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Greek anti-Americanism and the war inKosovoZinovia Lialiouti aa Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Politics andHistory, Athens, Greece

Available online: 18 Jul 2011

To cite this article: Zinovia Lialiouti (2011): Greek anti-Americanism and the war in Kosovo,National Identities, 13:2, 127-156

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Greek anti-Americanism and the war in Kosovo

Zinovia Lialiouti*

Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Politics and History, Athens, Greece

This paper focuses on the perceptions of Greek public opinion concerningNATO’s intervention in Kosovo as a case study for Greek anti-Americanism and,especially, its post-Cold War expression. Greek opposition towards NATOintervention in Kosovo (1999) has often been attributed to bias, nationalismand emotionalism. However, the main influential factor in the shaping of theGreek perception of the Kosovo war was the anti-American legacy. It should alsobe emphasized that the post-Cold War version of Greek anti-Americanism hasdistinct qualitative characteristics, the most important of those being its diffusioninto the ideological and political spectrum. Based on a qualitative analysis of thepress, this study attempts to show how this generalized anti-Americanismfunctions like a prism during the Kosovo crisis and to illustrate the influence ofa complex set of historical myths and conceptual schemes, as well as the role ofseveral secondary factors such as political strategies and party competition. In theconceptual field, the legacy of the Kosovo narration is the establishment of thetotalitarian argument as far as the US is concerned and the shaping of a negativeimage of American society that is directly linked to US aggression in foreignrelations.

Keywords: anti-Americanism; Greece; Kosovo; post-Cold War; media; discourseanalysis

Introduction

The opposition of the Greek public opinion to NATO intervention in Kosovo

(Pesmazoglou, 2000; Giallourides, Kefala, & Tsatsos, 2001) and the bombing of

Serbia for 78 days (24 March�11 June 1999) has often been presented as a sort of

Greek peculiarity attributed to bias, nationalism and emotionalism. Greek opposi-

tion has stood in apparent contrast to European public opinion’s approval of the

NATO military operation (Hammond, 2000; Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen,

& Riegert, 2000; Horjer, Nohrstedt, & Ottosen, 2002). However, it should be noted

that European attitudes were not homogenous.1

The interpretations given for the Greek attitude emphasized the traditional anti-

Americanism of the Greek people, the role of orthodoxy in Greek political culture, as

well as the historical and emotional ties with the Serbian people. In my opinion, the

religious and pro-Serbian elements have been overestimated. The main explanatory

factor for the Greek attitude is the legacy of anti-Americanism combined with a

leftist tradition in the country’s political culture since 1974. Anti-Americanism

currently intersects the entire Greek political spectrum and seems to be a common

point of reference for both extremes.2 Through analysis of the material provided,

*Email: jennylialiouti@yahoo.com

National Identities

Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2011, 127�156

ISSN 1460-8944 print/ISSN 1469-9907 online

# 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2011.572066

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primarily by the Greek press, I will argue that beneath the passionate anti-American

rhetoric there is a coherent set of beliefs that transcend the political and ideological

spectrum.

Methodological remarks

The present study is, theoretically, inscribed in the context of hermeneutics as

represented by the work of Paul Ricoeur. Based on the assumption that every social

activity is symbolically mediated, Ricoeur argues that the analysis of the rhetorical

dimension of ideologies and of the metaphorical elements of a given discourse is

fundamental in order to understand how ideologies produce and reproduce identities

(Ricoeur, 1986, pp. 258�261). According to Ricoeur, it is the task of a hermeneuticapproach to diminish the distance between the text and the reader and to incorporate

its meaning in the ‘present understanding that a man can have for himself ’ (Ricoeur,

1990a, p. 28). According to the tradition of hermeneutics, understanding is the

precondition for interpretation. Understanding, here, has the special meaning that

Ricoeur attributed to it emphasizing ‘the shift of emphasis from understanding the

other to understanding the word of his work’.

Influenced by Collingwood, Ricoeur argues that historiography can only grasp

past realities indirectly, since the realities of the past are not, in the strict sense,verifiable. Therefore, imagination is an important element in representing the past,

and the bond between history and narration can never be broken (Ricoeur, 1988,

p. 13, 1990b, pp. 16�21). An important concept that sustains the bond between

historical and fictitious narration is the concept of the ‘plot’ (Ricoeur, 1990b, p. 22).

According to Ricoeur, the plot mediates between the facts and the narration and its

particular quality is that it is understandable; it makes sense of a series of events

(Ricoeur, 1988, p. 10).

So, history, perceived as interpretation, has to combine the ‘narrative cohesion’with the ‘correspondence to the documentation’ (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 14; emphasis

added). The approach of hermeneutics and the linguistic turn in philosophy has had

a profound influence on historiography (Fay, 1998, pp. 1�12; Rorty, 1967). In this

context, Hayden White and his Metahistory (1975) shifted attention to the

‘rhetorical’ dimension of knowledge and to the way the various discourses shape

decisively our knowledge of the past (Fay, 1998, p. 2; White, 1975, p. 2). White tries to

sustain that the description of events, through the use of language, is already an

interpretation and entails an element of construction (White, 1998, pp. 27�28).Contrary to the novelist, though, the historian does not invent facts, but

‘discovers’ them and brings their meaning to light. Even though the meaning is

already present in human actions of the past, it is not fully visible by the actors, since

the consequences of human actions transcend the original goals they set. According

to White, historical narration is not a passive record of something that already exists,

but rather it actually creates something new (White, 1987, pp. 173�178).

Concerning the constructivist perception of historiography and the element of

interpretation, Collingwood insists that every human action can be perceived as aform of language. Therefore, the traces of past human activities are a sort of text and

the historian has to ‘read’ them as an expression of human thought. This ‘reading’

entails an interpretation, because the historian has to decide on the meaning

attributed by the actors to their actions (Collingwood, 2001, pp. 49�50). So, in a

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sense, the historian does not simply ‘discover’, but ‘creates’ his material (Collingwood,

2001, pp. 54, 76).

In the present study, I also take into consideration the performative nature of

language, based on the speech act theory (White, 1987, p. 178; Austin, 1962). I draw

upon the concept of discourse as elaborated by Michel Foucault and the Critical

Discourse Analysis approach (Teun Van Djick, Norman Fairclough, etc.). Foucaultinsists on the social and material dimension of discourse (Macdonell, 1986, pp. 97�98). He perceives discourse as a means of conflict and struggle, but he also points out

that a series of control mechanisms dominates the various forms of discourse

(Foucault, 1971). The various discourses are perceived not as groups of signs, but as

‘practices that systematically form’ their objects of reference (Foucault, 2003, p. 38).

The concept of discursive practices is fundamental in understanding Foucault’s

theory of discourse. Transcending the distinction between signifier and signified,

Foucault argues that discursive practices ‘produce’ their objects of reference (Dreyfus

& Rabinow, 1986, pp. 61�62). According to his definition, discursive practices are a

‘body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that

have defined a given period’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 92). Based on the above, the

arguments of D. Howarth emphasize the role of discourse in shaping identities and

defining the limits between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and constructing the rivalry between

them. Consequently, he establishes the highly political dimension of discourse

(Howarth, 2000, p. 9).Critical discourse analysis stresses that discourse should be examined as a social

practice rather than as an individual activity (Fairclough, 1995, p. 4). In this

approach, discourse is at the same time a means of representation and a form of

action (Fairclough, 1992, p. 63). Therefore, discourse analysis should focus on the

way texts function in the context of social and cultural practices (Fairclough, 1995,

p. 7). Critical discourse analysis is also interested in the way power relations and the

struggle for power shape discursive practices within an institution or society as a

whole (Fairclough, 1992, p. 36). Based on the above, discourse analysis is the ‘process

of analyzing signifying practices as discursive forms’. For that purpose, a variety of

linguistic and non-linguistic documents are examined as ‘texts’ (Howarth, 2000,

p. 10).

In the present study, the focus is on the role of the press. The press is here

considered as means of representing and at the same time as means of shaping mass

perceptions (Hall, 1982, pp. 56�90). The press, as a source for historical research,

gives us the opportunity to highlight this interaction between shaping and reflecting

mass perceptions. Ithiel de Sola Pool addresses the communication process as anintegral part of the historical process: ‘What is said in the communication channels

of any country at any given time is therefore, part of what is done in that country’

(Sola Pool, 1970, p. 26). Moreover, the relationship between media and politics is

characterized by interaction; the media describe political activity, but at the same

time they are an integral part of that activity (McNair, 2003, p. 47). In my approach,

media discourse is not just a reflection of anti-Americanism, but also an active actor

in its development.

I have selected five newspapers to study based on the following criteria: their

being a typical representation of the political and ideological fractions in Greece,

their levels of circulation and their tradition or status in the public sphere. The

newspapers selected are: Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia, Eleftheros Typos, Kathimerini and

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Rizospastis.3 The material consists of every piece of information that was published

concerning our subject during the entire period of the bombings and is used in order

to reconstruct Greek narration about the role of the US and NATO based on a

conceptual approach.According to Michael Freeden, concepts are the primary entities on which

political thought is based, as words are the primary entities of language (Freeden,

1998, pp. 2�3). Concepts, as he defines them, are ‘complex ideas that inject order and

meaning into observed or anticipated sets of political phenomena and hold together

an assortment of related notions’ (Freeden, 1998, p. 52). Freeden, in his emphasis on

the historical grounding of concepts, approaches the Begriffsgeschichte and the work

of Reinhart Koselleck. Begriffsgeschichte focuses on the crucial role of historical

concepts in reconstructing meaning (Richter, 1990). The importance of concepts inthe representation of historical past (Koselleck, 1983, p. 111) is also linked to

Koselleck’s emphasis on the importance of language as far as historical experiences

are concerned. It is in this spirit that he talks of the ‘autonomous power’ of words

and he argues that without these words ‘human actions and passions could hardly be

experienced, and certainly not made intelligible to others’ (Koselleck, 1983, p. 75).

