edu.br

Author Index

Aarts, H., 146, 451Abakoumkin, G., 104, 306, 307Abbott, A. S., 249, 329Abele, A. E., 253Abrams, D., 4, 77, 78, 202, 336,

422, 517Achille, N. M., 90Achilles, C. M., 124Adams, J., 259Adams, R. B., 41Adams, S., 369Adarves-Yorno, I., 183Adelman, L., 433Adler, A. B., 133Adler, P. A., 40, 167Adler, P., 40, 167Affleck, G., 487Agazarian, Y. M., 491Agnew, C. R., 136Aiello, J. R., 284, 285, 292, 312,

454Aiken, C., 365Akkermans, W., 165Al-Abideen, H. Z., 510Albert, K. P., 464Al-Bosta, S., 510Albright, L., 89Alexander, D., 451Alexander, K. R., 448

Alge, B. J., 292Alicke, M. D., 393Allen, K. M., 288, 447Allen, N. J., 357, 378Allen, V. L., 157, 181Alliger, G. M., 257Allison, G., 42Allison, J. A., 80Allison, S. T., 387, 389, 425Allmendinger, J., 20, 366Allport, F. H., 16, 17, 27, 57,

284, 286Allport, G. W., 426, 428, 438,

440, 441Altemeyer, B., 186Alterman, E., 346Altermatt, T. W., 32, 55Altman, I., 444, 447, 462, 463,

464, 465, 466, 468–469, 470,473, 491

Amegashie, J. A., 382Ames, D. R., 11, 257Amichai-Hamburger, Y., 473Amir, Y., 431, 437Ammon, L., 486Ancona, D. G., 316, 329, 350Andersen, S. M., 492Anderson, C., 167, 236, 237, 239,

244, 248, 514

Anderson, C. A., 44, 447Anderson, C. M., 104Anderson, E., 494Anderson, L. R., 24Anderson, N., 22Andersson, J., 320Annett, J., 357Annis, A. B., 459Anthony, T., 129, 202,

343Antony, M. M., 94Apparala, M., 515Appelbaum, R. P., 513Applebaum, E., 374Arcuri, L., 426Arcus, D. M., 93Ardry, R., 465Argote, L., 369Argyle, M., 455Ariely, D., 106Arkes, H. R., 330, 340Arkin, R. M., 106, 109Arms, R. L., 516Arnardottir, A. A., 490Arnold, D. W., 451Aron, A., 78, 433Aronoff, J., 54Aronson, E., 127, 437Aronson, J., 83

635

✵

Arriaga, X. B., 136Arrow, H., 4, 8, 19, 106, 121,

127, 134, 142, 354, 355,358

Arslanagic, B., 493Arterberry, M. E., 296Asch, S. E., 179, 180, 181, 182,

185, 188, 342Aselage, J., 398Asendorpf, J. B., 89, 93Ashburn-Nardo, L., 423Asher, S. R., 104Ashforth, B. E., 80Ashmore, R. D., 77, 81, 86Asmus, C., 444, 446Assmar, E. M. L., 389Atkin, R. S., 208Atoum, A. O., 288, 289August, R. A., 451Augustine, A. A., 90Averill, J. R., 58, 399Avolio, B. J., 251, 275, 277,

279Axelrod, R., 67, 403, 405, 408Axsom, D., 127Axtell, J., 155Ayman, R., 268Ayres, M. M., 187, 253Azuma, H., 75

Bachman, J. G., 91Back, K., 106, 119, 167Back, K. W., 137, 480, 495, 512Bacon, P. L., 73, 90, 91Badke-Schaub, P., 150Baer, D. E., 58Baer, R., 464Baetz, M. L., 274Bailenson, J. N., 46Bailey, D. E., 367Bailey, J. K. S., 257Bakeman, R., 37Baker, H. G., 173, 176Baldes, J. J., 297Bales, R. F., 6, 19, 22, 124, 132,

134, 150, 152, 170, 256, 318,381, 461

Baliousis, M., 186Balkwell, J. W., 164Ball-Rokeach, S. J., 102Baltes, B. B., 321Balthazard, P. A., 327Banaji, M. R., 423Bandura, A., 120, 428, 429, 488,

498Banker, B. S., 432, 433, 435Banks, C., 233Banks, D. J., 249Barabási, A., 13, 19Barájas, L., 76Barclay, P., 388Barefoot, J. C., 238Bargal, D., 23Barge, J. K., 321Bargh, J. A., 189, 237, 238, 514Barker, M., 261Barker, R. G., 449–452, 456, 471Barlow, S. H., 477, 494Barnett, L. A., 62, 81Baron, R. S., 188, 241, 289, 290,

334, 343, 344, 350, 447Barr, J. E., 495Barrett, D., 168Barrett, D. W., 72Barrick, M. R., 109Barry, B., 399, 409Barsade, S. G., 364Barsky, S. F., 467Bar-Tal, D., 395, 416, 426, 437Bartel, C. A., 317Bartels, J. M., 59–61Bartels, L., 206Bartholomew, R. E., 512, 524Bartis, S., 288Bartlem, C. S., 324Barton, W. H., 518Bartone, P. T., 133Barutchu, A., 80Basden, B. H., 320Basden, D. R., 320Basow, S. A., 148Bass, B. M., 246, 261, 271, 275,

276, 279, 374Bassett, R. L., 464

Batchelor, J. P., 460Bates, B., 495Bauer, C. C., 321Bauer, E., 202Baum, A., 444, 447, 459, 464,

473, 515Baum, C., 447Baum, C. S., 515Baumann, M. R., 302Baumeister, R. F., 58, 59, 61, 62,

65, 83, 91, 249, 289, 467Bavelas, A., 158, 168Bayazit, M., 402Bazerman, M. H., 194, 390Bazzini, D. G., 104Beach, S. R. H., 99, 100Beal, D. J., 137, 139, 142Beale, D., 448Beall, A. C., 46Beaman, A. L., 234, 518Beaton, E. A., 94Beauchamp, M. R., 157Bechtel, R. B., 449, 470, 473Beck, A. P., 489Beck, A. T., 480Beck, E. M., 507Becker, F., 453Bedeian, A. G., 157, 251, 257Bednar, R. L., 481, 494, 495Beehner, J. C., 162Beehr, T. A., 101Beer, J. S., 65Beersma, B., 194, 399Behfar, K. J., 390, 404Bell, B. S., 357, 377Bell, C. D., 225Bell, P. A., 444, 446, 447, 473Bell, S. T., 225, 360Bellah, R. N., 57, 85Bellatin, A. M., 489Bellinger, K. D., 317Bellisle, F., 291Bem, D. J., 333, 492Bem, S. L., 186, 187Bendersky, C., 406Benford, R. D., 106Benjamin, L. T., Jr., 225, 247, 432

636 AUTHOR INDEX

Benne, K. D., 8, 9, 150, 151, 152Bennett, H. S., 41Bennett, M., 79Bennett, N., 136, 297Bennis, W., 362, 446Bennis, W. G., 131, 247Berdahl, J. L., 4, 23, 106, 215, 228,

236, 239, 244, 248, 355, 358Bergan, T., 469Berger, J., 163, 164Berger, R. E., 288, 390Berger, S. M., 292Bergman, T. J., 162Berkerle, C. A., 511Berkowitz, L., 140, 186, 248, 505Berman, J., 458Berman, J. J., 495Berns, G. S., 200Bernston, G. G., 104Bernthal, P. R., 343Berry, J., 515Berry, S. H., 102Berry, T. R., 489Best, D. L., 264Betancourt, H., 406Bettencourt, B. A., 155, 157, 435Bianchi, M., 426Bickman, L., 493, 505Biddle, B. J., 144, 175Biederman, P. W., 362, 446Bierbrauer, G., 181Biernat, M., 79, 164, 165Bilotta, J. G., 134Bischoff, I., 387Bishop, G. D., 333Black, M., 493Black, R. H., 303, 319Blackstone, T., 192Blader, S., 390Blader, S. L., 226, 390Blaine, B., 81Blair, C., 320Blair, I., 406Blair, V., 120Blake, R. R., 269, 270, 271,

279, 413Blanchard, F. A., 433

Blanchard, K., 270, 271, 279Blanchard, K. H., 270, 271, 279Blaney, N., 437Blank, H., 167Blanton, H., 82Blascovich, J., 46, 52, 257, 263,

265, 287, 288, 310, 335Blass, T., 221, 227, 233, 242, 244Blatt, R., 374Bledman, R. A., 103Bledsoe, K. L., 76Blegen, M. A., 224, 398Bless, H., 198Bliese, P. D., 119Bloch, S., 492Block, C. J., 262Blommel, J. M., 286Bloomfield, J., 337Blumer, C., 340Blumer, H., 13, 506, 515Blumstein, P., 230Bó, P. D., 384Boatwright, K. J., 270Bogardus, E. S., 23Bogart, L. M., 40–41, 469Bohmer, R. M. J., 352, 359, 366,

370–371, 377Bohrnstedt, G. W., 95Bois, J. L., 98Boldry, J. G., 425Bollen, K. A., 118, 121, 127Bonacich, P., 160Bonanno, G. A., 103Bond, C. F., 19, 285, 288, 289Bond, J., 148, 485, 486Bond, M. H., 74, 86, 89, 261Bond, R., 182, 187, 189, 210, 261Boniecki, K. A., 467Bonikowski, B., 58Bonito, J. A., 162, 166Bonk, C. J., 166Bonner, B. L., 302, 303Bonney, M. E., 111Bono, J. E., 257, 258Bons, P. M., 269Bonta, B. D., 419Bookwala, J., 148

Boone, C., 361Boone, M., 495Booth, A., 91Borah, L. A., Jr., 398Borden, 80, 121Bordia, P., 121Borgatta, E. F., 22, 124, 132,

152, 256Borgatti, S.P., 38, 159Borkman, T. J., 476Bormann, E. G., 406Bornstein, G., 412, 413, 415Bornstein, R. F., 106, 186Bosselut, G., 128Botero, I. C., 327Bouchard, T. J., 308Boucher, H. C., 74Bourgeois, K. S., 64Bourgeois, M. J., 183, 194Bourgeois, P., 196Bourguignon, D., 10, 11Boutillier, R. G., 260Bowe, M., 11Bowers, C. A., 135, 364Bowers, D. G., 253, 374Bowlby, J., 67, 94Bowles, S., 71, 72Bowling, N. A., 101Boyatzis, R., 259Boyatzis, R. E., 231Boyd, R., 71, 72Bradbury, T. N., 395Bradley, P. H., 170Bradshaw, S. D., 93, 319Brady, J. J., Jr., 292Bramel, D., 34Brandes, U., 38Brandon, A. C., 202Branscombe, N. R., 79, 80, 164,

424, 430Brantmeier, C., 405Bratko, D., 228Brauer, M., 335, 425Braun, J. C., 393Braverman, M., 225Brawley, L. R., 127, 128Bray, R. M., 193, 208

AUTHOR INDEX 637

Bray, S. R., 157Brazil, D., 415Brechner, K. C., 387Brehm, J. W., 240, 395Brehm, S. S., 109, 395Brennan, K. A., 94Brenner, M., 300Brenner, O. C., 386Brewer, B. W., 128Brewer, L. E., 61Brewer, M. B., 65, 68, 73, 74, 84,

86, 193, 387, 401, 412, 413,423, 434–437, 441

Brickner, M. A., 297Bridgett, D. J., 296Brief, A. P., 49, 156, 446Briggs, R. O., 327Brinkman, H., 457Brinthaupt, T. M., 96, 111Brito, V. C. A., 40Broadnax, S., 81Brocato, R. M., 286Brockner, J., 323, 340Brodbeck, F. C., 276, 328, 329Bromley, D. G., 516Bronzaft, A. L., 448Brooks, D. K., 480Brooks, G. R., 491Brosnan, S. F., 389Brossart, D. F., 489, 492Brousseau, K. R., 317Broverman, D. M., 77Broverman, I. K., 77Brown, B. B., 81, 444, 462, 466,

473Brown, B. R., 386Brown, C. E., 162Brown, D. E., 246Brown, J. D., 162, 420Brown, L. H., 95Brown, M., 193Brown, R., 335, 430, 431, 433,

442Brown, R. J., 423, 434, 441Brown, T. M., 169Brown, V. R., 306, 307, 312Brown, Y., 198

Browning, L., 170Brownstein, A. L., 330Brunsman, B., 188Brush, C. A., 518Bruun, S. E., 296Bryant, R. A., 493Bryner, S., 320Bucciarelli, A., 103Budescu, D., 413Budman, S. H., 495Bufanio, K. A., 337Bugental, D. B., 224Buhrmester, D., 104Bukowski, W. M., 167Bullock, M., 183, 194, 212Bunderson, J. S., 259Bunker, B. B., 228, 230Burger, J. M., 106, 109, 228, 230Burger, T., 168Burke, J., 277Burke, M. J., 137, 139, 142, 269,

481Burke, P. J., 73, 150, 152Burkley, M., 82Burlingame, G. M., 477, 490, 493,

494, 499Burnett, J. W., 489Burnette, J. L., 23, 124Burney, C., 59Burnfield, J. L., 327Burnham, T., 384Burns, J. M., 247, 251, 271, 275,

279Burnstein, E., 317, 335, 392Burt, M. R., 240Busby, P. L., 444, 446Busceme, S., 192Bushe, G. R., 132Bushman, B. J., 44, 447Buss, A. H., 93Butera, F., 289Butkovic, A., 228Butler, D., 262Butler, E. A., 375Butler, L. D., 315Butler, T., 492Butner, J., 72

Buton, F., 128Buunk, A. P., 98–99, 101, 114,

487Buys, C. J., 24Byme, J. A., 380Byrne, D., 92, 109, 461Byrne, Z. S., 170

Cable, D. M., 90Cacioppo, J. T., 104Cadinu, M., 426Cadinu, M. R., 82Cahill, S., 40Cain, K. M., 296Caldwell, D. F., 228, 330Callan, V. J., 82, 261Callaway, M. R., 342Camacho, L. M., 306Camerer, C., 71, 72Cameron, J. E., 490Cameron, J. J., 103Cameron, W. B., 513Cammann, C., 374Campara, N., 493Campbell, D. T., 9–11, 27, 147,

326, 413Campbell, J., 100Campbell, L., 261Campbell, T., 448Campion, M. A., 361, 362, 363Canetti, E., 504, 508Canfield, R. W., 111Cannavale, F. J., 518, 519Cannon, M. D., 367Cannon-Bowers, J. A., 321, 361,

367Canon, L. K., 448Cantor, N., 101, 104Cantril, H., 34, 35Caporael, L. R., 52, 67, 86Carew, D. K., 271Carini, B., 121, 127Carless, S. A., 119Carli, L. L., 164, 165, 187, 262,

280, 292, 386Carlopio, J. R., 447Carlyle, T., 255

638 AUTHOR INDEX

Carmen Hidalgo, M., 462Carnaghi, A., 426Carneiro, R. L., 416Carnevale, P. J., 75, 396, 405Carpenter, C. R., 463Carrere, S., 469Carron, A. V., 120, 127, 136, 137,

138, 140, 157, 467Carson, K. D., 228Carson, P. P., 228Carson, R. C., 232Carter, S. E., 317Cartwright, D., 4, 14, 27, 28, 167,

215, 253, 490Caruso, D. R., 259Caruso, E., 390Carvalho, E. R., 40Carver, M. D., 104Cascio, W. F., 324Casey-Campbell, M., 118Castano, E., 10, 11Castell, P. J., 238Castore, C. H., 322Castro, S. L., 271Catalano, R., 101Catanese, K. R., 59–61Cattell, R. B., 23Cavanaugh, P. H., 447Ceci, S. J., 155Cecil, J. S., 207Ceplenski, P., 492Cerchioni, M., 82Chagnon, N. A., 419, 439Chaichanasakul, A., 103Chaiken, S., 186, 198Chamberlain, A. S., 468Chambliss, W. J., 513Chamley, C. P., 198Chan, D., 75Chan, E., 118Chan, J., 118Chang, A., 121Chang, E. C., 317Chang, S., 343Chansler, P. A., 374Chao, G. T., 154Chaplin, W. F., 162

Chapman, A. J., 515Chapman, R., 466Chappelow, J., 200Chapple, E. D., 468Charles, K. E., 447Chartrand, T. L., 514Chase, M., 457Chassin, L., 81Chasteen, A. L., 291Chatman, J. A., 365Cheavens, J. S., 487Cheek, J. M., 93Chein, I., 420Chemers, M. M., 265, 268, 269,

465Chen, F. F., 68Chen, S., 186, 232, 236, 237,

238, 244Chen, X. P., 75Chen, Y., 68, 73, 86Chen, Z., 343Cheney, D. L., 162Cheney, P. D., 456Cheng, S., 510Chernick, K. K., 449Chernicky, P., 234Chertkoff, J. M., 509Cherulnik, P., 468Cheshire, C., 224Chesner, S. P., 249Cheung, C. K. T., 64Cheyne, J. A., 464Chiba, S., 393Chilstrom, J. T., Jr., 193Chirot, D., 420, 429Chiu, C., 10, 75Choi, H., 154Choi, S., 74Choi, W., 64Chopko, S. A., 296Chow, C. W., 249Christakis, N. A., 148Christensen, A., 494–495Christensen, C., 249, 318, 329Christensen, P. N., 488Christian, M. S., 47Christopher, A. N., 391

Chun, J. U., 272Church, M., 104Churchman, A. S., 447, 473Cialdini, R. B., 72, 80, 121, 145,

188, 191, 196, 198, 200, 212,234, 244, 505

Cianni, M., 262Ciarocco, N. J., 59, 61Cicero, L., 239Cihangir, S., 328Cillessen, A. H. N., 167Cincotta, S., 80Cini, M. A., 111, 453Ciriacks, T., 405Clack, B., 465Claiborn, C. D., 489Clanton, N. R., 162Clapp, J. D., 41Clark, C. L., 94Clark, G., 508Clark, K. B., 235Clark, L. A., 236Clark, M. S., 69Clark, N. K., 318Clark, R. D., 181, 192, 198,

203, 237Clark, S., 413Clarkson, F. E., 77Clayton, D. A., 287Clayton, L. D., 205–206, 209,

357, 375Clearwater, Y. A., 469Clement, R. W., 109, 188, 197Clendenen, V. I., 291Cline, R. J., 489Clipp, E. C., 133Coats, E. J., 457Coats, S., 94Coch, L., 323, 324, 347Coe, C., 111Coetzer, G. H., 132Cogliser, C. C., 271Cohen, D., 76, 419, 439Cohen, E. L., 102Cohen, F., 265, 266Cohen, J. L., 24Cohen, M. D., 398

AUTHOR INDEX 639

Cohen, R. R., 137, 139, 142Cohen, S., 52, 448, 459Cohen, S. G., 367Cohen, S. P., 134, 170–173Cohn, E. G., 447Cohrs, J. C., 232Coie, J. D., 167Cole, C. M., 234Coleman, P. T., 391, 409Colligan, M. J., 512Collins, B. E., 303, 326Collins, J. M., 157Collins, R., 136, 147Collins, R. L., 99, 102Colman, A. M., 524Colman, M. M., 137, 138Colomy, P., 152Colquitt, J. A., 323Conaty, J. C., 162Condon, C. A., 186Condor, S., 431Conger, J. A., 274Conlon, D. E., 403, 405Connors, M. M., 449, 469Conroy, J., 467Constantian, C. A., 92Contractor, N., 4Contry, J. C., 509Cook, J. M., 109Cook, K., 163Cook, K. S., 224, 230Cook, S. W., 432, 433, 437Cook, T., 237Cool, C., 189Cooley, C. H., 10, 11, 12, 18,

27, 488Coon, H. M., 70, 75, 76, 86Cooper, C., 157, 175Cooper, E., 262Cooper, H. M., 187Cooper, L. A., 484Coovert, M., 277Copper, C., 129, 137, 138, 141Corazzini, J. G., 490, 491, 499Corbin, J., 34Corbin, L. H., 188Cordery, J., 374

