Got Political Skill? The Impact of Justice on the Importance of PoliticalSkill for Job Performance

Martha C. AndrewsUniversity of North Carolina Wilmington

K. Michele KacmarUniversity of Alabama

Kenneth J. HarrisIndiana University Southeast

The present study examined the moderating effects of procedural and distributive justice on therelationships between political skill and task performance and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)among 175 supervisor–subordinate dyads of a government organization. Using Mischel’s (1968) situ-ationist perspective, high justice conditions were considered “strong situations,” whereas low justiceconditions were construed as “weak situations.” We found that when both procedural and distributivejustice were low, political skill was positively related to performance. Under conditions of both highprocedural and high distributive justice, political skill was negatively related to performance. Finally,under conditions of low distributive justice, political skill was positively related to OCB, whereas underconditions of high distributive justice, political skill had little effect on OCB. These results highlight theimportance of possessing political skill in weak but not strong situations.

Keywords: justice, political skill, performance, OCB

Organizational politics has been the subject of considerableresearch over the past two decades. Organizational politics consistsof informal actions or behaviors not authorized by the organizationthat are performed with the intention of promoting an individual’sgoals (Aryee, Chen, & Budhwar, 2004). Research in this area hasfocused primarily on individual reactions to perceptions of politics(e.g., Gilmore, Ferris, Dulebohn, & Harrell-Cook, 1996; Randall,Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999), followed by a number ofstudies suggesting ways to reduce negative reactions to theseperceptions (e.g., Byrne, 2005; Byrne, Kacmar, Stoner, &Hochwarter, 2005; Harris & Kacmar, 2005; Hochwarter, Perrewe,Ferris, & Guercio, 1999; Witt, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2000). Re-cently, however, there has been a shift toward examining theusefulness of politics and personal characteristics that help indi-viduals succeed in political environments. One of the most fruitfulconcepts in this research stream is political skill.

Political skill refers to “the ability to effectively understandothers at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others toact in ways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizationalobjectives” (Ferris, Treadway, et al., 2005, p. 127). This researchstream has been fed in large part by the development and valida-tion of the political skill construct and political skill inventory

(Ferris, Treadway, et al., 2005). The political skill inventory hasallowed researchers to explore both antecedents and outcomes ofbeing politically skilled in organizations.

An early framework advanced by Ferris and Judge (1991)suggested that situational variables were a key determinant inwhether an actor could effectively enact political influence. Yetmuch of the extant research has focused on individual variables,including extraversion, proactive personality (Liu et al., 2007),self-monitoring, and conscientiousness (Ferris, Treadway, et al.,2005), with little research addressing the effectiveness of politicalskill in different contexts (e.g., Valle & Perrewe, 2000). In acontinued effort to expand our knowledge and understanding ofpolitical skill in organizations, Ferris et al. (2002) highlighted theneed to explore situations as one factor impacting the importanceof political skill in the workplace. Moreover, they also stated thatmore precision is needed beyond antecedents and outcomes, in-cluding moderators of political skill–outcome relationships.

Mischel’s (1968) situationist perspective suggests the environ-ment serves as a stimulus that alters individuals’ behaviors. Ac-cordingly, individuals adapt their behaviors to fit the situation. Wesubmit that the levels of procedural and distributive justice aresituational variables that may potentially influence the importanceof possessing political skill. Distributive justice reflects the level offairness in the workplace in terms of allocation of resources,whereas procedural justice reflects the fairness of procedures usedto determine the allocation of resources (Colquitt, Conlon, Wes-son, Porter, & Ng, 2001). More specifically, a high justice envi-ronment can be viewed as a “strong” situation where rules dictateactions and personality traits, such as political skill, are less vitalto succeed. This notion is consistent with Leventhal’s (1980)procedural fairness rules, which include consistency and accuracyof information. These rules are more likely to be seen in organi-

Martha C. Andrews, Department of Management, Cameron School ofBusiness, University of North Carolina Wilmington; K. Michele Kacmar,Department of Management and Marketing, University of Alabama; Ken-neth J. Harris, School of Business, Indiana University Southeast.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2008 SouthernManagement Association Meetings in St. Petersburg, Florida.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to K. MicheleKacmar, Department of Management and Marketing, University of Alabama,Box 870225, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0225. E-mail: mkacmar@cba.ua.edu

Journal of Applied Psychology © 2009 American Psychological Association2009, Vol. 94, No. 6, 1427–1437 0021-9010/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017154

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zations that are mechanistic, rigid, and hierarchical (Nowakowski& Conlon, 2005), which could be expected to limit the effective-ness of political skill. This type of environment weakens theimpact of individual traits and personalities so that they becomeless prominent. Conversely, a low justice environment can beviewed as a “weak” situation that enables those high in politicalskill to flourish. This kind of environment creates uncertainty,causing individuals with different characteristics to act in differentways. In addition to the situationist perspective, uncertainty man-agement theory (Lind & van den Bos, 2002) can help to explainand predict how individuals with varying levels of political skillwill behave in uncertain environments. According to uncertaintymanagement theory, individuals pay close attention to fairnesswhen there is uncertainty about procedural and distributive issues(van den Bos, 2001). When rules for actions are limited, individ-uals with high political skill recognize what actions are appropriateand rewarded and skillfully enact them. In addition, a weak situ-ation may be especially harmful to those low in political skill, asthis is the type of environment in which political skill is needed inorder to be effective.

