CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism and insurgencies are increasingly identified

as a growing source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.

Most of the conflicts today are between peoples and races and

these mainly afflict the developing world. Furthermore,

insurgent movements are generally able to find external

sponsors. Insurgency has, therefore, again become part of

inter-state conflict, a form of indirect aggression made

attractive by the inability of states to use conventional

military power and weapons of mass destruction. The use of

violence in insurgency sets it apart from movements of

political protest like Gandhiji's in India, Khomeini's in

Iran, Solidarity in Poland and the civil rights movements in

the US. Insurgent movements use political resources and

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instruments of violence against the ruling authorities to

accomplish their goals. Political activities include such

things as propaganda, arranging protest demonstrations,

recruiting cadres, training and infiltrating agents into the

official establishment, seeking external support, raising and

managing finances, creating supportive groups--workers,

farmers, writers, youth associations and the like--and

devising and implementing strategies and plans.

Insurgency is primarily a political phenomenon. Unless

an insurgent movement directs all its efforts towards

maintaining close links with the people it can have little

chance of eventual victory. Insurgency is the war of the

whole people and as such demands that the closest attention

be paid to those matters which concern the people. Military

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considerations are secondary to political, social and

economic policies. In the end, confrontation may be on the

military level, but the insurgent's capacity to be adequately

equipped for that eventuality is a direct function of the

duration and intensity of the political effort. Power may

grow out of the barrel of a gun but one must first persuade

people to take up that gun, care for it, hump it around for

years in the most difficult terrain and then to stand firm

and use the weapon. The successes of Shivaji, Mao and Ho Chi

Minh clearly show that to achieve this needs much more than

mere military expertise.

Success in marshalling and utilising resources depends

on effective organisation which could be mobilisational as in

the case of these leaders. They used their insurgent elites

to actively involve large segments of the population on

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behalf of their cause. On the other hand, the Red Brigades in

Italy, the Red Army in Japan, and the Muslim Brotherhood in

Syria are examples of selective organisation where small

elite groups threaten to carry out violent acts. Some

selective groups gradually evolve into mobilisational

movements, hence these are two ends of a continuum, with many

cases falling between them. One of the shortcomings of

Nigeria’s security management is its pro-realist orientation

that accords the deployment of force preeminent position.

Thus, the strategy of choice among national security managers

is the use of force in various guises to subdue those

identified as threatening national security. But the

government’s supposed superior force has not rolled back the

menace of insecurity which creates the impression that the

government is not doing enough to secure the people. This

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mindset led to attribute Nigeria’s intractable security

challenges to government’s apathy towards exterminating the

terror group and inefficiency on the part of the security

agencies. The Boko Haram sect poses a security challenge that

is alien to Nigeria’s regular security problems. While the

use of force might have worked in the past, it has proved

inefficient in the case of Boko Haram. This is so for four

major reasons: one, the Boko Haram uses al-Qaeda-style terror

strategies, which combine suicide bombing, targeted

assassination and guerrilla strategies to unleash violence on

the polity; two, the sect has diffuse leadership system,

making it impossible to initiate dialogue; three, its

ideology is anchored on irrationality driven by utopian

anarchism; and lastly, it has shifting membership that is

patently faceless. The anarchist bent of the Boko Haram

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worldview is validated by its bomb attacks on Christian

worship centres as well Muslims considered as not practicing

orthodox Islam.

One issue on which Nigerians are in agreement is that

their nation is going through a period of unprecedented

security challenges. However, there is lack of consensus on

how to deal with the problems. Hence, the problems are

degenerating. This is a worrisome revelation as it readily

suggests that the nation is under siege and that the police

no longer have the capacity to deal with the rising

insecurity in the land. By the end of this write-up, the

following questions will be attempted and explained; what are

these security challenges? What are their impacts? What are

we doing about the problems and how should we be responding

to them? The major challenge of Nigeria’s national security

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is the containment of diverse manifestations of violence

spearheaded by various rogue groups. The major group in

contemporary Nigeria that has stretched the resources,

expertise, patience and even the competence of Nigeria’s

security apparatuses to the limit, both individually and

collectively, is the Boko Haram sect. The sheer number of

deaths arising from bomb attacks orchestrated by the Boko

Haram far outstrips any other cause of death in Nigeria,

including epidemics.