Corey, G., 491Corey, M., 491Corneille O., 11, 29, 181, 386Cornelius, A. E., 128Cornell, S. D., 170Corning, A. F., 95, 516Cornwell, B., 164, 207Corsaro, W. A., 522Cortes, B., 428, 429Coser, L. A., 131Costa, P. T., Jr., 89, 91Costanzo, P. R., 186Cotton, J. L., 375Cottrell, N. B., 288, 290, 310Couch, A. S., 152, 256Coughlin, B. C., 108, 137, 522Courneya, K. S., 467Cousins, S. D., 75Covey, S. R., 374Cox, C., 415Cox, T. H., 364Cozzolino, P. J., 231Craig, S. B., 280Craig, W., 225Crain, R. L., 431Crandall, C. S., 148, 164, 173, 522Crano, W. D., 192, 198, 212Crawford, A. M., 136Crawford, M. T., 11Cress, U., 190Crisp, R. J., 434, 436, 442Crisson, J. E., 288Croak, M. R., 435Crocker, J., 81, 85, 262Croff, J. K., 41Croker, V., 64Cronen, S., 291Cross, S. E., 68, 73, 90, 91Crott, H. W., 335Crouch, E. C., 492Crouse, E. M., 432Cruickshank, M., 64Crutchfield, R. S., 186, 189Cruz, M. G., 343Csoka, L. S., 269Cuddy, A. J. C., 221, 427Cullum, J., 195

Cummings, J. N., 11Cupach, W. R., 326Curhan, J. R., 395Currey, K. P., 415Curtis, J. E., 58Curtis, M., 11Custers, R., 146Cybriwsky, R., 463

D’Andrea Tyson, L., 375Dabbs, J. M., Jr., 166, 307Dagley, J. C., 494Dahl, R. A., 216Dahlke, A. E., 509Dale, R., 162Dalix, A. M., 291Dalton, B., 414Dane, F. C., 207Dansereau, F., 271Dardis, G. J., 415Darley, J. G., 124Darley, J. M., 203–204, 211, 235,

240David, B., 335David, J. P., 393Davidson, B., 132Davidson-Podgorny, G., 438Davidson-Shivers, G. V., 166Davies, D., 132Davies, D. R., 493Davis, G. E., 464Davis, J. A., 58Davis, J. H., 208, 296, 302, 322,

335, 342Davis, J. R., 125Davis, K. E., 109Davis, M. H., 104Davis, W. L., 386Davison, K. P., 98, 484Davis-Stitt, C., 426Davitz, J., 300Davy, J., 253Dawes, R. M., 331Day, D. V., 257, 271Day, R. R., 269, 481De Brabander, B., 361De Bruin, E. M. N., 386

640 AUTHOR INDEX

de Castro, J. M., 291De Cremer, D., 385, 386, 421De Dreu, C. K. W., 22, 75, 131,

194, 198, 328, 344, 364, 386,393, 396, 399, 403, 405, 406,408, 424, 487

de Graaf, C., 291De Grada, E., 186, 344de la Roche, R. S., 513, 522de Moura, G. R., 77De Paola, C., 119de Tocqueville, A., 74, 75De Vader, C. L., 257, 263De Vries, N. K., 198de Waal, F. B. M., 67, 232, 389,

407Dean, B. L., 90Dean, J., 455Dean, L. M., 457Deaux, K., 77, 86Deci, E. L., 239Decker, S. H., 108Deeney, J. M., 134Delbecq, A. L., 308Delucchi, K., 486DeLucia-Waack, J. L., 476DeMatteo, J. S., 297Demby, A., 495Demoulin, S., 428, 429Den Hartog, D. N., 276Dennis, A. R., 309Denrell, J., 197Denson, T. F., 11Denvir, B., 111, 114DePaulo, B. M., 492DeRosa, D. M., 309Desalvo, J., 188Deseran, F. A., 403DeSmet, A. L., 406Deutsch, M., 131, 188, 196, 382,

396, 397, 398, 401, 408, 409,417

Devine, D. J., 137, 139, 205–206,209, 283, 353, 354, 357, 361,375

Devine, P. G., 436DeVries, H., 232

DeWall, C. N., 59, 61, 62DeYoung, C. G., 186Di Salvo, V. S., 326Diamon, S., 79Diamond, S. G., 460Diamond, W. D., 417DiazGranados, D., 157Dickerson, S. S., 98, 484Dickinson, A. M., 297Dickson, M. W., 321Dickson, W. J., 34Diehl, M., 306, 307Diener, E., 89, 90, 518, 520, 521,

526Dienesch, R. M., 271Dierselhuis, J., 11Dies, R. R., 488Dietz-Uhler, B., 80, 81, 315, 430Dijke, M. V., 231, 240Dijksterhuis, A., 146, 451DiLalla, D. L., 91Dillard, J. P., 230, 234Dion, K. L., 9, 119, 142Dionne, S. D., 253, 272Dipboye, R. L., 523Dishion, T. J., 148DiTomaso, N., 262, 277Dixon, J., 465Dixon, K. N., 489, 496Djapo, N., 493Dobbins, G. H., 254Dobson, D. M., 401, 403Dodge, K. A., 148, 167Doherty, W. J., 495Doise, W., 333Dolan, T. J., 80Dolinski, D., 192Doll, B., 392Dollar, N. J., 34Dollinger, S. J., 91Donaldson, S., 306Donath, C. H., 292Dooley, D., 101Doosje, B., 79, 80, 83, 164, 430Doosje, B. J., 424Doreian, P., 165Dorfman, P. W., 276

Dorsch, K. D., 128Douthitt, E. A., 284, 285, 292,

312Dovidio, J. F., 162, 412, 413,

427, 428, 429, 432, 433,435, 441

Downing, L. L., 518Downs, D. L., 64Doxsee, D. J., 489Dragonas, T., 75Drake, L. R., 369Drenan, S., 417Drigotas, S. M., 415Driskell, J. E., 44, 129, 162,

163, 166, 222, 261, 343,360, 375

Dryer, D. C., 109Dubé, L., 507Dubé-Simard, L., 517Dubro, A. F., 386Dubrovsky, V. J., 166Ducheneaut, N., 106Duck, J. M., 264Duckitt, J., 231, 430Duffy, F., 453Duffy, M. K., 297Dugo, J. M., 489Dugosh, K. L., 307, 309Dukerich, J. M., 249Dukes, F. O., 3Dumas, F., 289Dunford, B. B., 205–206, 209,

357, 375Dunning, E. G., 507, 522Dupue, R. L., 63Durakovic, E., 493Durand, D. E., 468Durante, M., 80Durham, R. J., 489Durkheim, É., 16, 17, 27, 121Dutton, K. A., 420Dvir, T., 277Dweck, C. S., 75Dyce, J., 109Dykema-Engblade, A. A., 317,

318Dzindolet, M. T., 306–307

AUTHOR INDEX 641

Eagly, A. H., 164, 187, 254, 262,264, 265, 276, 280, 366

Eaton, J. W., 256Ebbesen, E. B., 106Eby, L. T., 297Edelstein, M. R., 448Eden, D., 276Eden, J., 343Eder, D., 522Edmondson, A. C., 352, 359, 366,

367, 370–371, 377Edney, J. J., 455, 463–464, 466,

467Efran, M. G., 464Egan, T. D., 364Ehlers, A., 493Ehrhardt, A. A., 40–41, 469Ehrhart, M. G., 119Ehrlich, S. B., 249Eid, J., 257Eid, M., 90Eidelson, R., 77Eisenbach, R. J., 253Eisenberger, N. I., 52, 62Eisenberger, R., 398Eisenhardt, K. M., 364Elder, G. H., 133Eldredge, N., 134Ellemers, N., 80, 83, 164Ellertson, N., 140Elliott, E., 24Elliott, M. N., 102Elliott, R., 496Elliott, T. R., 135, 497Ellis, A. P. J., 361Ellsworth, P. C., 162, 207, 209Ellyson, S. L., 162Elms, A. C., 217, 221Emans, B. J. M., 230Emerson, R. M., 224Emler, N., 237Emmelkamp, P. M. G., 480Emmers-Sommer, T., 461Emrich, C. G., 248End, C. M., 80Endicott, J., 206Engels, F., 413

Engles, R., 148Engstrom, E., 461Ennis, J. G., 172Epitropaki, O., 263Epley, N., 188, 390Erdogan, B., 272, 297Erickson, G. A., 80Ernst, D., 11Esposito, J. L., 511Esser, A. H., 468Esser, J. K., 342Esses, V. M., 413Estabrooks, P. A., 140Estreich, D., 286Ettin, M. F., 477Etzioni, A., 244Euwema, M. C., 403Evans, G. W., 52, 447, 454, 455,

457, 459, 469Evans, N. J., 127Everly, G. S., Jr., 493Eys, M. A., 157Eysenck, H., 89

Faith, M., 435Falbe, C., 240Falbo, T., 228, 230Falk, A., 384Fall, R., 292Falloon, I. R. H., 488Fan, E. T., 343Fanon, F., 235Farbstein, J., 445Farley, K. M. J., 447Farrell, G. M., 152Farrell, M. P., 10, 40, 88, 114Farrington, D. P., 517Farris, K. R., 76Faust, K., 38, 159Feely, T. H., 170Fehr, E., 71, 72Feigenson, N., 203Feld, P., 343Feld, S. L., 107, 186Feldman, D. B., 487Feldman, J. J., 102Feldman, S., 186

Feldstein, M., 495Fellenz, M. R., 389Fennell, M. L., 262Ferencik, B. M., 492Ferguson, T. J., 406Ferreira, M. C., 389Ferris, G. R., 292Festinger, L., 40, 67, 96, 105, 106,

109, 113, 118, 119, 126, 196,197, 199, 201, 517

Feunekes, G. L. J., 291Fiedler, F. E., 266–269, 271, 278Field, N., 257Filer, M., 487Filkins, J. W., 209Finch, J. F., 382Finch, M. L., 518Fincham, F. D., 100, 395Fine, G. A., 40, 41, 127, 149,

227, 230Finlay, F., 320Finn, J. D., 124Firestone, I. J., 446Fischbacher, U., 384Fischer, G. W., 425Fischer, R., 389Fish, R. S., 189Fishbaugh, L., 187Fisher, B. A., 131Fisher, G. A., 95Fisher, J. D., 148, 444, 461, 473Fisher, R., 400, 409Fisher, S., 450Fisher, W. A., 148Fiske, A. P., 69, 70, 71, 76, 86,

287Fiske, S. T., 70, 193, 215, 221,

228, 238, 239, 244, 366, 423,427, 428, 429

Fitzpatrick, M. A., 230Flacks, R., 45Fleeson, W., 90Fleishman, E. A., 252, 369Flora, D. B., 494Flores, P. J., 485Florey, A. T., 365Flowers, M. L., 343

642 AUTHOR INDEX

Flynn, F. J., 257Flynn, K., 522Foa, E. B., 480Foddy, M., 163Fodor, E. M., 231, 237, 239, 343Foer, F., 419Fogg, B. J., 372Folk, G. E., Jr., 447Fontayne, P., 128Foran, K. A., 148Ford, D. E., 484Ford, R. S., 224, 398Ford, T. E., 69Forgas, J. P., 405Forsyth, D. R., 23, 81, 124, 135,

138, 253, 264, 265, 280, 356,390, 433, 434, 497, 499

Fortin, M., 389Fortune, W. H., 207, 209Foschi, M., 164, 227Foss, C., 466, 468Foss, R. D., 208Foster-Fishman, P. G., 329Foti, R. J., 256, 257, 263, 264Fournier, M. A., 253Foushee, H. C., 222Fowler, J. H., 148Fox, C., 63Fox, D., 300Fox, R., 365Foy, D. W., 136, 493Foy, E., 509Fraas, L. A., 259Frable, D. E. S., 487Fragale, A. R., 232Frager, R., 187Fraine, G., 466Francis, L. J.., 186Francis, R. C., 67Franke, R. H., 34Franklin, M. E., 480Franssen, V., 194Franz, T. M., 249, 329Fraser, S. C., 234, 518Fredrickson, J. W., 393Freedman, J. L., 234, 458, 472,

515

Freeman, K. A., 292Freeman, L. C., 158, 160, 175Freeman, S., 80, 121Freisthler, B., 41French, J. R. P., Jr., 137, 221, 223,

226, 227, 323, 324, 347, 381Freud, S., 190, 265, 477, 478, 497Frey, D., 328, 329, 331Frey, L. R., 42Fried, Y., 157, 175Friedkin, N. E., 119, 334Friedland, N., 240Friedman, R., 478Friedman, S. D., 248Friend, R., 34Frings, D., 336Froman, L. A., Jr., 398Fromkin, H. L., 74Fromm, E., 523Fromson, M. E., 429Frost, A. G., 50Frost, J. H., 106Fu, P. P., 230Fuegen, K., 165Fuhriman, A., 477, 490, 492, 494Fujita, F., 90Fukushima, O., 393Fung, A. S. M., 512Funk, C. L., 516Futoran, G. C., 307

Gabarro, J. J., 132Gabriel, S., 68Gaertner, L., 68, 83, 425Gaertner, S. L., 412–413, 427,

432, 433, 435Gailliot, M. T., 65Gaines, S. O., Jr., 75, 413Gajendran, R. S., 371Galanter, E., 316Galasso, J., 225Galea, S., 103Galinsky, A. D., 13, 226, 236,

237, 238Gallo, P. S., Jr., 398Gallois, C., 261Galvaing, M. P., 289

Gammage, K. L., 140Gan, Y., 74Gannon, T. M., 418García, B. F., 76Garcia, R., 292Garcia, S. M., 204Gardham, K., 433Gardner, H., 274Gardner, J. W., 247Gardner, P. D., 154Gardner, W., 73Gardner, W. L., 61, 65, 68, 286Garrett, M., 80Garvey, B., 181Gaunt, R., 428, 429Gauvin, S., 309Gavin, J. H., 365Gawronski, B., 167Gazda, G. M., 480Gecas, V., 73Geen, R. G., 292Geffner, R., 225Geis, F. L., 262Gelfand, M. J., 74, 404Gelfand, M. J. C., 75Gemmill, G., 248Genevie, L. E., 509George, J. M., 48, 49, 121Georgesen, J. C., 237Gerard, H. B., 127, 188, 196,

201, 431Gerbasi, A., 224Gergen, K. J., 484, 518Gergen, M., 238Gergen, M. M., 518Gerhardt, G., 522Gerhardt, M. W., 257, 258Gersick, C. J. G., 134Gerstner, C. R., 271Geyer, A. L., 184Giammanco, C. A., 138, 390Giannetti, C. C., 225Gibb, C. A., 258Gibb, J. R., 495Gibbons, D., 106Gibbons, F. X., 99, 101, 114Gibson, C. R., 230

AUTHOR INDEX 643

Gibson, D. R., 166Gibson, L. L., 369Gieryn, T. F., 105, 444Giesen, M., 460Gigone, D., 328Gilbert, S. J., 234Gilboa, S., 157, 175Gilchrist, J. C., 111Giles, H., 455Gill, D. L., 361Gillespie, D. L., 162Gillies, R. M., 292Gilmore, R., 417Gilovich, T., 188, 286Gilson, L., 375, 378Gilson, L. L., 372Ginnett, R. C., 222Ginsburg, G. P., 52, 335Gintis, H., 71, 72Giordano, P. C., 137, 522Giuliano, T., 320Gladwell, M., 90, 91, 196, 515Glaser, D., 464Glaser, K. H., 132Glass, D. C., 288, 448Glässner-Bayerl, B., 82Gleitman, H., 181Glick, J. C., 315Glick, P., 265, 420, 427, 441Gliner, M. D., 335Glor, J. E., 393Gmel, G., 148Gockel, C., 298Godfrey, D. K., 162Godwin, R., 447, 473Goedinghaus, M., 489Goethals, G. R., 265, 280, 334,

460Goetsch, G. G., 170Goettl, B. P., 488Goffman, E., 157, 288Golant, M., 489Gold, M., 495Goldberg, L., 522Goldenberg, J. L., 265Goldhammer, J., 137Golding, W., 430

Goldman, B., 357Goldman, M., 259Goldstein, A. P., 128, 520Goldstein, N. J., 188, 212Goldstein, P., 24Goleman, D., 259Goodacre, D. M., 132Goode, E., 512, 524Goodman, A., 495Goodman, G., 483Goodman, P., 478Goodwin, D. K., 41Goodwin, G. F., 360Goodyear, R. K., 489Goore, N., 286Gordijn, E. H., 198, 226Gordon, L. R., 343Gore, J. S., 91Gornik-Durose, M., 72Gottlieb, A., 203Gottlieb, N. H., 134Gould, S.J., 134Goulding, M. M., 479Goulding, R. L., 479Gouldner, A. W., 69Gouran, D. S., 316Govan, C. L., 64Goyal, S., 198Grabb, E. G., 58Graeff, C. L., 271Graen, G. B., 271Graetz, K. A., 415Grandmaison, P. S., 292Granovetter, M. S., 4, 167Granrose, C. S., 76Grant, L., 40Graziano, W. G., 382, 393Green, A. S., 166Green, D.P., 436, 441Green, L. R., 104, 195Green, M. L., 79Green, R. B., 24Green, T. C., 444, 473Greenberg, C. I., 446, 451Greenberg, J., 265, 266, 323,

391Greenleaf, C. A., 148

Greenwald, A. G., 423Greenwood, D. J., 32Greenwood, J. D., 4, 29Greer, D. L., 467Gregory, D., 140Greitemeyer, T., 328, 329Gresta, S., 426Greve, D. W., 479Griffeth, R. W., 119Griffin, J., 235Griffin, M. A., 128Griffitt, W., 447Griskevicius, V., 188Grob, A., 90Groff, B. D., 459Grose, M., 257Gross, N., 124Gruenewald, T. L., 62, 91, 102Gruenfeld, D. H., 236, 237, 238,

239, 244Grundmann, M. J., 455, 464Gruner, L., 129, 490Gualtieri, J., 135Guastello, S. J., 248Guerin, B., 289Guest, T. A., 518, 519Guetzkow, H., 303, 326, 392Guimond, A., 517Guinote, A., 193, 236, 425Gulick, L. M., 257Gullahorn, J. T., 106Gully, S. M., 137, 139, 357Gum, A., 487Gump, P. V., 239, 452Gunderson, E. K. E., 469Gunn, S. P., 234Gurr, T. R., 413Gurung, R. A. R., 62, 91, 102Gustafson, D. H., 308Guthman, E., 341Gutierrez, R., 336Guzman, M. J., 157Gyr, J., 392

Haas, D. F., 403Haas, S., 464Haber, G. M., 462, 467, 473

644 AUTHOR INDEX

Hackman, J. R., 20–21, 29, 135,317, 318, 355, 358, 366, 370,373, 374, 376, 377, 378

Haddock, G., 197Haga, W., 271Hagendoorn, L., 291Haidt, J., 72Haines, V. Y., 68Hains, S. C., 264Hair, E. C., 382, 393Halevy, N., 77Haley, H., 417, 418Halfhill, T., 354, 355, 357, 374Hall, A. L., 181Hall, C. L., 162Hall, E. T., 454, 456Hall, G. B., 94Hall, J. A., 253, 457Hallinan, M. T., 167Halperin, E., 428Halpin, A. W., 252Halpin, S. M., 164Halverson, R. R., 119Hamaguchi, E., 75Hamilton, D. L., 11–15, 27, 28,

79, 426Hamilton, V. L., 233, 234, 241Hamilton, W. D., 67Hammer, E. D., 315Hampton, K. L., 292Hand, H. H., 119Haney, C., 233Hanges, P. J., 277Hannaford-Agor, P. L., 206Hans, V. P., 33, 204, 206, 207,

208, 209, 213Hansen, W. B., 237, 466Hanson, L., 451Hantula, D. A., 309Harary, F., 167Hardin, G., 387Harding, D. J., 63Harding, J., 420Hardy, C., 296Hare, A. P., 3, 22, 35, 37, 41, 129,

132, 135, 149, 172, 173, 176,187, 381, 461

Hare, J. R., 37, 172Hare, S. E., 172, 176Harinck, F., 401Harkins, S., 294, 295, 310Harkins, S. G., 288, 295, 296, 297Harlow, A. F., 509Harlow, H. F., 67, 291Harlow, M. K., 67Harlow, R. E., 101, 104Harman, J., 137Harms, P. D., 231Harpin, R. E., 464Harrell, M. M., 157Harrick, E. A., 80Harris, C. B., 318Harris, D. W., 298Harris, J. R., 18Harris, L. T., 221, 429Harris, M. J., 237Harrison, A. A., 449, 469Harrison, D. A., 364, 371Harrod, W. J., 163, 262Hart, C. M., 82Hart, J. W., 296Hart, S. D., 227Härtel, C. E. J., 330Härtel, G. F., 330Harton, H. C., 183, 194, 195,