At this point, I should clarify that I am not interested in establishing a

correspondence between the argumentation of anti-American discourse and the

‘real’ America. What I am interested in doing is to present the conceptual structureof this discourse and to reveal its inner logic and consistency. From this point of view,

anti-Americanism has probably more to say for the society it originates from than for

the society it allegedly represents.4

Based on the above, I will try to point out the basic concepts that construct the

anti-American and anti-NATO discourse about the war in Kosovo. We can say that

what it finally comes down to is a simple narration with the following key-concepts: a

powerful enemy, innocent victims and the need for resistance. There is also a set of

secondary concepts that complete the narration. Most of these concepts appear inthe form of antithetical couples, and the negatively evaluated part refers to NATO

and the US: justice and morality vs. illegal and criminal action, rationalism vs.

madness, humanism vs. inhumanity.

Greek national identity and the legacy of Greek anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism is a controversial and highly debatable concept (Nolan, 2004,

p. 126). Scholars of the field have concluded that it’s actually easier to identify anti-Americanism than to define it (Rubinstein & Smith, 1985. p. 1). Consequently, a

variety of definitions has been suggested, each focusing on different aspects of the

phenomenon, such as psychological tendencies, attitudes, discourse, political

mobilization, etc. (Rubinstein & Smith, 1985, pp. 17�28; Isernia, 2006, pp. 58�59;

Roger, 2002, pp. 18�20; Tai, Peterson, & Gurr, 1973, p. 470; Diner, 1996, p. viii;

Doran & Sewell, 1988, p. 106; Berman, 2004, pp. xiii�xiv, 33�37). However,

Rubinstein and Smith argue that it’s pointless to address anti-Americanism in an

abstract way without reference to a specific country, political culture and historicalperiod (1985, pp. 2�3). In the context of the present study, we adopt the following

definition by Katzenstein and Keohane, according to which anti-Americanism

should be approached as ‘a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the

United States and of the American society in general’ (2006a, pp. 12�14).

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A major issue in the field of anti-Americanism studies is the degree of rationality

or irrationalism contained in the various expressions of the phenomenon (Doran &

Sewell, 1988, pp. 106; Revel, 2002; Berman, 2004, pp. xiii�xiv; Kimball, 2004,

pp. 239�240). The truth seems to lie somewhere in the middle (Katzenstein &

Keohane, 2006a, p. 15; Hollander, 2004, pp. 7�12; Bowen, 2006, pp. 230�232)

between those who discard anti-Americanism as an expression of irrationalism and

prejudice and those who choose to examine it as an altogether rational phenomenon.In any case, it is important to keep in mind that, despite the existence of irrational

elements, the discourse of anti-Americanism is characterized by an internal logic and

coherence and sort of autarchy and impermeability to external contradicting stimuli

(Roger, 2002, pp. 353�355, 584; Kuisel, 1996, pp. 9�10).

Another important methodological remark that has been addressed by many

scholars is the dialectic relationship between pro- and anti-Americanism, the

constant interaction between the two phenomena (Toinet, 1988, p. 134; Kuisel,

1996, pp. 8�9; Isernia, 2006, pp. 74�75; Bowen, 2006, pp. 233�234; Chiozza, 2006,

pp. 98�101; Roger, 2002, p. 18; Hollander, 2004, pp. 3�4; Katzenstein & Keohane,

2006a, p. 16). This feature is mainly attributed to the high ambivalence of America as

a symbol (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006b, p. 306). As will be discussed below, the

interaction between pro- and anti-Americanism is clearly manifested in the Greek

case.

Katzenstein and Keohane have coined the term legacy anti-Americanism for theGreek case (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006c). The role of history and collective memory

is particularly important in understanding anti-Americanism. Collective memory can

be approached as a supply of symbols, images and myths that shape decisively the

perception of the present. However, this is a bidirectional process in the sense that the

representation of the present affects the way the past is remembered (Dawisha, 1985,

p. 67; Roger, 2002, pp. 11�12, 353�355). Based on the above, it is easy to imagine that

anti-Americanism often inherits preexisting historical animosities and stereotypes and

thereof appears as the sequel of ideological constructions that may not be directly

connected to it. For example, in many parts of the globe anti-Americanism seems to

substitute anti-Western legacies (Embree, 1985, pp. 140�141; Hamid, 1985, pp. 100�101; Dawisha, 1985, pp. 72�73).

At this point, I would like to sketch a brief outline of the history of Greek anti-

Americanism. However, some introductory remarks on the formation of Greek

national identity are necessary. Before the creation of the Modern Greek state, two

distinct tendencies emerged concerning the interpretation of national identity in the

context of the movement of Modern Greek Enlightenment. The first is expressed bythe work of Adamantios Korais, a scholar devoted to the study of ancient Greek

literature who aspired to familiarize modern Greeks with the work of their

‘ancestors’. His approach encouraged the incorporation of the legacy of Ancient

Greece to the Modern Greek national identity and the dialogue with Western

cultural achievements. So, Modern Greece should be oriented to the illustrious

ancient past for one and to the modernized West for another.

The second tendency is expressed by the life and work of the militant Rigas

Feraios, who was also inspired by European Enlightenment, but he was driven by the

perception of a common Balkan destiny. His vision, which comprised a liberating

struggle of the Balkan people against the Ottoman Empire, emphasized the historical,

religious and cultural ties of the people in the Balkan region instead of Greek national

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purity and the claims over the Greek ancient heritage. However, Rigas’ perception of

national identity did not prevail (Gourgouris, 1996; Kitromilides, 1978; Kondylis,

1988; Dimaras, 1989).

The symbolic power of ancient Greece in relation to the movement of the

Philhellenism during the Greek Revolution influenced by Romanticism and

historicism, should also be mentioned. European Philhellenes sought to help thedescendants of ancient Greeks, even if they were often disillusioned after having

visited the actual Modern Greece. After the creation of the Modern Greek State and

the establishment of a bureaucracy inspired by the German model, priority was given

to the Western and ancient elements in the construction of national identity

(Gourgouris, 1996; Hamilakis, 2007; Marchand, 1996, Roessel, 2002)

This orientation coexisted with the expansionist vision of the revival of the

Byzantine Empire � the so-called ‘Megali Idea’ (Great Idea) � through the

annexation to the Greek state of territories in the Balkans and Asia Minor. For

about a century, Megali Idea was the dominant doctrine that nurtured nationalist

passions and a series of war adventures, more or less successful (Skopetea, 1988;

Veremis, 1989). During the nineteenth century, Greek political leadership and public

opinion were vulnerable to anti-Western outbursts, when the interests of the Great

European Powers were opposed to Greek nationalist aspirations. For instance, the

naval blockade of Greece during the Crimean War (1854) by French and English

forces (Kofas, 1980) and the disastrous Greek�Turkish War of 1897 that led Greeceto military humiliation and economic bankruptcy and finally, to the imposition of

international economic control (Tatsios, 1984). The Great Powers were also targeted

as responsible for internal misfortune, as they were repeatedly involved in Greek

political affairs and party rivalries.

In the twentieth century, despite the territorial gains for Greece of the First and

Second Balkan Wars and of the First World War, Greek nationalism suffered a

major trauma with the misfortunate end of the expedition in Asia Minor that

resulted in the uprooting of the Greek population in that region (1922) (Koliopoulos

& Veremis, 2010; Eglezou, 2009). The Asia Minor Catastrophe signified the collapse

of the Megali Idea and created a vacuum in national ideology. Asia Minor, the real or

imaginary homeland in the East, was now a paradise lost for Hellenism. As a

consequence, a series of artists and intellectuals elaborated the idea of Hellenicity,

which substantiated the features of the Greek landscape. It also idealized the folkish

artistic expressions as well as the work of primitive artists considered as expressions

of the national soul unspoiled by Western civilization and modernity (Tsaoussis,

1983). The Asia Minor Catastrophe once again brought to the surface anti-Westernfeelings, since the national defeat was attributed to foreign hostility and manipula-

tion (Campbell & Sherrard, 1969, pp. 127�138).

The end of the Second World War, during which Greece suffered great losses and

the outbreak of the Greek Civil War, a prelude to the emerging Cold War, triggered

questions concerning Greece’s sense of belonging. The defeat of the pro-communist

coalition led to the alignment with the Western, Atlantic community. However, the

relations with the Atlantic allies were at times problematic and the pro-Western

orientation of Greek public opinion was often questioned. The post-war period is

also characterized by a reinvigoration of nationalism and irredentism concerning

Greek political elites and public opinion (Stefanidis, 2007, pp. 55�76). It is in this

context, that Greek anti-Americanism emerges.

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Greek anti-Americanism is here examined as an integral part of European post-

war anti-Americanism. The year 1945 is symbolically considered to be the milestone

for a process of Americanization in the European continent, inextricably linked to

the development of anti-Americanism (Stephan, 2006, pp. 1�2, 14). The major

European powers (Great Britain, France and Germany) regardless of their

classification as winners or losers in the context of the Second World War, were

all in essence the losers of the emerging ‘American Century’ (Stephan, 2006, p. 8). Ina way, anti-Americanism evolved into a common element of European post-war

identity (Kroes, 2006, pp. 346�351; Meunier, 2006, p. 147; Stephan, 2006, p. 14).