CHAPTER TWO

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ISSUES CHALLENGING NIGERIAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY

Internationally and domestically, the issue of national

security is constantly on the front burner. Irrespective of

the regime type that is in control of governmental powers

within states or the configuration of powers in the global

arena, the preoccupation with national security has not

diminished in importance since the emergence of state system.

Within nation-states, whether it is military authoritarian

regimes or civil democratic governments, considerations

surrounding national security sit at the apex of the

hierarchy of states’ national interest. At the core of these

considerations are the twin issues of regime survival and the

preservation of the territorial integrity of the state

system.

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Overtime, especially in the cold war era, the

preoccupation of states with national security defined within

the parametric confines of regime and state survival made its

pursuit an end by itself rather than a means to an end. The

effect was that states became fixated with developing the

necessary capacity to ensure the survival of the government

in power as well as preserve the state system from collapse

arising from both internal and external threats and sabotage.

National security in Nigeria is still conceived from the

prism of the realist paradigm. Thus, the strategy often

adopted by the Nigerian state to tackle insecurity consists

of, and is anchored on, the deployment of superior fire power

to contain what the state has identified as threats to it,

which often coincide with the interest of the ruling elite.

As a result of the realist orientation and mindset of

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Nigerian security thinking, the Nigerian government

perennially earmarks larger and larger portions of state

funds for security. In the 2012 federal budget, the Nigerian

government allotted 19.4 percent of the total budget to the

security sector.

This traditional realist mindset underpinned the

equation of national security with the absence of threats to

governmental authority or the presence of domestic capacity

to contain centrifugal forces within the polity. Thus, under

this paradigm, national security was conceptualized within

the parametric context of innate and acquired capacity of

governments to ensure the protection of their countries from

external attacks or internal subversion, as well as the

preparedness of the military to protect state territories. It

also was interpreted as diligence in matters of intelligence

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gathering and secrecy, and the protection of resources and

rights considered critical to the functioning of states.

The core essence of this conceptualization is that

national security is motorized by the possession of the

ensembles of warfare as well as the existence of military

formations to deploy them. The implication, therefore, is

that threats to national security are mainly external rather

than internal. Thus, the whole essence of the apparatuses of

force is to rebuff and defeat any form of threat to the

state. As such, the achievement of national security falls

under the exclusive domain of the military and paramilitary

formations across the state. The shortcoming associated with

this conceptualization is its seeming restrictive boundaries

and analytical inadequacy.

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The concept of national security has mutated from its

static preoccupation characterized by narrow, restrictive,

militaristic and strategic perspective to dynamic, broad-

based incorporation of ensembles of various factors. The

shift and expansion in the paradigmatic preoccupation of

national security from traditional realist orientation to

multilayered and broad perspective draws from deeper insights

generated from other schools of thoughts. The various inputs

from diverse intellectual traditions in the attempt to

elucidate and expand the traditional frontiers of national

security have imbued the concept with certain mystique. But

attempts by various scholars to add quality and dynamism to

the concept of national security are principally concerned

with the issues of whose security is paramount and how to

provide it.

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The expansion in the constituent elements that shape

national security has produced a paradigmatic shift in

contemporary definitional criteria of the concept.

CHAPTER THREE

FORMS OF INSURGENCY, WARFARE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

A form of warfare may be viewed as one variety of

organized violence emphasizing particular type of armed

forces, weapons, tactics and targets. Three forms of warfare

have been associated with insurgent conflicts.

a. Terrorism.

b. Guerrilla warfare.

c. Conventional warfare.