212Hartry, A., 424Hartsen, K. M., 231Hartup, W. W., 167Harvey, J. B., 340Harvey, O. J., 411, 421, 431, 434,

438, 441Haslam, N., 11Haslam, S. A., 104, 264, 297, 298,

306, 335, 345, 425, 426, 428Hastie, R., 72, 204, 206–209, 211,

321, 322, 328Hastorf, A. H., 34, 35Hauenstein, N. M. A., 256Hawkins, C., 163, 206Hawkley, L. C., 104Hayduk, L. A., 455, 457Hayes, A., 486Hayes, S. M., 137

Haythorn, W. W., 470Hazan, C., 94He, Y., 103Healey, A. N., 352Healey, M. P., 50Healy, S., 92Hearne, G., 461Hecht, T. D., 357, 378Hechter, M., 144, 175Hefferline, R., 478Heffron, M. H., 464Heider, F., 109, 167, 394Heilman, M. E., 262Heiman, R. J., 74Heimerdinger, S. R., 420Heiney, M. M., 265Heingartner, A., 287Heinicke, C. M., 132Helbing, D., 510Heller, J. F., 459Heller, T., 259Hellman, P., 203Helmreich, R. L., 41, 222, 469Helms, J. E., 489Helms, M. M., 261Heltman, K., 162Helweg-Larsen, M., 509Hembroff, L. A., 164Hemelrijk, C., 52Hemenover, S. H., 90Hemmings, A., 221Hemphill, J. K., 248Henchy, T., 288Henderson, M. C., 76Henderson, W. D., 133Hendricks, E. A., 101Hendricks, F. M., 489Henley, N. M., 457Henningsen, D. D., 319, 328, 343Henningsen, M. L. M., 319,

328, 343Henrich, J., 71, 72Henry, K., 23Henry, K. B., 19, 121, 127, 142Heppner, P. P., 489Hepworth, J. T., 420Herek, G. M., 342

AUTHOR INDEX 645

Herfordt, J., 289Herman, C. P., 291Herman, E. M., 287Hernández, B., 462Herrera, M., 11Herschlag, L. R., 292Hersey, P., 270, 271, 279Hertel, G., 304Hertel, J. B., 489Hertel, P. T., 320Herzog, T. R., 449Hess, S., 462Hess, U., 196Heuzé, J., 128Hewitt, J., 457Hewstone, M., 192, 194, 197,

211, 212, 423, 430, 431, 433,434, 436, 442

Heylighen, F., 320Hicks, D., 76Higgins, D. M., 186Higgins, R. L., 80Highhouse, S., 481Hight, T. L., 487Hightower, R. T., 456Hill, A. H., 509Hill, C. A., 92Hill, C. E., 489Hill, W. F., 129, 490Hills, H. I., 232Hilty, J. A., 405Hinkin, T. R., 223Hinkle, S., 4, 423Hinrichs, K. T., 221Hinsz, V. B., 50, 297, 318, 321,

329, 350, 415, 420Hirokawa, R. Y., 316, 317, 329,

350Hirst, W., 318Hirt, E. R., 80Hitch, G., 320Hitch, G. J., 320Hoag, M. J., 494Hockenstein, P., 238Hocker, J. L., 380Hodges, B. H., 184Hodgkinson, G. P., 50

Hodson, G., 343, 413, 427Hoey, S., 487Hoffer, E., 516Hoffman, J. R., 296Hoffman, L. R., 262Hoffman, S., 181Hofstede, G., 75Hofstedt, P. M., 186Hogan, R., 52, 248, 254, 258,

266, 280Hogg, M. A., 4, 11, 27, 28, 73, 77,

78, 79, 86, 119, 120, 135,140, 142, 202, 264, 278, 317,318, 335, 422

Holland, C. H., 221Hollander, E. P., 193, 210, 239,

249, 259Hollar, D., 80Hollenbeck, J. R., 50, 359, 361Hollingshead, A. B., 55, 162, 166,

316, 320, 321, 329, 350,369, 506

Hollingworth, H. L., 506Hollon, S. D., 480Holmberg, D., 91Holmes, J. G., 103, 384, 491Holmes, M. R., 41Holmes, P., 495Holovics, M. A., 79Holt, R. W., 208Holton, B., 414Holtz, A., 490Holyfield, L., 127, 227Homan, A. C., 364Homans, G. C., 31, 52, 53Honeywell-Johnson, J. A., 297Hong, G., 414Hong, Y., 75Hood, W. R., 411, 421, 431,

438, 441Hooijberg, R., 262, 277Hook, L. H., 206, 461Hooper, D. T., 272Hoorens, V., 98Hoover, E., 137Hopkins, N., 264Hopper, C. H., 307

Hopthrow, T., 336Horne, A. M., 225, 491, 494Horner, P. A., 489Hornsey, M. J., 183Horowitz, I. A., 209Horowitz, L. M., 109Horwitz, I. B., 364Horwitz, S. K., 364Hottes, J., 386Houlden, P., 405Houle, C. O., 392Houlette, M., 432, 433, 435House, R. J., 276House, R. L., 274Houser, J. A., 169Houston, R., 493Houston, T. K., 484Hovland, C., 420Howard, J. A., 230Howard, J. W., 426Howard, R. B., 454, 455Howe, R. C., 335Howell, J. P., 253Howells, L. T., 462Hoyle, R. H., 44, 118, 121, 127,

136, 414, 415Hoyt, C. L., 46, 257, 265,

266, 280Huang, J. Y., 207Hubbard, J. A., 167Hubbell, A. P., 329Hübner, O., 150Huebsch, D., 320Hugenberg, K., 11Hughes, R. L., 507Huguet, P., 289Hui, C. H., 75Hulbert, L., 336Hulbert, L. G., 336, 405Humphrey, B., 120, 127Humphreys, L., 33Hung-yu, L., 202Hunt, J. G., 251Hunter, S. B., 287Hurley, J. R., 491Huston, J. H., 188Hutchinson, S., 323

646 AUTHOR INDEX

Huth, P., 342Hyde, M., 464Hyman, H. M., 44, 204Hymel, S., 225

Iacoboni, M., 287Iannaccone, L. R., 127Ickes, W., 95, 162Ilardi, B. C., 262Ilgen, D. R., 50, 359, 361, 369,

371, 374, 375, 378, 393Ilies, R., 257, 258, 271Imada, S., 72Indik, B. P., 127Inesi, M. E., 238Ingram, R. E., 486Innes, J. M., 289Insel, P. M., 120, 127Insko, C. A., 109, 110, 343, 413,

414, 415, 416, 417, 441Instone, D., 228, 230, 259Ip, G. W., 10Isenberg, D. J., 172Islam, G., 11, 162Iuzzini, J., 83Iverson, M. A., 111Iwao, S., 75Izumi, H., 374

Jablin, F. M., 170Jackson, A., 120Jackson, C., 195Jackson, C. L., 369Jackson, D., 461Jackson, J. M., 182, 183, 247,

296Jackson, L. M., 413Jackson, S. E., 364Jacobs, A., 492Jacobs, D., 413Jacobs, E., 369Jacobs, M. K., 483Jacobs, R. C., 147Jacobson, N. S., 494–495Jacoby, L. L., 291Jacquemotte, L., 80Jago, A. G., 324

Jahoda, G., 16, 28James, J., 3James, R., 206James, R. M., 163, 206Janicik, G. A., 317Janis, I. L., 12, 42, 137, 326, 337,

339, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345,346, 348

Jankowski, M. S., 522Janowski, C. L., 259Janssen, D. P., 421Janssen, O., 401Jarboe, S. C., 403Jarvis, P. A., 127Jaschik-Herman, B., 109Jasper, J. M., 522Javidan, M., 276Jaworski, R. A., 297Jaycox, L. H., 102, 480Jefferis, V., 61Jehn, K. A., 297, 316, 317,

321, 329, 350, 392,406, 413

Jenkins, T. B., 68, 90Jennings, J. R., 287, 288Jensen, M. A. C., 19, 129Jensen-Campbell, L. A., 393Jermier, J. M., 253Jetten, J., 164, 183, 345Jimerson, J. B., 147Jochims, M., 331–332Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C., 262,

276Johansson, A., 510John, O. P., 167Johns, M., 265Johnson, A. L., 101Johnson, B. T., 254, 276, 366Johnson, C., 79, 306Johnson, D. E., 270Johnson, D. W., 100, 193, 382,

383, 438Johnson, F., 481Johnson, J. E., 490Johnson, K. M., 435Johnson, L. D., 91Johnson, M., 50, 69, 359

Johnson, N. R., 501, 509, 524,527

Johnson, R. D., 518Johnson, R. T., 382, 383, 438Johnson, S., 271Joiner, T. E., Jr., 80Joireman, J. A., 386Jolliff, D. L., 491Jonas, K., 431Jones, D. J., 100Jones, D. R., 487Jones, E. C., 369Jones, E. E., 162, 260, 425Jones, E. S., 261Jones, J. R., 79Jones, M. B., 361Jones, T. S., 457Jones, W. H., 104Jordan, J., 238Jordan-Edney, N. L., 463–464Jordon, J. A., 488Jorgenson, D. O., 3Joseph, L., 286Joseph, S., 186Jost, J. T., 99Jostmann, N. B., 236Jourard, S., 130Judd, C. M., 11, 29, 47, 55, 335,

425Judge, T. A., 90, 257, 258, 276Jundt, D., 50, 359Jung, C. G., 89Jung, D., 249Jung, J., 102Jung, K., 90

Kagan, J., 93Kagan-Moore, L., 489, 496Kahn, A., 386, 460, 519Kahn, R., 80Kahn, R. L., 156, 404Kaiser, R. B., 52, 248, 254, 266,

280Kallgren, C. A., 145, 200Kalodner, C. R., 476Kalsnes, B., 102Kalven, H., Jr., 204, 207

AUTHOR INDEX 647

Kamarck, T. W., 287, 288Kameda, T., 66, 72, 195, 205, 296,

321, 322, 335, 337, 342Kanagawa, C., 73Kanas, N., 477Kandel, D. B., 110Kang, S., 197Kanouse, D. E., 102Kanter, R. M., 366Kantrowitz, M., 445Kanzer, M., 477Kaplan, M. F., 207, 323Kaplan, R. E., 481Kaplan, S. A., 47Kaplowitz, S. A., 226Karau, S. J., 277, 294, 296, 297,

298, 307, 311, 312, 330, 344,356

Kark, R., 228Kashima, E. S., 75Kashima, Y., 74Kashy, D. A., 488Kaskutas, L. A., 148, 485, 486Katz, A. H., 483Katz, D., 156, 404Katz, N., 4Katz, R., 255, 321Katzenbach, J. R., 374Kaul, J. D., 34Kaul, T., 481, 494, 495Kawakami, K., 427Kayes, D.C., 41Kearney, E., 228Keating, C. F., 162Keating, J. P., 40, 459Keil, L. J., 401Keinan, G., 361Kelem, R. T., 518Keller, E., 515Keller, K., 404Keller, T., 274Kelley, C. E., 460Kelley, H. H., 49, 111, 112, 167,

196, 384, 393, 396, 509Kelley, J., 145Kelley, R., 250–251Kelly, D., 257

Kelly, J. R., 49, 121, 260, 307,343, 344, 399

Kelman, H. C., 234, 240–241, 437Kelsey, R. M., 288Keltner, D., 167, 232, 236, 237,

239, 244, 514Kemery, E. R., 157Kemmelmeier, M., 70, 75, 76, 86Kemp, R. I., 318Kenis, P., 38Kennedy, C., 80Kennedy, J., 415Kennedy, J. C., 230Kennedy, R. F., 347Kenney, R. A., 263Kenny, D. A., 89, 256, 492Kenrick, D. T., 188Kent, S., 468Kenworthy, J. B., 79, 194, 430,

431Kerckhoff, A. C., 109, 512Kerr, J. L., 336Kerr, N. L., 54, 207, 208, 241,

201, 202, 212, 296, 298, 303,312, 330, 348, 350, 396

Kerschreiter, R., 328Keshet, S., 228Kessler, T., 232, 436Keys, C. B., 329Khan, S. R., 291Khare, V. P., 257Khazian, A. M., 453Kieffer, S. C., 492Kiesler, C. A., 188Kiesler, D. J., 479Kiesler, S., 11, 166Kilham, W., 234Killian, L. M., 521Kilmartin, C. T., 232, 491Kim, H., 186, 240, 489Kim, K., 75, 166Kim, S. H., 340, 380, 409Kim, U., 74, 75Kim, Y., 102Kimmel, A. J., 511Kinder, M. H., 489King, G. A., 382

King, L. A., 37King, M. C., 425King, R. G., Jr., 234Kipnis, D., 228, 230, 235,

238–239Kipper, D. A., 479Kirby, P., 320Kirchman, C. M., 104Kirchner, J. L., 415Kirchner, T. R., 336Kirkpatrick, L. A., 97Kirkpatrick, L. C., 209Kirmeyer, S. L., 451Kirson, D., 399Kirzner, E., 286Kitayama, S., 86Kitayma, S., 74Kivlighan, D. M., Jr., 489, 490,

491, 492Kiyonari, T., 388Kjos, G. L., 106Klandermans, B., 517Klauer, K. C., 289Klaver, E., 230Klein, K. J., 364Klein, L. C., 62, 91, 102Kleinpenning, G., 291Klentz, B., 234Klimoski, R., 316Kline, N. S., 468Klocke, U., 329Klonsky, B. G., 265Klotz, M. L., 393Kluger, J., 448, 462, 473Knibbe, R., 148Knievel, E. M., 302, 303Knight, D. P., 162Knight, G. P., 386Kniveton, B., 318Knowles, E. S., 186, 457, 464Knowles, M. L., 61, 286Knowlton, B. J., 287Kobrynowicz, D., 164Koenig, K., 45Kogan, N., 333Köhler, O., 303Kolb, D. M., 401

648 AUTHOR INDEX

Kolb, K. J., 292Kollock, P., 384Komorita, S. S., 387, 388, 398,

405Kondracki, B. A., 460Konecni, V. J., 106Koole, S. L., 101–102Kopp, W., 246, 260, 274, 279Koren, M., 361Koslowsky, M., 223, 224, 228Kösters, M., 494Kotter, J. P., 251Kounin, J. S., 239Kowalski, R. M., 111, 63, 94Kowert, P. A., 318, 342Kozlowski, S. W. J., 154, 357,

358, 369, 371, 374, 375, 377,378

Krackhardt, D., 169–170Krakauer, J., 450Kramer, G. P., 330, 348Kramer, R. M., 42, 154, 224, 306,

320, 327, 339, 342, 350, 387,415

Kraus, L. A., 104Kraus, M. W., 232, 236, 237,

244Krause, C. A., 215, 244Krause, D. E., 228, 239Krause, N., 19, 102, 103Krause, S., 92Krauss, R. M., 396, 397, 398, 401,

408, 417Kraut, R. E., 189Kravitz, D. A., 24, 293, 294Kreager, D., 63Kressel, K., 405Kreuser, B., 464Kring, A. M., 167Krishnan, R., 369Kristnamurti, J., 101Kristof-Brown, A., 109Krogel, J., 494Krone, K. J., 170Krueger, D. L., 261Krueger, J., 109, 188, 197Kruglanski, A. W., 186, 344, 391

Krull, L. A., 489Ku, G., 13Kuhn, T. S., 15Kulic, K. R., 494Kulik, J. A., 97Kulo, J., 492Kumar, K., 164Kumar, V. K., 128Kunda, Z., 101Kurland, N. B., 227Kurusu, T. A., 487Kushigian, R. H., 509Kushnir, T., 134Kutner, B., 420Kuypers, B. C., 132Kwan, V. S. Y., 74Kwapil, T. R., 95Kwon, S., 386

LaBarge, E., 489Lacoursiere, R. B., 129Ladbury, J. L., 321LaFleur, S. J., 165LaGanke, J., 321Lage, E., 191, 192Lago, T., 104Laing, R. D., 523Lakin, M., 480Lal Goel, M., 91Laliberte, M., 291Lalonde, R. N., 82Lam, A., 64Lam, S. K., 329Lambert, A. J., 291Lamm, H., 333, 334Lammers, J., 226Landau, J., 261Landau, M. J., 265Landers, D. M., 127Landry, P., 414Lange, J. E., 41Langfred, C. W., 139Langner, C. A., 236Langs, R. J., 477Lanier, K., 232Lankau, M. J., 262Lanni, J. C., 467

Lanzetta, J. T., 321LaPiere, R., 512Larsen, I. M., 318Larsen, K. S., 187Larsen, O. N., 509Larson, J. R., 249, 318, 329Laskin, E., 274Latané, B., 182, 183, 194, 195,

203–204, 210, 211, 291, 294,295, 296, 310, 334

Latham, G. P., 297Latham, M. E., 357Latheef, N. A., 198LaTour, S., 405Lau, D. C., 364Laughlin, P. R., 302, 303, 321Lavertue, N., 128Lawler, E. E., 375Lawler, E. J., 118, 224, 240, 398Lawrence, R. J., 454Lawson, R. B., 343Layne, C. M., 493Lazarsfeld, P.F., 107Lazer, D., 4Lazes, P., 32Lazonder, A. W., 315Le Bon, G., 16, 17, 27, 502, 514,

515, 518, 524, 526Le Mens, G., 197Lea, M., 166, 189, 190Leach, C. W., 79, 430Leach, D. J., 327Leak, G. K., 491Leaper, C., 187, 253Leary, M. R., 58, 61, 62, 63, 64,

65, 68, 83, 84, 90, 94, 111,253, 356, 390

Leather, P., 448Leavitt, H. J., 158, 168, 170LeBeau, L. S., 457Leclerc, F., 507Lee, E., 190Lee, H. K., 73Lee, L., 515Lee, M. T., 162Lee, P. W. H., 512Lee, R. M., 90

AUTHOR INDEX 649

Lee, S. W. S., 68, 73Lee-Chai, A. Y., 237, 238Leffler, A., 162Lehman, E.V., 20, 366Leichtentritt, J., 491Leigh, G. K., 495LeMay, E., 170Lencioni, P., 327, 469Lengel, L., 455Leon, G. R., 459Leonard, W. M., 522LePine, J. A., 361, 369Lepkin, M., 17Lepore, S. J., 447, 459Lese, K. P., 492Leslie, L. M., 404Lester, M. E., 495Leszcz, M., 135, 479, 486–494,

499Leung, A. S. M., 68Leung, K., 69Leung, P. W. L., 512Levesque, M. J., 492Levin, H. M., 274Levine, D. I., 375Levine, J. M., 3, 95, 96, 111, 113,

153, 154, 155, 192, 201, 202,212, 336, 360, 369, 380, 409,430, 447, 453

Levine, M., 522Levine, S. V., 516Levy, A. B., 489, 499Levy, D. A., 184Levy, L. H., 483, 499Lewicki, R. J., 398, 399, 409Lewin, K., 14, 17, 18, 23, 27, 42,

43, 53, 54, 119, 272, 273,276, 279, 443, 475, 480, 489,497

Lewis, A., 13–15Lewis, B. P., 62, 91, 102Lewis, J. C., 224Ley, D., 463Leyens, J., 181, 428, 429Liang, J., 104Lianos, G., 80Liberman, M. D., 287

Liberty, H. J., 506, 507Lickel, B., 11, 12, 13, 14, 27, 28,

291Liden, R. C., 271, 297Lieberman, M. A., 481, 489, 492,

495, 496Lieberman, M. D., 52, 62Lietaer, G., 482Lightstone, J., 515Likert, R., 253, 357Limayem, M., 309Limbert, W. M., 202Lind, E. A., 388Lindblom, C. E., 326Lindeman, M., 430Linder, D. E., 128Lindley, P., 488Lindskold, S., 403, 464, 518Linkous, R. A., 286Linley, P. A., 186Linville, P. W., 425Linzmayer, O. W., 380, 409Lipinski, R. M., 163, 206Lipman-Blumen, J., 249Lippitt, R., 42, 43, 53, 54, 272,

273, 279Lippmann, W., 426, 440Lipset, S. M., 522Lipsitz, A., 417Lischetzke, T., 90List, J. A., 385Littlepage, A. M., 369Littlepage, G. E., 50, 226, 230,