Following a situationist perspective, we believe a lack of polit-ical skill in organizations may be particularly problematic forindividuals who work in what is perceived to be an unfair workenvironment (i.e., weak situation). In environments that have fewrules, political skill can be used to influence procedures and createdesired outcomes. However, in fair environments (i.e., strongsituations), where rules and regulations exist and are followed andoutcomes are consistent and predictable, political skill is lesscritical to successful performance.

We began our study with two goals in mind. These goals orresearch questions came as a result of Ferris et al.’s (2002) call toexplore moderators of the political skill–outcomes relationshipsand investigate how situations influence these associations. First,is political skill equally effective under conditions of both high andlow procedural and distributive justice? Second, under what con-ditions is a lack of political skill harmful to performance andorganizational citizenship behavior (OCB)?

The Situationist Perspective

Mischel’s (1968) situationist perspective suggests that individ-uals modify their behavior in response to environmental stimuli.Thus, individuals do not behave stably and independent of theenvironment; rather, they are adaptive and responsive to the situ-ation (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989). Mischel, among others, sug-gested that individual responses would be somewhat strong inweaker situations and rather weak in strong situations (e.g., Bem &Funder, 1978; Monson, Hesley, & Chernick, 1982). Further, indi-vidual traits or personality characteristics may be more prominentin weak situations and less prominent in strong situations. Davis-Blake and Pfeffer (1989) proposed that organizations can beviewed as strong situations to the extent that three conditions exist.First, there must be a common understanding about appropriatebehaviors, such that individuals behave according to prescribedroles. Second, attitudes and behaviors must be able to be influ-enced by the structure and processes of the organization, includingcompensation and reinforcement patterns. Finally, organizationalculture must be able to have a powerful effect on behavior throughstories and rituals. Thus, formal policies, processes, and outcomes

that are fair represent a high justice organization and can beconstrued as a strong situation. Conversely, an absence of fairpolicies, processes, and outcomes can be construed as a weaksituation.

Organizational Justice

Organizational justice refers to the level of perceived fairness inthe organization. Two of the most predominantly studied forms ofjustice are procedural and distributive justice (Colquitt et al.,2001). Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the policiesand procedures used to make decisions. Distributive justice is theperceived fairness of the distribution of outcomes resulting fromthose procedures (Greenberg, 1990). Although empirical evidenceconfirms the distinctiveness between procedural and distributivejustice (Colquitt et al., 2001), both have been shown to predictsimilar favorable outcomes. Positive outcomes for the organizationinclude higher task performance, OCB, and commitment, andlower turnover and counterproductive work behaviors (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Positive outcomes for individuals in-clude increased job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, and supervisorsatisfaction (Colquitt et al., 2001).

Not only has justice served as a strong predictor of importantoutcomes, more recent research has examined the role of justice asa moderator in several predictor–outcome relationships (e.g.,Choi, 2008; Harris, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2007; Wallace, Edwards,Mondore, & Finch, 2008). For example, Choi (2008) found thatindividuals’ global assessments of fairness of the organizationmoderated the relationship between perceived fairness of a partic-ular event and OCB, such that this relationship was enhanced whenthe overall organization was considered to be just.

Political Skill

The notion of political skill was mentioned early on by Mint-zberg (1983) and Pfeffer (1981). Both viewed organizations aspolitical arenas; as such, they consisted of individuals exercisinginfluence. In the past three decades, researchers have emphasizedthe important role of political skill and similar constructs (e.g.,emotional intelligence, political savvy, and social intelligence) inenhancing individual success (Goleman, 1995; Luthans, Hodgetts,& Rosenkrantz, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981; Semadar, Robins, & Ferris,2006). Politically skilled individuals possess high self-awarenessand awareness of others. Thus, they are able to read others andidentify with them. Their interpersonal influence allows them toalter their behavior with those around them to achieve their desiredgoals. Their social astuteness enables them to select situationallyappropriate methods of influence (Ferris et al., 2007). Further, theyare able to develop critical alliances and coalitions as well assuccessfully negotiate. These individuals are able to accomplish allof this while portraying themselves as genuine, honest, and of highintegrity (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewe, 2005).