Schematically, we can argue that European anti-Americanism evolves around three

basic issues: (a) opposition to US foreign policy, (b) safeguarding national

independence, and (c) opposition to the domination of American culture or the

so-called American way of life. As far as Greek anti-Americanism is concerned,

disapproval of US foreign policy and hostility to the American way of life are the

main points of focus. So, it would be fair to say that it’s a mixture of political and

cultural anti-Americanism (Lialiouti, 2010a).

The roots of Greek anti-Americanism can be traced back to the period of the

Greek Civil War. Due to the Truman Doctrine (March 1947) (Jones, 1989; Close,

1995) and the establishment of American custody over Greece, the US was identified

with the regime established by the winners of the Civil War, a regime often attacked

for its democratic shortage (Fatouros, 1994, p. 419; Tsoukalas, 1994, p. 562;

Giannoulopoulos, 1992). For the anti-communist coalition, pro-Americanism ismainly perceived as anti-communism. In this context, the interpretation and

evaluation of Americanism is a highly charged ideological and political issue. In

short, pro-Americanism is identified with the bourgeois establishment, while anti-

Americanism serves as a means of de-legitimization of the status quo (Papadimitriou,

2007, pp. 178�207; Lialiouti, 2010b, pp. 115�136).

Anti-Americanism becomes an important issue in the Greek public debate, for the

first time during the 1950s with the emergence of the Cyprus issue. Cyprus quest for

independence from the British Empire with the support of Greece and the turbulence

provoked by the key players in this negotiation such as Great Britain, the US and

Turkey were for several years a source of anti-Western and anti-American feelings

(Stefanidis, 1999, 2007). The frustration experienced by the Greek due to the non-

fulfillment of their national claims was mainly attributed to the US and its failure to

stand for the ideals of justice and freedom (Lialiouti & Muehlenbeck, forthcoming).

The role of the US as the leader of the ‘free world’ in the battle with communism

was questioned even by the Greek Right which traditionally identified antic-ommunism with pro-Americanism (Papadimitriou, 1999, p. 230). This is the first

time that anti-Americanism, more as a tendency than an established phenomenon,

penetrates the whole ideological spectrum. Nationalism is an important explanatory

factor for this occurrence, but it is not the only one.

The claims for democratization and national sovereignty, as well as the

formulation of the so-called Centre-Left and the rise of the youth movement, also

have the denunciation of the US as a point of reference (Kremmidas, 1994, p. 16;

Charalambis, 1989, pp. 184�238; Vernardakis & Mavris, 1991, p. 137). During the

same period, there was also the development of a thorough and consistent critique

on the American social and cultural model, so-called ‘Americanism’, which goes

beyond the communist Left (Lialiouti, 2010b). In the 1960s, new tension in Cyprus

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and in Greek�Turkish relations, as well as the crisis of democratic institutions in

Greece (1965�1967) (Nikolakopoulos, 2001, pp. 341�352) are also connected by the

Greek public opinion with the role of the US in the region.

The experience of the dictatorship (1967�1974) had a decisive influence upon the

character of Greek anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism became a new form of

‘orthodoxy’ in the context of Greek political culture. The entire post-war period wasre-evaluated as a period of reduced national sovereignty due to the American policy

of interventions. The assessment of the trauma caused by the experience of the

dictatorship and the national tragedy of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus involved

more the denunciation of an external omnipotent enemy, the US, than self-criticism

in Greek society. In any case, the consensus over the culpability of the US is

manifested symbolically in the breakaway of the NATO military section (1974�1980), a decision made by the conservative government of Constantinos Karamanlis.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, anti-Americanism was organically linked

to claims of political change and democratization in Greece. It also became an

important element in the rhetoric of the up-and-coming Pan-Hellenic Socialist

Movement (PASOK) and is deeply affected by its populism. One aspect of the most

powerful slogan in the public debate of this period, which is the word ‘Change’, is the

desire to put an end to American control over Greece (Spourdalakis, 1988; Lyrintzis,

1983, 1982; Kariotis, 1992; Elefantis, 1981, pp. 105�129). This ideological mood is

clearly manifested in the election period of 1981, which brought PASOK to power.

During the PASOK administration (1981�1989), we could say that a sort ofgovernmental anti-Americanism was established that was more rhetoric than

anything else (Voulgaris, 2002, pp. 28�31). However, we shouldn’t underestimate

its legacy in terms of public discourse and political culture. The differentiation from

the choices of the US government is perceived as an equivalent of national

independence. A series of occurrences such as the declaration of independence of

the so-called Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983), the crash of the South Korean

jumbo jet (1983), the hijacking of the TWA airplane that departed from Athens, and

the American travel directive against Greece (June 1985) that followed, were

moments of anti-Americanism at its peak. In cases such as the above, the US

government, especially the Reagan administration, was presented by the Greek press

as a serious threat to Greece, in a number of ways.

Another important dimension of the anti-American legacy of this period involves

the contentious practices employed.5 During the 1970s and 1980s, a series of protest

marches against the role of the US were organized. The annual celebration of

the student uprising against the military regime in 1973 (Polytechneio) offers the

opportunity for an institutionalized form of such anti-American marches.6 The

legacy of these practices can clearly be seen in the massive and militantdemonstrations that took place during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (April�June 1999) and President Clinton’s visit to Athens that coincided with the celebration

of Polytechneio (November 1999).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the end of the Cold War inevitably affected

anti-Americanism, which seemed to fade away. This tendency is manifested not only

in the public discourse, but also in a series of quantitative researches concerning the

attitudes of Greek public opinion. Anti-Americanism, defined as the negative

attitude towards the US, decreases from 48.3% in 1985 to 34.3% in the first half of

1989, 324% in the second half and then slightly increases to 35.3% in 1990.7 However,

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the decline in anti-Americanism that these polls show would prove to be superficial.

Rather than a genuine decline, it is more appropriate to speak about a latent form of

the phenomenon. Moreover, Katzenstein and Keohane have argued that anti-

Americanism functions in a continuum, with various levels of tension that succeed

one another, but they all represent genuine forms of the phenomenon (Katzenstein &

Keohane, 2006a, p. 29).The original optimism that the end of the rivalry between the two superpowers

will lead to a world of peace is rapidly transformed into insecurity regarding the new

balance of power and the new role that the US will assume as the sole superpower. In

the post-Cold War era, Greek public opinion seemed puzzled about who the new

‘enemy’ was going to be. In this transitional period, scepticism about the role of the

US in the new international environment seems to prevail. It is interesting to mention

that, in 1989, Greek public opinion appears to have ‘greater trust’ in the USSR than

in the US to ‘handle world problems with greater responsibility’ (44% for the USSR

vs. 39% for the US).8

Only a few years after the end of the Cold War, anti-Americanism in Greece

seems to be invigorated. It is worth mentioning that statistical data indicate that this

invigoration precedes NATO intervention in Serbia which is usually considered as a

milestone for the ‘reawakening’ of Greek anti-Americanism. According to them,

negative attitude towards the US reaches 62.2% in 1996, three years before NATO

bombings in Serbia, and 63.6% in 2004 (Lialiouti, 2008, pp. 133�135). Moreover,

public opinion in Greece evaluated negatively the role of the US in a series of events

that brought tension to Greek�Turkish relations such as the crisis over the Imiaskerry (January 1996)9 and the capture of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Otsalan

(1998).10 Based on the above, we can argue that, the perception of the US as a threat

in the post-bipolar setting is established and reflects the fear towards the prospect of

American hegemony.

Finally, another point that is worth emphasizing concerns the ideological and

political references of Greek anti-Americanism. It is true that, in its original version,

anti-Americanism had a far more intense appeal in the Left and the Centre-Left,

even though it also affected the Right, especially since 1974. But, in its post-Cold

War version, the significance of ideological and party divisions diminished. In the

mid-1990s, the diffusion of anti-Americanism in the entire political spectrum is

established and no longer constitutes an element of distinction between right and left

political identity (Lialiouti, 2008, pp. 137�139).

It would be fair to argue that Cold War pro-Americanism, as expressed by the

Greek Right,11 was rather superficial and lacked significant ideological roots, other

than anti-communism. From this point of view, the Greek case enhances the remark

mentioned earlier that anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism are dialecticallylinked. In this new ideological environment, the anti-American discourse of the

Right and the extreme Right (Georgiadou, 2008, pp. 247�249) is worth exploring

(Lialiouti, 2010c).

Additionally, in the first post-Cold War years, Greek political culture appears to be

very defensive and vulnerable to nationalism (Georgiadou, 1995). Greece becomes for

the first time in her modern history a reception country for immigrants, while, at the

same time, she faces a potential threat in her northern borders due to the turbulence

provoked by the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The rise of the Macedonian question

and the tension with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

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illustrate Greeks’ perception of the post-Cold War setting as a threat to their territorial

integrity and their national and cultural identity as well (Voulgaris, 2006).

Hostility towards globalization, which is interpreted as a synonym for American-

ization, is another feature of the post-Cold War political culture.12 Neo-liberalism,

the ‘free market’ and the transformations in the labour field are at the centre of anti-

American, anti-globalization discourse. Berman observes that ‘Antiglobalization has

become the most prominent form of anti-capitalism since the collapse of commun-

ism’ (Berman, 2004, pp. xi�xii). In the public discourse, the Left, the populist Right

and the extreme Right seem to converge in denouncing the economic and cultural

consequences of globalization as consequences of Americanism.