259, 302, 330, 369Liu, J. H., 231, 334Liu, X., 104Lobel, M., 487Lobel, S. A., 364Locke, E. A., 251, 274, 297, 324,

357Locke, E. E., 274Lockwood, P., 101Lodewijkx, H. F. M., 127, 307Loeber, C. C., 165Lofland, J., 507Logel, C., 103Lohr, N., 81

Lois, J., 41LoMonaco, B. L., 509London, M., 370Long, C. R., 58Long, T. E., 493Longley, J., 337Loomis, J., 46Lopes, P. N., 259Lord, C. G., 162Lord, R. G., 252, 257, 263, 264Lorge, I., 300Lott, A. J., 118, 123, 188Lott, B. E., 118, 123, 188Lount, R. B., 303Lovaglia, M. J., 169, 391Lovell, J., 448, 462, 473Loving, T. J., 344Low, L. C. K., 512Lowery, L., 72Lowry, P. B., 456Loy, J., 127Lublin, S. C., 518Lucas, R. E., 89, 90Luce, R. D., 383Lueder, D. C., 271Luethgens, C., 331Luft, J., 492Luhtanen, R., 81Lukes, S., 68, 75, 215Lun, J., 68Lundgren, S., 192Lundy, R. M., 186Luong, A., 327Luria, S. M., 469Lutsky, N., 240Lyall, L. M., 162Lyde, M., 76Lyman, S. M., 464Lynch, P., 398

Maass, A., 191, 426Maassen, G. H., 165Maccoby, E. E., 254MacCoun, R. J., 208, 330, 348MacCracken, M. J., 292MacDonald, G., 62, 184Macfadyen, L., 457

650 AUTHOR INDEX

MacIver, R. M., 12Mack, J., 24MacKenzie, K. R., 490, 499Mackie, D. M., 11, 94, 121, 122,

197, 335, 427Mackie, M., 78MacKinnon, C. A., 238MacNair-Semands, R. R., 490,

492MacNeil, M. K., 18, 147Macy, B. A., 374Madsen, R., 57, 85Madson, L., 68Mael, F. A., 80Maes, J., 389Magee, J. C., 236, 237, 238, 244Magee, J., 393Mahan, T. L., 103Mahar, L., 269Maher, K. J., 263Mahler, H. I. M., 97Mai-Dalton, R. R., 261Maier, N. R. F., 301, 302Maio, G. R., 197Maitner, A. T., 11Major, B., 81, 228, 230Major, D. A., 154Makhijani, M., 277Makhijani, M. G., 265Maki, J. E., 395Malanos, A. B., 90Mallinckrodt, B., 103Malloy, T. E., 89, 259Maltby, J., 186Maner, J. K., 62Maney, K., 372Manier, D., 318Manis, M., 170Mann, F. C., 253, 274Mann, J. H., 256Mann, L., 67, 234, 322, 326, 337,

348, 506, 517, 519, 522, 526Mann, R. D., 206Mannetti, L., 186, 344Manning, J. G., 261Mannix, E. A., 194, 363, 364, 391,

399, 402, 404, 413

Manstead, A. S., 399, 405Mantell, D. M., 234Manuck, S. B., 287, 288Manz, C. C., 248Manzi, J. M., 74Maoz, I., 429Maras, P., 430Marcus, D. K., 489Marelich, W. D., 76Marigold, D. C., 197Markovsky, B., 164Marks, I. M., 488Marks, M. E., 358, 359, 367, 377Markus, H., 286Markus, H. R., 73, 74, 186Marmaros, D., 105Marmarosh, C. L., 490Marques, J. M., 202Marriott, R. G., 342Marsh, C., 221Marsh, J., 225Marsh, P., 66Marshall, G. N., 102Martell, R. F., 262Martens, A., 265Martens, M. L., 118Martens, R., 127Marti, C. N., 148Marti, M. W., 208Martin, B., 24, 293, 294Martin, E. D., 516Martin, J., 447Martin, M. M., 104Martin, R., 192, 197, 211, 212,

263, 271, 393, 430Martin, W. E., 124Martins, L. L., 372Martin-Skurski, M. E., 200Martorana, P., 236, 343Marx, K., 413Maslach, C., 74, 186, 187, 233,

523, 527Maslow, A. H., 58, 523Mason, C. M., 128Masser, B., 430Mathes, E. W., 518, 519Mathews, E., 448

Mathewson, G. C., 127Mathieu, J., 375, 378Mathieu, J. E., 358, 359, 367,

369, 377Matter, C. F., 457Matthews, A., 431Matthews, M. D., 257Matthews, R. W., 459Matz, D. C., 186, 199Mauch, D., 238Mausner, B., 188Maxfield, M., 265Mayer, J. D., 259Maynard, M. T., 372, 375, 378Mayo, E., 33, 34Mayo, M., 249Mayseless, O., 198Mazur, A., 162McAdams, D. P., 92McBride, D., 140McBurney, D. H., 447McCabe, K., 384McCammon, S. L., 493McCanse, A. A., 269McCarty, J., 24McCauley, C., 420, 429McClaren, H. A., 460McClelland, D. C., 92, 231, 238,

239McClintock, C. G., 395, 401McConnell, A. R., 11McCool, M. A., Jr., 509McCown, N. E., 253McCoy, J. M., 453McCrae, R. R., 89, 91McCusker, C., 75McDonald, R., 488McDougall, P., 225, 291McDougall, W., 65, 505McElreath, R., 71, 72McElroy, T., 99McFarland, C., 340McFarland, D. D., 170McGeorge, K. K., 80McGhee, D. E., 423McGillicuddy, N. B., 405McGlynn, E. A., 435

AUTHOR INDEX 651

McGovern, T.V., 491McGrath, J. E., 4, 6, 7, 8, 27, 32,

46, 55, 106, 307, 354, 355,358

McGraw, K. M., 262, 337McGregor, D., 357McGregor, I., 197McGrew, J. F., 134McGuire, C., 343McGuire, C. V., 79McGuire, G. M., 101, 102McGuire, J. P., 491McGuire, W. J., 79McIntosh, B., 343McIntyre, M., 354, 355, 357, 374McKay, C. P., 469McKeage, R. L., 131McKee, A., 259McKee, T. E., 487McKenna, K. Y. A., 5, 166, 189McKimmie, B., 164McLaughlin-Volpe, T., 77, 86,

433McLean, P. D., 480McLendon, C. L., 137, 139, 142McLeod, P. L., 364McMahon, A. M., 262McMorris, L. E., 134McNally, R. J., 493McNeill, W. H., 122McNiel, J. M., 90McPhail, C., 503, 504, 506, 524,

526, 527McPherson, M., 58, 109, 118, 125McQueen, L. R., 389McRoberts, C., 494Mead, M., 419Medalia, N. Z., 509Meek, D., 208Meeker, J. R., 386Meerloo, J. A., 516Meeus, W. H. J., 234Megargee, E. I., 262Meglino, B. M., 119Mehrabian, A., 460Mehta, J., 63Meier, B. P., 415, 420

Meier, G. H., 93Meindl, J. R., 249Meisenhelder, H. M., 317, 318Melamed, B. G., 493Melner, S. B. 357, 375Melucci, A., 522Mendes, W. B., 287, 288Mendoza, M., 103Mendoza-Denton, R., 433Merrigan, G. M., 34Merritt, A. C., 222Merry, C. J., 329Merton, R. K., 11, 107Mesquita, B., 162Messé, L. A., 54, 303Messick, D. M., 227, 249, 286,

384, 387, 389, 401, 425Metcalf, J., 459Meudell, P., 320Meudell, P. R., 320Meumann, E., 284Meyer, C. W., 232Michael, S. T., 487Michaels, J. W., 286Michaelsen, L. K., 164, 303, 319Michel, J. W., 228, 230Michels, R., 238Michener, H. A., 240Middlemist, R. D., 457Mikolic, J. M., 396Mikulincer, M., 95Milanovich, D. M., 222Milberg, S., 69Miles, M., 489, 496Milgram, S., 19, 28, 33, 199, 211,

216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 231,232, 233, 234, 244, 504, 506,507, 518, 523, 525

Miller, A. G., 221Miller, C. E., 147, 169, 323Miller, D. T., 11, 69, 145, 148,

340, 384, 507Miller, G. A., 316Miller, J. A., 282, 293, 312Miller, J. G., 76, 86Miller, J. K., 484Miller, J. L., 291

Miller, K. I., 274Miller, M. E., 195Miller, N., 241, 434, 435, 436,

437, 438, 512Miller, R. S., 109Mills, J., 69, 127Mills, T. M., 46Millson, M., 202Min, J. W., 41Minami, H., 464Miner, A. G., 302, 303Miner, J. B., 256Minionis, D., 135Mintz, A., 509Mintzberg, H., 251Mischel, W., 406Mischler, E. G., 166Misumi, J., 253, 509Mitchell, J. T., 493Mitchell, R. C., 496Mitchell, R. R., 496Mitchell, T., 390Mitchell, T. R., 393Mittleman, D. D., 327Mixon, D., 221Miyake, K., 99Mobley, W. H., 119Modigliani, A., 234Moehle, D., 417Moehrle, M. G., 308Moemeka, A. A., 68Moerhl, T. G., 79Moffitt, G., 11Mohammed, S., 316Mohrman, S. A., 375Mojzisch, A., 328Molina, L., 417, 418Molleman, E., 101Molm, L. D., 164, 224, 240, 261Molnar-Szakas, I., 287Monge, P. R., 274Monroe, C., 326Monteil, J. M., 289Monteith, M. J., 423Montoya, R. M., 110, 415Moody, J., 160, 166Moon, H., 361

652 AUTHOR INDEX

Moore, C. D., 149Moore, D. L., 289Moore, J., 108Moore, J. C., 163, 170Moore, P. J., 97Moore, R., 106Moore, W. C., 464Moos, R. H., 120, 127Moran, G. P., 288More, T. A., 58Moreland, R. L., 3, 19, 29, 95, 96,

106, 111, 113, 115, 142, 153,154, 155, 336, 360, 369, 377,453, 466

Moreno, J. L., 37, 38, 158, 165,479, 481, 497

Morgan, B. B., Jr., 135Morgan, R. D., 494Morgeson, F. P., 257, 272, 362Moritz, M., 287Morran, K. D., 489Morrill, C., 391, 393, 402, 409Morris, C. G, 318, 358Morris, D., 66Morris, M. L., 73, 90, 91Morris, S. B., 166Morris, W. N., 98Morrison, J. L., 102Morsella, E., 398Mortensen, C. R., 188Moscovici, S., 191, 192, 197, 210,

331, 333Moser, G., 466Mosier, J., 494Moskowitz, D. S., 253Moskowitz, G. B., 198, 204Mossholder, K. W., 136, 157, 406Mosso, C., 198Mott, N. L., 206Mottola, G. R., 423, 433, 435Mouton, J. S., 269, 270, 271,

279, 413Mowat, F., 446Mowday, R. T., 453Moxnes, P., 149, 265Mphuthing, T., 430Mucchi-Faina, A., 198

Mudrack, P. E., 118, 152Mueller, A. L., 226, 259Mueller-Johnson, K., 155Mullen, B., 3, 79, 129, 137, 138,

141, 163, 182, 289, 306, 343,507, 520

Muller, D., 289Mullison, D., 492, 494Multon, K. D., 492Mummendey, A., 425, 436Munduate, L., 230Mungy, G., 192Munroe, P. T., 168Munsterman, G. T., 206Murnighan, J. K., 322, 364, 399,

403Murphy, C. J., 253Murphy, J., 94Murphy, L. R., 512Murphy, M., 512Murphy, P., 392Murphy, P. J., 507, 522Murphy, S. A., 40Murphy-Berman, V., 458Murrell, A., 81, 430Murrell, S. A., 103Mušic, M., 493Muskin, P. R., 499Myers, A. E., 135Myers, D. E., 164Myers, D. G., 315, 333, 334,

348Myers, D. J., 95, 418, 508, 516Myin-Germeys, I., 95

Nachtigall, C., 494Nadler, J., 395Naffrechoux, M., 191, 192Nagasundaram, M., 309Nahrgang, J. D., 257, 272Nail, P. R., 184, 197Nakui, T., 307Nash, R. F., 52Nason, E. R., 358Nass, C., 190National Center for State Courts

(NCSC), 208

National Transportation SafetyBoard, 222

Naumann, S. E., 119Nauta, A., 101, 424Naveh, D., 41, 132Nawrat, M., 192Neale, M. A., 306, 363, 364,

395Nebeker, R. S., 494Nelson, B. N., 232Nelson, R., 271Nemeth, C. J., 191, 192, 198,

206, 462Newcomb, A. F., 167Newcomb, T. M. 18, 45, 105,

107, 110, 148, 167, 179, 201,517

Newlin, M. H., 166Newman, B., 202Newman, E., 262Newman, K. S., 63Newman, O., 464Newsham, G. R., 447Newsom, J. T., 103Newton, J. W., 519Nezlek, J., 239Nicholls, J. R., 270Nichols, D. R., 375Nickell, E., 106Nida, S. A., 203Nielsen, J. M., 91, 164Nielsen, M. E., 147Nier, J. A., 427, 432, 433, 435Nietzel, M. T., 207, 209Nieva, V. F., 369Nijstad, B. A., 22, 306, 307, 328Nikkel, E., 326Nisbett, R. E., 291, 419, 439Nixon, C. T., 230Nixon, H. L., 118Noel, J. G., 430Nolan, L. L., 381, 388, 392Nord, W. R., 187Norris, F. H., 103Northouse, P. G., 269Norton, M. I., 106Nosanchuk, T. A., 515

AUTHOR INDEX 653

Nosek, B. A., 423Nowak, A., 194, 195Nowlis, S. M., 186Nunamaker, J. F., Jr., 327Nutt, P. C., 340, 350Nuwer, H., 125, 128Nye, J. L., 264Nyquist, L. V., 262

Oakes, P. J., 73, 425Oberholzer-Gee, F., 385O’Brien, R. M., 413O’Brien, S. P., 91O’Connell, P., 225O’Connor, B. P., 109O’Connor, C., 399O’Connor, M. S., 308Offermann, L. R., 239Ofshe, R., 162Often, S., 4, 77Ogilvie, D. M., 265, 266O’Grady, K. E., 489Ogrodniczuk, J. S., 490Ohbuchi, K., 75, 393Oishi, S., 68Oldersma, F. L., 487Oldmeadow, J., 163Olekalns, M., 401Oliver, L. W., 137Oliver, P. E., 503, 516Olk, P. M., 106Olson, R., 34Olweus, D., 225O’Malley, P. M., 91Ong, A. D., 79Ono, K., 322Op, K., 144, 175Opotow, S., 429O’Reilly, C. A., 364Orive, R., 196Ormont, L. R., 491Orne, M. T., 221Örtqvist, D., 157Osborn, A. F., 305, 307, 309Osgood, D. W., 91O’Shea, P. G., 360Oskamp, S., 424

Ostrom, T. M., 297Otten, S., 226Otten, W., 386Ouellette, J. A., 192Oullette, R., 69Ouwerkerk, J. W., 79, 405,

430Overbeck, J. R., 238Owens, P. D., 343Oyserman, D., 68, 70, 73, 75, 76,

77, 86, 507

Pace, J. L., 221Packer, D. J., 218Page, C. H., 12Page, M. S., 76Page, R. C., 482Page-Gould, E., 433Pagnoni, G., 200Paladino, M., 428, 429Palinkas, L. A., 469Palmer, G. J., 259Palsane, M. N., 447Paluck, E.L., 436, 441Pandhi, N. A., 137Pannozzo, G. M., 124Pantaleo, G., 425Panzarella, R., 234Paquette, J. A., 104Paris, C. R., 321Parisi-Carew, E., 271Park, B., 238Park, E. S., 303Parker, J. C., 396Parker, K. C., 166Parkinson, C. N., 317Parks, C. D., 22, 296, 317, 387,

388, 398, 405Parks, M. R., 106Parks, S. D., 251Parkum, K. H., 91Parkum, V. C., 91Parrado, N., 146, 175Parsons, H. M., 447Parsons, T., 152Paskevich, D. M., 128Pastor, J. C., 249

Patel, K. A., 291Paterson, H. M., 318Patnoe, S., 437Patterson, M. L., 162, 454, 455,

460Patton, B., 409Paul, G. L., 496Paulus, L. E., 488Paulus, P. B., 306, 307, 309, 312,

316, 329, 350, 459Pavelshak, M. A., 96Paxton, P., 160, 166, 174Payne, B. K., 291Pearce, C. L., 274Pearce, J. L., 399Pearsall, M. J., 361Pearson, J. A., 98Pedersen, D. M., 58Peeters, M. A. G., 360Pelled, L. H., 227, 364Pelletier, L. G., 239Pelz, D. C., 364Pemberton, M., 100Pemberton, M. B., 414, 415Peng, T. K., 230Pennebaker, J. W, 98, 448, 484,

491, 511, 512Pennekamp, S. F., 79Pennington, N., 204, 206–208,

211, 213Penrod, S. D., 204, 206, 207,

211, 213Pepitone, A., 110, 137, 201, 517,

518, 519Peplau, L. A., 228, 230Pepler, D., 225Pérez, J. A., 192Perlick, D., 515Perlman, A., 286Perlman, D., 109Perls, F., 477, 478Perrin, S., 187Perrone, K. M., 487Perry, E. S., 489Personnaz, B., 192Peters, D., 155Peters, W., 237

654 AUTHOR INDEX

Peterson, C., 120, 257Peterson, J. B., 186Peterson, R. S., 198, 316, 343,

350, 390, 404Petrie, T. A., 148Pettigrew, T. F, 426, 432, 433,

434, 440Pharmer, J. A., 364Philips, J. L., 206, 209, 357, 361,

375Phillips, J. B., 162Phillips, K. W., 164, 193Phillips, S., 63Phillips, S. T., 467Phinney, J. S., 79Phoon, W. H., 511Piccolo, R. F., 276, 369Pickett, C. L., 11, 61, 65, 74Pierro, A., 186, 239, 344Pillutla, M. M., 399Pinkley, R. L., 414, 415Pinter, B., 413, 414, 415, 416, 441Piper, W. E., 490Pisano, G. P., 352, 359, 366,

370–371, 377Pittard-Payne, B., 91Pittinsky, T. L., 257Pittman, T. S., 58Platania, J., 288Platow, M. J., 80Platt, L., 487Platz, S. J., 254Plous, S., 330Podsakoff, P. M., 223Pokhrel, P., 81Polek, D., 365Poletes, G., 306Polivy, J., 291Polletta, F., 522Polley, R. B., 172Polzer, J. T., 306, 413Pomerantz-Zorin, L., 228Pontari, B. A., 391Poole, M. S., 19, 55, 142Popan, J. R., 79Popovic, T., 493Poppe, E., 420

Poppe, M., 231, 240Porter, C. O. L. H., 361Porter, L. W., 169–170, 399Porter, N., 262Postman, L. J., 426, 510Postmes, T., 166, 189, 190, 328,

345, 513, 516, 521, 522, 527Poundstone, W., 383Powell, M. C., 69Powers, J., 173, 176Pradhan, P., 297, 317Prapavessis, H., 136, 137Pratkanis, A. R., 343, 344, 345Pratt, J. H., 475Pratto, F., 231, 416–417, 418, 439Prentice, D. A., 11, 145, 148Prentice-Dunn, S., 521Presnell, K., 148Preston, L. A., 91Preston, M., 234Pribram, K. H., 316Price, K. H., 365Primeau, B. E., 162Prislin, R., 193, 202Pritchard, R. D., 157Probst, T. M., 75Propp, K. M., 318Proshansky, H., 420Pruitt, D. G., 333, 337, 340, 380,

387, 396, 401, 405, 409Pryce, J., 205–206, 209Putman, V. L., 307Putnam, R. D., 60, 76, 83Pynoos, R. S., 493Pyszczynski, T., 265, 266

Quattrone, G. A., 425Queller, S., 335Quinlivan, E., 62Quinn, A., 188Quinn, J., 425Quinn, R. P., 156

