Global shifts caused by the rise of anchor countries - De Gruyter

Abstract: Recently a group of large developing countries started to emerge as important driversof regional, and in some cases even global, change. “Anchor countries” are the largest economiesof their respective home regions. Their rise implies a power shift in different spheres of economyand politics and brings about new patterns in the organization of global space. We analyse this shiftwith regard to the global economic order and to global security policy. Furthermore, we explorehow the enhanced economic and military relevance of anchor countries is reflected in global go-vernance institutions.

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie Jg. 52 (2008) Heft 1, S. 4-19

Anchor countries – a new concept to capture the regional and global role of“emerging economies”

During the last centuries, global economic andpolitical power has been concentrated in theWest. Industrialization and trade enabled Euro-pean nations to accumulate capital in an un-precedented way and constitute themselves astruly global hegemonic powers. Subsequently,the rise of the United States of America chal-lenged European supremacy and the US estab-lished themselves as the largest and most inno-vative economy and new political as well asmilitary hegemon. The world economic andpolitical order became dominated by thetransatlantic West. Only after the SecondWorld War, Japan emerged as a third drivingforce of the world economy. During most ofthe post-war period, global economic powerwas thus heavily concentrated in the Triad re-gion consisting of North America, Europe andJapan (OHMAE 1985). Almost all multinationalcorporations were based in the Triad, and al-most the totality of technological innovationsemerged here. The G7 (now G8, after the in-clusion of Russia) was the largely undisputedclub of the economically powerful nations. Af-ter the Second World War the Soviet Union al-so emerged as a military contender of the US,but the inefficiency of its economic system andcollapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s halt-

ed its economic ascendance. Following thebreak-up of the Soviet Union, the USAemerged as the only superpower in global gov-ernance, especially due to its military suprema-cy, whereas economic power remained concen-trated in the Triad.

Patterns of global economic geography strong-ly reflected this structure. Global maps of pro-duction, distribution of knowledge assets (e.g.global top universities, patents, leading multi-nationals), trade and finance flows, labour pro-ductivity, per capita income, energy consump-tion and many other topics related to economicdevelopment all revealed similar patterns ofTriad dominance. Concentration of economicpower was mirrored in political influence, e.g.representation in key institutions of global go-vernance, such as the Bretton Woods institu-tions and the UN Security Council.

This situation is now changing fundamentally.A new group of countries from the “South” isemerging, with huge implications for the globaleconomy and international politics. Using theterminology proposed by STAMM (2004) we callthem “anchor countries”. Anchor countriescomprise the largest economies of each of thedeveloping regions as defined by the WorldBank plus those secondary economies that ac-count for at least 20 % of the remaining re-gional GDP – or, to put it more simply, the

Tilman Altenburg/Julia Leininger, Bonn

Global shifts caused by the rise of anchor countries

T. Altenburg/J. Leininger: Global shifts caused by the rise of anchor countries 5

largest economies of the non-Triad regions. 15countries are classified as anchor countries: Ar-gentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia,Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.1

Emerging economies from the “South” arecommonly termed “threshold countries”(Schwellenländer) or “Newly IndustrializingCountries”. None of these terms however is ap-propriate to capture the increasing role of thesecountries with regard to global economic andpolitical power shifts that the anchor countryconcept describes. With regard to “thresholdcountries”, STAMM (2004) rightly points outthat the group of countries which are “at thethreshold” to achieve a typical OECD profilewith regard to human development, economiccompetitiveness, governance and environmen-tal performance barely overlaps with the an-chor country group. In fact, five out of 15 an-chor countries are classified as lower-middle-income (Egypt, Indonesia, China, Thailand andIran) and three even as low-income countries(Nigeria, Pakistan and India). Their high ag-gregate GDP is only due to their huge popula-

tion size. If we take the Human DevelopmentIndex as a more comprehensive measure of de-velopment, only four of the 15 anchor coun-tries rank among the first 70 countries. Ac-cording to Stamm’s definition, only two anchorcountries – Brazil and Mexico – can also beconsidered to be “at the development thresh-old” (see Fig. 1). The other fairly advancedcountries tend to be relatively small, with littleweight in the regional or world economy.

The anchor country concept highlights eco-nomic weight in regional and global terms, re-gardless of the countries’ level of development.The anchor countries’ relative size in the re-gional economy tends to generate strong eco-nomic and political spillovers into the respec-tive regions and also goes along with a signifi-cant regional – sometimes also global –political role.2 The anchor country conceptthus emphasizes the fact that a number of de-veloping countries are becoming strong re-gional drivers and in some cases even gain sig-nificant influence on global affairs. We assumethat this gain of influence is causing a globalpower shift.

Fig. 1: Anchor and threshold countries

Source: own draft

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The current global power shift is unprecedent-ed in history. Although the history of econom-ic development has seen many cases of growthand decline (e.g. LANDES 1998) the recent riseof a group of new powers from the developingworld is unique due to a combination of twofactors: Extraordinarily high economic growth(particularly in China and recently also in In-dia) and enormous size in population and geo-graphic terms. In 2007, China and India aloneaccounted for 37.1 % of the global population(Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung 2007).Hence we are witnessing a marked increase ofper capita GDP income of several billion peo-ple and, as a result, much increased consump-tion, higher education, new consumption pat-terns, increasing carbon emissions. The effectson the rest of the world are much larger thanthose of previous catch-up processes, e.g.those of Ireland or South Korea. Analyticallywe may distinguish three characteristics thatset anchor countries apart from smaller devel-oping countries (see Fig. 2):

1. Significant country size effects. Anchorcountries are defined by the size of theireconomies relative to their respective worldregion – an indicator which strongly corre-lates with large populations and territories.As a consequence, internal developments inthese large countries contribute significantlyto the ability or inability to solve regionaland global problems. Whether the worldwill, for example, be able to achieve theMillennium Development Goals, e.g. tohalve poverty by the year 2015, strongly de-pends on developments within the anchorcountries. In 2007, China and India aloneaccounted for 47.2 % of the global poor,and the 15 anchor countries together for64.4 % (own calculation based on UNDP2007). China shifted 77 million inhabitantsout of poverty between 2003 and 2007(ibid.), thereby making a strong contributionto global poverty reduction – in contrast toAfrica and Latin America which are, on thewhole, not on track to achieve their povertyreduction targets (United Nations 2006).Likewise, successful biodiversity protectiondepends to a large extent on the nationalpolicies adopted in ecologically highly di-verse and species-rich anchor countries likeBrazil and Indonesia.