TERRORISM

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Although predating World War II, terrorism is very much

a feature of contemporary political conflict. Political

terrorism has been defined as the deliberate creation of a

state of terror which involves either the use of, or the

threat of use of, force in an attempt to influence groups or

individuals for political purposes. This excludes terrorism

for criminal purposes. However, modern developments in the

nature of political terrorism in some parts of the world have

blurred the boundaries between the strictly political and the

strictly criminal.

Terrorism involves several factors: it is indiscriminate

(though it may have specific targets, it is the nature of the

threat that is indiscriminate); its effects are out of

proportion to the physical results; it is unpredictable; and

it is arbitrary. It is marked by a sense of amorality; the

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terrorists operate outside the moral codes of society. The

means are viewed as being justified by the ends. It is the

ideal weapon of the small or weak groups; they are able to

extract the maximum amount of influence from the minimum

expenditure of force.

Terrorism and guerilla warfare are two different aspects

of violence. The guerilla recognises some of the conventions

of warfare, particularly those that differentiate between the

civilian and the armed combatant. Terrorism recognises no

such distinction although the boundary is not fixed. Many

terrorist groups have developed into guerilla bands while

many guerilla organisations have carried out acts which may

properly fall under terrorism.

POLITICAL TERRORISM

The main sub-groups of political terrorism are:

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(a) Revolutionary terrorism.

(b) State terrorism.

(c) International terrorism.

(d) Revolutionary Terrorism

In sum, therefore, though the general purpose of

terrorism has been to alter the behaviour and attitudes of

specific groups, this has not excluded the simultaneous

pursuit of one or more proximate objectives such as

extracting particular concessions (e.g. the payment of ransom

or the release of prisoners), gaining publicity, demoralising

the population through the creation of widespread disorder,

provoking governmental repression, enforcing obedience and

cooperation from those inside and outside the movement, and

enhancing the political stature of specific factions within

an insurgent movement.

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GUERILLA WARFARE

The upsurge in terrorism since the late 1970s

notwithstanding, the most familiar form of violence used by

insurgents has been guerilla warfare. In guerilla warfare the

primary targets are the government's "armed forces", police,

their support units, and, in some cases, key economic

targets. In terrorism, it is the unarmed civilians. As a

result, guerilla units are larger than terrorist cells and

tend to require proper logistical structure as well as base

camps. Their focus of activity is almost exclusively in the

rural areas.

The security challenges faced by the Nigeria will be

discussed briefly. They are;

Communal violence: (e.g. Jos crisis and the conflict

between farmers and herdsmen);

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Political Assassination: Odunayo Olagbaju in December

2001; Chief Bola Ige in 2001; Barrnabas Igwe and his

wife in 2002; Dr. Harry Marshal; a Senior Advocate of

Nigeria, Chief Ajibola Olanipekun; P.D.P. Vice Chairman

in the South-South, Aminosari Dikibo; Engineer Funso

Williams.

Electoral violence: 2003, 2007, and 2011. The violence

took place before and during elections except that of

2011 which was post-election. Adedidubu boys in Oyo

state; “Gbosa boys” in Kwara; Yan tauri and Yan banga in

Kano; Yan Kalari in Gombe; Sara Suka in Bauchi. All of

these youth gangs were formed and funded by politicians.

Youth militancy in the Niger Delta: Odi crisis of 1999

and “creek wars” since 2003 to the 2010 amnesty

programme. NDPVF, NDV, MEND etc.

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Oil theft, illegal oil bunkering and sea piracy.

Kidnapping and hostage taking: Started in the South

south but has now spread everywhere with the South east

and Delta State in the Niger Delta being the most

notorious;

NURTW crisis in the Southwest. The leadership crisis in

Oyo State took many lives and still threaten to take

more lives.

Sharia crisis in the North most especially in 2000 and

2001

The Boko Haram crisis: Ongoing. Most Nigerians focus on

this problem whenever the issue of insecurity is raised.