At this point, we should stress that the revival of anti-Americanism after the end

of the Cold War is not a Greek particularity, but should be addressed in the broader

European context. In Western Europe, this tendency is manifested as well.13 What

changes is the time and context. In various occasions, Europeans express their

anxiety and hostility to the role of the US as the sole superpower. Scholars have

pointed out two rather obvious, and practical, reasons for this: Europe no longer

needs American military protection against the Soviet threat and, being left as the

only superpower, the US is an ‘obvious target’ for criticism (Berman, 2004,

pp. xi�xii).

In any case, this development is indicative of the depth of the phenomenon and

has proved that anti-Americanism is not limited to pro-communism (Hollander,

2004, pp. 12�14, 59). For instance, in Germany, it is the first Gulf War (1991) that

stimulated the resentment against American hegemony, evoking memories of the

Second World War (Diner, 1996, pp. 118, 140; Berman, 2004, pp. 31�32), followed by

a reinterpretation of the concept of ‘West’ that had been defined in terms of the

NATO alliance (Diner, 1996, pp. 107�108). After the American military attack on

Iraq in 2003, the reinvigoration of anti-Americanism testifies for the continuity

between Cold War and post-Cold War anti-Americanism (Isernia, 2006, p. 90).

In addition, after the end of the bipolar world and the collapse of USSR, the

European Union began to emerge as the alternative power to the US and shaped its

collective identity by highlighting its differences from America. Therefore, anti-

Americanism becomes an ideological point of reference for the construction of the

post-Cold War European identity (Berman, 2004, pp. xi�xii, 9�10). The Iraq War

proved to be a catalyst regarding the desire for further European integration and the

creation of supranational European institutions (Konstantinidis, 2008, pp. 7�18).

Delanty has demonstrated that the idea of (Western) Europe was, in many ways, a

Cold War construction that was instrumental in the East�West confrontation. In

that context, Europe was a sub-category to the concept of the West and allegedly

attributed a cultural content to the US-dominated Atlantic Community (Delanty,

1995, pp. 115�130). As an ideological consequence following the collapse of the

USSR, Europe had to redefine her identity beyond the Cold War admissions. After

1989, though, Europe emerged as an autonomous concept while it seeks to establish

its distinct identity by defining its new eastern frontiers and enemies (e.g. Islam)

(Delanty, 1995, pp. 130�155; Burgess, 1998, pp. 209�225; Neumann, 1998, pp. 226�266). What I would like to suggest here is that this process of reinterpretation also

involves Europe’s western frontier and her relationship to her powerful Cold War

ally, the US.

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Perceptions of justice: Anti-Americanism as a filter

The historical legacy of Greek anti-Americanism should also be interpreted as a

conceptual and psychological legacy. This legacy consists of distinct and persistent

schemes that shape the way people perceive their place in the world, the balance of

power and the role of justice in that world. We can pinpoint three basic concepts that

bear a particular emotional, historical and cultural charge, and play a crucial role in

the way Greeks perceive their contemporary historical reality: (a) enemy, (b) victim,

and (c) resistance. Each is crucial in order to understand Greek narration about

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.

The concept of victim is directly linked to Greek perception about justice and

moral values, in a global context. There is a strong tradition in Greek society that

encourages the narration of the historical past of the Modern Greek state as the

history of a small and virtuous nation that had to deal with the aggression and

wrongs committed by the West. Through this lens, Greek history is a continuous

experience of victimization. And this sense of victimization feeds a constant demand

for justice that is never satisfied.Greek attitude towards Serbia and the US during the Kosovo crisis should be

examined with recourse to the key notions mentioned above. The roles of the enemy

and the victim are easily attributed.14 The concept of the American enemy as had

been constructed during the Cold War and enhanced by the country’s anti-Western

tradition, revived with new vigour in the post-Cold War period. The US and NATO,

which has always been perceived by the Greeks � even those with strong pro-

American and pro-NATO convictions � as a mere instrument of the US

(Couloumbis, 1966, pp. 132, 179, 205), are the assailants. American arguments

that the bombing of Serbia was decided in order to protect the Albanian minority of

Kosovo from MiloSevic’s ethnic cleansing were almost unanimously rejected as a

hypocritical pretext by the media, public opinion and many politicians (Tsakona,

2005).What is interesting in this attitude is the fact that Greek media, which are the

main focus of this study, did not deny the dark sides of the Milosevic’s regime and

often expressed their sympathy for the suffering of Albanians in Kosovo. What they

could not accept was the Americans claiming for themselves the role of the judge

who also has the authority to implement his rule. First of all, they pointed out a

paradox in the mixture of these two roles. But above all, and beneath every argument

made against NATO’s intervention, which is perceived as American intervention, lies

the complete mistrust in America’s ability to award justice to victims and victimizers,

and to rule based on some unanimously accepted moral values.15 According to the

Greek perception of events, Americans disguise power as justice.16 And the example

often cited is Thucydides’s Melian dialogue.17 Dan Diner argues that the dichotomy

between justice and power, between international law and the use of force is a typical

theme in the tradition of anti-Western discourse and has re-emerged as a central issue

in the context of post-Cold War anti-Americanism. George H.W. Bush’s term ‘New

World Order’ (1991) has been interpreted in that context (Diner, 1996, pp. 141�144).

There was also a widespread mistrust in the ability or the will of the Western

world, in general, to serve justice based on the recollection of the historical past.

Anti-Western feelings are a dimension of anti-Americanism but they are not

identical. On the other hand, the national desires and claims that were not satisfied

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in the post-Second World War period, as well as anti-imperialistic rhetoric found in

Greek political culture since 1974, encouraged the establishment of America as the

absolute symbol of injustice and immorality. This belief was the precondition for the

construction of the argumentation of the Greek press against the legitimacy of

NATO’s operation.

The argumentation emphasized two points: first, the fact that the bombings did

not have the approval of the UN Security Council and, second, that the disrespect for

national sovereignty, as far as Serbia was concerned, was an obvious violation ofInternational Law.18 Even though the mistreatment of the Albanian minority was

admitted, the means employed by the West were considered neither appropriate, as

the living conditions of Albanians deteriorated after the NATO bombings, nor

proportional, since the attack against a sovereign state was considered as an excessive

measure for a form of injustice (the violation of Albanian human rights by

Milosevic) that goes on unpunished in other parts of the planet, and finally without

any legitimacy.19

Another point of criticism against the US attitude toward Serbia was the double

standard argument.20 American claims that their intention was the protection of

Albanians and Milosevic’s punishment for the criminal actions of his regime was not

accepted as sincere based on the fact that they had not acted in a similar way in other

similar cases. The doctrine that the protection of human rights should be the new

priority for the international community was considered to be a mere pretext.21 The

double standard argument denied any credibility to American claims and raised

questions about their ‘true’ intentions. If Americans were obviously not sincere in

their commitment to justice and human rights, then they must have a ‘hidden

agenda’ that they seek to promote through hypocrisy and deception.22 But we will

come to the details of this ‘agenda’ later.

Anti-American stereotypes could also be traced in the Greeks’ unwillingness to

attribute the role of the judge to the US. According to those stereotypes, America is a

country without a history and its people are known for their rather simplistic way ofthinking.23 So, they lack the ability to make judgements in places of the world where

the burden of history is enormous and the situations that need to be resolved are

complex, such as the Balkans.24 America is also thought to be a cruel punisher,

because she herself has never suffered like other nations have, she has never

experienced any threat on her soil:

‘American citizens take for granted that America can do whatever she wants whenevershe wants and not being answerable to anyone. Besides, American citizens don’t knowthat war means fire, blood, death. Fire, blood and death touch the others. [..] thosepeople know nothing about being bombed. America has never been bombed. If evenone missile had fallen, let’s say, on Manhattan, if an alert had signalled a couple of timesand the people were running to the shelters for rescue, then things would be completelydifferent.’25

The conclusion that comes about naturally is that, according to Greek

perception, justice presupposes common experiences. Unless people share a sense

of common historical and social fate, any attempts to establish globally accepted

norms of justice will be deprived from credibility. The stereotype of American

differentiation, in a number of fields, makes them unsuitable judges. They don’t

belong to our world, so they can’t judge us.

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At this point, we can say that anti-Americanism functions as a filter that

decisively shapes Greeks’ way of perceiving what is ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ in world affairs.

There may be elements of injustice in the Milosevic regime, but the level of injustice

contained in American policies and actions surpasses them.26 From this point of

view, Milosevic appears more as a victim than a victimizer, because the US is the

world’s greater victimizer. And the ultimate victim appears to be the Serbian people

and also the Albanians who became refugees as a consequence of NATO

bombings.27 The concept of victim that the Greeks have accepted as a dimension

of their national identity became the unifying element with the Serbian people:

‘Violence and injustice remind me of the amount of my own weakness. I have become

an eyewitness of a destructive plan . . .’.28

The semantics of the concept ‘victim’ is vague, but we could say that it describes a

situation where small nations suffer the wrongdoings of the powerful ones which, as

a result, prevent them from fulfilling their destiny, from attaining a greater historical

or geopolitical role as they could have done if justice had prevailed. A link of

sympathy and solidarity brings together the victim-nations of the world, even though

their identity may change over time. In the current period, Greeks often list as

suffering nations the Kurds, the Cypriots and the Serbs, and claim that special

emotional and moral ties bind them with the above. In the public discourse, it is also

often reminded that Greeks, Russians and Serbs suffered the greatest sacrifices in the

struggle against Nazism during the Second World War.29

Many interpretations of the Greek attitude during the bombing of Serbia have

over-emphasized a so-called traditional pro-Serbianism based on cultural (mainly

religious), historical and emotional ties. This is a simplification that ignores periods

of tension between the two people, especially during the Greek Civil War.30 The

religious ties were often mentioned in the analysis of the Greek press, but careful

reading shows that this was more a secondary and superficial element that was used a

posteriori and not as an a priori condition for the identification with the Serbs and

the opposition to the US:

We are on the side of the Serbians, not because they have the same religion, but becausethey are the target of barbaric attack, the most barbaric and cynical attack since the 2ndWorld War . . .31

Metaphors and expressions derived from the Orthodox tradition were often used

to describe the drama of the Serbian people, especially since the bombings went on

during the Orthodox Easter.32 But they were more rhetorical schemes than

indications of an essentialist approach based on culture and religion. It is true,

though, that the picture was obscured by the anti-American and anti-Western

rhetoric launched by the late Archbishop of Athens, Christodoulos, that gained

excessive coverage from the media.33

A more concrete basis for identification with the Serbs was the fear that the role

of the victim could easily be attributed to the Greeks as well.34 The geographical

closeness to the war was a great source of anxiety.35 The sense of insecurity was also

intensified by statements and scenarios from the American side,36 but most of all

from the lack of rationality, according to the Greek point of view, in the American

choices.37 If the attack on Serbia was unjustified, illegal and irrational,38 as the Greek

press emphasized, then who could tell what the next target was going to be? If there

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are no distinct criteria by which the aggressor selects his victim, then we are all

potential victims, especially the Greeks who have been in that place many times in the

past. This sense of insecurity was a consequence of the end of the Cold War that

marked the end of certain established divisions between friends and enemies. Thesense of certitude provided by the acceptance of communism as the ultimate enemy

in the context of the North Atlantic Alliance no longer exists. The absence of the

ultimate enemy transformed the old allies into potential enemies: ‘. . . this unilateral

move certifies, once more, the desire of the US to impose their will to every

‘‘partner’’. And those who suffer the consequences, we stand week, and we simply

realize that, now that the big enemy is gone, our allies are rapidly transformed into

adversaries.’39

The American enemy: Is it the ‘new’ totalitarian enemy?

We have already suggested that in the post-Cold War setting, anti-Americanism in

Greece has undergone significant qualitative changes. These changes can be summed

up to the fact that the perception of the US as a powerful and dangerous enemy

becomes generalized and transcends the ideological and party boundaries. At this

point, I will try to conceptualize the public debate concerning the ‘nature’ and

characteristics of the ‘American enemy’.During the Cold War, the ideological and political confrontation in Greece was

inscribed in the broader confrontation between communism and anti-communism or,

according to another phrasing, the confrontation between totalitarianism and anti-

totalitarianism. The term ‘totalitarianism’, which referred to regimes such as Nazi

Germany and Stalinist Russia, had a philosophical and intellectual substantiation

(Borkenau, 1940; Arendt, 1951; Aron, 1965), and was also successfully propagated

by the mass media, and especially the press (Papadimitriou, 2007, pp. 177�207). As

the rivalry between the First and Second World intensified, the term ‘totalitarianism’was applied mainly to the Soviet Union (Adler & Paterson, 1970). In the context of

the Cold War, the ‘totalitarian enemy’ par excellence was the Soviet enemy.

However, in the mid 1990s, the Soviet threat no longer exists. Does this mean that

after the collapse of communism the world is free from ‘totalitarian’ enemies?

Surprisingly, no. The concept of totalitarianism did not disappear from the public

debate even though its traditional object of reference did. The concept remained

popular as the object of reference gradually changed and the concept began to

identify with the US. As I will try to establish with recourse to a number of texts, therepresentation of America as a totalitarian enemy was not casual, but rather it was

systematic and thorough.

The Greek press has implied or has explicitly argued that the US is the new

totalitarian enemy based on the conceptualization of certain aspects of the American

state, its policies and its alleged goals. First of all, the excessive power of America in a

non-bipolar world is a source of agony. And then, the columnists attested the lack of

rationalism in the way this enormous power is used. So, the first characteristic of the

American enemy is the combination of a fearsome power with irrationalism.40 Thesecond is the development of a so-called ‘new imperialism’ that threatens potentially

the entire globe.41 The aggressive nature of the US provokes a generalized insecurity

because every nation could become a target if it turns out to be an obstacle to

American plans. Americans aim at weakening in advance any potential rival, such as

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Russia, unified Germany or the European Union. The only hope comes from the fact

that the excessive American arrogance will eventually become the cause of her

destruction based on a concept borrowed from Greek tragedy, ‘hubris’.42

American aggression, as it was presented in the narration of the press, is

somehow different from the old-fashioned, Marxist approach of imperialism because

it has acquired a metaphysical and essentialist dimension. The post-Cold WarAmerican state is perceived as a power of evil.43 If Milosevic and Balkan chauvinism

represent a form of evil that survives from the past of mankind and therefore we

know how to deal with it, American aggression represents a form of evil from the

future and that provokes greater fear.44

In the context of this discourse, the ultimate goal of the US is world domination,

the establishment of a New World Order that was identified with lack of freedom,

independence and justice45: ‘There are no values any more, there is no global law and

order and there is no UN. All there is, is the fascism of military power . . .’. The New

Order was interpreted a new form of barbarianism that signifies the return to a new

Middle Age.46 In the New World Order, Americans will be the only judge and the

only punisher, and justice will be replaced by American interests.47

Furthermore, the term New World Order was directly linked to the Nazi

agenda.48 In the majority of cases, America was compared to Nazi Germany49 and

not to Soviet Russia, but there were references that relate the US to both regimes:

‘Americans] . . . are possessed, like the communists used to be, by the impression that

they represent the total truth’.50 In particular, the systematic comparison of the USto Nazism dates back to the first decades of the Cold War and to the anti-American

discourse of the Left that denounced the Truman Doctrine and American presence in

post-war Greece. The attack on Yugoslavia was thought to be an American

experiment for the establishment of New Order, as Spain in the 1930s was a prelude

to the prevailing of fascism.51 Finally, American resolutions seemed to threaten

fundamental conquests of the Western world, the prevailing of reason and politics

instead of brutal violence and war.

In the analysis of the Greek press, American imperialism has encouraged two

perceived enemies of Greece: Albanian and Turkish nationalism.52 Greeks were

afraid that a wider plan of destabilization of the Balkans had been drawn53 and that

Greek territories near the borders might be the target of an attack.54 Besides, in

Greece, Samuel Huntington’s theory about the ‘clash of civilizations’ had become

quite an issue and was generally considered to be potentially dangerous in case it was

adopted by the American state. In that context, many argued that Serbia was a

‘cultural target’ for the US due to her regime and religious and historical ties with

Russia. And if Serbia was a cultural target for the US, then Greece had every reason

to be afraid.55

The bombing of Serbia coincided with NATO’s fiftieth anniversary and the

announcement of the new doctrine that would dictate the Alliance’s actions in the

world created after the collapse of communism. Under the circumstances, the Greek

press was very critical of the so-called ‘new NATO’ and suggested that it would turn

into a ferocious weapon in the arms of the US in their struggle for world

domination.56

What is particularly interesting in this approach is that only a decade after the fall

of the Berlin War, NATO appeared to be completely deprived from legitimacy as far

as the public opinion of a NATO member country was concerned. Even the Greek

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Right, which had a lasting pro-NATO tradition, wanted to make her distantiation

clear, as it was exhibited by the writings of right-wing columnists.57

The implementation of ‘total war’ in Serbia was cited as another symptom of

American totalitarianism.58 Journalists and public opinion in Greece expressed their

indignation about the ferocity of NATO bombings.59 The bombing of the television

building in Belgrade became a symbol of NATO ferocity. Even more, the fact that

journalists became a target of attack facilitated the comparison of Americanism to

Nazism.60 The columnists had focused their polemic on the fact that civilians as well

as non-military facilities and infrastructure became NATO’s targets. They often

compared this tactic to the Nazi’s war practices and they concluded that NATO

practices in Serbia were worse.61 Besides, the aid of technology made this version of

total war unprecedented. The infamous ‘errors’ in NATO bombings with significant

losses in civilians’ lives both from the Serbian as well as the Albanian side were

considered another proof of NATO’s neglect of human lives.62 The press also argued

that American and NATO war tactics were based on the Nazi discrimination

between superior and inferior races. The pilots of NATO’s air force appeared as

members of a superior race as they were kept in a safe distance from the battleground

because their lives had enormous political value. On the other hand, the lives of

Serbians and Albanians did not have the same political and communicative value for

the Western world.63 And this lack of humanism was ultimately attributed to US

leadership64 and was considered to be another manifestation of totalitarianism: ‘The

domination of the American way of life, and most of all, of the American way of

thinking has established. . .power as superior value than humanism. Power is

interested only in the result and doesn’t care about the means.’

But, despite the above, for the totalitarianism hypothesis to be sustained, there

had to be a link between the external behaviour of a totalitarian state and what

happens inside its borders. And that missing link appeared in several analyses that

seek to exhibit manifestations of totalitarianism both at home and abroad. The lack

of pluralism,65 the domination of media propaganda,66 the passivity of American

citizens and the lack of democratic legitimization in the American political system

due to the high percentages of citizens who abstain from the election were listed as

symptoms of a declining democracy.67 Additionally, it was often mentioned that the

true power in the US lay in the military-industrial establishment and that politicians

had a secondary role.Columnists argued that the American political system had acquired authoritative

characteristics and that the poor quality of democracy was countervailed by the

economic miracle and the values of consumerism.68 ‘For the last fifty years, the

American people have been walking slowly but steadily through the gate of

despotism. For the last fifty years, the United States have been slipping through

authoritarianism . . .’ The contestation of the American model also dates back to the

Cold War anti-American discourse. A noticeable difference, though, is that this type

of argumentation is currently expressed by the Greek Right.