Given that political skill enables individuals to effectively selectand execute appropriate tactics of influence based on the situation,numerous positive outcomes have been found for those who pos-sess political skill. For example, political skill has been found to bepositively related to subordinate performance (Hochwarter et al.,2007; Liu et al., 2007; Semadar et al., 2006), career success(Breland, Treadway, & Duke, 2007; Harvey, Harris, Harris, &

1428 ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS

Wheeler, 2007), less emotional labor resulting from political be-haviors (Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, & Ferris, 2005), highermanagerial effectiveness (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, &Ammeter, 2004; Douglas & Ammeter, 2004), and the successfuluse of impression management tactics (Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska,& Shaw, 2007; Treadway, Ferris, Duke, Adams, & Thatcher,2007). For example, individuals high in political skill who exe-cuted ingratiation behavior were less likely to have their behaviorsviewed as manipulative influence than those low in political skill(Treadway et al., 2007). In addition, those high in political skillwho engaged in a variety of impression management tactics re-ceived higher performance ratings than those low in political skill(Harris, Kacmar, et al., 2007). Although research has demonstratedthe relationship between political skill and multiple positive out-comes, little is known about when the environment may constrainpolitical skill or when a lack of political skill has a negative impacton effective performance, which is the focus of the current study.

Present Study

A number of researchers have suggested that in addition tointelligence and hard work, political skill is necessary to be suc-cessful and can contribute to organizational efficiency (Ferris,Davidson, & Perrewe, 2005; Pfeffer, 1981). It has been argued thathighly politically skilled individuals should be rated higher onoutcomes because they have the savvy and shrewdness to knowwhere, when, and how to get things done (Ferris et al., 2007).Ultimately, this ability should lead to positive outcomes, such ashigher performance ratings. In work environments that are low inorganizational justice (i.e., weak situation), there is an absence ofthe rules that are necessary to ensure consistency of proceduresacross persons and time, which increases uncertainty. Decisionsmay not be based on accurate information, which gives politicallyskilled individuals the opportunity to effectively use influence sothat their performance is rated as effective (Ferris, Davidson, &Perrewe, 2005). However, individuals who do not possess politicalskill in a weak situation have little ability to influence and as aresult may be rated as less effective.

Uncertainty management theory (Lind & van den Bos, 2002)holds that uncertainty causes anxiety and people will respond morestrongly when there are variations in justice. This theory has beenused to explain why personality variables interact with justice inpredicting performance (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006).For example, Colquitt et al. (2006) argued that uncertainty man-agement underlies risk aversion and that this individual levelvariable can account for much of the variation in performance asa result of justice perceptions. They suggested that risk-aversepeople would be likely to respond to injustices in ways that wouldnot produce anxiety. A more passive response would be likely,such as reducing their task performance (Colquitt et al., 2006).

In the context of our research, it can be argued that those withpolitical skill may experience less uncertainty because, by defini-tion, political skill provides individuals with some control (Ferriset al., 2007). Uncertainty management theory can explain thepositive effect of political skill on performance under conditions oflow justice (i.e., weak situations). In a low justice environment(i.e., weak environment), those with low political skill may expe-rience high uncertainty and respond as suggested by Colquitt et al.(2006), with reduced task performance. Those with high political

skill are better equipped to manage the uncertainty and are able toovercome it. Thus, they can achieve higher levels of performance.

In high justice environments (i.e., strong situations), those withlow political skill are merely responding to the situation, such thatthe fair policies and procedures in place ensure performance.However, this same rigid and mechanistic structure has the effectof constraining the behaviors of those who possess political skill.This type of environment may have the effect of neutralizing thepolitical skills they rely on to be effective. Taken together, thesearguments suggest a crossover interaction formally described inour hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: (a) Procedural and (b) distributive justice willmoderate the relationship between political skill and taskperformance, such that when justice is higher (i.e., strongsituations), the relationship between political skill and per-formance will be negative; when justice is lower (i.e., weaksituations), the relationship between political skill and per-formance will be positive.

Another form of individual performance is OCB, which isdefined as helpful behaviors that fall beyond one’s formal jobresponsibilities, are not explicitly rewarded by the organization,and promote organizational effectiveness (Organ, 1988). The pos-itive relationship between organizational justice perceptions andOCB is well established (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Ex-amples include helping coworkers with heavy workloads, stayinglate, and attending functions that are not required. Because OCBsare not formally prescribed by the organization, individuals ofteninitiate these behaviors at their own discretion (Podsakoff, MacK-enzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Politically skilled individuals areideally suited to performing these behaviors, as they are sociallyastute, effectively read others, and have the ability to self-regulateand adapt to the situation. Further, there are no rules or policies inplace regarding OCBs, which gives politically skilled individualsno constraints and a great deal of latitude in performing them. Ithas been argued that to attain success, politically skilled individ-uals are more likely to perform OCBs as one way of distinguishingthemselves from others (Jawahar, Meurs, Ferris, & Hochwarter,2008; Liu, Perrewe, Hochwarter, & Kacmar, 2004). We suspectthat those high in political skill may be more inclined to enactOCBs than their low political skill counterparts, regardless of thelevel of justice in the work environment, as they can see howOCBs may be beneficial to their goals. Those high in political skillultimately believe that they will, in fact, be rewarded for perform-ing OCBs when the average person is not. Moreover, becauseunfair environments create high levels of uncertainty (Lind & vanden Bos, 2002), individuals with high levels of political skill canbe expected to perform more OCB, because they are moreequipped to manage uncertainties. An earlier view advanced byOrgan (1990) suggested that OCBs could be regarded as an em-ployee input that could be either increased or decreased in re-sponse to the level of perceived fairness of the environment.Employees would be expected to perform few OCBs in response tounfair treatment but would repay the organization for fair treat-ment by raising the level of OCBs they performed. Tepper, Lock-hart, and Hoobler (2001) further suggested that although individ-uals could restore equity by enhancing in-role performance or