Raab, J., 38Raaijmakers, Q. A. W., 234Rabbie, J., 101Rabbie, J. M., 413

Rackstraw, P., 198Radloff, R., 41, 469Radtke, P. H., 166Ragone, G., 513Raiffa, H., 383, 405Raimbault, N., 128Ranie, L., 102Ransom, S., 419Rantilla, A. K., 390Raphael, B., 493Rapp, T., 375, 378Rath, R., 428Ratner, R. K., 68Rause, V., 146Raven, B., 221–228Raven, B. H., 239Rawlinson, J. W., 479Ray, D., 11Read, K. E., 75Read, P. P., 144, 146, 150, 165,

175Real, K., 147Reddington, K., 259, 369Redl, F., 106Reed, E. S., 413Reed, M. B., 41Reeder, K., 457Rees, C. R., 152Reicher, S., 104, 264, 428Reicher, S. D., 73, 418, 522, 523Reichl, A. J., 430Reichling, G., 137Reid, L., 266Reider, M. H., 362Reifman, A., 207, 209, 515Reimer, A., 329Reimer, T., 329Remland, M. S., 457Rempel, J. K., 491Renkema, L. J., 188Reno, R. R., 145, 200Rentach, J. R., 155–156Repacholi, B. M., 447Reston, J., Jr., 215, 226, 244Reymen, I. M. M. J., 360Rhee, E., 73Rheingold, H., 13

AUTHOR INDEX 655

Rice, O. K., 417Rice, R. E., 189Rice, R. W., 259, 269Richard, F. D., 19Richards, H., 354, 355, 357, 374Richards, J., 200Richardson, D. S., 104Richey, B., 389Ridgeway, C. L., 127, 163, 164,

165, 175, 366Rieck, A. M., 369Riecken, H. W., 40Riess, M., 462Riggiero, J., 431Rimal, R. N., 147Ringelmann, M., 293, 294Riordan, C., 431Riordan, J. M., 231, 237Ríos, D. I., 76Ripley, J. S., 487Ritchie, T. D., 479Rivera, A. N., 389Robak, R. W., 492Robbins, A., 41Roberson, Q., 357Robert, H. M., 392Roberts, B. W., 231Roberts, T. L., 456Robison, W., 259, 369Roby, T. B., 321Roccas, S., 77Rochat, F., 234Roche, J., 457Rodin, J., 459Rodriguez-Perez, A., 428, 429Rodriguez-Torres, R., 428, 429Roe, C. W., 228Roethlisberger, F. J., 34Rofé, Y., 101Rogelberg, S. G., 296, 308, 327,

366Rogers, C., 481Rogers, M. S., 318Rogers, P. A., 111Rogers, R. W., 521Rohdieck, S., 398Roland, E. J., 307, 309

Rom, E., 95Roman, R. J., 73Romano, N. C., 456Romanova, N., 261Romberger, B., 262Rook, K. S., 103Room, R., 486Roos, P. D., 464Ropp, S. A., 433Rose, R., 178, 212Rosenbaum, M. E., 109Rosenbloom, T., 286Rosenfeld, P., 462Rosenfield, D., 432Rosenkrantz, P. S., 77Rosenthal, R. A., 156Rosenthal, S. A., 257Roseth, C. J., 383, 438Rosnow, R. L., 511, 526Ross, J., 393Ross, L., 181, 384, 394, 395Ross, M., 91, 390Ross, T. M., 369Ross, W. H., 405Rost, J., 251Roth, B. E., 477Roth, C. P., 460Roth, D. A., 291Roth, E. W., 491Roth, W., 63Rothbart, M., 426Rothgerber, H., 420, 425Rothschild, L., 11Rotton, J., 447Rouhana, N. N., 416, 437Rountree, C. A., 98Rousseau, J., 70, 84Rowe, G., 309Rowe, J. S., 286Rowland, K. M., 292Roy, D. F., 136Roy, M. C., 309Rozell, D., 79Rozin, P., 72, 181Ruback, R. B., 166, 307Rubin, J. Z., 340, 386, 399, 405Rubin, M., 423

Rubin, R. B., 325Rubini, M., 75Rubonis, A. V., 493Rudak, I., 192Ruddy, T. M., 369Rudman, L. A., 265, 441Ruffin, P. F., 414Ruiz-Quintanilla, S. A., 276Rule, B. G., 406Rumery, S. M., 366Runcimann, W. G., 517Runkel, M., 382Rusbult, C. E., 134Ruscher, J. B., 315Russell, B., 215Russell, G. W., 516Russell, J. A., 445Russell, R. J. H., 516Russo, E. M., 192Rust, M. C., 432, 433, 435Rutte, C G., 360Ryan, J. M., 109Ryan, M. K., 345Rydell, R. J., 11Ryen, A. H., 460Ryterband, E. C., 374

Sabini, J., 181Sacerdote, B., 105Sadler, M. S., 47, 55Sadler, P., 232Sadow, J. S., 292Sagar, H. A., 424, 433Sagarese, M., 225Sagiv, L., 77Sagrestano, L. M., 186Saks, M. J., 208–209Salas, C., 34Salas, E., 44, 162, 166, 222, 306,

321, 343, 360, 361, 364,367, 375

Salazar-Laplace, M. E., 462Salomon, K., 287Salovey, P., 259Saltz, E., 507Saltzman, W. R., 493Samaha, G. M., 98

656 AUTHOR INDEX

Sambolec, E. J., 303Sampson, E. E., 202Samuelson, C. D., 389, 391Sandal, G. M., 469Sanders, G. S., 289, 290, 334Sanders, J., 233, 234, 241Sanders, W. B., 463, 466, 522Sani, F., 11, 79Sanna, L. J., 22, 288, 296, 317Santee, R. T., 74, 187Santos, L., 34Sapp, S. G., 262Sarbin, T. R., 157Sassenberg, K., 69Sattler, D. N., 396Saul, J. R., 369Saul, K., 248Saunders, D. M., 399, 409Savitsky, K., 48, 390Savjak, N., 493Sawyer, K., 312Sayette, M. A., 336Sayfarth, R. M., 162Scandura, T. A., 262Scarr, H. A., 518, 519Schachter, S., 40, 96–98, 101,

105–106, 113, 114, 119, 127,140, 197, 200–202, 211

Schaerfl, L. M., 389Schaller, M., 62Schatten-Jones, E. C., 104Schaubroeck, J., 329Schauer, A. H., 292Schein, E. H., 235Schein, L. A., 499Schein, V., 262, 265Schenck-Hamlin, W., 230Schenk, C., 460Scheuble, K. J., 489, 496Schippers, M. C., 364, 378Schkade, J. K., 459Schlenker, B. R., 127, 188, 253,

335, 391, 467Schlenker, D. R., 467Schlesinger, A. M., Jr., 318, 339Schlundt, D. G., 291Schmid Mast, M. S., 162, 248

Schmidt, D. E., 459Schmidt, G. W., 50Schmidt, L. A., 94, 291Schmidt, N., 104Schmidt, S. M., 228Schmitt, B. H., 286, 507Schmitt, D. R., 383Schmitz, P., 75Schneebaum, T., 75Schneider, D. J., 426, 441Schneider, J., 163Schneider, M. L., 447Schneider, V., 38Schofield, J. W., 167, 424, 431,

432, 433, 437Scholten, L., 328Schopler, J., 109, 413, 414, 415,

416, 423, 441Schottenbauer, M., 490Schriesheim, C. A., 223, 253, 271Schrock, D., A, 493Schroeder, H. W., 445Schubert, M. A., 476Schuchart, G. E., 464Schuler, R. S., 156Schulkin, J., 94Schultz, P. W., 453Schulz-Hardt, S., 328, 329, 331Schuster, B., 507Schuster, M. A., 102Schut, H., 104Schutz, W. C., 92, 93, 109, 110,

113, 114Schwartz, B., 467Schwartz, D., 167Schwartz, J., 399Schwartz, J. L. K., 423Schwartz, P., 230Schwartz, S., 77Schwartz, S. H., 70, 203Schwartz-Kenney, B. M., 263Schwarzwald, J., 224, 228, 431Schweingruber, D., 504, 506Schweitzer, M. E., 336Scott, M. B., 464Scott, W., 486Sculley, J., 380

Seal, D. W., 40–41, 469Sears, R., 420Seashore, S. E., 135, 139, 253, 374Seburn, M., 58Sechrest, L., 317Sechrest, L. B., 237, 455Sederholm, H., 393Sedgwick, J., 13Sedikides, C., 68, 83, 100Seeman, A. A., 203Seers, A., 135, 274Segal, H. A., 235Segal, M. W., 105, 152Seger, C. R., 121, 122Seidman, G., 5Sekaquaptewa, D., 164Selamat, M. F. B., 198Seligman, M. E. P., 494Sell, J., 386, 391Semin, G. R., 75, 196, 514Semmer, N. K., 101Senders, P. S., 249Sensenig, J., 240Seok, D., 298, 303Sergel, S. L., 178, 212Sermat, V., 104Service, E. R., 416Sessa, V. I., 370Seta, C. E., 99, 288, 306Seta, J. J., 99, 288, 306, 459Sethna, B. N., 166Sexton, J. B., 222Seying, R., 205–206, 209Seymour, W. R., 292Seyranian, V., 192, 198, 212Shackelford, S., 192Shaffer, L. M., 291Shah, J. Y., 344Shah, P. P., 321Shahar, A., 286Shales, T., 282, 293, 312Shalley, C. E., 369Shamir, B., 276Shannon, J. K., 103Shao, L., 90Shapiro, D. A., 496Shaver, P., 94, 97, 104, 399

AUTHOR INDEX 657

Shaver, P. R., 94Shaw, H., 148Shaw, J. D., 297Shaw, J. S., 74Shaw, L. M., 135Shaw, M. E., 135, 168, 169, 170,

186, 301, 315, 495Shaw, Ma. E., 315Sheats, P., 9, 150, 151, 152Sheatsley, P. B., 102Shebilske, W. L., 488Shechter, D., 186Shechtman, Z., 491Sheehan, M., 466Sheinman, L., 239Sheldon, K., 155, 157Sheldon, K. M., 52Shelly, R. K., 168Shepard, H. A., 131Sheppard, B. H., 401Shepperd, J. A., 297, 387Sheridan, C. L., 234Sherif, C. W., 4, 123, 125, 140,

411–438, 441Sherif, M., 4, 18, 123, 125, 140,

146, 147, 179, 411–438, 441,521

Sherman, D. K., 11Sherman, G. D., 68Sherman, J., 198Sherman, M. P., 321Sherman, S. J., 11, 12, 13, 14, 27,

28, 426Sherrod, D. R., 459Shillington, A. M., 41Shils, E., 152Shipper, F., 253Shirom, A., 157, 175Short, J. F., Jr., 11Showers, C. J., 467Shriver, C., 453Shukla, R. M., 308Shure, G. H., 318, 386Sias, P. M., 170Sicoly, E., 390Sidanius, J., 231, 416–417, 418,

439

Siebold, G. L., 118, 119, 120,133, 142

Siegel, R., 393Sigall, H., 198Sikes, J., 437Silbiger, H., 259, 369Silver, W. S., 337Silvia, P. J., 95Simmel, G., 3, 125, 413Simon, A. F., 435Simon, B., 79, 82, 186, 425,

517Simon, R. J., 207Simon, S., 266Simonson, I., 186Simonton, D. K., 258Simpson, B., 386Simpson, J. A., 261, 401Singer, E., 44Singer, J., 447Singer, J. E., 448, 515, 518Sirois, F., 512Sivakumar, K., 202Sivanathan, N., 238Sjøvold, E., 173, 176Skinner, B. F., 49Skitka, L. J., 323Skyrms, B., 70Slater, P. E., 152Slavson, S. R., 476Slim, R., 414Sloane, L. R., 80, 121Smart, R., 92Smeesters, D., 386Smelser, N. J., 509Smith, C. L., 309Smith, C. M., 209, 322, 329Smith, D. H., 60, 91, 113Smith, D. K., 374Smith, E. M., 358Smith, E. R., 94, 121, 122, 427Smith, J. A., 256, 257, 492Smith, K. P., 148Smith, L., 63Smith, L. F., 164Smith, M., 100Smith, M. B., 333

Smith, P. B., 187, 189, 210, 261,389, 495

Smith, P. K., 236, 507Smith, R. H., 99Smith, S. G., 466Smith, S. L., 415Smith, T., 343Smith, T. W., 58–59Smith, V. L., 384Smith-Lovin, L., 109, 118, 125Smithson, M., 163Smoke, W. H., 392Snapp, M., 437Sneden, G. G., 134Snidman, N., 93Sniezek, J. A., 345Snodgrass, J., 445Snoek, J. D., 156Snow, D. A., 503, 516Snyder, C. R., 74, 80, 487Snyder, M., 231Solem, A. R., 301, 302Solomon, M. R., 417Solomon, S., 265, 266Solomon, S. H., 459Solomon, S. K., 459Soman, D., 506Sommer, K. L., 62–63, 91Sommer, R., 459–460, 461, 473Song, S. Y., 392Sonnenfeld, J. A., 364Sorenson, G. J., 279Sorrels, J. P., 145Sorrentino, R. M., 257, 260,

343, 382Sparrowe, R. T. 272, 297Spataro, S. E., 365Spears, R., 79, 80, 83, 164, 166,

189, 190, 328, 345, 430, 513,516, 521, 522, 527

Spence, J. T., 262Spencer Stuart, 261Spencer, C. P., 187Spencer, H., 416Spencer, R. W., 188Spencer, S. J., 103Spiegel, S. B., 489

658 AUTHOR INDEX

Spitz, H. I., 499Spitzberg, B. H., 326Spivey, R. W., 521Spoor, J. R., 121Spoor, S., 148Squire, S., 148Sriram, N., 426Srivastava, S., 65Sriwongkol, T., 166St. John, W., 42, 80Stadulis, R. E., 292Stager, S. F., 81Stahelski, A. J., 384, 396Staley, K., 315Stangor, C., 431Stanton, N., 357Stapel, D. A., 188Stapp, J., 74Stark, E. M., 297Stasser, G., 208, 315, 327, 328,

329, 348Stasson, M. F., 296, 319, 322,

335, 342Staub, E., 240, 420, 429Staudacher, C., 493Staw, B. M., 393Stawiski, S., 369Steblay, N. M., 234Stech, F. J., 401Stecker, R., 447Steel, G. D., 469, 471, 473Steel, R. P., 136, 155–156Steele, C. M., 83Steers, W. N., 76Stein, B. D., 102Stein, J. L., 162Stein, R. T., 259Steinel, W., 396, 399Steiner, I. D., 16, 293, 299,

300–305, 312Steinzor, B., 461Stempfle, J., 150Stenstrom, D. M., 11Stephan, C., 437Stephan, C. W., 436Stephan, F. F., 166Stephan, W. G., 431, 432, 436

Stephenson, G. M., 318Stern, E. K., 318Sternberg, R. J., 401, 403, 428Stets, J. E., 230Stevens, C. K., 109Stevens, D., 137, 138Stevens, M. J., 361, 362, 363Stevenson, R. J., 447Stevenson, W. B., 399Stewart, D., 328Stewart, D. D., 328Stewart, G. L., 248, 355, 364Stewart, M., 261, 262Stewart, P. A., 163Stice, E., 148Stiles, W. B., 162, 496Stinson, D. A., 103Stockton, R., 489Stoddard, J. L., 225Stogdill, R. M., 253, 255, 256,

258, 259, 261, 268, 274Stokes, J. P., 104, 127Stokes-Zoota, J. J., 19Stokols, D., 457, 473Stolte, J. F., 230Stoner, J. A. F., 332Stoner, J. A., 332Stones, C. R., 41Stoop, J. R., 301Storms, M. D., 291, 458Storr, A., 58Stotland, E., 11Stout, R. J., 222Strack, F., 198Stratenwerth, I., 82Stratham, A., 254Straus, S. G., 189Strauss, A., 34Strauss, A. L., 508Strauss, B., 285, 494, 499Streufert, S. C., 413, 419Strickland, D., 232Strickland, L. H., 238Strodtbeck, F. L., 132, 163, 206,

461Stroebe, M. S., 104Stroebe, W., 104, 306, 307, 431

Strong, S. R., 232Strube, M. J., 284Stryker, S., 150Stucke, T. S., 59–61Stucky, R. J., 80Stumpf, S., 389Stuster, J., 446, 469, 470, 473Suedfeld, P., 58, 449, 469, 471,

473Sugiman, T., 509Sugimori, S., 195Sugisawa, H., 104Suh, E. J., 253Suh, E. M., 68, 75, 90Sullivan, L., 448Sullivan, W. M., 57, 85Sulloway, F. J., 186Suls, J., 96, 114, 393Sumner, W. G., 422, 439Sun, H., 382Sundstrom, E., 297, 354, 355, 357,

374, 444, 446, 451, 467,468, 469

Sunstein, C. R., 335Sunwolf, 308Surowiecki, J., 300Sussman, S., 81Sutton, R. I., 453Swaffin-Smith, C., 228Swamidass, P. M., 374Sweeney, J., 24Swidler, A., 57, 85Swim, J. K., 164Swinson, R. P., 94Swinth, K. R., 46Syna, H., 405Syroit, J. E. M. M., 127Szymanski, K., 288, 296, 297

’t Hart, P., 346Tabanico, J. J., 453Tager, D., 103Taggar, S., 68Tajfel, H., 4, 26, 77, 78, 79, 422,

430Takahashi, Y., 76Takeda, M. B., 261

AUTHOR INDEX 659

Takezawa, M., 72, 322Tal-Or, N., 100Tambor, E. S., 64Tamura, R., 337Tan, C. R. M., 198Tan, D. K. B., 198Tan, T. K., 302, 303Tanaka, K., 464Tang, J., 261Tang, S., 202Tang, T. L., 375Tanis, M., 190, 484Tannenbaum, S. I., 361, 367Tarde, G., 515Tarnow, E., 222Tarrant, C. M., 204Tarrant, J. M., 490Tassone, J., 318Tata, J., 202Tate, D. F., 484Taylor, D. A., 470, 491Taylor, F. W., 357Taylor, H. F., 167, 394Taylor, R. B., 467Taylor, S. E., 62, 91, 102, 103, 487Tazelaar, M. J., 405Teddlie, C., 458Tedeschi, J. T., 389Teed, C., 489Teger, A., 395Ten Velden, F. S., 194Tennen, H., 487Teppner, B. J., 228Terdal, S. K., 64Terracciano, A., 91Terry, D. J., 82Tesser, A., 99, 100Tetlock, P. E., 337, 343Tharp, A., 489Thew, B. D., 515Thibaut, J., 201, 405, 414, 417Thibaut, J. W., 49, 111, 112, 167,

417Thoits, P. A., 73Thomas, D. S., 11Thomas, G. C., 458Thomas, K. W., 401

Thomas, R. L., 320Thomas, W.I., 11Thomas-Hunt, M. C., 164Thompson, J. E., 433Thompson, L., 380, 395, 401, 409Thompson, L. L., 194Thompson, M., 164Thompson, M. E., 240Thoreau, H. D., 58Thorne, A., 80, 121Thorne, B., 167Thorngate, W. B., 395Thrasher, F. M., 463Throop, C. J., 287Thurlow, C., 455Thye, S. R., 118, 224Tice, D. M., 59–61, 249Tichenor, V., 489Tiedens, L. Z., 109, 162, 232Tiger, L., 365Tilin, F., 132Tindale, R. S., 50, 66, 209, 312,

317, 318, 322, 350, 369Tindale, S., 28Tipton, S. M., 57, 85Tirnauer, D., 357Titus, L. J., 285Titus, W., 328, 348Tjosvold, D., 382To, H., 118Tobin, K., 106, 115Toch, H., 504, 507, 510, 523,

525Toennies, F., 12Toguchi, Y., 68Toledo, R., 506, 507Tolnay, S. E., 507Tolstoy, L., 255Tomaka, J., 288Tomic, A., 455Tong, E. M. W., 198Toobin, J., 42Torrance, E. P., 163Touliatos, J., 157Tracey, T. J., 109Travis, L. E., 286Travis, T., 336

Treadwell, T., 128Tredoux, C., 465Triandis, H. C., 68, 72, 74, 75, 76Triplett, N., 18, 283–284, 310Trochim, W. M. K., 404Trope, Y., 236Troper, J. D., 292Tropp, L. R., 78, 432, 433, 440Troyer, L., 168Tsui, A. S., 259, 364Tubre, T. C., 157Tucker, C. W., 505–506Tucker, T. L., 166Tuckman, B. W., 19, 129, 490Turner, A. L., 42, 475, 493, 495,