2. Considerable spillover effects beyond thecountries’ boundaries. Any action that is ta-

ken in a given country somehow effectsother countries. If countries increase theirgreenhouse gas emissions they contribute toglobal warming; if they succeed in fightinginfectious diseases within their boundaries,they automatically reduce the risks for othercountries; if they invest in military expendi-ture, other countries may feel the need to ad-apt their own expenditure to counterbalancethe increase of their neighbour’s materialpower basis. Spillovers from anchor coun-tries – both positive and negative – tend tobe much larger than those emanating fromsmall countries. China in particular impactsstrongly on the rest of the world, e.g. via itssupply of cheap manufactures that benefitconsumers worldwide and seriously threatencompetitors in other parts of the world; viaits demand for natural resources that drivesoil and other commodity prices up; via itsincreasing carbon emissions; and via its for-eign exchange reserves that are crucial to fi-nance the US trade deficit and keep theworld economy afloat. Likewise, the finan-cial crises that affect large parts of the deve-loping world started off from anchor coun-tries, in particular from Mexico in 1982 andagain 1994/95, and from Thailand and Indo-nesia in 1997.

3. Voice in global and/or regional governance.Given their increasing share in the globaleconomy and their stronger regional role,some of the most important anchor countrieshave all stepped up their foreign policy ef-forts and claim a stronger role in arenas andinstitutions of global governance. At theregional level, they are mostly the mostpowerful agenda-setters in the relevant insti-tutions. Brazil, Argentina and Mexico forexample occupy key roles in the Inter-American Development Bank, the formertwo also in the Organization of AmericanStates. Brazil in particular is an importantantagonist of the US with regard to the en-visaged Free Trade Area of the Americas,where differences between both countrieshave hampered the integration process(SCHIRM 2007, 7 ff.). Likewise, Nigeria is animportant factor in economic and politicalprocesses in Sub-Saharan Africa, e.g. in theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), the initiative New Partnershipfor Africa’s Development, and in peace-keeping missions. While most anchor coun-tries can mainly be considered as regional

leading powers, some claim more voice inglobal governance. In addition to Russia,which has already been accepted as a G8member, five other anchor countries - Chi-na, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa –can be considered to have a significant voicein global institutions. In 2007 these fivecountries were invited to the G8 summit inHeiligendamm as especially important part-ners for dialogue, although not (yet) formal-ly admitted to this “club”. The same coun-tries are actively involved in a number ofother global institutions. In addition, all ofthem have country size effects that affect notonly their own region but also global devel-opments (see Fig. 2). Of course, China andIndia stand out in this respect.

In the following we focus our analysis on thefive most influential anchor countries: Brazil,China, India, Mexico and South Africa.3 Anumber of global problems cannot be solvedwithout their political support (COOPER et al.2006). Tab. 1 provides a synopsis of the rele-vance of these anchor countries with regard tosome of the most important global problemsand shows how they contribute to, or in some

cases hamper, global policy-making and thework of global institutions that deal with theseproblems. We have opted here for an illustra-tive study of two policy fields where the mate-rial power base is clearly shifting towards an-chor countries, namely 1) the global economicorder and 2) global security policy. Further-more, we explore how the increased “materialrelevance” is mirrored in increasing claims topower and greater influence in key arenas andinstitutions of global governance.

The role of anchor countries as neweconomic powerhousesAnchor countries are among the most dynamiceconomies of the world. As they are in mostcases at quite low levels of economic develop-ment, economic reforms result in much higherrates of economic growth. Since 2003 China,India, Argentina, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia,and Turkey all grow at average rates higherthan 7 % per annum. Indonesia, Iran, Thailandand Saudi Arabia are slightly less dynamic, butstill grow at rates above 5 % (World Bank2007). According to projections, anchor coun-

Fig. 2: Characteristics of anchor countries

1 South Africa belongs to the group of anchor countries that do have a voice in global governance, whereas itscountry size does not have particularly important country size effects.

Source: own compilation



Tab. 1: Anchor countries (AC): their role in selected policy fields

Global policyfield

Climate & Environment

Energy

Trade

Finances

Security

AC´s material share of global problems

Global warming by CO2-

emissions:China, Russia and India ac-count for 27% of globalCO2-emissions;per capita consumption isbelow the level of industria-lized countries

Increasing energy insecuritydue to growing economies:Growing economies of G5consume one fifth (21.9 %)of electricity worldwide.

Integration of developingcountries in world trade sys-tem hampered due to dead-lock of international tradenegotiations:Brazil and India took lead-ing role as speakers of thedeveloping countries whichchallenged industrializedcountries in the still unfin-ished “Doha Round” in2003.

Risk of crises of internation-al financial markets:China has largest stocks offoreign exchange worldwide(1.3 billion US$), in largeparts invested in US statebonds. India also accumu-lates high reserves.

Weapons of mass destruction(WMD):AC dispose of more than 50% of worldwide WMD;thereof five of nuclearbombs.

Global regimes and insti-tutions to regulate theseproblems

Climate regime of UnitedNations, especially UNFramework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCC)United Nations Environ-ment Programme (UNEP)

Inter alia International EnergyAgency (OECD);Organization of the Petro-leum Exporting Countries(OPEC)

World Trade Organization(WTO)

International MonetaryFund (IMF)G8

Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty of 1970 (NNPT)International Atomic En-ergy Agency (IAEA)

Examples of AC´s role in regimes and global institutions

AC – mainly Brazil, Chi-na & India as “speakers”of the “South”- ascribemain responsibility for cli-mate change to industrial-ized countries due to theirhigh per capita consump-tion and underline ACs’right to industrialize.