1429POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE

extra-role performance, they would use OCBs, because these areless likely to be limited by situational factors.

For individuals low in political skill, the decision to engage inOCBs is likely determined by the strength of the situation. In highjustice environments (i.e., strong situations), those with low polit-ical skill may be more likely to perform OCBs, as suggested byOrgan (1990) and Tepper et al. (2001). In essence, they areresponding to the environment and repaying the organization forfair treatment through the performance of OCBs. However, in anunjust environment (i.e., weak situation), those with low politicalskill can be expected to perform few OCBs, as the environmentdoes not warrant repayment to the organization. Formally stated,we expect that:

Hypothesis 2: (a) Procedural and (b) distributive justice willmoderate the positive relationship between political skill andOCB, such that the relationship is stronger when justice islower (i.e., weak situations).

Method

Procedure

Data were collected from a division of a state government. Thedivision included a state hospital, and all employee jobs focused onhealth issues for the residents of the state. With the dual purposeof inviting potential respondents to participate and stressing that hewould act on the results from the study, the division director sentan e-mail to all division employees (N � 312) one week prior tothe beginning of data collection. Included in this e-mail was thepurpose of the study and the fact that participation was voluntary,their individual responses would be kept confidential, and onlyaggregated data would be reported back to the division. Our nextstep was to send each potential respondent a personalized e-mailthat reiterated the information mentioned in the director’s e-mailand described how to access the online survey. Specifically, weasked respondents to click on the hotlink offered in the e-mail andcomplete the survey within 30 days of receiving the e-mail. Toencourage participation, one follow-up e-mail was sent by thedirector and two were sent by the research team during the 30 daysthe survey was available.

We collected our dependent variables from the respondents’immediate supervisors. Employees provided the name of theirsupervisor so that we could match their responses to those of theirsupervisor. We asked the division supervisors to give us ratings oftheir direct reports during the same 30-day timeframe in which thesubordinates completed their surveys. The pen-and-paper supervi-sor surveys were distributed on-site by one of the authors. Eachsupervisor survey was personalized and contained only the namesof the subordinates the supervisor was to rate. We set up thesupervisor survey as a matrix; the items on which the subordinateswere rated were listed in the first column, and the subordinates’names were listed across the column headings. This approach wasused for three reasons. First, it allowed the supervisors to effi-ciently rate their employees. They needed to read an item onlyonce and then rate all of their subordinates on this item. Second, itgave the supervisor the ability to compare subordinates on eachquestion asked, resulting in more varied and perhaps more accurateratings. Finally, our guarantee of confidentiality was enhanced by

having the researcher personally distribute, collect, and leave withthe surveys.

Sample

We were able to match 175 supervisor and subordinate re-sponses for a response rate of 56%. In terms of demographics, oursubordinate sample was 61% female, the average age was 42.94years, the average job tenure was 4.00 years, and the averageorganizational tenure was 5.92 years. The 57 supervisors (50%male), on average, provided ratings on 3.07 subordinates. Theaverage age of the supervisors was 49.29 years, their average jobtenure was 6.37 years, and their average organizational tenure was12.32 years.

Measures

A 5-point Likert scale with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and5 (strongly agree) was used for responses to all survey items. Scaleitems were summed and then averaged to create an overall valuefor each construct. Responses were coded such that high levels ofthe constructs are represented by high values.

Subordinate Measures

Procedural justice. We tapped procedural justice with Parker,Baltes, and Christiansen’s (1997) four-item scale (� � .82). Asample item was “People involved in implementing decisions havea say in making the decisions.”

Distributive justice. Distributive justice was measured withPrice and Mueller’s (1986) six-item scale (� � .96). A sampleitem was “I am fairly rewarded for the amount of effort I putforth.”

Political skill. We used an 18-item political skill inventory(Ferris, Treadway, et al., 2005) to measure political skill (� � .89).A sample item was “I am good at using my connections andnetworks to make things happen at work.”