As far as the control of American society in general was concerned, the

argumentation targeted the model of ‘digital democracy’. ‘Digital democracy’ was

presented as the social and political model Americans seek to promote, a system

where citizens will turn into subjects and will believe any image to be true under the

influence of propaganda mechanisms and technology.69 Because, as it was argued,

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fascism could not prevail if the media were not under fascist control.70 The following

passage focuses on the ‘totalitarian’ dimension of the American mass media:

We used to be afraid of the prevailing of ‘Big Brother’ in the socialist regime, but thetotal control of the media has been achieved in the United States . . . an unprecedentedoperation of policing American public opinion has been taking place . . . tremendousbrain washing mechanisms have been activated.71

It is worth mentioning that the totalitarianism argument was often sustained byreferences to an emblematic writer of the anti-totalitarian tradition, George Orwell

and his 1984. Orwell’s ideas (‘Newspeak’) (Orwell, 1949) were also cited as a

comment for the use of language by NATO leaders and spokesmen.72 The concepts

of the words were distorted and a politically correct language was used to mask

violence and horror.73 Finally, Greek journalists wondered whether we were living in

‘1999 or in 1984?’.74

Alongside that, the columnists suggested that the presence of violence and crime

in America’s daily life was a result of a morbid social system.75 America is the

country where irrationalism dominates in daily life.76 President Clinton’s decision to

bomb Yugoslavia and the lack of reaction by the American citizens were correlated

to the high criminality in the US and the corruption of American youth.77 The

articles denounced the alienation of the American people and argued that the only

values Americans share are the ‘culture of guns’ and the worship of money. In

America, from the neighbourhood gang to the state itself, crime turns against the

weak. Behind the attack of these people against Serbia lies the ‘black thought of anti-

civilization’.78

The news coverage of a sad incident that took place in Denver, Colorado, where

two teenagers slaughtered students in their school for no obvious reason was quite

revealing.79 As it was explicitly said the dead children in Colorado and the dead

civilians in Yugoslavia were victims of the ideology of violence that dominates in the

US.80 The teenage murderers were a symptom of the American system that had set

for them as an example ‘raw violence and the arrogance of the mighty’.81 Finally,

terrorism was said to be the ultimate national ideology of the US.82

Greek media also criticized the role of the American media83 and the American

film industry in the psychological and cultural propaganda prior to the war against

Yugoslavia. Hollywood was believed to be another weapon for American imperial-

ism.84 They also pointed out that the dissemination of emblematic American

consuming goods, such as Coca-Cola, and the appeal of American cultural products

were equally part of American imperialism and we needed to protect ourselves from

them.85 It was often reminded that the project of New World Order had an economic

dimension, as well as a cultural and a political one.

Resistance or compliance?

Bearing in mind all of the above, we can now examine the final of our initial key-

concepts, ‘resistance’. Resistance is a word with a special historical burden as well. It

brings immediately to mind the people’s resistance to the Germans during the Nazi

occupation of Greece. But it can also be related to the word Revolution that is

commonly used to describe the Greek War of Independence (1821�1830) and the

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confrontation with the Ottoman Empire.86 Even more, the association of memories it

creates goes back to the history of ancient Greece and the period of the Persian

invasion.87 In any case, resistance brings to mind glorious moments of history as it

refers to a situation where relatively small groups of people managed to fight against

far more powerful military forces. Even though resistance may not always seem as

rational, its moral superiority leaves no other choice. On the contrary, it is exactly its

lack of rationality that establishes its moral superiority. Based on the above, theconcept of resistance seems to be part of the national myths as it implies that there is

some sort of mission for Greece and, supposedly, attributes a special quality to them.

It is worth mentioning that the concept of resistance is directly linked to the idea of

national continuity; the survival of Hellenism through the centuries is attributed to

its capacity of resistance towards its various enemies: the Frankish and Venetian

occupation in the Middle Ages, the four centuries-long Turkish occupation later on.

This belief is shared and propagated not only by conservative and nationalist

historians, but also by the left historiography. The emblematic work of Nikos

Svoronos on Modern Greek History is an illustrious example of this tendency; the

resistance towards the Franks and the Venetians gives birth to the Modern Greek

nation (Svoronos, 1955). In general, the left historiography is centered upon a

‘genealogy’ of popular liberation struggles interpreted with recourse to the

manichaeistic antithesis between good and evil. The most prominent expressions

of popular resistance are considered to be the Greek War of Independence (1821�1830) and the resistance towards the Nazi Occupation (1941�1944) (Karamanolakis,

2008, pp. 92�94; Panayotopoulos, 2004, pp. 567�577).In the narration of NATO’s operation in Kosovo by the Greek press, the concept

of Resistance appeared naturally: ‘In 1821 our people rose up with the slogan

Freedom or Death! Today the dilemma that life itself puts forward is ‘‘Resistance or

Subjection’’? Servitude or struggle for a life with real freedom?’88

And the similarities with the national narration of the historical past seemed

obvious. A superpower, the greatest military power history has ever known, attacked

a small and neighbouring nation89 and, for a number of reasons that we have already

mentioned, she could threaten Greece as well, or at least she threatened the values

Greece stood for. And the dilemma appeared: resistance or subjection? And

furthermore, what exactly constitutes resistance and what would signify subjection?90

The answers to these questions were more complex than they originally appeared

to be and they became part of the public debate. What Greece’s attitude should be

during the crisis was a very important issue in the public agenda. The Greek

government chose not to differentiate from NATO, even though the public opinionalmost unanimously condemned the bombings. The parties of the opposition, as well

as the newspapers friendly to them, criticized intensely the government for lack of

independence as far as the US and NATO were concerned.91 The confrontation

became more intense in the context of the election period for the European

Parliament of June 1999.92 Many argued that a peculiar alliance was built up

bringing together politicians and intellectuals from the Right, the nationalists, and

the communist and the non-communist Left.93 A basic unifying element in their

approach was anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric, a mixture of anti-imperi-

alism and nationalism.

The government emphasized that her priority was Greece’s best interest and

resorted to the slogan ‘Greece comes first’. She also argued that Greece should at any

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cost avoid all risks that might delay her entrance in the Euro zone. Based on

experiences such as this, scholars argue that there is a growing gap between what

political elites in Greece say, and especially the governmental elites, as far as Greek�American relations are concerned, and what they actually do, in their effort to keep

up with the feelings of the Greek public opinion (Stavridis, 2007, p. 10). Polls data

from this period indicated also that a big part of the public opinion felt comfortable

with the government’s handlings despite its pro-Serbian and anti-Americanattitude.94 Even columnists from the Centre-Left agreed that the need for self-

protection should be considered before the desire for resistance.95

In the public debate, these dilemmas were summed up by two antithetical

concepts: realism vs. emotionalism: ‘Let’s see things clearly. Our hearts may by close

to the Serbs . . . But our economic and strategic interests are closer to the big powers

of this world. As cynical as it may sounds, that’s reality . . .’96 Realism, even though it

seemed necessary and wise, was also often labelled as shameful.97

These thoughts also encouraged a form of self-criticism and a debate on the way

of life of modern Greeks and their values. The preference for realism instead of

resistance was believed to be encouraged by the consumerism and passivity that have

characterized the modern lifestyle. So, the next question that arose in the press was

how honest was Greek solidarity for the Serbs and their indignation against the US

since they wouldn’t want anything to jeopardize their wellbeing?98 Greeks had to

deal with the possibility that their idealism may not be as great as they would expectit to be.

Another set of questions raised during this period concerned the debate on

Modern Greek identity and whether Greeks perceived themselves as belonging to the

East or to the West. This sort of questioning was not recent. It has always been part

of the intellectual legacy of Modern Greece (Tsoukalas, 1999; Herzfeld, 1995,

pp. 218�233). But it reappeared with intensity during NATO intervention in Kosovo.

The distinction between East and West had lost in the post bipolar setting its Cold

War geopolitical and ideological content. What was now at stake was the sense of

belonging, not institutionally, as NATO and EU membership was not seriously

questioned, but culturally and emotionally. The concept of ‘West’, though, referred

to a certain model of economic and social development that had positive

and negative connotations and evoked a series of historical and cultural ties and

animosities.99

But all these questions and doubts were obscured by the prevailing anti-

Americanism and anti-imperialism. Serbia and Milosevic became the symbols ofresistance against the so-called ‘Pax Americana’.100 The following passages exhibit

the function of this symbolism beyond ideological and party discriminations and

they are derived from newspapers of the Right as well as from the official newspaper

of the Greek Communist Party: ‘I don’t know whether Slobodan Milosevic is

‘‘peculiar’’, ‘‘authoritative’’ or ‘‘communist’’. What I can certainly say is that, at

this hour, he represents the Serbian people and, along with them, all the people of

this planet who have a minimum of national dignity left . . . They undoubtedly will de

crushed. But, their struggle has a historical symbolism and great importance . . .’101

And: ‘Serbs, our brothers, hold on. You must hold on. You are defending today the

concept of motherland; you represent the world’s motherlands. You are the guards of

the Balkans, the defender of Europe . . . You are the guards of European civilization

against barbarity . . . History needs you. The future needs you.’102

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On the other hand, the Greeks, during this period, constructed a particularly

negative image of the European Union due to her inability or unwillingness to

develop any form of resistance against US planning and actions. European leaders

were severely criticized for not being able to defend the values on which the

unification of Europe was based and for allowing the bombing of a country in the

heart of Europe for the first time after the end of the Second World War.103

The quest for resistance, marked by intense emotionalism, found its way out in a

series of anti-war mobilizations.104 A sort of ritual was established concerning the

public expression of indignation. Crowded concerts by popular artists and the

emblematic participation of the composer Mikis Theodorakis, militant marches

routed to the American embassy105 offered a substitute of Resistance. The

contentious legacy of the post-authoritarian period (Metapolitefsi) was briefly

revived to some extent and set the example for similar anti-American protests in

the future, such as the massive demonstrations during the American invasion of Iraq

(February�April 2003).