AC adopt more active foreign energy policiesand redefine policies infunction of their energyimport requirements. Bi-lateral arrangements pre-vail. Risk of geopoliticalconflicts arising fromcompetition for resources.

AC oppose the industrial-ized countries´ (IC) claimfor further liberalizationof imports of goods andservices from IC to thedeveloping world. In turn,developing countries de-mand that IC should opentheir market for agricul-tural and textile goodsfrom developing coun-tries.

China increasingly power-ful in international eco-nomics due to interdepen-dence with US market. International financial re-gulation through IMF islimited because Chinachallenges the IMF whichit does not consider repre-sentative due to outdatedquota system.

Partial non-compliance of AC such as India, Pakistan; maybe also Iran.


tries will continue to grow at above-averagerates, so that their share in global productionwill increase significantly, e.g. “India’s econo-my could be larger than Japan’s by 2032, andChina’s larger than the US by 2041.” (WILSON/PURUSHOTHAMAN 2003, 4). By 2050, none ofthe European economies would be among thesix largest economies of the world (ibid.).

Economic spillovers from increased trade andinvestment Given the relatively large size of theireconomies compared to their respective worldregions, economic development trends in an-chor countries impact significantly on theglobal economy, and on neighbouring coun-tries within their regions in particular. The re-cent extraordinary growth of some of thelargest economies – particularly China, Indiaand Russia, but to a lesser extent also Argenti-na, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand,Turkey, and others – has therefore muchstronger economic spillover effects than highgrowth episodes in smaller countries wouldhave. Again, China has by far the strongest im-pact, not only due to its country size andunique long-term hyper-growth, but also be-cause of its strong export orientation. China’seconomy accounted for only 2.9 % of globalGDP in 1978, increasing its share to 4.7 % in2004 and, according to projections, will ac-count for as much as 7.9 % by the year 2020.China’s exports grew from 50 billion US$ in1990 to more than 1,000 billion today (GU/HUMPHREY/ MESSNER 2008).

Economic spillovers from anchor countries re-sult from expansion on the demand and on thesupply side. On the demand side, spendingpower concentrates in anchor countries at adramatic pace. In a study on Brazil, Russia, In-dia and China (the BRIC), WILSON/ PU-RUSHOTHAMAN / FIOTAKIS (2004, 2 ff.) calcu-late that the number of middle class consumerswith an income over $3,000 should doublewithin three years in these economies. Withina decade over 800 million people will havecrossed this threshold, while in 20 years therecould be about 200 million people in theseeconomies with incomes above $15,000. Nev-er in history has such an increase been ob-served in terms of gross addition of numbers tothe ranks of the consuming class. This will re-sult in greatly increased demand, e.g. for con-sumer goods. China is projected to become theworld’s largest car market within 20 years, and

India will become the second largest 15 yearslater. Global companies therefore increasinglyreorient their strategies away from the (rela-tively) declining old industrialized countries tothose of the dynamic anchor countries. This isreflected in increasing trade with, and in-creased foreign direct investment (FDI) in an-chor countries, e.g. in 2005 213,5 billion US $,which are 22 % of the world total.

Demand also increases for energy and mineralresources. This is particularly relevant for re-source-rich developing countries. In fact, thestrong increase in imports – China’s energy de-mand is expected to double by 2015, and India’sto increase by 50 % (KAPLINSKY/ MESSNER2008) – has already driven up global commodi-ty prices, which in turn resulted in stronger eco-nomic growth in the developing world. BothAfrica and Latin America have, in the last fouryears, achieved significantly higher economicgrowth than ever since the 1970s. Natural re-source exporters have benefited the most.

On the supply side, consumers in the rest of theworld benefit from cheaper imports, e.g. oftextiles from China. Similarly, multinationalcorporations can source inputs at lower costs –e.g. IT-services from India – and thereby in-crease their competitiveness. At the same time,increasing exports from China and other low-cost large-scale producers greatly increasecompetition for established producers, both athome and in third markets. This is a seriouschallenge for industries that compete directlywith products from anchor countries, fromsmall-scale footwear producers in Honduras toelectronics manufacturers in Hungary and soft-ware developers in Germany.

Adding to these trade effects, companies fromanchor countries increasingly invest abroad.This is a rather new phenomenon. In 2005 the15 anchor countries had invested 373,5 billionUS$ abroad, compared to a modest 118.1 bil-lion in 1995. Russia, Brazil, China, SouthAfrica, Mexico and Argentina all had foreigndirect investments above 20 billion US$. In2007, according to Fortune Global 500, 40 ofthe 500 largest companies of the world werebased in China, India, Brazil and Mexico (http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/, 9.1.2008; http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/glob-al500/2007/countries/US.htm, 9.1.2008). In-vestments in oil and gas played an importantrole, but the sectoral composition of outward



FDI also reveals the growing competitivenessof multinational corporations from developingcountries in manufacturing and service indus-tries. For example, Brazil’s Embraer is todaythe world leader for regional jets; China’sJohnson Electric is the world’s largest produc-er of small electric motors; Bharat Forge fromIndia is the second biggest forging company;China International Marine Containers Groupaccounts for 50 % of the marine containermarket; Mexican Cemex is among the largestcement producers (Boston Consulting Group2006, 5).

The economic spillovers have a strongly dif-ferentiating impact on other countries, e.g. de-pending on whether the latter are mainly com-petitors or suppliers of complementary goods.In addition, they enhance structural changewithin other countries. European producers forexample are increasingly forced to abandonknowledge-extensive consumer goods andshift towards more innovative products thatcannot yet be supplied by anchor countries.Developing countries have an incentive to shiftfrom manufacturing, where competition be-comes more fierce, to export production of rawmaterials. The geographic implications of suchshifts within and between countries are un-precedented in recent history and not yet wellresearched.