However, it is not the only problem we have to contend

with. It is interesting to note that in terms of loss of

lives Boko Haram crisis is not as explosive as the Jos.

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The number of people killed in military operations

against the Niger Delta militants equally surpass what

is now witnessed in the North in respect of the Boko

Haram crisis.

CHAPTER FOUR

INSURGENT STRATEGIES, APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS

Relating ends and means brings us to the crucial aspect

of strategy--the coordinated use of various means to achieve

goals. Strategies vary because of:

(a) The kind of goals chosen.

(b) The means emphasised.

(c) The type of plan made-systematic or otherwise.

(d) Conceptual sophistication--ranging from the clearly

articulated to the vague.

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(e) The interplay of conflicting political interests,

limited material resources and unanticipated events.

(f) The adoption of strategies which others have

successfully used but that are inappropriate for the

existing environment. (Successful insurgent leaders have

been able to convince others that their strategy had

universal applicability).

STRATEGIC APPROACHES

Recent and contemporary insurgent leaders have used four

broad strategic approaches.

(a) The Conspiratorial Strategy. It emphasizes an elite

small scale organization and low level violence.

(b) The Strategy of Protracted Popular War. This

stresses political primacy, mass organization and

gradually escalating violence.

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(c) The Military Focus Strategy. This strategy

emphasizes military primacy and concentrates on either

guerilla or conventional war.

(d) The Urban Warfare Strategy. It involves small scale

organization and low to moderate terrorist or guerilla

attacks in urban centers, with some proponents

envisaging an eventual transition to warfare in the

rural areas.

THE CONSPIRATORIAL STRATEGY

Perhaps the oldest and least complicated insurgent

strategy is the conspiratorial one. It seeks to remove the

ruling authorities through a limited but swift use of force.

Conspiracies are basically coups led by military officers who

are part of the ruling elite, or civilians. In many cases the

removal of the authorities is considered necessary to achieve

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the real goal, which is to change policies and/or a political

system that insurgents consider illegitimate. In other

situations the aim may be to replace the authorities to

prevent major policy initiatives that will upset the existing

distribution of social, economic and political privileges

(preservationist insurgents) or because the leaders are

perceived to be corrupt and inefficient (and thus opposed by

reformist insurgents).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

From the study above, it is found that the following

points could help tackle insurgency and terrorism. The cause

provides the motivation for insurgency. Whether real or

artificial, whether inspired by Communism or by virulent

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nationalism, the political goal is fundamental in motivating

people to action. Without a political goal, insurgency must

fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide

with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy,

cooperation and assistance cannot be gained.

Insurgency has no chance of success unless the rebels

have the complete and unresolved support of the majority of

the country's inhahitants. Popular support may be passive or

active. Passive support includes individuals who quietly

sympathise with the insurgents but are unwilling to provide

material assistance. Active support encompasses those who are

willing to make sacrifice and risk personal harm either by

joining the movement, or by providing information, hiding

places, medical assistance, guides and the like.

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No analysis of an insurgency can be complete or

meaningful without an assessment of the scope, complexity and

cohesion of an insurgent movement. Insurgents who subscribe

to conspiratorial and urban warfare strategies stress small,

closely knit and secretive organizations. Those who adopt

military focus or protracted popular war strategies require

more sophisticated organizational structures because of the

long struggle that is anticipated and the requirement for

substantial military activity.

CONCLUSION

Insurgencies will continue to pose important domestic

and foreign policy challenges for many nations. Apart from

the participants, insurgencies will be of interest to

decision makers, analysts, scholars, students, journalists

and many others. The understanding of insurgency is a complex

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and challenging process which calls for a systematic approach

and an open mind. Conflict and insecurity affects us all, we

all need to carve a role for ourselves in dealing with the

ugly situation. As Colleen C. Barrett observed, “When it

comes to getting things done, we need fewer architects and

more bricklayers”. The work starts with YOU and ME!

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