Supervisor Measures

Task performance. Supervisors used Podsakoff and MacKen-zie’s (1989) five-item scale (� � .91) to rate their subordinates’task performance. A sample item included “This subordinate ful-fills all responsibilities required by his/her job.”

OCBs. Supervisors responded to Settoon and Mossholder’s(2002) six-item scale (� � .87) to measure subordinate task-focused OCB. A sample item was “This subordinate assists co-workers with heavy work loads even though it is not part of thejob.”

Control Variables

On the basis of our review of the extant literature, when runningour analyses we controlled for tenure with supervisor, job tenure,organizational tenure, age, and hours worked per week, which wascoded as 1 (less than 30 hr), 2 (33 hr), 3 (36 hr), 4 (40 hr), 5 (45hr), 6 (50 hr), and 7 (more than 50 hr). These variables have beentheoretically suggested and empirically shown to be related tovariables of interest in this study (e.g., Sturman, 2003; Weekley &Ployhart, 2005); thus, we controlled for them to eliminate spurious

1430 ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS

relationships. Subordinates supplied the data for all of the controlvariables.

Analysis Approach

In this study, participants were nested within supervisors be-cause supervisors provided task performance and citizenship rat-ings for more than one subordinate. To account for the noninde-pendence in our data, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM;Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) to perform ouranalyses.

To test our hypotheses, we ran a series of HLM analyses foreach dependent variable. In one series, procedural justice served asthe moderator; in the other, distributive justice served as themoderator. In every set of analyses, we entered the control vari-ables of tenure with supervisor, job tenure, organizational tenure,age, and hours worked per week on the first step. We also con-trolled for the form of justice not serving as the moderator. On thesecond step, we entered the grand mean centered independentvariable of interest, political skill. On Step 3, we entered the grandmean centered moderator, either procedural or distributive justice.On the fourth step, we entered the grand mean centered interactionterm, political skill by either procedural or distributive justice.However, prior to conducting any analyses, we first ran a nullmodel to confirm that there was sufficient between-supervisorvariance in the supervisors’ performance and citizenship ratings towarrant using HLM.

Results

Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlationmatrix for the variables in this study. Not surprisingly, the corre-lation between procedural and distributive justice was strong.Procedural justice also was significantly correlated with politicalskill and OCB, but distributive justice was not. In addition toprocedural justice, OCB was correlated with political skill andperformance. Finally, several of our control variables were signif-icantly correlated with one another.

Prior to testing our hypotheses, we conducted confirmatoryfactor analyses on our key variables, procedural justice, distribu-tive justice, political skill, performance, and OCB to ensure thatthey were independent and that the items produced the expected

factor structures. To conduct our confirmatory factor analyses, weused LISREL 8.80 and a maximum likelihood estimation. Weestimated a five-factor solution with one factor representing eachof our scales. Fit indices showed that the five-factor model hadacceptable fit (CFI � .91; NNFI � .91; RMSEA � .088), and allof the standardized loadings were significant ( p � .01). To con-firm that a five-factor model was the most appropriate represen-tation of our data, we estimated two four-factor alternative models.The first model collapsed the two justice scales into one factor(CFI � .89; NNFI � .88; RMSEA � .101), whereas the secondmodel collapsed the two dependent variables (OCB and perfor-mance) into one factor (CFI � .88; NNFI � .88; RMSEA � .110).Neither alternative model fit the data as well as the five-factormodel. In addition, the chi-square difference test between thefive-factor model and each of the alternative models was signifi-cant, �diff

2 (4) � 289, p � .001; and �diff2 (4) � 492, p � .001,

indicating the superiority of the five-factor model.To further explore the discriminant validity of our scales, we

followed the procedure outlined by Fornell and Larcker (1981) andcalculated the square root of the average variance explained foreach of the scales in our study. This value, which we present on thediagonal in Table 1, represents the variance accounted for by theitems that compose the scale. To demonstrate discriminant valid-ity, this value must exceed the corresponding latent variable cor-relations in the same row and column. If this condition is met, thenwe have evidence that the variance shared between any twoconstructs, the correlation, is less than the average variance ex-plained by the items that compose the scale. As shown in Table 1,this condition is met for all of our scales.

The HLM results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Before runningthe full HLM analyses, a null model with no predictors wasestimated for our dependent variables to confirm that sufficientbetween-supervisor variance existed in our supervisor-rated de-pendent variables of performance and OCB. The results of thisanalysis were significant: performance, �56

2 � 85.61, p � .01;OCB, �56

2 � 170.04, p � .001. Further, 8% of the variance inperformance and 18% of the variance in OCB were due to asupervisor effect, demonstrating the appropriateness of our deci-sion to use HLM to conduct our analyses.