Industrial upgrading and its challenges forOECD countries From the perspective of the early industrializ-ers of the Triad, the rise of anchor countriescreates a strong challenge to step up their ef-forts in science, technology and innovation.Some of the anchor countries, particularlyBrazil and China, have made some progress inshifting from standardized manufacturing andoutsourced low-cost activities to buildingknowledge-based competitive advantages (AL-TENBURG/ SCHMITZ/ STAMM 2008). This is par-ticularly true for China, which increased itsshare of high-technology exports in total ex-ports from 7.9 to 29.9 % between 1996 and2005 (OECD 2007,14). China is now spending1.3 % of its GDP on research and develop-ment (R&D), having doubled this percentagein less than 10 years. In absolute terms, Chinais already one of the biggest spenders of R&Dworldwide, and spending increases muchfaster than in the EU (ibid. 23). The number ofresearchers is at the same level as that of theEU 25 and second only to that of the United

States (HUANG/SOETE 2007, 9). Also in India,350,000 engineering graduates are released tothe labour market each year (BOUND 2007, 9).In response to this, Western multinational cor-porations increasingly shift knowledge-basedoperations to China and India, where they es-tablished about 750, respectively 100, R&Dcentres within a few years (UNCTAD 2005).At the same time, companies from anchorcountries are increasingly going global, inmany cases acquiring Western companies withtheir technological expertise and patent rights,and establishing their own global brands,thereby challenging companies in the EU (Eu-ropean Commission 2004, 272).

Despite their rapid progress, thus far only fewanchor country firms or clusters of firms areseriously challenging knowledge-based com-petitive advantages of the old industrializednations. However, they do already create pres-sure to intensify innovation efforts in order toupgrade into high-technology fields that aresheltered from price-based competition fromthe emerging economies. Furthermore, multi-national corporations purchase more knowl-edge-based inputs from anchor countries,thereby developing new spatial patterns of val-ue chain organization.

The role of anchor countries as security playersIn a similar way, anchor countries are increas-ingly important players in international securi-ty politics. They have been increasing their ma-terial basis of military action since 1990; i.e.their military expenditure has been increasingin line with their economic growth (see Tab. 2).In some cases this material increase goes alongwith a more active political engagement in in-ternational security politics. Against this back-ground four global trends can be identified:

1. More than 50 % of existing weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) are located in an-chor countries, including nuclear arms. Byfurther increasing their stocks of WMD theyare contributing to further endanger worldpeace. This applies especially to anchorcountries of South Asia (India, Pakistan)and the Wider Middle East.

2. Small arms are a major global problem,which is also caused by anchor countries.

They are significant holders as well as pro-ducers of small arms on the global range, es-pecially in Latin America and Africa.

3. Anchor countries also help to maintainworld peace. On the one hand they have anexceptional share of contributions to UNpeacekeeping. It is remarkable that Indiaand Pakistan endanger a whole region bytheir nuclear arms race, while being thelargest personnel contributors to UN peace-keeping. On the other hand anchor countriesare engaged in regional security integration,e.g. South Africa and Nigeria contribute rel-evantly to the African security architecture,whereas Thailand and Indonesia are keyplayers in ASEAN´s security related inte-gration (HILPERT/WILL 2005, 18 f.; SHELTON2006, 134).

4. China stands out as a security player be-cause its exponential increase of military ex-penditure and its foreign policy change un-settle traditional structures of internationalsecurity policy.

Military ExpenditureAnchor countries’ relevance in global securitypolitics is reflected in their sizeable share of

global military spending, which amounts to16.8 %. Given the fact that the USA coversnearly half of the military expenditure world-wide (45.7 %), the 15 anchor countries spendone third of the remaining 54.3 % share ofglobal military expenditure, which is spent by191 states. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and In-dia are part of the ten, Brazil of the 15 largestmilitary spenders (SIPRI 2007, App. 8A).4Within the country group especially Iran andSaudi Arabia have increased their militarybudget substantially since 1990 (see Tab. 2), atthe same time the share of military spending oftheir respective national GDP decreased. SouthAfrica constitutes an exception because it re-duced its military spending during the periodof post-Apartheid (1994).

When it comes to military expenditure, Chinaagain trumps the other anchor countries. Al-though China has always been one of the ma-jor military powers in world politics, it recent-ly goes ahead by overtaking the former worldpower Russia, which has had the secondlargest military budget until 1998. The Asiandragon has more than doubled its militaryspending between 2000 and 2006. This in-crease of military financing is accompanied bya geopolitical reorganization of China’s

Tab. 2: Anchor countries – military expenditure (in Mio. $US)

1990 1995 2003 2006

China 13,200 15,000 36,600 49,500Russia *171,000 *21,700 *25,100 *34,700Saudi Arabia 18,112 13,090 18,944 29,032India 12,036 12,550 18,664 23,933Brazil *9,964 *11,882 11,979 *13,446Turkey 9,770 11,732 11,851 11,291Iran 1,873 2,351 7,013 9,849Indonesia *2,135 *2,613 3,319 *3,695Pakistan 3,054 3,435 4,138 4,572Mexico *1,972 2,901 3,336 3,136South Africa 5,209 3,320 3,338 3,610Egypt 2,359 2,171 2,816 2,710Thailand 2,484 3,240 2,077 2,045Argentine *1,832 2,273 1,748 *1,847Nigeria 432 389 784 724USA 457,648 357,382 440,813 528,692Global 1,136,000 855,000 1,016,000 1,158,000Global share 1 22.5 12.7 14.9 16.8

* = SIPRI estimate1 Decline of the anchor countries´ total share of global military spending has its origin in the strong decrease ofRussian military spending since 1990.Source: SIPIRI Data online: http://www.sipri.org, 13.12.2007



spheres of influence, particularly on the Asiancontinent. For one thing, China is financing adeep-water port at Gwadar in Pakistan andtries to cooperate with the Burmese militaryjunta to build another port on the Bay of Ben-gal (KAPLAN 2007). This military growth andreorganisation of geopolitics is widely per-ceived as a contradiction to China’s stated goalof a “peaceful rise” in global politics. Espe-cially the “only superpower” USA perceivesits role as military world leader challenged(LEGRO 2007, 515). But for the time being Chi-na is still far from reaching Washington’s para-mount position in worldwide military expendi-ture and capacities as China’s military budgetis still eleven times lower than that of the USA(SIPRI 2007). The current challenge lies in thecombination of China’s exponentially increas-ing material potential and its recent willing-ness to take a more active role in global gover-nance on the one hand, and the internationallyperceived uncertainty of political intentions inChinese foreign policy making on the otherhand (LEGRO 2007).