Finally, a widespread anti-Americanism was perceived to be equivalent to

Resistance. Many columnists of the Right defended this so-called ‘new anti-

Americanism’ after having made clear that they, personally, were not anti-Americans

during the Cold War. According to them, the current version of anti-Americanism

was a natural and justified reaction against the current choices of the US:

The new anti-Americanism is a healthy phenomenon. . .it is the result of the peoples’rage and indignation against the policy of the New World Order. It is an expression infavour of man and against the domination of money. It is the last defense of moralityand civilization . . .106

Concluding remarks

The focus on the reaction of Greek public opinion to American policy towards

Yugoslavia as a case study for Greek anti-Americanism offers a fascinating material.

The opposition to NATO and US handlings can be traced back to a complex set of

historical myths, conceptual schemes, systems of values, as well as secondary factors

like political strategies and party competition. Historical legacy also plays a crucial

role in the shaping and the expression of anti-Americanism. Greek anti-Americanism

exhibits a rich, persistent legacy that is reinvigorated in the post-Cold War period.

Anti-American discourse is structured upon basic elements of Greek national

identity such as the concept of victimization and the perception of the West as a

powerful enemy and as a potential cultural threat. This primary material is enriched

by the reinforcement of nationalism in the 1990’s and the adoption of a defensive

attitude towards globalization and the rise of criticism towards the role of the US in

the post bipolar world.

The post-Cold War version of Greek anti-Americanism has distinct qualitative

characteristics compared to its Cold War form, the most important of those being its

diffusion to the ideological and political spectrum. This generalized anti-American-

ism functions like a precondition for the shaping of the Greek attitude during the

Kosovo crisis. Anti-Americanism can be perceived as a prism that affects Greek

people’s views on global justice and the ability of the US to guarantee the protection

of ecumenical values and norms.

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In the conceptual field, the legacy of the Kosovo narration is the establishment of

the totalitarian argument as far as the US is concerned and the shaping of a negative

image of American society that is directly linked to US aggression in foreign

relations. The post-Cold War Greek anti-Americanism targets US foreign policy and

the American social, economic and cultural model, the so-called ‘Americanism’, as

well.

The case of Greek anti-Americanism during the Kosovo crisis should not be

interpreted as a unique case, explainable with recourse to irrationalism, but it should

be examined in a broader context of analysis. The current Greek anti-Americanism

can better be understood in the context of the ideological consequences of the post-

Cold War era and, from certain aspects, is the herald of the European anti-American

outburst that took place after President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq (2003) (Pew,

2003a, 2003b, 2004). From this point of view, it is worth exploring the hypothesis that

the post-Cold War anti-American discourse in Europe can be linked to the process of

constructing a common and distinct European identity.

Notes

1. In France, for example, American handlings in Kosovo were widely approved, while anti-Americanism remained vivid (Roger, 2002, p. 10). A part of the European elite addressedthe issue of American hegemony and the need for a distinct European policy in theBalkans (Grundmann, Smith and Wright, 2000). Also, a group of European intellectualsexpressed their opposition to American handlings in Kosovo (Ceaser, 2004, p. 59).

2. A quite similar tendency characterizes the French political culture according to a seriesof scholarly works (Golsan, 2007, p. 45; Roger, 2002, p. 10; Revel, 2002, p. 15).

3. Ta Nea and Eleftherotypia lean towards the centre-left and were supportive of thesocialist party which was the government in office at the time (PASOK). Eleftheros Typosand Kathimerini have an ideological inclination to the right and support the NewDemocracy (ND), leading opposition party at the time. Eleftheros Typos reflects thepopular tradition of the right, while Kathimerini is a more elitist conservative newspaper.Finally, Rizospastis is the official newspaper of the Greek Communist Party. Thenewspapers Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia have a digital archive on the web and wereelectronically accessed (www.tanea.gr, www.enet.gr). However, these archives do notdisplay page numbers on the articles and my references from these two newspapers arewithout page numbers.

4. I take in consideration the remarks of Edward Said in his approach on Orientalism: ‘thephenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally not with a correspon-dence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalismand its ideas about the Orient (the East as a career) despite or beyond anycorrespondence, or lack thereof, with a ‘‘real’’ Orient’ (Said, 1994, p. 5). Also,‘Orientalism is � and does not simply represent � a considerable dimension of modernpolitical � intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does withour ‘‘world’’’ (Said, 1994, p. 12).

5. Doug McAdam suggests that, based on the social movement theory, anti-Americanismshould also be examined as an expression of contentiousness (McAdam, 2006, pp. 251�269).

6. Vivid examples of this tendency are the protest marches of November 1981, which werethe first celebration of ‘Polytechneio’ with a socialist government in power, and ofNovember 1983, which coincides with the declaration of independence of the Republic ofNorthern Cyprus, that is thought to have American support. The number of people thatparticipated in these marches is estimated at 1,000,000.

7. The data mentioned above come from surveys conducted by the National Centre forSocial Research (EKKE). The question asked by the researchers concerned the degree ofsympathy in the US on a 10-point scale where ‘1’ means ‘no sympathy at all’ and ‘10’

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means ‘a great deal of sympathy’. I chose to encode the range of answers 1�4, where thedegree of sympathy is non-existent or low, as ‘negative attitude towards the US’. Thefluctuation of anti-Americanism that I have cited above identifies with the fluctuation ofthis percentage.

8. The data cited above come from a poll conducted by an American research institute thatwas included in Eurobarometer 1989. The European average for trust in US was 60% vs.54% for USSR. Greece and Spain were found to be the only two countries of the ECwhere trust in the Soviet Union was greater than trust in the US.

9. In January 1996, a potential war crisis between Greece and Turkey broke out concerningthe territorial rights over the skerry Imia in the Aegean Sea. The crisis was resolved withAmerican intervention. But the handlings of the Greek government were severelycriticized by the opposition and a big part of public opinion that were in favour of a moredynamic confrontation of Turkey and seemed to think that the US was not supportive ofGreece. After the crisis was resolved, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis thanked theUS government for her services during his speech in Parliament and provoked intensehoots of laughter from the opposition.

10. In 1998, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Otsalan, who was haunted by the Turkishgovernment as a terrorist, asked for protection from the Greek government. After a seriesof misfortunate handlings by the Greek side and with the assistance provided to them bythe American secret services, the Turks managed to arrest him. The Greek public accusedthe government of not being able to protect Otsalan, who was considered to be arevolutionary symbol, as well as an enemy of the Turks, and resented the role assumed inthis case by the US.

11. Historically, the Greek Centre-Right did not have a concrete ideological identity and wasprimarily defined negatively, for example by its opposition to communism (Kalyvas,1998, pp. 102�104).

12. The majority of Greek public opinion (51%) expresses its opposition towardsglobalization compared with 29% of EU average (Flash Eurobarometer, 2003). Themajority of Greek public opinion (51%) expresses its opposition towards globalizationcompared with 29% of EU average (Flash Eurobarometer, 2003).

13. It is also revealing that even during the Cold War, in a series of opinion polls, WestEuropeans said that they would prefer the power of the US to be equal with that of theUSSR rather than superior (Russett & DeLuca, 1983, pp. 191�192).

14. It is interesting that a similar narration of victimization prevailed in Germany during thefirst and second Gulf War. Germans revived their national past attributing tothe Americans the role of the aggressor and to themselves and the Iraqis the role ofthe suffering victim (Berman, 2004, p. 9).

15. Kathimerini, 9 April 1999, p. 4.16. Eleftherotypia, 3 April 1999; Kathimerini, 26 March 1999, p. 20.17. Kathimerini, 28 March 1999, p. 15.18. Eleftherotypia, 2 June 1999; Kathimerini, 25 March 1999, p. 4.19. Eleftherotypia, 14 April 1999, p. 1.20. The President of the Hellenic Republic, Kostas Stephanopoulos spoke on 3 May 1999

about ‘selective protection of minorities’; Ta Nea, 4 May 1999, p. 1.21. The following heading is indicative: ‘The hypocrisy and the cynicism of the New World

Order. US’s double standards for Albanians and Kurdish guerrillas . . .’ Eleftheros Typos,26 March 1999, pp. 16�17. Rizospastis, 24 March 1999, p. 3; Kathimerini, ‘HumanRights’, 30 March 1999, p. 20.

22. Kathimerini, 26 March 1999, p. 20; Eleftheros Typos, 26 March 1999, p. 2.23. Rizospastis, 3 April 1999, p. 4. Kathimerini, 2 April 1999, p. 4.24. Eleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 14, 27 March 1999, p. 68.25. Ta Nea, 5 April 1999. Also, Eleftherotypia, 12 May 1999. It is interesting to compare the

abstract cited above with the following by Jean Baudrillard after 9/11 quoted by Golsanaccording to which the US ‘brought the attacks on itself due to its ‘‘unbearable power’’and ‘‘while it was the terrorists who carried out the attacks ‘‘it was we who longed forthem’’’ (Golsan, 2007, p. 47).

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26. Kathimerini, 27 March 1999, p. 20; Eleftherotypia, 14 May 1999; Kathimerini, 24 April1999, p. 1.