499Turner, J. C., 4, 50, 73, 77, 79,

335, 422, 430Turner, J. D. F., 364Turner, M., 95Turner, M. E., 312, 343, 344, 345Turner, R., 504, 527Turner, R. H., 152, 521Turner, R. N., 431Tushman, M., 321Twenge, J. M., 59, 61, 62, 76, 81,

83, 187Tyler, T. R., 226, 390Tynan, D., 64

U.S. Senate Select Committee,344

Uchino, B. N., 103Uglow, J. S., 41Uhl-Bien, M., 271Uhles, A. N., 13–15Ulbig, S. G., 516Uleman, J. S., 73Underwood, B., 429Undre, S., 352Unzueta, M. M., 109Updegraff, J. A., 62, 91, 102Urban, L. M., 436Uris, A., 339Ursin, H., 469Ury, W., 400, 409Utman, C. H., 292

660 AUTHOR INDEX

Utz, S., 69Uziel, L., 285, 289–290Uzzell, D. L., 466

Vaernes, R., 469Vaes, J., 428, 429Vaillancourt, T., 225, 291Valins, S., 464Vallacher, R. R, 194, 195Vallerand, R. J., 239Van Avermaet, E., 386Van Boven, L., 390Van de Ven, A. H., 308Van de Vliert, E., 75, 230, 401,

403, 424van den Bos, K., 388van der Linden, J. L., 165Van Dijk, E., 385, 386van Dijk, W. W., 236Van Dijke, M., 231, 240van Engen, M. L., 262, 276Van Hiel, A., 194Van Kleef, G. A., 232, 236, 237,

244, 396, 399, 405van Knippenberg, D., 328, 364,

378Van Lange, P. A. M., 134, 385,

386, 405Van Olffen, W., 361van Oostrum, J., 413Van Orden, K., 80Van Overwalle, F., 320Van Raatle, J. L., 128Van Sell, M., 156Van Swol, L. M., 319Van Tuijl, H. F. J. M., 360Van Vianen, A. E. M., 403Van Vugt, M., 52, 82, 254, 266,

385, 386, 421Van Winkle, B., 108Van Witteloostuijn, A., 361Van Yperen, N. W., 188Van Zelst, R. H., 135van Zomeren, M., 79, 430, 513,

516, 527Vandello, J. A., 76, 188, 419VanLeeuwen, M. D., 288, 289

Varela, J. A., 317Vargo, S., 499Varvel, S. J., 103Vecchio, R. P., 270Veeraraghavan, V., 128Veitch, J. A., 447, 448Veitch, R., 447Vela-McConnell, J. A., 124Venkatesh, B., 198Venkatesh, S. A., 40, 108, 137,

420, 522Verley, J., 34Vertue, F. M., 94Vescio, T. K., 79Vevea, J. L., 83, 413, 414, 416,

441Vider, S., 507, 508, 510, 528Vidmar, N., 33, 204, 208, 209, 213Villa, J., 253Vinacke, W. E., 386Vincent, C. A., 352Vinokur, A., 317, 335Vinsel, A., 466, 468Vivian, J., 430Vlahov, D., 103Vliek, M. L. W., 79Voci, A., 431Vogel, D. R., 327Vogel, S. R., 77Voils, C. I., 423Vollrath, D. A., 50, 318, 350Volpe, C. E., 361, 367Von Dras, D., 489Voss, A., 289Vroom, V. H., 274, 324, 325

Wachtler, J., 98, 192, 206, 462Wackenhut, J., 506, 507Waddington, D., 522Wade, C., 187Wade, G., 431Wadleigh, P.M., 455Wagner, D., 38, 198Wagner, D. G., 163, 389Waldfogel, J., 385Walker, C. J., 511Walker, H. A., 262

Walker, L., 405Walker, M., 80, 121Wall, V. D., Jr., 381, 388, 392Wallace, D. L., 489Wallach, M. A., 333Wallenius, M. A., 448Walsh, D., 38Walsh, Y., 516Walshe, J., 80Walster, G. W., 308Walther, E., 167, 198Walumbwa, F. O., 277, 279Wan, C., 10Wang, A. Y., 166Wang, C. S., 13Wang, L., 489Wang, M. A., 288Wanlass, J., 492Wann, D. L. 80, 86, 430Ward, A., 384, 394Ward, A. J., 364Ward, C. M., 432, 433, 435Ward, R. E., Jr., 522Ware, R., 495Warlop, L., 386Warncke, M., 469Warner HBO, 121, 132, 142Warr, M., 315Warr, P. B., 327Warriner, G. K., 227Warwick, D., 45Wasserman, S., 38, 159Wasti, A., 75Watson, C., 262Watson, D., 236Watson, R. I., Jr., 517Watson, W. E., 164, 303, 319Waung, M., 162Wayne, S. J., 272, 297Weaver, J. L., 135Weaver, K., 204Webb, N. M., 292Weber, B., 304Weber, J. M., 384Weber, M., 226, 274Weber, T. J., 277, 279Webley, P., 345

AUTHOR INDEX 661

Webster, D. M., 391Webster, H. A., 101Webster, M., Jr., 261Wech, B. A., 136Wegge, J., 306Wegner, D. M., 320, 369Weigold, M. F., 335Weinberg, R., 120Weingart, L. R., 35, 131, 297,

317, 321, 386, 393, 401, 403,406, 408

Weinstein, N., 448Weisner, C., 148, 485, 486Weiss, H. M., 446Weiss, J. A., 317Weiss, J. F., 482Welch, D. A., 342Weldon, E., 297, 317, 321, 357Weldon, M. S., 319, 320Wells, P. A., 516Welsh, B. C., 517Wener, R. E., 457Werner, C. M., 444Werner, J., 335Werner, P., 516Werth, L., 198West, B. J., 361West, S. G., 68, 191, 234, 420Wetherell, M. S., 73Weybrew, B. B., 469Wheelan, S. A., 19, 55, 129, 131,

132, 142Wheeler, D. D., 337, 345Wheeler, D. S., 68, 90Wheeler, J., 137, 138Wheeler, L., 96, 99, 114, 470, 514Whisler, E. W., 50Whitaker, D. J., 100White, B. J., 411, 421, 431, 434,

438, 441White, M. W., 385White, R. K., 42, 43, 272, 273,

279, 424Whitley, B. E., Jr., 167, 231Whitney, D. J., 137–139Whitney, I., 507Whitney, K., 186

Whittal, M. L., 480Whyte, W. F., 31–34, 37, 55, 463Wick, D. P., 231Wicker, A. W., 451–452Widmeyer, W. N., 127, 128, 361Wieczorkowska, G., 13–15Wieselquist, J., 415Wiesenfeld, B. M., 323Wiggins, E. C., 207Wight, W., 390Wilder, D. A., 182, 433, 435Wilderman, S., 468Wildschut, T., 413–416, 441Wilke, H., 388Wilke, H. A. M., 163Wilkerson, J. M., 274Wilkinson, I., 228Williams, J., 401Williams, J. A., 431Williams, J. E., 264Williams, J. M., 507, 522Williams, K., 294, 295, 310Williams, K. D., 52, 61, 62–64, 86,

294–298, 311, 312, 356Williams, K. Y., 364Williams, N., 80Williams, W. M., 155Williamson, S. A., 134, 170–173Willis, F. N., 457, 458Willis, H., 194, 423Wills, T. A., 99, 487, 492, 493Wilmot, W. W., 380Wilpers, S., 89Wilpinski, C., 110Wilson, D. J., 193Wilson, D. S., 52Wilson, J. K., 91Wilson, J. R., 489Wilson, M., 417Wilson, M. S., 231Wilson, R. K., 391Wilson, S. R., 395Wincent, J., 157Winch, R. F., 109Winer, B. J., 252Wingbermuehle, C., 489Wingert, M. L., 360

Winquist, J., 323Winquist, J. R., 329Winter, D. G., 92Winthrop, R. C., 68Wiseman, R., 419Wiseman, R. L., 230Wisman, A., 102Witte, E. H., 303Witteman, H., 381Witteman, H. R., 403Wittenbaum, G. M., 29, 316,

329, 350Witty, T. E., 489Wolbert, A., 190Wolf, S., 182, 183Wolf, S. T., 415Wolfe, D., 11Wolfe, D. M., 156Wolfe, V. A., 315Wolin, S. S., 522Wood, A. M., 186Wood, D., 231Wood, J., 96, 192Wood, J. V., 103Wood, W., 186, 187, 192, 199,

365Wooding, S., 493Woodruff, S., 135Woody, E., 232Worchel, P., 392Worchel, S., 98, 192, 240, 420,

433, 458Word, L. E., 203Worringham, C. J., 286Worth, L. T., 425Worthington, E. L., Jr., 487Wortman, P. M., 317Wosinska, W., 72Wright, G., 309Wright, G. E., 489Wright, R. A., 297Wright, S. C., 78, 433, 434Wright, S. L., 98Wright, S. S., 81, 265Wrightsman, L. S., 207, 209Wu, A., 249Wu, J. Z., 405

662 AUTHOR INDEX

Wulf, L. J., 460Wulff, K. M., 102Wundt, W., 16Wyden, P. H., 314, 324, 349

Xin, K. R., 364

Yablonsky, L., 418, 463Yalom, I. D., 135, 479, 486–494,

496, 499Yamagishi, K., 387Yamaguchi, S., 74Yamamoto, M., 70Yammarino, F. J., 253, 272, 275Yang, H., 307, 309Yang, J., 406Yang, K., 89Yao, R., 136Yee, N., 106Yetton, P. W., 324Yin, R. K., 40, 42, 55Yohai, S., 458Yoon, J., 118, 224Yoon, K., 316, 329, 350York, E., 164, 207Yost, J. H., 511Young, L. V., 164

Young, M. J., 109Young, R. D., 81Youngreen, R., 149Youngs, G. A., Jr., 239, 398Yukelson, D., 120Yuki, M., 74Yukl, G., 228, 230, 240, 252,

259, 279Yum, N., 76Yzerbyt, V., 10, 11, 29, 386

Zabinski, M. F., 484Zaccaro, S. J., 120, 135, 249,

256, 257, 358, 359,367, 377

Zagefka, H., 430Zajonc, R. B., 284–288, 290, 392Zamarripa, P. O., 261Zamir, S., 413Zander, A., 4, 11, 14–15, 28, 253,

353, 356Zander, M. L., 302, 303Zanna, M., 188Zanna, M. P., 103, 334, 491Zavalloni, M., 333Zazanis, M., 120Zebel, S., 79

Zeigler, K. R., 58Zeisel, H., 204, 207Zelditch, M., 163, 225Zelikow, P., 42Zhao, L., 262Zhou, A. J., 102Zhou, J., 121Zhou, R., 506Zigarmi, D., 271Ziller, R. C., 124Zillmann, D., 80Zimbardo, P., 233Zimbardo, P. G., 233, 244, 315,

517–521, 524, 527Zimmerman, S., 322Zimmerman, S. K., 296Zimpfer, D. G., 495Zink, C. F., 200Zinkiewicz, L., 466Zubek, J. P., 59Zuber, J. A., 335Zuckerman, C., 329Zuckerman, E. W., 99Zurcher, L. A., Jr., 132Zuroff, D. C., 253Zyphur, M. J., 11, 47, 162Zyzniewski, L. E., 138, 390

AUTHOR INDEX 663

Subject Index

Page numbers for definitions are in boldface.

A Class Divided, 237Abilene paradox, 340Academy of the Fine Arts, 88Action research, 23Additive tasks, 300Adjustmentcoping with trauma anddisasters, 493

eating disorders, 291insight and group psycho-therapy, 492

of solos (tokens) in groups, 164regulation of space and copingwith extreme environments,469–470

therapeutic groups as a means ofimproving, 475–497

to noisy, stressful environments,448–449

Affiliation, 96–105attachment and, 94–95catastrophes and loss, 102convergence in crowds,515–516

in crowds, 505disaffiliation, 94health and, 103–104

motive (need for affiliation), 92need for intimacy and, 92need for power and, 92sex differences in, 91–92social comparison, 96–101stress and, 101–102

Agentic state, 233, 233–234Aggressiondeindividuation and, 517–519discontinuity and, 416–417group-level, 63scapegoating as a cause of,420–421

Akaramas tribes, 75Alcoholconsumption in groups, 41group norms and alcoholuse, 148

groupdrink, 336social networks and, 485–486

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA),485–486

Allocentrics (or interdependents),74, 73–74

Ambience, 445Anonymity, 296, 517–518Antarcticitis, 469

Anticonformity (or countercon-formity), 184

Approach/inhibition theory,236

Aristotle, 58Arousaldeindividuation and, 520frustration and intergroup

conflict, 420physiological reactions to

crowding, 457–458Asch situation, 180, 179–184Assembly bonus effect, 303Attachment, 94–96Attachment style, 94, 94–95Attitude(s)toward physical environments,

445–456prejudice and social facilitation,

291reduction in prejudice following

contact, 431–434Attractioncohesion and, 119, 122–123conflict and, 392–393, 394determinants of, 105–112,

165–167

664

✵

FIRO forms of compatibility,109–110

intergroup conflict and, 434minimax principle of, 110–111Newcomb’s dormitory study of,105–106

personal and social, 119–120proximity and, 105–106reciprocity and, 110rejection of dissenting groupmembers, 200–202

social exchange theory of,111–112

Attraction network, 165, 165–167Attributions during conflict,

395–396Audience, 284, 506Authority and authority relations,

See StatusAutokinetic effect, 146Autostereotyping, 78

B = f(P, E), 17, 255Baiting crowd, 521, 521–522Balance theory, 167, 394Bargaining, See NegotiationBasking in reflected glory

(birging), 81, 99Bazille, Frederic, 88, 100, 105, 111Behavior settings, 449, 449–453Behavioral assimilation, 384Behavioral commitment, 234Behaviorism, 49Betweenness, 159, 159–160Big Five theory of personality, 89,

89–90, 257–258conflict and, 393conformity, 186leadership and, 257–258team player personality,360–361

Biting mania, 512Black-sheep effect, 202Blatta orientalis, 287Bona fide groups, 42Bowling Alone, 60

Brainstorming, 305–309Delphi technique, 308–309electronic, 309limitations of, 305–307methods, 307–309nominal group technique,

308Brainwashing, 235Brainwriting, 307Brooks, Herb, 117, 121, 130, 135Brown vs. Board of Education, 432Bulimia in groups, 148Bulldogs and the Red Devils, 123,

125–126Bullying, 225Buzz groups, 308Bystander effect, 203

Caillebotte, Gustave, 111Carlyle, Thomas, 255Case study method, 40, 31–33,

40–42CasesAndes survivors, 144Apollo 13, 444Apple Computers conflict, 380Bay of Pigs planners (Excom),

314The bus accident therapy group,

475The impressionists, 88Jonestown, 215Kopp, Wendy, 246Mountain Medical Team, 352Palmer and Gorman, 57Robbers Cave, 411Saturday Night Live, 282Twelve angry men jury, 178U.S. Olympic Hockey Team,

117Who concert stampede, 501

Cassatt, Mary, 91Casualty, 495, 495–496Category(ies), 13Catharsis, 491Cézanne, Paul, 92

Charisma, 226Cho, Seung Hui, 63Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire, 332Choreomania, 512Circumplex model of group tasks,

6, 6–8Closed group, 124Closeness, 159, 159–160Coaction, 284Coalition formation, 398–399Coercive power, 224Cognitive closure, 344Cognitive dissonance, 126, 199,

394Cognitive processes, 50, 50–51Cognitive-behavioral therapy

group, 480Coleadership, 489, 489–490Collective behavior, 502,

501–525,characteristics of socialcollectives, 502–504

crowd formation, 505crowds, 504–509crowds-as-mad perspective,423–425

deindividuation theory of,517–522

emergent norm theory,521–522

social identity, 522–523theoretical analyses of, 514–523tipping point dynamics, 515sex differences in, 68regional and racial differences,74–76

Collective conscious, 16, 16–18Collective efficacy, 120Collective effort model (CEM),

298Collective information processing

model, 318Collective memory, 319, 318–320Collective moments, 509,

509–514Collective representations, 16

SUB J ECT INDEX 665

Collective self, See Social identityCollective self-esteem, 81, 81–82Collective(s), 13, 12–13, 503Collectivism, 67, 67–76civic engagement and, 68compared to individualism,67–72

conformity and, 186cultural differences in, 74–76exchange and communalorientations, 68–69

generational differences in, 76individual differences in,73–76

interdependents andindependents, 74–75

vertical and horizontal, 75Columbine High School, 493Common ingroup identity model,

435Commons dilemma, 387Communal relationships, 69Communicationbiases in floor time injuries, 206

biases in participation whenneed for closure is high, 344

centralization, 168–170coding systems, 35–37cohesion and, 120–121complementarity in, 232computer-mediated, 166,189–190, 456

in dilemma games, 71directional effects, 170with a disagreeing groupmember, 200–202

in embarrassing situations, 97–98equilibrium model of, 455expressing needs, 92–93facilitation of public speaking,286, 291

frequency of communicationand attraction, 106

Group Decision SupportSystems, 329–330

group decision-making,316–325

in hierarchically structuredgroups, 168–170

impact of seating arrangementson group discussions, 461

influence through, 200–202innocuous sociability, 94during intergroup conflict,414–416, 437

leaders’ communication tofollowers, 265–266, 274–277,324–325

linguistic intergroup bias, 426during negotiation, 396–398,401, 403

norms and, 146–147social support, 102–103patterns (e.g., wheel, chain), 169pitfalls in group discussions,325–327

polarization and, 332–335problem solving through,316–325

noise and communicationproblems, 448

relationship and task, 6roles and, 150–151self-disclosure, 130, 491shared information bias,327–330

turn-taking, 166Communication networks, 168,

168–170Comparison level (CL), 111,

111–112Comparison level for alternatives

(CLalt), 112Compensatory tasks, 300,

300–301Competition, 382, 100, 381–391,

413–416Complementarity principle, 109,

109–110Compliance, 183, 183–184,

240–241

Confirmation bias, 331, 330–331Conflict between groups

(Intergroup conflict), 381,412–421, 522–523

biased ingroup-outgroupperceptions, 421–430

causes of, 412–421discontinuity effect, 413–416intergroup biases, 422–427intergroup conflict resolution,

430–438moral exclusion and, 428–429realistic group conflict theory

of, 413Robbers Cave Experiment, 412,

411–438social dominance theory of,

416–417social identity theory, 430

Conflict in groups (Intragroupconflict), 380, 380–405

bargaining and, 396–397,399–401

causes of, 381–393dual-concern model of conflict

styles, 401–404during group development,

130–131in dyadic and group

interactions, 414–415escalation, 393–399group dissolution, 132–133individual differences and,

385–386, 395–396, 401–403management of, 404, 406realistic group conflict theory,

413resolution, 399–406role differentiation, 152self-serving and group serving

biases, 70soft and hard power tactics,

228using sociometry to reduce,

37–38value of, 404, 406

666 SUB JECT INDEX

Conflict resolution, 399–406cognitive approaches to,434–436

contact and, 431–434jigsaw method of, 437negotiation, 399–403resolution versus management,404, 406, 436

styles of, 401–403third parties and, 405

Conformity, 179, 179–190; see alsoSocial influence

Asch’s studies of, 179–181and cohesive groups, 137collectivism and, 70–71communalism and, 70communication and, 200–202compliance and conversion,184–185

deviants in educationalsettings, 81

idiosyncrasy credits, 193–194independence andanticonformity, 184–185

and individuation-seeking, 74majority influence, 181–182and obedience to authority,219–221

in online groups, 189–190personality and, 185–186sex differences in, 187size of group and, 182and social matching inbrainstorming groups, 306

sources of social pressure,196–204

tenure and, 155Congregations, 19Congruence, 184Conjunctive tasks, 302Contact hypothesis, 431,

431–433Contagion, 514, 514–515circular reactions and, 515crowd dynamics and, 514–515disruptive, 239

Contingency theory, 267,266–267

Convergence theory, 516Conversion in groups, 184, 147,

240–241Conversion theory, 191,

191–192Cooperation, 382, 67, 403,

437–438Correlation coefficient, 45Correlational studies, 45, 44–46Counterconformity, 184Court casesApodoca v. Oregon, 406, U.S.,