As shown on the left half of Table 2, when performance was thedependent variable, organizational tenure was the only significant

Table 1Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Procedural justice 3.34 0.80 .742. Distributive justice 2.99 1.05 0.45��� .893. Political skill 3.81 0.45 0.42��� 0.08 .584. Performance 4.26 0.70 0.01 0.05 �0.07 .885. OCB 3.94 0.63 0.22� 0.12 0.21� 0.48��� .726. Supervisor tenure 2.28 2.30 �0.14 �0.24�� �0.16 0.14 0.177. Job tenure 4.00 4.12 �0.11 �0.08 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.54���

8. Organization tenure 5.92 6.18 �0.10 �0.13 �0.02 0.14 0.05 0.58��� 0.68���

9. Age 42.94 10.43 0.01 �0.13 0.02 0.11 �0.00 0.26�� 0.37��� 0.42���

10. Hours worked 3.86 0.96 0.08 �0.14 �0.05 0.10 0.08 �0.04 �0.12 �0.12 0.01

Note. Values on the diagonal are the square root of the average variance explained, which must be larger than all zero-order correlations in the row andcolumn in which they appear to demonstrate discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). OCB � organizational citizenship behavior. N � 175.� p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.

1431POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE

control variable once all of the variables had been entered. Neitherpolitical skill nor procedural justice was significantly related totask performance. Finally, procedural justice significantly inter-acted with political skill when performance was the dependentvariable. On the right half of Table 2, after entering all thevariables the control variable of tenure with supervisor was asignificant predictor of OCB as was the main effect for politicalskill. However, the main effect for procedural justice and thepolitical skill–procedural justice interaction were not significantlyrelated to OCB.

Turning to Table 3, on the left half of the table after all of thevariables have been entered (i.e., Step 4), organizational tenurewas the only significant control variable when performance was

the dependent variable. Political skill did not have a significantmain effect with performance, but distributive justice did. Inaddition, the political skill–distributive justice interaction wassignificant. Finally, on the right side of Table 3, tenure withsupervisor was the only significant control variable when OCBwas the dependent variable. Although political skill and distribu-tive justice did not have significant main effects with OCB, theirinteraction was significant.

To determine if the form of the interaction predicted in ourhypotheses was supported, we graphed the significant interactionresults. We did so by plotting two slopes, one at one standarddeviation above the mean and one at one standard deviation belowthe mean (Stone & Hollenbeck, 1989). The resulting plots are

Table 2HLM Results for Procedural Justice as a Moderator and Performance and Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) as theDependent Variables

Dependent variable

Performance OCB

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

Control variablesTenure with supervisor .03 .03 .03 .02 .05� .06� .06� .05�

Job tenure �.01 �.01 �.01 �.01 �.02 �.02 �.02 �.02Organizational tenure .02� .02� .02� .02� .00 .01 .01 .01Age .00 .00 .00 .00 �.00 �.00 �.00 �.00Hours worked per week .10� .10� .10� .10 .07 .08� .07 .07Distributive justice .10� .10� .09 .09 .10� .09 .06 .05

Independent VariablePolitical skill .03 .02 .04 .25� .19 .20�

ModeratorProcedural justice .03 .05 .10 .11

InteractionPolitical Skill � Procedural Justice �.40�� �.14

�R2 .04 .00 .00 .01 .06 .03 .01 .00

Note. N � 175. R2 values were calculated following Snijders and Bosker’s (1999) formulas. HLM � hierarchical linear modeling.� p � .05. �� p � .01.

Table 3HLM Results for Distributive Justice as a Moderator and Performance and Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) as theDependent Variables

Dependent variable

Performance OCB

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

Control variablesTenure with supervisor .02 .02 .03 .02 .05� .05� .06� .05�

Job tenure �.01 �.01 �.01 �.01 �.01 �.01 �.02 �.02Organizational tenure .02� .02� .02� .02� .01 .01 .01 .00Age .00 .00 .00 .00 �.00 �.00 �.00 �.00Hours worked per week .09 .09 .10� .09 .05 .06 .07 .06Procedural justice .09 .09 .03 .03 .18�� .14� .10 .10

Independent variablePolitical skill �.01 .02 .00 .18 .19 .18

ModeratorDistributive justice .09 .10� .06 .07

InteractionPolitical Skill � Distributive Justice �.19� �.17�

�R2 .02 .01 .00 .02 .08 .01 .01 .01

Note. N � 175. R2 values were calculated following Snijders and Bosker’s (1999) formulas.� p � .05. �� p � .01.

1432 ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS

shown in Figures 1 and 2 for performance and Figure 3 for OCB.Figure 1 illustrates a disordinal interaction much like the onepredicted in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, when procedural justice ishigh, the relationship between political skill and performance isnegative. Just the reverse is true when procedural justice is low, asthe relationship between political skill and performance is positive.The graph in Figure 2 shows essentially the same relationship,but the interaction is ordinal and weaker. Finally, Figure 3 showsthat the relationship between political skill and OCB is positive forboth high and low distributive justice, but the relationship isstronger for low than high. Overall, these figures provide supportfor Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2b. Hypothesis 2a was not supported,as the interaction between political skill and procedural justice wasnot significant for OCB.