Weapons of mass destruction and small armsMore than half of the anchor countries disposeof biological, chemical or nuclear weapons,which means between 26,7 % (ballistic mis-siles) and 66,7 % (biological weapons) of allstates in possession of WMD (ibid.).

In the group of anchor countries South Asianand the Middle Eastern states stand out withregard to WMD, especially nuclear weapons(see Tab. 3). China and Russia possess nuclearweapons as declared by the Nuclear Non-Pro-liferation Treaty (NNPT) of 1970 (both belongto the five “nuclear weapons states” as de-clared by this treaty). Two others, India andPakistan, are nuclear powers without beingmembers of the NNPT regime (Israel counts asanother nuclear weapon state, not engaged inthe NNPT regime). After 1998, when Indiaconducted first nuclear tests, it has been con-tinuously increasing its arsenal of WMD, in-cluding nuclear weapons (MÜLLER/RAUCH2007). India defends this nuclear strategy byreferring to its neighbouring nuclear powers,China and especially Pakistan. The latter al-ready has gone to war with India three timesover the question of the border region Kashmir(1947-49; 1965; 1971). This continuing hostil-ity has lead to a nuclear arms race between In-dia and Pakistan. Since both countries did notagree to subordinate their armament to the

NNPT, Indo-Pakistani relations endanger thewhole region and hinder international nuclearcontrol. Uncritical US support to both coun-tries aggravates this situation. Moreover, Pak-istan has widely delivered technologicalknowledge on the construction of nuclearweapons to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Sincecontrols are lacking, it cannot be excluded, thatterrorists get access to knowledge and materialfor constructing nuclear bombs (BUNN/WIER2000). In respect of India’s other traditional re-gional rival China, it has explicitly let off itsrhetoric that China constitutes a major threat toIndia’s security. Although Indian-Sino (trade)relations are improving since Chinese presi-dent Hu Jintao visited Delhi in November2006 – the first visit of a head of state in onedecade – there are still major discrepancies be-tween both nations. China disapproves India’sconstant military modernization, e.g. Indialaunched a major naval build-up in recentyears, also acquiring key naval platforms fromRussia, an ally of China. Furthermore, bothcountries are the first and second largest im-porters of conventional weapons from 2002-2006; China with 13 % of world imports, fol-lowed by India (9.5 %). 5

Anchor countries of the fragile Wider MiddleEast stand out because of their above-averagestock of WMD: Egypt, Iran, Turkey and SaudiArabia have gained the ability to make use ofWMD (Tab. 3).6 One of these countries differsfrom this group due to its global role in nuclearpolitics: Iran has long been suspected to main-tain a nuclear research program in order to de-velop an atomic bomb (North Korea is alsosuspected to develop nuclear weapons). Al-though this suspicion was disproved in De-cember 2007, Iran´s credibility in internationalpolitics is still at stake. Iran is more and moreturning out as a power capable to polarizeworld politics due to its ideological conflictwith the USA, whereas Russia is one of itssupporters. In short, Iran’s capability to influ-ence global power constellations is extraordi-narily high (VAKAL 2005).

Compared to Asia and the Middle East, WMDare no particular issue in Sub-Sahara Africa.Actually, South Africa makes now use of itsnon-permanent seat in the UN-Security Coun-cil (2007-2008) to promote non-proliferationby stressing the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba; STOTT2007, 1). Notwithstanding this exemplary ini-

tiative for disarmament, South Africa remainsone of the largest exporters of small firearms,supporting some of the most lasting conflictssuch as Colombia, Israel, and Pakistan(COULD/LAM 2004, 144).

Since Argentina and Brazil had abandonedtheir plans to further develop their nuclear re-search programs in the 1990s, neither nuclearweapons, nor other WMD imply major securi-ty issues in Latin America. But this fact shouldnot belie the problem of small firearms: Brazil,Mexico and Argentina have a considerableshare in proliferation of small firearms due totheir high demand of these weapons. ExceptEgypt, Indonesia, Nigeria and Russia all otheranchor countries also can be found in the groupof 30 largest holdings of small arms (SmallArms Survey 2007, 47).

Engagement in UN peacekeeping Military resources may not only be used to en-danger, but also to protect world peace by con-tributing to UN peacekeeping missions. In linewith their increasing role in global politics, an-chor countries greatly augmented their contri-bution to UN peacekeeping missions, allocat-ing 34.5 % of the whole personnel in 2007(Tab. 3). South Asia stands out when it comesto support UN peacekeeping. Pakistan, Bang-ladesh and India are the three largest personnelcontributors to UN peacekeeping missions.Whereas these countries “traditionally” con-tribute, Indonesia has only recently intensifiedits global engagement for peacekeeping. WhileIndia’s and Pakistan’s personnel contributionsare commensurate with the growth rates oftheir respective military expenditure over time,Indonesia excels: The increase of personnelcontribution exceeded by far the growth of its

Tab. 3: Anchor countries’ personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping (PKO)* and nuclearweapons

UN peacekeeping Nuclear weapons 2Country Total 2002 1 Total 2007 1

Pakistan 4,763 10,629 Did not sign NNPT3

India 3,013 9,352 Did not sign NNPTNigeria 3,411 2,486 —China 139 1,811 Signed NNPT and

official nuclear weapon state2

Brazil 101 1,280 —South Africa 157 1,210 —Indonesia 51 1,075 —Egypt 175 984 —Turkey 176 944 —Argentina 653 897 —Russia 374 291 Signed NNPT and is official

nuclear weapon stateThailand 434 59 —Iran - 3 Signed NNPT, but maintains re--

search program on nuclear weaponsTotal 13,447 28,780Grand Total1 in PKO 44,359 83,445Global share in % 30,3 34,5

* Personnel contributions are taken apart from financial contributions. In the latter case, China is the only anchorcountry, which is part of the ten top providers (it is ranked on position seven).1 ‘Total’ includes all personnel contributions, that is police, military observers and troops; ‘Grand total’ refers to thesum of all personnel contributions (91 UN members in 2002 and respectively 114 in 2007).2 Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa have abstained from further developing nuclear weapons in the 1990ies.3 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970 (NNPT) divides its members into nuclear powers (in total fivecountries: USA, Russia, France, China, Great Britain) and non-nuclear powers. The latter are allowed to maintainnuclear resources, but for civilian use only.Source: own compilation of UN peacekeeping (www.un.org/Depts/dpko, 13.12.2007) and NEUNECK 2007



military expenditure. While military spendingincreased by the factor 1.6 to 1,075 mio. $US(2000-2006), personnel contributions grew bythe factor of 20 in the same period.7

Also the Chinese personnel contribution grew13 times to 1,811mio. $US. In Africa, Nigeriastands out as the ninth largest personnel con-tributor to UN peacekeeping, even surpassingFrance as the traditional European nation sup-porting UN peacekeeping. Nigeria also sup-ports sub-regional multilateral efforts to keeppeace in West Africa, e.g. the ECOWASCease-fire Monitoring Group in Liberia (1990-1999) and Sierra Leone (1997-2000)(ENGEL2007, 15). Anchor countries of the Wider Mid-dle East and the Maghreb underperform withregard to their contribution to multilateral en-gagement in UN peacekeeping missions. Iranand Saudi Arabia almost completely abstainfrom personnel contributions to UN peace-keeping; Egypt and Turkey have emphasizedtheir responsibility with regard to multilateralengagement for world peace by quintuplingtheir personnel contributions.

Anchor countries – a challenge forglobal governanceAnchor countries are steadily and in some cas-es even exponentially increasing their materialpower resources – a fact proven in the analysisof their economies and security policiesbeforehand. In theory such significant increas-es of economic and military resources of nation

states are accompanied by a behaviouralchange in international relations. An assump-tion that also fits anchor countries (GU/MESS-NER/HUMPHREY 2007). Anchor countries moreand more aim at recognition of their increasingresources of power by taking more active rolesin global governance (WILSON/PURUSHOTHAMAN 2003; HARRIS 2005). Consequentially,they are building new coalitions with otherstates in order to increase their bargaining pow-er within or beyond established internationalinstitutions. Thus, anchor countries challengeinstitutions of global governance. In turn, thisinfluence mostly entails the need to reform in-ternational institutions and sometimes fostersthe creation of new ones. Moreover, it maycause a decline of international institution’s rel-evance in global politics (Fig. 3). In the follow-ing, attention will be exemplarily drawn to re-cent developments of new coalitions betweenand initiated by anchor countries as well astheir impact on international institutions inglobal economic and security governance.

Shifts of economic spaces: New coalitions,global and regional institutionsGlobal economic and financial governance hasso far been dominated by a northern “club ofthe few”, G7, respectively G8, the internation-al financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) andWTO.8 In the 1970s G6 was established to fa-cilitate dialogue on economic cooperation. Atthat time first six, than seven states were con-sidered to be the major global economic play-ers – Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain,Italy, Japan, and USA. In the 1990s it evolved


Fig. 3: New coalitions of power and their effect on global governance institutions

to G8, being enlarged by Russia. Since its timeof creation G7 has evolved effectively to a cru-cial forum for international agenda-setting anddecision-making on global economic and late-ly also on more general issues (GSTÖHL 2007,32 ff.; LESAGE 2007, 113; on the history of cre-ation of G7/8 see GSTÖHL 2007). But duringthe last years critics have claimed that G8 lacksto represent emerging economic powers anddeveloping countries. Against this backgrounda renovation of North-South relations turnedup: First, in 1999 G8 reacted to the financialcrisis in Asia, Russia and Brazil by invitingtwelve Southern and Northern nations of sys-temic importance for the financial system tobuild G20 (finance). Nine out of ten Southernstates of G20 (finance) are anchor countries. Inshort, G20 (finance) came into being as an in-formal forum to promote dialogue on financialissues between South and North. Secondly,economically emerging anchor countries alsoquestion G8´s legitimacy. Although convincedof their legitimacy to decide upon issues ofglobal interest, G8 members somehow givepartial reason to its critics. In 2005 it started torecognize the increasing economic power offive non-G8 members, namely the G5 (Brazil,China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) – for-merly known as O5 = Outreach 5, taking theenlargement-perspective of the G8. – by invit-ing them to the annual G8 meetings on an in-formal basis. Some members, e.g. GreatBritain, went even further and suggested thatG8 should be enlarged to G13 (LESAGE 2007,114). In 2007 Germany’s G8 presidency fo-cused on improving the cooperation with an-chor countries. As a result G8 and G5 estab-lished the “Heiligendamm process” in order toembark on results-oriented dialogue on fourglobal issues: innovation, investment, develop-ment in Africa, science and technology (GNATH2007, 38). In autumn 2007 the “Heiligendammprocess” was institutionalized at headquartersof the Organisation of Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD).

Emerging economies have not only led to achange of North-South relations, but also to arenovation of South-South constellations. In Au-gust 2003 another G209 was formed in order tocreate a block of developing countries in inter-national trade negotiations of the Doha Round inCancún, Mexico (see Tab. 1). Then, developingcountries would not accept a draft proposal ofthe EU and USA, which claimed lower tariffs onindustrial imports into developing countries,

while tariffs on agricultural imports from devel-oping countries should be maintained. This pro-posal catalyzed interests of diverging states suchas China, Guatemala and Pakistan. Hence,Brazil initiated G20 and jointly with India, Chi-na (“the Big Three”) and South Africa has takena leading role to hold this group together. Al-though positions of singular states diversifiedsince then, the two opposing blocks persist.

Informal block building in economic areas in-creased the anchor countries’ claim for astronger role in global economic governancefurther and challenges global governance insti-tutions. First of all some anchor countries arecalling for reform of international institutions.For instance, the International MonetaryFund’s (IMF) role as a central rule-makingglobal financial governance institution hasbeen declining due to its quota system of 1946.Various initiatives already have been undertak-en in order to reform the quota system. IMFquotas influence votes and, thus, the organiza-tional structure of the institution. Europeanstates and the USA are still overrepresented inthe IMF executive board and have a factual ve-to power. Anchor countries, especially Chinaand India, claim an adaptation of the quota sys-tem to the current global financial reality. Sinceonly slight reforms have taken place, most eco-nomically powerful anchor countries reject theIMF´s role as a forum for global financial gov-ernance. The World Bank constitutes anotherexample of a declining international institution,e.g. China outruns the World Bank with regardto the extension of loans to African states and,thus, undermines the World Bank’s influence asa global economic governance institution.

New South-South coalitions and networksemerge in global economic governance. First,African-Asian ties have been formalized andstrengthened through the China-Africa Summitof December 2006 and the New Africa-AsiaStrategic Partnership (NAASP). Whereas theformer was a high level meeting of Africanheads of state with Chinese officials in Pekingin order to guarantee Chinese financial supportto African states (5 billion $US in 2007), thelatter is of normative nature. Inspired by theBandung Conference, NAASP aims at a moreprosperous and peaceful world. It serves as aforum for Asian and African developing coun-tries, whereas Indonesia takes a leading role.NAASP also implements economic projects inits participating countries.


Second, the current example par excellence foran emerging re-configuration of South-Southrelations in global governance is the inter-re-gional IBSA Forum Dialogue, which was creat-ed in 2003 by India, Brazil and South Africa (fora detailed analysis see CHEVALIER/ DRACHEN-FELS/STAMM 2008): “[It can] be characterizedas both a strategic alliance for the pursuit ofcommon interests of developing countries inglobal institutions but also as a platform for bi-,trilateral and interregional South-South cooper-ation.” (FLEMES 2007, 6). That is, IBSA mainlyfunctions as a forum for political coordinationamongst India, Brazil, and South Africa, aimingat coalition-building in “the South” in order tocreate common positions on global issues, par-ticularly on trade, energy security and transportas well as to strengthen cooperation betweenthese countries. In many ways this acclaimedcoalition signifies a formalization of existing bi-and trilateral relations in trade and finance be-tween India, Brazil, and South Africa. However,an effective strategic partnership is still missing(JOHN DE SOUSA 2007, 7).

Shifts of security spaces: New coalitions, global and regional institutionsIn global security policy one of the mostprominent examples with regard to adapting aninternational institution to de facto power sta-tus of anchor countries is the UN SecurityCouncil. In 2005 five anchor countries –Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria and South Africa– actively promoted the reform of the SecurityCouncil and claimed a permanent seat in thiscentral and exclusive UN organ, which still re-flects “rusty” power structures from the end ofWorld War II (HELLMANN/ROOS 2007). Indiaand Brazil along with Germany and Japan rep-resented the G4, which lobbied for UN Securi-ty Council enlargement. All anchor countrieswhich aimed at a permanent seat failed due tomissing regional support. No world regioncould agree on one or two “regional powers”,which would represent regional matters in theUN Security Council: India’s and Japan’s posi-tions were opposed by China, which feared itsregional power status at stake. Germany wasobjected by another European state, namelyItaly. Brazil met a very strong opposition oftwo other anchor countries, Argentina andMexico. Insurmountable obstacles also ap-peared, when it came to name one or twoAfrican countries. All African anchor coun-tries, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa claimeda permanent seat and would not – as G4 –

agree on other models of representation, e.g.rotating, regional permanent seats (for anoverview on the reform process see MALONE2007). In short, UN members could not agreeon reforming the UN Security Council in 2005.Although, the whole process also has a posi-tive implication: UN Security Council reformbrought the issue of power shifts in interna-tional relations openly onto the agenda ofglobal politics, which initiated a public debateon these shifts. This matter of fact is under-lined by the anchor country’s attempts to fostertheir global role through coalition building inmultilateral groups. For instance, Brazil’s, In-dia’s and South Africa’s ministers of defenceagreed on a security agenda within the scope oftheir IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2004.

On the regional level the creation of new struc-tures and institutions for security cooperationcan be observed. Against this background oneoutstanding example is the Shanghai Securitycooperation (SCO), which was the first inter-national organization initiated by China in2001 (GU 2007, 372). In 2003 member states(China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) signed a treaty toinstitutionalize SCO and thereby foster itsmain objectives, that is structuring geopoliticaland security interests in Central Asia. Sincethan this formal institutionalization wasbacked by military and political activities ofmembers states, e.g. military field exercises ofall member states in August 2003 or the cre-ation of the “SCO Regional AntiterrorismStructure” in Tashkent. One of the major im-pacts of SCO can be seen in its impact on Sino-Russian relations, which are given new groundand are qualitatively deepened (BAILES /DUNAY 2007, 2). Thus, up to now, SCO hin-dered confrontation of China and Russia intheir common space of influence Central Asia.SCO – just as any other regional cooperation –fulfils national interests of its members. Espe-cially China initiated SCO in order to achievenational interests: Firstly, due to its exponen-tial economic growth China is dependent onoil imports. Initiating SCO constituted oneChinese strategy to diversify its oil imports(GU 2007, 372). By winning Russia and Cen-tral Asian partners to cooperate on security is-sues, China intended to show its capacity to“…build an international bloc independent ofthe West and organized on non-Western princi-ples” (BAILES / DUNAY 2007, 13). Moreoverother states of the region have been attracted



by SCO. Hence, diverse states as Iran, India,Pakistan and Mongolia obtained observer sta-tus.

Whereas African and Asian anchor countriesare actively pushing integration of regional se-curity cooperation mechanisms, Latin Ameri-can anchor countries Brazil, Argentina andMexico focus on unilateral security initiativesdue to a prevailing North-South divide in theAmericas. Particularly, Brazil – to some extentalso Argentina – focus on conflict resolutionthrough mediation in South American conflicts,e.g. in the case of Paraguay and VenezuelaBrazil played an important role as a regionalmediator (SCHIRM 2007, 11). Moreover, as theattempts to reform the UN Security haveshown, Brazil is strongly oriented to the globalspace when it comes to security issues. On theglobal level Brazil refers to its leading regionalrole, although its claim for regional leadershipis opposed by Mexico and Argentina.

Outlook: Research challengesfor economic geography

The previous chapters have shown that the newglobal power shift changes the principles andprocesses of resource allocation worldwide, andthus also the resulting spatial patterns of societalorganization. Thus it creates a wide array ofquestions and challenges for economic geogra-phy. Long established mind maps and conceptsneed to be thrown overboard. Inherently geo-graphic concepts, such as North-South relations,or the Triad-concept, are losing analytical value.Centre-periphery relationships need to be rede-fined. The traditional pattern of global divisionof labour, where industrialized countries are ex-porting manufactured goods and bring in rawmaterials has already changed. Manufacturedconsumer goods now overwhelmingly comefrom Asia. More recently, even technology-in-tensive goods and services are being producedon the basis of proprietary technology in anchorcountries and exported to the old industrializedcountries – e.g. aircrafts from Brazil and soft-ware from India. More often, however, globalvalue chains under the coordination of Westernmultinationals combine competitive advantagesof OECD and anchor countries, thereby enhanc-ing global trade integration. Within such valuechains, corporations more and more often shiftR&D centres to China and India.

As patterns of value chain organization becomemore complex, new regional production net-works emerge, some of them at a large spatialscale. For example, an emerging pan-Asian pro-duction system combines advanced componentsand capital goods from Japan, Korea and Singa-pore with simple inputs coming from otherAsian economies; assembly takes place in Chi-na, but is more and more often supported by lo-cal R&D centres; and logistics services are lo-cated in Singapore or Hongkong (UNCTAD 2006,14). These new patterns challenge establishedWestern producers at all stages of the valuechain – not just the low-cost assembly opera-tions. Furthermore, geographic location in rela-tion to such production networks greatly influ-ences the development opportunities of coun-tries. The fact that Vietnam, for example, isamong the most rapidly growing economies ofthe world – despite anachronistic forms of eco-nomic governance by a communist party and aconsiderable percentage of state-owned enter-prises – can largely be attributed to itsfavourable location amidst the worlds mostthriving economic region. Yet so far few geog-raphers have studied the local, regional andglobal implications of these emerging networks.

In a similar way, political and military powerblocs and alliances are changing. New regionalpowers are challenging the USA as a the previ-ously undisputed hegemon. New South-Southalliances emerge and new global institutionsare challenging the industrialized countriesdominance in institutions of global governance.The analysis has also shown that economic, po-litical and military power shifts are interdepen-dent. For example, economic growth heightensthe importance of energy security, which in turndetermines the emerging countries’ foreignpolicies, military alliances, and their stancewith regard to global institutions.

These interdependencies and the resulting glob-al power shifts are increasingly attracting the at-tention of researchers from economic and polit-ical sciences. The rise of anchor countries how-ever also opens up an extensive new researchagenda for economic geographers. For example,further research is needed to explore the differ-ential impact of the economic and political riseof anchor countries, both in other developingand in industrialized countries. Likewise, geog-raphers may bring in new perspectives to ana-lyze the interconnectedness of different spatialscales, e.g. how local and national climate

change action correlates greenhouse gas emis-sions and the political stance of anchor coun-tries with regard to global climate governance.

Notes

1 Note that the concept of anchor countries is defineddynamically, and the composition of the group mayvary accordingly. At the time of writing Saudi Arabiastands on the classificatory threshold line between Up-per Middle Income Countries and High Income Coun-tries and may therefore graduate from the DAC list ofdeveloping countries. Algeria joined the group be-cause it passed the threshold value of 20 % of region-al GDP.

2 Whereas the concept of anchor countries has a struc-tural nature, other notions are functional in order tooperationalize specific phenomena as power hierar-chies in international relations (e.g. middle power,great power; COOPER 1997), regional leadership (e.g.regional power, NOLTE 2006), the potential influenceof regional powers on global politics (e.g. intermedi-ate state; HURRELL 2000) or conflict and cooperationin international relations (KUGLER 2006).

3 Our research focus is on newly emerging powers fromthe developing world. Russia is outside this researchfocus due to its longer history as a military and politi-cal superpower. The remaining “second level” anchorcountries are referred to wherever they are significantto the particular policy field which is analysed.

4 Counting military expenditure in Power PurchaseParity includes Iran, Pakistan and Turkey into to list ofthe 15 largest spenders.

5 The list of the 10 largest exporters of major conven-tional weapons is headed by the USA (30.2 %) andRussia (28.9 %) (Stockholm Peace Research Institute2007, 17).

6 Other states disposing of weapons of mass destructionare the five members of the UN Security Council, Is-rael, North Korea, Syria, South Korea, Libya, Albania(NEUNECK 2007, 129)

7 In total UN peacekeeping personnel (civilian policeofficers, military observers and troops) has nearly dou-bled in the same period of time, that is from 44,359(2000) to 83,445 (2006).

8 IMF, World Bank and WTO are international institu-tions with a wide range of members, but they havebeen dominated by industrialized countries of the“North”.

9 G20 (Cancún) of developing countries already sur-passes 20 members and therefore, is also called G20+.

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