404, 208Brown vs. Board of Education, 432Ham v. S. Carolina, 409, U.S.,

524, 209Terry Nichols and the

Oklahoma City bombing,206

Williams v. Florida, 399, U.S.,78, 208

Covert observation, 32Cross-categorization, 436Cross-cueing, 320Cross-cultural variations, 20–21bargaining games, 71–72collectivism across cultures,

71–72conceptions of the self across

cultures, 74–76contact cultures and interper-

sonal distance, 457cultural norms pertaining to

conflict, 419cultural variations in collectiv-

ism, 74–76culture of honor, 419emphasis on groups, 58in happiness, 90leadership across cultures, 276regional variations in violence,

419variations in intergroup

hostility, 419

Crowd stampede, 501, 510Crowding, 457, 457–459Crowds, 504, 504–510Crutchfield situation, 189,

189–190Cuban Missile Crisis, 345–347Culture of honor, 419Cutting off reflected failure

(corfing), 81Cyberostracism, 63, 63–64

Darwin, Charles, 65de Tocqueville, Alexis, 74–75Decategorization, 435, 434–435Degas, Edgar, 88, 111, 112Degree centrality, 159Dehumanization, 429, 428–429Deindividuation, 517, 517–520Delphi technique, 308, 308–309Density, 158, 158–159, 457Density-intensity hypothesis,

458Dependent variable, 43Descriptive norm, 145, 200Deviance in groups, 200–202Devil’s advocate, 345Diffuse status characteristics, 163Diffusion of responsibility, 203,

234Discontinuity effect, 413,

413–416Discretionary tasks, 304Discussionbiased exchange of informationduring, 327–330

consensus, 322group decision making,316–325

limitations of, 325–334negotiation, 396–398seating arrangements indiscussion groups, 459–460

Disjunctive tasks, 301Distraction-conflict theory, 289Distributive justice, 388, 69–70,

388–389

SUB J ECT INDEX 667

Diversity, 363–366cohesion and, 364and conflict in orchestras, 20–21deep-level and surface-level,365

in knowledge, skills, and abilities(KSAs), 361–363

leadership and, 261–262performance and, 364–365sex-ratios in groups, 365–366

Divisible tasks, 300Dollar auction, 395Double-standard thinking, 424Downward social comparison, 99,

98–99Drive theory, 286, 285–286Dual concern model, 401,

401–403Dual process theories of influence,

197Durkheim, Emile, 16–17Dynamic social impact theory,

194, 194–195

Eating disorders, 148Educational settingsbullying in schools, 225competition and comparison,100

cooperative learning, 438dormitory rooms and territori-ality, 464, 466, 468

goal structures and student per-formance, 382–383

“in crowds” in schools, 80–81intergroup conflict reductionprograms, 437–438

jigsaw learning groups, 437joining groups in college, 95–96online discussion groups, 166psychogenic illnesses in schools,512

study groups, 292Egocentrism, 390, 70Egoistic deprivation, 516,

516–517

Elaboration principle, 106,106–107

e-leadership, 277Electronic brainstorming (EBS),

309Electronic performance

monitoring (EPM), 291,291–292

Embarrassment, 97–98, 183Emergent norm theory, 521Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 31Emotion(s), 48altered experiencing in groups,520–521

anger and scapegoating, 420catharsis in groups, 491cohesion and group, 121–122during conflict, 399, 405–406coping with negative life eventsin groups, 493

environmental appraisals,465–466

exclusion and dehumanization,428–429

fans’ reactions to teamfailure, 80

group hate, 428intergroup, 427power and affect, 236–237scapegoating in groups,420–421

stereotype content model ofintergroup, 427–428

Emotional intelligence, 259,258–259

Encounter group, 481Endurance, 137, 570Entitativity, 9, 9–10, 13–14,

120–121, 435Entrapment, 340Environmental settingscrowding, 457–459dangerous settings, 448–449environmental load, 446–447extreme and unusualenvironments, 59, 469–470

groups in physical locations,444–448

interpersonal zones, 454–457noise, 448overcrowding and group

stampedes, 501, 510personal space, 454–457reactions to high density

settings, 457–459seating arrangements, 459–462temperature, 447territoriality, 462–470

Environment of evolutionaryadaptation (EEA), 266

Equality norm, 69, 388Equilibrium model of

communication, 455Equilibrium model of group

development, 134Equity norm, 69, 388Esprit de corps, 121, 121–122Essentialism, 11Ethnocentrism, 422, 422–423EUEs (extreme and unusual

environments), 469–470Eureka problems, 301Evaluation apprehension theory,

288Evolutionary psychology, 52,

65–67, 266, 421evolution of leadership, 266the herd instinct, 65–67intergroup conflict, 421psychology of groups, 65–67

Exchange relationships, 68Expectation-states theory, 163Experiment, 43Expert power, 226, 226–227Extraversion, 89, 89–90Extreme and Unusual

Environment (EUE), 469

Fads, 513False consensus effect, 197Families, 10–11, 68–70Fanship, 80

668 SUB JECT INDEX

Field research, 32–34, 41Field theory, 17–18Fight-or-flight response, 62, 102,

131Fischer, Scott, 450Flash crowd (smart mob), 13Followership, 249, 249–251Foot-in-the-door technique, 234Fraternal deprivation, 517Free riding, 296, 387–388Functional theory of group deci-

sion making, 316, 315–325Fundamental attribution error

(FAE), 235, 331, 395, 425Fundamental Interpersonal

Relations Organization(FIRO), 92, 92–93, 109–10

Gahuku-Gama of New Guinea,75

Game theory, 69, 71–72Gangs, 31–33, 108, 467Generation Me, 76Genocide, 429Gestalt group therapy, 478,

477–479Gleyre, Charles, 88, 105GLOBE study of leadership, 276Goals, 6–7communalism, and group, 70competitive and cooperativegoal structures, 382–383

cutting off reflected failure(CORFing), 80

hope as efficacy and pathwaysidentification, 48

motivations and, 48social loafing and, 297

Great leader theory, 255Gross Cohesion Questionnaire, 127Group(s), 3, 2–3categories vs. groups, 5as components of self, 72–74,78

definitions of, 3–4gestalt approach to, 17–18

as good or bad, 24interdisciplinary perspectives on,

21–22membership, 4negative processes in, 24networks vs. groups, 4perceiving, 9–10, 13–14primary, 10–12size, See Sizetypes of, 10–14

Group affective tone, 48, 48–49Group Attitude Scale, 127Group attribution error, 425Group cohesion 9-10antecedents, 122–127communalism and, 68–70conflict and, 392–393, 394, 406definitions, 118diversity and, 364emotional, 121–122group affective tone and, 48–49group development and,

129–140groupthink and, 137, 341–342interdependent goal structures

and, 383during intergroup conflictmeasures of, 127–129, 133and members’ compatibility,

109–110in military groups, 133perceived, 120–121performance and, 137–140severe initiations and, 127size of group space and

cohesion, 463–464social, 119–120social networks and, 158–160task (or teamwork), 120,

371–372as a therapeutic factor in groups,

490Group Cohesion Scale-Revised, 128Group decision makingalcohol and, 336brainstorming, 305–309

collective information proces-sing model, 318–319

conformity and, 179–183consensus and, 322conversion theory of, 191–192decision rules, 194, 208–209dissent and, 193–194drawbacks, 326–332functional theory of groupdecision making, 315–316

group decision rules, 301group decision support systems,329–330

groupthink and, 336–347intellective and judgmentaltasks, 302

by juries, 204–207memory processes, 318–320methods for preventing group-think, 346–347

normative model of decisionmaking, 324–325

participatory, 323–324polarization and risky-shift,332–336

problem type and, 6–7,300–304

satisficing, 327shared information bias,327–330

social decision schemes,321–323

voting, 321–322Vroom’s model of participatorydecision making, 324–325

Group decision support systems(GDSS), 329–330

Group development, 19–20,152–155

Group Development Questionnaire,133

Group dissolution, 132–134Group dynamics, 2, 14–26action research paradigm,22–23

assumptions of, 15–18

SUB J ECT INDEX 669

Group dynamics (continued)Cartwright and Zander’sdefinition of, 14

history, 14–26interdisciplinary nature of,21–22

power of, 18–19subjective, 202theoretical perspectives in, 47–52topics of research in, 24–26

Group Environment Questionnaire,127

Group Environment Scale, 127Group formationas an antidote to loneliness,104–105

companionship and, 104–105crowd formation, 505elaboration of social ties and,106–107

evolutionary bases, 65–67experience in groups and,95–96

homophily and, 107interpersonal attraction and,105–112

introversion-extraversion and,89–90

need to belong and, 58–59proximity and, 105–106relationality and, 90–91social comparison, 96–101social exchange theory, 49social support and, 100–104

Group Identification Scale, 127Group performancearousal and, 285–287audiences and coaction,284–285

brainstorming, 305–309circumplex model of grouptasks, 6–7

cognition and, 369–371cohesion-performancerelationship, 138–139

collective efficacy, 120

communication patterns and,168–170

composition and, 362–366contingency theory of groupeffectiveness, 267–269

dominant and nondominanttasks, 284–285

effectiveness of teams, 374–376evaluation apprehension and,287–288

flight crew effectiveness, 222goals and productivity, 297group development and, 19–20Hawthorne studies, 33–34home advantage, 467illusion of productivity, 306intellective and judgmentaltasks, 302

Köhler effect, 303–304leadership and, 42–44, 248–249orchestras, 20–21process gains, 304–309and productivity, 282–309sex-ratios and, 365–366social facilitation, 282–292social loafing, 293–298sports teams and failure, 80Steiner’s theory of, 298–304synergy, 303systems theory of, 49–51task demands, 298–303team learning and, 370–371teams, 352–376teamwork processes, 366–369types of task-oriented groups,283

Group polarization, 334, 331–336Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire,332–333

persuasive-arguments theory,335

risky-shift phenomenon, 333social comparison and, 334–335

Group psychoanalysis, 477Group Psychology and the Analysis of

Ego, 477

Group psychotherapy, 476,476–477

Group socialization, 153,152–155

Group space(s), 464, 454–462Group structure, 9, 8–9, 144Groupality, 23Group-centrism, 344Groupdrink, 336Groupmind, 18, 16–18Groupomania, 357Groups, as entities, 16–18Groups, crews, 354Group-serving, 70Group structure, 8–9attraction, 165–167communication, 168–170development of, 146–147,

150–152group socialization theory,

152–155groupthink and, 342hierarchical status structures,

160–164interdependence and, 8leadership emergence and, 248norms, 9, 145–149roles, 9, 149–157status, 161–165status differentiation, 161–162SYMLOG as a theory of,

35–36, 170–173Groupthink, 40, 137, 336–347causes of, 341–342as an example of a case study,

40–42groups that suffered from, 337Janis’s theory of, 336–347mindguards, 339prevention of, 345–347research studies of, 342–344symptoms of, 337–339, 341theories of, 344–345

Hall, Rob, 450Ham vs. S. Carolina, 209

670 SUB JECT INDEX

Harvard Negotiation Project,399–401

Hatfield-McCoy feud, 417–418Hawthorne effects, 33, 33–34Hazing, 128Head-of-table effect, 461,

461–462Healthalcohol consumption in groups,336

groups and eating disorders, 148and membership in cohesivegroups, 135

psychogenic illness, 512role stress and, 155–157

Helping in groups, 203–204Heuristic, 198, 330–321Hidden profile, 328Home advantage, 467Homophily, 107Hooligans, 507–508Horse-trading problem, 301–302Human nature, 65–67Human universals, 67Hung juries, 205–206

Identity, See Self; Social identityIdiocentrics (or independents), 74,

73–74Idiosyncrasy credits, 193Illusion of group productivity,

306, 306–307Implicit Association Test (IAT), 423Implicit leadership theories (ILTs),

263, 263–264Impression management, 94, 127Impressionists, 10, 88–112Inclusion and exclusion in groups,

61–65cyberostracism, 63–64dissent, 200–202exclusion from groups, 61–65exclusion from peer groups andself-esteem, 81

inclusion/exclusion continuum,61

intergroup conflict and,418–419

“life alone” studies of, 60–61rejection of the dissenter,

200–202shunning, 61sociometer model, 64–65

Indegree, 160Independence, 184, 382Independent variable, 43Independents (or idiocentrics), 74,

73–74Individual mobility, 83Individualism, 67, 67–76Individuation, 186, 434–436Individuation Scale, 74Inferior group member (IGM),

302–303Information saturation, 168Informational influence, 196, 196,

328–329Informational power, 227Ingroup-outgroup bias, 82,

422–424Initiations, 125–127Injunctive norm, 145, 200Innocuous sociability, 94Input-process-output (I-P-O)

model, 50, 50–51, 358–359Institutional Review Board (IRB),

33Integrative negotiation, 399Intellective tasks, 302Interaction, 6, 36–37, 414–415,

431–432, 505–506Interaction Process Analysis (IPA),

35, 6, 35–36, 152, 170Interaction rituals, 136Interactionism, 17Interchange compatibility, 109,

109–110Interdependence, 8Interdependents (or allocentrics),

74, 73–74Interpersonal behavior theory,

171–173

Interpersonal complementarityhypothesis, 232

Interpersonal grouppsychotherapy, 479

Interpersonal influence, 200,200–204

Interpersonal learning group, 476,480–483

Interracial conflict, 420–421, 507,508

anonymity and, 517group size and, 519–520IAT and intergroup biases,423–424

lynch mobs, 420–421, 507scapegoating, 420territoriality and, 465–466violence and identity, 523

Interrole conflict, 156Intragroup conflict, 381Intrarole conflict, 156I-P-O (Input-Process-Output)

models of teams, 50, 51,358–359

Iron lawof oligarchy,238, 238–239

Jigsaw method, 437Jobs, Steve, 380, 381, 382, 383,

384, 386, 387, 390, 391, 393,395, 396, 398

Jones, Jim, 215, 221, 222, 227,234, 236, 241, 244

Judgmental tasks, 302Jung, Carl, 89Juriesdecision rules in, 242–243dynamics of, 204–206effectiveness of, 207ethics of jury research, 33exclusion of women from, 91majority/minority influence in,205–206

size of, 208systematic jury selection, 209verdict- versus evidence-driven,204–205

SUB J ECT INDEX 671

Keech, Marion, 126–127Kelman’s theory of conversion,

240–241Kennedy, John F., 12, 40, 102, 255,

314, 318, 320, 324, 327, 339Kennedy, Robert F., 339, 347Köhler effect, 303Kopp, Wendy, 246, 248, 251,

260, 274, 280KrackPlot, 38KSAs, 361, 361–363

Law of effect, 49Law of small numbers, 425Law of triviality, 317Leaders and leadership, 246,

246–277autocratic vs. democratic, 42–44behaviors of, 251–255characteristics of, 249, 251coleadership in groups, 489creating effective teams, 362definition of, 246, 249–251great-leader theory, 255groupthink and, 342as an inborn trait, 247–248leader effectiveness, 266–277leader emergence, 255–266Lewin, Lippitt, & White’s studyof, 42–44

misconceptions about, 247–249negative leader behaviors anddecision making, 326

participatory decision making,42–44, 324–325

personality and, 257–258presidential, 314, 341–347as role behavior, 150–152role conflict, 156–157seating choice and, 461sex differences in leadershipstyle, 253–255

shared (distributed), 253substitutes for, 253task and relationship, 252–253trait approach to, 255–256

Leader Behavior DescriptionQuestionnaire (LBDQ), 253

LeaderMatch program, 269Leader–member exchange theory

(LMX), 271, 271–272Leadership effectiveness, 266–277Fiedler’s contingency model of,266–269

leader–member exchangetheory (LMX), 271–272

leadership grid theory, 269–270Lewin, Lippitt, & White’s studyof, 272–273

participation theories ofleadership, 272–274

situational leadership theory,270–271

transformational leadership,274–277

Leadership Grid, 269, 269–270Leadership substitutes theory, 253Least preferred co-worker scale (LPC),

267Legitimate power, 224, 224–226Level of analysis, 16, 20–21, 41,

47, 119, 128–129Lewin’s law of change, 475, 497Lifespace, 23Line-Oriented Flight Training

(LOFT), 222Linguistic intergroup bias, 426Loneliness, 104, 104–105Lord of the Flies, 430Lucifer effect, 233Lynch mobs, 420–421, 507,

519–520

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 31Majority influence, 179, 179–184,

345–346Mandated and founded groups, 355Manet, Edouard, 88, 92Mass delusions, 511, 511–512Maximizing tasks, 300Mediators, 405Megaturns, 166

Membership, 4, 59, 153–154deindividuation and, 518–519economics of, 111–112satisfaction, 135–136stability, 123–124types of members, 153–154

Milgram experiments, 216–221Mimicry in groups, 514Mindguard, 339Minimal intergroup situation, 77Minimax principle, 111, 110–111Minority influence, 179, 164,

190–195Minutes, 320Mirror neurons, 514Missionary-cannibal problem, 315Mixed-motive situation, 383MMORPGs (Massively

Multiplayer OnlineRole-Playing Games), 5

Mobs, 507, 447, 507–508Monet, Claude, 88–89, 92, 98,

100, 111Moral exclusion, 429, 428–429Moreno, Jacob, 37–38, 165Morisot, Berthe, 91Motivation, 48, 287–289,

383–384, 395–396Multilevel perspective, 19, 19–22,

119, 128–129, 444–445

National Training Laboratories,150, 481

Natural selection, 65–67Need for affiliation, 92Need for intimacy, 92Need for power, 92Need to belong, 58, 58–59Negative inequity, 389Negotiation, 399, 399–401dual-concern model of,

401–404expressing emotion and

effectiveness, 399Harvard Negotiation Project,

399–401

672 SUB JECT INDEX

perceptions during, 395–396, 401reciprocity and, 398sex differences in, 386–387social value orientation and,385–386, 395–396, 401–403

tactics, 396–398, 399–401,401–403, 405–406

Netdraw, 38Networks, 4, 144, 158–166;

see also Social networkanalysis (SNA)

Neurological processesbases of shyness, 93–94conformity and, 199crowding and, 42intergroup hostility, 429mimicry, 514ostracism and, 62reactions to exclusion, 42

Nominal group, 305Nominal group technique (NGT),

308Norm(s), 9, 144, 145–149anti-littering, 200characteristics of, 149communal dining, 291communalism, 69culture of honor, 419development of, 18of distribution, 388–389of engagement and intergroupconflict, 417–418

equity and equality, 69injunctive and descriptive,145–146

intergroup conflict, 418–420normative structure of queues,506–407

pertaining to bullying, 225prejudice reduction andsupportive norms, 431–432

prescriptive and proscriptive,145–146

productivity and, 139–140reactions to violations,199–200

reciprocity, 417–419reciprocity and conflict,

417–418Sherif’s study of, 18

Norm of reciprocity, 69, 69–70Normative influence, 198,

198–200, 325–326, 328–329Normative model of decision

making, 324, 324–325

Obedience to authority,216–221

Observation, 31, 31–37covert, 32overt, 32participant, 32, 32–33

Offline groups, 456Old sergeant syndrome, 135,

135–136Online groups, 5, 456conformity in online groups,

189–190, 221cyberostracism, 63–64effectiveness of online support

groups, 484electronic brainstorming

groups, 309electronic performance

monitoring, 291–292flaming, 221group decision support systems

(GDSS), 309, 329–330online behavior settings, 456social capital and, 60social presence in, 456social support, 102status in Internet groups, 166use of the Internet after

September 11, 2001 attack,102

virtual teams, 372Open group, 124Optimal distinctiveness

theory, 74Optimizing tasks, 300Orchestras, 366, 403

Organizations and organizationalbehavior

conflict in organizations, 391,393

group-level conflict styles, 404groups nested in, 19–21intergroup conflict in, 413leadership in, 246–247organizational entry, 153–154performance monitoring in,291–292

procedural justice and decisionmaking, 322–324

productivity of groups in,282–309

size of offices and authority, 468teamwork, 357

Originator compatibility, 110Ostracism, 61, 61–64, 201–202evolutionary approaches to,65–67

from online groups, 63–64reflexive vs. reflective stages, 62school shootings and, 63self-esteem and, 64–65, 81sociometer theory of, 64–65; seealso inclusion/exclusionprocesses

Outdegree, 160Outgroup homogeneity bias, 425,

424–425Overload, 446Overt observation, 32

Palo Alto Research Center, 137Panics, 508, 508–509Paradigm, 15Parkinson’s law, 317Parrado, Fernando, 144Participant observation, 32, 32–33Participation equalization effect,

166Participation observation, 32,

32–33Patton, General George S., 266Pecking order, 162

SUB J ECT INDEX 673

Peer groups, 61, 80–81bullying, 225in educational settings, 80–81exclusion from, 61group pressure, 137impact on self-esteem, 81influence, 18intergroup conflict, 419–420obedience, 219–221social comparisonamong,99–100

Perceived Cohesion Scale, 127Personal conflict, 392, 392–393Personal identity, 72, 72–73Personal space, 454, 454–457,

518–519PersonalityBig Five theory of, 88–89convergence theory ofcollectives, 516

emotional intelligence andleadership, 258–259

extraversion, 89–90individual differences inconformity, 186

interpersonal conflict and,392–393

joiners and loners, evolutionarybasis of, 65–67

leadership and, 256–258motivational style andleadership, 267

need for affiliation, 92need for cognitive closure, 344need for intimacy, 92need for power, 92qualities valued in groupmembers, 111

shyness, 93–94social comparison orientation,101

social facilitation and, 289–290social values orientation,384–386

team players, 360–361Person-group fit, 167Persuasive-arguments theory, 335

Phalanx, 122Pissarro, Camille, 111Planned dissolution, 132Pluralistic ignorance, 148, 203,

340Positive affective tone, 121Positive inequity, 389Power, 216approach/inhibition theory of,236

authority, 215–221bases of, 223–227bullying and, 225commitment, 234–235contingency theory of leader-ship and favorability, 267

domination of other groups andconflict, 416–418

foot-in-the-door technique,234

hierarchies of, 231–234intergroup conflict and,416–417

leadership as, 247metamorphic effects of,235–242

Milgram’s studies of obedience,216–221

need for, 92norm, 388priming, 237reactions to use of, 239–241seekers, 231sources of, 221–227as state of mind, 237status and, 216–221tactics, 228–230

Power bases, 222, 222–223coercive power, 224expert power, 226–227informational power, 227legitimate power, 224–226referent power, 226reward power, 223, 222–224

Power tactics, 228, 229–230,239–240

Prejudice, 13, 291Premature termination, 495Prescriptive norm, 145, 200Primary groups, 10, 10–12Primate group dynamics, 389Principle of social impact, 183Principle of social proof, 196Prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG),

383, 414–415Procedural justice, 323Process conflict, 392Process gains, 304–309Process losses, 293, 293–298Production blocking, 306Proscriptive norm, 145Prototypes (or stereotypes), 77Proximity principle, 105, 105–106Psychodrama, 479Psychogenic illness, 512Psychotherapy group, 476Public goods dilemmas, 387,

387–388Punctuated equilibrium model,

134, 134–135

Qualitative study, 34Quality circles, 375, 375–376Quantitative study, 35Questionnaire sur l’Ambiance du

Groupe, 128Queue, 506, 506–507

Racial identity, 79–82Reactance, 240, 395Realistic group conflict theory,

413Recategorization, 435, 435–436Reciprocity, 384, 69–70, 398,

417–418Reciprocity principle, 110Reference group, 44Referent power, 226Relational aggression, 225Relationality, 90, 90–91Relationship interaction, 6, 35–36Relationship role, 150, 150–151

674 SUB JECT INDEX

Relative deprivation, 516Reliability, 36, 36–37Renoir, Auguste, 88, 98, 100, 105Research methodsadvantages of each type, 42,43–44, 45–46

Asch situation, 179–181case studies, 40–43correlational, 44–46Crutchfield apparatus, 189ethics of, 33, 221experimental, 42–44generational paradigms, 146interdisciplinary methods, 21–22measuring cohesion, 127–129multilevel analysis, 16–17,20–21

observational methods, 31–37,505–506

prisoner’s dilemma game(PDG), 383–384

problems of the Hawthorneeffect, 33–34

qualitative and quantitativemethods, 34–37

rotational designs, 256self-report measures, 37–40simulated societies, 417social network analysis, 158–160statistical approaches tointerdependence, 47

Responsibilityattributed to the leader aftersuccess and failure, 249

avoiding blame for decisions,327

deindividuation and, 518egocentrism and conflict,390–391

norm of, 389responsibility for leading,250–251

Revolutionary coalition(s), 240Reward power, 223, 222–224Ringelmann effect, 293, 293–294Riots, 508

Ripple effect, 239Risky-shift phenomenon, 333,

332–333Robbers Cave Experiment, 412,

411–413Robert’s Rules of Order, 322, 392Role(s), 9, 144, 149–152,

155–157assigned to dissenters in groups,

202centrality and satisfaction,

169–170conflict, 156development of, 150–152differentiation, 150, 150–152fit, 157impact of roles on reaction to

crowded groups, 458–459incongruity, 264–265obedience and, 232–233role playing in psychodrama, 479sex roles and leadership,

253–255social role theory, 264–265stress, 155–157SYMLOG theory of, 171types of, 150–152

Role ambiguity, 156Role conflict, 156Role differentiation, 150,

150–152Role fit, 157Romance of leadership, 249Romance of teams, 357Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 70

Scapegoat, 43Scapegoat theory, 420Schadenfreude, 430Schlesinger, A. M., Jr., 318, 339Sculley, John, 380, 381, 382, 383,

384, 386, 387, 390, 391, 393,395, 396, 398

SEALAB, 470Seating arrangements, 237,

459–460

Self, 77–83affirmation in collectives, 523collective self-esteem, 81–82depersonalized, 78evaluation apprehension, 288inclusion of the group in the, 78self-presentational processes,288

Self-awareness, 520–521Self-categorization, 77, 77–78Self-categorization theory, 50Self-disclosure, 130, 491Self-esteem, 64–65, 76–77, 80–83,

99; see also collectiveself-esteem

collective self-esteem, 81–82conformity and, 186devaluation of outgroups andincreased, 430

enhancement in groups, 48,79–83

exclusion and, 64–65protecting, 82–83relative impact of threat toindividual vs. collectiveself, 83

and social comparison, 98–100social identity and, 79–83sociometer theory of, 64–65sports fans and teamperformance, 80

Self-evaluation maintenance(SEM) model, 99, 99–100

Self-presentation theory, 288Self-report measures, 37, 37–40Self-serving, 70Self-stereotyping (or autostereo-

typing), 78Sensitivity training group, 481Sex-based biasesand exclusion from groups,91–92

in authority allocations,163–165

in the selection of leaders,264–265

SUB J ECT INDEX 675

Sex differencesin affiliation, 91–92in alcohol use, 148in collectivism, 6891in competition and cooperation,386–387

in conformity, 187in identity, 79in leadership effectiveness,253–254

in leadership emergence, 262in leadership style, 253–255in participation in jurydeliberations, 206

in personal space needs, 455–456in reactions to exclusion, 62–63and team performance, 365–366in tend-and-befriend responses,62

Sex roles, 77–78, 79, 91Shackleton, Ernest, 137, 470Shared information bias, 328,

327–330Shared mental model, 317, 369Sherif’s study of norms, 146–147Shunning, 61Shyness, 93–94Sick building syndrome, 512Similarity principle, 107, 10,

107–109Sisley, Alfred, 88, 98Situational leadership theory, 270,

270–271Size (of the group)and cohesion, 124–125collective behavior and,519–520

and communication structures,168–169

conflict and size of coalitions,398–399, 405

dyads and triads, 3of juries, 208leadership emergence, 248of naturally forming groups, 3

staffing, 451–453Skinner, B. F., 49Smart mob(s), 13Social anxiety, 94Social capital, 60Social categorization, 77,

164–165Social cognition, 50–51cognitive overload, 446concept acquisition in groups,292

confirmation bias, 330–331distraction and performance, 289double-standard thinking, 424dual-process models of,197–198

entitativity, 9–10essentialism, 11group attribution error, 425implicit leadership theories,263–264

irrational decision makingprocesses, 327–331

misremembering leadership-related actions, 248

outgroup homogeneity bias,424–425

priming, 73–74, 188, 451reducing intergroup conflictthrough recategorization,434–436

self-stereotyping, 77–78social categorization processes,77–78, 422–427

social comparison as, 96–98stereotyping, 426–428transactive memory, 369–370

Social comparison, 96, 96–100,196–197, 334–335

during brainstorming sessions,306

conformity and, 196–197downward and upward, 98–100the false consensus effect, 197group formation and, 96–98

group polarization and,324–325

Newcomb’s BenningtonCollege study of, 44–45

orientation, 101in psychotherapy groups,

486–487reference groups and, 44relative deprivation, 516–517rumors and, 509–511Schachter’s studies of, 96–97self-esteem, 98–100social facilitation of consump-

tive actions, 291Social comparison orientation, 101Social compensation, 297Social contract, 70Social creativity, 82Social decision scheme(s), 320,

320–323, 327Social dilemmas, 387, 387–391fairness dilemmas, 388primates’ responses to, 389public goods dilemmas,

387–388responsibility dilemmas, 390–391social traps, 387

Social dominance orientation(SDO), 231

Social dominance theory, 416,416–417

Social exchange theory, 49,110–112, 132, 134

Social facilitation, 284, 282–292Social group(s), 12Social identification, 78Social identity (or collective self),

4, 72, 72–73, 335collective behavior and,

522–523collective self-esteem, 81–82collectivism and, 70conflict between groups and

identity, 430identification, 77–79

676 SUB JECT INDEX

intergroup processes and, 430minimal intergroup situation, 77personal and social identity,72–73

primacy of personal identity, 83self-categorization and, 13,77–78

self-esteem and, 79–83social creativity and, 82Social Identity Model ofDeindividuation Effects(SIDE), 189

social laboring, 297–298therapy groups and, 490

Social identity theory (SIT), 77, 4,13, 70, 72, 79–83, 189,297–298, 335, 430, 490,522–523

Social impact theory, 183Social influence, 178, 178–179brainwashing, 235conformity and, 179–190dual process theories ofinfluence, 197

dynamic social impact theory,194–195

group polarization and, 325groupthink and, 338–339,344–345

helping behavior, 203–204idealized influence of charis-matic leaders, 274–277

indirect and direct influence,191–194

individual differences in, 73–74informational influence,196–198

interpersonal influence,200–202

majority influence, 179–189minority influence, 190–195Moscovici’s studies of, 191–194normative influence, 198–200obedience, 216–221roles and, 232–233

social impact theory of, 183sources of, 196–204tactics of influence, 228tenure in groups and resistance

to, 155Social integration theory, 106Social justice, 388–389, 400–401Social learning theory, 488Social loafing, 294, 294–298Social matching effect, 306Social monitoring, 336Social movements, 513,

513–514Social network(s), 4balance in, 167connectors and relationality,

90–91group formation and, 106–107networks vs. groups, 4reciprocity in, 165social networks and alcohol use,

485–486spread of opinion in networks,

515transitivity in, 165

Social network analysis (SNA),158, 158–165

centralization, 165clusters (cliques or coalitions),

165–166cohesion and network structure,

125early forms, 37–38egocentric indexes, 159–160formula for ties, 4interpersonal attraction and,

165–167sociometric indicators of

network structure, 37–40strength of weak ties, 3–4

Social orientation theory, 289,289–290

Social perceptionbiases in the perceptions of

women as leaders, 264–265

during conflict, 395–396entitativity, 9–10fundamental attribution error(FAE), 235, 331, 395, 425

intergroup biases, 423–424observers’ inaccuracies, 34–35of others’ motives, 384, 386,395–396

perceiving introversion-extraversion, 89

perceiving leaders, 262–264perceiving status, 162–163perceptions of power, 236–238perceptions of women asleaders, 264–265

prejudice and groups, 11subjective group dynamics, 202

Social power, 216, See PowerSocial presence, 456Social response theory, 185Social role theory, 264, 264–265Social support, 100, 100–104, 490Social surrogates, 93Social trap, 387Social values orientation(s),

385–386, 395–396, 401–403Sociofugal spaces, 459, 459–460Sociogram, 38, 38–39Sociometer theory, 65, 64–65Sociometric differentiation, 165,

165–167Sociometrics, 38Sociometry, 38, 37–40, 158–160,

165–166Sociopetal spaces, 459, 459–460Solo status, 164, 366Specific status characteristic, 163Spiral model of conflict intensifi-

cation, 418–419SportsCohesivenessQuestionnaire, 127Sports fans, 80, 432, 507–508Sports performance, 361, 467Staffing theory, 451, 451–453Stag Hunt, 70Stanford Prison Study, 232–233

SUB J ECT INDEX 677

Statusbiases in allocation of, 163–164dominance and, 162equal status between groups andconflict resolution, 431–432

generalization, 163–164group-level status hierarchies,416–417, 418

in juries, 206–207leadership emergence, 257–262nature of, 161–165obedience and, 216–221in online groups, 166relations, 160–164solo status, 164spatial ordering and authority,457

specific status characteristics andleadership, 259

status characteristics, 163territories as indicators of, 466,468–469

turn-taking in discussion, 166Status differentiation, 161,

161–162Status generalization, 164,

163–164Steinzor effect, 461Stepladder technique, 308Stereotype (or prototype), 77, 426,

426–427, 436Stereotype content model (SCM),

427, 427–428Stereotype threat, 83Story model, 204Street Corner Society, 31–34Stress, 447battlefield stress and groups,135–136

environmental stress, 447–448,457–458

groups and social support,102–104

loneliness and, 104–105and the need for leadership, 248ostracism and, 61–62

physiological reactions to over-crowding, 457–458

post-traumatic stress disorderand groups, 493

response, 101–102role fit and, 157situational stress and groupthink,342

Stroop task, 289Structure, See group structureStructured learning group, 482,

482–483Structured observational methods,

35–37Study groups, 292Subjective group dynamics, 202Sucker effect, 296SuicideDurkheim’s theory of, 16following team failure, 80group cohesion and, 137mimicry, 511

Sunk cost, 340Superordinate goals, 433Support group, 476, 483–486Synectics, 308Synergy, 303Synomorphy, 451Syntality, 23Systematic Multiple Level

Observation of Groups(SYMLOG), 35, 170, 35–36,170–173

Systems theories of groups andteams, 49–51, 316, 358–359

Systems theory, 49, 49–50

Task(s)coaction and audience, 284–285difficulty and conformity, 188eureka and non-eurekaproblems, 301–302

intellective and judgmental,302

McGrath’s circumplex modelof, 6–8

Steiner’s taxonomy of, 298–304Stroop, 289teams and type of task

attempted, 356–357Task behavior, 35–36, 150–152,

252–253Task conflict, 391Task demands, 299, 299–300Task interaction, 6, 35–36Task leadership, 252–253Task role, 150, 150–151Task-relationship model, 252Team(s), 352, 352–359building, 359–366centralized information flow

and performance, 168–170cognition in, 369–371and cohesion, 137–140,

371–372collective efficacy, 120composition of, 359–366coordination problems in,

298–304in dangerous environments,

450decision making, 323–325diversity in, 363–366effectiveness of, 373–376fidelity of design, 374–375flight crews as, 222gender and team composition,

365–366group development and,

129–140leadership in, 266–277learning, 370–371member interference and loss of

effectiveness, 459performance, 373–376, 467player, 360–363processes, 366–371quality circles and, 375–376roles and role conflict, 152–154romance of, 357similarity and attraction,

107–108

678 SUB JECT INDEX

social loafing in, 293–298sports, 249, 361staffing (over and under),451–452

systems theories of, 358–359task involvement and perfor-mance, 297–298

team autonomy theory,355–356

teamwork, 120, 366–367types of, 353–355uses for, 374–376workplace design for effectivefunctioning, 453

Teamwork, 120, 367, 366–372Teamwork-KSA Test, 363Tend-and-befriend response, 62,

102Tenure in groups and

organizations, 155Territority, 462, 462–471gangs and, 467group spaces, 464within groups, 466–470home advantage, 467types of, 463–464

Terror management theory(TMT), 265, 265–266

T-group, 481, 480–481Theoretical perspectives, 49–52Theoriesapproach/inhibition theory,236

attachment theory, 94–95balance theory, 167, 394Barker’s theory of behaviorsettings, 449–451

behaviorism, 49Big Five personality theory,89–90

Campbell’s theory of groupentitativity, 9–10

challenge-threat theory, 287circumplex model of grouptasks, 6–7

cognitive dissonance, 126–127

collective information proces-sing model, 318

collective self-esteem theory,81–82

common ingroup identitymodel, 435

deindividuation theory,517–522

discontinuity theory, 414–416distraction-conflict theory, 289dual process models, 197–198,

401–403Durkheim’s theory of group-

mind, 16–17dynamic social impact theory,

194–195emergent norm theory, 521–522equilibrium model of commu-

nication, 455evaluation apprehension theory,

288evolutionary theory, 65–67,

266Fiedler’s contingency model,

266–269field theory, 17–18FIRO, 92–93French and Raven’s theory of

power bases, 221–227functional theory of group

decision making, 315–325functional theory of teamwork,

367–369Gladwell’s tipping point theory,

515great leader theory of leadership,

255group affective tone, 48–49group socialization, 152–155group-centrism theory, 344groupthink, 336–347Hackman’s model of team

autonomy, 355–356idiosyncrasy credit theory, 193implicit leadership theory,

263–264

input-process-output (I-P-O)models, 50

interpersonal complementarityhypothesis, 232

J-curve hypothesis, 17Le Bon’s theory of crowds,514–515

leader–member exchangetheory (LMX), 271–272

leadership grid theory,269–270

normative model of decisionmaking, 324–325

optimal distinctiveness theory,74

participation theories of leader-ship, 272–274

persuasive-arguments theory, 335psychoanalytic, 477punctuated equilibrium modelof group development,134–135

role theory, 150–151scapegoat theory of aggression,420

self-categorization theory,50–51

self-evaluation maintenance(SEM) model, 99–100

self-presentation theory, 288situational leadership theory,270–271

social dominance theory,416–417

social exchange theory, 49,110–112

social identity theory, 4, 13, 70,72, 77, 79–83, 189, 297–298,335, 430, 490, 522–523

social impact theory, 183social integration theory, 106social orientation theory,289–290

social role theory, 264–265sociometer model ofself-esteem, 64–65

SUB J ECT INDEX 679

Theories (continued)staffing, 451–453stereotype content model,427–428

style theories (e.g., LeadershipGrid), 269–270

systems theory, 49–50terror management theory,265–266

transformational leadership,274–277

Tuckman’s theory of groupdevelopment, 19–20,129–134

ubiquity theory of groupthink,244–345

Zajonc’s drive theory ofcompresence, 285–287

Zeitgeist theory of leadership, 255Therapeutic factor, 486Therapeutic group(s), 475–497Alcoholics Anonymous (AA),485–486

cognitive-behavioral therapygroups, 479–480

effectiveness of, 494–497group psychotherapy, 476–480interpersonal grouppsychotherapy, 480–481

interpersonal learning groups,480–483

leadership in, 489, 496negative effects of, 495–496social learning in, 488–490support (self-help) groups,483–485

therapeutic factors, 486–494types of, 476

Thomas Theorem, 11Thoreau, Henry David, 58Tit for tat (TFT), 404, 404–405,

416Tolstoy, Leo, 255Training groups, 481, 480–481Transactional leadership, 275, 275Transactive memory system, 320,

379–370Transference, 477Transformational leadership, 275Trends, 513, 512–513TRIZ groups, 308Trucking game experiment, 397Truth-supported wins rule, 301Truth-wins rule, 301Tulipmania, 512Type A/Type B personality, 360Typologies of groups, 10–14

Ultimate attribution error, 425,425–426

Ultimatum Game, 72, 71–72Unit of analysis, 47, 16, 17,

20–21Unitary tasks, 300Unpacking of responsibility, 390Upward social comparison, 99

Validity, 36–37van Gogh, Vincent, 88–89, 94Virginia Tech shooting of 2007, 63Virtual reality groups, 46Vladimir’s Choice, 418Voice effect, 323–324Voir dire, 209Volkerpsychologie, 16Voluntary associations, 58–60

Williams v. Florida, 208Winthrop, John, 68Workplace design for teams, 453Workshops as groups, 482–483Wundt, Wilhelm, 16

Yanomanö, 419

Zeitgeist theory, 255

680 SUB JECT INDEX

Group Dynamics - Government Arts College Coimbatore

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