Although we were interested in seeing the independent effectsof each of the interactions, we also ran them together in a singlestep. These results are presented in the Appendix. Only one of theinteractions was significant. We suggest that these results may beattributable to the effects of multicollinearity, given that the maineffects results change little.

Discussion

The present study was designed to establish whether politicalskill is equally effective under conditions of both high and lowjustice. In addition, we sought to determine the conditions underwhich a lack of political skill is harmful to performance and OCB.In addressing these research questions, we used Mischel’s (1968)situationist perspective and conceived of high justice environmentsas strong situations and low justice environments as weak situa- tions and uncertainty management theory to describe how weak

and strong situations would impact those with and without politicalskill. Specifically, we tested the interaction of procedural anddistributive justice with political skill on both task performanceand OCB. Our findings indicate that political skill allows individ-uals to overcome situational influences, as highly politicallyskilled individuals were rated similarly regardless of the level ofdistributive justice. However, we found the ratings for those witha lack of political skill varied with the level of both procedural anddistributive justice present.

Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be a positive relationshipbetween political skill and performance when justice is lower (i.e.,in weak situations) and a negative relationship between politicalskill and performance when justice is higher (i.e., strong situation).We found support for this hypothesis for both distributive andprocedural justice. Looking at the left side of Figures 1 and 2, itcan be seen that there is a dramatic difference in supervisor-ratedperformance under high and low levels of procedural and distrib-utive justice. When there is high procedural or distributive justice,not having political skill does not deflate one’s performance rat-ings, as supervisors are likely following the performance appraisalguidelines in place. These rules reflect a strong situation andensure that consistent performance ratings are being made. How-ever, when there is low procedural and distributive justice, lowpolitical skill does in fact seem to be harmful to performanceratings. The lowest performance ratings occurred for those withlow political skill under conditions of low procedural and distrib-utive justice. This suggests that political skill may in fact benecessary to be viewed as an effective performer, particularly inweak situations.

3.80

3.90

4.00

4.10

4.20

4.30

4.40

4.50

4.60

hgiHwoL

Political Skill

Perf

orm

ance

Low Procedural Justice

High Procedural Justice

Figure 1. Interactive effect of political skill and procedural justice onsupervisor-rated performance.

3.80

3.90

4.00

4.10

4.20

4.30

4.40

4.50

4.60

hgiHwoL

Political Skill

Perf

orm

ance

Low Distributive Justice

High Distributive Justice

Figure 2. Interactive effect of political skill and distributive justice onsupervisor-rated performance.

1433POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE

The positive slope for the low justice conditions was found inboth Figure 1 and Figure 2. The finding that political skill has apositive effect on supervisor ratings of performance under condi-tions of low justice suggests that when the environment is vague oruncertain (e.g., low justice), political skill can overcome it. Indi-viduals high in political skill likely thrive in this type of environ-ment, as they have the ability to understand others and effectivelyuse influence that enables them to get the job done. Further,political skill may be helpful in finding a way to make others seeyou as a good performer on multiple levels, including both taskperformance and OCB. In this same unjust environment, thosewho lack political skill were rated lowest in performance. This islikely due to the lack of policies guiding performance appraisals,which allowed managers to factor nonperformance aspects (i.e.,political skill ability) into their ratings. Apparently, an absence ofpolitical skill is only harmful when there is an absence of justice aswell.

The negative slope for the high justice conditions was found forboth Figure 1 and Figure 2. This implies that the behaviors of thosewith high political skill may be constrained by the rules andpolicies in place, thereby limiting their effectiveness. It is alsopossible that the supervisors have difficulty rating subordinates’task performance, as the subordinates’ political skill is cloudingthe supervisors’ ability to make accurate ratings. Thus, they maybe overcorrecting in a sense by providing lower ratings. Finally,we examined the interactive effects of procedural and distributivejustice with political skill on the outcome of OCB (Hypothesis 2).We found support only for distributive justice. This finding issomewhat similar to the distributive justice finding for perfor-mance in that the highest ratings of OCB were under conditions of

high distributive justice, regardless of the level of political skill.However, political skill was again positively related to OCB underconditions of low distributive justice. This suggests that politicallyskilled individuals can (indirectly) affect the distribution of re-wards. Although by definition OCB is not explicitly rewarded, it isassumed that political skill will pay off and in some way benefitthose who are politically skilled.

Implications for Practice

The findings of the present study have a number of implicationsfor practice. First, managers may wish to seek candidates whopossess some level of political skill, as these individuals may bemore likely to perform OCB and are able to effectively adapt toany work environment. Second, it should be noted that underconditions of high distributive justice, OCB ratings were strongregardless of the level of political skill. This underscores theimportance of creating a fair reward system, as the performance ofOCB by everyone (regardless of their level of political skill) is inthe best interest of the organization. Finally, managers and em-ployees should be aware of the potential problems of staffingindividuals who are low in political skill in situations where justiceis low; low levels of political skill are not necessarily a problem,but when combined with low justice, negative outcomes are likelyto result.