27. A very different approach to the conflict in Kosovo is presented by Rob Kroes. Kroesargues that the mediated image of Serbian violence towards the Muslim minority inBosnia evoked the memories of the Second World War and particularly the sense of guiltfor European initial passivity to Hitler’s aggression (Kroes, 2006, pp. 339�340).

28. Ta Nea, 6 April 1999, p. 1.29. Statements made by the leader of the Greek Communist Party, Aleka Papariga,

Rizospastis, 25 March 1999, p. 5.30. Kathimerini, 8 April 1999, p. 4.31. Kathimerini, 3 April 1999, p. 3.32. Eleftherotypia, 1 April 1999, p. 1; Eleftheros Typos, 10�11 April 1999, p. 14; Rizospastis,

6 April 1999, p. 1.33. Eleftheros Typos, 26 March 1999, pp. 10�11; Eleftheros Typos, 29 March 1999, pp. 16�17.

It is true that Archbishop Christodoulos adopted an essentialist approach in his critiqueagainst the US and the European Union emphasizing on the moral and culturalsuperiority of Orthodoxy.

34. Eleftherotypia, 9 April 1999, p. 1; Kathimerini, 30 April 1999, p. 20.35. Kathimerini, 8 April 1999, p. 4, 16 April 1999, p. 1.36. Greek reaction was particularly intense to Bill Clinton’s statement that NATO had to

intervene in Kosovo, among other reasons, in order to prevent a Greek�Turkish conflict:Ta Nea, 26 March 1999; Kathimerini, 26 March 1999, p. 2.

37. Kathimerini, 1 April 1999, p. 1.38. Eleftherotypia, 7 May 1999, p. 1.39. Kathimerini, 25 March 1999, p. 4.40. Kathimerini, 18 April 1999, p. 2.41. Ta Nea, 5 April 1999, p. 1.42. Eleftheros Typos, 26 March 1999, p. 2; Eleftheros Typos, 3 May 1999, p. 3; Rizospastis,

27 March 1999, p. 4; Kathimerini, 24 April 1999, p. 4; Eleftherotypia, 16 May 1999,p. 1.

43. Eleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 21.44. Eleftheros Typos, 30 April 1999, p. 8.45. Kathimerini, 14 April 1999, p. 4.46. Ta Nea, 26 March 1999; Eleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 2; Kathimerini, 18 April

1999, p. 14.47. Eleftherotypia, 2 May 1999, p. 1; Rizospastis, 25 March 1999, p. 2. Kathimerini, 26 March

1999, p. 1; Ta Nea, 8 May 1999, p. 1.48. As it is suggested by the columnists the term corresponds to the fascist ‘Ordine Nuovo’

and to the nazist ‘Neue Ordung’; Eleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 21.49. Eleftheros Typos, ‘Back to 1936’, 29 March 1999, p. 3.50. Kathimerini, 25 April 1999, p. 29.51. Eleftheros Typos, ‘They are bombing our future’, 4 April 1999, p. 2. On the same

wavelength Rizospastis, 26 March 1999, p. 25; Kathimerini, 25 April 1999, p. 16.52. Eleftheros Typos, 24 March 1999, p. 7; Rizospastis, 26 March 1999, p. 5.53. Eleftheros Typos, 1 April 1999, pp. 12�13; Rizospastis, 30 March 1999, p. 6, 4 April 1999,

p. 1.54. Eleftheros Typos, 28 March 1999, p. 2; Rizospastis, 27 March 1999, p. 1.55. Kathimerini, 26 March 1999, p. 4; Kathimerini, 14 April 1999, p. 4.56. Ta Nea, 3 April 1999, p. 1; Ta Nea, 11 June 1999; Eleftherotypia, 22 April 1999;

Rizospastis, 1 April 1999, p. 1; Eleftherotypia, 18 April 1999, p. 1, 27 April 1999, p. 1:‘Every sensible man reflects on and wonders: What’s the difference between the Nazi’sdoctrines and the ‘‘new doctrines’ of the modern emperor . . .? None whatsoever.’

57. Kathimerini, 28 March 1999, p. 14; Eleftheros Typos, 31 March 1999, p. 7.58. ‘. . . the nazist perception of total war has prevailed . . .’: Eleftheros Typos, 1 April 1999,

p. 7, 27 March 1999, p. 2.59. Eleftherotypia, 5 April 1999, p. 1.60. Ta Nea, 24 April 1999; Eleftherotypia, 24 April 1999.

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61. Ta Nea, 5 June 1999; Eleftheros Typos, 2 April 1999, p. 14, 15 May 1999; Rizospastis, 27March 1999; Eleftherotypia, 1 April 1999.

62. Ta Nea, 3 May 1999, p. 1; Ta Nea, 11 May 1999; Eleftherotypia, 3 May 1999.63. Eleftheros Typos, 8 May 1999, p. 7.64. Eleftherotypia, 6 May 1999, p. 1.65. Eleftheros Typos, 1 April 1999, p. 8.66. Kathimerini, 23 April 1999, p. 17.67. Kathimerini, 7 April 1999, p. 4.68. Eleftheros Typos, 28 March 1999, p. 36.69. Eleftheros Typos, ‘The tragedy of civilization’, 2 April 1999, p. 4.70. Eleftheros Typos, 14 April 1999, p. 2.71. Eleftheros Typos, 29 March 1999, p. 7.72. Eleftheros Typos, 10�11 April 1999, p. 16; Eleftherotypia, 25 April 1999, p. 1, 30 April

1999, p. 1.73. Kathimerini, 25 April 1999, p. 14; Kathimerini, ‘An ultimatum to humanity’, 27 April

1999, p. 1.74. Kathimerini, ‘1999 or 1984?’, 23 April 1999, p. 4.75. Kathimerini, ‘Violence and horror’, 23 April 1999, p. 10.76. Kathimerini, ‘1999 or 1984?’, 23 April 1999, p. 4.77. Eleftherotypia, 22 April 1999, p. 1.78. Eleftheros Typos, ‘The tragedy of civilization’, 2 April 1999, p. 4.79. Ta Nea, 3 May 1999.80. Eleftheros Typos, 22 April 1999, pp. 4, 21.81. Eleftherotypia, 22 April 1999, p. 1.82. Kathimerini, ‘Violence and horror’, 23 April 1999, p. 10.83. Eeleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 17.84. Eleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 7, 18 April 1999, p. 13.85. Eleftheros Typos, 16 April 1999, p. 4, 10 June 1999, p. 1.86. Rizospastis, 24 March 1999, p. 32.87. Rizospastis, 30 March 1999, p. 40.88. Announcement of the Communist Party for the celebration of the Greek Revolution on

25 March 1821 published by Rizospastis, 25 March 1999, p. 2.89. Kathimerini, 27 March 1999, p. 8.90. Kathimerini, 7 April 1999, p. 20.91. Eleftheros Tipos, 24 March 1999, pp. 3, 7, ‘Limited sovereignty’, 31 March 1999, p. 2;

Rizospastis, 24 March 1999, p. 3, 25 March 1999, p. 5.92. Kathimerini, 25 April 1999, p. 18.93. Kathimerini, 22 April 1999, p. 20.94. According to a survey by Alco 98.6% of Greek public opinion was opposed to the

bombings and 76.3% disapprove of the government co-signing NATO’s decision(Eleftheros Typos, 18 April 1999, p. 7). But, on the other hand, a poll by VPRCindicated that 51.4% approved of the government’s handlings even though 96% wereopposed to the bombings. (Ta Nea, 17 April 1999, p. 1).

95. Eleftherotypia, 7 April 1999, p. 1.96. Kathimerini, 28 March 1999, p. 14. Kathimerini, 3 April 1999, p. 20, 17 April 1999, p. 1,

18 April 1999, p. 1; also, Eleftherotypia, 5 May 1999, p. 1.97. Eleftheros Typos, 29 March 1999, p. 7; Rizospastis, 24 March 1999, p. 32, 31 March 1999,

p. 36. See also an interview of the leader of the Greek Communist Party, Aleka Papariga,to Eleftheros Typos, 6 June 1999, p. 10.

98. Eleftheros Typos, ‘Life style and subjection’, 25 April 1999, p. 14; Kathimerini, 27 March1999, p. 9.

99. Eleftherotypia, 5 June 1999, p. 1.100. Kathimerini, 26 March 1999, p. 1; Eleftheros Typos, 26 March 1999, pp. 14�15, 29 March

1999, p. 3; Rizospastis, 24 March 1999, p. 3.101. Eleftheros Typos, 24 March 1999, p. 8; and Kathimerini, 1 April 1999, p. 20: ‘That

‘‘dictator’’ has been chosen to express the will for resistance against raw and cruel force

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. . . Milosevic is about to become a hero for all those who suffer oppression. And that’s asad, not positive, development.’

102. Rizospastis, 28 March 1999, p. 1.103. Eleftherotypia, 11 April 1999, p. 1. The following statement of the President of the Greek

Parliament, Apostolos Kaklamanis is indicative: ‘. . . I am ashamed right now thatEurope is being drugged down a road chosen by Mrs Albright and Mr Clinton for theirown reasons, of course . . .’: Eleftherotypia, 13 May 1999, p. 1.

104. Eleftherotypia, 30 March 1999, 5 April 1999; Ta Nea, 27 April 1999.105. Eleftheros Typos, 27 March 1999, p. 8; Rizospastis, 27 March 1999, p. 1, 2 April 1999,

p. 1.106. Eleftheros Typos, ‘The hated American’, 28 March 1999, p. 14, 25 April 1999, p. 70.

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