Strengths

There are several strengths in this study that warrant mention-ing. First, the data collected were dyadic in nature, with thesubordinates providing the data for the independent variables andtheir immediate supervisors providing the data for the dependentvariables. Such a design provides some confidence that the resultsare not due to common method variance. Second, we offer a strongtest of the hypotheses by including multiple control variables toeliminate plausible alternative explanations for our results, as wellas using an analysis technique that controlled for a supervisorrating effect in our data. Third, we offer a constructive replication(Lykken, 1968) of our interactive results by testing two differentdependent variables.

Limitations and Future Research

In addition to the above strengths, there are limitations that mustbe acknowledged when interpreting our findings. One potentialweakness is that our respondents worked in a state governmentalagency. Empirical evidence suggests that there are differencesbetween employees in the public and private sectors (Utgoff,1983). Thus, it is unclear whether the results from the current studyare generalizable to the private sector. Future research examiningthese relationships in the private sector is needed to address thisissue. Another possible limitation in our study was the weak orinsignificant relationship found between justice and our outcomes.Although three of the four justice–consequence associations weresignificant when entered in Step 1, the significance levels droppedwhen included in the full model, and in general they are not asstrong as meta-analytic results have reported (Cohen-Charash &Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). One potential explanation forthis difference may be found in how we measured justice. In

3.40

3.50

3.60

3.70

3.80

3.90

4.00

4.10

4.20

hgiHwoL

Political Skill

OC

B

Low Distributive Justice

High Distributive Justice

Figure 3. Interactive effect of political skill and distributive justice onsupervisor-rated organizational citizenship behavior (OCB).

1434 ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS

particular, our procedural justice measure from Parker et al. (1997)appears to focus most heavily on the voice or decision controlcomponent of procedural justice. Perhaps if we had used a moregeneral measure of procedural justice our results would align moreclosely with extant research.

Finally, the data were collected at one point in time, eliminatingthe possibility of exploring causality. We hope future researcherswill examine potential alternative representations of the variablesin our study with longitudinal data, objective performance mea-sures, and other relevant variables to help determine if there areother complexities that we did not investigate and if recursiverelationships exist between our constructs. One such complexitycould be that individuals infer justice from the relationship be-tween political skill and performance. For example, if the highlypolitically skilled receive higher performance evaluations thantheir less politically skilled counterparts, individuals may concludethat procedural and distributive justice are low. Similarly, if indi-viduals lower in political skill receive higher performance ratingsthan those who are high in political skill, employees may concludethat justice is high. Unfortunately, we are unable to test this idea,but we hope future research efforts will design studies that bettertest these causality and alternative model predictions.

Another avenue for additional research is one that explores otherpotential contextual and situational variables that may alter polit-ical skill–outcome relationships. For example, the political skill–performance and OCB relationships could be examined undervarying conditions of uncertainty, such that political skill mightprove more beneficial under conditions of uncertainty and lessbeneficial under conditions of certainty. Additional potential mod-erators include formalization, centralization, and leader–memberexchange relationships.

Conclusion

Overall, this study contributes to the political skill literature bydemonstrating its differential effects in strong versus weak situa-tions. Specifically, these results draw attention to the importanceof political skill in low justice environments for successful taskperformance and OCB. This study makes an additional contribu-tion by providing empirical evidence of the relationship betweenpolitical skill and OCB. Further, these results highlight the condi-tions under which a lack of political skill can be detrimental toone’s task performance and OCB ratings. As the political skillstream of research continues to expand, it is important to continueto identify situations in which political skill enhances performanceand a lack of political skill may harm performance.

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Appendix

Table A1Results Comparing Interactions Entered Separately and Simultaneously

Dependent variables: Final step

Performance OCB

DJ PJ DJ and PJ DJ PJ DJ and PJ

Control variablesTenure with supervisor .02 .02 .02 .05� .05� .05�

Job tenure �.01 �.01 �.01 �.02 �.02 �.02Organizational tenure .02� .02� .02�� .00 .01 .00Age .00 .00 .00 �.00 �.00 �.00Hours worked per week .09 .10 .09 .06 .07 .06

Independent variablePolitical skill .00 .04 .04 .18 .20� .18

ModeratorsDistributive justice .10� .09 .09 .07 .05 .06Procedural justice .03 .05 .04 .10 .11 .11

InteractionsPolitical Skill � Distributive Justice �.19� �.09 �.17� �.15Political Skill � Procedural Justice �.40�� �.36� �.14 �.07

Note. N � 175. OCB � organizational citizenship behavior; DJ � distributive justice; PJ � procedural justice.� p � .05. �� p � .01.

Received September 5, 2008Revision received June 12, 2009

Accepted June 24, 2009 �

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1437POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE